




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
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A
TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF
REAL PROPERTY

BY
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P R E F A C E.

A large part of this book was published, five years ago, as a treatise on "Special Subjects" of the law of real property. The author then stated, in the preface, that he hoped to finish, within three or four years, a work on all the topics ordinarily comprised within that department of law. These two volumes embody the results of his efforts to realize that hope. The former portions of the treatise have been carefully revised, and their citations brought down to date; and the plan and outline contained in the fourth chapter have been closely followed in this the completed work.

Arising from experience with the difficulties encountered by students of the law of real property, three ideals have prompted and controlled the writing of these pages. They are the presentation of that law, *first*, in the perfect light of its own history; *second*, divested as far as possible of technicalities; and *third*, practically complete within the sphere which the discussion purports to include. The book itself must fall far short of such ideals. But a few words as to each of them may briefly explain what has been attempted.

The philosophy of English and American history is manifested in few concrete forms or systems in which it is so thoroughly legible as in the common law of real property. There is a clear reason, in the development of the Anglo-Saxon race, for every important principle of that splendid, logical system. Therefore, the so-called modern law of real property can be appreciated only superficially when studied alone. And an attempt to learn it, without taking note of the civil and juristic struggles through which it has been evolved, is as unfortunate for the student as would be a mere study of those struggles, regardless of the resulting rules and theories that are controlling the practical men of to-day. The latest adjudications of the best courts, and the reasons for them, drawn from the profound, though sometimes technical, arguments of the ages,

are what constitute the common law of realty for the thorough practitioner. An humble effort is made to present in this book both of those components of that law, and to insist that they shall not be separated in the labors of the learner.

Simplicity and terse clearness of illustration are primary *desiderata* in dealing with a subject which has been much affected by scholastic logic and methods of reasoning now discarded and obsolete. The doctrine of *scintilla juris*, for example, the principle of descent-cast, or the practice of fines and common recoveries, can not be wholly brushed aside and ignored; but they call for brief explanations in the forms of language and modes of thought of the present time. Without anticipating any knowledge yet to be acquired by the reader, it is earnestly sought in this work so to state these and the more important principles of the subject, and so to illustrate them, with recent authorities whenever possible, that an ordinarily careful reading can not fail to make them understood. The illustrations of each point or rule are not numerous, in most instances only one is given, and much care has been bestowed on all of them to make them as lucid as possible.

Nothing short of a voluminous digest can state all the modifications which recent English and American statutes have grafted on the common law of real property. But that common law, as it is to-day, developed with the aid of the old landmarks of legislation into a system of rounded symmetry and logical beauty, together with the accompanying typical code of one important State, may be set forth in a work of convenient size for students and lawyers. Such a work is one of the ideals that have caused the writing of these pages. New York's codification has been selected as the local system, both because of its own importance, and because it has been a model for so much legislation of other States. The special statutes of that one State and their constructions are added, in separate full-measure notes, at the proper places throughout the book. And thus it is sought to make a practically complete treatise on New York real-property law, yet without materially encumbering the text or other notes with anything that is purely local or special. It is hoped, moreover, that the text and general annotations, aiming as they do to explain the past and present common law of the land, may be found sufficiently clear and comprehensive to be of practical service to students and the

profession, even where New York's code has had little or no influence.

In referring to authorities, care has been taken to cite more on doubtful points than on those that may be regarded as settled. Recent cases have been preferred to older ones, wherever they were otherwise equally valuable. The book is not to be advertised for its citation of *many* cases. It must rather embody, in this particular, the results of careful selection from the ponderous masses of adjudications. And reference to a standard text-book, on the special topic of the page, often closes a note containing citations of only two or three illustrative and decisive cases. Mr. Digby's scholarly treatise on the "History of the Law of Real Property" and the profound work of Professors Pollock and Maitland on the "History of English Law" are very often cited and quoted. The names of standard writers on the subject, such as Cruise, Williams, Leake, Washburn, and Challis, adorn many pages. And, throughout the book, care has been taken to refer to special treatises, such as "Ewell on Fixtures," "Jones on Easements," "Bispham's Principles of Equity," "Perry on Trusts," "Thomas on Mortgages," "Taylor's Landlord and Tenant," "McAdam on Landlord and Tenant," Gray's "Rule against Perpetuities," "Chaplin on Suspension of the Power of Alienation," "Rawle on Covenants for Title," Fowler's "Real Property Law of the State of New York," and many others, to which the author is gratefully indebted.

If what is here written prove in some degree a help to those who are endeavoring to master all or some portion of this subject, which is too often spoken of as dry and technical, or an aid in causing students to look on the study of real-property law as neither irksome nor unpleasant, at least one of its chief objects will have been accomplished.

A. G. R.

NEW YORK, March, 1909.

CONTENTS.

VOLUME I.

	PAGE
TABLE OF CASES	xiii
INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE.	
CHAPTER	
I. Property Explained and Classified	1
II. Fixtures	11
III. Property, Other than Fixtures, that is Sometimes Real and Sometimes Personal	49
IV. Outline of Real Property Law	72
Table of Real Property Law	110

BOOK I.

KINDS OF REAL PROPERTY.

PART I.—LANDS. PART II.—TENEMENTS.

V. Lands and Tenements	113
----------------------------------	-----

PART III.—HEREDITAMENTS.

1. CORPOREAL. 2. INCORPOREAL.

VI. 1. Hereditaments Explained and Classified — Corporeal Hereditaments	115
2. INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.	
VII. (1) Rents	117
VIII. (2) Franchises	142
(3) Easements and Servitudes.	
IX. Easements. Kinds. How Created	149
X. Servitudes that are not Common-Law Easements	213
XI. Incidents of Easements and Servitudes — Their Termina- tion and Suspension — Remedies	241
XII. Special Features of Important Kinds of Easements and Ser- vitudes	270
XIII. (4) Profit à Prendre.	307
XIV. Licenses	320

BOOK II.

HOLDINGS OF REAL PROPERTY.

PART I. — ALODIAL HOLDING.

PART II. — TENURE — FEUDAL SYSTEM.

CHAPTER		PAGE
XV.	Outline of Book II. — Anglo-Saxon Holdings	333
XVI.	The Feudal System and its Fruits.	338
XVII.	Holdings of Real Property in the United States	386

BOOK III.

ESTATES IN REAL PROPERTY.

XVIII.	Estates — Explained and Classified	399
--------	--	-----

PART I.

ESTATES CLASSIFIED WITH REFERENCE TO THE COURTS THAT
RECOGNIZE THEM.

	1. LEGAL.	2. EQUITABLE.	
	2. EQUITABLE ESTATES.		
XIX.	(1) Uses		402
	(2) TRUSTS.		
XX.	Kinds of Trusts		427
XXI.	a. Express Trusts — Their Creation, Revocation, Requi- sites and Forms — Powers in Trust		434
	b. Implied Trusts.		
XXII.	(a) Resulting Trusts.		504
XXIII.	(b) Constructive Trusts		529
XXIV.	(3) Equity of Redemption		583

PART II.

ESTATES CLASSIFIED AS TO THEIR QUANTITY.

	1. FREEHOLD.	2. LESS THAN FREEHOLD.	
	1. FREEHOLD ESTATES.		
	(1) FREEHOLD ESTATES OF INHERITANCE — FEES.		
XXV.	Quantities of Estates.		585
XXVI.	a. Estates in Fee Simple		589
XXVII.	b. Qualified Fees		603
	(a) Estates in Fee Tail		604
	(b) Estates in Fee on Condition		619
	(c) Estates in Fee on Limitation.		620
	(d) Estates in Fee on Conditional Limitation		621

CHAPTER		PAGE
	(2) FREEHOLD ESTATES NOT OF INHERITANCE — LIFE ESTATES.	
XXVIII.	Nature and Kinds of Life Estates	624
XXIX.	a. Conventional Life Estates	627
	b. Legal Life Estates.	
XXX.	(a) Curtesy	365
	(b) Dower.	
XXXI.	History, Nature, Forms and Requisites of Dower — Quarantine	656
XXXII.	Property of which a Widow is Dowable	674
XXXIII.	Assignment of Dower	686
XXXIV.	How Dower may be Lost or Barred	702
XXXV.	(c) Jointure — Provisions in Lieu of Dower	731
XXXVI.	(d) Estates during Marriage — Homestead	747
XXXVII.	Rights and Duties of Life Tenants — Estovers — Emblements — Waste	761

VOLUME II.

2. ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD.

- | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|
| (1) FOR YEARS — CHATTELS REAL. | } | CHATTEL INTERESTS. |
| (2) FROM YEAR TO YEAR, MONTH TO MONTH, ETC. | | |
| (3) AT WILL. | | |
| (4) AT SUFFERANCE. | | |

THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT.

XXXVIII.	History and Kinds of Estates Less than Freehold.	789
	(1) ESTATES FOR YEARS.	
XXXIX.	Nature, Requisites and Duration of Estates for Years — Parties and Subject Matter	793
XL.	Creation of Estates for Years — Leases — Conditions in Leases — Covenants in Leases	804
XLI.	Rights of Tenants for Years — Reciprocal Duties of Landlords	841
XLII.	Duties of Tenants for Years — Reciprocal Rights of Landlords — Liability to Outside Parties	878
XLIII.	Termination of Estates for Years.	909
XLIV.	(2) Estates from Year to Year, and from Quarter to Quarter, from Month to Month, etc. — From Period to Period	922
XLV.	(3) Estates at Will	931
XLVI.	(4) Estates at Sufferance — Hold-Over Tenants	941

PART III.

ESTATES CLASSIFIED WITH REFERENCE TO THE NUMBER AND CONNECTION OF THEIR OWNERS.

CHAPTER	1. ESTATES IN SEVERALTY.	2. JOINT ESTATES.	PAGE
XLVII.	2. Joint Estates — Co-Tenancy		952
XLVIII.	(1) Estates in Joint Tenancy		956
XLIX.	(2) Estates, or Tenancies, in Co-Parcenary		967
L.	(3) Estates, or Tenancies, in Common		969
LI.	(4) Estates, or Tenancies, by the Entirety — Community Property and Interests.		975
LII.	(5) Partnership Estates		983
LIII.	(6) Joint Mortgages		987
LIV.	Rights and Duties of Co-Owners — Partition		989

PART IV.

ESTATES CLASSIFIED WITH REFERENCE TO THEIR CONDITIONAL OR QUALIFIED NATURE.

	1. ABSOLUTE.	2. QUALIFIED.	
LV.	2. QUALIFIED ESTATES		1007
	(1) Estates on Condition		1009
	(2) Estates on Limitation		1020
	(3) Estates on Conditional Limitation		1024
	(4) Mortgages.		
LVI.	History, General Nature, and Kinds of Mortgages		1028
LVII.	Mortgages — Interests, Rights, and Duties of the Parties		1053
LVIII.	Mortgages — Special Equities Associated with them — Priorities and Record — Discharging and Extinguishing Mortgages		1083
LXIX.	Mortgages — Enforcing Satisfaction of Mortgage Debt — Foreclosure of Mortgages		1111

PART V.

ESTATES CLASSIFIED WITH REFERENCE TO THE TIME FOR THEIR ENJOYMENT TO BEGIN.

	1. PRESENT.	2. FUTURE.	
LX.	Estates Present and Future — Classes of Future Estates		1134
LXI.	(1) Reversions		1139
	(2) Remainders.		
LXII.	Remainders — Explained and Classified		1148
LXIII.	a. Vested Remainders		1159
LXIV.	b. Contingent Remainders.		1166

CHAPTER		PAGE
LXV.	How Remainders may be made — Successive Remainders — Their Acceleration	1191
	(3) Executory Estates	
LXVI.	Kinds of Executory Estates — How Created	1198
LXVII.	a. Springing Uses — b. Shifting Uses	1202
LXVIII.	c. Powers	1208
LXIX.	d. Executory Devises	1246
LXX.	The Rules against Perpetuities and Accumulations	1260

BOOK IV.

TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY.

PART I.—TITLE BY DESCENT.

PART II.—TITLE BY PURCHASE.

LXXI.	Title — Explained and Classified	1295
-------	--	------

PART I.

TITLE BY DESCENT.

LXXII.	Descent — Intestate Succession.	1299
--------	---	------

PART II.

TITLE BY PURCHASE.

1. OTHER THAN BY ALIENATION. 2. BY ALIENATION.

LXXIII.	Purchase	1322
	1. PURCHASE OTHER THAN BY ALIENATION.	
LXXIV.	(1) Title by Escheat	1324
LXXV.	(2) Title by Occupancy	1328
LXXVI.	(3) Title by Accretion	1329
LXXVII.	(4) Title by Forfeiture	1333
LXXVIII.	(5) Title by Prerogative — Eminent Domain	1335
LXXIX.	(6) Title by Abandonment	1337
LXXX.	(7) Title by Estoppel	1338
LXXXI.	(8) Title by Prescription — Custom	1352
LXXXII.	(9) Title by Adverse Possession	1354

(2) TITLE BY ALIENATION.

(1) ALIENATION BY DEED OR GRANT.

LXXXIII.	Alienation — Deeds	1379
LXXXIV.	Kinds of Deeds	1381
LXXXV.	(a) Public Grant	1405
LXXXVI.	(b) Office Grant	1418

CHAPTER		PAGE
	(c) PRIVATE GRANT-DEEDS.	
LXXXVII.	Requisites of Deeds	1435
LXXXVIII.	Execution of Deeds	1461
LXXXIX.	Record of Deeds	1485
XC.	Orderly Component Parts of a Deed	1494
XCI.	Alienation by Devise, or Will	1544
XCII.	Alienation, (3) By Matter of Record, (4) By Special Custom	1565
XCIII.	Liens on Real Property	1569
XCIV.	Registration of Titles to Real Property	1581
INDEX		1591

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages. Vol. I. has pp. 1-788; Vol. II. pp. 789-1588.]

A.	Adams v. Collier	513
Aaron v. Bayne	v. Conover	1523, 1537
Abbey v. McPherson	v. Cowen	431, 530, 537, 546, 547, 548, 549
v. Wheeler	v. Dunklee	1516
Abbiss v. Burney	v. Fassett	1427
Abbot v. Weekly	v. Field	1549
Abbott v. Abbott	v. Fletcher	903, 905
v. Butler	v. Freeman	321
v. Holway	v. Frothingham	1500
v. Stewartstown	v. Goddard	915, 916
v. Wetherby	v. Irving Nat. Bk.	545
Abby H. Assoc. v. Willard	v. Jenkins	758
Abend v. End Fund Commission	v. Kensington Vestry	452, 453
Abendroth v. Manhattan R. Co.	v. Knowlton	981, 982
Aborn v. Searles	v. Lopdell	452
v. Smith	v. Marshall	282, 286
Abraham v. Bubb	v. McKesson	795, 936
Abrahams v. Tappe	v. Medsker	1455
Absalon v. Sickinger	v. Norris	1552
Absecon Co. v. McCullough	v. Palmer	1429
Acker v. Phoenix	v. Perry	494
Ackerman v. Gorton	v. Rockwell	1340
v. Hunsicker	v. Ross	591, 613
v. Shelp	v. Savage	1205
v. True	v. Sayre	1066
Ackerman's Adm'r v. Vreeland's	v. Smith	1308
Ex'rs	v. Tenants of Savage	1192
Ackers v. Phipps	v. Van Alstyne	295
Acklin v. McCalmont Oil Co.	Adams' Estate, <i>In re</i>	556
Ackroyd v. Smith	Adams Female Academy v.	
v. Smithson	Adams	488, 490
Acquaackanonck Water Co. v.	Addis v. Campbell	539
Watson	Addison v. Hack	330
Acton v. Blundell	v. Shepherd	124
v. Waddington	Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.	
v. Woodgate	United States	541
Adair v. Lott	Adee v. Hallett	1457
Adams v. Adams	Adlington v. Cann	435, 439, 441
v. Anderson	Adsit v. Adsit	741
v. Beadle	Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport	1085
v. Betz	Agar v. Fairfax	994
v. Bigelow	Agate v. Lowenbein	778-783
v. Bristol	Aguilar v. Aguilar	1085
v. Butts	Ahearns v. Hogan	557
v. City of Cohoes	Ahern v. McCarthy	1042
923, 925, 928, 929, 938	v. Steele	902, 905, 906, 907
	Ahrend v. Odiorne	1038
	Ahrens v. Jones	530, 531, 532

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Aiken v. Gale	1074	Allen v. Keily	945
Aikin v. Smith	462, 795	v. Kelly	950, 1425
Aikman v. Harsell	664	v. Kersey	1514
Aiman v. Stout	543	v. Leominster Sav. Bk.	1099
Ainsworth v. Ritt	855	v. Mansfield	1363
Akers, Matter of	1555, 1556	v. Mayfield	1153
Akl v. Bosler	596, 735, 743, 744, 745	v. McCoy	685, 697
Albanesius v. Peerless Rubber Mfg. Co.	1515	v. McPherson	352
Albany's Case	1213, 1243	v. Mooney	23
Albany Co. Sav. Bk. v. McCarthy	563, 651, 655, 1464, 1483	v. Pegram	51
Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay	714, 1446	v. Pray	744
Albert v. Albert	1284	v. Reynolds	714
v. State	858, 905	v. San Jose L. & W. Co.	250, 251
v. Uhrich	34, 45	v. Sayward	1348
Albin v. Riegel	61	v. Scott	1498
Albrecht, Matter of	975, 988	v. Smith	906
v. Long	1575	v. Stevens	482, 483, 486, 502, 1183, 1274
Albright v. Oyster	505	v. Sullivan R. Co.	1465, 1466
Albro v. Blume	1126	v. Taylor	274
Alden v. St. Peter's Parish	478, 492	v. Weber	57
Aldin v. Latimer Clark	274	v. Welch	1377
Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Barnard	16, 17, 22	v. Withrow	1438
Aldous v. Cornwell	1439	v. Wood	1121
Aldred's Case	278	Allerton v. Johnson	1505
Aldrich v. Aldrich	451, 452, 453, 454	Alles v. Lyon	980
v. Husband	20, 30	Alley v. Carleton	179, 180
v. Muirhead	751	Alling v. Chatfield	741
Alexander, <i>In re</i>	661	Allis v. Billings	1445
v. Alexander	1016, 1228	v. Moore	1371
v. Hodges	1016	Allore v. Jewell	539, 544
v. Jackson	757	Almand v. Scott	797
v. Loeb	948	Almstardt v. Bendick	1284
v. Tolleston Club	243	Almy v. Church	1358
v. Warrance	513	v. Hunt	1528
Aleyn v. Belchier	568, 569	v. Jones	477, 479, 493
Alford v. Earle	1560	Alshire, Lessee of v. Hulse	1503
Alger v. Kennedy	848	Alsop v. Riker	1369
Alkire v. Alkire	566	Alspaugh v. Adams	518
Allaire v. Allaire	532	Althause, Matter of	792, 798
Allan v. Gomme	163	Althof v. Conheim	981
Alleard v. Skinner	547	Alvord v. Collin	1431
Alleghany v. Morehead	1330	Ambrose v. Ambrose	437
Allen, <i>In re</i>	33	Ambs v. Hill	40
v. Allen	498, 615, 957, 959, 960, 1274, 1280, 1283, 1523	Amerden v. Deane	191, 1519
v. Carpenter	943	Amer. Bank Note Co. v. N. Y. El. R. Co.	199, 230, 246, 1359, 1375
v. Caylor	509	American Bible Society v. American Tract Soc.	503
v. Culver	836, 837	American Guild Co. v. Damon	1061
v. Fiske	329	American Ice Co. v. Catskill Cement Co.	59
v. Gillett	551	v. Eastern Trust Co.	1079
v. Hawley	757	American Life & F. Ins. Co. v. Ryerson	1121
v. Hirlinger	1217	American Mortgage Co. v. Hopper	1412, 1413
v. Hooper	748	American Note to Chesterfield v. Jansen	540
v. Howe	1014	American Press Ass'n v. Blantingham	1045
v. Jackson	1013		
v. Jaquish	915, 938		
v. Joy	228		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

XV

[References are to pages.]

American Sugar Refining Co.		Anstice v. Brown	512
v. Fancher	517, 519, 578	Anthony v. Gifford,	1329
Amer. Surety Co. v. Pauly	573	v. Hutchins	1475
Ames v. Blunt	561	v. Lapham	299
v. Hilton	1509	Antisdel v. Williamson	1104
v. Norman	978	Antomarchi v. Russell	293
v. San Diego	1358	Appell v. Appell	963
Ames Iron Works v. Kalama-		Apple v. Allen	473
zoo Pulley Co	578	Appleton v. Boyd	986, 987
Amherst v. Lytton	1193	v. Campbell	864
Amherst College v. Rich	483, 536,	v. Fullerton	245
	548	v. Marx	905
Amidon v. Harris	216	v. Rowley	642
Amory v. Kannoffsky	917	Apreece v. Apreece	457
v. Atty.-Gen.	487	Arbens v. Wheeling & H. R. Co.	232
Amphlett v. Hibbard	759	Arbenz v. Exley	925
Amsterdam Knitting Co. v.		Arbuckle v. Ward	193, 204, 205
Dean	303	Ard v. Brandon	1409
Ancaster (Duke of) v. Mayer	1101	Archer's Case	558, 645, 1178, 1186
Ancott v. Catherich	673	Archer v. Archer	214
Andersen, Matter of	229	v. Eckerson	1383, 1396
Anderson v. Anderson	533, 599, 692	v. Hudson	557
v. Blood	521, 522, 559, 574, 575,	Archibald v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R.	
	1090	Co.	382, 1376
v. Bock	1363	Ards v. Watkins	128, 131, 876
v. Harold	1463	Arents v. L. I. R. Co.	382, 1364,
v. Hayes	858		1375, 1376
v. Henderson	301	Argotsinger v. Vines	786, 1364
v. Mather	465	Arkwright v. Gell	306
v. Messinger	762	Armfield v. Walker	1492
v. Prindle	923, 924, 926, 928,	Armistead v. Kirby	1120
	929	Armory v. Kannoffsky	918
v. Sharp	1058	Armstrong's Estate, <i>In re</i>	758
v. Taylor	1575	Armstrong v. Armstrong	1475
v. Tydings	1572	v. Ashley	574
v. Winton	849, 850	v. Combs	1488
Anderton, <i>In re</i>		v. Cummings	888
Anding v. Davis	440	v. Kearns	821
Andrar v. Haseltine	292	v. Ross	1446, 1478
Andrews, Matter of	1550	v. Union College	699, 700, 701
v. Andrews	429, 492, 710	v. Wilson	768, 787
v. Appel	1539	Arnison v. Smith	534
v. Day Button Co.	18, 19, 20,	Arnold v. Arnold	453
	27, 39	v. Fee	245
v. Gillespie	1536, 1538	v. Grimes	1412
v. Hailes	208	v. Jack	954
v. Lincoln	1264, 1269	v. Lincoln	594
v. Matthews	1343	v. Mundy	1511
v. Nat. Sugar Ref. Co.	164	v. Ruggles	51
v. Royce	1253	v. Smith	1045
v. Rue	1505	v. Stevens	203
v. Senter	1016	Arnot v. Union Salt Co.	1058
v. Stelle	679	Arnoux v. Phye	1226
v. Williamson	861	Arnsby v. Woodward	911
Andrus v. Vreeland	913, 1107	Arrowsmith v. Burlingim	1419
Angier v. Stannard	462	Arthur v. Cole	1013, 1023
Angus v. Clifford	530, 533, 534	v. Weston	1454
v. Dalton	194, 202, 206, 209,	Asbury v. Fair	1362, 1363
	210, 211, 239, 247, 280, 281	Asche v. Asche	740
Ankeney v. Hannon	472	Ascough's Case	129
Annis v. Davis	1578	Ashcroft v. Eastern R. Co.	166
Anstee, Goods of	1550	Asheville Land Co. v. Lang	1513

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Asheville Woodworking Co. v. Southwick		38	Atty.-Gen. v. Moore's Ex'rs	491
Ashford v. Ashford	960, 962,	1367	v. Morris	223
Ashley v. Ashley	205,	1170	v. Morris, etc. R. Co.	225
v. Ryan		142	v. Newman	475
v. Warner		1022	v. Pearson	478
Ashurst v. Potter		50	v. Revere Rubber Co.	195
Ashwell v. Ayres		1467	v. St. John's Hospital	414
Assay v. Hoover		1241	v. Sands	408
Astley v. Micklethwait		1192	v. Soule	481
Aston v. Nolan		282	v. Stepney	478
Astor v. Hoyt		873	v. Vint	479
v. Mayor	1429		v. Wax Chandlers' Co.	491
v. Miller		840	v. William and Mary's Coll.	478
v. Wells		573	v. Williams	239
Atherton v. Atherton	709,	710	v. Windsor	523
Athey v. Knotts		562	Atwater v. Perkins	1226
Atkins v. Boardman		245	v. Russell	439
v. Bordman		247	Atwood v. Arnold	661
v. Chilson		787	v. Atwood	668, 729
v. Tomlinson		1524	v. Fricot	316
v. Yeomans	700,	701	v. Moore	1050
Atkinson v. Atkinson		452	v. Small	533, 534, 535
v. Baker		631	Attwater v. Attwater	598
v. Bordman		246	Auer v. Hoffman	947
v. Brady		996	v. Penn	919
v. Dowling		1243	v. Wahl	857
v. Walton		1079	Augusta Mfg. Co. v. Vertrees	1377
Atlanta K. & M. Ry. Co. v. McKinney		1467	Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Syme	1571
Atlanta Mills v. Mason	263,	264	Aurora v. Fox	280
Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt	1403,		Austen v. Taylor	429, 430, 460
	1463,	1518	Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham	1542
Atlas Refining Co. v. Smith		1571	Austin v. Austin	692
Attersoll v. Stevens		778	v. Ahearne	385, 897, 1068
Atty.-Gen. v. Abbott		225	v. Cambridgeport	1016, 1018
v. Baliol Coll.	476,	488	v. Fendall	1470
v. Baxter		478	v. Field	855
v. Bishop		245	v. Hall	990
v. Bowyer		479	v. Hatch	580
v. Breerton		475	v. H. R. R. Co.	280, 778
v. Briggs	487,	488, 490	v. Oakes	1230, 1234, 1240, 1557
v. Bushby		480	v. Rutland R. Co.	1330, 1512
v. C. R. Co.		145	v. Strong	849
v. Chambers		1331	v. Thompson	927, 935
v. Cock		478	v. Trustee	1444
v. Comber		479	Auworth v. Johnson	1830
v. Dean of Windsor		491	Aveline and Another v. Whis-son	1462
v. Doughty		278	Aveling v. Knipe	508
v. Downing		492	Avelyn v. Ward	812, 1019
v. Garrison		485	Averill v. Taylor	812, 1072
v. Gladstone		478	Avern v. Lloyd	1266
v. Glasgow Coll.		488	Avery v. Everett	650
v. Glyn	476,	488	Avery v. Pixley	1555
v. Haberdashers' Co.		481	Avon Mfg. Co. v. Andrews	1499
v. Heelis		480	Axtel v. Chase	1532
v. Hickman		478	Aycock v. Emmbrough	996
v. Hurst		488	Ayer v. Hawkes	933
v. Ironmongers' Co.	476,	488	Ayers v. Harris	1505
v. Jacobs-Smith		567	v. Watson	1513
v. Kell		479	v. Reidel	1367
v. Moore		474	Aylesford v. Morris	540

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xvii

[References are to pages.]

Ayling v. Kramer	161	Baker v. Frick	245, 246
Aylward v. O'Brien	68, 69, 578	v. Georgi	1032
Aynsley v. Glover	275	v. Griffin	1492
Ayres v. Dr., Case	1454	v. Hart	794, 795
Ayres v. Ayres	1458, 1551	v. Johnston	224
v. M. E. Church	498	v. Leathers	512
v. Trustees of M. E. Church	449	v. Mott	166
v. Waite	1033	v. Oakwood	101, 1355, 1359, 1361, 1364, 1373
		v. Potts	1104, 1459
B.		v. Sebright L. R.	780
		v. Sutton	480
Babb v. Reed	484	v. Talbot	1513
Babbage v. Powers	902	v. Updike	1038-1040
Babbitt v. Day	675	v. Vining	509, 510
Babcock v. Scoville	870	v. Whiting	551
v. Utter	159, 324, 326	v. Woman's Christian Tem. Union	592
Bach v. Kidansky	1038	Baldwin v. Baldwin	1552
Backhaus v. Backhaus	461, 468	v. Boston & M. R. Co.	245
Backhouse v. Bonomi	280, 282, 284, 286	v. Breed	30
Bacon's Appeal	461	v. Calkins	199
Bacon v. Bowdoin	812	v. Howell	1051
v. Bronson	531, 532	v. Humphrey	446
v. Fay	1004	v. Root	1348
v. Ransom	453, 481	v. Thompson	1491
Baden v. Pembroke	622	v. Van Vorst	1079
Badger v. Holmes	962	Baley v. Umatilla Co.	479
Badgley v. Bruce	689, 698	Ball v. Cullimore	934
Baer, Matter of	465, 1164, 1190	v. Dunsterville	1467
v. McCullough	1432, 1334	v. Shafter	1042
Baetty v. Gregory	158	v. Woolfolk	595, 637, 650, 651
Bagley v. Freeman	870	Ballacorkisk Mining Co. v. Har- rison	303
v. Ward	1575	Ballard v. Child	1522
Bagott v. Orr	1329	v. Demmon	180, 208, 209, 1370
Bailey v. Bailey	432, 1031, 1281	v. Dyson	199
v. Burges	1510	Ballentyne v. Smith	1424
v. Carleton	1362	Ballou v. Baxter	916
v. Ekins	1044	v. Hale	991
v. Galpin	574	Bally v. Wells	838, 874
v. Hoppin	1160, 1188	Baltimore Dental Ass. v. Fuller	924
v. Stephens	244, 308	Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. West	946
v. Warners	1574	Bancroft v. Consen	518
v. Wells	914	v. Otis	547, 548, 553, 556
v. Winn	1058	v. Wardwell	933
Bailey & Co. v. Clark	300	Banghart v. Flummerfelt	157
Baillie v. Plant	947	Bank v. Foster	554
Baillie v. Treharne	976	v. Gale	758
Bainbrige v. Browne	556	v. James	472
Bainway v. Cobb	25, 27, 29	v. King	518
Baird v. Baird	1399, 1458	v. Looney	580
v. Jackson	972	v. Miller	216
Bakeman v. Talbot	245, 247	v. O. E. Merrill Co.	44
Baker v. Atchison & T. R. Co.	702, 722	v. Read	565
v. Baker	682, 1142	v. Root	440
v. Barry	652, 1509	Bank for Savings v. Frank	1042
v. Bartlett	1490	Bank of Amer. v. Pollock	519
v. Bliss	579	Bank of Augusta v. Earle	142
v. Bradley	556	Bank of Utica v. Mersereau	1350
v. Crosby	186		
v. Fawcett	858		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Bank of U. S. <i>v.</i> Housman	1346,	Barnes <i>v.</i> Lynch	971
	1402	<i>v.</i> Midland R. T. Co.	297
Bank of Versailles <i>v.</i> Guthrey	757	<i>v.</i> Munro	514
Bankhead <i>v.</i> Brown	228, 229	<i>v.</i> Raper	668, 669
Banks <i>v.</i> Amer. Tract Soc.	275	<i>v.</i> Thuet	505, 517
<i>v.</i> Ogden	226, 1508	Barnet's Appeal	461
<i>v.</i> School Directors	178	Barnet <i>v.</i> Proskauer	1483
Banning <i>v.</i> Edes	1496	Barnett <i>v.</i> Barnett	1182
Bannon <i>v.</i> Brandon	1368	<i>v.</i> Shackelford	1481
Banta <i>v.</i> Merchant	61	Barney <i>v.</i> Bolt	997
Banzer <i>v.</i> Banzer	976	<i>v.</i> Keokuk	58, 242, 297
Baptist Ass'n <i>v.</i> Hart's Ex'rs	490	<i>v.</i> Pike	985, 986
Bapt. Church <i>v.</i> Wetherell	69	Barnhart <i>v.</i> Campbell	971
Barb Wire Co. <i>v.</i> C. B. & Q. R. Co.	232	Barnitz's Lessee <i>v.</i> Casey	1252
Barber <i>v.</i> Bowen	550	Barns <i>v.</i> Wilson	823
<i>v.</i> Brundage	1140, 1157, 1313	Barnsdall <i>v.</i> Boley	652
<i>v.</i> Cary	1224, 1230	Barnum <i>v.</i> Barnum	1273
<i>v.</i> Harris	977	<i>v.</i> Fitz Patrick	845
<i>v.</i> Pittsburgh, etc. Railway	593,	<i>v.</i> Phenix	1062
	594, 1256,	Barr <i>v.</i> Galloway	640
<i>v.</i> Robinson	1363	<i>v.</i> Gratz	381, 963
<i>v.</i> Root	748	<i>v.</i> Schroeder	1388, 1475
Barber's Settled Est. <i>In re</i>	1253	Barraclough <i>v.</i> Johnson	223
Barbour <i>v.</i> Barbour	663	Barrell <i>v.</i> Joy	436, 439
<i>v.</i> De Forest	1288	Barrett <i>v.</i> Boddie	850, 855
<i>v.</i> Nichols	1491	<i>v.</i> Cox	933
<i>v.</i> Tompkins	1514	<i>v.</i> Failing	652
Barclay <i>v.</i> Abraham	305	<i>v.</i> Greenwood Cem. Ass'n	299
<i>v.</i> Pickles	920	<i>v.</i> Hinckley	1050, 1058, 1059
Barden <i>v.</i> Hartley	559	<i>v.</i> Marsh	457
Bardon <i>v.</i> Land & River I. Co.	1432,	<i>v.</i> Rockport Ice Co.	59
	1489	<i>v.</i> Strahl	776
Bardswell <i>v.</i> Bardswell	456	Barroilhet <i>v.</i> Hathaway	1571
Bare <i>v.</i> Hoffman	268	Barron <i>v.</i> Barron	472, 518, 748, 749
Barford <i>v.</i> Street	594	Barrow <i>v.</i> Greenbough	536
Barker, <i>In re</i>	50	<i>v.</i> Isaacs	868
<i>v.</i> Barker	642	<i>v.</i> Rhinelander	540
<i>v.</i> Hill	571	<i>v.</i> Richard	160, 185, 186
<i>v.</i> Pearce	1185, 1317	Barrs <i>v.</i> Fewkes	525
<i>v.</i> Richardson	207	Barry <i>v.</i> Adams	1374, 1376
Barkeley <i>v.</i> Donnelly	479	<i>v.</i> Colville	961
<i>v.</i> Wilcox	240, 298, 301	<i>v.</i> Coombe	1463
Barksdale <i>v.</i> Garrett	723	<i>v.</i> Edlavitch	288, 289, 292
Barkshire <i>v.</i> Grubb	174	<i>v.</i> Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co.	1048
Barkworth <i>v.</i> Young	439	<i>v.</i> Merchants' Exchange Co.	1451
Barlow <i>v.</i> Wainwright	925, 928	Barson <i>v.</i> Mulligan	896, 900, 911,
Barnaby <i>v.</i> Johnston	926		948, 949, 971, 1032, 1063
Barnard <i>v.</i> Adams	488	Bartholf <i>v.</i> Bensley	1061
<i>v.</i> Campbell	578	Bartholomew <i>v.</i> West	757
<i>v.</i> Edwards	723	Bartlett, Petitioner	480
<i>v.</i> Gautz	450, 547, 553, 556	<i>v.</i> Bangor	224
<i>v.</i> Godscall	871	<i>v.</i> Drake	1463
<i>v.</i> Lloyd	181	<i>v.</i> King	478
<i>v.</i> Whipple	68	<i>v.</i> La Rochelle	1500
Barnard's Lessee <i>v.</i> Bailey	598	<i>v.</i> Pickersgill	507, 508, 510
Barnes <i>v.</i> Barnes	327, 1468, 1470,	<i>v.</i> Remington	426
	1474	<i>v.</i> Sanborn	1033
<i>v.</i> Bartlett	1498	<i>v.</i> Tinsley	642, 669
<i>v.</i> Boardman	1057, 1058	<i>v.</i> Van Zandt	662
<i>v.</i> Hosmer	53	Barton <i>v.</i> McGrader	559
<i>v.</i> Light	1361, 1362, 1363		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xix

[References are to pages.]

Barwick <i>v.</i> Moyse	565	Beadles <i>v.</i> Smyser	1339
<i>v.</i> Thompson	895	Beahan <i>v.</i> Stapleton	1504
Bascom <i>v.</i> Albertson	477, 491, 498, 499, 500	Beal <i>v.</i> Boston Spring Car Co.	128, 915
<i>v.</i> Cannon	178	<i>v.</i> Harrington	1039
Basford <i>v.</i> Pearson	1438	<i>v.</i> Stevens	1100
Basket <i>v.</i> Mass.	541, 1551	<i>v.</i> Warren	753
Baskin <i>v.</i> Baskin	1551	Beale <i>v.</i> Case	186
<i>v.</i> Huntington	1571	Beaman <i>v.</i> Russell	1441
Bass <i>v.</i> Edwards	177, 181	Bean <i>v.</i> Coleman	247
<i>v.</i> Gregory	194, 277	<i>v.</i> French	164, 166
Bassett <i>v.</i> Bassett	1440	<i>v.</i> Mayo	1528
<i>v.</i> Messner	758	Bear <i>v.</i> Snyder	690
<i>v.</i> Nosworthy	412, 559, 561, 576, 577, 579	Beard <i>v.</i> Knox	703
<i>v.</i> Shoemaker	548, 549	<i>v.</i> Murphy	301
<i>v.</i> Spofford	519	<i>v.</i> Rowan	826
Bassler <i>v.</i> Rewodlinski	956, 957, 978	Beardslee <i>v.</i> Beardslee	717
Batavia <i>v.</i> Wallace	564, 574	Beardsley <i>v.</i> Hotchkiss	751, 1181, 1235, 1252, 1280
Batavia M. Co. <i>v.</i> Newton W. Co.	1519	Bearss <i>v.</i> Ford	1047
Batchelder <i>v.</i> Hibbard	321, 324, 328	Beasley <i>v.</i> Bray	563, 564
<i>v.</i> Sturgis	1528	Beatie <i>v.</i> Butler	1078
<i>v.</i> Breton	1142, 1227, 1456	Beattie <i>v.</i> Hulse	45
Bates <i>v.</i> Bates	683	Beatty <i>v.</i> Clark	1229
<i>v.</i> Conrow	611	<i>v.</i> Gregory	329
<i>v.</i> Donaldson	816	<i>v.</i> Mason	1432
<i>v.</i> Holbrook	601	Beaty <i>v.</i> Bordwell	972, 990
<i>v.</i> Norcross	1491, 1492	Beaudely <i>v.</i> Brooks	414
<i>v.</i> Salt Springs Nat. Bank	1576	Beaufort <i>v.</i> Collier	473
<i>v.</i> Shroeder	786	Beauman <i>v.</i> Whitney	1454
<i>v.</i> Lidgerwood Mfg. Co.	438, 495	Beaumont <i>v.</i> Oliveira	480
<i>v.</i> Virolet	1516, 1517	Beavan <i>v.</i> Went	1448
<i>v.</i> Westborough	302	Beaver <i>v.</i> Beaver	442
Bath Gas L. Co. <i>v.</i> Claffy	125	<i>v.</i> Slanker	1085
Bath's Case, Earl of	532	Beaver Brook Reservoir Co. <i>v.</i> St. Vrain Reservoir Co.	258
Batstone <i>v.</i> Salter	512	Beavers <i>v.</i> Smith	694, 698
Batt <i>v.</i> Kelly	289	Bezar <i>v.</i> Flues	800, 840, 844, 845, 920
Batterman <i>v.</i> Albright	29, 61, 62, 63, 65	Bechtel <i>v.</i> Barton	715
Baum <i>v.</i> Grigsby	1039, 1040	Beck, Matter of	1553
<i>v.</i> Raley	1078	<i>v.</i> L. N. O. & T. R. Co.	324
<i>v.</i> Tomkin	1049	<i>v.</i> Rebow	39
Bauman <i>v.</i> Boeckeler	223, 225	Becker <i>v.</i> Becker	1282
Baumann <i>v.</i> Guion	975	<i>v.</i> Chester	1264, 1265, 1277
Baumer <i>v.</i> Antiau	916	<i>v.</i> St. Charles	223
Baxter <i>v.</i> Bradbury	1348	Beckett <i>v.</i> Allison	620
<i>v.</i> Taylor	268	Beckford <i>v.</i> Beckford	512
<i>v.</i> Wilson	1514	<i>v.</i> Parnecott	920, 1560
Bay <i>v.</i> Coddington	578	Beckham <i>v.</i> Drake	920
Bayley <i>v.</i> Bailey	1076	Beckley <i>v.</i> Schlag	543
<i>v.</i> Greenleaf	578	Beckman <i>v.</i> Davidson	1503
Baylor <i>v.</i> Decker	308	Beckwell <i>v.</i> Lancaster Ins. Co.	561
Baynes & Co. <i>v.</i> Lloyd & Sons	827	Beddoe <i>v.</i> Wadsworth	835, 1523
Bazille <i>v.</i> Murray,	1360-1362	Bedell <i>v.</i> Village of Sea Cliff	302
Beach Avenue, Matter of	225	Bedford <i>v.</i> Terhune	832, 837, 868, 870, 881, 913, 918
Beach <i>v.</i> Cooke	1100	Bedlow <i>v.</i> New York Floating Dry Dock Co.	832, 886, 901
<i>v.</i> Crain	830	<i>v.</i> Stillwell	683
<i>v.</i> Nixon	814, 819, 885, 886, 887, 910, 1024	Beebe <i>v.</i> Coleman	808, 871
<i>v.</i> W. & W. R. Co.	231	<i>v.</i> Estabrook	1321
<i>v.</i> Whittlesey	1500		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Beebee <i>v.</i> Griffing	1312	Benedict <i>v.</i> Torrent	971
Beech <i>v.</i> Keep	443	Bender <i>v.</i> Terwilliger	649, 998, 1006
Beecher <i>v.</i> Baldy	760	Benfey <i>v.</i> Congdon	945
<i>v.</i> Ferris	1342	Benham <i>v.</i> Minor	248
<i>v.</i> Wilson & Co.	508	<i>v.</i> Potter	273
Beedle <i>v.</i> Crane	554	Benjamin <i>v.</i> American Tele-	
Beekman <i>v.</i> Bonson	465, 498	phone & Telegraph Co.	971
<i>v.</i> Frost	1472, 1489	<i>v.</i> Benjamin	932
<i>v.</i> Saratoga, etc. R. Co.	228,	Benner <i>v.</i> Bailey	1468
	229	Benneson <i>v.</i> Aiken	1350
Beeler <i>v.</i> Cordwell	889	<i>v.</i> Savage	1221
Beers <i>v.</i> Beers	566, 1142	Bennet <i>v.</i> Davis	458, 472, 642
<i>v.</i> St. John	784	Bennett <i>v.</i> Aburrow	1237
Beetson <i>v.</i> Stoops	739	<i>v.</i> Austin	876
Begole <i>v.</i> Hazzard	437	<i>v.</i> Bates	1102
Beidler <i>v.</i> Crane	563	<i>v.</i> Child	977, 979
Beinstein <i>v.</i> Neales	1051	<i>v.</i> Culver	1389
Belcher <i>v.</i> Burnett	1189, 1190	<i>v.</i> Garlock	496, 497
Belden <i>v.</i> Seymour	1530, 1636	<i>v.</i> Gray	883
	1639	<i>v.</i> Harper	50
<i>v.</i> Union Warehouse Co.	837	<i>v.</i> Hibbert	1448
Belding <i>v.</i> Frankland	578	<i>v.</i> Holbech	957
Belford <i>v.</i> Crane	513	<i>v.</i> Jenkins	1533
Belfour <i>v.</i> Weston	821, 855	<i>v.</i> Judson	534
Belk <i>v.</i> Gillespie	1257	<i>v.</i> Long Is. R. Co.	229
<i>v.</i> Hamilton	237	<i>v.</i> Pierce	963
<i>v.</i> Meagher	314, 318	<i>v.</i> Stevenson	1079
Belknap <i>v.</i> Trimble	199, 200, 305	Bennock <i>v.</i> Whipple	946
Bell <i>v.</i> Adams	1356	Benscotter <i>v.</i> Green	446
<i>v.</i> American Protective		Benson <i>v.</i> Corbin	1170, 1194, 1195
League	870		1259, 1332
<i>v.</i> Burlington	224	<i>v.</i> Morrow	59
<i>v.</i> Campbell	544	<i>v.</i> Scot	702
<i>v.</i> Farmers' Bank	1474	<i>v.</i> Whittam	457
<i>v.</i> Hayes	1340, 1342	Bentham <i>v.</i> Smith	1229
<i>v.</i> Kennedy	1438	Bentley <i>v.</i> Callaghan	963
<i>v.</i> Marsh	1341	Berberet <i>v.</i> Berberet	547
<i>v.</i> Mayor	717	Bergen <i>v.</i> Bennett	1211, 1212, 1213,
<i>v.</i> Midland R. Co.	268		1215, 1240
<i>v.</i> Scammon	1392	Berger <i>v.</i> Hoerner	38, 42
<i>v.</i> Twilight	1237	Bergh <i>v.</i> Herring-Hall-Marvin	
<i>v.</i> Wardwell	220	S. Co.	43
<i>v.</i> Woodward	1512	Bergland <i>v.</i> Frawley	845
Bell Mining Co. <i>v.</i> Butte Bank	1077	Bergman <i>v.</i> Klein	1527
Bella's Estate, <i>In re</i>	596	Beringer <i>v.</i> Lutz	507, 510
Bellasis <i>v.</i> Burbrick	843	Bernard <i>v.</i> Bougard	510
<i>v.</i> Compton	436	<i>v.</i> Jersey	1073
Bellefontaine Imp. Co. <i>v.</i> Nied-		Bernhardt <i>v.</i> Lymburner	1088
ringhaus	1332	Bernheimer <i>v.</i> Adams	43
Bellew <i>v.</i> Russell	553	Bernier <i>v.</i> Bernier	1408, 1413
Bellinger, <i>In re</i>	1227	Bernstein <i>v.</i> Humes	1374, 1514
Bellis <i>v.</i> Bellis	1367	<i>v.</i> Meech	828
Bellows <i>v.</i> McGinnis	767	<i>v.</i> Nealis	1343
Belmont <i>v.</i> O'Brien	466, 581	Berrey <i>v.</i> Lindley	925
Belt <i>v.</i> Simkins	780	Berridge <i>v.</i> Glassey	1517
Bemis <i>v.</i> Wilder	866, 867	Berridge <i>v.</i> Ward	1508
Benbow <i>v.</i> Townsend	436	Berriman <i>v.</i> Peacock	782
Benedict <i>v.</i> Arnoux	573, 581	Berrington <i>v.</i> Casey	844
<i>v.</i> Barling	183	Berry <i>v.</i> Billings	1516
<i>v.</i> Luckenbach	50	<i>v.</i> Mutual Ins. Co.	873, 874
<i>v.</i> Morse	941	<i>v.</i> Todd	283
<i>v.</i> Pincus	812	Bertie <i>v.</i> Flagg	857

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xxi

[References are to pages.]

Bertles v. Nunan	749, 751, 753, 955, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 1446, 1447	Birmingham, etc. R. Co. v. Bessemer	222
Bertram v. Curtis	294	Bishop v. Bishop	1562
Bessemer I. & I. Co. v. Jenkins	70	v. Elliott	22, 39
Best v. Jenks	663	v. Howarth	1044
v. Zeh	997, 1006	Bissell v. Grant	247
Betjemann v. Brooklyn Union El. R. Co.	246	v. N. Y. C. R. Co.	222, 272
Betts v. Badger	251	Bissing v. Smith	1375
v. Betts	1107	Bisson v. West Shore R. Co.	592, 593, 1308
Beuerlien v. O'Leary	563	Bitter v. Jones	516
Beurhaus v. Cole	480	Bittinger v. Baker	771
Beveridge v. Schultz	238	Bixler v. Saylor	1386
Beverlin v. Casto	1516	Bjmerland v. Eley	1474
Beverly v. Burke	1361	Black v. Botts	1514
Beyer v. Le Fevre	1458	v. Elkborn M. Co.	318, 319, 684
Bibb v. Thomas	1555	v. Shreve	1471
Bickel's Appeal	507	Blackburn v. Blackburn	1163
Bickett v. Morris	58	v. Stables	431
Bickford v. Page	1525	v. Vigors	573
Bickmore v. Dimmer	862	Blackburne v. Hope-Edwardes	136, 137
Biddle v. Hussman	854	Blackman v. Fysh	1168
Bidwell v. Greenshield v. Whitaker	722 1569	v. Halves	237
Bigelow v. Bush	1123	v. Reilly	273
v. Cady	1273	v. Riley	1507, 1508
v. Cassidy	565	Blackmore v. Boardman	837
v. Hoover	1331	Blacksmith v. Fellows	1387
v. Hubbard	1528	Blackstone Bank v. Davis	425
v. Shaw	57, 58, 59	Blackwell v. Blackwell	1475
v. Stilphens	1439	v. Broughton	757
v. Wilson	1050	Blagge v. Miles	1237, 1238
Biglow v. Biglow	881, 901, 997, 998, 1375	Blaggrave v. Hancock	432
v. Gillott	1556	Blaine v. Ray	250
Bill v. Cureton	449	Blair v. Chicago	230, 1452
Billings v. McDermott	1431	v. Claxton	129, 853
v. Russell	563	v. McDonell	1475
v. Taylor	684, 693, 781	v. Osborne	1516
Billingslea v. Ward	440	v. White	636, 1058, 1455
Bimson v. Bultman	190	Blaisdell v. Leach	1475, 1498
Bindrim v. Ullrich	1284	Blake v. State Sav. Bk.	521
Bingham, Matter of	1044, 1427	v. Traders' Bank	1084
v. Bingham	536	v. Tucker	1344, 1346, 1351
v. Kirkland	1339, 1350	Blakely v. Sharp	171
v. Saleme	308	Blakeslee v. Sincepaugh	1340
Bingham's Appeal	1235	Blakslee v. Com'rs of Land Office	1330
Binkley v. Forkner	33, 35	Blanchard v. Baker	250
Birch v. Linton	1444	v. Blanchard	1163
Birch-Wolfe v. Birch	787	v. Bridges	207, 266
Bircher v. Parker	42, 1568	v. Brooks	1164, 1350
Birkhead v. Cummins	800, 807	v. Ellis	1339, 1348
Bird v. Decker	1465	v. Moulton	203
v. Higginson	1385	v. Potter	297
v. Merkle	499, 500	v. Savarese	283
Birdsall v. Grant	594	Blanchet v. Foster	567
v. Russel	1490	Blanck v. Sadler	1081
Birke v. Abbott	1104	Blancy v. Bearce	1050
Birmingham v. Allen	285	Bland v. Lipscombe	220
v. Kirwan	739, 741	Blandford v. Fackerell	483
Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cart- wright	1262, 1266	Blane, <i>Ex parte</i>	520
		Blass v. Terry	1103

[Referencee are to pages.]

Blatchford <i>v.</i> Newberry	1194	Bogan <i>v.</i> Swearingen	1471
Blauvelt <i>v.</i> Gallagher	1255	<i>v.</i> Mortgage Co.	1408
Blazy <i>v.</i> McLean	1042	Bogardus <i>v.</i> Trinity Church	659
Bleakley <i>v.</i> Sullivan	882	Bogart <i>v.</i> Perry	1572
Blenkinsopp <i>v.</i> Blenkinsopp	562, 567	Bogert <i>v.</i> Bliss	1099
		Boggs <i>v.</i> Anderson	574
Blessing <i>v.</i> House's Lessee	1497	Bogk <i>v.</i> Gassert	1034, 1036
Blewitt <i>v.</i> Boorum	1462, 1471	Bohn <i>v.</i> Hatch	54, 55, 776, 1340
Blickley <i>v.</i> Luce	908	<i>v.</i> Met. El. R. Co.	231
Blight <i>v.</i> Rochester	345, 895	Bohannon <i>v.</i> Combs	712
Blinkhorn <i>v.</i> Feast	522	<i>v.</i> Hough	1468
Blinn <i>v.</i> Schwartz,	801, 1388, 1445	Boies <i>v.</i> Benham	643, 678, 679, 680, 1038, 1058, 1070
Bliss <i>v.</i> Amer. Bible Soc.	478	Boist <i>v.</i> Empie	165
<i>v.</i> Collins	131	Bokee <i>v.</i> Walker	530
<i>v.</i> Gardner	880	Boland <i>v.</i> St. John's Schools	244, 269
<i>v.</i> Greeley	302, 303	Bolden <i>v.</i> Sherman	1512
<i>v.</i> Johnson	889, 950, 1366	Boling <i>v.</i> Clark	663
<i>v.</i> West	567, 1470	Bolivar Mfg. Co. <i>v.</i> Neponset Mfg. Co.	206
Blodgett <i>v.</i> Hildreth	437, 511, 960	Bolles <i>v.</i> Duff	611, 693, 695, 1033, 1115, 1117
<i>v.</i> Moore	1558	<i>v.</i> State Trust Co.	412
Blomstrom <i>v.</i> Dux	1040	Bolton <i>v.</i> Bolton	173, 174, 177, 181
Blood <i>v.</i> Blood	669	Boltz <i>v.</i> Stotz	664
<i>v.</i> Goodrich	1464	Bond <i>v.</i> Fay	1514
<i>v.</i> Light	1575	<i>v.</i> Godsey	776
Bloodgood <i>v.</i> Ayers	240, 302	<i>v.</i> Moore	523
<i>v.</i> Mohawk & H. R. Co.	232	<i>v.</i> Wilson	1486
Bloomer <i>v.</i> Waldron	1226, 1239	Bonelli <i>v.</i> Blakemore	176
Blum <i>v.</i> Keyser	1571	Bonetti <i>v.</i> Treat	871
<i>v.</i> Robertson	937	Bonfoey <i>v.</i> Bonfoey	660, 663
<i>v.</i> Weston	17	Bonne <i>v.</i> Lynde	1087
Blumberg <i>v.</i> Beekman	1035	Bonnett <i>v.</i> Sadler	778, 882
Blumenburg <i>v.</i> Myres	946	Bonner <i>v.</i> Peterson	687
Blumenthal <i>v.</i> Blumingdale	806, 807	Bonney <i>v.</i> Foss	54
	959, 960	<i>v.</i> Greenwood	262, 294
Blumenthal Bros. <i>v.</i> Culver	960	Bonsteel <i>v.</i> Sullivan	565
		Boody <i>v.</i> McKenney	1445
Bly <i>v.</i> Edison Electric Illum. Co.	214	Booker <i>v.</i> Anderson	538
Blydenburgh <i>v.</i> Northrop	680, 718	<i>v.</i> Tarwater	1456
Blygh <i>v.</i> Samson	535	Bookman <i>v.</i> N. Y. El. R. Co.	231
Blystone <i>v.</i> Blystone	565	Bool <i>v.</i> Mix	554, 801, 1442, 1443, 1444
Board of Street Opening, Matter of	978	Boone <i>v.</i> Clark	820, 1018
Board of Comm'rs of Town of Tarboro <i>v.</i> Micks	1091	<i>v.</i> Stover	809
Board of Comm's <i>v.</i> Babcock	1490	Boordem <i>v.</i> Morris	856
Board of Education <i>v.</i> Franklin	1133	Boorum <i>v.</i> Tucker	679, 711, 1070
Board of Health <i>v.</i> Valentine	905	Booth <i>v.</i> Baptist Church	1183
Board of Trade Tel. Co. <i>v.</i> Barnett	233	<i>v.</i> Booth	452
Board of Trustees, etc. <i>v.</i> Campbell	1464	<i>v.</i> Fordham	1006
Boardman <i>v.</i> Larrabee	1104	<i>v.</i> R. W. & O. T. R. Co.	601
<i>v.</i> Reed	1512, 1514	<i>v.</i> Starr	1539
<i>v.</i> Willard	443	Boraston's Case	812, 1115, 1160, 1172
Boatman <i>v.</i> Lasley	215, 242, 243	Borchard <i>v.</i> Eastwood	1498
Bobb <i>v.</i> Barnum	1455	Borcherling <i>v.</i> Katz	125, 882
<i>v.</i> Bobb	526	Borden <i>v.</i> Jenks	745
<i>v.</i> Wolff	1035	<i>v.</i> Vincent	206
Bockover <i>v.</i> Post	883	<i>v.</i> White	544
Bodfish <i>v.</i> Bodfish	197	Boreel <i>v.</i> Lawton	826, 846, 850, 896
Boerum <i>v.</i> Schenck	548	Borie <i>v.</i> Satterthwaite	571
Boese <i>v.</i> King	495		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xxiii

[References are to pages.]

Bork <i>v.</i> Martin	436, 515, 558	Bowen <i>v.</i> Sweeney	997
Borland <i>v.</i> Nichols	745	Bower <i>v.</i> Hodges	822
Borland's Lessee <i>v.</i> Marshall	639, 641	<i>v.</i> Peate	294
Borough of Verona <i>v.</i> A. R. R. Co.	218, 223	Bowers <i>v.</i> Johnson	1038
Borst <i>v.</i> Empie	308	<i>v.</i> Suffold Mfg. Co.	268
<i>v.</i> Empire	244	Bowler <i>v.</i> Curler	527
Borup, Matter of	229	Bowles' Case	628, 779, 1187
Bosley <i>v.</i> Bosley	29	Bowles, <i>In re</i>	1264, 1281
Boss <i>v.</i> Ewing	1040	Bowling <i>v.</i> Crook	912
Bostick <i>v.</i> Blades	1012, 1013	Bowlsby <i>v.</i> Speer	240, 301, 302
Bostleman <i>v.</i> Bostleman	506	Bowman <i>v.</i> Wettig	1431
Boston <i>v.</i> Richardson	1503, 1506, 1509	Bowne <i>v.</i> Deacon	306
<i>v.</i> Solberg	947	Boyce <i>v.</i> Brown	203
<i>v.</i> Worthington	1536	<i>v.</i> Fisk	538
Boston Bank <i>v.</i> Chamberlin	1442	<i>v.</i> Grandy	531, 533
Boston B. S. U. <i>v.</i> Trustees of Boston Univ.	186	<i>v.</i> Mis. Pac. R. Co.	193, 196, 209
Boston C. & M. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Gilmore	57	Boyd <i>v.</i> Carlton	698
Boston Water Power <i>v.</i> B. & W. R. Co.	228	<i>v.</i> Fire Patrol	475
Boston Water Power Co. <i>v.</i> Boston	1501	<i>v.</i> Hunter	683
Bostford <i>v.</i> Burr	507	<i>v.</i> McLean	507, 510, 511
Bostwick <i>v.</i> Atkins	555, 1444	<i>v.</i> Schlesinger	1042, 1488
<i>v.</i> Beach	712, 1226, 1230	<i>v.</i> Shaw	1117
<i>v.</i> Frankfield	912, 913, 918	<i>v.</i> Shorroek	27
<i>v.</i> Leach	64	Boyer <i>v.</i> Berryman	1446
<i>v.</i> McEvoy	1471	<i>v.</i> East	554, 555
<i>v.</i> Williams	1532	Boyers <i>v.</i> Newbanks	687
Boswell <i>v.</i> Coaks	550	Boykin <i>v.</i> Rain	650
<i>v.</i> Goodwin	1097	Boyle <i>v.</i> Boyle	451, 452, 453
Bosworth <i>v.</i> Hopkins	511, 514	<i>v.</i> Edwards	1538
Botsford <i>v.</i> Beers	562	<i>v.</i> Tamlyn	295
<i>v.</i> Burr	510, 526	Boylston <i>v.</i> Wheeler	639, 640
Boulton <i>v.</i> Crowther	280	Boynton <i>v.</i> Hubbard	540
Boults <i>v.</i> Mitchell	1499	Bozarth <i>v.</i> Largent	650, 652
Bouquet <i>v.</i> Heyman	563, 564	Brace <i>v.</i> Duchess of Marlborough	1570
Boutelle <i>v.</i> City Sav. Bk.	1180, 1212, 1222	Brackett <i>v.</i> Baum	643, 678, 680, 716, 718, 1069, 1070
Bouton <i>v.</i> Thomas	787, 846	<i>v.</i> Goddard	63, 65
<i>v.</i> Welch	1372	Bradbury <i>v.</i> Davenport	1076
Bouvier <i>v.</i> Balt. & O. R. Co.	995, 1018	<i>v.</i> Dumond	1361
Bovey <i>v.</i> Smith	576	<i>v.</i> Grimsel	207
Bowden <i>v.</i> Lewis	278	<i>v.</i> Wright	123
Bowditch <i>v.</i> Andrews	463	Bradford <i>v.</i> Cressy	1502, 1506
Bowen, <i>In re</i>	1273	<i>v.</i> Ferrand	303
<i>v.</i> Anderson	923, 929, 930, 946	<i>v.</i> Monks	1222
<i>v.</i> Bowen	593, 620	<i>v.</i> Pickles	240, 303
<i>v.</i> Beck	1403, 1463	<i>v.</i> Randall	1465
<i>v.</i> Brogan	773, 774	Bradford Corp. <i>v.</i> Ferrand	300
<i>v.</i> Clarke	919	Bradford E. & C. R. Co. <i>v.</i> N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.	190
<i>v.</i> Conner	167, 216, 242, 272	Bradfords <i>v.</i> Kents	744
<i>v.</i> Haskell	918	Bradley <i>v.</i> Bailey	769
<i>v.</i> Lingle	671	<i>v.</i> Covel	929
<i>v.</i> Phinney	1578	<i>v.</i> DeGoicouria	856
<i>v.</i> Prout	1497	<i>v.</i> Holdsworth	51
<i>v.</i> Swander	955	<i>v.</i> Lightcap	1050
		<i>v.</i> Northern Bank of Alabama	1465
		<i>v.</i> Walker	1388, 1446, 1488
		<i>v.</i> Wescott	1217
		Bradley Fish Co. <i>v.</i> Dudley	206, 264
		Bradner <i>v.</i> Howard	1343
		<i>v.</i> Faulkner	61

[References are to pages.]

Bradstreet v. Clark	1010	Brewster v. Kitchin	138
v. Huntington	382, 1356	v. Rogers Co.	247, 298
Bradt v. Church	126, 137	v. Striker	495, 792
Brady v. McCosker	533	Brice v. Brice	544, 1475
v. Smith	309	Brick Pres. Church, Matter of	69
v. Waldron	1064	Bride v. Watt	1360
Bragdon v. Hatch	1120	Bridge v. Osborn	51
Brahn v. Jersey City Forge Co.	810	v. Ward	766, 1572
Brainard v. Cooper	1072, 1073, 1123	v. Yates	958
v. Hudson	888	Bridgeman v. Johnson	1121
Braley v. Sharp	157, 160, 243	Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co.	142, 145
Braman v. Bingham	1471	Bridgeport Elec. & Ice Co. v. Meador	50, 1043
Bramberry's Estate	975	Bridger v. Pierson	166, 1389
Bramblet v. Davis	1513	Bridges v. Pleasants	478
Bramblette v. Howard	1511	v. Purcell	327
Bramhall v. Ferris	764, 766	v. Wyckoff	222, 223
Bramley v. Chesterton	948	Bridgewater v. Bolton	594
Branch v. Doane	198	Briggs v. Davis	496
Brand v. McMahon	33	v. Hannowald	1058
Brande v. Grace	275	v. Hartley	478
Brandies v. Cochrane,	1572	v. Light-Boats	414
Brandon v. Robinson	470, 1013, 1272	v. Penny	452, 454
Brandt v. Church	901	v. Thompson	847
v. Ogden	1367	Brigham v. Overstreet	780
Branham v. Record	534	v. Shattuck	524
Brannin v. Shirley	450	Bright v. Bright	448
Brannon v. Brannon	1488	v. Walker	194, 208
v. Vaughan	28	Bringlow v. Goodson	1243, 1244
Brantingham v. Huff	1317, 1318	Brinkham v. Jones	1063
Branton v. Griffiths	61	Bristol v. Carroll Co.	1331, 1362
Brassington, Goods of	1023, 1025, 1265, 1266, 1277, 1281	v. Hull	563, 564
Brattle Sq. Church v. Grant	587, 622	Bristol v. Burr	889, 951
Bray v. Neill	745	Bristow v. Boothby	1278
Brayton v. Jordan	685	v. Warde	1279
Brazier v. Glasspool	159, 169, 170, 174	Brittain v. McKay	60
Breakey v. Woolsey	1515	Brittin v. Handy	990
Brecknock Canal Co. v. Pritchard	855	Broadbent v. Ramsbotham	301, 303
Breed v. Gorham	1570	Broadway Nat. Bk. v. Adams	470
v. Ruoff	1117	Brock v. Brock	515
Breeding v. Davis	650, 654, 651	Broder v. Conklin	548
Breese v. Bange	24	Broderick v. Broderick	533
Breit v. Yeaton	1220	Broiestedt v. South Side R. Co.	1375
Bremer v. Manhattan R. Co.	203, 209, 211, 246, 266	Brokaw v. Hudson's Ex'rs	1562, 1563
Brendle v. German Reformed Cong.	482	Brolasky v. Ferguson	831
Brennan v. City of N. Y.	925, 949	Broman v. Young	792
Brett v. Cumberland	871	Bromfield v. Crowder	739
Brevoort v. Brevoort	998, 1124	Brondage v. Warner	294
Brewer v. Brewer	1280	Bronson v. Coffin	248, 295, 600, 1519, 1541
v. Browne	985	v. Rodes	1081
v. Hamor	1315, 1316	v. Strouse	482
v. Marshall	1540, 1541	Brook, <i>Ex parte</i>	45
v. National Bldg. Ass.	914, 915	v. Warde	1554
v. Stevens	800, 845	Brookes v. Drysdale	815
Brewster v. Bull	1254	Brookfield, Matter of	159
v. Carnes	1063	Brookline v. Mackintosh	300
v. Hatch	558	Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., Matter of	235
v. Hill	265, 794	Brooklyn City Ry. Co. v. New York	146
v. Kidgill	138		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

XXV

[References are to pages.]

Brooklyn, Matter of City of	235	Brown v. Mayer	892, 1055
Brooks v. Belfast	1562	v. McCormick	927, 1477
v. Berry	539	v. McKee	291, 834, 1542
v. Brooks	638, 1516	v. Meeting St. Baptist Soc.	492
v. Cedar Brook Imp. Co.	269	v. Nickle	1042
v. City of Belfast	477	v. Peck	541
v. Curtis	288, 289, 290, 291, 292	v. Perry	452, 453, 456
v. Fowle	508	v. Quintard	1268
v. Galster	40, 65	v. Raindle	965
v. Kip	1252	v. Reno Electric Co.	39
Brookville & M. H. Co. v. Butler	59	v. Richards	685
Brotherston v. Weathersby	508	v. Richter	496
Brough v. Higgins	776	v. Roland	56
Broughton v. Randall	675	v. Samuels	808, 947
Brouwer v. Jones	186	v. Simons	1084
Brown's Estate, <i>In re</i>	519	v. Smith	941, 1073
Brown's Trust, <i>In re</i>	1228	v. South Boston Sav. Bk.	1064
Brown, Matter of	465, 496, 1161, 1162	v. Staples	1538
v. Alabaster	175	v. Starin	214
v. Baker	471	v. Thorndike	1555
v. Baraboo	976	v. Thurston	769, 935
v. Baron	679	v. Wadsworth	1177, 1180, 1181
v. Bates	988	v. Warren	1498
v. Berry	180	v. Webster	1537
v. Betts	889	v. Wellington	961, 962
v. Boquin	1362	v. Werner	292
v. Bowen	240, 268, 298, 1339, 1341	v. Whitney	905
v. Bronson	682, 719	v. Williams	682, 719, 726
v. Brown	441, 1268, 1470, 1475, 1561	v. Windsor	282
v. Burlingham	1315	Brown Oil Co. v. Caldwell	1511
v. Cairns	125, 816, 918, 919	Browne v. Warner	813
v. Cherry	515	Brownell v. Old Col. R. R. Co.	148, 588
v. Chubb	1492, 1560	v. Palmer	217
v. Clark	1558	Browning v. Sire	1081
v. Cole	1073	Brownlie v. Campbell	533, 534
v. Concord	490	Brownlow v. Wollard	1475
v. Cooper	973	Browns v. Combs	441
v. Crump	781	Brownson v. Henry	1042
v. Dickerson	1533	v. Hull	975, 978
v. Doherty	1222	Brownsville v. Basse	1413
v. Fishel	1502, 1512	Broyles v. Waddel	776
v. Freed	1445	Bruce v. Nicholson	1570
v. Fulkerson	1189	v. Osgood	993
v. Gurney	1411	v. Slemp	513
v. Hager	1510	Brudin v. Inglis	1512
v. Hall	538	Brugman v. Noyes	862
v. Heard	1508	Brumagim v. Bradshaw	1361, 1363
v. Hobson	1513	Brumback v. Brumback	962, 963
v. Hodgdon	742	Brumfitt v. Roberts	67, 68
v. Hogle	959	Brummel v. Macpherson	1016
v. Holyoke W. P. Co.	129, 826, 848, 849	Brundred v. Walker	1348, 1350
v. Huger	1504	Brundy v. Mayfield	518
v. Jackson	1346	Bruner v. Briggs	649
v. Jones	522	v. Finley	551
v. Keller	896, 899	Brunton v. Hall	245
v. King	382	Brush v. Wilkins	1559
v. Leach	534	Brustman v. Motrie	764
v. Mason	1099	Bryan v. Batcheller	705
		v. Brasius	1063
		v. Uland	1387
		v. Wash	1474

[References are to pages.]

Bryan v. Winburn	897	Bullen v. Runnels	200
Bryce v. Cayce	1365	Bullene v. Haitt	1574
v. McCaig	316	Bullenkamp v. Bullenkamp	516
v. McNaughton	508, 559	Bullerick v. Wright	1237
Bryant v. Allen	509, 559	Bullock v. Finch	692
v. Hancock	862, 869	v. Sadlier	577
v. Lefever	274, 277	Bultmann v. Kindelon	864
v. Peck & Co.	544	Bumpus v. Platner	576
Brydges v. Brydges	441	Bunce v. Bunce	1316
Brydon v. Campbell	1489	v. Reed	1078
Bubier v. Roberts	739, 753	Bundy v. Bundy	458
Buchan v. Sumner	1571	Bunker v. Barron	1040
Buchanan v. Ashdown	1340	v. Locke	758
v. Curtis	225	Bunn v. Winthrop	445, 448
v. Logansport	158	Bunting v. Foy	671
v. Moore	1051	Burbank v. Fay	203, 212
Buck v. Binninger	886	v. Pillsbury	1528
v. Lantz	738, 1160	Burbridge v. Marcy	1577
v. Pickwell	63	Burden v. Burden	1452
v. Squires	1510, 1511	v. Sheridan	559
v. Swazey	510	Burdett v. May	1371
v. Urich	518	v. Spilsbury	1225
v. Warren	509	Burdick v. Cheadle	906
Buckelew v. Snedeker	961	Burdis v. Burdis	1012
Buckingham v. Corning	540, 542, 1110	Burfenning v. Chicago & St. P. R. Co.	1413
v. Jacques	1311	Burge v. Smith	712, 713, 714, 1455
Buckland v. Poeknell	1040	Burgess v. Muldoon	652
Buckle v. Mitchell	561	v. Wheate	408, 410, 413, 414
Buckley v. Buckley	30, 45, 1174, 1297, 1321		425, 1041
v. Doig	984, 985, 986	Burgner v. Humphrey	283
v. Duff	564	Burhans v. Vanzandt	773
v. Frazier	1317	Burhaus v. Hutcheson	639, 1061
v. Kenyon	118	Burk v. Hollis	42, 54
Bucklin v. Bucklin	1396	Burkam v. O. & M. R. Co.	232
Buckworth v. Thirkell	646, 647, 1246	Burkard v. Crouch	1340
Bud C. & I. Co. v. Humes	557	Burke v. Callanan	509
Buddington v. Bradley	250	v. Ireland	902
Budlong's Will, <i>In re</i>	556	v. Roper	483
Buehler v. McCormick	1061	v. Tindale	845
v. Pierce	1060	v. Valentine	457
Buel v. Southwick	618	Burkhardt v. McClellan	1574
Buffalo v. N. Y. El. R. Co.	231	Burleigh v. Clough	833, 1255
Buffalo Z. & C. Co. v. Crump	316, 318	Burlew v. Hunter	179, 181
Buffalo, etc. R. R. Co. v. Stigeler	1504	Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Rein-hackle	233
Buffinton v. Fall River	744	Burn v. Phelps	847
Buffners v. Lewis	961	Burvaby v. Equitable, etc.	957, 965
Buffum v. Buffum	985	Burnell v. Maloney	1368
v. Harris	243, 302	Burnet v. Burnet	617, 681
Buford's Heirs v. McKee	448	Burnett v. Bealmear	578
Bughman v. Central Bk.	578	v. Lynch	1404, 1463
Building L. & W. Co. v. Fray	1531	v. Pratt	988
Bulger v. Coyne	127, 818, 884	v. Rich	897
Bulkley v. Chapman	1059	v. Scribner	886, 888, 918
Bulkley v. Wilford	534	v. Wright	94, 1034, 1042, 1048, 1513
Bull v. Bull	467, 1232	Burnette v. Young	1467
v. Griswold	61	Burnham v. O'Grady	914
Bullard v. Briggs	662	Burnhard & Son v. Curtis	801
v. Chandler	483	Burns v. Bryant	931, 932, 937, 938, 946
v. Harrison	178, 249		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Cameron <i>v.</i> Gray	1469	Carin <i>v.</i> Gleason	519
Cameron Tobin Baking Co. <i>v.</i> Tobin	867	Carleton <i>v.</i> Darcy <i>v.</i> Redington	884 323
Camden & Atlantic Land Co. <i>v.</i> Lippincott	1330, 1331	Carley <i>v.</i> Graves	518, 519, 520
Camp <i>v.</i> Bates	787	Carli <i>v.</i> V. D. Co.	233
<i>v.</i> Whitman	183	Carlin <i>v.</i> Chappel <i>v.</i> Ritter	284 44
Campau <i>v.</i> Detroit	217	Carlisle <i>v.</i> Cooper	197, 266, 269
Campbell's Case	131	Carlee <i>v.</i> Ellsberry	1517
Campbell's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1281	Carlton <i>v.</i> Blake	291, 292
Campbell, Matter of	1560	<i>v.</i> Carlton	1552
<i>v.</i> Beaumont	773, 1195	<i>v.</i> Jackson	681
<i>v.</i> Brown	458	Carlyon <i>v.</i> Lovering	211
<i>v.</i> California	1580	Carmine <i>v.</i> Bowen	769
<i>v.</i> Campbell	676, 894, 896, 899, 1050, 1101	Carnall <i>v.</i> Wilson	464, 660
<i>v.</i> Carruth	1497	Carney <i>v.</i> Cain	430
<i>v.</i> City of Kansas	1502	Carolina R. Co. <i>v.</i> Steiner	232
<i>v.</i> Dearborn	1035	Caroll <i>v.</i> Ballance	130
<i>v.</i> Ellwanger	661, 662, 725, 1070, 1075, 1110	Caroon <i>v.</i> Cooper	671
<i>v.</i> Foster Howe Ass'n	1226	Carpentaria School District <i>v.</i> Heath	226
<i>v.</i> Hart	895, 896	Carpenter's Estate	537
<i>v.</i> Holt	101	Carpenter, Matter of	238, 468
<i>v.</i> Kansas City	488	<i>v.</i> Carpenter	557, 960
<i>v.</i> Leach	1213, 1228	<i>v.</i> Cushman	441
<i>v.</i> Lewis	837	<i>v.</i> Dexter	573, 1478, 1482
<i>v.</i> Loder	37	<i>v.</i> Garrett	640
<i>v.</i> McBee	652	<i>v.</i> Gwynn	223
<i>v.</i> McCoy	158	<i>v.</i> Lewis	1047
<i>v.</i> Mesier	287, 292, 293, 972, 990	<i>v.</i> Longan	1058, 1600
<i>v.</i> Murphy	696, 698	<i>v.</i> Mendenhall	963
<i>v.</i> Proctor	935, 936	<i>v.</i> Pocasset Mfg. Co.	28
<i>v.</i> Rawdon	1185	<i>v.</i> Thompson	895
<i>v.</i> Roddy	19, 35, 36, 55	<i>v.</i> Van Olinder	1180
<i>v.</i> Seaman	42	<i>v.</i> Anderson	639, 640
<i>v.</i> Stokes	997, 1157, 1163	<i>v.</i> Briggs	563
<i>v.</i> Walker	548, 549	<i>v.</i> Foster	197, 198, 258
<i>v.</i> Wilson	209	<i>v.</i> Georgia R. Co.	38
Canabeer <i>v.</i> N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.	258	<i>v.</i> Richardson	412, 1383
Canal Appraisers, The	297	<i>v.</i> Smith	1163
Canby's Leasee <i>v.</i> Porter	650	Carrel <i>v.</i> Read	854
Candee <i>v.</i> Hayward	1378	Carrick <i>v.</i> Errington	523
Canfield <i>v.</i> Andrews	299	Carrington <i>v.</i> Roots	63
Canning <i>v.</i> Pinkham	1475	Carroher <i>v.</i> Bell	912
Cannon <i>v.</i> Barry	787	Carroll <i>v.</i> Ballance	912
<i>v.</i> Hare	45	<i>v.</i> Collins	1317
<i>v.</i> Ryan	947	<i>v.</i> Safford	755
<i>v.</i> Stockmon	1355	<i>v.</i> Tomlinson	1035
Capen <i>v.</i> Peckham	12, 23	Carrow <i>v.</i> Headley	1106, 1107
Capers <i>v.</i> McKee	249	Carson <i>v.</i> Broady	973
<i>v.</i> Wilson	177, 181	<i>v.</i> Godley	904
Caperton <i>v.</i> Stege	42	Carter <i>v.</i> Balfour	488
Capital City Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Caldwell	12	<i>v.</i> Burr	825
Carbonic Acid Gas Co. <i>v.</i> Gey- sers Gas Co.	180	<i>v.</i> Challen	507
Carbrey <i>v.</i> Willis	175, 1506	<i>v.</i> Chaudron	1468, 1475
Care <i>v.</i> Keller	723	<i>v.</i> Doe ex dem. Chaudron	1465
Carey <i>v.</i> Rae	179	<i>v.</i> Chesapeake, etc. R. Co.	1512
<i>v.</i> Rawson	1037	<i>v.</i> Chevalier	1361, 1365
Cargar <i>v.</i> Fee	202	<i>v.</i> Conner	980, 982
		<i>v.</i> Denman	1525, 1528
		<i>v.</i> Denman's Executors	661
		<i>v.</i> Harlan	324

[References are to pages.]

Carter v. Holahan	1104	Central Wharf v. India Wharf	262
v. Holmon	1043	Cesar v. Karutz	535, 558
v. Madgwick	1517	Chace v. Gregg	993
v. Murcot	308	Chadbourne v. Rackliff	1444
v. Ruddy	1412	Chadwick v. Haverhill Bridge	148
v. Warne	870	Chaffee v. Maker	1161, 1162
v. Williams	641	v. McIntosh	982
Cartwright, <i>In re</i> , L. R.	775, 778	Chalefoux v. Potter	42
Cartwright v. Gardner	816	Chalker v. Dickinson	308
Carver v. Gough	41	Chalmers v. Smith	783, 830, 935
v. Jackson	1344	Chamber Collier Co. v. Hopwood	204
Caruthers v. Caruthers	735, 736	Chamberlain, Matter of	60, 61, 63
Carwardine v. Carwardine	1025, 1205	v. Chamberlain	536, 743, 744
Cary Library v. Bliss	490	v. Dunlop	917
Casborne v. Scarfe	1032, 1071	v. Meeder	1339
Case v. Case	538	v. Runkle	618, 1516
v. Coddling	510	v. Stearns	481
v. Dexter	1503	v. Taylor	901, 1217, 1376, 1377
v. Edgeworth	1412	v. Thompson	596, 1050, 1071
v. Green	472, 599	Chamberlin v. Donahue	933, 935,
v. Minot	170, 275		936
Casey v. Davis	564	v. Elizabethport S. C. Co.	231
v. Inloes	1327	Chambers v. Chambers	539, 540
Cason v. Hubbard	713	v. Crabbe	566
Cass v. Dicks	301	v. Stewart	1469
v. Thompson	677	Chamblee v. Broughton	1181
Cassada v. Stabel	1532, 1533	Champ v. Marshallsay	439
Cassagne v. Marvin	495	Champlain, etc. R. Co. v. Valen-	
Casserly v. Morrow	1438, 1439	tine	1512
Cassidy v. Old Colony R. Co.	240, 301	Champlin v. Baldwin	1303
v. Wallace	576	v. Champlin	508
Cassity v. Pound	664, 1377	v. Haight	581
Casson v. Dade	1552	v. Parish	810, 814, 1463
Casteel v. Potter	660	Chance v. McWorter	578
Castle v. Dod	527	Chandler v. Brown	1536
Castro v. Geil	1371	v. Chandler	1486
Catasauqua Nat. Bk. v. North	16	v. Cheney	975, 978, 980
Catham v. State	1325	v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct	
Cathcart v. Bowman	1528	Co.	261
v. Nelson	439	v. McCard	1504
v. Robinson	560, 561, 1089	v. Rider	1222
Catlin v. Hurlburt	1522	v. Simmons	1443, 1444
v. Ware	695, 696, 697, 1456	v. Temple	1475
Catt v. Catt	503	v. Thompson	266
Cattley v. Arnold	922, 923, 928	v. Thurston	62
Caulk's Lessee v. Caulk	617	Chapin v. Crow	1174
Cavanaugh v. Clinch	924	v. Hill	739, 744
Cave v. Holford	1005	v. Mott	1162, 1171
Cayuga R. Co. v. Niles	19	v. Shafer	1443
C. & R. R. Co., Matter of	235	Chaplin v. Chaplin	683
Cecconi v. Rodden	294, 1534, 1537	Chapman v. Chapman's Trustees	668
Cecil v. Salisbury	1444	v. Cheney	1264, 1284
Cecil Bank v. Snively	507	v. Gray	265
Cecil Nat. Bk. v. Thurber	521	v. Hamblet	1512
Cent. Bk. v. Heydorn	136, 137	v. Harney	818
Central Branch R. Co. v. Fritz	55	v. Holding	1374
Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell	146	v. Holmes	1524
Central Park Extension, <i>In re</i>	661	v. Laggett	1039
Central Trust Co. v. Egleston	428	v. Lee	1039
v. West India Ins. Co.	1061	v. Moulton	1259
Central Trust & Safe Dep. Co. v.		v. Price	642
Cinn. Grand Hotel	52	v. Sault Ste. Marie	1347

[References are to pages.]

Chapman <i>v.</i> Schroeder	685	Chew's Appeal	1160
<i>v.</i> Tanner	578, 1038	Chicago <i>v.</i> Drexel	223
Charity Com'rs <i>v.</i> Green	136	<i>v.</i> Middlebrook	1358
Charles <i>v.</i> Charles	653	<i>v.</i> Rumsey	1507
Charles River Bridge <i>v.</i> Warren		Chicago Dock Co. <i>v.</i> Kinzie	662, 712, 1329
Bridge	146	Chicago & N. W. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Bor.	
Charless <i>v.</i> Rankin	280	of Ft. Howard	57
Charlestown <i>v.</i> Tufts	1502	<i>v.</i> Hoag	202
Charlotte Furnace Co. <i>v.</i> Stouffer	19	Chicago, etc. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Belliwith	544
Chartiers Block Coal Co. <i>v.</i> Mellon	113	<i>v.</i> Kelley	1508
Chase <i>v.</i> Bennett	1490	Chicago Gas L. Co. <i>v.</i> People's	
<i>v.</i> Chase	459	Gas L. Co.	541
<i>v.</i> Cheney	69	Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Woodward	232
<i>v.</i> Hall	181	Chicago, K. & N. W. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Steck	301
<i>v.</i> Hazelton	782, 786	Chicago Lumber Co. <i>v.</i> Osborn	1576
<i>v.</i> Hubbard	1459	Chicago, N. & S. W. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Mayor	232
<i>v.</i> Palmer	1456	Chicago, Rock Isl. & P. R. Co. <i>v.</i> D. & R. G. R. Co.	165
<i>v.</i> Peck	1041	Chicago, St. F. & C. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Ward	243
<i>v.</i> Stockett	439, 440	Child <i>v.</i> Baylie	1261
<i>v.</i> Tacoma Box Co.	24	<i>v.</i> Chappell	268
<i>v.</i> Van Meter	1106	<i>v.</i> Starr	1506
<i>v.</i> Wemple	1434	Childers <i>v.</i> Loudin	995, 1005
<i>v.</i> Wingate	66	Childs <i>v.</i> Clark	128, 876
<i>v.</i> Woodbury	1087	<i>v.</i> Kansas City, etc.	973
Chase Nat. Bk. <i>v.</i> Security Sav. Bk.	1108	Chiles <i>v.</i> Calk	1357
Chasemore <i>v.</i> Richards	300, 302	Chilton <i>v.</i> Brooks	1078
Chastain <i>v.</i> Smith	507	Chilvers <i>v.</i> Race	445, 577
Chastey <i>v.</i> Ackland	275, 277	Chipman <i>v.</i> Emeric	784
Chatfield <i>v.</i> Wilson	299, 303, 304	Cholmonderley <i>v.</i> Clinton	1369
Chaumont <i>v.</i> Forsythe	1536	Choteau <i>v.</i> Jones	1489
Chauncey <i>v.</i> Arnold	1438, 1439	Chouteau <i>v.</i> M. P. R. Co.	684
Chauvin <i>v.</i> Wagner	1348	Chrisman <i>v.</i> Linderman	703
Chaytor, <i>In re</i>	780	<i>v.</i> Miller	316
Cheairs <i>v.</i> Coats	129	Christ Church <i>v.</i> Lavezzolo	275, 277
Cheatham <i>v.</i> Jones	757	<i>v.</i> Trustees	478
Cheek <i>v.</i> Aurora	1358	Christ's Hospital <i>v.</i> Budgin	522
Cheetham <i>v.</i> Hampon	902, 903	Christian <i>v.</i> Allee	1576
Cheever <i>v.</i> North	1561	<i>v.</i> Dripp	24, 27
<i>v.</i> Pearson	931	Christie <i>v.</i> Gage	1375, 1377, 1378
Cheney <i>v.</i> O'Brien	177	Christopher <i>v.</i> Austin	129, 852, 853
<i>v.</i> Straube	1531	Christy <i>v.</i> Courtenay	511
Cherokee Nation <i>v.</i> Hitchcock	801	<i>v.</i> Spring V. W. Works	1360
Cherrington <i>v.</i> Abney Mill	266	Chudleigh's Case	1192, 1205, 1206, 1265
Cherry <i>v.</i> Greene	1227	Church <i>v.</i> Church	671, 997
<i>v.</i> Heming and Neeham	1462	<i>v.</i> Hinton	478
Chesapeake & O. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Miller	144	<i>v.</i> Hubbard	1509
Cheshire <i>v.</i> Payne	566, 567	<i>v.</i> Meeker	308, 1330
Chesley <i>v.</i> King	303	<i>v.</i> Ruland	531, 533, 535, 576
<i>v.</i> Welch	769	<i>v.</i> Schoonmaker	901, 1375
Chessman <i>v.</i> Whittemore	1440	<i>v.</i> Seeley	131, 139, 884
Chester <i>v.</i> Dickerson	516	<i>v.</i> Sterling	507, 518
<i>v.</i> Willan	992	<i>v.</i> Wells' Executors	68
Chesterfield <i>v.</i> Janssen	530, 537, 541, 542	<i>v.</i> Wood	518
Chestnut <i>v.</i> Shane	1429	<i>v.</i> Wright	884, 1368
Chetham <i>v.</i> Williamson	307		
Chetwood <i>v.</i> Allen	1107		
Chew <i>v.</i> Cook	257		
<i>v.</i> Farmers' Bk.	724		
<i>v.</i> Kellar	591		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xxxi

[References are to pages.]

Church of St. Stanislaus v. Algemeine Verein	514, 516	Clark v. Durland	1375
Churchill v. Monroe	713	v. Duval	316
v. Onderdonk	639	v. Elizabeth	222
v. Scott	544	v. Everhart	534, 535
Chute v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co.	1378	v. Gilbert	1369
Chwatal v. Schreiner	1269	v. Glidden	325, 329
Cihak v. Klekr	174	v. Glos	1108
Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Cummins ville	233	v. Gordon	809
Citizens' National Bank v. Williams	1441	v. Graham	1464
Citizens' Savings Bank v. Mooney	662, 723	v. Greenfield	595, 817
Citron v. Bayley	860, 902, 907, 908	v. Hills	1502
City of Austin v. Hall	208	v. Hornthal	1545
City of Bedford v. Willard	1358	v. Lindsey	972
City of Brookhaven v. Baggett	827	v. Mackin	1093
City of Brooklyn, <i>In re</i>	228	v. Martin	188, 189, 190
v. Bklyn. C. R. R. Co.	906	v. McMahon	567
City of Buffalo v. D. L. & W. R. Co.	296	v. McNeal	576
City of Canton v. Shock	300	v. Nash	228
City of De Kalb v. Luney	1358	v. Pa. R. Co.	298, 300
City of Hastings v. Gillitt	1358	v. Parker	970, 971
City of London v. Vanacre	148	v. Parr	1523
City of Lowell v. Spalding	906	v. Regburn	1071
City of New York, Matter of	23	v. Reyburn	998, 1115, 1124
v. Law	215, 216	v. Smith	927, 1523
City of Portsmouth v. Shackford	1234	v. Wheelock	936, 939
City of Providence v. Bullock	984	v. Williams	368
City of St. Louis v. Hill	4	Clarke v. Byne	882
v. Rutz	1510	v. Cammann	1160, 1161
City of Quincy v. Jones	282	v. Courtney	1362
City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co.	577	v. Gibbons	1372
Claassen v. United States	1412	v. Leupp	456
Clad v. Paist	459	v. Long Is. R. Co.	572
Claffin v. B. & A. R. Co.	166	v. McClure	1367
v. Carpenter	63	v. Sawyer	533
v. Claffin	598	v. Smith	1248
Clancarty v. Clancarty	456	v. White	534
Clapp v. Byrnes	494	Clarkson v. Clarkson	1181
v. Ingraham	1217	v. Hanway	539
v. Inhabitants of Stoughton	749	Clary v. Owen	34, 35
v. Nichols	973	Clason v. Baldwin	1431, 1434
v. Noble	947	Claussen v. LeFranz	518
v. Pawtucket, etc.	964, 974	Clavering v. Clavering	445, 527, 781
v. Stoughton	524	v. Primrose	274, 276
Clark v. Baker	1344, 1347	Clay v. Freeman	676
v. Barnes	137, 798	v. Hammond	1388, 1445
v. Bayley	755	v. Mayr	652, 653
v. Burnham	512	v. Wood	433, 451, 452, 453, 454
v. Burt	1513	Claycomb v. Munger	1537
v. Cammann	431	Clayton v. Blakey	925
v. Cogge	177	v. Corby	206
v. Condit	1078	Clearwater v. Rose	591
v. Clark	510, 976	Cleaver v. Mutual Res. F. L. Ass'n	537
v. Conroe	1537	Clee v. Seaman	1339
v. Devoe	1540, 1541	Cleghorn v. Burrows	649
		v. Obernalte	513
		Clemence v. Steere	777, 782, 784
		Clemens v. Clemens	998
		v. Moore	565
		v. Speed	281, 282
		Clement v. Burtis	588, 1519
		v. Hyde	479

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Clement <i>v.</i> Wheeler	780	Coe <i>v.</i> Winnipiseogee Mfg. Co.	269
<i>v.</i> Youngman	312, 1499	<i>v.</i> Wolcottville Mfg. Co.	651
Clements <i>v.</i> Moore	562, 564	Coffee <i>v.</i> Smith	812, 813
Clendenning <i>v.</i> Lindner	919	Coffey <i>v.</i> Sullivan	526
<i>v.</i> Wyatt	540	Coffin <i>v.</i> Parker	1074
Clere's Case	1237, 1245	<i>v.</i> Talman	837, 874
Cleris <i>v.</i> Tiernan	274	Coffman <i>v.</i> Hack	933
Clerk <i>v.</i> Clerk	957, 965	Cogan <i>v.</i> Cogan	1185
Clerkson <i>v.</i> Bowyer	1055	Coggeshall <i>v.</i> Pelton	475, 480, 498
Cleveland <i>v.</i> Obenchain	1508	Coggins' Appeal	1270
<i>v.</i> Ware	196	Cogswell <i>v.</i> Cogswell	773, 774
Cleveland Trust Co. <i>v.</i> Lander	51	Cohen <i>v.</i> Berlin & Jones Envel- ope Co.	541
Cleves <i>v.</i> Willoughby	814	<i>v.</i> Ratkowski	1126
Clifford <i>v.</i> Atlantic Cotton Mills	903, 905	<i>v.</i> Simmons	283
<i>v.</i> Kampfe	660, 661, 663, 704, 723	Cohn <i>v.</i> Hill	830
<i>v.</i> Morrell	1221	<i>v.</i> Norton	844
<i>v.</i> O'Neill	1427	Cohoes <i>v.</i> D. & H. Canal Co.	217
Clift <i>v.</i> Clift	684	Coit <i>v.</i> Planer	881
Clinan <i>v.</i> Cooke	810, 814	<i>v.</i> Starkweather	1439
Clinton <i>v.</i> Myers	304	Coke <i>v.</i> Gutkese Cav.	858
<i>v.</i> Westbrook	1056	Colberg, <i>Re</i>	1555
Clipper M. Co. <i>v.</i> Eli M. & L. Co.	317, 318	Colbert <i>v.</i> Rings	735
Cloos <i>v.</i> Cloos	978	Colburn <i>v.</i> Marsh	1362, 1364
Close <i>v.</i> Samm	1365	Colby <i>v.</i> Duncan	1160
Closs <i>v.</i> Eldert	739, 740	<i>v.</i> Osgood	1530
Closuit <i>v.</i> John Aspin Lumber Co.	1367	Colchester <i>v.</i> Roberts	245
Clowes <i>v.</i> Dickenson	1087	Cole's Case	837
Clyde <i>v.</i> Simpson	580	Cole <i>et al v.</i> Bickelhaupt	901
Clyne <i>v.</i> Helmes	857, 902, 906	Cole <i>v.</i> Bowne	1363
Coats <i>v.</i> Taft	1497	<i>v.</i> Bradbury	200, 202, 243
Coates <i>v.</i> Cheever	684, 693, 780	<i>v.</i> Cole	518, 521
Coatsworth <i>v.</i> Thompson	886	<i>v.</i> Getzinger	573
Cobb <i>v.</i> Arnold	895	<i>v.</i> Gilson	541
<i>v.</i> Davenport	309	<i>v.</i> Haynes	1498
<i>v.</i> Lavalle	1332	<i>v.</i> Hills	1441
Coburn <i>v.</i> Anderson	523	<i>v.</i> Hinek	1079
<i>v.</i> Goodall	837	<i>v.</i> Hughes	1542, 1543
Cochran <i>v.</i> Goodell	955	<i>v.</i> Kimball	1526, 1536
<i>v.</i> Pascault	1530, 1531	<i>v.</i> Lake Co.	592
<i>v.</i> O'Hern	426	<i>v.</i> Littlefield	454
<i>v.</i> Stewart	1466	<i>v.</i> O'Neil	566
Cochrane <i>v.</i> Schell	1289	<i>v.</i> Sewell	1182, 1262, 1263, 1265, 1266, 1277
Cockell <i>v.</i> Taylor	538, 539	<i>v.</i> Stokes	546
Cockles <i>v.</i> Foley	125	<i>v.</i> Van Riper	752
Cockrell <i>v.</i> Proctor	1523	Colegrave <i>v.</i> Dias Santos	31
Cockrill <i>v.</i> Armstrong	675	Coleman <i>v.</i> Beach	1231
Cockrum <i>v.</i> West	1085	<i>v.</i> Chadwick	303
Cocks <i>v.</i> Simmons	972	<i>v.</i> Holmes	1371
Cockson <i>v.</i> Cock	839	<i>v.</i> Lewis	54
Codman <i>v.</i> Jenkins	125, 831	<i>v.</i> Manhattan Beach I. Co.	1378, 1497
<i>v.</i> Winslow	51	<i>v.</i> Parran	509
Cody <i>v.</i> Quarterman	927	<i>v.</i> Sanderlin	1458
Coe <i>v.</i> C. P. & I. R. Co.	57	<i>v.</i> Van Rensselaer	1049
<i>v.</i> Hobby	914, 915, 916, 917	Coleman & B. Co. <i>v.</i> Rice	1108
<i>v.</i> McBrown	56	Coles <i>v.</i> Coles	678, 679, 1069
<i>v.</i> Mills	491, 525	<i>v.</i> Trecothick	530, 538, 546, 1549
<i>v.</i> Persons Unknown	1399	Colgan <i>v.</i> Pellens	752, 1366
<i>v.</i> Washington Mills	484	Colgate's Executor <i>v.</i> Colgate	550, 740

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xxxiii

[References are to pages.]

Collagan v. Burns	1556	Commonwealth v. Barhight	1462
Collamer v. Langdon	1059	v. Beaver Borough	222
Collamore v. Collamore	613, 617	v. Charleston	387
Collier v. Jenks	67	v. Cheney	864
v. Miller	1093	v. Contner	124
v. Pierce	265, 275	v. Contor	119
Collins v. Aaron	1492, 1493	v. Coupe	222, 225
v. Carson	508, 559	v. Cutler	1475
v. Carsons	559	v. Franklin Ins. Co.	870
v. Case	558	v. Hite	1325, 1326
v. Colleran	1367	v. Kelly	218
v. Collins	1163, 1475	v. Matthews	225
v. Ewing	144	v. McAllister	520
v. Hasbrouck	866, 867	v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.	1334
v. Lynch	1367, 1368	v. Naile	1327
v. Moore	1068	v. Newbury	223
v. Pratt	871, 872	v. Railroad Co.	217, 222, 225
v. Prentice	177	v. Upton	212, 300
v. Riggs	1074	Commonwealth Bk. of Pa. v.	
v. Russell	640, 641, 682	Armstrong	517, 519
v. St. Peter's	256, 268	Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v.	
v. Smith	1252	Ellis	1038
v. Wickwire	1211, 1217	Company of Pewterers v. Christ's	
Collins Co. v. Marcy	324	Hospital	492
Collinson v. Jeffery	1073	Comstock v. Comstock	1523
v. Patrick	443	v. McEvoy	1576
Collister v. Fassitt	451, 452, 453	v. Sharp	252
v. Hayman	323	Conabear v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co.	256
Collner v. Greig	984	Conant v. Brackett	1576
Collumb v. Read	984	Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co.	1570
Collyer v. Collyer	125, 831	Concord Bank v. Bellis	1346, 1446
Colonial City Traction Co. v.		Concord R. R. v. Greeley	228
Kingston City R. Co.	235	Condon v. Maynard	1080
Colorado C. & I. Co. v. United		Conduitt v. Ross	1540, 1542, 1543
States	1413	Coney v. Laird	1437
Colrick v. Swinburne	298	Conger v. Duryee	817, 883, 1016
Colson v. Colson	644, 1179	v. Weaver	852
Colthirst v. Bejushin	1150	Congleton v. Pattison	837, 838
Coltness Iron Co. v. Black	118	Congregational Soc. of Dubuque	
Colton v. Colton	433, 452, 454	v. Fleming	17, 22
v. Gorham	872	Congregational Unitarian Soc.	
v. Ross	533	v. Hale	503
Columbia Bank v. Jacobs	1574	Conklin v. Egerton	1223
Colville v. Miles	796, 809	v. Parsons	17
Colvin v. Burnet	204	Conkling v. Davies	450
v. Warford	1561	v. Weatherwax	1044, 1102
Combes's Case	1465	Conlan v. Grace	1465
Comer v. Chamberlain	637, 654	Conley v. Schiller	825
v. Sheehan	1068	Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v.	
Comesky v. Village of Suffern	229	Talbot	1058
Commercial Bk. v. Sherwood	563, 955	Connecticut Trust and Safe De-	
	564, 953, 955	posit Co. v. Hollister	1267
Commissioners v. Clark	802	Connel v. Kibbe	285
Commissioners, etc. v. Directors		Connelly v. O'Brien	1160
of Poor	654	Conner, Matter of	1234
v. Jackson	921	v. Coffin	39
Commissioners v. Pemsel	474, 476, 480	v. Shepherd	685
v. Walker	414	v. Watson	740
Com. v. Roxbury	1500	v. Whitmore	635
Commonwealth v. Alger	387	Connery v. Brooke	1057
v. Allen	231	v. Brooks	247, 1500
v. André	1326	Connolly v. Keating	514

[References are to pages.]

Connolly <i>v.</i> Smith	706	Cooke <i>v.</i> Platt	495, 497
Connor <i>v.</i> Bell	1360	<i>v.</i> Stationers' Co.	525
<i>v.</i> Bradley	818	Cookson <i>v.</i> Richardson	539
<i>v.</i> Gardner	1180	Cool <i>v.</i> B. & L. Co.	64
<i>v.</i> State	786	<i>v.</i> Peters B. & L. Co.	322
<i>v.</i> Sullivan	202, 206	Coolbaugh <i>v.</i> Roemer	1572
<i>v.</i> Watson	1234	Cooley, Matter of	1580
Conover <i>v.</i> Hoffman	1239, 1240	<i>v.</i> Harris	1060
<i>v.</i> Porter	1437	Coolidge, Matter of	1194
<i>v.</i> Smith	838	<i>v.</i> Hagar	243
<i>v.</i> Stothoff	580	<i>v.</i> Learned	193
<i>v.</i> Wright	723	Coombe's Ex'r <i>v.</i> Carthew	546
Conrad <i>v.</i> Saginaw Mining Co.	39	Coombs, Goods of	1550
Conroe <i>v.</i> Birdsall	1443	Coombs <i>v.</i> Anderson	617
Consolidated Ice Co. <i>v.</i> Mayor, etc. of N. Y.	1361	Coomler <i>v.</i> Heffner	924
Consolidated Nat. Bk. of San Diego <i>v.</i> Hayes	964, 1122	Coon <i>v.</i> Rigden	1462
Constant <i>v.</i> Univ. of Roches- ter	573	<i>v.</i> Smith	1342
Consumers' Ice Co. <i>v.</i> Bixler	872	Coons <i>v.</i> Coons	508
Converse <i>v.</i> Converse	1548	Cooper <i>v.</i> Adams	934
<i>v.</i> Ferre	964, 972	<i>v.</i> Cooper	613, 976
<i>v.</i> Sickles	517, 519	<i>v.</i> Fretnoransky	917
Conway <i>v.</i> Alexander	1034	<i>v.</i> Heatherton	1268
<i>v.</i> Cable	1429	<i>v.</i> McDonald	642
<i>v.</i> Carpenter	919	<i>v.</i> Louanstein	167
<i>v.</i> Taylor	144	<i>v.</i> Reilly	538
Conway's Will	1550	<i>v.</i> Reynolds	1574
Cooch <i>v.</i> Gerry	1057	<i>v.</i> Watson	1536
<i>v.</i> Goodman	1462	<i>v.</i> Whitney	675
Coogler <i>v.</i> Rogers	1340, 1376	Coorsen <i>v.</i> Ziehl	1576
Cook <i>v.</i> Barr	438, 439	Cope <i>v.</i> Cope	1315, 1316
<i>v.</i> Brightly	138, 140	<i>v.</i> Wheeler	1110
<i>v.</i> Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.	321	Copehart <i>v.</i> Foster	52
<i>v.</i> Cook	558	Copeland <i>v.</i> Manton	1578
<i>v.</i> Dillon	662	<i>v.</i> Stephens	800
<i>v.</i> Harris	870	Copp <i>v.</i> Swift	16
<i>v.</i> Duckenfield	1235	Coppage <i>v.</i> Barnett	510
<i>v.</i> Eaton	626	Corbet <i>v.</i> Corbet	736
<i>v.</i> Hammond	380, 1141, 1143	<i>v.</i> Stone	1184
<i>v.</i> Harris	224	Corbett <i>v.</i> Norcross	993, 1478
<i>v.</i> Hutchinson	522	<i>v.</i> Spencer	1444
<i>v.</i> Johnson	562	Corbin <i>v.</i> Baker	543, 550
<i>v.</i> Lowry	498, 1289	Corey <i>v.</i> Schuster	759
<i>v.</i> Mancius	574	Corker <i>v.</i> Corker	1559
<i>v.</i> McClure	1331	Corle <i>v.</i> Monkhouse	577
<i>v.</i> Paul	1542	Corley <i>v.</i> McElmeel	532, 996
<i>v.</i> Prigden	326	Corlies <i>v.</i> Howland	1038
<i>v.</i> Soule	821, 823	<i>v.</i> Vannote	1466
<i>v.</i> Stearns	324, 327, 328	Corliss <i>v.</i> McLagin	31
<i>v.</i> Walker	675	Corn <i>v.</i> Bass	294
<i>v.</i> Walling	752	Cornelius <i>v.</i> Giberson	1360, 1362
<i>v.</i> Whellock	896	Cornell <i>v.</i> Hall	1036
<i>v.</i> Whiting	16, 17, 65	<i>v.</i> Lamb 118, 124, 134, 135, 393, 394	394
<i>v.</i> Winchester	1552	<i>v.</i> Maltby	521, 574, 575
Cooke, <i>Ex parte</i>	132	Corner <i>v.</i> Mackey	1425
<i>v.</i> Bremond	981	Cornfeld <i>v.</i> Tenenbaum	521
<i>v.</i> Bucklin	1257	Corning <i>v.</i> Gould	255, 258, 260
<i>v.</i> County of Kings	1221	<i>v.</i> Head	217
<i>v.</i> Crawford	1078	<i>v.</i> Troy I. & N. Factory	269, 1377, 1505, 1515
<i>v.</i> Lamotte	450	<i>v.</i> Woolner	1507
		Cornog <i>v.</i> Cornog	1052, 1057

[References are to pages.]

Cornwell v. Orton	425	Coxe v. State of New York	1415,
v. Wulff	1254		1417
Corpman v. Baccastow	1047	Cozine v. Graham	440
Correll v. Lauterbach	1224	Crabb v. Crabb	441
Corrigan v. City of Chicago	921	Craft v. Latourette	1041
v. Trenton Delaware Falls		v. Schlag	565
Co.	1465	Crafts v. Hibbard	1514
Corse v. Chapman	1160, 1283	Craig v. Butler	133, 856,
Cortelyou v. Van Brunt	211		857
Corwin v. Corwin	1392, 1393	v. First Presby. Church	70
Cory v. Cory	543	v. Pinson	1476, 1477
v. Sant a Ynez L. & T. Co.	1063	v. Summers	867, 868
Cory Universalist Soc. v. Beatty	478	v. Van Bebbar	1444
Cosgriff v. Dewey	962, 974	Craige v. Morris	660
v. Foss	957, 973, 990	Crain v. Wright	596, 597, 1474
Costello v. Grand Trunk R. Co.	650	Cramer, Matter of	1157, 1160
Coster v. Clarke	676	Crane, Matter of	465, 1158, 1164,
v. Lorillard	1389		1171
v. Mayor of Albany	229	v. Bolles	595
Costigan v. Pennsylvania R. Co.	1542	v. Brigham	23
Coten. v. Parti.	961, 969	v. Edwards	917
Cotter v. Layer	1229	v. Hardman	861
Cottman v. Grace	485, 499, 500	v. McMurtrie	1340
Cotton v. McKee	1047	v. Morris	1345
Cottrell, Matter of	1553	v. O'Connor	1572
C. B. Cottrell, etc. Co. v. Carter	1491	v. Powell	436, 438, 806, 807,
Couch v. Harp	511		1372, 1378
Coudert v. Cohn	881, 925, 938, 943	v. Reeder	1325, 1376
v. Huerstel	1430	Crane's Gulch M. Co. v. Scherrer	317
v. Sayre	160, 161, 167	Cranston, <i>In re</i>	480
Cougham v. King	840	v. Crane	1120
Coulson v. Alpaugh	456	Cranvill v. Sanders	1554
Coulter v. Norton	848	Crapo v. Pierce	1561
Countryman v. Deck	815	Crary v. Goodman	1367, 1375
Coupe v. Platt	859, 904, 906	Crawford v. Atlantic Coast Lum-	
Cournan v. Harrison	456	ber Corp.	780
Courter v. Stag	1013	v. Lockwood	756
Covert v. Cranford	299	v. Scovell	1445, 1446
Covington v. Geyler	294	v. Simon	1100
Cowen v. Radford Iron Co.	932	v. Thompson	591
v. Sunderland	858	v. Witherbee	836
Cowdrey v. Cowdrey	1467	Crawley v. Mullins	938
Cowee v. Cornell	547	Crawson v. Primrose	193
Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co.	1015	Creeden v. Mahoney	1474
v. Springs Co.	598, 600, 601,	Creel v. Kirkham	795
	1280	Creesy v. Willis	1101
v. Thayer	199, 251	Cregier, <i>In re</i>	728
Cowles v. Kidder	321	Cressee v. Security Land I. Co.	1492
v. Marble	1105	Crest v. Jack	30, 55
v. Reaves	1513	Cribben v. Deal	1438
Cowling v. Higginson	246	Crippen v. Morss	156, 971
Cowperthwaite v. Bank	535	Crisfield v. Storr	1317
Cox v. Arnold	1329	Crispen v. Hannavan	1366
v. Boyce	641	Criswell v. Grumbling	764
v. Foley	882	Croan v. Phelps	1315
v. Forrest	197	Crocheron v. Jaques	458
v. Freedley	1503	Crocker v. Cotting	159, 245, 246,
v. Garst	678		1505, 1509, 1514
v. James	1344	v. Lowenthal	1470
v. Miller	575	v. Mann	124
v. Sammis	938	v. Pierce	1350
v. Stafford	757	Crockett v. Boston	224

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Croft v. Bunster	1060	Culver v. Rhodis	963, 989
Croley v. Murphy	1455	Cumberland (Duke of) v. Cod-	
Cromie v. Hoover	43, 47	ington	1101
Crommelin v. Thiess	807, 945	Cumming's Appeal	538
Cromwell v. Tate's Ex'r	1465	Cummings v. Dearborn	1399
Crone v. Crone	551, 552	v. Newell	61
Croner v. Cowdrey	1325, 1326	Cunningham v. Cunningham	1552
Cronkhite v. Cronkhite	157, 158, 321, 324, 325	v. Cureton	16, 18, 20
Cronon v. Cotting	432	v. Davenport	442
Crook v. Van Devoort	971	v. Freeborn	449, 1396
Crooke v. County of Kings	473	v. Horton	934, 935
Crooked Lake Nav. Co. v. Kenka		v. Parker	815, 1010, 1015
Nav. Co.	632	v. Pattee	811
Crop v. Norton	508, 510	Cunyngname v. Thurlow	1243
Crosby v. Bessey	198	Curl v. Lowell	942
v. Loop	128	Curran v. Houston	1079
v. Parker	1498	Currant v. Jago	512
Crosdale v. Lanigan	159, 253, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329	Currie v. Misa	577
Crosland v. Rogers	174, 176	v. Page	713
Cross v. State Bank	1438	Currier v. Perley	928
v. Taylor	1430	Curran v. Finn	706
v. Tome	119	Curry v. Bott	651
v. United States	125	Curtis v. Angier	205, 206
v. U. S. Trust Co.	458, 283, 1285	v. Galvin	936
v. Weare Com. Co.	1492	v. Gardner	166
Crossley v. Lightowler	258	v. Hobart	687
Crossman v. Wycoff	1001	v. Hoyt	55
Crothers v. Crothers	556	v. Keisler	211
Crouche v. Foule	828	v. Kiley	903, 904
Crouse v. Wemple	203	v. Leavitt	1466
Crousque v. Quinn	735	v. Moore	1062, 1063, 1107
Crow v. Kightlinger	653	Curtiss v. Ayrault	169, 172
Crowe v. Wilson	780	v. Leavitt	142
Crowley v. Gormley	872	v. Miller	914
Croxall v. Shererd	422, 425, 461, 606, 613, 1160, 1567	Curtner v. United States	1410
Crozier v. Bray	1188, 1557	Cuschner v. Westlake	915
Crozier's Appeal	742	Cushing v. Ayer	1087
Cruger v. McLaury	140, 392, 394, 820	v. Blake	424, 430, 639, 642
Cruikshank v. Home for the		v. Danforth	559
Friendless	524, 1280	v. Edwards	1571
Cruise v. Billmire	704, 720	v. Spalding	597
Crum v. Bliss	1562	Cushman v. Coleman	429
v. Hill	16	v. Cushman	1157
v. Sawyer	760, 1558	Cushney v. Henry	458
Crumrine v. Crumrine	519	Cuthbert v. Chauvet	463
Crusoe v. Bugby	866, 867	Cuthbertson v. Irving	1346
Cruwys v. Colman	457	Cutler v. Cutler	1556
Cubbins v. Ayres	38	v. Tuttle	509, 512
Cubitt v. Mapse	224	Cutting v. Carter	787
v. Porter	286, 287, 292	v. Cutting	1214, 1218, 1219
Cudworth v. Bostwick	1578	Cutts v. York	1496
Cuffee v. Milk	613	Czermak v. Wetzal	814
Culbertson v. Witbeck	444		
Culbertson's Appeal	463		
Culberson v. Culberson	737		
Cullen v. Carey	1042		
Culrose v. Gibbons	450		
Culver v. Elwell	1578		

D.

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xxxvii

[References are to pages.]

Daily v. State	233	Daugherty v. Daugherty	741
Dalay v. Savage	903, 904	D'Augiban, <i>In re</i>	1212, 1220
Dale, <i>Ex parte</i>	520	Dauler v. Hartley	541
v. Bartley	1195	Daury v. Inhab. of Natick	479
v. Hamilton	439	Dausman v. Rankin	1548
v. Hunneman	1412	Daveis v. Collins	1365-1366
Dalton v. Angus	194, 196, 273, 278, 285	Davenport, Matter of	916, 1309
Daly, Matter of	921	v. Lacon	1574
v. Wise	535, 824, 856, 858, 862	v. Lamson	184, 245
Dame v. Dame	54, 55, 931	v. Magoon	783
Dammert v. Osborn	483, 486, 500, 502, 1285	v. Reg.	911, 1016
Damper v. Bassett	263	v. Ruckman	905
Damren v. Amer. L. & P. Co.	128	Davidson, Matter of	1290
Dana v. Burke	29	v. Cooper	1438
v. Dana	505, 519, 521	v. Ellmaker	895, 898
v. Murray	953, 955, 1169, 1170, 1195, 1214, 1227, 1270, 1272, 1278, 1280	v. Little	540
v. Valentine	197	Davies v. Davies	778, 927
Dance v. Dance	1039	v. Humphries	1084
Dand v. Kingscote	249	v. Sear	183
Danforth v. Sargent	945	v. Speed	1258
Danglarde v. Elias	713	v. Thomas	1038
Daniel v. Felt	1237	v. Williams	267
v. Leitch	678	Davis, Matter of	50, 570, 571
v. North	207	v. Andrews	759
v. Whartenly	755, 1180	v. Bigler	560
v. Wood	67	v. Bliss	33
Daniels v. Eldredge	1190	v. Brigham	199, 206
v. Mowry	1117	v. Clark	767, 768, 829, 1471, 1472
v. Pond	936	v. Coblens	101, 1359, 1370
Daniher v. Daniher	703	v. Commonwealth	1512, 1513
Danville Seminary v. Motte	990	v. Compton	981
Danziger v. Boyd	901, 1359, 1375, 1376, 1377	v. Davis	559, 618, 1038
v. Silberthan	720, 786	v. Denny	1548
Daper v. Mann	1112	v. Dudley	1442, 1444
Darby v. Callaghan	809	v. Eastham	41
v. Darby	984	v. Eyton	771
Darcey v. Bayne	959	v. Freeland	1412
v. Steger	828	v. Fuller	298
D'Arcy v. Blake	426	v. George	857
Darcy v. Kelley	481, 488, 490	v. Gilliam	782
Dark v. Johnston	321, 323, 325	v. Gray	1017
Darling v. Potts	550	v. Green	670
v. Rogers	497	v. Handy	1499
Darlington v. Painter	250	v. Inhabitants	480
Darnell v. Columbus S. C. Co.	275	v. Jenkins	713
Darrah v. Baird	44	v. Jones	24
Darrow v. Calkins	984, 985, 986, 1372	v. Judd	1468
Dart v. Dart	1349	v. Lansdale	1133
Dartmouth College v. Wood- ward	145, 212	v. Marlborough	539
Dashiel v. Harshman	1510	v. Mason	640, 641, 644, 830, 1252
Dashwood v. Magniac	767, 782	v. Morris	873
Dassori v. Zarek	872	v. Moss	43
Dastervignes v. United States	1357	v. Murphy	937, 938
Datesman's Appeal	776	v. Nash	935
Dauenhauer v. Devine	289, 292	v. New York	1577
		v. Pacific Power Co.	859, 861, 904, 906
		v. Page	742
		v. Ripley	596
		v. Rosenzweig Realty Co.	1041

[References are to pages.]

Davis v. Schwartz	562	Decker, <i>Ex parte</i>	1438
v. Shields	1463	v. Decker	622, 1044
v. Spaulding	240	v. Hartshorn	917
v. Stambaugh	439, 440	v. Livingston	749, 964
v. Strange	547	v. Morton	133, 857
v. Stroud	1361	Decoster v. Wing	1303
v. Thomas	1034	Dee v. King	196
v. Titusville, etc. Ry. Co.	1486	Deegan v. Wade	1218, 1219, 1268, 1274
v. Town Proprietors, etc.	826	Deeker v. Boies	1093
v. Tyler	895	Deen v. Millikin	537
v. Waddington	931	Deerfield v. Arms	1329, 1330, 1332
v. Ward	579	v. Conn. Riv. R. Co.	196
v. Williams	896, 1470	Deering v. Reilly	382, 1359, 1364
Davis, Adm'r v. Garrett	1474	Deery v. Cray	1481, 1501
Davock v. Nealon	1366	Deeves v. Constable	191, 192
Davoue v. Fanning	530, 542, 546, 548, 549, 1215	De Forest v. Byrne	862
Dawley v. Ayers	756	v. Walters	900, 901
v. Brown	901, 1375, 1377	De Frieze v. Quint	1365
Dawson v. Clarke	523, 525	De Garmo v. Phelps	1070, 1377, 1378
v. Coffman	782	Degary and Roe's Case	1473
v. Edwards	651	Degman v. Degman	1234
v. Kemper	289	De Graw v. Classon	496
v. Massey	554, 555	De Gray v. Monmouth B. C. H. Co.	187
v. Shirley	714, 1447	De Grey v. Richardson	641
v. Quinnerly	1178	De Haro v. United States	320
v. Waltemeyer	564	De Hierapolis v. Reilly	564
Day v. Adams	1476, 1500	Dehority v. Wright	1523
v. Allender	225	Dehring v. Beck	42
v. Cochran	640, 648, 650	Deigleman v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.	302
v. Perkins	25	Delafield v. Parish	1548
v. Roth	518	v. Shipman	1291
v. Savadge	157	De Lancey v. Finnegan	1077
v. Solomon	669	Delancey v. Ganong	126, 899, 900
v. Walden	263	v. Piepgras	78, 123, 134, 136, 146, 298, 386, 387, 391, 394, 395, 396, 1359, 1405, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1429, 1432, 1449, 1510
v. Watson	853	Delaney v. Boston	305
v. West	710	v. Fox	123, 762, 773, 1144
Dayton v. Donart	758	v. McCormack	1214
v. Drainage Comm'rs	302	v. McCormick	1233
Deal v. Cooper	1514	v. Valentine	565
Dean v. Ann Arbor St. Ry. Co.	233	Delannay v. Burnett	1408
v. Dean	440, 1249	Delaplaine v. Chicago, etc. R. Co.	807, 942, 1512
v. Phillips	662	Delavergne v. Norris	1529
v. Walker	1102	Delaware, etc. R. Co. v. Oxford Iron Co.	21
Dean of Windsor's Case	837	Del. & Rar. Canal Co. v. Wright	52
Deane v. Caldwell	913	Dellett v. Kemble	1340
v. Hutchinson	54, 873	Demarest v. Berry	1064
Dearborn v. Taylor	712	v. Williard	128, 837, 877
Dearing v. McKinnon, etc. Co.	562, 563	v. Wynkoop	576, 1033, 1055, 1370
Deaver v. Jones	1500	Demars v. Koehler	1528
Deavitt v. Ring	971	Demartini v. Anderson	863
De Barante v. Gqtt	445		
De Baun v. Moore	289		
Debow v. Colfax	62, 770, 771		
De Camp, Matter of	237		
v. Crane	641		
v. Dix	239		
v. Thompson	179		
De Caters v. Le Ray De Chau- mont	548		
De Celis v. Porter	548		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xxxix

[References are to pages.]

De Mathas v. Gibson	1539	Dester v. Manley	827
Demby v. Parse	45	De Themmines v. De Bonneval	478
Deming v. Bullitt	1468	Detroit v. Detroit M. R. Co.	225
v. Miles	652	Detroit City Railway v. Mills	229,
Dempsey v. Kipp	158		230
v. Tayler	1236	Detwiler's Appeal	870
v. Tylee	1280	De Vaughn v. Hutchinson	593, 1178,
Dempster v. Cleghorn	220		1180
Demuth v. Amweg	202, 268	Dever v. Hagerty	1360, 1376, 1377
Den v. Adams	940, 945	Devereaux v. Fairbanks	1115, 1116
v. Ashmore	897	Devereux v. McMahon	1463, 1476,
v. Drake	928		1477
v. Helmes	1516	Devin v. Dougherty	38
v. Jersey Co.	1510	Devinel v. Barnard	223
Den d. Camp v. Quinby	652	Devinney v. Norris	554
Den d. Fagan v. Walker	651	Devlin v. Collier	1059, 1523
Den d. Hadley v. Geiger	1376	Devoy v. Devoy	513
Den d. Hopper v. Demarest	640	Dewey v. Bellows	250
Den d. Micheau v. Crawford	1172	v. Campau	1481
Den d. Read v. Richman	1488	v. Lambier	964
Den d. Southerland v. Cox	1253	De Witt v. De Witt	677
Den d. Van Kleek v. O'Hanlon	1325	v. Pierson	846, 850
Den d. Wilson v. Small	1256	v. San Francisco	957
Denham v. County Comm'rs	228	De Wolf v. Murphy	662, 680
Dening v. Ware	447	Dexter v. Arnold	1073
Denis' Estate	473	v. Beard	161, 1540
Denison v. Denison	465, 494	v. Evans	452, 453
Denn v. Cornell	1344	v. Stewart	570
v. Slater	613	Dexter L. Co. v. Dexter	971
Dennett v. Hopkinson	61	Dey v. Dunham	1047
v. Pass	139	v. Greenebaum	867, 868
Dennis v. Wilson	216, 244	v. Prentice	1540
Dennison v. Foster	971	D'Eyncourt v. Gregory	15, 45
v. Goehring	447	Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon	
Dent v. Auction Mort. Co.	277		223
Denton v. Davis	439	v. Roeber	541
v. Jackson	1415	Dick v. Harby	467
v. Leddell	264	Dickens v. Barnes	1498
v. Nanny	680	Dickenson v. Codwise	518
v. Ontario Co. Nat. Bk.	573,	Dickerson v. Colgrove	1340
	1117	v. Grand Junction Canal Co.	250
v. Taylor	911	v. Northern R. Co.	1058
Denver, etc. R. Co. v. Harris	951	Dickey v. Thompson	1087
Denwan v. Prince	972	Dickinson v. Blake	764
Denzler v. O'Keefe	1108	v. Hoomes	1536, 1541
De Peyster v. Michael	389, 390, 391,	v. Williams	972, 990
	394, 395, 598, 599, 766	Dickson v. Desire	1533
De Puy v. Strong	974	Diederich v. Rose	21
Deraismes v. Deraismes	773	Diefendorf v. Diefendorf	1399
Derby v. Alling	224	Diehl v. Watson	857
v. Derby	485	Diers v. Ward	1367
Derrick v. Luddy	896	Dietrich v. Hutchinson	750, 752
Derry v. Peek	530, 533, 535	Dietz v. Mission Transfer Co.	1365
Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey	1412	Diggles, <i>In re</i>	452
Deshler v. Beery	720	Dikeman v. Taylor	1499
Deshong v. City of New York	212	Dikes v. Miller	1330
v. Deshong	996	Dill v. Camden Board of Educa- tion	162, 230, 258, 261
Desloge v. Pearce	315, 325	Dillaye v. Greenough	446
Des Moines v. Hall	226	Dillin v. Coppin	447
De Sollar v. Hansome	1343	Dillon v. Barnard	36
Despard v. Churchill	792	v. Coppin	448
v. Wallridge	897, 924, 947		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Dillon v. Dillon	615	Doe v. Clarke	1316
Dillman v. Will Co. Nat. Bk.	718	v. Cook	463
Dilts v. Kinney	1464	v. Courtenay	917
Dimmick v. Lockwood	1524, 1526	v. Cox	931, 932, 937
Dingley v. Bank of Ventura	1039	v. Davies	931, 932
v. Bon	575, 1491	v. Day	844, 845
v. Buffum	934	v. Durden	1357
v. Dingley	1160	v. Edlin	1559
Dinn v. Grant	571	v. Evans	899
Directors of Poor, etc. v. Royer	682	v. Green	923
District of Col. v. Robinson	195, 217	v. Gregory	1368
Diver v. Diver	975	v. Gwinell	696, 697
Dix v. Jaquay	778, 787	v. Harris	1555
Dixon v. Bristol Sav. Bank	1471	v. Hawthorn	478
v. Dixon	1421	v. Hazell	926
v. Monroe	1345	v. Hogg	867, 872
v. Niccolls	62, 128, 796, 877	v. James	561
v. Saville	669	v. Kennedy	1514
Doak v. Wiswell	45	v. Maberly	875
Doane v. Badger	248, 249	v. McKaeg	936
v. Doane	757	v. Perkes	1556
v. Hutchinson	53	v. Porter	928
v. Mercantile	996	v. Price	937
v. Willcutt	1348	v. Pyke	915, 916
Dobberstein v. Murphy	664	v. Raffan	926
Dobbins v. Brown	1536	v. Reed	1387
v. Duquid	827	v. Rees	912
v. Stevens	554	v. Richards	594
Dobie v. Armstrong	532	v. Ries	809, 812
Dobson v. Dobson	698	v. Rivers	641
v. Finley	1513	v. Rock	932
v. Hohenadel	1508	v. Routledge	577
Docter v. Darling	1528	v. Sherman	897
Dodd v. Acklom	916, 917	v. Skirrow	895
v. Burchell	172, 179	v. Smeddle	613
v. Holme	281, 282	v. Smith	816
Dodds v. Hakes	845	v. Smythe	900
Dodge v. Cole	518	v. Stennett	942
v. Cornelius	1550	v. Stratton	909, 925
v. Davis	973	v. Sybourn	462
v. Dodge	1469	v. Thompson	900
v. Emerson	1040	v. Turner	936, 942
v. Findlay	1550	v. Walker	843, 1560
v. McClintock	323, 327	v. Wells	899
v. McKeelinie	564	v. Wood	927, 934
v. Stevens	548, 1021, 1425	v. Wrighte	463
Dodin v. Dodin	1318	Doe d. Allender v. Sussan	1256
Dodkin v. Brunt	458	Doe d. Bennett v. Turner	769
Dodson v. Ball	1177	Doe d. Childers v. Bumgarner	640
v. Sevars	1254	Doe d. Christmas v. Oliver	1343
Doe v. Barford	1559	Doe d. Comberbach v. Perryn	1160
v. Baytup	894, 899	Doe d. Cook v. Webb	660
v. Bell	925	Doe d. Daniel v. Woodroffe	10, 1392
v. Bingham	1440	Doe d. Douglas v. Lock	165
v. Birch	911	Doe d. Foley v. Wilson	767
v. Bluck	911	Doe d. Georges v. Webb	1170
v. Browne	1382	Doe d. Goldin v. Lakeman	1499
v. Cafe	430	Doe d. Herbert v. Selby	1172
v. Campbell	1365	Doe d. Huggens v. Ketcham	1575
v. Carter	866, 870, 927, 933, 935	Doe d. Long v. Prigg	1160, 1162
v. Catomore	1441	Doe d. Morris v. Underdown	1161
		Doe d. Mussell v. Morgan	1249

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xli

[References are to pages.]

Doe d. Springs v. Hanks	1383, 1384	Dorrell v. Johnson	879, 945
Doe d. Tanner v. Dowell	1170	Dorrity v. Rapp	280, 281, 283, 285, 294
Doe d. Thomas Tenant <i>et al.</i> v. Roe and Stephen Blacker	1465	Dorsett v. Gray	865
Doheny v. Lacy	1377	Dorsey v. Habersack	289
Doherty v. Allman	777, 783	Doty v. Burdick	899, 900
v. Matsell	382, 1360, 1364, 1366, 1377	v. Gorham	56
Dohoney v. Wonack	1497	v. Hendrix	742
Dolan v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.	231, 232, 269	v. Teller	613
Dole v. Thurlow	1476	Dougal v. McCarthy	924, 933
Dollard v. Roberts	859, 861, 906	Dougan v. McPherson	546, 548
Dolliff v. Boston & M. R. Co.	172	Dougherty v. Duvall	1537
Dolliver v. Dolliver	544	v. Matthews	816, 817
v. Ela	28	v. Thomson	1157
v. St. Joseph Ins. Co.	794	v. Wellinger	596
Dolph v. Hand	1444	Douglas, <i>In re</i>	480
v. White	838, 839, 1541	v. Coonley	183, 262, 263
Dolton v. Sickel	129	v. Cruger	463
Domainville v. Mann	870	v. Scott	1345
Domestic Missionary Society v. Pell	1563	v. West	1469
Dominick v. Michael	1223	Douglass v. Anderson	900
v. Sayre	1231, 1232	v. Fulda	898
Donahue's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1298	v. Kendal	308
Donald v. Elliott	974	v. McKeever	1430
Donalds v. Plumb	466	v. Seiferd	924, 926
Donaldson v. Donaldson	444	v. Thomas	1524
v. Farwell	578	Douglaston Realty Co. v. Hess	836, 837
v. Strong	872	Dougrey v. Topping	720
Donason v. Barbers	962	Doupe v. Genin	855
Donegan v. Donegan	976, 979	Dovey's Appeal	1045
v. Mentz	1040	Dow v. Doyle	1169, 1170
Doneson v. Barbero	1439	v. Jewell	513
Donkersly v. Levy	917	Dowe, <i>In re</i>	617, 618
Donnell v. Humphreys	164	Downer v. Church	523, 525
Donnelly v. Eastes	1011	Downes v. D. & F. Co.	162
Donner v. Donner	558	v. Grazebrook	548
Donnica v. Coy	527	v. Jennings	567
Donnor v. Quartermas	973	Downey v. Tharp	1060
Donohoe v. Chicago Cricket Club	553	Downing v. Marshall	460, 494, 495, 499, 500, 503, 1210, 1231
Donohue v. Keystone Gas Co.	228, 1508	v. Mayes	1366
v. Whitney	1361	v. Townsend	448
Donovan v. Twist	1347, 1351	Dowse v. Gorton	1085
v. Ward	1443	Doyle v. Am. Co.	651
Dooley v. Greening	712	v. Gibbs	938
v. Potter	1074	v. Lord	274, 275, 276, 1498
Doolittle v. Lewis	1221, 1235	v. Rolwing	652
Dooly Block v. Rapid Tr. Co.	233	v. Sleeper	511
v. Stringham	783	v. Union Pacific R. Co.	857, 858
Doran v. Central R. R. Co.	1357	v. Whalen	428, 488, 490
v. McConlogue	450	Doyley v. Atty.-Gen.	467
Dority v. Dunning	163, 243, 244, 264	Dozier v. Gregory	785
Dorman v. Bates Mfg. Co.	224	Drake v. Baker	1537
Dorr v. Clapp	595	v. Brown	1163
v. Johnson	1258	v. Cunningham	897
Dorrance v. Bonesteel	919	v. Drake	1097, 1234, 1364
v. Raynsford	1427	v. Lacoe	831, 867, 872
		v. Moore	757
		v. Paige	1090
		v. Reggel	1489, 1492
		v. Root	759

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Drake <i>v.</i> Wilhelm	924	Duncan <i>v.</i> Rodecker	257, 290
Drane <i>v.</i> Gregory	993	Duncklee <i>v.</i> Butler	1272
Draper <i>v.</i> Salisbury	1455	<i>v.</i> Webber	809, 823
Drennen <i>v.</i> Walker	973	Duncomb <i>v.</i> Duncomb	682
Dresser <i>v.</i> Norwood	573	Duncombe <i>v.</i> Felt	781
Drew <i>v.</i> Swift	1504	Dundas <i>v.</i> Hitchcock	714
Drewett <i>v.</i> Sheard	261	Dundee Chem. Works <i>v.</i> Connor	544
Driggs <i>v.</i> Brown	983, 985	Dundy <i>v.</i> Chambers	1476
<i>v.</i> Dwight	844	Dunham <i>v.</i> Osborn	668, 727, 729
<i>v.</i> Phillips	205	<i>v.</i> Pitkin	181
Droste <i>v.</i> Hall	693	<i>v.</i> Presby	427
Drown <i>v.</i> Smith	777, 782	<i>v.</i> Reilly	9
Drucker <i>v.</i> Manhattan R. Co.	230,	<i>v.</i> Townsend	933
	231	<i>v.</i> Williams	1507, 1508
Druley <i>v.</i> Adam	240	Dunklee <i>v.</i> Wilton R. Co.	174, 265,
Drum <i>v.</i> Drum	1439, 1441		1498
Drury <i>v.</i> Bachelder	759	Dunlap <i>v.</i> Bullard	867, 868
<i>v.</i> Drury	733, 734, 735, 736,	<i>v.</i> Reardon	1512
	738	<i>v.</i> Stetson	1511
<i>v.</i> Foster	1438, 1439	Dunlop <i>v.</i> James	871, 872, 873
Drybutter <i>v.</i> Bartholomew	51	Dunn, Matter of	713
Dubois <i>v.</i> Beaver	66, 199	<i>v.</i> Flood	1280
<i>v.</i> Hull	1039	<i>v.</i> Mellon	845
<i>v.</i> Kelley	55	<i>v.</i> Rothermel	925
<i>v.</i> Kelly	42	<i>v.</i> Snell	773
Du Bois <i>v.</i> Ray	1163	<i>v.</i> Wheeler	462, 1369
Dubs <i>v.</i> Dubs	649	<i>v.</i> Youmans	253
Dubuque Nat. Bk. <i>v.</i> Weed	1047	Dunne's Trust	1243
Ducker <i>v.</i> DeGenovese	830, 902	Dunne <i>v.</i> Trustees, etc.	924, 933
Dudley <i>v.</i> Bachelder	509	Dunnica <i>v.</i> Sharp	1525
<i>v.</i> Congregation of St. Francis	1113	Dunning <i>v.</i> Finson	886
<i>v.</i> Dudley	509, 559	<i>v.</i> Ocean Nat. Bk.	50
<i>v.</i> Hurst	22, 55	Dunscomb <i>v.</i> Randolph	289
<i>v.</i> Sumner	1463	Dunton <i>v.</i> Outhouse	1040
<i>v.</i> Warde	45	Duppa <i>v.</i> Mayo	818
Duff <i>v.</i> Hart	849	DuPrat <i>v.</i> James	318
<i>v.</i> Hoffman	1577	Dupree <i>v.</i> Dupree	786
Duffers <i>v.</i> Bangs	18	Durand <i>v.</i> Curtis	814, 872
Duffield's Appeal	472	<i>v.</i> Higgins	1517
Duffy <i>v.</i> McGuinness	1108	<i>v.</i> Marcks	629, 1051
<i>v.</i> N. Y. & H. R. Co.	295	Durando <i>v.</i> Durando	668, 682, 727,
Dugdale, <i>In re</i>	598		728, 1142
Duggan <i>v.</i> Slocum	492	<i>v.</i> Wyman	872
Duguid <i>v.</i> Fraser	1558	Durant <i>v.</i> Palmer	903, 904, 905
Duke of Marlborough, <i>In re</i>	527	<i>v.</i> Smith	453, 456
<i>v.</i> Earl Godolphin	1279	Durel <i>v.</i> Boisblanc	155
Duke of Norfolk's Case	627, 1183,	Duren <i>v.</i> Presberrry	1504
	1261, 1265, 1277	Duret <i>v.</i> Charriere	745
Duke of Norfolk <i>v.</i> Arbutnot	601	Durfee, Petitioner	739
Duke of Portland <i>v.</i> Topham	568, 569	<i>v.</i> Garvey	1482
Duke of Somerset, The <i>v.</i> Fog-		<i>v.</i> Pavitt	515
well	1466	Durgin <i>v.</i> Lowell	227
Duke of Sutherland <i>v.</i> Heathcote	324	Durham <i>v.</i> Angier	663, 723, 724
Dukes <i>v.</i> Spangler	1469	Durham & S. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Walker	166
Dulton <i>v.</i> Warschauer	1050	Durling <i>v.</i> Hammar	518
Duluth, etc. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Roy	1412, 1413	Durnherr <i>v.</i> Raw	1070
Dumpor's Case	470, 816, 820, 1016	Durrence <i>v.</i> Nat. Bank	1488
Duncan <i>v.</i> City of Terre Haute	661,	<i>v.</i> Northern Nat. Bank	1490
	718, 722	Duryea <i>v.</i> Mackey	1427
<i>v.</i> Louch	249	Dusie <i>v.</i> Ford	508
<i>v.</i> Navassa Phosphate Co.	684	Dutcher <i>v.</i> Culver	119
		Dutra <i>v.</i> Pereira	1514

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xliii

[References are to pages.]

Dutton <i>v.</i> Poole	536	Eaton <i>v.</i> Tallmadge	971
<i>v.</i> Warschauer	1464	<i>v.</i> Watts	451
Duval <i>v.</i> Becker	265	<i>v.</i> Whitaker	748
<i>v.</i> Wellman	541	<i>v.</i> Whiting	1078
Duvall <i>v.</i> Craig	1532, 1533	Eaves <i>v.</i> Estis	18, 33
Dwenger <i>v.</i> Geary	70	Eberhardt <i>v.</i> Perolin	451, 452, 453
Dwight <i>v.</i> E. C. & N. R. R. Co.	786	Ebling <i>v.</i> Dreyer	1419, 1425
Dwight Printing Co. <i>v.</i> Boston	299	Ebner <i>v.</i> Stickter	326
Dyer <i>v.</i> Bank	1430	Ebrand <i>v.</i> Dancer	512
<i>v.</i> Clark	676, 983, 984	Eccles <i>v.</i> Treemer	800
<i>v.</i> Cranston Print-Works Co.	300	Eckerson <i>v.</i> Crippen	325
<i>v.</i> Dyer	507, 508, 511, 513, 526	<i>v.</i> Village of Haverstraw	222, 974
<i>v.</i> Eldridge	1368	Eckleman <i>v.</i> Miller	291
<i>v.</i> Sandford	166	Eckman <i>v.</i> Eckman	666, 1342, 1392, 1393
<i>v.</i> Sanford	252, 253, 256, 1463	Eddowes, <i>In re</i>	467
<i>v.</i> St. Paul	279	Eddy <i>v.</i> Chace	258, 259
<i>v.</i> Wightman	855	Eden <i>v.</i> Burtiss	1257
<i>v.</i> Wittler	651	Edesheimer <i>v.</i> Quackenbush	844, 888
Dyett <i>v.</i> Central Trust Co.	472, 496, 581, 1210	Edge <i>v.</i> Worthington	1037
<i>v.</i> Pendleton	129, 848, 849	Edgerly <i>v.</i> Barker	862, 1284
Dyke <i>v.</i> Rendall	737	Edgerton <i>v.</i> Brownlaw	429
<i>v.</i> Walford	1300	<i>v.</i> Page	129, 800, 844, 849, 850, 852
Dynëvor <i>v.</i> Tennant	263	Edgett <i>v.</i> Douglas	248, 249
		Edington <i>v.</i> Fitzmaurice	534
E.		Edlich <i>v.</i> Gminder	1474
Eadie <i>v.</i> Slimmon	544, 545, 1459	Edmands <i>v.</i> Boston	921
Eads <i>v.</i> Rutherford	972, 990	Edmison <i>v.</i> Lowry	849
Eager <i>v.</i> Furnivall	639	Edmonson <i>v.</i> Kite	831
Eagle Fire Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Cammet	1124	Edsall <i>v.</i> Merrill	962
Earl De La Warr <i>v.</i> Miles	197	Edson <i>v.</i> Bartow	483, 523, 536
Earl of Aylesford <i>v.</i> Morris	539	<i>v.</i> Munsell	218
Earl of Darlington <i>v.</i> Pulteney	1224	<i>v.</i> Parsons	536
Earle <i>v.</i> Arbogast	778, 829	Edwards, <i>In re</i>	1256, 1258
<i>v.</i> Earle	1447	<i>v.</i> Bibb	1259
Earley's Appeal	268	<i>v.</i> Culbertson	527
East Central Eureka M. Co. <i>v.</i>		<i>v.</i> Dickinson	1469
Central Eureka M. Co.	319	<i>v.</i> Edwards	510, 511
East Haven <i>v.</i> Hemingway	1415	<i>v.</i> Farmers' F. I. & L. Co.	1075
East Jersey Iron Co. <i>v.</i> Wright	312, 330	<i>v.</i> Hale	917, 941
Easterly <i>v.</i> Keney	425, 470	<i>v.</i> Jenkins	219
Eastham <i>v.</i> Anderson	802	<i>v.</i> Jones	443
<i>v.</i> Powell	1474	<i>v.</i> McLean	800, 856, 857, 862
<i>v.</i> Roundtree	518	<i>v.</i> Meyrick	553
Eastis <i>v.</i> Montgomery	547	<i>v.</i> N. Y. & H. R. R. Co.	905
Eastman <i>v.</i> Anderson	118, 119, 120, 242	<i>v.</i> Sleater	1211, 1212
Easton <i>v.</i> Isted	203	<i>v.</i> Trumbull	1038
Eaton <i>v.</i> Chesebrough	1528	<i>v.</i> Woodruff	1511
<i>v.</i> Eaton	801, 1388, 1446, 1476	Edwardsville R. Co. <i>v.</i> Sawyer	1459
<i>v.</i> Green	1034	Eels <i>v.</i> American T. & T. Co.	233
<i>v.</i> Hall	794	Egbert <i>v.</i> De Solms	471
<i>v.</i> Lyman	1529	Ege <i>v.</i> Ege	127
<i>v.</i> McCall	1116, 1127	<i>v.</i> Medlar	642, 1363
<i>v.</i> Simonds	1108	Egerton <i>v.</i> Brownlow	1203
<i>v.</i> Straw	837, 1259	<i>v.</i> Earl Brownlow	1202
<i>v.</i> Swansea Water Works		Ehmen <i>v.</i> Guthenberg	226
Co.	201, 206	Ehrenreich <i>v.</i> Froment	1503, 1506
		Ehrman <i>v.</i> Mayer	131, 139
		Eidlitz <i>v.</i> Lancaster	659, 1081
		Eidmiller Co. <i>v.</i> Guthrie	58

[References are to pages.]

Einstein <i>v.</i> Levi	824	Elterman <i>v.</i> Hyman	1041
Eipper <i>v.</i> Benner	439	Elting <i>v.</i> Palen	66
Eister <i>v.</i> Paul	895	Elwell <i>v.</i> Burnside	973, 974
Elden <i>v.</i> Schumacher	1446	<i>v.</i> Shaw	1465
Elder <i>v.</i> Rouse	1051	Elwes <i>v.</i> Maw	23, 27, 29, 37, 38, 39, 40, 47
<i>v.</i> True	1529, 1537	Elwood <i>v.</i> Klock	729
Eldred <i>v.</i> Meek	1261	<i>v.</i> Northrup	1425, 1426
Electro-Magnetic Co. <i>v.</i> Van Auken	316	Ely <i>v.</i> Edison Elec. Illum. Co.	153
Eleventh Ave., Matter of	222	<i>v.</i> Ely	855
Eldredge <i>v.</i> Forrestal	683, 727	<i>v.</i> Dix	955
Eldridge <i>v.</i> City of Binghamton	1359	<i>v.</i> Scofield	808
<i>v.</i> Post	1572	Ely's Adm. <i>v.</i> United States	1505
Elfeit <i>v.</i> Stillwater R. Co.	218	Emans <i>v.</i> Trumbull	308, 1329
Elgin <i>v.</i> Eaton	280	Emanuel <i>v.</i> Ennis	1312
Elibank <i>v.</i> Montolieu	749	Emanuel College <i>v.</i> Evans	1021
Elizabethtown & P. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Thompson	232	Embrey <i>v.</i> Jemison	541
Elcock <i>v.</i> Mapp	525	<i>v.</i> Owen	298
Ellerson <i>v.</i> Wescott	536, 995, 996, 1006	Embury <i>v.</i> Sheldon	623, 1027
Ellesmere Brewery Co. <i>v.</i> Cooper	1084	Emeric <i>v.</i> Alvarado	960, 972, 1498
Ellicott <i>v.</i> Mosier	688	Emerick <i>v.</i> Hackett	1399
Ellington <i>v.</i> Ellington	1361	Emernercker's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1558
Elliot <i>v.</i> Merryman	580	Emerson <i>v.</i> Fisk	321
<i>v.</i> Smith	898	<i>v.</i> Galloupe	439, 559
<i>v.</i> Stone	932	<i>v.</i> Harris	717, 725
<i>v.</i> Swartwout	544	<i>v.</i> McWhirter	317
<i>v.</i> Wood	1077	<i>v.</i> Mooney	166
Elliott <i>v.</i> Bishop	12	<i>v.</i> Shores	328
<i>v.</i> Fessenden	1563	<i>v.</i> Simpson	838
<i>v.</i> Ince	1446	Emmerson <i>v.</i> Heelis	62
<i>v.</i> Jefferson	1512	Emmett <i>v.</i> Penoyer	1042
<i>v.</i> N. E. R. Co.	284	Emmons <i>v.</i> Scudder	901, 932, 941, 946
<i>v.</i> Parker	1431	Eneminger <i>v.</i> The People	297
<i>v.</i> Piersoll	1427	Enfield <i>v.</i> Jordan	574
<i>v.</i> Rhett	253	Engel <i>v.</i> Ayer	216
<i>v.</i> Sleeper	1455	England <i>v.</i> Downs	566, 567
Ellis <i>v.</i> Bassett	160, 171, 178, 181	<i>v.</i> Reynolds	449
<i>v.</i> Cole	558	<i>v.</i> Slade	462, 897
<i>v.</i> Davis	533, 758	English <i>v.</i> McClure	1038
<i>v.</i> Ellis	688	<i>v.</i> Yates	816
<i>v.</i> Kyger	669	Ennor <i>v.</i> Hodson	519, 520
<i>v.</i> Maxwell	1286	Eno <i>v.</i> Del Vecchio	286, 291, 292, 293
<i>v.</i> Nimmo	447	Ensign <i>v.</i> Patterson	1491
<i>v.</i> Page	1297	Ensley <i>v.</i> Ballentine	519
<i>v.</i> Paige	43, 769, 909, 923, 937	Ensminger <i>v.</i> The People	239
<i>v.</i> Rowbotham	125	Enterprise O. & G. Co. <i>v.</i> Na- tional Transit Co.	961
<i>v.</i> Selby	481	Entleman <i>v.</i> Hagood	950
<i>v.</i> Tone	268	Enyeart <i>v.</i> Davis	809
<i>v.</i> White	757	<i>v.</i> Kepler	979
Ellison <i>v.</i> Daniels	1050, 1056, 1059	Episcopal Academy <i>v.</i> Phila.	479
<i>v.</i> Ellison	444, 447, 560	Eppstein <i>v.</i> Kuhn	943, 944, 945
<i>v.</i> Westcott	1003	Equitable Life Assurance Soci- ety of U. S. <i>v.</i> Brennan	155, 161, 184, 187, 189, 600
Ellsworth <i>v.</i> Central R. R. Co.	1496	Equitable Loan Security Co. <i>v.</i> Waring	954
<i>v.</i> Janssen	1242	E. R. Darlington Lumber Co. <i>v.</i> Harris	1579
Elmendorf <i>v.</i> Lockwood	661, 664, 703, 711	Erb <i>v.</i> Brown	256
Elmore <i>v.</i> Marks	1474		
Elms <i>v.</i> Elms	1556		
Elson <i>v.</i> Comstock	226		
Elsworth <i>v.</i> Grand Rapids	223		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xlv

[References are to pages.]

Erdman <i>v.</i> Moore	16	Evers <i>v.</i> Weil	861
Erhardt <i>v.</i> Boaro	316	Everson <i>v.</i> McMullen	681, 690
Erickson <i>v.</i> Mich. L. & T. Co.	283	Everts <i>v.</i> Beach	961
<i>v.</i> Smith	1039	Evertson <i>v.</i> Booth	1086
Erie Co. Sav. Bk. <i>v.</i> Schuster	1125	Ewell <i>v.</i> Hubbard	913, 1108
Erlanger <i>v.</i> New Sombrero Phosphate Co.	558	Ewing <i>v.</i> Barnes	1257
Ermentrout <i>v.</i> Stitzel	256	<i>v.</i> Burnett	382, 1367
Ernst <i>v.</i> Crosby	864	<i>v.</i> Shropshire	618
<i>v.</i> Straus	849, 850	<i>v.</i> Wilson	450
Ersine <i>v.</i> Davis	1454	Excelsior Brewing Co. <i>v.</i> Smith	34
<i>v.</i> Townsend	1029, 1030, 1050	Excelsior Steam Power Co. <i>v.</i> Halstead	945
Ervin <i>v.</i> Morris	1342	Ex. Mission Land & Water Co. <i>v.</i> Flash	558
Erwin <i>v.</i> Cent. U. Tel. Co.	233	Ex'or of Condict <i>v.</i> King	836, 1258
<i>v.</i> Erie R. Co.	298	Eyck <i>v.</i> Witbeck	1378
<i>v.</i> Hurd	68	Eyre <i>v.</i> Jordan	903
<i>v.</i> Parham	538	<i>v.</i> Potter	538
Eschbach <i>v.</i> Collins	1556	<i>v.</i> Shaftesbury	475
Esham <i>v.</i> Lamar	539	Eyton <i>v.</i> Eyton	536
Esling <i>v.</i> Williams	196, 204	Ezell <i>v.</i> Dodson	981
Espencheid <i>v.</i> Bauer	248		
Essex <i>v.</i> Essex	984		
Essex Co. Bank <i>v.</i> Harrison	574	F.	
Estate of Ensign, Matter of	710	Factor's, etc. Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Murphy	913, 1108
Estate of Edward Walsh	1464	Fagan <i>v.</i> McDonnell	515
Esty <i>v.</i> Baker	936, 1499	Fahn <i>v.</i> Bleckley	1090
Esty <i>v.</i> Currier	1499	Fairbanks <i>v.</i> Lamson	478
Eten <i>v.</i> Luyster	865, 915, 916	<i>v.</i> Metcalf	1471
Etheridge <i>v.</i> Osborn	800	<i>v.</i> Snow	544
Eureka Mowing Co., Matter of	19	Fairchild <i>v.</i> Edson	500, 536
Evangelical Lutheran St. J. & O. Home <i>v.</i> Buffalo Hydraulic Ass'n	144, 250	<i>v.</i> Fairchild	515, 516, 676, 983, 985, 986
Evans' Estate, <i>In re</i>	1157, 1163	<i>v.</i> Marshall	744
Evans, Matter of	1555	Fairis <i>v.</i> Walker	24
<i>v.</i> Bagshaw	995	Fairweather <i>v.</i> Burling	1005
<i>v.</i> Bicknell	531, 532	Falaenan <i>v.</i> Reliance S. F. Co.	35
<i>v.</i> Bidwell	897	Fall <i>v.</i> Sutter Co.	146
<i>v.</i> Brady	596	Falmouth <i>v.</i> Thomas	61
<i>v.</i> Evans	647, 1178, 1180	Falis Village Water Power Co. <i>v.</i> Tibbets	1508
<i>v.</i> Hamrick	877	Falvey <i>v.</i> Bridges	1358
<i>v.</i> Jayne	290	Fanning <i>v.</i> Gregoire	146
<i>v.</i> Keystone Gas Co.	786	Farabee <i>v.</i> McKerrihan	1490
<i>v.</i> McLucas	1536	Farabow <i>v.</i> Green	615
<i>v.</i> Ogsbury	743, 744	Fargis <i>v.</i> Walton	1458
<i>v.</i> Roberts	770	Fargo <i>v.</i> Squiers	1218, 1235, 1270, 1280
<i>v.</i> Saunders	819, 1241	Faris <i>v.</i> Phelan	1514
<i>v.</i> Smith	832, 1254	Farleigh <i>v.</i> Cadmann	450
<i>v.</i> Weatherhead	1177	Farley <i>v.</i> Craig	123, 128, 134, 139, 140, 876
<i>v.</i> Webb	741	<i>v.</i> Farley	1469
<i>v.</i> Welch	1045	<i>v.</i> Lea	1553, 1570
Evansville <i>v.</i> Page	226	<i>v.</i> Parker	1571
Evelyn <i>v.</i> Templar	447, 448, 561	Farmer <i>v.</i> Dean	550
Everett <i>v.</i> Carr	485, 486	<i>v.</i> Farmer	554
<i>v.</i> Edwards	291, 292	<i>v.</i> Pitt	1076
<i>v.</i> Everett	515	Farmer's Bank of Md. <i>v.</i> Heighe	1571
<i>v.</i> Peyton	471	Farmers' Bank <i>v.</i> Stockdale	1489
<i>v.</i> Remington	186, 188		
<i>v.</i> Whitfield	1371		
Everitt <i>v.</i> Everitt	955		
Everly <i>v.</i> Harrison	559		
Evers <i>v.</i> Challis	848, 862, 1270, 1284		

[References are to pages.]

Farmers' and Mechanics' Bk. v. King	517, 519	Fern v. Osterhout	718
Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Kip	1218, 1219, 1235	Fernie v. Scott	931
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Penn. Plate Glass Co. v. People	1081, 1327	Ferrel v. Woodward	148
Farnham v. Clements	508	Ferrer's Case	1004
Farnum v. Hefner v. Peterson	866, 870, 1376	Ferris v. Montgomery	973
Farquhar v. Darling	476, 478, 480, 481, 482	Person v. Sanger	535
Farrand v. Gleason	973	Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church	479, 484, 490
Farrar v. Bernheim v. Eastman v. Farrar v. Fessenden	1375, 1362, 548, 1469, 1376	Fetrow v. Merriwether	1399
Farrell v. Lockhart v. Lloyd v. Noel v. O'Brien v. Parlier	153, 319, 1337, 513, 1132, 533, 1033	Fetters v. Humphreys	174
Farrington v. American Loan and Trust Co. v. Forrester v. Kimball v. Putnam	1455, 1087, 871, 523, 1451	Fettretch v. Leamy	288, 289
Farwell v. Kloman v. Rogers v. Warren	521, 669, 1369, 955	Fidler v. John v. Lash	563, 1242
Fash v. Blake	1459	Field v. Brown v. Columbet v. Lang v. Manchester v. Mills v. Pierce v. Snell	202, 1514, 664, 224, 866, 868, 51, 1538, 864
Faukboner v. Corder	218	Fields v. Brown v. Dremen	864, 1038
Faulcon v. Johnston	62	Fietsam v. Hay	142
Faulks v. Burns	1469	Fife v. Miller	1182
Fauntleroy v. Dunn	1388	Fifer v. Allen	780, 1258
Faust's Adm'r v. Birner	1258	Fifty Associates v. Grace	872
Fawcett v. City of New York	1571	Fillebrown v. Hoar	129, 853
Fay v. Brewer	778	Fillmore v. Jennings	1329
Fayette L. Co. v. Railroad Co.	1334	Fincke v. Fincke	466
Featherstonhaugh v. Bradshaw v. Fenwick	832, 552	Findlay v. Smith	782
Feder v. Van Winkle	12	Finegan v. Eckerson	280
Feeder v. Van Winkle	23, 25	Finelete v. Sinnot	1501
Feit v. Richards	596	Finkelmeier v. Bates	909
Felker v. Richardson	917, 918	Finlay v. King v. King's Lessee	1014, 1012
Fellows v. Greenleaf v. Lee v. Loomis v. New Haven	449, 386, 552, 280	Finlayson v. Crooks	1090
Felton v. Deall v. Simpson	905, 203	Finley v. Hunter v. Isett v. Simpson	478, 439, 1403, 1463
Felts v. Martin	1132	Finn v. Lally	1361
Fennell v. Guffey	870	Firebaugh v. Ward	1571
Fentiman v. Smith	327	First Baptist Church of Hartford v. Wetherell	68
Fenton v. Miller v. Reed v. Steere	962, 973, 638, 1004	First Bapt. Soc. v. Grant	68
Ferchen v. Aradt	521	First National Bank v. Bruce v. Connecticut M. Life Ins. Co. v. Michigan Trust Co. v. Miller v. National Broadway Bank	759, 1090, 1227, 563, 564, 410, 581, 1027
Ferebee v. Pritchard]	566	v. Schuler v. Villegra	998, 281
Ferguson v. Kumlér	759	First Nat. Ins. Co. v. Salisbury	1055
v. Tweedy v. Witsell	637, 640, 265	First Parish v. Jones	19
		First Univ. Soc. of N. Adams v. Boland	604, 621, 1021, 1022, 1023, 1068
		Firth v. Rowe	38
		Fischbeck v. Gross	531, 536
		Fish v. Dodge	905

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xlvii

[References are to pages.]

Fish <i>v.</i> Fowlie	1574	Fletcher <i>v.</i> Bartlett	548
<i>v.</i> French	1060	<i>v.</i> Bass Riv. Sav. Bk.	1066
<i>v.</i> Howland	1040	<i>v.</i> Hansur	1454
Fishback <i>v.</i> Lane	760	<i>v.</i> Herring	66
Fisher <i>v.</i> Dixon	29	<i>v.</i> Holmes	1050, 1056
<i>v.</i> Fair	242	<i>v.</i> McKeon	1068
<i>v.</i> Fiege	300	<i>v.</i> McMillan	38
<i>v.</i> Fields	441, 595	<i>v.</i> Peck	576
<i>v.</i> Hall	494, 1470	<i>v.</i> Shepherd	711, 712, 714
<i>v.</i> Hershey	1003	<i>v.</i> Smith	299
<i>v.</i> Lighthall	862	Flickinger <i>v.</i> Shaw	325
<i>v.</i> Milliken	872	Flight <i>v.</i> Bentley	873
<i>v.</i> New Jersey Bank	954, 955	Flint <i>v.</i> Bacon	173
<i>v.</i> N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.	205	Flora <i>v.</i> Carbean	196, 203
<i>v.</i> Provin	975	Florala Sawmill Co. <i>v.</i> Parrish	770
<i>v.</i> Reach	1103	Florence <i>v.</i> Zeigler	579
<i>v.</i> Smith	1509	Florida S. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Brown	232
<i>v.</i> Thiskell	903, 905	Flowers <i>v.</i> Flowers	703
<i>v.</i> Wigg	970	Floyd <i>v.</i> Barker	524
<i>v.</i> Wister	1251, 1253, 1254	<i>v.</i> Carow	1140, 1144, 1563
Fisk <i>v.</i> Fisk	1054	<i>v.</i> Ricks	1466
<i>v.</i> Sarber	551	Fluck <i>v.</i> Rea	543
<i>v.</i> Stewart	1048	Flureau <i>v.</i> Thornhill	851
<i>v.</i> Stubbs	1482	Flye <i>v.</i> Berry	1050, 1055, 1099
Fiske <i>v.</i> Fiske's Heirs	1194	Flynn <i>v.</i> City of Detroit	1368
<i>v.</i> Tolman	1102	<i>v.</i> Flynn	50, 660, 661
Fitch <i>v.</i> Fitch	540	<i>v.</i> McDermott	740, 742, 745
<i>v.</i> McDowell	1158	Fobes <i>v.</i> Rome, W. & O. R. Co.	232, 272
<i>v.</i> Miller	1471	Fogal <i>v.</i> Pirro	1074
<i>v.</i> Rawling	157, 192, 219	Foley <i>v.</i> Godchaux	301
Fitzgerald <i>v.</i> Anderson	47	<i>v.</i> Kirk	773
<i>v.</i> Beckwith	1058	<i>v.</i> McCarthy	1507, 1508
<i>v.</i> Fitzgerald	527	Folger <i>v.</i> Mitchell	993
<i>v.</i> Goff	1469	Follansbe <i>v.</i> Kilbreth	507
<i>v.</i> Libby	1497	Folmsbee <i>v.</i> City of Amsterdam	230, 280
<i>v.</i> Shelton	1445	Folsom <i>v.</i> Rhodes	680
Fitzgibbons Boiler Co. <i>v.</i> Man-		Folts <i>v.</i> Huntley	854, 920
hasset Realty	34	Folwell's Case	654, 752
Fitzpatrick <i>v.</i> B. & M. R. Co.	251	Folz <i>v.</i> Shalow	938
<i>v.</i> Fitzpatrick	1440	Fonda <i>v.</i> Sage	620, 1015
Flack <i>v.</i> Gosnell	961	Fontain <i>v.</i> Ravenel	477, 488, 490
<i>v.</i> Graham	1468	Foose <i>v.</i> Whitmore	453, 456
<i>v.</i> Green Island	222	Foot <i>v.</i> Dickinson	786
<i>v.</i> March	776	<i>v.</i> New Haven & North Co.	324, 327
Flagg <i>v.</i> Dow	917, 918	Footo <i>v.</i> Bryan	515
<i>v.</i> Eames	1517	<i>v.</i> Cincinnati	921
<i>v.</i> Mann	575, 1047	<i>v.</i> Elevated Railroad	255, 256
Flaherty <i>v.</i> Moran	277	<i>v.</i> New Haven & North Co.	330
Flamm <i>v.</i> Perry	1000	Forbell <i>v.</i> City of New York	284
Fleenor <i>v.</i> Driskill	1005	Forbes <i>v.</i> Balenseifer	321
Fleetwood <i>v.</i> Lord	757	<i>v.</i> Gracey	314, 315, 319
Flegg <i>v.</i> Mann	1036	<i>v.</i> Moffatt	681, 1107, 1108
Fleischman <i>v.</i> Toplitz	133, 856, 857	<i>v.</i> Shattuck	60
Fleming <i>v.</i> Baker	1515	<i>v.</i> Sweesy	650
<i>v.</i> Burnham	1223	Force <i>v.</i> City of Elizabeth	532
<i>v.</i> Cohen	1463, 1506	Ford <i>v.</i> Cobb	19, 30
<i>v.</i> Griswold	1371	<i>v.</i> Erskine	685, 782
<i>v.</i> Morrison	1552	<i>v.</i> Ford	482
Flemington Nat. Bk. <i>v.</i> Jones	1058	<i>v.</i> James	1472
Fletcher <i>v.</i> Ashburner	50		
<i>v.</i> Ashley	567		
<i>v.</i> Barber	1125		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Ford v. Knapp	973, 990	Fox v. Buffalo Park	861
v. Lewis	512	v. Clarke	281
v. Livingston	1425, 1426	v. Fox	1272
v. Met. R. Co.	175	v. Hall	1398
v. New Haven & North Co.	253	v. Mackreth	548, 559
v. Tynite	70	v. Macreth	543, 546
v. Unity Church Soc.	1339	v. Nathaus	928
Fordyce v. Willis	435	v. Peoples	507, 559
Forrest v. Forrest	738	v. Rumery	1194
Forsyth v. Clark	594	v. Swan	875
Forster v. Hale	436, 439	v. Wharton	1057
v. Moore	1439	Foxworth v. Brown	574
v. Scott	1525, 1527	Fralick v. Lyford	503
v. Winfield	495	France v. Hamilton	1571
Forsythe v. Ballance	1412	Francis v. Francis	1351, 1355
v. Price	768	v. Sandin	664
Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith	146	v. Schoellkopt	786
Fortescue v. Barnett	443	v. Wilkinson	556
v. Bowler	787	Francks v. Whitaker	1172
Forth v. Chapman	1256	Frank v. Conradi	859
v. Norfolk	1071	v. Davis	1113
Fortmann v. Wheeler	1432	v. Mandel	905
Fortune v. Watkins	670	v. New York, L. E. & W.	
Forwood v. Forwood	737	R. Co.	868, 871, 872
Fosdick v. Schall	35	v. Tuozzo	1491
v. Town of Hempstead	477, 480	Frank's Appeal	507, 553
	499, 500	Franke, <i>In re</i>	741
Foss v. Crisp	653, 1448	v. Hewitt	813
v. Van Driele	851, 897, 898	v. Youmans	856
Foster v. Bowles	1102	Frankel, Matter of	1340
v. Browning	324	Franklin v. Brown	857, 858, 862
v. Bussey	1511	v. Merida	895, 924
v. Carson	1062	v. Talmadge	1454, 1464
v. Cook	740	v. Tracy	857
v. Day	580	Franklin Sav. Bk. v. Cochrane	1103, 1104
v. Durant	514		
v. Dwinel	643, 678, 1054	Franklin Savings Inst. v. People's Savings Bank	955
v. Foster	470	Franz v. Mendonca	207
v. Hackett	1348	Fratt v. Whittier	52
v. Leland	759	Frazier v. Brown	299
v. Mansfield	1472	v. Caruthers	912
v. Marshall	650, 651	v. Frazier	1232
v. Pearson	1532	Frear v. Sweet	1063, 1093
v. Perkins	1055	Fredickar v. East	1497
v. Reeves	904	Freeland v. Freeland	737
v. Robinson	769, 865	Freeman v. Ahearn	690
v. Wright, L. R.	1329	v. Bellegarde	1506, 1511
Foster's Appeal	985, 1572	v. Headley	933
Fothergill v. Fothergill	1229	v. Laing	1094
Fotterall v. Armour	921	v. Oppenheim	1355
Foulke v. Bond	1366, 1367, 1368	v. Schroeder	1050
Fourth Presbyterian Church v. Steiner	190, 192	v. Wilson	945, 950
Foveaux Cross, <i>In re</i>	480	Freemont v. Dedire	1044
Fowle v. N. H. & N. R. Co.	52	Freer v. Stotenbur	786, 787, 846
Fowler, <i>In re</i>	228	Freiberg v. Stoddard	521
v. Bott	855	Freidlander v. Ryder	24, 47
v. Chadima	712	Freiot v. Fountaine	712
v. Depau	1270	Freligh v. Platt	68, 69
v. Fowler	973	Frewen v. Law Life As. Soc.	773
v. Shearer	1465	French v. Allen	1575
v. Wood	1048		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xlix

[References are to pages.]

French v. Carhart	1389	Fulton v. S. R. T. Co.	232
v. Crosby	688	v. Stuart	868
v. Freeman	66, 67	v. Whitney	548, 549, 550
v. Lord	661, 711, 712, 722	Funk v. Eggleston	594
v. Mahan	978	v. Voneida	1530
v. Marstin	184, 204, 245, 246	Funston v. Hoffman	857
v. Morris	242	Furber v. Page	507
v. Pearce	1367	Furnas v. Durgin	1118
v. Peters	712	Furner v. Seabury	245
v. Pittsburg Vehicle Co.	548	Furnish v. Rogers	1171
v. Pratt	692	Furniss v. Ferguson	1061
v. Quincy	862	Furnold v. Bank of Missouri	1086
v. Rollins	653	Fursaker v. Robinson	448
v. Spencer	1399	Fusselman v. Worthington	126
v. The Old South Society	67, 68, 69, 598	Fyfe v. Beers	757
Freshour v. Hihn	218		
Frick v. Fiscus	1344	G.	
Frick Coal Co. v. Laughead	1297	Gaar v. Lockridge	1572
Friedland v. Myers	844	Gabbert v. Schwartz	1056
Fries v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.	230, 232	Gable v. Columbus Cigar Co.	563
Frink v. Adams	1047	v. Wetherbolt	897
Frisbie v. Frisbie	1072	Gadberry v. Sheppard	1015
Frith v. Cartland	520	Gaertner v. Bues	892
Fritsch v. Klausung	1241	Gaffield v. Hapgood.	39, 47
Fritz v. Pusey	1528	Gaffney v. Jafferis	675
v. Seeley	180	Gage v. Bissell	1004
v. Tompkins	180, 244, 265	v. Consumers' E. L. Co.	1582
Frommer v. Roessler	847	v. Gage	516
Frontin v. Small	1465	v. Sanborn	1399
Frost, <i>In re</i>	1275	Gaines v. Green Pond Iron	
v. Akron Iron Co.	945	Min. Co.	684, 781
v. Cloutman	613	v. Hennen	536
v. Courtis	1366	Gainsford v. Dunn	1234
v. Deering	810	Galbraith v. McLaughlin	538
v. Rainbow	758	v. Tracy	985
v. Yonkers Sav. Bk.	1060	Gale v. Edwards	1528
Frout v. Hardin	796	v. Harby	517
Fruit Co. v. Buck	566	v. Morris	1037
Fry v. Lane	536, 539, 540, 544	Gale's Ex'rs v. Morris	1043
v. Miller	62	Galin v. Neimcewicz's Ex'rs	1085
Fryer v. Rockefeller	1057, 1377	Gallagher v. Rahm	1498
Fugate v. Pierce	1365	v. Shipley	67
Fullam v. Foster	1505	Gallatian v. Cunningham	1388
Fuller, Goods of	1550	Galle v. Tode	563, 564, 565
v. Carr	1502, 1513	Gallego's Ex'rs v. Atty.-Gen.	490
v. Chamier	1178	Galpin v. Page	1424
v. Conrad's Admr.	695	Galt v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.	231, 232
v. Fletcher	1366	G. C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Eddins	232
v. Jenkins	1042	Galway v. Met. Elec. R. Co.	1142
v. Tabor	20	Gammon v. Bunnell	1471
v. Watson	685	Gandy v. Jubber	905, 923
v. Wilbur	633	Gann v. Whitstable Free Fishers	1509
Fullerton v. McCurdy	612, 1034	Gannon v. Peterson	781, 1027
Fullmer v. Poust	1577	Ganson v. Baldwin	924
Fulmer's Appeal	989	v. Tift	866, 867, 869
Fulmer v. Williams	1511	Gantert, Matter of	1215, 1230
Fulper v. Fulper	976	Ganz v. Lancaster	1110
Fulton v. Andrews	547	Garand v. Towne	601
v. Jansen	510		
v. Mehrenfield	226		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Garbut <i>v.</i> Bowling	736	Geiszler <i>v.</i> De Graaf	1522, 1523,
Gardiner <i>v.</i> Deering	782		1524, 1526, 1527, 1528,
<i>v.</i> Guild	1164		1532, 1533
<i>v.</i> Tisdale	220	Geller <i>v.</i> Hoyt	1464
Gardner, <i>In re</i>	452	Gen. Electric Co. <i>v.</i> Transit	
Matter of	1224, 1226	Equip. Co.	36
<i>v.</i> Gardner	1465	General Finance M. & D. Co. <i>v.</i>	
<i>v.</i> Greene	1351	Liberator P. B. B. Soc. L. R.	1344,
<i>v.</i> Keteltas	800, 826, 844, 887,		1346
	1531	Genet <i>v.</i> Hunt	1275
<i>v.</i> McClure	1038	Genter <i>v.</i> Morrison	1496
<i>v.</i> Watson	1045	George <i>v.</i> Baker	637, 1059
Garforth <i>v.</i> Bradley	1112	<i>v.</i> Bates	1498
Garland <i>v.</i> Smith	533	<i>v.</i> Braddock	479, 480
Garmire <i>v.</i> Willy	290	<i>v.</i> Cox	163, 245
Garner <i>v.</i> Anderson	1431	<i>v.</i> Grose	525
Garnhart <i>v.</i> Finney	912	<i>v.</i> Putney	851, 897, 1533
Garnons <i>v.</i> Knight	1473	<i>v.</i> Wood	1087, 1088
Garnsey <i>v.</i> Mundy	449, 450	George Bauernschmidt B. Co. <i>v.</i>	
<i>v.</i> Rogers	1103	McColgan	44
Garrard <i>v.</i> Garrard	738	George's Creek Co. <i>v.</i> Detmold	788
<i>v.</i> Lord Lauderdale	449	Georgia R. Co. <i>v.</i> Haas	56
Garrett <i>v.</i> Christopher	1398	Gerard <i>v.</i> Cooke	160
<i>v.</i> Jackson	210	Gerber's Estate	1267
<i>v.</i> Kan. City Coal Min. Co.	538	Gerbert <i>v.</i> Sons of Abraham	44
<i>v.</i> Ramsey	1362	Germain <i>v.</i> Orchard	1517
<i>v.</i> Wagner	1423	German Land Ass'n <i>v.</i> Scholler	1455
<i>v.</i> Weinberg	1365	German Mut. Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Grim	1376
Garrison <i>v.</i> Hutton	826, 844	German Ref. Church <i>v.</i> Seibert	69
<i>v.</i> Rudd	215	German Sav. & Loan Soc. <i>v.</i>	
Garritt <i>v.</i> Sharp	266, 267	Weber	35
Garth <i>v.</i> Arnold	618	Germond <i>v.</i> Jones	670
<i>v.</i> Sir John Cotton	787	Gerrard <i>v.</i> Cooke	248, 249
Gartside <i>v.</i> Outley	1068, 1169	Gerrish <i>v.</i> Clough	1330, 1331
Garver <i>v.</i> Clouser	1180	<i>v.</i> Shattuck	245
Garvey <i>v.</i> McDevitt	1214, 1215,	Gest <i>v.</i> Flock	1497
	1244, 1279	Getchell <i>v.</i> Benedict	223
Garvin <i>v.</i> Williams	555	Ghormley <i>v.</i> Smith	471
Gary <i>v.</i> Newton	1319	Gibbons <i>v.</i> Gibbons	741, 1163
Garzot <i>v.</i> Rubio	980	<i>v.</i> Hoag	1051
Gaskill <i>v.</i> King	1461	Gibbs <i>v.</i> Estey	20
<i>v.</i> Trainer	913, 1085	<i>v.</i> N. Y. L. Ins. Co.	547
Gates <i>v.</i> Dudgeon	1221	<i>v.</i> Thayer	1351
<i>v.</i> Paul	1497	Gibert <i>v.</i> Peteler	166, 278, 1017
<i>v.</i> Salmon	969	Gibson <i>v.</i> Bailey	1055
Gatewood <i>v.</i> Gatewood	641, 1071	<i>v.</i> Barbour	548
Gawne, Matter of	494	<i>v.</i> Brockway	1499
Gawtry <i>v.</i> Leland	161	<i>v.</i> Chouteau	1357
Gayetty <i>v.</i> Bethume	179, 180, 211	<i>v.</i> Crehore	1066, 1073
Gayford <i>v.</i> Moffatt	177, 182, 203,	<i>v.</i> Foote	508
	1367	<i>v.</i> Hammersmith Railway Co.	37
Gaylord <i>v.</i> Cincinnati G. B. Ass'n	873	<i>v.</i> Holden	288, 290, 838
<i>v.</i> Knapp	1040	<i>v.</i> Jeyes	539
<i>v.</i> La Fayette	429	<i>v.</i> Kirk	125, 831, 880
Gazlay <i>v.</i> Williams	1424	<i>v.</i> Needham	813
Gazzolo <i>v.</i> Chambers	826, 844	<i>v.</i> Rees	449
Gebb <i>v.</i> Rose	753	<i>v.</i> Thomas	574, 808, 1492
Gedney <i>v.</i> Gedney	961, 962, 989	<i>v.</i> Toole	508
Gee <i>v.</i> Thrailkill	514	<i>v.</i> United States	297
<i>v.</i> Young	771	Giddings <i>v.</i> Giddings	1558
Geible <i>v.</i> Smith	174	Giffen <i>v.</i> Olathe	226
Geiger <i>v.</i> Braun	947	<i>v.</i> Taylor	527

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

li

[References are to pages.]

Gifford <i>v.</i> Corrigan	1475	Glaze <i>v.</i> The Three Rivers	
<i>v.</i> Dyer	1558	Farmers Mutual Ins.	
<i>v.</i> First Presby. Soc. of		Co.	1470
Syracuse	69	<i>v.</i> Western, etc. R. Co.	205
<i>v.</i> Thorn	537, 538	<i>v.</i> Western & Atlantic R.	
<i>v.</i> Yarborough	1329	Co.	212
Gilbert <i>v.</i> Chapin	453, 456	Gleason <i>v.</i> Hamilton	1439
<i>v.</i> Cowan	760	Gleeson <i>v.</i> Martin White M. Co.	316
<i>v.</i> Gilbert	515, 1319	Glenorchy <i>v.</i> Bosville	429, 596
<i>v.</i> N. American F. Ins. Co.	1471	Glickauf <i>v.</i> Maurer	906
<i>v.</i> Overton	443	Glidden <i>v.</i> Bennett	28, 45
<i>v.</i> Peteler	160, 1010,	<i>v.</i> Blodgett	1165
	1491	Glidewell <i>v.</i> Spaugh	514, 515
<i>v.</i> Reynolds	720, 723	Globe Co. <i>v.</i> Quinn	39
<i>v.</i> Sprague	1344, 1345	Globe Marble Mills Co. <i>v.</i> Quinn	33
<i>v.</i> Witty	1170	Glos <i>v.</i> Gerrity	717, 726
Gilbertson <i>v.</i> Richards	1266	<i>v.</i> Hollowell	1582
Gildersleeve <i>v.</i> Hammond	280, 281	<i>v.</i> Wheeler	1360
Giles <i>v.</i> Anslow	455	Gloucester <i>v.</i> Wood	522
<i>v.</i> Comstock	854, 921	Gloucester G. & Q. Co. <i>v.</i> Russia	
<i>v.</i> Dugro	294	Co.	572
<i>v.</i> Little	591, 1013	Glover <i>v.</i> Condell	467, 810
<i>v.</i> Pratt	1463	<i>v.</i> Stillson	1169, 1222
<i>v.</i> Simonds	322, 323	Gluck <i>v.</i> Mayor	920
Gilford <i>v.</i> Winnipiseogee Lake		Goddard <i>v.</i> Bolster	22
Co.	196	<i>v.</i> Hall	125, 831, 881
Gilfoyle <i>v.</i> Cahill	947	<i>v.</i> Snow	567
Gilhooley <i>v.</i> Washington	849, 864	Goddard's Case	1345, 1496
Gill <i>v.</i> Middleton	906	Godman <i>v.</i> Simmons	1189
Gillan <i>v.</i> Dixon	976	Godolphin <i>v.</i> Abingdon	1298
Gillenwaters <i>v.</i> Campbell	1444	Godsey <i>v.</i> Standifer	963
Gillespie <i>v.</i> Allison	1160	Goe's Estate	598
<i>v.</i> Brooks	1465	Goebel <i>v.</i> Wolf	1164, 1288
<i>v.</i> Nabors	998	Goelet <i>v.</i> Asseler	8
<i>v.</i> Thomas	921	<i>v.</i> Roe	888
<i>v.</i> Weinberg	245	Goff <i>v.</i> Anderson	649
<i>v.</i> Worford	652	<i>v.</i> Congle	118, 1507
Gilliam <i>v.</i> Guaranty Trust Co.	496,	Goggin <i>v.</i> Manhattan R. Co.	1372
	1317, 1318	Going <i>v.</i> Emery	478
Gillig <i>v.</i> Maass	1490	Goldman <i>v.</i> Smith	564
Gillilan <i>v.</i> Swift	714	Goldschmid <i>v.</i> Mayor	786
Gillis <i>v.</i> Brown	632	Goldsmith <i>v.</i> Goldsmith	527, 546
<i>v.</i> Gillis	1464	Goldthwaite <i>v.</i> Janney	984, 986
Gilman <i>v.</i> Bell	1211	Golob <i>v.</i> Pisinsky	860, 904, 905, 906
<i>v.</i> Brown	1361	Gombault <i>v.</i> Public Adm'r	543
<i>v.</i> Dolan	1375	Gomez <i>v.</i> Gomez	1190
<i>v.</i> Reddington	1291	Gooch <i>v.</i> Atkins	664
Gilmore <i>v.</i> Armstrong	325	Gooch's Case	561
<i>v.</i> Driscoll	239, 268, 279, 280,	Good <i>v.</i> Fichthorn	453, 598
	282, 286	Goodale <i>v.</i> Mooney	481
Gilpatrick <i>v.</i> Glidden	533	Goodall <i>v.</i> Godfrey	160, 169, 171
Gilpin <i>v.</i> Hollingsworth	1174		179, 180
Girard Trust Co. <i>v.</i> Mellor	442, 443	Goode <i>v.</i> Gaines	762, 773, 894, 896,
Girard <i>v.</i> Philadelphia	491, 1545		899, 900, 1144
Girard Will Case	475	<i>v.</i> Riley	536
Girardy <i>v.</i> Richardson	863	Goodenow <i>v.</i> Ewer	973
Givan <i>v.</i> Doe	1486	Goodhart <i>v.</i> Hyett	268
Glacier Mt. S. M. Co. <i>v.</i> Willis	315	Goodheart <i>v.</i> Goodheart	670
Glacius <i>v.</i> Fogel	1102	Goodkind <i>v.</i> Bartlett	1492
Gladwell <i>v.</i> Holcomb	928, 929	Goodlet <i>v.</i> Smithson	1357, 1412
Glass <i>v.</i> Ellison	1056	Goodman <i>v.</i> City of Saltash	219
<i>v.</i> Hulbert	574	<i>v.</i> Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.	42

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Goodman <i>v.</i> Randall	1462	Gould <i>v.</i> Winthrop	1101
<i>v.</i> White	1050, 1123	<i>v.</i> Wise	1469
Goodrich <i>v.</i> Burbank	308, 309	Gouverneur <i>v.</i> Nat. Ice Co.	58, 113, 1512
<i>v.</i> Jones	17, 22, 66	Gouverneur <i>v.</i> Robertson	1448
<i>v.</i> Tenney	541	Govin <i>v.</i> De Miranda	444, 445, 465, 1369
<i>v.</i> Milwaukee	461	Gowen <i>v.</i> Philadelphia Exchange Co.	221, 227, 322
<i>v.</i> Pratt	1519, 1530	Gower <i>v.</i> Mainwaring	467, 1232
<i>v.</i> Russell	1325	Gowland <i>v.</i> De Faria	539
Goodright <i>v.</i> Cornish	1184, 1194, 1195	Goyette <i>v.</i> Keenan	1504
<i>v.</i> Davids	1016	Grace <i>v.</i> Wade	1091
<i>v.</i> Wells	412	Grace M. E. Church <i>v.</i> Dobbins	171, 203, 306
Goodspeed <i>v.</i> Fuller	1345, 1458	Grady <i>v.</i> McCorkle	679, 703
Goodtitle <i>v.</i> Kibbe	1192, 1205, 1510	<i>v.</i> Moulton	144
<i>v.</i> Tombs	37	Graeff <i>v.</i> De Turk	1234
Goodwin <i>v.</i> Coddington	29	Graff <i>v.</i> Rohrer	527
<i>v.</i> Gilbert	1346, 1403, 1518, 1519	Gragam <i>v.</i> Buchanan	1371
<i>v.</i> Goodwin	794	Graham <i>v.</i> Anderson	1482
<i>v.</i> Keney	1106	<i>v.</i> Connellsville R. Co.	55
<i>v.</i> Mass. Loan Co.	578	<i>v.</i> Graham	567, 735, 737, 738
<i>v.</i> Mass. L. & T. Co.	578	<i>v.</i> Hawkins	1398
<i>v.</i> Perkins	28	<i>v.</i> Houghtalin	1160
<i>v.</i> White	1475	<i>v.</i> Larmer	1505
Gorden, Matter of	739, 740, 988	<i>v.</i> Long	439
<i>v.</i> Gorden	700	<i>v.</i> Newman	1058
Gordon, Matter of	1580	<i>v.</i> Selbie	515
<i>v.</i> Constantine Hydraulic Co.	1490	<i>v.</i> Stern	1507, 1508, 1511
<i>v.</i> Cummings	907	<i>v.</i> Way	933
<i>v.</i> Dickison	669	G. C. & S. F. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Eddins	233
<i>v.</i> George	839	Grand R. & I. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Butler	113
<i>v.</i> Johnson	617; 1041	<i>v.</i> Heisel	232
Gore <i>v.</i> Brazier	1072, 1534	Grand Rapids St. R. Co. <i>v.</i> West Side St. R. Co.	230
<i>v.</i> Gibson	543, 544	Grand Tower, etc. <i>v.</i> Gill	963
<i>v.</i> Gore	1248	Grandona <i>v.</i> Lovdal	65
Gorges <i>v.</i> Stanfield	864	Grandville <i>v.</i> Jenison	224
Gorham <i>v.</i> Daniels	1201	Granger <i>v.</i> Crouch	1058
<i>v.</i> Eastchester Elec. Co.	1498	Granite Building Ass'n <i>v.</i> Greene	816
Goring <i>v.</i> Bickerstaffe	1261	Grannis <i>v.</i> Clark	828
Gosling <i>v.</i> Warburton	736, 739	Grant <i>v.</i> Chase	265
Goss <i>v.</i> Singleton	1369	<i>v.</i> Doane	1072, 1073
<i>v.</i> Tracy	533	<i>v.</i> Fowler	1363
Gott <i>v.</i> Cook	498, 1194, 1288, 1291	<i>v.</i> Oliver	1478
<i>v.</i> Gandy	927	<i>v.</i> Strong	1579
<i>v.</i> Powell	1424	<i>v.</i> White	946
Gotzian's Estate, <i>In re</i>	739	Grassi, <i>In re</i>	805
Gough <i>v.</i> Wood	35	Grattan <i>v.</i> Wiggins	1056
Gould Coupling Co., Matter of	1113	Gratz <i>v.</i> Gratz	991
Gould, Matter of	1561, 1580	<i>v.</i> Land & River Imp. Co.	1488
<i>v.</i> Boston Duck Co.	300	Graves <i>v.</i> Berdan	285, 855
<i>v.</i> Day	1470, 1475	<i>v.</i> Braden	1050
<i>v.</i> Eastern R. Co.	1509	<i>v.</i> Cochran	660
<i>v.</i> Glass	225	<i>v.</i> Conant	1039
<i>v.</i> Kemp	965	<i>v.</i> Deterling	1010
<i>v.</i> Lynde	1457	<i>v.</i> Graves	457, 526, 1489
<i>v.</i> Marsh	1058	<i>v.</i> Mattison	1514
<i>v.</i> Murch	572	<i>v.</i> Smith	288, 292
<i>v.</i> Newman	1057	<i>v.</i> Trueblood	642
<i>v.</i> Petit	410	<i>v.</i> Waterman	546
<i>v.</i> Thompson	933, 934		
<i>v.</i> Wagner	161, 1508, 1509		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

liii

[References are to pages.]

Graves v. Weld	768, 769	Greenwood v. Greenwood	703
Gray v. Bailey	980	v. Maddox	757
v. Bartlett	1341	v. Marvin	516, 676, 983, 984, 985
v. Barton	1457	Greenwood, etc. Ass'n v. Childs	1489
v. Deluce	1513	Greenwood Lake & Port Jarvis	
v. Gaff	849	R. Co. v. N. Y. & G. L. R. Co.	321
v. Gillespie	1055, 1063	Greer v. Blancher	954
v. Holmes	1317	v. Van Meter	274
v. Johnson	123	v. Wintersmith	1377
v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Co.	917, 919, 920	Gregg v. Bostwick	759
v. Reynolds	795	Gregor v. Cady	859
Craydon's Ex'rs v. Graydon	1013	Gregory, Matter of	1318
Greason v. Keteltas	497	Greidar's Appeal	914
Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster	459	Greiner v. Klein	662, 675
Greatrex v. Hayward	306	Gresham v. Chambers	1498
Green v. Allen	484	v. King	976
v. Armstrong	63	Greville v. Tylee	1557
v. Arnold	971, 1003	Grey v. Grey	511, 512
v. Berge	279	v. Mannock	615
v. Canaan	224, 225	Greybeal v. Powers	1502
v. Cannady	976	Gridley v. Bloomington	903, 905
v. Causey	726	Grier v. Penna. Coal Co.	1502
v. Clark	1345	Grieves v. Case	478
v. Geiger	889, 1115	Griffeth v. Beecher	1144
v. Goodall	567	Griffin, Matter of	502
v. Green	554, 1178, 1443, 1444	v. Bixby	66
v. Harvey	705	v. Diffendorfer	547
v. James	1050	v. Marine Co.	1120
v. King	977	v. Ransdell	42
v. Liler	668, 669, 1136	v. Shepard	1138, 1157, 1252
v. Pettingill	620, 1015	v. Treutlen	759
v. Putnam	973	Griffith v. Godey	539
v. Redding	133	v. Gody	544
v. Rennington	1357	Griffiths v. Griffiths	596
v. Roworth	547	v. Morrison	164, 172
v. Smith	530, 569, 570, 571	v. Vere	1286
v. Stone	1103	Grigg v. Banks	1050
Greenaway v. Adams	817, 865	v. Landis	1017
Green Bay & M. C. Co. v. Hewett		Griggs v. Smith	669
		Grigsby v. Hair	1039
Greenblatt v. Hermann	1427	Grim v. Murphy	1368
Greenby v. Wilcocks	1522	Grimball v. Patton	642
Greene v. Anglemire	1368	Grimes v. Harmon	459
v. Barnard	1038	v. Harmond	484
v. Canny	184, 245	v. Shirk	758
v. Cole	785	Grimley v. Davidson	289
v. Couse	897, 1351	Grimmer v. Friederich	1160
v. Greene	412, 457, 500, 676, 726, 996, 1226, 1284	Grimstead v. Marlowe	211, 309
v. O'Connor	1010	Grimstone v. Carter	1047, 1048
Greenfield v. Miller	1527	Grisfield v. Storr	1185, 1187
v. Mills	1496, 1529	Grissom v. Moore	676, 679, 702
Greenhaus v. Alter	1580	Griswold v. Butler	1445
Greenland v. Waddell	50, 1221, 1223, 1032, 1033	v. Johnson	970
Greenleaf v. Allen	125, 874	v. Met. Elec. R. Co.	51
v. Francis	303	v. Town of Bradford	922
v. Grounder	1423	Gritten v. Dickerson	643
v. R. Co.	994, 1002, 1005	Groce v. Ponder	679
Greenvault v. Davis	1532	Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co.	819, 872, 912
Greenwald v. Wales	563	Gross v. Lamospas	301
		Grosser v. City of Rochester	978

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Grouch v. Hazlehurst L. Co.	536	Hadley v. Taylor	905
Groustra v. Bourges	936	Hadman v. Ringwood	17
Grout v. Townsend	766, 1346	Hads v. Tierman	1517
Grove v. Jennings	1472	Haeussler v. Missouri Iron Co.	995, 1004
v. Kane	530	Haffick v. Stober	45
v. Todd	713	Haffnes v. Irwin	1516, 1563
v. Youell	827	Hafner v. Hafner	1288, 1290
Groves v. Groves	512	Hagan v. Varney	773, 776
v. Sentell	1086, 1088	Hagar v. Brainerd	873
Groynn v. Schwartz	1505	v. Walker	1125
Grubb v. Bayard	312	Hager v. Brainerd	1064
v. Burlington	777	Hagerty v. Hagerty	468
v. Grubb	307, 308	v. Lee	165, 166, 167, 273, 1403, 1463
Grumley v. Webb	558	Haggerty v. Harkenberry	1163
Grymes v. Boweren	39	Hahn v. Baker Lodge	252
Guaranty Sav. Bk. v. Bladon	1412	v. Dawson	1331
Gucker v. Met. Elec. R. Co.	51	v. Hutchinson	598, 766
Guernsey v. Guernsey	597	Hahnken Co. v. Pelletreau	1057
v. Lazear	642	Haiber v. Evans	292
v. Wilson	54, 1064	Haigh v. Kaye	527
Guess v. South Bound Ry. Co.	1470	Haight v. Littlefield	222
Guest v. Farley	461	Hailey v. Ano	1045
v. Opdyke	795	Haines v. Allen	480
Guffey v. O'Reilly	1340	v. Beach	1072
Gugel v. Isaacs	854, 921	v. Ellis	652
Guggenheimer v. Lockridge	1474	v. Thompson	1047
Guidet v. Brown	715	v. Thomson	1035
Guilleaume v. Rowe	544	Hair v. Downing	172, 174
Guild v. Allen	463, 503, 1308	Hairston v. Danville & Western Railway	1419
Guion v. Anderson	651	Halbert v. Turner	1076
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cusen- berry	1356	Haldane v. Sweet	717
Gulf, C. & S. Ry. Co. v. Settegast	1017	Haldeman v. Bruckhart	302, 303
Gulick v. Griswold	1224	Halderman v. Woodward	1049
Gumbert's Appeal	523	Hale v. Hale	1215
Gunn v. Brown	598	v. Hollon	540
v. Sinclair	929	v. Horne	525
Gunster v. Scranton I. H. & P. Co.	573	v. James	695
Gustavson v. Hamm	232	v. Lamb	447
Guthrie v. Jones	23, 38, 39	v. Morgan	1500
v. New Haven	224	v. Plummer	677
v. Russell	1529	v. Tokelove	1560
Guy v. Craighead	565	v. Woods	1465
Gwillim v. Donnellan	314	Haley v. Amestoy	1497
Gwinnell v. Eamer	905	v. Bannister	1268
Gwynn v. Thomas	1497	v. Sheridan	1325, 1448, 1450
Gwynne v. Heaton	538	Halferty v. Scearce	739
		Hall v. Armstrong	242
		v. Augsburg	197
		v. Ballentine	949
		v. Baltimore	223
		v. Bliss	551, 1235
		v. Butterfield	1444
		v. Chaffee	1252
		v. Congdon	508
		v. Dean	1528
		v. Dewey	126
		v. Dennerlein	1578
		v. Fields	757
		v. Fisher	974
H.			
Haak Lumber Co. v. Crothers	976		
Haaven v. Hoass	515		
Haberman v. Baker	1509, 1511		
Habershon v. Vardon	481		
Hackett v. Reynolds	1037		
Hackney v. Tracy	1258		
Haddock v. Osmer	534, 535		
Haddock v. Haddock	710		
Hadfield's Case	1387		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lv

[References are to pages.]

Hall v. French	762	Hamilton Trust Co. v. Clemes	1043
v. Germain	864	Hamlin v. Attorney-General	1507
v. Gould	862, 912	v. Hamlin	426, 670, 1475
v. Hall	1449	Hammann v. Jordan	289
v. Irvin, Matter of	852, 853	Hammell v. Hammell	1474
v. Kary	1439, 1474	v. Hyatt	546
v. La France F. E. Co.	1157, 1174	Hammett's Appeal	518
v. Lance	1056	Hammock v. Loan & Trust Co.	56
v. Leonard	1455, 1456	Hammond v. Hopkins	548, 549, 550
v. Linn	1542	v. Pennock	703
v. McCaughey	258	v. Schiff	291
v. McDuff	1038	v. Zehner	210
v. Meriden	224	Hampson v. Taylor	217
v. Otherson	654	Hampton v. Commonwealth	101
v. Piddock	973	v. Spencer	440
v. Priest	1170, 1256	Hamwood v. Oglander	412
v. Savage	713	Hanbury v. Fisher	452
v. Stephens	977, 979	Hancock v. Elmer	564
v. Tunnel	1052	v. McAvoy	268
v. Wadsworth	926, 928	Hand v. Marcy	1562
v. Wallace	933	Handhan v. McManus	282
v. West	933	Haney v. Marshall	1371, 1475
v. Western T. Co.	881	Hank v. McComas	993
v. Whiteall Water Power Co.	1511	Hankey v. Clark	216, 242, 243, 272
v. Young	510	Hankinson v. Riker	1576
Hallen v. Runder	13	Hanley v. Kansas & T. Coal Co.	1269
Hallenback v. Rogers	511	v. Wood	311
Hallenbeck v. Dewitt	1476	Hanna v. Palmer	1360, 1498
Halleran v. Bell	1364	Hannah v. Carver	973
Hallett's Estate, <i>In re</i>	517, 519, 520	v. Collins	1342
Hallett v. Thompson	425, 470, 766	v. Davis	1075
v. Wylie	809, 821, 855	Hannan v. Osborn	1310
Halliday v. Gass	1470	Hannem v. Pence	904
v. Manton	974	Hanneman v. Richter	994, 1004
Halligan v. Wade	853	Hannen v. Ewalt	138
Hallock v. Smith	1039	v. Hillyer	487
Halm v. Bealor	710	Hanning v. Mueller	439
Halpin v. Phoenix Ins. Co.	1100	Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron Co.	268
Halsey v. Brown	951	Hanrahan v. O'Reilly	38, 40
v. Convention of Prot. Epis. Church	475, 479, 490	Hanrick v. Patrick	1350
v. Rapid Transit R. Co.	230	Hansen v. Meyer	837
Halsted v. Halsted	998	Hanson v. Township of Red Rock	1504
Ham v. Van Orden	446	Haog v. Delorme	197
Hambro v. Hambro	882	Hapgood v. Brown	305
Hamden v. Rice	480	Harbeck, Matter of	1235
Hamero v. Hamero	125	Harber v. Evans	289, 293
Hameston v. Stead	917, 933	Hard v. Ashley	1557
Hamet v. Dundass	538	Hardaker v. Moorhouse	1243
Hamilton, <i>In re</i>	452	Hardaway v. Jones	1489
v. Brown	1325, 1326, 1327	Hardee v. Weathington	962
v. Chicago, B. & C. R. Co.	224	Hardenberg v. Hardenberg	955, 976, 977
v. Cutts	1534	Hardenburgh v. Lakin	714
v. Dennison	268	Harder, Matter of	1302
v. Graybill	853	Hardin v. Jordan	1512
v. Mohun	700	v. Shedd	239, 297
v. Nutt	1491	Harding v. Crethorn	918
v. Smith	1044	v. Glyn	454
v. State	1464	Hardison v. Lewis	919
v. White	205, 249		
v. Wright	827, 1375, 1376, 1377		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Hardisty v. Richardson	55	Harris v. Saunders	1470
Hardy v. Dyas	539	v. Scovel	17
v. Nelson	852, 1533	v. Shirley's Ex'rs	1475
Hare v. Celey Cro. Eliz.	795	v. Taylor	1081
v. Horton	19, 28	v. Thomas	787
Harford v. Taylor	826, 847	Harrisburg Bk. v. Tyler	518
Hargrave v. Cook	248	Harrisburg Electric Light Co. v.	
v. Reed	1546	Goodman	16, 53
Hargreaves, <i>In re</i>	1262, 1264	Harrison v. Boyd	659, 671
Harker v. Reilly	523	v. Brophy	479, 484
Harkness v. Burton	325	v. Fite	1510, 1511
v. Devine	1498	v. Foreman	1163
v. Sears	41, 45	v. Glucose Co.	541
Harlan v. Langham	1005	v. Guest	538
v. Logansport Co.	158	v. Harrison	453, 473
Harland v. Binks	449	v. Manson	550
v. Trigg	455	v. Platt	1363
Harlow v. Coffin	295	v. Ray	955, 975
v. Lake Superior Co.	781	v. Ricks	124
v. Stinson	295	v. Simons	1456
Harman v. Oberdorfer	1497	v. Trustees of Phillips Acad-	
Harmann v. Jordan	293	emy	1077, 1474
Harmon, Matter of	1571	Harrison County v. Seal	225
v. Brown	1021	Harrison's Executors v. Payne	694
v. Smith	1242	Harrison v. Middleton	932
Harmony v. Berger	12, 1051	Harrod v. Myers	1443
v. Bingham	1014	Harrold v. Lane	508
Harnett v. Maitland	778, 935, 942	Harsha v. Reid	1540, 1541
Harp v. Parr	547	Hart v. Chase	641, 649, 1071
Harper v. Archer	518, 701	v. Cole	861, 906
v. Clayton	664	v. Connor	181
v. Ely	572, 1065	v. Farmer's Bk.	573
v. Perry	1458	v. Hart	828
v. Phelps	455, 457	v. Lindsey	1453, 1464
Harrell v. Butler	1498	v. Lyon	1542
Harrer v. Wallner	662, 955, 979,	v. Sampson	110, 994
	980	v. Sansom	459
Harriman v. Harriman	1174	v. Seymour	421
Harrington v. Douglas	858	v. Windsor	821, 857
v. Erie Co. Savings Bk.	549	Hartigan v. Smith	1081
v. Fish	1478	Hartley v. Lord	1548
v. Fortner	1043	Hartopp v. Hartopp	556
v. Murphy	661	Hartshorn v. Chaddock	299
Harriot v. Harriot	618, 1517	v. Cleveland	1529
Harris v. Arnold	574	Hartung v. Witte	1513
v. Barnes	1248	Harty v. Doyle	12
v. Boardman	859	Harvey v. Brydges	950
v. Carson	769	v. Brisbin	653, 654, 655
v. Cohen	905	v. Byrnes	1514
v. De Pinna	274, 277	v. Gunzberg	923
v. Dougherty	515	v. Harvey	776, 778
v. Elliott	164, 272	v. Hobray	1107
v. Frink	62, 769, 931, 933, 935,	v. Merrill	541
	941, 1369	v. Mount	557
v. Gillingham	55	v. Varney	565
v. Hiscock	915, 1389	v. Walters	306
v. Hooper	1123	Harwood v. Benton	174
v. Howard	962, 1361	v. Goodright	1561
v. Mackintosh	269	v. Tompkins	278
v. McGovern	1370, 1371	Hasbrouck v. Bunce	1377
v. Oakley	1342	v. New Paltz, etc. Traction	
v. Ryding	284, 285	Co.	838, 1540, 1541

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lvii

[References are to pages.]

Hascall <i>v.</i> King	497, 498, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291	Hay <i>v.</i> Cohoes Co.	239, 279
Haskell <i>v.</i> Putnam	896	<i>v.</i> Earl of Coventry	1183
Haskins <i>v.</i> Hawkes	1055	<i>v.</i> Knauth	162
<i>v.</i> Kendall	523	Hayden <i>v.</i> Conn. Hospital	488, 490
Haslem <i>v.</i> Lockwood	67	<i>v.</i> Dutcher	274, 275, 276
Haslett <i>v.</i> Shepard	251	<i>v.</i> Easter	1472
Hassam <i>v.</i> Barrett	1048	<i>v.</i> Huff	1570
<i>v.</i> Hazen	1238	<i>v.</i> Peirce	652, 1490
Hastings <i>v.</i> Clifford	745	<i>v.</i> Stone	222, 224
<i>v.</i> Livermore	268	<i>v.</i> Stoughton	524, 1563
Hatch, <i>In re</i>	741	Haydock <i>v.</i> Haydock	547
<i>v.</i> Hatch	555, 1472	Hayes <i>v.</i> Foorde	1177
<i>v.</i> McCloud River Lumber Co.	857	<i>v.</i> Kershow	446, 448, 1393
<i>v.</i> Palmer	681	<i>v.</i> Kingdome	522, 526
Hatchett <i>v.</i> Hatchett	812, 1234	<i>v.</i> Parker	1443
Hatfield <i>v.</i> Sneden	587, 599, 604, 621, 622, 623, 646, 647, 655, 753, 1009, 1021, 1023, 1025, 1027, 1151, 1168, 1201, 1203, 1248, 1446, 1447	<i>v.</i> People	666
Hathaway <i>v.</i> Evans	1515	<i>v.</i> Pratt	480, 485
<i>v.</i> National Bk.	518	<i>v.</i> Ward	1085
<i>v.</i> Hathaway	745	Hayes Adm. <i>v.</i> Miller	933
<i>v.</i> Payne	1471	Hayford <i>v.</i> Spokesfield	257
Haug <i>v.</i> Schumacher	1162, 1276, 1277, 1283, 1284	Hayne <i>v.</i> Cummings	821
Haugh <i>v.</i> Peirce	691	<i>v.</i> Maltby	1387
Haughwout <i>v.</i> Murphy	572, 579	Hayner <i>v.</i> Smith	848
Hauptmann <i>v.</i> Hauptmann	676	Haynes <i>v.</i> Aldrich	881, 924, 929, 945, 946
Hauselt <i>v.</i> Patterson	1102	<i>v.</i> Bourn	591, 642, 666
Hauxhurst <i>v.</i> Lobree	910, 940	<i>v.</i> King	275
Haven <i>v.</i> Emery	56	<i>v.</i> Powers	690
Havens <i>v.</i> Seashore L. Co.	1402	<i>v.</i> Sherman	1263, 1269, 1270, 1280
<i>v.</i> Van Den Burgh	1559	Hays <i>v.</i> Doane	29
<i>v.</i> West Side Elec. L. Co.	53	<i>v.</i> McNealy	1427, 1428
Haverstick's Appeal	1174, 1189	<i>v.</i> Quay	442
Havey <i>v.</i> Germania Fire Ins. Co.	20	Hayward <i>v.</i> Kinney	625, 633
<i>v.</i> Gr. Junction R. R.	1055	<i>v.</i> Miller	188
<i>v.</i> Kelleher	996	Haywood <i>v.</i> Logan	858
<i>v.</i> Mehlgarten	972	Hazard <i>v.</i> Birdsall	997
Hawes <i>v.</i> Hawes	954	<i>v.</i> Robinson	195, 259
<i>v.</i> Shaw	895, 898	Hazen <i>v.</i> Thurber	689
<i>v.</i> Williams	1035	Hazle <i>v.</i> Bondy	1061
Hawkes <i>v.</i> Pike	1474	Hazleton <i>v.</i> Putnam	323, 330
Hawkins <i>v.</i> Chapman	595	Hazlett <i>v.</i> Powell	858
<i>v.</i> Files	1575	Head <i>v.</i> Phillips	1004
<i>v.</i> Hersey	34	Heald <i>v.</i> Builder's Ins. Co.	781
<i>v.</i> Kemp	1224	Healey <i>v.</i> Babbitt	273
<i>v.</i> Skegg	769	Heaps <i>v.</i> Dunham	544
Hawley <i>v.</i> Bradford	662, 718	Heard <i>v.</i> Read	1227, 1242
<i>v.</i> Clowes	780	Heartt <i>v.</i> Kruger	262, 291, 294
<i>v.</i> Diller	1412, 1413	Heath <i>v.</i> Barmore	597, 666
<i>v.</i> Inhabitants of Northampton	613, 1567	<i>v.</i> Chealock	1530
<i>v.</i> James	137, 426, 495, 497, 670, 672, 676, 703, 1269, 1272, 1278, 1279, 1281	<i>v.</i> Heath	84
<i>v.</i> Wolverton	781	<i>v.</i> Hewitt	1388, 1389, 1402, 1455
Hawkins <i>v.</i> Shippam	1466	<i>v.</i> Page	565
Hay, <i>In re</i>	1526, 1557	<i>v.</i> White	648
		Heaton <i>v.</i> Horr	1456, 1877
		Heavenridge <i>v.</i> Nelson	742
		Hebbard <i>v.</i> Haughian	1345, 1458
		Heckman's Est.	810
		Hedderich <i>v.</i> Smith	44
		Hedges <i>v.</i> Dixon Co.	425
		<i>v.</i> West Shore R. Co.	240, 296

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Heeney v. St. Peter's Church	69	Henry v. Root	1444, 1445
Heermans v. Burt	495, 497	Henry Pigot's Case	1444, 1445
v. Robertson	494, 495	Henschel v. Mamero	532
Heffner v. Lewis	39	Hensey v. Hensey	759
Hegan v. Pendennis Club	1398	Henshaw v. Clark	315
Hegeman v. Stern's Realty Co.	1425, 1426	Henson v. Moore	758
Hegnoy v. Head	547	Hentig v. Pipher	895
Heidenheimer v. Bauman	491, 523	Hentzel v. Barber	898, 901, 1492, 1493
Heilman v. Kroh	1483	v. Lincoln	978
Heimberger v. Boyd	651, 1073	Herbert v. Wren	684, 694, 739, 741
Heirkamp v. La Motte Granite Co.	27	Herbst v. Merrifield	1362
Heischler v. McKendrick	318	Hercules Powder Co. v. Knoxville R. Co.	1577
Heise v. Heise	1557	Herd v. Catron	1013
Heisen v. Heisen	663, 687	Herhold v. Chicago	223
Heiskell v. Trout	519, 521, 523	Herman v. Roberts	248, 249
Heister v. Green	1038	Herr v. Payson	553
Heith v. Horner	1039	Herrell v. Sizeland	924, 932, 937
Heitzfeld v. Bailey	578	Herrick v. Graves	759
Helbrey v. Schumann	544	v. Hopkins	1512
Helck v. Reinheimer	1152	v. Malin	1440
Held v. New York	1577	v. Marshall	161
Heller v. Cohen	1364, 1373, 1529	v. Teachout	1042
Helme v. Guy	1498	Herring v. Richards	1464, 1474
Helps v. Hereford	1343	Herriott v. Prime	1222
Hemenway, <i>Ex parte</i>	45	Hersberg v. Metzgar	61, 62
Hemingway v. Coleman	538	Herse v. Questa	1512
Hemphill v. Boston	227	Hersee v. Simpson	1160
v. Giles	927	Hersey v. Chapin	845, 934
Henck v. Barnes	838	Hershey v. Meeker County Bank	1244
Henderson v. Carbondale C. & C. Co.	819	Hertell v. Bogert	1059
v. Central Park R. Co.	257	Herter v. Mullen	925, 949
v. Connelly	1577	Hervey v. Hervey	735
v. Davenport	1236	Herzig v. Blumenkrohn	867
v. Eason	961	Herzog v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.	1229
v. Henderson	497, 1268	Hesnard v. Plunkett	755
v. Hunter	621, 1022, 1151	Hesperia Land & Water Co. v. Rogers	197
v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co.	231, 235	Hessel v. Johnson	915, 916
v. Ownby	54	Hester v. Hunnicutt	1533
Hendricks v. Isaacs	715	Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. R. Co. v. Phila.	258
v. Rasson	1475	Hetfield v. Cent. R. Co.	327
v. Robinson	562	v. Lawton	770, 927, 928, 929, 935
v. Stark	294, 1529	Heth v. Cocke	680, 1051
v. State	797	Hethrington v. Graham	704
Hennessey v. Old Colony R. Co.	1344, 1345	Hetzel v. Barber	1227, 1241, 1245
v. Patterson	751, 753, 757, 772, 789, 790, 1151, 1153, 1157, 1172, 1189, 1190	Hewett v. Hewett	1232
Hennessey v. Murdock	258, 1508	Hewitt v. Crane	557
Henniges v. Johnson	1454	v. Gen. Electric Co.	39
Henning v. Burnet	163	Hewline v. Shippam	329, 625, 633, 996
v. Warner	897	Hewlins v. Shippam	1461
Henricus v. Englert	1466	Hext v. Gill	787
Henry v. Allen	573	Hey v. Coleman	210
v. Brown	776	v. McGarth	922
v. Fine	1446	Heyn v. New York L. Ins. Co.	72, 1437
v. Huff	1362		
v. Koch	172, 291		
v. Raiman	554		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lix

[References are to pages.]

Hibberd v. Smith	1438	Hillary v. Gay	950
Hibbert v. Trask	1474	v. Waller	254, 258, 462
Hibblewhite v. McMorine	1558	Hillen v. Iselin	500, 1227, 1228,
Hickey v. Lake Shore & M. R. Co.	1438	1230, 1233, 1236, 1272, 1280	
v. Morrell	534, 535, 1543	Hiller v. Jones	565
Hickley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co.	1403	Hilliard v. Gal. Coal Co.	275
Hickman v. Link	1366	v. Scoville	996
Hickox v. Chicago & C. S. Ry. Co.	257	Hills v. Eliot	1049
Hicks, Matter of	519	v. Simonds	1284
v. Cochran	977	Hilsenbeck v. Guthring	861, 906
v. Gildersleeve	1321	Hilton v. Bender	1432
v. Silliman	269	v. Hilton	1320
v. Stebbins	670	v. Milburn's Ex'rs	1189
v. Swift Creek Mill Co.	328	Himmelmann v. Fitzpatrick	1105
Hidden v. Jordan	508	Hinchliffe v. Shea	703, 712
Hide v. Whistler	1499	Hinchman v. Stiles	694, 718
Hieatt v. Morris	291	Hinckel v. Stevens	309
Hier v. Mill Haven Co.	325	Hinckley v. Fields B. & C. Co.	1577
Higbie v. Westlake	694	Hindley v. Manhattan R. Co.	203
Higby v. Rice	960, 961	Hinds v. Allen	1538
Higginbotham v. Cornwell	745	v. Ballou	679, 681, 1070
Higgins, Matter of	1551	Hindson v. Ashby	1329, 1330
v. Downs	1171	v. Weatherill	553
v. Eagleton	571	Hines v. Hamburger	182
v. Flemington W. Co.	300	v. Trantham	964
v. Kingsley	1342	Hinkle v. Landis	566
v. Kusterer	58	Hinkson v. Lees	1163, 1164
v. McConnell	664	Hinsdale v. Humphrey	1403, 1518, 1519
v. Ormsby	661	v. Thornton	1467
v. Reynolds	272	Hirsh v. Auer	436, 468
Highberger v. Stiffler	544	Hiss v. Hiss	440
Higinbotham v. Stoddard	1375, 1504	Hitchcock v. Harrington	681, 690
Higman v. Humes	1347	v. Libby	1515
v. Stewart	1474	Hitner's Appeal	736
Higuera v. U. S.	1512	Hitner v. Ege	775
Hilbourn v. Fogg	894	Hitz v. National Met. Bk.	650
Hildebrand v. Fogle	1514	Hoag v. Hoag	465, 901
v. Willig	1468, 1470	v. Place	159
Hildreth v. Thompson	663, 700	Hobart v. Hobart	1000, 1551
Hiles v. Fisher	955, 978, 979, 1447	Hobbs v. King	1538
Hill v. Bartholomew	1475	Hoblyn v. Hoblyn	556
v. Bishop of Exeter	561	Hoboken v. Pa. R. Co.	296
v. Bishop of London	522, 525	Hoboken Land Co. v. Hoboken	224, 225
v. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co.	232	Hoboken Land Imp. Co. v. Kerrigan	1507
v. Cornwall	676	Hobson v. Gorringer	15, 19, 35, 36
v. De Rochemont	66	v. Phila.	1507
v. Epley	1341	v. Roles	1057
v. Gray	535	Hockenbury v. Carlisle	554
v. Hayes	905	Hockman v. Hockman	1570
v. Hill	70, 322, 323, 327, 433	Hodge v. Amerman	574
v. Lord	452, 454, 551, 1259	v. Sloan	188
v. Mundy	151, 166, 211, 221, 308, 309	Hodgens v. Powell	1498
v. Nye	24	Hodges v. Colcord	1409
v. Ressegieu	1318	v. S. R. Co.	232
v. Sewald	1535	v. Verner	508
v. Wentworth	18	v. Winston	758
	22, 23	Hodgkins v. Farrington	202, 287, 292, 321, 330
		Hodgkinson v. Enner	305
		v. Fletcher	1365

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Hodgson v. Farrell	538	Holman v. Loynes	553
Hodson v. Coppard	882	v. Wesner	617
Hoeffler v. Clogan	478, 484	Holmes, Matter of	1421, 1571
Hoepfner v. Sevestre	1372	v. Bellingham	1509
Hoeyler v. Flemming	129, 848	v. Best	961
Hoey v. Jarman	1441	v. Buckner	1492
Höff v. Tobey	1512	v. Danforth	1527
Hoffar v. Dement	967, 968	v. Gilman	4, 517, 520
Hofferberth v. Meyers	904, 905	v. Goring	178, 180
Hoffman v. Armstrong	65, 199	v. Loynes	543
v. Carrow	519	v. Mead	491, 499, 500
v. Delihanty	881	v. Penney	563
v. Hoffman	901	v. Railroad	1337
v. Kuhn	263, 288, 294	v. Seashore Electric Ry. Co.	1112
v. Savage	262	v. Seely	180, 181
v. Stigers	955, 976	v. Seli	984
Hogan v. Barry	161, 273	v. Seller	160, 166
v. Cent. Pac. R. Co.	232	v. Tremper	39, 40
v. Curtin	1023	v. Trout	1514
v. Grosvenor	1551	Holt v. Fleischman	190
v. Kavanogh	463	v. Murphy	1411
Hogdon v. Shannon	989	v. Wilson	976
Hoge v. Hoge	536	Holt Mfg. Co. v. Thornton	796
Hoghton v. Hoghton	542, 547	Holt's Will	1552
Hogsett v. Ellis	941, 942, 1069	Holtzman v. Douglas	1366
Hoitt v. Hoitt	1555	Holyoke v. Jackson	982
Holbrook v. Chamberlin	1463	Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sherman	846, 849
v. Young	847	Home Mut. L. Ins. Co. v.	
Holcomb v. Coryell	971	Marshall	472
Holden v. Chandler	1512	Hone v. Van Schaick	745
v. Garrett	1575	Honywood v. Honywood	767, 782
v. Wells	642	Hood v. Oglander	455, 456, 457
Holdfast v. Dowsing	1553	Hood-Barrs v. Heriot	472
v. Marten	593	Hoogland v. Watt	711
Holdom v. Ancient Order of U.		Hooker v. Cummings	308, 1018
W.	537	v. Hooker	645, 1187
Holford v. Hatch	869, 870, 874	v. Utica, etc. Turnpike Co.	912, 1145
Holland v. Alcock	475, 478, 479, 483, 484, 498, 499, 500, 1231	Hoole v. Atty.-Gen.	225
v. Brown	574, 1364	Hooper v. Felgner	462
v. Keyes	591	v. Scheimer	1412
v. Long	208	Hoopes v. Bailey	1036
v. Peck	484	Hoosier Stone Co. v. Malatt	215, 242, 271
Hollenback v. Rogers	513	Hooven, etc. Co. v. Featherstone	1577
Hollenbeck v. McDonald	265	Hope v. Blair	1575
Holley v. Glover	675	v. Brewer	483, 1285
Holliday v. Marshall	870	v. Hope	652, 654
v. Overton	430	Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Sav.	
Hollingsworth v. Flint	713	Bk.	16
Hollis v. Burns	923, 926, 929, 946	Hopkins v. Grimshaw	428, 429, 477, 482, 487, 490, 492, 525, 595, 1266, 1273, 1281
v. Drew Theological Seminary	483	v. Hopkins	423, 424, 829, 998
v. Pool	911, 938, 943	v. Kent	461, 462, 465, 494
Hollmann v. Platteville	70	v. Paxton	1504
Holloway v. Headington	448	v. Randolph	564
v. Hill	838	Hoppe v. Fountain	757, 758
v. Holloway	1004	Hopson v. Fowlkes	979
Holly v. Gibbons	1231		
v. Hirsch	495		
Holman v. Creagmiles	1528		
v. Holman	1345		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxi

[References are to pages.]

Hopper <i>v.</i> Barnes	216	Howard <i>v.</i> Haley	1088
<i>v.</i> Hopper	550	<i>v.</i> Howard	450, 538
Hoppes <i>v.</i> Cheek	846	<i>v.</i> Hunter	1556
Horan <i>v.</i> Thomas	818	<i>v.</i> Merriam	927
Horgan <i>v.</i> Bickerton	993	<i>v.</i> Moffatt	750
Horn <i>v.</i> Baker	23, 47	<i>v.</i> Reedy	1367
<i>v.</i> Horn	1361	<i>v.</i> Robbins	1085
<i>v.</i> Indianapolis Nat. Bk.	1066	<i>v.</i> State	217
<i>v.</i> Miller	1540, 1542	Howard Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Halsey	575, 1091
Hornbeck <i>v.</i> Westbrook	166	Howe <i>v.</i> Bachelder	61, 62, 63
Hornbeck's Ex'r <i>v.</i> American Bible Soc.	498	<i>v.</i> Bell	1502
Horndorf <i>v.</i> Horndorf	1282	<i>v.</i> Hodge	1054
Horne <i>v.</i> Ingraham	437	<i>v.</i> Howe	544, 1445
<i>v.</i> Smith	1407, 1503, 1505	<i>v.</i> Stevens	69
Horner <i>v.</i> Dellinger	139	<i>v.</i> West End St. R. Co.	230
<i>v.</i> Ellis	961	Howe's Ex'rs <i>v.</i> Van Schaick	1279
<i>v.</i> Leeds	809, 911	Howell <i>v.</i> Estes	172, 264
<i>v.</i> Stillwell	199, 258, 261	<i>v.</i> Jones	757, 758
Horsey <i>v.</i> Hough	538	<i>v.</i> King	184, 245
Horsley <i>v.</i> Rush	810	<i>v.</i> Leavitt	209, 1372
Horstmann <i>v.</i> Flege	739, 740, 741	<i>v.</i> Newman	700
Horton <i>v.</i> Bauer	1531, 1533	<i>v.</i> Schenk	61, 769, 865
<i>v.</i> Murden	1459	<i>v.</i> Western R. Co.	1079
<i>v.</i> N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.	911	Howells <i>v.</i> Hettrick	1048, 1090
<i>v.</i> Sledge	666	<i>v.</i> McGraw	727
Horwitz <i>v.</i> Norris	1227, 1228	Howgate, <i>In re</i>	1438
Hosford <i>v.</i> Ballard	127, 394	Howie <i>v.</i> Kasnowitz	1458, 1467
Hostetter <i>v.</i> Los Angeles Ter. R. Co.	1504	Howland <i>v.</i> Blake	510
Hotchkiss <i>v.</i> Third Nat. Bk. of Malone	534	<i>v.</i> Coffin	124, 880
Hotchkys, <i>In re</i>	775, 778	Howse <i>v.</i> Chapman	480
Hotel Co. <i>v.</i> Marsh	765	Howton <i>v.</i> Freason	177
Hothorn <i>v.</i> Louis	1079	Howze <i>v.</i> Dew	1051
Hotz's Estate	1013	Hoxie <i>v.</i> Carr	510
Houghton <i>v.</i> Chicago R. Co.	59	Hoxsie <i>v.</i> Ellis	664, 997
<i>v.</i> Mendenhall	291	Hoyle <i>v.</i> N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.	204
<i>v.</i> Pierce	1369	<i>v.</i> Plattsburgh & M. R. Co.	21, 22, 57
<i>v.</i> Richardson	535	Hoyt <i>v.</i> Hoyt	1055, 1224
Houlton <i>v.</i> Dunn	541	<i>v.</i> Ketcham	1018
Houpes <i>v.</i> Alderson	247	<i>v.</i> Kimball	1010, 1015
Hourmelin <i>v.</i> Sheldon	414	<i>v.</i> Latham	549
House <i>v.</i> Carr	1120	<i>v.</i> McLagan	1472
<i>v.</i> Fowle	715, 736	<i>v.</i> Swift	1099
<i>v.</i> House	29, 30	Hrouska <i>v.</i> Janke	1455
<i>v.</i> Jackson	679, 683, 702, 717, 1157, 1181, 1190, 1252	Hubbard <i>v.</i> Barry	1362
<i>v.</i> Lockwood	694, 1116	<i>v.</i> Gilbert	515
<i>v.</i> McCormick	1344, 1348, 1350	<i>v.</i> Goodwin	512
<i>v.</i> Metcalf	903, 905	<i>v.</i> Greeley	1470
Houseman <i>v.</i> Grossman	565	<i>v.</i> Housley	1217
Houston <i>v.</i> Laffee	323	<i>v.</i> Hubbard	1016
<i>v.</i> Randolph	1481	<i>v.</i> Norton	1343, 1524, 1530
<i>v.</i> Thornton	534	<i>v.</i> Shaw	864, 927
Hout <i>v.</i> Hout	1478	<i>v.</i> Town	276
Hovey <i>v.</i> Blanchard	573	Hubbell <i>v.</i> Hendrickson	1038, 1039, 1040
<i>v.</i> Hobson	1445, 1446	<i>v.</i> Moulson	1049, 1064
How <i>v.</i> Weldon	539	<i>v.</i> Warren	188
Howard <i>v.</i> Amer. Peace Soc.	490	Hubble <i>v.</i> Cole	781
<i>v.</i> Edgell	538	Huber <i>v.</i> Ryan	849
<i>v.</i> Fanshawe	819	Hubschman <i>v.</i> McHenry	54
		Huck <i>v.</i> Flentye	291, 293, 294
		Huckins <i>v.</i> Straw	1050

[References are to pages.]

Huddersfield Banking Co. v.		Hunt v. Moore	512
Lister	31	v. Raplee	1523
Hudson v. Steere	1528	v. Reilly	721
v. White	795	v. Rousmanier	322, 656, 817, 1078
v. Wright	511	v. Suayze	1091
Hudson R. Tel. Co. v. Watervliet		Hunter, Matter of	224, 478
Turn. & R. Co.	230	v. Anderson	1223
Huff v. McAuley	158	v. Dennis	1073, 1505
v. McCauley	151, 307, 324, 802	v. Hume	1514
v. McDonald	961, 962, 989	v. Hunter	136, 137, 1471
Huffman v. Hall	223	v. Law	758
Huggins v. Ketchum	1575	v. Osterhautd	1016
v. Yates	522	v. Truckee Lodge	1578
Hughes v. Allen	676	v. Whitworth	649
v. Edwards	1014	Hunter's Appeal	751
v. Harlan	1021, 1076	Huntington v. Asher	58, 151, 163, 248, 249, 308
v. Mackin	1231	v. Huntington	678
v. Tabb	580	v. Parkhurst	925, 933, 937
v. White	510, 518	v. Whaley	1368
v. Williamson's Lessee	1486	Huntley v. Huntley	446
Hughes Lumber Co. v. Valentine	1515	v. Kingman	564
Hugnly Mfg. Co. v. Galetton Mills	1065	Huntress v. Portwood	1498
Huguenin v. Baseley	554, 557	Hurd v. Curtis	1541
v. Beasley	536	v. Cushing	765
Hulbert v. Clark	1048	Hurdman v. Nor. East R. Co.	302
Hulick v. Scovil	1474	Husband v. Aldrich	973, 990
Hull v. Cronk	1107	Huse v. Den	70
v. Glover	1475	Huson v. Young	247
v. Hull	1288	Huss v. Stephens	1455, 1456, 1457
v. Lund	1500	Hussey v. Castle	567
v. McCall	1073	v. Hufferman	53
v. Woods	1362	v. Ryan	903
Hulley v. Security Trust Co.	276	Hussman v. Durham	1410, 1412
Hulme v. Tenant	472	Huston v. Steele	653
Hulse v. Bacon	714, 753	Hutchings v. Huggins	759
Humbertson v. Humbertson	432	Hutchins v. Carleton	1455, 1459
Humble v. Curtis	1060	v. Heywood	411
Hume v. Randall	1214	v. King	63, 1029
v. United States	538	v. Lee	436
Humes v. Bernstein	1377	v. Van Vechten	436, 438, 439
v. Gardner	850	Hutchinson & Tenant, <i>In re</i>	452
Hummelman v. Mounts	1459	v. Alberding	671
Humphrey v. Phinney	695, 697	v. Copestake	266
Humphreys v. Blaisingame	261	v. Cummings	859
v. Eastlock	1508	v. Hutchinson	527
v. McKissock	1498, 1499	Hutchinson Investment Co. v.	
Humphries v. Brogden	279, 283, 284, 285	Caldwell	1297, 1316
Hunford v. Thayer	238	Huttemeier v. Albro	160, 171, 265
Hungerford v. Wagoner	929	Hutto v. Tindall	225
Hunkins v. Hunkins	703	Hutton v. Benkard	1239
Hunnicut v. Peyton	1362	Huyek v. Andrews	152, 1525, 1527, 1530
Hunt v. Bailey	947	Hyatt v. Griffiths	946
v. Bay State Iron Co.	31, 34, 56	v. Pugsley	1303
v. Blackburn	976	v. Wood	944
v. Gray	1439	Hyer v. Little	543
v. Hall	786	Hyman v. Boston C. M.	1532
v. Johnson	753	v. Hauff	675
v. Kingston	1312, 1315	Hyndman v. Hyndman	552, 654
v. Matthews	566		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxiii

[References are to pages.]

I.			
		Irving v. Campbell	1488
		Irving v. DeKay	497
Ibbetson, <i>In re</i>	1556	Irvings v. Thomas	535
Ibbs v. Richardson	942	Irwin v. Brown	974, 990
Ide v. Ide	1256	v. Dixon	218
Idle v. Cooke	604, 861	Iseham v. Morrice	1385
Ilchester, <i>Ex parte</i>	1554	Iselin v. Starin	214, 1342
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois	59, 147, 240, 297, 298	Iseman v. Mayers	499
v. Miller	302	Isenhardt v. Brown	745
Illinois Starch Co. v. Ottawa Hy-		Isett v. Lucas	636, 1058
draulic Co.	1117	Isham v. Bennington Iron Co.	1488
Illinois Steel Co. v. Budsisz	1366	Issitt v. Dewey	1474
Imhoff v. Witmer	1445	Ithaca Church v. Bigelow	68
Imlay v. Union B. R. Co.	232	Ive v. Sams	917
Inchiquin v. French	441	Iverson v. Swan	1342
Inclendon v. Northcote	740	Ives v. Ashley	548, 549
Ind. School Dist. of West Point		v. Williams	947
v. Werner	1570	Ivory v. Burns	439, 441
Indian Head Bank v. Clark	573	v. Klein	773
Indiana, etc. R. Co. v. Swannell	580	Izod v. Izod	467
		Izon v. Gorton	927
Indianapolis Abattoir Co. v.			
Temperly	860	J.	
Ingalls v. Hobbs	861	Jackman v. Arlington Mills	299
v. Morgan	1086	Jackson v. Aldrich	936
v. Newhall	962, 963	v. Allen	912, 1016
v. Plamondon	170, 172, 291	v. Alsop	1297, 1321, 1563
Ingersoll, Matter of	452, 453, 500	v. Andrew	784
v. Sergeant	123, 130, 134, 388	v. Babcock	323
Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor	485, 492	v. Bard	1345
Ingraham v. Baldwin	895, 897, 936	v. Blodgett	1058
Ingram v. Fraley	456	v. Bodle	809
v. Little	1438	v. Bryan	937, 1349
Ingwersen v. Rankin	905	v. Brownson	767, 782
Inhabitants, etc. v. County		v. Buel	883
Comm'rs	228	v. Bull	594
Inhab. of Palmyra v. Pa. R. Co.	146	v. Burgott	1580
Inhabitants of Phillipsburgh v.		v. Cadwell	561, 1393, 1399, 1424
Bruch's Exec'rs	1546	v. Cary	461
Inhab. of Sudbury v. Jones	53	v. Catlin	1471
Inlow v. Christy	548	v. Collins	126
Innan v. Morris	881	v. Cory	1454
Insurance Co. v. Haven	794	v. Croy	1475, 1476
International Trust Co. v.		v. Crysler	1016
Weekes	911, 912, 920	v. Davis	897
Inter-State Bldg. Ass'n v. Ayers	1577	v. Delacroix	809
Investment Co. v. O. & N. R.		v. Dillon	1399
Co.	164	v. Douglass	1417
Iowa L. & T. Co. v. King	702, 1124	v. Dubois	1090
Ireland v. Gerahty	485	v. Dunsbagh	1384, 1393, 1395, 1396, 1466
v. Nichols	816	v. Edwards	661, 662, 675, 1215, 1218
Irey v. Markey	1360, 1361	v. Farmer	951
Iron S. M. Co. v. Chusman	316	v. Feller	512
Ironmongers' Co. v. Atty.-Gen.	490	v. Gardner	913
Irvine v. Irvine	1348, 1349, 1443	v. Garnsey	561
v. Sullivan	523, 525	v. Gilchrist	1388
v. Tarbat	1413	v. Green	1448
v. Wood	905	v. Gumaer	1378

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Jackson v. Harrison	818, 867	Jackson v. Waltermire	669
<i>v. Harsen</i>	901, 1368	<i>v. Wells</i>	593
<i>v. Hart</i>	1413	<i>v. Widger</i>	1502
<i>v. Hartwell</i>	414	<i>v. Wilcox</i>	1412
<i>v. Hathaway</i>	164, 243	<i>v. Willard</i>	678, 1071
<i>v. Hayner</i>	1476	<i>v. Wilsey</i>	922
<i>v. Holloway</i>	1545	<i>v. Woodruff</i>	1360
<i>v. Huntington</i>	900	<i>v. Wright</i>	1346
<i>v. Hurlock</i>	1560	Jackson Lumber Co. v. McCreary	1366
<i>v. Jackson</i>	650, 653, 655, 1464, 1550	Jackson & S. Co. v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co.	324
<i>v. Jacoby</i>	1440	Jackson Co. v. Phila. W. & R. Co.	158
<i>v. Johnson</i>	637, 640, 651	Jackson d. Gratz v. Catlin	417
<i>v. Kingsley</i>	933	<i>Nicholl v. Brown</i>	1182, 1183
<i>v. Kisselbrack</i>	812	<i>Van Buren v. Meyers</i>	565
<i>v. Kniffen</i>	1174	<i>Varick v. Waldron</i>	1252
<i>v. Lawton</i>	1413	Jackson ex dem. Trowbridge v. Dunsbagh	1203
<i>v. Leonard</i>	1365	Jackson ex dem. Wadsworth v. Wendell	1466
<i>v. Littell</i>	1351	Jackson's Will, In re	1224
<i>v. Livingston</i>	970	Jacksonville Bank v. Beesley	507, 510
<i>v. Lunn</i>	1325, 1414	Jacksonville, etc. Co. v. Hooper	1466
<i>v. Lynch</i>	1076	Jacobs, Matter of v. Ludemann	561
<i>v. Mancius</i>	765, 766	<i>v. Mickle</i>	1124
<i>v. Marsh</i>	1538	<i>v. Morrison</i>	563, 575, 621
<i>v. Matsdorf</i>	513	Jacobson, Matter of	1550
<i>v. McClellan</i>	126	Jacoby's Estate	1550
<i>v. McConnell</i>	1505	<i>Jaffe v. Harteau</i>	857
<i>v. McKenny</i>	810	Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co. v. Chandler	166, 216, 257
<i>v. McLeod</i>	943	James, Matter of v. Cohen	446, 562
<i>v. Merrill</i>	594	<i>v. Du Bois</i>	617, 618
<i>v. Middleton</i>	1190, 1423	<i>v. Kerr</i>	539, 540
<i>v. Moore</i>	463, 510, 974, 1370	<i>v. Lewis</i>	1512, 1561
<i>v. O'Donaghy</i>	659, 699	<i>v. Morey</i>	466, 681, 1297
<i>v. Parkhurst</i>	940, 941, 942	<i>v. Morgan</i>	538
<i>v. Perrine</i>	1500, 1508	<i>v. Patten</i>	1462, 1463
<i>v. Phillips</i>	428, 474, 475, 477, 479, 480, 481, 487, 490, 1477, 1478	<i>v. Plant</i>	263
<i>v. Pierce</i>	933	<i>v. Smith</i>	507, 559
<i>v. Roby</i>	316	<i>v. Stevenson</i>	261
<i>v. Root</i>	1455, 1459	James White Memorial Home v. Haeg	1548
<i>v. Rounseville</i>	68	Jameson v. Hayward	995
<i>v. Rowland</i>	897, 1472	<i>v. Rixley</i>	1003
<i>v. Schoonmaker</i>	1345, 1363	Jamieson v. Millemann	323, 330
<i>v. Schutz</i>	912	Jamison v. McWhorter	1178
<i>v. Sebring</i>	1392, 1393	<i>v. Miller</i>	1574
<i>v. Sellick</i>	685	Janes v. Falk	444
<i>v. Seward</i>	565	<i>v. Jenkins</i>	170, 274
<i>v. Sheldon</i>	912	Jangraw v. Mee	1365
<i>v. Silvernail</i>	766, 867, 870, 872	Jansen v. McCahill	1465
<i>v. Smith</i>	989, 1567	Jaques v. Gould	855
<i>v. Stackhouse</i>	1387	<i>v. Hall</i>	437
<i>v. Sternberg</i>	828	Jaqui v. Johnson	250
<i>v. Stevens</i>	753, 1348	Jaquith v. Mass. Bap. Convention	513
<i>v. Stiles</i>	901	Jarboe v. Hey	470
<i>v. Topping</i>	595	Jarman v. Wiswall	1125
<i>v. Turrell</i>	1064	Jarnigan v. Jarnigan	710
<i>v. Vanderheyden</i>	664, 721		
<i>v. Van Hoesen</i>	764		
<i>v. Van Zandt</i>	590, 618		
<i>v. Vermilyea</i>	1362		
<i>v. Walsh</i>	559		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxv

[References are to pages.]

Jarrah T. & W. P. Corp. v. Samuel	1031, 1076	Johnson v. Barg	129, 854
Jarvis v. Aikens	1339	v. Brasington	1181
v. Brooks	983	v. Camp	62
v. Dean	225	v. Chely	897
v. Driggs	886, 888	v. Clarkson	523
v. Hoffman	755	v. Cole	1321
v. Lynch	1510	v. Collins	1529
Jay v. Michael	179	v. Corbett	67, 659
Jaycox v. Smith	1133	v. Farley	1474
Jefferies v. Allen	720	v. Farrell	1548
Jefferis v. East Omaha L. Co.	1329	v. Fesemeyer	553
Jefferson Co. Bldg. Ass'n v. Heil	1474	v. Girtman	1360
Jeffery v. Hursh	1047	v. Grenell	1509, 1511
Jeffrey v. Moran	1570	v. Hoffman	797
Jeffries v. Jeffries	187	v. Hunt	16
Jeffrys v. Jefferys	448	v. Johnson	490, 737, 933, 1468
Jemison v. Bell Telephone Co.	113	v. Jordan	160, 170, 171, 265, 1498
Jemmit v. Varrel	480	v. Kinnicut	247
Jemmott v. Cooley	137	v. McIntosh	386, 1405
Jenkins v. Collard	1333, 1344, 1348, 1350	v. Mehaffey	16
v. Eldridge	437, 535	v. Mellicott	544
v. Fahey	996	v. Montgomery	713, 714, 1455
v. Good C. & M. Co.	563	v. Moore	1441
v. Holt	737	v. Nat. Exch. Bank	1571
v. Jenkins	523, 818, 1443, 1454	v. Oppenheim	283, 846, 857
v. Keymes	615	v. Preston	1268
v. Pye	556	v. Prosperity Loan Ass'n	1042
Jenkinson v. Auditor General	1432	v. Shelter Island Grove Ass'n	1502
v. Winans	897	v. Shelter Island G. & C. M. Assoc.	162, 188
Jenks v. Horton	773	v. Sherman	872
v. Quinn	1538	v. Shields	663, 664
Jenkyn v. Vaughan	564	v. Skillman	326
Jenner v. Morgan	131, 132	v. Smith	445, 712, 1570
Jennings v. Broughton	535	v. Stagg	873, 874
v. Conboy	1218, 1245	v. Thomas	698, 700, 701
v. Moore	1058	v. Thrower	895, 896
v. Selleck	522	v. Toulmin	961
v. Tisbury	217	v. Van Velsor	711
v. Van Schaick	907	v. Webster	913
Jenison v. Walker	250	v. Whiton	1174
Jeremiah v. Pitcher	514, 516	v. Wilson	991
Jermyn v. Hunter	34	v. Zink	1066
Jerome v. Ortman	1467	Johnston's Estate	1264, 1273
Jervis v. Bruton	615	Johnston v. Case	962, 1361, 1366
Jessup v. Bamford B. Co.	301	v. Dahlgren	662
Jewell v. Porter	753	v. Furnier	1444
Jewett v. Feldheiser	703, 726	v. Hargrove	818
v. Hussey	204, 205	v. Houston	1052
Jewitt v. Brooks	852	v. Hughes	502
Jillson v. Wilcox	613	v. Hyde	250
Jameson v. Pierce	1001	v. Johnston	975, 977
Jobling v. Tuttle	204	v. Jones	1332
Johanson v. Atlantic City R. Co.	1367	v. King	910
John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Patterson	173	v. Knight	1238
Johns v. French	1571	v. Muzzay	1403
v. James	449	v. Smith	118
v. McKibben	1361, 1363	v. Spicer	425, 445, 1327
v. Wilson	1103	v. Swann	480
Johnson v. Albertson	925	v. Van Dyke	660, 698

[References are to pages.]

Johnstone v. Haddlestone	926	Joos v. Fey	977
Jokinisky v. Miller	1488	Joplin v. Light Co.	146
Joliet First Nat. Bk. v. Adams	31	Jordan v. Adams	1180
Joliffe v. Baker	530	v. Cheney	1058
Jones, Matter of	51, 1453	v. Roach	617
v. A. & V. R. Co.	544	v. Sayre	1050
v. Adams	243, 268	v. Sullivan	907
v. Bragg	678	v. Van Epps	662, 675
v. Brewer	694	Jordeson v. S. S. & D. Gas Co.	208, 208,
v. Brumme	903, 905		1370
v. Caffey	651	Jorgensen v. Squires	905
v. Carter	593	Joseph v. Ager	248
v. City of Des Moines	714	Joslin v. Rockwell	1431
v. Clark	897, 898, 1068, 1069	Jourdan v. Dean	472
v. Clifton	753	Joy v. St. Louis	160, 1518
v. Davies	637	Joyce v. Conlin	267
v. Devore	722	Judy v. Thompson	1100
v. Dougherty	1552	Julian v. Central Trust	143
v. Durrer	797, 816, 1017	Jull v. Jacobs	1194
v. Elkins	518, 520	Junction Mining Co. v. Spring-	
v. Fleming	743, 1447	field J. C. Co.	829
v. Gardner	661	Jupiter M. Co. v. Bodie Const.	
v. Gilbert	758	M. Co.	316, 317, 318
v. Habersham	1451, 1545	Jupp v. Buckwell L. R.	977
v. Hill	787	Jutte v. Hughes	786
v. Holstein	1504	Juvenal v. Jackson	579
v. Jones	101, 615, 753, 980, 981, 1013		
v. Kelly	483		
v. Leath	1504	K.	
v. Light	566	Kabley v. Worcester Gas L. Co.	813
v. McNarrin	1045	Kaes v. Gross	759
v. Mitchell	1574	Kahn v. Chapin	548, 549
v. Moores	1579	Kain v. Fisher	61, 685
v. Morgan	430	Kaler v. Beaman	249
v. Obenchain	753	v. Campbell	299
v. Palmer	481	Kalish v. Kalish	533
v. Parker	679, 876, 1070	Kamena v. Huebig	635
v. Percival	246, 249	Kamphouse v. Gaffner	322, 326
v. Philipps	218	Kane, Matter of	1464
v. Pound Stone	1504	v. Bolton	206
v. Powell	723	v. N. Y. El. R. Co.	231, 232, 272
v. Pritchard	292	v. Sanger	1537
v. Reilly	126	v. Vanderburgh	787
v. Robbins	1477, 1478	Kanouse v. Slockbower	1511, 1512
v. Roe	1141, 1246, 1546	Kansas v. Colorado	300
v. Rush	1038	Kansas City M. & B. R. Co. v.	
v. Simpson	564	Lackey	302
v. Spartenburg Herald Co.	929	Kansas City Milling Co. v. Riley	225
v. Swayze	1473, 1474	Kansas N. & D. R. Co. v. Cuy-	
v. Tapling	266	kendall	232
v. Thomas	61	Kaplan v. Bergman	1527, 1529
v. Thompson	544	Kappell v. Bailey	1540
v. Towner	69	Karmuller v. Krotz	167, 1500
v. Van Bochove	257	Katz v. Kaiser	170
v. Van Doren	1090	Kaufman's Will, <i>In re</i>	1527, 1528, 1558
v. Van Dosen	572	Kaufman v. Clark	845
v. Varick	498	v. Peacock	662, 718
v. Wagner	284	Kay v. Pa. R. Co.	322
v. Westcomb	1194	v. Scates	421
v. Williams	475, 480		
v. Windwood	1243		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxvii

[References are to pages.]

Kea v. Robeson	1497	Kendall v. Fader	1579
Kean v. Calumet Canal Co.	297	v. Mann	507
Keany v. Morse	471	Keneage v. Elliott	118
Kearnes v. Cullen	829, 903	Keneda v. Gardner	1376
Kearney v. Taylor	1429	Keniston v. Gorrell	774
Keates v. Cadogan	535	Kenna, Matter of	1489
Keating v. Cincinnati	279	Kennard v. Miller's Ex'rs	477
v. Condon	874	Kennedy v. De Tafford	551, 552,
v. Springer	273, 275, 276		1065
Keating I. & M. Co. v. Marshall		v. De Trafford	960, 973
Elec. L. & P. Co.	53	v. Fury	413
Keats v. Hugo	276, 277, 306	v. Hoy	1284
Keay v. Goodwin	993	v. Kennedy	557, 647
Keays v. Blinn	769	v. McCloskey	510, 518
Keech v. Hall	1050, 1068	v. Mineola, etc. Co.	1507
v. Sandford	551, 552	v. Owen	1403
Keegan's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1548	Kennell v. Abbott	533
Keeler v. Eastman	767, 782	Kenner v. Amer. Contract Co.	1018,
v. Keeler	52		1147
Keeling v. Hoyt	561	Kennett v. Plummer	1050
Keely v. Moore	1548	Kenny v. Collier	852
Keen v. Coleman	1443	v. Parks	1468, 1470
Kegerreis v. Lutz	508	v. Tucker	540
Kehr v. Snyder	1332	Kenny v. Udall	749
Keil v. Healey	1370	v. Seu Si Lun	817
Kein's Estate, <i>In re</i>	50	Kensit v. Gt. Eastern R. Co.	299
Keiper v. Klein	275, 1498	Kent v. Dean	558
Keith v. Miller	440	v. Gerhard	1040
Kekewich v. Manning	443	v. Hopkins	1320, 1321
Keleman, Matter of	453, 456	v. Kent	1557
Kelland v. Fulford	50	v. Morrison	1226, 1255
Keller v. Nutz	1492	v. Riley	564
Kelley v. Goodwin	62	v. Waite	163, 206
v. Saltmarsh	251	v. Welch	1532, 1537
v. Whitney	1061	v. Williams	1487
Kellogg v. Ames	1057	Kenyon, <i>In re</i>	1164
v. Malin	1524	v. Kenyon	682, 1142
v. Platt	1532, 1533	v. See	1188, 1189, 1190
v. Smith	1505	v. Segar	1477
Kells v. Helm	291	Keogh v. Daniell	43
Kelly v. Bloomingdale	1578	Kepler v. Larson	1516
v. Dunning	174, 302	Keppell v. Bailey	839
v. Dutch Church	851	Kerfoot v. Cronin	1492
v. Harrison	1414	Kerley v. Kerley	1758
v. Kelly	510	Kerlin v. Campbell	522
v. McGrath	663	Kern v. Howell	511
v. Meins	594	Kernochoan v. N. Y. E. R. R.	
v. Nichols	476, 482, 488, 490	Co.	845, 846, 925
v. Owen	706	Kerr, Matter of	146
v. Rummerfield	795	v. Day	458
v. Sheehy	889	v. Freeman	1398
v. Varnes	947	v. Kingsbury	44, 56
v. Waite	925	v. Verner	1170
Kelsey's Appeal	973	Kerrick v. Ruggles	1577
Kelsey v. Abbott	1432	Kerrigan v. Tabb	484
v. King	231	Kerwin v. Post	1576
Kemp v. Bradford	1163	Kessler v. Letts	277
v. New York Produce Ex- change	1318	v. Pearson	863
Kempe v. Goodall	894	Ketchem v. Bell	1067
Kempshall v. Stone	787	Ketchum v. Newman	283
Kendall v. Case	1255	Keteltas v. Penfold	290, 1543
		Kettlewell v. Watson	573, 574

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Keuren v. Corkins	1062	Kingman v. Sinclair	1100
Kew v. Trainor	816, 1016	Kingman & Co. v. Cornell, etc. Co.	1474
Keyes v. Wood	1061	Kingsbury v. Burnside	508
Keys v. Test	1340	v. Collins	769
Kibler v. Miller	1239	Kings Co. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens	1507
Kidd, Matter of	566	Kingsland v. Chittenden	1513
Kidder v. Rixford	972, 973, 990	v. Clark	921
Kiersted v. Orange & A. R. Co.	125, 831, 832, 881	v. Murray	1427, 1428
Kiester v. Miller	914	Kingsley v. Goldsborough Land Imp. Co.	179
Kilburn v. Adams	205	v. Holbrook	63
Kilford v. Blaney	1044	v. Kingsley	757
Kilgour v. Ashcom	160	v. McFarland	28
v. Gockley	1058	v. Siebrecht	870
Killmer v. Wuchner	776, 973	v. Smith	654
Killmore v. Howlett	64	Kingston-upon-Hull v. Horner	248
Kilpatrick v. Barron	1227, 1279	Kinimel v. Smith	507
v. Johnson	1288	Kinna v. Smith	1054
v. Peshine	161	Kinne v. Webb	567
Kimball v. Blaisdell	1346, 1351	Kinney v. Watts	825, 1343, 1346, 1347
v. Blanchard	463	v. Wells	1475
v. Cross	812	Kinports v. Boynton	1572
v. Eaton	1475	Kinsell v. Billings	27, 29
v. Ladd	202	Kinsey v. Bailey	36
v. Lockwood	1068	v. Feller	566
v. Rowland	818	Kinsley v. Abbott	988
v. Sattley	60	v. Ames	940, 944
v. Walker	1458	Kinsolving v. Pierce	1376
Kimbel v. Kimbel	740	Kintner v. Jones	518
Kimber's Est., <i>In re</i>	1508	Kip v. Hirsh	465
Kimberly, Matter of	953, 955, 1162	Kippner v. Laverty	1256
Kimmel v. McRight	512	Kirby v. Potter	1511
v. Shaffer	618	v. Talmadge	574, 808
Kincaid's Appeal	69, 70	Kircher v. Schalk	1057
Kincaid v. Kincaid	1445	Kirk v. Crystal	33
Kine v. Farrell	536	v. Hamilton	1339, 1340
King v. Brigham	1367	v. Kirk	458, 500, 997
v. Carmichael	989	v. Turner	1468
v. Cole	594	Kirkham v. Sharp	244
v. Dennison	522, 523, 525	Kirkwood v. Finegan	277
v. Donnelly	458	Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick	682, 709
v. Gilson	1524	v. Yates Ice Co.	1512
v. Grafton	910	Kirsch v. Tozier	550, 574, 581
v. Hamlet	540	Kirsheedy v. Union Dime Sav. Inst.	1123
v. Jones	1523, 1531	Kirtland v. Pounsett	933
v. King	50	Kirwan's Trust, <i>In re</i>	467, 568
v. Leake	224, 225	Kischman v. Scott	547
v. Miller	777, 782	Kiser v. Heuston	1490
v. Mitchell	522, 523	Kissam v. Barclay	38, 41
v. Mullins	1333	v. Dierkes	1223, 1224, 1226, 1242
v. Newman	1034	Kitchell v. Burgwin	757
v. Pedly	904	Kitching v. Brown	191
v. Reynolds	826	Kites v. Church	119
v. Smith	1365	Kittanning Academy v. Brown	1358, 1368
v. Thompson	55, 776	Kittle v. St. John	914
v. Tiffany	251	Kittredge v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals	657
v. Townshend	465		
v. Whaley	465		
v. Whiton	1227		
v. Wight	290		
Kingdon v. Bridges	512		
v. Nottle	1523, 1531		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxix

[References are to pages.]

Kittredge <i>v.</i> Woods	61, 63, 65, 66, 769	Kraemer <i>v.</i> Adelsberger	1047, 1048, 1049, 1077
Kleeman <i>v.</i> Frisbie	1061	Kraft <i>v.</i> Welch	882
Klie <i>v.</i> Van Broock	783, 787	Kramer <i>v.</i> Amberg	819
Kline <i>v.</i> Beebe	641	<i>v.</i> Carter	187, 1537
<i>v.</i> Jacobs	125	Kranz <i>v.</i> Oedelhofen	1050
<i>v.</i> Kline	566	Kratemayer <i>v.</i> Brink	933
<i>v.</i> McDonnell	508	Krausi <i>v.</i> Pife	848
<i>v.</i> McGuckin	1071	Kreuger <i>v.</i> Schultz	1376
<i>v.</i> Ragland	511, 513	Krider <i>v.</i> Ramsay	869
Kling <i>v.</i> Dress	830	Krier's Private Road	195
Klutts <i>v.</i> Klutts	671	Kripp <i>v.</i> Curtis	177, 179, 181
Knaßbe <i>v.</i> Sevelle	274	Krüger <i>v.</i> Le Blanc	31
Knapp <i>v.</i> Burton	1375, 1378	Krupp <i>v.</i> Scholl	567
<i>v.</i> Crane	1109	Kruschke <i>v.</i> Stefan	985
<i>v.</i> Hungerford	997	Kruse <i>v.</i> Scripps	1514
<i>v.</i> Marlboro	1532	Kuecken <i>v.</i> Voltz	167
<i>v.</i> St. L. T. R. Co.	232	Kuhn <i>v.</i> Newman	461
<i>v.</i> Windsor	976	Kullman <i>v.</i> Cox	549, 550
Knecken <i>v.</i> Voltz	244	Kulp <i>v.</i> March	445
Kneeland <i>v.</i> Van Valkenburgh	1508	Kunes <i>v.</i> McCloskey	1430
Kneettle <i>v.</i> Newcomb	756	Kursheedy <i>v.</i> Union Dime Sav.	
Kneller <i>v.</i> Lang	1360, 1367, 1368, 1375	Inst.	679, 1069, 1070
Knickerbocker Ice Co. <i>v.</i> St. R. Co.	42d 1508	Kurtz <i>v.</i> Hoke	246
<i>v.</i> Bennett	925	<i>v.</i> Wirschmann	1006
<i>v.</i> Boughton	451, 452, 456, 457	Kutter <i>v.</i> Smith	43
<i>v.</i> Heaton	222	Kutz <i>v.</i> McCune	1528
<i>v.</i> Knight	433, 451, 452, 1254	Kyle <i>v.</i> Hamilton	1047
<i>v.</i> Land Ass'n	1413	<i>v.</i> Kavanagh	1398, 1399
<i>v.</i> Maroney	1013	<i>v.</i> Kyle	700, 724
<i>v.</i> Thayer	1348	Kyte <i>v.</i> Kyte	954
<i>v.</i> Weatherwax	494		
Knights <i>v.</i> Quarles	874	L.	
<i>v.</i> Simmons	161	La Barron <i>v.</i> Babcock	960, 961
Knoch <i>v.</i> Van Bermuth	581	Lacey <i>v.</i> Arnett	158
Knollenberg <i>v.</i> Nixon	1105	<i>v.</i> Dobbs	1551
Knolls <i>v.</i> Banhart	959	<i>v.</i> Woodward	318
Knoth <i>v.</i> Manhattan R. Co.	153	Lachman <i>v.</i> Deisch	845
Knowles <i>v.</i> Hull	941	Lackey <i>v.</i> Holbrook	1050, 1063
<i>v.</i> Dow	219, 221	<i>v.</i> Seibert	1574
<i>v.</i> Tootbaker	1503, 1505	Lacy <i>v.</i> Pixler	1444
Knowlton <i>v.</i> Atkins	439, 496	Ladd <i>v.</i> Boston	160, 273
Knox's Estate	1437	<i>v.</i> Chase	1237
Knox <i>v.</i> Jones	495	<i>v.</i> Ladd	1220, 1225
Koch <i>v.</i> Roth	578, 1039	<i>v.</i> Putnam	1118
<i>v.</i> West	1489	<i>v.</i> Stevenson	1045
Kocher <i>v.</i> Kocher	774	Lade <i>v.</i> Shepherd	221
Koehle <i>v.</i> N. Y. El. R. Co.	269	Ladue <i>v.</i> Detroit & M. R. Co.	1097
Koehler <i>v.</i> Hughes	1469, 1473	Ladyman <i>v.</i> Grave	206, 208
Koehler & Co. <i>v.</i> Brady	817, 1017	Ladywell Mining Co. <i>v.</i> Brookes	558
Kolasky <i>v.</i> Michels	811	La Farge <i>v.</i> Mansfield	843, 854
Kollock <i>v.</i> Scribner	811	Lafferty <i>v.</i> Milligan	1525
Konvalinka <i>v.</i> Schlegel	741, 1217	La Grave <i>v.</i> Hellinger	1113
Kopplitz <i>v.</i> Gustavus	925	Lahey <i>v.</i> Kortright	998, 1124, 1221
Kopp <i>v.</i> Gunther	440	Lahr <i>v.</i> Met. El. R. Co.	229, 231, 273
Korbe <i>v.</i> Barbour	55, 56	<i>v.</i> Met. R. Co.	230
Korn <i>v.</i> Campbell	186	Laidlaw <i>v.</i> Organ	535
Kortright <i>v.</i> Cady	678, 1029, 1030, 1063, 1071, 1105	Laird <i>v.</i> Moonan	1578
Kountze <i>v.</i> Kennedy	533, 534	Lake, <i>In re</i>	1089
		<i>v.</i> Gray	713

[References are to pages.]

Lake Erie R. Co. v. Kennedy	159,	Langdon v. Sherwood	1412
	324	v. Simson	1269
Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Priest	600	v. Templeton	1362, 1363
Lake Superior, etc. Co. v. Cunningham	588, 589, 619,	Langenour v. Shanklin	1413
	1162	Langford v. Selmes	134
Lakey v. Scott	1144	Langley v. Chapin	620, 1010, 1430
Lamar v. McNamee	917	v. Langley	1239, 1545
Lamb's Estate, <i>In re</i>	757	v. Sneyd	462
Lamb v. Danforth	1523, 1537	Langton v. Marshall	1481
v. Lamb	831, 832, 881,	Lanier v. Booth	210
v. Jeffrey	1060	Lanigan v. Kille	828, 852
v. Montague	1074	Lanning v. Carpenter	1570
v. Shays	760	Lansing v. Capron	1121
v. Sherman	1572	v. Goelet	1033, 1115
Lambden v. Sharp	1468	v. Thompson	856
Lambe v. Reaston	1505	Lansing I. & E. Works v. Walker	33
Lambert v. Huber	1376, 1377	Lansingburgh Bk. v. Crary	63
v. Robinson	950	Lapere v. Luckey	275
Lamberton v. Dunham	534	Lapham v. Norton	28, 55
Lambes v. Eames	452	Lariverre v. Rains	1163
Lamm v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co.	229, 231	Larkin v. Avery	705, 807, 925, 937
L'Amoreaux v. Van Rensselaer	498	v. McMullin	1578
Lampet's Case	1199, 1204, 1252	Larned v. Donovan	1059
Lamplugh v. Lamplugh	512	v. Hudson	932, 933, 938, 939
Lampman v. Milks	155, 169, 170,	Larnon v. Knight	527
	174, 175, 281, 291	Larrabee v. Hascall	439
Lamson v. Clarkson	897	v. Larrabee	539
v. Sutherland	1096	Larsen v. Peterson	173, 175
Lancaster v. Amsterdam Imp. Co.	1451, 1453	Larson v. Met. St. R. Co.	281
v. Dolan	561	Lasala v. Holbrook	239, 279, 280,
v. Eve	8		282, 285
Lancaster Co. Bk. v. Stauffer	650,	Lash v. Lash	955
	1572	Lassiter v. Dawson	750
Lancaster Trust Co. v. Long	559	Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, The v. United States	486,
Landell v. Hamilton	1543		487, 488, 489, 490
Landell's Appeal	1133	Latham v. Atwood Cro. Car.	60
Landon v. Hutton	448, 562	Lathers v. Coates	856
v. Townshend	639, 641, 644,	Lathrop v. Elsmer	215
	935	v. Elsner	160, 215, 244, 258
Landram v. Jordan	1284	v. Gilbert	518
Lane v. Capsey	267	v. Singer	756
v. Cox	857	Latourette v. Latourette	664
v. Duchac	1058	Lattimer v. Livermore	186
v. Eaton	480	Lauderdale Peerage Claim	17
v. Ewing	444	Laudy, Matter of	1551
v. Hill	1557	Laughran v. Smith	806, 810, 879,
v. King	1068		923
v. Lamke	272	Laumier v. Francis	157
v. Lane	1551	Lavagnino v. Uhlig	255
v. Nelson	1429	Lavalle v. Strobel	993
v. Page	568	Lavis v. Sturgeon	592
v. Philips	757	Law v. Douglas	1254
v. Ruhl	923, 926, 929,	v. Pemberton	813
	930	Lawes v. Lumpkin Estate	748
v. Shears	1047	Lawrence v. Brown	665, 720, 721
v. Thompson	1500	v. Burrell	856
Lanfers v. Henke	693	v. Cooke	453, 456
Lanford v. Poppe	201	v. Farley	1475
Lang's Will, Matter of	1557	v. Fox	1103
Langdon v. Blackburn	533	v. French	129, 853

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxi

[References are to pages.]

Lawrence v. Kemp	39	Legg v. Horn	158, 195, 204
v. Lawrence	562, 613, 741	v. Strudwick	928
v. Miller	851	Leggett v. Doremus	1243
v. Norton	1004, 1006	v. Firth	1188, 1255
v. Springer	159, 253, 324, 325, 327, 328	v. Hunter	1223
v. Stratton	1057	v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.	1347, 1399
v. Taylor	810	v. Perkins	495, 498
v. Town of Hempstead	1359, 1375	v. Stevens	1255
v. Webster	960	Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan	201, 202, 209, 210, 211
Lawrence R. Co. v. Williams	232	Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v. Bamford	534, 802
Lawson v. Morton	672, 693	Lehmeyer v. Moses	857
Lawton v. City of Rochelle	229	Lehnen v. Dickens	897
v. Lawton	27, 39, 45	Leidlein v. Meyer	306
v. Rivers	179, 250	Leiferman v. Osten	850
v. Salmon	18, 24, 25, 27, 45	Leigh v. Dickerson	964, 973
v. Ward	184, 245	v. Green	1430, 1432
Law Union, etc. Ins. Co. v. Hill	1561	v. Hewitt	66
Laybourn v. Gridley	113	v. Taylor	39, 45
Lazear v. Porter	682	Leighton v. Leighton	778, 787
Leach v. Hastings	243	v. Perkins	1538
v. Leach	682	Leinen v. Elter	998
v. Thomas	778	Leiter v. Day	844
Leake v. Leake	413	v. Pike	837, 840
v. Robinson	523	Leland v. Gassett	31, 54
Learned v. Cutler	703, 714	Le Lievre v. Gould	533
Learoyd v. Godfrey	904	Lemage v. Goodban	1557
Leary v. Corvin	509	Lemaitre v. Davis	281, 282, 286
v. Leary	1312	Leman v. Best	44
Leask v. Horton	1467	v. Whitley	527
Leavenworth Lodge v. Byers	281	Lemayne v. Stanley	1549
Leavitt v. Fletcher	821, 857	Leming v. Stephens	1579
v. Lamprey	664, 727	Lemmon v. Webb	65, 113, 199
v. Leavitt	922, 925, 931, 935, 937	Lemmons v. Reynolds	955
v. Pell	751	Lemon v. Graham	596
v. Thornton	1429	Le Neve v. Le Neve	572, 573, 574, 1090, 1486, 1492
Leavitt v. Beirne	470	Lenfers v. Henke	684
v. Pell	1220	Lennen v. Lennen	915
Leazure v. Hillegas	1451	Lennig's Ex'rs v. White	1497
Le Barron v. Babcock	989	Lenox v. Lenox	1193
Le Boeuf v. Gary	1571	Lent v. Howard	463
Ledoux v. Samuels	1364	Lentilhon v. City of New York	1571
Ledyard v. Phillips	61	Lentz v. Eimermann	1576
Lee v. Fernie	568	v. Martin	1047
v. Kirby	538	v. Victor	316
v. Lake	223	Lenz v. Aldrich	861, 907
v. Lindell	661, 662, 675	Leonard v. Burr	604, 621, 1021, 1022, 1162, 1281
v. Massachusetts F. & M. Ins. Co.	1496	v. Clough	28, 53, 54
v. McLeod	158, 325, 329	v. Gunther	907
v. Sandy Hill	223	v. Leonard	179, 200, 695
v. Simpson	1237	v. Medford	64
v. Stone	674, 1096, 1572	v. Quinlan	1503
v. Timken	743	v. White	164
v. Tower	735, 739, 740, 745	Leonard's Lessee v. Diamond	462
Leech v. Schwedar	273	Leopold v. Hallheimer	1080
Leeds v. Cheetham	855	v. Judson	852
Leeper v. Taylor	447, 448	Lerned v. Morrill	1503
Lees v. Fisher	1033	Leslie v. Leslie	439, 440
Le Fevre v. Le Fevre	325, 326, 741		

[References are to pages.]

Leslie <i>v.</i> Marshall	826	Leydecker <i>v.</i> Brintnall	861
<i>v.</i> Pounds	906	Leyman <i>v.</i> Abeel	864
Lessard <i>v.</i> Stram	301	Liabstadter <i>v.</i> Federgreen	951
Lesse of Village of Futlas <i>v.</i> Merenfeld	1502	Libby <i>v.</i> Chase	751
Lesser <i>v.</i> Lesser	1226	<i>v.</i> Tufts	1087
Lester <i>v.</i> Young	1182	Liddard <i>v.</i> Liddard	451
L��thieullier <i>v.</i> Tracy	1194	Liefe <i>v.</i> Saltingstone	1217
Letts <i>v.</i> Kessler	277	Liford's Case	64, 70, 248
Levering <i>v.</i> Bimel	1451	Light <i>v.</i> Light	741
Levi <i>v.</i> Earl	751	Lightfoot and Butler's Case	1465
Levick <i>v.</i> Brotherline	534	Liggins <i>v.</i> Inge	253
Levine <i>v.</i> Baldwin	859	Liles <i>v.</i> Terry	553
<i>v.</i> Goldsmith	961, 1000, 1001	Lilly <i>v.</i> Dunn	1071
Levit <i>v.</i> Witherington	1530	<i>v.</i> Fifty Associates	819
Levitsky <i>v.</i> Canning	847	Lincoln <i>v.</i> Burrage	1540, 1543
Levy <i>v.</i> Brothers	277	<i>v.</i> Chadbourne	300
<i>v.</i> Brush	507, 516, 559, 983	<i>v.</i> Davis	59, 239, 297, 1512
<i>v.</i> Evans	508	<i>v.</i> Emerson	1344, 1348
<i>v.</i> Levy	498, 499, 500, 997, 1155	<i>v.</i> Lincoln	594
<i>v.</i> Long Island Brewery	873	Lincoln & K. Bk. <i>v.</i> Drummond	1016
<i>v.</i> McCartee	1448	Lincoln Rapid Transit Co. <i>v.</i> Rundle	230
<i>v.</i> McCarter	498	Lincoln Trust Co. <i>v.</i> Nathan	856
Lewis <i>v.</i> Angermiller	918	Lindeman <i>v.</i> Lindsay	158
<i>v.</i> Beall	1396	Linden Steel Co. <i>v.</i> Rough Run Mfg Co.	1578
<i>v.</i> Carstairs	163	Lindley <i>v.</i> O'Reilly	459
<i>v.</i> Coxe	714	Lindsay <i>v.</i> Lindsay	1469
<i>v.</i> Doane	1119	Lindsey <i>v.</i> Brewer	758
<i>v.</i> Farrell	1058	<i>v.</i> Leighton	859, 907
<i>v.</i> Ford	1044	Lindsay <i>v.</i> Fry	1360, 1361
<i>v.</i> Gollner	188, 292	Lindwall <i>v.</i> May	849
<i>v.</i> Henderson	1039	Lines <i>v.</i> Darden	454, 1234
<i>v.</i> Herrere,	1478	Lingen <i>v.</i> Lingen	1316
<i>v.</i> Hinman	1490	Linn <i>v.</i> Davis	471
<i>v.</i> Howe	1376, 1377, 1393	Lins <i>v.</i> Seefeld	1507
<i>v.</i> Jones	67, 781	Linsley <i>v.</i> Sinclair	516
<i>v.</i> Kinnaird	1498	Linton <i>v.</i> Crosby	757
<i>v.</i> Lewis	599, 1524	<i>v.</i> Hart	131
<i>v.</i> Lyman	66	Lion <i>v.</i> Burtiss	618
<i>v.</i> McGee	1456	Lippencott <i>v.</i> Allander	143
<i>v.</i> McNatt	60, 770	<i>v.</i> Davis	1181
<i>v.</i> Monson	1431	<i>v.</i> Mitchell	472
<i>v.</i> N. Y. & H. R. Co.	52, 196, 246, 382, 1365	Lippett <i>v.</i> Kelley	1501
<i>v.</i> N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.	218, 1364	Lippard <i>v.</i> Humphrey	1548
<i>v.</i> Ocean Nav. & P. Co.	38, 42, 43, 47	Lippincott <i>v.</i> Wikoff	1222
<i>v.</i> Parrett	720	Lippitt <i>v.</i> Huston	617
<i>v.</i> Payne	1440	Lipsky <i>v.</i> Heller	275
<i>v.</i> Portland	218	Liptrot <i>v.</i> Holmes	462
<i>v.</i> Prather	1472	Liquid Carbonic Co. <i>v.</i> Wallace	174
<i>v.</i> Shearer	1038, 1388, 1398	List <i>v.</i> Hornbrook	286, 293
<i>v.</i> Small	1048	Little <i>v.</i> Birdwell	1013
<i>v.</i> Smith	741, 742	<i>v.</i> Chadwick	518, 519, 521
<i>v.</i> Waters	1192	<i>v.</i> Downing	1365
<i>v.</i> Watson	1464	<i>v.</i> Martin	880, 881
Lewis Adm'r <i>v.</i> Watson	1465	<i>v.</i> White	1478
Lewis' Appeal	980	<i>v.</i> Wright	938
Lewisohn <i>v.</i> Henry	1158	Little Ex'or <i>v.</i> Bennett	1228
Ley <i>v.</i> Peter	932	Little M. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Hambleton	233
		Littlefield <i>v.</i> Crocker	711, 712
		<i>v.</i> Maxwell	309

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxiii

[References are to pages.]

Littlefield v. Paul	705	Lomax v. Bird	1073
Littlejohn v. Egerton	760	London v. Curtis	923
v. Leffingwell	961	v. Garway	523
Lively v. Paschal	736	v. Richmond	840
Livesey v. Jones	481, 485, 491	v. Riggs	182, 184
Livett v. Wilson	201, 202, 210	London Loan Co. v. Drake	45
Livingston v. Arnoux	1421, 1422	London & S. W. R. Co. v.	
v. Haywood	1142	Gomm	842, 1540, 1542
v. Livingston	446, 882	Long v. Aldred	1560
v. McDonald	301	v. Fuller	1385
v. Miller	394	v. Kansas City Stock Yds.	
v. Moingona Coal Co.	284	Co.	723
v. Peru I. Co.	1362, 1464	v. King	511
v. Potts	917	v. Poth	810
v. Reynolds	767, 787	Long Island R. Co. v. Conklin	1348,
v. Stickle	817, 874, 875		1384, 1514
Livingstone v. Tanner	909, 935, 941	v. Garvey	235
v. Ten Broeck	307	Longdale Iron Co. v. Swift's Iron	
Llewellyn v. Jersey	1512	Works	578
Lloyd v. Conover	675	Longendyke v. Anderson	156
v. Cozens	867	Longfellow v. Longfellow	123, 894,
v. Gould	447		895, 900
v. Hart	50	Longmore v. Broom	1232
v. Hough	125, 831, 880, 881,	Look v. Norton	381
	942	Loomis v. Bedel	1532
v. Johnson	702	v. O'Neal	795
v. Lloyd	1050	v. Wilbur	782
v. Lynch	959	Looney v. McLean	858
v. Passingham	422	Lorah v. Nissley	1466
v. Planters' Mut. Ins. Co.	651	Loranger v. Carpenter	962
v. Rosbee	949	Lord v. Crowell	1071
v. Spillett	506	v. Lord	745
Lloyds Bk. Limited v. Bullock	560	v. Meadville Water Co.	240, 298
Lobdell v. Hayes	426, 670	v. Wardle	70
Lock v. Furze	827, 851, 852	v. Wilcox	1040, 1041
Locke v. F. L. & T. Co.	450	Lord Abergavenny's Case	947
v. Hale	1528	Lord Batterson v. Comm'rs, etc.	
v. Moulton	620	of London	275
v. Rowell	759, 765	Lord Braybrooke v. Atty.-Gen.	1235
v. Whitney	1366	Lord Chesham, <i>In re</i>	70
Lockhart v. Van Dyke	954	Lord Derby's Case	1173
Lockman v. Reilly	50	Lord Dudley v. Lord Warde	45
Lockrow v. Horgan	857	Lord Say and Seal's Case	1455
Lockwood v. Gehlert	1430, 1431,	Lord Stratheden, <i>In re</i>	480
	1434	Lord Thurlow of Gwynne v.	
v. Mildeberger	1238, 1239	Heaton	538
v. Wood	157, 211	Lore's Heirs v. Truman	1467
Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence	299	Lorie v. North Chicago City R.	
Lockyer v. Savage	766	Co.	230
Loder v. Whelpley	547	Loring v. Brodie	1227
Lodge v. Lee	1505	v. Eliot	1174
v. Martin	921	Lorings v. Marsh	477, 488, 490
v. White	872	Los Angeles Cemetery Co. v. Los	
Loebenthal v. Raleigh	1227	Angeles	225
Loeser's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1548	Losee v. Stanley	595, 1415, 1425
Logan v. Eva	576	Losey v. Stanley	412, 496, 1157,
v. Gardner	1442		1201
v. Green	912	Lothrop v. Foster	690, 713, 1456
v. Rose	1342	v. Thayer	778, 935
v. Simmons	567	Lott v. Wykoff	590, 591, 618
v. Smith	1058	Lougheed v. The Dykeman's	
v. Stogsdale	178, 237	Baptist Church	1161

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Loughran v. Lemmon	975	Lundy v. Lundy	537
v. Ross	43	Lunn v. Oslin	777
v. Smith	925	Lunsford v. La Motte Lead Co.	1468
Louis v. Hancock Co.	932	Lunt v. Lunt	1059
Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Knapp	1039	Luntz v. Greve	642, 753
Louisville Bk. v. Hall	984, 985	Lurman v. Hubner	1258
Louisville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky	142	Lusk v. Lewis	523
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Koelle	242	Lutjen v. Lutjen	1559
Lounsbery v. Snyder	850, 925	Lutrel's Case	211, 250, 266
Lounsbury v. Norton	1034	Luttrell v. Boggs	653
v. Purdy	508, 515	v. Reynolds	640
Love v. Bell	283	Lutwich v. Mitton	1394
v. Flahive	1411	Lutz, Matter of	1316
v. Harbin	1402	Lyle v. Palmer	25
Lovejoy v. Lovett	1500	v. Richards	613, 1567
v. Lunt	1430	Lyman v. Arnold	245, 1500
v. Richardson	1465	v. Gedney	913, 1107, 1453, 1454
Loveless v. Thomas	759	v. Hale	65
Lovell v. Quitman	1555, 1556, 1557	Lynch v. Livingston	1402, 1483
Lovering v. Lovering	822, 823	v. Rosenthal	541
Lovesey v. Smith	567	v. Sauer	826
Lovett v. Gillender	1013	v. Swan	861, 906
v. Taylor	527	v. Versailles Gas Co.,	818, 911
Low v. Elwell	935, 950	Lynde v. Hough	867
v. Holmes	997	Lynn v. Turner	248
Lowe v. Emerson	772, 898, 1144	Lynn's Appeal	782
v. Lowe	676	Lyon v. Burtis	613, 1567
Lowell v. Boston	300	v. Cunningham	933
v. Cragin	1058	v. McDonald	278
Lowenberg v. Brown	161	v. McLaughlin	269, 299
Lowenhaupt v. Stanisics	1290	v. Morgan	1342
Lowery v. Rowland	964	v. Parker	1540, 1541
Lowman v. Lowman	1108	v. Reed	918
Lowndes v. Lane	535	v. Sanford	1574
Lowry's Lessee v. Steele	641	Lyons v. McCurdy	985
Lozear v. Shields	543	v. Ostrander	1164
Lucas v. Brandeth	430, 595	Lyons Nat. Bank v. Shuler	1571
Luce v. Burchard	1559, 1560	Lytle v. Beveridge	618, 1181
v. Carley	1368		
v. Stubbs	690		
Luco v. De Toro	441		
Luddington v. Gardock	929, 938	M.	
v. Kime	593, 1171, 1178	Maatta v. Kippola	757
Luddy, <i>In re</i>	1257, 1258	Maberly v. Lorton	467
Ludlow v. Ludlow	1551	Macauley v. Smith	1042, 1049
Ludwell v. Newman	1532	Maccubbin v. Cromwell	440
Lufkin v. Curtis	713	MacDonald v. Bach	1527
v. Zane	902, 904, 905	Macdonough v. Starbird	38, 53
Luger v. Goerke	925	Macduff, <i>In re</i>	481
Luhez v. Eimer	1449	MacGreal v. Taylor	554, 801, 1388, 1442, 1443
Luhrs v. Eimer	1325	Machir v. Funk	1238
Luhrz v. Hancock	387, 755, 801, 1445	Mack v. Anderson	1109
		v. Austin	1049
Lukens v. Lasker	292	v. Patchin	823, 852
Lulus v. Hancock	1388	v. Prang	1061
Lum v. McEwen	541	Mack's Appeal	478
Lumberville D. B. Co. v. Assessors	142	Mackall v. Mackall	547
Lumley v. Haggerty	1368	Mackay v. Kockreth	927
Lumsden v. Manson	1060	v. Martin	558
Lund v. Lund	1047	Mackay's Will	1551
v. Parker	1359	MacKellar v. Sigler	920

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxv

[References are to pages.]

Mackenna v. Fidelity Trust Co.	725	Manchester Bld'ng. & L. Ass'n	
MacKenzie v. Trustees of Pres- bytery of Jersey City	488, 490, 503	v. Beardsley	1099, 1100
Mackey v. Harmon	294	Manchester B. W. Co. v. Carr	778
Mackin v. Haven	1543	Manchester H. B. L. Ass'n v. Porter	124
MacKinnon v. Sewell	1194	Mandel v. McClave	662, 718
Macknet v. Macknet	741	Manderback v. Orphan's Home	243
Mackreth v. Symmons	1038	Mandigo v. Conway	1526
Macomber v. Godfrey	214	Manhattan Co. v. Evertson	670
v. Nichols	232	Manhattan Real Estate Ass'n v. Cudlipp	735, 1157
Macon v. Mullahy	574	Manice v. Manice	428, 432, 496, 498, 1266, 1267, 1284, 1285, 1287, 1288, 1291
MacRae, Matter of	1318	Mann v. Betterley	539, 543
Maetier v. Osborn	1017	v. Edson	668, 669
Macy v. Met. El. R. Co.	787	v. Lacoma Land Co.	296
Madden v. Madden	1223	v. Mann	1360
Maddison v. Alderson	558	Mannel v. Wulff	319
v. Andrews	511	Manning's Case	1204, 1248
Maddox v. Burnham	1409	Manning v. Beck	563
v. Goddard	1499	v. Laboree	678
Madigan v. McCarthy	19, 41, 54	v. Smith	265, 1516
v. Walsh	663	v. Wasdale	220, 300, 307, 308
Madison v. Larmon	1262, 1264, 1275	Mansfield v. Mansfield	625, 1022
Madison Female Inst. v. United States	795	v. Mayor, etc. of New York	1085
Madson v. Madson	721	Mansur v. Blake	1512
Magaw v. Lambert	855	Mantz v. Buchanan	692
Magee v. Magee	1367	Manuel v. Wulff	314, 319, 1448
v. Mellon	721	Manwaring v. Jenison	36
Maggini v. Pezzoni	544	Maples v. Millon	65
Magie v. Reynolds	1058	Marden v. Dorthy	574, 808
Magill v. Brown	477, 479	Marion v. Johnson	288
v. Hinsdale	897, 898, 1465	Mark v. Village of West Troy	223, 227
Magniac v. Thomson	425	Markham v. Markham	920
Magnolia v. Marshall	297	Markillie v. Ragland	594
Magoon v. Harris	1500	Markoe v. Wakeman	971, 993
Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Sav. Bk.	1580	Marks v. Dellaglio	857
Mahan v. Mahan	447, 448	v. Halligan	1157
Maher v. Hanley Brewing Co.	932	v. Marks	1248
Mahoning County v. Young	588	v. Ryan	44
Main v. Davis	394	Maroney v. Boyle	1040, 1421, 1422, 1423
v. Schwartzwelder	25	Marquess of Northampton v. Pol- lock	1076
Maitland v. Irving	557	Marr's Appeal	534
Majestic Hotel v. Eyre	133	Marr v. Gillian	462
Major v. Todd	1468	Marsden's Trust	568, 569
Major, Admr. v. Bukley	1517	Marsellis v. Thalhimer	649, 1185, 1316, 1317
Maker v. Lazell	1497	Marsh, Matter of	235
Malarin v. United States	1440, 1441	v. Brace	872
Malcolm v. Allen	1079	v. Butterworth	847
v. Benford-Hancock	1241	v. Fairbury	226
Malin v. Malin	458	v. Lazenby	757
Mallery v. Facer	1087	v. Lee	1094
Mallett v. Foxcroft	1005	v. McNider	58
Malloney v. Horan	712	v. Ne-Ha-Sa-Ne-Park Assoc.	1375, 1514
Mallory v. Hitchcock	681, 1108	v. Village of Fairbury	1502
v. Russell	676	v. Wheeler	523
Malloy v. Malloy	507, 510		
Malone v. McLawrin	641		
v. Roy	1066		
Malroy v. Sloans	528		
Manchester v. Point St. Iron Works	1513		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Marshall <i>v.</i> Carson	550	Massey <i>v.</i> Goyder	281
<i>v.</i> Crehore	1004	<i>v.</i> Huntington	443
<i>v.</i> Green	64, 322	Massingill <i>v.</i> Downs	1570
<i>v.</i> Grosse Clothing Co.	919	Masten <i>v.</i> Olcott	1502
<i>v.</i> Mellon	781	Masters <i>v.</i> Pollie	65
<i>v.</i> Moseley	132	Masterson <i>v.</i> Munro	1501
<i>v.</i> Palmer	964	Masury <i>v.</i> Southworth	838
<i>v.</i> Peters	57	Mather <i>v.</i> Chapman	1329
<i>v.</i> Roll	566	Mathews <i>v.</i> Mathews	703, 997
Marston's Appeal	1552	Mathewson's Case	144
Marston <i>v.</i> Hobbs	1521, 1523, 1559	Mathewson <i>v.</i> Fitch	1376
<i>v.</i> Roe	1560	Matt <i>v.</i> Hawkins	292
Martin <i>v.</i> Abbott	703, 726	Matteson <i>v.</i> Palsler	563
<i>v.</i> Baird	436, 439, 510	Matthews <i>v.</i> Bliss	990
<i>v.</i> Baker	840	<i>v.</i> DeGroff	905
<i>v.</i> Ballou	1013	<i>v.</i> Dixey	292
<i>v.</i> Bower	1090	<i>v.</i> Duryee	680, 717, 718
<i>v.</i> Funk	445, 446	<i>v.</i> Hipp	925
<i>v.</i> Houghton	321	<i>v.</i> Hoagland	446
<i>v.</i> Jackson	1368	<i>v.</i> Hudson	615
<i>v.</i> Jones	1516	<i>v.</i> Sheehan	1135
<i>v.</i> Martin	515, 699, 720, 756, 847, 875	<i>v.</i> Ward	388, 425, 1327
<i>v.</i> McReynolds	988	Mattison <i>v.</i> Ausmuss	1369
<i>v.</i> Rector	818, 1363	<i>v.</i> Mattison	617
<i>v.</i> Remington	751	Mattocks <i>v.</i> Farrington	1574
<i>v.</i> Roe	43	<i>v.</i> Stearns	749
<i>v.</i> Rowe	47	Matzon <i>v.</i> Griffin	1051
<i>v.</i> Smith	925	Maul <i>v.</i> Rider	993
<i>v.</i> Swift	1579	Maule <i>v.</i> Ashmead	828
<i>v.</i> Tobin	130	<i>v.</i> Weaver	1403, 1519
<i>v.</i> Trail	640	Maundrell <i>v.</i> Maundrell	1212, 1217, 1246
<i>v.</i> Turnbaugh	1106	Maundy <i>v.</i> Maundy	533
<i>v.</i> Waddell	386, 1405	Maus <i>v.</i> Worthing	1464
<i>v.</i> Walker	1004	Mausert <i>v.</i> Christian Feigenspan	867
Martineau <i>v.</i> Simonson	1553	Maxon <i>v.</i> Gray	703
Martins <i>v.</i> Gardiner	1556	<i>v.</i> Lane	1342
Martling <i>v.</i> Martling	424, 429, 461, 1180	Maxwell <i>v.</i> Vaught	1572
Marvin <i>v.</i> Brewster	314	May <i>v.</i> Gillis	133, 856
<i>v.</i> Brewster I. M. Co.	283	<i>v.</i> LeClaire	1398
<i>v.</i> Brooks	508	<i>v.</i> Traphagen	1431, 1434
<i>v.</i> Marvin	515	Mayberry <i>v.</i> Beck	1514
<i>v.</i> Smith	496, 712, 721, 1242	Mayburry <i>v.</i> Brien	426, 669, 675
Marx <i>v.</i> McGlynn	414, 496	Mayer <i>v.</i> McCreery	812, 813
Masch <i>v.</i> Graner	563	<i>v.</i> Mutchler	1578
Mason <i>v.</i> Chicago	226	<i>v.</i> Watts	642, 759
<i>v.</i> Davison	201	Mayho <i>v.</i> Buckhurst	838
<i>v.</i> Deese	642	<i>v.</i> Cotton	758
<i>v.</i> Fenn	42	Maynard <i>v.</i> Hill	710
<i>v.</i> Horton	160, 171, 261, 262	<i>v.</i> Moore	1403
<i>v.</i> Jones	1317	Mayo <i>v.</i> Newhoff	19, 20, 164, 183
<i>v.</i> Limbury	451	<i>v.</i> Woods	1431
<i>v.</i> Mason	661, 712	Mayor, Matter of	50, 162
<i>v.</i> Mason's Ex'rs	1288	<i>v.</i> Cashman	828
<i>v.</i> Shrewsbury & S. R. Co.	153	<i>v.</i> Chadwick	306
<i>v.</i> Wierengo	946	<i>v.</i> Mabie	822, 825, 1533
Massachusetts H. L. Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Wilson	1069	<i>v.</i> Sheffield	227
Mass. Nat. Bk. <i>v.</i> Shinn	43, 137, 798	<i>v.</i> Sonneborn	125
Mass. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals <i>v.</i> Boston	481	<i>v.</i> Twenty-third St. R. Co.	146
		<i>v.</i> Williams	561, 572
		Mayor of Beverly <i>v.</i> Atty.-Gen.	491
		Mayor of Bradford <i>v.</i> Pickles	303

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxvii

[Referencee are to pages.]

Mayor of Hull <i>v.</i> Homer	193	McClure <i>v.</i> Raben	539, 540
Mayor of Lyons <i>v.</i> Advocate General of Bengal	490	McComb <i>v.</i> Wright	810
Mayor of N. Y. <i>v.</i> Huntington	895	McConaughy <i>v.</i> Bennett	1537, 1541
Mayor, etc. of N. Y., Matter of	235, 921	McConnell <i>v.</i> Blood	24, 31
Maywood <i>v.</i> Logan	857	<i>v.</i> Brillhart	1463
McAdams <i>v.</i> Bailey	1345	<i>v.</i> Downs	1463, 1532
McAlester <i>v.</i> Landers	826, 847	McCord <i>v.</i> Oakland, etc. Co.	961
McAlister <i>v.</i> Burgess	478	McCormack <i>v.</i> Coddington	1325, 1448, 1449
McAllaster <i>v.</i> Niagara Fire Ins. Co.	54, 55	McCormick <i>v.</i> Grogan	452
McAlpine <i>v.</i> Resch	574	<i>v.</i> Knox	1069
McAnulty <i>v.</i> McAnulty	1559	<i>v.</i> Taylor	687
McArthur <i>v.</i> Franklin	661, 663	McCormick H. M. Co. <i>v.</i> Griffin	436
<i>v.</i> Gordon	438, 516	McCoy <i>v.</i> McCoy	1319
<i>v.</i> Robinson	518, 580	<i>v.</i> Rhodes	1091
<i>v.</i> Scott	625, 633, 1163, 1266, 1267	McCoy, Lessee of <i>v.</i> Galloway	1504
McAteer <i>v.</i> McMullen	1491	McCracken <i>v.</i> Flanagan	1039
McBreen <i>v.</i> McBreen	642, 653	<i>v.</i> McCracken	782
McBryde <i>v.</i> Patterson	632	McCreary <i>v.</i> Bomberger	1237
McCabe <i>v.</i> Bruere	1377	<i>v.</i> McCreary	514
<i>v.</i> Kastens	905	McCullough <i>v.</i> Absecum Land and Improvement Co.	1503
<i>v.</i> Swap	681	<i>v.</i> Broad Exchange Co.	266
McCaffrey, Matter of	497	<i>v.</i> Irvine	45, 783, 785
McCahill <i>v.</i> McCahill	515	<i>v.</i> Irvine's Executors	41
McCamant Ex'or <i>v.</i> Nickolls	1234	<i>v.</i> Maryland	1429
McCandless' Appeal	1003	<i>v.</i> Valentine	642
McCandless <i>v.</i> Engle	544	McCune <i>v.</i> Baker	459
McCarren <i>v.</i> Coogan	1115, 1117	McCurdy <i>v.</i> Canning	955, 978, 979
McCarren <i>v.</i> O'Connell	319	McCusker <i>v.</i> McEvey	1339, 1348
McCartee <i>v.</i> Orphan Asy. Soc.	458	McCutchen <i>v.</i> Dittman	573
<i>v.</i> Orphan Asylum	498	McDaniel <i>v.</i> Walker	216
<i>v.</i> Teller	734, 735, 736	McDermott <i>v.</i> French	976, 977
McCarthy <i>v.</i> Marsh	1311	McDevitt <i>v.</i> Lambert	928
McCartney <i>v.</i> Bostwick	413, 513, 515	McDonald <i>v.</i> Bear River Co.	266, 1468
<i>v.</i> McCartney	1474	<i>v.</i> Eggleston	1438, 1439
<i>v.</i> Titsworth	515	<i>v.</i> Mass. Hospital	479
McCarty <i>v.</i> Kitchenman	265	<i>v.</i> O'Hara	1242
McCaskill <i>v.</i> McCormac	650	<i>v.</i> Woodward	764
McChesney's Lessee <i>v.</i> Wainright	1501	M'Donald <i>v.</i> Drew	1361
McClanahan <i>v.</i> Porter	690, 695, 696, 697	<i>v.</i> Lindall	179
McClanahan <i>v.</i> Western Lunatic Asy.	1358	McDonogh's Ex'rs <i>v.</i> Murdock	405, 492
McCleary <i>v.</i> Wade	482	McDowell <i>v.</i> Little	713
McCleary <i>v.</i> Boston & M. R. Co.	218	McDuffee <i>v.</i> Sinnott	1355
McClellan <i>v.</i> Coffin	1105	McElroy <i>v.</i> McElroy	523, 525, 595
<i>v.</i> Grant	557	<i>v.</i> McLeary	172
<i>v.</i> Whitney	796, 809	McElwain's Will, <i>In re</i>	1464
McClenahan <i>v.</i> Stevenson	1367	McEntire <i>v.</i> Brown	1366
McClintic <i>v.</i> Wise	1039	McFadden <i>v.</i> Allen	27, 28, 33, 1051
McClintock's Appeal	63	<i>v.</i> Blocker	1573
McClintock <i>v.</i> Rogers	1514	McFadin <i>v.</i> Rippey	848
M'Clowry <i>v.</i> Croghan	827	McFarland <i>v.</i> McFarland	983, 1044
McClung <i>v.</i> Missouri Trust Co.	1105	McFarlane <i>v.</i> Williams	119
<i>v.</i> Ross	962, 989	McFarlin <i>v.</i> Essex Co.	200
McClure <i>v.</i> Fairchild	726	McGahan <i>v.</i> Bank of Rondout	960, 962, 963
<i>v.</i> Fairfield	643, 703, 717	McGarrahan <i>v.</i> Mining Co.	1412, 1413
<i>v.</i> Herring	1467	McGary <i>v.</i> Hastings	1532, 1537
<i>v.</i> Leaycraft	191	McGee <i>v.</i> Walker	61
		McGettigan <i>v.</i> Potts	239, 279, 280
		McGillis <i>v.</i> McGillis	1157, 1174, 1317

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

McGinnis v. Egbert	318	McKinley Creek M. Co. v. Alaska	
v. Jacobs	510	U. M. Co.	317, 318
McGoon v. Scales	1422	McKinney v. Holt	887
McGoun v. McGoun	710	v. Pinkard	539
McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio		v. Rhoads	1496
Cent. R. Co.	558	v. Settles	1459
McGowan v. McGowan	509, 536, 1281	v. Street	1341
McGraw, Matter of	1334, 1451, 1452	McKinnon v. Thompson	1545
McGregor v. Brown	63, 777, 781	McKinny v. Browning	850
v. Comstock	384, 613, 1312, 1382, 1383, 1567	McKircher v. Hawley	1069
v. The Board of Education	1068	McKonkey v. Cockey	555
v. Wait	208	McLane v. Bovee	1412
McGrew v. Harmon	1532, 1533	McLaren v. Spalding	921
McGuckin v. Milbank	1124, 1527, 1529	McLarney, Matter of	1558
McGuire v. Devlin	551	McLarren v. Brewer	518, 520
v. Grant	239, 279, 280	McLaughlin v. C. & S. C. R. Co.	232
v. Ramsey	510	McLaughlin v. Durr	1113
McHan v. Ordway	467, 552	v. Randall	1467
McHugh v. McCole	479, 484, 491	McLean v. Caldwell	872, 873
v. O'Connor	448	v. Towle	1060
McIlhinny v. McIlhinny	618	McLeery v. McLeery	726, 727
McIllister v. Devane	264	McLennan v. McDonnell	1470
McIlvain v. Scheibley	638	McLeod v. Tarrant	1516
McIlvaine v. Coxe	1414	McLeran v. Benton	936
McIlver v. Estabrook	42	McMahon v. Gray	664, 1377
McIlwain v. Karstens	1421	v. Russell	703
McInerney v. Beck	1399	McManus v. McManus	1044
McIntire v. Barnes	1578	McMasters v. Negley	647, 654
v. Hughes	448	McMath v. Levy	40
v. Pryor	573	McMillan, Matter of	1313, 1425, 1426
McIntyre, Matter of	71, 1434	v. Cheeney	753
v. Costello	669	v. Cronin	248, 249
v. Sandford	1421, 1422	v. Fish	596, 1458
v. Sanford	1575	v. Richards	1056
McIver v. Walker	1504	v. Solomon	855
M'Iver v. Walker	1512	McMonegal v. Wilson	759
McIver's Lessee v. Walker	1503	McMullen v. Hoffman	541
McKay, Matter of	670, 794	McMurphy v. Minot	138, 873
v. Hyde Park	222	McMurtry v. Brown	1461
McKeage v. Hanover F. Ins. Co.	23, 52	McNabb v. Pond	67
McKee v. Angelrodt	873	McNeeley v. South Pa. Oil Co.	955, 976
v. Del. & H. Canal Co.	240, 302	McNeely v. Langan	1366
v. Gayle	1571	McNeil v. Ames	870
v. Griggs	557	v. Kendall	868
v. Lamon	405	McNeillidge v. Galbrath	1232
v. Pfout	765	McPherson v. McPherson	962
v. Wilcox	757	v. Rallins	1491
McKeeby v. Webster	795, 865, 927	v. Reese	1468
McKelway v. Seymour	620, 814, 1016	v. Schade	1529
McKenna v. Brooklyn Union		M'Pugh Co. v. Wallace	1577
El. R. Co.	52, 231, 244	McQuade v. Emmons	886
v. Fidelity Trust Co.	1110	McRea v. Cent. Nat. Bk.	12
McKenzie v. Gleason	1507, 1508, 1512	McRee's Adm'rs v. Means	454
v. McKenzie	283	McSorley v. Larissa	1066
McKeon v. Bisbee	319	M'Tavish v. Carroll	182
v. Whitney	124, 831, 880	McTigue v. McTigue	641
McKibbe v. Darracott	1017	McVay v. McVay	440
McKiernan v. Hesse	23	McVey v. Durkin	288, 289, 292
		Meacham v. Blaess	1516, 1517
		v. Bunting	642, 652, 709, 1369
		v. Steele	1074

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxix

[References are to pages.]

Mead <i>v.</i> Brockner	1127	Merrigan <i>v.</i> English	1578
<i>v.</i> Mitchell	994, 998	Merrill <i>v.</i> Bischoff	964
<i>v.</i> Owen	795	<i>v.</i> Bullock	941
<i>v.</i> Portland	229	<i>v.</i> Hayden	412, 524, 1563
Meagher <i>v.</i> Hayes	34	<i>v.</i> Nelson	1456
Means <i>v.</i> Dowd	537	<i>v.</i> Peaslee	446
<i>v.</i> Wells	381	<i>v.</i> Willis	920
Meason's Estate	51	Merritt <i>v.</i> Bartholick	1059
Mebane <i>v.</i> Patrick	203	<i>v.</i> Clason	1437
Mechanics' Bank <i>v.</i> Weill	1057, 1060	<i>v.</i> Harris	1018
Mechanics' Nat. Bk. <i>v.</i> Stanton	56	<i>v.</i> Judd	39
Mecklen <i>v.</i> Blake	1523	<i>v.</i> Lambert	1031
Mecum <i>v.</i> Peoria & O. R. Co.	821	<i>v.</i> Parker	250
Medara <i>v.</i> DuBois	1503, 1506	Merritt's Lessee <i>v.</i> Horne	641
Medical College Laboratory <i>v.</i> New York University	538	Merselis <i>v.</i> Van Riper	1074
Medinah T. Co. <i>v.</i> Currey	818, 1016	Mersereau, Matter of	659
Mee <i>v.</i> Gordon	441, 1282	Mershon <i>v.</i> Duer	426
Meek <i>v.</i> Breckenridge	158	Mervine <i>v.</i> Vanlier	1422
<i>v.</i> Kettlewell	443, 447	Merwin <i>v.</i> Backer	1360
Meeker <i>v.</i> Meeker	1457	<i>v.</i> Camp	1476
<i>v.</i> Puyallup	480	<i>v.</i> Wheeler	309
<i>v.</i> Wright	976	Meserole <i>v.</i> Sinn	856
Meeks <i>v.</i> Ring	800	Messer <i>v.</i> Rhodes	1498
<i>v.</i> Willard	1505	Messing <i>v.</i> Messing	961, 976
Meiggs <i>v.</i> Hoagland	1364, 1372	Messman <i>v.</i> Egenberger	1320, 1321
Meigs <i>v.</i> Dexter	1474	Mestaer <i>v.</i> Gillespie	531, 535
Meikel <i>v.</i> Borders	1398	Metcalfe <i>v.</i> Central Brook Park Ass'n	156
Meiners <i>v.</i> St. Louis	225	<i>v.</i> Crystal Brook Park Ass'n	216
Meldon <i>v.</i> Devlin	811, 812	<i>v.</i> Hart	322
Melick <i>v.</i> Dayton	1505	<i>v.</i> Moses	563, 564
Mellen <i>v.</i> Mellen	805	Metcalfe <i>v.</i> Pluvertoft	577
Mellor <i>v.</i> Walmsley	1510	<i>v.</i> Union Trust Co.	496
Melms <i>v.</i> Pabst Brewing Co.	774, 777, 783	Methodist Church <i>v.</i> Jaques	518
Melvin <i>v.</i> Proprietors, etc.	651, 748, 749, 1369	<i>v.</i> Young	1547
<i>v.</i> Whiting	200, 208	Metropolitan Ass'n <i>v.</i> Petch	268
Memmert <i>v.</i> McKeen	1527, 1528	Metropolitan Bk. <i>v.</i> St. Louis Dispatch Co.	1121
Memphis R. Co. <i>v.</i> R. R. Com'rs	144	Metropolitan St. R. Co. <i>v.</i> New York	146
Mence <i>v.</i> Mence	523, 1555, 1556	Mettart <i>v.</i> Allen	1491
Mendel <i>v.</i> Hall	946	Mettler <i>v.</i> Miller	640, 641, 644, 1481
Mendell <i>v.</i> Delano	167, 266	Meuley <i>v.</i> Zeigler	1476
Mendenhall <i>v.</i> Klinck	321	Mexia <i>v.</i> Oliver	1446
Menger <i>v.</i> Carrothers	1368	Meyer <i>v.</i> Graham	1358
Meni <i>v.</i> Rathbone	911	<i>v.</i> Johnston	57
Meno <i>v.</i> Hoeffel	879	<i>v.</i> Kinzer	980, 981
Menzies <i>v.</i> Breadalbane	1330	<i>v.</i> Whitaker	57
Merced M. Co. <i>v.</i> Fremont	319	Meyers <i>v.</i> Becker	292
Mercer's Lessee <i>v.</i> Selden	640	<i>v.</i> Gemmel	274
Merchant's Bank <i>v.</i> Thomson	712, 718	<i>v.</i> Schemp	56
Merchants' & Manuf. Bk. <i>v.</i> Cummings	1085	Michael <i>v.</i> Foil	1345
Mercier <i>v.</i> Chace	758	Michigan Life Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Cronk	28
Meredith <i>v.</i> Heneage	455, 522	Michigan Trust Co. <i>v.</i> Lansing Lumber Co.	1051
Merges <i>v.</i> Ringler	1528	Mickey <i>v.</i> Barton	1361, 1439
Meriam <i>v.</i> Brown	54	Mickle <i>v.</i> Douglas	283
Merithew <i>v.</i> Andrews	1042	<i>v.</i> Miles	118, 120, 802
Merkle <i>v.</i> Beidelman	1060	Mickles <i>v.</i> Dillaye	1066
Merrell <i>v.</i> Bishoff	1122	Mickus <i>v.</i> Townsend	1349
Merrifield <i>v.</i> Cobleigh	1015	Middlebrook <i>v.</i> Corwin	66
Merrifield <i>v.</i> Worcester	240, 298	Middlebury Bank <i>v.</i> Edgerton	143

[References are to pages.]

Middleford v. Church Mills Knitting Co.	248	Miller v. Rutland, etc. R. Co.	1053
Middleton v. Dougherty	765	v. Shields	767, 776
v. Finda	1454	v. Smith	1579
v. Middleton	531, 535, 536	v. The State	322
v. Steward	752	v. Topeka Land Co.	1501
Middletown v. Newport Hospital	161	v. Wright	466
Middleworth v. Ordway	1317	Miller's Ex'rs v. Commonwealth	479
Midland F. Co. v. Wilson	144	Millett v. Ford	1178
Midland Gt. West R. Co. v. Johnson	536	v. Fowle	1506
Midland R. Co. v. Fisher	1403	Millican v. Millican	556
Miesen v. Canfield	1361	Millikan v. Patterson	1431
Milbank v. Vane	616	Milliken v. Graham	575
Mildmay's Case	610, 642	v. Ham	508
Miles' Appeal	1555, 1556	Milling v. Becker	918
Miles's Will	1549	Mills v. Bliss	617, 1039
Miles v. Harford	1283	v. Catlin	1523
v. Janvrin	849, 859, 906	v. Davison	429, 492
v. Miles	768	v. Gore	1470
v. Sherwood	1513	v. Husson	468, 471, 1241
Mill River W. Mfg. Co. v. Smith	59, 1506, 1512	v. Johnston	459
Millard v. Hathaway	528	v. Mills	678, 1064, 1274
v. McMullin	960	v. Penny	1367
v. Truax	1066	v. Rundlett	16
Miller's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1042	v. Van Voorhies	661, 663, 672, 680, 1270, 1123
Miller v. Albright	1039	Millspaugh v. Mitchell	1595
v. Atkinson	479, 485	Milne's Appeal	293
v. Baker	65	Milner v. Nelson	1482
v. Bingham	1369	Milnes v. Branch	138
v. Black Rock Spring Co.	302	Milroy v. Lord	444
v. Brown	291	Milwaukee Cold Storage Co. v. Decker	558
v. Bumgardner	1366	Miner, Matter of	1563
v. Cheney	769, 942	v. Beekman	1033
v. Cook	1086	v. Brown	955, 976
v. Coudert	1321	Mineral Development Co. v. Tuggle Land	1514
v. Cramer	1514	Mingay v. Lackey	700, 1000, 1001
v. Eames	1188	Mining Co. v. Tunnel Co.	317
v. Edison Elec. Illum. Co.	845, 846	Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minn. & St. Louis R. Co.	324, 325
v. Emans	1147, 1252, 1398	Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co.	56
v. Finegan	757	Minor v. Hill	1058
v. Fox	1513	v. Natchez	1432
v. Gilbert	633	Minot, Matter of	1559
v. Hancock	906	v. Baker	487
v. Lapham	265, 305	v. Minot	1157
v. Laubach	301	v. Mitchell	559
v. Levi	819, 886, 910	v. Tappan	1190
v. Little	755	Minshall v. Lloyd	24, 39, 47, 53
v. Maguire	864	Minshull v. Oakes	836
v. Mann	1497	Minter v. Crommelin	1413
v. McAlister	591	Minturn v. Seymour	446
v. Meers	1474	Mirick v. Hoppin	1068
v. Miller	741, 1316, 1141, 1143	Mission of the Immaculate Virgin	
v. Mowers	1437	v. Cronin	1360, 1362, 1364, 1365
v. Pearce	536	Missionary Society v. Humphreys	1273
v. Pence	663, 723	Mississippi Mills Co. v. Smith	299
v. Prescott	912, 1016	Missouri v. Illinois	193
v. Quick	1047	v. Nebraska	1330
v. Rowan	481		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxxix

[References are to pages.]

Missouri K. & T. Co. v. Union Trust Co.	1073	Montague v. Selb	990
Missouri K. & T. Trust Co. v. Krumseig	540	Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co.	113
Missouri V. L. Co. v. Borwick	62	Montefiore v. Browne	1220
Mistler v. O'Grady	906	Montello, The	297
Mitchel v. Reynolds	541	Montesquieu v. Sandys	553
v. Seipel	175	Montgomery v. Craig	900
Mitchell v. Bain	298	v. Gunther	1362
v. Bunch	459	v. Reed	1521, 1523
v. Einstein	1507	v. S. A. W. R. Co.	232
v. Farrish	704	Montignani v. Blade	1268
v. Franklin	124	Moodle v. Garnance	131
v. Hazen	1524	Moody v. Garnon	131
v. Mayor	282	v. King	647
v. Met. El. R. Co.	52	v. Matthews	748
v. Mitchell	726, 742	v. McClelland	279, 281
v. Parham	1468	v. Moody	976
v. Reed	275, 551	v. Smith	814
v. Seipel	160, 171	Mooers v. Wait	782, 997
v. Smith	1580	Moon v. Jennings	990
v. Stetson	53	Mooney v. Byrne	1034, 1035, 1075
v. Warner	1522, 1526		1076
v. Young	915	Moor v. Cary	309
Mitchell, Lessee of v. Ryan	1474	Moore, Matter of	628, 1113, 1152, 1201, 1258, 1259, 1272
Mitford v. Mitford	578	v. Alden	745
v. Reynolds	475	v. Am. L. & T. Co.	581
Mittnacht v. Slevin	292, 293	v. Appleby	1163
Mixter v. Woodcock	1367	v. Banking Co.	23
Moakes & Co. v. Rice	609	v. Boyd	935, 936, 937
Mobile Bldg. Ass'n v. Robertson	1569	v. Cable	1065
Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile	297, 1358	v. City of New York	772
Mochon v. Sullivan	1576	v. Cleghorn	430
Moehring, Matter of	1214, 1218, 1219	v. Cornell	753
Moelle v. Sherwood	1390, 1398, 1439, 1440	v. Crawford	571
Moellering v. Evans	279	v. Crofton	447, 448
Moffatt v. Smith	128, 1144	v. Crouse	215, 243
v. Strong	847	v. Darbey	654
Moffet v. Elmendorf	817, 955, 1239, 1545	v. Esty	643, 1045
Moggridge v. Thackwell	486, 489, 524	v. Flynn	1474
Mohr v. Parmelee	294	v. Frost	724
Molineaux v. Reynolds	524, 1563	v. Guar. Tr. Co.	866
Moll v. McCauley	156	v. Hamerstay	518
Mollan v. Griffith	1101	v. Harmon	1505
Molton v. Camroux	801	v. Hazleton	1461
Monarch C. & M. Co. v. Hand	1088	v. Hegeman	498
Monarque v. Monarque	998, 1124, 1428	v. Holcombe	578
Moncrief v. Ross	1216	v. Hopkins	1482
Monday v. Monday	1033	v. Kerr	993
Mong v. Roush	490	v. Levert	295
Monroe v. Bowen	1011	v. Littel	766, 1156, 1157, 1163, 1181, 1383
v. Hall	1013	v. Lyons	1160, 1282
v. Luke	381	v. McClain	1512
v. West	1577	v. Mayor	660, 661
Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker	518	v. Moore	446, 485, 508, 511, 542, 548, 549
		v. Morrow	943
		v. Murphy	192
		v. Page	753
		v. Parker	1177
		v. Pitts	620, 1016

[References are to pages.]

Moore <i>v.</i> Rake	1141, 1548	Morris Canal Co. <i>v.</i> Ryerson	1345,
<i>v.</i> Rawson	259, 329		1458
<i>v.</i> Raynor	287, 292	Morrison <i>v.</i> Bowman	1465
<i>v.</i> Rollins	684, 781	<i>v.</i> Chadwick	853
<i>v.</i> Scruggs	518	<i>v.</i> Clark	970, 971
<i>v.</i> Simonson	776	<i>v.</i> Keen	1512
<i>v.</i> Smith	39	<i>v.</i> King	183
<i>v.</i> Stinson	473	<i>v.</i> Marquardt	273, 274
<i>v.</i> Townshend	778, 784, 785,	<i>v.</i> Morrison	1475
	829, 935	<i>v.</i> Schorr	591, 629
<i>v.</i> Weber	857	<i>v.</i> Skowhegan Bank	1511
<i>v.</i> Williams	516, 1362, 1363	Morse <i>v.</i> Benson	184
<i>v.</i> Wingfield	1264, 1266, 1281	<i>v.</i> Carpenter	1454
Moore <i>v.</i> Townshend	997	<i>v.</i> Copeland	253, 324, 329
Moorman <i>v.</i> Gibbs	1090	<i>v.</i> Goddard	847
Moran <i>v.</i> Hayes	437	<i>v.</i> Hill	530, 548, 549
<i>v.</i> Moran	479, 484	<i>v.</i> Salisbury	1229, 1467
<i>v.</i> Munhall	1042	<i>v.</i> Williams	203
<i>v.</i> Stewart	735, 737, 738	Mortimer <i>v.</i> Manhattan R. Co.	51
Mordant <i>v.</i> Thorold	700	Mortland <i>v.</i> Mortland	1459, 1475
Morehouse <i>v.</i> Cotheal	782, 1256	Morton <i>v.</i> Funk	1251
Morey <i>v.</i> Herrick	510	<i>v.</i> Noble	711
<i>v.</i> Hoyt	47	<i>v.</i> Onion	1558
Morgan, Matter of	1320, 1321	<i>v.</i> Weir	819
<i>v.</i> Boyes	267	Morund <i>v.</i> McClintock	218
<i>v.</i> Gronow	1278	Moseley <i>v.</i> Virgin	882
<i>v.</i> Hudwell	964	Mosely <i>v.</i> Reily	1432
<i>v.</i> Malleson	443, 447	Moses <i>v.</i> Loomis	1016
<i>v.</i> McCollister	918	<i>v.</i> Pittsburg, etc. R. Co.	226
<i>v.</i> Minot	543, 553	<i>v.</i> Sanford	325
<i>v.</i> Morgan	426, 641, 1064, 1252,	Mosher <i>v.</i> Funk	522
	1287	<i>v.</i> Mosher	675, 677
<i>v.</i> Powers	938	Moshier <i>v.</i> Meek	1041
<i>v.</i> Short	847	<i>v.</i> Norton	1066
<i>v.</i> Smith	662, 671	Mosley <i>v.</i> Mosley	561
Moriarta <i>v.</i> McRea	684	Moss <i>v.</i> Dowman	1409
Morice <i>v.</i> Bishop of Durham	455,	<i>v.</i> Gallimore	1067, 1068
	458, 476, 480, 481,	<i>v.</i> Moss	507
Morley <i>v.</i> Loughman	547	<i>v.</i> Shear	1513
Morrill <i>v.</i> Mackman	809	<i>v.</i> Sheldon	1517
<i>v.</i> Morrill	1043	Mosseller <i>v.</i> Deaver	950
Morris's Appeal	24	Moster <i>v.</i> Miller	1438
Morris <i>v.</i> Bacon	1058	Moston <i>v.</i> Stout	912
<i>v.</i> Clare	512	Motes <i>v.</i> Bates	321
<i>v.</i> Commander	199	Motley <i>v.</i> Sawyer	662
<i>v.</i> Edgington	179, 180, 181	Mott <i>v.</i> Ackerman	494, 1201, 1223,
<i>v.</i> French	20, 54		1239, 1278
<i>v.</i> Hastings	981	<i>v.</i> Clayton	1508
<i>v.</i> Jansen	1348	<i>v.</i> Harrington	553
<i>v.</i> McCarty	975	<i>v.</i> Mott	546
<i>v.</i> McClary	1362	<i>v.</i> Newark German Hospital	1488
<i>v.</i> Phelps	852	<i>v.</i> Oppenheimer	1523, 1542
<i>v.</i> Potter	1311	<i>v.</i> Palmer	40, 53
<i>v.</i> Rowan	1506	<i>v.</i> Underwood	961, 962
<i>v.</i> Sargent	1482	Mottley <i>v.</i> Blake	997
<i>v.</i> Stuart	1514	Motz <i>v.</i> Mitchell	544
<i>v.</i> Tillson	802	Moulton <i>v.</i> Cornish	1033, 1063, 1117,
<i>v.</i> Ward	1303, 1312, 1389		1123, 1127
Morris C. & B. Co. <i>v.</i> Brown	621,	<i>v.</i> Newburyport W. Co.	300
	1022	<i>v.</i> Robinson	118
Morris Canal & B. Co. <i>v.</i> Diamond		Mounsey <i>v.</i> Ismay	157, 220
Mills P. Co.	202	Mount <i>v.</i> Tuttle	503, 1334, 1452

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxxiii

[References are to pages.]

Mowry <i>v.</i> Bradley	676	Murray <i>v.</i> Miller	503
<i>v.</i> City of Providence	480	<i>v.</i> Murray	566
<i>v.</i> Sanborn	1120	<i>v.</i> Pannaci	1366
Moxon <i>v.</i> Wilkinson	317	<i>v.</i> Porter	1057
Moyer <i>v.</i> Drummond	757	<i>v.</i> Quigley	963
<i>v.</i> Hinman	1572	<i>v.</i> Shave	918
Muckleroy <i>v.</i> Bethany	1466, 1468	<i>v.</i> Wilson	1059
Mudge <i>v.</i> Hammill	1178	<i>v.</i> Zeller	1488
<i>v.</i> Salisbury	159	Musham <i>v.</i> Musham	1366
Mueller <i>v.</i> C. M. & St. P. R. Co.	42	Muskett <i>v.</i> Hill	321
Muhlker <i>v.</i> Harlem R. Co.	230, 231, 232, 269	Muskgrave <i>v.</i> Sherwood	293
<i>v.</i> Ruppert	1503	Muskingum Val. T. Co. <i>v.</i> Ward	84
Muldoon <i>v.</i> Deline	1514	Muskingum Val. Turnpike <i>v.</i> Ward	1455, 1456
<i>v.</i> Devlin	1503	Mussey <i>v.</i> Holt	1469
Mullany <i>v.</i> Mullany	642	<i>v.</i> Union Wharf	244, 262
Mullen <i>v.</i> Doyle	551	Mussoorie Bank <i>v.</i> Raynor	452, 455
<i>v.</i> Stricker	275, 276	Mustard <i>v.</i> Wohlford	1443
Muller <i>v.</i> Manhattan R. Co.	1372	Mutual Benefit Loan Co. <i>v.</i> Jaeger	1402
<i>v.</i> Wadlington	1058	Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Brown	1462, 1464, 1465
Mulloy <i>v.</i> Ingalls	1477	<i>v.</i> Grace Church	597
Mulock <i>v.</i> Byrnes	432	Mutual Life Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Armstrong	536, 537
Mulry <i>v.</i> Norton	1329, 1331, 1332	<i>v.</i> Corey	1339, 1482, 1483
Mulvane <i>v.</i> Rude Ex'or	1255	<i>v.</i> Dake	1488, 1489, 1490
Mumford <i>v.</i> Brown	973	<i>v.</i> Everett	467, 1229
<i>v.</i> Whitney	320, 328	<i>v.</i> Kirchoff	1074
Mundy <i>v.</i> Duke of Rutland	284	<i>v.</i> Shipman	664, 668, 1237, 1238, 1239
<i>v.</i> Mundy	1551, 1553	Myers, Matter of	1557
<i>v.</i> Munson	735	<i>v.</i> Bell Telephone Co.	165
<i>v.</i> Warner	796	<i>v.</i> Bolton	961, 962, 990
Munford <i>v.</i> McVeigh	540	<i>v.</i> Brodbeck	1529
Munger <i>v.</i> Curtis	1577	<i>v.</i> Burns	859
<i>v.</i> Perkins	699	<i>v.</i> City of St. Louis	1504
Munn <i>v.</i> Burges	1120	<i>v.</i> Dunn	182, 183
Munox <i>v.</i> Wilson	1473	<i>v.</i> Gemmel	275
Munro <i>v.</i> Merchant	1325	<i>v.</i> Hansbrough	651
Munshower <i>v.</i> Patton	1357	<i>v.</i> Jackson	527
Munsion <i>v.</i> Reid	172	<i>v.</i> Kingston Coal Co.	932
Munson <i>v.</i> Carter	1475	<i>v.</i> Mutual Life Ins. Co.	1455
Murdock <i>v.</i> Bridges	481	<i>v.</i> Myers	440
<i>v.</i> Clarke	1064	<i>v.</i> Safe Dep. & Trust Co.	1228
<i>v.</i> Gifford	24, 30	Mygatt <i>v.</i> Coe	751, 834, 838, 839, 1522, 1523, 1524, 1536, 1540, 1541, 1542
<i>v.</i> Murdock	648		
<i>v.</i> Waterman	1109		N.
Murless <i>v.</i> Franklin	511	Nab <i>v.</i> Nab	440
Murley <i>v.</i> Ennis	316	Nackhour <i>v.</i> Wiener	917
Murly <i>v.</i> McDermott	292	Nagee's Appeal	461
Murphy's Estate	453, 481, 1222	Nail <i>v.</i> Maurer	737
Murphy, Matter of	1160, 1560	Nairn <i>v.</i> Prowse	1040
<i>v.</i> Briggs	563	Nalle <i>v.</i> Thompson	970
<i>v.</i> Carlin	452, 453	Nance <i>v.</i> Nance	567
<i>v.</i> Century Bld'g Co.	828	Napper <i>v.</i> Sanders	1155, 1173, 1192, 1194
<i>v.</i> Cook	461, 468	Nash <i>v.</i> Minneapolis Co.	903
<i>v.</i> Kelley	240, 301		
<i>v.</i> Lincoln	178		
<i>v.</i> McKeon	1562		
<i>v.</i> Portrum	1315		
<i>v.</i> Price	1532		
Murray <i>v.</i> Albertson	133, 855, 862		
<i>v.</i> Ballou	574, 577, 579, 1045		
<i>v.</i> Harway	817, 912		
<i>v.</i> Marshall	1104		

[References are to pages.]

Nash v. Minnesota Title Co.	534	Nelson v. Loder	1105
v. Morley	480	v. Pomeroy	740, 1161
v. N. E. Ins. Co.	247, 269	v. Potter	1545
Nashville Trust Co. v. Lammon	527	v. Rogers	1102
Nason v. Grant	1469, 1574	v. Russell	1160
Nat. Bank v. Bonnell	1474	v. Thompson	919
v. Ins. Co.	517	Nepean v. Doe	942
v. Levy	31, 1051, 1068	Neresheimer v. Smith	566
v. Matthews	1334	Nesbit v. Lockman	547, 553
v. North	20	Nestal v. Schmidt	559
National Bank of Catasauqua		Nettleton v. Siker	322
v. North	52	v. Sykes	64
National Bk. of Commerce v.		Neuberger v. Keim	563, 565
National Bk. of N. Y.	1393	Neubert v. Colwell	1256
National Bk. of Com. v. Smith	580	Neves v. Scott	429
National Com. Bank v. Gray	288, 289	Neville v. Wilkinson	532
National Com. Bk. & Loan Co. v.		Nevins v. Gourley	619, 1011
Spencer	564	New v. Hunting	449, 450
National Exch. Bk. v. Cunn-		Newall v. Wright	1055
ham	183	Newbrough v. Walker	852
National Life Ins. Co. v. Lee	1543	Newby v. Cox	736
National Oil Ref. Co. v. Bush	125, 942	Newcomb v. Bonham	1031, 1076
National Revere Bk. v. Morse	578	v. Boston Protect. Dep't	476
National U. Bk. v. Natl. M. Bk.	984	v. Ramer	796
Nattingly v. Nye	564	Newcomen v. Coulson	249
Naul v. Naul	996	Newell v. Wigham	884
Nauman v. Weidman	482	New England L. & T. Co. v.	
Naumberg v. Young	862	Spitler	1446, 1489
Nave v. Berry	778	New Eng. Nat. Bank v. N.	
v. Smith	993	Western Nat. Bank	661, 662, 680
Naylor v. Cox	1331	Newhall v. Lynn Sav. Bk.	718, 1120
v. Field	753	v. Wheeler	1359
Neal v. Black	450	Newham v. May	532
v. Brandon	796	N. H. Land Co. v. Tilton	1501
v. City of Rochester	59	Newhoff v. Mayo	167
v. Clark	432	New Ipswich Factory v. Batch-	
v. Hopkins	1507	elder	167, 1498
Neale v. Seeley	306	New Jersey Zinc Co. v. N. J.	
Neas v. Lowell	903	Franklinite Co.	283
Nebraska v. Iowa	1327, 1330	Newkerk v. Newkerk	593, 594
Nebraska Nat. Bk. v. Johnson	536	Newman v. Anderton	120
Needham v. Branson	978	v. Holdmyfast, Stra.	883
Neel v. Beach	1221	v. Nellis	163, 243
Neelly v. Lancaster	654	v. Newman	741
Neely v. Butler	640	v. Payne	543, 553
v. Phila.	212, 1508	Newsom v. Luster	1476
Negus v. Becker	288, 292, 294	Newson v. Smythies	821
Nehasane Park Ass'n v. Lloyd	1431, 1434	Newstead v. Searles	567
Neilson v. I. E. R. Co.	57	Newton v. Emerson	1463
v. McDonald	543	v. Harland	950
Nellis v. Lathrop	898	v. Porter	519
v. Nellis	618, 1153	Newwan v. Bank of Cal.	990
Nelson v. Barnett	660	New York, Matter of City of	296, 1510
v. Brown	679, 740, 741, 1070, 1123, 1125	New York & Brooklyn Bridge,	
v. Butterfield	1502	<i>In re</i>	50, 662, 722, 723
v. Davidson	1360	N. Y. Cable Co., Matter of	235
v. Davis	430	New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v.	
		Aldridge	240, 296

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxxv

[References are to pages.]

New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. The Brockway Brick Co.		Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. R. Co.	1011, 1018, 1020, 1147, 1189, 1452
	1417	v. Ogden	983
New York Co. Nat. Bk. v. Amer. Surety Co.	563	Nidever v. Ayers	1398
New York Dry Dock Co. v. Stillman	465	Nightingale v. Burrell	613, 1249, 1257, 1258
New York El. R. Co. v. Fifth Av. Nat. Bk.	52	v. Hidden	1516
v. Fifth Nat. Bk.	231, 269	Niles v. Sheldon	1561
New York H. & N. R. Co. v. Boston & Maine R. Co.	146	Niles v. Stevens	1222
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mayer v. Milnor	715, 180	Nimmo v. Davis	540
v. Viele	1317, 1318	Niland v. Murphy	1475
New York Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Livingston	817, 1239	Nims v. Bigelow v. Sherman	662, 897
v. Milnor	184	Nineteenth & Jefferson St. Presby. Ch. v. Fithian	776
N. Y. L. & W. R. Co., Matter of	886, 1282	Niver v. Crane	515
N. Y. & Charleston S. S. Co. v. Harbison	1465	Nix v. Bradley	472
New York & O. R. Co. v. Van Horn	1429	Noakes v. Rice	1076
New York R. E. & B. I. Co. v. Motley	133, 856, 857	Noble v. Bosworth v. Sylvester	53, 18
New York Rubber Co. v. Rothery	299, 300, 1341	v. Teeple	954
N. Y. Speedway, Matter of	1415	Noblitt v. Beebee	975
New York Steam Co. v. Stern	465	Noel v. Garnett	742
New York University v. Loomis Laboratory	573	Nolan v. Rockaway Park Imp. Co.	1331, 1332
Ney v. Mumme	990	Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders	521
Neyland v. Benby	511	Noon's Will, <i>In re</i>	1560, 1561
Niantic Bank v. Dennis	1572	Noonan v. Ilsley	1339
Nichol v. Henry	1445, 1489	v. Lee	1531
v. Thomas	1524	Norcross v. Griffiths	1510
Nicholas v. Chamberlain	172, 248	v. Norcross	1050, 1540, 1541
Nicholls v. Butcher	4	Nordenfelt v. The Maxim, etc.	541
v. O'Neill	748, 749	Norfleet v. Cromwell	160
Nichols v. Aylor	202	Norman v. Wells	836, 838, 839
v. Baxter	865	Normille v. Gill	288, 289, 293
v. Chamberlain	171, 264	Norrell v. Augusta, etc. R. Co.	1358
v. Council	1357	Norris v. Baker	199
v. Disner	1422	v. Beyea	613
v. Eaton	470, 766	v. Marshall	1060
v. Gladden	1180	v. Morrison	681, 758
v. Levy	425, 1190	v. Thompson	481
v. Luce	178, 180, 181	Norriss v. Morrill	925
v. Nichols	566, 995	North v. Barnum	899
v. Park	426, 670, 672, 703, 710	v. Graham	604, 1018
v. Reynolds	1488, 1490	v. Henneberry	1441
v. Ridley	1094	v. Stafford	882
v. Wentworth	204	Nor. Cent. R. Co. v. Canton Co.	43
v. Williams	929	North Eastern R. Co. v. Elliott	281
Nicholson v. Halsey	466, 1145	North End Sav. Bk. v. Snow	1104
Nickells v. Atherstone	918	North Noonday M. Co. v. Orient M. Co.	315, 316, 318
Nickerson v. Buck	1552	North Salem v. Eagle Co.	300
v. Swett	1439	Northcut v. Whipp	673
Nicoll v. Mumford	449	Northern Co. Ins. Co. v. Whipp	1037
		Northern Pacific Ry. v. Townsend	1058
		Northport R. E. & I. Co. v. Hendrickson	1360, 1361, 1364, 1377
		Northrup's Lessee v. Brehmer	1493
		Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Freeman	1091

[References are to pages.]

Norton <i>v.</i> Craig	66	O'Connor <i>v.</i> Felix	571
<i>v.</i> Babcock	1529	<i>v.</i> Gifford	522, 523
<i>v.</i> Dashwood	23, 27, 29	<i>v.</i> Irvine	507
<i>v.</i> McDevit	642	<i>v.</i> Pittsburgh	280
<i>v.</i> Palmer	1058, 1116	Odd Fellows <i>v.</i> Hegele	288, 293
<i>v.</i> Weir	909	Oddie <i>v.</i> Brown	1287
Norwood <i>v.</i> DeHart	1104	Odell <i>v.</i> Montross	1032, 1077
<i>v.</i> Kirby	895	<i>v.</i> Solomon	902, 903, 904, 906
Nostrand <i>v.</i> Knight	1498, 1499	Odes <i>v.</i> Woodward	1570
Note to Chesterfield <i>v.</i> Janssen	540	Odom <i>v.</i> Beverly	646
Nottingham <i>v.</i> Calvert	717	<i>v.</i> Riddick	1446
Nowlin Lumber Co. <i>v.</i> Wilson	795	O'Donald <i>v.</i> MacIntyre	889, 896, 951
Noyes Will	1557	O'Donnell <i>v.</i> Penny	1505
Noyes <i>v.</i> Anderson	1017, 1079	O'Donnell <i>v.</i> Kelliher	1464
<i>v.</i> Collins	1512	<i>v.</i> Kelsey	1513
<i>v.</i> Dyer	1361, 1513	<i>v.</i> McIntyre	385, 834, 1068
<i>v.</i> Hemphill	268	<i>v.</i> White	509
<i>v.</i> Mantle	314	O'Donoghue <i>v.</i> Boies	554, 555
Nudd <i>v.</i> Hobbs	221	O'Flynn <i>v.</i> Powers	1427
Nugent <i>v.</i> Riley	1047	Ogden's Appeal	461
Null <i>v.</i> Howell	728	Ogden <i>v.</i> Grove	177
Nunn <i>v.</i> O'Brien	453, 456	<i>v.</i> Jennings	178, 1498
Nunnally <i>v.</i> Southern Iron Co.	321	<i>v.</i> Ogden	1471
Nutt <i>v.</i> Cuming	1073, 1133	<i>v.</i> Stock	28
<i>v.</i> Norton	1558	Ogilvie <i>v.</i> Hull	849
Nutter <i>v.</i> Fouch	682, 719	O'Halloran <i>v.</i> Fitzgerald	896
Nycum <i>v.</i> McAllister	755	O'Hara, Matter of Will of	533, 536
Nye <i>v.</i> Hoyle	1519, 1541	O'Hear <i>v.</i> De Goesbriand	68
<i>v.</i> Lowry	1464, 1465	Ohlfield <i>v.</i> Curtis	604
<i>v.</i> Taunton Branch R. Co.	718	Oil Creek R. Co. <i>v.</i> Great Western R. Co.	815
		Okeson <i>v.</i> Patterson	193, 200
O.		Oland's Case	62, 771
		Oland <i>v.</i> Burdwick	771, 865, 927
Oak <i>v.</i> Dustin	543	Olcott <i>v.</i> Bynum	509
Oakes <i>v.</i> Chalfont	1204	<i>v.</i> Thompson	250, 251
<i>v.</i> Delancey	1503, 1510	Old South Soc. <i>v.</i> Wainwright	1366
Oakland Cem. Co. <i>v.</i> Bancroft	25	Olden <i>v.</i> Mather	124, 795
Oakley <i>v.</i> Monck	947	Oldewurtel <i>v.</i> Wiesenfeld	919
<i>v.</i> Oakley	660	Oldham <i>v.</i> Litchford	535
<i>v.</i> Schoonmaker	885, 886	Oliffe <i>v.</i> Wells	536
Oastler <i>v.</i> Henderson	917, 918, 919	Oliphant <i>v.</i> Leversidge	511
Oates <i>v.</i> Beckworth	1371	<i>v.</i> Burns	1051, 1350, 1491, 1492
O'Beirne <i>v.</i> Allegheny, etc. R. Co.	1058	Oliver <i>v.</i> Bush	1536
Oberly <i>v.</i> Lerch	50	<i>v.</i> Davy	1579
Obermeyer <i>v.</i> Behn	70, 1430	<i>v.</i> Hook	203
<i>v.</i> Liebman	1090	<i>v.</i> Moore	806
Obert <i>v.</i> Bordine	462	<i>v.</i> Piatt	518, 1536
<i>v.</i> Dunn	281	<i>v.</i> Pitman	179
O'Brien, Appeal of	1548	Olmstead <i>v.</i> Camp	228
<i>v.</i> Ball	921	<i>v.</i> Latimer	1099, 1102
<i>v.</i> Clark	1514	<i>v.</i> Rawson	1537, 1538
<i>v.</i> Elliot	735	Olmsted <i>v.</i> Olmsted	667, 1316
<i>v.</i> Fleckenstein	1492	Olney <i>v.</i> Fenner	204, 209
<i>v.</i> Goodrich	196	<i>v.</i> Gardiner	206
<i>v.</i> Lewis	553	<i>v.</i> Wharf	232
<i>v.</i> Philadelphia	280	Olson <i>v.</i> Schultz	906
<i>v.</i> Smith	129, 854	Olwine <i>v.</i> Holman	1369
Ocean Grove Camp M. Ass'n <i>v.</i> Com'rs of Asbury Park	304	Omaha & N. P. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Janecek	232
<i>v.</i> Sanders	119, 815	Omaha & R. V. R. Co. <i>v.</i> Rickards	246

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxxvii

[References are to page.]

Ombony v. Jones	38, 41	Ottinger v. N. Y. El. R. Co.	
Ommanney v. Butcher	481		787, 1142, 1252
Onderdonk v. Onderdonk	524, 1564	Ottumwa Lodge v. Lewis	285
160th Street, Matter of	222	Otway v. Hudson	671
O'Neil v. Van Tassel	262, 294, 1527, 1529	Ould v. Washington Hospital	474, 475
O'Neill's Will	1550	Oursler v. B. & O. R. Co.	268
O'Neill v. Breese	275	Ousby v. Jones	1502
v. Webster	1482	Outcalt v. Appleby	774
Onset R. Co. v. County Comm'rs	230, 231	Outerbridge v. Phelps	167, 174
Onslow v. Corrie	831	Outthank v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co.	159
Onthank v. L. S. & M. C. R. Co.	250	Overbagh v. Patrie	599
Onward Bldg. Soc. v. Smithson	1344, 1345	Overfield v. Christie	1365
Orcutt v. Moore	796	Overman v. Sasser	16, 45, 62
Orecny v. Goetz	1560	Overseers of Poor v. Sears	594
Orlando v. Gooding	1441	Owen, Matter of	1553
Orlebar v. Fletcher	993	v. Baker	1482
Orman v. Day	294	v. Brookport	1507
Ormond's Case	1203	v. Evans	1061
Ormsby v. Pinkerton	174	v. Field	242, 258, 307, 621, 1022
O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke	539, 540	v. Gibbons	967, 1297, 1321
O'Rourke v. Henry Prouse	792	v. Morton	961
Cooper Co.	1575	v. Slatter	681, 720, 721
v. O'Connor	1222	Owens v. Lewis	62
v. Sherwin	169, 172, 173, 179	v. Miss. Soc. M. E. Church	500
v. Smith	1580	v. Owens	537
Orr v. Gilman	1342	v. Williams	436
v. Hadley	58	Owings v. Emery	781
Orr Ewing v. Colquhoun	453	v. Jones	905
Orth v. Orth	1398, 1530	Owens v. Owens	446
Ortmayer v. Elcock	1551	Oxford Township v. Columbia	1358
Osborn v. Cook	712	Oxley v. James	923, 927, 928
v. Horine	1466, 1537	Oyster v. Albright	510
v. Kistler	545	v. Knull	591
v. Robbins			
Osborne v. Auburn Telephone Co.	231, 232, 233		P.
v. Butcher	268	Pace v. Bartles	1035
v. Endicott	1345	v. Goodson	795
v. Gordon	467	Pacific Bank v. Hannah	664
Oschinsky v. Greenbery	916	Pacific Nat. Bk. v. Windram	471
Osgood v. Abbott	593, 620	Pacific P. Tel. Co. v. Irvine	233
v. Dewey	125, 932	Pacific Sheet Metal Works v. Roeder	1510
v. Eaton	508	Pack v. Shanklin	480
v. Franklin	537, 538, 1221	Packard v. Ames	1203
v. Osgood	1035	v. Johnson	963
Oshey v. Sir Baptist Hicks	1496	v. Old Colony R. R.	441
Osmond v. Fitzroy	543	Packer v. Bird	1510
Osmun v. Porter	745	v. Rochester, etc. R. Co.	1056
Osten v. Jerome	302	Paddock v. Strobridge	534
Ostheimer v. Single	559, 703	Padelford v. Padelford	767
Oswald v. Caldwell	1468, 1470	Page v. Edwards	35
v. Gilfert	828	v. Estes	749, 750
v. Wolf	216	v. Kinsman	895
Otis, Matter of	870	v. Parr	853
v. McMillan	917	v. Thomas	983, 985, 986
v. Smith	1498	v. Waring	1493
v. Otis	410, 413	Paget v. Melcher	465, 1157, 1164
v. Spencer	1469, 1470	v. Page	511
Ottawa v. Yentzer	223		

[References are to pages.]

Paget v. Palmer	1015	Parker Adm'r v. Ross	1194
Paice v. Canterbury	486	Parkes v. White	548, 599
Paige v. Paige	676	Parkist v. Alexander	551
v. Schenectady R. Co.	230, 1508	Parkman v. Welch	1088
v. Waring	1364	Parks v. Bishop	245, 246
Paine's Case	637, 642	v. Boston	854, 921
Paine v. Barnes	1215	v. Hardey	688
v. Chandler	169, 172, 175, 179, 289, 306	v. McClellan	700
v. Jones	1104	v. Morris Ax & T. Co.	1061
v. McDowell	35	Parmelee v. Oswego S. R. Co.	936
v. Meller	572	v. Simpson	1474
v. Rector	909	Parnall v. Parnall	452
v. Woods	57, 58, 59	Parret v. Shaubhut	1489
Paisley's Appeal	453	Parrett v. Avery	70
Palk v. Clinton	1074	Parrish v. Parrish	676
Palmer v. Bowker	934	Parry v. Clark	1523
v. Culbertson	1319, 1320, 1321	Parsell v. Stryker	137, 798
v. Des Couriers	1038	Parsons v. Camp	322
v. Fletcher	273	v. Copeland	30
v. Forbes	56	v. Johnson	173, 174, 244, 264, 265
v. Garland	1425	v. Meller	1445
v. Horton	706	v. Parsons	750
v. Larchmont Elec. Co.	233	v. Phelan	519
v. Monison	50	v. Winslow	776
v. Palmer	177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 702, 964, 971, 1474	Parsons, The Robert W.	297
v. Wetmore	274	Partridge v. Gibert	255, 262
v. Young	552	v. Gilbert	288, 291, 292, 293, 294
Palmer's Adm'rs v. Mead	1116	v. Havens	511
Palmer's Private Road	237	v. Lyon	294
Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Risley	518	v. Scott	280
Pancoast v. Pancoast	981	Paschal v. Acklin	479
Pangburn v. Miles	1515	Paterson R. Co. v. Grundy	230
Papillon v. Voice	1178	Paton v. Murray	1122
Paradine v. Jane	133, 855, 1014	Patten v. Fitz	1527
Pardee v. Aldridge	1058	v. Scott	1357
Paris v. Hulett	1116	v. Tallman	1552
Parish v. Baird	156	Patterson v. Ellis's Ex'or	1256, 1258
v. Kaspere	202, 243, 321, 324	v. Hewitt	319
v. Rogers	137, 798	v. Hitchcock	316
Park v. Bates	851	v. Leming	550
v. Castle	929	v. Mills	1108
v. Pratt	1376	v. Nixon	1374
Parke v. Mears	1478	v. Northern Trust Co.	816
Parker v. Barker	594, 1341	v. Pease	1348
v. Beasley	1105	v. Stoddard	933
v. Brooke	472	Patteson's Appeal	61, 62
v. Brown	1522	Pattison v. Gilford	268
v. Chancellor	1478	v. Hull	1058
v. Conner	575, 576	Patton v. Chamberlain	440
v. Foote	194, 204, 211, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278	v. Moore	579
v. Framingham	207	Paul, <i>In re</i>	945
v. Hayes	534, 535	v. Fulton	579
v. Kane	1469	v. Mockley	216
v. May	485	Paulsen v. Manske	1576, 1577
v. Murphy	690	Pavkovich v. Southern Pac. R. Co.	780
v. Nightingale	188, 189, 1539	Pawlett v. Atty.-Gen.	414
v. Parker	686, 696, 1013, 1253	Pay's Case	1250
v. Proprietors, etc.	989	Payne v. Becker	664
v. Strickland	61	v. Burnham	1062

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxxix

[References are to pages.]

Payne v. Dotson	705, 710	Penfold v. Warner	712
v. Johnson's Executors	1238	Penhallow v. Dwight	61
v. Parker	748	Penn's Hospital v. Delaware	479
v. Rogers	903, 905, 906	Penne v. Peacock	1243
v. Wilson	617, 621, 1039,	Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal	
	1043	Co.	299
Payton v. Burns	318	v. Flock	1497
v. McPhaul	1497	v. Martin	1039
Peabody v. Brown	1454	Pennock's Estate	453, 456
v. Hewitt	1456	Pennock v. Lyons	817, 1017
v. Long Acre Square Bldng.		Pennsylvania v. Lord Baltimore	459
Co.	885, 892	Penna. Canal Co. v. Harris	1502
v. Minot	969	Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sander-	
v. Sadtler	1507	son	299, 306
v. Tarbell	511	Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Borough	
Peacock v. Raffin	924	of Freeport	212, 258
Pearce v. Gamble	549	v. Duncan	231, 269
v. McClenaghan	264	v. Montgomery County P.	
v. Moore	1375	R. Co.	227
v. Savage	988, 1153	v. St. L. A. & T. H. R. Co.	125,
v. Warren	1057		882
Pearne v. Cold Creek M. & M. Co.	177	Penny v. Corwithe	1437
Pearsall v. Post	220	Penrhyn Slate Co. v. Granville	
v. Westcott	287, 288, 289	Elec. Light & P. Co.	199
Pearson v. Carlton	1317	Penrod v. Bruce	1511
v. Collins	482	Penry v. Richards	1501
v. Hartman	242, 271	Pentland v. Keep	1146
v. King	1376	Penton v. Robart	42
v. Spencer	177, 182	v. Roberts	60
Pease v. Egan	1085	People v. Adirondack Park Ass'n	235
v. Inhabitants of Whitman	955,	v. Alberty	781
	976	v. Angel	901
v. Lawson	1465	v. Bennett	864, 888
Peasley v. Drisco	1497	v. Botsford	926
Peavey v. Tilton	1494	v. Brooklyn	1429
Peck v. Batchelder	16	v. Campbell	1430
v. Carpenter	961	v. Canal Appraisers	59
v. Conway	160, 167, 187	v. Chase	1582, 1583
v. Goodberlett	240, 301	v. City Bk. of Rochester	520
v. Herrington	301	v. Cogswell	478, 479
v. Hiler	845, 848	v. Conklin	1327
v. Ingersoll	869	v. Crissman	1583
v. Mallains	1514	v. Culver	918
v. Ormsby	756	v. Cutting	1325
v. Peck	558	v. Darling	925, 929, 930, 946,
v. Roe	277		947
v. Schenectady R. Co.	232	v. Deehan	1417
v. Walton	1385	v. Dreher	223
v. Young	1414	v. Folsom	1325
Peele v. Chever	1365	v. Foss	272
Peers v. Lucy	308	v. Gillis	625, 633, 812
Pegram v. N. Y. El. R. Co.	51, 269	v. Guthrie	1503
Peil v. Reinhart	859, 906	v. Howlett	901
Peirce v. Hubbard	1178	v. Kellogg	223
Peirs v. Peirs	780	v. Kelsey	913, 943
Pelham-Clinton v. Newcastle	614	v. Kerr	231, 232
Pell v. Mercer	475	v. Keyser	987
Pells v. Brown	883, 1261	v. Ladew	1360, 1432, 1434
Pelton v. Place	867, 882, 919	v. Lambier	1331, 1332
Pemberton v. Barnes	1023	v. Lewis	1432, 1434
Pendill v. Marquette Co. A. Soc.	1344	v. Lichtman	996
		v. Mauran	1416

[References are to pages.]

People v. McAdam	792, 886	Perkins v. Davis	1577
v. McCarty	864, 888	v. Swank	40
v. North Riv. Sug. Ref. Co.	541	Perley v. Langley	211, 219, 309
v. O'Brien	146	Pernam v. Wead	178
v. Open Board of Stock		Perrin v. Blake	1175
Brokers' Building Co.	543,	v. Leverett	1574
	548, 549	Perrine v. Cheeseman	1465
v. Peckens	533	Perriot v. Peck	1502
v. Powers	481, 499, 500, 502,	Perrot v. Perrot	782
	1231	Perry's Appeal	1058
v. Simon	1582, 1583	Perry v. Carr	66, 781, 927, 935
v. Simonson	1183	v. Clark	1521
v. Simpson	886	v. Tynen	1224
v. Smith	229	Perry-Herrick v. Attwood	560
v. Snyder	1345, 1497	Perryman's Case	1472
v. Supervisors	961, 1429	Pertwee v. Townsend	136
v. Sutherland	1454	Peter v. Beverly	1221, 1222
v. Trinity Church	1415	v. Kendal	143, 144
v. Turner	1430, 1432	Peters v. Barnes	914
v. Underhill	218, 222, 224	v. Cartier	1398
v. Van Rensselaer	389, 394,	v. Ham	1489
	1357	v. Little	201
v. Voorhis	1427	v. McKeon	1533
v. Wieboldt	1340	v. Mortimer	541
v. Woodruff	1043	v. Stone	829
v. Zundel	1364	Peterson v. Boswell	519
People, etc. v. Com. of Taxes	57	v. De Baun	1157
People ex rel. Astor	229	v. Jackson	617
People ex rel. Cassavoy v.		v. Kinkhead	900
Dimond	1092	v. Laik	1444
People ex rel. Cross v. Ahearn	905	v. Mayer	920
People ex rel. Cunningham v.		Petrie v. Badenoch	551
Osborn	204	Pettee v. Hawes	164
People ex rel. Elec. R. Co. v.		Pettigrew v. Evansville	269
Com. of Texas	56	Pettingill v. Porter	163, 179
People ex rel. Frost v. N. Y. C.		Petty v. Styward	987
& H. R. Co	192, 1519	Peugh v. Davis	1064, 1076
People ex rel. Int. Nav. Co. v.		Peysler v. Mayor	545
Barker	38	Peyton v. London	286
People ex rel. Met. St. R. Co.		Pfaff v. Golden	128, 876
v. Tax Com'rs	143, 144	Pfanner v. Sturmer	935
People ex rel. Stewart v. R.		Pfeiffer v. Rheinfrank	83, 1455
Com'rs	235	Pflugger v. Carmichael	18, 19
People ex rel. W. G. Co. v.		Pfitum v. Spencer	811
Deehan	146, 1413	Pharis v. Gere	889, 1425
People's Bk. v. Loeffert	562	v. Muldoon	318
People's Gas Co. v. Tyne	57, 240	Phelan v. Brady	574, 808
v. Tyner	303	v. Olney	1058
People's Ice Co. v. Davenport	59	Phelps, Matter of	1464
People's Sav. Bk. v. Alexander	871	v. Nolen	304
Peoria v. Central Nat. Bank	1511	v. Phelps	426, 515, 516, 663,
Peoria G. & E. Co. v. Dunbar	1501		668, 669, 671
Pequawkett Bridge v. Mathes	1468	Phelps' Executor v. Pond	457
Percifull v. Platt	983	Pheysey v. Vicary	179
Percival v. Chase	1367	Philadelphia v. Fox	428
v. Hughes	294	v. Girard's Heirs	477
Perdue v. Bell	1036	v. Keystone Battery A	480
Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Baertz	1577	v. Overseers	479
Perelles v. Magoon	1501	v. Spring Garden	298
Perin v. Carey	475	Philbrick v. Ewing	244
v. Megibben	677	Philbrook v. Delano	526, 616, 1346,
Perkins, <i>In re</i>	568, 1227		1457

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

XCI

[References are to pages.]

Phillips, Matter of	1550	Pierce v. Tregg	985
Phillips v. Brown	1237	v. Waring	555
v. Covert	927, 935, 936, 942,	v. William	692
	943	Pierre v. Fernald	276, 724
v. Farley	637, 648	Pierrepont v. Barnard	322
v. Ferguson	1012, 1013	Pierson v. Armstrong	467
v. Haliday	67	v. Lane	617
v. Herron	617	v. Speyer	299
v. Homfray	927	Piggott v. Mason	839
v. La Forge	642	Pigot's Case	1439, 1476
v. Overfield	518	Pike v. Wassell	706
v. Phillips	172, 203, 452, 453,	Pile v. Pedrick	291
	457, 1089	Pillars v. McConnell	510
v. Pullen	538	Pillot v. Landon	426, 430
v. Ritter	1342, 1375	Pillow v. Roberts	1465
v. Roquemore	1575	v. Southwest Imp. Co.	1004
v. Smith	781	v. Wade	715
v. Stevens	830	Pillsbury v. Alexander	226, 1502
v. Swank	595	Pinckney v. Burrage	1367
v. Thompson	787	Pinero v. Judson	933
v. Winslow	56	Pingree v. Comstock	449
Phinizy v. Guernsey	572	Pinhorn v. Souster	936
Phipps v. Phipps	957, 964, 972, 973	Pinkum v. Eau Claire	216
v. State	308	Pinney v. Fellows	439, 511, 526
v. Tarpley	1505	Pinnacle v. Clough	437
v. West Md. R. Co.	232	Pistol v. Piccardson	1545
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Continental		Pitcher v. Livingston	1524, 1525
Ins. Co.	164	Pitman v. Hill	1355
Phoenix I. W. Co. v. N. Y. Se-		v. Pitman	430
curity Co.	36	v. Poor	326
Pickard v. Sears	1339	Pitney v. Husted	1506, 1509
Pickens v. Davis	1561	Pittman v. Weeks	1365
v. Ryner	1468	Pitts v. Aldrich	717
Pickerell v. Carson	13	v. Hendrix	61
Pickering v. Moore	67	v. Maier	1034
v. Rudd	199	v. Parker	1039
v. Shotwell	478	Pittsburgh Amusement Co. v.	
Pickett v. Bartlett	947	Ferguson	812
v. Ferguson	898	Pitzzman v. Boyce	324
v. Jones	1059, 1078	Pizzala v. Campbell	659
v. Loggon	539	Place v. Dudley	1529
Pidcock v. Bishop	534	v. Hayward	554
Pierce v. Brew	1458	Planter's Bank v. Davis	641
v. Brown	1014	Platt v. Elias	1458
v. Chace	978	v. Finck	714, 715, 1447
v. Cleland	183	v. Kline	863
v. Cloud	209	v. Squire	1072
v. Dyer	262, 285, 294	v. Vattier	458
v. Emery	56	v. Vermillion	1513
v. Fernald	207, 1368	Pleasant v. Benson	927
v. Frace	1412	Pleasants v. Blodgett	1492
v. George	25, 34	Pledge v. Carr	1095
v. Georger	1482	v. White	1096
v. Hakes	1464	Plessy v. Ferguson	4
v. Hower	513	Plet v. Willson	1359
v. Keator	243, 244, 309	Pleydell v. Pleydell	1256
v. Knight	1545	Plimpton v. Converse	201, 209, 264
v. Kusic	757	v. Plimpton	776
v. Oliver	1004	Plucker v. Teller	549
v. Pierce	547, 557, 735, 737	Plumb v. Tubbs	394, 601, 1015
v. Selleck	180	Plumer v. Plumer	30, 896
v. Spear	1090	Plunket v. Holmes	645

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Plymouth <i>v.</i> Hickman	439	Portland <i>v.</i> Keep	207
Plympton <i>v.</i> Boston	773, 774, 775	Posner Bros. <i>v.</i> Bayless, Trustee	1465
Podleck <i>v.</i> Phelan	42	Post <i>v.</i> Campan	1526
Podmore <i>v.</i> Gunning	536	<i>v.</i> Kearney	837, 867
Poignard <i>v.</i> Smith	900	<i>v.</i> Martens	810, 814
Poillon <i>v.</i> Poillon	669, 670, 672	<i>v.</i> Moore	452
Poland <i>v.</i> Vesper	760	<i>v.</i> Pearsall	220, 221, 225, 242, 243, 271, 307, 308, 309
Polhemus <i>v.</i> Emson	1572	<i>v.</i> Rohrbach	492
<i>v.</i> Trainer	873	Post Hill Imp. Co. <i>v.</i> Brandegee	1500
Polk <i>v.</i> Daly	920	Postlethwaite <i>v.</i> Payne	201, 210
Pollard <i>v.</i> Barnes	197, 198, 201	Potomac Dredging Co. <i>v.</i> Smoot	780
<i>v.</i> Dwight	1522	Potter <i>v.</i> Adams	1440
<i>v.</i> Gare	175, 273	<i>v.</i> Couch	470, 597, 598, 1273
<i>v.</i> Maddox	1500	<i>v.</i> Cromwell	12, 16, 18, 19, 23, 1051
Polley <i>v.</i> Johnson	62	<i>v.</i> Everitt	664
Pollitt <i>v.</i> Kerr	701	<i>v.</i> Jacobs	530
Pollock <i>v.</i> Farmers' L. & T. Co.	118	<i>v.</i> Mercer	812
Polly <i>v.</i> Bessey	198	<i>v.</i> North	211
<i>v.</i> McCall	198	<i>v.</i> Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co.	45
Polyblank <i>v.</i> Hawkins	748, 749	<i>v.</i> White	291
Pomeroy <i>v.</i> Mills	217	Pottkamp <i>v.</i> Buss	1499
Pomfret <i>v.</i> Ricroft	177, 249, 845	Pottle <i>v.</i> Lowe	1227
<i>v.</i> Windsor	933	Poull <i>v.</i> Mockley	242, 272
Pond <i>v.</i> Bergh	640, 1308	Powell <i>v.</i> Bagg	201, 202
Pool <i>v.</i> Alger	295	<i>v.</i> Clark	1514
<i>v.</i> Blackie	642	<i>v.</i> Crow	1042
<i>v.</i> Harrison	523	<i>v.</i> Gossom	640
<i>v.</i> Lamb	895	<i>v.</i> McAshan	39
<i>v.</i> Morris	616	<i>v.</i> Monson Mfg. Co.	24, 665, 695, 696, 697, 711, 712
Poole <i>v.</i> Bentley	813	<i>v.</i> Sims	274
<i>v.</i> Engelke	940, 941	Power <i>v.</i> Cassidy	500, 501
<i>v.</i> Huskinson	223	Powers' Appeal	539
<i>v.</i> Needham	599	Powers, Matter of	1044
Poor <i>v.</i> Hazelton	540	<i>v.</i> Dennison	1523
<i>v.</i> Oakman	28, 54	<i>v.</i> Golden Lumber Co.	1072
<i>v.</i> Sears	861, 904	<i>v.</i> Heffernan	176
<i>v.</i> Woodburn	578	<i>v.</i> Jackson	683
Pope <i>v.</i> Dapray	514, 516	<i>v.</i> Sample	757
<i>v.</i> Devereux	201, 256	Powerscourt <i>v.</i> Powerscourt	478
<i>v.</i> Durant	658	Powley <i>v.</i> Walker	781
<i>v.</i> Jackson	24	Powys <i>v.</i> Blgrave	787
<i>v.</i> O'Hara	253, 329	Prahar <i>v.</i> Tousey	857
<i>v.</i> Shinkle	19	Prairie State Bk. <i>v.</i> United States	1085
Popplewell <i>v.</i> Modkinson	284, 300	Pratt <i>v.</i> Baker	31
Porch <i>v.</i> Fries	651, 652	<i>v.</i> Ogden	327
Porche <i>v.</i> Bodin	61	<i>v.</i> Paine	910, 1021
Port <i>v.</i> Jackson	871	<i>v.</i> Philbrook	534, 535
Porter's Will, Matter of	1464	<i>v.</i> Pratt	1051
Porter <i>v.</i> Bk. of Rutland	441	<i>v.</i> Sladden	523
<i>v.</i> Bleiler	810	<i>v.</i> Sweetser	259
<i>v.</i> Bradley	834, 1528	<i>v.</i> Trustees	453
<i>v.</i> Hill	990	Pratt, Hurst & Co. <i>v.</i> Tailer	905, 906
<i>v.</i> Hubbard	649, 942	Pray <i>v.</i> Hegeman	498, 1286, 1288, 1289
<i>v.</i> Lazear	682, 719	<i>v.</i> Pierce	1402
<i>v.</i> Merrill	595, 817	<i>v.</i> Stebbins	978
<i>v.</i> Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co.	35	Preble <i>v.</i> Reed	172
<i>v.</i> Spencer	882		
<i>v.</i> Turner	807		
Porter Hardware Co. <i>v.</i> Lee	1577		
Portington's Case	620, 621, 911, 1010, 1022		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xciii

[References are to pages.]

Precht v. Howard	43	Proctor v. Bishop of Bath	1283
Preiser v. Wielandt	949	v. Gilson	67
Prentice v. Geiger	299	v. Hodgson	178
v. Janssen	1236	v. Pool	1497
Prentis v. Bates	1548	Proffitt v. Henderson	777
Prentiss v. Bowden	1571	Proprietors, etc. v. Springer	1362,
v. Warne	919		1363
Presby v. Benjamin	129, 826, 847	Proprietors of Mills v. Braintree	
Presby. Ch. in Newark v. Andruss	68	Water Supply Co.	269
Prescott v. Nevers	963	Proseus v. McIntyre	512
v. Phillips	258	Proud v. Hollis	845
v. Trueman	1526	Providence v. Bullock	986
v. Williams	1529	Providence Co. Savs. Bk. v. Hall	946
v. Wills	13	Providence Ins. for Savings v.	
Preston v. Bosworth	1016	Carpenter	442
v. Briggs	42	Providence Telegram Pub. Co.	
v. Hall	240	v. Craham Engraving Co.	1466
v. Hawley	125, 795, 831, 832,	Providence Tool Co. v. Corliss	
	881, 942, 944, 1368	Steam Engine Co.	172
v. Hull	301	Province v. Crow	1500
v. Preston	439, 505, 517	Provost v. Calder	901
v. Ryan	60	Provost of Beverly's Case	1175
Prevatt v. Harrelson	1361	Provost of Dumfries v. Aber-	
Prevot v. Lawrence	895	crombie	490
Prey v. Stanley	597	Pruden v. Paxton	970
Price, Matter of	1425	Prutsmen v. Baker	1472, 1473
v. Brayton	60, 65	Pryor v. Foster	894, 897, 899
v. Breckinridge	224	Pugh v. Acton	43
v. Brown	519, 1364	v. Hayes	421
v. Fenn	1427, 1428	v. Pugh	518
v. Hobbs	696	Pugsley v. Aikin	874, 923, 927, 928,
v. King	1398, 1399		929
v. Lafayette Co. Bk.	1343	Pulitzer v. Livingston	1273
v. Maxwell	1563	Pullen v. Pullen	652
v. Pestka	975	Pullian v. Sells	929
v. Pickett	771	Pulpress v. African Church	485
v. Plainfield	222	Pulsford v. Richards	534
v. Price	51, 143, 448, 638, 666,	Purdy v. Coar	1070, 1102
	709	v. Hayt	628, 954, 955, 957, 1152,
v. P. F. W. & C. R. R. Co.	1472		1169, 1170, 1183, 1194,
v. Reeves	510		1195, 1272, 1389, 1402
v. Sisson	425, 430, 461	v. Huntington	1047, 1107
v. Weehawken Ferry Co.	53	v. Purdy	510
v. Williams	812	Purefoy v. Rogers	1186
Prickard v. Sears	1341	Purtle v. Bell	1367
Prickett v. Ritter	926, 928	Pusey v. Desbouvrie	536
Priddy v. Griffith	684	v. Pusey	70
Pride, <i>In re</i>	1107, 1108	Putnam v. Ritchie	960, 972
Priest v. Cummings	713	v. Story	1174, 1189
v. Nichols	861, 907	v. Westcott	792
Priester v. Hohloch	118	v. Wise	795
Prime v. City of Yonkers	302	Putney v. Dresser	956
Primm v. Walker	1332	Putzel v. Drovers & Mec. Nat.	
Prince v. Case	321, 323, 327	Bk.	294
Prindle v. Anderson	814, 926, 938	v. Van Brunt	1500
Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co.	283, 284,	Pyatt v. Waldo	1297
	285	Pybus v. Smith	599
Prior v. Prior	997	Pye v. Daubuz	1531
Pritchard v. Bailey	472	Pyer v. Carter	172, 174
Pritts v. Ritchey	672	Pyke v. Crouch	1553
Probst v. Rochester Steam Laun-		Pylant v. Reeves	1039
dry Co.	808, 811	Pynchon v. Stearns	777

[References are to pages.]

Q.			
Quackenbush v. Leonard	510	Ranken v. James	771, 1193
v. Mapes, No. 1	84, 1109, 1458	Rapps v. Gottlieb	1061, 1062
Quade v. Bertsch	1157, 1164	Ratliffe v. Mason	676
Quicksall v. Philadelphia	222	Rathbone v. Dyckman	1256
Quigley v. Gridley	531, 569	Rausch v. Moore	664
v. Johns Mfg. Co.	907	Ravenel v. Ingram	1538
Quimby v. Dill	765	Raw v. Von Zedlitz	544
v. Manhattan Cloth Co.	25	Rawden v. Shadwell	541
v. Straw	178	Rawley v. Brown	795
Quincy v. Jones	280	v. Holland	1205
Quinn's Estate	473	Rawlins v. Buttell	705
Quinn v. McDole	1120	Rawson v. Fox	92, 1470
v. Morse	286, 293	v. Rawson	638
Quintard v. Bishop	267	Rawstron v. Taylor	303
Quivey v. Baker	1350	Ray v. Long	975, 978
		v. Pung	726
		Raymond v. Holborn	1125
		v. Nash	1505
		v. Smith	1470
		v. Wagner	1552
		Raynor v. Raynor	693
		v. Selmes	1123, 1127
		Rea v. Algren	859
		v. Eagle Transfer Co.	816
		Read v. Erie R. Co.	1347
		v. Robinson	449, 1472
		v. Williams	495, 1233
		Readdy v. Pendergast	556
		Reade v. Livingston	565
		Reading v. Althouse	306
		v. Waterman	1050
		Readman v. Conway	903
		Ready v. Kearsley	461, 468
		Reagle v. Reagle	574, 752
		Ream v. Harnish	796
		Reck v. P. Ins. Co.	1372
		Reckhow v. Schenck	934, 936, 938, 942
		Rector v. Gibbon	518, 520
		v. Waugh	969, 992
		Rector of Chedington's Case	799
		Rector, etc. Christ P. E. Church	
		v. Mack	1133
		Reddick v. Long	1361
		Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawier	954
		Redfield v. Parks	1360
		v. Reid	1073
		Redgrave v. Hurd	534, 535
		Redman v. Forman	303
		Redmond v. Excelsior S. F. & L.	
		Assn.	1340
		Red River v. Caddo	1511
		Redstrake v. Townsend	618
		Reech v. Kennegal	536
		Reed v. Dickerman	742
		v. Farr	1342
		v. Gannon	575
		v. Locks and Canals	1502, 1512
		v. Lukens	530, 571, 572
		v. Morrison	720
		v. Painter	510
		v. Reed	509, 780, 936, 943,
			1002, 1065

R.			
Raby v. Reeves	120		
Race v. Gilbert	662		
Radam M. C. Co., <i>In re</i>	412		
Radcliff v. Mayor	229, 279, 280		
Radcliff's Executors v. Mayor of Brooklyn	229		
Radey v. McCurdy	43		
Radley v. Kuhn	1289		
Rafferty v. Central Traction Co.	230		
Railroad Co. v. Bingham	232		
v. Georgia	146		
v. Maine	146		
v. Malott	166		
v. Robinson	235		
v. Schurmeier	226		
Railsback v. Walke.	807, 925		
Raines v. Walker	1496, 1497		
Ralston v. Field	1572		
v. Truesdell	617		
v. Turpin	543, 544		
Ramberg v. Wahlstrom	960		
Ramsdill, Matter of	1580		
Ramsey v. Wilkie	828		
Ramthun v. Halfman	225		
Randall, <i>In re</i>	1273		
v. Beatty	1561		
v. Bookey	522		
v. Cleaveland	785		
v. Jaques	1465		
v. Josselyn	1253		
v. Kreiger	661		
v. Latham	166		
v. Lower	1349		
v. Marble	1012, 1013		
v. McLaughlin	160		
v. Morgan	436		
v. Phillips	987		
v. Rigby	138		
v. Sanderson	275		
Randell, <i>In re</i>	1548		
Rands v. Kendall	672		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

XCV

[References are to pages.]

Reed <i>v.</i> Reynolds	853	Rep. Chemical Co. <i>v.</i> Victor Co.	564
<i>v.</i> Shepley	897	Rerick <i>v.</i> Kern	158, 326
<i>v.</i> Whitney	426, 670	Resurrection Gold Mining Co. <i>v.</i> Fortune Gold Mining Co.	1512
Reeder <i>v.</i> Sayre	63, 769, 771, 806, 810, 925, 926, 927, 928, 938	Reyburn <i>v.</i> Wallace	774, 775
Reedy <i>v.</i> Camfield	1361	Reyman <i>v.</i> Henderson Nat. Bk.	24
Reel <i>v.</i> Elder	704, 705, 720	Reynard <i>v.</i> Spence	675
Reese <i>v.</i> De Bernardy	540, 544	Reynolds, <i>Ex parte</i>	559
<i>v.</i> Zinn	931	<i>v.</i> Bristow	482
Reeve, Matter of	1312	<i>v.</i> City Nat. Bank	1469
<i>v.</i> Atty.-Gen.	485	<i>v.</i> Cook	1344
<i>v.</i> Lisle	1077	<i>v.</i> Denslow	495
<i>v.</i> Long	1185	<i>v.</i> Fargo	293
Reeves <i>v.</i> Abercrombie	1042	<i>v.</i> Harris	1424
<i>v.</i> Baker	452, 456	<i>v.</i> Hennessy	1120
<i>v.</i> Evans	412	<i>v.</i> Hull	758
<i>v.</i> McComeskey	919	<i>v.</i> I. S. M. Co.	317
<i>v.</i> Sebern	1575	<i>v.</i> Morris	509
Reformed Dutch Church, Matter of	69	<i>v.</i> Reynolds	704, 705, 727
<i>v.</i> Ten Eyck	1437	<i>v.</i> Schuler	39, 43
Regan <i>v.</i> Fosdick	946, 949	<i>v.</i> Van Beuren	906
<i>v.</i> Lutky	935	Rex <i>v.</i> Hudson	221
Regina <i>v.</i> Chorley	257	<i>v.</i> Newman	479
<i>v.</i> County Court Judge	142	Rhea <i>v.</i> Rawle	679
<i>v.</i> Davenport	910	Rheinlander <i>v.</i> Farmers' L. & T. Co.	1369
<i>v.</i> Inhabitants of St. Paul	1467	Rhoads <i>v.</i> Davidheiser	301
<i>v.</i> Pratt	245	Rhodes <i>v.</i> McCormick	285
<i>v.</i> Westbrook	118	<i>v.</i> School Dist.	1468
Reich <i>v.</i> Dyer	1034	Ricard <i>v.</i> Williams	193, 195
Reichenbach <i>v.</i> Quin	478	Rice <i>v.</i> Barrett	428
Reichert <i>v.</i> St. L. & S. F. R. Co.	232	<i>v.</i> Bernard	985
<i>v.</i> Stilwell	1113, 1121	<i>v.</i> Boston & W. R. Corp.	820, 1018
Reid <i>v.</i> Board of Education	226	<i>v.</i> Bunce	1341
<i>v.</i> Fitch	518	<i>v.</i> Culver	855, 1576
<i>v.</i> Gordon	422	<i>v.</i> Norfolk	302
<i>v.</i> Kirk	54	<i>v.</i> Parkman	1426
<i>v.</i> Klein	1508	<i>v.</i> Peet	1386
<i>v.</i> McGowan	1571	<i>v.</i> Roberts	291
<i>v.</i> Rhodes	1497	<i>v.</i> Walinszius	1574
<i>v.</i> State	1325	Rich <i>v.</i> Black	543, 548
<i>v.</i> Weissner Brewing Co.	1017	<i>v.</i> Bolton	924, 932, 937
Reidy <i>v.</i> Small	450	<i>v.</i> Braxton	1430
Reiff <i>v.</i> Horst	660, 661	<i>v.</i> Doyenn	920
<i>v.</i> Reiff	768, 770	<i>v.</i> Keyser	943
Reilly <i>v.</i> Man. El. R. Co.	231	<i>v.</i> Rich	710
<i>v.</i> Ringland	769	Richard <i>v.</i> Bent	1523
Reimer <i>v.</i> Stuber	208, 218	Richards <i>v.</i> Attleborough Branch R. R.	180, 253
Reinders <i>v.</i> Koppelman	998	<i>v.</i> Bellingham Bay Land Co.	660, 661
Reining <i>v.</i> R. Co.	230	<i>v.</i> County Commissioners	225
<i>v.</i> N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.	232, 272	<i>v.</i> Rose	176, 281, 285, 286, 291
Reis <i>v.</i> McDevitt	1079	<i>v.</i> Torbert	776, 778
Reisert <i>v.</i> City of New York	284, 304	Richardson <i>v.</i> Bigelow	268
Reitz <i>v.</i> Reitz	515	<i>v.</i> Clements	250
Reitzel <i>v.</i> Eckard	727, 728	<i>v.</i> Crandall	541
Remington <i>v.</i> Higgins	1043	<i>v.</i> Day	1438, 1439
Rennyson's Appeal	274, 276	<i>v.</i> Gifford	925
Renshaw <i>v.</i> Bean	266	<i>v.</i> Green	557
Renton <i>v.</i> Conley	1578	<i>v.</i> Langridge	933
Renz <i>v.</i> Stoll	439		
Reorganized Church <i>v.</i> Church of Christ	559		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Richardson v. Linney	555	Ripley v. Gelston	544
v. McNulty	258	v. Page	16
v. Palmer	1500	v. Waterworth	631
v. Pangridge	923	v. Yale	935
v. Pond	245, 246, 247	Rippetoe v. Dwyer	990
v. Pulver	714	Ripple v. Gilborn	997
v. SeEVERS	512	Rising v. Stannard	936, 941, 942
v. Stodder	472, 642	Ritch v. Talbot	50
v. Tobey	160, 834, 1542, 1543	Ritger v. Parker	307
v. Vermont Cent. R. Co.	279	Ritt v. Dodge	664
v. Watts	1514	Ritter v. Stevenson	1576
v. Wymann	712	Ritzler v. Raether	916
Richart v. Scott	282	Rivis v. Watson	131, 140
Richmond v. Lee	857	Rix v. Johnson	1503
Richmond R. Co. v. Durham & N. R. Co.	322	Roake v. American Tel. Co.	233
Rickard v. Dana	843, 865	Roan v. Holmes	682, 701, 719
v. Rickard	995	Roanoke Investment Co. v. Kansas City S. E. R. Co.	257
Ricker v. Lee	499	Roath v. Driscoll	302, 303
Ricketts v. Salwey	1343	Robarts v. Haley	518
Ricks v. Pope	597, 962	Robb's Appeal	507
Riddell v. Riddell	676	Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College	483, 1284
Riddick v. Walsh	680	Robbins v. Austin	1465
Riddle v. Whitehill	985	v. Bates	559
v. Whitehouse	517	v. Corvell	1550
Rider v. Smith	248	v. Kimball	508, 559
v. Thompson	1500	v. Robbins	515, 682
Ridgely v. Cross	764, 1237	Robert's Appeal	512
Ridgeway Stone Co. v. Way	34	Robert v. Corning	1272, 1274, 1275, 1280
Ridgway v. Ludlow	1512	Roberts v. Anderson	561
v. Masting	712	v. Baumgarten	1358
Ridout v. Dowding	522	v. Birks	1515
Rifener v. Bowman	1441	v. Brett	821
Rigden v. Vallier	954	v. Carr	223
v. Walker	510	v. Cary	1244
Riggan v. Green	1445	v. Clemens	1548
Riggs, <i>In re</i>	866, 1552	v. Cone	796
v. Palmer	537	v. Cooper	1376
v. Pursell	815, 817, 866, 873, 1015, 1151	v. Decker	1511
v. Riley	1355	v. Dixwell	426
Right v. Beard	933	v. Lewis	1214, 1215, 1218, 1219, 1254
v. Bucknell	1344, 1346	v. Lloyd	443
v. Darby	922, 924, 929	v. Morgan	989
v. Price	1549, 1552	v. Mullinder	444
Righter v. Forrester	1575	v. Nor. Pac. R. Co.	530, 570, 571, 1340, 1341
v. Ludwig	1303	v. Phillips	1552
Rightsell v. Hale	265	v. Richards	1048
Rigler v. Cloud	426, 642	v. Roberts	249, 250, 251, 1393, 1500
Riland v. Eckert	1575	v. Round	1556
Riley v. Lissner	859	v. Stevens	470
v. Riley	526, 748	v. Washburne	144, 146
Rindge v. Baker	291	v. Whiting	768
Rine v. Wagner	503	v. Wynne	532
Rines v. Mansfield	1517	Robertson v. Brulatour	412
Ring v. Lawless	1548	v. Coal Co.	283, 284
v. McCoun	465	v. Hayes	798
Ringgold v. Bryan	578	v. Norris	748
Rinkenberger v. Meyer	1237		
Riordan v. Britton	1574		
Ripley v. Cross	895, 896		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xcvii

[References are to pages.]

Robertson <i>v.</i> Pickrell	1347, 1351	Rogers <i>v.</i> Abbott	1090
<i>v.</i> Robertson	753	<i>v.</i> Blackwell	1446
<i>v.</i> Sully	1099	<i>v.</i> Boynton	894, 896, 899
<i>v.</i> Wilson	1189	<i>v.</i> Brokaw	16, 20, 24, 31, 36
Robie <i>v.</i> Smith	936	<i>v.</i> Colt	1475
Robins <i>v.</i> Coryell	1464	<i>v.</i> Crow	52
Robinson <i>v.</i> Adams	495	<i>v.</i> Eagle Fire Ins. Co.	1392, 1393, 1396
<i>v.</i> Allison	1226-1366	<i>v.</i> Higgins	534, 543
<i>v.</i> Appleton	1039	<i>v.</i> Hillhouse	1457
<i>v.</i> Bates	711	<i>v.</i> Humphreys	1068
<i>v.</i> Clapp	66, 199, 274	<i>v.</i> Hurd	1444
<i>v.</i> Deering	936	<i>v.</i> Marshall	553
<i>v.</i> Govers	690, 694, 700	<i>v.</i> New York & Texas Land Co.	527
<i>v.</i> Kerrigan	1582	<i>v.</i> Potter	664
<i>v.</i> Kime	768	<i>v.</i> Rawlings	1408
<i>v.</i> Lehman	869	<i>v.</i> Rogers	522, 1546
<i>v.</i> Litton	1252	<i>v.</i> Sinsheimer	172, 287, 291
<i>v.</i> Miller	670, 728, 984	<i>v.</i> Smith	1087
<i>v.</i> N. Y. El. R. Co.	231, 269	Roll <i>v.</i> Rea	1090
<i>v.</i> Palmer	1160, 1164	Rollin <i>v.</i> Cross	1576
<i>v.</i> Payne	1517	Rollins <i>v.</i> Mooers	1503
<i>v.</i> Queen	751	Romain <i>v.</i> Lewis	1413
<i>v.</i> Randolph	593	Roman <i>v.</i> Taylor	857
<i>v.</i> Roberts	990	Rome Exchange Bk. <i>v.</i> Eames	1157
<i>v.</i> Robinson	518, 1548	Romer <i>v.</i> Conter	1482
<i>v.</i> Ryan	1063	Romig <i>v.</i> Gillett	1063
<i>v.</i> Sherman	990	Roof <i>v.</i> Stafford	1442
<i>v.</i> Wheeler	779, 786, 787	Roosa <i>v.</i> Harrington	1153, 1157, 1167, 1188, 1190
<i>v.</i> White	1511	Roosevelt <i>v.</i> Hopkins	817
<i>v.</i> Wiley	756	<i>v.</i> Smith	880
Robison <i>v.</i> Codman	965	Root <i>v.</i> Bryant	1579
Robles <i>v.</i> Clark	512	<i>v.</i> Commonwealth	217, 322
Roby <i>v.</i> Colehour	553	<i>v.</i> Wadhams	324
<i>v.</i> N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.	257, 259	Rootes <i>v.</i> Holliday	1470
Roca <i>v.</i> Byrne	518, 519	Roper <i>v.</i> Lloyd	848
Roche <i>v.</i> Mason	1548	Rorbach <i>v.</i> Crossett	929
Rochefoucauld <i>v.</i> Boustead	510, 527, 1369	Rorke <i>v.</i> Abraham	467
Rochester, Matter of	1511	Rosche <i>v.</i> Kosmowski	1079
Rochester Water Comm'rs, Matter of	235	Rose <i>v.</i> Bunn	221, 306, 307
Rochester & C. Turnpike Co. <i>v.</i> Parriour	410	<i>v.</i> City of Farmingham	203
Rockland Canal Co. <i>v.</i> Radcliffe	212	<i>v.</i> Clark	666
Rockland W. Co. <i>v.</i> Tillson	249	<i>v.</i> Davis	894, 895, 896
Rockwell <i>v.</i> Bradley	1050	<i>v.</i> Hatch	457, 500
<i>v.</i> Hobby	1037	<i>v.</i> Hawley	1015, 1162
Rodgers <i>v.</i> Bonner	578	<i>v.</i> Rose	702
<i>v.</i> Peckham	1062	Roseboom <i>v.</i> Van Vechten	612, 613, 1567
Rodwell <i>v.</i> Phillips	60	Rosenan <i>v.</i> Childress	1368
Roe <i>v.</i> Archbishop of York	913, 914	Rosenberg <i>v.</i> Lustgarten	924
<i>v.</i> Baldmere	616	Rosenfiel <i>v.</i> Arrol	903
<i>v.</i> Lees	922	Rosenthal <i>v.</i> Ives	315
<i>v.</i> Lonsdale	964	<i>v.</i> Mayhugh	721
<i>v.</i> Strong	1510	<i>v.</i> Renick	1428
<i>v.</i> Vingut	431, 1284	Rosevelt <i>v.</i> Fulton	537
Roe d. Perry <i>v.</i> Jones	1188	Rosewell <i>v.</i> Pryor	273
Roe d. Wilkinson <i>v.</i> Tramarr	1495	Rosf's Charity	478
Roffey <i>v.</i> Henderson	39	Rosher, <i>In re</i>	597, 598
Rogan <i>v.</i> Beck	1571	Ross <i>v.</i> Adams	1385
Rogers, Matter of	1235	<i>v.</i> Conway	547

[References are to pages.]

Ross <i>v.</i> Perry	1536	Russell <i>v.</i> Heublein	216
<i>v.</i> Thompson	205, 224	<i>v.</i> Hilton	468, 497
<i>v.</i> Watson	619	<i>v.</i> Jackson	523
Rosseau <i>v.</i> Bleau	1474	<i>v.</i> Maloney	1342
Rosse's Case	626, 627	<i>v.</i> Maxwell L. G. Co.	1407
Rossmiller <i>v.</i> State	59	<i>v.</i> Russell	1214
Rotch <i>v.</i> Emerson	481	<i>v.</i> Southard	1077
Roth <i>v.</i> Rauschenbusch	1254	<i>v.</i> Watts	160, 169, 171, 175, 273
Rothe <i>v.</i> Bellingrath	1577	Rust <i>v.</i> Low	295
Rothschild <i>v.</i> Schiff	486, 502	Rutgers <i>v.</i> Kingsland	576, 1489
<i>v.</i> Williamson	926	Rutherford <i>v.</i> Greene's Heirs	596
Rothwell <i>v.</i> Dewees	990	Rutherford Realty Co. <i>v.</i> Cook	1061
Round Lake Ass'n <i>v.</i> Kellogg	1518	Rutz <i>v.</i> Kehn	1342
Roundel <i>v.</i> Currier	592	Ruyter <i>v.</i> Reid	1125
Rowan <i>v.</i> Lytle	123, 639, 641, 914, 915, 938, 942, 943	Ryan <i>v.</i> Brown	59, 297
<i>v.</i> Sharps' Rifle Mfg. Co.	1096	<i>v.</i> Carter	1416, 1417
Rowbotham <i>v.</i> Wilson	283	<i>v.</i> Clark	800
Rowe <i>v.</i> Becket	1369, 1398	<i>v.</i> Dox	558
<i>v.</i> Hamilton	715	<i>v.</i> Freeman	649
<i>v.</i> Johnson	701	<i>v.</i> Growney	1443
<i>v.</i> St. P. M. & M. R. Co.	301	<i>v.</i> N. V. & S. I. R. Co.	246
Rowell <i>v.</i> Doggett	180	<i>v.</i> Wilson	905, 1459
Rowland <i>v.</i> Miller	187, 192	Ryder <i>v.</i> Cobb	1579
<i>v.</i> Rowland	954	<i>v.</i> Loomis	508
Rowley <i>v.</i> Rowley	569	<i>v.</i> Robinson	811
Royce <i>v.</i> Adams	1223	Rye <i>v.</i> George	572
<i>v.</i> Guggenheim	848, 849, 850, 852	Ryer <i>v.</i> Gass	1108
Royston <i>v.</i> Royston	661	Ryerson <i>v.</i> Eldred	896
Rozier <i>v.</i> Griffith	996	<i>v.</i> Quackenbush	124, 127, 831
Ruch <i>v.</i> Rock Island	1018	Ryle <i>v.</i> Ryle	530, 546
Ruckman <i>v.</i> Outwater	66		
Rudd <i>v.</i> Cornell	1006, 1164, 1171		S.
Ruddiman <i>v.</i> Taylor	222, 226, 1502	Sackett <i>v.</i> Sackett	785
Rudy's Estate	523	Sackville-West <i>v.</i> Holmesdale	431
Ruess <i>v.</i> Ewen	1360	Saddler <i>v.</i> Lee	303
Ruffner <i>v.</i> Hill	1513	Sadler <i>v.</i> Pratt	1228
Rugby <i>v.</i> Merryweather	221	Safford <i>v.</i> Safford	726, 729
Ruggles <i>v.</i> First Nat. Bk. of Centreville	1133	<i>v.</i> Stubbs	1368
<i>v.</i> Lawson	1472	Saffyn's Case	800
Rumill <i>v.</i> Robbins	181, 182	Sage <i>v.</i> City of New York	1330,
Rumph <i>v.</i> Abercrombie	539		1510
Rumsey <i>v.</i> N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.	231, 240, 296	<i>v.</i> Jones	1526
Runnels <i>v.</i> Webber	1528	<i>v.</i> Mayor	1415
Runyan <i>v.</i> Mersereau	1063	<i>v.</i> Sherman	676
Rush <i>v.</i> Vough	535	Sager <i>v.</i> Galloway	786
Rush County <i>v.</i> Stubbs	28	<i>v.</i> Tupper	1105
Rushin <i>v.</i> Shields	1470	Sainsbury <i>v.</i> Matthews	62
Russ <i>v.</i> Alpaugh	1535	Sanford <i>v.</i> Travers	1347
<i>v.</i> Perry	661, 721	<i>v.</i> Sanford	1348
Russel <i>v.</i> Fuel Gas Co.	558	St. Andrew's Church's Appeal	882
<i>v.</i> Hayner	1577	St. Anthony F. W. Co. <i>v.</i> Minneapolis	248
<i>v.</i> Lode	1513	St. Anthony F. W. P. <i>v.</i> Minneapolis	299
<i>v.</i> Russel	1037, 1038	St. George <i>v.</i> Wake	567
Russell, Matter of	954, 955, 1160	St. John <i>v.</i> Andrews Institute	483, 1290
<i>v.</i> Allen	515	<i>v.</i> Dann	617
<i>v.</i> Erwin	895, 896	St. Louis <i>v.</i> Rutz	1511
<i>v.</i> Fabyan	943		
<i>v.</i> Farley	532		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xcix

[References are to pages.]

St. Louis & A. R. Co., Matter of	235	Sanders v. Partridge	870
St. Louis B. Co. v. Curtis	1498	v. Ransom	1498, 1501
St. Louis Mining Co. v. Montana Mining Co.	317	v. Riedinger	1361
St. Louis Nat. Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co.	324, 328	v. Semcich	1559
St. Louis Radiator Mfg. Co. v. Carroll	52	Sanderson v. Pa. Coal Co.	299
St. Louis Transfer Co. v. L. M. B. Co.	232	v. Price	1069
St. Louis V. & D. H. R. Co. v. Terre Haute & I R. Co.	819	v. White	492
St. Paul v. Northern Pac.	1412	Sandford v. Bulkley	1122
St. Paul, etc. R. Co. v. Schurmeir	1510, 1511	v. McLean	682, 719, 726
St. Paul M. & M. R. Co. v. Donohue	1409	San Diego Gas Co. v. Frame	1468
St. Paul S. & Y. F. R. Co. v. Div. St. P., etc. R. Co.	1510	Sands v. Hughes	901, 1377
St. Paul's Church v. Atty.-Gen.	492, 523	v. Old Colony T. Co.	1181
St. Paul's Ch. v. Ford	68	Sanford, <i>In re</i>	629
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co.	63, 64, 308	v. Bennett	1429
St. Stephens, <i>In re</i>	488	v. Ellithorp	712
St. Vincent Asylum v. Troy	203, 1357, 1358	v. Hill	1087
Sale v. Prat	308	v. Kane	1078
v. Thornberry	453	v. Safford	963
Salisbury v. Andrews	1503	v. Sanford	1350, 1413
v. Clarke	439, 511, 513	Sanfoss v. Jones	507, 510
v. Shirley	837	San Francisco v. Lawton	1399
Salisbury Savings Soc. v. Cutting	1339, 1350	San Francisco, etc. R. Co. v. Oakland	1459
Salley v. Robinson	55	Sanger v. Bancroft	1059
Salmon, <i>In re</i>	1095	Sanguinetti v. Peck	301
v. Stuyvesant	1236	Sanitary District v. Allen	1368
Saltmarsh v. Barrett	525	Sanitary Dist. v. Cook	44
Saltonstall v. Sanders	473, 480, 481, 485	Sappington v. Oeschli	1090, 1575
Salisbury v. Denton	467, 1232	Sarah Jane Sandilands, <i>In re</i>	1462
Sammes Case	958, 1516	Saranac L. Co. v. Comptroller of N. Y.	1432
Sampson v. Burnside	324, 327	Sargent v. Baldwin	450
v. Camperdown Cotton Mills	42	v. Ballard	200
v. Camperdown Mills	53	v. Courrier	796
v. Easterby	837	v. Eureka S. P. Co.	579
v. Grogan	778	v. Hubbard	245, 267
v. Hoddinott	306	v. Roberts	737
v. Schaeffer	935	v. Smith	837
Samson v. Rose	769	v. Towne	10, 594
Samuels v. Borrowscale	1365	Sarles v. Sarles	767, 781
San Antonio Brewing Assn. v. Ice Co.	19, 33	Sarson v. Roberts	861
Sanborn v. Rice	1503	Sarter v. Clarkson	1039
Sand v. Church	126, 207, 832, 1146, 1366	Sarver v. Clarkson	679, 719
Sanderlin v. Baxter	172	Satterly v. Kobbe	995, 998, 999, 1003, 1004, 1006
Sanders v. Cassidy	1057	Sauer v. Bilton	778, 783
v. Godding	1505	v. City of New York	229
v. Martin	293	Saulet v. Shepherd	1331
v. McMillan	692, 696, 697	Saunders' Case	781, 1500
		Saunders v. Bennett	1577
		v. Blythe	664, 1496
		v. Flauniken	1538
		v. Hanes	832
		v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.	147, 1329, 1330, 1415, 1416
		v. Newman	250
		v. Reilly	9
		v. Schmaelzle	1501
		v. Simpson	209, 1371
		Saundress v. Gaynesford	410
		Savage v. Crill	712
		v. Dooley	1071

[References are to pages.]

Savage v. Jackson	535	Schmitt v. Willis	680
v. Lee	1201	Schmitzins v. Bailey	269
v. Mason	294	Schmucker's Est. v. Reed	522, 523
v. Savage	753	Schnebly v. Schnebly	685
Savannah, etc. R. Co. v. Shields	227	Schneider v. Norris	1437
Savery v. Browning	1497	Scholle v. Scholle	1007
v. King	539	School Committee v. Kesler	1475
Savings Bank v. Holt	1057	School District v. Batshe	941
Sawyer, <i>In re</i>	532	v. Lindsay	158
v. Cubby	1153, 1160, 1263, 1266, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1285	v. Lynch	202
v. Kendall	1365, 1366, 1512	Schoonmaker v. Michaels	231, 521, 541
v. McGillicuddy	859, 904, 906	Schouler, Petitioner	480
v. Peters	1469	Schouton v. Kilmer	756
v. Prickett	535	Schrier v. Shaffer	951
Sawyer-Austin Lumber Co. v. Clark	1577	Schrimpscher v. Stockton	598
Sayer v. Sayer	807	Schroeder v. Bozarth	1146
Sayers v. Hoskinson	684, 767, 781, 782	v. Gurney	1090
Sayles v. Best	1571	Schulenberg v. Harriman	1410
Sayre v. Townsend	507, 509, 515	v. Zimmerman	195
Sayre Newton Lumber Co. v. Park	1577	Schulte v. Warren	1511
Says v. Barnes	555	Schulting v. Schulting	776, 778
Scallan v. Manhattan R. Co.	208, 209	Schultz v. Arnot	1362
Scanlan v. Wright	1448	v. Byers	279, 280, 281
Scates v. Henderson	1502	Schultz's Appeal	536
Scattergood v. Kirk	547	Schultze v. Mayor	515, 516
Scatterwood v. Edge	1194, 1262, 1265, 1277	Schumaker v. Mather	533
Schaefer v. Blumenthal	294, 1368	Schurmeir v. St. P. & P. R. Co.	233
v. Thompson	167	Schutt v. Large	1493
Schafer v. Hauser	1369	Schuyler v. Broughton	981
v. Reilly	1399	v. Smith	901, 943, 945, 947
Scheffermeyer v. Schaper	536	Schwallback v. Chicago M. & S. P. R. Co.	1369
Scheick v. Donohue	1105	Schwalm v. Beardsley	1506
Schenck v. Barnes	471, 766	Schwartz v. Ballou	1438
Schenk v. Ellingwood	1229	Schwerdt v. Placer Co.	217, 218
Schenley v. Commonwealth	207, 208	S. V. R. Co. v. Lawrence	233
Schermerhorn v. Cotting	1274, 1281, 1284, 1291	Scobell v. Block	16
Schettler v. Smith	1172, 1195	Scobey v. Kinningham	1048
Scheurer v. Brown	1061	Scoones v. Morrell	1508
Schieffelin v. Carpenter	914, 917	Scott, <i>In re</i>	1319
Schierloh v. Schierloh	509, 515, 520, 559	v. Ashlin	698
Schile v. Brokhahus	268, 287, 292, 294, 828	v. Beecher	1101
Schlaefter v. Corson	518	v. Bentel	175
Schlageter v. Gude	1360	v. Brown	541
Schlemmer v. North	41	v. Bryon	1237
Schlereth v. Schlereth	1269, 1284	v. Edgar	1040
Schlesinger v. Kansas City R. Co.	1015	v. Gallagher	574
Schlicher v. Keeler	1473, 1474	v. Guernsey	957, 973, 996, 998
Schloss v. Feltus	578	v. Haverstraw Clay & Brick Co.	830
Schmidt, Matter of	1316	v. Lane	703
v. Brown	243	v. Lunt	138
v. Lewis	291	v. Manchester Print	1574
v. Quinn	177, 178, 179, 181	v. McMillan	1541, 1542, 1543
Schmitt v. Traphagen	1347, 1351	v. Simons	903
		v. Tyler	541, 1012, 1013, 1022
		v. Umbarger	548
		v. West	1157
		Scovill v. McMahon	1010
		Scoweruft, <i>In re</i>	478
		Seranton v. Booth	1527, 1528, 1532

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

ci

[References are to pages.]

Scranton v. Stewart	1444	Sergeant v. Nash, Field & Co.	817, 867
v. Wheeler	297	Sergeson v. Sealey	1229
Scriver v. Smith	152, 214, 240	Serry v. Curry	664
Scully v. Murray	831, 925	Servis v. Nelson	427
v. Sanders	1501	Seton v. Slade	1076
Seaboard Realty Co. v. Fuller	857	Sevier v. Greenway	1042
Seagram v. Knight	787	Sewall v. Lee	706
Seaman, Matter of	1163	v. Wilmer	1235
v. Hogeboom	1504	Sewell v. Augerstein	52
v. Smith	1512	v. Underhill	572
Searcy v. Hunter	1444	Sewing Machine Co. v. Dakin	1439
Searle v. Powell	923	Seymour v. Creswell	1361
Sears v. Ackerman	596	v. Delancy	538
v. Chapman	485	v. Freer	50, 1369
v. Choate	598	v. Lewis	169, 177
v. Putnam	1563	v. McDonald	186
v. Russell	1270	v. McKinstry	1038
v. Shafer	557	v. Page	1509
Seatoff v. Anderson	28	v. Sanders	755
Seaver, Matter of	1235	v. Warren	806, 813, 814
v. Fitzgerald	1271	v. Wilson	563
Seavey v. Cloudman	939	Sexton v. Breese	62, 1050,
Sebald v. Mulholland	293, 1542,		1056
	1543	v. Chicago Storage Co.	867, 868
Second, etc. Church v. Desbrow	457,	Shaber v. St. Paul W. Co.	1541
	594	v. Wheaton	564
Security Bank v. Holmes	1523	Shacklett's Appeal	1574
Security Co. v. Bryant	745	Shaeffer's Appeal	525
v. Snow	1231	Shaeffer v. Chambers	1066
Security Co. of Hartford v. Cone	1163	Shafer v. Wilson	268, 281
Security Land and Exploration Co. v. Burns	1504	Shaffer v. Hahn	993
Security Trust Co. v. Temple Trust Co.	52	Shaffstall v. McDaniel	1099
Seddon v. Senate	850	Shallcross's Estate	1264
Sedgwick v. Hollenback	1523, 1524,	Shampless v. Welch	441
	1531, 1533	Shaner v. Wilson	628
v. Laffin	591	Shanks v. Klein	983
Seeger v. Pettit	39	Shannon v. Pentz	1161
Seeley v. Bishop	180	Sharon v. Davidson	990
SeEVERS v. Gabel	830	v. Tucker	1355
Seidelbach v. Knaggs	465	Sharon Iron Co. v. City of Erie	1017
Seidensparger v. Spear	324	Sharp v. Cheatham	1541, 1542
Seitz v. Messerschmitt	1326	v. Robertson	1376
Seitzinger's Estate	470, 1273	v. Ropes	186
Selah v. Selah	543, 544	v. Sharp	4
Selb v. Montague	681	Sharpe v. Hancock	266
Selden v. Del. Canal Co.	327	Shattuck, Matter of	479, 482,
v. Keen	1013		485, 486, 502
v. Vermilya	1215	v. Lamb	1375, 1532, 1533
Sell v. West	512	Shaw v. Beveridge	67, 68
Sellers v. Union L. Co.	142	v. Bowman	768, 769, 865
Sellman v. Bowen	698	v. Hill	935, 981
Selman v. Lee	577	v. Hoffman	1021
Selons, <i>In re</i>	960	v. Loud	1455
Selover v. Commercial Co.	1478	v. McCarty	864, 888
Semple v. Cook	1362	v. Norfolk Co.	1055
Seneca Nation v. Christie	1415	v. Partridge	872
v. Knight	1511	v. Poor	1490
Senhouse v. Christian	249	v. Spencer	523
Serff v. Acton Local Board	182	Shawmut Bank v. Boston	855
		Sheafe v. O'Neil	688
		Shearer v. Ranger	661, 1528
		v. Shearer	670, 984, 985

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Shedlinsky v. Budweiser Brew- ing Co.	864	Shipley v. Leidig	1475
Sheetz v. Sweeney	1505	Shipman v. Beers	274
Sheffey v. Gardiner	1526	v. Rollins	503
v. Gardner	1532	Shipp v. Miller	1513
Sheffield v. Parker	442	Shire v. Plimpton	1537
Sheffield Society v. Aixlewood	557	Shires v. Glascock	1552
Sheldon v. Bliss	735, 737	Shirk v. City of Chicago	1358
v. Edwards	16, 19, 54	v. Thomas	1574
v. Stockbridge	479	Shirley v. Crabb	252, 262, 263
Shell v. Duncan	1430	v. Shirley	472, 473
v. West	894	Shively v. Bowlby	58, 59, 239, 240, 297, 298, 1330, 1331, 1405, 1415
Shellar v. Shivers	38, 42	Shneider v. Mahl	832
Shelley's Case	1175, 1176, 1177, 1179, 1180, 1181	Shoemaker v. Smith	510
Shelley v. Shelley	70	v. Walker	426
Shelton's Case	1461	Shoonmaker v. Sheely	1178
Shen v. Shenk	1066	Shope v. Schaffner	717
Shepard v. Briggs	862	Shores v. Carley	641, 748
v. Man. El. R. Co.	231	Short v. Bacon	496
v. Manhattan R. Co.	51, 664	v. Currier	536
v. Shepard	753	v. Moore	750
v. Spaulding	915, 1389, 1402	Shortall v. Hinckley	650, 651, 653
Shepardson v. Perkins	306	Shorthill v. Ferguson	1524
Shepherd v. Jeringon	973	Shotwell Executor v. Mott	498
v. May	1102	Shoup v. De Long	1181
v. Nave	1503	Shriver v. Shriver	578, 1063, 1075
v. White	513	Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav. Co.	59
Sheppard v. Wardell	713	Shufeldt v. Spaulding	1504
Sheridan v. Briggs	573	Shuur v. Rodenback	1471
v. House	1456	Sibley v. Ellis	211
Sherk v. Endress	445	v. Ross	1042
Sherman v. Baker	478, 484	Siddall's Estate	1271
v. Ballou	964	Siddons v. Short	281
v. Buick	1413	Sidebotham v. Holland	928
v. Champlain Tr. Co.	899	Sidney v. Shelley	523
v. Dodge	462	Siedler v. Syms	1273
v. Engel	915	Siemon v. Schurek	515, 579
v. Foster	1491	Siggers v. Evans	449
v. Hayward	660, 662, 712	Siglar v. Van Riper	659
v. Ludin	857	Sigmund v. Howard Bank	826, 844
v. Newton	742	Silberman v. Uhrlaub	190
v. Skuse	471	Sill v. White	654
v. Wilder	863	Silliman v. Paine	1364
v. Willett	61	Silsby v. Trotter	312
v. Williams	826	Silva v. Garcia	781
Sherras v. Craig	1097	v. Hopkinson	1177
Sherrred v. Cisco	291, 293	Silver v. Summer	895
Sherwood v. Amer. Bible Soc.	457	Silver Spring B. & D. Co. v. Wanscuck	299
v. Burr	195	Silvers v. Potter	519, 521
v. Cent. Mich. Sav. Bk.	520	Silvester v. Wilson	1177
v. Seaman	283	Simar v. Canaday	662, 1109
Shick v. Carroll Co. Comm'rs	217	Simis v. McElroy	101, 901, 1356, 1366, 1373
Shields v. Arndt	261	Simmons v. Cloonan	169, 172, 306
v. Hunt	698	v. Leonard	1551
v. Lozear	1031, 1052, 1056, 1057, 1063, 1099, 1105	v. Norton	768, 777
v. Russell	1034	v. Spratt	1456
v. Titus	243	Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran	
Shinn v. Shinn	978		1513
Shipley v. Bunn	1442	Simonds v. Cudmore	912
v. Fifty Assoc.	907		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

ciii

[References are to pages.]

Simonds <i>v.</i> Simonds	670	Slengluff <i>v.</i> Gainer	1464
<i>v.</i> Turner	870	Sloan <i>v.</i> Biemiller	1512
Simonson <i>v.</i> Hutchinson	1044	<i>v.</i> Campbell	1039
<i>v.</i> Lauck	1060	Sloane <i>v.</i> Stevens	1177
Simonton <i>v.</i> Houston	724, 741	Sloat <i>v.</i> McDougall	172, 175
<i>v.</i> Thompson	1504	Slocombe <i>v.</i> Glubb	567
Simpson <i>v.</i> Ammons	965	Slockbower <i>v.</i> Canousse	1004
<i>v.</i> Boston & M. R. Co.	195	Slocum <i>v.</i> Seymour	63
<i>v.</i> Dix	1055	Sloniger <i>v.</i> Sloniger	664, 1377
<i>v.</i> First Nat. Bk.	1035	Small <i>v.</i> Clifford	960, 961
<i>v.</i> Reed	617	<i>v.</i> Procter	1351
<i>v.</i> Savage	845	Smalley <i>v.</i> Isaacson	996
Simpson Brick Press Co. <i>v.</i> Wormley	35	Smiles <i>v.</i> Hastings	181
Sims <i>v.</i> Bardoner	1443	Smiley <i>v.</i> Fries	1497
<i>v.</i> Gay	625, 1022	Smith, Matter of	556
<i>v.</i> Jones	797	Smith, Matter of Will of	553
<i>v.</i> Smith	1443	<i>v.</i> Abbott	525
Sinclair <i>v.</i> Huntley	1344, 1347	<i>v.</i> Allen	1317, 1318, 1457
<i>v.</i> Jackson	1222, 1228, 1346	<i>v.</i> Agawam Canal Co.	300
<i>v.</i> Learned	1073	<i>v.</i> Ashton	1229
Singer <i>v.</i> New York	1508	<i>v.</i> Attersoll	441
Singer Mfg. Co. <i>v.</i> Lamb	1444	<i>v.</i> Balcom	515, 516
Singerland <i>v.</i> International Const. Co.	297	<i>v.</i> Bank	1421
Singleton's Heirs <i>v.</i> Singleton's Executors	692	<i>v.</i> Barrie	601
Sioux City, etc. <i>v.</i> Griffey	1410	<i>v.</i> Bartlett	1510, 1511
Sioux City, etc. Co. <i>v.</i> Wilson	1471	<i>v.</i> Bell	946, 1248, 1561
Sip <i>v.</i> Lawback	721	<i>v.</i> Benson	18
Sipley <i>v.</i> Wass	1572	<i>v.</i> Blood	68
Sir Moyle Finch's Case	1455	<i>v.</i> Boston & Albany R. Co.	229
Sisson <i>v.</i> Donnelly	1459	<i>v.</i> Bowen	1215
<i>v.</i> Hibbard	19, 20, 33	<i>v.</i> Bowes	1229
Sites <i>v.</i> Eldridge	1221, 1231, 1245	<i>v.</i> Brotherline	553
Sizor <i>v.</i> Logansport	1511	<i>v.</i> Burtis	1356
Skaggs <i>v.</i> Elkus	926	<i>v.</i> Chamberlin	1478
Skally <i>v.</i> Shute	848	<i>v.</i> Chapin	1366
Skellenberger <i>v.</i> Ransom	537	<i>v.</i> Chapman	1478
Skett <i>v.</i> Whitmore	436	<i>v.</i> Church	1368
Skinkel's Assignees <i>v.</i> Bristow	712	<i>v.</i> Chesebrough	1268
Skinner <i>v.</i> Fletcher	1481	<i>v.</i> City of Brooklyn	300
<i>v.</i> Wilder	65, 66	<i>v.</i> City of Buffalo	1502
Skipwith's Ex'r <i>v.</i> Cunningham	1474	<i>v.</i> City of Rochester	58, 59, 297, 1415, 1511
Skirm <i>v.</i> Rubber Co.	564	<i>v.</i> Clark	1012, 1126
Skolfield <i>v.</i> Skolfield	692, 695	<i>v.</i> Cole	1475
Skrymsher <i>v.</i> Northcote	523	<i>v.</i> Cooke	523
Skull <i>v.</i> Glenister	163, 184	<i>v.</i> Cooper	765
Slater <i>v.</i> Maxwell	538	<i>v.</i> Death	1243
<i>v.</i> Oriental Mills	521	<i>v.</i> Derr's Adm'r	1316
<i>v.</i> Rawson	381	<i>v.</i> Devlin	915
Slatter <i>v.</i> Meek	698	<i>v.</i> Drake	546
Slatterly <i>v.</i> Winne	238	<i>v.</i> Dyer	1054, 1055
Slattery <i>v.</i> Schwannecke	573	<i>v.</i> Edgewood Casino Club	816
Slee <i>v.</i> Manhattan Co.	643	<i>v.</i> Edwards	1171
Sleeper <i>v.</i> Laconia	1506, 1510	<i>v.</i> Evans	1505
Slegel <i>v.</i> Lauer	1023	<i>v.</i> Fleischman	1113
Slicer <i>v.</i> Bank of Pittsburg	1032	<i>v.</i> Flora	225
Slide & Spur Gold Mines <i>v.</i> Seymour	1022, 1038	<i>v.</i> Floyd	307, 466, 467, 1232, 1233
Slingerland <i>v.</i> Inter. C. Co.	1357, 1358	<i>v.</i> Fyler	119
		<i>v.</i> Gaines	996
		<i>v.</i> Gale	999, 1360, 1361
		<i>v.</i> Gardner	1069

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Smith <i>v.</i> Gatewood	157, 211	Smith <i>v.</i> Smith	692, 782, 1003, 1039,
<i>v.</i> Goulding	327, 328		1512, 1559
<i>v.</i> Griffin	179	<i>v.</i> Somes	568, 1212, 1243
<i>v.</i> Gromow	817	<i>v.</i> Sprague	1528, 1538
<i>v.</i> Handy	714	<i>v.</i> Stacey	1515
<i>v.</i> Hastings	1080	<i>v.</i> State	217, 225,
<i>v.</i> Havens Relief Fund So-			1507
ciety	482	<i>v.</i> Tarbox	178
<i>v.</i> Hiles-Carver	1038	<i>v.</i> Thackerah	280
<i>v.</i> Hodsdon	1045	<i>v.</i> Townsend	1411
<i>v.</i> Hogg	1575	<i>v.</i> Townshend	546
<i>v.</i> Hollenbeck	1367	<i>v.</i> Trustees	1003
<i>v.</i> Howell	660, 1463	<i>v.</i> United States	1441
<i>v.</i> Hughes	205	<i>v.</i> Wheeler	918
<i>v.</i> Hunter	1253	<i>v.</i> Whitney	38, 39
<i>v.</i> Jefts	1529	<i>v.</i> Willard	513
<i>v.</i> Jewett	767	<i>v.</i> Woodworth	705
<i>v.</i> Kay	534, 556	<i>v.</i> Worn	159
<i>v.</i> Kelley	636, 1058	<i>v.</i> Wunderlick	852
<i>v.</i> Kerr	479, 856, 857, 917	Smith <i>ad.</i> Perry & Howell	1464
<i>v.</i> Kimbell	1256, 1258	Smithsonian Institution <i>v.</i> Meech	
<i>v.</i> Ladd	165		511, 513
<i>v.</i> Langewald	261	Smithwick <i>v.</i> Ellison	66
<i>v.</i> Lee	181, 182	Smock <i>v.</i> Smock	1556
<i>v.</i> Littlefield	938, 940, 941,	Smyles <i>v.</i> Hastings	258, 259, 261
	942, 943	Smyth, <i>Ex parte</i>	132
<i>v.</i> Lockwood	170	Smythe <i>v.</i> Smythe	541, 1012
<i>v.</i> Malings	129	Sneathen <i>v.</i> Sneathen	1474
<i>v.</i> Mapleback	915	Snedeker <i>v.</i> Waring	16, 20, 25, 27,
<i>v.</i> Marrable	861		31, 36
<i>v.</i> Mason	515	Sneed <i>v.</i> Osborn	1340, 1342
<i>v.</i> McCarty	643	Snell <i>v.</i> Dwight	427, 541
<i>v.</i> McChesney	1557	<i>v.</i> Levitt	256
<i>v.</i> McCorkle	1357	Snelling, Matter of	1548
<i>v.</i> McEnany	853, 854	Snerigan <i>v.</i> St. Louis	59
<i>v.</i> McGregor	70	Snideman <i>v.</i> Snideman	910
<i>v.</i> Miller	202, 203, 204, 210	Snively <i>v.</i> Hitechew	574
<i>v.</i> Monmouth Mut. F. Ins.	1047	Snodgrass <i>v.</i> Reynolds	852
<i>v.</i> Morse	1455	Snook & Austin Co. <i>v.</i> Steiner	850
<i>v.</i> Mundy	898	Snow <i>v.</i> Boycott	1108
<i>v.</i> New York	142	<i>v.</i> Inhabitants of Orleans	1499
<i>v.</i> Osage	223	<i>v.</i> Orleans	1376
<i>v.</i> Owen	278	<i>v.</i> Perkins	67
<i>v.</i> Packard	1118	<i>v.</i> Pressey	1047
<i>v.</i> Packhurst	1187	<i>v.</i> Pulitzer	170, 172, 176, 281,
<i>v.</i> Parsons	498, 1288,		826, 828, 848, 849, 851, 852
	1290	<i>v.</i> Stevens	678
<i>v.</i> Precht	896	Snowbill <i>v.</i> Read	913
<i>v.</i> Price	61	Snyder <i>v.</i> Jennings	1533
<i>v.</i> Putnam	872, 873	<i>v.</i> Lane	1530
<i>v.</i> Raleigh	129, 853	<i>v.</i> Murdock	572
<i>v.</i> Rector	817, 912	<i>v.</i> Parmalee	1058
<i>v.</i> Rector, etc. St. P. Ch.	1017	<i>v.</i> The People	752, 760
<i>v.</i> Reich	1364	Soar <i>v.</i> Foster	512
<i>v.</i> Reid	574	Sobey <i>v.</i> Brisbee	807
<i>v.</i> Roberts	1106, 1125	Soberanes <i>v.</i> Soberanes	547
<i>v.</i> Ryan	1445, 1446	Sohier <i>v.</i> Eldredge	132, 776
<i>v.</i> Scholtz	613, 741	<i>v.</i> Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.	
<i>v.</i> Scott	1574		1429
<i>v.</i> Secor	498, 1275	<i>v.</i> Trinity Church	68, 69, 70
<i>v.</i> Sheltering Arms	1579	Sohler <i>v.</i> Sohler	532, 559
<i>v.</i> Slocomb	1507	Solinger <i>v.</i> Earle	1302

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

CV

[References are to pages.]

Solomon v. Vintner's Co.	206, 282, 286, 291	Spencer v. Weston	724
Somers v. Schmidt	1538	Spensley v. Valentine	244, 308
Somerset C. Co. v. John	1060	Spero v. Shultz	287, 292, 1373
Somes v. Skinner	555	Sperry v. Seidel	950
Sonnemann v. Mertz	1515	Spicer v. Ayers	527
Soper v. Lawrence	1356, 1366, 1373	Spielman v. Kliest	873, 1491
Sopwith v. Maughan	741	Spiller v. Scribner	1340
Sorrell v. Carpenter	574	Spindler v. Gibson	655
Soulsby v. Neving	949	Spinning v. Spinning	660
South Berwick v. Huntress	1438, 1439	Spirett v. Willows	527
South Branch R. Co. v. Parker	246	Sporrer v. Eifer	540
South Carolina R. Co. v. Steiner	232	Sporza v. German Sav. Bk.	1425
South Cong. Meeting House v. Hilton	807	Spradbery, <i>In re</i>	1059
South Metr. Cemetery v. Eden	163	Sprague v. Baker	1532
S. W. Mo. Light Co. v. Joplin	146	v. Cochran	50, 1043
Southard v. Benner	566	v. Quinn	946
v. Cent. R. Co.	1018	Spread v. Morgan	741
v. Sutton	1342	Spreckels v. Spreckels	982
Southbridge Sav. Bk. v. Mason	16	Spring v. Randall	471
Southern California L. Co. v. McDowell	1421	v. Short	1089
Southern Construction Co. v. Silva	535	Springer v. Chicago R. E. L. & T. Co.	866, 871
Southern Iron Works v. Central of Ga. R. R. Co.	1508	v. De Wolf	871
Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Burr	1412	v. Kroeschell	1577
Southport Banking Co. v. Thompson	31	Springfield Water Works v. Jenkins	303
Southwestern R. Co. v. Thomason	51	Spring Val. W. Works v. Schottler	142
Southworth v. Parker	964	Spring's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1280
v. Southworth	1550	Sproul v. McCoy	756
Souverbye v. Arden	445	Spro v. B. & A. R. Co.	217
Sowden v. Craig	20, 36	Spruck v. McRoberts	54, 55
Sowerby v. Coleman	220	Squire v. Learned	818
Sowles v. Butler	1047	v. Whitton	535
v. Lewis	1057	Staats v. Ten Eyck	1520
Spafford v. Hedges	897	Stachelberg v. Stachelberg	1524
Spangler v. Stanler	673	Stack v. Pepper	1503
Spannocchia v. Loew	738	Stackpole v. Beaumont	541
Sparks v. Hess	1499	v. Curtis	199
Sparman v. Keim	554, 1444	v. Healy	272
Sparrow v. Kingman	384, 714, 766, 1351, 1383, 1475	v. Schmucker	1475
v. Pond	60, 63, 770	Stafford v. Coyney	227
Spaulding v. Abbot	244	Stafford, etc. Canal v. Birmingham Canal	212
Speed v. St. Louis M. B. T. Co.	1389	Stafford Nat. Bank v. Sprague	1498
Speidel v. Henrici	1369	Stagg v. Eureka Co.	896
Speir v. Utrecht	218	Staggers v. Matthews	473
v. Town of New Utrecht	204	Stahl v. Stahl	727, 728
Spencer's Case	833, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 845, 1540, 1542	Staines v. Morris	872
Spencer v. Austin	969, 970	Stall v. Wilbur	61, 62
v. Carr	1474	Stambaugh v. Lung	509
v. Kilmer	170, 172, 243, 265	Stamm v. Bostwick	1449
v. McDougal	1407	Standard Bank v. Stokes	292, 294
v. Reese	1481	Standish v. Babcock	517, 518, 520
v. Spencer	1049	Stanley v. Bonham	652
v. Spruell	617	v. Colt	620, 1010
		v. Green	1500, 1514
		v. Kempton	1057, 1058
		v. Schwalby	1359, 1361, 1398
		Stanton v. Miller	1472
		Staple v. Heydon	243
		Staples v. Brown	650, 651

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Staples <i>v.</i> Emery	66	Steele <i>v.</i> Fisher	744
Starbuck <i>v.</i> Starbuck	670, 672, 710	<i>v.</i> La Frambois	728
Stark <i>v.</i> Huber M. Co.	1061	<i>v.</i> Sioux Valley Bank	1398
<i>v.</i> Starrs	1413	Steere <i>v.</i> Steere	436, 439
Starkey <i>v.</i> Brooks	522	<i>v.</i> Tiffany	258
Starr <i>v.</i> Jackson	935	Stees <i>v.</i> Kranz	839
<i>v.</i> Stevenson	578	Steffins <i>v.</i> Earl	923, 924, 926, 929, 930
State <i>v.</i> Birmingham	202	Steigers' Adm. <i>v.</i> Hillen	701
<i>v.</i> Elliott	22	Stein <i>v.</i> McGrath	994, 1005
<i>v.</i> Fisher	224	<i>v.</i> Rice	854
<i>v.</i> Ga. Med. Soc.	143	Steinback <i>v.</i> Krone	886
<i>v.</i> Green	223	Steinbuechel <i>v.</i> Lane	1511
<i>v.</i> Griffith	480, 483	Steiner <i>v.</i> Emery	857
<i>v.</i> Guilbert	1582, 1583	<i>v.</i> McDaniel	758
<i>v.</i> Howard	1499	Steinhardt <i>v.</i> Cunningham	495, 497
<i>v.</i> Klein	971	Steinke <i>v.</i> Bentley	174
<i>v.</i> Leverick	227	Steinway <i>v.</i> Steinway	955, 1160, 1268, 1281
<i>v.</i> Massey	905	Stelz <i>v.</i> Skreck	979
<i>v.</i> McGonigle	1440	Stephens <i>v.</i> Bridges	130, 632, 912, 1145
<i>v.</i> Milk	1511, 1512	<i>v.</i> Ely	43
<i>v.</i> Minn. Threshing Mfg. Co.	143, 144	<i>v.</i> Hockemeyer	160
<i>v.</i> Minneapolis & M. R. Co.	226	<i>v.</i> Reynolds	137, 798
<i>v.</i> Mitchell	225	<i>v.</i> Rinehart	1472
<i>v.</i> Moore	60, 319, 770	<i>v.</i> Stephens	1266
<i>v.</i> Nor. R. Co.	56	<i>v.</i> Taprell	1555
<i>v.</i> Pottmeyer	58	<i>v.</i> Waldron	1091
<i>v.</i> Probate Court	1428	<i>v.</i> Weldon	1090
<i>v.</i> Rondebush	436	Stephenson <i>v.</i> Boody	1350
<i>v.</i> South Amboy	224	<i>v.</i> McClintock	509
<i>v.</i> Suttle	261, 262	<i>v.</i> Short	482
<i>v.</i> Thatcher	1471	Stapp <i>v.</i> Frampton	544
<i>v.</i> Trask	227	Starger <i>v.</i> Van Sicklen	906
<i>v.</i> Trinity Church	68	Sterling <i>v.</i> Peet	1534
State <i>ex rel.</i> West <i>v.</i> Thompson	1465	<i>v.</i> Warden	321, 950
<i>v.</i> Westfall	1582	Sternbach <i>v.</i> Friedman	664
<i>v.</i> Williamson	929	Sternberg <i>v.</i> O'Brien	541, 1012
<i>v.</i> Wilson	220	Sterry <i>v.</i> Arden	561, 565
<i>v.</i> Young	1461	Stetson <i>v.</i> Curtis	161
State Bank <i>v.</i> Evans	1471	<i>v.</i> Stetson	1555, 1561
State Nat. Bk. <i>v.</i> Smith	18	Stevens <i>v.</i> City of N. Y.	932, 938, 950
State Treas. <i>v.</i> S. & E. R. Co.	57	<i>v.</i> Cooper	1088
Staton <i>v.</i> Mullis	1495	<i>v.</i> Hatch	1470
Stead <i>v.</i> Mellor	454	<i>v.</i> Hauser	1375
Stearns <i>v.</i> Gage	575	<i>v.</i> Martin	960
<i>v.</i> Harris	1018, 1147	<i>v.</i> Melcher	31, 773, 964, 972, 973, 990
<i>v.</i> Janes	204	<i>v.</i> Nashua	217
<i>v.</i> Richmond	279	<i>v.</i> N. Y. El. R. Co.	152, 217
Stedfast <i>v.</i> Nicoll	1319	<i>v.</i> Ogden	1578
Stedfast <i>ex dem.</i> Nicoll <i>v.</i> Nicoll	1185	<i>v.</i> Orr	175
Stedman <i>v.</i> Gassett	898, 1068	<i>v.</i> Patterson & Newark R. Co.	240, 296
<i>v.</i> Southbridge	217	<i>v.</i> Reynolds	552
Steed <i>v.</i> Hinson	128	<i>v.</i> Rose	776, 778, 780
Steeds <i>v.</i> Steeds	954	<i>v.</i> Shippen	479
Steeffel <i>v.</i> Rothschild	829, 903	<i>v.</i> Smith	677
Steel <i>v.</i> Miller	1469	<i>v.</i> Stevens	693
<i>v.</i> Payne	814		
<i>v.</i> Steel	577, 1042		
<i>v.</i> Walter	1108		
Steele, <i>In re</i>	778		
<i>v.</i> Steele	745		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

cvii

[References are to pages.]

Stevens v. Theatres	1133	Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson	
v. Underhill	1044	Iron Co.	312
v. Wait	962, 1497	Stocker v. Planet Bldng. Soc.	844
v. Winship	765	Stockton v. Dundee Mfg. Co.	1133
Stevenson v. Black	1058, 1367	Stockton v. Fitzgerald	1509
v. Cofferin	964, 990	v. Phelps	62
v. Crapnell	527	Stoddard v. Gibbs	641
v. Lambard	853	v. Hart	1038, 1050
v. Lesley	1163	v. Rotton	1048
v. Texas	1575	Stokes v. Singers	239
v. Wallace	282	v. Weston	1160
v. Wiggin	216, 243	Stokoe v. Singers	239, 257, 275
Stevenson Brewing Co. v. Iba	1061	Stolts v. Tuska	808
Steward v. Winters	862, 882	Stoltz v. Doehreng	1316
Stewart, Matter of	1236	Stone v. Ashley	1476
v. Apel	925	v. Clark	1505
v. Allegheny	997	v. Hackett	444
v. Barrow	1070	v. Hooker	1533
v. Brown	756	v. Marvel	1462
v. Doughty	62, 768, 770, 771, 865, 927	v. State	299
v. Duffy	1369	v. Stone	513, 1430
v. Exch. Bank	563	v. United States	1412
v. Fellows	550	v. Vandermark	741
v. Forst	849	v. Wood	1465
v. Frink	218	Stoolfoos v. Jenkins	641
v. Hartman	177, 178, 237	Storrs' Agr. School v. Whitney	493
v. Keener	896, 897	Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co.	4, 153, 160, 222, 230, 231, 232, 269
v. Long Island R. Co.	831, 837, 867, 868, 869, 911, 913	Stott v. Rutherford	828
v. McSweeney	1432	Stoughton v. Leigh	684
v. Miles	896	v. Lynch	1345
v. Neely	683	Stout v. Stout	1264
v. Patrick	1503, 1506	Stover v. Chasse	128, 876, 1244
v. Ross	650, 651	v. Evcleshimer	1189
v. Smith	832	v. Stover	984
v. Stevens	324	Stow v. Tift	679, 1070
v. Thomas	976	Stowell v. Bennett	1529
v. Weed	1474, 1475, 1532, 1533, 1537	v. Lincoln	299
v. White	204	Stowers v. Postal T. C. Co.	233
Stickland v. Aldridge	439	Strain v. Sweeney	781
Stickney, Matter of	1560	Strathmore v. Bowes	566, 1560
Stickney's Will, <i>In re</i>	1012, 1281	Stratton v. Bailey	751
Stidham v. Matthews	713	v. Dialogue	507
Stillman v. Burfeind	1510	v. Physio-Medical College	484
v. White Rock Mfg. Co.	201, 202	Strasburger, Matter of	827, 852
Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer	300, 305	Strauss v. Bendheim	555
Stillwell v. Carpenter	1421, 1455	Strayer v. Long	698
v. Foster	160	Streatfield v. Streatfield	742
v. Swarthout	1425, 1426	Street v. Central Brewing Co.	902
Stilwell v. Knapper	1279, 1321	Streit v. Fay	929
v. Melrose	1021	Strickland v. Parker	25, 56
Stimmel v. Brown	282	Strickler v. Todd	158, 195, 211
Stiner v. Stiner	543	Stringer v. Barker	1157
Stinson v. Anderson	1472	v. Young	1154, 1412
v. Sumner	712	Stringfellow v. Tennessee C. I. & R. Co.	1357
Stirling v. Vaughan	1473	Strobe v. Downer	1125
Stitt v. Smith	660	Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co.	298-
Stivers v. Gardner	453	Strong's Appeal	480
Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone		Strong, Matter of	482
Iron Works	1018	v. Clem	663, 664
		v. Doyle	66, 67

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

<p>Strong <i>v.</i> Gordon 514 <i>v.</i> Lord 985 <i>v.</i> Strong 534 Stronghill <i>v.</i> Anstey 580 Strough <i>v.</i> Wilder 1477, 1478 Stroup <i>v.</i> Stroup 426, 672 Stuart <i>v.</i> Easton 474, 475, 480, 1010, 1021 <i>v.</i> Kissam 472 <i>v.</i> Palmer 235 Stubbings <i>v.</i> Village of Evanston 854, 921 Stuckey <i>v.</i> Keefe 976, 977 Stull <i>v.</i> Rich P. I. Co. 1362 Stults <i>v.</i> Brown 1041 <i>v.</i> Sale 757 Sturgeon <i>v.</i> Wingfield 1343 Sturges <i>v.</i> Bridgman 194, 212 Sturr <i>v.</i> Beck 298 Sturtevant <i>v.</i> Jaques 523 Stutphen <i>v.</i> Therpelson 274, 276 Stuyvesant <i>v.</i> Davis 819, 911 <i>v.</i> Mayor 187, 815 <i>v.</i> Woodruff 178, 179 Styles <i>v.</i> Wardle 1496 Sucy <i>v.</i> Pigot 264 Sudbury Parish <i>v.</i> Jones 54 Sudenberg <i>v.</i> Ely 1081 Sufflav <i>v.</i> Brown 172, 175 Sullivan <i>v.</i> Carberry 42, 47 <i>v.</i> Graffort 289, 293 <i>v.</i> Iron, Silver Mining Co. 4 <i>v.</i> I. S. M. Co. 314, 319 <i>v.</i> Ringler 924 <i>v.</i> Schmitt 801, 826, 844 <i>v.</i> Sullivan 995, 996, 1552 <i>v.</i> Ryan 169, 173, 175 <i>v.</i> Zeiner 261, 282 Sully <i>v.</i> Schmitt 129, 848, 849 Summer <i>v.</i> Child 1428 Summers <i>v.</i> Babb 698 Summet <i>v.</i> City Realty & B. Co. 618 Sumner <i>v.</i> Conant 714, 1447 <i>v.</i> Darnell 1010, 1015 <i>v.</i> Partridge 642 <i>v.</i> Skinner 1571 <i>v.</i> Stevens 205 <i>v.</i> Williams 1516 Surdam <i>v.</i> Cornell 1157 Surplice <i>v.</i> Farnsworth 849, 850 Susman <i>v.</i> Whyard 1035 Susquehanna & W. V. R. & C. Co. <i>v.</i> Quick 962, 1361, 1363 Sutherland <i>v.</i> Sutherland 679, 702 Sutliff <i>v.</i> Atwood 802 <i>v.</i> Forgey 706, 1448 Sutphen <i>v.</i> Therkelson 277 Sutton <i>v.</i> Askew 703 <i>v.</i> Casseleggi 752 <i>v.</i> Miles 617 <i>v.</i> Rolfe 675 <i>v.</i> Warren 638</p>	<p>Suydam <i>v.</i> Jackson 778, 779, 829, 830, 844, 856 <i>v.</i> Jones 837, 1531, 1533, 1539 <i>v.</i> Voorhees 1044 Swaine <i>v.</i> Perine 681, 1084 Swan <i>v.</i> Hammond 1558 <i>v.</i> Inderlied 811 <i>v.</i> Wiswall 679, 701, 1123 <i>v.</i> Yaple 1059 Swansborough <i>v.</i> Coventry 160, 273 Swarthout <i>v.</i> Ranier 1188, 1218, 1245, 1255 Swartz <i>v.</i> Swartz 158, 1499 Swasey <i>v.</i> Emerson 574 Swazey <i>v.</i> Brooks 1516 Sweaney <i>v.</i> Mallory 720 Swedish E. L. Church <i>v.</i> Jackson 161, 262 Sweeney <i>v.</i> Warren 1210, 1227 Sweet <i>v.</i> Henry 575, 1491 <i>v.</i> Parker 1076 <i>v.</i> Perkins 272 <i>v.</i> Sweet 1002 Sweetapple <i>v.</i> Bindon 431, 641 Sweetman <i>v.</i> Prince 846 Sweetzer <i>v.</i> Jones 1088 Swerigen <i>v.</i> St. Louis 297, 1405, 1415 Swift's Appeal 1242 Swift <i>v.</i> Beneficial Soc. 482 <i>v.</i> Goodrich 299 Swinburne <i>v.</i> Swinburne 511 Swindon Water Works <i>v.</i> Wilts Canal 299 Swink <i>v.</i> Thompson 1465 Swinton <i>v.</i> Bailey 1556 Sword <i>v.</i> Low 16 Swords <i>v.</i> Edgar 903, 905 Symmes <i>v.</i> Drew 180 Symonds <i>v.</i> Hall 796 Synge <i>v.</i> Synge 567 Synnott <i>v.</i> Simpson 449 Syracuse Sav. Bk. <i>v.</i> Holden 465, 494 Szathmary <i>v.</i> Adams 906</p> <p style="text-align: center;">T.</p> <p>Tabatt <i>v.</i> Grant 164 Taber <i>v.</i> Willetts 1221 Tabernacle Church <i>v.</i> Fifth Av. Church 468 Tabor <i>v.</i> Bradley 173 <i>v.</i> Fox 1061 <i>v.</i> Robinson 38 Tadman <i>v.</i> Henman 897 Tafts <i>v.</i> Manlove 1574 Taft <i>v.</i> Dimond 439 <i>v.</i> Stekin 18 <i>v.</i> Taft 1472 Taggart <i>v.</i> Murray 594, 1218</p>
---	--

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

cix

[References are to pages.]

Tainter v. Cole	971	Taylor v. Hart	856
Talamo v. Spitzmiller	814, 933, 937, 938	v. Hartwell	425
Talbot's Case	131	v. Harwell	470, 598
Talbot v. Cruger	38, 42, 43	v. Horde	1356
v. Hudson	228, 229	v. Kemp	776
v. Whipple	916	v. Lawrence	663
Talk v. Moxbury	1539	v. Mason	1013
Tallmadge v. East River Bank	155,	v. McClure	1474
161, 185, 188, 189		v. Meade	472
Tallman v. Coffin	837, 888	v. Millard	199, 308, 309, 992, 993
v. Bresler	817	v. Mitchell	482
v. Earle	915, 919	v. Morris	1223
v. Franklin	814	v. Murphy	981
v. Murphy	826, 848, 856, 859	v. Needham	895
Taltarum's Case	610, 611	v. Newcomb	781
Tamelung v. Emigration Co.	1413	v. O'Brien	941
Tanner v. Valentine	326	v. Russell	576
Tanney v. Tanney	552	v. Short's Adm'r	1088
Tapling v. Jones	250, 266, 275	v. Sutton	1014
Tappan v. Boston Water Power Co.	1513	v. Taylor	542, 547, 556, 710, 1171, 1253, 1258
v. Deblois	474, 477	v. Wainman	1346
v. Redfield	1464	v. Warnaky	178
Taraldson v. Incorporated Town, etc.	1358	v. Waters	327
v. Lime Springs	237	v. Whitehead	671, 830
Tarbell v. West	1068, 1492	v. Wynne	1572
Tarbox v. Grant	448, 562	Taylor d. Smith v. Biddal	1261
Tardy v. Creasy	1542	Teal v. Walker	1047, 1049
Tarpey v. Madsen	1408, 1409	Teass v. City of St. Albans	1505
Tarplee v. Sonn	961, 963	Teele v. Bishop of Derby	478, 484, 488, 490
Tarry v. Ashton	902	Tefft v. Munson	1051, 1339
Tate v. Blackburne	16, 20	Teller v. Boyle	133, 800, 855
v. Fratt	288, 289, 292	Temple v. Hawley	1220
v. Lawrence	1478	Templeman v. Biddle	769
Tatge v. Tatge	439	Tenant v. Goldwin	273
Tatham v. Vernon	1272	v. Stoney	449
Taub v. Spector	1342, 1505, 1515	Teneick v. Flagg	569
Taunton v. Costar	950	Ten Eick v. Simpson	571
Taussig v. Reel	1227	Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen	860
Taw v. Bury	1473	Ten Eyck v. Craig	1064
Taylor's Estate	745	v. Whitbeck	547, 1399, 1468, 1475, 1492
Taylor v. Atwood	538	v. Witbeck	561, 572, 575, 576, 1089, 1385, 1457, 1469
v. Bay City St. R. Co.	232	Tenn. Coal Co. v. Gardner	1492
v. Benham	50	Tenn. Coal & I. R. v. Hamilton	299
v. Boardman	559	Terrell v. Allison	1123
v. Boulware	167	Territory v. Lee	315
v. Bradley	843	Territt v. Cowenhoven	851, 896
v. Brodhead	1553	Terry v. Johnson	1464
v. Bryn Mawr	479	v. Rodahan	1237
v. Calvert	543, 548	v. Rosell	1050
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co.	232	v. Wiggins	594
v. Cooper	852	Terwilliger v. Brown	1427
v. Fomby	1512	v. Ontario C. & S. R. Co.	1239
v. Fowler	719	Tewart v. Lawson	1287
v. Garrish	204	Texas Loan Agency v. Fleming	918
v. Gerrish	157	Texas & P. R. Co. v. Smith	1413
v. Glaser	1466, 1468		
v. Guest	534		
v. Hampton	255		

[References are to pages.]

Thackery <i>v.</i> Eldigan	785	Thompson <i>v.</i> Ela	1117, 1118
<i>v.</i> Wood	1524	<i>v.</i> Gould	572
Thackrah <i>v.</i> Haas	544	<i>v.</i> Gregory	323, 324
Thalheimer <i>v.</i> Lempert	849	<i>v.</i> Hart	50
Thalls <i>v.</i> Smith	1339	<i>v.</i> Hartline	550
Thames <i>v.</i> Caldwell	1041	<i>v.</i> Hoop	681, 744
Thatcher <i>v.</i> Howland	1502	<i>v.</i> Kenyon	1117
<i>v.</i> Matthews	1512	<i>v.</i> Leach	1461
<i>v.</i> Omans	461	<i>v.</i> Maddux	1161
<i>v.</i> Powell	1431	<i>v.</i> Man. R. Co.	269, 787, 845, 846
<i>v.</i> St. Andrew's Church	1280, 1470	<i>v.</i> Marshall	1056
Thaxter <i>v.</i> Turner	222	<i>v.</i> McElarney	158, 328
Thayer <i>v.</i> Bacon	1342	<i>v.</i> Miner	179, 183
<i>v.</i> Finnegan	1044	<i>v.</i> Morrow	696, 697
<i>v.</i> Finton	1504	<i>v.</i> Owen	1553
<i>v.</i> McGee	1281	<i>v.</i> Simpson	765, 766, 1340
<i>v.</i> McLellan	1360	<i>v.</i> Shattuck	1539
<i>v.</i> Torrey	1514	<i>v.</i> Thompson	669, 1496
<i>v.</i> United Bro. Soc.	895	<i>v.</i> Webster	564
<i>v.</i> Wellington	439	Thompson's Ex'rs <i>v.</i> Norris	491
The Daniel Ball	297	Thomsen <i>v.</i> McCormick	273
The W. B. Cole	1489	Thomson <i>v.</i> Chick	929
Thebaud <i>v.</i> Hollister	1106	<i>v.</i> Ludington	1164, 1167
Thellusson <i>v.</i> Woodford	1246, 1267, 1286	<i>v.</i> Waterlow	174
Theological Seminary <i>v.</i> Wall	615	Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. <i>v.</i> Durant Land Imp. Co.	859
Thiel <i>v.</i> Bull's Ferry Land	950	Thorg <i>v.</i> Seibrecht	565
Third Ave. R. R. Co., Matter of	230	Thorington <i>v.</i> Hall	1227
Thirty-fourth Street R. Co., Matter of	235	<i>v.</i> Thorington	1160
Thoenike <i>v.</i> Fiedler	321, 324	Thorn <i>v.</i> De Breteuil	1290
Thomas <i>v.</i> Davis	12, 16	<i>v.</i> Sutherland	42
<i>v.</i> Evans	581, 774	<i>v.</i> Wilson	252
<i>v.</i> Ford	217	<i>v.</i> Wollcombe	868
<i>v.</i> Frost	947	Thornborough <i>v.</i> Baker	1055
<i>v.</i> Hayward	838	Thornburg <i>v.</i> Wiggins	957, 976
<i>v.</i> Inglis	18	Thorndike <i>v.</i> Burrage	947
<i>v.</i> Junction City Irrigation Co.	325	Thorne, Matter of	1317, 1318
<i>v.</i> Marshfield	205	<i>v.</i> Cann	1106
<i>v.</i> McCormick	526	<i>v.</i> Newby	1125
<i>v.</i> Miller	1297, 1321	Thornley <i>v.</i> Thornley	749, 980
<i>v.</i> Nelson	810	Thornton <i>v.</i> Burch	768
<i>v.</i> Pullis	1340	<i>v.</i> Grant	1332
<i>v.</i> Sanford S. Co.	925	Thoroughgood's Case	1471, 1475, 1476
<i>v.</i> Scutt	620, 1042	Thorp <i>v.</i> Keokuk Coal Co.	1390, 1398, 1399, 1461
<i>v.</i> Sorrell	321, 322	<i>v.</i> Thorp	667
<i>v.</i> Stickle	1348	Thorpe <i>v.</i> Hanscom	1445
<i>v.</i> Sylvester	880	Thousand Is. Pk. Ass'n <i>v.</i> Tucker	221, 222
<i>v.</i> Thomas	264, 773, 774	Thousand Island Steamboat Co. <i>v.</i> Visger	297
<i>v.</i> Taggart	72, 1437	Thrasher <i>v.</i> Everhart	1466
<i>v.</i> Wyatt	84, 1455, 1456	Thresher <i>v.</i> East London Water Works	44
<i>v.</i> Young	897, 899	Throckmorton <i>v.</i> Holt	1556
Thomason <i>v.</i> Lewis	33	Thropp's Appeal	45, 47
Thompson <i>v.</i> Bird	1088	Thropp <i>v.</i> Field	1016
<i>v.</i> Bowman	984	Thunder <i>v.</i> Belcher	1068
<i>v.</i> Burhans	1362, 1364, 1375	Thurber <i>v.</i> Dwyer	925, 929, 938
<i>v.</i> Carmichael	1320	Thurlough <i>v.</i> Dresser	1489
<i>v.</i> Cochran	671		
<i>v.</i> Dearborn	1475		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

cxi

[References are to pages.]

Thursby <i>v.</i> Plant	125	Tollet <i>v.</i> Tollet	1229
Thurston <i>v.</i> Hancock	280	Tolman <i>v.</i> Sparhawk	1367
Thynn <i>v.</i> Thynn	536	Toltec Branch Co. <i>v.</i> Babcock	1355
Tibbals <i>v.</i> Jacobs	1474	<i>v.</i> Cook	1355
Tibbets <i>v.</i> Horne	19, 35, 36	Tomkins <i>v.</i> Sandys	1231
Tice <i>v.</i> Annin	1032	Tomle <i>v.</i> Hampton	902, 904
Tiddiken <i>v.</i> Cantrell	1439	Tomlin <i>v.</i> Hilyard	993
Tierman <i>v.</i> Poor	1043	Tomlinson <i>v.</i> Stiles	1574
Tierney <i>v.</i> Wood	443	Tompkins, Matter of	465, 496
Tietjen <i>v.</i> Palmer	1507	<i>v.</i> Fonda	664, 1377
Tiffany <i>v.</i> Tiffany	514	<i>v.</i> Snow	901
Tift <i>v.</i> Horton	19, 33, 34	<i>v.</i> Verplanck	955
Tilden Will	502	<i>v.</i> Vintroux	1513
Tilden <i>v.</i> Green	467, 477, 485, 486, 500, 501, 1210, 1231, 1236, 1252, 1281	<i>v.</i> Wiltberger	1087
Tilghman <i>v.</i> Little	896	Toms <i>v.</i> Williams	1269
Tillaux <i>v.</i> Tillaux	527	Tone <i>v.</i> Brace	825
Tillinghast, <i>In re</i>	617	Toney <i>v.</i> Wondling	515
<i>v.</i> Champlin	985	Tonnele <i>v.</i> Wetmore	533
<i>v.</i> Coggeshall	429, 641	Took <i>v.</i> Glascock	749
Tillotson <i>v.</i> Prichard	1477	Toole <i>v.</i> Beckett	907
Tilon <i>v.</i> Reynolds	345, 896	Toombs <i>v.</i> Spratlin	1194
Tilton <i>v.</i> Cofield	1045	Toothe <i>v.</i> Bryce	169, 170, 172, 175, 248
<i>v.</i> Vail	1001	Torrey <i>v.</i> Bank of Orleans	550
Tilyou <i>v.</i> Reynolds	898, 901	<i>v.</i> Burnett	42
Timberlake <i>v.</i> Parish Ex'rs	1194	<i>v.</i> Minor	721
Timlin <i>v.</i> Standard Oil	903, 904, 905	<i>v.</i> Torrey	941
Timpson <i>v.</i> Mayor	1358	Torriano <i>v.</i> Young	927
Tindall <i>v.</i> Miller	1180	Torry <i>v.</i> Black	782
Tingley <i>v.</i> Harris	1180	Total <i>v.</i> Bonnefoy	201
Tinicum Fishing Co. <i>v.</i> Carter	211, 215, 242, 243, 308, 309	Totten <i>v.</i> Stuyvesant	675
Tink <i>v.</i> Walker	671	Toulumme C. M. Co. <i>v.</i> Maier	316
Tinker <i>v.</i> Forbes	161, 277	Tourville <i>v.</i> Naish	579
<i>v.</i> Met. El. R. R. Co.	1508	Towerson <i>v.</i> Jackson	1069
Tinsman <i>v.</i> Belvidere, etc. R. Co.	268	Towery <i>v.</i> Henderson	1470
Tippets <i>v.</i> Walker	51	Towle <i>v.</i> Nesmith	479
Tisher <i>v.</i> Beckworth	1469	<i>v.</i> Remsen	1376
Titcomb <i>v.</i> Fonda J. & G. R. Co.	1377	Towler <i>v.</i> Towler	467, 1210, 1231
<i>v.</i> Wood	578	Towles <i>v.</i> Fischer	1237
Title, etc. Restoration Co. <i>v.</i> Kerrigan	1582	Town <i>v.</i> Hazen	322
Titman <i>v.</i> Moore	759	<i>v.</i> Needham	963
Titsworth <i>v.</i> Stout	972	Town of Brighton <i>v.</i> Doyle	1066
Titus <i>v.</i> Warren	758	Town of Corinth <i>v.</i> Emery	978
Tobey <i>v.</i> Moore	184, 1281	Town of Freedom <i>v.</i> Norris	1332
<i>v.</i> Webster	845	Town of Shapleigh <i>v.</i> Pillsbury	1203
Tobias <i>v.</i> Ketcham	495	Town of Solon <i>v.</i> Williamsburg	
Tod <i>v.</i> Baylor	698	Savings Bank	1465
Todd <i>v.</i> Eighmie	1492	Town of Suffield <i>v.</i> Hathaway	272
<i>v.</i> Flight	903, 904	Towne <i>v.</i> Butterfield	896, 935
<i>v.</i> Nelson	564	<i>v.</i> Fiske	52
<i>v.</i> Oviatt	641	Townley <i>v.</i> Bedwell	480
<i>v.</i> Sawyer	766	<i>v.</i> Watson	1556
<i>v.</i> U. D. S. Institution	1488	Townsend, Matter of	228, 229
Todhunter <i>v.</i> D. M. I. & M. R. Co.	1271	<i>v.</i> Bogert	999
Toll Bridge <i>v.</i> Osborn	51	<i>v.</i> Boyd	1355
Tolle <i>v.</i> Orth	946	<i>v.</i> Hubbard	1465
Tollemache <i>v.</i> Earl of Coventry	70	<i>v.</i> McDonald	261
Tolles <i>v.</i> Winton	24, 25	<i>v.</i> Morris	1535, 1536
		<i>v.</i> Nickerson	843, 844
		<i>v.</i> Westcott	564
		Townshend <i>v.</i> Frommer	460, 461, 494, 496, 1124, 1210

[References are to pages.]

Townshend <i>v.</i> Howard	1555, 1556, 1558	Trustees, etc., <i>v.</i> Merryweather	222
Townson <i>v.</i> Tickell	1473	Trustees of Baptist Church <i>v.</i> Hart's Executors	475
Towson <i>v.</i> Moore	556	Trustees of Canandaigua <i>v.</i> Foster	903
Tracy <i>v.</i> Albany Exchange Co.	811, 947	Trustees of Columbia College <i>v.</i> Lynch	160, 161, 187, 189, 190
<i>v.</i> Atherton	178, 200, 208, 211, 1366	<i>v.</i> Lynch & Thacher	190, 191, 1519
<i>v.</i> Murray	745	<i>v.</i> Thacher	187
<i>v.</i> Tracy	515	<i>v.</i> Thacher & Lynch	161
Trafton <i>v.</i> Hawes	1392, 1466	Trustees of Hollis' Hospital, <i>In</i> <i>re</i>	1280
Trambly <i>v.</i> Ricard	1476	Trustees of Hopkins Academy <i>v.</i> Dickinson	1331
Transportation Co. <i>v.</i> Chicago	279, 280	Trustees of N. Y. & Bklyn. Bridge, Matter of	235
Traphagen <i>v.</i> Burt	516, 558, 983, 984	Trustees of N. Y. Protestant Episcopal School <i>v.</i> Davis	499
Trapnall <i>v.</i> Merrick	880	Trustees of Phillips Academy <i>v.</i> King	414
Trask <i>v.</i> Little	42	Trustees of Smith Charities <i>v.</i> Connolly	90
<i>v.</i> Sturges	1227	Trustees of Union College <i>v.</i> City of New York	601, 619, 1011, 1014, 1015, 1061
Traute <i>v.</i> White	288, 289, 290	Tuck <i>v.</i> Fitts	701
Travers <i>v.</i> McElvain	1362	Tuckahoe Canal Co. <i>v.</i> Tucka- hoe R. R. Co.	146
Treackle <i>v.</i> Coke	831	Tucker's Appeal	461
Treadwell <i>v.</i> Inslee	196	Tucker, <i>In re</i>	1044
Treat's Appeal	458, 480, 485	<i>v.</i> Allen	1440
Trees <i>v.</i> Savage	929	<i>v.</i> Andrews	566, 750
Trcewan <i>v.</i> Barnes	933	<i>v.</i> Bennett	450
Trentman <i>v.</i> Neff	1497	<i>v.</i> Burrow	512
Trenton Potteries <i>v.</i> Oliphant	541	<i>v.</i> Clark	1339
Treton <i>v.</i> Treton	897	<i>v.</i> Cooney	1532, 1533
Treivan <i>v.</i> Lawrance	1343	<i>v.</i> Howard	245, 247
Trimble <i>v.</i> Hunter	1572	<i>v.</i> Linger	781
Trimm <i>v.</i> Marsh	678, 1050, 1051, 1056, 1065, 1071	<i>v.</i> McArthur	1526
Trimmier <i>v.</i> Darden	776	<i>v.</i> Moreland	1444
Tripe <i>v.</i> Marcy	1050	<i>v.</i> Phipps	536
Tripp <i>v.</i> Armitage	16	<i>v.</i> Satterthwaite	1500
<i>v.</i> Hasseig	61	<i>v.</i> Shaw	573
<i>v.</i> Ide	1120	Tuffree <i>v.</i> Polhemus	993
Tritt <i>v.</i> Crotzer	468	Tullett <i>v.</i> Armstrong	473
Trolan <i>v.</i> Rogers	1535	Tully <i>v.</i> Dunn	843
Trope <i>v.</i> Kerns	1339	<i>v.</i> Tully	955
Trotter <i>v.</i> Smith	553	Tunstall <i>v.</i> Christian	276, 277, 280, 281, 282
Trout <i>v.</i> McDonald	303	<i>v.</i> Trappes	1571
Trowbridge <i>v.</i> Cross	676	Tureaud <i>v.</i> Gex	1572
<i>v.</i> Ehrich	1507, 1508	Turner, Appeal of	1548
Troxell <i>v.</i> Johnson	1537	Turner's Estate	569
<i>v.</i> Silverhorn	553	Turner <i>v.</i> Baker	1366
Truax <i>v.</i> Gregory	159	<i>v.</i> Haupt	574, 1045
True <i>v.</i> Morrill	758	<i>v.</i> Hebron	308
Truesdale <i>v.</i> Ford	1363	<i>v.</i> Howard	190, 1458
Trull <i>v.</i> Eastman	1351	<i>v.</i> Hoyle	580
<i>v.</i> Granger	827, 843, 844	<i>v.</i> Kuehnle	695
Truman <i>v.</i> Lore	1464	<i>v.</i> Meyers	638
<i>v.</i> Love	1476		
Trumbull <i>v.</i> Rivers	179		
<i>v.</i> Trumbull	1180, 1181		
Trusdell <i>v.</i> Lehman	591		
Trustees <i>v.</i> Brett	861		
<i>v.</i> Hoboken	223		
<i>v.</i> Jackson Square Church	490		
<i>v.</i> Kirk	1364		
<i>v.</i> Lynch	600		
<i>v.</i> Venable	1547		
Trustees, etc. <i>v.</i> Haven	226		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

cxiii

[References are to pages.]

Turner v. Meymott	879	Underhill v. Saratoga R. Co.	1012
v. Moore	1362	Underwood v. Birchard	826, 844
v. New York	101, 1360, 1431,	v. Campbell	1466
	1432	v. Carney	163
v. Petigrew	518	v. Curtis	1279
v. Sawyer	517, 519, 520, 552	Unger v. Leiter	680
v. Shaw	753	v. Mooney	962
v. Smith	1108	Unglish v. Marvin	795
v. Stephenson	1362	Union Brewing Co. v. Meier	664
v. Thompson	274, 275	Union College v. Wheeler	510
v. Wentworth	16	Union El. R. R. Co., Matter of	228
v. Wright	780	Union L. Co. v. London	178
Turney, <i>In re</i>	1264	Union M. & M. Co. v. Leitch	317
v. Smith	701	Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hanford	1104
Turpie v. Lowe	1076		
Turpin v. Dennis	1343	Union Nat. Bk. v. Goetz	518
v. Lemon	1431, 1434	Union Pac. R. Co. v. Artist	475, 484
Tusch v. German Sav. Bk.	439	v. C. R. I. & P. R. Co.	125
Tustin v. Faught	1455	v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co.	570,
Tuten v. Gazan	1482		571
Tuthill v. Davis	1255	v. Harris	542
v. Morris	1100, 1105	Union Stock Yards Bk. v. Gilles-	
Tuttle v. Robinson	29	pie	517
v. Tompkins	821	Union T. Co. v. W. & S. F. R.	
v. Turner	1474	Co.	39
Tuxedo Park Ass'n v. Sterling		Union Water Co. v. Crary	210
Iron & R. Co.	1504	United N. J. R. & C. Co. v. Con-	
Twining v. Burlington	1357	solidated Fruit Jar Co.	959
Twort v. Twort	973	United States v. Am. Tel. Co.	1415
Twynam v. Pickard	840	v. Anderson	1472
Twyne's Case	537, 562, 563, 564,	v. Appleton	172, 243, 1498
	565	v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co.	158, 322
Tyler v. Beacher	228	v. Bostwick	778, 783, 829, 857
v. Black	531, 532, 535	v. California L. Co.	1387, 1399
v. Cooper	199	v. Cameron	1504
v. Hammond	264	v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.	1355,
v. Heidom	394		1405
v. Jewett	757	v. Chase	1379
v. Moore	1516, 1582, 1583	v. Chavez	101, 1352, 1359, 1373
v. Tyler	566	v. Chicago, etc. R. Co.	1411
v. Wilkinson	193, 204	v. Coffin	553
Tyndall v. Fleming	1160	v. Commonwealth, etc. Trust	
Tyrell v. Painton	547	Co.	815, 818, 1051
Tyrrrel's Case	422, 424, 460, 1394,	v. Dalles Military Rd.	1398
	1395	v. Freel	1099
Tyrrrell v. The Bank of London	553	v. Freight Ass'n	541, 1012
Tyson v. Hardesty	1505	v. Grande Irrigation Co.	298
v. Smith	219	v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.	226
		v. Ingram	1411
		v. I. S. M. Co.	317
		v. Joint Traffic Ass'n	541
		v. Le Baron	1345
		v. Loughrey	620, 1015
		v. Minor	1413
		v. Murray	1504
		v. New Orleans R. Co.	35
		v. Repentigny	387
		v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.	
			298, 300
		v. Spalding	1440
		v. Tenn. & C. R. Co.	620, 815,
			1010, 1011, 1015
U.			
Udell v. Stearns	1560		
Uggl v. Brokaw	904, 907		
Uhl v. Ohio River R. Co.	1499		
Uhlefelder v. City of Mt. Vernon	221		
Uhr v. Cowen	854, 921		
v. Semple	983		
Ullman v. Cameron	471, 473		
Ulp v. Campbell	712		
Underhill v. Collins	917, 919		
v. Horwood	538		

[References are to pages.]

United States Security Co. v. Cent. Nat. Bk.	573	Vanderpool v. Smith	850
United States Trust Co. v. Hogencamp	1194	Vander Volgen v. Yates	503, 526
v. Maxwell	1316	Vanderzee v. Slingerland	1157
v. Soher	1287	Van Deusen v. Young	729, 767
United Trust Co. v. Stanton	1455	Vandevort, Matter of	1233
v. Wabash W. R. Co.	870	Van Doren v. Everitt	768, 769
Univ. of London v. Yarrow	480	Van Dorn v. Van Dorn	697
Uphan v. Hammill	1422	Van Duyne v. Thayre	1054
Upington v. Corrigan	74, 392, 394, 396, 593, 596, 597, 598, 620, 927, 1147, 1188, 1253, 1281, 1547	v. Van Duyne	457
Upton v. Archer	1020, 1438	Van Duzer v. Van Duzer	650
v. Larkin	315	Vane v. Lord Barnard	779
v. Townend	848, 849, 852	Van Grutten v. Foxwell	1177, 1179
Uridias v. Morrell	941, 943	Van Hattan v. Scholl	1123
Usher v. Richardson	721	Van Home v. Campbell	1172, 1188, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254
Usticke v. Bawden	1561	v. Crain	840
Utterton v. Robins	1560	v. Dorrance	589
		v. Fonda	959, 990
		Van Houten v. First Ref. Dutch Church	69
		V.	
		Van Joel v. Hornvey	275
		Van Kleech v. Dutch Reformed Church	524
		Van Loan v. City of New York	1571
		Van Maren v. Johnson	981
		Van Name v. Van Name	663
		Van Ness v. Gardiner	613, 1567
		v. Hyatt	1071
		v. Pacard	39, 40, 41
		v. Packard	12
		Van Note v. Downey	748
		Vanorden v. Johnson	1491
		Van Orman v. Phelps	1002
		Van Osdell v. Champion	598
		Van Pelt v. McGraw	1064
		Van Rensselaer v. Albany & S. R. Co.	160
		v. Ball	393, 394, 820, 1017
		v. Barringer	394
		v. Bonesteel	394
		v. Bouton	394
		v. Bradley	840
		v. Brice	864
		v. Chadwick	123, 134, 139, 140
		v. Dennison	137, 138, 394, 798
		v. Gallup	128, 394
		v. Hays	123, 136, 138, 390, 392, 393, 394, 395, 597, 599, 1385, 1453
		v. Jewett	394, 883
		v. Jones	394
		v. Kearney	618, 1344, 1347, 1348
		v. Mould	58
		v. Penniman	914
		v. Platner	137, 874
		v. Radcliff	307, 312, 864
		v. Read	118, 136, 138, 392, 394, 874
		v. Slingerland	394
		v. Synder	394
		v. Wright	884
Vail v. Foster	1040		
v. Long I. R. Co.	1018		
v. Vail	1001, 1321		
Valentine, Matter of	1425		
v. Healey	925, 970, 971		
v. Hutchinson	655		
v. Schreiber	156, 211, 216		
v. Wetherill	1143, 1303, 1311, 1312		
Vallette v. Tedens	508		
Valley Falls Co. v. Dolan	178		
Valliant v. Dodemede	872		
Valpey v. Rea	1445		
Vanatta v. Brewer	910		
v. Carr	520		
v. Jones	222		
Vanarsdall v. Fauntleroy	640		
Van Arsdale v. Van Arsdale	739		
Van Axte v. Fisher	1157, 1220		
Van Baalte v. Harrington	564		
Van Beurey v. Wotherspoon	811, 886		
Vanblaricum v. Yeo	1466		
Van Brunt v. Van Brunt	1283		
Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk	559		
Van Camp v. Searle	1574		
Vance v. Nogle	472		
v. Vance	733, 734		
Van Cleaf v. Burns	705, 709		
Van Cortland v. Kip	1560		
Van Cortlandt v. Tozer	1483		
Van Cott v. Prentice	450, 496		
Vanderbilt v. Schreyer	1113		
Vanderheyden v. Crandall	1141, 1187		
Vanderpoel v. Loew	1283		
v. Van Allen	24		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

CXV

[References are to pages.]

Van Rensselaer's Executors v. Gallup	394	Viser v. Rice	1438
Vansciver v. Bryan	1576	Vivian v. Moat	900
Van Solingen v. Town of Harrison	1477	Voegel v. Ronalds	947
Vanstory v. Thornton	758	Voelckner v. Hudson	659
Van Vechten v. Kealor	1102	Vogel v. Lehritter	805, 1545, 1552
Van Voorhis v. Brintnall	667, 709	v. Webber	311
Van Vronker v. Eastman	1066	Vogelsmeier v. Prendergast	1330
Van Wagner v. Brown	1057	Vogler v. Geiss	256
v. Van Nostrand	1536	Vollmer's Appeal	289
Van Winkle v. Constantine	714	Volz v. Steiner	1527
v. Van Winkle	1507, 1508, 1522	Von Arb v. Thomas	682
Van Wyck, <i>In re</i>	1223	Von Beck v. Thomsen	1318
Varick v. Edwards	539	Von Hesse v. MacKaye	450
v. Jackson	384, 1383	Voorhees v. McGinnis	16, 23
v. Smith	1419, 1562	v. Presby. Church	68, 69, 753
Varney v. Stevens	773	Voorhis v. Burchard	1499
Vartie v. Underwood	662, 680, 718	Voorhis, Matter of	1551
Vaugh, <i>In re</i>	1258	v. Freeman	21, 25
Vaughan v. Barclay	459	Vosburgh v. Teator	1342
v. Dowden	1073	Vose v. Dolan	1438
v. Godman	1475	Vosseller v. Slater	1526
v. Hancock	61	Vossen v. Dautel	179
v. Swayzie	1497	Vought v. Vought	753
Veasey v. Doton	535	Vreeland v. Jacobus	662, 680
Veghte v. Raritan, etc. Co.	158, 253, 254, 258, 330	Vreeland's Executors v. Ryno's Executor	752
Veit v. Dill	1390	Vyvyan v. Arthur	837
v. Schwob	1454, 1455		
Venable v. W. W. R. Co.	661, 702, 718, 722	W.	
Verdin v. Slocum	1572	W. B. Cole, The	1489
Vermont Village v. Miller	224, 226	Wachter, Matter of	659
Vernam v. Smith	894, 895, 896	Wadd v. Hazleton	442, 444, 445, 447, 448, 562
Vernon's Case	627, 722, 733, 734, 736, 739	Waddington v. Buzby	1548
Vernon v. Smith	838	Wade v. Miller	663, 678
v. Vernon	451, 740	v. Paget	412, 466
Ver-Planck v. Godfrey	1080	Wadhams v. Amer. Home, etc. Soc.	751
Verplank v. Sterry	561	Wadsworth v. Tillotson	299
v. Wright	815, 835, 839	v. Wadsworth	1325
Verrier v. Loris	982	Wafer v. Mocato	595
Verzier v. Convard	451	Wager v. Link	1103
Vetter's Appeal	120	v. Wager	1516
Viall v. Carpenter	178, 180	Wagner v. Hanna	242
Vick v. Ayres	933	v. Mallory	303, 791, 794
Vickers v. Leigh	596	Wagoner v. Silva	974
Vidal v. Girard's Executors	474, 475, 477, 479	Wagstaff v. Read	577, 1457
Vielie v. Osgood	1463	Wainford v. Heyl	472
Vihleim v. Mathews	1538	Wainwright v. Low	1449
Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson	152, 280	v. Sawyer	1189
Village of St. Johnsville v. Smith	54	v. Talcott	558
Village of West Springs v. Collins	1541	Wait v. Baldwin	62
Villers-Wilkes, <i>In re</i>	488	v. Belding	1546
Vinton v. Greene	251, 257	v. Bovee	975
Virgin v. Virgin	660, 661, 679	v. Wait	652, 709
Virginia Coal Co. v. Kelly	518	Wake v. Hall	23, 39, 53
		Wakefield v. Newell	240, 301
		Wakeman v. Glover	1499
		Walden v. Conn	845
		Waldorf v. Simpson	1439

[References are to pages.]

Wales v. Bogue	1570	Walter v. Post	327
Walker's Case	124, 128, 786, 876, 880	v. Tompkins	1227
Walker's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1464	Walters v. Bredin	1517
Walker v. Boynton	1508, 1509	v. Denfenbaugh	1050
v. Clifford	175	v. Hutchins	767, 864
v. Cronin	304	v. Jordan	705
v. Dalt	542	v. Walters	671
v. Deaver	1536	Walton v. Cronly	870, 873
v. Farmer's Bank	1052	v. Follansbee	1348
v. Fletcher	208	v. Lowry	63
v. Furbush	937	v. Walton	522
v. Long	651, 753	v. Waterhouse	1350
v. Pierce	249	Walwyn v. Coutts	449
v. Reeves	870	Walz v. Walz	166
v. Schuyler	685, 697	Wanser v. De Nyse	1424
v. Sherman	22, 30	Warburton v. White	980, 981, 982
v. Shoemaker	845, 850	Ward v. Bartholomew	1378
v. So. Pac. R. Co.	240, 301, 302	v. Cochran	1360, 1366, 1367
v. Stetson	293	v. Cooke	1097
v. Townsend	223	v. Fagin	857
v. Wilson	1523	v. Hasbrotuck	806, 814
Walkerly's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1161	v. Ives	642
Wall v. Bissell	987	v. Lenthal	1241
v. Hinds	55	v. Lumley	914
v. Lee	68	v. Met. Elec. R. Co.	51, 52, 256
v. Pittsburgh Harbor Co.	296	v. People	58
v. Wall	1511	v. Stanard	1389
Wallace v. Berdell	1475	v. Ward	512, 515, 641, 961, 967, 973
v. Fletcher	207, 218	v. Warren	196, 204
v. Harnstad	134, 388, 1440	v. Webber	536
v. Insurance Co.	760	v. Wooten	666
v. Johnstone	1034	Warden v. Adams	1057
v. Jones	1425	Warder v. Henry	779
v. Kennelly	918	Wardle v. Brocklehurst	172
v. McEchron	994, 1004, 1006	Wardwell v. Hale	1161
v. Miller	970	Ware v. Chew	275
v. Silsby	1470	v. Lithgow	826
v. Smith	598	v. Owens	677, 984
v. Walsh	1364, 1365	Warfel v. Knott	291
Wallach v. Van Riswick	381, 706, 1136, 1325, 1333, 1334	Warfield v. Lindell	963
Wallack v. Galton	1033	v. Ross	539
Waller v. Armistead	555	Waring v. Crow	258
Wallgrave v. Tebbs	536	v. King	946
Wallis v. Hands	800, 916, 917, 918	Warn v. Bickford	1530
v. Wallis	1393	Warner v. Abbey	795
Walls v. Acheson	919	v. Beach	1559
Walsh v. Breman	1042	v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co.	1237
v. Erwin	317	v. Fleetwood	24
v. Foster	1486	v. Grayson	12
v. Frey	861	v. Kenning	19
v. Fry	906	v. McMullin	411
v. Lonsdale	119	v. Rice	470
v. McBride	508	v. Snyder	470
v. Powers	1445	v. Southworth	287, 292, 1506
v. Sichles	42	v. Tanner	1021
v. Wilson	718	v. Van Alstyne	703
Walsh's Adm'x v. Vermont		Warnock v. De Witt	317
Mut. Fire Ins. Co.	475	v. Harlow	1090
Walston v. Smith	511	Warren v. Blake	160, 169, 171, 175, 177
Walter v. Greenwood	973		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

cxvii

[References are to pages.]

Warren <i>v.</i> Chambers	1331	Watson <i>v.</i> Watson	637, 650, 651, 690
<i>v.</i> Leland	63	<i>v.</i> Wyman	1061
<i>v.</i> Lynch	1437	Watt <i>v.</i> Trapp	197
<i>v.</i> Parkhurst	299	<i>v.</i> Watt	515
<i>v.</i> Twilley	662	Watters <i>v.</i> Bredin	1011, 1504
<i>v.</i> Tynan	440, 510	<i>v.</i> Cummins	535
<i>v.</i> Union Bank	517, 519, 1425	Wattles <i>v.</i> South Omaha I. & C. Co.	830
<i>v.</i> Wagner	129, 830	Watts, <i>Ex parte</i>	598, 655
<i>v.</i> Westbrook Mfg. Co.	298	Watts, Matter of	1157
<i>v.</i> Wilder	579	<i>v.</i> Ball	641
Warriner <i>v.</i> Rogers	447	<i>v.</i> Julian	679
Warrington <i>v.</i> Warrington	977	<i>v.</i> Julien	1123, 1126
Warthen <i>v.</i> Siefert	969	<i>v.</i> Kelson	172, 173, 179
Washbon <i>v.</i> Cope	1259	<i>v.</i> Welman	1527, 1528
Washburn <i>v.</i> Burnham	1041, 1042, 1488	Watuppa Reservoir Co. <i>v.</i> City of Fall River	147, 298, 1405, 1415
<i>v.</i> Burns	977, 979	Waverly <i>v.</i> Page	301
<i>v.</i> White	933	Waverly Water Front, etc. Co.	
Washington Ice Co. <i>v.</i> Shortall	57, 58, 59	<i>v.</i> White	1510
Washington Natural Gas Co. <i>v.</i> Johnson	871	Way <i>v.</i> Hooton	1355
Wash. Trust Co. <i>v.</i> Morse Iron Works	33	Weale <i>v.</i> Lower	1173, 1203
Wason <i>v.</i> Davis	1040	Weart <i>v.</i> Crusier	618
Wass <i>v.</i> Buckman	640	Weatherall <i>v.</i> Thornburgh	1286
Water Co. <i>v.</i> Knoxville	146	Weatherby <i>v.</i> St. Giorgio	580
Water Power Co. <i>v.</i> Water Comm'rs	59, 239, 297, 1415	Weaver <i>v.</i> Barden	579
Waterman <i>v.</i> Andrews	1503	<i>v.</i> Gregg	661, 662
<i>v.</i> Morgan	448	<i>v.</i> Jones	125
<i>v.</i> Smith	1412	<i>v.</i> Rush	664
<i>v.</i> Soper	66	<i>v.</i> Sturtevant	663
<i>v.</i> Webster	1078	Webb <i>v.</i> Bird	277
Waters <i>v.</i> Hubbard	1116	<i>v.</i> Haeffer	1120
<i>v.</i> Lilley	221, 308, 309	<i>v.</i> Hoselton	1061
<i>v.</i> Margerum	615	<i>v.</i> Jones	1558
<i>v.</i> Randall	1035	<i>v.</i> Mullins	1439, 1440
<i>v.</i> Tazewell	472	<i>v.</i> Plummer	66
Watertown Steam Engine Co. <i>v.</i> Davis	34	<i>v.</i> Russell	831, 915
Watkins, Matter of	688	<i>v.</i> Sweet	1181
<i>v.</i> Eaton	972	<i>v.</i> Townsend	685
<i>v.</i> Goessler	1061	<i>v.</i> Trustees, etc.	647
<i>v.</i> Green	773	<i>v.</i> Wools	456
<i>v.</i> Migen	1469	Webber <i>v.</i> Chapman	209, 218
<i>v.</i> Peck	200, 203, 208, 210, 218	<i>v.</i> Gage	269
<i>v.</i> Thornton	641	Weber <i>v.</i> Bridgman	1210
<i>v.</i> Weston	430	<i>v.</i> Rogers	949
Watriss <i>v.</i> Cambridge First Nat. Bk.	43, 44	<i>v.</i> Tanner	750, 752
Watson <i>v.</i> Almirall	857, 862	Webster <i>v.</i> Calden	1055
<i>v.</i> Bioren	163	<i>v.</i> Clear	1413
<i>v.</i> Bryan	796	<i>v.</i> Ellsworth	647
<i>v.</i> Gray	286, 292	<i>v.</i> Harris	1511
<i>v.</i> Hillman	1474	<i>v.</i> Kings Co. Trust Co.	1472
<i>v.</i> Hunter	787, 882	<i>v.</i> Luther	1409
<i>v.</i> Mercer	1429	<i>v.</i> Morris	492
<i>v.</i> New York	1507	<i>v.</i> Nichols	837
<i>v.</i> Penn	132	<i>v.</i> Potter	1499
<i>v.</i> Pipes	1464	<i>v.</i> Stevens	163, 286
<i>v.</i> Smith	613	<i>v.</i> Trust Co.	759, 1527, 1528
		<i>v.</i> Van Deventer	955, 964, 987, 990
		<i>v.</i> Webster	767, 782
		<i>v.</i> Wiggins	480

[References are to pages.]

Wedge v. Moore	681	Werner v. Tuch	1105
Weed v. Pierce	562	v. Zierfuss	563
Weeke's Settlement, <i>In re</i>	467	Wertheimer v. Hosmer	817, 1177
Weekley v. Weekley	51	Wescott v. Binford	1180
Weeton v. Woodcock	42	Wessel v. Rathjohn	1475
Wegge v. Madler	1508	West v. Berney	1242, 1243
Weiant v. Rockland Lake Trap Rock Co.	1502	v. Fitz	595
Weigmann v. Jones	273, 289	v. Freude	935
Weil v. Abrahams	863	v. Knight	475
Weill v. Baker	287, 292	v. Lassels	131
Weimar v. Fath	1222	v. Moore	62
Weinstein v. Weber	1238	v. Stewart	54, 55, 1523
Weir v. Tate	683, 684, 726	v. Walker	735, 737
Weis v. Meyer	262	West Cemetery v. P. P. & C. R. Co.	235
Weisinger v. Murphy	651	West Chicago Ass. v. Cohn	903, 905
Weiss v. Heitcamp	526	West Chicago R. Co. v. Chicago	297, 298
v. Levy	941	West Co. v. Lea	56
v. Mendelson	916	West Point Iron Co. v. Reymert	166
v. South Bethlehem	217, 1342	West Seattle L. & I. Co. v. Novelty Mill Co.	1344
Weissenfels v. Cable	1457	West Shore R. Co. v. Wenner	53, 818
Welby v. Thornagh	533	West Union Tel. Co. v. Shepard	52, 231
Welch v. Brimmer	647	v. Williams	233
v. Chandler	643	Westbrook v. Vanderburgh	745
v. Dutton	1399	Westcoat v. Wilson	993
v. McGrath	550	Westcott v. Cady	954, 970
v. Polley	519	v. Campbell	697
v. Wadsworth	101	v. Middleton	601
Welcome v. Hess	919	Westerly Sav. Bk. v. Stillman Mfg. Co.	1043
Weld v. Nichols	294	Western v. McDermott	1539
v. Sabin	1069	Western R. Co. v. Ala. G. T. R. Co.	232
Well's Trust, <i>In re</i>	1240	Westgate v. Wixon	28
Weller v. Weller	1475	Westinghouse v. German Nat. Bk.	574
Welles v. Bailey	1329	Westlake v. De Graw	857
v. Castles	462	v. Wheat	443, 445
v. Garbutt	1051	Westmoreland & C. Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt	57, 240, 303, 787, 882
Wellesley v. Mornington	568	Weston v. Arnold	293
Wellford v. Chancellor	551	v. Foster	619, 1011
Welling v. Ryerson	1060	v. Sampson	308
Wells, Matter of	1562, 1563	v. Stoddard	994, 996, 1002, 1004, 1005, 1006
Wells v. Batts	751	v. Weston	17, 947
v. Beall	699	Westphal v. City of New York	305
v. Betts	655	Wetherbee v. Ellison	66
v. Cowles	51	Wetmore v. Bruce	160, 1527, 1528
v. Garbutt	169, 175, 289	v. Carryl	1557
v. Jackson Iron Mfg. Co.	1505	v. Fisk	248
v. Miller	1084, 1503	v. Parker	499, 1546
v. Seeley	1303	v. Wetmore	471
v. Tolman	247	Wetyen v. Fick	724
v. Van Dyke	1066, 1422	Weyand v. Tipton	1432
v. Waterhouse	534	Weyh v. Boylan	1062
v. Wells	1122		
Welsh v. Phillips	1059		
v. Taylor	211, 258, 261, 262		
Wendell v. People	1415		
Wendt v. Walsh	424, 460, 461, 465, 494		
Wentworth v. Abbetts	1376		
v. Poor	251		
v. Portsmouth & D. R. Co.	797		
Werians v. Peebles	1457		
Werner v. Padula	133, 824		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

CXIX

[References are to pages.]

Weyl v. S. V. R. Co.	232	White v. Hunt	870
Weyman v. Ringold	287, 292	v. Kauffman	1044
Whalen v. Cadman	757	v. Luning	1504
v. Manchester Land Co.	170	v. Manhattan R. Co.	253, 256, 258, 324, 328
Whaley v. Roehrich	25	v. Miller	1578
v. Stevens	215	v. Nassau Trust Co.	214, 247, 280, 281
Whalin v. White	889	v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.	165
Whan v. Steingotter	1500	v. Nuptial Benefit Union	541
Wharf v. Howell	1035	v. Patten	1339, 1349
Wharton v. Garvin	1513	v. Rittenmeyer	1049, 1071
v. Masterman	1287	v. Ross	440
v. Wharton	615	v. Stellwagon	892
Wheatfield v. Grundmann	217, 222	v. Story	178, 695
Wheatley v. Calhoun	677	v. Trustees British Museum	1551
v. Chrisman	158	v. Wager	753
Wheaton v. Maple	207	v. White	414, 477, 488, 490, 653, 740, 741
Wheeldon v. Burrows	170	v. Whitney	1536
Wheeler v. Clark	205	v. Wiley	216
v. Clutterbuck	1311, 1312	v. Willard	1201
v. Frankenthal	807	v. Williams	1039, 1503
v. Hotchkiss	652	v. Willis	685
v. Kirkland	50	v. Y. M. C. A.	859
v. Kirtland	508, 509, 660, 661, 718, 723	White's Bank v. Nichols	256, 257, 259, 273
v. Reynolds	158	Whitehead v. Kennedy	553
v. Spinola	1358, 1502, 1512	v. Nickelson	757
v. West	321	v. Woodruff	1575
v. Young	1339, 1350	Whitehouse v. Bolster	536
Wheelock v. Cavitt	1483	v. Cummings	180, 181
v. Warschauer	897	v. Whitehouse	446
Wheelwright v. Wheelwright	1472	Whiteside v. Cooper	1164, 1249
Whelen v. Phillips	540	Whitfield v. Garriss	596
Whelock v. Thayer	1526	v. Harris	1472
Whetstone v. Hunt	1516	Whiting v. Brastow	45
Whicker v. Hume	477, 479	v. Burke	1084
Whipple v. Fairchild	1189	v. Dyer	507
v. Foote	62	v. Edmonds	123, 897, 899, 900, 901, 1368
Whitaker v. Brown	165	v. Gaylord	286, 287
v. Greer	699	v. Whiting	1369
v. Hawley	120	Whitley v. Davis' Lessee	1466
v. McBride	297, 1511	v. Johnson	1347, 1350
v. Whitaker	1474	Whitlock v. Washburn	1210
Whitbeck v. Cook	1524	Whitman v. Lex	477
Whitcomb v. Starkey	874	Whitmarsh v. Cutting	63, 769
White's Will	1555	v. Walker	63, 322
White, Matter of	1548	Whitmore v. Pulp Co.	858
v. Arndt	45	Whitney v. Allaire	843
v. Berry	919	v. Brown	950
v. Bradley	227, 274, 275, 276	v. Buckman	1494
v. Brooks	990	v. Foster	1043
v. Burnley	1362	v. Lee	163
v. Carpenter	508	v. Olney	1499
v. Chapin	306	v. Taylor	1408
v. Clarke	660	v. Union R. Co.	167
v. Cutler	767, 768, 782	v. Whitney	675
v. Ditson	480	Whittaker v. Pendola	1412
v. Dresser	239, 247, 268	v. Whittaker	617
v. Fish	484		
v. Foster	63, 64, 1491		
v. Godfrey	1507		
v. Hicks	1237, 1239		
v. Howard	500, 503		

[References are to pages.]

Whitten v. Whitten	995, 1004	Wilkinson v. Leland	229
Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples	248	v. Paddock	712
Whittier v. Cocheco Mfg. Co.	199,	v. Parish	675, 997
	250	v. Scott	1458
v. Winkley	182, 183	v. Wilkinson	541, 782
Whitton v. Whitton	971	Wilks v. Burns	1224
Whitworth v. McComb	222	Willard v. Denise	573
Wholey v. Cavanaugh	1388, 1398	v. Willard	991, 1572
Whyddon's Case	1471	Willcox v. Hines	907
Whyte v. Builders' League	171	Willet v. Brown	676
Wick v. Bredin	16, 18	Willetts v. Willets	453, 456
v. McGinnis	16	Willetts v. Brown	1039
Wicke's Estate, <i>In re</i>	1548	Willey v. Greenfield	1375
Wickerham v. Orr	1543	William & Anthony Streets,	
Wickersham v. Crittenden	557	Matter of	921
v. Orr	158, 291, 329	William Deering & Co. v. Beard	759
v. Savage	1228	Williams' Appeal	24, 569
Wickham v. Hawker	308, 309	Williams, Matter of	471
Wicklund v. Lindquist	1468	v. Angell	1186
Wieland v. Kobick	1443	v. Baker	651
Wigg v. Villers	1206	v. Bayley	544
Wiggin v. Heywood	1071	v. Bolton	787
v. Wiggin	897	v. Carle	566
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio &		v. Council	1376
M. R. R. Co.	15, 20, 39, 56	v. Cowden	1013
Wigglesworth v. Dallison	768, 769	v. Cox	684
Wightman v. Catlin	849	v. Dakin	1016
v. Reynolds	1348	v. Day	780
v. Schliefer	715	v. Deriar	924
Wilber v. Wilber	715, 1160, 1271,	v. Downing	843, 1385
	1276	v. Earle	837
Wilcocks v. Hannyngton	443	v. Fitzbough	540
Wilcox v. Bread	1512, 1514	v. Haddock	50, 530, 569,
v. Hines	858		570, 571
v. Jackson	1412	v. Hay	283, 284
v. McClellan	799	v. Hilton	987, 1116
v. Musche	1529	v. James	246
v. Randall	677, 678	v. Jewett	290
v. Wheeler	594	v. Jones	522, 1193, 1194
Wilcoxson v. Miller	1091	v. Kershaw	481, 523
Wild v. Deig	237	v. Kierney	671,
Wilde v. Smith	456	v. Kimball	1315
Wilder, Matter of	1511	v. Knight	1180
v. Brooks	753	v. Laden	940, 945, 946
v. Ranney	1221	v. Lambe	704
v. St. Paul	221, 223, 258	v. Magee	1467
v. Wheeler	242	v. Morris	322
Wiles v. Peck	714, 1447	v. Nelson	200
Wiley v. Hunter	300	v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co.	231
v. Wiley	780	v. Paine	1446
Wilgus v. Lewis	950	v. Pearson	485
Wilhelm v. Federgreen	1373	v. Sheldon	1417
v. Lee	1055	v. Short	836
v. Wilken	1390, 1398, 1399,	v. Teachey	1059
	1459	v. Thorne	471
Wilkesbarre v. Wyoming Hist.		v. Vanderbilt	818, 917
Soc.	594	v. Van Geison	1104
Wilkin, Matter of	468	v. Vreeland	532
Wilkins v. McGehee	1078	v. Williams	456, 474, 475, 477,
v. Wingate	880, 884, 896		498, 512, 576, 663, 710, 1291,
v. Young	957, 965		1470, 1474
Wilkinson v. Buist	1221	v. Wingo	146, 147, 1413

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

cxxi

[References are to pages.]

Williamsburgh Savings Bk. v.		Wing v. Carr	1579
Town of Solon	1441	v. Chase	1468
Williamson v. Brown	574, 575	v. Cooper	1042
v. N. J. So. R. Co.	21, 57, 1051	v. Gray	40
v. Williamson	1533, 1534	Winham v. McGuire	325
Williamston, etc. R. Co. v. Battle	158	Winlock v. Hardy	1351
Willington v. Gale	1071	Winn v. Abeles	280, 1367
Willion v. Berkley	604, 606, 608	Winne v. Ulster Co. Sav. Inst.	330
Willis v. Eastern Trust & Bank-		Winnepesaukee C. M. Ass'n v.	
ing Co.	886, 1054	Gordon	620, 1016
v. Erie T. & T. Co.	233	Winnepiseogee Lake Co. v.	
v. Gottman	1483	Young	197
v. McKinnon	901	Winnipisiogee Paper Co. v. N. K.	
v. Moore	61	Land Co.	1512
v. Willis	513	Winniposeokee P. Co. v. Eaton	1533
Willison v. Watkins	126, 899, 900,	Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v.	
	936	Barney	1410
Willoughby v. Horridge	148	Winship v. Pitts	777, 783
Wills v. Cooper	466	Winslow v. Baltimore	811, 947
Wilmot v. Lathrop	972	v. Balt. & O. R. Co.	1220
Wilmurt v. McGrane	274, 1541	v. Cooper	1514
Wilson's Appeal	1575	v. Merchants' Ins. Co.	24
Wilson v. Allen	462	v. Tighe	552
v. Alston	1344, 1347	Winslow Bros. Co. v. McCully	
v. Anderson	450	Stone Mason Co.	1576
v. Blake	1362	v. Reed	1509
v. Branch	1443	Winsor v. Mills 598, 1262, 1264,	1273,
v. Cluer	1065		1275
v. Cochran	1529, 1537, 1541	Winstell v. Hehl	878
v. Craig	705	Winston v. Hodges	1462
v. Edmonds	776, 778	v. Johnson	165
v. Finch	861	Winter v. Brockwell	329
v. Fisher	1344, 1347	v. N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co.	233
v. Forbes	59	v. Peterson	1507
v. Hildreth	1504	Winterbottom v. Ingraham	933
v. Hunter	1499	Winterbourne v. Morgan	844
v. Lyon	1038, 1040	Wintermute v. Light	61
v. Marion	575	Winthrop v. Fairbanks	165, 167
v. New Bedford	302	Wisconsin Central R. Co. v.	
v. Odell	1288	Forsythe	1410, 1413
v. Parshall	1042, 1043	Wiscot's Case	616, 959, 966, 992
v. Prescott	947	Wisdom v. Reeves	1467
v. Proctor	758	Wise v. Hyatt	963
v. Taylor	923, 926	Wiseman v. Lucksinger	157, 158,
v. Troup	1119, 1212, 1213		204, 205, 325, 326
v. Vanstone	1077, 1108	Wisnall v. Wilkins	960
v. Waddell	284	Wissell v. Ott	938, 1316
v. Widenham	1521	Wissler v. Hershey	180
v. Wightman	170	Witbeck v. Van Rensselaer	884
v. Wilson	592, 976, 1014	Witby v. Mumford	1539
Wilston v. Pilkney	914	Witham v. Bland	1045
Wiltshear v. Cottrell	23	v. Brooner	1383
Wiltshire v. Sidford	286	v. Perkins	637, 651
Wimbleton & Putney Commons		Withers v. Jenkins	639, 647
Conservators v. Dixon	246	v. Larrabee	923, 930
Wimer v. Simmons	261	v. Yeadon	1232
Wimple v. Fonda	1164	Witherspoon v. Duncan	1412
Winant v. Hines	917	Withington v. Warren	1476
Windham v. Portland	665	Withy v. Mumford	839, 1536
Windt v. German Ref. Church	70	Witmark v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co.	916,
Winfield v. Hennessy	185, 187		917, 918
v. Henning	836	Witthaus v. Schack	711, 712

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[References are to pages.]

Witty v. Acton	886	Wood v. Wand	306
Woerz v. Rademacher	494, 497, 515	v. Wentz	920
	516, 1226	v. Wood	709
Wolcott v. Johns	1473	Woodbeck v. Wilders	993
Wolf v. Bollinger	1556, 1557	Woodbridge Co. v. Hires Co.	910
v. Dozer	807	Woodburn's Estate	741
v. Hunter	1490	Woodbury v. Allan	262
v. Kilpatrick	903	v. Parsley	327
v. Theresa Village Fire Ins. Co.	1035	v. Short	1330
Wolfe v. Frost	293, 320, 324, 327	Woodfill v. Patton	1555
	330	Woodgate v. Fleet	875, 1141, 1281, 1421, 1423
v. Larison	696	Woodhaven Junction Land Co. v. Solly	186, 192
v. Lynch	1427	Woodhull v. Little	1001, 1002
v. Van Nostrand	1185	v. Longstreet	991
Wolfe v. Wolfe	808, 929	v. Rosenthal	1498
Wolters v. Shraft	511	Woodin v. Wentworth	300
Womack v. McQuarry	855	Woodlee v. Burch	1064
Women's Church Ass'n v. Campbell	487, 488	Woodman v. Pease	16
Wonderlin v. Cadogan	1456	v. Pitman	59
Wood, <i>In re</i>	1270, 1327	v. Spencer	1506
v. Abrey	539	v. York & C. R. Co.	1465
v. Beach	1394, 1413	Woodruff v. Adair	1037
v. Boyd	165	v. Cook	628, 1152, 1195
v. Burnham	426, 429	v. Erie R. R. Co.	896
v. Chapin	1394, 1399	v. Morristown Sav. Inst.	1060, 1061
v. Copper Miner's Co.	266	v. Oswego Starch Factory	137, 798, 1385
v. Cox	441, 522	v. Paddock	261
v. Craft	538	v. Woodruff	1463
v. Downes	553	Woods, Goods of	1550
v. Drew	1271	v. Hildebrand	1440
v. Fleet	993	v. Hull	1368
v. Fowler	59	v. Rose	1489
v. Goodwin	1073	Woodside v. Adams	1052
v. Griffin	778, 1142, 1275	v. Hewell	509, 510
v. Hammond	1215, 1451	Woodward v. Dowse	705
v. Harper	1088	v. James	412, 500
v. Hewitt	56	v. Jewell	580
v. Hubbell	854	v. Sartwell	1398
v. Irwin	551	v. Seeley	323
v. Kelley	197	Woodworth v. Payne	68, 588, 593
v. Keyes	693	v. Raymond	177, 178
v. Leadbitter	322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 330, 1466	Woolley, Den. d. v. Brewer	1345
v. Manley	322	Woolmer's Estate	523
v. M. A. L. R. Co.	324	Woolridge v. Lucas	650
v. Mich. Air Line	328	Woolsey, Matter of	236
v. Morehouse	1432	v. Chapman	1410
v. Movehouse	1422	v. Funke	19
v. Panie	480	v. N. Y. El. R. Co.	231
v. Partridge	132	Woonsocket Sav. Inst. v. Ballou	1044
v. Phillips	889, 950	Wooster v. Cooper	1241
v. Powell	694	Worcester v. Georgia	386
v. Rabe	515, 516	v. Green	307
v. Robinson	579	Workman v. Curran	195, 201, 202, 206
v. Seaver	1562	Worrell v. Forsyth	737
v. Seely	720	Worrill v. Wright	1258
v. Sharples	852	Worthing v. Webster	1432
v. Taylor	1517	Worthington v. Cooke	131
v. Trask	1050		
v. Veal	207		

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

cxixiii

[References are to pages.]

Worthington v. Gimson	206	Y.	
Worthley v. Burbanks	1361		
Wotten v. Shirt	140	Yackle v. Wightman	1572
Wotton, Goods of	1550	Yale v. Dederer	714, 1447
Wragg v. Comptroller-Gen.	1038	Yancey v. Tatlock	1530
Wren v. Wren	981	Yandes v. Wright	283
Wright v. Astoria Co.	1471	Yanish v. Tarbox	1504, 1505
v. Cartwright	799, 1204	Yankee Jim's Water Co. v. Crary	261
v. De Groff	720	Yard's Appeal	503
v. Denn	1044	Yater v. Mullen	54
v. Du Bignon	40	Yates v. Compton	1216
v. Dunham	1433	v. Milwaukee	1510
v. Holford	1170	v. Paddock	659
v. Killiam	318	v. Van De Bogert	382
v. Lancaster	1456	v. Yates	498
v. Macdonnell	44	Yates Co. Nat. Bk. v. Baldwin	1057
v. Manifold	1552	Yeackle v. Litchfield	543, 548, 549
v. Methodist Church	1562	Yeakle v. Nace	261
v. Moore	199	Yearely v. Yearely	1045
v. Nipple	92, 1524	Yelverton v. Yelverton	414
v. Page	593, 594	Yeo v. Mercereau	671
v. Pearson	429, 430, 441	Yocum v. Siler	596
v. Proud	553, 555	Yonge v. Hooper	546
v. Roseberry	1413	York v. Stone	965
v. Saddler	1325, 1448, 1449	York Bank's Appeal	1571
v. Smith	546	Yorty v. Paine	1497
v. Sperry	1523	Youman's Will, <i>In re</i>	1175, 1177
v. Swan	1412	Young v. Bankier Distillery Co.	298
v. Syracuse O. & N. Y. R. Co.	1378	v. Baxter	36
v. Tallmadge	1220	v. Chandler	39
v. Trustees of M. E. Church	632	v. Commissioners	488
v. Vanderplank	547	v. Dake	1184, 1201
v. Wakeford	1224, 1225	v. Easley	470
v. White	1160	v. Frost	1002
v. Williams	306	v. Martin	451
v. Wright	441, 539, 540	v. McNeill	1369
Wright ex dem. Plowden v. Cartwright	1199	v. Miller	1058
Wrigley v. Swainson	566	v. Raincock	1522
Wronkow v. Oakley	715, 1447	v. Schofield	1575
Wrotlesley v. Adams	1140, 1516	v. Stearns	1472
Wunder v. McLean	903	v. Tarbell	687
Wusthoff v. Schwartz	848, 849	v. Wilson	1576
Wyatt v. Harrison	280	v. Young	442, 446, 447, 671
Wyckoff v. Gardner	978	Young Women's Christian Home	
Wylie v. Charlton	444	v. French	1010
Wyman v. Ballard	1528, 1531	Youngblood v. Sexton	864
v. Brown	1402	Youngman v. E. & W. R. Co.	56
v. Oliver	684	v. Elmira, etc. R. Co.	1050
v. Woodbury	456	Youngs v. Carten	561
Wynn v. Sarer	518	v. Youngs	524
Wynne v. Alexander	1513	Yount v. Yount	544
v. Alston	1038		
Wyse v. Russell	849	Z.	
Wythes v. Lee	571	Zacharie v. Franklin	1464
		Zachmann v. Zachmann	735, 737
X.		Zahrt, <i>In re</i>	740, 743
Xenos v. Wickham	1461	Zapf v. Carter	1363, 1364
		Zapp v. Miller	961, 962, 963
		Zeiminger v. Schnetzler	288
		Zeisweiss v. James	479, 488

TABLE OF CASES CITED,

[References are to pages.]

Zell v. First Universalist Soc.	163	Zimmerman v. Streeper	445
Zeller v. Eckert	899	Zipp v. Barker	191
v. Southern Yacht Club	1331	Zoeller v. Riley	563
Zerbe v. Miller	563	Zorkowski v. Astor	825, 947
Zerbey v. Allan	204, 264	Zorntlein v. Bram	975
Zimmerman v. Barber	511, 512	Zouch v. Parsons	801, 1442
v. Lebo	442	Zundell v. Gess	512

THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY.

INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE.

CHAPTER I.

PROPERTY EXPLAINED AND CLASSIFIED.

§ 1. Plan of this treatise.	Goods and chattels — Lands, tenements, and hereditaments.
§ 2. Property defined.	
§ 3. Exclusive appropriation.	§ 7. Divisions of property — Real and personal.
§ 4. Divisions of property — Civil law.	§ 8. Leading distinctions between real property and personal property.
§ 5. Divisions of property — Early common law — Movable and immovable.	§ 9. Property which is sometimes real and sometimes personal.
§ 6. Divisions of property —	

§ 1. Plan of this Treatise. — The “everlasting hills” are not more ancient than many of the legal principles that regulate their ownership and use. The geology of jurisprudence discovers and explains those principles, fixed or operating in human institutions. As any conception of the earth is necessarily imperfect, which ignores the teachings of its *strata*, rocks, and fossils, so any discussion of law — and especially of the law of real property — which fails to deal with the splendid history and development of its subject, must be not only incomplete, but also to some extent erroneous. It is for this reason that much space is devoted in the following pages to the unfolding of modern elements of the law of realty from ancient practice, thoughts, and theories. In no other way can they be thoroughly understood. Therefore the simple plan of this treatise, after explaining its general subject-matter and dividing it into its four natural departments, — I. Lands, tene-

ments, and hereditaments; II. Holdings of these; III. Estates in them; and IV. Titles to them, — is to endeavor, as to each of these divisions and its subdivisions, first to make clear its meaning and nature as they appear from history and present usage, and then to unfold and explain the rules and principles of law that have grown up around it through the centuries.

§ 2. **Property defined.** — The idea of exclusiveness is the essential feature of all adequate definitions of property that have been formulated by jurists or philosophers. The statement, therefore, that property is something which one owns, to the *exclusion* of every other person, may be sufficient to convey a definite and practical conception of its meaning. But since the time when the word came into frequent use in the common law, which was probably not earlier than the beginning of the eighteenth century,¹ it has been employed by the best writers in many different senses. Among these various meanings there are three most frequent and prominent, which are especially the most important in connection with the subject-matter of this treatise.

(1) The term “property” is often used to denote the *object* or thing to which a right of ownership may attach. Such is its signification when it is said that a certain book, or horse, or farm is the property of a designated person; that one’s property is situated in a specified county or city; or that all property has been divided into things movable and things immovable.² (2) Again, it is employed to indicate the *right* or *interest* which one has in a thing to the exclusion of all other individuals. Thus a man is said to have property in mills, or mines, or land; and when an article is bailed, the general property in it remains in the bailor, while the possession passes

¹ “As to *property*, though throughout the middle ages the French and Latin forms of the word occasionally occur, and the use of it is insured by the writ *de proprietate probanda*, we believe that until the last century it was far less frequent than would be supposed by those who have not looked for it in the statute book. Instead of property in the vaguer of the two senses which it now bears, men used *possessions* and *estate*. In a narrower sense *property* was used as an equivalent for best right (s. g. Co. Lit. 145 b; ‘But there he two

kinde of properties; a general propertie, which every absolute owner hath; and a special propertie’), but in the Year Books it is by no means common.” 2 Pollock & Maitland, *Hist. Eng. Law* (2d ed., 1899), p. 153.

² Standard Dict., “Property,” 1.

This is the sense in which the word must be used in the discussion of *estates* in real property. The *property*, or object of ownership, is then thought of as one thing, and the interest or *estate* in it, as another. See *Long Is. R. Co. v. Garvey*, 159 N. Y. 334, 337; § 292, *infra*.

to the bailee.¹ (3) The word is very frequently used to embrace anything and everything that may be owned by one person to the exclusion of others, — the external objects themselves and the rights and interests which may exist in connection with them. This last sense includes the other two, and is the broadest and loosest, though perhaps at the present time the most commonly employed, meaning of the term. When a man speaks of all his property, he is usually employing the word with this sweeping signification. He may thus include, for example, a house and lot which he owns absolutely and all his right and interest in the same, a life estate in an adjoining acre of land the residue of which is owned by some other person, a perpetual right to cross a neighbor's field, the furniture in his dwelling-house, the cattle upon his farm, shares of stock in a corporation, and a chose in action arising from contract or tort.²

The second of these three classes of definitions is logically and theoretically correct. There is, of course, an ownership, an exclusive appropriation (*proprietas*) of a thing, a dominion over it, as distinguished from the thing itself. It would have conduced to clearness and precision of thought if legislators, judges, and jurists had always agreed in confining their use of the word *property* to this etymologically and philosophically correct meaning, and in employing some other term or expression to denote the external objects to which such right, interest, ownership, or dominion might attach. But the history of the common law shows that they have been far from agreeing upon any such limitations.³ Therefore, in treating of one of its most important divisions, the term "property" must frequently be employed in the broadest and most general sense here stated; while in many instances, as the context will ordinarily make clear, it must be so restricted as to embrace only the objects or things that may be owned, as distinguished from the interests or estates which may exist in them. Care will be taken in this work to explain the sense in which the word is employed, in all instances in which ambiguity might otherwise result.

¹ Bouvier's Law Dict., "Property;" Standard Dict., "Property," 2; Co. Lit. 145 b; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *452, *453.

² See Wms. R. P. (17th ed.) p. 4; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *2; Austin's Juris.

(4th ed.) 371, 804; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 2.

³ "The word 'property' is used in so many senses as to be nearly useless for juristic purposes." Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 302.

§ 3. **Exclusive Appropriation.**— But, whatever may be the signification of the word in the context in which it is found, it must always be borne in mind that nothing can be property which is not *exclusively* appropriated to individual ownership.¹ An undiscovered pearl at the bottom of the deep sea is not property, nor is there in it any property right in any sense of the word; and the same is true of any unknown island or other land outside of the geographical limits of governmental ownership.² The emancipation proclamation of 1863 took away all property in slaves, by forbidding exclusive appropriation of the labor of negroes.³ The right of a wife to take out insurance upon the life of her husband, since other persons may have the same right and their exercise of it does not affect hers, is not property, but at most a *status*.⁴ So, we have no property in the air or sunlight, as we ordinarily enjoy them, since they are not thus appropriated to our own exclusive use or control.⁵

§ 4. **Divisions of Property — Civil Law.** — Starting with the generic word *res*, as denoting objects of ownership, the Romans divided the things thereby indicated into *res mancipi* and *res nec mancipi*. While the former of these classes doubtless included at first all things which could be touched and handled, it was subsequently restricted to tangible articles in the sale of which certain formalities were prescribed; and the latter class then embraced all other tangible things and all those that were intangible and incorporeal. Articles that could be touched and handled were also divided into things *movable* and things *immovable*; and this distinction is still preserved in some civil-law jurisdictions.⁶

§ 5. **Divisions of Property — Early Common Law — Movable and Immovable.**— In the early and cruder stages of the common law, the division, which the civilians applied to tangible

¹ Definitions above quoted; Bracton, ch. xii. § 5.

² Com. Dig., *Biens*; Rutherford, Inst. 20; *Nicholls v. Butcher*, 18 Ves. 193; *Sharp v. Sharp*, 6 Bing. 630.

³ 2 Nicolay & Hay, *Lincoln*, p. 73; 2 Morse's *Lincoln*, p. 130.

⁴ *Holmes v. Gilman*, 138 N. Y. 369, 379; *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U. S. 537, 549; *City of St. Louis v. Hill*, 116 Mo. 527.

⁵ But, of course, a right to enjoy

these may become so appropriated as to become valuable property. Such are the rights to light and air which the owner of land may have over streets, squares, or other open places. *Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 90 N. Y. 122. See *Sullivan v. Iron, Silver Mining Co.*, 143 U. S. 431; *Pothier, des Choses*; 18 *Viner, Abr.* 63.

⁶ *Maine, Anc. L. ch. viii.*; *MacKenzie's Roman Law, 166-190*; *Hadley's Lectures*, 86.

objects only, into things *movable* and things *immovable*, was adopted and extended roughly to all kinds of property.¹ The method of holding and enjoying the soil of the earth, houses, trees, and other things, which could not ordinarily be carried from place to place, gave emphasis and durability to this classification.² Soon after the conquest of England by William the Conqueror (probably about the twentieth year of his reign there), all absolute ownership of such things by private individuals was done away with by the introduction of the feudal system.³ The theory upon which that system was established and maintained was that all property of a permanent and immovable character belonged primarily and ultimately to the king; that he, as such absolute owner, had distributed it in large parcels amongst his chief followers, vassals, or tenants to *hold* of himself; that they, in turn, had in like manner sub-parcelled it out to their own vassals or tenants; that these latter had done the same as to the portions which they themselves received; and so on, down to those who took actual possession of the property, enjoyed it and made the avail or proceeds therefrom. Such holding one of another, under that system, is called *tenure*. He who thus holds is called a *vassal* or *tenant*; he of whom the property is held is the *lord*. The king, being the chief lord, above all others, is denominated *lord paramount*, and the others *mesne* lords; while he who is tenant or vassal only, and has no one holding of himself, but by his own labor enjoys the property and obtains the proceeds from it, is tenant *paravail*. Thus, each holder of the property between the king and the tenants paravail is the vassal or tenant of the one above himself, from whom he has received it and of whom he holds it, and the *mesne* lord of those to whom he in turn has parcelled it out. The purposes for which the system was invented and employed were chiefly military. As a condition to his right to hold his property, each vassal was compelled to serve in the wars with his lord, and also to render to him certain services and pecuniary returns. These duties and burdens became more and more oppressive with the growth and spread of the system,

¹ Glanvill, x. 6; Bracton, f. 61 b; Maine, Anc. L. ch. viii.

² "Glanvill and Bracton—at the suggestion, it may be, of foreign jurisprudence—can pass from movables to immovables and then back to movables

with an ease which their successors may envy." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 2.

³ See fuller discussion of that system, Book II. ch. ii., *infra*.

until the legislative power intervened (in the twelfth year of Charles II.¹) and swept most of them away by statute.²

It is manifest at a glance that such a system, cumbersome and technical as it was, could not well be applied to articles that are temporary, movable, and easily destroyed. Cattle, carriages, household furniture, and the like are too perishable and insignificant to be subject to any feudal rights or duties. Absolute ownership by private individuals was accordingly recognized in such articles; and thus the distinction became very emphatic and important between those things which are *movable* and which one might own absolutely and those that are *immovable*, the only way of holding which by any one except the king was by *tenure*, under a superior lord and subject to all the burdens and incidents of feudal tenancy or vassalage.³

§ 6. Divisions of Property — Goods and Chattels — Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments. — Property of a tangible and movable character readily came also to be designated as *goods* or *chattels*, or, by the combination of the two words, *goods and chattels*.⁴ Comparatively little is said of such articles by the law records and reports of feudal times.⁵ But upon immovable things the skill and subtlety of the legal profession were energetically bestowed; and statutes, reports, and learned treatises have preserved the results. In process of time such things were spoken of as *tenements*,⁶ because they were subject to tenure, i. e. were *holden* one of another; and as *hereditaments*,⁷ because on the death of the tenant or vassal they might pass to his heir, to be held by him of the lord in the same manner in which they had been held by the ancestor and subject to the same feudal rights and obligations. The word *lands*,⁸ also,

¹ 12 Car. II. ch. 24.

² 2 Blackst. Com. ch. iv.

³ Doubtless movable articles were much associated with things of a permanent nature, so as to pass with them; and in this manner they came under the operation of the feudal system. See 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 149.

⁴ These words are constantly used interchangeably, or together, to include all forms of property that we now call personalty. The etymological distinction between them is probably more commonly observed in England than in this country. See Sale of Goods Act,

56 & 57 Vict. ch. 71; also cases in English probate reports; Bouvier's Law Dict., "Goods and Chattels."

⁵ This is not so much because they were few and valueless, as because the procedure affecting them was ordinarily in the lower courts, and being simple and expeditious, was not brought to the attention of jurists as forcibly as that concerning realty. See 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 150 *et seq.*

⁶ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 72, n. 5; § 98, *infra*.

⁷ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 181; § 99, *infra*.

⁸ See § 60, *infra*.

as denoting those tangible, substantial things which have permanency as to time and fixedness as to space, came readily into use; and so, during the vigorous sway of the feudal system, the property with which it dealt was constantly referred to as embracing *lands, tenements, and hereditaments*. This division of property into *goods and chattels* on the one hand, and *lands, tenements, and hereditaments* on the other, still retains its hold upon the common law; but it is not so generally employed, in this country at least, as the more familiar classification into *real property* and *personal property*, which is to be next considered.¹

§ 7. Divisions of Property — Real and Personal. — The statute 12 Car. II. ch. 24, which was regarded by Blackstone as a greater acquisition to the civil liberty of England than even *Magna Charta* itself, took away most of the burdensome incidents of feudal tenure; and, while it left the theory of the feudal system still operative there, it broke down the chief distinction between different kinds of property, to which distinction that system had given emphasis. Although in England he who has an acre of land still *holds* it theoretically of the king, yet for most practical purposes he may now own it as fully and absolutely as he may his horse or his watch.² After the enactment of that statute, therefore, property naturally became classified upon a new basis or principle. An obvious and logical division of actions at law for wrongfully taking or detaining property had existed for a long time. When the only remedy was an action against the person who had done the wrong, and the judgment recoverable was simply for pecuniary damages and not for the return of the specific thing abstracted, it was called a *personal* action; while, if it could result in a judgment for the return of the article taken or detained, — the recovery of the *real* thing, — it was denominated a *real* action.³ It was natural that, after the overshadowing influence of the feudal system had been removed, the subject-matter affected by such actions should be divided in the same way as the actions themselves, and that property should be classified as (1) *Real Property*, or such as can be recovered specifically when it has been wrongfully taken or detained from its owner; and (2) *Personal Property*, or that for the wrongful abstraction or

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. ch. ii.

² Co. Lit. 65 a, 93 a; 3 Blackst. Com. p. *167 *et seq.*; Wms. R. P. (17th ed.) 7.

³ Co. Lit. 118 b, 285 a, 288 b; Bract. 101 b; 3 Blackst. Com. p. *117; Stephen on Pleading, ch. i.

detention of which the specific common-law action is for damages against the wrongdoer.¹ This classification of the kinds of property into real and personal, with its historic foundation upon the different forms of common-law actions, is the most complete and satisfactory and the one universally recognized at the present time. It must be confessed, however, that the abolition in most common-law jurisdictions of those ancient forms of actions,² together with many of the distinctions which rested upon them, the establishment and use of new kinds of remedies and methods of procedure, the immense increase in the bulk of personalty in very modern times, the invention and production of various new forms of property of both classes and the multitude of novel uses and purposes to which things have been applied have made it difficult, in many instances, to determine whether given articles are real property or personalty. Some of the leading distinctions between them, in this respect, may be summarized as follows:—

§ 8. **Leading Distinctions between Real Property and Personal Property.**—(1) From an historical standpoint, as above shown, real property is such as, when wrongfully taken or retained from its owner, could have been recovered by a common-law *real* action; personal property is that for the wrongful abstraction or detention of which the specific common-law action was one for damages against the *person* of the wrongdoer.³ (2) Generally speaking, real property is fixed and immovable as to space and permanent as to time; personal property is temporary and perishable as to time and movable as to space.⁴ This is simply a general distinction, which in many cases is wholly inapplicable. For example, a door key, though carried around in one's pocket and liable to be lost or destroyed at any time, may be real property;⁵ while a house, though very heavy and difficult to move, may, under some circumstances (as when it is built by a tenant upon leased premises for purposes of trade or manufacture), be taken away from the land as personal property.⁶ (3) Real property may descend to the *heirs* of an owner thereof, who dies

¹ Co. Lit. 118 b; Bract. 101, 102; Wms. R. P. (17th ed.) p. 23; Digby, Hist. Law R. P., Appendix, § 1; 4 Law Quart. Rev. 394.

² See 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 27, § 36; Chase's Blackst. pp. 716-734; Goelet v. Asseler, 22 N. Y. 225, 228.

³ Ibid.; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 71, n. 2; Wms. R. P. (17th ed.) p. 23.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *16; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 303.

⁵ See "Fixtures," § 10, *infra*.

⁶ See §§ 32, 46, *infra*.

intestate as to it;¹ personal property passes to the executors or administrators of its deceased owner, to be used so far as necessary for the payment of his debts, and the residue either to be disposed of according to the provisions of his will, or, if it be not disposed of by a will, to be divided amongst his *distributees*² as ascertained by common-law principles or the ruling statutes of distributions.³ (4) The ancient common law did not permit real property to be taken on execution for the payment of debts; but it did allow personal property to be so taken.⁴ This distinction has been materially modified by modern statutes, creditors being now generally able to reach their debtors' real property, or some interest therein, for the payment of their debts; but the prevailing rule requires the personalty to be exhausted before the real property can be taken.⁵ (a)

Many other distinguishing features might be mentioned. Thus, the law which affects real property is that of the place where it is located, that which governs personalty is usually the law of the place of its owner's domicile; a conveyance of real property is now uniformly required to be made by a writing, while personal property may generally be transferred by delivery and acceptance. The two classes of property are governed by different rules as to the levying and collecting of taxes upon them and the methods of making, filing, recording, and satisfying of mortgages and other liens and encumbrances. These distinctions and many others, the knowledge of which is

(a) Thus, it is required in New York that an execution "must, except in a case where special provision is otherwise made by law, substantially require the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out of the personal property of the judgment debtor; and, if sufficient personal property cannot be found, out of the real property belonging to him at the time when the judgment was docketed in the clerk's office of the county, or at any time thereafter." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1369; *Saunders v. Reilly*, 105 N. Y. 12, 21; *Dunham v. Reilly*, 110 N. Y. 366.

¹ By the canons and statutes of descent. N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 18, art. iii.; *Stimson*, Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3100-3169; *Title by Descent*, § 91, *infra*.

² This word is employed as the most convenient and accurate (though it is not generally used as much as might be) to describe those persons who are entitled by law to share in the personalty of an intestate decedent. It includes the "next of kin"—i. e. the

blood relatives who may so share—and a surviving husband or wife.

³ 22 & 23 Car. II. ch. 10; 29 Car. II. ch. 30; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2732-2734; *Stimson*, Amer. Stat. L. ch. iv.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *160, *161; 2 *Woerner*, Adm'n, p. 1093.

⁵ *Digby*, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 281-284; 2 *Woerner*, Adm'n, p. 1093.

necessary to a clear apprehension of the law of real property, will be explained in the following pages.

§ 9. **Property which is sometimes Real and sometimes Personal.** — At any particular instant of time every piece of property in the world is either real or personal. There is no third or intermediate class. Yet some things that are personal to-day may be real to-morrow; and others that are now real in character may be personal a year hence. To articles which readily or frequently change in this manner the term "mixed property" has been occasionally applied.¹ It is not a desirable expression, however; and, when employed, must never be taken as intimating the existence of any distinct class or division. Illustrations of things, which because of their varying conditions may raise important questions regarding their nature as realty or personalty at any given time, are ice, crops, trees, buildings, etc., and fixtures. A brief discussion of such articles as these is important, in order to ascertain the exact limits of the subject-matter dealt with by the law of real property. Such discussion naturally divides itself into two parts; namely, (1) An investigation of that somewhat extensive class of articles called fixtures; and (2) An inquiry into the nature of such other things as may readily change from the one species of property to the other, but are not embraced by the term "fixtures."

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 428; *Dudley v. Ward*, 1 Ambler Ch. 113.

CHAPTER II.

FIXTURES.

§ 10. Fixtures — History and definitions.

§ 11. *Criteria* for determining whether realty or personalty.

1. *Intent as a Criterion.*

§ 12. Reasonably presumable intent.

§ 13. Intent directly expressed.

§ 14. Intent shown by contract.

§ 15. Estoppel to deny intent — Fraud — Public policy.

§ 16. Other tests subsidiary to intent.

2. *Annexation as a Criterion.*

§ 17. Constructive annexation.

§ 18. Actual annexation.

§ 19. Weight, size, etc., of fixture.

§ 20. Adaptability to premises.

§ 21. Conclusion as to annexation.

3. *Relation between the Parties as a Criterion.*

§ 22. Classes of parties.

§ 23. *Affixed by permanent owner of land.*

§ 24. Fixtures as between vendor and vendee.

§ 25. Between parties under contract to buy and to sell.

§ 26. Between heir or devisee and personal representative of deceased landowner.

§ 27. Between co-owners of the land.

§ 28. Between mortgagor and mortgagee of the land.

§ 29. Between unpaid vendor, etc., of the fixture, and lienor of land.

§ 30. *Affixed by temporary owner of land.*

§ 31. Fixtures annexed by tenant for years.

§ 32. Trade fixtures.

§ 33. Domestic fixtures.

§ 34. Agricultural fixtures.

§ 35. Summary of exceptions in favor of tenants for years.

§ 36. Time when tenant for years may remove fixtures.

§ 37. Effect of renewal of lease on right to fixtures.

§ 38. Fixtures annexed by life-tenant.

§ 39. Fixtures annexed by other temporary owners.

§ 40. Conclusion, as to fixtures.

§ 10. **Fixtures — History and Definitions.** — Until times comparatively recent, the common law as we know it gave but scant attention to personal property. Doubtful questions as to the nature of an article were, before the time of Henry VI., con-

stantly solved by treating it as a part of what is now called realty. It was thus brought within the favored class, and under the operation of the well-known legal principles which had developed with the Anglo-Saxon race.¹ In support of this tendency, the maxim *quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit* — whatever is affixed to the soil (or freehold) is a part of it and passes with it — became of much importance.² The result was that, whenever one who had possession of land attached personal articles to it, or used them as things accessory to its enjoyment, they became, in contemplation of law, a part of the land and a portion of the real property of its owner. Such things, being thus attached or *affixed* to the land, either actually, or constructively from the manner of their use in connection with it, were called *fixtures*. And the definition was accordingly framed, that fixtures are things in their inherent nature chattels, which have been so annexed to real property as to be deemed a part of it.³ This meaning still largely adheres to the word. Many judges and text-writers commonly employ it with such a signification.⁴

As personal property grew in amount and importance before the law,⁵ and the spread of commerce and business enterprise increased and diversified the purposes for which real property could be employed, numerous exceptions were en-

¹ 3 Reeves' Hist. Eng. L. 15, 369; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *384, *385; 2 Kent's Com. p. *341; Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450, 459; Elliott v. Bishop, 10 Exch. 496, 507, 508.

² Broom's Legal Maxims, pp. *401-431; Warner v. Grayson, 200 U. S. 257, 269.

³ See definitions of this kind in Worcester's Dict.; Webster's Dict.; Ewell on Fixtures, p. 6; Hill on Fixtures, § 1; Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450, 459; Story, J., in Van Ness v. Packard, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 137, 147. In the early treatises on the common law the term "fixtures" does not appear as a distinct heading. The subject is discussed, however, frequently under the topic "waste," and to some extent under that of "executors and administrators" in connection with the question as to what may be "assets" in their hands. See Brown on Fixtures, § 2; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 2712, subd. 4.

⁴ See, for a few illustrations, Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287; McRea v. Cent. Nat. Bk., 66 N. Y. 489; Feder v. Van Winkle, 53 N. J. Eq. 370; Harmony v. Berger, 99 Pa. St. 320; Capeu v. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88, 94; Thomas v. Davis, 76 Mo. 72; Capital City Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 95 Ala. 77; Tyler on Fixtures, pp. 36, 37.

⁵ It would be incorrect to follow the writers of a century or more ago and to state that there was very little personal property during feudal times. 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 149 *et seq.* But it was the growth of this kind of property in importance before the law, especially before the higher courts whose records and reports we have, and in particular for the tenant for *years* when his right became fixed as an *estate*, that caused a relaxation of the ancient preference for calling such things realty.

grafted upon the maxim *quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit*.¹ In cases in which the relation between the owner of the land and the person who places such things upon it is that of landlord and tenant, those exceptions have now become so important as practically to constitute the rule.² In most instances, the tenant for life or for a term of years may remove from the land, before he surrenders it back to the landlord, the personal chattels which he has annexed thereto or used in connection therewith.³ The existence of so many exceptions to the maxim has caused some modern writers to go to the other extreme in framing their definitions of fixtures. They accordingly define them as personal chattels annexed to or used in association with land and removable by the person who so annexed or uses them.⁴

Neither of the definitions above given accurately describes fixtures. The bricks in the wall of an ordinary building were at one time personalty; and they have been annexed to the land in such a manner as to form a part of it. They are included by the first of these definitions. Yet they are not fixtures, and are never treated as such by the law. On the other hand, a tenant's tables, chairs, carpets, and other articles of household furniture, used by him in connection with the land, and perhaps to some extent fastened to the dwelling-house, are personal chattels which he may take away. They are fully within the second definition; and yet they are never treated by the law as fixtures. It follows that there are some chattels which, although annexed to or used in association with realty, may *unquestionably* be removed by their owners. They are not fixtures, but simply personal property. Other things of a personal character, when annexed to the land, become *unquestionably* a part of the real property. These likewise are not fixtures; and this is because they can make *no question* arise as to whose property they are. There are yet other articles of a personal character which have been annexed to real property, or are used in association with or as accessory to it, and they are of such a nature, and such use or enjoyment is had of them in connection with the land, that it can not be determined until certain tests are applied and certain *questions* answered whether they are real or personal. They are so

¹ Broom's Legal Maxims, pp. * 417-
* 431.

² See §§ 32-34, *infra*.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ Ferard's Fixtures, p. 11; Bouvier's

Law Dict.; Burrill's Law Dict.; Ewell on Fixtures, p. 4 *et seq.*; Hallen v. Runder, 1 C. M. & R. 266; Pickerell v. Carson, 8 Iowa, 544; Prescott v. Wells, 3 Nev. 82.

situated or used, moreover, that, as the property changes hands and different interests and rights therein succeed one another, the question as to their removability may arise again and again. Such things are fixtures. Hence the following definition, as framed by a careful writer, appears to be substantially accurate and complete; namely, fixtures are "things associated with or more or less incidental to the occupation of lands and houses or either thereof, and with regard to which the question most frequently arising is that of their removability by the person claiming to remove them."¹

It is conceived that such a definition as that last quoted is the only one that can give any logical or satisfactory idea of the term under discussion. It is its liability to raise a question between adverse claimants that marks as a fixture an article used in connection with real property. The question thus raised is to be answered, as above indicated, by the application of certain tests or *criteria*, which are deduced from the decisions and will be hereafter explained. By this application of the *criteria* some fixtures may be shown to be real and others personal; while an article, which remains all the time in the same position and condition, may turn out to be real property as between some claimants, and, as between others, personalty. While connected or associated with the houses or lands, it remains all the time a fixture. The *criteria* are applied to determine whether for the purpose in hand the fixture is realty or personalty.²

The word "fixtures" will be used in this treatise with the meaning indicated by the last definition above stated. The reader must constantly remember, however, that courts and text-writers frequently employ it in some one of the other senses above explained. Quite commonly it is used simply to denote articles that have been so associated with realty as to become a part thereof. In the reading of any statute, text-book, or judicial opinion, which makes use of the word, the context is to be carefully examined to ascertain its meaning as there employed.

¹ Brown's Law of Fixtures (4th ed.), pp. 1-3. When a fixture is thus understood—taken at the point at which it may readily cause disputes—the expressions "real fixture" and "personal fixture" become intelligible. Remaining all the time in the same position, it may, by virtue of different contracts

and changes in the circumstances and relations of the parties, be realty to-day between A and B, and personalty to-morrow between C and D. See 32 Cent. Law Jour. 202.

² See the excellent discussion in Brown on Fixtures (4th ed.), p. 1 *et seq.*

§ 11. **Fixtures — Criteria for determining whether Realty or Personalty.** — So long as one and the same person remains the absolute and unrestricted owner of land and the things placed upon it, little thought is often given to the question whether such things are real or personal in character. But when the rights of other persons begin to attach to the property, as by the death intestate of its owner, or by his devising, selling, leasing, mortgaging, or otherwise encumbering or disposing of the land, the question as to what shall pass or be retained as part of the realty frequently becomes very material. Back of that question, as applied to any specific article, is the inquiry, what was the nature of that article while it was there upon the land before the question of ownership was mooted? And this last inquiry naturally suggests the further question, *what is the probable or reasonably presumable intent with which it was affixed to or used in connection with the land?* Do the circumstances of its annexation and use indicate that it was meant to remain personalty or to become a part of the realty? This is the primary and most important matter for investigation, and that to which the other *criteria* are largely subsidiary. One of the other tests is the *nature of the annexation*. This involves also an examination into the effects which the removal of the article in question would have upon the realty. And the third chief inquiry is *concerning the parties between whom the question of ownership arises*, — their relations to each other and to any other person who may have affixed the article, the part, if any, which each took in its annexation, and their respective interests in the land to which it is annexed or with which it is associated. These three *criteria* will be discussed in the order in which they have been stated.

1. *Intent as a Criterion.*

§ 12. **Reasonably Presumable Intent.** — Assuming that a personal chattel has been attached actually or constructively to realty, or used in association therewith so as to cause a question to arise as to its character, the most important inquiry is as to the probable or reasonably presumable intention with which it was so affixed or used.¹ Intention alone

¹ For a few of the many authorities which properly lay great stress upon this criterion, see *D'Eyncourt v. Greg-*

ory, L. R. 3 Eq. 382; *Hobson v. Goringe* (1897), 1 Ch. 192; *Wiggins Ferry Co. v. O. & M. R. Co.*, 142 U. S.

can not change an article from personalty into realty. There must be also some annexation of the thing to the land, or some use or enjoyment of it in association with the land. Thus, a large stone, brought into a door-yard and intended to be used in the future for a stoop, was held to be personalty before it had been actually so used; ¹ and the rolls purchased for a rolling-mill, paid for and brought into it but never adjusted to it nor used with it, do not become a part of the realty, although they are brought there for the purpose of being at some future time fastened to the mill and used in connection therewith. ² It is equally true that a mere unexpressed intention to treat a fixture as personalty will not, as a rule, change it from realty into a chattel. A vendor of a house and lot, for example, will not be allowed, before the deed passes, to remove valuable fixtures, simply because, after making the contract of sale, he declares that it was his secret intention to remove them. ³ The law can not take cognizance of such undisclosed thoughts of him who fastens an article to the land; but it can and does regard the *reasonably presumable* intent, to be gathered from all the facts and circumstances of the case. ⁴

§ 13. **How Intent may be shown** — **Directly expressed.** — It frequently happens, of course, that such reasonably presumable intent is the same as the actual purpose with which the chattel was annexed, and that the direct testimony of him who affixed or used it is controlling as to its character. ⁵ In

396, 415; *Potter v. Cromwell*, 40 N. Y. 287; *Voorhees v. McGinnis*, 48 N. Y. 278; *Wick v. Bredin*, 189 Pa. St. 83; *Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Barnard*, 84 Mich. 632; *Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Sav. Bk.*, 150 Mass. 519; *Erdman v. Moore*, 58 N. J. L. 445; *Sword v. Low*, 122 Ill. 487; *Cunningham v. Cureton*, 96 Ga. 489; *Overman v. Sasser*, 10 *Lawyers' Rep. Ann.* 723, note; *Tyler on Fixtures*, ch. vii.; *Ewell on Fixtures*, ch. i. § iv.; 13 *Amer. & Eng. Ency. of L.* (2d ed.) p. 597.

¹ *Woodman v. Pease*, 17 N. H. 282; *Cook v. Whiting*, 16 Ill. 480; *Ripley v. Page*, 12 Vt. 353.

² *Johnson v. Mehaffey*, 43 Pa. St. 308; *Cook v. Whiting*, 16 Ill. 480; *Ex parte Asthury*, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 630; *Mills v. Rindlett*, 23 N. H. 271; *Johnson v. Hunt*, 11 Wend. (N.Y.) 135; *Peck*

v. Batchelder, 40 Vt. 233; *Tripp v. Armitage*, 4 M. & W. 687.

³ *Snedeker v. Waring*, 12 N. Y. 170; *Rogers v. Brokaw*, 25 N. J. Eq. 496; *Catasauqua Nat. Bk. v. North*, 160 Pa. St. 303; *Crum v. Hill*, 40 Iowa, 506; *Thomas v. Davis*, 76 Mo. 72; *Tate v. Blackburne*, 48 Miss. 1.

⁴ The question is a mixed one of law and fact, and, when a jury is sitting, is to be submitted to it under proper instructions from the court. *Turner v. Wentworth*, 119 Mass. 459; *Southbridge Sav. Bk. v. Mason*, 147 Mass. 500; *Scobell v. Block*, 82 Hun (N. Y.), 223; *Harrisburg Electric Light Co. v. Goodman*, 129 Pa. St. 206.

⁵ *Erdman v. Moore*, 58 N. J. L. 445; *Sheldon v. Edwards*, 35 N. Y. 279; *Copp v. Swift*, 26 S. W. Rep. 438 (Tex. Civ. App.); *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 115.

one case, a church society had torn down the edifice in which it had formerly worshipped, and removed the bell and its framework. The latter were placed at the front of a lot on which the society was building a new structure. An execution against the church society having been put into the hands of the sheriff, that officer attempted to levy upon the bell, thus located, as personal property. The church society having proved that its intention was to place the bell in the new belfry when completed, it was held that the sheriff's attempted levy was a nullity. The intention to put it back upon the land of the church and into the new building for use there, being clearly shown, caused the bell thus located to remain realty.¹ So, where the owner of a farm had taken down a fence and piled the rails in a heap, intending to build with them another fence upon the same farm, it was held that they remained a part of his real property.² And where rails were cut from the timber upon a farm and placed along the line of an intended fence upon the *same* premises, it was decided that they were thus made a part of the realty.³ If the church society had intended to sell or otherwise to dispose of the bell instead of putting it into its new edifice, or if the rails in either of the two cases last cited had been placed in piles for the purpose of being taken to market and sold, the result in each case would have been different and the fixtures involved would have been personalty. Accordingly, where the owner

¹ Congre. Soc. of Dubuque v. Fleming, 11 Iowa, 533; Weston v. Weston, 102 Mass. 514, 518, 519; Hadman v. Ringwood, Cro. Eliz. 145; Ewell on Fixtures, p. 354.

² Goodrich v. Jones, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 142; Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Barnard, 84 Mich. 632; Harris v. Scovel, 85 Mich. 32.

³ Conklin v. Parsons, 1 Chandler (Wis.), 240. In Cook v. Whiting, 16 Ill. 480, the owner of a farm hauled upon it hewed timber, to be placed in a granary, and posts to be built into a fence. Both of these came from a tract of land other than the farm upon which they were designed to be thus used. Before using either of them for the purpose indicated, he sold the farm, nothing being said in the contract as to whether or not the posts and timber should pass to the vendee. It was held

that they did not pass under the deed, but remained the personal property of the vendor. The distinction between this case and Conklin v. Parsons (*supra*) grows out of the facts that in the latter case the trees were cut *from the same land upon which they were to be used as rails in building the fence*, while in the former they were cut from *other land than that upon which they were to be used*. The cutting of them and moving of them to another part of the *same land*, with intent to use them there as parts of a fence, did not change their nature from realty to personalty. But when they were cut upon one tract and moved unto *another* they were thus made personalty, and must remain so until they were actually annexed to or used in association with the land upon which they were thus brought.

of a tract of land had split out a stone and slightly removed it from its original connection with the ledge, intending to carry it from the farm and use it in preparing a tomb on another lot, it was held to have become personal property, and so was not passed by his deed of the land.¹ In all of these cases the location and treatment of the things in question were consistent with an intent to regard them either as real property or as personalty, and therefore direct evidence of the *actual* intent of their owners was controlling. The same result follows when the person who makes the annexation affirmatively declares his mind to other persons interested in the property; and they either expressly consent, or act upon his statements, or make no objection against his acting accordingly.² So, if an owner of land place on it a fixture that can be removed without injury to the freehold, and plainly notify those who subsequently become his heirs and personal representatives that he wishes it to remain either personalty or realty, direct proof of such expressed wish will ordinarily settle any question that may arise between them as to its ownership.³

§ 14. **Intent shown by Contract.** — In other instances, such direct evidence of what was actually intended goes for naught, because an investigation of all the facts and circumstances of the case causes the court reasonably to presume to the contrary. Especially does this result frequently flow from contracts made between persons interested in fixtures and those who attach them to the land. Thus, if the vendee of a chattel agree with the vendor that it shall remain personalty and the title to it shall not pass until it is paid for, no amount of annexation of it to realty by the purchaser, and no strength of intention on his part that it shall become his real property, can change its nature as between the parties to such contract.⁴

¹ Noble v. Sylvester, 42 Vt. 146.

² Lancaster v. Eve, 94 Eng. C. L. R. 715, 726; Duffers v. Bangs, 122 N. Y. 423; Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287; Eaves v. Estes, 10 Kan. 314; Thomas v. Inglis, 7 Ont. Rep. 588; State Nat. Bk. v. Smith, 15 Wash. 160; Tyler on Fixtures, pp. 127, 128.

³ Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. St. 271, 273, 274; and see Lawton v. Salmon, 1 H. Bl. 259; Cunningham v. Cureton, 96 Ga. 489; Wicks v. Bredin, 189 Pa. St.

83; Pfluger v. Carmichael, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 153; Tyler on Fixtures, p. 691.

⁴ Taft v. Stetin, 117 Mass. 471; Smith v. Benson, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 176; Andrews v. Day Button Co., 132 N. Y. 348; Ewell on Fixtures, p. 66 *et seq.* This is simply a clear instance of intent, as plainly evinced by contract express or implied. It has been said in some cases that here it is confusing to speak of any test as to fixtures being ne-

When the owner of a fixture gives a chattel mortgage upon it, or agrees to sell it as personal property, it must remain a chattel, as between him and the mortgagee or prospective vendee, until the mortgage is discharged or the contract satisfied.¹ Such articles are often so fastened to a building as to become realty as to third persons who are not parties or privies to the contract; but the agreements properly made definitely settle the question of intent and the nature of the fixture, as between those by whom they are made.² Among themselves and their privies the fixture must have the nature and character assigned to it by the parties to the contract; and, in cases of doubtful construction, the practical interpretation of the contract by them will be of primary importance.³ The agreement, which thus becomes decisive of the question of intent, need not be expressed, but may be implied from the nature, purposes, and circumstances of the transaction.⁴ Where, for example, land and houses were leased, with an option in the lessee to purchase the same at a price agreed upon, and certain fixtures firmly annexed to one of the houses were designated as intended to go to the lessee in case he purchased the premises, it was held that other fixtures in the buildings were excluded by implication and were not passed by the deed which the lessee subsequently obtained.⁵

§ 15. Estoppel to deny Intent — Fraud — Public Policy. — The owner of land may be estopped to assert an intention to

cessary; but the rights of the parties should be simply controlled by their agreement. See *Hobson v. Gorringer* (1897), 1 Ch. 182; *Andrews v. Day Bulton Co.*, 132 N. Y. 348, 354.

¹ *Tift v. Horton*, 53 N. Y. 377, 380; *Sisson v. Hibbard*, 75 N. Y. 545; *Tibbets v. Horne*, 65 N. H. 242; *Burrill v. S. N. W. Lumber Co.*, 65 Mich. 571.

² *Potter v. Cromwell*, 40 N. Y. 287; *Ford v. Cobb*, 20 N. Y. 344; *Campbell v. Roddy*, 44 N. J. Eq. 244; *Warner v. Kenting*, 25 Minn. 173; *San Antonio Brewing Assn. v. Ice Co.*, 81 Tex. 99. Of course, after the fixture is firmly annexed and would otherwise be realty, the agreement must be in writing, to comply with the requirements of the statute of frauds.

³ *Matter of Eureka Mowing Co.*, 86 Hun (N. Y.), 309; *Pfänger v. Carmichael*, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 153; *Woolsey*

v. Funke, 121 N. Y. 87, 92; *Sheldon v. Edwards*, 35 N. Y. 279; *Andrews v. Day Bulton Co.*, 132 N. Y. 348.

⁴ *Madigan v. McCarthy*, 108 Mass. 376; *Pope v. Skinkle*, 45 N. J. L. 39; *Mayo v. Newhoff*, 47 N. J. Eq. 31; 48 N. J. Eq. 619; *Charlotte Furnace Co. v. Stouffer*, 127 Pa. St. 336; *Cayuga R. Co. v. Niles*, 13 Hun (N. Y.), 170.

⁵ "If there be many things of the same class or kind, the expression of one or more of them in a conveyance implies the exclusion of all not expressed, although the law would have implied all if none had been enumerated. (2 Pars. on Cont. [8th ed.] 516; *Hare v. Horton*, 5 B. & Ad. 715.)" *Matter of Eureka Mower Co.*, 86 Hun (N. Y.), 309, 315; *Andrews v. Day Bulton Co.*, 132 N. Y. 348; *First Parish v. Jones*, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 184; *Pope v. Skinkle*, 45 N. J. L. 39.

remove fixtures. A vendor transfers by estoppel the articles which he has placed upon the land, or allowed to remain there, in such a manner as to induce the vendee to believe that they are realty and thus to conclude the purchase.¹ And a landlord who causes his tenant to make valuable annexations to the property by expressly or impliedly representing that they may be removed by the tenant, will not be heard to claim them as his own.² Under such circumstances the law fixes the reasonably presumable intent, without regard to what may have been the actual intent.³ So, to prevent fraud or the violation of right rules of public policy, articles will often be treated as one kind of property which were secretly intended when annexed to be regarded as the other.⁴

§ 16. **Other Tests are largely subsidiary to Question of Intent.**—In endeavoring to ascertain the reasonably presumable intention with which a fixture has been annexed to land or used in association with it, it frequently happens that no direct declaration of such intention can be found by the court, or if found it is not conclusive; also that no contract either express or implied relating to the character of the article as realty or personalty can be proved, and that no estoppel or principle of public policy operates against any of the adverse claimants. It then becomes necessary to apply the other tests or *criteria* above enumerated. One of these is an inquiry into the nature of the annexation, including an examination of the effects which the removal of the article in question would have upon the realty; and the other concerns itself with the parties between whom the question of ownership arises, their relations to each other and to any other person who may have affixed the article, the part, if any, which each took in its annexation and their respective interests in the land to which it is fastened or with which it is associated. While these

¹ *Snedeker v. Waring*, 12 N. Y. 170; *Rogers v. Brokaw*, 25 N. J. Eq. 496; *Tate v. Blackburne*, 48 Miss. 1; *Nat. Bk. v. North*, 160 Pa. St. 303.

² *Andrews v. Day Button Co.*, 132 N. Y. 348; *Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. R. R. Co.*, 142 U. S. 396; *Aldrich v. Husband*, 131 Mass. 480.

³ It has been said in some cases that the agreement or act, which is thus to determine the nature of an article, must be made or done before its annexation to the realty. See *Gibbs v. Estey*, 15

Gray (Mass.), 587. But, at least as to fixtures removable without injury to the realty, the great weight of authority is the other way. *Fuller v. Tabor*, 39 Me. 519, 522; *Morris v. French*, 106 Mass. 326; *Sowden v. Craig*, 26 Iowa, 156; *Mayo v. Newhoff*, 47 N. J. Eq. 31, 48 N. J. Eq. 619.

⁴ *Havens v. Germania Fire Ins. Co.*, 123 Mo. 403; *Sisson v. Hibbard*, 75 N. Y. 542. See *Nat. Bk. v. North*, 160 Pa. St. 303; *Cunningham v. Cureton*, 96 Ga. 489.

are often dealt with as matters for investigation separate and distinct from that already considered, yet they will ordinarily be found, in the last analysis, to have been used by the courts as subsidiary *criteria* to arrive at the reasonably presumable *intent* of the use or annexation. Their great importance for that purpose is directly or indirectly emphasized by nearly every decision upon the law of fixtures. It will conduce to clearness of thought to regard and treat them in that light.

2. *Annexation as a Criterion.*

§ 17. **Fixtures — Annexation, Use, or Enjoyment, as determining whether they are Realty or Personalty. — Constructive Annexation.** — The annexation of a fixture to realty may be either actual or constructive. It is actual when the article is physically attached to or united with the land; constructive, when no such real annexation exists, but the article is commonly used as appurtenant to the real property, appropriated and adapted to it and made accessory or reasonably necessary to its beneficial use and enjoyment.¹ The maxim *quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit* was formulated with primary reference to things firmly attached to the land. Actual, physical annexation was at first necessary to convert a chattel into real property.² But as soon as the courts began to give more heed to the matter of *intent*, they discovered many things which, although not actually united to the realty, were to be treated as a part of it, under the law of fixtures. It was accordingly held, as early as the fourteenth year of Henry VIII., that a millstone, which had been removed from the mill to be picked and was intended to be restored to its original position, was passed by a deed conveying the mill.³ Since that time the doctrine of constructive annexation of fixtures has been fully recognized.⁴ Other illustrations of things so annexed are

¹ *Wystow's Case*, 4 Man. & Ry. 280, note (g); *Liford's Case*, 11 Coke, 46 b, 50 b; *Voorhis v. Freeman*, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 116; *Williamson v. N. J. So. R. Co.*, 29 N. J. Eq. 311, 330. "In respect to all cases of constructive annexation, there exist both adaptation to the enjoyment of the land and localization in use as obvious elements of distinction from mere chattels personal." *Hoyle v. Plattsburgh & M. R. Co.*, 54 N. Y. 314, 323.

² *Broom's Legal Maxims*, p. 401 *et seq.*; *Diederich v. Rose*, 228 Ill. 610.

³ *Wystow's Case*, 14 Hen. VIII. 25 b, which will be found translated in 4 Man. & Ry. 280, note (g); *Liford's Case*, 11 Coke, 46, 50 b.

⁴ See *Co. Lit.* 8 a; *Cro. Eliz.* 372; *Delaware, etc. R. Co. v. Oxford Iron Co.*, 36 N. J. Eq. 452; *Amos & Ferrard on Fixtures*, p. 168; *Ewell on Fixtures*, pp. 33-39.

door keys, detached door knobs, doors, windows, and window blinds, which are to be replaced upon the house, fences taken down but to be rebuilt upon the same land, and a church bell taken down and set loosely upon the premises while the church edifice is being repaired or rebuilt.¹ A common result of constructive annexation is the making of the article at once a fixture and a part of the real property.² And, in order to produce these results, the thing must be appropriated and specially adapted to the real property, used as accessory to its enjoyment, and reasonably necessary to give it completeness.³ Thus, a door key held for sale in the shop of a vendor of such articles is personal property; but when it has been bought by the owner of a house and fitted to the lock of one of the doors and is used for the purpose of locking and unlocking the same, it has become a part of the realty, though its owner may carry it around in his pocket.⁴ So a movable window-blind, by being fitted and adjusted to the window of a house, may become and remain a part of the realty, although at the time when the question as to its nature arises it is not actually used at the window to which it belongs.⁵ Such adaptation of chattels to real property and their use in connection with it point strongly to the conclusion that they have become a part thereof. This is because they indicate an *intention* on the part of their owner that they should be so treated. The method of using articles, however, and their fitness for and adaptability to the enjoyment of the land, will frequently not be conclusive as to such intention. The application of other *criteria*, or clear, direct evidence of intent may rebut the presumption which would otherwise arise from this test. Such, for instance, is frequently the result when the parties between whom the question arises are landlord and tenant, or their legal representatives.⁶

§ 18. **Actual Annexation — Effect of Removal.** — When the fixture is actually fastened or united to the real property, one

¹ *Liford's Case*, 11 Coke, 46, 50 b; *Bishop v. Elliott*, 11 Exch. 113; *State v. Elliott*, 11 N. H. 540; *Hill v. Wentworth*, 28 Vt. 428, 436; *Dudley v. Hurst*, 67 Md. 44; *Goodrich v. Jones*, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 142; *Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Barnard*, 84 Mich. 632; *Congr. Soc. of Dubuque v. Fleming*, 11 Iowa, 533.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*; *Hoyle v. Plattsburgh & M.*

R. Co., 54 N. Y. 314, 323, quoted *supra*; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 58.

⁴ *Bishop v. Elliott*, 11 Exch. 113.

⁵ *Liford's Case*, 11 Coke, 46, 50 b; *Walker v. Sherman*, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 636; *Goddard v. Bolster*, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 427; *State v. Elliott*, 11 N. H. 540.

⁶ See discussion of this relationship as affecting rights in fixtures, §§ 31-37, *infra*.

of the chief matters to be investigated is whether or not its removal would leave the premises in a worse condition than they were before it was taken away.¹ This test is to be applied by considering what would be the condition of the realty immediately after the article in question should be removed and before any repairs were made. He who claims the right to take the fixture from the land can not maintain his position merely by showing a readiness on his part to make any repairs which might become necessary because of its removal. If it can not be removed without thereby materially injuring the real property from which it is sought to be taken, it is usually a part of that real property; and that fact alone determines the rights of the parties by whom it is claimed.² Thus, in an early English case, the question at issue was as to the nature of articles composing the stock of a distiller. They consisted of certain stills firmly set in brickwork and let into the ground, vats supported by and resting on brickwork and timber, but not let into the ground, and other vats standing on frames of wood, which likewise were not let into the ground but stood upon the floor. It was decided that the stills were a part of the realty, but that all of the vats were personal property.³ Where a portable grist-mill was fastened to a building by bolts and rods, which passed through the frame timbers and floor joists, and the rods and bolts were secured by nuts firmly fastened upon the ends, the mill being designed for a permanent grist-mill for the neighborhood, it was held to be a part of the realty.⁴

¹ *Elwes v. Maw*, 3 East, 38; *Norton v. Dashwood* (1896), 2 Ch. 497; *McKeage v. Hanover F. Ins. Co.*, 81 N. Y. 38; *Feeder v. Van Winkle*, 53 N. J. Eq. 370; *Capen v. Peckham*, 35 Conn. 88; *Ewell on Fixtures*, p. 8 *et seq.*; *Tyler on Fixtures*, ch. iv.

² This test is very strong, and has frequently been treated as conclusive. *Wake v. Hall*, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 195; *Wiltshier v. Cottrell*, 1 El. & Bl. 674; *Guthrie v. Jones*, 108 Mass. 191; *McKiernan v. Hesse*, 51 Cal. 594; *Tyler on Fixtures*, pp. 226-228. Of course, express contract may overcome the presumption. And it has been held in some cases that, even in the absence of contract, strong and firm annexation so

that to remove would be to injure the realty was not absolutely conclusive as to the nature of the fixtures. *Ex parte Moore v. Banking Co.*, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 379; *Hill v. Wentworth*, 28 Vt. 428; *Allen v. Mooney*, 130 Mass. 155; *Crane v. Brigham*, 11 N. J. Eq. 29; *Coe's Estate*, 1 Tucker (N. Y. Surr.), 125; *Ewell on Fixtures*, p. 15 *et seq.* The question, whether or not the fixture itself will be injured by its removal, is not material. *Matter of City of New York*, 192 N. Y. 295.

³ *Horn v. Baker*, 9 East, 215. See also *Vorhees v. McGinnis*, 48 N. Y. 278; *Feeder v. Van Winkle*, 53 N. J. Eq. 370.

⁴ *Potter v. Cromwell*, 40 N. Y. 287.

But portable engines, looms, machinery, or other fixtures, which are loosely fastened to a house by means of cleats, screws, or screw-bolts, or in such a manner that they can be readily removed without injury to the soil or the structure to which they are attached, are more readily held to be personalty, unless a different intention is shown by some of the other tests applied.¹

If the fixture be of a *completory* character, i. e. necessary to make a finished and symmetrical structure of the building with which it is used, it is uniformly held, in accordance with the above-stated principles, to have become a part of the real property.² The removal of such an article must necessarily leave the premises in a deteriorated condition. A tenant for years of a farm removed the clapboards from one side of the house and built an extension upon that side, projecting the roof so as to make it continuous over the entire structure. When he left the farm at the expiration of his lease he could not take away the extension thus built, because to do so would be to leave the building in an incomplete condition.³

§ 19. **Weight, Size, etc., of Fixture.**—The actual annexation of a fixture to real property may consist either in its being fastened into the soil or in or upon some structure on the land, as in the cases above cited under this subdivision, or in its being simply set or placed upon some part of the realty. When there is no actual fastening shown, yet the great weight or bulk of the article, its location upon the land, or its adaptability to the use to which the premises are put may show that it is a part of the real property.⁴ When it is

¹ *Davis v. Jones*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 165; *Minshall v. Lloyd*, 2 M. & W. 450; *Vanderpoel v. Van Allen*, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 157; *Murdock v. Gifford*, 18 N. Y. 28; *Rogers v. Brokaw*, 25 N. J. Eq. 496; *McConnell v. Blood*, 123 Mass. 47; *Chase v. Tacoma Box Co.*, 11 Wash. 377.

² *Warner v. Fleetwood*, cited in *Herlakenden's Case*, 4 Coke, 64; *Freidlander v. Rider*, 30 Neb. 783; *Snedeker v. Waring*, 12 N. Y. 170; *Watts-Campbell Co. v. Youngling*, 125 N. Y. 1; *Speiden v. Parker*, 46 N. J. Eq. 292; *Teaff v. Hewitt*, 1 Ohio St. 511.

³ *Freidlander v. Rider*, 30 Neb. 783; *Lawton v. Salmon*, 1 H. Bl. 259, note a.

⁴ *Powell v. Monson Mfg. Co.*, 3

Mason (U. S.), 459; *Winslow v. Merchants' Ins. Co.*, 4 Met. (Mass.) 306; *Breese v. Bange*, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 474, 491; *Pope v. Jackson*, 65 Me. 162, 166; *Tolles v. Winton*, 63 Conn. 440; *Hill v. Mundy*, 89 Ky. 36; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 104 *et seq.* In Pennsylvania, indeed, adaptation and necessity for the reasonable use of the premises is said to be the chief test, if not the only one. *Christian v. Dripps*, 28 Pa. St. 271; *Morris's Appeal*, 88 Pa. St. 368; *Williams's Appeal*, 16 Atl. Rep. 810. And see *Reyman v. Henderson Nat. Bk.*, 98 Ky. 748; *Fairis v. Walker*, 1 Bailey L. (S. C.) 540.

very heavy and its location is such as to point towards an intention to make it permanent, it will readily be held to be realty. Accordingly, where a sculptor placed in the grounds in front of his house a statue of Washington, which with its pedestal weighed about three tons and was simply set upon a solid stone foundation without being in any other way fastened to it, it was decided that the statue was a part of the realty; and the same conclusion was reached in reference to a sundial, constructed upon a block of similar stone and weighing about two hundred pounds, which was appropriately located on a permanent foundation in the same grounds.¹ It is upon this principle that monuments and ornamental shafts and statues in cemeteries or on lawns are usually treated as a part of the realty.²

§ 20. *Adaptability to Premises.* — It is plain from the above discussion that the question of the *adaptability* of the article to the use of the land is of much importance.³ The fixture may be light in weight and loosely attached to the building, or merely set in it or upon the land; and yet be so fitted and appropriated to the premises for the purposes for which they are employed as to be clearly a part of them.⁴ Much stress is laid on this test by some writers and judges. But, here again, although such clear adaptation appear, yet frequently the fixture may be removed as personalty, because it is clearly proved in some way that it was put there with intent to have it removable as a chattel by one who has a right to deal with it in that manner. An illustration of such a one would be a tenant for years or for life.⁵

¹ *Snedeker v. Waring*, 12 N. Y. 170, a leading case; *Strickland v. Parker*, 54 Me. 263, 266; *Bainway v. Cobb*, 99 Mass. 457; *Feeder v. Van Winkle*, 53 N. J. Eq. 370; *Ewell on Fixtures*, p. 25.

² *Oakland Cem. Co. v. Bancroft*, 161 Pa. St. 197; *Tolles v. Winton*, 63 Conn. 440; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 57.

³ "For example, look at the machinery in a cotton manufactory; the question to be examined would be, whether the machinery was necessary to constitute the factory, and without it would the building in which it was used be a manufactory at all. Whether the machinery was fast or loose would not determine the question whether it was

a part of the freehold or not; but whether it was particularly adapted to the use of the building, and was really necessary to constitute the building fit for the uses to which it was erected." *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 102; *Bainway v. Cobb*, 99 Mass. 457; *Pierce v. George*, 108 Mass. 78; *Voorhis v. Freeman*, 2 Watts & S. (Pa. St.) 116; *Lyle v. Palmer*, 42 Mich. 314; *Quimby v. Manhattan Cloth Co.*, 24 N. J. Eq. 260.

⁴ *Lawton v. Salmon*, 1 H. Bl. 259, note a; *Whaley v. Roehrich* (1908), 1 Ch. 615; *Main v. Schwartzwelder*, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 273; *Day v. Perkins*, 2 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 359; *Pothier, de communanté*, § 56.

⁵ See §§ 32-34, 38, *infra*.

§ 21. **Conclusion, as to Annexation.** — In concluding this part of the discussion of fixtures, it is safe to say that the consideration of the manner in which the article is annexed to the land, to ascertain its character as realty or personalty, is largely if not chiefly important as helping to determine the *intent* with which it was placed or used upon the realty. When it is necessary to have it remain there in order to complete the structure to which it is attached or with which it is used, or when it can not be removed without material injury to the soil or building, usually the conclusion is practically resistless that it was placed or used there as a permanent annexation to the realty. In such cases this test alone determines the reasonably presumable intent. When, on the other hand, the fixture is loosely attached to the soil or building and its removal would cause no injury, the *prima facie* conclusion from such attachment alone is that it is personalty. But this may be easily overcome if the application of any of the other *criteria* show a contrary intent on the part of him by whom the fixture was annexed.

3. *Relation between the Parties as a Criterion.*

§ 22. **Relation between Parties, as determining whether Fixtures are Realty or Personalty — Classes of Parties.** — The legal relation between the parties, who are adversely claiming a fixture, is another important *criterion* for determining whether it is realty or personalty. It must be repeated, however, that this test is also to a large extent subsidiary to the determination of the reasonably presumable intent with which the article was annexed to the land or used in association therewith. Such intent on the part of one who has a permanent interest in the real property is apt to be different from that which actuates a temporary owner. Hence this branch of our subject naturally falls into two chief divisions; namely: (1) The effects of the relations between parties interested in realty upon or in connection with which fixtures have been placed or used by one having a permanent interest; and (2) The effects of the relations between interested parties upon fixtures which have been placed on land or used in association with it by one having a temporary interest. The parties between whom the questions arise in the first of these chief divisions are: *a.* Vendor and vendee; *b.* One under

contract to sell and one under contract to buy; *c.* Heirs or devisees and personal representatives of a deceased owner of the land; *d.* Co-tenants of the realty, including tenants in common, joint tenants, coparceners, tenants by the entirety, and partners; *e.* Mortgagor and mortgagee of the realty; *f.* Unpaid vendor, mortgagee, or other lienor of the fixture, and vendee, mortgagee, or other lienor of the realty. Those between whom the questions arise in the second chief division are: *a.* Landlord and tenant for years; *b.* Tenant for life or his personal representatives, and remainderman, reversioner, or other subsequent owner of the land; and *c.* Other kinds of temporary holders and the succeeding owners of the real property. The effects of each of these relationships will be separately considered.

§ 23. (1) **Fixtures placed upon Land by its Permanent Owner.**—In all of those cases in which the attachment to the land has been made by a permanent owner, the general presumption of law, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, is that the fixtures have become part of the realty.¹ This is a natural presumption arising from the well known fact that most structures erected upon land by its absolute owners are *intended* to be permanent. But this conclusion may be readily prevented by direct evidence that such was not the intent of him by whom the article was annexed, or by the stronger adverse presumption which may sometimes arise from the application of one or more of the other *criteria* above discussed. Thus, by direct agreement with his mortgagee at the time when he annexes fixtures to his land, a mortgagor may retain them as personal property;² and the owner of land may, of course, so place chattels of any kind upon it as to show clearly by their position, method of annexation, or want of adaptability to the premises that he intended to have them remain personalty.³ In the light of these general rules, each of the relations under this chief division may be briefly examined.

¹ *Lawton v. Salmon*, 1 H. Bl. 259, note *a*; *Elwes v. Maw*, 3 East, 38; *Lawton v. Lawton*, 3 Atk. 13; *Norton v. Dashwood* (1896), 2 Ch. 497; *Snedeker v. Waring*, 12 N. Y. 170; *McFadden v. Allen*, 134 N. Y. 489; *Bainway v. Cobb*, 99 Mass. 457; *Kinsell v. Billings*, 35 Iowa, 154.

² *Heirkamp v. La Motte Granite*

Co., 59 Mo. App. 244; *Christian v. Dripps*, 28 Pa. St. 271; *Boyd v. Shorrock*, L. R. 5 Eq. 72. See *Andrews v. Day Button Co.*, 132 N. Y. 348. But such cases rarely occur; and ordinarily fixtures placed on land by a mortgagor become part of the security for the mortgagee. See last preceding note.

³ Notes on intention, §§ 13, 20, *supra*.

§ 24. *a. Between Vendor and Vendee.*—The presumption is strong, in favor of the vendee, that fixtures are real property and pass to him under the deed. Public policy and in many instances the doctrine of estoppel *in pais* preclude the vendor apparently to increase the value of land by annexing chattels to it, and then, having by such means induced a purchase, to remove from the land the things thus attached.¹ Numerous authorities emphasize this strong presumption in favor of the vendee.² In order to rebut it, the vendor must produce clear evidence of his contrary intent and his absolute fairness in dealing with the purchaser.³

§ 25. *b. Between One under Contract to Sell and One under Contract to Buy.*—The presumption is also strong that fixtures are embraced within a contract for the purchase and sale of the land. He who is under agreement to buy may ordinarily insist that they shall pass by the deed, or may refuse to complete his purchase of the land, though the title to that be good, if the vendor can not give good title to the fixtures.⁴ When one who is in possession of realty under contract to buy it annexes fixtures thereto and then wrongfully fails to complete his purchase, the articles so attached are presumed to have become a part of the realty and to remain the property of the owner of the land. The proposed vendee may obtain title to the fixtures by completing his contract; and, if he fail to do so, his loss of them is occasioned by his own fault.⁵ If, on the other hand, he who is in possession under contract to purchase place fixtures upon the land and then the owner can not or will not convey to him the title, the articles so annexed are presumed to remain the personal property of him who annexed them.⁶ But, of course, in either of these cases such presumption as to the character of the fixtures may be over-

¹ Notes on intention, §§ 13, 20, *supra*.

² *Ogden v. Stock*, 34 Ill. 522; *McFadden v. Allen*, 134 N. Y. 489, 491; *Leonard v. Clough*, 133 N. Y. 292; *Poor v. Oakman*, 104 Mass. 309, 318; *Glidden v. Bennett*, 43 N. H. 306; *Lapham v. Norton*, 71 Me. 83; *Ewell on Fixtures*, p. 274 *et seq.*

³ *Dolliver v. Ela*, 128 Mass. 557; *Hare v. Horton*, 5 Barn. & Ad. 715; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 553.

⁴ Authorities in last two preceding notes; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 542 *et seq.*

⁵ *Westgate v. Wixon*, 128 Mass.

304; *Mich. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cronk*, 93 Mich. 49; *Kingsley v. McFarland*, 82 Me. 231; *Seatoff v. Anderson*, 28 Wis. 212. But a third party, who has annexed a fixture as personalty, with the acquiescence of the intended vendor and vendee, may remove it even after the latter has broken his contract to purchase. *Brannon v. Vaughan*, 66 Ark. 87.

⁶ *Goodwin v. Perkins*, 134 Cal. 564; *Rush County v. Stubbs*, 25 Kan. 322; *Lapham v. Norton*, 71 Me. 83. See *Carpenter v. Pocasset Mfg. Co.*, 180 Mass. 130.

come by positive evidence of the contrary intent of the parties, or by the application of any of the other *criteria* in such manner as to produce a stronger adverse presumption.

§ 26. *c. Between Heirs or Devisees, and Personal Representatives of a Deceased Owner of the Land.*—In early times the heir was always given the benefit of any doubt, in contests between him and the executors or administrators of his deceased ancestor.¹ While he is not aided so strongly by the modern common law, yet he still has in his favor a presumption that the fixtures of his ancestor pass to him with the real property which he inherits and with which they are associated.² Such presumption may be readily rebutted by evidence that the ancestor intended the articles to remain personalty. And the circumstances attending the latter's annexation or use of them are here given full consideration in determining whether he regarded them as part of his realty or intended that they should remain chattels.³ A devisee has in his favor substantially the same rule as that which obtains between the heirs and the personal representatives of a deceased owner of real property. He takes all the fixtures unless the testator is shown to have intended otherwise.⁴ (*a*)

(*a*) In New York, the rights of heirs and devisees in fixtures are affected by the following statute: "The following shall be deemed assets and go to the executors or administrators, to be applied and distributed as part of the personal property of the testator or intestate, and be included in the inventory. . . . 4. Things annexed to the freehold, or to any building, for the purpose of trade or manufacture, and not fixed into the wall of a house so as to be essential to its support. . . . 9. . . . Things annexed

¹ Year Book, 21 Hen. VII. 26 b; *Elwes v. Maw*, 3 East, 38, 51; *Norton v. Dashwood* (1896), 2 Ch. 497; *Bainway v. Cobb*, 99 Mass. 457; *Shepp. Touchst.* 470.

² The English courts at one time manifested a tendency to relax this rule in favor of the personal representatives of a deceased owner of land, especially when the fixture had been placed upon the property for the purposes of trade or manufacture or domestic use. But those cases have since been overruled; and the common law as stated in the text may now be regarded as settled on both sides of the Atlantic. *Fisher v. Dixon*, 12 Cl. & F. 312; *Tuttle v. Robinson*, 33 N. H. 104;

House v. House, 10 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 158; *Hays v. Doane*, 11 N. J. Eq. 84; *Kinsell v. Billings*, 35 Iowa, 154.

³ Effects of clearly expressed intent, § 13, *supra*. It may be said generally that an heir is a favorite of the law. In several respects this favor has been somewhat relaxed, or done away with by statutes, in modern times. See *Bosley v. Bosley*, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 390, 397, 398; *Goodwin v. Coddington*, 154 N. Y. 283; 2 *Jarman on Wills* (4th Eng. ed.), p. 840, Rules V., VI.

⁴ *Norton v. Dashwood* (1896), 2 Ch. 497; *Dana v. Burke*, 62 N. H. 627; *Tyler on Fixtures*, pp. 701-703. And see *Batterman v. Albright*, 122 N. Y. 484, 488.

§ 27. *d.* **Co-tenants, including Tenants in Common, Joint Tenants, Coparceners, Tenants by Entirety, and Partuers.** — To all of these relationships the general rules as to fixtures, which apply between vendor and vendee, heir or devisee and personal representatives, etc., are applicable. The articles are presumed to be a part of the realty, unless the method of their annexation or use, or other evidence of the intention of the parties, show that they remain chattels.¹ And this is true whether they be placed upon the land by the act of all of the

to the freehold, or to a building, shall not go to the executor, but shall descend with the freehold to the heirs or devisees, except such fixtures as are mentioned in the fourth subdivision of this section. The right of an heir to any property, not enumerated in this section, which by the common law would descend to him, is not impaired by the general terms of this section." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 2712, subd. 4 and 9, which statute was originally 2 R. S. 82, § 6, subd. 4 and §§ 7, 8. In their original note to this statute the revisers say: "It has been supposed that the same legal character should be given to an article, without reference to the parties in controversy; and that therefore certain fixtures, which are deemed chattels as between landlord and tenant, should be considered in the same light as between executor and heir." (3 R. S. 639, 2d ed.). In the case of *House v. House* (10 Paige, 158), however, Chancellor Walworth decided that the water-wheels, mill-stones, belting apparatus, and running gear of a grist and flour mill, though clearly not fixed into the wall of the house so as to be essential to its support, were parts of the realty and descended with the mill to the heir at law. See also *Walker v. Sherman*, 20 Wend. 636, 645. These decisions were approved and followed in *Buckley v. Buckley*, 11 Barb. 43, and commended in a *dictum* of Johnson, C. J., in *Murdock v. Gifford*, 18 N. Y. 28, 32. And while in *Ford v. Cobb*, 20 N. Y. 344, Denio, J., expresses himself as not entirely satisfied with the reasoning of the Chancellor in *House v. House*, yet he adds: "But as the judgment in that case may be said to have become a rule of property, it should not be disturbed without the greatest consideration, and certainly not in a case like the present, which may be satisfactorily disposed of on other grounds." It may be safely said, therefore, that, at least where the decedent owned both the land and the fixture as a complete establishment or business plant, the heir or devisee takes the fixture the same as at common law; and that, if any change exist by virtue of the statute, it is in the cases in which the article in question was not owned as a part of the ownership of the realty or was applied and used for a purpose substantially distinct from the main purpose of the other structures, i. e., it is not an essential part of one complete business plant or establishment. See *Ewell on Fixtures*, pp. 225-227; *Tyler on Fixtures*, pp. 691-699.

¹ *Parsons v. Copeland*, 38 Me. 537; *Walker v. Sherman*, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 636; *Baldwin v. Breed*, 16 Conn. 60, 66; *Plumer v. Plumer*, 30 N. H. 558;

Aldrich v. Husband, 131 Mass. 480; *Crest v. Jack*, 3 Watts (Pa.), 238; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 707.

co-tenants or by that of one or more of them. It is simply an outgrowth of the general principle by which improvements made by one or more of several co-owners of real property *prima facie* belong to them all.¹

§ 28. *e. Mortgagor and Mortgagee of the Land.*—Several different theories exist in this country as to the nature of a mortgage of real property and the remedies which it affords to the mortgagee.² But the courts of England and of all the United States are agreed that, in determining the rights of parties contending for fixtures, a mortgage is to be treated in the same way as a deed; and the mortgagee is given the same preference over the mortgagor which is accorded to the vendee over the vendor.³ The fixture will be treated as part of the security for the mortgage on the land, unless one or more of the other *criteria* afford evidence strong enough to rebut the presumption that it is realty. The result is the same, as between these parties, whether the mortgage was delivered before or after the chattel was placed upon the real property, or whether it is a mortgage in fee, or for a term of years, or simply of a leasehold interest owned by the mortgagor.⁴ In annexing fixtures to the land after giving the security, the mortgagor is regarded as looking to the redemption of the property when the debt shall become due, and thus as making additions for his own benefit.⁵ However expensive the improvements may be, he can save himself from loss by paying the debt and redeeming the entire property from the mortgage.

§ 29. *f. Unpaid Vendor, Mortgagee, or other Lienor of the Fixture, and Vendee, Mortgagee, or other Lienor of the Land.*—The questions which are presented under this heading may arise from one or more of a number of diverse transactions;

¹ *Cosgriff v. Foss*, 152 N. Y. 104; *Stevens v. Melcher*, 152 N. Y. 551, 565; § 698, *infra*. Of course, by express or implied agreement properly made, additions made to land so held may be removed as his chattels by or for the one who annexes them.

² These are explained at §§ 74-80, *infra*.

³ *Colegrave v. Dias Santos*, 2 B. & C. 76; *Huddersfield Banking Co. v. Lister* (1895), 2 Ch. 273; *Snedeker v. Waring*, 12 N. Y. 170; *Pratt v. Baker*, 92 Hun (N. Y.), 331; *Leland v. Gassett*,

17 Vt. 403; *Burnside v. Twitchell*, 43 N. H. 390; *Rogers v. Brokaw*, 25 N. J. Eq. 496. And see *Nat. Bk. v. Levy*, 127 N. Y. 549, 553; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 559 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Southport Banking Co. v. Thompson*, L. R. 37 Ch. Div. 64; *Joliet First Nat. Bk. v. Adams*, 138 Ill. 483; *Kruger v. Le Blanc*, 75 Mich. 424; *Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co.*, 97 Mass. 279; *Corliss v. McLagin*, 29 Me. 115; *Ewell on Fixtures*, p. 282.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *McConnell v. Blood*, 123 Mass. 47.

but each of them presents the case of two innocent claimants of a fixture which is on the land of some third party, generally a wrongdoer. Thus, suppose that A purchases of B on credit an engine and heavy machinery, the agreement being that the title to them shall not pass to A until he has fully paid for them, then A fastens them firmly upon his land, upon which C already holds a mortgage or upon which A subsequently gives a mortgage to C, and A does not pay for the fixtures thus annexed to the freehold nor satisfy C's mortgage; the question may arise as to whether B, as an unpaid vendor of the engine and machinery, shall be first entitled to them, or whether C, as mortgagee of the property to which they are attached, shall have a prior claim to them as part of the security for his mortgage debt. So if A, having already annexed fixtures to his land, treat them as chattels and secure a loan to himself from B by a chattel mortgage upon them, and subsequently as security for another loan to himself from C give to C a mortgage purporting to cover the fixtures as well as the land, and neither loan be paid, the question may arise between B and C as to which of their claims upon the fixtures shall have preference. Again, one of the adverse claimants may be a chattel mortgagee of the fixture and the other a mechanic's lienor upon the land; or one may be a conditional vendor of the fixture, while the other is a vendee of the real property to which it is annexed. In short, such questions may be presented whenever a fixture is claimed by two parties, either of whom would be entitled to it as between himself and a third person, and that third person is the one who so dealt with the article as to give it the character of a fixture.

The solution of such questions depends largely upon the extent to which the expressed intention of the owner of the land, at the time when he so annexed or dealt with the chattel, is to be given effect by the courts. Some courts make this expression of intention the chief controlling element, others give it less weight, while still others refuse to give it any material force in arriving at their decisions. There result three distinct rules for the solution of such controversies.

Where treated as Personalty. — In those states in which the greater stress is laid on the landowner's expression of intention at the time when he dealt with the fixture as such, the person who by virtue of such dealing holds a chattel mortgage against it, or any other right by a contract treating

it as personalty, is usually given the preference, when the fixture can be removed without injury to the realty, unless the other claimant has the protection of a statute. Such is the law of New York, Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Texas, and perhaps some other states.¹ The fact that the owner of the land *intended* that the article should remain personalty, and at the time of annexing it expressed such intention in his contract with its vendor or chattel mortgagee, is, in the absence of controlling statute and of fraud and bad faith on the part of the latter, conclusive, in his favor, in determining it to be that kind of property.² But some statutes, such as that of New York, give the prior right to such a fixture to one who becomes an innocent purchaser or encumbrancer of the realty, for value, *after it is attached*, unless the agreement by which the article is sought to be retained as personalty is so filed, or recorded, and indexed, that a proper examination of the title to the real property would reveal its existence.³(a) The courts, moreover, strive to avoid all injustice in the carrying out of these contracts. And, if the claimant who asserts that the

(a) The New York statute provides that a conditional sale of a chattel attached, or to be attached, to a building, shall be void as against subsequent *bona fide* purchasers or encumbrancers of the premises on which the building stands, and as to them the sale of the chattel shall be deemed absolute, unless the contract of conditional sale shall describe such premises sufficiently for their identification, stating the block and section in any city where the block system of recording and indexing conveyances is used, and shall be filed and indexed as prescribed by the statute — so that a proper examination of the title to the premises would reveal the existence of the conditional sale contract. L. 1904, ch. 698, amending Pers. Prop. L. (L. 1909, ch. 45), §§ 62–64; *Kirk v. Crystal*, 118 App. Div. 32, 34.

¹ *Tift v. Horton*, 53 N. Y. 377; *Sisson v. Hibbard*, 75 N. Y. 542; *Davis v. Bliss*, 187 N. Y. 77, 82; *Washington Trust Co. v. Morse Iron Works*, 187 N. Y. 307; *Brand v. McMahon*, 15 N. Y. Supp. 39; *Warren v. Liddell*, 110 Ala. 232; *Thomason v. Lewis*, 103 Ala. 426; *Binkley v. Forkner*, 117 Ind. 182; *Eaves v. Estis*, 10 Kan. 314; *Burrill v. S. N. Wilcox Lumber Co.*, 65 Mich. 571; *Lansing I. & E. Works v. Walker*, 91 Mich. 409; *San Antonio Brewing Ass'n v. Ice Co.*, 81 Tex. 99; *In re Allen* (1907), 1 Ch. 575; *Ewell on Fixtures*, p. 282 *et seq.*

² *Tift v. Horton*, 53 N. Y. 377, in which *Folger, J.*, says (p. 383): "The general rules governing the rights of parties in chattels thus annexed to the

real estate rest, as it appears, upon the presumptions which the law makes of what their purpose is in the act of annexation. . . . Hence I conclude that the agreement of the owner of the land with the plaintiffs" (the plaintiffs were the chattel mortgagees), "as it did fully express their distinct purpose that these annexations of boiler and engines should not make them a part of the real estate, was sufficient to that effect without any concurring intention of the defendants as prior mortgagees." See *Globe Marble Mills Co. v. Quinn*, 76 N. Y. 23; *McFadden v. Allen*, 134 N. Y. 489, 494.

³ N. Y. L. 1904, ch. 698, amending Pers. Prop. L. (L. 1909, ch. 45), §§ 62–64; *Kirk v. Crystal*, 118 N. Y. App. Div. 32, 34; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 1983.

fixture is personal be shown to have obtained his alleged interest fraudulently, or not in good faith, or to have acted so as to be estopped to demand it, or to have sold it with full knowledge that it was to be placed in a building in such manner as to form a part of the realty, the other party, who is an innocent purchaser or encumbrancer of the realty, for value and without notice, prevails.¹

Where treated as Realty.—In those jurisdictions in which the expressed intention of the owner of the real property is given but little weight in such controversies, the vendee, mortgagee, or other lienor of the land is generally given the preference over him who demands the fixture as personalty. This is the rule more favored in Massachusetts, Maine, Delaware, and possibly one or two other states.² In such jurisdictions, unless the mortgagee or other claimant of the fixture as realty has consented to its being placed or retained on the land as a chattel, or has done some act by which he is estopped to deny that he has so consented, the maxim *quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit* is given full operation in his favor; he is regarded as the one to whom the owner of the land is reasonably presumed to have intended to pass the fixture, and it goes to him as part of his real-property security. It has been suggested that this rule is adopted in favor of a mortgagee of the land, because in those states and countries where it obtains he is regarded as in effect the owner or purchaser.³ But this suggestion, while showing some reason for the differences in result, does not fully account for the divergence of the rule of New York from that of Massachusetts; for the New York courts give the preference to the claimant of the fixture as a chattel, so long as he is innocent of any fraud or unfair dealing, and is unaffected by statute, whether he is contending against a mere *lienor* of the land, such as a mortgagee who is not there regarded as the owner or purchaser of the land, or against an absolute owner, such as a vendee. The real distinction between the two rules lies in the fact that the

¹ See *Jermyn v. Hunter*, 93 N. Y. App. Div. 175; *Fitzgibbons Boiler Co. v. Manhasset Realty Corp.*, 125 N. Y. App. Div. 764; *Excelsior Brewing Co. v. Smith*, 125 N. Y. App. Div. 668; *Ewell on Fixtures*, pp. 29, 36, 41; *Intent shown by Contract*, § 14, *supra*.

² *Clary v. Owen*, 15 Gray (Mass.), 522; *Pierce v. George*, 108 Mass. 78;

Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279; *Ridgeway Stone Co. v. Way*, 141 Mass. 557; *Meagher v. Hayes*, 152 Mass. 228; *Hawkins v. Hersey*, 86 Me. 394; *Watertown Steam Engine Co. v. Davis*, 5 Houst. (Del.) 192; *Albert v. Urich*, 180 Pa. St. 283.

³ *Folger, J.*, in *Tift v. Horton*, 53 N. Y. 377, at p. 384.

courts of Massachusetts give the more weight to the *presumption* that the permanent owner of land intended his fixtures to be realty in favor of those who claim interests in the land through him; while the New York courts lay the greater stress upon the *expressed intention* of the landowner, as found in the contract between him and the party who insists that the fixture is a chattel.¹

Where the Time of Annexation is most Material.—A third rule for the solving of such questions is adopted by the United States Supreme Court and the courts of New Jersey, New Hampshire, Vermont, Illinois and the majority of the American states; also, in substance, by the English courts. It loses sight almost entirely of the intention of the owner of the land in annexing the fixture, and works out the equities of the parties to the action by determining whether or not the vendee, mortgagee, or other lienor of the land justifiedly relied upon the fixture as constituting a part of the realty at the time when he made his purchase or acquired his lien. If he did so, then he is given the preference; while if he did not, the article is treated as personal property so far as it is necessary to so treat it in order to satisfy first the claim of the other party.² Thus, by this method of deciding between the adverse claims, if a fixture were placed upon the land and a chattel mortgage upon it given to A for money loaned by him to the landowner, and subsequently B without notice of A's rights and for money advanced by him to the landowner were to take a mortgage upon the land with the fixture thus

¹ Between the mortgagor and real-property mortgagee the presumption is practically conclusive that the fixture belongs to the latter. The argument of the Massachusetts courts is that, since the mortgagor himself can not remove it as a chattel, he can not give to another the right to do so. See cases cited in preceding note, and especially *Clary v. Owen*, 15 Gray, 522.

² *Fosdick v. Schall*, 99 U. S. 235, 251; *United States v. New Orleans R. Co.*, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 362; *Porter v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co.*, 122 U. S. 267; *Campbell v. Roddy*, 44 N. J. Eq. 244; *Tibbets v. Horne*, 65 N. H. 242; *Page v. Edwards*, 64 Vt. 124; *Paine v. McDowell*, 71 Vt. 28; *Binkley v. Forkner*, 117 Ind. 182, 185; *Simpson Brick*

Press Co. v. Wormley, 166 Ill. 383; *German Sav. & Loan Soc. v. Weber*, 16 Wash. 95; *Hobson v. Gorringer* (1897), 1 Ch. 183. Some of the later English authorities favor the real-property mortgagee, who obtained his lien first, only in case he has entered under his mortgage. *Gough v. Wood* (1894), 1 Q. B. 713. And see *Hobson v. Gorringer* (1897), 1 Ch. 183.

Where the articles have become so firmly attached as in effect to have lost their separate identity and become part of the realty, the claimant of them as realty prevails. *Porter v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co.*, 122 U. S. 267; *Binkley v. Forkner*, 117 Ind. 176. See *Falaenaw v. Reliance S. F. Co.*, 69 Atl. Rep. 1098, 1100 (N. J. Ch.).

annexed to it, B's claim would have the preference and A could take only so much of the value of the fixture as was not needed in satisfying B's mortgage;¹ but if, on the other hand, B were to take his real-estate mortgage *before* the article was annexed to the land and mortgaged to A as a chattel, then A's claim would have the preference, and B could take only so much of the value of the fixture as was not needed to satisfy A's chattel mortgage.² While this rule discards most of the ordinary *criteria* for determining whether a fixture is real property or personalty, it seems to be the principle that is most apt to result in substantial justice.

It should be added that, whatever be the theory upon which this question is decided in any court, if the entire value of the fixture be not needed to satisfy the demand of him in whose favor the decision turns, the residue of its value is held to belong to the other innocent claimant rather than to the owner of the land who has done the wrong. Thus, in those states where the chattel mortgagee or unpaid vendor of the fixture is given the preference, any remaining value of it after his claim is satisfied belongs to the vendee, or mortgagee or other lienor of the real property.³

§ 30. (2) **Fixtures placed upon Land by its Temporary Owner.**

— A fundamental proposition of the common law is that fixtures annexed by one man to the land of another are to be regarded *prima facie* as a part of that land.⁴ Contract express or implied, or natural equities between the parties, may show, however, that this is not the nature of some such articles. And the development in business enterprise and wealth in personalty and some modifications of the relation of landlord and tenant have engrafted important modern exceptions upon the original rule. The rise, growth, and results of those exceptions are to be next examined. They appear in

¹ *Hobson v. Gorringe* (1897), 1 Ch. 183; *Tibbets v. Horne*, 65 N. H. 242. See *Sowden v. Craig*, 26 Iowa, 156.

² *Campbell v. Roddy*, 44 N. J. Eq. 244; *General Elec. Co. v. Transit Equip. Co.*, 57 N. J. Eq. 460; *Buzzell v. Cummings*, 61 Vt. 213; *Dillon v. Barnard*, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 430, 440. See *Phoenix I. W. Co. v. N. Y. Security Co.*, 83 Fed. Rep. 757.

Purchasers of realty at execution sales acquire no more right than that held by the judgment debtors. Hence

they can not take fixtures against the claims of persons who have sold them to the debtors, or loaned money on them under agreements that they shall remain personalty. *Manwaring v. Jenison*, 61 Mich. 117; *Young v. Baxter*, 55 Ind. 188; *Kinsey v. Bailey*, 9 Hun (N. Y.), 452.

³ Preference of real-property mortgagee over mortgagor, § 28, *supra*; especially *Snedeker v. Waring*, 12 N. Y. 170; *Rogers v. Brokaw*, 25 N. J. Eq. 496.

⁴ § 10, *supra*.

connection with three general classes or divisions of relationships to the land; namely: *a.* That of landlord and tenant for years; *b.* That of tenant for life or his personal representatives, and reversioner, remainderman, or other owner of the subsequent interest in the land; and *c.* Other kinds of temporary holders or tenants and the succeeding owners of the real property. It is in this general department of its consideration that the unfolding and scope of the law of fixtures are most readily traced and understood.

§ 31. *a.* **Fixtures annexed by Tenant for Years.** — The tenant of real property for a term of years, as he is known today, did not exist in common-law jurisdictions previous to the reign of Henry VI. Before that time he who held the land of another for such a limited period was a mere agent or bailiff of the landowner.¹ He could not retain the property against the will of his employer or principal. Everything that he annexed to or placed upon the freehold, in such a manner as to make it a fixture, he so placed there as the agent or representative of the owner of the real property, and thus made it a part of the land.² As soon as actions for waste were permitted against such an agent or bailiff in possession of the realty, they began to be brought for his acts in removing such annexations; and the questions thus presented were at first uniformly decided in favor of the owner of the land.³ The maxim *quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit* was given full operation in such instances.⁴ And whatever might be the

¹ Com. Dig. Landl. & T. 5; Smith, Landl. & T. 8-12; Goodtitle v. Tombs, 3 Wils. 118, 120; Campbell v. Loder, 3 Hurl. & C. 520, 527, n.; 1 Cruise Dig. 258.

² Co. Lit. 53a, 57a; Gibson v. Hamersmith Railway Co., 32 L. J. Ch. 337.

³ Tyler on Fixtures, p. 150; notes to Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38.

⁴ "If we call to mind the peculiarity of the relation subsisting in old times between the lessor and his lessee, — a relation in which *status* was everything and in which contract had no place, the tenant being the mere bailiff or agent of his landlord, — we can readily understand how, in that early state of society and of property, the maxim *accessio cedit principali* found unobstructed operation. From this maxim, which in its special application to land assumed in

the civil law the form of *solo cedit quod solo inædificatur*, and in our law the form of *quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit*, it followed, in virtue of the relation aforesaid subsisting between landlord and tenant, that *everything of whatever sort put up upon or put into the soil by the tenant became part and parcel of the soil, and the tenant had no right even during his term to remove or to unfix it again.* It was, in fact, the landlord's fixture from the first, and the tenant had neither any property in it, nor any right nor power over it, beyond its use, in this the earliest phase of the agricultural relation, or so long as this phase of that relation continued. And it is matter of history that the primitive relation subsisted in all its unmitigated rudeness for a period sufficient to allow the full development of the law of agricultural fixtures purely

nature of the articles, or for whatever purpose their annexation to the land might have been made, the presumption was that they belonged to the landlord and could not, against his will, be unfixed or removed by the bailiff-tenant.

By virtue of a number of statutes, the first of which was enacted in the time of Edward I. and the last during the reign of Henry VI., the relation between the landowner and his tenant was gradually changed, until the latter came finally to be recognized, as he now is, as the owner of an interest or estate in the land, which he can maintain during his term against his landlord and all other persons, and the possession of which he may regain by action when wrongfully deprived of the same.¹ Partly as a result of this change in their position and rights, and largely also for the purpose of encouraging such temporary owners carefully to cultivate and improve the realty and to pay good rents, important exceptions have been engrafted one by one upon the ancient rule as to fixtures associated with land by tenants for years.

§ 32. (a) **Trade Fixtures.**—The first of those exceptions was made in relation to articles placed upon the land by the tenant *for purposes of trade or manufacture*. It was, accordingly, held by Lord Holt, in *Poole's Case*,² that a soap-boiler might remove, during his term, the soap vats, coppers, kettles, etc., which he had set up upon the demised premises for the purpose of his manufacture and trade and the removal of which would not injure the freehold. Since that decision, in 1704, this exception has been generally recognized. And such articles as temporary sheds or buildings,³ the counters, shelves, and other fixtures in a store,⁴ copper-stills and kettles

and simply so called, that is to say, of erections and other things which were indispensable to the bare or necessary enjoyment or culture of the land as such." *Brown's Law of Fixtures* (4th ed., 1881), p. 7. See *People ex rel. Int. Nav. Co. v. Barker*, 153 N. Y. 98.

¹ This change was completed probably not later than the year 1458. 1 Wash. R. P. p. *291, note (6th ed., § 608); 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 106 *et seq.*

² 1 Salk. 368. See *Elwes v. Maw*, 3 East, 38, and notes.

³ *Kissam v. Barclay*, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 360; *Devin v. Dougherty*, 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 455; *Lewis v. Ocean*

Nav. & P. Co., 125 N. Y. 341; *Talbot v. Cruger*, 151 N. Y. 117; *Smith v. Whitney*, 147 Mass. 479; *Firth v. Rowe*, 53 N. J. Eq. 520; *Shellar v. Shivers*, 171 Pa. St. 569; *Macdonough v. Starbird*, 105 Cal. 15; *Carr v. Georgia R. Co.*, 74 Ga. 73.

⁴ *Tabor v. Robinson*, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 483, 485; *Guthrie v. Jones*, 108 Mass. 191; *Hanrahan v. O'Reilly*, 102 Mass. 201; *Ombony v. Jones*, 19 N. Y. 234; *Asheville Woodworking Co. v. Southwick*, 119 N. C. 611; *Cubbins v. Ayres*, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 329; *Berger v. Hoerner*, 36 Ill. App. 360; *Felcher v. McMillan*, 103 Mich. 494; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 230 *et seq.*

for distilling,¹ engines and machinery,² and the like have been allowed to be removed by the tenant, if they could be detached without injury to the building or land.³ The expression "trade fixtures" is commonly employed to include all such articles as are embraced within this exception.⁴ And the word "trade" is given a wide meaning in this connection, and includes practically everything annexed to land for the pecuniary advantage of the tenant and not entirely for agricultural purposes.⁵

§ 33. (b) **Domestic Fixtures.** — The second exception, which the common law recognized in favor of the tenant for years, relates to articles placed by him upon the land *for domestic use and convenience and the necessary enjoyment of the premises.* This class of articles is usually denominated *domestic fixtures.* It includes things employed for ornament or utility or both.⁶ Thus, stoves,⁷ portable bath-tubs, ranges and heaters,⁸ ornamental chimney-pieces, pier glasses and hangings, and wainscot fixed only by screws⁹ are illustrations of such fixtures.¹⁰

¹ Reynolds v. Shuler, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 323; Holmes v. Tremper, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 29; Moore v. Smith, 24 Ill. 512.

² Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450; Globe Co. v. Quinn, 76 N. Y. 23; Andrews v. Day Button Co., 132 N. Y. 348; Heffner v. Lewis, 73 Pa. St. 302; Smith v. Whitney, 147 Mass. 479; Conrad v. Saginaw Mining Co., 54 Mich. 249; Hewitt v. General Electric Co., 61 Ill. App. 168; Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59; Brown v. Reno Electric Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 229.

³ Ibid.; also Wake v. Hall, L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 295; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio, etc. R. Co., 142 U. S. 396; Wall v. Hinds, 4 Gray (Mass.), 256, 271; Conner v. Coffin, 22 N. Y. 538; Powell v. McAshan, 28 Mo. 70; Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Pa. St. 437; Tyler on Fixtures, pp. 148-158; Ewell on Fixtures, pp. 80-110.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 137; Holmes v. Tremper, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 29; Young v. Chandler, 102 Me. 251; Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38; Union T. Co. v. W. & S. F. R. Co., 116 Iowa, 392; Ewell on Fixtures, pp. 80-110.

⁸ Elwes v. Maw, 3 East, 38, 53;

Bishop v. Elliott, 11 Ex. 113; Lawrence v. Kemp, 1 Duer (N. Y.), 363.

⁷ Roffey v. Henderson, 17 Q. B. 574, 575; Lawrence v. Kemp, 1 Duer (N. Y.), 363.

⁸ Guthrie v. Jones, 108 Mass. 191; Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13; Lawton v. Salmon, 1 H. Bl. 259, 260, note a.

⁹ *Ex parte* Quincy, 1 Atk. 477; Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13; Beck v. Rebow, 1 P. Wms. 94; Grymes v. Bow-eren, 6 Bing. 437; Leigh v. Taylor (1902), App. Cas. 157; Wall v. Hinds, 4 Gray (Mass.), 256; Gaffield v. Hapgood, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 192.

¹⁰ Some cases, as early as those which recognized trade fixtures as belonging to the tenant, had recognized ornamental fixtures as also the tenant's property. But the authority of these was denied in other decisions. In 1743, Lord Hardwicke regarded the question as settled in favor of the tenant (Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 13, 16), and in the leading English case of Elwes v. Maw (3 East, 38, 53), decided in 1803, Lord Ellenborough, after speaking of the exception of trade fixtures in the tenant's favor, says: "The indulgence in favor of the tenant for years during the term has been carried still further, and he

The cases under this head are not very numerous; but they make clear the law that such things may be removed by the tenant, if the severance from the realty will not materially injure it nor destroy the essential character of the fixtures as articles of personalty.¹

§ 34. (c) **Agricultural Fixtures.**—A third exception, generally recognized in favor of the tenant for years by the common law of the United States, but not by that of England, relates to articles placed by him upon the land *for agricultural purposes*. Illustrations of such fixtures are nursery trees,² hop-poles,³ fences,⁴ and buildings erected for purposes of husbandry.⁵

The ancient common law, which so strongly favored the landlord as against his so-called tenant, — his mere bailiff or agent, — was formulated in this respect chiefly upon questions of waste committed by farmer tenants in removing agricultural appliances from the land. It was attempted in England, in the principal case of *Elwes v. Maw*,⁶ to break through the rule of *stare decisis*, and to extend to agricultural fixtures the same liberal principle in the tenant's favor which had been accorded him in regard to trade fixtures. But the court refused to allow such an extension, and held, on the principle of *stare decisis*, and also because to hold otherwise would be "to introduce a dangerous innovation into the relative state of rights and interests holden to subsist between landlords and tenants,"⁷ that fixtures placed upon the land for purposes of agriculture should be presumed to be the property of the

has been allowed to carry away matters of ornament, as ornamental marble *chimney-pieces*, *pier glasses*, *hangings*, *wainscot fixed only by screws*, and the like." See *Tyler on Fixtures*, pp. 357-369; *Ewell on Fixtures*, pp. 127-137; 2 *Taylor, Landl. & T.* (8th ed.) p. 153; 2 *Smith's L. C.* p. *198 *et seq.*

¹ *Ibid.*; *Hanrahan v. O'Reilly*, 102 *Mass.* 201; *Amb's v. Hill*, 13 *Mo. App.* 585; *Wright v. Du Bignon*, 114 *Ga.* 765.

² *Brooks v. Galster*, 51 *Barb.* (N. Y.) 196.

³ *Wing v. Gray*, 36 *Vt.* 261.

⁴ *Mott v. Palmer*, 1 *N. Y.* 564, 572.

⁵ *Elwes v. Maw*, 3 *East*, 38; *Van Ness v. Pacard*, 27 *U. S.* (2 *Pet.*) 137, 145; *Perkins v. Swank*, 43 *Miss.* 349;

McMath v. Levy, 74 *Miss.* 450; *Holmes v. Tremper*, 20 *Johns.* (N. Y.) 29; *Tyler on Fixtures*, pp. 271-317; *Ewell on Fixtures*, pp. 110-127.

⁶ 3 *East*, 38.

⁷ *Per Ld. Ellenborough*, 2 *Smith's L. C.* p. *188. And he adds: "But the danger or probable mischief is not so properly a consideration for a court of law, as whether the adoption of such a doctrine would be an innovation *at all*; and, being of opinion that it would be so, and contrary to the uniform current of legal authorities on the subject, we feel ourselves, in conformity to and in support of those authorities, obliged to pronounce that the defendant had no right to take away the erections stated and described in this case."

landlord. Some exceptions to this rule have since then been made in England by statute,¹ but the common law of that country has remained unchanged.

This strict English law was not adapted to the circumstances and needs of the American colonies and states. All that could be done to encourage the clearing of the soil and thrifty husbandry was here required from the courts. In many of the United States, therefore, agricultural fixtures are allowed to be taken away by the tenant.² This exception, however, is not even here so strongly favored nor so universally recognized as are those which relate to trade fixtures and to fixtures for domestic use and convenience and the necessary enjoyment of the premises.³

§ 35. **Summary of Exceptions in Favor of Tenants for Years.**

— It follows from the above discussion that fixtures placed upon land or used in association with it by a tenant for years are presumptively the property of the landlord; but if they can be removed without injury to the freehold, and are employed for trade, domestic use, or agricultural purposes (though the latter class is not included by the common law of England), they are exceptions to the general rule and may ordinarily be taken away by the tenant as his own property. Since these exceptions are so broad in their scope and include nearly all articles that are ever affixed to real property by temporary owners, the statement is often made by judges and text-writers that the *presumption* as to articles annexed to the premises by a tenant is in his favor. But this is neither logically nor historically accurate. The tenant can not maintain his right to an article merely by showing that it is a fixture placed upon the property by himself and removable without injury to the freehold. He must also prove that it is either a trade fixture, or a domestic fixture, or (in this country) an agricultural fixture. If he fail to bring it within one of these classes, it is presumed to be real property and to belong to the landlord.⁴ And it must be repeated here that,

¹ 14 & 15 Vict. ch. 25, § 3; 38 & 39 Vict. ch. 92; 2 Smith's L. C. pp. *196, *197; Brown on Fixtures, pp. 26-39.

² Notes 2-5, p. 40, *supra*.

³ See *Van Ness v. Pacard*, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 137, 143; *Harkness v. Sears*, 26 Ala. 493; *McCullough v. Irvine's Executors*, 13 Pa. St. 438; *Carver v.*

Gongh, 153 Pa. St. 225; *Davis v. Eastham*, 81 Ky. 116; *Ewell on Fixtures*, p. 112 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ombony v. Jones*, 19 N. Y. 234; *Kissam v. Barclay*, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 360; *Schlemmer v. North*, 32 Mo. 206; *Madigan v. McCarthy*, 108 Mass. 376, 377; *Ewell on Fixtures*, pp. 134-136.

even when the character of the article itself would bring it within one of these exceptions in favor of the tenant, the application of one or more of the other *criteria* may show that it was put upon the land with the *intention* of making it a part of the realty; and thus the result may be the retention of it by the landlord as a portion of his property.

§ 36. **Time when Tenant for Years may remove Fixtures.**— The landlord and tenant may, of course, vary their rights as to fixtures by any agreement into which they may see fit to enter.¹ And they may thus designate the time within which the articles may be removed by the tenant.² When the time of removal is not settled by contract, the law in England and in most of the United States is that the tenant must take away his fixtures within the term of his lease, or during such further time as he retains possession of the real property in his character as a tenant, or they will become the property of the landlord. When he actually surrenders the premises to the landlord, whether before, or at, or after the expiration of the time designated in the lease, the tenant, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, ordinarily relinquishes his right to all articles thereon which are not unquestionably personal property.³ But in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri and Kentucky it has been declared that, within a reasonable time after the expiration of his lease and the concurrent surrender of the premises, the tenant may lawfully take away as his own such fixtures as he might have so removed during his term.⁴ In *any* jurisdiction, moreover, where the removal during the term has been prevented by the landlord, the tenant has a reasonable time after its expiration in which to take away his fixtures.⁵ And the same privilege is accorded him when

¹ *Dubois v. Kelly*, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 496; *Thorn v. Sutherland*, 123 N. Y. 236; *Torrey v. Burnett*, 38 N. J. L. 457; *McIlver v. Estabrook*, 134 Mass. 550.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Weeton v. Woodcock*, 7 M. & W. 14; *Penton v. Robart*, 2 East, 38; *Ex parte Brook*, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 100; *Sampson v. Camperdown Cotton Mills*, 64 Fed. Rep. 939; *Talbot v. Cruger*, 151 N. Y. 120; *Lewis v. Ocean Nav. & P. Co.*, 125 N. Y. 341; *McIlver v. Estabrook*, 134 Mass. 550; *Trask v. Little*, 182 Mass. 8; *Sullivan v. Carberry*, 67 Me. 531; *Preston v. Briggs*, 16 Vt. 124; *Deh-*

ring v. Beck, 146 Mich. 706; *Mueller v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co.*, 111 Wis. 300; *Griffin v. Ransdell*, 71 Ind. 440. See *So. Dak. Comp. L.* 1887, § 3206.

⁴ *Shellar v. Shivers*, 171 Pa. St. 569; *Berger v. Hoerner*, 36 Ill. App. 360; *Walsh v. Sicbler*, 20 Mo. App. 374; *Caperton v. Stege*, 91 Ky. 351; *Chalfoux v. Potter*, 113 Ala. 215.

⁵ *Mason v. Fenn*, 13 Ill. 525; *Bircher v. Parker*, 40 Mo. 118; *Goodman v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.*, 45 Mo. 33; *Podleck v. Phelan*, 13 Utah, 333. See *Lewis v. Ocean Nav. & P. Co.*, 125 N. Y. 341, 345; *Burk v. Hollis*, 98 Mass. 55.

the time at which the term will end depends on a contingency, or is for any reason uncertain, and it may be terminated unexpectedly to the tenant.¹ In no case, however, has it been held that, if the lease be terminated by breach of contract by the tenant and the re-entry of the landlord, the tenant can thereafter remove fixtures from the demised premises.²

§ 37. **Effect of Renewal of Lease on Right to Fixtures.** — In those cases in which the lessee has erected removable fixtures upon the land, and then, after the expiration of the term during which he so erected them, has remained continuously in possession under a renewal lease, but without any agreement concerning the fixtures, there is direct conflict of authority as to his right to them during the last term or at its expiration. What may be fairly designated as the New York rule upon this matter is that the tenant thereby loses his title to such fixtures and his right to remove them. The reason stated for this rule, in the leading case of *Loughran v. Ross*, is that the acceptance of the new lease of the premises, without reservation of right or mention of any claim to the fixtures, and occupation under the new letting are equivalent to a surrender of the possession of the entire property, including the fixtures, to the landlord at the expiration of the first term. "The tenant is in under a new tenancy, and not under the old; and the rights which existed under the former tenancy, and which were not claimed or exercised, are abandoned as effectually as if the tenant had actually removed from the premises, and after an interval of time, shorter or longer, had taken another lease and returned to the premises."³ While this is admitted to be "quite technical reasoning,"⁴ yet it has been steadily adhered to in the state of New York;⁵ and the same rule has been followed in England, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Indiana, California,

¹ *Martin v. Roe*, 7 El. & Bl. 237; *Reynolds v. Shuler*, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 323; *Loughran v. Ross*, 45 N. Y. 792, 794; *Ellis v. Paige*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43; *Watriss v. Cambridge Nat. Bk.*, 124 Mass. 571; *Nor. Cent. R. Co. v. Canton Co.*, 30 Md. 347; *Cromie v. Hoover*, 40 Ind. 49.

² *Pugh v. Acton*, L. R. 8 Eq. 626; *Kutter v. Smith*, 69 U. S. (2 Wall.) 491; *Mass. Nat. Bk. v. Shinn*, 18 N. Y. App. Div. 276; *Davis v. Moss*, 38 Pa.

St. 346; *Keogh v. Daniell*, 12 Wis. 163.

³ 45 N. Y. 792, 794.

⁴ *Lewis v. Ocean Nav. & P. Co.*, 125 N. Y. 341, 350.

⁵ *Talbot v. Cruger*, 151 N. Y. 117; *Stephens v. Ely*, 162 N. Y. 79. See *Bernheimer v. Adams*, 70 N. Y. App. Div. 114, 122; *Precht v. Howard*, 187 N. Y. 136; *Radey v. McCurdy*, 209 Pa. St. 306; *Bergh v. Herring-Hall-Marvin S. Co.*, 136 Fed. Rep. 368.

and probably a majority of the American states in which the question has arisen.¹

The opposing rule is that of Michigan, which is followed in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Texas, and perhaps a few other states.² In the leading case of *Kerr v. Kingsbury*,³ upon this side of the controversy, Judge Cooley severely criticises the argument of the New York courts, and insists on the right of the lessee to remove the fixtures while he remains in possession under his renewal lease, or continuously as lessee after its expiration. He bases his conclusion upon the ground that the reason for usually requiring the lessee to remove fixtures during his term is in order that the subsequent possession of the lessor may not be disturbed by their removal; and such reason does not operate so long as the lessee himself retains possession of the land. He says, among other things: "A regard for the succeeding interests is the only substantial reason for the rule which requires the tenant to remove his fixtures during the term; indeed, the law does not in strictness require of him that he shall remove them during the term, but only before he surrenders possession, and during the time he has a right to regard himself as occupying in the character of a tenant."⁴

While the New York rule in such cases may be more logically in accord with the history and development of the law of fixtures and that of landlord and tenant in England, and as a settled law of property should not be disturbed probably in those states in which it has been adopted; yet the rule of Michigan accords better with the more liberal policy of most of the American courts in regard to fixtures, and seems to be most apt to result in substantial justice to all parties interested in erections on demised premises.

§ 38. *b. Fixtures annexed by Life Tenant.* — Substantially the same principles should control the right to fixtures

¹ *Thresher v. East London Water Works*, 2 B. & C. 608; *Watriss v. Cambridge First Nat. Bk.*, 124 Mass. 571; *Darrah v. Baird*, 101 Pa. St. 265; *Gerbert v. Sons of Abraham*, 59 N. J. L. 160; *Carlin v. Ritter*, 68 Md. 478; *George Banernschmidt B. Co. v. McColgan*, 89 Md. 135; *Hedderich v. Smith*, 103 Ind. 203; *Marks v. Ryan*, 63 Cal. 107; *Sanitary Dist. v. Cook*,

169 Ill. 184; *Leman v. Best*, 30 Ill. App. 323.

² *Kerr v. Kingsbury*, 39 Mich. 150; *Bank v. O. E. Merrill Co.*, 69 Wis. 501; *Wright v. Macdonnell*, 88 Tex. 140.

³ 39 Mich. 150; s. c. 33 Amer. Rep. 362.

⁴ 39 Mich. 150, 152; 33 Amer. Rep. 362, 364.

between a tenant for life and the succeeding owner of the land as those which apply to the relation of landlord and tenant for years. When, therefore, the article is a trade fixture, or is employed for domestic use and convenience, and its removal will not injure the realty, the life tenant who annexed it may take it away during his life; or, if he fail to do so, then, after his death, it may be removed by his executors or administrators.¹ This right has been denied as to agricultural fixtures;² but there is good authority in favor of treating these also as removable.³ Since the life tenant's interest in the real property is always of uncertain duration, he is not required to remove his fixtures while it continues.⁴ In this particular, then, his rights in such annexations differ from those of an ordinary owner for years. But if a tenant for life voluntarily surrender his interest in the premises and give up possession without removing his fixtures, or if his holding terminate by breach of contract on his part and entry by the succeeding owner, he has no right to enter and remove them.⁵ When his natural death terminates his estate, as is ordinarily the case, it is just and proper that his executors or administrators should have a reasonable time thereafter within which to remove fixtures. Yet it is conceived that no such right should be allowed them, if he committed suicide or otherwise voluntarily terminated his own interest in the land.⁶

¹ *Lawton v. Lawton*, 3 Atk. 13; *Lord Dudley v. Lord Warde*, Ambler, 112, 113; *Leigh v. Taylor* (1902), App. Cas. 157; *Beattie v. Hulse* (1905), 1 Ch. 406; *Lawton v. Salmon*, 1 H. Bl. 259; *D'Eyncourt v. Gregory*, L. R. 3 Eq. 382; *Harkness v. Sears*, 26 Ala. 493; *Whiting v. Brastow*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 310; *Johnson's Ex'rs v. Wiseman's Ex'rs*, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 357, 360; *Buckley v. Buckley*, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 43, 61; *Williams on Executors* (7th Am. ed.), 862. A lessee of a life tenant has the same rights as the life tenant himself. *White v. Arndt*, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 91; *Cannon v. Hare*, 1 Tenn. Ch. 22; *Haffick v. Stober*, 11 Ohio St. 482.

² *Haffick v. Stober*, 11 Ohio St. 482; *McCullough v. Irvine*, 13 Pa. St. 438; *Gliddon v. Bennett*, 43 N. H. 306. See *Demby v. Parse*, 53 Ark. 526; *Albert v. Ulrich*, 180 Pa. St. 283; *Doak v. Wiswell*, 38 Me. 569.

³ *Overman v. Sasser*, 107 N. C. 432; *Whiting v. Brastow*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 310.

⁴ Last three preceding notes, and especially *Lawton v. Lawton*, 3 Atk. 13.

⁵ *London Loan Co. v. Drake*, 6 C. B. n. s. 798; *Ex parte Brook*, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 100; *Thropp's App.*, 70 Pa. St. 395; *Ex parte Hemenway*, 2 Lowell (U. S.), 496; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 491.

⁶ The questions before the courts as to the rights of life tenants and their personal representatives to fixtures have not been very numerous. It has been asserted by some judges and text writers that the law is not so liberal in their favor as it is in favor of tenants for years. *Dudley v. Warde*, Ambler, 112, 113; *Albert v. Ulrich*, 180 Pa. St. 283; *Elwes v. Maw*, 3 East, 38; *Kerr on R. P.* § 133. Yet there seems to be no tangible distinction pointed out, nor any reason for one; and a careful and ex-

§ 39. *c. Fixtures annexed by other Temporary Owners of the Real Property.*—The principles above explained, as to the fixtures of the designated temporary owners of realty, apply generally to all tenants, or holders whose interests are not permanent. Those principles may be summarized in three general propositions; namely: (a) Trade, domestic, or agricultural (in the United States) fixtures, which can be detached without injury to the real property, may ordinarily be removed as personalty by the temporary owner who annexed them; (b) When the time during which he is to retain the real property is fixed and definite, or when such time being in itself uncertain he causes his tenancy to terminate by his own act or fault, then he must remove them within his term or during such further time as he retains possession of the real property in his character as tenant, or he can not remove them at all; and (c) When the time during which he is to retain the real property is uncertain and he does not cause his tenancy to end by his own act or fault, or when his tenancy which was by its terms definite and certain is prematurely terminated without his act or fault, then he or his personal representatives, as the case may be, have a reasonable time after the expiration of the tenancy within which to remove such fixtures. These propositions are supported by the great weight of authority; although, as is above pointed out, they are to some extent qualified or repudiated in a few jurisdictions. Applying them to the less important cases of temporary ownership, which have not yet been considered, they will readily solve, in harmony with the decided cases, most of the questions which arise as to the fixtures of such temporary owners.

It follows, for example, that, between a tenant in tail,¹ or his personal representatives, and the succeeding owner, since the duration of the estate of such tenant is uncertain, the same rules as to fixtures apply as those which prevail in the relation of a life tenant or his personal representatives and

haustive writer has summed the matter up as follows: "Lord Hardwicke seems to treat the question of fixtures, as between the representatives of tenants for life or in tail, and the remainderman, in about the same light as between landlords and tenants for years; and there does not seem to be any reported

case, the determination of which has proceeded upon a known or recognized distinction between these parties." Tyler on Fixtures, p. 492.

¹ For definition and explanation of tenancy in tail, or estates tail, see § 72, *infra*.

the subsequent owner.¹ The tenant at will² has generally the same rights and privileges as to fixtures as those which belong to a tenant for years; and, if his holding be suddenly terminated by the landlord, he has a reasonable time after abandoning possession within which he may remove them.³ And the same is true of a tenant at sufferance.⁴ A tenant from year to year or from month to month, etc.,⁵ is, during the time for which his holding is running, practically the same in this respect as a tenant for years; and the law of fixtures is the same as to him as it is in regard to a tenant for years.⁶

§ 40. **Fixtures — Conclusion.** — The application of the *criteria* which are discussed in the preceding pages will, in most cases, readily determine to which of the two great classes of property a fixture belongs. Sometimes some one of the tests alone is decisive of the question, sometimes two or all of them must be applied. But it will always materially aid in the investigation to remember that the reasonably presumable intent of him who annexed the article to the land or used it in association therewith is generally the inquiry of primary importance, and that the other *criteria* are subordinate means for the determination of that question. And it is to be also steadily borne in mind that, if the fixture be attached so as

¹ Tyler on Fixtures, p. 483; note to *Elwes v. Maw*, 2 Smith's L. C. pp. *169, *206.

² For definition and explanation of such tenancy, see § 73, *infra*.

³ *Martin v. Roe*, 7 El. & Bl. 237; *Cromie v. Hoover*, 40 Ind. 49; *Lewis v. Ocean Nav. & P. Co.*, 125 N. Y. 341.

⁴ For definition and explanation of this tenancy, see § 73, *infra*; *Lewis v. Ocean Nav. & P. Co.*, 125 N. Y. 341.

⁵ For definitions and explanations of these tenancies, see § 73, *infra*.

⁶ *Martin v. Roe*, 7 El. & Bl. 237; *Sullivan v. Carberry*, 67 Me. 531. Those claiming under any of the parties whose rights to fixtures are discussed in the text stand in the shoes of those through whom they claim, and are bound generally by the same rules and principles. Thus an assignee in bankruptcy has the same rights as to such articles as those

which belonged to his assignor, and, as against third parties, a vendee has the same rights that were his vendor's. *Horn v. Baker*, 9 East. 215; *Miushall v. Lloyd*, 2 M. & W. 450; *Gaffield v. Hapgood*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 192; *Fitzgerald v. Anderson*, 81 Wis. 341; *Tyler on Fixtures*, p. 633 *et seq.* And an execution creditor possesses the same rights which belonged to his debtor. *Morey v. Hoyt*, 62 Conn. 542; *Freidlander v. Ryder*, 30 Neb. 783, 785; *Thropp's App.*, 70 Pa. St. 395. If, therefore, the execution were one which could reach personal property only, the sheriff could not ordinarily take the fixtures from land of which the debtor was a permanent owner, while he would be able, in most instances, to reach fixtures erected by the debtor for trade, agricultural, or domestic purposes upon land in which such debtor had only a temporary interest. *Ibid.*

to be compleatory of the building, or so that its removal (no repairs being made) would in itself injure the property, that fact alone is ordinarily conclusive evidence of the intention that it should be a part of the realty. When it can be removed without injury, the *criteria* are to be applied successively or together, in the light of all the circumstances of each case.

CHAPTER III.

PROPERTY, OTHER THAN FIXTURES, THAT IS SOMETIMES REAL AND SOMETIMES PERSONAL.

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| § 41. What may be sometimes realty and sometimes personalty. | § 48. Buildings erected on one's land with his consent. |
| § 42. Money. | § 49. Rolling-stock of railroads. |
| § 43. Stock of a corporation. | § 50. Water and ice. |
| § 44. Right of action for injury to real property. | § 51. Vegetable products of the earth. |
| § 45. Gas and electric light fixtures and appliances. | § 52. <i>Fructus industriales.</i> |
| § 46. Buildings. | § 53. <i>Fructus naturales.</i> |
| § 47. Buildings erected on one's land without his consent. | § 54. Manure. |
| | § 55. Pew rights. |
| | § 56. Burial rights. |
| | § 57. Heir looms. |

§ 41. **What Things may be sometimes Realty and sometimes Personalty.**—The nature and characteristics of a number of articles, which may readily change from one species of property to the other but are not usually fixtures, have been from time to time investigated and determined by the courts. They are ordinarily not fixtures, because the questions concerning them in the various positions in which they are commonly found have been decided, and they do not now call for the application of the tests which are required to determine whether fixtures are realty or personalty. Illustrations of such articles are ice, trees, growing crops, buildings, and the like. A brief resumé of the conditions under which they are real property and those under which they are personalty will best complete our inquiry into the inherent nature of the subject-matter, the law of which is dealt with in this treatise. Those things which are most commonly chattels will be first considered; and the progress of the inquiry will be, in general, towards those that are most frequently real property.

§ 42. **Money.**—Money is never treated as real property, except sometimes in equity under the doctrine of equitable

conversion. By virtue of that doctrine, which rests upon the maxim that "equity regards that as done which ought to be done," real property may be dealt with as personalty, and *vice versa*.¹ If, for example, a testator direct by his will that a certain piece of land be sold and the proceeds paid to a designated person, equity treats that land as personal property from the time of the death of the testator until the sale is actually made;² and when a will orders a sum of money to be invested in real property for the benefit of a person named, such money is regarded by equity as realty from the time of the testator's death.³ So, if real property be sold upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, or by virtue of a judgment, decree, or order of court in a partition suit, or in proceedings for the sale of the lands of infants, lunatics, or other persons incapable of managing their own affairs, the proceeds of the sale, or so much thereof as remains after the mortgage or other liens or encumbrances properly payable therefrom are satisfied, are dealt with in equity as the real property of those whose lands were thus sold.⁴ A contract for the purchase and sale of land causes equity to deal with it as personalty in the hands of the vendor, or his personal representatives in case of his death, and with the purchase price as real property in the hands of the vendee, or his heirs in case of his death.⁵ And when land is taken for public purposes under the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the money paid for the same is realty in so far as it must be so regarded in order to work out the equities of those who had interests or rights in the land.⁶ In all such cases the right of dower, and that of curtesy and all other rights and interests which would be

¹ *Fletcher v. Ashburner*, 1 Bro. C. C. 497; *Bridgeport Elec. & Ice Co. v. Meader*, 30 U. S. App. 581, 588; *Sprague v. Cochran*, 144 N. Y. 104, 112; *Thompson v. Hart*, 169 N. Y. 571; *Ashhurst v. Potter*, 29 N. J. Eq. 625, 643; *Bennett v. Harper*, 36 W. Va. 546.

² *Ibid.*; *Taylor v. Benham*, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 233, 268; *Greenland v. Waddell*, 116 N. Y. 234, 239; *In re Keim's Estate*, 201 Pa. St. 609; *King v. King*, 13 R. I. 501, 506; *Ritch v. Talbot*, 74 Conn. 137.

³ *Seymour v. Freer*, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 202, 214; *Fletcher v. Ashburner*, 1 Bro. C. C. 497.

⁴ *Re Barker*, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 241; *Dunning v. Ocean Nat. Bk.*, 61 N. Y. 497; *Lockman v. Reilly*, 95 N. Y. 64; *Ford v. Livingston*, 140 N. Y. 162; *Oberly v. Lerch*, 18 N. J. Eq. 346; *Lloyd v. Hart*, 2 Pa. St. 473.

⁵ *Palmer v. Morrison*, 104 N. Y. 132; *Williams v. Haddock*, 145 N. Y. 144; *Matter of Davis*, 43 N. Y. App. Div. 331; *Benedict v. Luckenbach*, 162 Pa. St. 18.

⁶ *Kelland v. Fulford*, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 491; *In re N. Y. & Brooklyn Bridge*, 27 N. Y. Supp. 597; *Flynn v. Flynn*, 167 Mass. 312; *Wheeler v. Kirkland*, 27 N. J. Eq. 534. Such award is usually personal. *Matter of Mayor*, 116 N. Y. App. Div. 252.

incident to the real property attach to its equitable representative, the money.¹

§ 43. **Stock of a Corporation.** — The interest of an individual stockholder in the property of a corporation or joint-stock association is now uniformly held on both sides of the Atlantic to be personalty, unless it is declared otherwise by positive statute;² and this is true even though the property owned by the corporation consist entirely of realty.³ In a few early English cases, and in one or two decisions following them in this country, it was said that, when the property of the corporation was chiefly land, its shares of stock were also realty.⁴ But practically all such utterances have been discredited and overruled.

§ 44. **Right of Action for Injury to Real Property.** — A right of action for injury to real property is, as a rule, personalty.⁵ If the owner of such injured realty devise it by his will, which takes effect after the right of action accrues, the devisee does not thereby acquire the right to sue, but such right passes as personal property to the executors or administrators of the decedent.⁶ So, if the owner of the injured land sell it without expressly or impliedly transferring the right of action for the trespass, he retains the right to sue the wrongdoer.⁷ But where the trespass is a continuing one, such as that caused by a railroad running over or near the land, the purchaser, devisee, or heir usually acquires the right to sue for the injury occasioned after his acquisition of title; and frequently the contract or deed is so drawn as to transfer to a purchaser of the land the entire chose in action for all the injury caused

¹ Last preceding note.

² *Bradley v. Holdsworth*, 3 M. & W. 422; *Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander*, 184 U. S. 111; *Matter of Jones*, 172 N. Y. 575; *Tippets v. Walker*, 4 Mass. 595; *Codman v. Winslow*, 10 Mass. 146; *Arnold v. Ruggles*, 1 R. I. 165; *Toll Bridge v. Osborn*, 35 Conn. 7; *Allen v. Pegram*, 16 Iowa, 163; *Southwestern R. Co. v. Thomason*, 40 Ga. 408.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Drybutter v. Bartholomew*, 2 P. Wms. 127; *Weekley v. Weekley*, 2 Younge & C. 281, n; *Welles v. Cowles*, 2 Conn. 567; *Meason's Est.*, 4 Watts

and *Shaw* in an unincorporated railroad company were held in Kentucky to be real property which might descend to heirs and in which a widow might have dower. *Price v. Price*, 6 Dana (Ky.), 107. See *Field v. Pierce*, 102 Mass. 253, 261.

⁵ *Griswold v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 122 N. Y. 102; *Mortimer v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 129 N. Y. 81.

⁶ *Griswold v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 122 N. Y. 102; *Shepard v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 117 N. Y. 442; *Gucker v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 38 N. Y. App. Div. 47; *Jones on Easements*, §§ 525-528.

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Ward v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 152 N. Y. 39; *Pegram v. Elevated R. Co.*, 147 N. Y. 125.

both before and after the title passed to him.¹ If the owner of the land, the value of which is lessened by the existence and operation of a railroad, grant to the railroad company the right to continue the infliction of the injury, which is open and visible, a subsequent purchaser of the land acquires it subject to that right, and cannot sue to restrain its exercise though he has no notice of the grant and the deed is not recorded.² When such a right is sold by the committee of a lunatic, who owns the land, the money obtained for it becomes in equity a part of the real property of the lunatic.³ This results from equitable conversion as above explained.⁴

§ 45. **Gas and Electric Light Fixtures and Appliances.** — The gas pipes which run through the walls and under the floors of a building are a permanent part of the structure. But the brackets and fixtures which appear in the rooms, halls, etc., and can be readily removed from their connections with the pipes without injury to the building, are held by the weight of authority to be mere chattels.⁵ Their character may, however, be controlled by agreement.⁶ And it is held in New Jersey and a few cases in other jurisdictions that, as between vendor and vendee, or mortgagor and mortgagee, but not between landlord and tenant when the tenant made the annexation, all the gas fixtures, as well as the gasometers and instruments for generating gas, are to be taken, *prima facie* at least, as constituting a part of the realty.⁷ Manifestly the same general rules apply to electric light fixtures and appliances as those which determine the character of fixtures used for burning gas. The wires and attachments that are in the walls and floors are ordinarily a part of the house, while the

¹ Mitchell v. Met. El. R. Co., 134 N. Y. 11; N. Y. El. R. Co. v. Fifth Ave. Nat. Bk., 135 U. S. 432; Del. & Rar. Canal Co. v. Wright, 21 N. J. L. 469; Fowle v. N. H. & N. R. Co., 107 Mass. 352; s. c. 112 Mass. 334. See McKenna v. Brooklyn Union El. R. Co., 184 N. Y. 391; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Shepard, 169 N. Y. 170; Schomacker v. Michaels, 189 N. Y. 61, 65; § 179 *infra*.

² Ward v. Met. El. R. Co., 152 N. Y. 39; Lewis v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 202.

³ Ford v. Livingston, 140 N. Y. 162.

⁴ § 42, *supra*.

⁵ McKeage v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 38; Towne v. Fiske, 127 Mass. 125; Nat. Bk. of Catsauqua v. North, 160 Pa. St. 303; Copehart v. Foster, 61 Minn. 132; Rogers v. Crow, 40 Mo. 91.

⁶ Fratt v. Whittier, 58 Cal. 126.

⁷ Keeler v. Keeler, 31 N. J. Eq. 181, 191; Security Trust Co. v. Temple Trust Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 514; St. Louis Radiator Mfg. Co. v. Corroll, 72 Mo. App. 315; Sewell v. Augerstein, 18 L. T. Rep. n. s. 300; Cent. Trust & Safe Dep. Co. v. Cinn. Grand Hotel, 26 Weekly Law Bull. 149.

articles that appear in the rooms and can be readily removed without injury to the building are personal property.¹

§ 46. **Buildings.** — The buildings which a permanent owner of land erects upon it are a part of the realty, unless a different intention is very clearly manifested by him at the time of their erection. This results not only from the maxim *quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit*, but also from the further well-recognized principle, *cujus est solum ejus est usque ad cælum* in one direction, and *usque ad Orcum* in the other.² Hence dwelling-houses, stables and other outbuildings, fences, and hedges are ordinarily a part of the real property to which they are attached.³ And this is true though the house be made from materials which do not belong to the owner of the land. The landowner is obliged to answer to the former owner of the materials for their value; but by annexing them to his land he has made them his own real property.⁴ After a structure is once so placed upon land as to become a part of it, the structure can not be the subject of conveyance as personalty; nor can it be orally reserved as the personal property of the grantor when the realty is sold. If the grantor wish to reserve the building to himself but to convey the land, he must make such reservation, either in the deed by which the real property is conveyed or by some other writing which complies with the requirements of the statute of frauds relative to the sale of lands, tenements, and hereditaments.⁵ Where, for example, an owner of land upon which stood part of a barn conveyed the land by a deed in which the barn was not mentioned, but it was orally agreed between the parties that it should remain the property of the vendor, it was held that that part of it which stood on the land conveyed passed under the deed to the vendee and constituted a portion of the real property of a subsequent pur-

¹ See *Havens v. West Side Elec. L. Co.*, 17 N. Y. Supp. 580; *Harrisburg Elec. L. Co. v. Goodman*, 129 Pa. St. 206; *Keating I. & M. Co. v. Marshall Elec. L. & P. Co.*, 74 Tex. 605.

² 1 Wash. R. P. p. *1; *Broom's Legal Maxims*, p. *395; *Barnes v. Hosmer*, 196 Mass. 323.

³ *Minshall v. Lloyd*, 2 M. & W. 450; *Wake v. Hall*, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 195; *Mott v. Palmer*, 1 N. Y. 564, 572; *Price v. Weehawken Ferry Co.*, 31 N. J. Eq.

31, 34; *Inhab. of Sudbury v. Jones*, 62 Mass. 184, 189.

⁴ *Mitchell v. Stetson*, 61 Mass. 435; 2 Kent's Com. p. *362. See *West Shore Co. v. Wenner*, 70 N. J. L. 233.

⁵ *Leonard v. Clough*, 133 N. Y. 292; *Noble v. Bosworth*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 314; *Hussey v. Hefferman*, 143 Mass. 232; *Doane v. Hutchinson*, 40 N. J. Eq. 83; *Sampson v. Camperdown Mills*, 64 Fed. Rep. 939; *Macdonough v. Starbird*, 105 Cal. 65; 63 Alb. Law J. 367.

chaser of the same land who bought with full notice of the oral agreement.¹ Structures that can not be sold, except by contract which complies with the requirements of the statute of frauds relative to transfers of interests in real property, can not be mortgaged or otherwise encumbered by any form of agreement which does not conform to that statute.² At the time when a building is placed upon the land, however, the owner, by clearly indicating his intention, may retain it as personal property. Thus, if he expressly agree with some one else who is interested in it that it shall remain personally, or mortgage it as a chattel, or build it in such a temporary manner or in such a position as clearly to show that it is not meant to remain on the land, it does not become a part of the freehold, nor does it pass to one who purchases the land with notice of the character of the building or of the agreement by which it is affected.³

§ 47. **Buildings erected on One's Land without his Consent.** — If one person erect a building on the land of another without the express or implied assent of the latter, it becomes at once a part of the land and the property of the landowner. And this is true even though he who builds the house believes that he himself is the owner of the land.⁴ So where one, during the pendency of an action to try the title to land, erected a building thereon with the permission of the defendant in the action, it was held that he could not remove it against the wish of the plaintiff, who prevailed in the suit.⁵ The cases are numerous in which persons who supposed themselves to have perfect title to real property, and in that belief made valuable improvements thereon, have lost both the land and the improvements in suits brought by paramount owners.⁶

¹ Leonard v. Clough, 133 N. Y. 292; Burk v. Hollis, 98 Mass. 55; Webster v. Potter, 105 Mass. 414; Deane v. Hutchinson, 40 N. J. Eq. 83; Bonney v. Foss, 62 Me. 248.

² See last two preceding notes.

³ Coleman v. Lewis, 27 Pa. St. 291; Morris v. French, 106 Mass. 326, 329; Dame v. Dame, 38 N. H. 429; Yater v. Mullen, 24 Ind. 277; Sheldon v. Edwards, 35 N. Y. 279; Leonard v. Clough, 133 N. Y. 292, 297.

⁴ Poor v. Oakman, 104 Mass. 309, 317; Meriam v. Brown, 128 Mass. 391; Bonney v. Foss, 62 Me. 248; Spruck v.

McRoberts, 139 N. Y. 193; McAllaster v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 80; Village of St. Johnsville v. Smith, 184 N. Y. 341, 348; Leland v. Gasset, 17 Vt. 403; West v. Stewart, 7 Pa. St. 122.

⁵ Henderson v. Ownby, 56 Tex. 647. See Madigan v. McCarthy, 108 Mass. 376; Hubschman v. McHenry, 29 Wis. 655.

⁶ Bohn v. Hatch, 133 N. Y. 64; Sudbury Parish v. Jones, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 184; Guernsey v. Wilson, 134 Mass. 482, 486; Leland v. Gasset, 17 Vt. 403; Reid v. Kirk, 12 Rich. L. R.

When a structure thus passes to the owner of the land because it is placed thereon without his consent, a court of law will not compel him to make any compensation, to the person who built it, for the materials or labor employed in its erection; and a court of equity ordinarily follows the same rule.¹ He takes the risk of such loss when he builds upon land which he does not certainly know to be his own. It seems, however, that he may move a court of equity to grant him compensation from the landowner for the labor and materials employed, if he who erected the building show that in doing so he acted upon the belief that he had title to the land, which belief had some probable basis, and that the real owner of the property, knowing of such acts and belief, suffered him to go on without notice of the true state of the title.²

§ 48. **Buildings erected on One's Land with his Consent.**— When one person builds on the land of another with the latter's consent, the former may retain the structure as his personal property. When the purpose for which he was permitted to build has been accomplished, or during the temporary holding which he may have of the land, he may remove the structure as his own.³ The consent of the owner of the freehold may be either express or implied. It is usually express when the builder is not given any interest or estate in the land, but simply a license or easement to erect and maintain the building.⁴ It is more commonly implied when he who builds the structure has some temporary interest or

(S. C.) 54; *Campbell v. Roddy*, 44 N. J. Eq. 244; *Crest v. Jack*, 3 Watts (Pa.), 238; *West v. Stewart*, 7 Pa. St. 122; *Graham v. Connellsville R. Co.*, 36 Ind. 463; 2 Kent's Com. pp. *334, *335.

¹ Last three preceding notes. In *McAllaster v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.*, 156 N. Y. 80, the defendant, which had replaced a burned building by a similar one on the land of the insured but after its proper time to elect to do so under its policy had expired, was compelled to pay the amount of the policy in cash, although the house thus erected by it became at once the property of the insured. Thus, as the result of its wrongfully building on another's land, the company was practically required to pay twice the amount of the policy, — once

in cash and once in the value of the house so rebuilt.

² *Bohn v. Hatch*, 133 N. Y. 64, 68; *Spruck v. McRoberts*, 139 N. Y. 193; *Hardisty v. Richardson*, 44 Md. 617; *King v. Thompson*, 34 U. S. (9 Pet.) 204; 1 Pom. Eq. Juris. § 1241.

³ *Curtis v. Hoyt*, 19 Conn. 154; *Dudley v. Hurst*, 67 Md. 44; *Korbe v. Barbour*, 130 Mass. 255; *Lapham v. Norton*, 71 Me. 83; *Salley v. Robinson*, 96 Me. 474; *Dame v. Dame*, 38 N. H. 429; *Dubois v. Kelly*, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 496; *Central Branch R. Co. v. Fritz*, 20 Kau. 430.

⁴ *Wall v. Hinds*, 4 Gray (Mass.), 256; *Dame v. Dame*, 38 N. H. 429; *Harris v. Gillingham*, 6 N. H. 9; *Ham v. Kendall*, 111 Mass. 297.

estate in the land, such as an estate for years, from year to year, or for life.¹ In such latter instances the buildings are practically within the domain of fixtures, and their character as realty or personalty is to be determined by the tests applicable to fixtures, as above explained. It follows that when they are erected by a tenant for trade, agricultural (in the United States), or domestic purposes, and are not so constructed that their removal would injure the freehold, he may remove, sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber them as personal property.² Such rights of those who erect buildings upon the land of others with the landowners' consent, prevail only between the parties to the consent and against those who take interest in the lands with notice of such rights. They are inoperative against innocent purchasers or encumbrancers of the land, without notice, actual or constructive, of the rights of the builders; and as to such purchasers and encumbrancers the erections are real property.³

§ 49. **Rolling-stock of Railroads.** — It is settled that the depots, station-houses, water-tanks, masonry, foundations, columns, substructures, and superstructures of railroads, either surface, underground, or elevated, are real property.⁴ The rails and ties are also commonly treated as realty; but it is held that where they are put down upon a specified part of the roadbed pursuant to a contract that they shall remain personalty in that position until paid for, they do not become real property until payment is made.⁵ As to the character of the rolling-stock of a railroad, there is direct conflict of authority. It is held to be real property by the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of Kentucky, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and several other states;⁶ while in New York, New Jersey, Iowa, Ohio, Wisconsin, and probably a majority of the states of this country,

¹ Wood *v.* Hewitt, 8 Q. B. 913; Wiggins Ferry Co. *v.* O. & M. R. Co., 142 U. S. 396; Doty *v.* Gorham, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 487; Korbe *v.* Barbour, 130 Mass. 255; Mechanics' Nat. Bk. *v.* Stanton, 55 Minn. 211.

² §§ 31-35, *supra*.

³ Kerr *v.* Kingsbury, 39 Mich. 150; Meyers *v.* Schemp, 67 Ill. 469; Brown *v.* Roland, 92 Tex. 54; 2 Bract. 18.

⁴ People *ex rel.* El. R. Co. *v.* Com. of Taxes, 101 N. Y. 322; Hunt *v.* Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Haven *v.* Emery, 33 N. H. 66; Pierce *v.* Emery, 32 N. H. 484; Georgia R. Co. *v.* Haas, 127 Ga. 187.

⁶ Minn. Co. *v.* St. Paul Co., 69 U. S. (2 Wall.) 609; Hammock *v.* Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77; Phillips *v.* Winslow, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 431; Palmer *v.* Forbes, 23 Ill. 301; Strickland *v.* Parker, 54 Me. 263; State *v.* Nor. R. Co., 18 Md. 193; Youngman *v.* E. & W. R. Co., 65 Pa. St. 278; Coe *v.* McBrown, 22 Ind. 252.

it is treated as personalty.¹ The questions have most frequently arisen as to whether it should be taxed as realty or personalty, and in connection with the question as to the effect of failure to file as a chattel mortgage a railroad trust deed or mortgage given upon all the property of the corporation.² In answering such questions the better logical reasons appear to be in favor of treating the rolling-stock of a railroad as personal property.³

§ 50. **Water and Ice.** — The water of a stream, lake, or pond forms, while there, a part of the land over which it lies; but, because of its mobile and evanescent character, it can not be dealt with by itself as real property. Thus, a deed of a designated body of water would pass nothing to the grantee. But a deed of a described tract of land covered with water would pass the land and the water on it at the time.⁴ When the water becomes congealed, the ice, as it rests in its natural condition upon the surface, is still a part of the land over which it is formed.⁵ Since, however, it is more stable

¹ Hoyle v. Plattsburgh & M. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 314; People, etc. v. Com. of Taxes, 101 N. Y. 322; State Treas. v. S. & E. R. Co., 28 N. J. L. 21; Williamson v. N. J. & S. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 311; Neilson v. I. E. R. Co., 51 Iowa, 184; Coe v. C. P. & I. R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 372; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bor. of Ft. Howard, 21 Wis. 44; Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 231, 237; Boston, C. & M. R. Co. v. Gilmore, 37 N. H. 410.

² Last two preceding notes.

³ Ibid. In some states, such as Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Nebraska, West Virginia, and Texas, constitutional provisions declare that rolling-stock of a railroad shall be personal property, and liable to execution and sale in the same manner as the personalty of individuals. Jones on Railroad Securities, § 171.

⁴ Co. Lit. 4 a, b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 18; Shep. Touchst. 91. When water, oil, or natural gas is bottled, barrelled, or otherwise separated and retained from the land, it is, of course, personal property. When percolating naturally through the soil, or lying or flowing in bulk upon or within it, these substances are part of the land

upon which they are found for the time being. But when they escape and pass into or upon other land, the former owner's title to them ceases; and they become while there a part of the real property of the owner of the land to which they have passed. Because of the analogy, thus suggested, to the movements and ownership of wild animals, these three substances have been spoken of by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as "*minerals fere nature.*" Westmoreland & C. Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 130 Pa. St. 235. See 5 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 731; People's Gas Co. v. Tyne, 131 Ind. 277, 408. It is doubtful, however, whether water can be at all properly classified as a mineral; and it is quite certain that the rules and decisions as to mining rights, which bear so directly upon property in oil and natural gas, have no direct application to water, either standing, running, or percolating.

⁵ Allen v. Weber, 80 Wis. 531; Marshall v. Peters, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 218; Myer v. Whitaker, 5 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 172; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 Ill. 46; Bigelow v. Shaw, 65 Mich. 341.

than water, the landowner may treat it in this condition as personal property, and may sell, mortgage, or otherwise deal with it as such. He may dispose of the soil and ice together as real property, and a transfer of the land without mentioning the ice will have that effect; or he may dispose of the land and reserve the ice as personalty, either in the deed or by an oral reservation; or he may, it seems, dispose of the ice while in its natural condition on the surface as personal property.¹ After the ice has been cut and severed from the water, it is personalty, and can be dealt with only as such.² In all of these respects ice partakes of the nature of an annual crop formed upon the surface of the water. It is *prima facie* a portion of the land over which it is made, but, either before or after it is cut, it may be dealt with by its owner as personalty; and it must be so treated after it has been severed from the land.³

As between the state and the individual owners of land along the banks of streams, lakes, or ponds, the question of the ownership of the water and ice is ordinarily answered by determining who owns the land under the water. Along a non-navigable stream each riparian proprietor owns to the thread of the stream, while the bed, ice, and water of navigable streams belong to the state.⁴ This follows the uniform *criterion*; but, as to what streams are navigable in contemplation of law and what are not, the common law is not so well settled in this country, with its large rivers actually navigable far above tide-water, as it is in England, with its short streams navigable only so far as the tide ebbs and flows. In England, a stream in which the tide does not ebb and flow is uniformly treated as non-navigable, and the riparian proprietors own to the *filum aqueæ*.⁵ In some of the United States, such as Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Michigan, Pennsyl-

¹ *Huntington v. Asher*, 96 N. Y. 604; *Van Rensselaer v. Mould*, 48 Hun (N. Y.), 396; *Higgins v. Kusterer*, 41 Mich. 318; *Eidmiller Co. v. Guthrie*, 42 Neb. 238; 21 Amer. Law Reg. n. s. 320; 32 Amer. Law Reg. n. s. 66; 48 Alb. Law J. 504.

² *Ward v. People*, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 395, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 144. See *Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall*, 101 Ill. 46; *State v. Pottmeyer*, 33 Ind. 402.

³ Last three preceding notes.

⁴ *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1, 31; *Smith v. City of Rochester*, 92 N. Y. 463; *Gouverneur v. Nat. Ice Co.*, 134 N. Y. 355; *Paine v. Woods*, 108 Mass. 160, 172; *Bigelow v. Shaw*, 65 Mich. 341; *Marsh v. McNider*, 88 Iowa, 390.

⁵ *Bickett v. Morris*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. 47; *Orr Ewing v. Colquhoun*, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 839; *Barney v. Keokuk*, 94 U. S. 324, 337; *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1, 31.

vania, North Carolina, and several other states, the soil under the large rivers, which are in fact navigable but not subjected to the ebb and flow of the tide, is held to belong to the state;¹ and the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that those rivers which form boundaries between states, and are used or may be used for purposes of commerce, are navigable rivers of the United States, and this, too, without regard to the consideration whether or not the tide ebbs and flows within them.² The states around the Great Lakes, and not the individual riparian owners, have title to their beds and water.³ In New York it is held that, except as to streams regulated by statute, the English common-law *criterion* applies to streams in general, but at least the Hudson and Mohawk rivers are governed by the rule of the civil law, according to which the riparian owners do not hold the bed of the stream even where there is no tide.⁴

Ice formed upon a stream, lake, or pond the bed of which belongs to the state is the property of the public in general, and may be cut and removed by the one who first appropriates it and cuts, or surveys and fences it off as his.⁵ But, when one has taken possession of a portion and appropriated it to himself, the rights of others are excluded.⁶ (a)

§ 51. **Vegetable Products of the Earth — Fructus Industriales — Fructus Naturales.** — Things which belong to the vegetable kingdom are either *fructus naturales*, the natural, sponta-

(a) It is provided by statute in New York that each riparian owner along the Hudson River may cut and remove the ice opposite his land, as far as the *filum aquæ*, provided he erects safeguards to prevent accidents to travellers and teams as required by the statute. N. Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 260; *American Ice Co. v. Catskill Cement Co.*, 99 App. Div. 31, 182 N. Y. 553.

¹ *Houghton v. Chicago R. Co.*, 47 Iowa, 370; *Wood v. Fowler*, 26 Kan. 682; *Benson v. Morrow*, 61 Mo. 345; *Ryan v. Brown*, 18 Mich. 196; *Shrunk v. Schnylkill Nav. Co.*, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 71; *Wilson v. Forbes*, 2 Dev. L. (N. C.) 30; *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1, 31.

² *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1, 58; *Water Power Co. v. Water Comm'rs*, 168 U. S. 349; *Swerigan v. St. Louis*, 185 U. S. 38.

³ *Lincoln v. Davis*, 53 Mich. 375; *Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois*, 146 U. S. 387.

⁴ *Smith v. City of Rochester*, 92 N. Y. 463, 473; *People v. Canal Apprais-*

ers, 33 N. Y. 461; *Neal v. City of Rochester*, 156 N. Y. 213; *Lincoln v. Davis*, 53 Mich. 375.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Paine v. Woods*, 108 Mass. 160; *People's Ice Co. v. Davenport*, 149 Mass. 322; *Barrett v. Rockport Ice Co.*, 84 Me. 155; *Wood v. Fowler*, 26 Kan. 682; *Rossmiller v. State*, 114 Wis. 169; *Woodman v. Pitman*, 79 Mo. 456; *Brookville & M. H. Co. v. Butler*, 91 Ind. 134; *Bigelow v. Shaw*, 65 Mich. 341. See *Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall*, 101 Ill. 46; *Mill River W. Mfg Co. v. Smith*, 34 Conn. 462.

⁶ *Ibid.*

neous productions of the earth which do not require annual cultivation; or *fructus industriales*, fruits which are the result of yearly culture. Since the former are the more closely and permanently connected with the soil and appear more really to be a part of it, they are more frequently treated as real property than are the latter.¹ Each of these classes requires brief consideration.

§ 52. **Fructus Industriales.**—These include not only those crops which require the yearly sowing of seed, such as corn, potatoes, beans, peas, and the like, but also those which are produced by vines or shrubs springing up anew each year from old roots but needing training and culture in order to the production of valuable fruit.² Types of the latter kinds of products are hops, requiring as they do that the vines shall be trained upon poles or other supports and cultivated in order that a crop may result,³ and turpentine, which, though taken from trees, yet requires annual care and culture for its production.⁴ Nursery trees also are practically *fructus industriales*, since care and training by man are necessary to their production in a form suitable for market.⁵ It is sometimes difficult in individual cases to decide what products of the soil are *fructus industriales*; but it may be stated in general that they include all fruits and crops which need annual sowing, or cultivation, or training, or care by man, in order to the production of any substantial, valuable result. Things are not to be placed in this class simply because by cultivation a *better* crop will be produced. Thus, blackberries and strawberries are not *fructus industriales*; for the vines or bushes will produce valuable crops from year to year without man's care, although training and culture may cause them to bring forth larger and better fruits.⁶

The common law treats these annual products of the soil (*fructus industriales*) as part of the realty, unless they are so dealt with by the owner of the land or the character of the

¹ Matter of Chamberlain, 140 N. Y. 390; Sparrow v. Pond, 49 Minn. 412; Brittain v. McKay, 1 Ired. L. (N. C.) 265; Preston v. Ryan, 45 Mich. 174.

² Co. Lit. 55 b, n., 364; Williams, on Exr's, 597. Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N. C. 63; State v. Moore, 11 Ired. L. (N. C.) 70; Penton v. Robert, 2 East, 88; Forbes v. Shattuck, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 568; Chaplin, Landl. & T. ch. xxi.

³ Latham v. Atwood, Cro. Car. 515; Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M. & W. 501; 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 122.

⁴ Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N. C. 63.

⁵ Penton v. Robert, 2 East, 88; Price v. Brayton, 19 Iowa, 309.

⁶ Sparrow v. Pond, 49 Minn. 412; Matter of Chamberlain, 140 N. Y. 390; Kimball v. Sattley, 55 Vt. 285.

ownership is such as to indicate that they are personal property.¹ Hence, if the landowner grant or devise it without mentioning the crops that are growing upon it, they pass to the grantee or devisee.² And when an ancestor dies intestate, although the annual crops standing upon his land whether then ready for harvest or not belong primarily to his personal representatives, this is only for the purpose of paying his debts; and if not needed to satisfy his creditors they pass with the land to his heirs, unless it is otherwise provided by statute.³ (a) Even though the crops are mature, but have not yet been severed from the land, they are generally treated as *prima facie* a part of the real property.⁴ But in this condition the courts have more readily regarded them as personally, against the claim of the heirs, and in some instances against that of devisees.⁵

While a few early cases held that a conveyance of the land upon which stood annual crops necessarily included

(a) In a number of the American states this is regulated by statute. The law of New York is as follows: "The following shall be deemed assets and go to the executors and administrators, to be applied and distributed as part of the personal property of the testator or intestate, and be included in the inventory; . . . 5. The crops growing on the land of the deceased at the time of his death. 6. Every kind of produce raised annually by labor and cultivation, except growing grass and fruit ungathered." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 2712; *Batterman v. Albright*, 122 N. Y. 484; *Matter of Chamberlain*, 140 N. Y. 390.

¹ Last preceding note; *Branton v. Griffiths*, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 349; *Bradner v. Faulkner*, 34 N. Y. 347; *Howell v. Schenck*, 24 N. J. L. 89; *Smith v. Price*, 39 Ill. 28.

² *Falmonth v. Thomas*, 1 Cr. & M. 89; *Vaughan v. Hancock*, 3 C. B. 766; *Batterman v. Albright*, 122 N. Y. 484, 488; *Banta v. Merchant*, 173 N. Y. 292; *Wintermute v. Light*, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 278, 283; *Bradner v. Faulkner*, 34 N. Y. 347; *Dennett v. Hopkinson*, 63 Me. 350; *Bull v. Griswold*, 19 Ill. 631; *Cummings v. Newell*, 86 Minn. 130; *Willis v. Moore*, 59 Tex. 628.

³ *Kain v. Fisher*, 6 N. Y. 597; *Batterman v. Albright*, 122 N. Y. 484, 488; *Stall v. Wilbur*, 77 N. Y. 158; *Howe v. Bachelder*, 49 N. H. 204; *Penhallow v. Dwight*, 7 Mass. 34; *Pattison's Appeal*, 61 Pa. St. 294; *Broom's Legal Maxims*, p. *305; 2 *Woerner Adm.* § 282.

⁴ Thus a crop of corn standing unharvested in the field in December was held to have passed to the grantee of the land. *Tripp v. Hasseig*, 20 Mich. 254, 261. See *Parker v. Strickland*, 11 East, 362; *Kittredge v. Woods*, 3 N. H. 503. A crop growing on land when it is sold on execution passes with the land. *Hersberg v. Metzgar*, 90 Pa. St. 217; *Pitts v. Hendrix*, 6 Ga. 452; *Porche v. Bodin*, 28 La. An. 761. And the same is true as to a sale on foreclosure or in partition. *Ledyard v. Phillips*, 47 Mich. 305; *Joues v. Thomas*, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 428. But see *Albin v. Riegel*, 40 Ohio St. 339.

⁵ Last three preceding notes; *Penhallow v. Dwight*, 7 Mass. 34; *Sherman v. Willett*, 42 N. Y. 146; *Howe v. Bachelder*, 49 N. H. 204; *McGee v. Walker*, 106 Mich. 521.

them unless they were expressly excepted in the deed,¹ yet the great weight of authority is now in favor of permitting an oral reservation of the crops, without violating the statutes of frauds. The owner may treat them, even before they are severed from the soil as personal property, and may orally reserve them to himself or transfer them to another by any method which complies with the requirements of the section of the statute of frauds relating to personalty.² So they may be taken on execution as personal property; and a mortgage of them as chattels generally gives to the mortgagee an ownership of them superior to the rights of subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the land.³ After the crop is severed from the soil, even though not yet removed from the land on which it grew, it is uniformly treated as personal property, and does not pass with a conveyance of the land unless the grantor act in such a manner as to preclude himself from denying the vendee's right to the crop.⁴

Again, the character of the ownership of the land by him who claims the annual crops may be such as to cause them to be treated as part of his personal property. This is true of such products raised by a tenant for years, at will, or for life, while the tenancy continues;⁵ and where the holding is for an uncertain period, such as that of a life tenant or tenant at will, the right to cultivate and harvest the crops which are the result of his annual labor ordinarily belongs to the tenant as to such crops which are growing upon the land when the

¹ See *Emmerson v. Heelis*, 2 Taunt. 38; *Sainsbury v. Matthews*, 4 M. & W. 343; *West v. Moore*, 8 East, 339.

² *Sexton v. Breese*, 135 N. Y. 387, 391; *Stall v. Wilbur*, 77 N. Y. 158; *Pattison's Appeal*, 61 Pa. St. 294; *Owens v. Lewis*, 46 Ind. 488; *Kelley v. Goodwin*, 95 Me. 538; *Howe v. Bachelder*, 49 N. H. 204; *M. V. L. Co. v. Barwick*, 50 Kan. 57; *Polley v. Johnson*, 52 Kan. 478; *Overman v. Sasser*, 10 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 722 and note. Where the owner of a mortgaged farm sells a crop of wheat growing thereon, and then before it is harvested delivers possession of the land to the mortgagee, the mortgage debt not yet being due, the purchaser of the crop as such owns it in preference to the claims of the mortgagee of the land. *Sexton v. Breese*, 135 N. Y. 387.

³ *Whipple v. Foote*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 418; *Fry v. Miller*, 45 Pa. St. 441; *Wait v. Baldwin*, 60 Mich. 622.

⁴ *Dixon v. Niccolls*, 39 Ill. 372; *Hersberg v. Metzgar*, 90 Pa. St. 217; *Stockwell v. Phelps*, 34 N. Y. 363; *Faulcon v. Johnston*, 102 N. C. 264.

⁵ *Co. Lit.* 55; *Oland's Case*, 5 Co. Rep. 116 a; *Whipple v. Foote*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 418; *Stewart v. Doughty*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 103; *Harris v. Frink*, 49 N. Y. 24, 30; *Batterman v. Albright*, 122 N. Y. 484, 490; *Kelley v. Goodwin*, 95 Me. 538; *Johnson v. Camp*, 51 Ill. 219, 220. But the crops may readily become a part of the realty, if the tenant voluntarily abandon or forfeit the land. *Ibid.*; *Chandler v. Thurston*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 205, 210; *Debow v. Colfax*, 10 N. J. L. 128.

tenancy terminates.¹ This right of a tenant for an uncertain period to his away-going crops is to be more fully treated of hereafter under the head of emblements.

§ 53. **Fructus Naturales.** — These are trees and their fruits, shrubs and grasses, which come to perfection without needing labor or intervention by man. Under most circumstances they are a part of the land upon which they are standing, and pass with it by grant, devise, or descent.² They are so closely allied, in contemplation of law, to the soil itself that, while standing as they have grown upon it, they can not be transferred by oral contract; but the conveyance must comply with the requirements of that part of the statute of frauds which relates to the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest therein.³(a) It has been held in New York and some of the other American states, that, if standing trees be sold by written contract so that the purchaser owns them distinct from the soil, they may be regarded as personal property in his hands and transferred or otherwise dealt with as such. His purchase of them, without including any of the soil in which they are rooted, works a constructive severance of them from the land. He must buy them as real property from the owner of both soil and trees; but after so buying he may own them as a portion of his personalty.⁴

(a) It is to be again noted that section 2712 N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. declares that "every kind of produce raised annually by labor and cultivation" is to be part of the personal assets of a deceased person, "except growing grass and fruit ungathered." Note (a), p. 61, *supra*. It is thus made clear that, even though fruits such as apples, peaches, pears, etc., or such grasses as clover or sedge, may be carefully cultivated, and so improved in quality or increased in quantity, they are, while still standing uncut in the field or hanging ungathered upon the trees, a part of the real property of the deceased owner of the land. *Matter of Chamberlain*, 140 N. Y. 390.

¹ *Kittredge v. Woods*, 3 N. H. 503; *Whitmarsh v. Cutting*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 360; *Termes de la Ley*, "Emblements." See *Reeder v. Sayre*, 70 N. Y. 180, 184, 185.

² *St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co.*, 173 N. Y. 149; *Matter of Chamberlain*, 140 N. Y. 390; *Batterman v. Albright*, 122 N. Y. 484; *Hutchins v. King*, 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 53; *Sparrow v. Pond*, 49 Minn. 412; *Slocum v. Seymour*, 36 N. J. L. 138; *White v. Foster*, 102 Mass. 375.

³ *Carrington v. Roots*, 2 M. & W. 248; *Green v. Armstrong*, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 550; *McGregor v. Brown*, 10 N. Y. 114; *Howe v. Bachelder*, 49 N. H. 204; *Brackett v. Goddard*, 54 Me. 309; *Whitmarsh v. Walker*, 42 Mass. 313; *Buck v. Pickwell*, 27 Vt. 157; *Walton v. Lowry*, 74 Miss. 484.

⁴ *Lansingburgh Bk. v. Cray*, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 542; *Warren v. Leland*, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 613; *Clafin v. Carpenter*, 4 Met. (Mass.) 580; *Kingsley v. Holbrook*, 45 N. H. 313; *McClintock's Appeal*, 71

A sale of standing trees or grass, which results in the immediate passing of the title, must be carefully distinguished from a contract for their future sale and delivery. Such a contract may be made orally, when it provides for their severance by the vendor and delivery to the vendee;¹ while, if under its provisions they are to be cut by the vendee, the contract is unenforceable unless it is in writing.² The latter form of the contract contemplates the passing of the title while they are still connected with the soil, and therefore is an agreement for the sale of an interest in land. In the case, however, where the vendor is to sever them from the ground, the sale is not to be consummated and the title is not to pass until they have become personal property by reason of such severance, and it is therefore a sale of that kind of property.³

A sale of standing trees or grass, which results in an immediate passing of the title, must also be carefully distinguished from a mere license given by the owner to another to come upon the land and cut and remove them. Such a license, though given orally, as it usually is, is a complete justification to him who acts upon it and removes the grass or trees.⁴ But it gives to him no ownership of or enforceable

Pa. St. 365. The courts of England and those of some of the United States have distinguished between a sale of trees when the sap is out of them and they are to be cut and removed by the vendee before it returns (or when they are sold, for their immediate removal by the vendee, so that they are not to receive any further sustenance from the soil), and a sale of them to be owned by the vendee while standing with the sap in them and to receive further nourishment from the soil before their removal. They have held that in the former case the purchaser owns them as personal property, and may even buy them as such if he do so when there is no sap in them, while in the latter case it is a sale of real property, and they remain realty in his hands or in the hands of those claiming under him so long as they continue to draw sustenance from the ground. This distinction, making the character of the trees depend on whether or not they are to receive further nutriment from the soil, is logically correct

but often difficult of application, and it has been practically discarded in the United States. *Ibid.*; *Liford's Case*, 11 Coke, 46 b; *White v. Foster*, 102 Mass. 375; last three preceding notes.

¹ *Bostwick v. Leach*, 3 Day (Conn.), 476, 484; *Killmore v. Howlett*, 48 N. Y., 569; *St. Regis Paper Co. v. S. C. Lumber Co.*, 173 N. Y. 149; *White v. Foster*, 102 Mass. 375; *Marshall v. Green*, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 35.

² P. 62, note 2, *supra*.

³ P. 62, note 4, *supra*.

⁴ See "license," discussed § 240, *infra*, as an excuse when executed for what would otherwise have been a trespass. Some courts hold that as soon as the trees are cut pursuant to a license, though not yet removed from the land, they become the personal property of the licensee, and the license to remove them is then irrevocable. *Nettleton v. Sykes*, 8 Met. (Mass.) 34; *Leonard v. Medford*, 85 Md. 666; *Cool v. B. & L. Co.*, 87 Ind. 531; *Bostwick v. Leach*, 3 Day (Conn.) 476.

interest in them until they have been severed from the ground. Before such severance the landowner may revoke the license and prevent the licensee from going upon the land; while, if the transaction had resulted in a valid sale of the grass or trees, the vendor would have lost all control over them.¹

Trees cut or blown down and lying upon the land where they grew, or grass severed from the ground but still lying upon it, will pass with a transfer of the land when there are no circumstances to indicate a contrary intent.² But in these conditions they may also be treated as personal property, in the same manner as *fructus industriales*.³ And when they have been removed from the land upon which they grew, or the trees have been sawed or hewn into timber or cut or piled up in such a way as to indicate a permanent severance from the soil, they become personalty.⁴

As was above pointed out, trees planted and cultivated as nursery products and designed to be sold and transplanted while yet young are in reality *fructus industriales*, and are governed by the principles of law applicable to annual crops. Nursery trees are often treated by text-writers as fixtures; but they are uniformly personal property, if the owner choose to so regard them, and it will be found that the courts have constantly applied to them the rules of law which control fruits of yearly cultivation.⁵

Standing trees being ordinarily real property, it is settled that, if the trunk of a tree be wholly on one man's land while the roots extend into another's soil and the branches overhang it, the entire tree and all its fruits, if any, belong to the owner of the land on which the trunk stands.⁶ The adjacent owner, however, may lop off the branches and roots at the dividing line between the two lots of land.⁷ When, on the other hand, the trunk of a tree stands partly on one man's

¹ Last preceding note.

² Brackett v. Goddard, 54 Me. 309; Kittredge v. Woods, 3 N. H. 503; Cook v. Whiting, 16 Ill. 480.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Batterman v. Albright, 122 N. Y. 484, 489; Price v. Brayton, 19 Iowa, 309. It has been held, however, that nursery trees planted by the owner of the land become part of the realty, as security under a mortgage of the land

which was given before the planting of the trees. Maples v. Millon, 31 Conn. 598; Adams v. Beadle, 47 Iowa, 439; Brooks v. Galster, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 196; Miller v. Baker, 1 Met. (Mass.) 27.

⁶ Masters v. Pollie, 2 Rolle, 141, 144; Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 201; Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177; Skinner v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 115.

⁷ Ibid.; Lemmon v. Webb (1894), 3 Ch. Div. 1; Grandona v. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161.

land and partly on another's, the dividing line between the lots passing through the trunk whether at its middle or not, the entire tree and its fruits belong to the two landowners as tenants in common.¹

§ 54. **Manure.**—Manure made upon a farm, from the consumption of its products and in the ordinary manner, is regarded, either as between vendor and vendee, mortgagor and mortgagee, or landlord and tenant, as a part of the real property. And this is generally true of both the manure itself and of composts formed of its mixture with hay, straw, soil, or other substances, and whether it or they be found where the manure is dropped or gathered into heaps or piles or moved to different parts of the farm.² It has been held, however, that, when raked into heaps for the purpose of being removed from the farm and sold, manure is to be treated as personalty;³ while, if so gathered for the purpose of being carted to another part of the same farm and used there, it remains a part of the land.⁴ The reason for the general rule is that, since the substance of the land produces the manure, it should remain on the farm for its enrichment, and the soil should not be impoverished because of its removal by a vendor or outgoing tenant.⁵ But this reasoning is repudiated in New Jersey, North Carolina, and New Brunswick, in all of which jurisdictions manure is ordinarily held to be personal property.⁶

When the food from which the manure is produced is not raised on the land upon which it is dropped by the animals, the reason for treating it as a part of the realty does not exist,

¹ *Dubois v. Beaver*, 25 N. Y. 123; *Griffin v. Bixby*, 12 N. H. 454. And neither owner can legally destroy or injure the tree without the consent of the other. *Ibid.*; *Waterman v. Soper*, 1 Ld. Raym. 737; *Skinner v. Wilder*, 38 Vt. 115. See *Robinson v. Clapp*, 65 Conn. 365.

² *Middlebrook v. Corwin*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 169; *Goodrich v. Jones*, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 142; *Elting v. Palen*, 60 Hun (N. Y.), 306; *Lewis v. Lyman*, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 437; *Kittredge v. Woods*, 3 N. H. 503; *Perry v. Carr*, 44 N. H. 118; *Chase v. Wingate*, 68 Me. 204; *Norton v. Craig*, 68 Me. 275; *Wetherbee v. Ellison*, 19 Vt. 379; *Strong v. Doyle*, 110 Mass. 92.

³ *Leigh v. Hewitt*, 4 East, 154; *French v. Freeman*, 43 Vt. 93; *Strong v. Doyle*, 110 Mass. 92; *Middlebrook v. Corwin*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 169. And, of course, its character as realty or personalty may be controlled by custom or agreement. *Webb v. Plummer*, 2 B. & Ald. 746; *Fletcher v. Herring*, 112 Mass. 382; *Hill v. De Rochemont*, 48 N. H. 87.

⁴ Last two preceding notes.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ruckman v. Outwater*, 28 N. J. L. 581; *Smithwick v. Ellison*, 2 Ired. L. (N. C.) 326; *Staples v. Emery*, 7 Me. 201; 1 Wash. R. P. p. *6.

and it is accordingly held to be personal property. Thus, where a tenant of a farm fed his cattle upon grain produced from a source foreign to the land, he was entitled during his term to remove it from the farm.¹ And where the owner of a stable in which he kept team horses sold it together with the house and small yard around them, it was held that a quantity of manure in the cellar of the stable did not pass to the vendee, but remained the personal property of the vendor.² So, manure dropped in the street is the personal property of the first taker.³

Manure, while still where it was dropped on the land from the products of which it was made, may be treated as personalty by the landowner and transferred or encumbered as such. He may, accordingly, dispose of it by any contract which complies with the statute of frauds as to sales of personalty, and a subsequent conveyance of the farm will not pass the manure to the vendee under the deed. It is thus capable of being constructively separated from the land by oral contract, in the same manner as ice and annual crops.⁴

§ 55. **Pew Rights.**—In England, the freehold of church property is in the parson for the time being. The pewholder has a right to occupy the pew during divine services, and this is an incorporeal right in the nature of an easement in the lands of another.⁵ When it is granted to one in perpetuity or for life, his ownership of it is real property; but when it is simply leased to him for one or more years, his interest in it is personal property, — a chattel real.⁶ In this country, in the absence of statutory provisions, the same statements apply

¹ *Gallagher v. Shipley*, 24 Md. 418; *Snow v. Perkins*, 68 Md. 483; *Pickering v. Moore*, 33 Atl. Rep. 828 (N. H.). But the fact that a tenant furnished to his live-stock some hay and grass not raised on the premises will not give him any title to the manure made, especially if he fail to specify how much of either he supplied, and what proportion they bore to the entire amount of food consumed by the live-stock. *Lewis v. Jones*, 17 Pa. St. 262, 267.

² *Proctor v. Gilson*, 48 N. H. 62.

³ *Haslem v. Lockwood*, 37 Conn. 500.

⁴ *French v. Freeman*, 43 Vt. 93; *Collier v. Jenks*, 19 R. I. 137; *Strong*

v. Doyle, 110 Mass. 92; *Ewell on Fixtures*, p. 122; *Tyler on Fixtures*, pp. 352-356.

⁵ *Brumfitt v. Roberts*, 5 C. P. 224, 232; *Phillips v. Haliday* (1891), App. Cas. 228; *Shaw v. Beveridge*, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 26; *Daniel v. Wood*, 18 Mass. 102.

⁶ *McNabb v. Pond*, 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 7; *Johnson v. Corbett*, 11 Paige (N. Y.), 265, 276. *French v. The Old South Society*, 106 Mass. 479. When an interest in any kind of realty is for a term of years only, that interest is a mere chattel real, — personalty. See § 73, *infra*.

as to the nature of the pewholder's rights and ownership;¹ but the determination of where the title to the church grounds and edifice resides depends on the character and organization of the church society. In some of the states, statutes declare pews in churches to be personal property; while in other states they are thus made real property.² In either case, the rights of the owner of the pew do not include the privilege of occupying or using it at any time except during divine services, or for any other purposes than those connected in some way with public worship.³

The church society or organization has such a vital interest in the character and personnel of its pewholders, in the uses to which the pew is to be put and in the compensation to be paid for the same, that it is generally permitted, without any of the restrictions of technical rules of law, to treat the terms of the deed or contract as the sole *criterion* of the nature and extent of the estate, rights, and duties of the owner of a pew. Thus, if a deed conveying an acre of land in fee simple should contain a clause purporting to restrict absolutely the right of the grantee to alien the same, such clause

¹ *Freligh v. Platt*, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 494; *Ithaca Church v. Bigelow*, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 28; *Woodworth v. Payne*, 74 N. Y. 196, 200; *Sohier v. Trinity Church*, 109 Mass. 1, 21; *Aylward v. O'Brien*, 160 Mass. 118; *State v. Trinity Church*, 45 N. J. L. 230; *Barnard v. Whipple*, 29 Vt. 401. In *Shaw v. Beveridge*, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 26, 27, the court said, per Nelson, Ch. J.: "But in this state owners of pews have an exclusive right to their possession and occupation for the purposes of public worship; not as an easement, but by virtue of their individual rights of property therein, derived perhaps, in theory at least, from the corporation represented by the trustees who are seised and possessed of the temporalities of the church." But the right is uniformly treated as substantially an easement. And its owner may have an action of trespass against any one who wrongfully interferes with the right. *Ibid.*; *Voorhees v. Presby. Ch.*, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 108; *St. Paul's Ch. v. Ford*, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 16; *French v. The Old South Society*, 106 Mass. 479.

² See *Jackson v. Rounseville*, 46 Mass. 127; *O'Hear v. De Goesbriand*, 33 Vt. 593; *Church v. Wells' Executors*, 24 Pa. St. 249; *Mass. Rev. L. 1902*, ch. 36, § 38; *Aylward v. O'Brien*, 160 Mass. 118; *Smith v. Blood*, 106 N. Y. App. Div. 317, 323.

³ *Brumfitt v. Roberts*, 5 C. P. 224; *Erwin v. Hurd*, 13 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 91; *First Bapt. Soc. v. Grant*, 59 Me. 245; *Presby. Ch. in Newark v. Andruss*, 21 N. J. L. 325. At meetings for temporal purposes, but such as have some bearing directly or indirectly upon the management or interests of the church, it would seem that the owner of a pew has the exclusive right to sit therein. *Wall v. Lee*, 34 N. Y. 141, 149; *First Baptist Church of Hartford v. Wetherell*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 296. But when the use of the edifice for the time being is wholly foreign to the business or affairs of the church, — as when it is leased for purposes not connected with the public worship of the church society, — the pewholder has no such exclusive right. *Jackson v. Rounseville*, 46 Mass. 127, 132.

would be null and void:¹ but, in the conveyance of a pew, whether in fee simple, for life, or for years, such a restriction is valid and enforceable.² So the contract is the only thing ordinarily to be consulted in determining the power of the society to tax the holder of the pew and otherwise to demand compensation for its use.³

So long as the church authorities do not act wantonly or maliciously against the holder of a pew, he can not prevent any alterations, repairs, or even removal or taking down of the building by them.⁴ He can not compel the holding of divine services in the structure, nor prevent the society from abandoning it as a place of worship.⁵ If the building be destroyed by fire or other casualty, or become so dilapidated that it must be taken down, he has no right to compensation for the loss of his pew.⁶ If, however, a pew be taken away when it is not reasonably necessary to do so, the owner may recover proper compensation.⁷ So, alterations must be made with a just regard to the relative rights of the holders of the pews; and if in the course of alterations or repairs a pew be placed in a position relatively less advantageous than that which it formerly occupied, the owner may recover compensation for his loss.⁸

§ 56. **Burial Rights.**—The right of sepulture is governed by substantially the same legal principles as are pew rights, except that the former are rarely granted otherwise than in perpetuity. The cemetery society, or other organization for burial purposes, usually retains the ownership of the soil, while the owner of the burial plot or right has an easement as real property, or a license, to bury there so long as the ground

¹ See discussion of the rule which prevents a grantor in fee simple from restricting the right of alienation by his grantee, §§ 280, 282, *infra*.

² *French v. The Old South Society*, 106 Mass. 479. See 22 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 206; *Aylward v. O'Brien*, 160 Mass. 118.

³ *Gifford v. First Presby. Soc. of Syracuse*, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 114; *Bapt. Church v. Witherell*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 296; *German Ref. Church v. Seibert*, 3 Pa. St. 282, 291; *Chase v. Cheney*, 58 Ill. 509.

⁴ *Howe v. Stevens*, 47 Vt. 262; *Heeny v. St. Peter's Church*, 2 Edw.

Ch. (N. Y.) 608; *Aylward v. O'Brien*, 160 Mass. 118.

⁵ *Freligh v. Platt*, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 494; *Matter of Ref. Dutch Church*, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 237; *Van Houten v. First Ref. Dutch Church*, 17 N. J. Eq. 126.

⁶ *Ibid.*; *Voorhees v. Presby. Church*, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 135; *Re Brick Presby. Church*, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 155; *Kincaid's Appeal*, 66 Pa. St. 411; *Jones v. Towne*, 58 N. H. 462.

⁷ *Voorhees v. Presby. Church*, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 108; *Sohier v. Trinity Church*, 109 Mass. 1, 21; *Aylward v. O'Brien*, 160 Mass. 118.

⁸ *Ibid.*

is used for burial purposes. The deed or contract in this case also is treated as practically the sole *criterion* of the relative rights and duties of the parties.¹ The owner of the burial lot or privilege holds it subject to municipal control and police regulations, and to the right of the society, so long as it acts in good faith, to abandon it as a burial ground. The right granted is also revocable whenever such a course is required by public necessity.² It is to be added, as a matter of course, that when a cemetery association sells the *land* to the various purchasers of the lots, each purchaser acquires the corporeal real property by his deed and holds it subject to the rules and regulations of the society. But it is more customary for the society to convey an easement or a license, as above explained, and retain to itself the title to the land.

§ 57. **Heirlooms.**—In the English law, articles, which in their inherent nature are personal property, sometimes become so associated by custom with ancestral houses or structures as necessarily to descend with them, as part of the real property, to the heir. These are called heirlooms. They are generally such implements or articles of furniture as can not be removed without practically dismembering the inheritance. Illustrations are, old family pictures and jewels, fish in a pond, jewels of the crown, maps, charts, and other evidences of the inheritance, and the like.³

Heirlooms, in this accurate sense, have never been recognized by the law of this country, unless perhaps title deeds passing with the land may be so treated.⁴ But the same term is sometimes used loosely and inaccurately to denote articles which remain personalty but by act of the parties have been retained in the same family for a number of generations. Heirlooms as recognized in England are always real prop-

¹ *Windt v. German Ref. Church*, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 471; *Craig v. First Presby. Church*, 88 Pa. St. 42; *Sobier v. Trinity Church*, 109 Mass. 1, 21.

² *Ibid.*; *Kincaid's Appeal*, 66 Pa. St. 411; *Dwenger v. Geary*, 113 Ind. 106, 113; *Hollmann v. Platteville*, 101 Wis. 94; *B. L. & I. Co. v. Jenkins*, 111 Ala. 135.

³ *Liford's Case*, 11 Co. Rep. 46 b, 50; *Ford v. Tynte*, 2 Johns. & H. 150; *Shelley v. Shelley*, 37 L. J. Ch. 357; *Lord v. Wardle*, 3 Bing. N. C. 680; *Pusey v. Pusey*, 1 Vern. 273; *In re*

Lord Chesham, L. R. 31 Ch. Div. 466; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *18, *428; *Shep. Touchst.* p. *470. See *Tollemache v. Earl of Coventry*, 2 Cl. & F. 611; *Hill v. Hill* (1902), 1 Ch. 807.

⁴ Title deeds ordinarily pass with the land and belong to its owner, and are not property in and of themselves; but it would not be safe to say that they have been distinctively treated as heirlooms in this country. See *Parrett v. Avery*, 159 Mass. 594; *Huse v. Den*, 85 Cal. 390; *Smith v. McGregor*, 10 Ohio St. 461, 473; 48 Alb. Law Jour. 514.

erty — hereditaments. As will be explained hereafter, they afford the best illustration of hereditaments which are not tenements.¹

The general nature of real property having been explained, and the circumstances under which various classes of articles are to be embraced within it having been examined, the way is now cleared for the discussion of the rules and principles of law that have been built upon and around it by the wisdom of the centuries.

¹ See § 62, *infra*.

CHAPTER IV.

OUTLINE.

I. *Kinds.*
II. *Holdings.*

III. *Estates.*
IV. *Titles.*

§ 58. The four departments of real-property law.

I. *Kinds of Real Property.*

§ 59. Lands — Tenements — Hereditaments.

§ 60. I. Lands.

§ 61. II. Tenements.

§ 62. III. Hereditaments.

II. *Holdings of Real Property.*

§ 63. KINDS OF HOLDINGS.

§ 64. I. Alodial holding.

§ 65. II. Tenure.

III. *Estates in Real Property.*

§ 66. CLASSES OF ESTATES.

§ 67. I. *Classified as to courts.* — (1. Legal. 2. Equitable.)

2. Equitable estates.

§ 68. (1) Uses.

§ 69. (2) Trusts.

§ 70. (3) Equities of redemption.

§ 71. II. *Classified as to quantity.*

§ 72. 1. Freehold estates. — (1) Of inheritance, or Fees; (2) Not of inheritance, or Life estates.

§ 73. 2. Estates less than freehold. — (1) For years; (2) From year to year; (3) At will; (4) At sufferance.

§ 74. III. *Classified as to number*

and connection of owners. — (1. In severalty. 2. Joint estates.)

§ 75. 1. Estates in severalty.

2. Joint estates.

§ 76. (1) Joint tenancy.

§ 77. (2) Coparcenary.

§ 78. (3) Estates in common.

§ 79. (4) Estates by entirety.

§ 80. (5) Partnership estates.

§ 81. (6) Joint mortgages.

§ 82. IV. *Classified as to qualified nature.* — (1. Absolute. 2. Qualified.)

2. Qualified estates.

§ 83. (1) Estates on condition.

§ 84. (2) Estates on limitation.

§ 85. (3) Estates on conditional limitation.

§ 86. (4) Mortgages.

§ 87. V. *Classified as to time for enjoyment to begin.* — (1. Present. 2. Future.)

§ 88. 1. Estates *in presenti.*

§ 89. 2. Estates *in futuro.* — (1) Reversions; (2) Remainders; (3) Executory estates.

IV. *Titles to Real Property.*

§ 90. Definition of title — Its elements.

§ 91. I. Title by descent.

§ 92. II. Title by purchase.

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| <p>§ 93. 1. Title by purchase other than by alienation.</p> <p>§ 94. 2. Title by alienation.</p> | <p>§ 95. Liens on real property.</p> <p>§ 96. Registration of titles and liens.</p> |
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§ 58. **Four Departments of Real-property Law — Kinds — Holdings — Estates — Titles.** — The discussion of real property and the law relating to it naturally divides itself into four leading departments. The first of these is an explanation of the different *kinds* of real property — lands, tenements, and hereditaments. The second deals with the *holdings* of real property, and in doing so brings to light many of the historical reasons at the foundation of great legal principles. The third discusses the *estates* or interests that may be owned in lands, tenements, or hereditaments. And the last explains the *titles* by which real property may be acquired and held. A preliminary outline of each of these branches of our subject will be of interest and assistance to the student.

I. *Kinds of Real Property.*

§ 59. **Lands — Tenements — Hereditaments.** — The historical consideration of the common-law divisions of property shows that, during the vigorous sway of the feudal system, things which were objects of ownership were either goods and chattels, or lands, tenements, and hereditaments; and that, after that system had lost most of its pristine vigor, they were either real property or personal property. It thus appears that real property consists of lands, tenements, and hereditaments.

§ 60. **I. Land,** which is the least comprehensive of these three terms, embraces all real property that is substantial and tangible. It comprehends the soil of the earth and the permanent productions and erections upon it, as trees, houses, fences, poles, wires, and other structures. It includes all the *strata* of the soil and the space downward to the centre of the earth, as well as all the space and structures above the surface indefinitely outward. If one own an acre on the surface of the soil, his land is ordinarily embraced within a cone or pyramid, having the centre of the earth as its apex, extending upward and outward indefinitely into space, with its sides passing through the edges of the plot marked out by the acre upon the surface of the soil. The sides or *superficies* of this cone constitute his *close*, for the wrongful breaking through of

which by another the common law gives to the owner of the land an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*.¹

§ 61. **II. Tenements** is a word of broader signification than land. It denotes all property of which feudal tenure could be predicated, i. e. which one as vassal could hold of another as lord. It includes land and also mere incorporeal rights, such as franchises, rents, ways, and other easements and servitudes, — practically every species of real property known to the American law, whether tangible or intangible. It is in the fact that tenement embraces these incorporeal kinds of property that its distinction from land is to be emphasized. Including these and all lands also, it is frequently and quite accurately used as a *generic* word to denote real property of every description.²

§ 62. **III. Hereditament (heir-ement)** is any property capable of being inherited — anything that can be transmitted by the law of descent from ancestor to *heir*. It is said by Coke and Blackstone to be the largest and most comprehensive of the three words, land, tenement, hereditament.³ It embraces lands and substantially all tenements, and also some things which are neither lands nor tenements, such as heirlooms. Since, however, heirlooms are not recognized in this country, and they are the only things which in England are really hereditaments and not tenements,⁴ it follows that the word “hereditament” has no broader scope in the United States than the word “tenement.” It is possible, moreover, in

¹ See 3 Blackst. Com. ch. xii.

² “Thus *liberum tenementum*, frank tenement, or freehold, is applicable not only to lands and other solid objects, but also to offices, rents, commons, and the like: and, as lands and houses are tenements, so is an advowson a tenement; and a franchise, an office, a right of common, a peerage, or other property of the like unsubstantial kind, are all of them, legally speaking, tenements.” 2 Blackst. Com. p. *17.

³ Chase’s Blackst. p. 219.

⁴ Mr. Blackstone says (2 Blackst. Com. 17): “And so a condition, the benefit of which may descend to a man from his ancestor, is also an hereditament.” By a condition he means the right sometimes reserved by a grantor of land to re-enter and take it back from the grantee or any one claiming under him,

if a certain stipulation or restriction contained in the deed be violated by such grantee or any such claimant. When the land is conveyed in fee simple, with such restriction, the right to recover it back if the restriction be broken is called a possibility of forfeiture (or possibility of reverter). This may descend to the heirs of the grantor, but it can not be assigned or devised, nor held one of another. In the law of this country it is the nearest approach to a hereditament that is not a tenement; but it is not, strictly speaking, either of these, since it is not property. It is a mere chance or possibility, which may pass to the heirs of the grantor, not as heirs, but by way of representation. *Upington v. Corrigan*, 151 N. Y. 143.

either country, to create a tenement that shall not be a hereditament. Thus, if A grant to B a right of way over A's land, to continue during B's life only, such right or easement is a tenement; but it is not a hereditament, since it must terminate at B's death and therefore can not descend to his heirs.

There are two kinds of hereditaments: 1. Corporeal; and 2. Incorporeal. 1. Corporeal are such as are tangible or cognizable by the senses and are the same as land as above defined. 2. Incorporeal hereditaments are *rights*, neither tangible nor visible, nor otherwise cognizable by the senses, which arise out of a thing corporeal, or are concerned with, or annexed to, or exercisable within corporeal property.¹ Such are a right of one person to pass over the land of another, or to drain water across another's lot, the right to build or maintain a ferry, bridge, or road, and the right to collect compensation for the use of leased premises.

There are four kinds of incorporeal hereditaments, which are important in American law. These are, (1) rent, (2) franchise, (3) easement, (4) *profit à prendre*. Six other kinds are recognized and dealt with by the English law, namely: advowsons, tithes, offices, dignities, corodies or pensions and annuities; but, with the exception of the last, these things are not known in this country, and the law of annuities belongs rather to a work on wills or contracts than to one on real property. (1) Rent is defined as the right to a certain profit issuing periodically out of lands or tenements. A familiar example is the right which the landlord has to collect from his tenant compensation for the use of the leased premises. (2) A franchise is a special right or privilege conferred by the government upon one or more individuals, such as does

¹ "In short, as the logicians speak, corporeal hereditaments are the substance, which may be always seen, always handled; incorporeal hereditaments are but a sort of accidents, which inhere in and are supported by that substance; and may belong, or not belong to it, without any visible alteration therein. Their existence is merely in idea and abstracted contemplation; though their effects and profits may be frequently objects of our bodily senses. And indeed, if we would fix a clear notion of an incorporeal hereditament,

we must be careful not to confound together the profits produced, and the thing, or hereditament, which produces them." (2 Blackst. Com. p. *20). A rent, for example, is an incorporeal hereditament, because it is merely the *right* to periodic compensation for the use of leased property. The money, or other valuable compensation which the tenant pays, is not, in legal contemplation, the rent, but merely the proceeds, profits, or returns which the rent produces. See § 100, *infra*.

not belong generally to the citizens of the country. Thus, a ferry right, a bridge right, or the right to build and operate a railroad or to be a corporation is a franchise. (3) An easement has been well defined as "a privilege without profit" (i. e. without *profit à prendre*, or the right to take anything from the land), "which the owner of one piece of land called the dominant tenement has over another piece of land called the servient tenement." An example of this large and important class of incorporeal hereditaments is a right of way, or the privilege of maintaining a drain, which one owner of land has over the land of another. It is essential to the existence of an easement, as thus defined, that there shall be two distinct tenements — a dominant and a servient. But there are also many similar rights with which the law of real property has to deal, and in which there is only one tenement involved — the servient. Such are rights in streets, wharves, or parks, or privileges which individuals *as such* may have over land of others. These latter, although frequently called easements, are perhaps more properly designated by the general, civil-law term *servitudes*, which, as commonly employed, embraces all easements as well as all other forms of rights owned by one person over the land of another. (4) A *profit à prendre* is the right of one individual to take something of value from the land of another. Illustrations are a mining right, a right to cut and remove timber, and the privilege of grazing cattle upon the fields of others. These rights are often designated as commons; but the latter word is a narrower old English term, which is not much used in the United States. They are all included within the generic term *servitudes*.

A license, which is an authority to do some act or acts upon the land of another without possessing any estate or interest therein, is so similiar to incorporeal hereditaments, especially to easements, that its treatment logically and properly follows that of those other intangible rights. A mere license, although it is generally a complete justification for any act done pursuant to its terms and while it remains operative, does not give to its owner any right which is enforceable against the will of the landowner. The latter may generally revoke it, at any time before its execution is complete. It is, moreover, most commonly made by parol, while easements and other *servitudes* are created by grant, or prescription, or methods equally strong and binding.

II. *Holdings of Real Property.*

§ 63. **Kinds of Holdings.** — The ample control, which the owner of real property may now have over it, is the result of long and gradual development. Absolute ownership of land, except by the king, was unknown to the feudal law. Hedged about originally by the most refined and cumbersome restrictions, the subject who possessed realty has laboriously, and step by step, made his way towards an independent ownership, until, in England to-day, little but the theory of tenure remains. By *tenure* from some superior lord, however, is still the manner of holding land, in the mother country, by every one except the king. In the United States, the advance towards unrestricted ownership and control has been much greater. There is no tenure of land here; but the owner is said to have it by an *alodial* holding; that is, there is no recognition of any superior lord or over-master under whom he retains his possession or control. The two methods of holding real property, then, are, I. Alodial holding in this country; II. By tenure in England.

§ 64. **I. Alodial Holding.** — Protection by the state must be back of all adequate and satisfactory enjoyment of property of any kind. That protection is reasonably accompanied by some rights and interests in the property, which are reserved to the state. Such are the right of taxation, the right to take property when needed for public purposes, — or eminent domain, — and the right of escheat, which gives the title of property to the state when its owner dies intestate and without heirs or without heirs by whom it can be inherited. Real property held alodially is owned subject to such rights of the state, but free and independent of all other domination or control. Its owner has it in substantially the same way in which he has his watch or horse.

§ 65. **II. Tenure.** — The feudal system gave birth and nurture to very many of the leading principles, which now help to make up the law of real property on both sides of the Atlantic. Most of these originally clustered around the idea of tenure, or the holding of land by one person, as vassal or tenant, of another as lord. As terse illustrations of this fact, it may be stated that the subtle idea of *seisin*, the leading distinctions between the kinds of estates or interests which may be owned in real property, the development of the right

to transfer those interests from one to another, and the methods and forms by which such transfers are made, especially the unfolding of a warranty and its effects on alienation *inter vivos*, were all directly produced or largely modified by the existence of feudal tenure. These are fully discussed hereafter. But it will conduce to clearness to explain here that the important word "seisin" embraces not only the thought of *possession*, or right of possession, of real property, but also that of a claim of a *freehold estate* therein — an estate either for life or that may descend to the owner's heirs. Thus, seisin in fact is the actual possession of realty, coupled with a claim of a freehold estate therein; and seisin in law is the *right* to the possession of, and the ownership of, a freehold estate in real property which no one else is holding adversely. A life owner, or an owner in fee, of land, who has possession, is seised in fact; an heir, who has inherited vacant land of which he has not yet taken possession, is seised in law; but a tenant for years, since his estate is less than one for life, has only possession and not seisin.

The most ancient and honorable English tenure was that by 1, *Knight-service*. It was purely military in character, and required from the vassal, as compensation for his retention of the land, attendance upon the lord and services for him in the wars. These services were regarded as honorable and free (i. e., worthy of a free man) and they were originally uncertain in amount. He who held by this species of tenure was said to have a *proper feud*; and all other kinds of tenure gave rise to so-called *improper feuds*.

As wars became less exacting and the acts of peace more plentiful, tenure by knight-service gradually abated. The most important of those holdings that succeeded it is that which is still the prevailing modern English tenure, — 2, In *free and common socage*. The services which it requires from the tenant are still regarded as free and honorable; but they are fixed and definite in amount and consist in the return of money or its equivalent to the lord, rather than in military exploits. Some of the land in the United States was held by this form of tenure before the revolution.¹

There have existed three other more important forms of English tenure. One of these is that in 3, *Villein-socage* (origi-

¹ See *Delancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26; Gray Rule against Perpetuities, §§ 22-28.

nally *ancient demesne*), in which the services or returns rendered by the vassal to the lord are fixed and certain in amount, but base, servile, or menial in character. Another was tenure in 4, *Pure villeinage*, in which the services were base or servile and unlimited in amount, — measured only by the reasonable ability and endurance of the tenant, — a species of “English serfage” now, of course, no longer employed. And the third is tenure by 5, *Copyhold*, a form still in existence, which arose out of pure villeinage and in which the tenant, once either in his own person or in that of his ancestor a slave or villein, but subsequently emancipated and thus enabled to contract with his lord and to contend with him in the courts, may prove his interest and rights in the land by a *copy* of the record or court roll formerly kept in the old manor court, or court baron, of the manor in which the land is situated.

A word as to the inferior or subsidiary species of tenure will be sufficient in this brief outline. They were tenure by 6, *Frankalmoin*, in which the services were religious in character but not fixed in amount; by 7, *Divine service*, requiring certain and prescribed religious duties; by 8, *Grand sergeanty*, in which the vassal rendered some special, personal service for the king; by 9, *Petty sergeanty*, which required the yearly rendering to the king of some article for his personal use in war, as a lance or a bow; by 10, *Burgage*, small holdings in the ancient boroughs by a certain rent; and by 11, *Gavelkind* by which the Kentish men held their lands under special, favorable customs. It will be seen, from the fuller discussion hereafter, that some of these — and especially *frankalmoin* — while classed with the lesser tenures, throw much clear light on the growth of feuds and on the abiding principles which feuds matured.

III. *Estates in Real Property.*

§ 66. **Classes of Estates.** — An estate is the interest which one has in lands, tenements, or hereditaments. This is to be carefully noted as something entirely distinct, not only from the lands, tenements, or hereditaments themselves, but also from the methods of holding them and from the titles by which they may be acquired or held. Thus, an acre of land may be held by A as vassal of B, the right to thus hold having been conveyed to A by C and being expressly made to continue during A's life only. The interest, or ownership

which A has in the land, to continue during his life, is his *estate* in that land; his title or means of acquiring the estate is through C; he holds it subject to the feudal rights of B; and thus the four conceptions — land, holding, *estate*, title — stand out distinct. Again, A, the owner of land, may create over it a perpetual right of way, which he grants to X and Y jointly for twenty years, and after that time to Z and his heirs forever. The right of way is a tenement, X and Y have a joint *estate* in that tenement for twenty years, Z has an *estate* to begin in possession after twenty years and last perpetually, and the title, or means of acquiring these different *estates* or interests in the one tenement, is derived from A, the common grantor.¹ The law of personal property has comparatively very little to do with estates. This is owing to the fact that, because of the temporary and perishable character of personality, the ownership or interest in it is usually absolute and entire, and hence does not call for particular discussion apart from the title. But, since real property is ordinarily permanent and has been through all the ages the object of careful study and refined distinctions, estates in it have been made, classified, divided and subdivided until the rules and principles relating to them in their numerous aspects have come to form, perhaps, the most important branch of the law of real property.

The classifications of estates are from five distinct stand-points; namely: I. With reference to the courts by which they are recognized — their legal or equitable nature; II. With reference to their quantity — the extent or duration of the interest; III. With reference to the number and connection of their owners; IV. With reference to their conditional or

¹ The word *estate*, as here employed in its technical and proper sense, is also to be carefully distinguished from the meaning frequently ascribed to it by popular usage. In this latter sense it very commonly signifies the property generally which a person owns. Thus, a man is often said to have left a large or a small estate at his death, or to have lost all of his estate in speculation; and executors, administrators, and trustees are constantly spoken of as representing the estates of decedents. In this loose, special, or popular sense of the word, *estate* is synonymous with

the word *property*. In the technical sense of the law of real property, *estate* is one's *interest* in the property or object of ownership. This distinction between the two senses of the word may be made clearer by the following example: If A own a thousand acres of land during his life and B own one acre of the same kind of land in fee simple (i. e., for him and his heirs forever), while A has the greater estate, in the loose sense of the greater quantity of property, yet B has the greater estate, in the accurate, technical sense of real property law.

qualified nature; V. With reference to the time when the enjoyment of them may begin — whether the owner may have the possession or income of the property at present, or must wait for it till some future time. A brief outline here of these classes and divisions will prepare the way for the more exhaustive discussion of subsequent chapters.

§ 67. I. Estates classified with Reference to the Courts by which they are recognized — Their Legal or Equitable Nature. — Before the court of chancery took any cognizance of real property, or of rights or interests therein, the only final arbiter as to the creation, transfer and devolution of these was the court of law. Hence, the estates which the latter sanctioned and controlled were called *legal* estates; and they are still described by the same expression. They comprise, of course, the larger part of the interests that are owned in real property. But the desire, and in a large sense the necessity, of having a right or ownership in realty distinct from these legal estates — an interest which the law courts long refused to recognize, but which was to be owned and controlled by one person while the legal estate resided in another — afterwards gave rise to a *use* and a *trust*, both of which were recognized and fostered by the courts of equity. This was accomplished, for example, by giving land to A for the use of B, or in trust for B. A then held the legal estate and was regarded by the law courts as the absolute owner of the land; while B came, in time, to be treated by the courts of equity as owning the *equitable* estate and, for all substantial purposes, as the sole owner of the property. When A held thus for B generally, while B was to manage and control the land for himself, A was said to hold for the use of B, and B owned a *use*. When, on the other hand, A held the property specially, actively to manage and control it for the benefit of B and to hand over to him the net proceeds, he was said to hold in trust for B, and B owned a *trust*. These two equitable estates — the use and the trust — as viewed from the standpoint of their owner, may be collectively defined as the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property of which the legal estate is in another person. A third form of the equitable estates is the so-called *equity of redemption*, in those jurisdictions in which a mortgage of real property transfers the legal estate or interest to the mortgagee. In most of the United States, a mortgage of land is now merely a lien upon it, and the mortgagor retains the legal estate. But

in England and a few of our states, such as Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the legal interest passes to the mortgagee, while the right to redeem the land, at and after the maturity of the debt, has been perfected and preserved by equity for the mortgagor and constitutes his equitable estate. In summary, then, from this point of view, all estates are either 1, Legal, or 2, Equitable; and the equitable estates are: (1) uses; (2) trusts; and (3) equities of redemption.

§ 68. (1) *Uses*. — After its invention in early feudal times and prior to the twenty-seventh year of the reign of Henry VIII., the use was the prominent form of equitable ownership. The holder of the legal estate was designated the feoffee to uses, and the owner of the equitable interest (the use) the *cestui que use*. The former was a mere receptacle for the legal title and estates; while the latter had all the management, control, and benefit of the property. The *cestui que use* had these, moreover, divested of most of the duties, responsibilities, and burdens that ordinarily attach to the ownership of property. His interest could not be reached by his creditors, nor forfeited for his crimes, nor made subject to the claims of a wife, husband, or feudal lord. The courts of equity had favored this estate too strongly, in failing to give it such incidents so requisite to the fair and proper employment of land for business and commercial purposes; and one result of this failure was a number of attempts to remedy the evils by means of legislation. These culminated in the celebrated "Statute of Uses," 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10, by which it was enacted, in substance, that, whenever one person was seised of a legal estate for the use of another, the owner of the use (the *cestui que use*) should have also the legal estate in the same quality, manner, form, and condition in which he had the use. By a strained construction of that statute, however, its purpose was frustrated; and the use, slightly altered in the method of its creation and with most of the ordinary property incidents, duties, and burdens now attached to it, has been retained as an equitable estate distinct from the legal, but under the generally employed new appellation of a *passive express trust*.

§ 69. (2) *Trusts*. — Trusts, including their original types which existed as such before the Statute of Uses and the old use with its new name, are now the most important of the equitable estates. It will suffice, in this outline, to explain

briefly the nature of the chief classes into which they are divided.

Trusts, in respect to the mode of their creation, are primarily divided into two classes : *a*, Express, and *b*, Implied. They are express when they are explicitly declared by the instrument or agreement, or appear from a proper construction of its terms ; implied when raised by equity, either to effectuate what is assumed to be the intention of the parties, or to work out justice regardless of what may have been the intent.¹

a. Express trusts, as here defined, include such as are ordinarily called *precatory*, i. e., trusts not declared by direct words of command, but indicated — most commonly in a will — by expressions of hope, request, entreaty, recommendation, and the like, used in such manner as reasonably to evince the testator's intent that the devisee shall hold or dispose of some or all of the property for another. All of the express trusts are subdivided into two classes ; viz. (*a*) active, and (*b*) passive. (*b*) A passive express trust is simply the old use with its new name, as above explained ; while a trust is (*a*) active when the trustee has some active duties to perform for the *cestui que trust*, as, for example, to manage the property and pay the net proceeds over to him. Within the general sphere of the express trusts are also included, not only those that are private and for definite beneficiaries, but also those called public or *charitable*, the distinguishing characteristics of which are that their object is some public utility, their individual beneficiaries are indefinite, and they may be validly made to continue forever. It is to be added that quite similar to an express trust is an arrangement by which a duty to dispose of realty is imposed on one to whom the legal estate is not transferred. This creates a power in trust. And such powers are properly to be discussed in connection with the general topic of express trusts.

b. Implied trusts are either (*a*) resulting or (*b*) constructive. A resulting trust is one which equity raises in order to carry out what is assumed to be the intention of the parties. A constructive trust is one implied by equity in order to work out justice, regardless of what may have been the intent of the

¹ Unfortunately, the use, by one or two prominent writers, of divisions different from these that are commonly employed, has tended to breed confusion

in regard to the exact limitations of the terms "express trusts" and "implied trusts." See 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 24-27, 112 ; § 35, *infra*.

parties. A brief statement as to each of these will explain its essential nature and forms.

(a) Resulting trusts are of four kinds. One of these commonly arises when, in one transaction, real property is bought in the name of one person and the purchase price as such is paid by another. He who takes the legal title and estate ordinarily holds the land in trust for him who thus pays the consideration. A second form exists when a holder of trust funds purchases realty with them and takes title in his own name; a third when real property is conveyed "in trust," but the trusts are not wholly declared or partly or entirely fail; and a fourth, in some instances, though not so readily to-day as in former times, when a conveyance of land is made by a deed which expresses no consideration nor any use or purpose for which the grantee is to hold. In all such instances, the holder of the legal estate is a trustee for the owner of the fund, or the grantor, or those who have succeeded to his interest by descent or otherwise.

(b) Constructive trusts arise either from actual fraud — circumstances of imposition — or from fraud presumed by equity though not actually proved, or from transactions in which there is no fraud, but in which the raising and enforcing of a trust affords the most adequate and complete remedy. Thus there are three subdivisions of this important branch of trusts. An instance of the first of these exists where one by acts of imposition or unfair dealing obtains a legal estate from another, so that the latter might have an action at law in tort for the wrong. In equity, he may have a constructive trust in the property declared against the wrongdoer, and a reconveyance to himself decreed. Again, when a trustee of real property purchases it from the *cestui que trust*, equity presumes fraud and, unless the purchaser overcome this presumption by positive evidence of fairness, raises a constructive trust against him. In such cases, equity goes far beyond law, which never presumes fraud, and furnishes illustrations of the second class of constructive trusts. And lastly, as illustrating the third class of such trusts, when a valid contract is made for the purchase and sale of real property, the intended vendor becomes at once a trustee of the property for the intended vendee, and the latter is treated as holding the purchase money in trust for the former, not because of any fraud either actual or presumed, nor because the parties are

regarded as so intending, but because upon this principle of a trust the best remedy — usually a specific performance suit — is available to either party if the other fail to carry out the contract.

§ 70. (3) **Equities of Redemption.** — In the original form of a mortgage the legal estate was always transferred to the mortgagee. If the debt secured by the mortgage were not promptly paid on the day when it was due — the “law day” — the title and estate became absolute in the lender, and the mortgagor could not subsequently regain the land. In the process of ameliorating this hardship on the borrower, equity gave to him the so-called “equity of redemption,” — the right to redeem the land and regain it for himself, by paying the principal of the debt, interest, and costs in full *after* the law day. This right has been so greatly enlarged in most of the states of this country that it has been merged into a legal estate now retained by the mortgagor until foreclosure of the mortgage is complete. But in England and Massachusetts, for examples, the changes have not been so great; and, as was above explained, the equity of redemption remains in the mortgagor or his successors in interest until the mortgage is paid off or otherwise discharged or foreclosure of it is complete.

§ 71. **II. Estates classified with Reference to their Quantity, or the Extent or Duration of the Interest in them.** — In this respect the primary division of estates is into, 1, *Estates of freehold* and 2, *Estates less than freehold*. For the purpose of this brief outline, it is sufficient to define a freehold estate as one which is either a life estate or a greater interest. Thus, the following estates, namely: to A for his own life, to A during the life of B, to A and the heirs of his body, to A and his heirs so long as they continue to live upon the land, to A and his heirs forever, are all freehold estates. Such interests were regarded by the courts, in fental times, as the only ones worthy of a free man’s contemplation and acceptance; only a free man could hold such estates, and hence the name which was applied to them. An estate less than freehold is one which, in contemplation of law, is not so great or important as a life estate. Illustrations of them are, an estate to A for ten years (or for any number of years or other interval measured by a definite period of time), and to A at the will of himself and his landlord or during the will of

either of them. Such interests were regarded as trivial and unimportant and not worthy of being owned by a free man.

§ 72. 1. **Freehold Estates** are either (1) Estates of inheritance, or (2) Estates not of inheritance. (1) An estate of inheritance is one capable of descending from ancestor to heir by the law of descent. Such are the estates in fee, these being again subdivided into *a*, Fee simple, and *b*, Qualified fees.

a. An estate in fee simple is the highest and most comprehensive interest known to the law — an estate to *one and his heirs forever*. The owner of it has absolute dominion and control of the property, so that he may sell it in perpetuity, devise it away absolutely by his will, or let it descend to his heirs generally upon his death.

b. Qualified fees are also estates to one and his heirs, but there is appended some condition, qualification, or restriction, such that the owner may not have the absolute, perpetual dominion of the property. The subdivisions of this class are: (a) Fee conditional at common law, which by the statute *de donis conditionalibus*¹ became the fee tail; (b) Fee on condition; (c) Fee on limitation; and (d) Fee on conditional limitation. (a) A fee conditional at common law, which by the ancient statute *de donis conditionalibus*² was converted into the fee tail (or estate tail), is an estate to one and the heirs of his body or some part or class of such heirs; i. e., while the conveyance is in a sense to him and his heirs, so that the estate is a fee, yet the words employed restrict the inheritance to his own issue, or some part of them, and exclude other relatives. Illustrations are, an estate to X *and the heirs of his body*; to X *and the heirs of his body by his wife Mary*; to X *and the heirs male or female of his body*. (b) A fee on condition is an estate to one and his heirs, but conveyed to him with words of conditional or hypothetical import, such that the estate is to be defeated and the property revert to the grantor, deviser, or other person who conveyed it, or his heirs, if the condition be broken by the happening of the contingent event, and he who conveyed the estate or his heirs re-enter. An illustration is an estate to X and his heirs, *provided they do not sell intoxicating liquor upon the premises*. If they sell such liquor there,

¹ See next succeeding note.

² 13 Edw. I. stat. 1, ch. 1, § 2 (A. D. 1285). The provisions, operation, and

effects of this famous statute are explained in § 281, *infra*.

and he who conveyed the estate or his heirs re-enter upon the property, the estate of X is thereby defeated. (c) A fee on limitation is an estate to one and his heirs, but conveyed to him by the use of words denoting duration of time, as "while," "during," "so long as," etc. (any expression that is a translation of *donec*); such that, when the limitation thus indicated expires by the happening of the contingent event, the estate will terminate and the property revert to the grantor, or other person who conveyed, or his heirs, without the necessity for their re-entry. An illustration is an estate to X and his heirs, *so long as they do not sell intoxicating liquor upon the premises*. If they sell such liquor there, the estate of X at once terminates and the property reverts to him who conveyed it, or to his heirs. (d) A fee on conditional limitation is an estate to one and his heirs, but conveyed by the use of words of either condition or limitation, and with the provision that on the happening of the contingent event the estate shall depart from the person to whom it is first conveyed and go over to another. An illustration is either an estate to X and his heirs, *but if they sell intoxicating liquor upon the premises then to Y and his heirs*, or an estate to X and his heirs *until they sell intoxicating liquor upon the premises and then to Y and his heirs*. If X or his heirs or successor in interest sell such liquor there, the estate at once passes to Y or his heirs, without the necessity for any entry upon the premises by the latter. The fee on conditional limitation was not permitted to be made directly by a deed at common law; but, after wills of real property were authorized by statute, such an estate could be made by will as one of the forms of executory devises; and, by the employment of a use, it could be made indirectly by deed as a shifting use. These methods of creating and dealing with it are fully explained hereafter.

(2) Freehold estates not of inheritance are the life estates. These are classified, according to the manner in which they are created, into *a*, Conventional life estates, or those made by act, contract, or convention of the parties; and *b*, Legal life estates, or those made by operation of law. *a*. The conventional life estates comprise: (a) An estate to one for his own life, illustrated by an estate to X *so long as he lives*; (b) An estate *per autre vie*, i. e., to one person during the life of another, illustrated by an estate to X *so long as Y lives*; and (c) An estate for an uncertain period, which is not at will

and may last for life, illustrated by an estate to X *so long as a designated tree shall stand* or an estate to Y *while she remains a widow*. Of these three forms, the estate *per autre vie* is regarded as the smallest; and it has always been treated as the least of all the freehold interests. *b.* The legal life estates are: (a) Curtesy, — the life interest of a husband in all the real property of which his wife was beneficially seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture, provided a child be naturally born of the marriage, born alive and capable of inheriting the property; (b) Dower, — the life interest of a wife in one third of the real property of which her husband was beneficially seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture; (c) Jointure, — a provision or settlement of property by or for a husband upon his wife, to be taken by her in lieu of dower; and (d) Estates by marriage, such as the husband's common-law interest in and right to income from his wife's real property of any kind during the coverture. It will be noted that all of the legal life estates arise from the relationship of husband and wife. They have always been favored by the common-law courts.

§ 73. 2. **Estates less than Freehold** embrace four classes, namely: (1) Estates for years; (2) Estates from year to year, including those from month to month, from week to week, from day to day, etc.; (3) Estates at will; (4) Estates at sufferance. (1) An estate for years is one which is measured by some definite period of time, whether it be one hour, ten days, twenty years, or ten millions of years. All estates so measured have precisely the same standing before the common law; all are governed by the same principles and each of them, whether its period of time be great or small, is of lesser importance and a lesser estate in contemplation of law than a life estate which is the least of the freeholds. Estates for years are *chattels real*. (2) When a tenant has held real property for a year or more, paying rent according to a yearly reckoning, and after such time has elapsed he remains in possession without further contract, he may ordinarily be treated by the landlord as tenant for another year; and if he remain after that year he may be treated as tenant for another year, and so on from year to year; and such a proceeding creates for him by implication of law an estate from year to year. When a tenant pays rent regularly every month, without any contract as to how long he shall remain

as a tenant and without any yearly reckoning in the transaction, he becomes by implication of law a tenant from month to month; while, if such payments be weekly, the tenancy becomes from week to week; and thus estates from month to month, from week to week, from day to day, etc., are caused to arise. (3) An estate at will is one created by contract, express or implied, whereby landlord and tenant agree that the latter shall hold the real property as tenant, either at the will of both parties (which is the most common form of such tenancy), or at the will of one of them only who is designated in the contract. The party at whose will the estate is so held may terminate it, whenever he elects to do so, without the consent of the other. This is the least of all the estates that rest upon contract either express or implied. (4) An estate at sufferance is one which arises from the wrongful¹ holding over and remaining in possession by a tenant who came rightfully upon the land. It is not the result of contract, but merely of the *laches* or forbearance of the landlord in not ejecting the tenant after the expiration of his rightful tenancy. This is the lowest and most insignificant of *all* the estates. The tenant at sufferance differs from a trespasser merely in the fact that his original coming upon the land was rightful, while a trespasser is a wrongdoer from the beginning. The estates from year to year, at will and at sufferance are *chattel interests*.²

§ 74. III. Estates classified with Reference to the Number and Connection of their Owners. — The classes of estates, which arise from a consideration of the ways in which a number of persons may together own real property, are 1, *Estate in severalty*, and 2, *Joint estates*; and the latter are (1) Estate in joint tenancy; (2) Estate in coparcenary; (3) Estate in common; (4) Estate by the entirety; (5) Partnership estates, and (6) Estates or interests in joint mortgages.

§ 75. 1. An Estate (or a Tenancy) in Severalty exists when one has the right to enjoy real property separately and dis-

¹ "Wrongful" here means simply without any right founded on contract or other legal act. It does not necessarily include the thought of any moral turpitude. Any holding over by a tenant, without legal right, is wrongful.

² The practical distinction, made in some states, between chattels real

(estates for years) and chattel interests, is that the former may be reached by an execution while the latter can not be so reached. See N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 33; Fowler's Real Prop. L. of N. Y. (2d ed.) p. 190; 1 Stimson's Amer. Stat. L. § 1344.

tinct from the interests of others. It is the most natural and common of all these classes of estates.

§ 76. 2. **Joint Estates.** — (1) **An Estate in Joint Tenancy** is one held or owned together by two or more persons in equal shares by purchase. The owners are said to be seised *per my et per tout* — that is, each owns an undivided share equal to that of each of the others, and also each owns the whole. From this theory or fiction of entire ownership by every joint tenant flows the great distinguishing characteristic of this estate, the right of *survivorship*; by which is meant that, whatever be the quantity of estate, and even though it be limited to the owners and their heirs, the survivor or survivors take the entire estate to the exclusion of the heirs or representatives of their deceased co-owners. Joint tenants must acquire their interests by purchase (i. e. any method other than by descent from a deceased ancestor), at the same time, from the same source, and so that their individual interests are the same in amount; and, when one of them is in possession of the property, they are all deemed by the law to be in possession. These requisites are ordinarily expressed by saying that a joint estate has the *four unities* of time, title, interest, and possession.

§ 77. (2) **An Estate or Tenancy in Coparcenary** arises, in England, when, upon the death of an ancestor, his real property descends to two or more female heirs. There is no survivorship in this kind of tenancy. It has the three unities of title, interest, and possession, but not that of time. It is not now recognized in any of the United States; for in such cases of descent the land is held by the heirs as tenants in common.¹

§ 78. (3) **An Estate (or a Tenancy) in Common** exists when undivided interests are owned by two or more persons without the right of survivorship and with no unity annexed to it save that of possession. The interests or quantities of ownership of the co-tenants may be different, and they may acquire them at different times and from different sources or titles. Upon the death of one of them his interest may descend to his heirs or be disposed of by his deed or will. The possession of one, however, is deemed to be that of all, and thus the unity of possession is requisite. The co-tenants may deal with their interests very much in the same way as

¹ See tenancy in common explained in the following paragraph.

if they owned them in severalty, except that while the estate continues to be in common no one of them can treat any part of the property as absolutely his own. This is the loosest and, as a rule, the most satisfactory of all the co-ownerships. It is the kind preferred and most frequently employed in this country.

§ 79. (4) **Estate by Entirety.** — When real property is conveyed to husband and wife, and nothing is said as to the quality of their interests, they take in it an estate by the entirety. They are said to be seised *per tout et non per my.* Hence, the right of survivorship attaches the same as in joint estates. But unlike joint tenants, neither husband nor wife, who hold an estate by the entirety, can sell or encumber the property so as to impair the right of survivorship of the other. This kind of estate is the strongest and most compact of all the co-ownerships. It has all the unities of time, title, interest, and possession. It exists in most of the United States; but in a few of them it has been abolished, directly or indirectly, by statute.

§ 80. (5) **Partnership Estates.** — When real property is purchased with partnership funds for partnership purposes, the partners are, in some respects, tenants in common thereof, while, in other particulars, they are joint tenants. As a general rule, they are the former as among themselves and the latter as to outside parties. The doctrine that the property is equitably converted into personalty while in their hands is also applied (fully in England, and in this country so far as required for working out the affairs of the firm) to determine the ultimate interests of those who claim rights in the same.

§ 81. (6) **Joint Mortgages.** — Where a mortgagee is regarded as the owner of an estate in the mortgaged property, two or more persons, who have each contributed some of the money to secure the re-payment of which the mortgage is given, become co-tenants of that estate; and their interests are sometimes those of joint tenants, while sometimes they are tenants in common. It may be said, as a general rule, that, as to their rights and interests as among themselves and without regard to any remedies which they may pursue for the recovery of the money, they are tenants in common; while, for the purpose of prosecuting their remedies — such, for instance, as foreclosure of the mortgage — they are joint tenants.

§ 82. **IV. Estates classified with Reference to their Qualified Nature.** — So classified estates are: 1, *Absolute or unqualified*, which need only to be mentioned here, and 2, *Qualified*. In the classification of estates with reference to their quantity, the qualified fees were explained as estates in fee; i.e. conveyed to one "and his heirs," but with some condition, limitation or restriction annexed, so that the owner does not have the fee simple, or unrestricted, perpetual dominion of the property. Such qualifications may be connected with estates of any quantity, as well as with a fee. Thus, property may be conveyed to A for his life, *provided* he do not sell intoxicating liquor upon the premises; or to A (without mentioning his heirs), *so long as* he does not sell intoxicating liquor there; or to B for ten years on condition that he live upon the land, etc. The species of interests found within the classes of which these are examples are, (1) Estates on condition, (2) Estates on limitation, (3) Estates on conditional limitation, and (4) Mortgages.

§ 83. (1) **An Estate on Condition** is one with some restriction or qualification annexed, to the effect that if a specified contingent event occur¹ the estate is to commence, or to be enlarged, diminished, or defeated. When the *commencing or enlarging* of the estate is made to depend upon the happening of the event, there results an estate on condition precedent; while in the other two cases, — when it is to be *diminished, or defeated* because of the occurrence, — there results an estate on condition subsequent. An estate to X for life, to begin when he marries Y and not before, is on condition precedent. Illustrations of estates on condition subsequent are, to X for fifty years, provided he sell no intoxicating liquor on the premises; to X and his heirs, to be cut down, however, to an estate for his life, or to be wholly defeated, if Z come back from Rome. When any estate whether it be a fee or a lesser interest is on condition subsequent, two things are necessary to terminate it; namely, breach of the condition and

¹ The expression, "if some contingent event occur," and those of similar meaning, are used here and elsewhere, in speaking of this group of estates, in a general sense, to denote the coming to pass or occurring of that which is indicated as the cause for the termination or passing over of the estate. It, accordingly, includes the

failure of something to happen, when that is specified as such a cause. Thus, if real property were conveyed to X for life, on condition, however, that he should marry Y within the next ten years, the happening of the contingent event in that case would be the failure of X to marry Y within the specified ten years.

re-entry upon the land by him who created the estate, or by his successor in interest. The property then reverts to him who so enters.

§ 84. (2) **An Estate on Limitation** is one created by the use of words denoting duration of time, such as "while," "during the continuance of," "so long as," etc. — any expression that is a translation of *donec*. Thus, a conveyance to X, so long as he shall live on the premises, creates a life estate on limitation. And an estate to X and the heirs of his body, while they do not sell intoxicating liquor on the land, is a fee tail on limitation. The happening of the specified event — the natural ending of the limitation — in itself terminates such estates as these; and the property reverts at once to him who created the estate, or to his successor in interest, without the necessity for any re-entry.

§ 85. (3) **An Estate on Conditional Limitation** arises from a conveyance of real property to one person, with words of either condition or limitation, and with the further proviso that, upon the happening of the specified contingent event, it shall depart from him and go over to another person. Such are estates, to X and his heirs until he marries and then to Y and his heirs; to X for ten years, but if he sell intoxicating liquor on the land, then to Y for the residue of the term; to X and the heirs of his body, provided that if Y return from Rome it is to go to Y and his heirs forever. The distinctive feature of such an estate is that the mere happening of the specified event *prematurely* terminates the interest of the first party and carries it over to the other. The common-law courts disliked this characteristic, and, therefore, were opposed to estates on conditional limitation.

§ 86. (4) **Mortgages**. — One of the original forms of estates on condition subsequent has developed, through changes wrought chiefly by courts of equity, into the modern mortgage, with its varied forms and remedies. In England and a few of the United States, a mortgage transaction still results in the conveying of a conditional estate to the mortgagee. But, as was heretofore said,¹ in most of the American states, the mortgagee now acquires only a lien on the land, before foreclosure; and all the estate, both legal and equitable, is retained by the mortgagor until foreclosure of the mortgage is complete. The *form* of the contract remains everywhere that of a sale, on condition that the vendor (mortgagor) may recover the property

¹ § 81, *supra*.

if he repay the money loaned or do some other prescribed act on or before a designated day, which is called the "law day;" but its substance and operation have been vastly changed, chiefly through the invention and use of the "equity of redemption."¹ And the generally accepted definition of a modern mortgage is: "Any conveyance of land intended by the parties at the time of making it to be a security for the payment of money or the doing of some prescribed act."² The different forms and kinds of mortgages, the diverse theories under which they are dealt with in the several states, and the rights and remedies of the parties to them supply the subject matter for one of the most interesting and important chapters in the law of real property.

§ 87. **V. Estates classified with Reference to the Time when the Enjoyment of them may begin** — *whether the owner may have the possession or enjoyment of the property at present, or must wait for it till some future time.* The natural and established division of estates, from this standpoint, is into, 1, Estates *in præsentia* — in present possession; and 2, Estates *in futuro* — in expectancy, or future estates. For, although a man's interest in property may be very great, it may be so limited that it can not be enjoyed by him until some future time; and other interests, whether great or small, may be such as to afford immediate possession and enjoyment.

§ 88. **1. An Estate in Præsentia**, the familiar, ordinary kind of interest which gives actual permanency of the profits to continue as long as the estate, needs only to be mentioned as a class under this method of viewing estates. It is the kind of interest most frequently owned and most commonly desired.

§ 89. **2. Estates in Futuro**, or in expectancy, in which the right to possess and enjoy the property is postponed, are classified as (1) Reversions, (2) Remainders, and (3) Executory estates.

(1) *A reversion* is a future estate, created by operation of law, to take effect in possession, in favor of a grantor or his heirs or the heirs of a testator, after the natural termination of a prior particular estate granted or devised. If, for example, X, the owner of a piece of land in fee simple, convey it to Y for his life, the law at once creates and gives to X the residue

¹ See § 70, *supra*.

² Quoted and adopted from 2 Wash. R. P. p. *43, by the N. Y. Court of

Appeals, in *Burnett v. Wright*, 135 N. Y. 543, 547.

of the estate in fee simple, so that he may again possess the land after Y's death has naturally terminated Y's estate. Y's life interest is then the particular estate, and that which the law has created for or reserved to X is the reversion. If X die at or before the time when the grant to Y takes effect, or if the conveyance to Y be by will, the reversion is reserved for the heirs of X. So when the owner of an estate for life leases out the land, say for ten years, the law immediately creates and reserves for him a reversion of the residue of the life estate, so that he may again have possession after the particular estate for ten years has elapsed. A reversion is always made by operation of law, and never by act of the parties; it must always be preceded by a particular estate, upon which it is said to depend, and it must be so created and limited as not to curtail or interrupt that particular estate, but to take effect in possession at its natural termination.

(2) *A remainder* is a future estate, *made by act of the parties*, to take effect in possession after the natural termination of a prior particular estate, which is created by the same transaction. It differs from a reversion in that it is always made by act of the parties and never by operation of law. Thus, if X, the owner of a piece of land in fee simple, convey it to Y for his life and then to Z and his heirs forever, Y's life interest is the particular estate, and Z has a remainder in fee simple. So, X might make, from his estate, a number of successive remainders, as if he conveyed the land to P for ten years, then to Q for life, then to R and the heirs of his body, and then to S and his heirs forever. Like a reversion, a remainder must always be preceded by a particular estate, upon which it is said to depend, and it must be created to take effect in possession, if ever, at the natural termination of the particular estate, which it must never be made to interrupt or curtail. It is also requisite to a valid remainder that it shall be created by the same transaction as the particular estate upon which it depends. The primary division of remainders is into *a*, vested, and *b*, contingent. *a*. A vested remainder is one in which there is a present fixed right to future enjoyment of the property. An illustration is an estate to X for life, remainder to Y who is a living person. Here, while Y can not possess and enjoy the land until after the death of X, yet his *right* to such future enjoyment is not affected by any contingency or uncertainty. It may be added that a vested estate, generally, whether

a remainder or not, is defined as a present, fixed right to present or future enjoyment. *b.* A contingent remainder is one in which either the person to take it is not in being or not ascertained, or the event upon which it is to be enjoyed is uncertain, or both; and so the right to the future enjoyment of the property is not fixed. Illustrations are an estate to X for life, remainder to his unborn son; an estate to X for ten years, remainder to Y and his heirs forever if he marry Z; an estate to X for life and, at his death, to the person who is then president of the United States. It is also to be added that a contingent estate, generally, whether a remainder or not, is frequently defined as an uncertain right to future enjoyment. Special forms of contingent remainders are cross remainders and alternate remainders, as to each of which it is enough here to remark that it is made so that it will ultimately go to one or the other of two or more designated persons, as one or another of specified contingent events may occur. Any kind of remainder may be made directly in the legal estate, or by the employment of a use. When a contingent remainder is made in a use, it is known as a contingent use.

(3) *An executory estate* is one, created by act of the parties, to take effect in possession in the future, without any particular estate upon which it depends. Such an estate is illustrated by a devise of land to X and his heirs, to begin in possession when he marries Y; or to a minor for life, to commence on his twenty-first birthday; or to X, for life, and ten days after his death, to Y and his heirs forever. In the first two of these illustrations, no preceding estate whatever is mentioned; in the last one, while a preceding interest is given to X, yet the estate conveyed to Y, which is the executory one, does not depend upon it, since there is to be a period of ten days between them. It is this fact, of its having no particular estate upon which to rest, that distinguishes an executory estate from both a reversion and a remainder. The same fact also caused the common-law courts to look upon executory estates, when freehold in quantity, with disfavor, and to refuse to permit them to be made directly by deed. This aversion to them was due chiefly to the mode of procedure in the ancient methods of conveyancing, which will be fully explained hereafter. It is sufficient here to add that, at first by means of uses and powers, and subsequently by wills also, freehold executory estates were ultimately permitted to be created and employed.

But it is only by virtue of very modern statutes that they have been allowed to be created directly by deed. Before such recent statutes, the methods resorted to were : *a*, springing uses, *b*, shifting uses, *c*, dispositions of uses by virtue of powers and *d*, executory devises. *a*. A use made to arise in the future, without any preceding interest or particular estate on which it depends, is a springing use. Such is a conveyance by deed of land to X and his heirs for the use of Y when he marries. When Y marries, he acquires the use ; and the Statute of Uses then executes it and thus confers on him the legal estate. Had the attempt been made to deed the legal estate directly to Y, but not to be vested in and enjoyed by him until his marriage, the deed would have been a nullity, if it were before the modern enabling statutes. *b*. A shifting use is a conditional limitation in a use. An illustration is an estate to X and his heirs, for the uses of Y and his heirs, but if Z return from Rome then for the use of Z and his heirs. The Statute of Uses, executing the use, bestows the legal estate upon Y, and shifts it to Z on his returning from Rome and thus acquiring the use. An attempt thus to shift the legal title directly by deed, and without employing the use, since it would curtail the first estate if allowed, would have been abortive before the modern enabling statutes. *c*. A power in this department of law is the right to dispose of a use. Accordingly, if an owner of land, instead of creating a springing use or a shifting one, confer on another person the right to dispose of future uses in the property ; and the latter, who is the donee of a power, appoint the use to spring up in the future or to shift from one appointee to another, the Statute of Uses executes the uses as they come into existence, and thus executory estates emerge. A single illustration, which is enough here, is found in a power conferred by X, the donor, upon Y, the donee, to appoint the use in fee of a specified acre of land, and the appointment of that use by Y to Z and his heirs, to begin when Z marries. The Statute of Uses transfers the legal estate to Z as soon as upon his marriage he acquires the use. *d*. An executory devise is a future estate, created by will, such as could not be made directly by deed at common law. Illustrations are devises of the legal estate in land to X and his heirs to begin when he marries ; to X and his heirs until Y returns from Rome, and then to Y and his heirs ; to X for his life, and ten days after his death to Y and his heirs. The legal estate was allowed to

be thus disposed of by will, after the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII. ch. 1, as amended and explained by 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. ch. 5.¹ Executory freehold estates are favored by modern statutes, which in many of the United States now permit them to be made directly by deed, as freely as by will, and without the necessity of employing either uses or powers. Executory estates less than freehold have never been under the restrictions placed upon executory freehold estates by the common-law courts.

IV. *Titles to Real Property.*

§ 90. **Definition of Title — Its Elements — How acquired.** — Title is generally defined as the means of acquiring and holding the ownership of property. "*Titulus*," says Coke, "*est justa causa possidendi id quod nostrum est.*" Its distinction from estates in and holdings of realty has been already illustrated.² A complete title involves three elements; namely, possession, right of possession, and right of property. These appear, distinct and separate, in the process of acquiring title by adverse possession in one of the more conservative, common-law states, such as New Jersey, where sixty years of adverse holding and occupancy are frequently necessary to a complete transfer of title by this method. If, in that state, A without any apparent right take B's land from him and hold it adversely, A has at once possession, while B retains the right of possession and the right of property. For twenty years thereafter, B may perfect his title again simply by regaining possession.³ After twenty years of such adverse holding, A acquires both the possession and the right of possession; while B then has left only the right of property and can not now perfect his title again except by judicial proceedings. After forty years more of such adverse holding, making sixty in all, A acquires the right of property

¹ After the feudal system affected all the land in England, and before the Statute of Wills, it was impossible to dispose by devise of any *legal* estate in real property. Testators could will away only the *use*. Even their ability to do this was taken away by the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10. And so, for five years — from 27 Hen. VIII., to 32 Hen. VIII. — no valid devise was made in England of any

interest, either legal or equitable, in real property. After the Statute of Wills became operative, it was naturally construed as allowing executory *legal* estates to be devised, just as executory *uses* had been freely made by will before the Statute of Uses. Digby, *Hist. R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 382.

² § 66, *supra*.

³ *Gen. Stat. of N. J.* p. 1977, § 23.

also;¹ and B's title has thus passed to A, by three successive stages under the statute of limitations, each of which stages carried one of the elements of title.

The two chief methods of acquiring title to real property are, I. By descent, and II. By purchase.

§ 91. I. **Title by Descent.**—When an owner of real property leaves it, at his death, undisposed of by any act of his, the law at once casts it upon his heir or heirs; and this is the only instance, afforded by the common law, of title by descent. The heir or heirs, to whom the law thus transfers the real property of their deceased ancestor, are ascertained by the common-law canons of descent, or by the modifications of or substitutions for these which are made by the modern statutes of descent. It is to be noted that other methods of acquiring title by law are not treated as descent, but as purchase. Thus, a wife obtains dower, or a husband curtesy, by operation of law; but both of these interests are acquired by purchase. It is only when the *law* casts property upon an *heir* that title passes by descent.

§ 92. II. **Title by Purchase** includes all methods of acquiring property, other than that by descent as above explained. He who obtains land by will, or by adverse possession, acquires it by purchase; as does also the individual who takes it by deed, and the state to which it escheats when its owner dies intestate and without heirs. The divisions of this means of obtaining realty, which are suggested by convenience, are: 1, Title by purchase other than by alienation; and, 2, Title by alienation, which comprises the "four common assurances of the realm;" namely: (1) alienation by deed, or grant, (2) alienation by devise, (3) alienation by matter of record, and (4) alienation by special custom.²

§ 93. 1. **Title by Purchase, other than by Alienation**, includes those forms which may be called subsidiary, and which are not so common as the other methods. It is enough here to name and briefly define each species. (1) Title by *escheat* is the passing of the property back to the state, as its primary and ultimate receptacle, when the individual owner has died intestate and without heirs, or without heirs who are capable of inheriting that particular property. Feudal escheat was the falling back of the estate to the lord, from the deceased vassal

¹ Gen. Stat. of N. J. p. 1972, §§ 1, 2.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *293-*295.

who had died without heirs capable of inheriting; this was an incident of tenure, which ceased in this country with that method of holding real property; but it furnished the model upon which escheat to the state, as it now exists in the United States, was built up by statutes. (2) Title by *occupancy* results from property, which has been left vacant and unowned, being taken and appropriated as his own by an individual. The only remaining instance of it, at common law, is in the case where a tenant *per autre vie* dies before the *cestui que vie*; as if land be owned by X for the life of Y, and X die before Y. The common law then permits any one, who first obtains possession, to own and hold it for the rest of Y's life. Even this case of title by occupancy is now abolished, in most jurisdictions, by statute. (3) Title by *accretion* is that which results from the gradual increase (so gradual that an observer does not detect its progress as it is going on) along a stream, or lake, or the sea shore, as the action of the water causes additional particles to adhere to and thus become a part of the land. (4) Title by *forfeiture* is the result of some illegal act, or negligence, on the part of the owner of realty, whereby it passes either to the person injured or to the public. It is little countenanced in this country, and much less than it formerly was in England. (5) Title by *prerogative* is sometimes extended to cover such interests in real property as accrue to the crown, or to persons who claim under the title of the crown, by virtue of the position as *parens patriæ* occupied by the king. It does not exist in American law, and needs to be mentioned merely for the sake of completeness. (6) Title by *abandonment* — resulting from the former owner's leaving the land unoccupied, under circumstances which indicate that he does not intend to reclaim it, and its being taken and possessed by another — is commonly named as a separate and distinct class under this branch of our subject; but it will be found, as shown hereafter, that every case placed in this category properly belongs under the head of title by either estoppel, dedication, prescription, or adverse possession. (7) Title by *estoppel* arises from the fact that he who would otherwise be the owner of lands, tenements, or hereditaments is precluded by his own act or representation to assert, as against another claimant, his right or interest therein. As in the law of contracts generally, the estoppel effecting the passing of title may be either *in pais*, or of record, or by deed. (8) Title by *prescription*, by which incor-

corporeal hereditaments only are acquired,¹ is such as rests upon the presumption, after twenty years (this is the common law and ordinary period, though in some states it is made different by statute) of continuous, peaceable, uninterrupted and adverse enjoyment of such an incorporeal right, that he who has been so enjoying it had at one time a grant of it, which has been lost. The period of time required to perfect such a title and the requisites of the adverse user during that period have been worked out and prescribed by the common law, in analogy to the statutes of limitations, but without much direct statutory assistance. (9) Title by *adverse possession*, by which corporeal hereditaments only are acquired,² is wholly the creature of the statutes of limitations. The title to the land is passed over to the adverse holder as the result of twenty years (this is the usual period, though the statutes of the different states vary) of continuous, peaceable, uninterrupted occupation thereof with an adverse claim of right. Such occupancy is said, in some cases, simply to cut off the remedy of the rightful owner of the land, while the title is left theoretically at least in him; but in England and many of the United States it is held to pass the complete title to the adverse holder.³

§ 94. 2. **Title by Alienation.** — Alienation is the voluntary resigning or giving over of property by one person and its receipt and acceptance by another. The most common methods of acquiring realty are included within this class. As heretofore stated, they are the so-called "four common assurances of the realm;" namely: (1) Alienation by deed or grant, (2) Alienation by devise, (3) Alienation by matter of record, and (4) Alienation by special custom.

(1) *Alienation by Deed or Grant.* — A deed is a writing, containing the elements of a contract, signed, sealed, and delivered by the parties. Its most ordinary employment, of

¹ This is true when the word "prescription" is technically and accurately employed. But it is sometimes used in a sense broad enough to include the acquisition of any kind of real property, whether corporeal or incorporeal, by adverse holding or user for the requisite length of time. See *United States v. Chavez*, 175 U. S. 509, 522; *Davis v. Coblenz*, 174 U. S. 719, 724.

² But "adverse possession" and "prescription" are sometimes used

interchangeably. See last preceding note.

³ 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 27, § 34; *Baker v. Oakwood*, 123 N. Y. 16; *Simis v. McElroy*, 160 N. Y. 156; *Campbell v. Holt*, 115 U. S. 620; *Turner v. New York*, 168 U. S. 90; *Hampton v. Commonwealth*, 19 Pa. St. 329; *Welch v. Wadsworth*, 30 Conn. 149; *Jones v. Jones*, 18 Ala. 248; *Cooley*, Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 449.

course, is in transferring or otherwise affecting the title to real property. The forms that it has assumed for these purposes are historically divided into three groups; namely: *a*, the common-law deeds; *b*, the forms of conveyancing that arose and operate by virtue of the Statute of Uses; and *c*, the kinds of deeds or grants at present employed. The word "grant" is here used, in connection with "deed," because it is the term now quite commonly employed by courts and writers to include practically all forms of alienation by deed.

a. The common-law deeds, which were the only ones known before the enactment of the Statute of Uses, embraced six forms that were primary and five that were secondary. A deed is said to be primary when it is capable of passing title from one person to another originally and completely, without reference to the previous operation of any other document or form of transfer; it is secondary when its operation depends on a former manipulation of the title through some other instrument or transaction. The six primary common-law deeds were, *feoffment*, which accompanied the ceremony known as livery of seisin of the land and conveyed corporeal hereditaments ordinarily in fee simple; *gift*, which transferred an estate tail; *grant* (in its original and narrower sense), which conveyed incorporeal hereditaments; *lease*, which dealt with a smaller estate, usually less than freehold; *exchange*, by which an estate in one piece of property was traded for the same quantity of estate in another, and *partition*, which allotted in severalty distinct pieces of property formerly owned by co-tenants. The five secondary deeds were: *confirmation*, used to validate and make indefeasible a prior voidable transfer; *surrender*, by which a tenant or temporary holder gave back his estate to the landlord or reversioner; *release* (the reverse of the surrender), by which a reversioner gave up his interest to the temporary holder of the land; *assignment*, which transferred to a third party the whole of a temporary interest, such, for example, as an estate for years, and *defeasance*, which has become a part of the modern mortgage and provides that a previous conveyance shall become null and void on the happening of a specified event. These ancient forms of deeds, with some modifications and occasionally with new names, are still generally retained. But, in some of the states of this country, the feoffment and

gift are no longer used.¹ The defeasance is now uniformly a mere clause or part of another deed, such as a mortgage, rather than a separate instrument by itself.

b. The operation of the Statute of Uses consisted in its taking the legal estate from him, who was seised of property for the use of another, and passing it over to that other, — the *cestui que use*, — thus “*executing*” the use by uniting it and the legal estate in the same person. While that statute, because of the ways in which it was construed, never accomplished what its framers intended — never destroyed uses — yet it soon came to be employed as a great convenience in secret conveyancing of real property. It was apparent, from the moment of its enactment, that title to real property might be readily passed from A to C by having it conveyed by A to B *for the use of C*. Thus the parties themselves transmitted (or transmuted) the title part of the way — from A to B — and the statute then carried it the rest of the way — from B to C. It was then said to be conveyed “by transmutation of possession.” But in this process the conveyance from A to B was necessarily open and notorious; for it must take place by feoffment and livery of seisin on the land, when it was called (a) a *Feoffment to uses*, or by a proceeding in court, when it took the form of either (b) a *Fine to uses* or (c) a *Common recovery to uses*. In order to avoid the publicity of such transfers and secretly to utilize the statute, three other methods of conveying by its aid, which were said to operate “without transmutation of possession” soon came to be very commonly employed. These were (d) *Covenant to stand seised*, (e) *Bargain and sale*, and (f) *Lease and release*. (d) *A covenant to stand seised* can operate only between husband and wife or persons related by blood, and for a meritorious or good consideration as distinguished from one that is valuable. Its simple operation is that, without going on the land and without any other act of publicity, A covenants and agrees to hold the property (stand seised of it) for the use of B. By virtue of such covenant, B becomes the owner of the use; and the Statute of Uses then instantly transfers to him the legal estate. (e) *The bargain and sale* is for valuable consideration, and does not require any relationship of blood or marriage. Without any publicity, A merely agrees to sell the land to B,

¹ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 16; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 314–321.

and B bargains to purchase it. This agreement or "bargain" gives the use to B; and the Statute of Uses then instantly takes to him the legal title. The parties make the bargain, and the Statute makes the sale. (f) The secrecy of these forms of conveying being objectionable, it was provided by the Statute of Enrolment, 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 16, that any transfer of a *freehold* estate by bargain and sale should be invalid, unless made by deed and enrolled, within six months after its date, in one of the king's courts of record at Westminster. The conveyance by *lease and release* was invented for the purpose of evading that statute; and it consists of a bargain and sale of an estate *less than freehold* (usually for one year) from A to B, and then of a release from A to B of the residue of the estate in fee simple. Neither the bargain and sale for a term of years nor the release was required by the statute to be enrolled. These last three methods of disposing of and acquiring titles to realty, and also the feoffment to uses, are still permitted in most common-law jurisdictions. But the simpler forms of the deeds of to-day, as well as the better operation of our modern recording acts, have done away with their actual utility and use.

c. The modern kinds of deeds are modifications of those already mentioned; but, largely because of the prominence and importance now given to the covenants for title, and especially that of warranty, different names are generally employed. The four species most commonly used are: (a) The *quitclaim* deed, which was originally a mere release, but has come to be also in most states the lowest form of primary conveyance—a mere naked transfer, without any covenant as to title; (b) The modern *bargain and sale* deed, which is an outgrowth and condensation of the older deed of the same name—another but preferable form of naked transfer, without any covenant as to title; (c) The bargain and sale with one or more special covenants for title, such as the favorite covenant *against the grantor's acts*; and (d) The *warranty deed*, sometimes called the full covenant and warranty deed, which, in addition to purporting to convey the property in the strongest and fullest terms, contains all the usual covenants by which the grantor binds himself and his heirs forever to make good and defend the title of the grantee and his successors in interest. In addition to these chief species of conveyances, there are in use at the present time numerous

subsidiary forms, most of which are in substance modifications of the bargain and sale deed. Such are sheriffs' deeds, executors' deeds, referees' deeds, receivers' deeds, tax deeds, etc.

The modern deeds are also classified and discussed with regard to the kinds of grantors or parties by whom they are made and delivered. Thus, (a) the *public* grant (using grant in its generic sense) by the state or general government is one form; (b) the *office* grant, made by some duly authorized public officer, is another; and (c) the *private* grant — the most frequently employed form — is the third.

The essential requisites of all these forms of conveyances, their execution, delivery, witnessing, acknowledging, proving, and record, and their orderly component parts, as arranged by courts and statutes ancient and modern, present broad fields of inquiry and discussion within the domain of the law of real property.

(2) *Alienation by Devise.* — A devise is a gift of real property by will. The right thus to transfer landed interests, as it is now enjoyed, is the result of much change and development, in which famous statutes have played a very important part. Hence, the discussion of title by will embraces in the first instance (a) an explanation of the general nature and operation of devises in the different periods of their history. It next deals with (b) the present methods of executing wills, in order to make them capable of passing real property. And, lastly, it examines (c) the different varieties of devises and the general rules and principles of construction applicable to them.

(a) In the Anglo-Saxon period of the common law, and before the feudal system became established in England, wills of realty were quite freely permitted and used, at least by lords and great men. They were ordinarily made in writing, authenticated by the testator's making the sign of the cross upon them, and deposited in monasteries for safe keeping.¹

(The introduction of feuds interfered with this system, because it was considered to be a right of the lord to prevent his vassal from willing away the legal estate in the land; and, until this difficulty was overcome by statute, no holder of land by tenure could devise any interest therein except the use or equitable estate.¹) It was decided that the Statute of

¹ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) ch. viii.

Uses, 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10, since it was to take the legal estate wherever the use was bestowed, had forbidden even the willing away of a use; and so there were no valid wills in England of *any* interests in real property for five years — from 27 Hen. VIII. to 32 Hen. VIII. (By the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII. ch. 1, as amended and explained by 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. ch. 5, most legal and equitable interests in real property were permitted to be transferred by will in writing; and this was generally and somewhat loosely done until the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II.* ch. 3. The last-mentioned enactment, which required a will of realty not only to be in writing but also to be signed by the testator and attested and signed by at least three credible witnesses, controlled such instruments until the taking effect of our modern wills statutes,) such as that of 1 Vict. ch. 26 in England, or the Revised Statutes of 1830 in New York. Thus, these modern statutes introduced the sixth and last general period in the history of wills of real property.

(b) The law of the place where the land is situated is that which is uniformly applied to the determination of the validity and effects of its transfer by will. Tersely summarized here, that law may be said usually to require that the written will shall be signed or *subscribed* by the testator, in the presence of at least two witnesses (some states require three, and that number is everywhere preferable), or if subscribed in their absence that the signature be acknowledged by him to them; that he declare to them that it is his will and request them to attest and subscribe it as witnesses, and that they thereupon attest and subscribe it as such witnesses. The different states, of course, have local variations in these requirements; (a) but those here stated are the essentials most uniformly prescribed.

(c) Among the most important matters relating to the

(a) The New York statute, as to the execution of a will, requires that: "1. It shall be subscribed by the testator at the end of the will: 2. Such subscription shall be made by the testator, in the presence of each of the attesting witnesses, or shall be acknowledged by him, to have been so made, to each of the attesting witnesses: 3. The testator, at the time of making such subscription, or at the time of acknowledging the same, shall declare the instrument so subscribed, to be his last will and testament: 4. There shall be at least two attesting witnesses, each of whom shall sign his name as a witness, at the end of the will, at the request of the testator." N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 18, § 21; 2 R. S. 63, § 40.

kinds or varieties of devises are those which arise from the operation of residuary clauses in wills, and from the lapsing of direct and explicit devises because of the death of the beneficiaries before the testators. At common law, a residuary clause or devise in a will—a general gift of the residue of the testator's property after specific gifts have been made—could not dispose of real property; but now, in England and most of the United States, the modern statutes have enabled it to do so. A will now generally speaks and operates as of the time of the death of the testator; and so lapsed devises may be taken up and disposed of by residuary clauses. The discussion of devises also calls for a resumé of the special forms of estates thereby frequently conveyed, such as executory devises, devises for charitable uses, etc

(3) *Alienation by Matter of Record.*—Title acquired by matter of record does not depend upon the direct acts of the parties, but looks to the sanction of a court for its substantiation and preservation. It is ordinarily the outcome of a judgment or decree. While, under the modern practice in this country, these do not as a rule *give* title, but merely crystallize and confirm that which is assumed to have already existed, yet they are to be examined as important methods of *perfecting* titles. Two kinds of assurances, moreover, which are within this group and were for a long time extensively used in England, did actually and originally in many instances transfer an entire interest in realty from one person to another. They were *finés* and *common recoveries*. The study of these two forms of judicial proceeding, which were technical, artificial, and collusive in character, throws much light upon the history and leading principles of a considerable part of the common law.

(4) *Alienation by Special Custom.*—There are no instances, of any practical importance, of title by special custom in this country. But a complete survey of our subject includes the few methods of thus acquiring property, such as those associated with Burgage tenures and Gavelkind holdings, which have been operative in some parts of England. The effects of some local customs in *modifying* the rights and interests of landowners, especially in cases where the estates are less than freehold, are also properly embraced within this subdivision of the methods of acquiring title.

§ 95. **Liens on Real Property.**—Ownership of real property

may be either free, clear, and indefeasible, or affected by liens or other encumbrances. (An encumbrance is a right or claim against the property, which does not interfere with the passing of the title, but impairs the value.) Such is a restriction as to use, more onerous than the law would naturally require, or a mortgage, or a lien for taxes or water rent. Some of these encumbrances, such, for example, as the first illustration just given, are not ordinarily liens, since they are only restrictions, and not claims for any payment or value out of the land. The discussion of these comes naturally in connection with the instruments which create them, such as conveyances, leases, and covenants. (A lien — which is also an encumbrance — is a hold or claim, which one person has over the property of another as security for the payment of some charge or debt out of that property.) As these are necessarily involved in a thorough examination of title to real property, they are logically to be discussed at the end of the subject of title.

The mortgage, which is one of the most important liens, has been already explained, as a development from estates on condition subsequent; and the equitable liens or mortgages, such as vendors' liens, vendees' liens, *lis pendens*, etc., were included in its discussion. Statutory liens remain to be noticed. And it will be sufficient here to name and define the most important forms among them. Such are liens for taxes, levied yearly by the public authorities against the property; also water rents — in the large cities, — and assessments or betterment charges imposed upon lands for payment for special public improvements at or near where the lands are located. Such also are judgment liens, obtained by the "docketing" of judgments against landowners, as authorized and regulated by statutes; mechanics' liens, filed pursuant to statute for compensation due to persons who have contributed labor or material to the repair or improvement of the land; attachment liens, obtained by plaintiffs during the pendency of litigation; and unsafe building liens and liens in favor of boards of health, which are filed because of the properties' violation of municipal ordinances or rules. Such rights, while not directly assailing the title, may readily take most or all of the value from its owner.

§ 96. **Registration of Titles and Liens.** — A system of "registering titles," first brought into practice by Sir Robert

Torrens in South Australia, and therefore known as the "Torrens System," has been substantially adopted in a few of the United States, such, for example, as Illinois and Massachusetts. It is entirely statutory; and the local acts vary considerably. But the general scheme includes a judicial proceeding to determine that the applicant owns the property, to which proceeding all interested persons are made parties, a certificate of title to the successful petitioner by a public official designated by the statute, registration of the certificate in a book kept for that purpose, all subsequent transfers and liens made by note on such certificate or a new one duly registered and the making of the certificate conclusive evidence of the title of its holder. The merits claimed for such a system are the security which it gives to titles and the ease and rapidity with which it enables them to be transferred.

It is hoped that the utility of the foregoing survey of the ground to be covered in the following chapters may be increased by the annexed tabulated summary of its contents.

Book I.
KINDS OF REAL PROPERTY.

- { PART I. LANDS.
- { PART II. TENEMENTS.
- { PART III. HEREDITAMENTS. { 1. Corporeal.
- 2. Incorporeal

Book II.
HOLDINGS OF REAL PROPERTY.

- { PART I. ALODIAL, before feudal system, and after the Reformation
 - 1. Knight-service
 - 2. Free and common socage
 - 3. Villein socage — Ancient
 - 4. Pure villeinage
 - 5. Copyhold
 - 6. Frankalmoin
 - 7. Divine service
 - 8. Grand sergeanty
 - 9. Petty sergeanty
 - 10. Burgage
 - 11. Gavelkind
- { PART II. BY TENURE
 - 1. Legal. — Recognized in law

Book III.
ESTATES IN REAL PROPERTY.

- { PART I. AS TO COURTS
 - 1. Legal. — Recognized in law
 - 2. Equitable
- { PART II. AS TO QUANTITY.
 - 1. Freehold
 - 2. Less than Freehold
- { PART III. AS TO NUMBER & CONNECTION OF OWNERS.
 - 1. Severalty. — Separate and distinct
 - 2. Joint Estates
- { PART IV. AS TO QUALIFIED OR UNQUALIFIED NATURE
 - 1. Absolute — Not conditional
 - 2. Qualified.
- { PART V. AS TO TIME FOR ENJOYMENT TO BEGIN.
 - 1. Present Estates — In possession
 - 2. Future Estates

Book IV.
TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY.

- { PART I. BY DESCENT — Passing by law from ancestor to descendant
 - 1. Other than by Alienation
- { PART II. BY PURCHASE
 - 2. By Alienation

- (1) Reuts { a Rent-service.
- (2) Franchises. { b Rent-charge.
- (3) Easements and servitudes. (License.) { c Rent-seck.
- (4) Profit à prendre.

olution in the United States.

at demesue. } Chief forms.

. } Inferior or subsidiary forms.

all courts.

- (1) Uses. { a Express { (a) Active.
- (2) Trusts { b Implied { (b) Passive.
- (3) Equities of Redemption. { (a) Resulting.
- (1) Of inheritance { a Fee simple. { (b) Constructive.
- (b) Qualified fees { (a) Fee conditional — fee tail.
- (b) Fee on condition.
- (c) Fee on limitation.
- (d) Fee on conditional limitation.

- (2) Not of inheritance, or for life { a Conventional { (a) For one's own life.
- (b) *Per autre vie*.
- (c) For uncertain period which may last for life.
- (a) Curtesy.
- (b) Dower.
- (c) Jointure.
- (d) Estate by marriage.
- (1) For years (chattels real).
- (2) From year to year { b Legal
- (3) At will.
- (4) At sufferance } Chattel interests.

d distinct ownership.

- (1) Joint tenancy.
- (2) Coparcenary.
- (3) Estates in commou.
- (4) Estates by entirety.
- (5) Partnership estates.
- (6) Joint mortgages.

- nal nor qualified.
- (1) Estates on condition.
- (2) Estates on limitation.
- (3) Estates on conditional limitation.
- (4) Mortgages.

session.

- (1) Reversions.
- (2) Remainders { a Vested.
- (b) Contingent.
- (3) Executory Estates { a Springing uses.
- (b) Shifting uses.
- (c) Powers.
- (d) Executory devises.

eir.

- (1) By escheat.
- (2) By occupancy.
- (3) By accretion.
- (4) By forfeiture.
- (5) By prerogative.
- (6) By abandonment.
- (7) By estoppel.
- (8) By prescription.
- (9) By adverse possession.
- (1) By deed or grant { a Common-law kinds.
- (b) Kinds operating by Statute of Uses.
- (c) Modern kinds { (a) Public grant.
- (b) Office grant.
- (c) Private grant.
- (2) By devise.
- (3) By matter of record.
- (4) By special custom.

BOOK I
KINDS OF REAL PROPERTY.

PART I. — LANDS.

PART II. — TENEMENTS.

PART III. — HEREDITAMENTS.

PARTS I AND II.

CHAPTER V.

LANDS AND TENEMENTS.

§ 97. Lands.

§ 98. Tenements.

§ 97. **Lands.** — The topic of this book is real property, in the sense of things which are *objects* of ownership. The holdings of such things, the estates or interests in them and the titles to them are the distinct subjects of the other three books. Naturally the first of these *things* — these objects of ownership — which engaged the attention of men, was land — the real property that is cognizable by the physical senses. Land embraces whatever is parcel of the terrestrial globe, whatever is affixed thereto, whether by nature — as trees, grass, herbs, and water — or by the act of man — as houses, fences, poles, and wires — and all the space beyond them indefinitely outward. When the lawyer thinks of land, he must immeasurably enlarge upon the ordinary, lay conception of it and make it include everything of which his physical senses might give him knowledge, from the centre of the earth upward into unlimited space. *Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad cælum, et ad orcum.* I can restrain my neighbor from swinging his shutters out over my roof; and he who, without permission, digs into my soil a thousand feet below the surface, or stretches a telegraph or telephone wire over it, or flies in an air-ship thousands' of feet above it, is guilty of trespass.¹

§ 98. **Tenements.** — As things not tangible, nor cognizable in any way by the physical senses, came more and more to

¹ See § 62, *supra*, and note; *Laybourn v. Gridley* (1892), 2 Ch. 53; *Lemmon v. Webb* (1895), App. Cas. 1; *Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon*, 152 Pa. St. 286; *G. R. & I. R. Co. v. Butler*, 159 U. S. 87, 92; *Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co.*, 204 U. S. 204, 217; *Gouverneur v. Nat. Ice Co.*,

134 N. Y. 355. When an article, though very small, such as a wire, is thus retained, so that it may be taken away by the sheriff, an action of ejectment will lie for its removal. *Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co.*, 186 N. Y. 486, 492; *Jemison v. Bell Telephone Co.*, 186 N. Y. 493.

demand a place in the domain of realty, the necessity arose for a word that should include these as well as land, and that should embrace practically everything that we now call real property. Tenure was affecting all these things; and between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries they all came to be denoted by the word *tenements*.¹ "Unless we are mistaken, that word first came into use for the purpose of comprising meadows, pastures, woods, and wastes, for at an early time the word *terra* will hardly cover more than the arable land. But *tenementum* will also comprise any incorporeal thing which can be holden by one man of another. . . . Thus, for example, rents charge, rents seck, rights of common, become tenements. Statutes of Edward I.'s day gave the word a sharper edge."² As already explained, the word "tenements" practically embraces all the forms of real property — real *things* — known to the American law.

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 236, note 3.

² 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 148.

PART III.

HEREDITAMENTS.

1. CORPOREAL.

2. INCORPOREAL.

CHAPTER VI.

HEREDITAMENTS EXPLAINED AND CLASSIFIED — CORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.

§ 99. **Hereditaments.** — Early local customs, under the name of “principals” or “heirlooms,” which gave certain favorite chattels to the heir,¹ gradually hardened into law and added to the category of real things some articles that are naturally neither lands nor tenements. The heir inherited them, as he did other real property; and so they and it came to be called collectively *hereditaments*. That word is accordingly used everywhere to denote every kind of real property. But in this country it is practically no wider in scope than tenements. And, as was explained above, it is possible to create a tenement which is not a hereditament.²

Dividing hereditaments into their two classes — corporeal and incorporeal — as to the first of these, it is only necessary to repeat that all real property that is tangible or in any way cognizable by the physical senses is said to be corporeal, and that all corporeal hereditaments are lands. All other hereditaments are incorporeal; i. e., mere *rights*, which arise out of things corporeal or are connected with or annexed to or exercisable within corporeal property. Comprising as they do some of the most valuable property interests of the present day, and ramifying into important kinds and species, the incorporeal hereditaments call for separate and careful con-

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 363.

² § 62, *supra*.

sideration. As was heretofore stated, their four kinds, which are important in the American law of real property, are (1) Rents, (2) Franchises, (3) Easements and servitudes, and (4) *Profit à prendre*.¹

¹ For the six other forms, which exist in England, see § 62, *supra*.

“ We can not leave behind us the law of incorporeal things, the most medieval part of medieval law, without a word of

admiration for the daring fancy that created it, a fancy that was not afraid of the grotesque.” 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 149.

2. INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.

CHAPTER VII.

(1) RENTS.

§ 100. Rent — Definition.

§ 101. Kinds of rent.

a. *Rent-service.*

§ 102. Rent-service — Incident of reversion.

§ 103. Fealty — Estoppel to deny title.

§ 104. Distress — Remedies for non-payment, etc.

§ 105. To whom rent-service reserved — To whom proceeds payable.

§ 106. Assignment, or transfer.

§ 107. Discharge — Suspension — Apportionment.

§ 108. Discharge of rent-service.

§ 109. Suspension of rent-service.

§ 110. Apportionment of rent-service.

§ 111. Effects of destruction of or injury to buildings.

b, c. *Rent-charge, Rent-seck.*

§ 112. Definitions and distinctions.

§ 113. General characteristics of rent-charge and rent-seck.

§ 114. Remedies for enforcing and recovering proceeds.

§ 115. Reservation. Assignment, or transfer.

§ 116. Discharge, suspension, and apportionment.

§ 117. Discharge of such rents.

§ 118. Suspension of such rents.

§ 119. Apportionment of such rents.

§ 100. **Rent — Definition.** — The early common-law rent (*reditus*) was a mere right to services rendered by a tenant to his lord or landlord. This has been styled the old “tenuarial” rent.¹ But other cognate rights have been so persistently designated by the same word that the rent of to-day must be defined in broader terms. It is a *right to a certain profit issuing periodically* out of lands or tenements.² And the elements of this definition require careful attention.

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 129.

² The substance of this definition is from 2 Minor's Inst. 32. It is there added that the right must issue out of lands or tenements *corporeal*. This re-

quirement is undoubtedly correct, as viewed from common-law theory; and it may well be added that Dr. Minor's exposition of the law of rent is probably the clearest and most scientific one in existence. But, since the practice is

In the first place, then, rent is a mere *right*. It is not the money, goods, or services, which the tenant renders to his landlord, nor is it the mere privilege of suing for any of these things when due; but it is a right against the realty to receive from it some compensation or return. Hence it is incorporeal.¹ The money, or other thing of value, which the rent is the right to receive, is the proceeds, fruits, or profits of the rent. It will prevent much confusion of thought and conduce to clear and accurate results to bear this distinction constantly in mind.² Rent, as thus understood, is ordinarily real property or a chattel real; while its fruits or proceeds, when received, and the right to sue for them when due and unpaid are personalty.

Again, rent is a right to a *certain profit*. This profit, or the fruits or proceeds of the rent, may consist of money, goods, services, or any other things of value.³ It was at first commonly paid in services, rendered by the vassal to his lord or the tenant to his landlord, which fact gave the name to the most important kind of rent—the rent-service.⁴ The things thus rendered must be a gain or *profit* to the owner of the rent, and not anything which he had before the rent was created. Therefore, a return of part of the soil to the grantor of land or of trees or herbage growing upon it at the time of the grant could not be properly treated as the proceeds of rent; but a reservation of crops yet to be grown or of cattle thereafter to be raised on the premises may be so treated.⁵

now so common of leasing out incorporeal rights, such for example as railroad franchises, and having the right to the compensation from the lessee constantly treated by the courts as *rent*, it is thought best to omit from our definition all requirement that the property out of which it issues shall be corporeal. See *Eastman v. Anderson*, 119 Mass. 526.

It is said by some authorities that rent may issue also out of "the furniture," which is leased together with the real property in which it is located. *Mickle v. Miles*, 31 Pa. St. 20.

¹ *Van Rensselaer v. Read*, 26 N. Y. 558, 564; *Pollock v. Farmers' L. & T. Co.*, 157 U. S. 429, 580, 158 U. S. 601; 2 Min. Inst. 32.

² Writers, and even courts, fre-

quently use the word "rent" to mean or include these returns or proceeds. See 2 Blackst. Com. p. *41; 3 Kent's Com. p. *460; 2 Leake, 373; Standard Dict. "Rent;" Abb. L. Dict. "Rent;" *Priester v. Hohloch*, 70 N. Y. App. Div. 256.

³ Lit. § 213; *Keneage v. Elliott*, 9 Watts (Pa.), 258; *Cornell v. Lamb*, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 652.

⁴ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 129.

⁵ *Coltress Iron Co. v. Black*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 315, 335; *Reg. v. Westbrook*, 10 Q. B. 178; *Buckley v. Kenyon*, 10 East, 139; *Moulton v. Robinson*, 27 N. H. 550; *Johnston v. Smith*, 3 P. & W. (Pa.) 496; *Co. Lit.* 142a; 2 Min. Inst. 33.

And the profit must be *certain* or ascertained in amount. Hence, the right to labor, or money, generally and without any quantity being fixed or any method being designated for determining how much it shall be, is not rent. But, in conformity to the maxim *id certum est quod certum reddi potest*, it is sufficient if some standard or *criterion* be fixed upon by which the amount can be ascertained. Thus, the right to receive for the use of leased premises as much a year as X, an outside party, shall decide upon, or the price of one hundred bushels of wheat at a designated market on a day specified, is a good rent.¹

The profit or proceeds of the rent, moreover, must issue *periodically*. This may be yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, or as measured by any other definite periods; but it must be at regular, equal intervals throughout the time during which the rent is to continue.² Hence, if one purchase land, and, instead of paying a gross amount for the same, agree to pay a fixed sum yearly or monthly, etc., while his estate continues, the right of the grantor to receive such payments is rent; while if the agreement be that the purchase price shall be paid in instalments, *but not at regular intervals during the continuance of the estate*, the right to such instalments is not rent.³

The profit must issue out of *lands or tenements*, i. e., out of tenements of some kind.⁴ It is this requirement that distinguishes rents from annuities. The latter are rights to periodical income or payments, which are fixed and certain; but they are charged upon the *person* who is to make the payments, and not upon real property.⁵ The primitive idea of rent was that it must be attached to *corporeal* hereditaments; for the right to distrain upon the property out of which it issued, i. e., the right to take goods and chattels therefrom

¹ Walsh v. Lonsdale, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 9; Smith v. Fyler, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 648; Commonwealth v. Contnor, 18 Pa. St. 439, 447; Ocean Grove Camp M. Ass'n v. Sanders, 67 N. J. L. 1; Cross v. Tome, 14 Md. 247; McFarlane v. Williams, 107 Ill. 33; Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584; Co. Lit. 96 a; Gilbert, Rents, 9. But it has been said in Massachusetts that, "the word 'rent' may include the compensation to be paid for the occupation of land by a

tenant . . . whether the amount to be paid has been defined by the agreement of the parties, or has been left indefinite." Kites v. Church, 142 Mass. 586, 589.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *41.

³ 2 Min. Inst. 33.

⁴ Co. Lit. 142 a; Watk. Conv. 273; Eastman v. Anderson, 119 Mass. 526.

⁵ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) v. 131; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *40.

for arrears of the payments or render to be made, which was always incident to a proper rent, could not be enjoyed out of things intangible and incorporeal.¹ But even the early common law recognized some species of rights called rents, to which distress did not belong.² And, although perhaps the most numerous authorities still insist that rent must issue out of land, yet practically it is now generally treated as capable of being incident to all kinds of tenements, and even in some cases to the furniture that is leased with them.³

§ 101. **Kinds of Rent.** — The three important classes, into which all rents may be divided, are: a, *rent-service*, b, *rent-charge*, and c, *rent-seck*. Rent-service, in the present practical sense of the term, is a rent reserved upon a grant or lease of real property when a *reversion* exists in the grantor or lessor.⁴ The relation of landlord and tenant, as it is familiarly known to-day, ordinarily gives rise to this kind of rent. Rent-charge is that for which the land is specially *charged* or encumbered with a distress,⁵ usually by the terms

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *41; 2 Min. Inst. 33; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 133; Raby v. Reeves, 112 N. C. 688; Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674.

² This is *rent-seck*. See § 112, *infra*.

³ Eastman v. Anderson, 119 Mass. 526; Mickle v. Miles, 31 Pa. St. 20; Vetter's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 52; Newman v. Anderton, 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 224; 5 Co. 16 b; Gilbert, Rents, 187. In those states like New York, in which all distress for rent has been abolished by statute, this use of the word "rent" is wholly logical, as well as customary and convenient. See N. Y. L. 1846, ch. 271; Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 2031. It was also argued, against the possibility of rent issuing out of incorporeal hereditaments, that, since they were originally allowed for the public good, they were not fit subjects for private profit. Upon this matter, Dr. Minor says: "Hence, if one seised in fee simple, of a way, or common, should lease it for years, reserving a periodical compensation therefor, it is *not a rent*, because it issues out of an *incorporeal*, and not a *corporeal* tenement. (Gilb. Rents, 20, etc.; 1 Th. Co. Lit. 441-442.) The reasons assigned for this doctrine are that the person en-

titled *cannot distress* for the amount in arrear where the tenement is incorporeal; nor can he have a writ of *assize*, inasmuch as the recognitors of *assize* cannot have a view of the subject; and that incorporeal hereditaments were originally created and allowed for the *public good*, and therefore were not deemed fit subjects of *private profit*. Hence, although a reversion and remainder are *incorporeal*, yet upon a grant of either, reserving a return or compensation, such compensation is a *proper rent*, because the estate was created to *make profit of*; and although there can be no distress until by the determination of the particular estate the interest in reversion or remainder comes into possession, yet *then the grantor of the land may distress for all arrears*. (Gilb. Rents, 21 to 23; 1 Th. Co. Lit. 442.)"

⁴ This means that the grantor or lessor lets out a smaller interest in the property than he himself owns, and retains the residue, as when an owner in fee leases the land for a term of years, or for one's life. See "reversions," § 89, *supra*.

⁵ It may conduce to clearness to repeat here that the right of "distress,"

of the grant or reservation, and where the owner of the rent *has no reversion* or other expectant interest in the land itself. Rent-seck is like rent-charge in the fact that its owner has no reversion in the land or tenement out of which its fruits are to issue; but it differs from the latter in that its owner has no right of distress. It is, therefore, *reditus siccus*, or dry or barren rent, because there is no means of enforcing the rendering of its proceeds except by action at law.¹ Each of the three forms of rent thus briefly defined will be explained more in detail hereafter. Particular names have also been given to some special sorts of rent, which are not employed in this country and which it will suffice to name and tersely define. Thus, the certain, established rents of the ancient freeholders and copyholders of manors, which can not be departed from or varied, are rents of *assize*. Such of these as were paid by the freeholders are often called *chief-rents*, *reditus capitales*; and both sorts are indifferently denominated *quit-rents*, because by the rendering of them the tenant is freed from all other services and returns. Where the payments required were to be made in silver, the rent was often called *white-rent*, *blanch-farm*, *reditus albus*; and it was thus distinguished from those in which the fruits or returns consisted of labor, grain, or other sorts of money, which were designated *black-mail*. When the sum to be paid is as much as the use of the tenement is worth during the period for which it is to be so paid, or is nearly equal to that amount, it is frequently denominated *rack-rent*. All of these are simply varieties of the three important classes above outlined.²

a. *Rent-service.*

§ 102. **Rent-service — Incident of Reversion.** — The letting out of lands to be held by tenants, upon their making compensation or return to the owners, is doubtless as old as individual proprietorship in real property. And the use of

or of "distraint," means the privilege of going on the land and taking any goods or chattels there, in payment of any amount due as return or proceeds of the rent. At common law, it belongs, as matter of right, to the owner of a rent-service; but it must be specifi-

cally created by contract, in order to attach to any other species of rent.

¹ This is Littleton's classification, which has been uniformly followed. Lit. § 213; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *42; 3 Kent's Com. p. *460.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *42, *43.

the word, *rent (reditus)* or its equivalent is almost as ancient.¹ In England, however, the law of rent did not assume special importance, nor call for much care from the courts, until after the *villeins*, who had cultivated the *demesnes* of the great lords of manors, began to be emancipated; and then to have parcelled out to them, to cultivate for the support of themselves and their families, the lands to which they had been attached.² Those to whom the corporeal property was thus given out were required to render to or for its owner (the reversioner), at regular intervals, a designated quantity of corn, wheat, or other provisions, or the performance of a stipulated amount of work and services.³ The uniform result of such an arrangement was that the owner or proprietor of the land retained a reversion to himself or to himself and his heirs. He passed to his tenant only a portion of his own interest, whether that portion were for one or more years, or for the life of the tenant or some other person, or in fee of some kind, and retained the residue. And so it has come about that whenever, for a regular, periodical return of value from the tenant, land is parted with by one who retains the ultimate ownership, his right to the receipt of such value is designated rent-service. Therefore, rent-service may be more comprehensively defined as the *right to a certain profit* out of lands or tenements, belonging to the owner of a *reversion*, in return for the property that passes. This most important form of rent is, of course, not tenurial in this country; it flows from contract — between landlord and tenant. But in practice it retains the name of its feudal ancestor, and is governed by substantially the same principles.⁴

¹ See 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 129.

² *Ibid.*; 3 Cruise Dig. p. *271 *et seq.*

³ In process of time, the lands so let out were called *farms* — from the Anglo-Saxon word *feorm*, which means provisions. The right to the compensation was rent; and, since at first it was commonly in form of services, it was distinguished from the other forms of rent by the name *rent-service*. Gilbert, Rents, 9; 3 Cruise Dig. p. *272.

⁴ Smith, Landl. & T. 90; Com. Dig. Rent, ch. 1; § 113 *infra*. Before the 18th year of Edward I. (1290), rent-

service could be reserved to the grantor of an estate in fee simple. For, although in one sense he parted with all his interest in the land and kept no reversion, yet, because of the rights as lord of the fee which the feudal system enabled him to retain, chief among which rights was that of taking back the land if the grantee — the vassal — violated any of his feudal obligations, the grantor could and usually did retain for himself and his heirs a *quasi* reversion, which was called his “possibility of reverter” and which was sufficient to have a rent-service as its incident. But

§ 103. **Fealty to Owner of Rent-service — Estoppel to deny Title of Reversioner.** — “When a tenant holds his land by fealty and certain rent,” says Cruise, “it is a *rent-service*; and this was the only kind of rent originally known to the common law.”¹ The mutual bond or obligation of a vassal to his lord, which the feudal law styled fealty, required among other things that the tenant should defend the title of his lord, promptly notify him of any attacks upon it, and never in any way assert any right or interest in the land adverse to his. None of the feudal effects of this relation can operate now in this country; but, whether it be as many have supposed an outgrowth of the ancient fealty, or a principle which has grown up independently thereof, the estoppel of a tenant to deny the title of his landlord is as strong a rule of law to-day as it was in the time of Lord Coke. And so, as a more modern American enunciation of the principle than that above quoted from Cruise, it may be said that whoever holds real property out of which proceeds a rent-service is in general estopped to deny the title of his landlord, the reversioner.²

§ 104. **Distress — Remedies for enforcing Rent-service and recovering its Fruits or Proceeds.** — “The characteristics of rent-service; 1. It arises by reversion, and is always in retri-

the statute *quia emptores* (18 Edw. I. ch. 1) provided that, in all conveyances in fee simple except those made directly by the king or with his waiver of the statute, the grantee should not hold his land by teure of the grantor, but should hold of the same lord of whom the grantor had held. This did away with all feudal obligations and relations between grantor and grantee in fee simple, when both were subjects (except where the king, waiving the statute, permitted his own tenants to make such a relation between themselves and their grantees), and thus rendered it impossible to reserve a rent-service upon such a transfer. The ordinary grantor in fee simple has now no reversionary interest of any kind, to which a rent-service can attach as incident. Lit. §§ 122, 216-218, 225-228; Deu d. Farley v. Craig, 15 N. J. L. 191; Bradbury v. Wright, 2 Dong. 624; Van Rensselaer v. Hayes, 19 N. Y. 68; Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick, 22 N. Y. 32; De Lancey v. Piepgras, 138 N. Y. 26, 38. The

statute of *quia emptores* is recognized as law in all of the United States, except Pennsylvania and possibly one or two other states. And, therefore, outside of such exceptional states, the uniform rule both here and in England, is that rent-service can not be reserved on a grant of land in fee simple. Ibid.; Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 337; Gray on Perpetuities, §§ 20-51. Stat. *quia emptores*, § 291, *infra*, and note on Manor Lands of New York at the end of Ch. XVII, *infra*.

¹ Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. i. §§ 2-8.

² Delaney v. Fox, 2 C. B. n. s. 768; Rowan v. Lytle, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 616, 621; Whiting v. Edmonds, 94 N. Y. 309; Longfellow v. Longfellow, 54 Me. 240, 61 Me. 590; Gray v. Johnson, 14 N. H. 414. This principle, which simply needs to be stated here to complete our view of rent-service, is discussed more fully in connection with estates for years. For its origin and history, see 6 Amer. L. Rev. 1.

bution for the land out of which it issues; 2. It supposes a tenure" (holding) "of the grantor and a reversion to him; 3. The arrears are recoverable *by distress as of common right.*"¹ The distinguishing feature of this last-mentioned right, as connected with rent-service, — the right to take goods and chattels of the tenant from the land to an amount sufficient to pay the sum due as fruits or profits (arrears) of the rent, — is that it was given to the lord or landlord by the common law as a matter of *common right*, and needed not to be reserved or mentioned in the contract of letting the land.² It was because of the existence of this right to distrain, then inseparably connected with rent-service, which was *the* rent of the early common law, that the early writers laid it down that rent must issue out of land or tenements corporeal; for such property is, of course, the only kind upon which distress can be made.³ In a number of the United States, such as New York, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, the drastic remedy of distress has been abolished by statute.⁴ (a) It is not generally favored in this country, even where not abrogated.⁵ In England, it has been extended to all kinds of rent; and it is treated with similar favor in a few of the American states.⁶

The ordinary modern remedy for obtaining the proceeds or fruits of rent-service when due is an action of debt,⁷ or

(a) The Revised Statutes of New York (1830) gave preference to a landlord's claim for arrears of rent, over judgment creditors of the tenant. 1 R. S. 476. By the laws of 1846, ch. 274, which was one of the results of the "Tenants' War," this preference was done away with and all distress for rent of every kind was abolished. See 4 Wilson's Hist. Amer. People, p. 131.

¹ 2 Min. Inst. 36.

² 3 Cruise Dig. p. *272; Bac. Abr. Rents (A) 2; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *42; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 576; Cornell v. Lamb, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 652. Originally, this right merely enabled the reversioner to seize and retain the goods and chattels. But by statute it has been made to include the right to sell them and apply the proceeds to the payment of the amount due. Stat. 2 Wm. & M. ch. 5; 3 Blackst. Com. pp. *13, *14; 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 557; 1 McAdam, Landl. & T. p. 200.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *41; Commonwealth v. Contner, 18 Pa. St. 439, 447.

⁴ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 2031.

⁵ See Crocker v. Mann, 3 Mo. 472; Harrison v. Ricks, 71 N. C. 7; Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. i. § 65, n. 1.

⁶ 4 Geo. II, ch. 28, § 5; Addison v. Shepherd (1908), 2 K. B. 118; Olden v. Mather, 67 Atl. Rep. 435 (N. J. Ch.); Manchester H. B. L. Ass'n v. Porter, 106 Va. 528; Mitchell v. Franklin, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 477, 480; 2 Min. Inst. 37.

⁷ Co. Lit. 47 b; Gilbert, Rents, 93, 98; Walker's Case, 3 Co. 22 a; McKeon v. Whitney, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 452; Howland v. Coffin, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 52, 12 Pick. 125; Ryerson v. Quackenbush, 26 N. J. L. 236; 1 McAdam, Landl. & T. p. 349.

an action on the covenant or special promise contained in the lease.¹ A similar remedy, given by statutes, though not technically based on rent, is the action in *assumpsit* for use and occupation, in cases where the relation of landlord and tenant exists and a return for the use of the land is implied but no definite amount is agreed upon.² It seems to be generally recognized, also, that a proceeding by bill or petition in equity may be had, for enforcing rights arising as or from rent or from the use of realty, when for any reason there is no adequate redress at law.³

In the liberal methods of procedure permitted by our modern codes, when the reversioner brings an action for the arrears or fruits of the rent, the tenant sometimes defends by denying the existence of *any rent*; and the court, if of competent jurisdiction, proceeds to try and determine the issue thus raised, which involves both the question of rent and that of the right to its proceeds.⁴ The rent-service *per se* is thus established in an action purely personal in nature;⁵ but this should be carefully noted as an outcome of liberal judicial procedure and not allowed to engender any confusion as to the distinction between rent-service and its proceeds or profits. It is also to be carefully noted, however, that the word "rent" is commonly used, in a loose sense, to denote such proceeds or profits; and that actions are constantly said to be "for the recovery of rent," whether their object be for obtaining such fruits or proceeds alone, or for that purpose and also for the establishment of the *right*.

¹ Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. 237; Ellis v. Rowbotham (1900), 1 Q. B. 740; Cross v. United States, 81 U. S. (14 Wall.) 479; Kiersted v. O. & A. R. Co., 69 N. Y. 343; Greenleaf v. Allen, 127 Mass. 248; U. P. R. Co. v. C. R. I. & P. R. Co., 164 Ill. 88; Brown v. Cairns, 63 Kan. 693.

² Stat. 2 Geo. IV. ch. 19, § 14; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 220; Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. i. § 77; Gibson v. Kirk, 1 Q. B. 850, 856; Osgood v. Dewey, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 240; Collyer v. Collyer, 113 N. Y. 442, 448; Codman v. Jenkins, 14 Mass. 93; Kline v. Jacobs, 68 Pa. St. 57. This form of action will not lie where the technical relation of landlord and tenant does not exist. Preston v. Hawley, 139 N. Y. 296; Lloyd v. Hough, 42 U. S. (1 How.) 153;

Nat. Oil Ref. Co. v. Bnsh, 88 Pa. St. 335; Goddard v. Hall, 55 Me. 579; Weaver v. Jones, 24 Ala. 420.

³ Cockles v. Foley, 1 Vern. 359; Hamero v. Hamero (1894), 2 Ch. 564; Pa. R. Co. v. St. L. A. & T. H. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290; Borchering v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq. 150; 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 656 *et seq.* These various remedies will be more fully discussed in dealing with the law of landlord and tenant.

⁴ Mayor v. Sonneborn, 113 N. Y. 423; Bath Gas L. Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24; Chaplin, Landl. & T. p. 169 *et seq.*

⁵ "The appropriate remedy for the recovery of a rent, before the abolition of real actions, was by Assize of Novel Disseisin." Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 239, note.

In most of the states of this country, summary proceedings for quickly dispossessing tenants, who fail to make the payments when due, are given by statute. They are effective against those who are unquestionably tenants and who can not or do not set up an adverse claim of title.¹ They are not, strictly speaking, a form of remedy for the recovery of arrears of rent, since their only result usually is to put the tenant out of possession; but the practical outcome of the institution of such proceedings is very frequently to bring about a prompt payment or return which else would have been delayed or not made at all. The same results are often obtained, though more slowly, in an action of ejectment or its equivalent prescribed by statute, by which title to the rent, or land, or both, is now ordinarily determined.² The common law, and that of most of the United States at the present time, requires a clause of re-entry in the lease or grant, in favor of the lessor or grantor, in order that he may retake possession, or eject the tenant from the land for non-payment of rent.³ The common law was also very minute and exacting in its requirements as to demand for the payment, as a prerequisite to such procedure; but those stringent rules are now generally much modified or entirely abrogated by statutes.⁴(a)

(a) In New York the stringent common-law requirements as to demand for payment of arrears of rent were abolished by L. 1805, ch. 95 (based on Eng. Stat. 4 Geo. II. ch. 28), which provided that an action of ejectment "should stand instead of a demand of the rent in arrear." This was found (in 1813) in 1 R. L. ch. 63 (p. 440), § 23, and (in 1830) in 2 R. S. 505, § 30, and is now § 1504, Code Civ. Pro. Again, a very usual clause in common-law leases was that which reserved to the lessor a right of re-entry in default of goods whereon to distrain. By the same act that abolished distress for rent, L. 1846, ch. 247, § 1, it was provided that, where such a clause exists, ejectment may be had for non-payment after fifteen days' notice of intention to begin the action; that statute is now § 1505, Code Civ. Pro.

The result of these two sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, — §§ 1504,

¹ See N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2231-2265; 2 McAdam, Landl. & T. ch. 34; Chaplin, Landl. & T. p. 539 *et seq.*

² Willison *v.* Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 43, 48; Jackson *v.* Collins, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 5; Bradt *v.* Church, 110 N. Y. 537; Sand *v.* Church, 152 N. Y. 174; Hall *v.* Dewey, 10 Vt. 593; Fusselman *v.* Worthington, 14 Ill. 135. "To maintain ejectment for non-payment of rent, the demise must contain a proviso or condition which will afford

a right of re-entry." Chaplin, Landl. & T. § 583.

³ *Ibid.*; Jackson *v.* McClellan, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 295; Delancey *v.* Ganong, 9 N. Y. 9; Jones *v.* Reilly, 174 N. Y. 97, 103, 104.

⁴ 2 Geo. II. ch. 28; Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 2020-2040. These common-law requirements will be explained in discussing the law of landlord and tenant.

§ 105. **To whom Rent-service may be reserved — To whom its Proceeds are payable.** — Since rent-service is in return for the land that passes, it must be reserved to the grantor or lessor, or to him and his heirs, and not to a stranger.¹ After being thus reserved, it may be sold or assigned by contract, separate from the reversion, as will be more fully explained hereafter.² When such a rent is reserved generally, without specifying to whom, it belongs to the lessor or grantor; and if he fail to dispose of it and it continue after his death, it passes at his death to the person who could then have taken possession of the land as its owner if the lease or grant had not been made.³

Since proceeds or arrears of rent are personal property, while the rent itself is real in nature, if an owner of rent-

1505, — thus arising from different sources and causes, may be summarized as follows. When a right of re-entry for non-payment is reserved *in any form* in the lease or grant of the land, and is not made dependent on any default of goods whereon to distrain, ejectment may be had *without any demand* when six months' rent or more is in arrear, but not before (§ 1504). When the lease or grant contains a clause of re-entry *dependent on default of goods whereon to distrain*, ejectment may be had as soon as any rent is in arrear "provided a written notice of intention to re-enter was given fifteen days before the commencement of the action," — (§ 1505). *Martin v. Rector*, 118 N. Y. 476; *Bulger v. Coyne*, 20 N. Y. App. Div. 225, 227; *Chaplin, Landl. & T.* p. 513 *et seq.* Of course the remedy under § 1505 is always available, if the instrument contain the clause relative to default of goods whereon to distrain; for, since no right of distress exists, there always is such default. *Hosford v. Ballard*, 39 N. Y. 147, 151. These principles and statutes apply in New York to all kinds of rent. But they have been used and discussed most in connection with the perpetual rents reserved on conveyances of the land in fee, because in the more ordinary relation of landlord and tenant summary proceedings afford a much quicker remedy. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2231-2265. Such proceedings do not apply to cases of perpetual rents. See notes on New York Manor Lands at the end of Ch. XVII., *infra*.

¹ Lit. § 346; Gilbert, Rents, 61; *Ege v. Ege*, 5 Watts (Pa.), 134, 138; *Ryerson v. Quackenbush*, 26 N. J. L. 236.

² § 106, *infra*.

³ 3 Cruise Dig. p. * 278. If, in the reservation, the words "during the term," or their equivalent be used, the rent passes, at the death of the owner of the land, to those who succeed to the reversion; but if no such words be used, or the reservation be to the lessor or grantor and his executors, administra-

tors, or assigns, or to any combination of these, the common-law rule is that the rent shall cease at the time of the death of the grantor or lessor. Gilbert, Rents, 65 *et seq.*; Bac. Abr. Rent (H); 2 Th. Co. Lit. 413, u. (K). When rent is reserved otherwise than by deed to joint tenants, it accrues to all, thus following the reversion; but when the lease is by deed of indenture, the parties are estopped from claiming the rent otherwise than according to the deed. Gilbert, Rents, 63.

service die after an instalment of the proceeds has become due, it is payable to his personal representatives; but an instalment which is not due at that time is payable, when it does mature, to him who has the reversion at the time of such maturity. Hence, if the lessor owned the land in fee simple, a payment falling due after his death would belong to his heir or devisee, together with the reversion; while if the lessor himself had only an estate for years and sub-let the same reserving a rent-service, such payment so falling due must be made to his personal representatives, since they acquire the reversion in the term of years.¹

§ 106. **Assignment or Transfer of Rent-service.** — Since rent-service is *incident to* the reversion, it passes upon a sale of the latter, unless a contrary intention is expressed.² But the reverse of this is not true; i. e., a sale of the rent alone — the incident — does not by implication carry with it the reversion — the principal.³ Hence, if a landlord sell and convey the demised premises subject to the lease, the purchaser acquires thereby, in the absence of special agreement to the contrary, the right to the periodical payments to be made by the tenant. But when the landlord simply sells the right to those periodical payments, i. e. the rent, he retains the ownership of the reversion. Thus, he may sell the rent and retain the reversion, or sell the reversion and retain the rent; but in order to do the latter he must clearly express his intention to that effect. And, when he sells both rent and reversion, he may either do so in explicit terms, or expressly sell the latter and let the law pass the former with it as incident.⁴ It must be added that, at common law, whenever by any such transactions the rent and the reversion come into different hands, the former ceases to be rent-service (because it ceases to be incident to the reversion) and becomes rent-seck.⁵

¹ Gilbert, Rents, 66, 67; Bac. Abr. Rent (H).

² Walker's Case, 3 Co. 22; Bntt v. Ellett, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 544, 547; Van Rensselaer v. Gallup, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 454; Stover v. Chasse, 6 N. Y. Misc. 394; Farley v. Craig, 11 N. J. L. 262; Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 Ill. 372; Steed v. Hinson, 76 Ala. 298.

³ Ards v. Watkins, Cro. Eliz. 637; Childs v. Clark, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 52; Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 308; Pfaff v. Golden, 126 Mass. 402.

⁴ Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 308; Moffatt v. Smith, 4 N. Y. 126; Demarest v. Willard, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 206; Beal v. Boston Spring Car Co., 125 Mass. 157; Damren v. Amer. L. & P. Co., 91 Me. 334; Crosby v. Loop, 13 Ill. 625; Co. Lit. 143 a.

⁵ Lit. § 225; Co. Lit. 151; 2 Min. Inst. 40; Farley v. Craig, 15 N. J. L. 192; Demarest v. Willard, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 206, 209.

§ 107. **Discharge, Suspension, and Apportionment of Rent-service.** — Rent-service has always been favored by the common law, both because it was a natural and ordinary incident of tenure between lord and vassal or landlord and tenant and because, by bringing new tenants upon the land, it afforded additional strength and protection to the kingdom. Hence, if any change occur in the number or relation of the parties interested in the land, the rent may be readily extinguished or suspended, in whole or in part, or apportioned among those who are fairly entitled to participate in its fruits. The causes for its discharge or suspension will be first examined and then its apportionment, both as to persons and as to time, will be considered.

§ 108. **Discharge of Rent-service.** —² When the tenant has been evicted from all the leased property, that is when he has been put out of possession either by the act of the landlord or by some one claiming under the landlord or by the owner of a paramount title, the rent is discharged.¹ When he has been evicted from a portion only of the property let to him and has retained possession of the residue, the rent is often discharged only *pro tanto*, while it continues for the part, if any, which he retains. In this case, however, if the partial eviction be due to the wrong or negligence of the landlord or of those claiming through him, the tenant may stand upon the principle of entirety of contract and insist on a suspension of the entire rent so long as he is thus deprived of any portion of the premises.² In all cases of eviction, the tenant is liable to the payment of the arrears of rent which became due before the eviction, for the obligation continues as long as the consideration.³

¹ *Ascoug's Case*, 9 Co. Rep. 134, 135; *Smith v. Raleigh*, 3 Camp. 513; *Lawrence v. French*, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 443; *Dyett v. Pendleton*, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 727; *Presby v. Benjamin*, 169 N. Y. 377; *Sully v. Schmitt*, 147 N. Y. 248; *Brown v. Holyoke W. P. Co.*, 152 Mass. 463; *Hoeveler v. Flemming*, 91 Pa. St. 322; *Cheairs v. Coats*, 77 Miss. 846; *Warren v. Wagner*, 75 Ala. 188; *Gilbert*, Rents, 145. Sometimes this is spoken of as a suspension of the rent, because, if the tenant regains his possession during the term, the rent revives from that time. But, being once wholly

evicted, he need not retake possession, though it become possible for him to do so. He may, and generally does, let the eviction extinguish the rent. *Ibid.*

² *Smith v. Malings*, Cro. Jac. 160; *Blair v. Claxton*, 18 N. Y. 529; *Christopher v. Austin*, 11 N. Y. 216; *Edgerton v. Page*, 20 N. Y. 281; *Fillebrown v. Hoar*, 124 Mass. 580; *Dolton v. Sickel*, 49 Atl. Rep. 679 (N. J. Snp.); *Warren v. Wagner*, 75 Ala. 188; 2 *Taylor*, Landl. & T. 649.

³ *Ibid.*; *Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. iii. § 2*; *O'Brien v. Smith*, 13 N. Y. Supp. 408; *Johnson v. Barg*,

Again, the landlord may release the rent-service to the tenant, or purchase the term, and thus do away with the rent; or, by purchasing the property out of which the rent issues, the tenant may unite the two ownerships and thus cause the rent to cease. Whenever the rent and the property out of which it proceeds thus come into the same hands, at the same time and in the same right, the rent is said to be *extinguished*; ¹ and sometimes this result is loosely but inaccurately styled a merger of the rent. ²

§ 109. **Suspension of Rent-service.** — Whenever the coming together of the rent and the property which produces it is not absolute, but either conditional or for a portion of the estate only, the rent may be merely suspended for a time and not discharged or extinguished. Thus, if the landlord purchase the tenant's interest on condition and the condition be broken so that the term returns to the tenant, or if having leased the land for ten years the landlord buy it back for five years, while he so holds it the rent is suspended but revives again upon the return of the land to the tenant. ³

§ 110. **Apportionment of Rent-service.** — The common law has always favored the apportionment of rent-service among the different *persons* who were *at the same time* fairly entitled to its proceeds. But it never permitted such division of any instalment of its proceeds between two *successive* owners of the land from which the rent issued. ⁴ Accordingly, when the owner of the reversion of a piece of land, from which rent is issuing as against the tenant, sells it in distinct parcels to two or more persons, each purchaser thereby becomes

8 N. Y. Misc. 307. The effects on rent-service, produced by the different forms of eviction, will be more fully discussed in dealing with the law of landlord and tenant.

¹ Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. iii. §§ 5, 6; 3 Preston, Conv. 201; Stephens v. Bridges, 6 Madd. 66; Carroll v. Ballance, 26 Ill. 9. But not, if only part of one interest pass to the other owner. Martin v. Tobin, 123 Mass. 85.

² Technically and accurately speaking, merger applies only to the absorption of one *estate* by another in the *same* property; as when the owner of an estate in fee simple in an acre of land buys up a life estate in the same

acre and thus causes the latter to be *merged* or swallowed up by the former. Extinguishment is the absorption of one *kind* of property by another, and is illustrated by the destruction of rent in this way when the owner of the rent purchase the land or by the extinguishment of a mortgage when the mortgagee buys up the mortgaged premises. Bouvier's Law Dict., "Extinguishment."

³ Gilbert, Rents, 150; Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. iii. § 2, n.; 2 Leake, 407; Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 337; Martin v. Tobin, 123 Mass. 85.

⁴ Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. iii. §§ 28-43.

entitled to a share of the rent proportionate to the piece of land that he buys;¹ and, if the owner of leased property devise it to several persons, or upon his death intestate it descend to two or more individuals as his heirs, each becomes in like manner the owner of his *pro rata* share of the rent.² So, when the tenant purchases a part of the land from his landlord, or otherwise acquires it, or the landlord buys back for his own use a part of the land which he has leased, or such part descends upon or is devised or otherwise passed to him, the rent is in like manner divided and continues to issue ratably only out of that portion of the property which still remains leased.³ A single exception to this principle arises when the services or proceeds of the rent are indivisible, as when, for example, for the use of the land the tenant is to deliver a horse to his landlord on the first day of each and every month. In that case, if the landlord buy back a portion of the leased property or distribute his reversion, or let it be distributed by operation of law, among several persons, the rent ceases; while if the tenant sell and assign separate portions of the land to strangers, the rent is multiplied and the landlord may obtain as many horses each month as he thus has tenants.⁴ These anomalous results may, of course, be prevented by express agreements or arrangements among the parties.

On the other hand, rent-service is never apportioned *as to time*, by the common law; i. e., it is never divided between successive owners of the reversion so that each can claim a share of an entire payment to be made by the tenant.⁵ Therefore, when one who owns a rent-service for his life dies during the period for which the rent is running, as during the quarter, month, or week, and before the instalment of income for that period becomes due and payable, the proceeds are

¹ *Moodle v. Garnance*, 3 Bulst. 153; *West v. Lassels*, Cro. Eliz. 851; *Bliss v. Collins*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 876; *Rivis v. Watson*, 5 M. & W. 255; *Ehrman v. Mayer*, 57 Md. 612; *Greenl. Cruise Digest*, xxviii. ch. iii. §§ 28-31. See *Church v. Seeley*, 110 N. Y. 457.

² *Ards v. Watkins*, Cro. Eliz. 637, 651; *Campbell's Case*, 1 Roll. Abr. 237; *Moody v. Garnon*, 3 Bulst. 153; *Linton v. Hart*, 25 Pa. St. 193.

³ *Lit.* § 222; *Gilbert, Rents*, 165;

Bliss v. Collins, 8 Barn. & Ald. 876; *Worthington v. Cooke*, 56 Md. 51.

⁴ *Lit.* § 222; 1 *Inst.* 149 a, b; *Gilbert, Rents*, 165-167; *Talbot's Case*, 8 Co. Rep. 102 b, 104.

⁵ *Jenner v. Morgan*, 1 P. Wms. 392; *Clun's Case*, 10 Co. Rep. 127 a. Unlike interest, such rent is not regarded as accruing from day to day, but it all accrues and becomes due on the day fixed for payment.

never apportioned by the common law for that period; and neither his heirs nor his personal representatives are entitled to any part thereof.¹ If under such circumstances the rent cease at his death — as when the owner of land for life leases it and dies during the time designated for the lease to run, thus terminating both the lease and the rent — the common law does not permit any one to recover the proceeds for any portion of the period then unexpired and the tenant is accordingly released to that extent;² while, if the rent continue notwithstanding the life-tenant's death — as when the lease was granted by the owner in fee who subsequently conveyed the reversion to such life-tenant for the latter's life — the instalments of proceeds for the period which was running and unexpired when such life-tenant died, is all given by the common law to the succeeding owner of the rent.³ This defect in the common law has been removed by statutes in England,⁴ and generally in the United States;⁵ so that now rent-service is apportionable, both as to persons and as to time; and, on the death of a life-owner of a reversion, his personal representatives are thus made entitled to such proportion of the payment for the period in which he died as the time during which he lived in that period bears to that entire period. (a)

(a) In New York, the statute 2 Geo. II. ch. 19, § 15 was practically copied and enacted in 1788 (2 Jones & Var. 241, § 27), and passed into the Revised Laws of 1813 (1 R. L. 143) and into the Revised Statutes of 1830 (1 R. S. 747, § 22). That act, as it is finally worded in the Revision of 1909 (L. 1909, ch. 52, § 222), provides that: "Where a tenant for life, who shall have demised the real property, dies before the first rent day, or between two rent days, his executor or administrator may recover the proportion of rent which accrued to him before his death." It having been held in *Marshall v. Moseley*, 21 N. Y. 280, that this act, like that of 2 Geo. II. ch. 19, § 15 from which it came, did not correct the difficulty in cases where the leases had been made by persons other than the life-owners, the statute, ch. 542, L. 1875, which is now in substance Code Civ.

¹ Last preceding note; *Marshall v. Moseley*, 21 N. Y. 280; *Watson v. Penn*, 108 Ind. 21, 23; *Sohier v. Eldredge*, 103 Mass. 345.

² *Jenner v. Morgan*, 1 P. Wms. 392; *Ex parte Cook*, 2 P. Wms. 501; *Wood v. Partridge*, 11 Mass. 488, 493; *Marshall v. Moseley*, 21 N. Y. 280, 281.

³ *Ibid.*; *Ex parte Smyth*, 1 Swanst. 337; *Greenl Cruise Dig.* tit. xxviii. ch. iii. § 44; *Woodfall, Landl. & T.* 248.

⁴ Being recoverable only in a single

sum, and not until the prescribed day of payment, the common law gives it " (the income) " to him who is the reversioner at the time, and no case can be found where a court of equity has adopted a different rule." *Marshall v. Moseley*, 21 N. Y. 280, 282.

⁵ 2 Geo. II. ch. 19, § 15; 4 Wm. IV. ch. 22; 33 & 34 Vict. ch. 35.

⁶ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 2027, 2028.

§ 111. **Effects of Destruction of Buildings, or Injury to them.** — A destruction of the leased premises or an injury to them, by any cause not traceable to wrong or neglect on the part of the landlord, does not, at common law, have any effect on rent-service.¹ This also has been remedied in many states, by statutes which enable the tenant to terminate the rent and lease by removing from the premises after the building or buildings have been destroyed without any fault on his part.² (a)

b, c. Rent-charge, Rent-seck.

§ 112. **Rent-charge — Rent-seck — Definitions and Distinctions.** — It has always been found convenient, as in the rais-

Pro. § 2720, swept away all the objectionable features of the common law and made rents wholly apportionable as to time. See also L. 1909, ch. 52, §§ 221, 223.

(a) In New York the statute, which was first enacted as L. 1860, ch. 345, and is now L. 1909, ch. 52, § 227, provides that: "Where any building, which is leased or occupied, is destroyed or so injured by the elements, or any other cause as to be untenable, and unfit for occupancy, and no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the lessee or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his fault or neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of the land so leased or occupied; and he is not liable to pay to the lessor or owner rent for the time subsequent to the surrender." The tenancy ceases with such destruction of the premises, unless the tenant elect to remain and retain possession. Such election may be shown by a continued retention of any part of the premises. *Decker v. Morton*, 31 App. Div. 469. But merely retaining possession for a short time, in order to remove debris and the carcasses of burned animals, as required by the board of health, will not show an election to remain as tenant. *Fleischman v. Topfritz*, 134 N. Y. 349; *N. Y. R. E. & B. I. Co. v. Motley*, 143 N. Y. 156. See *Craig v. Butler*, 83 Hun, 286. The landlord can recover all rent *due* at the time of such destruction. *Craig v. Butler*, 156 N. Y. 672, affirming 83 Hun, 286; *Werner v. Padula*, 49 App. Div. 135. The statute means physical destruction, and does not include such unfitness for occupancy as is caused by small-pox in the house. *Majestic Hotel v. Eyre*, 53 App. Div. 273. See also *May v. Gillis*, 53 N. Y. App. Div. 393. The tenant may waive this statute, by express terms in the lease; but unless there is a clear waiver the statute will operate. *May v. Gillis*, 169 N. Y. 330. See *Werner v. Padula*, 49 N. Y. App. Div. 135, 138, *aff'd* 167 N. Y. 611.

¹ *Paradine v. Jane*, Aley, 26; *Teller v. Boyle*, 132 Pa. St. 56; *Murray v. Albertson*, 50 N. J. L. 167; *Greenl. Crnise Dig.* tit. xxviii. ch. iii. § 9; 1 *Taylor, Landl. & T.* § 372.

² 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 2062; *Green v. Redding*, 92 Cal. 548; *May v.*

Gillis, 169 N. Y. 330. And thus also the tenant is enabled to recover back any part of payments in advance due and made before the destruction of the building. *Werner v. Padula*, 49 N. Y. App. Div. 135, 138, *aff'd* 167 N. Y. 611.

ing of marriage portions and other settlements, for the owner of real property to grant out of it and charge upon it the right to certain periodical payments, while he himself retained his entire original estate in the land upon which such right was charged. The species of incorporeal property thus created resembled rent-service in many respects, and in process of time came to be also denominated rents. They have been called *improper* rents, by a careful writer, because they are not in return for any land that passes.¹ Such charges of regular payments or returns upon realty may be made, however, either by retaining the land and granting the rent, or by granting the land and creating against it and specifically charging upon it a rent in favor of the grantor.² But such rent, whether made in conveying the land or on retaining it, is created as a distinct and separate entity and *is not incident to any reversion*. Rent which is incident to a reversion must be rent-service, either in its ancient feudal form, or its modern contract form; and when rent is owned independent of any reversionary interest — held as a distinct thing, not connected with any other right or ownership in the land out of which it issues — it is not rent-service.³

When rent is thus specifically charged upon land and not made incident to a reversion, there is never any distress annexed to it by the law *as of common right*.⁴ And, therefore, if the parties desire to have the right to distrain as incident to such rent, they must specifically create and reserve that

¹ "The important discrimination to be here made is between rents proper — that is, rents reserved — on the one side, and rents improper — that is, rents granted — on the other. Rents proper, or rents reserved, are rents reserved upon a grant of lands. . . . A rent improper, or rent granted, is where a certain sum is granted, payable periodically, issuing out of the grantor's lands." . . . "This distinction . . . affords a clue which, in general, suffices to guide the student through whatever intricacies belong to" this subject. 2 Minn. Inst. 35.

² Langford v. Selmes, 3 Kay & J. 220, 229; — v. Cooper, 2 Wils. 375; Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. i. §§ 6, 7.

³ Therefore, in this country, wherever the statute of *quia emptores* is in force the grantor of an estate in fee simple can not now reserve a rent-service to himself, because he can keep no reversionary interest to which it can be incident; but where that statute has not been adopted such a grantor may retain for himself a rent-service out of the land. Van Reusselaer v. Chadwick, 22 N. Y. 32; Delancey v. Piepgras, 138 N. Y. 26, 39; Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 337; Wallace v. Harnstad, 44 Pa. St. 492. See also § 102, *supra*.

⁴ Lit. §§ 218, 225-228; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *42; Cornell v. Lamb, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 652, 659; Farley v. Craig, 15 N. J. L. 192.

right by their own contract or convention.¹ When this is done, the rent so charged on the land is a *rent-charge*; otherwise it is a *rent-seck*.² Since only corporeal hereditaments can be distrained upon, it is apparent also that rent-charge must be made to issue out of land. Hence, a rent-charge may be defined as the right to a certain profit issuing periodically out of lands (or tenements corporeal), which is not incident to any reversion and to secure which, usually by the terms of the grant and never as of common right, the land is specially charged with a right of distress. And a rent-seck may be described as a right to a certain profit issuing periodically out of lands or tenements, which is not incident to any reversion and to secure which there is no right of distress. Since these two classes of rents are so nearly identical — differing only in respect to one kind of remedy, distress — they will be here treated of together. In states like New York, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, where all distress for rent of every kind has been abolished,³ there is no difference whatever between them; or, more accurately speaking, rent-charge no longer exists in such states, and only rent-seck and rent-service remain.

Rent-charge and rent-seck are sometimes spoken of together as *fee-farm* rents. They are substantially such, when made to continue in perpetuity. But the term *fee-farm* rent was used in a somewhat different sense in the early common law (to denote a rent-service reserved on a conveyance in fee); and it is also essentially misleading as intended to embrace all rents-charge and rents-seck, for in these rents interests less than fees may be readily created.⁴

§ 113. **General Characteristics of Rent-charge and Rent-seck.** — These rents are never incident to any reversion. They stand out distinct from the lands or tenements out of which they issue and may be dealt with as separate entities. Hence the statute of *quia emptores* did not in any way interfere with the granting or reserving of them in fee simple. They do not

¹ Last preceding note. By the statute 4 Geo. II. ch. 28, § 5, the right of distress was given in England for all rents. See § 104, *supra*.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p *42; *Cornell v. Lamb*, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 652, 659. Rent-seck means dry rent, *reditus siccus* — not having the sap of distress.

³ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 2031; § 104, *supra*.

⁴ “A non-tenurial rent often comes into being by virtue of a grant. The holder of land imposes such a rent upon his land in favor of some other person. It may be a rent for life or a rent in fee.” 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 130.

presuppose any tenure or fealty between the owner of the land and the owner of the rent; and so they may exist in the same forms and with the same effects where the feudal system has been abolished as in those countries where the theory or practice of that system still remains.¹ (a) They and all their incidents are, in fine, the result of express contract or covenant between the parties; and, except in so far as statutes have interfered with them, they always have been and still are just what the parties to the covenants have made them by the words which they have employed. Rents of this character are not very common in the United States; but the reasons which have caused them to be extensively used in England,²

(a) The operation of the feudal system on the manor lands of New York and the general way in which rent was reserved and retained in connection with the manors are explained hereafter. Note at end of Ch. XVII. There has been much discussion, as to the nature of the rents which that manorial system employed, and as to the remedies and rights connected with those rents. The lands were let out in fee, by the owners (many of whom were called patroons) who held under the king, and perpetual rents were reserved to such owners. These were rents-service; because, although the statute of *quia emptores* has always operated in New York, yet it was impliedly waived by the king in favor of these perpetual leases. *Van Rensselaer v. Hayes*, 19 N. Y. 68, 71; *Delancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26, 39. The abolition of all tenure between one citizen and another (in 1787) made such rents in substance *rents-charge* (at least as to all such rents subsequently created); and when distress was taken away (in 1846) they became *rents-seck*. But it has been clearly held, at first by virtue of the statute, L. 1805, ch. 98, and, after the repeal of that act in so far as it affected such leases in fee (L. 1860, ch. 396), as a principle which had always existed independent of statute, that these perpetual rents run with the land and bind the heirs and assigns of the original covenantors and can be enforced against them in substantially the same manner as other rents. *Van Rensselaer v. Read*, 26 N. Y. 558, 564; *Cent. Bk. v. Heydorn*, 48 N. Y. 260; *Hunter v. Hunter*, 17 Barb. 25; *Delancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26; note at end of Ch. XVII., *infra*. The non-payment of rent under any such lease, for twenty years, is now made presumptive evidence of a release of the rents and reversions to the owner of the fee. See L. 1909, ch. 52, § 72, which also provides for a procedure for the establishment of such a release.

¹ They are "non-tenurial." "The tenurial rent was a *redditus*: to use a term which comes into use somewhat late in the day, it was 'rent-service.' But there were other rents; we may call them 'non-tenurial,' there being no technical term which covers them all. These non-tenurial rents fell into two classes, for each of which in course of time lawyers invent a name. If the

non-tenurial rent can be exacted by distress, it is a *rent-charge*; if not, it is a *rent-seck*; *redditus siccus*, or dry rent." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 129.

² For recent instances of them in England, see *Pertwee v. Townsend* (1896), 2 Q. B. 129; *Charity Comrs v. Green* (1896), 2 Ch. 811; *Blackburne v. Hope-Edwardes* (1901), 1 Ch. 419.

such as marriage settlements, settlements in lieu of dower and the raising of portions for children, *may* operate here; and, with the exception of some restrictions upon the forms of remedy, there is nothing in our law inconsistent with their more general use. (a)

§ 114. Remedies for enforcing Rent-charge and Rent-seek and recovering their Fruits or Proceeds. — Since the common law connects no distress, as of common right, with these rents, if the owner desire to have this remedy he must expressly reserve it by his contract; and, as has been before said, if he do so, the rent is thereby made rent-charge. In England, this remedy as matter of right, has been extended by several statutes to what were formerly rents-seek and also to rents-charge.¹ The same has been done in some of the states of this country; while in others, as was above pointed out, all distress for rent of every kind has been abolished.²

Whether any right of distress exists or not, he to whom the payment of the profits is due may have an action at law to recover the same from the holder of the property out of which they are payable. He may also generally, by virtue of the contract itself, enter upon the premises and either defeat the title of the holder thereof as for breach of condition, or hold the property until its income pays the amount due.³ The latter is the remedy most commonly provided for in the contract.⁴ The form of action, when one is brought, and the

(a) The Constitution of New York (1894), Art. I. § 13, provides that, "No lease or grant of agricultural land, for a longer period than twelve years, in which shall be reserved any rent or services of any kind, shall be valid." See *Mass. Nat. Bk. v. Shinn*, 163 N. Y. 360; *Stephens v. Reynolds*, 6 N. Y. 454; *Parsell v. Stryker*, 41 N. Y. 480; *Clark v. Barnes*, 76 N. Y. 301; *Parish v. Rogers*, 20 N. Y. App. Div. 279. But there is no prohibition against the making of a perpetual rent-seek, issuing out of other kinds of real property. *Hawley v. James*, 16 Wend. 61, 154; *Woodruff v. Oswego Starch Factory*, 177 N. Y. 23, 26; *Hunter v. Hunter*, 17 Barb. 25; *Van Rensselaer v. Platner*, 2 Johns. Cas. 24; *Van Rensselaer v. Dennison*, 35 N. Y. 393; *Cent. Bk. v. Heydorn*, 48 N. Y. 260; *Bradt v. Church*, 110 N. Y. 537.

¹ 32 Hen. VIII. ch. 37; 8 Ann. ch. 14; 4 Geo. II. ch. 28; 11 Geo. II. ch. 19; 57 Geo. III. ch. 52. See *Blackburne v. Hope-Edwardes* (1901), 1 Ch. 419.

² § 104, *supra*.

³ *Jemmott v. Cooley*, 1 Lev. 170; *Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. i.*

§§ 70-72. If he be unable to enter peaceably, he may have ejectionment.

⁴ *Ibid.* In some of the United States, the right of re-entry for non-payment of rent is given by statute, and so exists independent of any agreement by the parties. 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 2054.

extent of the right of entry and its effects depend upon the terms of the instrument by which the rent was created, and may also be much affected by the forms of procedure prescribed by the codes of the states in which the lands are situated. And the methods of procedure are generally made by the codes substantially the same for all kinds of rent.¹

§ 115. **Reservation of Rent-charge and Rent-seek — Assignment of them, and Transfer of the Property out of which they issue.** — The reservation of either of these forms of rent must be to one of the parties to the contract by which it is created, and not to a stranger. The payments of the proceeds are to be either to the person designated in the contract as entitled to them or to his assignee. For such rent may be freely assigned, either in whole or in part, as a distinct and independent form of property; and if the land out of which it issues be sold the purchaser takes it subject to the rent.²

A distinction has been attempted here between a rent reserved and one granted, to the effect that in case of the latter the grantee of the land out of which it was granted should not be charged with the covenant to pay the rent.³ But, in the leading case of *Van Rensselaer v. Hayes*,⁴ Denio, J. insists that the law was never so and quotes with approval the following statement of Sir Edward Sugden: "Covenants ought to be held to run in both directions, with the rent or interest carved out of or charged upon it," (the land) "in the hands of the assignee, so as to enable him to sue upon them, and with the land itself in the hands of the assignee, so as to render him liable to be sued upon them." And Judge Denio continues: "There seems to be no distinction favorable to the defendant between a perpetual rent-charge granted by the owner of the estate and a like rent reserved in fee by indenture, where the grantee covenants for himself and his assigns to pay it." And the law may now safely be said to be that, whether the rent-charge or rent-seek be granted or reserved, the assignee of the rent may recover its proceeds in a proper

¹ See these explained, § 104, *supra*.

² *Scott v. Lunt*, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 596; *Van Rensselaer v. Read*, 26 N. Y. 558; *Van Rensselaer v. Dennison*, 35 N. Y. 393; *Cook v. Brightly*, 46 Pa. St. 439; *Hannen v. Ewalt*, 18 Pa. St. 9; *McMurphy v. Minot*, 4 N. H. 251; *Sugden, Vend. & P.* (13th ed.) p. 483; 1 *Taylor, Landl. & T.* § 261. Some of

the English authorities are the other way. See *Milnes v. Branch*, 5 M. & S. 411; *Brewster v. Kidgill*, 12 Mod. 166; *Randall v. Rigby*, 4 M. & W. 130; *Spencer's Case*, 1 Smith's L. C. p. *68, notes.

³ *Brewster v. Kitchin*, 1 Ld. Raym. 317, 322.

⁴ 19 N. Y. 68, 90, 91.

action, and the grantee of the land becomes bound to pay them.¹

§ 116. **Discharge, Suspension, and Apportionment of Rent-charge and Rent-seck.** — Changes in the relations or interests of the parties concerned are much more apt to cause the discharge or extinguishment of rents-charge and rents-seck, than to result merely in their suspension or apportionment. This is because such rents were “against common right,” and were looked upon with disfavor by the common law.²

§ 117. **Discharge of Rent-charge and Rent-seck.** — It is accordingly settled that, if the owner of either of these rents purchase the whole *or any part* of the land or tenement out of which it issues, the rent is entirely extinguished. It is regarded as an entire thing, issuing out of every part of the land, and so is not apportioned.³ So, if the owner of the rent release *any part* of the land from its burden, the whole rent is extinct.⁴ But these results may be prevented by express or necessarily implied agreements of the parties, entered into at the time of the conveyance or release. Thus, when the owner of the rent purchases a portion of the land, it may be validly stipulated in the deed that the rent shall remain upon the residue; and, when he releases a part of the land from the burden, the rest may be expressly charged in the deed of release.⁵ Such new contracts are usually treated, however, as creating *new rents*, after the discharge of the old, rather than as preserving any of the old or former rents. And the result is that the new burdens thus imposed upon the property are subordinate to all existing encumbrances which have attached to it since the creation of the original rents.⁶

¹ Last three preceding notes; Williams's App., 47 Pa. St. 283, 290; 2 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 1200-1211.

² Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. i. §§ 6, 7, ch. iii, §§ 16-19.

³ *Dennett v. Pass*, 1 Bing. N. C. 388; *Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick*, 22 N. Y. 32, 33; *Horner v. Dellinger*, 18 Fed. Rep. 495; *Ehrman v. Mayer*, 57 Md. 612; 1 Co. Inst. 147 b; *Gilbert, Rents*, 152.

⁴ *Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick*, 22 N. Y. 32, 34; 1 Co. Inst. 148 a; 18 Vin. Abr. 504; 3 Vin. Abr. 10, 11. Notice the radical difference, in these respects, between such rents as these and rent-

service, which is freely apportionable as to persons, or amount. See § 110, *supra*. In England, the statute 22 & 23 Vict. ch. 35, § 10, now makes all of these rents apportionable when the owner of the rent releases a part of the land.

⁵ And the owner of the land may so deal with the other parties as impliedly to show his acquiescence in the apportionment. *Church v. Seeley*, 110 N. Y. 457; *Farley v. Craig*, 15 N. J. L. 192, 262; 1 Co. Inst. 147 b.

⁶ 1 Co. Inst. 147 b; *Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. iii §§ 20, 21*; *Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick*, 22 N. Y. 32, 36.

§ 118. **Suspension of Rent-charge and Rent-seck.** — It follows, from the above discussion, that such rents as these can not be merely suspended, as can rent-service. They must either exist in their entirety or be completely extinguished. If by specific agreement the parties cause a cessation in the lien of the rent for a limited time, they are, in reality, discharging the original burden and causing a new one to arise after an interval; and it is not a suspension of any one continuous rent.¹

§ 119. **Apportionment of Rent-charge and Rent-seck.** — While the *purchase*, by the owner of such a rent, of a portion of the land out of which it issues extinguishes it entirely and so can work no apportionment, such is not the result when a part of the land *descends* to the owner of the rent. In the latter case, he passively becomes owner of some of the land by operation of law, and so the law apportions the rent and retains the *pro rata* burden upon the residue of the land.² So, it has always been held that, by *scire facias* or execution, a portion of the rent may be taken from the owner thereof, without affecting his title to the residue.³ Again, when the grantee of rent-charge or rent-seck releases a part of it to the grantor or his alienee of the land, or sells a portion of it to a stranger (to whom the tenant attorned at common law, though attornment is now generally abolished by statutes), an apportionment takes place and the holder of the land must pay the proceeds of the rent *pro rata* to the respective owners.⁴ Objections were at one time strenuously urged against such apportionment of rent of any kind, on the ground that it might result in exposing the tenant to several suits or distresses for a thing which was originally entire. But the obvious answer has always been recognized as sufficient, that he may avoid such inconveniences by promptly making the returns or payments when they become due.⁵

What is said above, regarding the apportionment of rent-service *as to time*, applies also to rent-charge and rent-seck.

¹ Last preceding note.

² Lit. § 224, and Gilbert, Rents, 155, 156, both cited by Denio, J., in *Van Rensselaer v. Chadwick*, 22 N. Y. 32, 34, 35; *Cruger v. McLaury*, 41 N. Y. 219.

³ *Wotten v. Shirt*, Cro. Eliz. 742;

Gilbert, Rents, 165; *Cook v. Brightly*, 46 Pa. St. 439, 440.

⁴ *Rives v. Watson*, 5 M. & W. 255; *Farley v. Craig*, 15 N. J. L. 192, 262; *Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxviii. ch. iii. § 23.*

⁵ *Wotten v. Shirt*, Cro. Eliz. 742; Gilbert, Rents, 164.

It was not permitted by the common law; but now, in England and most of the United States, rents of all kinds, annuities, dividends, and payments of every description becoming due at fixed periods are made, by statutes, apportionable among the various owners according to the times of their respective ownerships in the periods for which the payments are made.¹

¹ § 110, *supra*.

CHAPTER VIII.

(2) FRANCHISES.

§ 120. Franchise — Definition.

§ 121. Franchises, general and special.

§ 122. Purposes for which franchises exist.

§ 123. How franchises may be acquired.

§ 124. No franchise right obtained by implication.

§ 125. How franchises may be lost or destroyed.

§ 120. **Franchise — Definition.** — A franchise is a special privilege, which is conferred by the government on an individual or corporation and which does not belong to the citizens of the country generally by common right.¹ It is treated by the English law as a branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject;² and in both that country and this it has generally been classed as real property — an incorporeal hereditament.³ On both sides of the Atlantic, however, there are many instances of franchises, which are property but not hereditaments, and which, if partaking of

¹ *Bank of Augusta v. Earle*, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 519, 595; *Ashley v. Ryan*, 153 U. S. 436, 441; *Curtis v. Leavitt*, 15 N. Y. 9, 170; *Fietsam v. Hay*, 122 Ill. 293; *Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co.*, 36 Conn. 255.

² *Reg. v. County Court Judge* (1891), 1 Q. B. 792, 2 Q. B. 263; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *37; *Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxvii. § 1.*

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *37; *Reg. v. Cambrian R. Co.*, 6 Q. B. 427; *Louisville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky*, 188 U. S. 385, 394; *Smith v. New York*, 68 N. Y. 552, 555; *Lumberville D. B. Co. v. Assessors*, 55 N. J. L. 529, 537; *Sellers v. Union L. Co.*, 39 Wis. 525, 527; *Spring Val. W. Works v. Schottler*, 62 Cal. 69, 110. The historical reason for treating franchises as real property is doubtless

in the fact that they were at first uniformly exercisable only within the limits of lands belonging to their owners, and so were readily regarded in very much the same way as the lands. "For the popular mind these things are things. The lawyer's business is not to make them things, but to point out that they are incorporeal. The layman who wishes to convey the advowson of a church will say that he conveys the church; it is for Bracton to explain to him that what he means to transfer is not that structure of wood and stone which belongs to God and the saints, but a thing incorporeal, as incorporeal as his own soul or the *anima mundi*." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 124.

the nature of real property at all, must be more chattels real. Such are special privileges granted to corporations, to continue for a term of years only and then to terminate. Such things could not descend from ancestor to heir, even if they were to become the property of a natural person. Upon his death, they must pass to his executors or administrators, to be applied and distributed as personal property.¹ But, of course, the great mass of franchises, which are granted in perpetuity, are real property and incorporeal hereditaments. It is to be added that this legal use of the word "franchise" must not be confounded with its political use, in which it denotes the right to vote at a public election.

§ 121. **Franchises, general and special.** — With respect to their nature, franchises have been divided into two classes — general and special. A general franchise simply authorizes the carrying on of some kind of business or work, or creates a corporation for such a purpose; while a special franchise adds to the privileges thus conferred some peculiar or particular right.² "The general franchise of a corporation is its right to live and do business by the exercise of the corporate powers granted by the state. The general franchise of a street railroad, for instance, is the special privilege conferred by the state upon a certain number of persons known as the incorporators to become a street railroad corporation and to construct and operate a street railroad upon certain conditions. Such a franchise, however, gives the corporation no right to do anything in the public highway without special authority from the state, or some municipal officer or body acting under its authority. When a right of way over a public street is granted to such a corporation, with leave to construct and operate a street railroad thereon, the privilege is known as a *special* franchise, or the right to do something in

¹ Lippencott v. Allander, 27 Iowa, 460; State v. Ga. Med. Soc., 38 Ga. 608, 626. See Price v. Price, 6 Dana (Ky.), 107; 3 Kent Com. p. *459.

² Ibid. See People *ex rel.* Met. St. R. Co. v. Tax Com'rs, 174 N. Y. 417, 439, which is explained in the next section, § 121, *infra*; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, 106. A franchise conferred upon an individual or a corporation must also be distinguished from a mere power given by law to a

corporate being. Thus, the right to be a corporation is always a franchise. But a right, conferred upon a corporation by its charter, to carry on a business or to do acts which the citizens of the state may do or carry on as of common right, is not a franchise, but merely a corporate power. See State v. Minn. Threshing Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 213, 225; Peter v. Kendal, 6 B. & C. 703; Middlebury Bank v. Edgerton, 30 Vt. 182, 190.

the public highway, which, except for the grant, would be a trespass."¹

§ 122. **Purposes for which Franchises exist.** — Franchises have been held in England for a great variety of purposes, which are not recognized in this country. Such are rights to hold a court, to have waifs, wrecks, estrays, treasure-trove, royal fish, forfeitures and deodands, and many such privileges peculiar to the English system of government.² In the United States, also, the purpose and objects for which they may be granted are not restricted; but those of most importance are the rights to build and maintain ferries, bridges, railroads, and turnpike roads and the right to be a corporation.³ The last-named franchise is, of course, the one most extensively employed; and it is as multifarious in its aspects as the forms which the ingenuity of man is permitted to give to corporations.⁴

¹ *People ex rel. Met. St. R. Co. v. Tax Com'rs*, 174 N. Y. 417, 435. It was held in that case that both kinds of franchises are taxable by the state as *property*. But Vann, J., adds, in speaking of the special franchises, brought under the tax law by statute: "The new property is real estate in name, but not in reality, for it is a mere privilege to do something in public streets and places not permitted to citizens generally," p. 439. See *State v. Minn. Threshing Mfg. Co.*, 40 Minn. 225; *E. L. S. Orphans' Home v. Buffalo Hydraulic Assoc.*, 64 N. Y. 561.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *37. "The realm of medieval law is rich with incorporeal things." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 124.

³ The question as to what is a ferry has led to some interesting discussion. "It is impossible, in a general way," says the New York Court of Appeals, "to specify to what distance over intervening waters ferries may be operated. A ferry could not be established between New York and Boston, or New York and Newport or Philadelphia. The distance would be too great, and the business of transporting passengers and freight between such distant places would be that of common carriers upon public waters. But when the intervening waters are not wide and can be

traversed at regular and brief intervals by boats adapted to a ferry business, there can be no question that ferries may be established and operated." Then the ferry is a continuation of the highway from one side of the stream, arm of the sea, or other body of water, to the other. *Mayor, etc. of N. Y. v. N. J. S. N. Co.*, 106 N. Y. 28, 30. It was held in this case that a company was doing a ferry business, whose boats, running from and returning to New York City, stopped at several places on Staten Island and two places in New Jersey, making a round trip of about twenty-four miles; that it was a ferry between each of those places and New York City, but was not such between the two places on the New Jersey shore, or between two places on the shore of Staten Island, since between such places the boats *did not pass over intervening waters*; but as between such places alone it was simply doing the business of a common carrier. See also *Peter v. Kendal*, 6 B. & C. 703; *Roberts v. Washburne*, 10 Minn. 23, 27; *Conway v. Taylor*, 1 Black (U. S.), 603; *Midland F. Co. v. Wilson*, 28 N. J. Eq. 537; *Collins v. Ewing*, 51 Ala. 101.

⁴ See *Memphis R. Co. v. R. R. Com'rs*, 112 U. S. 609; *Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Miller*, 114 U. S. 176, 185; *Grady v. Moulton*, 61 Minn. 185;

§ 123. **How Franchises may be acquired.** — In a few instances, franchises have been acquired by prescription, and have thus been held by *presumed* grant from the state.¹ But they are generally granted by express legislative act; and these acts are either general in character, authorizing the acquisition of such rights by any corporations that may be organized and conducted in the manner specified, or they are special statutes, each providing for the giving of particular privileges to designated individuals or corporations. It is now the settled policy of most of the United States to organize corporations and confer upon them their various franchises by means of general statutes, rather than by special legislation.² (a) But a franchise, whatever may be its character, must arise from a grant of the sovereign; and it is this fact that distinguishes it from all other kinds of incorporeal property.³

§ 124. **No Franchise Rights obtained by Implication.** — The grant of a franchise, whether made as the result of a general act or by special legislation, constitutes a contract between the state and the individual or corporation. Hence, the provision of the Federal Constitution, which forbids the states to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, prevents it from being abrogated or materially altered by state legislation without the consent of the other party, unless the right so to do has been expressly reserved.⁴ (b) The franchise,

(a) “This is done in New York, as follows: The Legislature shall not pass a private or local bill in any of the following cases: . . . Granting to any corporation, association, or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks. Granting to any private corporation, association, or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever.

“Providing for building bridges, and chartering companies for such purposes, except on the Hudson River below Waterford, and on the East River, or over the waters forming a part of the boundaries of the State.

“The Legislature shall pass general laws providing for the cases enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which in its judgment may be provided for by general laws.” N. Y. Const. (1894), Art. 3, § 18.

(b) “Corporations may be formed under general laws; but shall not be created by special act, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where,

Attorney-General v. C. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425; Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255, 266.

¹ 1 Co. Inst. 114 a; 9 Co. Rep. 27 b; Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxvii. § 15.

² 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 441.

³ § 120, *supra*.

⁴ Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518. Many states reserve the right to alter or abolish franchises created under their general laws. 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 442-

moreover, constitutes a valuable right of property, which can not be directly taken or destroyed, even for public purposes by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, unless just compensation is made.¹ Thus, if a railroad or bridge company be authorized by the legislature to so construct a bridge as to occupy the place of a former ferry, or if one turn-pike privilege be directly appropriated or abolished in order to make way for another, the individual or corporation whose property is thus impaired must be fully reimbursed.²

But this principle does not prevent the state from indirectly and consequentially impairing or wholly destroying the value of a franchise, by granting similar or antagonistic rights to other parties. The settled rule of constitutional law upon this matter is that public grants are to be strictly construed; and nothing passes by implication against the state, or against any of its departments or agencies of government, in derogation of the legislative powers which are requisite to accomplish the end of their creation.³ It was, accordingly, held that the grant by statute of a franchise to the Charles River Bridge Company to construct and maintain a bridge over that river and to receive toll for a limited period for the use of the same contained no implied engagement by the State of Massachusetts, forbidding it to confer upon another corporation — The Warren Bridge Company — the right to construct another bridge over the same river, in the same line of traffic and so near to the first as to divert travel from it and thus to diminish its value.⁴ The only way in which the first corpora-

in the judgment of the legislature, the objects of the corporation can not be attained under general laws. All general laws and special acts passed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to time or repealed." N. Y. Const. (1894), Art. 8, § 1; *Mayor v. Twenty-third Street R. Co.*, 123 N. Y. 311; *People v. O'Brien*, 111 N. Y. 1; *People ex rel. W. G. Co. v. Deehan*, 153 N. Y. 528.

447. Such reserved rights become in substance part of the contract. *Railroad Co. v. Georgia*, 98 U. S. 359; *Railroad Co. v. Maine*, 96 U. S. 499; *S. W. Mo. Light Co. v. Joplin*, 113 Fed. Rep. 817; *Inhab. of Palmyra v. Pa. R. Co.*, 62 N. J. Eq. 601.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*; *Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell*, 4 Gray (Mass.), 474; *Matter of Kerr*, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 119; *N. Y. H. & N. R. Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co.*, 36 Conn. 196; *Roberts v. Washburne*, 10 Minn. 23, 28.

³ *Fanning v. Gregoire*, 57 U. S. (16 How.) 524; *Williams v. Wingo*, 177 U. S. 601; *Joplin v. Light Co.*, 191 U. S. 150; *Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. New York*, 199 U. S. 1, 37; *Brooklyn City R. Co. v. New York*, 199 U. S. 48; *Water Co. v. Knoxville*, 200 U. S. 22; *Delancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26, 38.

⁴ *Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge*, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420; *Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe R. R. Co.*, 11 Leigh (Va.), 42; *Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith*, 30 N. Y. 44; *Fall v. Sutter Co.*, 21 Cal. 237.

tion could have protected itself against such subsequent act of the legislature was by obtaining an express statutory provision to that effect.¹ And it is to be emphasized that even such an express statute could not be constitutionally sustained, if it went so far as to amount to a general abrogation by the legislature of powers entrusted to it for the public welfare.²

§ 125. **How Franchises may be lost or destroyed.**—By surrender, merger, misuser or non-user, franchises may be done away with. If the owner thereof grant or transfer the right back to the state for the purpose of having it cease to exist, the franchise as a piece of property is thereby destroyed by surrender. And, when by any means the state acquires for itself the title to such a right or privilege which it has previously granted, it merges, or is extinguished, into the general right of sovereignty.³

If the holder of a franchise misuse it, as by employing it for an illegal purpose or an object not authorized by his charter or grant, the state may take it from him for such violation of duty. When he employs it for the purposes for which it was created and also for other purposes for which he has no legal authority, and it is reasonably possible to distinguish the legal user from that which is illegal, he will be deprived of the latter only and his rightful franchise will not

¹ Last preceding note; *Williams v. Wingo*, 177 U. S. 601. Therefore, a city's grant of an "exclusive" franchise to a water company can not be impaired by an opposing water plant sought to be maintained by the city during the life of the franchise. *Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co.*, 202 U. S. 453, 469.

² "Any act of the legislature, disabling itself from the future exercise of powers entrusted to it for the public good, must be void, being in effect a covenant to desert its paramount duty to the whole people. It is therefore deemed not competent for a legislature to covenant, that it will not, under any circumstances, open another avenue for the public travel within certain limits, or a certain term of time; such covenant being an alienation of sovereign powers and a violation of public duty.

"But if, in order to provide suitable public ways, the state has availed itself

of private capital, and secured its reimbursement by the grant of a charter of incorporation, with the right to take tolls for a limited period; and the public necessity should afterwards require the creation of another way, the opening of which would diminish the profits of the first, and so prevent the corporators from receiving the compensation intended to be secured to them; the state, thus sacrificing the private property of the corporation for public uses, would unquestionably be bound, as a sacred moral duty, to make full indemnity therefor, in some other mode." *Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxvii. § 29*, note; *Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois*, 146 U. S. 387; *Saunders v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.*, 144 N. Y. 75; *Watuppa R. Co. v. City of Fall River*, 154 Mass. 305.

³ This is called in England a destruction of the franchise "*by merger in the crown.*" *Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxvii. § 16*; 1 Crabb, *Real Prop. § 731*.

be forfeited; but when the two are so related or blended that the unlawful part can not be readily separated from that which is lawful, the misuser results in a forfeiture of the entire privilege.¹

So non-user, or failure of the owner to enjoy a franchise, for such a period of time as to raise a presumption that he does not intend again to exercise the right, may result in a forfeiture. Since all franchises in the United States are granted for some public utility, it is in a broad sense true that an unreasonable *non-user* is also a *misuser*, and hence, under such circumstances, the state is justified in entirely depriving the wrongdoer of his franchise.² The length of time which is sufficient to establish such a non-user must vary, of course, according to the nature of the franchise itself and the circumstances under which it is enjoyed, a very short time sufficing when the public is greatly inconvenienced, and a discontinuance of the enjoyment of the right for even many years being insufficient when the public welfare is but little affected thereby.³

¹ Thus, "where a person has a franchise to hold a market every week, on the Friday, and he holds it on the Friday and the Monday, in this case nothing shall be forfeited but that which he hath purposed. But he who has a fair to hold two days, and holds it three days, forfeits the whole." Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxvii. § 21. And the reason is, manifestly, that, while in the former case the good can be separated from the bad, in the latter this can not be done,

since no one can tell on which two of the three days he legally holds the fair.

² *City of London v. Vanacre*, 12 Mod. 270, 271; *Brownell v. Old Col. R. R.*, 164 Mass. 29; Greenl. Cruise Dig. tit. xxvii. §§ 20-26.

³ *Brownell v. Old Col. R. R.*, 164 Mass. 29; *Chadwick v. Haverhill Bridge*, 2 Dane Abr. 686; *Willoughby v. Horridge*, 12 C. B. 742, 747; *Ferrel v. Woodward*, 20 Wis. 458, 461.

(3) EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES.

CHAPTER IX.

EASEMENTS. KINDS. HOW CREATED.

- § 126. Easements defined.
- § 127. Analysis of definition.
- § 128. Servitudes defined.
- § 129. Classes of easements and servitudes.
- § 130. How easements may be acquired.
- a. *Easements created by Express Grant.*
- § 131. Express grant of easements.
- § 132. Express grant by covenant or condition in deed.
- § 133. Maps or plans showing intended grant.
- § 134. Express grant of easements appurtenant to land.
- b. *Easements created by Reservation.*
- § 135. Reservation explained.
- § 136. Reservation distinguished from exception.
- § 137. Requisites of reservations of easements.
- c. *Easements created by Implied Grant or Implied Reservation.*
- § 138. Implied grant or implied reservation.
- § 139. (a) From severance of entire tract and conveyance of part.
- § 140. Severance and implied grant.
- § 141. Severance and implied reservation.
- § 142. Classes of easements created by implied reservation.
- § 143. (b) Ways of necessity.
- § 144. Founded on necessity.
- § 145. Termination — Suspension.
- § 146. Location and change.
- § 147. To what extent they may be used.
- § 148. (c) Equitable easements.
- § 149. Their requisites.
- § 150. Forms of contract from which they arise.
- § 151. By and against whom they may be enforced.
- § 152. When they terminate.
- d. *Easements created by Prescription.*
- § 153. Prescription explained.
- § 154. History of prescription.
- § 155. Nature of user requisite to prescription. It must be :
- § 156. (a) Open, visible, and notorious.
- § 157. (b) Continuous and uniform.
- § 158. (c) Peaceable and uninterrupted.
- § 159. (d) With adverse claim of right.
- § 160. (e) With acquiescence of owner of servient land.

§ 161. (f) Against landowner who was seised in fee.

§ 162. (g) Against one free from disability.

§ 163. Prescription rests on presumed grant or other legal origin.

§ 164. No prescription where no grant can be presumed.

§ 126. **Easements — Definition.** — In modern law, the word “easement” is frequently employed, in a very loose sense, to denote any right or privilege which one person has over the land of another. In the early common law it was employed, with more care and precision, to describe a class of rights around which definite and logical legal principles have crystallized.¹ Not all of those principles are wholly applicable to many of the privileges and immunities which are now frequently styled easements. It, therefore, conduces to clearness of conception, and ease in understanding the kinds of incorporeal hereditaments now to be discussed, first to define and explain the strict, technical, common-law easement and then to examine those other similar, but broader and looser rights, which, for want of a better term, may be described by the generic civil-law word, *servitudes*. We may, in the first place, then, define a common-law easement as follows:

An easement is a privilege without profit (i. e., without *profit à prendre*, or the right to take anything from the land), acquired by grant or prescription, which privilege the owner of one piece of land, called the *dominant tenement*, has over another piece of land, called the *servient tenement*. “The essential qualities of easements,” says Mr. Washburn, “are these: 1st, they are incorporeal; 2d, they are imposed on corporeal property, and not upon the owner thereof; 3d, they confer no right to a participation in the profits arising from such property; 4th, they are imposed for the benefit of corporeal property; and 5th, there must be two distinct tenements, — the dominant, to which the right belongs, and the servient, upon which the obligation rests.”² And he might well have added here, as he does in other connections,³ 6th, they are always acquired, either by some form of grant, or by prescription which presupposes a grant. Illustrations of easements are: a right of way, i. e., a privilege of walking, driving, or otherwise going over another’s land; a right to drain water or have it flow over another’s soil; a right to

¹ Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) pp. 181–191; 2 *Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law* (2d ed.) p. 145.

² *Wash. Ease. and Serv.* p. 3.

³ *Wash. Ease. and Serv.* pp. *7, *20, *21.

light, air, or prospect or view across neighboring property; a right to foul or pollute the air, or a stream, and many other similar privileges.

§ 127. **Analysis of Definition.** — It is to be noted, in the first place, that an easement is a privilege *without profit* — without authority to take anything from the soil or land over which the right exists. It is thus distinguished from a *profit à prendre*, or the right to take something of value, such as grass, turf, gravel, or marl from the land itself. An easement may be very valuable and produce much income or profit for its owner. But the value must consist in the mere privilege of using the land, as by walking, or driving, or looking across it, and not in the right to abstract anything from the soil of the servient tenement, or its products, or the structures or erections thereon. The right to drive from one's own land over the land of one's neighbor is an easement; but the right to let the horses graze as they go over such neighboring land, or the right to take sea-weed or ice from another's property, is a *profit à prendre*, and not an easement.¹ Again, an easement is a privilege without profit, *acquired by grant or prescription*. Since a prescriptive right rests upon the presumption of a grant, it is sometimes said, with accuracy, that all easements are obtained by grant, either express, implied, or presumed. This fact distinguishes them from mere licenses, and from these natural and customary rights which rest upon no express grant and for which no grant can be presumed. A license to one person to do an act or series of acts upon land of another is merely a permission given by parol, confers no interest in or over the land itself and is ordinarily revocable by the licensor at any time before it has been wholly executed; while an easement, being created by grant, always includes an interest in the land over which it is to be enjoyed and can be enforced by its owner even against the will of the holder of the servient tenement. Those natural rights, moreover, such as adjacent riparian proprietors along a stream or the seashore have reciprocally against each other, or adjoining owners of lands have for the lateral or subjacent support of their soil, are not, strictly speaking, easements, since they

¹ *Hill v. Lord*, 48 Me. 83, 99; *Huntingdon v. Asher*, 96 N. Y. 604; *Huff v. McCauley*, 53 Pa. St. 206, 209.

A grant of the exclusive use of land

is not an easement, since such a conveyance excludes the grantor, and is in effect a conveyance of the soil itself. *Buszard v. Capel*, 8 B. & C. 141.

exist without grant or prescription.¹ It should be added that the grant by which an easement is acquired is ordinarily private and that, even when it is public, it imposes upon the grantee no special duty or obligation to the public or any part of it; and it is this fact that distinguishes easements from franchises.²

Lastly, an easement is a privilege without profit, acquired by grant or prescription, which privilege *the owner of one piece of land, called the dominant tenement, has over another piece of land, called the servient tenement.* Not only must there be two distinct and separate pieces, but the privilege must be wholly in favor of the one and against the other as a burden. Hence, the rights to light, air, and access, which adjoining owners have in streets and highways, and the right of passing over them, which inheres in the general public, are not easements, nor are the rights of access to natural streams and the right to their uninterrupted flow in an unpolluted condition, which are owned by riparian proprietors. Such rights are servitudes, as appears hereafter; but they are not easements, since they do not require for their existence two separate and distinct tenements, the one wholly dominant and the other wholly servient.³ An easement exists for the benefit of the dominant

¹ Speaking of such rights and privileges as these, Earl, J., says, in *Scriver v. Smith*, 100 N. Y. 471, 479: "Such rights have some semblance to easements, and no harm or inconvenience can probably come from classifying them as such for some purposes. But they are not in fact real easements. Every easement is supposed to have its origin in grant or prescription, which presupposes a grant, and it is quite absurd to suppose that the owner of land, at the head of a stream, has an easement by grant or prescription for its flow over all the land of the riparian owners for many miles to its mouth. Would any of the usual covenants in a deed be violated because a natural stream of water flowed through the land, and the upper owners, therefore, had an easement in such land? Clearly not." Also *Huyck v. Andrews*, 113 N. Y. 81, 85; *Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson*, 192 N. Y. 54, 59.

² See § 120, *supra*.

³ The distinctions between such rights as these and easements were emphasized and applied by the New York Court of Appeals in *Stevens v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 130 N. Y. 95. It is a settled principle of common-law easements that if, in favor of one lot of land A have an easement over B's land, such, for example, as a right of way, and A purchase another distinct lot adjoining that in favor of which the way exists, he can use the way not for the benefit of both lots but only for that for which it originally existed. Now, in the above-cited case, M owned a lot of land fronting on the east side of Pearl Street in New York City and extending from the centre of that street half way through the block to the next street to the east — Water Street, — and in favor of such lot he enjoyed all the street rights in Pearl Street. Subsequently, he bought the adjoining lot in the rear, thus obtaining one continuous strip from the middle of Pearl Street to

owner alone, and the servient tenant acquires thereby no reciprocal rights and has no chose in action for its discontinuance. Thus, when the easement consists in the right to discharge water, in an artificial stream, over the land of another, though the water may be advantageous to the servient tenant, yet the latter acquires no right to have the flow continued, nor any right of action because the stream is subsequently diverted or entirely stopped.¹

§ 128. *Servitudes* — defined and explained. — In the civil law, the word *servitude* is used, in its general significance, to denote the subjection of one person or thing to another person or thing. A *personal* servitude is the subjection of one person to another; a *mixed* servitude is the subjection of a thing to a person or *vice versa*; a *real* or *prædial* servitude is a charge or burden laid on one piece of land for the use and utility of other land belonging to another proprietor.² The last-named form is employed generally to describe any such charge or burden, and its proper use by common-law writers is with the same broad signification. Hence real or prædial servitudes embrace (1) All common-law easements, as above

the middle of Water Street. After he had built a warehouse on the entire strip between those two streets, the elevated railroad was constructed on Pearl Street, and he sued the railroad company for the damages thus caused to his entire warehouse. It was contended, in behalf of the defendant, that his recovery must be limited to compensation for the damages caused by the railroad to that half of the warehouse which stood upon the lot originally owned by him and fronting on Pearl Street, and the above-stated principle as to easements was invoked in favor of this contention. But it was held that he should recover compensation for the damages to the entire structure, since the street rights invaded by the elevated structure were not easements. Follett, J., writing the opinion, said: "The characterization of these street rights as easements and the implying that they are governed by the rules and are subject to the limitations of common-law easements tends to obscure the rights of abutting owners on the one hand and of the corporation on the

other. They may be easements, in the sense that the owner of land is sometimes said to have an easement for lateral support in adjacent land, or that the owner of land bordering on navigable waters having certain private rights to the shore is sometimes said to have an easement, but in neither case are the rights common-law easements. There is no dominant nor servient estate, and the rules applicable to easements have not generally been applied to such rights." These rights, however, are constantly called easements by the New York Court of Appeals, as well as by the other courts generally. See *Ely v. Edison Elec. Illum. Co.*, 172 N. Y. 1; *Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 90 N. Y. 122; *Knoth v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 187 N. Y. 243, 252; *Farrell v. Lockhart*, 210 U. S. 142, 148. But, as in the Stevens case, when the distinction becomes material, they make it in nomenclature.

¹ *Mason v. Shrewsbury & S. R. Co.*, 6 Q. B. 578, 587; 10 Eng. Rul. Cas. 22, 30.

² *Bouvier Law Dict.*, "Servitude."

explained; (2) All forms of *profit à prendre*, or rights to take something from the land itself; and (3) All those natural, legal, and customary rights above mentioned, such as the reciprocal rights of proprietors along streams or highways, which are not common-law easements and which do not carry with them the privilege of taking anything from the land itself. For the sake of convenience, this last class of rights will be designated in the following pages simply as *servitudes*, and they will be treated of in connection with easements. A separate discussion will be devoted to the subject of *profit à prendre*.

It is to be added that the word servitude, as used in its general sense by the civilians and very frequently by common-law writers, looks more to the *burden* on the land than to the right or privilege. Thus, an easement is, in a liberal sense, a form of real or prædial servitude; but, more strictly, an easement is the privilege or right looked at from the standpoint of the owner of the dominant tenement, while from the point of view of the owner of the servient tenement it is a servitude.

In our discussion, then, of all those rights and privileges, which one person may have in the land of another, and the burdens which the latter must endure, there will be in reality three topics involved; namely: *First*, Easements, as above defined and explained; *Second*, Those other rights and burdens similar to easements, for which somewhat illogically but for the sake of convenience and for want of a better term the generic word "servitudes" will be used; and *Third*, *Profit à prendre*. The first two of these, being similar in most particulars, will be largely treated of together, but care will be taken to point out the distinctions between them as the discussion progresses. It should be said in passing that the second division properly includes a class of rights which are commonly called *easements in gross*. These are rights granted to or otherwise acquired over another's land by some individual *as such* and without regard to his ownership of any land, that is to say there is no dominant tenement, the right being attached to the *person* and not to any land whatever.

§ 129. **Classification of Easements and Servitudes.** — Easements are either *affirmative* or *negative*; and the same classification may be extended to servitudes generally. They are affirmative when their owner has a positive right to do some

act or series of acts upon the land on which the burden rests, as the right to pass over it, or to let water drip upon it from the eaves of his house. They are negative when they consist in the right to restrain the owner of the servient property from doing or permitting thereon that which might otherwise be lawfully done. Such are rights to prevent one from building on his own land, to restrain him from digging away his soil so as to endanger the foundations of a house standing on the dominant tenement, and to preclude him from building except in a specified manner, or from carrying on certain designated trades or kinds of business in themselves legal and permissible.¹

Again, easements are either *apparent* or *non-apparent*, which distinction practically defines itself, and which applies to other servitudes as well. A right of way, or a right to swing shutters over one's neighbor's land, is an apparent easement, since in the act of enjoying it its owner may be readily seen; while the privilege of using a hidden, underground drain through another's soil is, of course, non-apparent in character.

All easements and servitudes are also classified as *continuous* and *discontinuous*, which classes are thus defined: "Continuous are those of which the enjoyment is or may be continued, without the necessity of any actual interference by man, as a waterspout or a right of light or air. Discontinuous are those the enjoyment of which can be had only by the interference of man, as rights of way, or a right to draw water."²

Easements have been further divided into *appurtenant* (sometimes called also *appendant*), and *in gross*. An easement is *appurtenant* when it is for the benefit of the property of the grantee. In that case, it is an assignable right and, if it be sufficiently great in quantity, it is inheritable with the dominant tenement. Strictly and accurately speaking, all easements properly so called (i. e., all common-law easements), are *appurtenant*, since they are for the benefit of the

¹ All the forms of equitable easements, hereafter explained, are negative. See § 148, *infra*; also *Talmadge v. East River Bank*, 26 N. Y. 105; *Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Brennan*, 148 N. Y. 661.

² *Lampman v. Milks*, 21 N. Y. 505; *Durel v. Boisblanc*, 1 La. An. 407.

This classification of servitudes is made by the Code of France and is recognized and applied with important results by the common-law courts. See §§ 139, 140, *infra*.

corporeal dominant tenements upon which their existence depends.¹ It follows that the expression, "easement in gross" is a misnomer; but it is, in fact, used by judges, legal writers and the profession generally to describe a right over another's property, not appurtenant to any land, but simply belonging to its owner as an individual, i. e., where there is a servient tenement but no dominant, the right or privilege being attached to the *person* and not to any land whatever.² We may, therefore, employ the expression, but with the understanding that it denotes a servitude and not a common-law easement.³ An easement appurtenant is preferred to one in gross; and a grant or reservation will not be construed as creating the latter kind when it can reasonably be held to be for the benefit of any land of the grantee. Thus, a right of way, which leads to the grantee's land and is useful in connection with it, is appurtenant to such land, and this, although the land is not mentioned in the deed by which the way is created or transferred. So, where one conveyed to another a parcel of land; and on the same day granted to him, "his heirs and assigns, and tenants and occupiers," a right of way over a strip of ground adjoining the property already transferred to him, which way led to such property, it was held that the right of way was appurtenant to the land already conveyed.⁴

Easements and servitudes are sometimes classified as *natural, legal, customary, and conventional*. But all common-law easements are conventional, that is, they are the result of contract, or convention between the parties from which arises a grant express or implied. On the other hand many servitudes, which are not easements, exist by nature or arise by operation of law or by custom, without any contract or convention express or implied between the parties interested

¹ See *Longendyke v. Anderson*, 101 N. Y. 625, 629; *Parish v. Baird*, 160 N. Y. 302; analysis of definition of easements, § 127, *supra*.

² "It has sometimes been said that there is no such thing as an easement in gross; that a privilege not appurtenant to land is not an easement. The term 'easement in gross' is used because it is a term in general use by legal writers, by judges and by the profession; and as against such usage

of the term it is useless to attempt to establish a refinement of definition intended to do away with the term." *Jones on Easements*, § 33. See *Crippen v. Morse*, 49 N. Y. 63; *Valentine v. Schreiber*, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 235; *Metcalf v. Central Brook Park Ass'n*, 63 N. Y. App. Div. 445.

³ See servitudes, defined and explained, § 128, *supra*.

⁴ *Moll v. McCauley*, 83 Iowa, 677.

in or affected by them. Thus, a natural servitude is illustrated by the burden to which a lower field is subject, to receive the surface water which flows upon it from higher ground;¹ the obligation of the owner of the soil of a street or highway to let the public use the same, which obligation arises when the highway is created by public authority, is a sample of a legal servitude; and the burdening of pieces of land in favor of the rights of the inhabitants of certain localities or villages to dance and play games on the same have afforded a few instances of servitudes arising from custom.² These various forms of servitudes will be more fully examined in discussing the methods by which such incorporeal rights and obligations are created.

§ 130. **How Easements may be acquired.** — Easements have been defined as privileges acquired by *grant* or *prescription*. And prescription, or adverse enjoyment of some burden on another's land for the requisite length of time, may bring these rights into existence because it rests upon the presumption of a grant, which has been lost or destroyed and therefore can not be directly proved. The *grant*, then, or transfer of the right or privilege by deed, is actually or presumptively at the foundation of all common-law easements. Parol license, permission, or acquiescence can not ordinarily create or transmit them. Thus, an oral promise to allow one to send water through a drain on the promisor's land,³ or to take water from his aqueduct,⁴ or to maintain an embankment upon the premises for the benefit of the promisee,⁵ though founded upon a valuable consideration, does not at law run with the land nor create an easement therein.

In some states a parol agreement for an easement is sus-

¹ *Laumier v. Francis*, 23 Mo. 181. "The French law reckons five natural servitudes; namely, 1. The flowing of water from higher to lower land. 2. The right to a spring or fountain of water on the part of the owner on whose land it rises. 3. The right of a landowner to a watercourse flowing through or forming a boundary of his land. 4. The fixing and maintaining boundaries between lands of adjacent owners; and 5. Building and maintaining fences for separating the lands of different owners. 1 *Lepage Desgodets*, 15." Wash. Ease. p. *15.

² *Fitch v. Rawling*, 2 H. Blackst. 393; *Brakely v. Sharp*, 1 Stockt. (N. J.) 9; *Lockwood v. Wood*, 6 Q. B. 31, 66; *Day v. Savadge*, Hob. 85; *Gateward's Case*, 6 Rep. 60; *Smith v. Gatewood*, Cro. Jac. 152; *Mounsey v. Ismay*, 3 H. & Colt. 486, 492, 498.

³ *Wiseman v. Lucksinger*, 84 N. Y. 31.

⁴ *Cronkhite v. Cronkhite*, 94 N. Y. 323; *Taylor v. Gerrish*, 59 N. H. 569, 570.

⁵ *Banghart v. Flummerfelt*, 43 N. J. L. 28.

tained in equity, when it is founded upon a valuable consideration and there has been such a part performance of the contract by the promisee as would take the case out of the statute of frauds if it were a contract for the purchase and sale of land.¹ And a very few states, such as Pennsylvania and Iowa, go even further than this and hold that a mere executory, parol license, on the faith of which the licensee has done work, incurred expense, or otherwise materially changed his position, can not be revoked at the will of the licensor alone, but becomes enforceable as an interest in the land, and, therefore, is in effect an easement.² This last doctrine, however, is *pro tanto* a repeal of the statute of frauds by the courts and is discountenanced in England and most of the United States. "A parol license to perform an act on the land of another, while it justifies anything done by the licensee before a revocation, is, nevertheless, revocable at the option of the licensor, and this although the intention was to

¹ "The doctrine that equity will interfere in some cases of oral license in order to prevent great damage arising to the licensee from the revocation of the license appears to be gaining ground. . . . The principle is that where two persons have entered into a complete, sufficient, and legal contract for a license, which contract is not only founded upon a valuable consideration, but of which the terms are defined by satisfactory proof, and accompanied by acts of part performance unequivocally referable to the supposed agreement, equity will regard such a contract for a license as creating an easement, and will enforce the easement either by compelling the grantor to give a deed of the easement, or by restraining him from interfering with the grantee in his enjoyment of the right acquired by the contract. The terms of the contract, however, must be plain and definite. If they are indefinite, as if it is doubtful whether the license is to be for life, or at the pleasure of the grantor or otherwise, equity will not enforce the agreement, or if the evidence is too vague to establish any agreement, or if the acts of part performance are not so clear, definite, and certain in their object and design as to

point exclusively to a complete and perfect agreement, of which they are a part execution." Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 29, p. *18, citing *Dempsey v. Kipp*, 61 N. Y. 462; *Wiseman v. Lucksinger*, 84 N. Y. 31; *Cronkhite v. Cronkhite*, 94 N. Y. 323; *Wheeler v. Reynolds*, 66 N. Y. 227; *Huff v. McAuley*, 53 Pa. St. 206; *Thompson v. McElarney*, 82 Pa. St. 174; *Meek v. Breckenridge*, 29 Ohio St. 642; *Butt v. Napier*, 14 Bush (Ky.), 39; *Legg v. Horn*, 45 Conn. 409, 415; *United States v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co.*, 1 Hughes C. C. 138. See also *Veghte v. Raritan Co.*, 19 N. J. Eq. 142; *Williamston, &c. R. Co. v. Battle*, 66 N. C. 540, 546; *Jackson Co. v. Phila. W. & R. Co.*, 4 Del. Ch. 180.

² *Rerick v. Kern*, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 267; *Wheatley v. Chrisman*, 24 Pa. St. 298; *Strickler v. Todd*, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 63, 74; *Lacey v. Arnett*, 33 Pa. St. 169; *Campbell v. McCoy*, 31 Pa. St. 263; *Swartz v. Swartz*, 4 Pa. St. 353, 358; *Lindeman v. Lindsay*, 69 Pa. St. 93, 100; *Buchanan v. Logansport*, 71 Ind. 265; *Wickersham v. Orr*, 9 Iowa, 253, 260; *Baetty v. Gregory*, 17 Iowa, 109, 114; *Lee v. McLeod*, 12 Nev. 280; *School District v. Lindsay*, 47 Mo. App. 134; *Harlan v. Logansport Co.*, 32 N. E. Rep. 930; § 239, *infra*.

confer a continuing right and money had been expended by the licensee on the faith of the license."¹

The grant, by which an easement is created or conveyed, may be either express or implied; and, when express, it may consist, either of a grant of a right or privilege over land which is retained by the grantor, or of a reservation by him to himself or his heirs of a right or privilege over the land conveyed, which reservation is made in his deed of conveyance of the land. Adding to the three divisions of the grant of easements thus emerging the method of gaining them by prescription, we have the following four modes by which they may be acquired and transferred; namely: a. *By express grant*, where the grantor retains the land over which the right is conferred; b. *By reservation in a deed*, where the grantor parts with the land and in the deed of conveyance reserves an easement over it; c. *By implied grant*; and d. *By prescription*, which presupposes a grant. Each of these four methods and the varieties of easements to which they give rise and their characteristics and incidents will be separately discussed.

a. *Easements created by Express Grant.* *start here*

§ 131. **Express Grant of Easements.** — The nature of an easement created by express grant is to be chiefly determined, of course, by a proper construction of the language used by the parties to the instrument. The dominant and servient tenements must each be described with sufficient accuracy to be clearly identified as such, and the character and location of the right must in general be made clear by the words of the conveyance.² The privilege, being once brought into existence by deed, is presumed to be permanent, unless a contrary intention is expressed. If, for example, it be intended to make it to continue only during the life of a

¹ *Crosdale v. Lanigan*, 129 N. Y. 604; also, *Cahoon v. Bayard*, 123 N. Y. 298; *Lawrence v. Springer*, 49 N. J. Eq. 289; *Lake Erie R. Co. v. Kennedy*, 132 Ind. 274; *Babcock v. Utter*, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 27-60. See also the subject of revocation of licenses, § 239, *infra*.

² *Brazier v. Glasspool* (1901), W. N. Cas. 237; *Matter of Brookfield*, 176 N. Y. 138; *Crocker v. Cotting*, 181

Mass. 146; *Truax v. Gregory*, 196 Ill. 83; *Smith v. Worn*, 93 Cal. 206. An easement granted by the use of vague or indefinite terms may be construed in accordance with the uniform acts of the parties in using and enduring it for many years, and so evincing their intent. *Hoag v. Place*, 93 Mich. 450; *Mudge v. Salisbury*, 110 N. Y. 413, 417; *Outhank v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co.*, 71 N. Y. 194.

designated person or for a specified term of years, this fact must be expressed in the deed.¹ The grant may be made in connection with the dominant tenement, or separately and as a distinct thing, thereby imposing the easement as a burden upon the estate of the grantor and rendering it servient to land already owned by the grantee.² Again it may be made by a covenant or condition, contained in the deed of the servient tenement, as to the method of using it in connection with another piece of land, though the latter does not belong to the grantor and though the deed is not signed by the grantee. So, in the process of partitioning land among co-tenants, such as tenants in common or joint tenants,³ or in the transfer by one transaction of a number of lots of land to different purchasers,⁴ easements may be expressly brought into existence by the agreements and stipulations inserted in the deeds. In short, all that is necessary to the creation of an easement by express grant is the evincing, in the deed, of a clear intention on the part of the grantor to make one parcel of land subservient to another, whether that other belongs at the time to himself or to a third person.⁵

§ 132. **Express Grant of Easements by Covenants or Conditions in Deeds.** — As was said above, covenants and conditions in deeds of corporeal property frequently impose easements upon the lands conveyed, or retain them on other real estate of the grantor. Prominent among these are those stipulations and agreements in grants, which restrict or regulate the use to be made of the property transferred or reserved.⁶ Thus, a very common form of covenant, put into deeds by which land

¹ *Lathrop v. Elsner*, 93 Mich. 599.

² *Holmes v. Seller*, 3 Lev. 305; *Gerard v. Cooke*, 5 B. & P. 109; Com. Dig., "Chemin," D. 3.

³ *Huttmeier v. Albro*, 18 N. Y. 48; *Ellis v. Bassett*, 128 Ind. 118; *Goodall v. Godfrey*, 53 Vt. 219; *Mason v. Horton*, 67 Vt. 266; *Kilgour v. Ashcom*, 5 H. & J. (Md.) 82; *Burwell v. Hobson*, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 322.

⁴ *Johnson v. Jordan*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 234, 242; *Russell v. Watts*, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 559; *Swansborough v. Coventry*, 9 Bing. 305; *Mitchell v. Seipel*, 53 Md. 251; *Brakely v. Sharp*, 10 N. J. Eq. 206, 209; *Randall v. McLaughlin*, 10 Allen (Mass.), 366; *Warren v. Blake*,

54 Me. 276; *Stillwell v. Foster*, 80 Me. 333.

⁵ *Gibert v. Peteler*, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 488, 514; see also *Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch*, 70 N. Y. 440; *Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 90 N. Y. 122; *Barrow v. Richard*, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 351; *Richardson v. Tobey*, 121 Mass. 457; *Norfleet v. Cromwell*, 70 N. C. 634.

⁶ *Joy v. St. Louis*, 138 U. S. 1; *Van Rensselaer v. Alhany & S. R. Co.*, 62 N. Y. 65; *Wetmore v. Bruce*, 118 N. Y. 319; *Coudert v. Sayre*, 46 N. J. Eq. 386; *Ladd v. Boston*, 151 Mass. 585; *Peck v. Conway*, 119 Mass. 546; *Stephens v. Hockemeyer*, 46 N. Y. St. Rep. 329, 19 N. Y. Supp. 666.

is conveyed, or reserved, or partitioned, is one which provides for the kinds of buildings which may be erected thereon, or regulates the character of the trades or business which the purchaser may carry on upon the premises.¹ When such agreements are incorporated into a number of deeds, by which the owner of a large tract of land splits it up into building lots and conveys them to a number of different purchasers, not only does the grantor thus obtain rights to compel the various lot owners to live up to these agreements, but those owners also ordinarily have reciprocal easements against one another, which will be recognized and enforced in a court of equity.² Another ordinary way of creating easements or servitudes by covenant is by laying out streets or ways across land, or open spaces such as squares or parks, and selling lots along them, or with reference to them, as places to be always kept open for the use of the purchasers. The vendor and his successors in interest thus become bound to keep such places open and unobstructed for the benefit of those who buy land in reliance upon the representations so made;³ and the various lot purchasers also acquire the right to restrain one another from closing or obstructing them.⁴

§ 133. **Maps or Plans, showing intended Grant of Easements.**

— When a map or plan, according to which lots are sold, designates a portion of the grantor's property as intended to be kept open for the benefit of the grantees, each purchaser acquires an easement to have that part kept open and unobstructed; and this, even though there is no express covenant to that effect inserted in his deed, and whether or not the public accepts the designated land for a street or other public place.⁵ But, according to the New York Court of Appeals, the only obligation that the law will thus imply from the exhibition of the plan or map and the selling of lots

¹ Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440; Stetson v. Curtis, 119 Mass. 266; Condert v. Sayre, 46 N. J. Eq. 386; Kilpatrick v. Peshine, 24 N. J. Eq. 206; Gawtry v. Leland, 31 N. J. Eq. 385; Middletown v. Newport Hospital, 16 R. I. 319.

² Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher and Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 87 N. Y. 311; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S. v. Brennan, 148 N. Y. 661; Knight v. Simmons (1896), W. N. 22; Ayling v. Kramer, 133 Mass. 12; Tinker v. Forbes, 136 Ill. 221; Herrick v.

Marshall, 66 Me. 435. See these equitable easements more fully discussed §§ 149-152, *infra*.

³ Dexter v. Beard, 130 N. Y. 549; Condert v. Sayre, 46 N. J. Eq. 386; Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538.

⁴ Tinker v. Forbes, 136 Ill. 221; Herrick v. Marshall, 66 Me. 435; Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105; Lowenberg v. Brown, 79 N. Y. App. Div. 414.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Swedish E. L. Church v. Jackson, 229 Ill. 506; Gould v. Wagner, 196 Mass. 270.

with reference to it is the negative one, that prevents the closing of the open places indicated, or their use for any purpose inconsistent with the vendees' enjoyment of their easements in them; and, in the absence of express covenant that the vendor will use any portion of his land in a particular manner, he will not be required to erect anything upon it or do any affirmative act thereon for the benefit of the lot purchasers. In *Johnson v. Shelter Island Grove and Camp Meeting Association*,¹ lithographed maps, according to which lots from a large tract were sold at public auction, were distributed among the bidders. On the maps, a certain large space was indicated as open and public and called "The Ramble." In the middle of "The Ramble" was marked out a small, rectangular place, upon which was the word "Chapel." After the lots around "The Ramble" were sold and the deeds given, the association began to build a hotel upon the place marked "Chapel" on the map; and one of the purchasers, whose lot fronted on "The Ramble," brought an action to enjoin such erection and compel the building of a chapel upon the rectangular space. It was decided that, in the absence of covenant as to the character of the building to be constructed upon that space, the vendees were not entitled to the relief sought; and that the mere existence of the word "Chapel" upon that place on the map did not constitute any such covenant either express or implied. The court said, per Parker, J.: "It is the policy of the law to encourage the most advantageous use of land; and the courts will not be diligent in searching for pretexts with which to check the enterprise of an owner of the fee at the behest of one who is not actually interfered with in the proper enjoyment of his easement."² It is thought that this decision is to be regarded as, at best, a border-line case. Its doctrine is opposed by the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in *Dill v. The School Board*;³ and it is safe to assume that, under such conditions, the New York courts would be quick to seize upon any slight additional facts-or representations in order to raise a covenant implied, or created by estoppel, against the grantor.⁴

¹ 122 N. Y. 330.

³ 47 N. J. Eq. 421.

² See *Downes v. D. & F. Co.*, 75 N. Y. App. Div. 513; *Matter of Mayor (Leggett Ave.)*, 80 N. Y. App. Div. 618, 620.

⁴ See *Hay v. Knauth*, 36 N. Y. App. Div. 612.

§ 134. **Express Grant of Easements as Appurtenances to Land.** — When an easement has become appurtenant to a parcel of land, it usually passes with a conveyance of that land, whether mentioned in any covenant or condition or other part of the deed or not, and whether or not it is necessary to the enjoyment of the corporeal property by the grantee.¹ If, then, in transferring the land, it be desired to separate and reserve from it an easement which has once become appurtenant thereto, this must be done by the use of explicit and unmistakable terms. Where one owning a lot fronting on a public street bought other land in the rear adjoining that which he already possessed, which land so purchased had appurtenant to it a right of way over a private alley, he was not bound to relieve the alley from the easement existing on it and impose the burden upon the land already owned by him in the front.² When a way is appurtenant to land a part of which is conveyed to another, the right of way will exist in favor of each of the parts into which the original parcel is thus divided.³ But, although this is the broad form in which the law is usually stated, the principle must be taken with the modification that the burden on the servient tenement shall not be thereby made any greater than was originally intended. If, for example, the owner of a large field used for agricultural purposes should grant a small piece of it to another and reserve a right of way over the piece so granted, for the benefit of his remaining field, he could not then sell the field off into building lots and thus burden the way so reserved so that the owners of all the lots should be entitled to its enjoyment.⁴

Only incorporeal hereditaments can pass as appurtenant to land. "A thing corporeal can not properly be appurtenant to a thing corporeal, nor a thing incorporeal to a thing in-

¹ *Newman v. Nellis*, 97 N. Y. 285; *Webster v. Stevens*, 5 Duer (N. Y.), 682; *Huntington v. Asher*, 96 N. Y. 604; *Kent v. Waite*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 138; *Underwood v. Carney*, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 285; *George v. Cox*, 114 Mass. 382; *Dority v. Dunning*, 78 Me. 381; *Pettingill v. Porter*, 8 Allen (Mass.), 1.

² *Zell v. First Universalist Society*, 119 Pa. St. 390. When a right of way is appurtenant to a piece of land which is passed to a lessee by an oral

demise, the way goes with the land. *Skull v. Glenister*, 16 C. B. N. S. 81, 90.

³ *Underwood v. Carney*, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 285, 290; *Watson v. Bioren*, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 227; *Whitney v. Lee*, 1 Allen (Mass.), 198.

⁴ *Allan v. Gomme*, 11 Ad. & E. 759; *South Metr. Cemetery v. Eden*, 16 C. B. 42; *Henning v. Burnet*, 8 Exch. 187. See *Lewis v. Carstairs*, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 193.

corporeal.”¹ Whenever one piece of land passes in connection with the grant of another, it may be said to pass as “*parcel*,” but never by the use of the word “*appurtenance*;” and it is equally true that land can not pass as appurtenant to an incorporeal right, nor one incorporeal hereditament as appurtenant to another.²

b. *Easements created by Reservation in Deeds of Land.*

§ 135. **Reservation.** — In the deed by which land is conveyed, an easement may be created and reserved for the benefit of the grantor. This is illustrated by a case in which a grantor of land, bounded upon a stream of water, reserved to himself, by his deed, a privilege in the stream, for the benefit of his mill and the land under and around it which he retained.³ And where one, conveying a portion of his land, stated in the deed that he retained for himself a bridge path in front of his house and across the piece transferred, this was held to create an easement of a right of way by reservation.⁴

§ 136. **Reservation distinguished from Exception.** — A reservation of an easement or other servitude by deed always results in the creation of something new, — i. e. something which did not before exist as an easement or servitude, — and in retaining it as an item of property belonging to the grantor. Being thus brought into existence, as property, by the deed itself, it must always be incorporeal. Thus, if A sell the westerly half of his farm to B, and in the deed reserve to himself over that half a right to pass from a highway to the easterly half of the farm, which A retains for himself, the way is a new piece of property, made by A’s deed and owned by him as an easement created by reservation; for while, as owner of the entire farm, A had possessed the right to go over the westerly half as he pleased, yet he did not own that right *as an easement* until such westerly half became the

¹ Co. Lit. 121 b.

² Co. Lit. 121 b, 122 a; Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 25, 54; Investment Co. v. O. & N. R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 378; Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 N. Y. 165; Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 447; Leonard v. White, 7 Mass. 6; Donnell v. Humphreys, 1 Mont. 518, 525.

³ Pettee v. Hawes, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 323; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N. Y. 400.

⁴ Bean v. French, 140 Mass. 229; Mayo v. Newhoff, 47 N. J. Eq. 31; Tabbutt v. Grant, 94 Me. 371; Andrews v. Nat. Sugar Ref. Co., 72 N. Y. App. Div. 551.

property of B, because a man can not have an easement over his own land. On the other hand, an exception — or thing excepted — in a deed is something, whether corporeal or incorporeal, not created by the terms of the deed, but already in existence and expressly kept out from the operation of the grant and not allowed to pass under the deed. For example, if an owner of a farm convey it all, except the house thereon and the land under it and around it as a garden, or except a right of way, or right of flowage owned by him and appurtenant to the land transferred, such property retained is a proper *exception* and not a reservation.¹

It follows, as a matter of course, that easements may be created by reservations, but never by exceptions, since exceptions properly so called deal only with property rights already in existence. But the courts look at the substance and intention of a deed, rather than at its mere form; and so, frequently, the words employed are construed as creating an easement by reservation, although the property is spoken of as an exception, because it appears that the intention of the parties is to create something new and retain it for the grantor; while the word "reserving" or "reservation" is often held to refer only to a thing in existence, and not to be intended to raise incorporeal rights by reservation, because from an examination of the entire deed and the surrounding circumstances such appears to be its fair construction.² Accordingly, where the grantor of a tract of land stated in the deed that he *reserved* for himself "the wood and underground produce of the estate," his statement was held to refer to an exception rather than to a reservation.³ And a deed which conveyed a city lot by metes and bounds, "*excepting* and *reserving* therefrom a strip of land ten feet wide . . . across the rear or inner end . . . for an alley," was construed as passing to the grantee all the corporeal property mentioned, and reserving to the grantor an easement of an alleyway over the strip.⁴

¹ *Boist v. Empie*, 5 N. Y. 33; *Myers v. Bell Telephone Co.*, 83 N. Y. App. Div. 623; *Winthrop v. Fairbanks*, 41 Me. 307; *Smith v. Ladd*, 41 Me. 314.

² *Wood v. Boyd*, 145 Mass. 176; *White v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.*, 156 Mass. 181; *Whitaker v. Brown*, 46 Pa. St. 197; *Haggerty v. Lee*, 50 N. J. Eq.

464; *Chicago, Rock Isl. & P. R. Co. v. D. & R. G. R. Co.*, 143 U. S. 596.

³ *Doe d. Douglas v. Lock*, 4 Nev. & M. 807, where the distinctions between exceptions and reservations are examined at length by Lord Chief Justice Denman.

⁴ *Winston v. Johnson*, 42 Minn. 398.

§ 137. **Requisites of Reservations of Easements.** — A reservation of an easement must always be to the grantor, and not to a stranger. If, for example, the grantor of an estate to A reserve a right of way over the land for B, a third person who is not a party to the deed, this gives nothing to B which he did not own before. If B already owned a way over the land, the effect of such a statement in the deed would be simply to save the grantor from any liability which might arise upon the covenants in his deed because of the existence of such easement.¹

Again, as a general rule, the reservation must be out of the estate granted, and not out of other property. But "in some peculiar cases such a reservation may operate in the nature of a grant from the grantee, to charge upon other premises the burden of contributing the means of enjoying what is thus reserved."² When, however, the grantee makes such a charge upon another estate, — and that other estate must evidently be other property of his own, — he is simply, in the one deed between him and the grantor, conveying something to the grantor, not strictly by way of *reservation*, since it is not *reserved* out of that with which the grantor parts, but as a separate and distinct covenant or contract incorporated into the deed by which the grantor conveys to him the land.³

Lastly, a reservation being equivalent to a grant, and in fact a form of grant, the strict rule of law requires that there shall be proper words of limitation and inheritance — the use of the word "heirs" in some collocation — if the grantor intend the right to extend beyond his own life.⁴ This is simply an application of the common-law principle, which, with a few exceptions, requires the use of the word "heirs" in order to the creation or conveyance of an estate in fee

¹ Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 95; Bridger v. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601, 603; West Point Iron Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. Y. 703.

² 3 Wash. R. P. p. * 646.

³ Holms v. Seller, 3 Lev. 305; Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 488, 514; Dyer v. Sandford, 9 Met. (Mass.) 395; Randall v. Latham, 36 Conn. 48, 53; Emerson v. Mooney, 50 N. H. 315; Haggarty v. Lee, 54 N. J. L. 580.

⁴ Durham & S. R. Co. v. Walker, 2

Q. B. n. s. 940, 967; Clafin v. B. & A. R. Co. 157 Mass. 489; Ashcroft v. Eastern R. Co., 126 Mass. 196; Bean v. French, 140 Mass. 229; Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co. v. Chandler, 9 Allen (Mass.), 159; Curtis v. Gardner, 13 Met. (Mass.) 457; Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 73. See Baker v. Mott, 78 Hun (N. Y.), 141; Railroad Co. v. Malott, 135 Ind. 113; Walz v. Walz, 101 Mich. 167.

simple by deed. But, with regard to easements and servitudes created by reservation, the modern cases on both sides of the Atlantic have relaxed this strict, technical rule, and now seek to determine the extent of the right by getting at the intention of the parties to the instrument. In doing this, a clear distinction is drawn between the reservation of a common-law easement and that of the form of servitude which is called an easement in gross. The latter, being personal in its nature and not connected with any lands belonging to its owner, is conclusively presumed to have been intended to last for his life only, unless it is reserved to him and his heirs. But when the right retained is a common-law easement, and therefore appurtenant to land of the grantor, the presumption, in the absence of words or circumstances to show the contrary, is now usually that it is meant to be a permanent accession and benefit to that land.¹ As is explained above,² the question whether the privilege reserved is an easement in gross, — a mere personal right, — or is to be construed as appurtenant to some other estate, “must be determined by the fair interpretation of the grant or reservation creating the easement, aided, if necessary, by the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances.”³

c. Easements created by Implied Grant or Implied Reservation.

§ 138. **Implied Grant or Implied Reservation — Illustrations — Forms.** — The subject of easements arising by implication of law presents a broad field of inquiry. Whenever such rights are called into existence, in favor of either grantor or grantee, in the absence of words which can be construed as directly creating them, but for the purpose of enabling the owner of land properly to use and enjoy that which has been conveyed to him, or retained by him when he conveyed other land, they are easements created by implied grant;⁴ and in many in-

¹ Coudert v. Sayre, 46 N. J. Eq. 386, 395; Hagerty v. Lee, 54 N. J. L. 580; Cooper v. Louanstein, 37 N. J. Eq. 284; Newhoff v. Mayo, 48 N. J. Eq. 619; Schaefer v. Thompson, 116 N. Y. App. Div. 775; Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132; Mendell v. Delano, 7 Met. (Mass.) 176; Winthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307; Karmuller v. Krotz, 18 Iowa, 352; Whitney v. Union R. Co., 11 Gray

(Mass.), 359, 365; Kuecken v. Voltz, 110 Ill. 264.

² § 128, *supra*.

³ Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 549.

⁴ New Ipswich Factory v. Bachelder, 3 N. H. 190; Outerbridge v. Phelps, 13 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 117, 125; Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. An. 469; Jones, Ease. § 141.

stances such rights and duties are brought into existence and enforced so as to work out justice between parties between whom the relation of grantor and grantee does not exist, or as to whom there is no privity,¹ nor any other contractual relation. When, for example, a person has erected a mill, and for its use cut an artificial raceway through his own land, and then sells the mill, retaining the land through which the raceway passes, the right to use such waterway in connection with the mill granted continues annexed by implication to the mill as necessary to its beneficial use and enjoyment. Again, if the owner of a tract of land sell a portion of it entirely surrounded by that which he keeps, or a portion which entirely surrounds the part retained by himself, a way of necessity is at once implied in favor of the piece of land which is so enclosed. And purchasers of neighboring city lots, all from the same source of title, who take their deeds with uniform restrictive covenants therein restraining them from using their land in ways in which they might otherwise employ it, ordinarily have in a court of equity, raised by implication for the purpose of working out justice among them, the right to enjoin and prevent one another from breaking or violating such restrictive covenants. Numerous as are the cases such as these which the reports present, they may be grouped into three general classes, which are typified by the three illustrations just given. These three modes of creating easements by implied grant or reservation are: (a) *By severance of an entire piece of property and conveyance of a part thereof*, of which method the first of the above illustrations is an instance; (b) *By creating ways of necessity*, of which the second illustration is an example; and (c) *By raising equitable easements, or servitudes*, which are typified by the last of the above illustrations. By each of these modes of implied grant or reservation are brought into existence many varieties of easements, which are next to be examined in the order here indicated.

§ 139. (a) **Easements arising by Implication from the Severance of an Entire Piece of Property and Conveyance of a Part thereof.** — Accurately speaking, a person can not have an easement over his own land. If he burden a portion or tract of

¹ Privity is "mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property." 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 189, 523. There is such relationship between grantor and

grantee, ancestor and heir, or owners in common of land; but not, of course, between mere neighbors.

it in favor of another tract or portion, as by draining one piece over the other, or by building a house upon one part in such a manner that it is supported by the other part, he creates what *would be* an easement if the owner of one parcel of land had a right to enjoy it over the land of another; but it is at most only what some writers call a *quasi* easement so long as both tenements belong to the same proprietor.¹ If, with things in this condition, the two parts come into the hands of different persons, either by the owner's selling or otherwise transferring the piece which enjoys the right and retaining that upon which the burden rests, or by his conveying the servient parcel and keeping the dominant, an easement may be brought into existence, and such will usually be the result. One leading principle, upon which rests the creation of easements in this manner, is that the parties to the transfer are presumed to act with reference to the actual, visible, and known condition of the properties at the time, and to intend that the benefits and burdens manifestly belonging to each part of the entire tract shall remain unchanged.² And the other principle, which has caused a wide distinction to be made in this connection between implied *grants* and implied *reservations* of easements, is that a grant is to be construed most strongly against the grantor and in favor of the grantee.³ It is this last principle that compels us to consider the class of easement now before us under two subheads; namely, those created by implied *grant* and those created by implied *reservation*.

§ 140. **Easements created by Implied GRANT, upon Severance of Entire Tract of Land.** — The law is uniform, in England and throughout the United States, that, upon a severance of

¹ Such an adaptation of his property or properties by the same owner, so that one part shall enjoy a right or privilege to the detriment or burdening of another, corresponds to what in the French law is called *destination du père de famille*. Pardessus, *Traité des Servitudes*, 430, 431; Code Nap. art. 642; La. Civ. Code, art. 763; Seymour v. Lewis, 13 N. J. Eq. 439, 443. See Gale & What. Ease. 50-52; Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219.

² Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505; Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385; Curtiss v. Ayrault, 47 N. Y. 73; Simmons

v. Cloonan, 81 N. Y. 557; O'Rourke v. Smith, 11 R. I. 259; Brazier v. Glasspool (1901), W. N. Cas. 237.

When the incidents or *quasi* easements are open and visible, knowledge of their existence is inferred as to both grantor and grantee. Simmons v. Cloonan, 81 N. Y. 557; United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumn. (U. S.) 492.

³ Russell v. Watts, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 559, 572; Wells v. Garbutt, 132 N. Y. 430; Sullivan v. Ryan, 130 Mass. 116; Toothe v. Bryce, 50 N. J. Eq. 589; Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276, 289; Burns v. Gallagher, 62 Md. 462.

an entire tract of land by its owner and the transfer of the *dominant* portion, an easement arises in favor of the grantee in all those apparent and reasonably necessary appendages with which the land retained by the grantor has been encumbered in favor of that conveyed.¹ Or, as stated by the New York Court of Appeals, per O'Brien, J., "When the owner of a tract of land conveys a distinct part of it to another, he impliedly grants all those apparent and visible easements which at the time of the grant were in use by the owner for the benefit of the part so granted, and which are essential to a reasonable use and enjoyment of the estate conveyed. The rule is not limited to continuous easements or to cases where the use is absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the thing granted. It applies to those artificial arrangements which openly exist at the time of the sale, and materially affect the value of the thing granted."² Nor is it necessary that that which is thus claimed as an easement shall be in actual use at the time when the grant is made. It is sufficient that it is open, visible, and reasonably necessary, and that the grantor has knowledge of its existence. The grantee is then presumed to contract with reference to it and to intend to acquire it as a part of his purchase. In the case of *Spencer v. Kilmer*,³ from which the above-quoted language of the New York Court of Appeals is taken, the lessor of a parcel of land, upon which, pursuant to the requirements of the lease, the lessee had built fish ponds and then had laid conduits from the ponds to springs on adjoining land of the lessor not embraced in the lease, sold the property upon which the fish ponds were thus constructed for him "with the appurtenances," and retained title to the property where were the springs. At the time of the sale, some of the conduits were not in actual use; but all of them were there visible and ready to be used at any time, and the springs on the land of the grantor were the only reasonably available source of supply of water for the fish ponds. It was held that the right to

¹ *Wheeldon v. Burrows*, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 31; *Brazier v. Glasspool* (1901), W. N. Cas. 237; *Lampman v. Milks*, 21 N. Y. 505; *Spencer v. Kilmer*, 151 N. Y. 390. Also *Katz v. Kaiser*, 154 N. Y. 294, 298; *Wilson v. Wightman*, 36 N. Y. App. Div. 41; *Tooth v. Bryce*, 50 N. J. Eq. 589; *Johnson v. Jordan*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 234; *Case v.*

Minot, 158 Mass. 577; *Janes v. Jenkins*, 34 Md. 1; *Ingals v. Plamondon*, 75 Ill. 118; *Smith v. Lockwood*, 100 Minn. 221.

² *Spencer v. Kilmer*, 151 N. Y. 390, 398. Also *Snow v. Pulitzer*, 142 N. Y. 263; *Whalen v. Manchester Land Co.*, 65 N. J. L. 206.

³ 151 N. Y. 390.

conduct the water from the springs to the ponds, through the pipes thus laid, passed with the deed to the grantee. The ponds having been built for the grantor and with his knowledge, he was bound by the same rule as if he had placed them there himself. O'Brien, J., said further: "The thing which the defendant [the grantor] granted was the lot with the fish pond then in use, constituting a very important element in the value of the property. The principal appliances for maintaining it by supplying the water were open and visible, and the defendant knew that there was no reasonable way to maintain it without them." So, where the owner of two lots of land built on one of them a house, the cornice of which projected over the other lot, and then sold the house and the land on which it stood, it was held that neither he nor those who succeeded to his title to the vacant lot could prevent the grantee of the house from maintaining the cornice as thus constructed.¹ Such easements are not implied, however, when co-owners of land partition it by conveying at the same time separate pieces to each other,² nor when one owner of land divides it into separate parcels which he sells to different purchasers by one and the same transaction, unless it appear from the circumstances that such rights already in existence were *intended* to continue as easements.³ In these cases the courts more readily presume that each owner was intended to take his parcel in severalty, free and clear of any rights in the others; and, therefore, if easements are to arise from such a severance of an entire estate, they must be expressly granted or reserved, or their continuance must be a strict necessity, or the intent to bring them into existence must be otherwise clearly manifested.⁴

¹ Grace M. E. Church v. Dobbins, 153 Pa. St. 294. See Nichols v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121.

² Whyte v. Builders' League, 164 N. Y. 429.

³ Russell v. Watts, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 559; Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Met. (Mass.) 234; Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276; Huttmeier v. Albro, 18 N. Y. 48, 51; Ellis v. Bassett, 128 Ind. 118; Goodall v. Godfrey, 53 Vt. 219; Mason v. Horton, 67 Vt. 266; Burwell v. Hobson, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 322.

⁴ Referring to an easement created by the simultaneous sales of several lots by the same grantor, Lord Justice

Cotton said: "It really is not a reservation, but in order to make all those grants which are looked upon as one transaction available and effectual, it is considered that each of the grantees is to be looked upon as taking from the grantor, while he has still the power to give it, what it is right that he should get; so that there is an implicit grant against all the other grantees of those easements which will be reasonably necessary for the property which is conveyed." Russell v. Watts, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 559, 573. Also Blakely v. Sharp, 10 N. J. Eq. 206; Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251.

In order that an easement may arise by implied grant, it must be of value to the estate conveyed, and the grantee must be presumed to have taken it into consideration and paid for it in connection with his purchase.¹ It must also be "reasonably"² (though not absolutely) "necessary" to the use and enjoyment of that which is expressly granted. By this is said to be meant that, "if without alteration involving labor and expense, the convenience is fit and proper for the use of the property as it exists at the time of the conveyance, or so necessary in that sense, the easement passes."³ "The law gives a reasonable intendment in all such cases to the grant, and passes with the property all those easements and privileges which at the time belong to it and are in use as appurtenances."⁴ It must, moreover, be open and *apparent*, i. e. there must be some visible sign or mark, by which a person who was examining the entire property with reasonable care could discover that one portion of it was burdened in favor of another.⁵ Such are party-wall rights,⁶ an open ditch or canal,⁷ visible pipes used for conduits or aqueducts,⁸ and the like.⁹

¹ Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385; Curtiss v. Ayrault, 47 N. Y. 73; Simmons v. Cloonan, 81 N. Y. 557, 566; O'Rourke v. Smith, 11 R. I. 259; Henry v. Koch, 80 N. Y. 391. "On the other hand, the presumption that the parties contract with reference to the visible condition of the property at the time may be repelled by actual knowledge on the part of the contracting parties of facts, which negative any deduction to be drawn from the apparent condition." Jones, *Ease*, § 126; Simmons v. Cloonan, 81 N. Y. 557; United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumn. (U. S.) 492.

² Not *absolutely* necessary, but reasonably requisite. McElroy v. McLeary, 71 Vt. 396.

³ Howell v. Estes, 71 Tex. 690, 694; Preble v. Reed, 17 Me. 169; Sloat v. McDougall, 30 N. Y. St. Rep. 912; Snow v. Pulitzer, 142 N. Y. 263; Spencer v. Kilmer, 151 N. Y. 390.

⁴ United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumn. (U. S.) 492, 500.

⁵ Suffield v. Brown, 4 De G. J. & S. 185; United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumn. (U. S.) 492; Butterworth v.

Crawford, 46 N. Y. 349; Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. St. 178; Ingalls v. Plamondon, 75 Ill. 118; Providence Tool Co. v. Corliss Steam Engine Co., 9 R. I. 564; Sanderlin v. Baxter, 76 Va. 299.

⁶ Rogers v. Sinsheimer, 50 N. Y. 646; Griffiths v. Morrison, 106 N. Y. 165; Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 171.

⁷ Dodd v. Burchell, 1 Hurl. & C. 113; Hair v. Downing, 96 N. C. 172; Munsion v. Reid, 46 Hun (N. Y.), 399.

⁸ Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121; Wardle v. Brocklehurst, 1 El. & El. 1058; Butterworth v. Crawford, 46 N. Y. 349; Dolliff v. Boston & M. R. Co., 68 Me. 173.

⁹ The fact that a pipe, aqueduct, etc., is concealed from casual vision does not prevent it from being apparent within the requirement of this rule. If by ordinary inspection it would be discovered through marks, objects, or indications of any kind, this is sufficient to make it apparent. Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121; Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916; Watts v. Kelson, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 166; Toothe v. Bryce, 50 N. J.

It was formerly declared, also, that no such right or privilege could pass by implication, unless, when acquired as an easement, it would be *continuous* in its nature, i. e. would be enjoyed without the necessity of any act of man. This requirement is prominently dwelt on in the leading case of *Lampman v. Milks*,¹ and is mentioned as a prerequisite in many of the text-books and decided cases.² But most of the authorities which dwell on this requirement employ the word "continuous" in the sense of *permanent*, and not with its technical signification, to denote a continuous easement as above defined;³ and all that is actually required in this respect is that, from the visible and apparent disposition and arrangement of the parts of his property before the severance, it must appear that it was the purpose of the owner to create a permanent and common use and enjoyment of the one part for the benefit of the other.⁴ In the above quotation from the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in *Spencer v. Kilmer*⁵ we find these words: "The rule is not limited to *continuous* easements or to cases where the use is absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the thing granted. It applies to those artificial arrangements which *openly* exist at the time of the sale, and materially affect the value of the thing granted." While this utterance is only a *dictum*, the easement involved in that case being continuous in the strict, technical sense, yet it seems to be most fully in harmony with the reasons which give rise to easements by implied grant, and to have the support of the most carefully considered decisions with regard to such easements as are discontinuous but at the same time open and visible and apparently meant to be permanent.⁶

Eq. 589. And an easement or servitude is apparent if the parties have actual knowledge of its existence, or knowledge of facts which should put them as reasonable persons upon inquiry. *Larsen v. Peterson*, 53 N. J. Eq. 88. And see *Tabor v. Bradley*, 18 N. Y. 109.

¹ 21 N. Y. 505; *Jones, Ease.* §§ 143-147.

² See *Watts v. Kelson*, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 166; *Sullivan v. Ryan*, 130 Mass. 116; *Bolton v. Bolton*, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 968; *Parsons v. Johnson*, 68 N. Y. 62, 66. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island says: "The rule applies espe-

cially in favor of easements of air and light, lateral support, partition walls, drains, aqueducts, conduits, and water-pipes or spouts, all these being *continuous* easements technically so called, — that is to say, easements which are enjoyed without any active intervention of the party entitled to enjoy them." *O'Rorke v. Smith*, 11 R. I. 259, 263.

³ § 129, *supra*.

⁴ *John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Patterson*, 103 Ind. 582; *Francie's Appeal*, 96 Pa. St. 200; *Flint v. Bacon*, 13 Hun (N. Y.), 454.

⁵ 151 N. Y. 380, 391.

⁶ Cases cited above in connection

§ 141. Easements created by Implied RESERVATION upon Severance of Entire Tract of Land. — There are some weighty opinions and decisions, especially among the earlier cases, to the effect that an easement will as readily arise by implied reservation as by implied grant, — that if the owner of an entire tract of land, one piece of which enjoys a right or *quasi* easement over the other, convey the servient part and retain the dominant, an easement will be implied in his favor as freely and fully as it would have been implied against him if he had sold the portion which enjoyed the privilege and retained that which sustained the burden. The leading decision in support of this doctrine is the much-discussed and criticised case of *Pyer v. Carter*,¹ decided in 1857. In that case, the owner of two houses constructed a visible drain under both of them; and then sold, first the lower house, under which the other was drained, to one purchaser, and then the higher house to another purchaser. The vendee of the lower house stopped the drain. In an action against him by the second vendee, judgment was rendered in favor of the latter, although it was not shown that the vendee of the lower house had any actual knowledge of the drain at the time of his purchase. The court said that the defendant took his piece of the property subject to all the existing, apparent signs of servitude, and that by “apparent signs was to be understood not only those which must necessarily be seen, but those which may be seen or known on a careful inspection by a person ordinarily conversant with the subject.”² The purchaser of the upper house bought it with the right to the drain existing as an easement appurtenant. The principle thus enunciated has been adhered to in some of the United States, such as New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Illinois, North and South Carolina, and perhaps some others;³ and it was followed by the earlier decisions in New York and New Jersey.⁴

with this section; *Brazier v. Glasspool* (1901), W. N. Cas. 237; *Barkshire v. Grubb*, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 616; *Thomson v. Waterlow*, 6 Eq. 36; *Bolton v. Bolton*, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 958; *Parsons v. Johnson*, 68 N. Y. 62, 66; *Jones, Ease*, § 195.

¹ 1 H. & N. 916.

² 1 H. & N. 916, 922.

³ *Dunkles v. Wilton R. Co.*, 24 N. H. 489; *Harwood v. Benton*, 32 Vt. 724; *Ormsby v. Pinkerton*, 159 Pa. St. 458;

Geible v. Smith, 146 Pa. St. 276; *Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Wallace*, 219 Pa. St. 457; *Cihak v. Klekr*, 117 Ill. 643; *Hair v. Downing*, 96 N. C. 172; *Crosland v. Rogers*, 32 S. C. 130; *Steinke v. Bentley*, 6 Ind. App. 663.

⁴ *Lampman v. Milks*, 21 N. Y. 505; *Outerbridge v. Phelps*, 13 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 117; *Kelly v. Dunning*, 43 N. J. Eq. 62; *Fetters v. Humphreys*, 18 N. J. Eq. 260. See La. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 769.

But the case of *Pyer v. Carter* has been so thoroughly disapproved in England that it is practically overruled;¹ and in this country the decisions of many of the best courts deny that an easement can be as readily reserved for the grantor as implied in favor of the grantee.² This is upon the principle that a deed is to be most strictly construed against the grantor, and, further, that a grantor shall not be permitted to derogate from his own grant. The purchaser may have the benefit of all fair implications and intendments; and so the severance of an entire tract may impliedly confer upon him an easement, if it be *reasonably necessary* to the enjoyment of his property. But, say these later cases, the general rule is that the vendor can not have the benefit of any such presumptions, to the impairment of that which he has expressly granted; and, when he is to have an easement over land that he has absolutely conveyed, he must be able to establish it by express contract or reservation. Such is now the settled law of New York,³

¹ *Suffield v. Brown*, 4 De G. J. & S. 185, 196 (1864); *Brown v. Alabaster*, L. R. 37 Ch. Div. 490; *Russell v. Watts*, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 559; *Ford v. Met. R. Co.*, L. R. 17 Q. B. Div. 12, 27; *Pollard v. Gare* (1901), 1 Ch. 834.

² *Wells v. Garbutt*, 132 N. Y. 430; *Sloat v. McDougall*, 30 N. Y. St. Rep. 912, 9 N. Y. Supp. 631; *Sullivan v. Ryan*, 130 Mass. 116; *Carbrey v. Willis*, 7 Allen (Mass.), 364; *Warren v. Blake*, 54 Me. 276; *Stevens v. Orr*, 69 Me. 323; *Tooth v. Bryce*, 50 N. J. Eq. 589; *Larsen v. Peterson*, 53 N. J. Eq. 88; *Burns v. Gallagher*, 62 Md. 462; *Mitchel v. Seipel*, 53 Md. 251; *Scott v. Bentel*, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 7; *Walker v. Clifford*, 29 So. Rep. 588 (Ala.).

³ *Wells v. Garbutt*, 132 N. Y. 430; *Paine v. Chandler*, 134 N. Y. 385; *Sloat v. McDougall*, 30 N. Y. St. Rep. 912. In *Wells v. Garbutt*, Vann, J., said, at p. 435: "As a grantor cannot derogate from his own grant, while a grantee may take the language of the deed most strongly in his favor, the law will imply an easement in favor of a grantee more readily than it will in favor of a grantor, and this distinction explains many of the apparent inconsistencies in the reported cases. Some learned judges, in considering what may be

termed an implied grant, as distinguished from an implied reservation, without, however, mentioning the distinction, have used language apparently applicable to all easements existing by implication, when, in fact, intended to be limited to those existing in favor of a grantee. Others, in deciding that an easement was impliedly created by a grant and conveyed to the grantee, have gone farther in their discussion than the point involved required and have broadly declared the rule to be reciprocal and applicable alike to benefits conferred and burdens imposed, provided the marks of either were open and visible. Such was the case of *Lampman v. Milks*, 21 N. Y. 505, where the discussion outran the decision, for, while it was decided that, on the facts then appearing, an easement should be implied in favor of the grantee, against the grantor and his remaining lands, it was asserted that under like circumstances an easement would be implied in favor of the grantor, against the grantee and his lands. The latter proposition was involved neither in the case decided, nor in any of those called upon to support it, except such as have since been overruled, either expressly or impliedly."

New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maine, Maryland, Virginia, and Mississippi.¹

While such is the general rule as to creation of easements by implied reservation, there are some important exceptions to it, which are recognized by all courts and which are next to be examined.

§ 142. **Classes of Easements which may be created by Implied Reservation.** — The general principle is that a grantor can not derogate from his own grant. Yet, even in those jurisdictions where this maxim is most rigidly enforced, there are two well-recognized classes of cases in which the grantor must be accorded an easement over the property conveyed, although his deed is silent upon the matter. One of these is where there are mutual easements or servitudes required by both parties to the contract; as where the owner of two houses which mutually support each other, or both of which rest upon a wall, — as a party wall, — sells one and retains title to the other. Here, just as an easement in the right to support passes by implication to the grantee, so, as a matter of logical necessity, a similar easement is impliedly reserved to the grantor.² The other class embraces those rights and privileges which are *absolutely or for all practical purposes necessary* to the enjoyment by the grantor of the property retained by him, as where a man continues to own a lot of land entirely surrounded by other land which he sells. He then has a right of way of necessity, although the deed by which he transfers the surrounding property make no mention of any such right.³

§ 143. (b) **Ways of Necessity — How they arise.** — The creation of easements by implied grant or reservation as thus far discussed, where an entire tract or estate is divided and a portion of it conveyed, ordinarily results from the fact that, before such division, one part of the property was encumbered in favor of the other with a distinct and well-defined ease, burden, or servitude, and the separation of the two pieces caused this to become a complete easement. Thus, if one who has established a drain from his house over his adjacent lot sell the former and retain the latter, the right to the

¹ Last note but one; also *Crosland v. Rogers*, 32 S. C. 130, 133; *Bonelli v. Blakemore*, 66 Miss. 136.

² *Richards v. Rose*, 9 Exch. 218; *Snow v. Pulitzer*, 142 N. Y. 263; *Powers v. Heffernan*, 233 Ill. 597.

³ The right of *way of necessity*, which is *the* illustration of this class, is more fully explained in the following sections.

drain as *then existing* and reasonably necessary becomes an easement belonging to the purchaser. A way of necessity differs from cases such as this, in that, while it always springs from an implied grant or reservation resulting from some division of land into at least two distinct pieces, it does not require that any defined and known way as such shall have previously existed over the one parcel and in favor of the other. The fact alone that the purchaser of a thing can not use it for any beneficial purpose, without the enjoyment of some right or privilege in connection with other property of the vendor, causes the law to presume that the parties intended that right or privilege to pass with the grant, though it did not before distinctively exist; and in like manner the fact alone that the vendor can not use for any beneficial purpose that which remains to him, unless he enjoy some right or privilege over what he has conveyed, causes the law to presume a reservation of such right or privilege.¹ Hence, when a conveyance is made of a lot of land entirely surrounded by other land of the vendor, or surrounded partly by his land and partly by that of other persons through which no available way exists for the grantee; or when, under like conditions, the grantor retains the lot so enclosed and conveys the other portion of his property, a way of necessity is thereby brought into existence for the benefit of the owner of the parcel thus surrounded.² The circumstances may be such as to cause this way to be located over a road already in existence; but if there be no such road or none that is suitable, the owner of the servient tenement has the right to designate where one shall exist, provided he makes it reasonably convenient for the enjoyment of the dominant property.³ In accordance with the general principle, however, that no implication runs against the state, a legislative grant or other conveyance by the state has been held not to pass with it a way of necessity.⁴

¹ Warren *v.* Blake, 54 Me. 276.

² Pomfret *v.* Ricroft, 1 Saund. pp. *320, *323, No. 6; Clark *v.* Cogge, Cro. Jac. 170; Howton *v.* Frearson, 8 T. R. 50; Gayford *v.* Moffatt, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 133; Palmer *v.* Palmer, 150 N. Y. 139; Bass *v.* Edwards, 126 Mass. 445; Seymour *v.* Lewis, 13 N. J. L. 439, 444; Ogden *v.* Grove, 38 Pa. St. 487; Collins *v.* Prentice, 15 Conn. 39; Woodworth *v.* Raymond, 51 Conn. 70, 75; Dee *v.*

King, 73 Vt. 375; Stewart *v.* Hartman, 46 Ind. 331.

³ Pearson *v.* Spencer, 1 B. & S. 571; Palmer *v.* Palmer, 150 N. Y. 139; Schmidt *v.* Quinn, 136 Mass. 575; Bolton *v.* Bolton, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 968; Kripp *v.* Curtis, 71 Cal. 62; Cheney *v.* O'Brien, 69 Cal. 199; Capers *v.* Wilson, 3 McCord (S. C.), 170.

⁴ Pearne *v.* Cold Creek M. & M. Co., 90 Tenn. 619.

It is not the necessity alone, but the implied grant or reservation that gives rise to a way of this kind. "Such a way is not created by mere necessity, but always originates in some grant or change of ownership, to which it is attached, by construction as a necessary incident, presumed to have been intended by the parties."¹ Therefore it can not arise over the property of one who is a stranger to the transaction by which land is conveyed and acquired.² To bring it into existence one of the parcels or tracts involved must be conveyed, or its ownership must be changed by operation of law. Such direct transfer, by act of the parties, may be made by deed, or devise, or by a partition among co-owners;³ and a sale of land on execution, or pursuant to the judgment of a competent court, is an illustration of its passing by operation of law.⁴ When a way has sprung up through any such transaction, it endures, as the property of the owner of the dominant estate and the successors to his title, as long as the necessity continues.⁵

§ 144. **Founded on Necessity.** — There must be a *necessity* for its use in connection with the enclosed parcel of land, in order that such a way may come into existence. The fact that it is very convenient, or more convenient than some other means of access, will not suffice.⁶ Thus, where the

¹ *Woodworth v. Raymond*, 51 Conn. 70, 75; *Stewart v. Hartman*, 46 Ind. 331; *Tracy v. Atherton*, 35 Vt. 52.

² *Bullard v. Harrison*, 4 M. & S. 387; *Proctor v. Hodgson*, 10 Exch. 824; *Woodworth v. Raymond*, 51 Conn. 70. "If a man can be supposed to hold land without any right of access to it, a grant of it would not convey to the grantee any right to pass over the adjoining land, however necessary it might be to the enjoyment of the thing granted. He would acquire nothing more than the grantor held." *Nichols v. Luce*, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102, 104.

³ *Palmer v. Palmer*, 150 N. Y. 139; *Viall v. Carpenter*, 14 Gray (Mass.), 126; *Murphy v. Lincoln*, 63 Vt. 278; *Ellis v. Bassett*, 128 Ind. 118; *Blum v. Weston*, 102 Cal. 362.

⁴ *Pernam v. Wead*, 2 Mass. 203; *Schmidt v. Quinn*, 136 Mass. 575; *Smith v. Tarbox*, 31 Conn. 585; *White v. Story*, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 543, 549; *Val-*

ley Falls Co. v. Dolan, 9 R. I. 489. But where land was taken by condemnation proceedings for a school, and no attempt was made to condemn any way to it, although it was land-locked, no way of necessity existed—none could be implied under such conditions. *Banks v. School Directors*, 194 Ill. 274.

⁵ *Logan v. Stogsdale*, 123 Ind. 372; *Taylor v. Warnaky*, 55 Cal. 350.

⁶ *Proctor v. Hodgson*, 10 Exch. 824; *Holmes v. Goring*, 2 Bing. 76; *London v. Riggs*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 798; *Union L. Co. v. London G. D. Co.* (1902), 2 Ch. 557; *Palmer v. Palmer*, 150 N. Y. 139; *Ogden v. Jennings*, 62 N. Y. 526; *Bascom v. Cannon*, 158 Pa. St. 225; *Stuyvesant v. Woodruff*, 21 N. J. L. 133; *Quimby v. Straw*, 71 N. H. 160; *Dee v. King*, 73 Vt. 375. There are some early *dicta* to the effect that the way will arise if it be *reasonably* convenient though not strictly necessary. In one case, Lord Mansfield said: "I know

purchased property is surrounded on three sides by land of the vendor and on the other one by the ocean or other navigable body of water, while the approach by land might be much the easier and shorter, yet, since the vendee *can* reach his lot by using a boat, he has no right by implication to pass over his grantor's adjacent premises.¹ So, if the grantee can reach his property over a public highway, though it be long and round about,² or if he have a steep, narrow, and inconvenient road across land of a third party,³ no way of necessity arises in his favor. And the fact that it is much cheaper to float logs from the lot granted, down a non-navigable stream which flows over land of the grantor, does not give a way of necessity down that stream, when there is another way out by railroad.⁴

The older books and cases use language to the effect that the necessity must be absolute, — i. e. that there must be no other means whatever of getting to the land, — in order that a way of necessity shall be brought into existence. But the better statement of the rule, which is sustained by the latest and best decisions, seems to be that such a way will arise when, without it, there could be no practical use of the enclosed property, or it could not be used in the manner or for the purpose manifestly intended by the parties to the conveyance.⁵ If, for example, the consideration for the enclosed parcel were five thousand dollars, and it would cost five hundred thousand dollars to construct any approach to it, other than one over the vendor's adjacent land, a way of necessity would be implied.⁶

not how it has been expounded, but it would not be a great stretch to call that a necessary way without which the most convenient and reasonable mode of enjoying the premises could not be had." *Morris v. Edgington*, 3 Taunt. 24, 31. See also *Pheysey v. Vicary*, 16 M. & W. 484; *Lawton v. Rivers*, 2 McCord (S. C.), 445; *Alley v. Carleton*, 29 Tex. 74; *Watts v. Kelson*, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 166, 175.

¹ *Kingsley v. Goldsborough Land Imp. Co.*, 86 Me. 279; *Turnbull v. Rivers*, 3 McCord (S. C.), 131; *Lawton v. Rivers*, 2 McCord (S. C.), 445; *Burlew v. Hunter*, 41 N. Y. App. Div. 148, 151. But see *Jay v. Michael*, 92 Md. 198.

² *Vossen v. Dautel*, 116 Mo. 379;

Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 49; *Stuyvesant v. Woodruff*, 21 N. J. L. 133.

³ *Dodd v. Burchell*, 1 Hurl. & C. 113; *Carey v. Rae*, 58 Cal. 159; *Kripp v. Curtis*, 71 Cal. 62; *M'Donald v. Lindall*, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 492; *Leonard v. Leonard*, 2 Allen (Mass.), 543.

⁴ *De Camp v. Thompson*, 16 N. Y. App. Div. 528, 531.

⁵ *Schmidt v. Quinn*, 136 Mass. 575; *Paine v. Chandler*, 134 N. Y. 385; *O'Rorke v. Smith*, 11 R. I. 259; *Thompson v. Miner*, 30 Iowa, 386.

⁶ *Pettingill v. Porter*, 8 Allen (Mass.), 1, 6; *Paine v. Chandler*, 134 N. Y. 385; *Smith v. Griffin*, 14 Colo. 429; *Oliver v. Pitman*, 98 Mass. 46, 50; *Goodall v. Godfrey*, 53 Vt. 219.

§ 145. **Termination of Ways of Necessity — Their Suspension.** — All the ordinary methods of destroying and suspending easements (which methods are fully examined hereafter)¹ apply generally to a way of necessity. By clear, express contract, for example, a man may release and do away with such a privilege, even though the effect be to shut him off from all access to his own land.² But, dependent as it is upon necessity, this sort of a way has, as its own, peculiar, additional cause for ceasing to exist, the ending of the necessity. When the necessity no longer continues, the way terminates.³ This may be brought about by the opening of a public highway through or along the dominant tenement,⁴ or by the owner of that tenement acquiring another road or path over other land,⁵ or by his purchase of more land, thus enabling himself to reach an existing thoroughfare,⁶ or by the coming of the dominant and servient estates into the same hands at the same time and in the same right,⁷ or by any other transaction by which is brought to an end the necessity for the way which was impliedly granted.⁸

While a way of necessity is extinguished by the coming together of the dominant and servient estates in the same hands, at the same time and in the same right — it being often said in such a case that the right is *merged*, though the technically accurate expression is that it is *extinguished* — yet it may readily be brought again into existence and pass with the dominant estate upon the subsequent conveyance of that tenement alone to another person.⁹ So the way of necessity may be suspended for a time, as by the leasing of one tenement for a term of years or for life by the owner of the other

¹ §§ 187–195, *infra*.

² *Richards v. Attleborough Branch R. R.*, 153 Mass. 120. See *Symmes v. Drew*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 278; *Goodall v. Godfrey*, 53 Vt. 219.

³ *Palmer v. Palmer*, 150 N. Y. 139; *Holmes v. Seeley*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 507; *Fritz v. Tompkins*, 41 N. Y. Supp. 985; *Rowell v. Doggett*, 143 Mass. 483, 489; *Whitehouse v. Cummings*, 83 Me. 91; *Seeley v. Bishop*, 19 Conn. 128; *Wissler v. Hershey*, 23 Pa. St. 333.

⁴ *Palmer v. Palmer*, 71 Hun, 30, *aff'd* 150 N. Y. 139; *Abbott v. Stewartstown*, 47 N. H. 228.

⁵ *Holmes v. Goring*, 2 Bing. 76; *N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Milnor*, 1 Barb.

Ch. (N. Y.) 353; *Viall v. Carpenter*, 14 Gray (Mass.), 126.

⁶ *Ballard v. Demmon*, 156 Mass. 449; *Baker v. Crosby*, 9 Gray (Mass.), 421; *Carbonic Acid Gas Co. v. Geysers Gas Co.*, 72 N. Y. App. Div. 304.

⁷ *Brown v. Berry*, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 98.

⁸ *Morris v. Edgington*, 3 Taunt. 24; *Pierce v. Selleck*, 18 Conn. 321; *Nichols v. Luce*, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102; *Gayetty v. Bethune*, 14 Mass. 49; *Alley v. Carleton*, 29 Tex. 74; *Woodr. Ways*, 72.

⁹ *Brown v. Berry*, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 98.

tenement; and it will revive when the lease ends and the two parcels of land pass again into the possession of their different owners.¹

§ 146. **Location and Change of Ways of Necessity.** — The kind of easement now under discussion is usually, at the outset, undefined as to place. If before the conveyance of the land a convenient way had been in use for the benefit of the dominant tenement, it would ordinarily be understood that the same should be continued.² Otherwise, the parties may agree on the location of the way and may change it as often as both concur.³ But, when, as is ordinarily the case, it is to be designated anew and the parties to the purchase and sale have not agreed as to its location, the right to determine where the route shall lie rests with him over whose lands it is to be, provided that, upon request, he place it so that it shall be reasonably convenient to him by whom it is to be enjoyed.⁴ If, upon being asked to do so, the owner of the servient tenement fail to designate a suitable place for the way, the owner of the dominant tenement may locate it; but in doing so he must have due regard to the convenience and interests of the servient proprietor.⁵

As a rule, there can be only one way of necessity. And, therefore, where the grantor had been accustomed to use two different roads to the parcel of land conveyed and they both lay over other property of his own, he had the right to close one of them and leave only the other for the use of the grantee.⁶

¹ Such a right is not lost, extinguished, nor suspended by mere non-user; but, if the servient owner adversely obstruct it for the period of twenty years, it may be thereby destroyed. *Smiles v. Hastings*, 24 Barb. 44, 22 N. Y. 217. See how easements may be lost, destroyed, or suspended, §§ 187-195, *infra*.

² *Barnard v. Lloyd*, 85 Cal. 131; *Whitehouse v. Cummings*, 83 Me. 91; *Ellis v. Bassett*, 128 Ind. 118; *Chase v. Hall*, 41 Mo. App. 15. See *Bass v. Edwards*, 126 Mass. 445.

³ *Smith v. Lee*, 14 Gray (Mass.), 473; *Rumill v. Robbins*, 77 Me. 193.

⁴ *Bolton v. Bolton*, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 968; *Capers v. Wilson*, 3 McCord (S. C.), 170; *Palmer v. Palmer*, 150 N. Y. 139; *Schmidt v. Quinn*, 136

Mass. 575; *Dunham v. Pitkin*, 53 Mich. 504; *Kripp v. Curtis*, 71 Cal. 62; *Hart v. Connor*, 25 Conn. 331; 2 Rolle Abr. pl. 17.

⁵ *Palmer v. Palmer*, 150 N. Y. 139; *Burlew v. Hunter*, 41 N. Y. App. Div. 148, 151; *Nichols v. Luce*, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102, 104; *Morris v. Edgington*, 3 Taunt. 24; *Holmes v. Seely*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 507.

⁶ *Bolton v. Bolton*, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 968. But of course distinct parcels conveyed by the same grant may each give rise to a separate way of necessity. See *Nichols v. Luce*, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102. In *Bolton v. Bolton* it is said that the grantor, if he keep the landlocked piece, — the dominant tenement, — may select the way.

After a way of necessity has been once designated by express agreement of the parties, or located by one and used by the other in such a manner as to imply his acquiescence, it can not be changed by either without the other's consent. The fact that the owner of such a right uses, for a considerable length of time without protest, the road or path fixed upon by the other party is usually sufficient to prove his acceptance of that particular way.¹

§ 147. **To what Extent Ways of Necessity may be used.** — When a way of necessity manifestly arises for some particular purpose only, the use of it is restricted to the accomplishment of that purpose. Thus, in a case where the land-locked property conveyed was a mill-dam and race, and the only reason for the existence of a way was to enable the grantee to make repairs to them, he was restricted to a reasonable use of the grantor's land for that one purpose, and could not prevent the latter from cultivating the soil over which the right existed, so long as this did not interfere with such enjoyment of the way.² When, however, there is no such restriction on the extent to which the owner of such easement may employ it, the law of England and of all the states of this country permits it to be used for all the purposes for which it may be required in order that there may be a full enjoyment of the dominant tenement as it is at the time of the conveyance.³ The parties contract with reference to the enclosed piece of land as it is situated when their agreement is made; and the condition of that piece at that point of time, or its condition as then clearly contemplated by them, will determine the *maximum* use to be made of the way of necessity to which the transfer gives rise. When, for example, the enclosed parcel is used for the carrying on of a particular kind of business, or is purchased with a view on the part of the grantee of conducting such business thereon, which fact is known by the grantor or reasonably presumed to be known by him, an adequate way for that purpose is implied.⁴ And, on the sale of land to one who has notice that the vendor is

¹ *Pearson v. Spencer*, 1 B. & S. 571; *Palmer v. Palmer*, 150 N. Y. 139; *Hines v. Hamburger*, 14 N. Y. App. Div. 577; *Smith v. Lee*, 14 Gray (Mass.), 473. See *Rumill v. Robbins*, 77 Me. 193; *Abbott v. Stewartson*, 47 N. H. 228.

² *M'Tavish v. Carroll*, 7 Md. 352.

³ *London v. Riggs*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div.

798; *Serff v. Acton Local Board*, L. R. 31 Ch. Div. 679; *Gayford v. Moffatt*, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 133; *Myers v. Dunn*, 49 Conn. 71; *Whittier v. Winkley*, 62 N. H. 338.

⁴ *Serff v. Acton Local Board*, L. R. 31 Ch. Div. 679.

going to divide up adjoining property into building lots in such a manner as to make a road over the property purchased practically indispensable, such road becomes a way of necessity reserved for the grantor.¹

When the law upon this topic is stated as above, the limit placed by the English courts upon the implication of the right to use ways of necessity is practically reached. But the prevailing principle in the United States is that the owner of the dominant tenement may enjoy such an easement, not only to the extent and for the purposes demanded by the situation of his property at the time of the grant, or in the way then contemplated by the parties to the transaction, but also in such manner as is requisite to the use of his land at any time for lawful objects.² "If," says the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, "the parties supposed a way passed as a necessary incident of the grant, how can it be inferred that they intended only a way for a particular purpose, when they knew the land was capable of being used for many purposes?"³ It is, accordingly, held that the proprietor of such a right, who employs his land for the erection thereon of a dwelling-house, may use the way to walk over, drive over, and haul such articles over as are required for the convenient enjoyment of the property by himself and his family. So the owner of an upper story of a building, the lower part of which belongs to another person, may use the stairways and halls through the parts below him, so far as is required for the proper enjoyment of his property, whether or not such use was contemplated at the time when the portions of the house passed into the hands of the different proprietors.⁴

A way of necessity, having been once located, can not be subsequently prolonged and increased by its owner, so as to

¹ *Davies v. Sear*, 7 Eq. 427.

² *Myers v. Dunn*, 49 Conn. 71; *Camp v. Whitman*, 51 N. J. Eq. 467.

³ *Whittier v. Winkley*, 62 N. H. 338.

⁴ *Thompson v. Miner*, 30 Iowa, 386; *Morrison v. King*, 62 Ill. 30; *Benedict v. Barling*, 79 Wis. 551; *Mayo v. Newhoff*, 47 N. J. Eq. 31; *Pierce v. Cleland*, 133 Pa. St. 189; *Nat. Exch. Bk. v. Cunningham*, 46 Ohio St. 575. It may be noted here, however, that such a way through the lower stories of a house would terminate upon the destruction of the house by accident or decay, un-

less the two owners concurred in restoring it to the same condition in which it had previously existed. Such destruction would do away with all the interest in the house of the owner of the upper part. But, if the owner of the lower part co-operated in restoring the building to its original condition, this would restore his corporeal property to the former owner of the upper portion, and with it the way through the lower stories. *Douglas v. Coonley*, 156 N. Y. 521.

become more burdensome. Thus, if a highway to which it at first leads be closed, it can not be extended over land of the grantor to another highway.¹ Nor can it be used for the benefit of land other than that for which it was originally created. If, for example, its owner purchase from a third party a lot of land adjoining that in favor of which the right exists, he must not go over the way for the purpose of reaching the newly acquired parcel, even though he attempt to do so by going first upon the land to which the way belongs.² When he passes from the latter piece to the former, the question as to whether or not he went over the way to enable him to do so is one of fact for the jury. "Did he use the way to get to the dominant estate, or was the use of it merely colorable to get to the lot beyond." If the latter, he was guilty of trespass.³

§ 148. (c) **Equitable Easements**—defined and illustrated.—From covenants or conditions in deeds, and even from oral agreements or representations, equity frequently raises or implies easements which are not recognized in a court of law. These are always negative in character. Hence, they are often designated as *negative equitable easements*. They are brought into existence and enforced by courts of equity, for the purpose of working out justice between owners of neighboring lands, and in disregard of the existence or non-existence of privity, or contractual or conventional relationship of any kind between such neighbors.⁴ Their most prominent and frequent illustration is presented by the owner of a tract of land selling it off in separate lots or parcels to different purchasers and inserting in the deeds, or otherwise imposing upon the vendees, stipulations as to the kinds of buildings which may be erected upon the property, or the trades or sorts of business which may be there carried on, or the uses in other respects to which it may be put.⁵ When such agreements evince a

¹ The remedy of the landowner, whose access to his property is thus cut off, is against the public for the damages caused by the closing of the highway. *Morse v. Benson*, 151 Mass. 440.

² *Howell v. King*, 1 Mod. 190; *Lawton v. Ward*, 1 Ld. Raym. 75; *Davenport v. Lameon*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 72; *Greene v. Canny*, 137 Mass. 64, 69; *French v. Marstin*, 32 N. H. 316; *Wool-*

rych on Ways, p. *34. See § 198, *infra*.

³ *Skull v. Glenister*, 16 C. B. N. S. 81, 102. See *London v. Riggs*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 798; *N. Y. L. Ins. & T. Co. v. Milnor*, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 353.

⁴ See definition and illustrations of privity, p. 168, note 1, *supra*.

⁵ *Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Brennan*, 148 N. Y. 661; *Tobey v. Moore*, 130 Mass. 448.

uniform, general plan of a common grantor or mutual grantors with respect to the manner of improvement and occupation of the land, and are not exclusively for the benefit of the grantor, but are meant to be for the advantage generally of the entire tract, equity will enjoin the breach of them by any of the grantees, upon the suit of any of the other lot owners.¹ Equitable easements may, accordingly, be defined as those rights, which a court of equity alone accords to landowners, to restrain neighboring proprietors from using their land in ways in which it might be freely employed but for the existence of restrictive covenants, conditions, or stipulations affecting beneficially and usually in substantially the same manner all the parcels involved. Thus, where the owner of several lots of land sold them to different purchasers, and it was stipulated in the deeds that no house to be built thereon should be set within ten feet of the line of the street, it was held that there were thereby created, in respect to the various pieces, mutual easements and servitudes, which equity would enforce, by enjoining the violation of their terms, among the grantees and their successors in interest.² So, in a case in which the covenants in the deeds were that the grantees would not erect or permit to be erected, on the property conveyed, any livery-stable, slaughter-house, etc. (enumerating various trades "offensive to the neighboring inhabitants"), each purchaser had an easement against all the other lots, to prevent their owners from establishing or maintaining any of those trades upon them.³

§ 149. **Requisites of Equitable Easements.**—It is to be noticed that equitable easements are most commonly mutual or reciprocal rights, which the landowners have, the one against the other. Each lot is a dominant tenement, as to all the others involved in the general plan, and a servient tenement in favor of each of those others. In order that such rights and duties shall spring into existence, it is necessary, *in the first place*, that the restrictions placed upon all the parcels involved in a general scheme shall be substantially the same, and imposed by a common grantor or mutual grantors. A lot affected

¹ Last preceding note.

² *Winfield v. Hennesy*, 6 C. E. Green (N. J.), 188, 190; *Tallmadge v. The East River Bank*, 26 N. Y. 105.

³ *Barrow v. Richards*, 8 Paige (N.Y.), 351. It is, in a sense, illogical to discuss equitable easements under the head

of implied grant. They are not legal grants; yet they are, so to speak, equitably implied grants arising from the severance of an entire tract, and so they are best treated of in the present connection.

by one kind of covenant or stipulation can not enjoy an equitable easement over another, the only restrictions on which are materially different, since there is no general scheme of improvement or development.¹ And, if A convey an entire tract of land to B, with a restrictive covenant which B does not insert in the deeds whereby he transfers separate lots therefrom to different purchasers, the latter acquire no equitable easements through that covenant.² One grantor, or he and his successors in interest, or the purchasers among themselves, must affect the separate lots with substantially uniform restrictions, in order thus to give rise to such easements.

Secondly, there must appear, either in the express terms of the agreement or by necessary implication from all the circumstances, a clear intention to establish the restriction for the benefit of the land generally and that of the person suing. In *Badger v. Boardman*,³ the first deed, which was of a house and lot, contained a covenant that no shed or outbuilding at the rear of the house should ever be built any higher than the one then existing. Subsequently the same vendor sold his other and adjoining lot to another purchaser, who sought to restrain the first vendee from increasing the height of the shed. But the court of equity refused to grant the relief asked for, because there was nothing in the deeds or circumstances of the case to show that the restriction as to the defendant's building was intended to inure to the benefit of the plaintiff or his land.⁴ "If the covenant is silent;" says the New York Court of Appeals, "if there is no mutual agreement or understanding between the various owners creating an easement; if there is nothing in the surrounding circumstances from which mutual rights can be fairly inferred, then no action can be maintained."⁵

Thirdly, those against whose property the equitable easement is sought to be enforced must have notice that the re-

¹ Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Brennan, 148 N. Y. 661; Everett v. Remington (1892), 3 Ch. 148; Beale v. Case, 138 Mass. 138; Boston B. S. U. v. Trustees of Boston University, 183 Mass. 202.

² Korn v. Campbell, 192 N. Y. 490.

³ 16 Gray (Mass.), 559.

⁴ See also Woodhaven Junction

Land Co. v. Solly, 148 N. Y. 42; Sharp v. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381.

⁵ Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Brennan, 148 N. Y. 661, 672. See Barrow v. Richards, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 351; Brouwer v. Jones, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 153; Seymour v. McDonald, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 502; Lattimer v. Livermore, 72 N. Y. 174; Skinner v. Shepherd, 130 Mass. 180.

striction was intended for the benefit of the land of him who is endeavoring to assert the right. "It is not necessary in order to sustain the action that there should be privity either of estate or of contract; nor is it essential that an action at law should be maintainable on the covenant; but there must be found somewhere the clear intent to establish the restriction for the benefit of the party suing or his grantor, *of which right the defendant must have either actual or constructive notice.*"¹ And the record of the deed is sufficient notice of the existence of that right.²

§ 150. **Forms of Contract from which Equitable Easements arise.** — The most common forms of agreement from which easements are implied by courts of equity are covenants by vendees in deeds of conveyance, i. e. stipulations whereby the purchasers undertake that the property shall or shall not be used in specified ways or for designated purposes. Illustrations of these have already been given in those cases in which stand-back covenants, so-called, require any house built upon the land to be a certain distance from the street line,³ and in those restrictions against nuisances, which are so often found in deeds and which prohibit the carrying on, upon the property, of certain trades or kinds of business.⁴ When the contract takes simply the form of a covenant, and no conditional element is annexed, then, upon its breach, the grantor may either sue the grantee at law for damages or enjoin him in equity from any further violation of his agreement; but the mere infraction of a covenant by the purchaser gives no right to the vendor or those who succeed to his interests to re-enter and take back the property.⁵ Whenever, then, the stipulations in the deeds are *covenants*, each grantee has an equitable easement against his neighbors who are restricted in substantially the same manner as himself in conveyances from the same grantor.

In the few cases in which the question has been presented to the courts, it has been also held that neighboring land-

¹ Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Brennan, 148 N. Y. 661, 671.

² Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546. A covenant against encumbrances in a deed of conveyance is broken by the existence of an equitable easement against the property conveyed. Kramer v. Carter, 136 Mass. 504; Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184.

³ Winfield v. Heunesy, 6 C. E. Green (N. J.), 188, 190; § 148, *supra*.

⁴ Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440; Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311; Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93; De Gray v. Monmouth, B. C. H. Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 340.

⁵ Stuyvesant v. Mayor, etc., 11 Paige (N. Y.), 414, 427.

owners, who claim under the same grantor and through his deeds containing similar restrictive *conditions* — i. e. stipulations upon the violation of which the grantor or his heirs may re-enter and take back the property — are entitled to equitable easements against one another and may prevent, by injunction, the breach of the conditions.¹

The principle, upon which rests the class of easements now under discussion, is that, where adjoining and neighboring lot owners are permanently bound in conscience and good morals to abstain from employing their properties in certain ways, equity will compel any one or more of them, at the suit of any other, to abstain from violating such obligation; and this without regard to any privity either of contract or of estate between the litigating parties. In applying this doctrine, the courts have gone to the full extent of holding that, although the restriction be not entered into in the form of covenant or condition, and even though it be a mere oral contract or representation, it may, nevertheless, create an equitable easement and impose a burden or servitude, provided it appear that the parties meant to establish a permanent restraint upon the use or mode of occupation of the land.² This is forcibly illustrated by the case of *Lewis v. Gollner*,³ in which the New York Court of Appeals held that an injunction was properly decreed against the erection, in a fine residential section of Brooklyn, of a tenement house, by one who had notice that her grantor had orally agreed with the neighboring lot owners, for a valuable consideration, not to erect any apartment or tenement house in that vicinity.

The only limitations upon this principle, so broadly and liberally applied by courts of equity, are that the intention of the parties, however expressed, shall be clear and explicit,⁴ that that intention shall be to impose a permanent uniform restriction upon the use or method of occupation or enjoyment of the respective parcels of land, and that he against whom

¹ *Parker v. Nightingale*, 6 Allen (Mass.), 341; *Clark v. Martin*, 49 Pa. St. 289, 290.

² *Tallmadge v. East River Bank*, 26 N. Y. 105; *Hubbell v. Warren*, 8 Allen (Mass.), 173; *Hodge v. Sloan*, 107 N. Y. 244, 250; *Hayward v. Miller*, 6 N. Y. Misc. 254; *Everett v. Remington* (1892), 3 Ch. 148.

³ 129 N. Y. 227.

⁴ It was the fact that the intention of the parties to restrict the rectangular piece of land to its use for a chapel was not sufficiently clear that caused the court to refuse the injunction prayed for in *Johnson v. Shelter Island G. & C. M. Assoc.*, 122 N. Y. 330, the facts of which are stated in § 133, *supra*.

such restriction is sought to be enforced shall have had notice of the same at the time of his purchase.

§ 151. **By and against whom Equitable Easements may be enforced.** — “There are many cases in this country and England,” says the New York Court of Appeals, “which uphold the doctrine laid down in *Tallmadge v. The East River Bank* (26 N. Y. 105) to the effect that although the legal title be absolute and unrestricted, yet the owner may, by parol contract with the purchasers of successive parcels in respect to the manner of its improvement and occupation, affect the remaining parcels with an equity requiring them also to be occupied in conformity to the general plan which is binding upon a subsequent purchaser with notice.”¹ This *dictum* expresses the limitations of the principle upon which is ascertained who may be bound by equitable easements and by whom they may be enforced. All persons who purchase lots from a common grantor with substantially the same covenants, conditions, or other restrictions in their deeds, all grantees who are affected by stipulations or representations (even though made orally) as to the use to which their land shall be put, and all those who purchase from any such owners with notice of the limitations affecting the property, are bound by such easements and may enforce them against one another. A grantor, moreover, who has conveyed parcels of land subject to uniform restrictions, which are meant to be for the benefit of an entire tract or neighborhood, impresses an equitable easement or servitude upon his remaining property, so that his vendees within any reasonable distance may restrain him from occupying or improving that which he retains otherwise than in conformity to the general plan. And this equity affects all subsequent purchasers of the remaining portions, who have notice of the prior agreements, even though their legal titles be unrestricted by any express covenants or conditions.² Thus, where the vendor of a large tract of land inserted in the deeds to the purchasers of a number of the lots first sold a covenant restraining them from building any frame houses upon the land, it was held that the same restriction affected in equity the parcels which he retained, and ran with them against all who subsequently bought with

¹ *Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Brennan*, 148 N. Y. 661, 672.

² *Tallmadge v. The East River Bank*, 26 N. Y. 105; *Trustees of Colum-*

bia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 447; *Clark v. Martin*, 49 Pa. St. 289, 290; *Parker v. Nightingale*, 6 Allen (Mass.), 341; *Pom. Eq. Jur.* § 1295.

notice of the facts.¹ Where one conveyed a house lot and inserted in the deed a condition that the grantee should not erect upon the back part of the premises any building above a designated height, the grantor then owning the adjoining lot, and the respective parcels subsequently came into the hands of new owners by grants from the parties to the first deed; it was held that, since the condition was manifestly for the benefit of the original grantor's lot, if not for both pieces, the land first sold, at least, remained bound by it, and the owner of either lot might have a bill in equity to restrain the erection upon the other of a building above the prescribed height.² Clearly, in this case, if the benefit were intended for both lots, each owner could enforce it against the other. The basis of such rights is equitable estoppel; it is held in equity to be unaffected by the statutes of frauds, and the extent to which the principle will be carried and the amount of territory which will be brought within its operation in any case depend upon the sound discretion of that court.³

§ 152. **When Equitable Easements terminate.**—Equitable easements may be released, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, in the same manner as other easements. They are sometimes destroyed, also, by a change in the neighborhood in which the land affected by them is situated. They are creatures of equity, brought into existence for the purpose of working out justice among the various parties who are bound by them and may enforce them. And, therefore, when a change in the character of the surrounding properties, or in the uses to which they are put, is such that it would no longer be right and just to enforce negative restrictive stipulations in favor of those to whom they have not been directly made, they cease to operate except for those who may maintain actions at law upon them. In other words, they cease to cause equitable easements to exist when it would no longer be equitable to imply such easements.⁴ A covenant, for example, which restrains all the lot owners in a certain prescribed section of a city from erecting upon their lands

¹ *Bimson v. Bultman*, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 198; *Turner v. Howard*, 10 N. Y. App. Div. 555; *Silberman v. Uhrlaub*, 116 N. Y. App. Div. 869; *Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch*, 70 N. Y. 440, 447; *Pom. Eq. Jur.* § 1295.

² *Clark v. Martin*, 49 Pa. St. 289, 290.

³ *Bimson v. Bultman*, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 198.

⁴ *Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch and Thacher*, 70 N. Y. 440, 87 N. Y. 311; *Fourth Presbyterian Church v. Steiner*, 79 Hun (N. Y.), 314; *B. E. & C. R. Co. v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.*, 123 N. Y. 316; *Holt v. Fleischman*, 75 N. Y. App. Div. 593.

any building except three story, brown stone front, private residences, may be enforced by all those for the benefit of whose land it was created, so long as that style of dwelling is suitable and in keeping with the locality. But when manufacturing or business establishments have so encroached upon this section that it would be a detriment to the property to insist on the observance of the covenant, then equity will not grant an injunction against its breach, on the ground that any easement or servitude is to be implied.¹ A change in the character of the neighborhood, however, will not do away with equitable easements while they are still useful and important to the various lot owners, though in different ways and for different purposes from those originally intended.² And it is also to be carefully noted that no change in the character of the neighborhood will destroy the right of a grantor and those who succeed to his interest to sue *at law* for the breach of an express covenant in his deed, or to re-enter and defeat the estate of the grantee for violation of a condition therein expressed. Thus, if A convey land to B by a deed in which B covenants that certain things shall not be done on the premises, A and all those who succeed to his rights may always maintain an action at law against B and those in privity with him for any violation of such agreement; and this regardless of any changes that may occur in the neighborhood.³ Among those who succeed to A's rights under such circumstances have been classed *subsequent* purchasers of lots adjoining B's or reasonably close to the same; for in favor of such proprietors it has been held at law that the negative easements were *directly* created. But contiguous owners, who bought their parcels of A before the sale to B, and those whose lots are so situated in relation to B's that it can not be said as a matter of law that the covenant was *directly* made for their benefit, can have no remedy against B except in so far as equity affords one because it raises equitable easements; and such easements will cease to be when the working out of justice among the respective lot owners no longer requires their existence.⁴

¹ Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch and Thacher, 70 N. Y. 440, 87 N. Y. 311.

² Zipp v. Barker, 40 N. Y. App. Div. 1.

³ McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36. See Deeves v. Constable, 87 N. Y. App. Div. 352, 357; Kitching v. Brown, 180 N. Y. 414.

⁴ Amerden v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 355;

It follows, moreover, from the above-stated principles, and has also been expressly decided, that if he who seeks to enjoin the breach of an equitable easement be shown to have broken the stipulation upon which it rests, or to have knowingly acquiesced in frequent violations of it by his neighbors, equity will refuse him the relief for which he prays when he asks for an injunction against its breach by others.¹

d. *Easements created by Prescription.*

§ 153. **Prescription defined and explained.** — Prescription is a mode of acquiring the ownership of incorporeal hereditaments by long-continued user or enjoyment. It originated in the desire of the courts to quiet titles, and to put an end to long and expensive litigation in cases in which the evidence adduced would be vague and unsatisfactory because of the antiquity of the facts and events with which it must attempt to deal. This judicial tendency has been the primary cause of the growth of three methods of obtaining property, which are now well established in our law, namely, by custom, by adverse possession, and by prescription. Custom is distinguished from prescription in that the former is a mere local usage, not annexed to any particular person, but belonging to the community rather than to its individuals, while the latter is a personal usage or enjoyment confined to the claimant and his ancestors or those whose estate he has acquired.² Thus, a privilege for the inhabitants of a certain town or parish to dance and play games on a particular piece of land may grow out of a custom immemorially continued;³ but if the owner of a lot of land has a right of way over his neighbor's field because he, or he and his grantors, have walked across it for many years, he is the owner of an easement founded on

Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 104; *People ex rel. Frost v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co.*, 168 N. Y. 187, 194; *Fourth Presbyterian Church v. Steiner*, 79 Hun (N. Y.), 314. See *Woodhaven Junc. L. Co. v. Solly*, 148 N. Y. 42.

It follows from these principles that, when the owner of a lot of land which is encumbered by equitable easements desires to do anything thereon in violation of the restrictions, in order in doing so to become secure against subsequent attacks both at law and in equity, he

must obtain releases from all the neighboring proprietors who have a right to enforce the easements, and also from the grantor (or his successors in interest) in connection with whose deed or transfer the restrictive stipulations originated.

¹ *Moore v. Murphy*, 89 Hun (N. Y.), 175; *Deeves v. Constable*, 87 N. Y. App. Div. 352. See *Woodhaven Junc. L. Co. v. Solly*, 148 N. Y. 42.

² Blackst. Com. p *263.

³ *Fitch v. Rawling*, 2 H. Blackst. 393. See § 170, *infra*.

prescription. Adverse possession differs from both custom and prescription in that it is, properly speaking, a means of acquiring title to corporeal hereditaments only, and is usually the direct result of statutes of limitations;¹ while they are the outgrowth of common-law principles, with but little aid from the legislature, and, properly speaking, have to do with the acquisition of no kind of property except incorporeal hereditaments.²

§ 154. **History and Development of Prescription.** — In the ancient common law, prescription meant the acquisition of an incorporeal hereditament by enjoying it for so long a time that there was no evidence as to when it began to be used. He who rested his claim to a right upon prescription must show immemorial enjoyment of it by himself or by those under whom he claimed — an exercise of it so long continued that “the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.”³ After the troublous times of Richard I., because of the great difficulty in tracing titles back beyond that period, it became less and less customary to attempt to do so; and, by the year 1275, the law was settled that a right might be established by prescription if its continued and uninterrupted adverse user could be shown to extend backward as far as the beginning of his reign (1189).⁴ But as this period became unreasonably long, in the lapse of years, the time necessary to raise a strict prescription was limited by a statute in the 32nd year of Hen. VIII. (1541), at sixty years;⁵ and, subsequently, the courts, finding the necessity for proving even that length of user to be inconvenient and burdensome, looked about them for some principle upon which it might be further shortened. This they obtained by inventing the fiction of a grant made and lost in modern times. And when they sought to fix a period, after the lapse of which a grant should be presumed, they found a ready analogy in the twenty years prescribed by

¹ The passing of corporeal hereditaments by adverse possession is discussed in dealing with title to real property.

² See *Boyce v. Mis. Pac. R. Co.*, 186 Mo. 583; *Missouri v. Illinois*, 200 U. S. 496, 520.

³ Lomax, Dig. 614, 615; Lit. § 170; Co. Lit. 115 a; *Termes de la Ley*, title Prescription; *Mayor of Hull v. Homer*, Cowp. 102, 109.

The civil law also uses the word *prescription* to denote the means of ac-

quiring intangible rights by long user or enjoyment. Merlin, *Répertoire de Jurisprudence*, title Prescription, sect. 1; 11 *Law Mag. & Rev.* 109.

⁴ *Jones, Ease*. § 158.

⁵ *Coolidge v. Learned*, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 503, 508; *Ricard v. Williams*, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 59; *Tyler v. Wilkinson*, 4 Mass. 402; 2 *Greenl. Ev.* § 539. See *Arbuckle v. Ward*, 29 Vt. 43; *Okeson v. Patterson*, 29 Pa. St. 22; *Crawson v. Primrose*, 4 Del. Ch. 643.

the Statute of Limitations (21 Jas. I. ch. 16, A. D. 1623) as the time within which one might acquire the title to corporeal hereditaments by adverse enjoyment. This length of enjoyment was accordingly settled upon in England as sufficient to establish a prescriptive right. It was adopted as a period adequate to raise a presumption of a grant which had been lost and therefore could not be produced as evidence; or, as the most modern theory is, to raise a conclusive presumption of a grant, or some other legal origin, at least twenty years old. And such is the English doctrine of to-day, according to which prescriptive easements may be created by twenty years adverse user or enjoyment of the way, drain, water-flow, or other incorporeal thing.¹ In summary, then, the ancient English doctrine, upon this topic, was the resting of title by prescription upon immemorial usage; while the modern one is based upon the conclusive presumption of a grant or other legal origin, after twenty years of uninterrupted adverse enjoyment.² The statute 2 & 3 Will. IV. ch. 71 (1832), which is known as the Prescription Act, has settled a number of questions, about which the English courts found difficulties because of the differences between the ancient theory and the modern one. That statute fixes the exact time of prescription, for certain classes of easements (the prevailing period being twenty years), and particularly prescribes what must be proved in order to establish the right to them.³

In the United States, the modern English doctrine of a

¹ *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 4 Q. B. Div. 162; *Bright v. Walker*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 211; *Bass v. Gregory*, L. R. 25 Q. B. Div. 481.

² *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 4 Q. B. Div. 162; *Bass v. Gregory*, L. R. 25 Q. B. Div. 481; *Parker v. Foote*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309. For a series of years, during the progress of the changes described in the text, judges were in the habit of leaving it to juries to presume a grant, as a matter of fact, from a long exercise of an incorporeal right; and they usually adopted the period of twenty years by analogy to the statute of limitations. If one jury failed to find a grant, as a matter of fact, from such period of user, it was dismissed and another empaneled; and this process was continued until some jury concluded

as a fact, whether there were any evidence to that effect or not, that there had been a grant given and lost. But this method of apparently making the question purely one of fact to be determined by the jury was found to be too great a strain on the consciences of jurors, and was therefore abandoned in favor of the legal fiction of a grant presumed by the court. *Bass v. Gregory*, L. R. 25 Q. B. Div. 481, 484. The modern theory of conclusively presuming a grant, or some other legal origin, is discussed more at length, § 163, *infra*.

³ *Bright v. Walker*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 211, 217; *Sturges v. Bridgman*, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 852; *Dalton v. Angus*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 17, note 1; Tud. Lead. Cas. 14.

presumed grant or other legal origin is generally adopted; but the length of time, which must elapse before such presumption will be indulged, varies in the different states with the variations in the periods prescribed by the statutes of limitations. Thus, in Connecticut it is fifteen years, in analogy to its statute of limitations;¹ in Pennsylvania, as the result of a like analogy, it is twenty-one years;² while in New York, for a similar reason, it was formerly twenty-five years and is now twenty.³ But in some cases, in this country, the fiction of an implied grant has been repudiated and the prescriptive period made the same as that fixed by the statute of limitations, by direct analogy and without regard to any presumption as to the origin of the right.⁴ And in a few states there are special statutes dealing with the subject of the acquisition of easements by prescription.⁵ The nature of the presumption of a grant, or other legal origin, will be more fully discussed after the requisites of prescriptive easements have been examined.⁶

§ 155. **Nature of the User requisite to create Easements by Prescription.** — The user during the twenty years (or other period determined as is above explained from the statute of limitations of the state in which lies the land affected) is required by the law, in order to give rise to a prescriptive easement, to have been (a) open, visible, and notorious, (b) continuous and uniform, (c) peaceable and uninterrupted, (d) with an adverse claim of right, and (e) with the acquiescence of the owner of the land, (f) who was seised in fee and (g) who, at the time of the beginning of such enjoyment, was

¹ *Sherwood v. Burr*, 4 Day (Conn.), 244, 249; *Legg v. Horn*, 45 Conn. 409, 415.

² *Strickler v. Todd*, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 63, 69.

³ *Gerard on Titles to Real Estate* (4th ed.), p. 759; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 365, 366. In Arizona Territory, California, Idaho, and Nevada the period is five years; in Arkansas, Florida, and Tennessee it is seven years; in Alabama, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming it is ten years; in Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, Ver-

mont, and Virginia it is fifteen years; in Ohio and Pennsylvania it is twenty-one years, and in the other states it is twenty years. *Jones, Ease.* § 160, note and statutes and cases cited.

⁴ *Krier's Private Road*, 73 Pa. St. 109. See *Workman v. Curran*, 89 Pa. St. 226; *Atty.-Gen. v. Revere Rubber Co.*, 152 Mass. 444; *Schulenberg v. Zimmerman*, 86 Minn. 70.

⁵ See *Ricard v. Williams*, 20 U. S. (7 Wheat.) 59, 110; *Hazard v. Robinson*, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 272. *District of Col. v. Robinson*, 180 U. S. 92; *Simpson v. Boston & M. R. Co.*, 176 Mass. 359.

⁶ § 163, *infra*.

free from disability to resist its imposition upon his property. Each of these requisites is to be briefly explained.

§ 156. (a) **The User must be Open, Visible, and Notorious.** — By this is meant that it must be of such a nature and frequency that the owner of the servient land knows, or must be reasonably presumed to know, of its existence. If, for example, the right had been claimed only once or twice during the twenty years, or the use had occurred only in the middle of the night or in some other secret manner, this would not be likely to have given any notice to the owner of the land affected, and would not be sufficient for the establishment of an easement.¹ But if the enjoyment were such that the landowner could reasonably have known of its existence, even though he had no actual knowledge thereof, that would be all in this respect that the law requires.²

§ 157. (b) **The User must be Continuous and Uniform.** — In some of the books and cases, the form of expression is that the enjoyment must have been "*continuous and uninterrupted*," that is, that it must neither have been stopped or suspended by the claimant of the right in such a manner as to indicate an abandonment, nor interfered with by the owner of the land over which the right is exercised so that the substantial continuity of the prescriptive period was broken.³ The interference by the owner of the servient land is discussed in the following section; and simply the acts and omissions of the claimant of the right, which may interrupt the running of the period of adverse user, are to be here considered. This involves inquiries as to: *first*, what is to be regarded as continuous enjoyment; *second*, how far uniform or similar in character the acts of enjoyment must be; and, *third*, how far the acts of one person may be united with those of another so as to make a continuity for the period of time required.

¹ *Gilford v. Winnepiseogee Lake Co.*, 52 N. H. 262; *Deerfield v. Conn. Riv. R. Co.*, 144 Mass. 325; *Treadwell v. Inslee*, 120 N. Y. 458; *Flora v. Carbean*, 38 N. Y. 111; *Esling v. Williams*, 10 Pa. St. 126; *Cleveland v. Ware*, 98 Mass. 409; *Dee v. King*, 73 Vt. 375.

² *O'Brien v. Goodrich*, 177 Mass. 32; *Lewis v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.*, 162 N. Y. 202; *Boyce v. Mis. Pac. R. Co.*, 168 Mo. 583. "And in cases where the enjoyment was in the beginning wrongful,

and the owner of the adjoining land may be said to have lost the full benefit of rights through his laches, it may be a fair test of whether the enjoyment was open or not to ask whether it was such that the owner of the adjoining land, but for his laches, must have known what the enjoyment was and how far it went." *Lord Blackburn*, in *Dalton v. Angus*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740, 827. See *Ward v. Warren*, 82 N. Y. 265.

³ *Wash. Ease.* (4th ed.) p. 167, p. *101.

First. Generally speaking, a voluntary breach of the continuity of user involves such conduct on the part of the claimant of the right as to indicate an abandonment—a giving up of the use for a time with intent not to resume the same.¹ If, because of some accident, or for the benefit or convenience of the claimant of the right, it be not exercised for some time, perhaps even for some of the years during the twenty, this would not defeat the acquisition of the easement, unless it was reasonable to presume from all the circumstances attending the cessation of the user that it was for the time being intended to be relinquished.² Whether or not such intention is to be presumed will depend, to a large extent, upon the character of the right claimed. There must, for example, be a degree of continuity in the use of a mere passageway different from that of flowing land with water, or enjoying light and air over the property of another; and the failure to employ the former for a considerable length of time would be less indicative of an intention to relinquish it than would the stopping of the latter for a much shorter period.³ In one case, the easement claimed was the right to carry on in the claimant's building a trade offensive to his neighbors; and it was held that the suspension of its exercise for two years, there having been no interference by others, was not such an interruption as to affect the right.⁴ This decision is mentioned as a border-line case. It is criticised in *Carlisle v. Cooper*,⁵ by the New Jersey court, as allowing too great a voluntary interruption of the enjoyment. And it is certainly in accordance with the weight of authority to state that from long-continued non-user alone, before the prescriptive period is complete, the courts may presume an intent to abandon the claim. Thus, where the person who claimed a right of way had passed over the land in 1819, and then again in 1824, and from then on without further intermission until 1843, it was held not to be a continuous use except from 1824.⁶ And in

¹ *Pollard v. Barnes*, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 191.

² *Earl De La Warr v. Miles*, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 535; *Carr v. Foster*, 3 Q. B. 581; *Hall v. Augsbury*, 46 N. Y. 622; *Hesperia Land & Water Co. v. Rogers*, 83 Cal. 10; *Dana v. Valentine*, 5 Met. (Mass.) 8; *Wood v. Kelley*, 30 Me. 47; *Haog v. Delorme*, 30 Wis. 591. But see *Carlisle v. Cooper*, 4 C. E. Green

(N. J.), 256, 261; *Winnepiseogee Lake Co. v. Young*, 40 N. H. 420.

³ *Bodfish v. Bodfish*, 105 Mass. 317; *Cox v. Forrest*, 60 Md. 74.

⁴ *Dana v. Valentine*, 5 Met. (Mass.) 8, 13.

⁵ 4 C. E. Green (N. J.), 256, 261.

⁶ *Watt v. Trapp*, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 136.

the leading case of *Pollard v. Barnes*,¹ where the right contended for was to pile lumber upon another's land, and this had been enjoyed from 1822 to 1846, except between the years 1829 and 1834 when no lumber had been piled there, it was held that there had been a voluntary abandonment of the right which destroyed the continuity of its enjoyment, and that the time in favor of the claimant being limited to that from 1834 to 1843 did not constitute the requisite prescriptive period. The conclusion, to be drawn from the somewhat conflicting decisions, appears to be that all the circumstances of each case are to be investigated to ascertain the cause of the cessation of the use, and that the continuity of the enjoyment is to be regarded as broken when it is reasonable to presume, either from the length of the non-user alone, or from that element in connection with the other facts, that there was an *intention* to abandon the claim.² It is to be added that the time, from which the running of the period is to be reckoned in determining whether or not there has been a sufficient length of continuous enjoyment, is when the injury or invasion of the servient owner's right begins, and not the time when the party producing such injury begins the acts which bring about that result. Thus if one claim a prescriptive right to flow the land of another with a mill-pond, he must show, in order to sustain his contention, that the requisite period has elapsed since the dam was so far completed as to cause the flowage upon that land to begin; and he can not have the benefit of the time required for the construction of the dam, during which time the water was not raised upon his neighbor's property.³

Second. The nature and character of the acts of enjoyment must be substantially uniform and the place where they are performed must be practically the same throughout the entire twenty years, or other prescriptive period. "While the law does not require the use to be, in all respects, identical

¹ 2 Cush. (Mass.) 191.

² "A ready illustration would present itself to the mind where, from analogy to the above cases, there would seem to be no want of continuity, although the easement was but rarely used. Suppose a man had been accustomed to go across another's land to a meadow, once a year, for the purpose of cutting and bringing away the grass growing thereon, and had continued this

for twenty years or more under a claim of right, it would be sufficient, it is believed, to acquire thereby an easement of way for that purpose. Nor would this right be affected by the long intervals between the times of the user." Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 169, p. *102, citing *Carr v. Foster*, 3 Q. B. 581.

³ *Branch v. Doane*, 17 Conn. 402, 18 Conn. 233; *Crosby v. Bessey*, 49 Me. 543; *Polly v. M'Call*, 37 Ala. 20.

and the same, both in manner and extent, in order to gain an easement; any material change in these respects, while the right is being gained by prescription, may defeat the same. If it shall have been actually gained, a mere failure to use it to the extent to which the right has been acquired will not affect such right."¹ It was, accordingly, decided that the New York Elevated Railroad Company had not gained a right, against the owners of lots fronting on the street over which the servitude was claimed, to continue to operate its road upon that street, by virtue of the fact that it had maintained thereon a tentative, experimental structure for eleven years, and had then taken it down and built in a different position and operated in a different manner for nine years its permanent elevated road.² So, in a case in which one flowed his neighbor's land for ten years by using a dam of a certain height, and then increased the height of the dam so that more land was covered by the water, and continued this for ten years longer, it was held that he had thereby acquired an easement over only so much of his neighbor's property as was flowed during the first ten and entire twenty years.³ It is chiefly upon this principle that the law forbids the gaining of an easement by prescription to have the boughs of a tree overhang another's land, or its roots remain imbedded therein. The growth of the tree produces a constant change in the burden and inconvenience which it imposes.⁴ But if a right be asserted and enjoyed during the entire prescriptive period, with only slight or immaterial alterations, an easement may emerge as the result.⁵ All that the law requires is that the

¹ *Ballard v. Dyson*, 1 Taunt. 279; *Cowell v. Thayer*, 5 Met. (Mass.) 253; *Homer v. Stillwell*, 35 N. J. L. 307; *Wash. Ease.* (4th ed.) p. 171, p. *104.

² *Amer. Bank Note Co. v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 129 N. Y. 252; *Homer v. Stillwell*, 35 N. J. L. 307.

³ *Baldwin v. Calkins*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 167; *Pcnrhyn Slate Co. v. Granville Electric L. & P. Co.*, 181 N. Y. 80, 92; *Whittier v. Cocheco Mfg. Co.*, 9 N. H. 454; *Morris v. Commander*, 3 Ired. (N. C.) 510; *Wright v. Moore*, 38 Ala. 593, 598. The extent of the easement is fixed by the user. *Tyler v. Cooper*, 47 Hun, 94, aff'd 124 N. Y. 626; *Taylor v. Millard*, 118 N. Y. 244.

⁴ *Lemmon v. Webb* (1894), 3 Ch. 1;

Norris v. Baker, 1 Rolle, 393; *Robinson v. Clapp*, 65 Conn. 365. The owner of the land into which the roots extend and over which the branches hang, may lop them off, although they have been there for twenty years; and he may do this without the necessity of giving any notice to his neighbor, the owner of the tree. *Hoffman v. Armstrong*, 48 N. Y. 201; *Dubois v. Beaver*, 25 N. Y. 123; *Lemmon v. Webb* (1894), 3 Ch. 1, 17; *Pickering v. Rnnd*, 4 Camp. 219, 1 Stack. 56; *Gale, Ease.* (6th ed.) p. 461; *Jones, Ease.* § 177.

⁵ *Belknap v. Trimble*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 577; *Davis v. Brigham*, 29 Me. 391; *Stackpole v. Curtis*, 32 Me. 383; *Whittier v. Cocheco Mfg. Co.*, 9 N. H. 454.

adverse user shall impose substantially the same burden upon the same land during the whole of the requisite time.¹

Third. It is not necessary to the acquisition of a prescriptive easement that the user shall be by the same person during the entire period, provided the possession and enjoyment of the right have been legally continued from one owner of the dominant estate to the other.² If, for example, an ancestor use a way over his neighbor's field for twelve years, and, after his death, the heir who inherits his land continue the user for eight years more, the prescription will be complete.³ The same will be true when the successive owners of the land in favor of which the right is claimed are vendor and vendee, deviser and devisee, or otherwise related in privity of estate to each other, so that the title of one is legally derived from the other. And, in like manner, there may be three or more persons, upon each of whom in succession the title to the dominant estate devolves by some legal process, and the sum total of whose periods of enjoying the right contended for is the time necessary to cause an easement to arise.⁴ But when a succeeding holder does not claim in any way through his predecessor, as if, for example, one has disseised the other, or the first occupant has abandoned the land and the enjoyment of the right contended for, and the other has then entered and possessed both, the time of the user by one can not be tacked on to that of the other for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period.⁵

§ 158. (c) **The User must be Peaceable and Uninterrupted.**—Since the creation of an easement by prescription rests upon the presumption of a grant which has been lost and therefore can not be produced as evidence, no easement can arise in that way, if, during the time needed for its acquisition, the owner of the servient estate has interrupted the use or successfully protested against its continuance. An interruption by him consists in his cutting off and preventing the

¹ *Belknap v. Trimble*, 3 Paige (N.Y.), 577; *Bullen v. Runnels*, 2 N. H. 255; *Luttrel's Case*, 4 Rep. 87; *Wash. Ease.* (4th ed.) p. 172, p. *105.

² *Leonard v. Leonard*, 7 Allen (Mass.), 277; *Sargent v. Ballard*, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 251; *Williams v. Nelson*, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 141; *Cole v. Bradbury*, 86 Me. 380.

³ *Cole v. Bradbury*, 86 Me. 380;

Leonard v. Leonard, 7 Allen (Mass.), 277.

⁴ *Cole v. Bradbury*, 86 Me. 380.

⁵ *Holzman v. Douglas*, 168 U. S. 278; *Watkins v. Peck*, 13 N. H. 360; *Melvin v. Whiting*, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 184; *McFarlin v. Essex Co.*, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 304; *Okeson v. Patterson*, 29 Pa. St. 22; *Tracy v. Atherton*, 36 Vt. 503.

enjoyment for a time. However brief such an interference may be, it will stop the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the purchaser of a mill property, which was conveyed to him by metes and bounds but at the end of which was an unfenced strip belonging to his grantor, had been accustomed for twenty years to pass regularly over a path across that strip, as the most convenient way of reaching the mill; but his grantor had occasionally piled boards and other lumber upon the path and thus closed the passageway. It was held that the owner of the mill had not obtained a right of way by prescription.¹ So when it has been necessary to employ force in order to continue the enjoyment,² or when one path or route has been exchanged for another and neither has been used for the entire requisite period,³ no easement is thereby brought into existence.⁴

The requirement that the enjoyment shall be peaceable means that it must be without any forcible resistance, or legal proceedings against it, on the part of him over whose land the right is claimed; and, in some jurisdictions, that it must be without his verbal protest or remonstrance. His commencing an action at law to recover damages for the past user, or a suit in equity to enjoin its continuation, is recognized by all the courts as an effectual interruption of the enjoyment.⁵ In some states, moreover, if he remonstrate with the claimant of the right, or forbid him to come upon the land, and do nothing more, it is held in well considered cases that this is sufficient to break the continuity of the prescriptive period.⁶ But, in the majority of the states of this

¹ *Plimpton v. Converse*, 42 Vt. 712.

² *Eaton v. Swansea Water Works Co.*, 17 Q. B. 267, 275; *Livett v. Wilson*, 3 Bing. 115; *Stillman v. White Rock Mfg. Co.*, 3 Woodb. & M. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 538, 549; *Powell v. Bagg*, 8 Gray (Mass.), 441; *Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan*, 30 N. J. Eq. 180, 43 N. J. L. 605.

The enjoyment must be *per patientiam veri domini qui seivit et non prohibuit, sed permisit de consensu tactio*. *Powell v. Bagg*, 8 Gray (Mass.), 441, 443.

³ *Total v. Boonefof*, 123 Ill. 653; *Peters v. Little*, 95 Ga. 151; *Pope v. Devereux*, 5 Gray (Mass.), 409; *Mason v. Davison*, 27 Nova Scotia, 84.

⁴ *Powell v. Bagg*, 8 Gray (Mass.),

441; *Pollard v. Barnes*, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 191.

⁵ *Eaton v. Swansea Water Works Co.*, 17 Q. B. 267; *Workman v. Curran*, 89 Pa. St. 226; *Postlethwaite v. Payne*, 8 Ind. 104; and see *Lanford v. Poppe*, 56 Cal. 73.

⁶ In *Powell v. Bagg*, 8 Gray (Mass.), 441, 443, which was an action against one who claimed, by virtue of twenty years' use, the right to an aqueduct over his neighbor's land, although within that time he had been denied the right by such neighbor and ordered off the premises, — *Bigelow, J.*, said: "It was not necessary for the plaintiff to commit an assault and battery on the defendant or his servants, or to use actual force to

country and the latest decisions both here and in England, such a method of interrupting the right and causing the running of the requisite time to begin *de novo* is denied; and it is held that this can be done only by some overt act of interference, other than mere words whether written or spoken.¹ In some of the states, such as Indiana, Iowa, Maine, and Massachusetts, statutes provide for notices which, when given as required by the acts, shall have the effect of interrupting or preventing the acquisition of easements by continuous enjoyment.²

§ 159. (d) **The User must be with an Adverse Claim of Right.** — It must be in opposition, express or implied, conscious or unconscious, to the owner of the land over which the right is claimed. The attitude of him who is acquiring an easement by prescription must be such that, if he were

eject them from the premises in order to disturb and break the continuity of possession or use, and prevent it from ripening into a title by lapse of time." Also *Stillman v. White Rock Mfg. Co.*, 3 Woodb. & M. 538; *Livett v. Wilson*, 3 Bing. 115; *Smith v. Miller*, 11 Gray (Mass.), 145; *Workman v. Curran*, 89 Pa. St. 226; *Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Hoag*, 90 Ill. 339; *Nichols v. Aylor*, 7 Leigh (Va.), 546; *Field v. Brown*, 24 Gratt. (Va.) 74.

¹ *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Kimball v. Ladd*, 42 Vt. 747; *School District v. Lynch*, 33 Conn. 330, 334; *Demuth v. Amweg*, 90 Pa. St. 181; *Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan*, 43 N. J. L. 605; *Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Diamond Mills P. Co.*, 64 Atl. Rep. 746 (N. J. Ch.). In *Kimball v. Ladd*, the decision of *Powell v. Bagg*, *supra*, is distinguished; and in *Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan*, the argument upon this side of the controversy is well put by Depue, J., in a passage in which he says: "If the easement has been interrupted by any act which places the owner of it in a position to sue and settle his right, if he chooses to postpone its vindication until witnesses are dead or the facts have faded from recollection, he has only his own folly and supineness to which to lay the blame. But if by mere protests and denials by his adversary, his right might

be defeated, he would be placed at an unconscionable disadvantage. He could neither sue and establish his right, nor could he have the advantage usually derived from long enjoyment in quieting titles. Protests and remonstrances by the owner of the servient tenement against the use of the easement rather add to the strength of the claim of a prescriptive right; for a holding in defiance of such expostulations is demonstrative proof that the enjoyment is under a claim of right, hostile and adverse; and if they be not accompanied by acts amounting to a disturbance of the right in a legal sense, they are no interruptions or obstructions of the enjoyment." Where verbal denials of the right are supported by some acts on the part of the landowner, it should ordinarily be left to the jury to decide whether or not they are sufficient to prove a want of acquiescence in the user. *Connor v. Sullivan*, 40 Conn. 26; *Wash. Ease.* (4th ed.) p. 184, p. *113.

² *Ind.* 1 R. S. (1894) §§ 5746-5749; *Parish v. Kaspere*, 109 Ind. 586; *Cargar v. Fee*, 140 Ind. 572; *Iowa*, R. S. (1888) §§ 3206-3210; *State v. Birmingham*, 74 Iowa, 407; *Maine*, R. S. (1883) ch. 105, §§ 1, 13, 14; *Cole v. Bradbury*, 86 Ms. 380; *Mass. Pub. St.* (1882) ch. 196, § 1; *Hodgkins v. Farrington*, 150 Mass. 19; *Jones, Ease.* § 160, note.

asked why he was so acting, his correct answer would be that he was doing so *against*, or at least *without*, the license or consent of the owner of the servient estate.¹ When it appears that the enjoyment has been by permission asked for, or for a rent paid, or for some other equivalent rendered,² or when there is such a legal relation between the parties that the consent of the one to the acts of the other is to be presumed — as when the relation is that of landlord and tenant, or life-tenant and remainderman or reversioner³ — this ordinarily rebuts the presumption of a grant and thus destroys the foundation for a prescriptive easement. The *criterion*, upon which the American courts uniformly depend for determining whether or not the user has been adverse and under a claim of right, is well stated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, as follows: "There must be an adverse possession or assertion of right, so as to expose the party to an action, unless he had a grant; for it is the fact of his being thus exposed to an action, and the neglect of the opposite party to bring suit, that is seized upon as the ground for presuming a grant in favor of long possession and enjoyment, upon the idea that this adverse state of things would not have been submitted to if there had not been a grant."⁴ When the acts of the one party are thus an invasion of the right of the other, they may lay the foundation for a prescriptive easement, even though they are performed in ignorance of the fact that they constitute in effect a trespass. Thus, if one erect a house on his land so that the cornice extends over his neighbor's lot, or a railroad company so build its iron structure in a street as to injure the abutting property, the requisite continuance of the enjoyment may give an easement though the owner or company acted on the belief of an existing right.⁵ The actual invasion of the neighbor's right, and the absence of license or permission ex-

¹ *Easton v. Isted* (1903), 1 Ch. 405; *Flora v. Carbean*, 38 N. Y. 111; *Burbank v. Fay*, 65 N. Y. 57; *Morse v. Williams*, 62 Me. 445; *Blanchard v. Moulton*, 63 Me. 434; *Oliver v. Hook*, 47 Md. 301; *Rose v. City of Farmingham*, 196 Ill. 226.

² *St. Vincent Asylum v. Troy*, 76 N. Y. 108; *Crouse v. Wemple*, 29 N. Y. 540; *Boyce v. Brown*, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 80; *Watkins v. Peck*, 13 N. H. 360; *Arnold v. Stevens*, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 106; *Smith v. Miller*, 11 Gray (Mass.), 145.

³ *Gayford v. Moffatt*, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 133, 135; *Phillips v. Phillips*, 48 Pa. St. 178, 184.

⁴ *Felton v. Simpson*, 11 Ired. (N. C.) 84; *Mebane v. Patrick*, 1 Jones (N. C.), 23; *Jones, Ease.* § 165, note 3; § 163, *infra*.

⁵ *Grace M. E. Church v. Dobbins*, 153 Pa. St. 294; *Hindley v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 185 N. Y. 335, 355; *Bremer v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 191 N. Y. 333.

press or implied, together constitute an enjoyment with an adverse claim of right.

It follows that the claimant of a prescriptive right is not ordinarily required to prove a negative by directly producing evidence to the effect that his holding was without license. The fact that he has enjoyed it during the entire requisite period is in itself sufficient to raise the presumption that it was adverse.¹ If, on the other hand, his enjoyment be shown to have originated in a license, or to have been exercised at any time with the permission of the owner of the servient estate, it will be conclusively presumed to have been continued under such authority until the time at which the claimant unequivocally shows that he abandoned his license and used the right adversely.² "It is well known that a single lisp of acknowledgment by a defendant that he claims no title fastens a character upon his possession which makes it unavailable for ages."³ So, where A gave B permission to construct and use a drain through A's soil, it was held that B's use of the same for twenty years, without more being said or indicated concerning the matter, did not create an easement in B's favor.⁴ But where it was shown that the license to construct a drain was intended to be merely temporary, and that, after the expiration of the time specified, the licensee continued to use the drain for the prescriptive period, it was held that an easement was thereby acquired.⁵

When a grant of an easement by deed is shown, there is, of course, no room for any question as to prescription.⁶ It is also held that when by parol agreement one party is authorized to enjoy *as his own* a right over the land of another, and does

¹ And the burden rests upon him who alleges that the use has been by virtue of a license or permission, to prove that fact by affirmative evidence. *Tyler v. Wilkinson*, 4 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 397; *Parker v. Foote*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; *Nichols v. Wentworth*, 100 N. Y. 455; *Ward v. Warren*, 82 N. Y. 265, affirming 15 Hun, 600; *Esling v. Williams*, 10 Pa. St. 126; *Stearns v. Janes*, 12 Allen (Mass.), 582; *Olney v. Fenner*, 2 R. I. 211; *French v. Martin*, 24 N. H. 440; *Jones, Ease*, § 186.

² *Jewett v. Hussey*, 70 Me. 433; *Arbuckle v. Ward*, 29 Vt. 43; *Legg v. Horn*, 45 Conn. 409, 415; *Taylor v.*

Garrish, 59 N. H. 560, 570; *Spir v. Town of New Utrecht*, 121 N. Y. 420; *People ex rel. Cunningham v. Osborn*, 84 Hun (N. Y.), 441, 443; *Zerbey v. Allan*, 215 Pa. St. 383; *Jobling v. Tuttle*, 75 Kan. 351.

³ *Colvin v. Burnet*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 564, 568; *Stewart v. White*, 128 Ala. 202.

⁴ *Smith v. Miller*, 11 Gray (Mass.), 145.

⁵ *Wiseman v. Lucksinger*, 84 N. Y. 31.

⁶ *Chamber Collier Co. v. Hopwood*, L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 549; *Hoyle v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.*, 60 Conn. 28.

so, this makes the user adverse, and its continuation for the proper time may create an easement.¹ The user by virtue of a mere license, so that it may be said to be the enjoyment of the right of the licensor with his permission, will not lay the foundation for a prescriptive easement; but the enjoyment of the right *as his own* by the claimant of the easement will be available to support his claim, even though it originated in an oral contract with the owner of the servient estate.²

The requirement that the user shall be with an adverse claim of right involves an element sometimes stated as a distinct and independent requisite, namely, that it shall also be *exclusive*. By this is to be understood that the right must not depend for its exercise upon a similar privilege existing in others, but the claimant must enjoy it, not only adversely to the owner of the servient estate, but also independently of all other persons.³ Therefore a person can not acquire by prescription a right of way as an easement over a public highway.⁴ And when a space around a building is left open so that people generally cross it when convenient, and a neighboring proprietor uses it more frequently for that purpose than do other persons, he can not thereby obtain a prescriptive easement, unless he lays out or indicates in some manner a distinct path appropriated to the beneficial use of his own land.⁵ By the principle under discussion is not meant that a clear right of way or other private easement is to be defeated

¹ *Ashley v. Ashley*, 4 Gray (Mass.), 197; *Wiseman v. Lucksinger*, 84 N. Y. 31; *Jewett v. Hussey*, 70 Me. 433, 443; *Arbnckle v. Ward*, 29 Vt. 43, 52; *Sumner v. Stevens*, 6 Met. (Mass.) 337.

² "The doctrine of *Ashley v. Ashley*" (4 Gray (Mass.), 197) "has been much discussed. The rule seems to be, that when the oral agreement which is followed by user amounts to a grant of the easement claimed and the grantee thereafter uses the easement, claiming it as his own, for the period of prescription, such user will give a prescriptive right to the easement; but if the parol agreement amounts merely to a license or permission to use the easement, the period of prescription does not begin to run till the licensee does some act which unequivocally shows that he abandons his license and is using the easement adversely." Wash. Ease. (4th ed.)

p. 155, p. *89. See also *Jones*, Ease. § 179.

³ *Wheeler v. Clark*, 58 N. Y. 267; *Kilburn v. Adams*, 7 Met. (Mass.) 33; *Thomas v. Marshfield*, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 240; *Ross v. Thompson*, 78 Ind. 90.

⁴ *Hamilton v. White*, 1 Seld. (N. Y.) 9; *Driggs v. Phillips*, 103 N. Y. 77; *Glaze v. Western, etc. R. Co.*, 67 Ga. 761; *Ross v. Thompson*, 78 Ind. 90. The rights which an individual has over a public highway are not strictly speaking easements, but servitudes enjoyed by him in common with the rest of the public. But an easement may be gained across a railroad track by twenty years' enjoyment. *Fisher v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.*, 135 Mass 107, 108.

⁵ *Kilburn v. Adams*, 7 Met. (Mass.) 33. See *Smith v. Hughes*, 12 Vt. 113; *Curtis v. Angier*, 4 Gray (Mass.), 547.

merely because others have used the same road or enjoyed a similar right; two or more persons may each acquire, by adverse enjoyment, an independent right in the same thing :¹ but it is meant that the user must be distinct and independent, disassociated from the rights of other people and standing out by itself adverse to the rest of the world.² Thus, tenants in common of a parcel of land *may* acquire, in connection with its use, an easement over another lot belonging to one of them in severalty; but in such a case the proof on which the jury is to find the adverse character of the enjoyment must be very clear and conclusive.³ It need hardly be added that, since one can not use a thing adversely to himself, there can be no creation of an easement by prescription while both tenements are wholly possessed by the same person.⁴

§ 160. (e) **The User must be with the Acquiescence of the Owner of the Land over which the Right is claimed.** — This requirement, though frequently stated as distinct, is in reality a mere combination of two of those above discussed; namely, the enjoyment must be open, visible, and notorious, so that the landowner either knows of its existence or could reasonably do so, — so that the law treats him as having knowledge of it, — and it must be peaceable and uninterrupted. He is proved to have acquiesced when knowledge of the invasion of his right and the absence of effectual resistance of such invasion are established against him.⁵ And this is done when it is shown that the user was "*ita quod, nec per vim, nec clam, nec precario.*"⁶ As is above stated, the most recent cases both in England and in this country hold that effectual resistance is not made by mere verbal remonstrances or denials of the right, but requires either forcible opposition or proceedings in law or equity against him who is seeking to acquire the easement.⁷

¹ Bolivar Mfg. Co. v. Neponset Mfg. Co., 16 Pick. (Mass.) 241; Kent v. Waite, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 138; Davis v. Brigham, 29 Me. 391.

² Davis v. Brigham, 29 Me. 391; Curtis v. Angier, 4 Gray (Mass.), 547; Borden v. Vincent, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 301.

³ Bradley Fish Co. v. Dudley, 37 Conn. 136.

⁴ Olney v. Gardiner, 4 M. & W. 496; Clayton v. Corby, 2 Q. B. 813; Ladyman v. Grave, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 763;

Worthington v. Gimson, 2 El. & El. 618, 624.

⁵ Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) pp. 180-184, pp. * 111- * 113.

⁶ Bract. fol. 222, D. 39, 3, 23; Co. Lit. 114 a; Eaton v. Swansea Water Works Co., 17 Q. B. 267; Solomon v. Vintner's Co., 4 H. & N. 602; Angus v. Dalton, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; Connor v. Sullivan, 40 Conn. 26; Kane v. Bolton, 36 N. J. Eq. 21; Workman v. Curran, 89 Pa. St. 226.

⁷ § 158, *supra*.

§ 161. (f) **The Adverse User must be against a Landowner who is seised in Fee Simple.** — Prescription operates only against one who is “capable of making a grant.”¹ And since a tenant for years or for life can not grant away the interest of the remainderman or reversioner, it is uniformly held that adverse enjoyment of a right over land in possession of such a temporary holder does not create an easement that can prevail against the succeeding owner.² Where, for example, a right of way was asserted because of adverse use and enjoyment for time out of mind, over land possessed for most of the time by a tenant for ninety-nine years, whose lease had recently expired, it was held that the claim was not effectual against the owner of the inheritance.³

It is not settled by the authorities whether or not an easement may be obtained by use against a lessee or other temporary holder, while the land is in his possession. He may undoubtedly grant such a right to last during the continuance of his own estate;⁴ and it would seem that adverse enjoyment against him for twenty years ought to give rise to an easement that would continue during the residue of his term. Likewise, if the servient estate be in the possession of one who has a conditional or determinable fee therein, it is reasonable to assume that an easement might be acquired by prescription that would avail against him so long as his estate lasted, and terminate with his interest in the land.⁵ In *Wallace v. Fletcher*,⁶ it is said by Bell, J., that “the tenant for life or years may grant easements, or *permit them to be acquired by user*, and they will be valid against himself and those who hold his estate during its continuance, and perhaps not afterwards, where the reversioner had previously neither cause nor right to complain.” But in *Bright v. Walker* it was decided that the adverse use of a way, with a claim of right, for a period of more than twenty years, over land in the possession of a tenant or lessee for life, gave no right in

¹ *Barker v. Richardson*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 579.

² *Bradbury v. Grimsel*, 2 Saund. 175 d; *Daniel v. North*, 11 East, 372; *Blanchard v. Bridges*, 4 Adol. & El. 176; *Sand v. Church*, 152 N. Y. 174; *Parker v. Framingham*, 8 Met. (Mass.) 260; *Pierce v. Fernald*, 26 Me. 436; *Schen-*

ley v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 29; *Portland v. Keep*, 41 Wis. 490.

³ *Wood v. Veal*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 454.

⁴ *Wheaton v. Maple* (1893), 3 Ch. 48, 63; *Wallace v. Fletcher*, 30 N. H. 453.

⁵ *Toullier*, *Droit Civil Français*, 419.

⁶ 30 N. H. 453. See *Franz v. Mendonca*, 131 Cal. 205.

the nature of an easement against either the lessor or the lessee.¹

§ 162. (g) **The Adverse User must be against an Owner of the Land who, at the Time of the Beginning of such Enjoyment, was free from Disability to resist its Imposition upon his Property.** — A grant can not be presumed to have been made by a person who was legally incapable of making it. If, therefore, the adverse enjoyment begin against one who is at the time insane, or an infant, or otherwise incapacitated to sue in his own name alone for the infraction of his right, the prescriptive period will not begin to run while such disability continues and he remains the owner of the land.² By the weight of authority it is held that no incapacity to sue, except that which existed when the adverse enjoyment commenced, will interfere with the acquisition of an easement by prescription; that the prescriptive period will begin to run as soon as that incapacity is removed or the servient estate passes into the hands of another owner in fee, and that no subsequently accruing or superimposed disability will have any effect.³ Thus, if A be an infant when B begins to use a path over his lot, a right of way may be obtained by B across the land in the time of prescription after A becomes of age, though A

¹ 1 Cr. M. & R. 211.

"On the other hand, though it is clear that a tenant for life of a dominant estate may acquire an easement in a servient one by adverse enjoyment, it does not seem to be settled whether it would, when acquired, inure in favor of him who has the inheritance by way of reversion." (Citing *Holland v. Long*, 7 Gray, 487.) "But though in the above-cited case the court avoid the question, it would seem that, if the tenant held by lease from the tenant of the fee of the dominant estate, an easement gained by such a holding by the tenant would inure to the landlord's benefit, in analogy with the doctrine of a class of cases which hold that, if a tenant by disseisin extends his holding over a neighboring parcel of land till a prescriptive title is gained, it will inure to the benefit of his landlord" (citing *Andrews v. Hales*, 2 Ellis & B. 349, and cases therein cited). "And the head-note of *Ladyman v. Grave* is in these

words, when speaking of prescription under the statute of 2 & 3 William IV. ch. 71: '*Semble*, the owner in fee of land demised for a term of years is subject to any right of access and use of light over his land which may be acquired by the owner of an adjoining house during the demise,'" (citing *Ladyman v. Grave*, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 763). Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 186, pp. *115, *116.

² *McGregor v. Wait*, 10 Gray (Mass.), 72, 74; *Melvin v. Whiting*, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 184; *Watkins v. Peck*, 13 N. H. 360; *Schenley v. Commonwealth, etc.*, 36 Pa. St. 29; *Reimer v. Stuber*, 20 Pa. St. 458; *City of Austin v. Hall*, 93 Tex. 591.

³ *Scallon v. Manhattau R. Co.*, 185 N. Y. 359; *Bailard v. Demmon*, 156 Mass. 449; *Tracy v. Atherton*, 36 Vt. 503; *Walker v. Fletcher*, 30 N. H. 434; *Melvin v. Whiting*, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 184; *Reimer v. Stuber*, 20 Pa. St. 458; *Jordeson v. S. S. & D. Gas Co.* (1899) 2 Ch. 217.

should be imprisoned after the adverse user began, and either before or after he became of age, and should become insane before his release from prison. And if A should die at any time after B began the walking over his property, and the title to the land should thus descend to A's heir or otherwise pass to another owner in fee (he being under no disability), the prescriptive period would at once begin in B's favor.¹ (a) Some courts insist, however, that no easement can arise by prescription unless he who claims it proves affirmatively that, during the whole of the requisite period, the owners of the servient estate were competent to convey a clear title thereto and to sue in their own names for any violation of their rights.²

§ 163. **Presumption of a Grant or other Legal Origin arising from Proof of the Requisite User.** — There has been much discussion, and some conflict of opinion, as to the nature of the presumption, or principle, upon which rest most of the modern decisions concerning prescriptive easements. Is it a presumption of law or of fact? Is it conclusive or disputable? Is it confined to the presumption of a grant? The summary of most of the answers of to-day on both sides of the Atlantic is that, when all the requisites of adverse user or enjoyment as described in the preceding sections have been proved, there arises a conclusive presumption of law that the claimant of the easement had at one time a right by grant, or in some other lawful form, over the servient property.³

(a) In New York the statute of limitations expressly provides as follows: "A person can not avail himself of a disability unless it existed when his right of action or of entry accrued." "Where two or more disabilities coexist, when the right of action or of entry accrues, the limitation does not attach until all are removed." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 408, 409; *Scallon v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 185 N. Y. 359.

The forms of disability which stay the running of the statutory period are infancy, insanity, and imprisonment for a term less than for life. N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 375; *Howell v. Leavitt*, 95 N. Y. 617; *Darrow v. Calkins*, 154 N. Y. 503, 512.

¹ *Ballard v. Demmon*, 156 Mass. 449.

² *Saunders v. Simpson*, 37 S. W. Rep. 195 (Tenn.).

³ *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Campbell v. Wilson*, 3 East. 294; *Bremer v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 191 N. Y. 333, 338; *Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan*, 43 N. J. L. 605; *Pierce v. Cloud*, 42 Pa. St. 102; *Plimpton v. Converse*, 42 Vt. 712; *Webber v. Chapman*, 42 N. H. 326; *Olney v.*

Fenner, 2 R. I. 211; *Boyce v. Mis. Pac. R. Co.*, 168 Mo. 583. "In this country the prevailing doctrine is, that an exclusive and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years creates a presumption, *juris et de jure*, and is conclusive of title whenever, by possibility, a right may be acquired by grant." *Depue, J.*, in *Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan*, 43 N. J. L. 605.

Just as the statutes of limitations were at first treated as rules of disputable presumption, and were subsequently decided to be statutes of repose; so, after the ancient theory of immemorial enjoyment was discarded and the shorter period of prescription adopted, the courts at first made the proper adverse user for such time merely *prima facie* evidence of a grant, it being regarded by some as a presumption of fact and by others as a disputable presumption of law; and afterwards the most of them came to deal with it as a conclusive presumption of law.¹ It is held, however, in some of the United States, as California, Indiana, and Mississippi, that it is a rebuttable presumption, even after all the requisite facts as to the adverse enjoyment have been established.²

The inquiries in any case as to the length of the enjoyment, its nature as adverse, open, peaceable, and uninterrupted or otherwise, and whether or not the owner of the servient land acquiesced in it, or was laboring under any disability to defend his rights, all involve questions of fact, which are usually for the jury. And not until these matters have all been decided in favor of the claimant of the right is the foundation laid for a presumption of any kind.³ But when the law of a state has once settled upon any number of years — say twenty — as the prescriptive period, and in a given case in that state all those questions of fact involved in the establishment of the requisites of the adverse use have been settled

¹ Last preceding note.

² *Union Water Co. v. Cray*, 25 Cal. 504; *Postlethwaite v. Payne*, 8 Ind. 104; *Lanier v. Booth*, 50 Miss. 410; *Watkins v. Peck*, 13 N. H. 360. See *Hammond v. Zehner*, 21 N. Y. 118; *Hey v. Coleman*, 78 N. Y. App. Div. 584, 586.

³ *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan*, 43 N. J. L. 605; *Smith v. Miller*, 11 Gray (Mass.), 145, 148; *Garrett v. Jackson*, 20 Pa. St. 331; *Livett v. Wilson*, 3 Bing. 115; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 17.

Mr. Washburn, in his work on Easements, argues well upon this question. He says: "Any seeming discrepancy between the ancient doctrine of prescription and the modern notion of a presumed grant where the deed has been lost, as to the conclusiveness of

the evidence thereby resulting in favor of a title to incorporeal hereditaments, may be reconciled, if we bear in mind that, to constitute such a use or enjoyment as raises such presumption of a grant, requires, in addition to the requisite length of time, that it should have certain qualities and characteristics, such as being adverse, continuous, uninterrupted, and by the acquiescence of the owner of the inheritance out of or over which the easement is claimed. And if we assume that these have been established by sufficient proof, it would, doubtless, in such a case and after such a use and enjoyment, be held to create as conclusive a presumption in favor of him who makes the claim, as if it had been established by prescription in its ancient sense." *Wash. Ease.* (4th ed.) p. 129, p. *70.

in the claimant's favor, it is not only in harmony with the results of the most thoroughly considered modern cases, but also in accordance with the reasonable policy which gave rise to prescriptive titles, to insist that a *conclusive* presumption of the rightfulness of the enjoyment shall at once arise, and that evidence shall not thereafter be admitted to overthrow such conclusion or to prevent the establishment of a prescriptive easement.¹

A proper way, therefore, in which to sum up the best modern judicial thought as to the basis of prescriptive rights, seems to be to assert that it rests upon the presumption of a *lost grant*, or of *some other legal origin*. The questions as to the existence, duration, and nature of the user having all been decided in the claimant's favor, the presumption that it is founded on right is *conclusive*—*juris et de jure*.²

§ 164. **No Prescriptive Easement where no Grant can be presumed.**—Out of the narrower theory, however, that a prescriptive title must rest upon a presumed *grant*, has sprung the well-settled negative rule of law, that no easement which could not be the subject of a grant can be acquired by prescription.³ Since, therefore, a common-law grant can transfer incorporeal hereditaments only,⁴ the title to land or any interest in it can not be acquired by prescription.⁵ Any adverse possession or user, which is to pass title to corporeal hereditaments, must ordinarily find its power to do so in some statute. So, in a case in which Parliament had given

¹ The questions as to the existence, duration, and nature of the user are, of course, for the jury. The logical position is that these are to be settled before any presumption of any sort, as to the origin of the easement, is to be indulged. But, these being settled in favor of the claimant, the presumption of his right should then be conclusive. *Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan*, 43 N. J. L. 605, 608; *Sibley v. Ellis*, 11 Gray (Mass.), 417; *Bremer v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 191 N. Y. 333, 338; *Parker v. Foote*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; *Stricker v. Todd*, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 63, 69; *Tracy v. Atherton*, 36 Vt. 503; *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740.

² See this exemplified in the discussion of servitudes acquired by "public

prescription," §§ 168, 169, *infra*. See also *Welsh v. Taylor*, 134 N. Y. 450; *Valentine v. Schreiber*, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 235.

³ *Lockwood v. Wood*, 6 Q. B. 31, 50, 64; *Smith v. Gatewood*, Cro. Jac. 152; *Grimstead v. Marlowe*, 4 T. R. 717; *Curtis v. Keesler*, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 511; *Perley v. Langley*, 7 N. H. 233; *Lit. § 170*; *Co. Lit. 113 b*.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *317.

⁵ *Luttrell's Case*, 4 Co. 87; *Potter v. North*, 1 Vent. 383, 387; *Carlyon v. Lovering*, 1 Hurl. & N. 784; *Strickler v. Todd*, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 63, 69; *Cortelyou v. Van Brunt*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 357; *Gayetty v. Bethune*, 14 Mass. 49, 53; *Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter*, 61 Pa. St. 21; *Hill v. Lord*, 48 Me. 83, 96.

to a corporation the right to construct and operate a canal for public use, and an individual who for over twenty years had drawn water from the canal to run a steam-engine placed by him upon its banks pleaded a prescriptive right when sued by the company, it was held that his plea was bad, since the corporation had no power to do anything concerning the water except to use it for a canal.¹ And, because the City of New York holds its streets in trust for the public use, and can not legally make a grant that will interfere with that use, a private owner's enjoyment for twenty years of a vault that encroaches on the street does not give him any conclusive right to its continuance.²

It follows also, from the doctrine of an assumed grant or other legal origin, that an easement can not be acquired from the state by adverse enjoyment, for no presumption can run against the state.³ But such rights *may* be gained against cities, towns, and other public or *quasi* corporations.⁴

¹ Rockland Canal Co. v. Radcliffe, 18 Q. B. 287; Stafford, etc. Canal v. Birmingham Canal, L. R. 1 Eng. & Ir. App. 254, 268, 278; Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57. A prescriptive right can not be obtained to commit a nuisance. Campbell v. Seaman, 2 N. Y. Super. Ct. 231, aff'd 63 N. Y. 568; Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray (Mass.), 473; Sturges v. Bridgman, L. R. 11 Ch. Div.

852, 855; Wood on Nuisances, pp. 40, 105.

² Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475, 483.

³ Pa. R. Co. v. Borough of Freeport, 138 Pa. St. 91; Glaze v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 67 Ga. 761; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518.

⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER X.

SERVITUDES THAT ARE NOT COMMON-LAW EASEMENTS.

§ 165. Servitudes — How acquired.

a. *Servitudes arising from Grant.*

§ 166. Directly created by grant.

§ 167. Easements in gross.

b. *Servitudes arising from Prescription.*

§ 168. Public prescription.

§ 169. Requisites of public prescription.

c. *Servitudes arising from Custom.*

§ 170. Creation and nature of such servitudes.

d. *Servitudes created by Dedication.*

§ 171. General requisites of dedication.

§ 172. Offer by landowner.

§ 173. Revocation of landowner's offer.

§ 174. Acceptance of offer by public.

§ 175. Statutory dedication.

§ 176. Effects of dedication.

e. *Servitudes created by Operation of Law.*

§ 177. Such servitudes explained and distinguished.

§ 178. Requisites — Public nature.

§ 179. Requisites — Compensation.

§ 180. Kinds of servitudes so created.

f. *Servitudes existing by Nature.*

§ 181. Natural servitudes — Kinds.

§ 165. **Servitudes — How acquired.** — It was explained in the last chapter that real or *prædial* servitudes, when the term is employed in the broad sense of the early common-law writers, embrace all common-law easements; all those natural, legal, and customary rights in or over land which are not franchises nor common-law easements, and which do not carry with them the privilege of taking anything from the servient land; and all forms of *profit à prendre*, or rights to take something from the servient land.¹ The preceding chapter was devoted to the acquisition and leading characteristics of the first of those groups, — the common-law easement,

¹ §§ 127-129, *supra*.

which was defined as a privilege without profit (without *profit à prendre*), created by grant or prescription, which the owner of one piece of land called the dominant tenement has over another piece of land called the servient tenement.¹

The present chapter deals with the creation and chief characteristics of the second group of rights above named, which for the sake of clearness and for want of a better distinctive term are here designated simply as *servitudes*. While commonly called easements even by the highest courts, they are clearly distinguished from common-law easements, properly so called, by the facts that they may come into existence by means other than grant or prescription, and that they do not require the existence of two distinct tenements, the one dominant and the other servient.² Illustrations of them are found in the rights enjoyed by the public in streets and highways,³ in the reciprocal privileges and duties belonging to the owners of adjacent riparian lands,⁴ and in the natural right of every owner of land to have it laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor.⁵ There are six methods by which such servitudes may exist or be brought into being; namely: *a.* By grant, in some of its forms; *b.* By prescription — public prescription; *c.* By custom; *d.* By dedication; *e.* By operation of law; and *f.* By nature. These methods are to be discussed in the order here named, and in connection with such discussion the nature and prominent features of the servitudes to which they may respectfully give rise are to be examined.

a. Servitudes arising from Grant.

§ 166. **Servitudes directly created by Grant.** — In favor of a competent grantee, the owner of a parcel of land may impose

¹ § 126, *supra*.

² See §§ 127, 128, *supra*. The word "servitudes" is thus used, not in a new sense, but simply to distinguish such rights from common-law easements. "Such rights have some semblance to easements, and no harm or inconvenience can probably come from classifying them as such for some purposes. But they are not in fact real easements. Every easement is supposed to have its origin in grant, or prescription which presupposes a grant; and it is quite absurd to suppose that the owner of land, at the head of a

stream, has an easement by grant or prescription for its flow over the land of riparian owners for many miles to its mouth." Earl, J., in *Scriber v. Smith*, 100 N. Y. 479. And see *Archer v. Archer*, 84 Hun (N. Y.), 297, 298; *Bly v. Edison Electric Illum. Co.*, 172 N. Y. 1.

³ *Iselin v. Starin*, 144 N. Y. 453.

⁴ *Brown v. Bowen*, 30 N. Y. 519; *Acquackanonck Water Co. v. Watson*, 29 N. J. Eq. 366; *Macomber v. Godfrey*, 108 Mass. 219.

⁵ *White v. Nassau Trust Co.*, 168 N. Y. 149, 155.

upon it any legal burden that he may choose to create. In order to make an *easement* in this way, he must evince a clear intent to make one lot of land subservient to another; but, when by grant a servitude which is not an easement is to arise, it is simply required that the *one piece of land* shall be encumbered with a burden for the benefit of some designated grantee.¹ This may be accomplished by a direct conveyance by the landowner of some right or privilege over his property, or by a direct reservation in a deed of the servient estate, or by a covenant or condition contained in the instrument of conveyance. The contract, however, must usually be express, when a *servitude* is to come into existence by virtue of a grant alone. When either law or equity fixes by implied grant a burden or obligation upon land, it does so in favor of some other land, to which the right is appurtenant; and thus a common-law easement is brought into existence.²

§ 167. **Easements in Gross.** — The form of servitude (outside of common-law easements) most commonly made by express grant is the so-called "easement in gross," which, as above explained, though generally called an easement, is in reality a form of servitude, but not strictly an easement, since it requires the existence of only one tenement.³ Thus, if a person who owns no land in the neighborhood be granted a right to walk over a certain lot, or a drover be deeded a permanent privilege of driving his cattle across a strip of land connecting two highways and this purely for his convenience in taking them to market and without regard to any ownership of real property by him, a servitude of this character is created.⁴

An easement in gross is so purely personal in its nature that it is not ordinarily assignable, devisable, or inheritable, and the grantee can not even permit another to enjoy it with him against the will of the grantor. In most jurisdictions it can not be made inheritable, devisable, or assignable, by any words in the deed by which it is created.⁵ But, in New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and perhaps one or two

¹ § 165, *supra*.

² §§ 138-152, *supra*.

³ §§ 127, 128, *supra*.

⁴ *Ackroyd v. Smith*, 10 C. B. 164; *Lathrop v. Elsmar*, 93 Mich. 599; *Garrison v. Rudd*, 19 Ill. 558; *City of New York v. Law*, 125 N. Y. 380.

⁵ *Boatman v. Lasley*, 23 Ohio St. 614; *Moore v. Crose*, 43 Ind. 30; *Hoosier Stone Co. v. Malott*, 130 Ind. 21, 24; *Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter*, 61 Pa. St. 21; *Whaley v. Stevens*, 21 S. C. 221.

other states, it may be made transferable in these ways, by apt words used in the deed of grant.¹ Easements in gross are not favored by the law; and a grant of a right over land is presumed to be appurtenant to other land, unless the contrary is shown directly, or by necessary implication from the words of the instrument, or from the surrounding circumstances.² When it is clearly an easement in gross, if there be no explicit declaration as to how long it is to continue, it will be construed as lasting only during the life of the grantee, or for such other period as will be sufficient to carry out the purposes of the grant.³ Thus, where the right was reserved simply for the benefit of the grantor's lessee, it was held that it would end when the lease terminated.⁴ But in those states in which such rights are inheritable they may be made to last in perpetuity, if such an intention be clearly expressed.⁵

b. *Servitudes arising from Prescription.*

§ 168. **Public Prescription.** — In discussing the subject of acquiring *easements* by prescription, it was shown that the most modern theory upon which the courts rest the creation of incorporeal hereditaments through long-continued adverse user or enjoyment is the conclusive presumption of a grant or *other legal origin*.⁶ Since there can be no logical presumption of a grant to such an indefinite and constantly changing thing as the general public, the principle at the foundation of "public prescription" for streets and highways must be simply the indisputable assumption, after such rights have been enjoyed in the requisite manner for the necessary period,

¹ City of New York v. Law, 125 N. Y. 380, 392; Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132, 137; Hankey v. Clark, 110 Mass. 262; Engel v. Ayer, 85 Me. 448; Paul v. Mockley, 33 Wis. 482; Stevenson v. Wiggin, 56 N. H. 308; Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 12. See White v. Wiley, 36 N. Y. St. Rep. 102.

² Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495; Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591; Oswald v. Wolf, 126 Ill. 542; Valentine v. Schreiber, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 235, 240; Hopper v. Barnes, 113 Cal. 636.

³ McDaniel v. Walker, 24 S. E. Rep. 378 (S. C.); Metcalf v. Crystal

Brook Park Ass'n, 63 N. Y. App. Div. 445.

⁴ Russell v. Heublein, 66 Conn. 486; Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co. v. Chandler, 9 Allen (Mass.), 159, 170.

⁵ Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 301; Amidon v. Harris, 113 Mass. 59; Bank v. Miller, 6 Fed. Rep. 545, 550. It is not technically accurate in such cases to say that the easement in gross is granted in fee, "because an easement in fee must be appurtenant to land held in fee." Jones, Ease. § 43; Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 301. See Hankey v. Clark, 110 Mass. 262.

⁶ § 163, *supra*.

that they had a "legal origin" of some kind. They may have commenced as dedicated servitudes, or as rights taken by eminent domain, or otherwise. The precise nature of the origin is immaterial. The fiction is that it was a *legal* beginning of some sort, and practically all the states of this country recognize and protect the resultant highway rights and privileges.¹ Most of the cases in which servitudes have been recognized as established in this manner have dealt with streets, roads, or public ways; but in a few instances prescriptive titles to other rights of convenience or utility to the public have been upheld.² The burdens so imposed upon land are servitudes; but they are not easements, since they are enjoyed by the general public, who have no dominant estate.³

§ 169. *Requisites of Public Prescription.* — A prescriptive highway, or right to some special use of a street or road, may be established by proof that the enjoyment of it by the general public, for the requisite length of time, has been open and notorious, continuous and uniform, peaceable and uninterrupted, with an adverse claim of right, and with the acquiescence of an owner of the land who was seised in fee and who, at the time of the beginning of such enjoyment, was free from disability to resist its imposition upon his property. These essentials are stated in the same form as that in which they were above enumerated in dealing with *easements* by prescription. When they are all established, a right is ordinarily as fully and conclusively proved in the one class of cases as in the other.⁴ So, if it be shown that the public use was with

¹ *Cohoes v. D. & H. Canal Co.*, 134 N. Y. 397; *Corning v. Head*, 86 Hun (N. Y.), 12; *Smith v. State*, 23 N. J. L. 130; *Weiss v. South Bethlehem*, 136 Pa. St. 294; *Commonwealth v. Railroad Co.*, 135 Pa. St. 256; *Sprow v. B. & A. R. Co.*, 163 Mass. 330; *Pomeroy v. Mills*, 3 Vt. 279; *Hampson v. Taylor*, 15 R. I. 83; *Stevens v. Nashua*, 46 N. H. 192; *Campau v. Detroit*, 104 Mich. 560; *Wheatfield v. Grundmann*, 164 Ill. 250; *Shick v. Carroll Co. Comm'rs*, 106 Ind. 573; *Schwerdth v. Placer Co.*, 108 Cal. 589.

² *Stedman v. Southbridge*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 162.

³ *Stevens v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 130 N. Y. 95; § 165, *supra*.

⁴ "In general, it must be such as to

warrant a presumption of laying out, dedication, or appropriation, by parties having authority so to lay out, or a right to so appropriate, like that of prescription or non-appearing grant in case of individuals. It stands upon the same legal grounds, a presumption that whatever was necessary to give the legal effect and operation was rightly done, though no evidence of it can be produced except the actual enjoyment of the benefits conferred by it." *Jennings v. Tisbury*, 5 Gray (Mass.), 73, 74. Also *District of Columbia v. Robinson*, 180 U. S. 92, 98; *Wheatfield v. Grundmann*, 164 Ill. 250; *Root v. Commonwealth*, 98 Pa. St. 170; *Thomas v. Ford*, 63 Md. 346; *Brownell v. Palmer*, 22 Conn. 107; *Howard v. State*, 47 Ark. 431.

the license or permission of the landowner, or that it was not under a claim of right, or that it was desultory or not continued in the same manner and to the same extent throughout the entire prescriptive period, or according to the weight of authority if during part of such period the landowner were under a legal disability which existed when the adverse enjoyment began, the servitude will not be proved to have arisen.¹ But in a few states it has been held that, since prescriptive privileges in favor of the general public are not founded upon the presumption of a grant, the mere disability of the owner of the servient estate to make a grant does not stand in the way of the acquisition of such a right.²

In a few of the United States, as New York, Indiana, and California, there are statutory provisions regarding such acquisition of highways.³ These generally require that the way or street shall be specifically used *as a highway*; and, if the positive provisions of the statute be complied with, it is then generally not fatal to the acquisition of the right that the user was not wholly adverse, or that the landowner was under some legal disability to sue.⁴ (a)

(a) The New York statute (Consol. Laws, ch. 25, being L. 1909, ch. 30, § 209) provides that "All lands which have been used by the public as a highway for the period of twenty years or more shall be a highway, with the same force and effect as if it had been duly laid out and recorded as a highway, and the commissioners of highways shall order the overseers of highways to open all such highways to the width of at least two rods." Dealing with a case arising under this act, the Court of Appeals, per Earl, J., says: "The mere fact that a portion of the public travels over a road for twenty years cannot make it a highway; and the burden of making highways and sustaining bridges cannot be imposed upon the public in that way. There must be more. The use must be like that of a highway generally. The road must not only be travelled upon, but it must be kept in

¹ Irwin v. Dixon, 9 How. (U. S.) 10; Borough of Verona v. A. R. R. Co., 152 Pa. St. 368; Lewis v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 496; McCleary v. Boston & M. R. Co., 153 Mass. 300; Morund v. McClintock, 150 Ill. 129; Jones v. Phillips, 59 Ark. 35; Lewis v. Portland, 25 Oreg. 133; Edson v. Munsell, 10 Allen (Mass.), 557; Watkins v. Peck, 13 N. H. 360; Faulkner v. Corder, 127 Ind. 164; Reimer v. Stuber, 20 Pa. St. 458.

² Webber v. Chapman, 42 N. H. 326; Wallace v. Fletcher, 30 N. H. 434;

Elliott on Roads, 138. And see Speir v. New Utrecht, 121 N. Y. 420; Freshour v. Hihn, 99 Cal. 443.

³ N. Y. Highway Law (Consol. Laws, ch. 25), § 209; Strong v. Makeever, 102 Ind. 578; Freshour v. Hihn, 99 Cal. 443; Stewart v. Frink, 94 N. C. 487; Commonwealth v. Kelly, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 632.

⁴ Ibid.; Speir v. New Utrecht, 121 N. Y. 420; People v. Underhill, 144 N. Y. 316; Schwerdt v. Placer Co., 108 Cal. 589; Elfeit v. Stillwater R. Co., 53 Minn. 68.

c. *Servitudes arising from Custom.*

§ 170. **Creation and Nature of such Servitudes.** — It was stated above that “custom is distinguished from prescription in that the former is a mere local usage, not annexed to any particular person but belonging to the community rather than to its individuals, while the latter is a personal usage or enjoyment confined to the claimant and his ancestors or those whose estate he has acquired.”¹ Custom, moreover, is an outcome of immemorial usage, and will not ordinarily result from proof of twenty years of adverse enjoyment.²

There have been presented to the courts very few cases in which title to incorporeal hereditaments has been held to rest on custom alone. In the rare instances in which it has given rise to servitudes, it has been shown to have continued for time out of mind in favor of a practically definite class of families or persons constituting a town, village, or other community, and to have been reasonable in purpose and scope, so as not to preclude the ordinary use of the land by its owner.³ Thus, in *Fitch v. Rawling*⁴ it was held that a custom for the inhabitants of a certain parish to enter upon a designated piece of land, at reasonable times in each and every year, and

repair or taken in charge and adopted by the public authorities. . . . A private way opened by the owners of the land through which it passes for their own use does not become a public highway merely because the public are also permitted for many years to travel over it.” *Speir v. New Utrecht*, 121 N. Y. 420, 429. See also *Lewis v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.*, 123 N. Y. 496; *People v. Underhill*, 144 N. Y. 316; *People v. Osborn*, 84 Hun, 441; *Harriman v. Howe*, 78 Hun, 280; *Buffalo v. D. L. & W. R. Co.*, 39 N. Y. Supp. 4; *Davenpeck v. Lambert*, 44 Barb. 596.

¹ § 153, *supra*.

² *Goodman v. City of Saltash*, L. R. 7 App. Cas. 633; *Edwards v. Jenkins* (1896), 1 Ch. 308; Co. Lit. 110 b. “The same rights and privileges which may be claimed as a custom may also be claimed as a prescription. An easement upon another man’s land, such as a right of way, a right to turn a plough upon another man’s land, or for a fisherman to mend his nets there, a right to have a gateway, or to pass quit of toll, may be sustained as a custom, or as a prescription. If these rights are common to any manor, hundred, district, parish, or county, as a local right,

they are holden as a custom; if the same are limited to an individual and his descendants, to a body politic and its successors, or are attached to a particular estate, and are only exercised by those who have the ownership of such estate, they are holden as a prescription, which prescription is either personal in its character, or is a prescription in a *que estate*.” *Perley v. Langley*, 7 N. H. 233, 235; *Knowles v. Dow*, 22 N. H. 387.

³ *Fitch v. Rawling*, 2 H. Blackst. 393; *Tyson v. Smith*, 9 Adol. & El. 406; *Gray on Perpetuities*, ch. xvii.

⁴ 2 H. Blackst. 393.

play at cricket and other games was good, and could be established against the landowner by showing that they and their ancestors had enjoyed this privilege for time whereof the memory of man ran not to the contrary. But it was declared that it could not be claimed as a good custom for all the people of England to do this, nor in favor of strangers or other persons, not residents of the parish, who happened to be there at the times when the games were played.¹ A custom for all the inhabitants of a town to go upon a certain *close* on a specified day in each year, for the purpose of horse-racing, was decided to be valid.² But the residents of a village could not thus obtain the right to go upon a piece of land, *at their pleasure*, to exercise horses³ or to play golf,⁴ since this would be unreasonable; nor could they, in this way, gain the privilege of walking or riding over a field at times in the year when the owner had corn or other annual crops growing or standing thereon, because this would tend to destroy altogether the profits of his land.⁵

Emphasis is to be laid upon the fact that a customary servitude must be confined to the inhabitants of a local district, town, or parish. Thus, it was decided in New York that the general public could not obtain a right to deposit manure, wood, and other substances on a public landing-place on the bank of a navigable stream.⁶ And in that case Chancellor Walworth says: "The law is well settled that a customary accomodation in the lands of another, to be good, must be confined to the inhabitants of a local district, and cannot be extended to the whole community or people of the State."⁷ In a country like this, where towns and villages are newer and change more rapidly than in England, while the theory of the creation of servitudes by custom may prevail, yet the circumstances which give rise to the above-enumerated requi-

¹ Also *Abbot v. Weekly*, 1 Lev. 176; *Bland v. Lipscombe*, 4 El. & B. 713, 714, note.

² *Mounsey v. Ismay*, 3 H. & C. 486.

³ *Sowerby v. Coleman*, 2 Ex. 96, 99.

⁴ *Dempster v. Cleghorn*, 2 Dow, 40, 49, 62.

⁵ *Bell v. Wardwell*, Willes, 202.

⁶ *Pearsall v. Post*, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 111, 118. "All prescription must be either in a man and his ancestors, or in a man and those whose estate he hath:

which last is called prescribing in a *que estate*." Chase's Blackst. p. 418. "If one claims a prescriptive right to an easement in another's land, by reason of owning or occupying land to which such right is appurtenant, he is said to claim in a *que estate*." Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 18, p. *10.

⁷ *Post v. Pearsall*, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425, 432; *State v. Wilson*, 42 Me. 9; *Gardiner v. Tisdale*, 2 Wis. 153; *Manning v. Wasdale*, 5 Adol. & El. 758.

sites rarely concur; and in many of the United States such rights have never been held to have been called into existence.¹ In a few states, as above shown, customary servitudes have been clearly sustained.²

d. *Servitudes created by Dedication.*

§ 171. **General Requisites of Dedication.** — Dedication is a means by which title to real property may pass from a person to the general public (or some part thereof) through an offer made by the former and accepted by the latter. Its most common operation is to impose a *servitude* upon land, as, for example, to make the soil subject to use for a highway, street, square, park, landing, or wharf.³ It is founded wholly on the doctrine of estoppel *in pais*; a representation being made by the offer of the landowner such as it is reasonable to presume was intended to be acted on by the public, and the latter reasonably acting accordingly in such a manner that injury would result to it if the representation were denied and the offer withdrawn.⁴ The discussion of servitudes created by dedication, therefore, divides itself naturally into two parts — *first*, the offer of a right over his land, made by the owner thereof to the public, and *second*, the acceptance of the offer by the public.

§ 172. **The Offer by the Landowner.** — *First.* The offer or representation may be made in any proper manner which indicates a clear intent or willingness on the part of the owner of the land to have it used by the public. A deed of the right to the public authorities, a parol declaration that

¹ Post *v.* Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425; *Rose v. Bunn*, 21 N. Y. 275; *Ackerman v. Shelp*, 8 N. J. L. 125; Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) pp. 140-144, pp. *77-*80.

² *Knowles v. Dow*, 22 N. H. 387; *Nudd v. Hobbs*, 17 N. H. 524. See *Hill v. Lord*, 48 Me. 83; *Waters v. Lilley*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145.

³ The doctrine of the dedication of servitudes to the public is of comparatively modern date. "Thus it is stated by Gibson, C. J., in *Gowen v. Philadelphia Exchange Co.*," 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 141 "that the doctrine of dedication to the public, without the intervention of trustees, began in 1732,

Rex v. Hudson" (2 Strange, 909), "and was next applied in *Lade v. Shepherd*, in 1735" (2 Strange, 1004). "It then slept until 1790, in the case of *Rugby v. Merryweather*" (11 East, 375). Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 207, p. *131. Since the last-named date, a great many cases have been decided upon its principles; and it is now a settled doctrine in both England and America.

⁴ *Wilder v. St. Paul*, 12 Minn. 192, 200; *Thousand Is. Pk. Ass'n v. Tucker*, 173 N. Y. 203, 209; *Uhlefelder v. City of Mt. Vernon*, 76 N. Y. App. Div. 349.

the property is designed for public use, or acts, or circumstances, though nothing but silent acquiescence, are sufficient if unequivocal in character to perform that part of the process of dedication which is for the landowner.¹ The cases are numerous, for example, in which lots have been sold with reference to a map or plan, showing them to be bounded on strips of land designed for public streets, highways, squares, or other open places; and it has been held that the offer was thus made to dedicate the land so indicated.² "It is every day's practice to presume a dedication of land to the public use from an acquiescence of the owner in such use."³

The requirement must be emphasized that the overt act or tacit permission must be such that, from it, the design to make the offer to the public can be clearly and fully spelled out or presumed. It was, accordingly, decided that there was no dedication of a way, in a case in which the landowner laid out a street through his premises and graded and paved it, but erected at both ends of it gates, which were, however,

¹ Trustees, etc. v. Merryweather, 11 East, 375; McKay v. Hyde Park, 134 U. S. 84; Flack v. Green Island, 122 N. Y. 107; Matter of 160th Street, 48 Hun (N. Y.), 488; Commonwealth v. Railroad Co., 135 Pa. St. 256; Hayden v. Stone, 112 Mass. 346; Commonwealth v. Coupe, 128 Mass. 63; Wheatfield v. Grandmann, 164 Ill. 250.

² Haight v. Littlefield, 147 N. Y. 338; People v. Underhill, 144 N. Y. 316; Eckerson v. Village of Haverstraw, 6 N. Y. App. Div. 102; Price v. Plainfield, 40 N. J. L. 608; Clark v. Elizabeth, 40 N. J. L. 172; Quicksall v. Philadelphia, 177 Pa. St. 301; Riddiman v. Taylor, 95 Mich. 547; Thaxter v. Turner, 17 R. I. 799. But the making of a plan or map of one's land, on which streets or other open places are indicated, not followed by any dealing with the land with reference to such places, does not evince an intent to dedicate them. Whitworth v. McComb, 69 Miss. 882; Vanatta v. Jones, 42 N. J. L. 561; Birmingham, etc. R. Co. v. Bessemer, 98 Ala. 274. When an owner of land thus sells it off in lots, with reference to a plan or map showing squares, streets, etc., by or along which the parcels are bounded, all the

purchasers who buy with reference to such map or plan are held to have the right to have the spaces kept open as indicated, even though the offer or representation may not be made in such a manner as to lay the foundation for a dedication to the public. Bissell v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 61; Bridges v. Wyckoff, 67 N. Y. 139; Matter of Eleventh Ave., 81 N. Y. 436; Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Thousand Is. Pk. Ass'n v. Tucker, 173 N. Y. 203; Commonwealth v. Beaver Borough, 171 Pa. St. 542. But this last-named right is the result of an *implied grant* to such purchasers of an *easement* over such streets or places; and it is to be carefully distinguished from servitudes upon such places arising from dedication, in favor of the public. The latter rests upon *estoppel*, the former upon *implied grant*; the former requires the existence of two distinct tenements—the lot sold as dominant and the land over which the right exists as servient—while the latter is a burden on the one tenement only—the land over which the public have the right. See §§ 139, 140, *supra*.

³ Knight v. Heaton, 22 Vt. 480, 483.

removed for a time while the road was being finished.¹ The existence of the gates negated all presumption of an offer to the public, and their removal for a time was explained by the fact that it was done for the purpose of completing the roadway. Thus, very slight acts on the part of him over whose property the right is claimed, such as putting a fence, post, or rock in the road, or by a sign-board forbidding passage through it, will readily do away with any assumption that he meant a dedication to ensue.² And mere acquiescence by the owner of land in its occasional and varying use for travel by the public is insufficient to establish an intent to dedicate it for a street.³ Yet, since the doctrine upon which rest the principles of dedication of servitudes is estoppel *in pais*, it is to be added, as of course, that if the landowner so act as to lead the public to believe that he meant to offer it the use of his property, even though in reality he had no such intention, he will be precluded from denying the existence of a dedicated right, to the prejudice of those who have in good faith acted upon the representation so made.⁴

§ 173. **Revocation of Landowner's Offer.** — The owner of land, who has offered the use of it to the public, may withdraw the offer at any time before its acceptance, and thus prevent a dedication from ever being effectuated.⁵ His death before the public has accepted the proffered servitude is in itself a revocation.⁶ The offer, moreover, is deemed to be

¹ *Carpenter v. Gwynn*, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 395, 406.

² "A single act of interruption by the owner is of much more weight upon the question of intention than many acts of enjoyment on the part of the public; the use without the intention to dedicate it as a public way not being a dedication." Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 212, p. * 135; *Poole v. Huskinson*, 11 M. & W. 827; *Roberts v. Carr*, 1 Camph. 262; *Barracough v. Johnson*, 8 Adol. & El. 99; *Dwinel v. Barnard*, 28 Me. 554; *Commonwealth v. Newbury*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 51; *Huffman v. Hall*, 102 Cal. 26; *Herhold v. Chicago*, 108 Ill. 467; *Hall v. Baltimore*, 56 Md. 187; *State v. Green*, 41 Iowa, 693; *Bauman v. Boeckeler*, 119 Mo. 189. So the payment of taxes on the land, as private property, militates against a presumed intent to offer it to the public; but this may be readily rebutted by other proof

that a dedication has actually occurred. *Ottawa v. Yentzer*, 160 Ill. 509; *Getchell v. Benedict*, 57 Iowa, 121; *Elsworth v. Grand Rapids*, 27 Mich. 250; *Buschman v. St. Louis*, 121 Mo. 523; *Smith v. Osage*, 80 Iowa, 84.

³ *Borough of Verona v. A. R. R. Co.*, 152 Pa. St. 368.

⁴ *Wilder v. St. Paul*, 12 Minn. 192. See *Lee v. Lake*, 14 Mich. 12, 18.

⁵ *Bridges v. Wyckoff*, 67 N. Y. 139; *Lee v. Sandy Hill*, 40 N. Y. 442; *Mark v. West Troy*, 57 N. Y. St. Rep. 323; *Chicago v. Drexel*, 141 Ill. 89; *Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon*, 72 Mich. 249; *People v. Dreher*, 101 Cal. 271; *Becker v. St. Charles*, 37 Mo. 13. See *Trustees v. Hoboken*, 33 N. J. L. 13; *Atty-Gen. v. Morris*, etc. R. Co., 4 C. E. Green (N. J.), 386, 391.

⁶ *People v. Kellogg*, 67 Hun (N. Y.), 546; *Bridges v. Wyckoff*, 67 N. Y. 130; *Walker v. Townsend*, 43 Ohio St. 537.

kept open only a reasonable time; and, after that has elapsed without anything having been done on the part of the public to complete the dedication, the landowner may treat his proposition as in effect rejected, and employ his property accordingly, without the necessity for any formal revocation of his offer.¹

§ 174. **Acceptance of the Offer by the Public.** — *Second.* When the offer, still in force, is accepted by the public, the dedication becomes complete; and until that time it is merely incipient.² As is stated above, the acceptance must be made within a reasonable time after the offer, or the offer will be deemed revoked.³ All that is required to constitute the acceptance is that the public shall, in some unmistakable manner, indicate an intention to avail itself of the right tendered by the owner of the land.⁴ This is frequently done in an express contract entered into by the duly authorized public authorities and the proprietor of the servient estate. But it may also be readily accomplished by any direct dealing by such authorities with the *locus in quo*, such as grading and paving or sewerage the street, fencing in the square, or otherwise improving the place in question, so as to evince the exercise of control over it for the designated object.⁵ And, while in a few cases it has been held that acceptance requires some overt act other than mere user,⁶ yet the weight of authority, in this country at least, is to the effect that mere enjoyment by the public in the manner indicated by the offer of the servitude and so that its discontinuance would be detrimental to the public, or even enjoyment alone for a con-

¹ *Cook v. Harris*, 61 N. Y. 448; *Derby v. Alling*, 40 Conn. 410; *Crocket v. Boston*, 5 Cnsh. (Mass.) 182; *Bartlett v. Bangor*, 67 Me. 460; *Baker v. Johnston*, 21 Mich. 319. What constitutes a reasonable time is to be determined by the particular circumstances of each case. See *Vermont Village v. Miller*, 161 Ill. 210; *Grandville v. Jenison*, 84 Mich. 54; *Bell v. Burlington*, 68 Iowa, 296.

² *Cubitt v. Mapse*, 8 C. P. 704; *People v. Underhill*, 144 N. Y. 316; *State v. South Amboy*, 57 N. J. L. 252; *Hayden v. Stone*, 112 Mass. 346; *Dorman v. Bates Mfg. Co.*, 82 Me. 438; *Field v. Manchester*, 32 Mich. 279. If the act of the landowner alone could cause the servitude to exist, he might

sometimes impose an onerous burden upon the public without its consent.

³ § 173, *supra*.

⁴ *People v. Underhill*, 144 N. Y. 316.

⁵ *King v. Leake*, 5 Barn. & Ad. 469; *Matter of Hunter*, 164 N. Y. 365; *Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & C. R. Co.*, 124 Ill. 235; *Ross v. Thompson*, 78 Ind. 90; *Price v. Breckinridge*, 92 Mo. 378; *Hall v. Meriden*, 48 Conn. 416; *State v. Fisher*, 117 N. C. 733.

⁶ See *Green v. Canaan*, 29 Conn. 157, 163; *Guthrie v. New Haven*, 31 Conn. 308, 321; *Hoboken Land Co. v. Hoboken*, 36 N. J. L. 540. Thus, in Iowa, it is expressly provided by statute that a public way shall not be established by user alone. 1 Iowa, R. S. (1888) § 3206.

siderable length of time, finishes the dedication and makes the right and burden complete.¹ When the right is in itself essential to the public convenience, the user alone, without regard to its length, is ordinarily sufficient; but otherwise mere enjoyment is simply an item of evidence of acceptance, which may be easily overcome by counter-proof, unless it has been continued so long and under such circumstances as to make it clear that the public convenience and rights would be materially affected by its cessation.² Under such conditions it has been held that proof of user, in one case for five years,³ and in another for four years,⁴ was sufficient evidence of acceptance of the servitude. When the public would not be in any way inconvenienced by the termination of the use, then, in order to establish the right by proof of the enjoyment alone, it must be shown that it has continued for at least twenty years, or during the prescriptive period.⁵ But in such a case the servitude is in reality created by prescription and not by dedication.⁶

¹ *King v. Leake*, 5 Barn. & Ad. 469; *Green v. Canaan*, 29 Conn. 157; *Atty.-Gen. v. Abbott*, 154 Mass. 323; *Bauman v. Boeckeler*, 119 Mo. 189; *Smith v. Flora*, 64 Ill. 93; *Los Angeles Cemetery Co. v. Los Angeles*, 32 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 240; *Buchanan v. Curtis*, 25 Wis. 99; *Kansas City Milling Co. v. Riley*, 133 Mo. 574. "Even in case an acceptance by formal adoption by the public authorities be essential, as it is in some states, in order to impose on the public the duty of maintaining and keeping in repair, yet if in fact there has been a dedication, and in the estimation of the authorities the want and convenience of the public require the land to be used for the purpose of a highway, they may use it for that purpose and thus cut off the owner from retraction." *Jones, Ease*, § 450, citing *Hoboken Land Co. v. Hoboken*, 36 N. J. L. 540; *Harrison County v. Seal*, 66 Miss. 129.

² *Matter of Beach Avenue*, 70 Hun (N. Y.), 351; *Commonwealth v. Railroad Co.*, 135 Pa. St. 256; *Detroit v. Detroit & M. R. Co.*, 23 Mich. 173; *Ramthun v. Halfman*, 58 Tex. 551; *Meiners v. St. Louis*, 130 Mo. 274.

³ *Jarvis v. Dean*, 3 Bing. 447. See

Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425.

⁴ *Los Angeles Cemetery Co. v. Los Angeles*, 32 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 240.

⁵ *Gould v. Glass*, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 179; *Smith v. State*, 23 N. J. L. 130; *Atty.-Gen. v. Morris, etc. R. Co.*, 4 C. E. Green (N. Y.), 386, 391; *Hoole v. Atty.-Gen.*, 22 Ala. 190; *Day v. Allender*, 22 Md. 511, 526; *Hutto v. Tindall*, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 396.

⁶ "Ways by prescription and ways by dedication rest upon entirely different principles. The first is established upon evidence of user by the public, adverse and continuous for a period of twenty years or more, from which use arises a presumption of a reservation or grant and the acceptance thereof, or that it has been laid out by the proper authorities, of which no record exists. The second is created by the permission or gift of the owner, and upon the acceptance of such gift by the public authorities it becomes a way, and the owner cannot withdraw his dedication." *Commonwealth v. Coupe*, 128 Mass. 63; *Commonwealth v. Matthews*, 122 Mass. 60; *Richards v. County Commissioners*, 120 Mass. 401; *State v. Mitchell*, 58 Iowa, 567.

§ 175. **Statutory Dedication.** — In a number of the United States, most of which are in the West, there are statutes regulating the dedication of property by private persons to the public.¹ Some of them are confined to the creation of incorporeal hereditaments in this manner, while others are made broad enough to effect the transfer of corporeal property.² The prominent idea in them all is that the making, acknowledging, and filing by the landowner, of a plat or plan, upon which are shown streets, squares, parks, or other open places designed for public use, shall constitute a dedication of those places without further acts or formalities.³ Formal acceptance by the public is, under most of such statutes, not necessary to complete the dedication; but, of course, the right always exists in the local authorities to reject a proffered servitude or other property which would not be for the public convenience or utility. By some of the statutes, moreover, the method of accepting by the public is specifically outlined.⁴

In states where such means of dedication are prescribed, such, for example, as Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and California, it is uniformly held that, if the statute be not properly complied with, but all the requisites of a common-law dedication be shown to exist, a servitude may be thus established.⁵ Such special acts, therefore, do not exclude the other methods of acquiring easements and servitudes.

§ 176. **Effects of Dedication.** — In the absence of statutory modification, the ordinary results of the dedication of a servitude are that the title to the land remains as before, the right over it passes as a servitude, in favor of the public, for the

¹ *Railroad Co. v. Schurmeier*, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 272; *Vermont Village v. Miller*, 161 Ill. 210; *Marsh v. Village of Fairbury*, 163 Ill. 401; *Fulton v. Mehrenfeld*, 8 Ohio St. 440; *Ruddiman v. Taylor*, 95 Mich. 547; *State v. Minneapolis & M. R. Co.*, 62 Minn. 450; *Pillsbury v. Alexander*, 40 Neb. 242; *Giffen v. Olathe*, 44 Kan. 342; *Carpentaria School District v. Heath*, 56 Cal. 478; *Evansville v. Page*, 23 Ind. 525, 527; *Callaway Co. v. Nolley*, 31 Mo. 393; *Elliott, Roads & Streets*, § 114.

² *Trustees, etc. v. Haven*, 11 Ill. 554; *Moses v. Pittsburg, etc. R. Co.*, 21 Ill. 516; *Des Moines v. Hall*, 24 Iowa, 234, 244.

³ *United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.*, 154 U. S. 225; *Elson v. Comstock*, 150 Ill. 303; *Carpentaria School Dist. v. Heath*, 56 Cal. 478.

⁴ *Reid v. Board of Education*, 73 Mo. 295; *Fulton v. Mehrenfeld*, 8 Ohio St. 440; *Ehmen v. Guthenberg*, 50 Neb. 715; *Elson v. Comstock*, 150 Ill. 303.

⁵ *Banks v. Ogden*, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 57; *Evansville v. Page*, 23 Ind. 525, 527; *Marsh v. Fairbury*, 163 Ill. 401; *Mason v. Chicago*, 163 Ill. 351; *State v. Minneapolis & M. R. Co.*, 62 Minn. 450; *Burton v. Marx*, 38 Mich. 761; *Carpentaria School Dist. v. Heath*, 56 Cal. 478.

purposes and to the extent indicated by both the offer and the acceptance,¹ and the local public authorities thereupon become responsible for the proper care and improvement of the way, square, or other place, and liable in damages to any one rightfully there who may be injured because of its being out of repair.² The right and burden, moreover, will keep pace with any extensions or necessary changes in the land. Thus, if it be a way across a piece of land to navigable waters, it will continue to lead to those waters, though the land be extended much farther out into them either by natural causes or by the voluntary act of the owner of the soil.³

e. *Servitudes created by Operation of Law.*

§ 177. **Such Servitudes explained and distinguished.** — Rights that the public have in streets, parks, wharves, canals, natural streams, and the like, are very largely the results of statutes; and, when they arise in that way, they are servitudes created by operation of law. The privileges and immunities, which legislative enactments confer upon members of the public in general and, to a limited extent, upon individuals and corporations for special purposes, are as numerous and varied as the requirements and opinions of different communities. But the servitudes to which they give rise are all affected by the constitutional inhibitions against the taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation, and against the taking of such property in opposition to the will of its owner for any purposes other than those of a public nature. It is the fact, moreover, that they spring from the exercise of the right of eminent domain, either by the state generally or by some municipality or corporation upon which that right has been conferred, that distinguishes them from all other servitudes and that is to be specially noted as indicating the line of

¹ Thus the dedication may be restrictive, as for a foot-path, or for all purposes except to carry coals, etc., and the public must then confine its use to the purposes and within the limits so indicated. *Stafford v. Coyney*, 7 Barn. & C. 257; *White v. Bradley*, 66 Me. 254; *Gowen v. Phila. Exchange Co.*, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 141; *Hemphill v. Boston*, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 195; *State v. Trask*, 6 Vt. 355; *State v. Leverick*, 34

N. J. L. 201; *Pa. R. Co. v. Montgomery County P. R. Co.*, 167 Pa. St. 62; *O'Neil v. Sherman*, 77 Tex. 182; *Woods, Ways*, 13.

² *Mayor v. Sheffield*, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 189; *Savannah, etc. R. Co. v. Shiels*, 33 Ga. 599, 619. See *Durgin v. Lowell*, 3 Allen (Mass.), 398.

³ *Mark v. Village of West Troy*, 151 N. Y. 453.

demarkation between them and servitudes created by dedication. The latter are the outcome of an offer, voluntarily and intentionally made by the landowner,¹ while servitudes arising by operation of law are taken *in invitum* from the proprietor of the servient land.²

§ 178. **Requisites of Servitudes created by Operation of Law — Public Nature.** — The primary requisite of servitudes of this kind is that the use, for which the right is taken shall be public in its nature. By this is not meant that the enjoyment and benefit must be universal, or even extend throughout the entire state; but it is sufficient if they be such as to contribute in some measure to the progress or general welfare of the community or district in which the privilege is exercised.³ Such a use is involved, for example, in the employing of land for a highway, or a railroad, or a public park, though the chief or only benefit therefrom accrue to the residents of the town in which it is located.⁴ It is the *nature* of the use, rather than the extent to which it is applied, that determines its character; and when it is manifestly open to all, or is really for public good under the circumstances, though designed primarily for the convenience of only a few individuals, or to accommodate one person more specially than others, it complies with the requirement now under discussion.⁵ It is to be added that, in some rare instances, constitutional provisions authorize the creation of such rights, against the will of the owner of the land, for private uses alone, as in New York for

¹ § 172, *supra*.

² *Matter of Townsend*, 39 N. Y. 171; *Matter of Union El. R. Co.*, 112 N. Y. 61; *In re City of Brooklyn*, 143 N. Y. 596; *Denham v. County Comm'rs*, 108 Mass. 202, 205.

³ *Beekman v. Saratoga, etc. R. Co.*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 45, 73; *Matter of Townsend*, 39 N. Y. 171, 174; *Donohue v. Keystone Gas Co.*, 181 N. Y. 313; *Concord R. R. v. Greeley*, 17 N. H. 47, 61; *Cooley, Const. Lim.* 532.

⁴ *Beekman v. Saratoga, etc. R. Co.*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 45, 73; *Boston Water Power v. B. & W. R. Co.*, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 360, 399; *Talbot v. Hudson*, 16 Gray (Mass.), 417, 421; *Olmstead v. Camp*, 33 Conn. 532; *Bankhead v. Brown*, 25 Iowa, 540, 549.

⁵ Thus, the demands of public utility enable riparian owners to use a stream more fully in arid sections than in places where water is plentiful. *Clark v. Nash*, 198 U. S. 361; p. 300, *infra*; *Denham v. County Comm'rs*, 108 Mass. 202, 205. See *Wash. Ease.* (4th ed.) p. 454, p. *327; citing *Talbot v. Hudson*, 16 Gray (Mass.), 417, 421; *Beekman v. Saratoga, etc. R. Co.*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 45, 73; *Inhabitants, etc. v. County Comm'rs*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 185, 188; *Tyler v. Beacher*, 44 Vt. 648; *Matter of Townsend*, 39 N. Y. 171, 174; *Allen v. Joy*, 60 Me. 124, 139; *Bankhead v. Brown*, 25 Iowa, 540, 545; *In re Fowler*, 53 N. Y. 60, 62.

private roads;¹ but in England and most of the United States such an invasion of individual rights is not permitted.²

§ 179. **Requisites of Servitudes created by Operation of Law — Compensation.** — The other distinctive requisite of servitudes created by operation of law is that just compensation shall be made to the owner of the land upon which the burden is imposed. This is to be sufficient to pay him for the value of the servitude taken, including damages for the *direct* injury which he suffers because of its creation and existence. The general principle is that compensation can not be recovered for indirect and consequential injuries which may be inflicted upon a piece of land by the invasion or taking of other private property for public purposes. Thus, when a state, or city, or town, in changing the grade of a street by proper authority, depreciates the value of an abutter's property, but does not specifically take any of it from him, he has ordinarily no right of action for the resulting injury.³ (a) But the precise limitations of this principle are not easily ascertainable. There has been much divergence of opinions and decisions concerning them, especially in relation to street rights, in the different states of this country.

An abutting owner has property rights in the use of the street, which his land adjoins, for ingress and egress and for the receiving of light and air. Whether he owns any of the soil of the street or not, he is entitled to compensation in damages for any direct interference with these rights, unless it is occasioned by such uses of the street as were originally contemplated, or are necessary, appropriate, and usual for the

(a) In New York, statutes provide for payment of damages for injury caused by change of grade of streets in towns and villages. L. 1903, ch. 610 (adding § 11 a to the Highway Law); L. 1909, ch. 30, § 59; *Matter of Borup*, 182 N. Y. 222; *Comesky v. Village of Suffern*, 179 N. Y. 393, 394; *Matter of Anderson*, 91 App. Div. 563; *Lawton v. City of Rochelle*, 123 App. Div. 832. Otherwise damages for change of grade of streets are not recoverable, except by virtue of special statutes for individual cases. See L. 1893, ch. 537; *People ex rel. Astor*, 124 App. Div. 195.

¹ See discussion of private roads laid out by operation of law, § 180, *infra*. N. Y. Highway Law (L. 1909, ch. 30, being Con. L. ch. 25), §§ 211-219.

² *Wilkinson v. Leland*, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 626, 658; *Talbot v. Hudson*, 16 Gray (Mass.), 417, 421; *Bankhead v. Brown*, 25 Iowa, 540, 548. Such was the rule, also, under the constitution of New York prior to 1846 *Beekman v. Saratoga, etc. R. Co.*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 45, 73; *Matter of Townsend*, 39 N. Y. 171, 174.

³ *Mead v. Portland*, 200 U. S. 148; *Sauer v. City of New York*, 180 N. Y. 27; *Smith v. Boston & Albany R. Co.*, 181 N. Y. 132; *Radcliff's Executors v. Mayor of Brooklyn*, 4 N. Y. 195; *Coster v. Mayor of Albany*, 43 N. Y. 399; *Lahr v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 104 N. Y. 268, 292; *Lamm v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co.*, 45 Minn. 71; *Detroit City Railway v. Mills*, 85 Mich. 634. See *Bennett v. Long Is. R. Co.*, 181 N. Y. 431.

proper enjoyment thereof by the public.¹ New uses of the street, coming within such contemplation or usage, may be authorized by legislation for the benefit of the public, without the necessity for providing for any remuneration to the abutting proprietors. "Such are the cases in respect to changes of grade; the use of a street for a surface horse railroad; the laying of sewer, gas, and water pipes beneath the soil; the erection of street lamps and hitching posts, and of poles for electric lights used for street lighting."² So the uses of a street for a surface, cable, or electric railway, provided they do not interfere with its enjoyment for ordinary street purposes, do not usually create nor take servitudes so as to bestow upon adjoining owners any right to compensation.³ But New York holds otherwise, when the abutting proprietors own the soil (fee) of the street.⁴ The erection and operation of an elevated railroad on a city street, not being an improvement of the street for the benefit of the public, but rather an additional use by virtue of a right granted to a corporation, is the taking and appropriation of rights of abutting owners in such a way as to render the railroad company liable to them in damages. And this is true, though the structure is erected pursuant to a state statute requiring it; for otherwise the abutters would be deprived of their property (servitudes) without due process of law.⁵ And the same is true of buildings erected for like purposes on streets by railroad companies, even by order of the state, so as to deprive abutters of light, air, and access. Such interference with the street rights of an adjacent owner is a taking of those rights *pro tanto*, and the value

¹ *Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 90 N. Y. 122; *Drucker v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 106 N. Y. 157; *American Bank Note Co. v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 129 N. Y. 252; *Fries v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.*, 169 N. Y. 270; *Paterson R. Co. v. Grundy*, 51 N. J. Eq. 213; *Dill v. Camden Board of Education*, 47 N. J. Eq. 441; *Onset St. R. Co. v. County Comm'rs*, 154 Mass. 395; *Lincoln Rapid Transit Co. v. Rundle*, 34 Neb. 559.

² *Lahr v. Met. R. Co.*, 104 N. Y. 268, 292; *Folensbee v. City of Amsterdam*, 142 N. Y. 118.

³ *Matter of Third Ave. R. Co.*, 121 N. Y. 536; *Rafferty v. Central Traction Co.*, 147 Pa. St. 579; *Lorie v. North*

Chicago City R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 270; *Howe v. West End St. R. Co.*, 167 Mass. 46; *Halsey v. Rapid Transit R. Co.*, 47 N. J. Eq. 380; *Hudson R. Tel. Co. v. Watervliet Turn. & R. Co.*, 135 N. Y. 394, 397; *Blair v. Chicago*, 201 U. S. 401; *Grand Rapids St. R. Co. v. West Side St. R. Co.*, 48 Mich. 433; *Detroit City Railway v. Mills*, 85 Mich. 634, 658. See note (a) as to New York, p. 232, *infra*.

⁴ *Paige v. Schenectady R. Co.*, 178 N. Y. 102, 109; note (a) p. 232, *infra*.

⁵ *Muhler v. Harlem R. Co.*, 197 U. S. 544, reversing S. C. 173 N. Y. 549.

of what is so taken, must be paid for; and, in connection with this, compensation must be made for the damage done to his land adjoining the street, which is the one great injury. He is paid for a direct taking of property rights—servitudes—from him; and the right to such payment is inseparable from his land, and passes with it when it is transferred.¹ But owners of land not abutting on the street on which is the road can not recover compensation for any injury (for such injury is indirect) occasioned to their properties by its erection, existence, or operation.² No servitudes are thereby taken from them. There is a conflict in the decisions as to the right of adjacent owners to recover damages for injury occasioned by steam railroads on the *surface* of streets. In the majority of the United States, it is held that the construction and operation of such roads upon streets and highways, of which the ownership of the soil is in the *abutting proprietors*, is a perversion of them to a use not ordinary nor originally contemplated, and that, accordingly, such owners may have compensation for the servitudes thus taken and the consequent loss in the value of their property.³ But a few of the courts have maintained that such an employment of a highway is

¹ McKenna v. Brooklyn Union El. R. Co., 184 N. Y. 391 and cases cited; Schomacker v. Michaels, 189 N. Y. 61; Osborne v. Auburn Telephone Co., 189 N. Y. 393; Bohn v. Met. El. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 576; Kane v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 164; Abendroth v. Manhattan R. Co., 122 N. Y. 1; Lahr v. Met. El. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 268; Drucker v. Manhattan R. Co., 106 N. Y. 157; Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Muhler v. Harlem R. Co., 173 N. Y. 549, 556; Dolan v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 175 N. Y. 367, 370; Pa. R. Co. v. Duncan, 111 Pa. St. 352. The damages, in such cases, include the amount by which the value of the abutting property is decreased by the construction and operation of the road, because of the loss to it of access, light, and air and the injury caused to it by noise, loss of privacy, etc. Woolsey v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 134 N. Y. 323; Rumsey v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co., 133 N. Y. 79, 136 N. Y. 543; Buffalo v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 138 N. Y. 257; Bookman v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 302, 147 N. Y. 298; Robinson v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 175 N. Y. 219; N. Y. El. R. Co. v. Fifth Nat. Bk., 135 U. S. 432; Lamm v. Chicago,

etc. R. Co., 45 Minn. 71. Since this right adheres to the land, a purchaser in fee of the abutting property, after the construction of the road, may maintain an action for the entire injury. The owner for the time being is usually the only one who can successfully sue. When it has been agreed that a prior owner shall have damages, he who thus sues obtains them in trust for him. McKenna v. Brooklyn Union El. R. Co., 184 N. Y. 391; Shepard v. Man. El. R. Co., 169 N. Y. 160; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Shepard, 169 N. Y. 170. See Schomacker v. Michaels, 189 N. Y. 61; Galt v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 157 Ill. 125; Beach v. W. & W. R. Co., 120 N. C. 498.

² Ibid. Especially Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Reilly v. Man. El. R. Co., 43 N. Y. App. Div. 80.

³ Williams v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97; Henderson v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 78 N. Y. 423; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Kelsey v. King, 33 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 39; Chamberlain v. Elizabethport, S. C. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 43; Commonwealth v. Allen, 148 Pa. St. 358; Onset R. Co. v. County Comm'rs, 154 Mass. 395; Western R. Co. v. Ala.

ordinary and reasonable and does not give rise to any cause of action for damages.¹ The courts of New York, Michigan, Illinois, Tennessee, and a few other states have decided that a steam railroad may be authorized upon the surface of streets, the soil of which the *city* owns, without the necessity of making compensation to the abutting owners, provided the grade of the street is not changed, and it is left substantially free and unobstructed for the purposes of ordinary travel.² (a) In some

(a) The New York courts have decided, as to steam, electric and horse railroads on the surface of a street, and also as to telegraph and telephone poles, that they constitute an additional burden (and in that sense take property) for which compensation must be made to the abutter, *if he own the soil of the street*. *Peck v. Schenectady R. Co.*, 170 N. Y. 298; *Paige v. Schenectady R. Co.*, 178 N. Y. 102, 109; *Osborne v. Auburn Telephone Co.*, 189 N. Y. 393, 396. But if he do not own that soil, the damages are only consequential and call for no compensation, unless the appropriation and use of the street become so great and annoying as to degenerate into a nuisance. The elevated railroad cases, beginning with *Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 90 N. Y. 122, do not run counter to this distinction; but add an element to it, by holding that the elevated structures, being for the benefit of the railroad companies and not erected "to improve the street for the benefit of the public," result in *direct* taking of servitudes of light, air, and access, for which compensation must be made to the abutters, even though they own none of the soil of the street. *Fobes v. R. W. & O. R. Co.*, 121 N. Y. 505; *Reining v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.*, 128 N. Y. 157; *Kane v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 125 N. Y. 164; *Fries v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.*, 169 N. Y. 276; *Muhler v. Harlem R. Co.*, 173 N. Y. 549, 197 U. S. 544; *Dolan v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.*, 175 N. Y. 367.

G. T. R. Co., 96 Ala. 272; *Reichert v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co.*, 51 Ark. 491; *Weyl v. S. V. R. Co.*, 96 Cal. 202; *Imlay v. Union B. R. Co.*, 26 Conn. 249; *F. S. R. Co. v. Brown*, 23 Fla. 104; *S. Car. R. Co. v. Steiner*, 44 Ga. 546; *Galt v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.*, 157 Ill. 125; *Bnrkam v. O. & M. R. Co.*, 122 Ind. 344; *Barb Wire Co. v. C. B. & Q. R. Co.*, 70 Iowa, 105; *Chicago K. & W. R. Co. v. Woodward*, 47 Kan. 191; *Phipps v. West Md. R. Co.*, 66 Md. 319; *Taylor v. Bay City St. R. Co.*, 101 Mich. 140; *Gustavson v. Hamm*, 56 Minn. 334; *St. Louis Transfer Co. v. L. M. B. Co.*, 111 Mo. 666; *Omaha & N. P. R. Co. v. Janeczek*, 30 Neb. 276; *Lawrence R. Co. v. Williams*, 35 Ohio St. 168; *Railroad Co. v. Bingham*, 87 Tenn. 522; *G. C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Eddins*, 60 Tex. 656; *Hodges v. S. R. Co.*, 89 Va. 653; *Taylor v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co.*, 83 Wis. 636.

¹ *Elizabethtown & P. R. Co. v. Thompson*, 79 Ky. 52; *Fulton v. S. R.*

R. T. Co., 85 Ky. 640; *Hill v. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co.*, 38 La Ann. 599; *Arbenz v. W. & H. R. Co.*, 33 W. Va. 1; *McLaughlin v. C. & S. C. R. Co.*, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 583. See *Macomber v. Nichols*, 34 Mich. 212; *Montgomery v. S. A. W. R. Co.*, 104 Cal. 186, 192; *Knapp v. St. L. T. R. Co.*, 126 Mo. 26.

² This question has arisen most prominently in reference to the City of New York, which owns in fee simple the soil of many of its streets on Manhattan Island. *Fobes v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co.*, 121 N. Y. 505; *Reining v. N. Y. L. & W. R. Co.*, 128 N. Y. 157; *Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. Co.*, 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 9; *People v. Kerr*, 27 N. Y. 188; *Kane v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 125 N. Y. 164; *G. R. & I. R. Co. v. Heisel*, 38 Mich. 62; *Olney v. Wharf*, 115 Ill. 519; *Railroad Co. v. Bingham*, 87 Tenn. 522; *C. N. & S. W. R. Co. v. Mayor*, 36 Iowa, 299; *Hogan v. Cent. Pac. R. Co.*, 71 Cal. 83; *K. N. & D. R. Co. v. Cuykendall*, 42 Kan. 234; *Arbens v. Wheeling & H. R. Co.*, 33 W. Va. 1.

of the states, however, such as Minnesota, Ohio, and Texas, the owners of the adjacent lands are given the same remedies for injury to their properties because of such a railroad, whether or not the city owns the soil of the highway on which it is located.¹ There is a similar conflict of authority as to the effect of the placing of telegraph and telephone poles and wires upon streets and highways; it being insisted in some states, such as Illinois and Virginia, that compensation for this use of the way need not be made to abutting proprietors unless their properties are unnecessarily injured,² while in other jurisdictions, such as New Jersey and Michigan and in New York when the abutter owns the soil of the street, the existence of such poles and wires *per se* affords ground for the recovery of damages.³

§ 180. **Kinds of Servitudes created by Operation of Law.** — While the kinds of servitudes which arise by operation of law are numerous and varied, the most important and frequently employed of these are roads and ways acquired by corporations, such as turnpike, canal, and railroad companies; public highways; private roads laid out by public authority; public rights in non-navigable streams and waters, and special provisions as to buildings and walls in large cities.

Incorporated companies, such as railroad and turnpike corporations which need the use of large tracts of land for the carrying on of their business, are ordinarily given, by either general or special legislation, the power to exercise the right of eminent domain; and under that authority they acquire roads and ways, in a *quasi*-public capacity and for uses of a public nature.⁴ They take, as a rule, not the ownership of the soil and corporeal hereditaments, but simply servitudes in the form of road and street rights and privileges. The

¹ Carli *v.* V. D. Co., 32 Minn. 101; Schurmeir *v.* St. P. & P. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82; L. M. R. Co. *v.* Hambleton, 40 Ohio St. 496; S. V. R. Co. *v.* Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41; Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. *v.* Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523, 541; G. C. & S. F. R. Co. *v.* Eddins, 60 Tex. 656; B. & M. R. Co. *v.* Rein-hackle, 15 Neb. 279; Dooly Block *v.* Rapid Tr. Co., 9 Utah, 31.

² Pacific P. Tel. Cable Co. *v.* Irvine, 49 Fed. Rep. 113; Board of Trade Tel. Co. *v.* Barnett, 107 Ill. 507; West U. Tel. Co. *v.* Williams, 86 Va. 696; Stowers *v.* Postal T. C. Co., 68 Miss. 559; Willis *v.* Erie T. & T. Co., 37

Minn. 347; Daily *v.* State, 51 Ohio St. 348.

³ Dean *v.* Ann Arbor St. Ry. Co., 93 Mich. 330; Erwin *v.* Cent. U. Tel. Co., 148 Ind. 365; Eels *v.* American T. & T. Co., 143 N. Y. 133; Palmer *v.* Larchmont Electric Co., 158 N. Y. 231; Osborne *v.* Auburn Telephone Co., 189 N. Y. 393, 396. In New Jersey, a statute requires compensation to be made in such cases. Winter *v.* N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co., 51 N. J. L. 83; Broome *v.* N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co., 49 N. J. L. 624; Roake *v.* Amer. Tel. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 35.

⁴ Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1141.

proceedings for this purpose usually consist of an application to the court, upon due notice to all persons interested in the land to be affected, which, if successful, results in a judgment or decree to the effect that, upon making just compensation to such persons, the corporation shall take the property for the uses and purposes mentioned in its application. Commissioners are then appointed by the court, who view the land, receive evidence as to its value, and determine upon the amount of compensation to be paid; and, upon having their report confirmed, and making or providing for the payments thereby required, the applicant becomes entitled to the enjoyment of the land.¹ (a)

(a) The general provisions of the New York statutes as to the condemnation and taking of private property for public purposes are found in the N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 3357-3384, which may be summarized as follows: The proceeding must be commenced by verified petition to the Supreme Court, presented by the person, corporation, officer, or institution entitled to take the property, who is called the plaintiff. The petition must describe the plaintiff; give a description, by metes and bounds, with reasonable certainty, of the property to be taken and state its value; give the names and places of residence of the owners of the property, who are styled the defendants; state the public use for which the property is required and give a concise statement of the facts showing the necessity for its acquisition for such use; aver that the plaintiff has been unable to agree with the owner of the property for its purchase and the reason of such inability; that it is the intention of the plaintiff, in good faith, to complete the work or improvement for which the property is to be taken, and that the preliminary steps required by law have been taken to entitle him to institute the proceedings, and demand that it be adjudged, that the public use requires the property to be so taken, that the plaintiff is entitled to so take it upon making compensation therefor, and that commissioners be appointed to appraise and ascertain the amount of such compensation to be paid. There must be annexed to the petition a notice stating the time and place at which the petition will be presented to a Special Term of the Supreme Court held in the judicial district where the property or some portion of it is situated. At least eight days before its presentation to the court, a copy of the petition and notice must be served upon each of the defendants, in the same manner in which a summons is required by the Code to be served. At the time of making such service, or at any time thereafter and before entry of the final order in the proceeding, the plaintiff may file in the office of the clerk of each county where any part of the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the proceeding, giving the names of the parties, the object of the proceeding, and a description of the property; and, after this is properly recorded and indexed, it is notice of the proceeding to all subsequent purchasers and

¹ Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1142-1149; Lewis, Eminent Domain, §§ 489-493, 584-587.

Highways and roads belonging to the public at large, when they are not dedicated nor gained by grant or public prescription, are an outcome of the exercise of the right of eminent domain by or in connection with public officials such as highway commissioners, overseers of highways, street or

encumbrancers of the property. The defendants may appear and answer, in the same manner as in an action in the Supreme Court, incapacitated parties appearing by their guardians existing or to be appointed by the court. An answer must be verified; and it may deny any of the allegations of the petition, or set up new matter constituting a defence. When an answer is interposed and issues are thus raised, they may be tried either by the court or by a referee; and the decision or report must be filed or handed to the attorney for the successful party within twenty days after the final submission of the case. If the decision or report be in favor of the defendants, the proceeding is to be dismissed. When it is in favor of the plaintiff, or when there has been no trial, judgment is to be entered, adjudging that the property is to be taken for the public purpose specified, and that the plaintiff is entitled to take it for that purpose upon making just compensation. After such judgment is entered, the court must appoint three commissioners to take evidence and fix the amount of compensation. If a trial has been had, this appointment is made after eight days' notice to all the defendants who have appeared. The commissioners must give eight days' notice of their meetings, except when they meet pursuant to order of the court or an adjournment. They must view the property and examine such witnesses as the parties desire, decide upon the amount of compensation to be made, and report to the court. They are not to make any deductions because of increase in value of other property caused by the improvement. Upon the filing of their report, either party may move, upon notice to the others, for its confirmation; and, if it be confirmed, a final order is entered directing that compensation shall be made accordingly, and that the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter upon the property for the purposes specified. There are also provisions for a writ of assistance, if needed, to enable the plaintiff to obtain possession, for entry of judgment against him for the amount of the compensation fixed upon by the commissioners, for new appraisals when deemed proper by the court, for appeals from the judgment or order, and for the taxing of the costs of the proceeding. See *Matter of Rochester Water Comm'rs*, 66 N. Y. 413; *Matter of Marsh*, 71 N. Y. 315; *Matter of N. Y. Cable Co.*, 104 N. Y. 1, 43; *Re Staten Is. R. T. Co.*, 103 N. Y. 251; *Stuart v. Palmer*, 74 N. Y. 183; *Matter of Brooklyn, etc. R. Co.*, 72 N. Y. 245; *Matter of 34th St. R. Co.*, 102 N. Y. 343; *Colonial City Traction Co. v. Kingstou City R. Co.*, 153 N. Y. 540; *Henderson v. N. Y. C. R. Co.*, 78 N. Y. 423; *Matter of Mayor, etc. of N. Y.*, 99 N. Y. 570; *Matter of C. & R. R. Co.*, 67 N. Y. 242; *Matter of St. L. & A. R. Co.*, 133 N. Y. 271; *West Cemetery v. P. P. & C. R. Co.*, 68 N. Y. 591; *Matter of Trustees N. Y. & B'klyn Bridge*, 137 N. Y. 95; *Long Is. R. Co. v. Garvey*, 159 N. Y. 334; *People v. Adirondack Park Ass'n*, 160 N. Y. 225; *Matter of City of B'klyn*, 148 N. Y. 107; *Railroad Co. v. Robinson*, 133 N. Y. 271; *People ex rel. Stewart v. R. Comm'rs*, 160 N. Y. 202.

park boards, etc., the names being different in the different states. Under the statutory provisions enacted for this purpose, application is usually required to be made to a court for the appointment of commissioners to ascertain whether or not the proposed way is necessary and to assess the damages to be paid to the persons interested in the lands over which they may decide that it should pass. After the confirmation by the court of their report or decision in favor of the road, it becomes the duty of the highway officials of the town or locality to lay out and open the way accordingly.¹(a) The

(a) When public streets, highways, or other public places are to be laid out and opened in a city or village of New York, a particular mode of procedure is usually outlined, either in the charter of the city or village, or in some special law enacted for that locality. A sample of such special legislation is found in the provisions of the charter of the City of New York, relative to streets and parks. N. Y. L. 1897, ch. 378, §§ 970-1011. And for closing such streets, see L. 1895, ch. 1006. It is provided by the N. Y. Constitution, Art. III. § 18, that, "The legislature shall not pass a private or local bill . . . laying out, opening, altering, working, or discontinuing roads, highways, or alleys, or for draining swamps or other low lands." But it is held that this is not applicable to city streets or avenues. *Matter of Woolsey*, 95 N. Y. 135. Outside of such local enactments, the making of streets is controlled by the general provisions of the Highway Law (N. Y. Con. L. ch. 25, Art. 8 being L. 1909, ch. 30, §§ 190-240), which are in substance as follows. (See amendment by L. 1910, ch. 344.)

Any person or corporation assessable for highway labor may make written application to the commissioners of highways of the town in which he or it resides or is assessable, to alter or discontinue a highway or to lay out a new one. Within thirty days thereafter, upon five days' notice to the commissioners of highways and such notice to interested parties as the county court shall order, he or it must apply, by verified petition, to the County Court for the appointment of commissioners to determine upon the necessity of the work proposed and assess the damages which will result. Thereupon the court appoints as such commissioners three disinterested freeholders, who must not be named by any person interested in the proceedings and who must be residents of the county, but not of the town, where the highway is or is to be located. They take the constitutional oath of office and fix upon a time and place at which they shall meet to hear the highway commissioners of the town where the highway is or is to be located and other interested parties. The applicant must cause at least eight days' previous notice of such meeting to be posted in at least three conspicuous places in the town, and also served upon the interested parties, or mail it to them if they do not reside in the same town or service can not be made upon them there. The commissioners appointed by the court examine the highway or property and, at their meeting (which they may adjourn from time to time), receive such evidence and reasons as may

¹ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1140-1149; Lewis, *Eminent Domain*, §§ 173, 176, 489-493.

street rights and burdens above discussed, such as those imposed by railways, telegraph and telephone poles and wires, gas or electric light appliances, etc., are simply additional servitudes placed upon streets and highways and more or less affecting as such servitudes the rights and interests of the proprietors of adjoining lands.¹

In a few states, including New York, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Missouri, *private* roads, when necessary, may be created and laid out by operation of law.² Where the right to do this exists, it must be derived from a specific constitutional provision; for, since the proceeding consists in the seizure of the property of one private individual for the benefit of another, it is contrary to the fundamental law of the land, except in so far as that law has been directly modified by the people of any state.³ The proceedings for the laying out of such a way are ordinarily required to be before a jury of freeholders of the town, by whom the questions as to the necessity for the road and the compensation to be paid for it are determined. It is generally provided that the compensation, as thus fixed, shall be paid to the owner or owners of the land over which

be adduced, and, having made a decision and assessed the damages, if any, file one copy of the decision in the office of the town clerk and another in that of the county clerk. Within thirty days after their decision is filed with the town clerk, any party interested may apply to the county court for an order confirming, vacating, or modifying such decision. The proceedings thereon are the same as an ordinary, special proceeding before the court. If no such application be made within the thirty days, the decision of the commissioners becomes final. The decision, when it becomes thus final or confirmed, must be carried out by the commissioners of highways of the town, the same as if they had made an order to that effect. The statute contains, also, minute provisions as to laying out roads which may interfere with orchards, gardens, burying-grounds, etc., the making of highways through two or more towns and along division lines, new hearings when necessary and the costs of the proceedings.

The order of the County Court or judge confirming the report of the commissioners is not appealable, *Matter of De Camp*, 77 Hun, 478; nor will *certiorari* lie to review the decision of the commissioners, *N. Y. Code Civ. Pro.* § 2122; *Hanford v. Thayer*, 88 Hun, 136. See *N. Y. Const. art. 1, § 7*; *Gerard on Titles to R. E. ch. ii.*

¹ See § 179, *supra*.

² *N. Y. Const. art. 1, § 7*; *Con. L. ch. 25, §§ 211-219*; *Palmer's Private Road*, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 340; *Belk v. Hamilton*, 130 Mo. 292; *Taraldson v. Lime Springs*, 92 Iowa, 187.

³ *Ibid.*; *Logan v. Stogdale*, 123 Ind. 372; *Blackman v. Halves*, 72 Ind. 515; *Wild v. Deig*, 43 Ind. 455; *Stewart v. Hartman*, 46 Ind. 331.

the private road is to exist before it can be actually laid out and used.¹ (a)

(a) This New York provision for laying out private roads by operation of law, substantially in its present form, was enacted by L. 1848, ch. 71; and see provisions affecting it in L. 1853, ch. 174; L. 1859, ch. 373; L. 1860, ch. 468. It is now found in §§ 211-219 of the highway law (L. 1909, ch. 30, being Con. L. ch. 25), which rest upon the following constitutional provision (Const. art. 1, § 7): "Private roads may be opened in the manner to be prescribed by law; but in every case the necessity of the road and the amount of all damage to be sustained by the opening thereof shall be first determined by a jury of freeholders, and such amount, together with the expenses of the proceeding, shall be paid by the person to be benefited."

The sections of the highway law above cited provide in substance as follows: The proceedings begin with a written application to the commissioners of highways of the town in which the road is proposed to be located, specifying its width and location, courses and distances, and the names of the owners and occupants of the land through which it is sought to have it laid out. One or more of the commissioners then appoints a day, as early as the convenience of the parties interested will allow, when, at a place designated in the town, a jury will be selected to decide upon the necessity of such road and assess any resulting damages. The commissioners deliver to the applicant a copy of his application, to which is attached a notice addressed to the owners and occupants of the land, stating when and where the jury is to be selected. The applicant, on the same day or the next day (excluding Sundays and holidays), must serve copies of these on the owners or occupants, or mail them to them if they do not reside in the town or can not be served there. At the time and place thus fixed a jury is selected, and the time and place determined at which they are to meet and hear evidence and arguments. The jury view the premises, and, at their meeting so determined upon, hear the allegations of the parties and examine such witnesses and other evidence as may be produced, and, if they determine that the proposed road is necessary, assess the damages to the person or persons through whose land it is to pass, and deliver their verdict in writing to the commissioners of highways. The commissioners annex to such verdict the application and their certificate that the road is laid out, and the same are filed and recorded in the town clerk's office. Within thirty days thereafter, any owner of the land may apply to the County Court for an order confirming, vacating, or modifying the verdict, and the proceedings thereon are ordinary special proceedings. If no such application be made, the verdict is deemed final. Before the road is opened, the damages assessed by the jury must be paid by the applicant; but if the jury certify that the private road was made necessary by the alteration or discontinuance of a public highway, the damages are to be refunded to the applicant by the town. See *Satterly v. Winne*, 101 N. Y. 218; *Matter of De Camp*, 79 Hun, 478; *Hunford v. Thayer*, 88 Hun, 136; *Matter of Carpenter*, 11 Misc. 690; *Beveridge v. Schultz*, 32 Misc. 444; 2 L. R. (1813) 276; note 2, p. 229, *supra*.

¹ Last two preceding notes.

A state may declare streams and other bodies of water that are not navigable to be public highways; and this is frequently done by statute.¹ Such streams or waters thus become burdened with servitudes created by operation of law. So, in large cities, rights, privileges, and burdens in connection with partition walls and other structures, methods of building and supporting houses, regulations as to drains, etc., are more or less determined by statutes; and servitudes are thus brought into existence by operation of law.² Some of the most important of these rights and burdens are more fully examined hereafter in the discussion of particular classes of easements and servitudes.³

f. *Servitudes existing by Nature.*

§ 181. **Natural Servitudes — Kinds.** — The maxim *sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas* has its most important illustrations in the operation of those natural rights and burdens which are attached in some degree to all corporeal hereditaments, and which must be here mentioned in order to complete our examination of the methods of acquiring easements and servitudes. Such privileges and obligations as nature establishes over lands are servitudes, but not common-law easements.⁴ They are always strongly appurtenant to the land; and adhere to and pass with it in its transfer, unless they are prevented from doing so by some positive law or agreement of the parties. Examples of them are found in the servitudes of lateral and subjacent support, which are the rights of a landowner to have his soil supported in its natural condition by that of the other proprietors of lands adjoining his own on the sides of it, and beneath it if any;⁵ in proper means of access from riparian

¹ *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1; *Water Power Co. v. Water Comm'rs*, 168 U. S. 349; *Hardin v. Shedd*, 190 U. S. 508; *Smith v. City of Rochester*, 92 N. Y. 463, 473; *Lincoln v. Davis*, 53 Mich. 375; *Ensminger v. The People*, 47 Ill. 384. The word "highway," as used in a grant, does not mean a waterway of any kind, unless such is clearly shown to be the intent of the parties. *De Camp v. Dix*, 159 N. Y. 436.

² N. Y. L. 1892, ch. 275, § 9; N. Y. L. 1888, ch. 533, § 59; N. Y. L. 1897, ch. 378, §§ 1608-1620; *Atty.-Gen. v. Wil-*

liams, 178 Mass. 330; *Jones, Ease.* §§ 586, 634-640.

³ Ch. XII., *infra*.

⁴ *Stokes v. Singers*, 8 E. & B. 31, 36; *McGuire v. Grant*, 25 N. J. L. 356; 2 *Fournel, Traité de Voisinage*, 400; § 165, *supra*, and note.

⁵ *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Lasala v. Holbrook*, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 169; *Hay v. Cohoes Co.*, 2 N. Y. 159; *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199; *White v. Dresser*, 135 Mass. 150; *McGettigan v. Potts*, 149 Pa. St. 155; *McGuire v. Grant*, 25 N. J. L. 356.

lands to natural bodies of navigable waters;¹ in the reciprocal privileges and burdens of owners of lands along the banks of natural streams whether on the surface or underground, such as the right and obligation to have the waters thereof flow over their accustomed bed unpolluted and substantially undiminished;² and in the rights to use, ward off, or intercept surface waters flowing in undefined courses,³ or percolating underground water, oil, or natural gas.⁴

Each of these forms of natural servitudes has given rise to many important questions and some conflict of opinion. A separate and somewhat detailed discussion of each of them is therefore required, and will be given in the following chapters, and so no further examination of them here is needed.⁵

¹ *Ramsey v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.*, 133 N. Y. 79; *N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Aldridge*, 135 N. Y. 83; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois*, 146 U. S. 387; *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1; *Stevens v. Patterson & N. R. Co.*, 34 N. J. L. 532; *Hedges v. West Shore R. Co.*, 150 N. Y. 150.

² *Brown v. Bowen*, 30 N. Y. 519; *Scriver v. Smith*, 100 N. Y. 471; *Acquackanonck Water Co. v. Watson*, 29 N. J. Eq. 366; *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1; *Merrifield v. Worcester*, 110 Mass. 216; *Druley v. Adam*, 102 Ill. 177; *Lord v. Meadville Water Co.*, 135 Pa. St. 122.

³ *Barkley v. Wilcox*, 86 N. Y. 140; *Peck v. Goodberlett*, 109 N. Y. 180; *Bowlsby v. Speer*, 31 N. J. L. 351; *Casidy v. Old Colony R. Co.*, 141 Mass. 174; *Murphy v. Kelley*, 68 Me. 521; *Wakefield v. Newell*, 12 R. I. 75; *Preston v. Hall*, 77 Iowa, 309.

⁴ *Acton v. Blundell*, 12 M. & W. 324; *Bradford v. Pickles* (1895), App. Cas. 587; *Bloodgood v. Ayers*, 108 N. Y. 400; *Davis v. Spaulding*, 157 Mass. 431; *People's Gas Co. v. Tyne*, 131 Ind. 277, 408; *Westmoreland Gas Co. v. De Witt*, 130 Pa. St. 235; *McKee v. Del. & H. Canal Co.*, 125 N. Y. 353; *Walker v. So. Pac. R. Co.*, 165 U. S. 593.

⁵ See §§ 206-210, 220-225, *infra*.

CHAPTER XI.

INCIDENTS OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES — THEIR TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION— REMEDIES.

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| § 182. Topics of this chapter.
a. <i>Incidents of Easements and Servitudes.</i>
§ 183. Transfer of them.
§ 184. Use and enjoyment of them.
§ 185. Repairs of them.
§ 186. Alterations of them.
b. <i>Termination, Destruction, and Suspension of Easements and Servitudes.</i>
§ 187. Natural termination.
§ 188. Methods of destroying and suspending them. | § 189. (a) Release.
§ 190. (b) Disclaimer, or abandonment and estoppel.
§ 191. (c) Non-user.
§ 192. (d) Adverse obstruction, or prescription.
§ 193. (e) Destruction of that on which the right depends.
§ 194. (f) Union of tenements.
§ 195. (g) Excessive claim or user.
§ 196. Remedies for obstructions or injuries to easements and servitudes. |
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§ 182. **Topics of this Chapter.** — The acquisition and general nature of common-law easements and those of servitudes which are not easements have been separately discussed in the last two preceding chapters. In regard to their important incidents, such as their transfer, use, repairs, and alterations, all of these rights may now be most conveniently and intelligibly examined together. Those incidents, the methods by which easements and servitudes may be terminated or suspended and the remedies for their obstruction or injury are the topics of this chapter. Some special features of particular, important species of these incorporeal hereditaments will be separately examined in the next succeeding chapter.

a. *Incidents of Easements and Servitudes, including their Transfer, Use, Repairs, and Alterations.*

§ 183. **Transfer of Easements and Servitudes.** — The prevailing rule as to easements in gross, in both England and

America, is that they are not assignable nor inheritable, and can not be made so by any form of words in the deeds or contracts by which they are brought into being. They are attached to the persons to whom they are granted, and can not exist in any other way.¹ So, the other forms of servitudes above discussed, which do not require the existence of any dominant estate, such, for example, as the rights of the public in a street or highway, are commonly of such a character that they must remain the property of the town, parish, or other political body which acquired them, or must cease to exist.² In a few of the United States, however, such as Massachusetts and Wisconsin, it is held that easements in gross may be so created as to be readily passed from hand to hand in the same ways in which other species of real property are transferred.³ And there are some forms of the other servitudes having no dominant tenements, such as rights of way acquired by railroad or turnpike companies, of which valid transfers may unquestionably be made so long as the purposes and ends to which they are applied are not materially changed.⁴ These rights and privileges over land which belong to individuals or corporations as such, and are not appurtenant to other land, may be said, in summary, to be ordinarily independent, proper objects of such agreements, assignments, and transfers as the interested parties choose to make; with the two qualifications, however, that the public interests shall not be injuriously affected by such conveyances or agreements, and

¹ *Ackroyd v. Smith*, 10 C. B. 164; *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Koelle*, 104 Ill. 455; *Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter*, 61 Pa. St. 21; *Pearson v. Hartman*, 100 Pa. St. 84; *Cadwalader v. Bailey*, 17 R. I. 495; *Wagner v. Hanna*, 38 Cal. 111; *Boatman v. Lasley*, 23 Ohio St. 614; *Post v. Pearsall*, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425, 432; *Hall v. Armstrong*, 53 Conn. 554; *Hoosier Stone Co. v. Marlott*, 130 Ind. 21, 24; *Fisher v. Fair*, 34 S. C. 203; *Wilder v. Wheeler*, 60 N. H. 351; *Wash. Ease*. (4th ed.) p. 13, p. *9.

² *Post v. Pearsall*, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425, 432. A servitude conveyed to a city, "its successors and assigns," has been held to be capable of being assigned, however; and it seems to be clear that, if the parties use such express words to that effect, they may thus make these

rights, not strictly servitudes in fee since a fee must be appurtenant to land, but contract rights in perpetuity which may be legally transferred from hand to hand. See also *Wilder v. Wheeler*, 60 N. H. 351.

³ The intention that the right shall be enjoyed by the grantee, his heirs and assigns, must be clearly manifested. *Bowen v. Conner*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132; *French v. Morris*, 101 Mass. 68; *Owen v. Field*, 102 Mass. 90; *Hankey v. Clark*, 110 Mass. 262; *Poull v. Mockley*, 33 Wis. 482.

⁴ This occurs, for example, when a railroad franchise and all its ways, rights, and privileges are sold or leased. See *Eastman v. Anderson*, 119 Mass. 526; *Barney v. Keokuk*, 94 U. S. 324, 340; 12 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of L. 660.

that, in most jurisdictions, mere easements in gross are of a purely personal character and are not capable of passing from hand to hand.¹

On the other hand, an easement or servitude which is appurtenant to a dominant tenement adheres to that tenement and passes with it in its transfer by descent, devise, or act *inter vivos*.² It is not even necessary that the right or privilege shall be mentioned in the deed of the land to which it is appurtenant; though in practice the statement that the instrument is meant to convey the lot particularly described, with all its appurtenances, is the form of the express contract by which such incorporeal hereditaments are ordinarily granted.³ An appurtenant easement, moreover, can not be conveyed by its owner separate from the land. It can not be converted into an easement or right in gross. It inheres in the corporeal, dominant property, and can not exist in any other form.⁴ In order that it shall be thus appurtenant and adhere thus closely to the land, passing with it and not being severable from it, the easement must be of some benefit to the corporeal property, a valuable adjunct to it, appropriate and reasonably

¹ The distinction must be again carefully noted between an easement and a *profit à prendre*. The latter means the right to take something from the servient estate, while the former never involves that right. While an easement in gross is ordinarily of a purely personal character and not assignable nor transferable in any way, a *profit à prendre*, even though it be the property of an individual as such and without any reference to his ownership of any dominant tenement, may be readily made assignable and inheritable by the use of apt words in the deed or contract by which it is created. *Post v. Pearsall*, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425; *Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter*, 61 Pa. St. 21, 39; *Buffum v. Harris*, 5 R. I. 243; *Stevenson v. Wiggin*, 56 N. H. 308; *Wash. Ease.* (4th ed.) p. 13, p. *9. And see *Pierce v. Keator*, 70 N. Y. 419.

² *Staple v. Heydon*, 6 Mod. 1; *United States v. Appleton*, 1 Sumn. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 492, 503; *Newman v. Nellis*, 97 N. Y. 285; *Cady v. Springfield Water Works Co.*, 10 N. Y. Supp. 570; *Jackson v. Hathaway*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 447;

Manderhack v. Orphans' Home, 109 Pa. St. 231; *Jones v. Adams*, 162 Mass. 224; *Brakely v. Sharp*, 9 N. J. Eq. 9; *Chicago, St. F. & C. R. Co. v. Ward*, 128 Ill. 349; *Parish v. Kaspars*, 109 Ind. 536; *Cole v. Bradbury*, 86 Mo. 380; *Cadwalader v. Bailey*, 17 R. I. 495; *Shields v. Titus*, 46 Ohio St. 528; *Coolidge v. Hagar*, 43 Vt. 9.

³ *United States v. Appleton*, 1 Sumn. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 492, 502; *Spencer v. Kilmer*, 151 N. Y. 390, 399; *Newman v. Nellis*, 97 N. Y. 285; *Dority v. Dunning*, 78 Me. 381; *Alexander v. Tolleston Club*, 110 Ill. 65; *Kent v. Waite*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 138; *Shields v. Titus*, 46 Ohio St. 528.

⁴ *Hankey v. Clark*, 110 Mass. 262; *Cadwalader v. Bailey*, 17 R. I. 495; *Moore v. Crose*, 43 Ind. 30; *Schmidt v. Brown*, 226 Ill. 590; *Ackroyd v. Smith*, 10 C. B. 164; *Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter*, 61 Pa. St. 21; *Boatman v. Lasley*, 23 Ohio St. 614; *Newman v. Nellis*, 97 N. Y. 285. By express words an easement may be made appurtenant to any certain portion of the land. *Leach v. Hastings*, 147 Mass. 515.

requisite to its enjoyment for the purposes for which it is conveyed.¹ But there need be no absolute necessity that the easement shall exist in order that the land may be properly enjoyed. Thus, if the owner of a lot of land fronting on a public highway purchase the adjoining lot in the rear, access to which has uniformly been over a private way (not a way of necessity) from another public street, the fact that he may now reach both parcels from the one highway which one of them adjoins will not interfere with his acquisition of the private way as appurtenant to his newly acquired property.² An easement or servitude that is appurtenant to a piece of land adheres to every part of it; and when the land is divided and parcelled out among a number of different owners, either by act of the parties or by operation of law, each of them may enjoy the right, so long as this does not result in unduly increasing the burden on the servient tenement.³

§ 184. Use and Enjoyment of Easements and Servitudes. —

The ways in which easements or servitudes may be used and the extent to which their enjoyment may be carried are to be determined, from a fair construction of the deed or instrument by which they are granted or reserved when they are the result of agreement by the parties, from the method of user by which they have been acquired when they arise from prescription or custom, from an ascertainment of the purposes for which the rights were originally contemplated or for which they are appropriate and useful for public enjoyment when they are created by operation of law, and from their requirement for the protection or reasonable employment of the land when they exist by nature.

When a right of way is expressly granted for a footpath, the grantee can not use it for a carriage road or horseway.⁴ And where the lessor of a parcel of land reserved over it a way to and from a stable which belonged to him, "on foot, and for horses, oxen, cattle, and sheep," it was held that this did not give him the right to carry manure in a wheelbarrow

¹ *Ackroyd v. Smith*, 10 C. B. 164; *Bailey v. Stephens*, 12 C. B. N. s. 91; *Borst v. Empire*, 5 N. Y. 33; *Pierce v. Keator*, 70 N. Y. 419; *McKenna v. Brooklyn Union El. R. Co.*, 184 N. Y. 391; *Dennis v. Wilson*, 107 Mass. 591; *Boland v. St. John's Schools*, 163 Mass. 229; *Lathrop v. Elsner*, 93 Mich. 599; *Knecken v. Voltz*, 110 Ill. 264; *Spensley*

v. Valentine, 34 Wis. 154; *Dority v. Dunning*, 78 Me. 381.

² *Fritz v. Tompkins*, 39 N. Y. App. Div. 73; *Parsons v. Johnson*, 68 N. Y. 62; *Mussey v. Union Wharf*, 41 Me. 34.

³ *Philbrick v. Ewing*, 97 Mass. 133; *Spaulding v. Abbot*, 55 N. H. 423.

⁴ *Kirkham v. Sharp*, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 323.

from the stable across the land.¹ So, if there be granted or reserved to A the privilege of passing over B's land simply to reach lot No. 1, A will be a trespasser if he use the road to reach lot No. 2, even though he may pass over the way to lot No. 1 in the first place and thence across the latter to lot No. 2.² "The grantee of a way is limited to use his way for the purposes and in the manner specified in his grant. He can not go out of his way, nor use it to go to any other place than that described, nor to that place for any other purpose than that specified, if the use in this respect is restricted."³ Whatever is necessary, however, to the reasonable enjoyment of the easement passes with it;⁴ and when the grant or reservation is made generally without any particular specification of the place or method of its use, it may be enjoyed to such an extent and in such a reasonable manner as does not unnecessarily burden the servient tenement.⁵ Accordingly, when the right is a footpath, it must be high and wide and light enough for the convenient passing of persons and such things as they usually carry.⁶ When it is a "wagon road," it may be employed for the transportation of any reasonable loads on wagons of any ordinary form and size.⁷ And where it was a right of way to a warehouse, it included, as an incident to its proper enjoyment, the right of the tenant of the warehouse to pile goods upon the land and keep them there for a reasonable length of time, in the process of moving them to and from the building.⁸

¹ *Brunton v. Hall*, 1 Q. B. 792; *Furner v. Seabury*, 135 N. Y. 50.

² *Davenport v. Lamson*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 72; *Crocker v. Cotting*, 181 Mass. 146; *Howell v. King*, 1 Mod. 190; *Colchester v. Roberts*, 4 M. & W. 769; *Lawton v. Ward*, 1 Ld. Raym. 75; 1 Rolle Abr. 391, pl. 3; § 147, *supra*.

³ *French v. Marstin*, 24 N. H. 440, 32 N. H. 316; *Regina v. Pratt*, 4 E. & B. 860; *Colchester v. Roberts*, 4 M. & W. 769, 774; *Greene v. Canny*, 137 Mass. 64, 69; *Woolrych on Ways*, p. *34.

⁴ *Baker v. Frick*, 45 Md. 337; *Baldwin v. Boston & M. R. Co.*, 181 Mass. 166; *Arnold v. Fee*, 148 N. Y. 214; *Gillespie v. Weinberg*, 148 N. Y. 238.

⁵ *Abbott v. Butler*, 59 N. H. 317; *Bakeman v. Talbot*, 31 N. Y. 366;

George v. Cox, 114 Mass. 382, 388; *Parks v. Bishop*, 120 Mass. 340; *Atty.-Gen. v. Williams*, 140 Mass. 329.

⁶ *Atkins v. Bordman*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 457; *Tucker v. Howard*, 128 Mass. 361; *Gerrish v. Shattuck*, 132 Mass. 235.

⁷ *Atkins v. Bordman*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 457; *Richardson v. Pond*, 15 Gray (Mass.), 387, 389; *Bakeman v. Talbot*, 31 N. Y. 366.

⁸ *Appleton v. Fullerton*, 1 Gray (Mass.), 186; *Lyman v. Arnold*, 5 Mason, 195, 198; *Sargent v. Hubbard*, 102 Mass. 380. It is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury as to what things are reasonably necessary or convenient, so as to be included within that which the owner of the easement or servitude may enjoy; but the jury is to act under the instructions of the

A right or privilege acquired by prescription must result from a user of the servient estate in the same place and within definite boundaries during the entire period of limitation.¹ The manner and extent of such user then determine the character and limitations of the easement or servitude thus acquired. It can "never outrun or exceed the user in which it had its origin."² Thus, when a railroad company has acquired a right of way by prescription, it is limited to the enjoyment thereof to the width which it has employed during the period of adverse user.³ So, where the prescriptive roadway is obtained solely for agricultural purposes, and the dominant property subsequently becomes a manufacturing or residential district, the right can not be enjoyed for these new purposes so as to impose a heavier burden upon the servient tenement.⁴ But a fair and reasonable employment of the right gained by prescription will be upheld by the courts; and the owner of the dominant estate will not be restricted in its enjoyment unless his acts substantially change or increase the burden on the other's land. It was accordingly held that the mere fact that the owner of a so-called "nine-acre field," who had acquired by adverse user a general right of way from it to a highway, carried over the road a quantity of hay, of which a small portion had been raised on an adjoining field, did not constitute an excessive use of the easement.⁵

It may be repeated that the uses to which a way of necessity may be applied are determined by its requirements for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant estate for the purposes contemplated by the parties to the conveyance, and that

court as to the classes and character of the incidental privileges which they may include. *Baker v. Frick*, 45 Md. 337; *Atkinson v. Bordman*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 457; *Richardson v. Pond*, 15 Gray (Mass.), 389.

¹ *Jones v. Percival*, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 485; *South Branch R. Co. v. Parker*, 41 N. J. Eq. 489; *Kurtz v. Hoke*, 172 Pa. St. 165; § 157, *supra*.

² *Amer. Bank Note Co. v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 129 N. Y. 252, 266; *Lewis v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.*, 40 N. Y. App. Div. 343; *Ryan v. M. V. & S. I. R. Co.*, 62 Miss. 162; *Richardson v. Pond*, 15 Gray (Mass.), 387.

³ *O. & R. V. B. Co. v. Rickards*, 38 Neb. 847.

⁴ *Parks v. Bishop*, 120 Mass. 340; *Wimbledon & Putney Commons Conservators v. Dixon*, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 62.

⁵ *Williams v. James*, 2 C. P. 577; *Parks v. Bishop*, 120 Mass. 340; *Bremer v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 191 N. Y. 333; *Betjemann v. Brooklyn Union El. R. Co.*, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 83; *Cowling v. Higginson*, 4 M. & W. 245. It is to be noted that the owner had acquired a general way in these cases. When by grant or fair implication a right is obtained for only one lot, it can not, as shown above in this section, be used for other land. See also § 147, *supra*, especially *French v. Marstin*, 32 N. H. 316; *Crocker v. Cotting*, 181 Mass. 146.

the way ceases when the necessity terminates.¹ Rights which exist in the natural order of things, such as the right to the lateral support of soil, or that to the usual flow of a natural stream, are servitudes which may be enjoyed and must be endured to the extent which the ordinary uses of the land in its natural condition requires, but do not ordinarily extend to the benefit of artificial erections or improvements. A right, for example, to have one's soil laterally supported by that of his neighbor does not exist naturally in favor of buildings, nor does it include any soil or its products in other than their natural condition.² The waters of a natural stream may be used by the owner of the land over which it flows, in any manner and to any extent that he may desire, so long as he does not change the place at which they pass into his neighbor's property, nor pollute them, nor substantially diminish their volume.³

The owner of the servient estate may employ his land for such purposes as he pleases, consistent with the reasonable and proper use of the easement or servitude.⁴ If, for example, the right be a private way, the servient owner may, as a general rule, maintain a gate or bars across it, provided that this is not contrary to the contract of the parties and does not materially interfere with the use of the way.⁵ But he must not so place obstructions in the way, nor so remove or destroy the accessories to its use, as to restrict essentially the reasonable enjoyment of the right. Therefore, where the easement consisted of a carriage road, the proprietor of the land over which it existed was enjoined from depositing stones in the way, and from hauling heavy loads over it in

¹ §§ 145, 147, *supra*.

² *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *White v. Dresser*, 135 Mass. 150; *White v. Nassau Trust Co.*, 168 N. Y. 149, 155; §§ 207, 208, *infra*.

³ *Brewster v. Rogers Co.*, 169 N. Y. 73; § 222, *infra*.

⁴ *Bakeman v. Talbot*, 31 N. Y. 366, 371.

⁵ *Huson v. Young*, 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 63; *Bean v. Coleman*, 44 N. H. 539; *Houpes v. Alderson*, 22 Iowa, 160, 163; *Connery v. Brooks*, 73 Pa. St. 80; *Atkins v. Bordman*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 457; *Richardson v. Pond*, 15 Gray (Mass.), 387, 389. In one case, where the right of way was granted over a space twenty

feet wide, it was held that the servient tenant might place obstructions within that space, so long as he did not shut out a convenient way. *Johnson v. Kinnicut*, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 153, 156. But the express grant or reservation of a well-defined width entitles the grantee to the entire space unobstructed. *Tucker v. Howard*, 122 Mass. 529, 128 Mass. 361; *Nash v. N. E. Ins. Co.*, 127 Mass. 91; *Bissell v. Grant*, 35 Conn. 288, 295. So, the landowner may cultivate the soil, over which the road exists, in such a manner as not to interfere with the use of the privilege according to the terms of the grant or reservation. *Wells v. Tolman*, 156 N. Y. 636.

such a manner as to cut it up and make it unsuitable for light carriages.¹

In a word, the owner of the easement or servitude shall have the right to use it and all things accessory to its enjoyment in the manner contemplated and implied in its original creation or existence; and the owner of the land shall have the enjoyment of his property in all methods not inconsistent with such use and enjoyment of the incorporeal right or privilege.

§ 185. **Repairs of Easements and Servitudes.** — The owner of the servient tenement *may* be bound, by grant, reservation, or prescription, to make such repairs as may be necessary to the proper enjoyment of the easement or servitude by its owner.² But, as a general rule, this obligation does not rest upon him; and the dominant tenant can insist on no repairs or improvements other than those which he himself makes or causes, even though they may be necessary to the enjoyment of his right.³ The authority, however, to amend, repair, or improve the property, to the extent which may be fairly requisite to the utility to its owner of the right or privilege as reasonably contemplated by the parties, goes with it as an incident to its ownership. Such incidental rights have been described as "secondary easements."⁴ Thus, the grant of a way includes the right of its owner to keep it in good condition for the purposes for which it was created. And the right to use a house or any part of it for a particular purpose carries with it the right to repair it to the extent which that purpose requires.⁵

While the owner of the dominant tenement has authority

¹ *Herman v. Roberts*, 119 N. Y. 37.

² *Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples*, 164 Mass. 319, 330; *Middleford v. Church Mills Knitting Co.*, 160 Mass. 267; *Bronson v. Coffin*, 108 Mass. 175; *Lynn v. Turner*, Cowper, 86; *Kingston-upon-Hull v. Horner*, Lofft, 576.

³ *Gerrard v. Cooke*, 5 B. & P. 109, 115; *Rider v. Smith*, 3 T. R. 766; *Doane v. Badger*, 12 Mass. 65; *Espencheid v. Bauer*, 235 Ill. 172; *Joseph v. Ager*, 108 Cal. 517; *Hargrave v. Cook*, 108 Cal. 72.

⁴ *Nicholas v. Chamberlain*, Cro. Jac. 121; *Tooth v. Bryce*, 50 N. J. Eq. 589, 609.

⁵ *Benham v. Minor*, 38 Conn. 252;

Liford's Case, 11 Rep. 46 b, 52 a; *Wetmore v. Fisk*, 15 R. I. 354; *Herman v. Roberts*, 119 N. Y. 37; *Huntington v. Asher*, 96 N. Y. 604; *Edgett v. Douglas*, 144 Pa. St. 95. Nor do words in the deed of conveyance of a way, declaring that no easement shall pass by implication, nor long user of the way without actually making any repairs, deprive the owner of a way of the right to make repairs when necessary. "The very existence of a right of way precludes the idea that the party who has the right can not repair or keep the way in order." *McMillan v. Cronin*, 75 N. Y. 474, 477; *St. Anthony F. W. Co. v. Minneapolis*, 41 Minn. 270, 274.

to make such repairs as the proper uses of his right demand, yet, as between him and the servient tenant, he is under no obligation to repair, unless required to do so by contract or prescription.¹ He may let the way, drain, wall, or other subject of the right become useless if he please; and, except in cases in which this is a violation of his duty to the public or to his neighbor to keep his property in a safe condition, he is not answerable therefor to any one.²

The privilege of making necessary and reasonable repairs includes, of course, the right to go upon and use the servient property to the requisite extent. The owner of a dam and right of flowage may enter upon the soil and take as much of it as is needed to keep the dam in good condition, doing as little injury as possible to the servient land; and he who has a right of way is entitled to have such use of the adjacent land as is required to make and keep a good road.³ But when the means of enjoying his right are out of repair, he must not pass over or appropriate other portions of the servient tenement, unless the owner of the latter is bound to repair, or has wilfully and wrongfully obstructed or interfered with the proper use of the easement or servitude. The owner of such a privilege can not, by his own act or neglect, let the means of utilizing it become defective, and, in consequence thereof, impose a heavier or different burden upon the servient property.⁴ If, however, the proprietor of the latter, by intentional wrong, impair the means of enjoying the right, the dominant owner may use the adjacent land as long as the unwarrantable interference continues.⁵

§ 186. **Alterations of Easements and Servitudes.** — The very existence of an easement or servitude, placing as it does the enjoyment of one man's land to some extent in the hands of another, calls for careful, exact, and quite stringent regula-

¹ Taylor v. Whitehead, Doug. 744; McMillan v. Cronin, 75 N. Y. 474; Jones v. Percival, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 485, 487; Walker v. Pierce, 38 Vt. 94.

² Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Wms. Saund. 321; Duncan v. Louch, 6 Q. B. 904; Roberts v. Roberts, 55 N. Y. 275; Kaler v. Beaman, 49 Me. 207; Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. 65.

³ Edgett v. Douglas, 144 Pa. St. 95; Gerrard v. Cooke, 5 B. & P. 109; Duncan v. Louch, 6 Q. B. 904; Huntington v. Ashcr, 96 N. Y. 604; Herman v.

Roberts, 119 N. Y. 37; Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. 65; Newcomen v. Coulson, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 133; Senhouse v. Christian, 1 T. R. 560; Dand v. Kingscote, 6 M. & W. 174.

⁴ Rockland W. Co. v. Tillson, 75 Me. 170; Capers v. McKee, 1 Strobb. (S. C.) 164; McMillan v. Cronin, 75 N. Y. 474.

⁵ Taylor v. Whitehead, Doug. 744; Bullard v. Harrison, 4 M. & S. 387; Hamilton v. White, 5 N. Y. 9; Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 293, p. *196.

tions of their reciprocal rights and duties. The property of each must be so used as not to cause any injury to the other, with which it is so intimately associated; yet the restrictions must ordinarily be no more severe than such as are required by this principle. "The right of the easement owner and the right of the landowner are not absolute, irrelative, and uncontrolled, but are so limited, each by the other, that there may be a due and reasonable enjoyment of both."¹

It is accordingly held that the owner of the right may make such improvements and alterations as do not substantially change its character.² But he may be enjoined from adding anything to it, or taking anything from it, or employing it in a manner or place, which may result in his enjoyment upon the servient land of something materially different from that to which he is strictly entitled; and this though the change or improvement might be of no immediate detriment to the servient estate, or might be to it in some sense a benefit.³ Thus, a slight alteration in a road, made by the owner of the right of way for the purpose of straightening it and rendering it more convenient to all parties, will be permitted.⁴ And a change in the method of using water as it runs over one's own land, whether the stream be natural or artificial, gives no right of action to his neighbors, provided it does not materially affect the character of the water nor the manner in which it flows over their lands.⁵ But an open drain can not be changed to a drain through a pipe, or *vice versa*, against the will of the owner of the land through which it passes.⁶ Nor will the proprietor of a mill run by water power be per-

¹ *Olcott v. Thompson*, 59 N. H. 154, 156.

² *Roberts v. Roberts*, 55 N. Y. 275.

³ *Luttrell's Case*, 4 Rep. 84 b; *Tapling v. Jones*, 11 H. L. Cas. 290; *Dickerson v. Grand Junction Canal Co.*, 15 Beav. 260; *Onthank v. L. S. & M. C. R. Co.*, 71 N. Y. 194; *Evangelical Lutheran St. J. & O. Home v. Buffalo Hydraulic Ass'n*, 64 N. Y. 561; *Merritt v. Parker*, 1 N. J. L. 460; *Johnston v. Hyde*, 32 N. J. Eq. 446; *Allen v. San Jose L. & W. Co.*, 92 Cal. 138; *Dewey v. Bellows*, 9 N. H. 282; *Darlington v. Painter*, 7 Pa. St. 473; *Jennison v. Walker*, 11 Gray (Mass.), 423. The owner of land has an arbitrary right to determine whether or not it shall be improved.

A benefit bestowed upon it against his will is a legal injury to him. *Ibid*.

⁴ *Lawton v. Rivers*, 2 M'Cord (S. C.), 445. And see *Burris v. People's Ditch Co.*, 104 Cal. 248; *Richardson v. Clements*, 89 Pa. St. 503; *Blaine v. Ray*, 61 Vt. 566.

⁵ *Luttrell's Case*, 4 Rep. 84 b; *Saunders v. Newman*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 258, 262; *Whittier v. Cochecho Mfg. Co.*, 9 N. H. 454; *Blanchard v. Baker*, 8 Me. 253; *Buddington v. Bradley*, 10 Conn. 213.

⁶ *Allen v. San Jose L. & W. Co.*, 92 Cal. 138; *Dickerson v. Grand Junction Canal Co.*, 15 Beav. 260; *Jaqui v. Johnson*, 27 N. J. Eq. 526.

mitted to alter the machinery therein or its workings in such a manner as to interfere essentially with the operation of other mills below his own.¹

On the other hand, the owner of the servient tenement must do nothing to alter materially the servitude to which his land is subjected. Even though the act might result in an improvement of the easement or servitude and increase its usefulness to its owner, the latter may have an injunction against the working of any substantial change in his right or in the mode of its enjoyment.² Subject to this limitation, the servient tenant may work and improve his land and put it to any legal use which he may desire. The owner of an easement in the use of an aqueduct, for example, can not restrain the landowner from putting a more ornamental covering over the reservoir and otherwise improving his property, in such a manner as not to materially interfere with the enjoyment of the right.³ The owner of land over which a way of necessity is to exist may locate it in the first instance, if he make it reasonably convenient; but, after it is once fixed, he can not change it without the other's consent.⁴ In case, however, of the material alteration of any easement or servitude by the servient tenant, if it be used in its changed condition for so long a time as to show an acquiescence on the part of its owner, he can not thereafter have it restored to its original form without the consent of the servient owner.⁵

b. *Termination, Destruction, and Suspension of Easements and Servitudes.*

§ 187. **Natural Termination.** — Incorporeal rights and obligations, of course, may be so limited at the time of their creation that they can not perpetually endure, but must come to a natural end in the lapse of time. Thus, a grant to one of a right of way over his neighbor's field, "for and during his natural life," will terminate at the death of the grantee.

¹ *Wentworth v. Poor*, 38 Me. 243; *Cowell v. Thayer*, 5 Met. (Mass.) 253; *King v. Tiffany*, 9 Conn. 162.

² *Vinton v. Greene*, 158 Mass. 426; *Roberts v. Roberts*, 55 N. Y. 275; *Allen v. San Jose L. & W. Co.*, 92 Cal. 138;

Haslett v. Sheperd, 85 Mich. 165; *Kelley v. Saltmarsh*, 146 Mass. 585.

³ *Olcott v. Thompson*, 59 N. H. 154.

⁴ § 146, *supra*.

⁵ *Betts v. Badger*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 223; *Fitzpatrick v. B. & M. R. Co.*, 84 Me. 33.

So a privilege of using another's land may be expressly made to continue only for some definite period of time, as a stated number of years or months; or to last until some contingent event does or does not occur, or until some designated purpose shall be accomplished. In such cases, it is hardly necessary to say, the easement or servitude terminates naturally when the time for which it was made has elapsed, or the purposes of its creation have been fulfilled.¹

Aside from such natural ending, these rights and burdens, whether created for some temporary purpose or to continue perpetually, may be terminated or suspended in the various ways which are next to be investigated.

§ 188. **Methods of destroying and suspending Easements and Servitudes.** — The means of destroying, and sometimes suspending, these rights are by (a) release, (b) disclaimer, or abandonment and estoppel, (c) non-user, (d) adverse obstruction, or prescription, (e) destruction of that upon which the right depends, (f) union of the dominant and servient estates, and (g) excessive claim or user. In most instances, any of these methods of dealing with the incorporeal right destroys it altogether; but under some conditions, which will be hereafter explained, the easement or servitude is only suspended for a time, and revives when such operating cause of its cessation is removed. Each of these ways of terminating easements and servitudes, or causing them to cease to operate for a season, will be separately examined.

§ 189. (a) **Release of Easements and Servitudes.** — *Technical Release under Seal.* — Anything of an incorporeal nature may be terminated and destroyed by an express release under seal, from the owner of the right to the owner of the servient property.² It may also be temporarily suspended, to operate again in the future, or partly done away with, set aside, or altered in any manner agreed upon by the parties to the contract. So long as the rights of third persons are not interfered with, those who are interested in the land and the rights and burdens upon or over it may regulate or terminate the latter in any way that is clearly indicated by their deed. It has accordingly been held that an express release of a right of way ends it, although the effect is to cut off the releasor's

¹ Hahn v. Baker Lodge, 21 Oreg. 30; Shirley v. Crabb, 138 Ind. 200; Thorn v. Wilson, 110 Ind. 325.

² Dyer v. Sanford, 9 Met. (Mass.) 395; Comstock v. Sharp, 106 Mich. 176.

means of access to his land because it is entirely surrounded by land of the releasee and that of other persons.¹

Such express contracts, by which interests in real property are affected, are generally required by the statutes of frauds to be in writing; and, in order to be a common-law release, the writing must be under seal.

Release in Form of License. — Using the word “release” for a moment, however, in its broad, general sense, to denote a voluntary relinquishment of a thing in any manner, it may be stated as a well-established principle that by a mere license, which is a permission given orally or by a writing not under seal, the owner of an *easement* may effectually release it to the servient tenant. This is done by an authority to the owner of the servient land to do something upon it which will obstruct the enjoyment of the easement; as when he is expressly permitted to erect upon it a house or wall, in such a way as to shut out from the windows of his neighbor, the licensor, the light and air in the enjoyment of which the latter had in some manner acquired an adverse right.² While an easement can not be *created* by parol agreement; yet, when an oral license is thus given to do an act *on the land of the licensee*, and the effect thereof is to destroy or impair an easement appurtenant to land of the licensor, the latter will not be permitted to revoke the license so as to stop or interfere with any changes, additions, or improvements that have been begun or made upon the servient land in consequence of the authority so given.³ But a parol license to do an act on the *licensor's land* can not have such an operation. The licensor may revoke it at any time, and compel the licensee to restore the property to its original condition.⁴

Both of the rules of law above stated — that an easement may be destroyed by a license to do an act on the licensee's land, but that irrevocable privileges can not flow from a license to do an act on the licensor's land — are well illustrated by the decision in *Morse v. Copeland*.⁵ The plaintiff in that case

¹ *Richards v. Attleborough Branch R. Co.*, 153 Mass. 120.

² *Liggins v. Inge*, 7 Bing. 682; *Elliott v. Rhett*, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 405, 418, 419; *Dyer v. Sanford*, 5 Met. (Mass.) 395; *Dunn v. Youmaus*, 224 Ill. 34.

³ *Winter v. Brockwell*, 8 East, 308; *Pope v. O'Hara*, 48 N. Y. 446; *Veghte v. Raritan Co.*, 19 N. J. Eq. 142, 153;

Ford v. New Haven & North Co., 23 Conn. 214, 223; § 243, *infra*.

⁴ *Liggins v. Inge*, 7 Bing. 682; *Dyer v. Sanford*, 9 Met. (Mass.) 395; *Crosdale v. Lanigan*, 129 N. Y. 604; *White v. Man. R. Co.*, 139 N. Y. 19; *Lawrence v. Springer*, 49 N. J. Eq. 289; §§ 240, 242, *infra*.

⁵ 2 Gray (Mass.), 302.

owned a right of flowage over land of the defendant. He gave to the latter oral permission to erect a dam upon that land, in such a position as to prevent the water from flowing over a part of it which had formerly been covered by the water; and also an oral license to dig and maintain a drain, from the land thus taken from the pond, through a portion of plaintiff's land to a stream. A few years thereafter, the plaintiff attempted to revoke these licenses and compel the defendant to remove the dam, and to cease to use and to fill up the ditch which he had constructed for the drain. It was held that he could not compel the removal of the dam, since that was upon the licensee's land; but that he might revoke the license for the ditch upon his own land, and have his property restored to its original condition.

The distinction here made is, in substance, that, if the effect of the oral license be to *destroy* or *impair* an easement, it can not be revoked by the licensor after the erection or change which it authorizes has been made or commenced; but if the effect be to *create* or *enlarge* an easement, it may be revoked by the licensor at any time. It follows that natural servitudes, such as the right to the natural flow of a stream, or to have one's soil supported by that of his neighbor, can not be done away with or affected by oral permission to do something upon the land of the licensee, since this would be, in effect, the *creation* of an easement over the licensor's property. If, for example, A, the owner of lower land, give to B, the owner of higher adjoining land, the right to divert upon B's land a stream which flows through both properties, or to use up all or most of its waters, this is the *creation* of a negative easement over the land of A, the licensor; and the statutes of frauds require such a contract to be in writing.¹

§ 190. (b) **Disclaimer, or Abandonment and Estoppel.** — In addition to an express release, which may terminate any easement or servitude, an abandonment of such rights, or the ceasing to use them under circumstances which indicate an intent not to resume their enjoyment and without any formal or direct contract, may also do away with them. It is "a settled doctrine of the law," says the New York Court of Appeals, "that the landowner's right in an easement may be destroyed by his abandonment of it, and that whether there has been an abandonment is a question of intention depending

¹ Veghte v. Raritan Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 142, 154.

upon the facts of the particular case.”¹ A careful examination of the facts of the cases, in which incorporeal rights have been held to have been abandoned by methods other than express release, will show that practically all of such decisions rest upon the doctrine of estoppel *in pais*; and that, when that principle is not involved, the loss of the right is in reality due to some cause other than mere abandonment, such, for example, as adverse user or prescription.

In the leading case of *Corning v. Gould*,² there was an alley-way between the land of the plaintiff and that of the defendant; and the centre line of the alley was the dividing line between their two properties. The plaintiff built upon a part of this way and ran a fence along the middle line of it, thus leaving the other half of the alley within the enclosure of his neighbor's land. In that condition the last-named land was sold to the defendant, who then occupied exclusively that portion of the alley which was inside of said dividing fence and next to his own lot. The action having been brought for damages for the obstruction of the way, it was held that, since the plaintiff had built in such a manner as to evince an intent to give up the right, and his neighbor had acted accordingly in using the land, and the property had been sold under those circumstances, the easement was at an end. In the case of *Taylor v. Hampton*,³ so frequently cited in connection with this topic, the easement was a right to flow water upon another's land for the raising of a mill pond. The owner of the mill removed it further up the stream, and established it in a new place, in such a manner as to indicate that he meant to keep it there permanently. The owner of the land, which had been flowed but was now left bare by the change in the location of the mill, converted it into a rice-field, cultivated it, and subsequently sold it in that condition. It was held that the owner of the mill, after retaining it in its new position for nine years, could not restore it to its former site and again flow the land thus used for the raising of rice. In each of these cases, the owner of the right had so acted as to represent, or be reasonably presumed to have represented, that he did not intend to use it again; he had done this in such a way as reasonably to induce the other to act upon the repre-

¹ Foote v. Elevated Railroad, 147 N. Y. 367, 371; Lavagnino v. Uhlig, 198 U. S. 443.

² 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 531. See also Partridge v. Gibert, 15 N. Y. 601.

³ 4 McCord (S. C.), 96.

sentation, and that other had justifiedly so acted, and would suffer injury in consequence if the representation were denied. The former owner of the easement was accordingly estopped to reclaim its enjoyment. So, where one who owned an easement over a street believed that he owned also the soil in fee and wrongfully enclosed it, it was held that he had not thereby abandoned his easement; but it was declared that an abandonment would have resulted, if by his conduct others had been induced to act on the belief that the right was extinguished.¹ There are probably no well-considered cases in which it has been decided that the mere failure to enjoy an easement or servitude for less than the prescriptive period, however emphatic may have appeared the intention to relinquish it, constituted a destruction of the right, unless the party favorably affected thereby had changed his position, or might at least reasonably be presumed to have changed it, on the faith of the representation thus made.² In *Moore v. Rawson*,³ which has been called the leading case upon this topic, it was held that the plaintiff, after taking down a wall containing windows for which he had an easement in the light and air over his neighbor's lot and building a solid blank wall in its place, could not recover against the adjoining owner for an obstruction to the light and air of windows which he subsequently opened in

¹ *White's Bank v. Nichols*, 64 N. Y. 65; also *White v. M. R. Co.* 139 N. Y. 19; *Snell v. Levitt*, 110 N. Y. 595. In commenting upon the last two cases cited the New York Court of Appeals says: "The peculiar features in the *White* and *Snell* cases, which have been referred to, were, in the one an express authorization to build the elevated railroad, and, in the other, an express relinquishment of an easement to conduct water; upon both of which agreements the parties favorably affected thereby had acted." *Foote v. El. R.*, 147 N. Y. 367, 371. And again the same court says: "This court has several times held that a release or abandonment of the easement of light, air, and access which are appurtenant to property abutting upon a public street may be established by any evidence which clearly indicates an intention upon the part of an abutting owner to abandon the right, at least where it has been acted upon by the other party." *Conabeer v. N. Y. C. &*

H. R. R. Co., 156 N. Y. 474, 485, citing the above cases and *Ward v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 152 N. Y. 39.

² Mr. Washburn reaches this same conclusion as to title to corporeal hereditaments. After summarizing the cases, he concludes: "It is probably, therefore, not too strong a conclusion to assert, that in no case can a man lose his title to a freehold in land by any act or oral declaration of abandonment, unless it comes within the category of estoppel, or is followed by such a possession by the person claiming title thereto in his stead as brings the case within the statute of limitations." 3 Wash. R. P. (5th ed.) p. 72, p. *457, par. 5 (see 6th ed. § 1888). See also *Vogler v. Geiss*, 51 Md. 407, 411; *Pope v. Devereux*, 5 Gray (Mass.), 409; *Erb v. Brown*, 69 Pa. St. 216; *Collins v. St. Peters*, 65 Vt. 618; *Ermentrout v. Stitzel*, 170 Pa. St. 540; *Dyer v. Sanford*, 9 Met. (Mass.) 395, 402.

³ 3 Barn. & C. 332

the new wall. And the decision was placed upon the ground that "By building the blank wall he may have induced another person to become the purchaser of the adjoining ground for building purposes, and it would be most unjust that he should afterwards prevent such person from carrying those purposes into effect."¹ This is as far as either reason or authority appears to carry the principle. And the following statement of Lord Campbell, C. J., in speaking of the intention to abandon and the communication of that intention to the servient owner, appears to be in accord with the weight of authority, both ancient and modern. He says: "I doubt whether the communication of that intention destroys the right until the communication is acted upon. Then it certainly does."² It follows that mere use of an easement for a purpose not authorized, its excessive use or misuse, or the failure to employ it for a brief time, is not in itself sufficient to constitute an abandonment. These acts do not of themselves make such representations as, when acted on by the other party, preclude the owner of the right from subsequently insisting on its enjoyment.³

When the giving up of the right is in favor of the public, and the offer so made is accepted by the public, an abandonment by dedication results. In the case of *Regina v. Chorley*,⁴ where the defendant owned a private right of way to his malt house over the plaintiff's land, the court said that if he had removed the house and walled up the entrance and acquiesced in the use of the road by the public, this would have been an abandonment of the easement. So, when a railroad company removes its tracks from a public street in a way which indicates a relinquishment of its rights therein, or a telegraph or telephone company takes down its poles and wires so as to leave the public highway unobstructed, an abandonment of such rights results from the fact that there is a dedication to the public of the unobstructed street or road.⁵ In the last analysis, these methods also are abandonments

¹ Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) p. 712, p. *547.

² *Stokoe v. Singers*, 8 E. & B. 31, 39.

³ *Roby v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.*, 142 N. Y. 176, 181; *White's Bank v. Nichols*, 64 N. Y. 65; *Hayford v. Spokesfield*, 100 Mass. 491; *Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co. v. Chandler*, 121 Mass. 3; *Vinton v. Greene*, 158 Mass. 426; *Chew*

v. Cook, 39 N. J. Eq. 396; *Duncan v. Rodecker*, 90 Wis. 1.

⁴ 12 Q. B. 515.

⁵ *Jones v. Van Bochove*, 103 Mich. 98; *Henderson v. Central Pass. R. Co.*, 21 Fed. Rep. 358; *Hickox v. Chicago & C. S. Ry. Co.*, 78 Mich. 615; *Roanoke Investment Co. v. Kansas City & S. E. R. Co.*, 108 Mo. 50.

resulting from estoppel *in pais*; since it is the act of the public, upon the faith of the representation made by the owner of the right, which completes the destruction of the easement or servitude. If, therefore, the public have not acted on the assumption of the relinquishment of an easement, its owner may restore it and use it again.¹

There are a few cases in which incorporeal rights have been said to have been abandoned, where the owners have simply ceased to use them during the entire prescriptive period, or they have been adversely obstructed by the servient tenant during that length of time.² While it is, of course, true, in the broad sense of the term, that one does abandon such property by giving it up for so long a time as to preclude himself from subsequently claiming it, it is equally apparent that the destruction of easements and servitudes in such ways is logically to be discussed under the topics non-user and adverse obstruction or prescription. These methods of losing such rights are to be next examined.

The burden of proving an abandonment, thus resting upon the doctrine of estoppel *in pais*, is upon him who asserts that the easement or servitude has been so extinguished; and he must support his contention by clear and unequivocal evidence.³

§ 191. (c) **Non-user.** — Mere non-user for any length of time of an easement or servitude arising by any method other than prescription does not of itself work an extinguishment.⁴ The fact that the right has not been enjoyed for a long period is an item of evidence, to aid in proving an abandonment; but, in order to make such proof complete, an intention to

¹ Hestonville M. & F. Pass. R. Co. v. Phila., 89 Pa. St. 210.

² Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 478, 482; Veghte v. Raritan, etc. Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 142, 156; Prescott v. Phillips, cited 6 East, 213; Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 239, 265. See Smylea v. Hastings, 22 N. Y. 217, 224; Steere v. Tiffany, 13 R. I. 568; Wilder v. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 192, 208; Hall v. McCaughey, 51 Pa. St. 43; Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90, 114; Corning v. Gould, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 531, 535.

³ Hennessy v. Murdock, 137 N. Y. 317, 325; Richardson v. McNulty, 24 Cal. 339; Waring v. Crow, 11 Cal. 366;

Beaver Brook Reservoir Co. v. St. Vrain Reservoir Co., 6 Colo. App. 130.

⁴ Crossley v. Lightowler, 3 Eq. 279; Carr v. Foster, 3 Q. B. 581; Canabeer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 156 N. Y. 474; Hennessy v. Murdock, 137 N. Y. 317; Welsh v. Taylor, 134 N. Y. 450; White v. Manhattan R. Co., 139 N. Y. 19; Horner v. Stillwell, 35 N. J. L. 307; Dill v. Camden Board of Education, 47 N. J. Eq. 441; Butterfield v. Reed, 160 Mass. 361; Eddy v. Chace, 140 Mass. 471; Steere v. Tiffany, 13 R. I. 568; Lathrop v. Elsner, 93 Mich. 599; Pa. R. Co. v. Borough of Freeport, 138 Pa. St. 91.

relinquish and an estoppel *in pais* must be established by all the evidence, and this is not accomplished by showing non-user alone.¹ The owner of the privilege is under no obligation of any kind to use it, unless he has voluntarily assumed such obligation; and, therefore, while he merely fails to enjoy it, he is to be considered as still retaining his claim until the contrary is clearly shown against him.

The same reasoning may appear to apply to an easement or servitude acquired by prescription. But there are numerous *dicta*, by the best courts, to the effect that rights which have been obtained in that manner may be extinguished simply by the subsequent failure of their owners to make use of them during the prescriptive period. Thus, it has been said by the New York Court of Appeals that "A right acquired by prescription may be lost by non-user; but it cannot be lost or extinguished by mere non-user, when it has been acquired by deed."² Bracton declared that "incorporeal rights acquired by use may be equally lost by disuse."³ The same statement was made by Lord Erskine in *Hillary v. Waller*,⁴ and by Judge Story in *Hazard v. Robinson*;⁵ and in *Corning v. Gould*,⁶ after stating that Mr. Evans and Chancellor Kent inclined, with the civil law, to the rule that something more than mere non-user for the prescriptive term is necessary to work a legal destruction of such a right, Judge Cowen says: "The doctrine in the English and American cases cited is otherwise, and, in 1823, the court of appeals, in Maryland, expressly recognized the effect of simple non-user." In many cases, moreover, the judges are careful to state that easements "*created by grant*" can not be destroyed by non-user alone, thus implying the opinion that they might be so done away with if they arose by prescription.⁷ On the other hand, there are several judges and writers who have discarded this distinction. In *Veghte v. Raritan Water Power Co.*,⁸ for example, Chancellor Zabriskie said: "I do not find any decisions founded on this distinction, and it

¹ *Moore v. Rawson*, 3 Barn. & C. 332; *Eddy v. Chace*, 140 Mass. 471; *Roby v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.*, 142 N. Y. 176; *White's Bank v. Nichols*, 64 N. Y. 65, 74; *Pratt v. Sweetser*, 68 Me. 344.

² *Smyles v. Hastings*, 22 N. Y. 217, 223.

³ Bract. Lib. 4; 3 Kent Comm. p. *448, note.

⁴ 12 Ves. 239, 265.

⁵ 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 272, 276.

⁶ 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 531, 536.

⁷ First two notes to this section.

⁸ 19 N. J. Eq. 142, 156.

would seem to be unfounded, as prescription is based upon the presumption of a grant.”

The most satisfactory theory upon which are based prescriptive rights is the presumption of a grant *or some other legal origin*.¹ If such a presumption can arise from a prescribed period of user, it is logical and just to assume, from an equal period of non-user, that the right never in fact existed, or that it has been in some legal way extinguished.² For the purpose of quieting titles and preventing litigation over stale claims, the servient tenant should be allowed to overcome the effect of proof of use for twenty years by counter proof of subsequent failure to enjoy for twenty years. But the only instances in which mere non-user should produce such a result are those in which the owners of the rights have voluntarily failed to employ them during the prescriptive period. A continuous easement—such, for example, as the right to have water flow from a stream upon one's land for irrigation purposes—should not be lost because its usefulness was interrupted for a long time by natural causes; as, in the case supposed, by the natural failure of the stream for many years to rise to a sufficient height to supply the irrigating waters.

Discontinuous easements gained by prescription and continuous rights so acquired, which are intentionally shut off and relinquished by their owners, should be extinguished by their non-user during the prescriptive period. While there is a scarcity of actual adjudications in favor of this proposition, yet, as shown above, it has many strong *dicta* for its support and is not opposed by any decided cases.

In some of the western states and territories of this country, and in Louisiana, it is expressly provided by statute that easements obtained by prescription may be lost by the subsequent failure of their owners to enjoy them during the prescriptive period.³

§ 192. (d) **Adverse Obstruction, or Prescription.**—It has been shown that the cessation of the user of a prescriptive easement or servitude, for the period of time requisite to gain title by prescription, is regarded by some courts as sufficient

¹ § 163, *supra*.

² *Corning v. Gould*, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 531, 535.

³ Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 801-811; Mont. Civ. Code (1895), §§ 1250-1260; N.

Dak. Rev. Code (1895), §§ 3351-3361; S. Dak. Comp. Laws (1887), §§ 2760-2770; La. Code, §§ 790-804; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 2157, 2290.

of itself to extinguish the right.¹ It has also been explained how non-user for any considerable length of time, accompanied by acts or representations on the part of the dominant owner, which may be assumed to be meant to induce the servient tenant to act upon them, and which have that effect and so work an estoppel *in pais*, results in a destruction of easements and servitudes by abandonment.² The owner of the privilege or claim is, in both of these cases, the one who causes its destruction. When, on the other hand, the servient proprietor adversely shuts off in some way the enjoyment of the incorporeal right, and this continues during the entire prescriptive period, the termination of the easement or servitude is caused by adverse obstruction, or prescription.³ If, for example, one have the right to flow the land of another for the purpose of raising a mill pond, the continued, peaceable, and uninterrupted occupation of the land by its owner for twenty years or more, under a claim adverse to the right of flowage, extinguishes the easement.⁴ And if the servient tenant build a wall, fence, or house across a way which is owned by his neighbor, and thus for twenty years prevent the enjoyment of the road or path, the easement is thereby done away with.⁵

In order thus to extinguish such an incorporeal right, the adverse obstruction or denial of the right must have the same requisites as those heretofore summed up as necessary to the *acquisition* of easements by prescription.⁶ And this means, in brief, that the acts or conduct of him who is so destroying the right must be of such a nature as to expose him to an action at law or in equity brought by the owner of the easement or servitude at any time before the period of prescription is complete.⁷ In the process of destroying this property right of the dominant owner, the hostile party is in reality

¹ § 191, *supra*.

² § 190, *supra*.

³ *Woodruff v. Paddock*, 130 N. Y. 618; *Townsend v. McDonald*, 12 N. Y. 381; *Dill v. Camden Board of Education*, 47 N. J. Eq. 441; *Smith v. Lange-wald*, 140 Mass. 205; *Wimer v. Simmons*, 27 Oreg. 1; *Yankee Jim's Water Co. v. Crary*, 25 Cal. 504.

⁴ *Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co.*, 125 Mass. 544.

⁵ *Drewett v. Sheard*, 7 C. & P. 465; *Welsh v. Taylor*, 134 N. Y. 450; *Yeakle*

v. Nace, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 123, 125; *Shields v. Arndt*, 4 N. J. Eq. 234.

⁶ *Smyles v. Hastings*, 22 N. Y. 217; *Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co.*, 125 Mass. 544; *Horner v. Stillwell*, 35 N. J. L. 307; *James v. Stevenson* (1893), App. Cas. 162; *Mason v. Horton*, 67 Vt. 266.

⁷ Cases cited in preceding note; also *State v. Suttle*, 115 N. C. 784; *Humphreys v. Blasingame*, 104 Cal. 40; *Sullivan v. Zeiner*, 98 Cal. 346; §§ 155-162, *supra*.

acquiring an adverse right against him; and it must be shown that such adverse right was obtained in the manner required for the gaining of prescriptive titles.¹ When the requisites thus demanded are established, the result may be the destruction of any easement or servitude, no matter by what method it was acquired.²

§ 193. (c) **Destruction of that upon which the Right depends.** — The partial destruction of the servient property does not extinguish an easement or servitude, provided enough of it remains to enable the owner of the right to continue its enjoyment.³ But, when that in, upon, or over which the right exists has been so substantially destroyed that it can not be used as it formerly was, the easement or servitude is done away with,⁴ unless the parties have directly stipulated to the contrary,⁵ or subsequently act in such a manner as to show an intention to have the right continued.⁶

Thus, a right of way through the halls and stairways of a house, whether to reach the upper stories of the same building or to enter other structures of the dominant owner, is ended by the destruction of the house; and the owner of the easement can not compel its restoration by requiring that the house, or any part of it, shall be rebuilt.⁷ So, where one house is supported by the wall of another, or both buildings make use of a party wall erected upon the dividing line between them, the substantial destruction of the wall, even though its foundation may still remain, terminates the easements enjoyed in it by the landowners.⁸ Likewise, where the land, to which a right of way over adjoining property was appurtenant, was entirely taken away from its owner by a change in the bed of the Mississippi River, the easement was thereby destroyed.⁹ And a way granted to a widow, to enable her to enjoy her dower land, ceases when she dies and her dower interest is thereby terminated.¹⁰

¹ *State v. Suttle*, 115 N. C. 784.

² *Mason v. Horton*, 67 Vt. 266; *Welsh v. Taylor*, 134 N. Y. 450; *Woodbury v. Allan*, 215 Pa. St. 390; *Swedish E. L. Church v. Jackson*, 229 Ill. 506.

³ *Bonney v. Greenwood*, 96 Me. 335.

⁴ *Shirley v. Crabb*, 138 Ind. 200; *Heartt v. Kruger*, 121 N. Y. 386; *Pierce v. Dyer*, 109 Mass. 374.

⁵ *O'Neil v. Van Tassel*, 137 N. Y. 297.

⁶ *Douglas v. Coonley*, 156 N. Y. 521.

⁷ *Shirley v. Crabb*, 138 Ind. 200.

⁸ *Heartt v. Kruger*, 121 N. Y. 386; *Partridge v. Gibert*, 15 N. Y. 601; *Pierce v. Dyer*, 109 Mass. 374; *Bonney v. Greenwood*, 96 Me. 335. But, by contract, the parties may make such a wall right permanent. *O'Neil v. Van Tassel*, 137 N. Y. 297.

⁹ *Weis v. Meyer*, 55 Ark. 18.

¹⁰ *Hoffman v. Savage*, 15 Mass. 130; also *Central Wharf v. India Wharf*, 123 Mass. 561, 567; *Mussey v. Union Wharf*, 41 Me. 34.

In like manner, if an easement exist as appurtenant simply to a certain dwelling-house, mill, or other structure, and the building to which it so belongs be destroyed, the right is thereby brought to an end. But a distinction must be here carefully noted between such a privilege as appurtenant *to the land generally*, though used for the benefit of a building upon it, and one simply appurtenant to the building *as such*. In the latter case, the destruction of the building terminates the easement; while, in the former, the right continues in favor of similar structures erected in place of that for which it was at first enjoyed.¹ So if the structure, in connection with which alone an easement exists, be destroyed and then within a reasonable time rebuilt in substantially the same form in which it was before, the right revives in favor of the dominant owner. The owner of a house and lot had a right to the use of the stairway of his neighbor's building, and thence through a door in a party wall to his own rooms above. Both houses having burned, they were rebuilt in practically the same form in which they had previously existed. In an action to recover again the use of the stairway and door through the party wall, it was held that, while the owner of the servient property might have built differently or not at all, and thus might have wholly destroyed the easement which had been suspended, yet the building of the houses as they were before showed that their owners considered this as the best way to use the properties; and the easement accordingly revived.²

§ 194. (f) **Extinguishment and Suspension by Union of the Dominant and Servient Estates.** — Since the ownership of property carries with it the right to its general use and enjoyment, ordinarily no person can have an easement or servitude over his own land. He employs it as he may please, as his own, and not by virtue of any rights against any other person or property. Therefore the union of the dominant and servient estates, in the same person and in one and the same right, will usually extinguish an easement which has belonged to the former estate.³ Accordingly, where the

¹ *Day v. Walden*, 46 Mich. 575, 586. The land of course remaining, the right which is appurtenant *to the land*, rather than to the building, remains. That on which it depends is not destroyed.

² *Douglas v. Coonley*, 156 N. Y. 521;

Shirley v. Crabb, 138 Ind. 200; *Hoffman v. Kuhn*, 57 Miss. 746.

³ *James v. Plant*, 4 Adol. & El. 749; *Dynevor v. Tennant*, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 279; *Damper v. Bassett* (1901), 2 Ch. 350; *Atlanta Mills v. Mason*, 12

absolute owner of a parcel of land, to which was appurtenant the right of drawing water through aqueduct pipes over adjacent property, bought the servient tenement, the easement was at once extinct.¹ And when the owner of a right of way purchased the field over which the pathway ran, the easement as such was at an end.²

But, in order that an extinguishment may thus result, the person who acquires the two tenements must have at the same time the same estate of inheritance in both, "equal in validity, quality, and all other circumstances of right."³ And, if his title to one of them be defeated because it was not perfect, as he supposed, the union in him of the possession and seisin of the two pieces of land will not be held to have destroyed the easement previously existing.⁴ It follows that, when the owner of only an undivided interest in one of the tenements, such as one of several joint-tenants or tenants in common thereof, acquires title to the other tenement, or when the owner in severalty of one of the pieces obtains an undivided interest in the other, the uniting of such titles in him does not extinguish an easement.⁵

It is also a consequence of the principle last stated that, when the same person is the absolute owner of one of the parcels of land (in fee), and of the other for life, or for a term of years however long or short it may be, this does not result in the destruction of any easement or servitude. It simply suspends any such rights during the continuance of the temporary estate; and they revive again when the possession and enjoyment of the two tenements are again separated, as by the death of the life tenant or the expiration of the estate for years.⁶

Mass. 244; *Parsons v. Johnson*, 68 N. Y. 62, 66; *Denton v. Leddell*, 23 N. J. Eq. 64; *Zerbey v. Allan*, 215 Pa. St. 383; *Dority v. Dunning*, 78 Me. 381; *Plimpton v. Converse*, 42 Vt. 712; *McClister v. Devane*, 76 N. C. 57; *Howell v. Estes*, 71 Tex. 690.

¹ *Nichols v. Chamberlain*, Cro. Jac. 121; *Sucy v. Pigot*, Poph. 166.

² *Parsons v. Johnson*, 68 N. Y. 62.

³ 2 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 1316, p. * 85; *Thomas v. Thomas*, 2 Cr. M. & R. 34, 41; *Dority v. Dunning*, 78 Me. 381; *Tyler v. Hammond*, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 193, 195; *Atlanta Mills v. Mason*, 120 Mass. 244.

⁴ *Tyler v. Hammond*, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 193.

⁵ *Atlanta Mills v. Mason*, 120 Mass. 244. The most that could ever result from such a partial unity of ownerships would be a temporary suspension of the right while the co-tenant of one piece was the entire owner of the other; and a complete revival and restoration of it when by sale or otherwise such partial merger of the two estates was terminated. *Bradley Fish Co. v. Dudley*, 37 Conn. 136, 144.

⁶ *Thomas v. Thomas*, 2 Cr. M. & R. 34, 41; *Pearce v. McClenaghan*, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 178; *Dority v. Dunning*, 78

It is to be added that, even in cases where such rights have been wholly extinguished by the coming together of the two estates, if the ease or accommodation, which when the two parcels of land were separately owned constituted an easement or servitude in or over one of them in favor of the other, remain as apparent and reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of that which had been the dominant tenement, then, upon the division of the two corporeal properties again by the conveyance of one of them, it will again come into existence as an easement or servitude, although no express words to that effect are used in the instrument of conveyance.¹ But it is not accurate to speak of such a result as the *revival* of a pre-existing right, which had been dormant or suspended for a season. It is the *creation of a new right*, similar to or identical with that which had existed before. When it is an easement, such as a right of way or a right of drainage, it is brought into existence by implied grant upon the severance of an entire estate.² When it is a mere servitude, such as the right to lateral support of soil or to the ordinary flow of a stream, it is a right which exists again as such by nature as soon as the two ownerships are distinct.³ When an easement is merely *suspended* by the temporary union of the two tenements, the possessor of them can not lawfully destroy the right, or prevent it from reviving when they are again separated.⁴ But, when the permanent union of the two titles *extinguishes* an incorporeal hereditament, their owner is, of course, at liberty to so alter their condition as to prevent any such right from ever again springing into existence; or he may do this by an express denial of the right to his grantee in the conveyance of one of the parcels of land.⁵

Me. 381; Hollenbeck v. McDonald, 112 Mass. 247; Brewster v. Hill, 1 N. H. 350; Chapman v. Gray, 15 Mass. 439; Gay, Petitioner, 5 Mass. 419.

¹ Fritz v. Tompkins, 168 N. Y. 524; Grant v. Chase, 17 Mass. 443; McCarty v. Kitchenman, 47 Pa. St. 239; *In re Bull*, 15 R. I. 534; Miller v. Lapham, 44 Vt. 416; Ferguson v. Witsell, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 280; Rightsell v. Hale, 90 Tenn. 556; Dunklee v. Wilton R. Co. 24 N. H. 489.

² §§ 139, 140, *supra*; Spencer v. Kilmer, 151 N. Y. 390.

³ § 181, *supra*; Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Met. (Mass.) 234; Collier v. Pierce, 7 Gray (Mass.), 18, 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Manning v. Smith, 6 Conn. 289; Collier v. Pierce, 7 Gray (Mass.), 18, 20; Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Met. (Mass.) 234, 239; Huttmeier v. Albro, 18 N. Y. 48; Parsons v. Johnson, 68 N. Y. 62; Duval v. Becker, 81 Md. 537.

§ 195. (g) **Extinguishment by Excessive Claim or User.** — The owner of an easement or servitude has no right, merely of his own volition, to increase its burden upon the servient property; and, if he do so, it is settled that the owner of the latter may recover damages at law for the injury or enjoin its continuance by a suit in equity.¹ It was, at one time, thought to be the law of England that, for such unauthorized excessive use or claim, the owner of the privilege might be compelled to relinquish it altogether and that the servient land should in consequence be relieved of the entire burden.² But the rule now established, both there and in so far as the question has arisen in this country also, is that, if that which is wrongfully and excessively claimed or enjoyed can be distinguished and separated from that which is rightfully owned, this will be done and only the excessive amount will be taken away and prohibited.³ When, however, such separation and distinction can not be made, the prohibition of the excessive claim results in the destruction also of the entire original right.⁴ Thus, in a number of cases in which the owner of a house enjoying an easement in light and air has enlarged the window and sought thus to impose an additional burden upon his neighbor's land, the question has arisen as to whether for that reason the entire window could be closed, or whether simply the excessive portions could be darkened; and it has been held that only the latter remedy could be enforced if the original window could be certainly located and restored.⁵ But where the owner of a stable, the boards on which had shrunk so that he could put small window-panes into the crevices, made diminutive windows in this way; and, after he had acquired a prescriptive right under the

¹ *Wood v. Copper Miner's Co.*, 14 C. B. 428, 446; *Sharpe v. Hancock*, 7 Mann. & G. 354; *Chandler v. Thompson*, 3 Camp. 80; *Mendell v. Delano*, 7 Met. (Mass.) 176.

² *Garritt v. Sharp*, 3 Adol. & El. 325; *Jones v. Tapling*, 11 C. B. n. s. 283; *Blanchard v. Bridges*, 4 Adol. & El. 176; *Cherrington v. Abney Mill*, 2 Vern. 646; *Hutchinson v. Copestake*, 9 C. B. n. s. 863; *Renshaw v. Bean*, 18 Q. B. 112.

³ *Luttrell's Case*, 4 Rep. 84 b, 86; *Chandler v. Thompson*, 3 Camp. 80; *Tapling v. Jones*, 13 C. B. n. s. 876; *Renshaw v. Bean*, 18 Adol. & El. n. s.

111; *McCullough v. Broad Exchange Co.*, 101 N. Y. App. Div. 566, aff'd 184 N. Y. 592; *Bremer v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 191 N. Y. 333, 338; *Mendell v. Delano*, 7 Met. (Mass.) 176; *McDonald v. Bear River Co.*, 13 Cal. 220; *Carlisle v. Cooper*, 6 C. E. Green (N. J.), 576, 595.

⁴ *Blanchard v. Bridges*, 4 Adol. & El. 176; *Hutchinson v. Copestake*, 9 C. B. n. s. 863; *Renshaw v. Bean*, 18 Q. B. 112.

⁵ *Luttrell's Case*, 4 Rep. 86, 89; *Chandler v. Thompson*, 3 Camp. 80; *Tapling v. Jones*, 13 C. B. n. s. 876.

English doctrine of ancient light, gradually widened the openings and then placed in larger windows, it was decided that, since the rightful claim could not be restored to its original condition, the neighboring landowner might build in such a manner as entirely to shut out the light and air from the windows.¹ It is conceived that this distinction is sound; and that whether or not an excessive claim may result in extinguishing an easement or servitude is to be determined by the general principle of law that a right will not be lost or destroyed by its connection or association with a wrong, if the two things can be fairly and accurately separated.²

§ 196. **Remedies for Obstructions or Injuries to Easements and Servitudes.** — When the servient tenant does or permits anything which interferes with the enjoyment of an easement or servitude, its owner has one or more of three different remedies; namely, abatement, an action at law for damages, and a proceeding in equity.

When the use of the right is obstructed, as by a wall, or gate, or house, the party thereby injured may lawfully remove the obstacle, if he can do so without any breach of the peace.³ And, when a public way or servitude is so interfered with, any citizen who is thereby inconvenienced may remove the obstruction. Such acts of removal are abatements of nuisances. “And the reason why the law allows this private and summary method of doing one’s self justice is because injuries of this kind, which obstruct or annoy such things as are of daily convenience and use, require an immediate remedy, and can not wait the slow progress of the ordinary forms of justice.”⁴

Or he whose right is thus interfered with may maintain an action at law — usually trespass on the case, or simply an action for damages under the codes — for each distinct act

¹ *Garritt v. Sharp*, 3 Adol. & El. 325.

² The principle appears, in the law of personal property, in the rules applicable to confusion of goods. 2 Blackst. Com. p. *405.

³ *Sargent v. Hubbard*, 102 Mass. 380; *Morgan v. Boyes*, 65 Me. 124; *Quintard v. Bishop*, 29 Conn. 366; *Joyce v. Conlin*, 72 Wis. 607.

⁴ Chase’s Blackst. p. 621. “Although the court may have refused a mandatory injunction for the removal of a house which obstructed a right of way, if the

right of way is established, the party entitled to it may assert the right at common law, and may, after notice and request to remove the obstructing house, pull it down, although it is actually inhabited; and under such circumstances a court of equity will grant leave to the party entitled to the way . . . to pursue any remedies or to do any acts he can lawfully take or do to abate the obstruction.” Jones, *Ease*, § 891, citing *Laue v. Capsey* (1891), 3 Ch. 411; *Davies v. Williams*, 16 Q. B. 546.

of injury to his easement or servitude.¹ When the plaintiff is in possession of land to which the right is appurtenant, he may have an action for *any* injury to such right. Thus, a tenant at will, or for years, a life tenant or an owner in fee simple may then maintain his action.² A person not in possession — a reversioner or remainderman — has a right of action when the wrong done is of such a permanent character that his interest in the land is thereby injuriously affected.³ (a)

Generally, when the owner of an easement or servitude has at law a complete and adequate remedy for an interruption of his right or an interference with it, equity will not entertain any application for relief.⁴ But, when the court of law affords

(a) In New York, the owner or possessor of what is claimed by another to be the *servient* tenement of an easement or servitude may also have an action for the determination of such claim. "Where a person has been, or he and those, whose estate he has, have been for one year in possession of real property, or of any undivided interest therein, claiming it in fee, or for life, or for a term of years not less than ten, he may maintain an action against any other person to compel the determination of any claim adverse to that of the plaintiff, which the defendant makes to any estate in that property, . . . including any claim in the nature of an easement therein, whether appurtenant to any other estate or lands or not." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1638. And the procedure in such an action is fully prescribed in the following sections of that code, §§ 1639-1650.

¹ Osborne v. Butcher, 26 N. J. L. 308; Hancock v. McAvoy, 151 Pa. St. 460; Bowers v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 322; Child v. Chappell, 9 N. Y. 246.

² Baxter v. Taylor, 4 Barn. & Ad. 72; Hamilton v. Dennison, 56 Conn. 359; Hastings v. Livermore, 7 Gray (Mass.), 194; Noyes v. Hemphill, 58 N. H. 536, 557; Com. Dig. Action on the Case for a Nuisance, B.

³ Bell v. Midland R. Co., 10 C. B. n. s. 287; Metropolitan Ass'n v. Petch, 5 C. B. n. s. 504; Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519; Richardson v. Bigelow, 15 Gray (Mass.), 154; Tinsman v. Belvidere, etc. R. Co., 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 255. The quantity of damages is to be measured by the extent of the injury actually done by the wrongful act. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199; Schile v. Brokhahn, 80 N. Y. 614; Shafer v. Wilson, 44 Md. 268, 280. But it should never include an estimated amount for future injury, for the defendant may stop the wrong-doing at any moment. Bare v.

Hoffman, 79 Pa. St. 71. Actual loss to one's business, occasioned by the nuisance, may be included; and when a stream used for irrigation purposes is diverted, the damages embrace the amount of injury accruing from consequent loss of crops. Shafer v. Wilson, 44 Md. 268, 280; Schile v. Brokhahn, 80 N. Y. 614; Ellis v. Tone, 58 Cal. 289; Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron Co., 84 Pa. St. 279. See also White v. Dresser, 135 Mass. 150; Oursler v. B. & O. R. Co., 60 Md. 358; Demuth v. Amweg, 90 Pa. St. 181. When no actual damages accrue, but the right is invaded by the defendant, the action at law lies, nevertheless, for the obstruction; and nominal damages at least may be recovered. Collins v. St. Peters, 65 Vt. 618; Chase's Blackst. p. 717 *et seq.*

⁴ Goodhart v. Hyett, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 182; Pattison v. Gilford, 18 Eq. 259, 262; Jones v. Adams, 162 Mass. 224; Earley's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 496.

no remedy, or only an inadequate one, then the court of equity will act, by way of injunction, to restrain irreparable mischief, or to suppress continued and oppressive litigation, or to prevent a multiplicity of suits.¹ Thus, relief will be interposed by injunction to prevent the diversion of a natural stream and to restore it to its former condition when it has been wrongfully diverted; for a court of law could only give damages for the injury and could not otherwise stop or prevent it. Besides, if the party aggrieved must look to law alone for his redress, he must continue to bring successive actions for damages, and these are obviated by the injunction granted by equity.² So, for the continuous pollution of a natural stream,³ or the interference with street rights by a permanent elevated railroad or other structure,⁴ and generally for any lasting interruption or interference, equity will grant relief by means of an injunction.⁵ The injunction so issued is merely prohibitory, when its only object is to put a stop to the unauthorized and wrongful acts; and it is mandatory when it aims to compel the removal of obstructions and the consequent restoration of the easement or servitude to its proper condition.⁶ That court also may, and frequently does, in the one proceeding, award damages in compensation for injuries already sustained because of past obstructions or interferences.⁷

¹ 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 925, 926; *Carlisle v. Cooper*, 6 C. E. Green (N. J.), 576, 591; *Coe v. Winnipiseogee Mfg. Co.*, 37 N. H. 254; *Webber v. Gage*, 39 N. H. 182.

² *Corning v. Troy I. & N. Factory*, 40 N. Y. 191.

³ *Harris v. Mackintosh*, 133 Mass. 228; *Lyon v. McLaughlin*, 32 Vt. 423, 425.

⁴ *Story v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 90 N. Y. 122; *Thompson v. Man. R. Co.*, 130 N. Y. 360; *Pegram v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 147 N. Y. 135; *Koehle v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 159 N. Y. 218; *Pa. R. Co. v. Duncan*, 111 Pa. St. 352. These elevated railroad cases are a few of the many in which injunctions have been obtained against the defendants, to take effect in case damages, also adjudged, were not duly paid to the plaintiffs. In such cases, the damages being paid or the matters otherwise adjusted by the parties after judgment

is entered, the injunction does not become operative. This has become the favorite and ordinary method of suing, for the ultimate purpose of simply obtaining damages, in the elevated railroad cases and similar injuries. See also *Muhler v. Harlem R. Co.*, 173 N. Y. 549; *Robinson v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 175 N. Y. 219; *Dolan v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.*, 175 N. Y. 367; *N. Y. El. R. Co. v. Fifth Nat. Bk.*, 135 U. S. 432.

⁵ *Proprietors of Mills v. Braintree Water Supply Co.*, 149 Mass. 478; *Brooks v. Cedar Brook Imp. Co.*, 82 Me. 17; *Schmitzins v. Bailey*, 48 N. J. Eq. 409; *Pettigrew v. Evansville*, 25 Wis. 223; *Hicks v. Silliman*, 93 Ill. 255.

⁶ Cases cited in last four preceding notes; *Bolsud v. St. John's School*, 163 Mass. 229; *Nash v. New Eng. Ins. Co.*, 127 Mass. 91, 97.

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Pegram v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 147 N. Y. 135, 144.

CHAPTER XII.

SPECIAL FEATURES OF IMPORTANT KINDS OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES.

§ 197. Specific easements and servitudes.

Rights of Way.

§ 198. Private ways.

§ 199. Highways.

Rights to Light, Air, and Prospect.

§ 200. Special features to be examined.

§ 201. Express grant of such rights.

§ 202. Implied grant of such rights.

§ 203. Ancient lights.

§ 204. Prescriptive right to air.

§ 205. Prospect or view.

Rights to Lateral and Subjacent Support.

§ 206. Forms of these rights to be examined.

§ 207. Lateral support of land or soil.

§ 208. Lateral support of buildings.

§ 209. Subjacent support of land or soil.

§ 210. Subjacent support of buildings.

Party-wall Rights and Similar Easements and Servitudes.

§ 211. Different kinds of wall rights.

§ 212. *a.* Independent wall.

§ 213. *b.* Common wall.

§ 214. *c.* Right to wall support.

§ 215. *d.* Party wall — Definition — Nature.

§ 216. Creation of party-wall rights.

§ 217. Use of party walls.

§ 218. Repairing, removing, and rebuilding party walls.

§ 219. Division fences.

Water Rights.

§ 220. Kinds of rights in water.

§ 221. *a.* Natural water rights.

(*a.*) Well-defined streams — Rights of access.

§ 222. Ownership and use of natural streams.

§ 223. (*b.*) Rights as to surface waters.

§ 224. (*c.*) Rights as to percolating and subterranean waters.

§ 225. *b.* Artificial water rights.

§ 197. **Specific Easements and Servitudes.** — The foregoing discussion completes a general summary of the law of easements and servitudes. It has dealt with their essential natures and forms, the ways in which they may be acquired, and the chief characteristics of the forms of such rights which may be gained by the different methods respectively; the

incidents of them in general as incorporeal hereditaments; how they may be lost, destroyed, or suspended, and the different remedies available to their owners for injuries to them and for the preservation of their rightful use and enjoyment. There yet remains an examination, one by one, of some of the most important specific kinds of easements and servitudes. The forms which will be thus specially considered, in the order here named, are rights of way; rights to light, air, and prospect; rights to lateral and subjacent support of soil and buildings; party-wall rights and similar privileges, and water rights.

Rights of Way.

§ 198. **Private Ways.** — Ways, as private rights, are the most numerous and ordinary instances of common-law easements. They include all cases in which an individual or class of individuals has a fixed right of passage, by an established route, over land of the servient owner to and from land of the dominant owner. They may be brought into existence by any of the four methods above discussed by which easements may be acquired; namely, by express grant, by reservation in a deed of the servient tenement, by implied grant, and by prescription. They have all the characteristics and incidents which apply to easements in general; they may be lost, suspended, or destroyed by any of the methods above outlined, and the extent of the right to use them and the manner in which they may be enjoyed, altered, repaired, and improved have been already fully examined in the foregoing discussion of the general law of easements.¹ Private easements of way, therefore, are to be regarded as the typical form of such incorporeal right, and the principles relating to them embrace practically the entire body of the law of easements. A right of way in gross, which, technically speaking, is not an easement at all but a mere servitude, has been heretofore shown to be unassignable and uninheritable in most jurisdictions;² while in a few of the United States, such as Massachusetts and Wisconsin, it may be readily passed from hand to hand

¹ See discussion, *supra*, as to questions relating to their characteristics and principles:

² *Ackroyd v. Smith*, 10 C. B. 154; *Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Koelle*, 104

Ill. 455; *Pearson v. Hartman*, 100 Pa. St. 84; *Hoosier Stone Co. v. Malott*, 130 Ind. 21, 24; *Post v. Pearsall*, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425, 432; §§ 126, 127, *supra*.

by the same methods by which other species of real property are transferred.¹ With this qualification, private rights of way, whether appurtenant or in gross, are all governed by substantially the same legal rules and principles.

§ 199. **Highways.** — Public ways, or highways, are in substance easements in gross existing in favor of each member of the public. Their creation and chief characteristics and how they may be terminated have been explained in the last two preceding chapters, as far as the limits of this work will permit.²

When the state or municipality acquires not only the rights of way but also the land itself over which the roads or streets are made, as is the case, for example, with many of the streets of New York City,³ the ownership by the public is of corporeal property; and the abutting owners then have special forms of servitudes over the highways in front of their lots. It has been already explained that compensation must be made to such abutters, when such rights are *directly* taken away or impaired.⁴

In the cases, which are the most usual, in which the ownership of the land remains in the original proprietors or their successors in interest, and the public acquires only servitudes over it — by public prescription, dedication, or operation of law, as above explained⁵ — the soil may be used by its owners in any manner that is consistent with full and proper enjoyment of the way by the public. Subject to this restriction, they may take minerals, trees or crops from it, cultivate it, or use it for any reasonable purpose in connection with their adjacent lands.⁶ The public servitude has its inception and limitations in the reasonable public requirements, according to the nature of each case. And, when the uses thus called for are abandoned or otherwise terminated, the land remains for its original owners or their successors freed from the burdens which the public enjoyment had imposed.⁷

¹ Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132; Hankey v. Clark, 110 Mass. 262; Poull v. Mockley, 33 Wis. 482; § 127, *supra*, and cases cited.

² §§ 178-180, 189, 190, *supra*.

³ Kane v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 165, 182; Fobes v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 505; Reining v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 157.

⁴ § 179, *supra*.

⁵ §§ 168, 169, 172-174, 178-180, *supra*.

⁶ Higgins v. Reynolds, 31 N. Y. 151; Lane v. Lamke, 53 N. Y. App. Div. 395; Sweet v. Perkins, 115 N. Y. App. Div. 784; Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass. 33; People v. Foss, 80 Mich. 559; Town of Suffield v. Hathaway, 44 Conn. 521; 1 Lewis, Em. Dom. § 132 *et seq.*

⁷ Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 25; Bissell v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 23 N. Y.

Rights to Light, Air, and Prospect.

§ 200. **Special Features to be examined.** — When an easement in the continuous and uninterrupted flow of light, or air, or both, or in an unobstructed prospect, view, or outlook over another's land, is once shown to exist, it is a right or privilege which is subject to the same rules of law as those which govern other easements. The special discussion of these incorporeal hereditaments, therefore, relates to the particular methods by which they may be acquired and held. These will be examined in their order, first with reference to light and air and then with reference to prospect or view.

§ 201. **Express Grant or Express Reservation of Right to Light and Air.** — By express contract, either in the form of a direct grant, or by a reservation in a deed of the servient land, or by means of an explicit covenant, an easement in the enjoyment of light, or air, or both, may be brought into existence; and the extent and nature of the right will depend, of course, upon the proper construction of the words used in the instrument.¹ Such express stipulations ordinarily run with the land of both parties to the contract and bind all subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers who take with notice of the easements.²

§ 202. **Implied Grant of Right to Light and Air.** — It is a settled doctrine of the English courts that, upon the severance of an entire tract or parcel of land and a conveyance of one of the pieces, an easement in the form of a right to enjoy light and air over the portion which the *grantor* retains may be impliedly brought into existence.³ But those courts do not go to the extent of implying any *reservation* of light or air in favor of the grantor.⁴ The principle upon which the easements can be implied against the grantor — that he will not

61; *Thomsen v. McCormick*, 136 Ill. 135; *Benham v. Potter*, 52 Conn. 248; *Healey v. Babbitt*, 14 R. I. 533; *Blackman v. Reilly*, 138 N. Y. 318.

¹ *Dalton v. Angus*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Keating v. Springer*, 146 Ill. 481; *Lahr v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 104 N. Y. 287; *Ladd v. Boston*, 151 Mass. 585; *Weigmann v. Jones*, 163 Pa. St. 330; *Hagerty v. Lee*, 45 N. J. Eq. 1, 15; *Morrison v. Marquardt*, 24 Iowa, 35.

² *Hogan v. Barry*, 143 Mass. 538; *White's Bank v. Nichols*, 64 N. Y. 65,

73; *Lahr v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 104 N. Y. 287, 292.

³ *Leech v. Schweder*, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 463, 472; *Swansborough v. Coventry*, 9 Bing. 305; *Palmer v. Fletcher*, 1 Lev. 122; *Rosewell v. Pryor*, 6 Mod. 116; *Pollard v. Gare* (1901), 1 Ch. 834.

⁴ *Russell v. Watts*, L. R. 10 App. Cas. 590, 596; *Pollard v. Gare* (1901), 1 Ch. 834; *Tenant v. Goldwin*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089, 1093. See *Jones, Ease.* §§ 563, 564.

be permitted to do anything in derogation of his own grant — is manifestly inapplicable as against the grantee under similar circumstances. It is held in England, however, that the principle does apply to simultaneous grants of both parcels from the same grantor to two different grantees; and that, in such a case, he who purchases the house has by implication an easement in light and air for the windows which overlook the land of the other vendee.¹

In a few of the United States, such as New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Louisiana, the English doctrine in this respect is followed, with the qualification usually added that it must be shown that the easement contended for as the result of the severance of the two parcels of land is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the portion conveyed.² And in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Georgia, and possibly a few other states, such a right may be brought into existence in this manner when it is a positive, actual necessity to the reasonable enjoyment of the portion granted, but not when such an absolute necessity does not exist.³ But, in the great majority of the states of this country, it is held that the conditions, under which property is rapidly improving and being transferred from hand to hand, are such that no easement in light or air should be implied when a plot or tract of land is divided and a portion of it sold,⁴ or when different parts of

¹ *Allen v. Taylor*, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 355. It is said in a few English cases that, while the principles above stated are there fully recognized so far as the right to light is concerned, there are no positive decisions applying them to the right to air also, although the *dicta* speak of the same rules as applicable to both. And it is at least safe to say that the courts of England will not restrain a mere obstruction to air unless the complainant can show that he has been enjoying it through some definite channel or aperture, such as a window or chimney flue or other similar opening. *Aldin v. Latimer Clark* (1894), 2 Ch. 437; *Bryant v. Lefever*, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 172; *Harris v. DePinna*, L. R. 33 Ch. Div. 238, 250.

² *Sutphen v. Therkelson*, 38 N. J. Eq. 318; *Greer v. Van Meter*, 54 N. J. Eq. 270; *Janes v. Jenkins*, 34 Md. 1; *Clawson v. Primrose*, 4 Del. Ch. 643; *Cleris*

v. Tiernan, 15 La. Ann. 316. The New Jersey courts go farther than those of England, in this respect, and permit an easement in light and air to be implied as a *reservation* in favor of the grantor; but they do not allow it to be gained by prescription. *Greer v. Van Meter*, 54 N. J. Eq. 270; *Sutphen v. Therkelson*, 38 N. J. Eq. 318; *Hayden v. Dutcher*, 31 N. J. Eq. 217.

³ *Rennyson's App.*, 94 Pa. St. 147; *Robinson v. Clapp*, 65 Conn. 365; *Turner v. Thompson*, 58 Ga. 268; *Morrison v. Marquardt*, 24 Iowa, 35; *White v. Bradley*, 66 Me. 254; *Powell v. Sims*, 5 W. Va. 1.

⁴ *Parker v. Foote*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309, 315; *Myers v. Gemmel*, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 537; *Knabe v. Levelle*, 23 N. Y. Supp. 818; *Doyle v. Lord*, 64 N. Y. 432, 439; *Palmer v. Wetmore*, 2 Sand. (N. Y.) 316; *Wilmurt v. McGrane*, 16 N. Y. App. Div. 412, 418; *Shipman v.*

it are conveyed at the same time to different purchasers.¹ The rule is different here, however, when a portion of the premises, such as one story of a house or a building adjoining a vacant lot, is *leased* for a term of years and the residue is retained by the landlord or by those who subsequently succeed to his rights and interests. It has been uniformly held that the tenant for years can then restrain the owner of the remaining portions of the property from obstructing the light and air which are reasonably essential to the use and enjoyment of the demised property in the manner contemplated by the parties to the lease.²

§ 203. **Ancient Lights.** — By the prescriptive act of England, it is provided that, “when the access and use of light to and for any dwelling-house, workshop or other building shall have been actually enjoyed therewith for the full period of twenty years without interruption, the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and indefeasible, any local usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing.”³ The substantial effect of that statute is to put into the form of written law the doctrine of “ancient lights,” which has always been recognized in that country and which is the rule that the right to the unobstructed flow of light into windows or other openings may be acquired by prescription, in favor of a house, over the adjoining land of another owner.⁴

This English doctrine has been repudiated in all of the United States except Delaware.⁵ And there are two reasons

Beers, 2 Ahh. N. C. (N. Y.) 435; *Christ Church v. Lavezzolo*, 156 Mass. 89; *Randall v. Sanderson*, 111 Mass. 114; *Keating v. Springer*, 146 Ill. 481; *Keiper v. Klein*, 51 Ind. 316; *Mullen v. Stricker*, 19 Ohio St. 135; *White v. Bradley*, 66 Me. 254.

¹ *Mitchell v. Reed*, 192 N. Y. 255; *Collier v. Pierce*, 7 Gray (Mass.), 18; *Lipsky v. Heller*, 85 N. E. Rep. 453, 472 (Mass.); *Turner v. Thompson*, 58 Ga. 268. In some states, this matter is regulated by statute. 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 2254; 4 *Shars. & B. Lead. Cas. R. P.* 246.

² *Doyle v. Lord*, 64 N. Y. 432; *O'Neill v. Breese*, 3 N. Y. Misc. 219; *Case v. Minot*, 158 Mass. 577, 584; *Brande v. Grace*, 154 Mass. 210; *Warc v. Chew*,

43 N. J. Eq. 493; *Hilliard v. Gal. Coal Co.*, 41 Ohio St. 662; *Lapere v. Luckey*, 23 Kan. 534; *Darnell v. Columbus S. C. Co.*, 129 Ga. 62. See *Keating v. Springer*, 146 Ill. 481; *Keiper v. Klein*, 51 Ind. 316; *Haynes v. King* (1893), 3 Ch. 439.

³ 2 & 3 Wm. IV. ch. 71.

⁴ *Chastey v. Ackland* (1895), 2 Ch. 389; *Van Joel v. Hornvey* (1895), 2 Ch. 774; *Lord Batterson v. Comm'rs, etc. of London* (1895), 2 Ch. 708; *Tapling v. Jones*, 11 H. L. Cas. 290; *Aynsley v. Glover*, 18 Eq. 544.

⁵ *Parker v. Foote*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; *Myers v. Gemmel*, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 537; *Banks v. Amer. Tract Soc.*, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 438, 467; *Christ Church v. Lavezzolo*, 156 Mass. 89; *Hayden v.*

laid down by our courts, either one of which is amply sufficient ground for their refusal to follow the lead of the English tribunals in this matter. One is that it is incompatible with the condition and needs of our country, which is undergoing such rapid changes in the progress of its growth and development.¹ And the other is that the English doctrine of ancient lights is illogical and inconsistent with the principles upon which other prescriptive rights are founded, because there is no *adverse* character in the enjoyment of light through the windows of one's house over the land of his neighbor.² "The actual enjoyment of the air and light by the owner of the house is on his own land only. He makes no tangible or visible use of the adjoining lands, nor, indeed, any use of them which can be made the subject of an action by their owner, or which in any way interferes with the latter's enjoyment with the light and air upon his own lands, or with any use of those lands in their existing condition."³

The outcome of the American theory and practice upon this subject is that owners of land, overlooking which windows have been built by others, are not required, as is the proprietor of land in England under similar conditions, to shut out the light by erections upon their own properties before there has been a twenty years' enjoyment of it through the windows, or take the risk of being deprived, at the end of the prescriptive period, of much of the utility and value of their vacant lots. It also follows, as a logical and generally recognized consequence in this country, that, in the absence of restrictive legislation, a landowner may at any time, by fences, houses, or other erections upon his own premises, darken his neighbor's house or other structure, no matter how long it has been enjoying the unobstructed light. And, in most cases, it has been held that the courts will not inter-

Dutcher, 31 N. J. Eq. 217; Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. St. 147; Keating v. Springer, 146 Ill. 481; Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135; White v. Bradley, 66 Me. 254; Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295; Tnnstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1. In Delaware it has been declared that the doctrine of "ancient lights" was adopted as a part of the common law. See Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643, which is discussed and questioned but not overruled by

Hulley v. Security Trust Co., 5 Del. Ch. 578.

¹ Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; Doyle v. Lord, 64 N. Y. 432; Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N. J. Eq. 318, 323; Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436.

² Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. (N. Y.), 309; Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N. J. Eq. 217.

³ Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 215.

fere with the exercise of this legal right, even though the motive in making the erection be purely malicious.¹

§ 204. **Prescriptive Right to Air.** — The uniform rule in the United States, with the exception of Delaware, is that a prescriptive right to the flow of air, whether generally or in a defined channel or flue, can no more be acquired than can such an easement in a continuous flow of light.² The reasons are the same as to both light and air; and the two are generally treated together, as governed by precisely the same principles.³ The English courts, however, while adhering broadly to their doctrine of "ancient lights," and now being held to it by the statute above quoted, refuse to sustain prescriptive easements in the access and flow of air, except in cases where its enjoyment has been continued for twenty years or more through a definite flue or channel. They have sustained such an easement, for example, in the right of plaintiff to ventilate a cellar through a hole bored through the rock so as to connect with a well in defendant's land;⁴ but have denied that a prescriptive right could be acquired to have the air flow generally into one's back yard,⁵ or over neighboring land so as to prevent a chimney from smoking,⁶ or for the purpose of running a windmill.⁷

§ 205. **Prospect or View.** — Although they differ so radically in regard to the methods of creating easements in light and air, yet the courts on both sides of the Atlantic agree that the only way in which can be acquired merely the right to an unobstructed view or prospect, — being as it is only a matter of pleasure or delight as distinguished from the enjoyment of light, or air, or both, which are so often necessities,

¹ *Tinker v. Forbes*, 136 Ill. 221; *Levy v. Brothers*, 4 N. Y. Misc. 48; *Letts v. Kessler*, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 108. But it has been held, in a few cases, that where a high board fence or other obstruction is erected solely from malicious motives, and with no purpose other than to injure one's neighbor, an injunction against it will be granted by a court of equity. *Kirkwood v. Finegan*, 95 Mich. 543; *Peck v. Roe*, 110 Mich. 52; *Flaherty v. Moran*, 81 Mich. 52; *Kessler v. Letts*, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 108.

² *Keats v. Hugo*, 115 Mass. 204; *Christ Church v. Lavezzolo*, 156 Mass. 89; *Parker v. Foote*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.)

309; *Tunstall v. Christian*, 80 Va. 1; *Sutphen v. Therkelson*, 38 N. J. Eq. 318.

³ *Parker v. Foote*, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; *Keats v. Hugo*, 115 Mass. 204, 215.

⁴ *Bass v. Gregory*, L. R. 25, Q. B. Div. 481; *Dent v. Auction Mart Co.*, 2 Eq. 238.

⁵ *Chastey v. Ackland* (1895), 2 Ch. 389; *Harris v. DePinna*, L. R. 33 Ch. Div. 238.

⁶ *Bryant v. Lefever*, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 172, 179, 181.

⁷ *Webb v. Bird*, 10 C. B. n. s. 268, 13 C. B. n. s. 841.

— is by express grant or covenant.¹ It can not be gained by implied grant or prescription. It follows that, in the absence of such express contract to the contrary, one may build upon his own land, so as to obstruct his neighbor's view of a highway, the sea, or a landscape; or so as to partially shut off his signs or wares from public view.² But when an express covenant prohibiting such an interference has been entered into in the deed between the vendor and vendee of a parcel of land, it will be enforced by injunction in equity in favor of him for whose benefit it was made, even though he was not a party to the contract.³

Rights to Lateral and Subjacent Support of Soil and Buildings.

§ 206. **Forms of these Rights to be examined.** — Those servitudes which exist by nature, and therefore do not require any act or convention of the parties for their creation, have been heretofore frequently illustrated by rights to the support of land in its natural condition and to the flow of water in its customary channels. Similar privileges are frequently created by agreement or conduct of the parties, and then usually come into being as common-law easements. Such are rights to lateral or subjacent support of buildings or walls, and to the constant or peculiar flow of artificial streams. These matters are also regulated, to quite an extent, by statutes; and thus servitudes of this character are brought into existence by operation of law. The rights, immunities, and duties peculiar to the support of lands and buildings are the first group of such easements and servitudes to be examined. And they will be discussed in the following order, namely: lateral support of land or soil, lateral support of buildings (exclusive of special questions of wall rights which will be the subject of a subsequent section), subjacent support of land or soil, subjacent support of buildings.

§ 207. **Lateral Support of Land or Soil.** — Upon the principle *sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas*, there exists by nature

¹ Aldred's Case, 9 Coke, 57 b; Atty.-Gen. v. Doughty, 2 Ves. Sr. 453; Dalton v. Angns, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740, 824; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; Harwood v. Tompkins, 24 N. J. L. 425; Lyon v. McDonald, 78 Tex. 71;

Bowden v. Lewis, 13 R. I. 189; Tud. Lead. Cas. R. P. 123.

² Ibid.; Butt v. Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158; Smith v. Owen, 35 N. J. Eq. 317.

³ Gibert v. Peteler, 38 N. Y. 165.

the right of every landowner to have his soil supported laterally, in its natural state, by the soil or structure of the neighboring proprietor.¹ When, therefore, one makes an excavation upon his own land, in such a manner that the sand, clay, or other material of the adjoining land will fall into the pit or be disturbed if not artificially supported, and there is no special contract or statute authorizing him to so dig, he must shore up or otherwise support the other's soil, so as to retain it in its natural condition; or he will be liable in damages for the resulting injury.² And this is true regardless of the location, contour, or constituent materials of the neighboring land, in so far as these exist in a state of nature. Thus, the lower owner upon a hillside must support the soil of the upper owner, to as great an extent as is necessary to retain it in its natural and undisturbed condition. And, whether the properties be on a hill or a plain, the amount of such support required will depend, of course, upon the quality of the soil, — grading from nothing or almost nothing in rocky sections to a heavy burden in places where the soil is sandy or from any other cause readily movable. This right to the lateral support of natural soil is absolute, unless restricted by contract or statute; and when it is interfered with, all that its owner needs to prove, in order to establish a cause of action, is that he has suffered damage because of such disturbance. He need not show that the excavation which caused his soil to cave in was done in any careless, negligent, or unskilful manner.³

There is a conflict of authority as to whether or not this right to lateral support of soil exists against a city, town, or other municipality, in favor of land abutting upon a public street or highway. While in some of the United States it is held to exist against such public entities as well as against private owners,⁴ yet in England, and probably by the weight

¹ *Humphries v. Brogden*, 12 Q. B. 739, 743; *Lasala v. Holbrook*, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 169; *Hay v. Cohoes*, 2 N. Y. 159; *Radcliff v. Mayor*, 4 N. Y. 195; *McGettigan v. Potts*, 149 Pa. St. 155; *Schultz v. Byers*, 53 N. J. L. 442; *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199; *Moody v. McClelland*, 39 Ala. 45; *Moellering v. Evans*, 121 Ind. 195; *Stearns v. Richmond*, 88 Va. 992.

² *Ibid.*; Article in 1 Amer. Law Rev. 1.

³ *Transportation Company v. Chicago*, 99 U. S. 635; *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199; *McGuire v. Grant*, 25 N. J. L. 356; *Green v. Berge*, 105 Cal. 52; *Richardson v. Vermont Cent. R. Co.*, 25 Vt. 465.

⁴ *Dyer v. St. Paul*, 27 Minn. 457; *Burr v. Leicester*, 121 Mass. 241; *Cabot v. Kingman*, 166 Mass. 403; *Stearns v. Richmond*, 88 Va. 992; *Keating v. Cincinnati*, 38 Ohio St. 141.

of authority in this country, the principle is maintained that a municipality, acting under due authority, is not liable to a landowner for the falling away of his soil because of proper grading or alteration of a street.¹ But an adjacent landowner must support the street in its permanent and natural condition for public use.²

§ 208. **Lateral Support of Buildings.** — The natural right to lateral support does not extend to any buildings or artificial structures which may be erected on the land. And, therefore, if one place his house upon the verge of his lot, he does not thereby have the right to insist that it also shall have the support of his neighbor's soil.³ If in digging upon his own property the adjacent proprietor do nothing that would interfere with the land in question in its natural state, i. e., if he excavate so that such land would remain intact if it were not loaded with the additional weight of the building, then any injury thus occasioned is ordinarily *damnum absque injuria*.⁴ The process of excavating must, of course, be carried on with sufficient care and skill so as not to injure the adjoining structure by the manner in which it is done, even though the mere existence of the hole thus dug would have occasioned no damage to the neighboring land in its natural state.⁵ But this requirement emerges, not from the mere right of lateral support, but from the fact that negligent, unskilful, or improper digging or blasting may in itself result in a nuisance or a trespass upon the adjacent land.

¹ *Boulton v. Crowther*, 2 B. & C. 703; *Transportation Company v. Chicago*, 99 U. S. 635; *Radcliff v. Mayor*, 4 N. Y. 195; *Folmsbee v. City of Amsterdam*, 142 N. Y. 118; *White v. Nassau Trust Co.*, 168 N. Y. 149; *Callender v. Marsh*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 418; *Fellowes v. New Haven*, 44 Conn. 240; *O'Connor v. Pittsburgh*, 18 Pa. St. 187; *Quincy v. Jones*, 76 Ill. 231; *Aurora v. Fox*, 78 Ind. 1; § 179, *supra*. In some of the United States there are statutes which require compensation for injuries caused to abutting land by the grading, or altering, of highways. See § 179, note (a) *supra*; *O'Brien v. Philadelphia*, 150 Pa. St. 589; *Elgin v. Eaton*, 83 Ill. 535.

² *Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson*, 192 N. Y. 54, 59.

³ *Angus v. Dalton*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Partridge v. Scott*, 3 M. & W. 220; *Wyatt v. Harrison*, 3 Barn. & Ad. 871; *Transportation Co. v. Chicago*, 99

U. S. 635; *Dorrity v. Rapp*, 72 N. Y. 307; *White v. Nassau Trust Co.*, 168 N. Y. 149; *Finegan v. Eckerson*, 32 N. Y. App. Div. 233, 235; *Schultz v. Byers*, 53 N. J. L. 442; *McGettigan v. Potts*, 149 Pa. St. 155; *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199; *Gildersleeve v. Hammond*, 109 Mich. 408; *Quincy v. Jones*, 76 Ill. 231.

⁴ *Thurston v. Hancock*, 12 Mass. 220; *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199; *Lasala v. Holbrook*, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 169; *Austin v. H. R. R. Co.*, 25 N. Y. 334, 346; *Smith v. Thackerah*, 1 C. P. 564; *Backhouse v. Bonomi*, 9 H. L. Cas. 503.

⁵ *Austin v. H. R. R. Co.*, 25 N. Y. 334, 346; *Radcliff v. Mayor*, 4 N. Y. 195; *McGuire v. Grant*, 25 N. J. L. 356; *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199, 201; *Tunstall v. Christian*, 80 Va. 1; *Charless v. Rankin*, 22 Mo. 566; *Winn v. Abeles*, 35 Kan. 85.

It is now held by many courts, also, that the exercise of proper care and diligence, on the part of him who intends to dig in such a manner that a building on the land of another may be thereby damaged, requires him to notify the owner of such building, or to see to it that he has knowledge of the proposed excavation.¹ "It is more than a neighborly act," says a New Jersey court, "to give such notice, because it involves the right of one man to assert his right, regardless of the injury he may cause his neighbor without such warning."² But some leading tribunals have denied that, in the absence of statutory requirement, there exists any such duty on the part of a careful excavator.³ And, as already indicated, it is nowhere required that formal notice be given to a neighboring owner who already has knowledge or reasonable notice of the intended improvement.⁴

A right to the lateral support of a house or other artificial structure may be acquired, as an easement, by any of the forms of grant.⁵ Thus, it may be directly created and conveyed by deed, or reserved in the conveyance of the contiguous land. And when the owner of two houses so built together as to require mutual support conveys one of them, or otherwise separates the ownerships of them, the right of each house to continue to be supported by the other may readily arise by implied grant.⁶

It is thoroughly settled law in England that a properly constructed ancient building, i. e., a building which has stood in the same position for twenty years or more, may acquire by prescription the right to continuous support by the land of the adjacent proprietor in its natural condition, or if that be removed, an adequate lateral support supplied by such adjacent owner.⁷

¹ *Massey v. Goyder*, 4 Carr. & P. 161; *Dodd v. Holme*, 1 Adol. & El. 493; *Schultz v. Byers*, 53 N. J. L. 442; *Larson v. Met. St. R. Co.*, 110 Mo. 234; *Shafer v. Wilson*, 44 Md. 268; *Clemens v. Speed*, 93 Ky. 284; *First Nat. Bk. v. Villegra*, 92 Cal. 96.

² *Schultz v. Byers*, 53 N. J. L. 442, 446.

³ See *Dorrity v. Rapp*, 72 N. Y. 307; *White v. Nassau Trust Co.*, 168 N. Y. 149; *Gildersleeve v. Hammond*, 109 Mich. 408; *Obert v. Dunn*, 140 Mo. 476.

⁴ *Dodd v. Holme*, 1 Adol. & El. 493; *Schultz v. Byers*, 53 N. J. L. 442;

Dorrity v. Rapp, 72 N. Y. 307; *Gildersleeve v. Hammond*, 109 Mich. 408; *Leavenworth Lodge v. Byers*, 54 Kan. 323; *Moody v. McClelland*, 39 Ala. 45.

⁵ *North Eastern R. Co. v. Elliott*, 1 J. & H. 145; *Siddons v. Short*, L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 572; *Richards v. Rose*, 9 Exch. 218; *Lampman v. Milks*, 21 N. Y. 505, 514; *Tunstall v. Christian*, 80 Va. 1.

⁶ *Richards v. Rose*, 9 Exch. 218; *Lemaitre v. Davis*, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 281; *Fox v. Clarke*, 9 Q. B. 565. See *Snow v. Pulitzer*, 142 N. Y. 263.

⁷ *Angus v. Dalton*, 6 App. Cas. 740;

It is also held in that country that contiguous buildings belonging to different owners have by prescription a right of support from each other, after twenty years of uninterrupted, adverse enjoyment.¹ These rules exist there in analogy to the English doctrine of "ancient lights."

There are some strong *dicta* in this country also, and a few early decisions, which uphold the principle that rights of lateral support may be gained by prescription.² Thus, in the early New York case of *Lasala v. Holbrook*,³ Chancellor Walworth said: "There is another class of cases, however, where the owner of a building on the adjacent lot is entitled to full protection against the consequences of any new excavation or alteration of the premises intended to be improved, by which he may be in any way prejudiced. These are ancient buildings, or those which have been erected upon ancient foundations, and which, by prescription, are entitled to the special privilege of being exempted from the consequences of the spirit of reform operating upon the owners of the adjacent lots, and also those which have been granted in their present situation by the owners of such adjacent lots, or by those under whom they have derived their title." But, in harmony with the general American doctrine that a prescriptive title must rest upon an adverse user of such a nature as to give a cause of action in favor of the person against whom the acts of enjoyment are performed, in several important and carefully considered cases of more recent date the English rule upon this matter has been repudiated; and it has been held that, when there is no actual adverse use or occupancy of any part of the land of the contiguous owner, the right to lateral support of a building or other artificial erection can not be acquired by prescription.⁴ And it is safe to say that this is now the generally accepted rule on this side of the Atlantic.⁵

Dodd v. Holme, 1 Adol. & El. 493, 505; *Solomon v. Vintner's Co.*, 4 H. & N. 585; *Backhouse v. Bonomi*, 9 H. L. Cas. 503.

¹ *Lemaitre v. Davis*, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 281; *Solomon v. Vintner's Co.*, 4 H. & N. 585; *Brown v. Windsor*, 1 Cr. & J. 20. See *Adams v. Marshall*, 138 Mass. 228.

² *Lasala v. Holbrook*, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 169, 173; *Stimmel v. Brown*, 7 Houst. (Del.) 219; *Stevenson v. Wallace*, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 77; *Richart v. Scott*, 7

Watts (Pa.), 460; *Aston v. Nolan*, 63 Cal. 269; *City of Quincy v. Jones*, 76 Ill. 231.

³ 4 Paige, 169, 173.

⁴ *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199, 207; *Tunstall v. Christian*, 80 Va. 1; *Handhan v. McManus*, 42 Mo. App. 551, affirmed in 100 Mo. 124; *Sullivan v. Zeiner*, 98 Cal. 346; *Clemens v. Speed*, 93 Ky. 284; *Richart v. Scott*, 7 Watts (Pa.), 460; *Mitchell v. Mayor*, 49 Ga. 19.

⁵ In *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199, 207, Chief Justice Gray said: "It

In some of the states of this country, positive statutes regulate such rights and burdens as are above discussed in this section, especially in regard to houses and building operations in large cities.¹ (a)

§ 209. **Subjacent Support of Land or Soil.** — Where different *strata* of earth or soil, one beneath the other, are owned by different persons, and there is no contract nor statute which affects their interests, the owner of the upper *stratum* has an absolute right to have his land supported in its natural condition by the *stratum* below.² And this right exists whether the

(a) For those parts of the city of New York which before the consolidation of Jan. 1, 1898, constituted the cities of New York and Brooklyn, it is provided by statute that, when an excavation is to be carried more than ten feet below the curb, the party making it must support and maintain, uninjured, contiguous walls and buildings, if he be given the necessary license to enter upon the lands of their owners for that purpose; but, when an excavation is not to be carried more than ten feet below the curb, the owners of adjoining walls and buildings must support and preserve them at their own expense. N. Y. Laws 1885, ch. 456; 1887, ch. 566, § 3; 1892, ch. 275, § 9; 1855, ch. 6; 1888, ch. 583. Under these statutes, when the excavation is to be made more than ten feet below the curb, the person making it must request permission from the neighboring proprietors to enter upon their lands to an extent sufficient to enable him to shore up and protect their walls; and it is no defence, in an action against him for damages for injury occasioned by his excavation, that the plaintiff did not proffer such a license without being asked for the same. *Dorrity v. Rapp*, 72 N. Y. 307; *Cohen v. Simmons*, 21 N. Y. Supp. 385. See also *McKenzie v. McKenzie*, 141 N. Y. 6; *Ketchum v. Newman*, 116 N. Y. 422. Unless full, explicit license to enter on the land is given when so requested, he who excavates is not bound to protect the adjoining wall or building. *Sherwood v. Seaman*, 2 Bosw. 127; *Johnson v. Oppenheim*, 55 N. Y. 280. But when such permission is requested and given, he must support them, though he digs less than ten feet; *Blanchard v. Savarese*, 97 App. Div. 53, *aff'd* 184 N. Y. 537. This statute does not apply to excavations that affect merely the foundations of a stoop; and therefore they are governed by the rules of the common law. *Berry v. Todd*, 14 Daly, 450.

is difficult to see how the owner of a house can acquire by prescription a right to have it supported by the adjoining land, inasmuch as he does nothing upon, and has no use of, that land which can be seen or known, or interrupted or sued for by the owner thereof, and therefore no assent of the latter can be presumed to the acquirement of any right in his land by the former."

¹ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1170, 2251.

² *Humphries v. Brogden*, 12 Q. B.

739; *Love v. Bell*, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 286; *Rowbotham v. Wilson*, 8 H. L. Cas. 348; *Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co.*, 172 Pa. St. 438; *Robertson v. Coal Co.*, 172 Pa. St. 566; *Williams v. Hay*, 120 Pa. St. 485; *Marvin v. Brewster I. M. Co.*, 55 N. Y. 538, 556; *N. J. Zinc Co. v. N. J. Franklinton Co.*, 13 N. J. Eq. 322; *Erickson v. Mich. L. & T. Co.*, 50 Mich. 604; *Burgner v. Humphrey*, 41 Ohio St. 340; *Mickle v. Douglas*, 75 Iowa, 78; *Yandes v. Wright*, 66 Ind. 319.

lower property consists of rock, clay, minerals, or other stable substances, or of easily movable materials such as quicksand; ¹ and whether one of the *strata* is surface land, or both are some distance below the surface.² The lower owner must not remove his soil, by digging it away, or even by pumping it out, as, for example, when it is quicksand, in such a manner as to cause a subsidence of the land above.³

Questions relating to subjacent support of soil are most numerous and important in mining localities. The natural right to such support does not prevent the owner of subsurface mineral property from utilizing it by removing the minerals; but it requires him, in the process of mining, to leave, or in some manner to supply and maintain, an adequate protection against the subsidence of the land of the upper proprietor.⁴ When, therefore, the owner of the entire interest in a tract of land sells the lower mineral portion and keeps the surface, he impliedly retains also the natural servitude in the support of his surface soil; and, when he conveys the upper *stratum* and retains the lower, he impliedly grants also the right against himself to have the upper *stratum* vertically supported in its natural state.⁵ The owner of the mineral property, while required to endure this servitude of support, has a reciprocal right to a way through the upper *strata* to the surface. He may use the surface land, as by constructing and working shafts and roads, to as great an extent as is reasonably necessary for the proper enjoyment of his own property, provided he thereby injures the other proprietor as little as possible.⁶ Such rights frequently arise in substantially the same manner and with practically the same incidents as ways of necessity.

§ 210. **Subjacent Support of Buildings.** — Beyond the rights and burdens already explained, as existing between different owners of different *strata* of soil, the common law does not

¹ Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass. 403.

² Robertson v. Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 566; Mundy v. Duke of Rutland, L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 81, 89.

³ Ibid.; Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 438. See Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N. Y. 522; Reisert v. City of New York, 174 N. Y. 196; Popplewell v. Modkinson, 4 Exch. 248, 251; Elliott v. N. E. R. Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 333.

⁴ Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739, 745; Wilson v. Waddell, L. R. 2

App. Cas. 95; Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503; Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. St. 485; Carlin v. Chappel, 101 Pa. St. 348; Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. St. 429.

⁵ Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739, 746; Harris v. Ryding, 5 M. & W. 60; Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 438, 442; Livingston v. Moingona Coal Co., 49 Iowa, 369.

⁶ Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa. St. 438.

ordinarily go in the creation of natural servitudes of vertical support. Other rights and privileges of a similar character arise if at all from express or implied grant or from prescription, and are technical common-law easements. Such is the right to burden the surface *stratum* with buildings and insist that the owner of the portion of earth lower down, such as the owner of mines below, shall sustain the weight of the building in addition to that of the upper soil in its natural condition. There is very little positive adjudication upon this branch of the law of subjacent support. But the above statements are clear in principle, and harmonize with the cases actually decided and with the opinions and utterances of eminent judges and jurists.¹ The ordinary statement of such writers, with regard to separate ownerships of higher and lower properties, is that the upper one has a right by nature to be supported *in its natural condition* by the lower *stratum*.²

There is more positive adjudication as to the rights and duties of separate owners of different stories or flats of a house. And it is settled that neither can remove, destroy, or alter his portion in such a manner as to work an injury to any other owner;³ that the owner of an upper story is entitled to vertical support from the lower parts of the building and to share in such lateral support as the building may of right enjoy;⁴ but that ordinarily neither of such owners can compel any of the others to make repairs or to contribute towards the making of the same.⁵

Party-wall Rights, and other Similar Easements and Servitudes.

§ 211. **Different Kinds of Wall Rights.**—The various forms of expressions employed to denote wall rights and privileges are frequently used, even by lawyers and judges, in loose and inaccurate senses; and the term “party-wall right” has been made

¹ *Humphries v. Brogden*, 12 Q. B. 739, 745; *Dalton v. Angus*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Pierce v. Dyer*, 106 Mass. 374; *Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co.*, 172 Pa. St. 438; *Dorrity v. Rapp*, 72 N. Y. 307.

² *Dalton v. Angus*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Lasala v. Holbrook*, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 169; *Pierce v. Dyer*, 109 Mass. 374.

³ *Harris v. Ryding*, 5 M. & W. 60;

Dalton v. Angus, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Graves v. Berdan*, 26 N. Y. 498.

⁴ *Harris v. Ryding*, 5 M. & W. 60; *Dalton v. Angus*, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740; *Birmingham v. Allen*, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 292; *Richards v. Rose*, 9 Exch. 218; *Graves v. Berdan*, 26 N. Y. 498; *Conuel v. Kibbe*, 33 Ill. 175; *Rhodes v. McCormick*, 4 Iowa, 368.

⁵ *Pierce v. Dyer*, 109 Mass. 374, 376; *Ottumwa Lodge v. Lewis*, 34 Iowa, 67.

to describe all sorts of easements and servitudes found in connection with structures erected upon division lines. But, from the more recent and accurate use of words in this connection, we may observe four distinct, important species of wall rights. It is important carefully to distinguish these and observe the chief characteristics of each, especially as they come into play in erecting, altering, preserving, or destroying buildings in large cities. They are the rights which arise and exist in connection with, *a*, an independent wall, *b*, a common wall, *c*, a mere easement of support in a wall which belongs entirely to another, and *d*, a party wall.¹

§ 212. *a*. **Independent Wall.**—An independent wall, as its name indicates, is owned separately and distinctly by the proprietor of the land on which it stands. Such are ordinarily the front and rear walls of houses, and the side walls which are erected wholly on the lot upon which the house stands and without any connection with any other structures. About the only form of easement incident to this kind of wall is that of support, which arises when a house is so constructed that its side wall, although in form entirely independent, has come to depend more or less on the wall of an adjacent building, or when two houses are so constructed that their adjoining distinct walls mutually support each other.²

§ 213. *b*. **Common Wall.**—By this is meant a wall of which the two adjoining owners are tenants in common (or possibly joint tenants), i. e., each owns an undivided interest in the entire structure; and no part of it is owned independently and absolutely by either of them.³ This is the kind of structure which a wall erected partly on one man's land and partly on another's may become when no statute, nor contract, nor prescriptive right makes its nature different.⁴ Yet most walls so built are affected by some contract, express or implied, or governed by positive statutory enactment. And the results are that they are generally not common walls, but erections of

¹ See *Watson v. Gray*, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 192, 194.

² *Richards v. Rose*, 9 Exch. 218; *Lemaitre v. Davis*, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 281; *Webster v. Stevens*, 5 Duer (N. Y.), 553; *Eno v. Del. Vecchio*, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 53; *Solomon v. Vintner's Co.*, 4 H. & N. 585. See *Peyton v. London*, 9 B. & C. 725; *Adams v. Marshall*, 138 Mass. 228.

³ *Wiltshire v. Sidford*, 1 Mann. & Ry. 404; *Cubitt v. Porter*, 8 B. & C. 257, 165; *Watson v. Gray*, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 192, 194.

⁴ *Backhóuse v. Bonomi*, 9 H. L. Cas. 503; *List v. Horubrook*, 2 W. Va. 340, 345; *Gilmore v. Driscoll*, 122 Mass. 199, 207; *Quinn v. Morse*, 130 Mass. 317; *Whiting v. Gaylord*, 66 Conn. 337.

some other nature, and most frequently party walls. Indeed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a wall thus built upon two lots is ordinarily presumed to be a party wall, and is governed by the rules of law applicable to such a structure.¹ Those rules, as hereafter explained, have necessarily to deal with easements and servitudes. But, in connection with a mere common wall, there are usually no such rights or burdens, except those which happen to be made by special contract between the owners. This last named form of wall is, therefore, described here simply for the sake of completeness.

§ 214. *c. Right of Support in a Wall which belongs entirely to Another.* — This may be a privilege of supporting a wall of a house, as above explained.² But, in connection with building operations in cities, it is most frequently in the form of an easement in the support of the beams or joists of a house in the wall upon the adjoining lot. Thus, A, intending to erect a house upon his own lot and finding that B, the owner of the contiguous land, has already built up close to the dividing line between the two properties, frequently purchases from B the right to support the beams of his contemplated structure in the wall already existing upon B's lot. He then erects his building without constructing any new wall upon that side, and depends, for the security of his house, upon the validity of the contract which he has made with B. Such a right, being a common-law easement, may be acquired by any form of grant, or by prescription. But he who depends for the safety of his building on a privilege of this nature has upon him, in any litigation concerning it, the burden of clearly establishing its existence.³ As a rule, it is the least satisfactory, for its owner, of all the kinds of wall easements and servitudes.

§ 215. *d. Party Wall — Definition — General Nature.* — A party wall is a division wall erected on or near the line between two pieces of land belonging to different owners, and so constructed that each owns absolutely that portion of it which stands upon his own land and also a right of support in the

¹ *Cubitt v. Porter*, 8 B. & C. 257; *Schile v. Brokhahus*, 80 N. Y. 614; *Campbell v. Mesier*, 4 Johns, Ch. (N. Y.) 334; *Weyman v. Ringold*, 1 Bradf. (N. Y.) 40; *Warner v. Southworth*, 6 Conn. 471; *Weill v. Baker*, 39 La. Ann. 1102.

² § 212, *supra*.

³ *Hodgkins v. Farrington*, 150 Mass. 19; *Rogers v. Sinsheimer*, 50 N. Y. 646; *Pearsall v. Westcott*, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 99, 102; *Spero v. Schultz*, 14 N. Y. App. Div. 423; *Moore v. Rayner*, 58 Md. 411; *Whiting v. Gaylord*, 66 Conn. 337.

entire wall. Thus, if A and B owning adjacent lots of land build a party wall twelve inches thick standing one-half on A's lot and one-half on B's, A owns all the corporeal substance of the six inches of the wall on his land, the right to compel B to retain the other six inches for its support and the right to make such use of the entire structure (as by sticking beams into it and resting joists upon it) as may be reasonably required in the proper construction and preservation of the house on A's property. And B has the ownership of the six inches on his lot and the same kinds of rights against A's half of the wall. While, then, there is no co-ownership of the tangible materials of which the wall is composed, there are cross easements or servitudes in the mutual rights to support of each half of the wall by the other half and in the beam and building rights required for the respective houses.¹ It is not necessary, however, that a party wall should stand with one-half of it upon each of the adjoining parcels of land. The greater portion, or even all of it, may be on one side of the dividing line; or that line may run diagonally through the wall.² The incorporeal rights and privileges are the same, in all such cases, and the only distinctions are as to the quantities of the corporeal substance which belong to each proprietor. Each one owns the bricks and mortar, or other substantial materials, upon his side of the division line, even though they may include very little, or the most, or the whole of the wall. But he holds them subject to the support, beam, and building rights of his neighbor, as above explained. In some cases, it has been shown that the structure in question stood entirely on one man's land, and even some little distance away from the

¹ "The adjoining owners are not joint tenants or tenants in common of the party wall. Each is possessed in severalty of his own soil up to the dividing line, and of that portion of the wall which rests upon it; but the soil of each, with the wall belonging to him, is burdened with an easement or servitude in favor of the other, to the end that it may afford a support to the wall and buildings of such other." *Bonvier's Law Dict.* "Party Wall." *Hoffman v. Kuhn*, 57 Miss. 746; *Odd Fellows v. Hegele*, 32 Pac. Rep. 681 (Oreg.); *Partridge v. Gilbert*, 15 N. Y. 601, 614; *Brooks v. Curtis*, 50 N. Y. 639; *Negus*

v. Becker, 143 N. Y. 303; *Nat. Com. Bk. v. Gray*, 71 Hun (N. Y.), 295; *Normille v. Gill*, 159 Mass. 427; *Traute v. White*, 46 N. J. Eq. 437; *Milne's Appeal*, 81 Pa. St. 54; *Gibson v. Holden*, 115 Ill. 199; *Graves v. Smith*, 87 Ala. 450.

² *Pearsall v. Westcott*, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 99, 102; *Fettretch v. Leamy*, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 510, 530; *McVey v. Durkin*, 136 Pa. St. 418; *Tate v. Fratt*, 112 Cal. 613; *Zeininger v. Schnitzler*, 48 Kan. 63; *Barry v. Edlavitch*, 84 Md. 98; *Marion v. Johnson*, 23 La. Ann. 597.

lot of the other; and yet such other landowner has been held to have in it all the rights and privileges appertaining to a party wall.¹

The expression "party wall" does not necessarily imply a solid structure.² There is, for example, no rule of law which prevents one who is building such a wall, under an agreement with his neighbor that the latter will pay for half of it, from leaving in it chimney flues. And when it is the general custom of the place to put flues in party walls, such custom may be invoked to show that the wall was built in accordance with the understanding and intention of the contracting parties.³ But the rights and privileges to which such a structure gives rise are limited in extent, and are ordinarily confined to the purposes of mutual support.⁴ Hence one lot owner can not, without the consent of the other, erect the wall with openings in it, such as windows or doors, nor place or maintain them in it after its erection,⁵ nor construct or use it for any purpose other than those of a division wall for the support and preservation of the two houses and as an external wall for each.⁶

§ 216. **Creation of Party-wall Rights.** — In some states, party walls and their accompanying rights and duties are specially provided for by statutes. And, in all jurisdictions, they may

¹ Pearsall v. Westcott, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 99; Tate v. Fratt, 112 Cal. 613; Dorsey v. Habersack, 84 Md. 98; McVey v. Durkin, 136 Pa. St. 418.

² Hammann v. Jordan, 129 N. Y. 61; Fettretch v. Leamy, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 510, 525; Ingals v. Plamondon, 75 Ill. 118.

³ Hammann v. Jordan, 129 N. Y. 61; De Bann v. Moore, 32 N. Y. App. Div. 397, 398; Batt v. Kelly, 75 N. Y. App. Div. 321.

⁴ "Various reasons of inconvenience or peril have been assigned for the doctrine, but they are all referable, we think, to the general doctrine that the easement is only a limited one, and it is not to be extended so as to include rights and privileges not belonging to the character of a wall which is to be owned in common, (and in which the rights of each owner are equal." Normille v. Gill, 159 Mass. 427; Fettretch v. Leamy, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 510; Harber v. Evans, 101 Mo. 661; Sullivan v.

Graffort, 35 Iowa. 531; Dunscomb v. Randolph, 107 Tenn. 89.

⁵ De Bann v. Moore, 22 N. Y. App. Div. 485; also cases cited *supra*, last six notes, and especially Nat. Com. Bk. v. Gray, 71 Hun (N. Y.), 295; Brooks v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639; Normille v. Gill, 159 Mass. 427; Wells v. Garbutt, 132 N. Y. 430; Paine v. Chandler, 134 N. Y. 385; Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 118; Trante v. White, 46 N. J. Eq. 437.

⁶ Normille v. Gill, 159 Mass. 427; Wistar v. Amer. Bap. Soc., 2 W. N. C. (Pa.) 333; Dauenhauer v. Devine, 51 Tex. 480; Dawson v. Kemper, 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. 180, 181.

But, of course, a contract, expressly made by the parties or implied from their conduct, may vary these principles, and enable one of the owners of a party wall to put windows in it or otherwise vary its form or use. Hammann v. Jordan, 129 N. Y. 61; Weigmann v. Jones, 163 Pa. St. 330; Grimley v. Davidson, 35 Ill. App. 31; Barry v. Edlavitch, 84 Md. 95.

arise from express contract or covenant, including reservation of such rights in the conveyance of corporeal property, or from implied grant or contract, or from prescription.

The general purport of statutes, which authorize the erection and maintenance of such walls, is that, in a city or town, one who builds a wall of brick or stone contiguous to the vacant lot of his neighbor may place one-half of it upon such neighbor's land, and that, when the latter uses the wall, which he may do at any time, he shall contribute one-half of the cost of its construction. Such enactments, varying considerably in details, are found, and sustained by the courts as valid forms of exercise of the police power, in the District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.¹ In other states, such as Massachusetts and New Jersey, such legislation has been declared to be unconstitutional and void, as an attempt to authorize an illegal taking of private property for private purposes.² It would seem that, in the absence of positive constitutional authority, statutes of such a nature ought not to be sustained.

One of the most common methods of bringing party walls into existence is as the result of express grant or covenant entered into by the owners of the two contiguous lots of land.³

Many come into being, also, by virtue of contracts implied by the law from the conduct and transactions of the owners of the parcels of land affected. Probably the most prevalent illustration of this latter method of creating them is found in that large class of cases in which one person has built two or more connected houses in a row, with single walls (ordinarily eight or twelve inches thick) between them, and has subsequently sold them and the lots of land on which they stand respectively to different purchasers, or has sold one or more and retained the adjacent ones. Unless

¹ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 2170-2177; Jones, Ease. §§ 635-640.

² "It seems to me that where my neighbor takes exclusive possession and occupation of my land by covering it with a solid wall of masonry many feet high, he 'takes' it from me in the most thorough and effective manner, although the legal title remains in me. I do not understand that the legal title is at all involved in an unlawful 'taking' of land, but that it is a question rather of practical dominion over, and

the right to use it at the owner's free will and pleasure, so that he does not injure his neighbor or the public." *Traute v. White*, 46 N. J. Eq. 437, 440; *Williams v. Jewett*, 139 Mass. 29. But see *Evans v. Jayne*, 23 Pa. St. 34, 36.

³ *King v. Wight*, 155 Mass. 444; *Garnire v. Willy*, 36 Neb. 340; *Brooks v. Curtis*, 50 N. Y. 639; *Keteltas v. Penfold*, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 122; *Gibson v. Holden*, 115 Ill. 199; *Duncan v. Rodecker*, 90 Wis. 1.

the deeds or other contracts between the parties expressly provide otherwise, such walls thus become party walls by implication of law, whether the dividing lines are described as running through the middles of such walls, or simply through such walls, or the descriptions of the lots are only by courses and distances or simply by designation of the buildings.¹ Each purchaser is presumed to have contracted with reference to the actual condition of the properties at the time, and to have taken his house and lot with all the benefits and burdens which apparently belonged to them. So, if one build a wall of his house partly upon land of his neighbor, and this without the consent of such neighbor, the latter may, at his election, treat the structure as a party wall, and, without paying for any portion of it, may use it as such. The one who constructed it is estopped by his location of it to deny that he intended to make it a party wall;² but the other, if he so elect, may refuse to treat it in that manner and compel its removal from his land.³ Again, when neighbors construct their houses at the same time and erect between them a single wall in and upon which each supports his building, it thereby becomes a party wall by implication.⁴ And, in general, whenever the owners of contiguous lots of land place a wall upon or near the boundary line between them and mutually use it for the support of the beams or joists or roofs of their buildings, and whenever two persons become separate owners of distinct houses so constructed with reference to some wall, and there is no positive contract between them to the contrary, the law presumes that the wall is a party wall.⁵

¹ *Richards v. Rose*, 9 Exch. 218; *Solomon v. Vintner's Co.*, 4 H. & N. 585, 586; *Eno v. Del Vecchio*, 4 Duer (N.Y.), 53; *Partridge v. Gilbert*, 15 N. Y. 601; *Brooks v. Curtis*, 50 N. Y. 639, 642; *Heartt v. Kruger*, 121 N. Y. 386; *Carlton v. Blake*, 152 Mass. 176; *Everett v. Edwards*, 149 Mass. 588; *Warfel v. Knott*, 128 Pa. St. 528; *Ingals v. Plamondon*, 75 Ill. 118; *Henry v. Koch*, 80 Ky. 391; *Hieatt v. Morris*, 10 Ohio St. 523.

² *Heartt v. Kruger*, 121 N. Y. 386; *Rogers v. Sinsheimer*, 50 N. Y. 646; *Lampman v. Milks*, 21 N. Y. 505, 507; *Henry v. Koch*, 80 Ky. 391. But he is not estopped to prevent the other from running the wall further back upon the lot. *Schmidt v. Lewis*, 63 N. J. Eq. 564.

³ *Sherred v. Cisco*, 4 Sand. (N. Y.) 480; *Potter v. White*, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 644; *Brown v. McKee*, 57 N. Y. 684; *Pile v. Pedrick*, 167 Pa. St. 296; *Houghton v. Mendenhall*, 50 Minn. 40; *Kells v. Helm*, 56 Miss. 700.

⁴ *Rindge v. Baker*, 57 N. Y. 209; *Huck v. Flentye*, 80 Ill. 258; *Miller v. Brown*, 33 Ohio St. 547; *Eckleman v. Miller*, 57 Ind. 88; *Wickersham v. Orr*, 9 Iowa, 253; *Rice v. Roberts*, 24 Wis. 461; *Hammond v. Schiff*, 100 N. C. 161.

⁵ "In the absence of evidence to the contrary a common wall between two adjoining estates is presumptively a party wall, either from an agreement to that effect or from its being built.

Lastly, by prescription a division wall between buildings becomes a party wall after continuous adverse user as such for the full prescriptive period.¹ The burden of proof to show all the elements of such user rests strongly upon him who claims the party-wall rights. He must show, not only the proper method of enjoyment by himself, or by himself and his predecessor in title, but also the negative fact that no disability of the other party prevented the running of the full prescriptive period.²

§ 217. *Use of Party Walls.* — The principle of law which regulates the enjoyment of these structures and the rights connected with them is that they are for the common benefit and convenience of the adjoining properties; and the only restriction ordinarily imposed upon the right of one party to use them is that such use shall not be detrimental to the other owner.³ Accordingly, one alone, in the absence of restraining contract, may make the foundation deeper and stronger, or build the wall up higher, and both of these things he may do to the full thickness of the wall on both sides of the line between the adjoining lots;⁴ he may add thickness to it upon his side of that line, and so, by any or all of these means, he may make the wall suitable for a larger building, or for one different in other respects from that originally existing or contem-

upon the lines of such estates for that purpose by the respective owners. Of course, this presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the whole wall belongs to the owner of one estate, or by evidence that the owner of the two estates owns half of the wall in separate ownership, subject to no easement in favor of the other." Jones, *Ease*. § 644, citing *Cubitt v. Porter*, 8 B. & C. 257; *Matt v. Hawkins*, 5 Taunt. 20; *Watson v. Gray*, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 192; *Schile v. Brokhahus*, 80 N. Y. 614; *Campbell v. Mesier*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 334; *Weyman v. Ringold*, 1 Brad. (N. Y.) 40; *Weill v. Baker*, 39 La. Ann. 1102; *Warner v. Southworth*, 6 Conn. 471; *Mnrly v. McDermott*, 8 Adol. & El. 138.

¹ *Schile v. Brokhahus*, 80 N. Y. 614; *Lewis v. Gollner*, 129 N. Y. 227; *Eno v. Del Vecchio*, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 53; *McVey v. Durkin*, 136 Pa. St. 418; *Hodgkin v. Farrington*, 150 Mass. 19;

Graves v. Smith, 87 Ala. 450; *Brown v. Werner*, 40 Md. 15.

² *Moore v. Raynor*, 58 Md. 411; *Spero v. Schultz*, 14 N. Y. App. Div. 423.

³ *Partridge v. Gilbert*, 15 N. Y. 601; *Mitnacht v. Slevin*, 142 N. Y. 638; *Myers v. Becker*, 143 N. Y. 303; *Carlton v. Blake*, 152 Mass. 176; *Lukens v. Lasker*, 202 Pa. St. 327; *Graves v. Smith*, 87 Ala. 450; *Tate v. Fratt*, 112 Cal. 613; *Andrae v. Haseltine*, 58 Wis. 395; *Jones v. Pritchard* (1908), 1 Ch. 630.

⁴ *Standard Bank v. Stokes*, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 68; *Eno v. Del Vecchio*, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 53; *Brooks v. Curtis*, 50 N. Y. 639; *Negus v. Becker*, 143 N. Y. 303; *Carlton v. Blake*, 152 Mass. 176; *Everett v. Edwards*, 149 Mass. 588; *Matthews v. Dixey*, 149 Mass. 595; *Barry v. Edlavitch*, 84 Md. 95; *Dauenhauer v. Devine*, 51 Tex. 480; *Haiber v. Evans*, 101 Mo. 661.

plated.¹ When one of the owners has thus made additions to a party wall, the other may use it in its changed condition, without paying anything for the benefit of the improvements, unless he has bound himself by contract to make compensation for such advantages.² The substantial reason why one can not put windows, doors, or other openings in the wall against the will of the other is that this would injuriously restrict the practical uses to be made of it by the latter.³

§ 218. **Repairing, Removing, and Rebuilding Party Walls.**— A party wall being for the benefit and convenience of the adjoining proprietors, they are obliged to contribute ratably towards keeping it in suitable condition for the purposes for which it was erected or exists. If, therefore, it need repairing, one of them may do the work or have it done and hold the other responsible for one-half of the expense thereby reasonably incurred.⁴ But this right extends only to *repairs* properly so called. And if they allow the wall to become so dilapidated and ruinous that the only practical way to restore it is to rebuild it from the foundation up, the party-wall rights as such cease to exist, and neither can compel the other to contribute towards the renewal of the wall; nor will either of them, without the concurrence of the other, be justified in rebuilding it even entirely at his own expense.⁵ So, if any ordinary party wall be destroyed by inevitable accident, as by fire, wind, or flood, neither owner can compel the other to help to restore it, nor can either replace it without the consent of the other.⁶

¹ Walker v. Stetson, 162 Mass. 86; Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 72; Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601; Quinn v. Morse, 130 Mass. 317; Mittenacht v. Slevin, 142 N. Y. 638, 683; Musgrave v. Sherwood, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 338, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 339; Sebald v. Milholland, 155 N. Y. 455.

² Walker v. Stetson, 162 Mass. 86; Eno v. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 53. "There are decisions, however, to the effect that one who builds a party wall higher for his own convenience is entitled to contribution from the other owner, who, without an agreement in relation to the wall, uses the additions, to the extent of one-half of the value of the additions at the time they are used." Jones, Ease. § 703, citing Sanders v.

Martin, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 213; 31 Amer. Rep. 598.

³ § 215, *supra*; Normille v. Gill, 159 Mass. 427; Weston v. Arnold, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 1084; Milne's Appeal, 81 Pa. St. 54; Harber v. Evans, 101 Mo. 661; Sullivan v. Graffort, 35 Iowa, 531; Harmann v. Jordan, 129 N. Y. 61.

⁴ Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 334; Huck v. Flentye, 80 Ill. 258; Sherrard v. Cisco, 4 Sand. (N. Y.) 480; Odd Fellows Ass'n v. Hegele, 24 Oreg. 16.

⁵ Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601, 615; Antomarchi v. Russell, 63 Ala. 356; List v. Hornbrook, 2 W. Va. 340; Reynolds v. Fargo, 1 Sheld. (N. Y.) 531.

⁶ Sherrard v. Cisco, 4 Sand. (N. Y.) 480, 487; Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y.

It is because of its characteristics, as above explained, that the existence of a party wall on a lot of land, and the ordinary covenants relating to it, do not constitute an encumbrance within the meaning of a covenant against encumbrances in a deed of the land or in a contract for its sale.¹ But when to these is added a perpetual covenant, running with the land, to the effect that the adjoining owners and their heirs and assigns shall forever share equally the expense of repairing or *rebuilding* the wall, and that whenever rebuilt it shall be of the same size as before and of similar materials, the wall controlled by such a covenant constitutes an encumbrance upon the titles to both of the lots.² So, a wall built entirely upon one piece of land, but subject to use for all purposes as a party wall by the owner of the adjacent lot, is an encumbrance upon the lot on which it stands.³

One owner of a party wall has no right to tear it down, or otherwise to do away with it, as long as it is safe and suitable for the adjoining owner.⁴ But, in the process of building or repairing on his own property, one may take it down, or otherwise deal with it for his own convenience, provided he restores it for the use of the other proprietor and causes the latter no injury or inconvenience while such removal, restoration, or other changes are being effected.⁵ He who thus assumes to deal with a party wall for his own benefit does so at his own risk, and must, at his peril, save his neighbor harmless from loss or legal injury by virtue of such change or changes.⁶

§ 219. **Division Fences.** — Somewhat similar to easements connected with walls are rights which sometimes exist in favor of landowners to compel their neighbors to build or

601; *Heartt v. Krnger*, 121 N. Y. 386; *Bonney v. Greenwood*, 96 Me. 335; *Pierce v. Dyer*, 109 Mass. 374, 377; *Huck v. Flentye*, 80 Ill. 258; *Orman v. Day*, 5 Fla. 385; *Hoffman v. Kuhn*, 57 Miss. 746.

¹ *Hendricks v. Stark*, 37 N. Y. 106; *Schaefer v. Blumenthal*, 169 N. Y. 221; *Weld v. Nichols*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 538; *Bertram v. Curtis*, 31 Iowa, 46.

² *O'Neil v. Van Tassel*, 137 N. Y. 297; *Corn v. Bass*, 43 N. Y. App. Div. 53; *Savage v. Mason*, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 500; *Mackey v. Harmon*, 34 Minn. 168.

³ *Cecconi v. Rodden*, 147 Mass. 164; *Giles v. Dugro*, 1 Dner (N. Y.), 331;

Mohr v. Parmelee, 11 J. & S. (N. Y.) 320.

⁴ *Partridge v. Gilbert*, 15 N. Y. 601; *Partridge v. Lyon*, 67 Hun (N. Y.), 29; *Brondage v. Warner*, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 145.

⁵ *Standard Bk. v. Stokes*, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 68; *Putzel v. Drovers & Mec. Nat. Bk.*, 78 Md. 349; *Partridge v. Gilbert*, 15 N. Y. 601.

⁶ *Bower v. Peate*, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 321; *Percival v. Hughes*, L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 441; *Dorrrity v. Rapp*, 72 N. Y. 307; *Schile v. Brokhahus*, 80 N. Y. 614. But he is not liable for injuries caused by the acts of an independent contractor. *Negus v. Becker*, 143 N. Y. 303; *Covington v. Geyler*, 93 Ky. 275.

help build and maintain division fences between the parcels of land. No such rights exist naturally at common law; but they sometimes arise by grant or prescription.¹ And, in most states, statutes now provide more or less fully for the erection, repairing, and preservation of division fences. Generally, such statutes require each owner of the contiguous properties to erect one-half of the fence, or to contribute one-half of its cost, also to pay one-half of the cost of its repairs, or restoration if destroyed, and to abstain from doing anything to cause its destruction or injury. Fence-viewers are also provided for and authorized to fix the amounts to be paid by the land-owners, respectively, when the latter can not agree.^{2(a)} Such fences may be placed one-half upon the land of each conterminous owner, when there is no prescription or contract to the contrary.³ Such statutes, therefore, afford means of bringing fence servitudes into being and regulating them by operation of law.

Water Rights.

§ 220. **Kinds of Rights in Water.**—In connection with real estate, property in water can only be predicated of its use, which serves in its enjoyment to give value to the corporeal hereditaments with which its use is associated. Hence it is that the valuable legal incidents of water take the form of easements or servitudes. And most of them are not technical common-law easements, but rather servitudes, since they exist by nature and do not have one estate wholly dominant and another distinctly servient. When, however, artificial water rights, privileges, and obligations arise, as they sometimes do, by grant or prescription, they are common-law easements in the strict, technical sense of that term. The logical classification, therefore, of these forms of incorporeal heredita-

(a) In New York division fences in towns are now regulated by the Town Law, L. 1909, ch. 63, §§ 360-369, L. 1892, ch. 20, art. 5; and those between farms by the Town Law. See Gerard on Titles to R. E. (4th ed.) p. 779.

¹ Boyle v. Tamlyn, 6 B. & C. 329; Adams v. Van Alstyne, 25 N. Y. 232; Rust v. Low, 6 Mass. 90, 97; Moore v. Levert, 24 Ala. 310.

² Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 2181-2190; 12 Amer. & Eng. Ency. L. 1050.

³ Duffy v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 496; Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175; Harlow v. Stinson, 60 Me. 347, 349. See Pool v. Alger, 11 Gray (Mass.), 489

ments is into *a*, natural water rights and *b*, artificial water rights or easements. And the first of these classes presents three distinct divisions; namely, the rights, immunities, and burdens associated with, (a) natural and well-defined streams, (b) surface waters not in defined streams, and (c) percolating or subterranean waters — not in defined streams. These three groups of natural water rights and obligations will be first discussed, in the order named, and then the easements connected with artificial water courses will be briefly examined.

§ 221. *a. Natural Water Rights* — (a) **Well-defined Streams** — **Right of Access.** — Around natural bodies of water and streams flowing in defined channels (whether on or below the surface of the soil), the riparian proprietors have rights of access to and enjoyment of the water facilities, which are valuable property rights and of which they can not be deprived without due process of law. For about forty years in the state of New York, it was formerly held that those whose titles extended only to high-water mark along navigable streams had no ground for complaint because their means of approach to such waters were shut off by the building of railroads, wharves, or other structures in front of their properties and below high-water mark. But this view has been discarded by that state; and the rule has been there adopted, which is generally followed, that such owners of lands can not legally be deprived, without their own consent, of the reasonable enjoyment of the waters in front of their properties.¹ Among such privileges, appertaining to each riparian owner, are the right of access to the navigable part of the water from the front of his land, and the right to construct a wharf for his own use or the use of the public. It is, accordingly, held that he may have an action for an injunction or for the recovery of damages against a railroad company or other person or institution by whose acts these natural rights are injuriously affected.² But the former doctrine of New York seems to be still adhered to in New Jersey, and possibly in a few other states.³ And it is the uniform rule

¹ *Rumsey v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co.*, 133 N. Y. 79; *N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Aldridge*, 135 N. Y. 83; *Matter of City of New York*, 168 N. Y. 134. See *Hedges v. West Shore R. Co.*, 150 N. Y. 150; *City of Buffalo v. D. L. & W. R. Co.*, 190 N. Y. 84.

² *Ibid.*; *Wall v. Pittsburgh Harbor Co.*, 152 Pa. St. 427.

³ *Stevens v. Paterson & Newark R. Co.*, 34 N. J. L. 532. See *Hoboken v. Pa. R. Co.*, 124 U. S. 656, 688, 690, 691; *Mann v. Tacoma Land Co.*, 153 U. S. 273, 283, 287; *Coxe v. State of New York*, 144 N. Y. 396; *Mark v. West Troy*, 151 N. Y. 453.

of the federal government and of the states alike that the rights of such owners must yield to the requirements of navigation and the improvements and use of property which it demands.¹

The common-law test of navigability of streams — tide-waters only being navigable — while applying well in England, where no rivers are in fact navigable except so far as the tide ebbs and flows, is not wholly applicable to a country like this with its large and important inland water highways. In the different states, therefore, there is much divergence of opinion as to what kinds of streams are to be regarded as navigable in the technical sense, and as to how far the ownership of riparian proprietors extends. The tendency of the western states is to treat rivers as navigable in law when they are so in fact, though there is no tide within them.² The eastern states adhere more closely to the common-law test. (a) The Supreme Court of the United States has decided that rivers, which form the boundaries between states, and are used or may be used for purposes of commerce, are navigable rivers of the United States; and this, too, without regard to the consideration whether the tide ebbs and flows within them. The same has been held as to the Great Lakes.³

(a) In New York, it is held that, except as to streams regulated by positive statute, the common-law criterion is applicable to streams in general, but that the Hudson and Mohawk, even above tide-water, are governed by the civil law, according to which the riparian proprietors do not own the bed of the stream. *Smith v. City of Rochester*, 92 N. Y. 473; *The Canal Appraisers*, 33 N. Y. 46. See *Lincoln v. Davis*, 53 Mich. 375; § 50, *supra*.

¹ *Scranton v. Wheeler*, 179 U. S. 141; *Gibson v. United States*, 166 U. S. 269; *Slingerland v. International Const. Co.*, 169 N. Y. 60. In the case last cited, it was decided that, if the improvement permanently injured the riparian owner's access to the navigable water, he might recover damages for the loss; but the proof of such loss and damage must be very clear and convincing. See *Thousand Island Steamboat Co. v. Visger*, 179 N. Y. 206; *Barnes v. Midland R. T. Co.*, 126 N. Y. App. Div. 435; *Whitaker v. McBride*, 197 U. S. 510.

² *Barney v. Keokuk*, 94 U. S. 324; *Swergen v. St. Louis*, 185 U. S. 38; *Chase's Blackst.* p. 221.

³ *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1-58; *Water Power Co. v. Water Comm'rs*, 168 U. S. 349; *Swergen v. St. Louis*,

185 U. S. 38; *Kean v. Calumet Canal Co.*, 190 U. S. 452; *Hardin v. Shedd*, 190 U. S. 508; *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois*, 146 U. S. 387; *Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile*, 187 U. S. 479, 487; *The Robert W. Parsons*, 191 U. S. 17, 25; *West Chicago R. Co. v. Chicago*, 201 U. S. 506. *The Montello*, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 411; *The Daniel Ball*, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557; § 50, *supra*. In many of our states while the public has the right to navigate the large streams, in which there is no tide, but which are in fact navigable, yet the title to the soil of such streams is vested in the riparian owners. *Smith v. City of Rochester*, 92 N. Y. 473; *Magnolia v. Marshall*, 39 Miss. 119; *Eneminger v. The People*, 47 Ill. 366; *Ryan v. Brown*, 18 Mich. 196; *Blanchard v. Porter*, 11

Below high-water mark of navigable waters, in most jurisdictions, the state is the owner of the land, subject to the rights of the riparian proprietors, and the right of navigation in favor of such proprietors and the public generally.¹ The state holds such lands in trust for the public; and while it may make reasonable grants and concessions of the land under water, to individuals or corporations, it can not grant or give up so much as to make a practical abdication of its control over such waters or so as to prejudice the public right of navigation or the private rights of the riparian owners.² When the stream or body of water is not navigable, the rights of the state, or of the public, are generally not involved, and the natural servitudes exist simply among the neighboring owners along the banks.

§ 222. **Ownership and Use of Natural Streams.**—The proprietors along the banks of a stream do not own the waters thereof as such; and this is true though they own the bed of the stream, and though for a portion or even all of its course one person may own all the soil over which it flows and the land on both sides.³ But each has a right to its reasonable use, as it flows past or over or through his property, whether it be on or below the surface of the soil; and each one can require of his neighbors and of all the riparian owners that it shall be permitted to flow upon and over or through his land in its natural bed, unpolluted and substantially undiminished in quantity by virtue of anything done by them.⁴

In so far as it relates to the contamination of flowing

Ohio, 138. A grant by the crown (or state) of the land along a navigable sound and the islands therein does not include the land below high-water mark, unless the intent that it shall do so is expressly declared in the grant. *De-lancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26.

¹ *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U. S. 1, and cases cited.

² *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois*, 146 U. S. 387; *West Chicago R. Co. v. Chicago*, 201 U. S. 506, 520. See *United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.*, 174 U. S. 690.

³ *Embrey v. Owen*, 4 Exch. 353; *Sturr v. Beck*, 133 U. S. 541; *Brown v. Bowen*, 30 N. Y. 519; *Colrick v. Swinburne*, 105 N. Y. 503; *Acquaackanouck Water Co. v. Watson*, 29 N. J. Eq. 366; *Lord v. Meadville Water Co.*, 135 Pa. St. 122; *Merrifield v. Worcester*, 110

Mass. 216; *Davis v. Fuller*, 12 Vt. 178; *Mitchell v. Bain*, 142 Ind. 604. A stream, or natural water-course, "is a natural stream, flowing in a defined bed or channel, with banks and sides, having permanent sources of supply." *Barkley v. Wilcox*, 86 N. Y. 140, 143; *Erwin v. Erie R. Co.*, 98 N. Y. App. Div. 402, 404.

⁴ *Aqua currit et debet currere ut currere solebat*. *United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.*, 174 U. S. 690, 702; *Phila. v. Spring Garden*, 7 Pa. St. 348; *Clark v. Pa. R. Co.*, 145 Pa. St. 438; *Brewster v. Rogers Co.*, 169 N. Y. 73; *Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co.*, 164 N. Y. 303; *Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River*, 134 Mass. 267; *Clark v. Pa. R. Co.*, 145 Pa. St. 438, 449; *Warren v. Westbrook Mfg. Co.*, 88 Me. 69, 71; *Young v. Bankier Distillery Co.* (1893) App. Cas. 691.

waters, this rule is practically absolute.¹ If there be such a thing, in any jurisdiction, as a legal right to foul the waters of a natural stream in any degree, it must be very closely restricted in its extent and must be founded on the obligation sometimes placed upon the individual by the demands of the arts or sciences, or of proper agriculture or manufacture, for the promotion or conservation of the greater good of the public in general.² An illustration of such a requirement is found in the mining districts of Pennsylvania, where the courts permit the water from a mine lawfully worked to be poured into a natural stream even though the stream is thereby somewhat polluted.³

The rule as to the diversion of a stream is also absolute, to the extent that it enables each owner to insist that the stream, however much it may be shifted around on land of others, shall flow upon and from his land in its natural channel.⁴ As to the diminution of the quantity of the water, the circumstances of each case, such as its volume, the rapidity of its flow, and the character of the surrounding country must all be taken into consideration in determining the rights and duties of the riparian proprietors. Each of them may use all that is necessary for drinking and domestic purposes,⁵ and all that is otherwise required for any objects that will not result in an unreasonable diminution of the quantity of water to the mate-

¹ *Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal Co.*, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 769; *Jackman v. Arlington Mills*, 137 Mass. 277; *Dwight Printing Co. v. Boston*, 122 Mass. 583; *Warren v. Parkhurst*, 186 N. Y. 45; *Prentice v. Geiger*, 74 N. Y. 341; *Acquackanonck Water Co. v. Watson*, 29 N. J. Eq. 366; *Lion v. McLaughlin*, 32 Vt. 423; *Canfield v. Andrews*, 54 Vt. 1; *Silver Spring B. & D. Co. v. Wanssneck Co.*, 13 R. I. 611; *Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence*, 77 Me. 297; *Barrett v. Greenwood Cem. Ass'n*, 159 Ill. 385.

² *Tenn. Coal. & I. R. v. Hamilton*, 100 Ala. 252, 260; *Sanderson v. Pa. Coal Co.*, 86 Pa. St. 401; *Miss. Mills Co. v. Smith*, 69 Miss. 299.

³ *Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson*, 113 Pa. St. 126. The discharge into a stream of the usual impurities from streets does not give a cause of action against the city or town. *Chatfield v. Wilson*, 28

Vt. 49; *Frazier v. Brown*, 12 Ohio St. 294. And see *Stone v. State*, 138 N. Y. 124.

⁴ *Stowell v. Lincoln*, 11 Gray (Mass.), 434; *Fletcher v. Smith*, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 781; *Pierson v. Speyer*, 178 N. Y. 270, 273; *Hartshorn v. Chaddock*, 135 N. Y. 116; *Covert v. Cranford*, 141 N. Y. 521; *N. Y. Rubber Co. v. Rothery*, 132 N. Y. 293, 296; *Kensit v. Gt. Eastern R. Co.*, L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 122; *St. Anthony F. W. P. v. Minneapolis*, 41 Minn. 270.

⁵ It is said that he may exhaust the water, if necessary, for culinary and other domestic purposes of his family, or for watering his cattle. *Swindon Water Works v. Wilts Canal*, 7 H. L. Cas. 697; *Wadsworth v. Tillotson*, 15 Conn. 366; *Anthony v. Lapham*, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 175; *Swift v. Goodrich*, 70 Cal. 103; *Kaler v. Campbell*, 13 Oreg. 596.

rial detriment of the other owners along the stream.¹ Any abstraction of the water, which is unreasonable under the circumstances, will give rise to a cause of action, whether it be done by directly pumping or dipping it from the stream or by indirectly removing it in some other manner. It was accordingly held, in *Smith v. City of Brooklyn*,² that the city was liable in damages to the riparian owners, for greatly diminishing the volume of the flow of a natural stream by pumping large quantities of water from artesian wells sunk by it in its own lands at and near the sources of the water supply. But where the waters directly taken are only percolating to the stream and are not in a definite channel, as was true in the *Smith* case in New York, the opposite rule remains clearly the law of England.³

These rights and obligations in natural streams may, of course, be modified by contracts express or implied, or by prescriptive titles or privileges.⁴ In some of the United States, also, especially in those along the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountains having important mining interests, prior appropriation of water facilities is made to give superior rights.⁵ And the so-called mill acts of several states give special facilities for milling operations to certain riparian owners, particularly to those who are the first to take advantage of the provisions of such statutes.⁶ The right of irrigation, moreover, in some instances even to the extent of practically exhausting such currents, is authorized by legislative enactments in some of the arid and hotter sections of this country.⁷ These rights,

¹ *Bailey & Co. v. Clark* (1902), 1 Ch. 649; *N. Y. Rubber Co. v. Rothery*, 132 N. Y. 293; *Clark v. Pa. R. Co.*, 145 Pa. St. 438; *Gould v. Boston Duck Co.*, 13 Gray (Mass.), 442; *Dyer v. Cranston Print-Works Co.*, 22 R. I. 506; *Woodin v. Wentworth*, 57 Mich. 278; *City of Canton v. Shock*, 66 Ohio St. 19; *Fisher v. Fiege*, 137 Cal. 39.

² 160 N. Y. 357. See also *Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer*, 93 N. W. Rep. (Minn.) 907; *Haupt's Appeal*, 125 Pa. St. 211; *Higgins v. Flemington W. Co.*, 36 N. J. Eq. 538; *Moulton v. Newburyport W. Co.*, 137 Mass. 163.

³ *Popplewell v. Modkison*, 4 Exch. 248; *Bradford Corp. v. Ferrand* (1902), 2 Ch. 655; *Chasemore v. Richards*, 2 H. & N. 168, 7 H. L. Cas. 349.

⁴ *Manning v. Wasdale*, 5 Adol. & El. 758; *Wiley v. Hunter*, 2 Eastern, 228. No easement can be acquired as a right to pollute a stream against a statutory prohibition. *Brookline v. Mackintosh*, 133 Mass. 215. Nor by prescription to create a public nuisance. *Commonwealth v. Upton*, 6 Gray (Mass.), 473; *North Salem v. Eagle Co.*, 138 Mass. 8.

⁵ *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 418, 1171.

⁶ *Angel Wat. Cour.* § 483; *Lincoln v. Chadbourne*, 56 Me. 197; *Smith v. Agawam Canal Co.*, 2 Allen (Mass.), 355; *Lowell v. Boston*, 111 Mass. 454, 467.

⁷ *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 1179; *United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.*, 174 U. S. 690; *Kansas v. Colorado*, 206 U. S. 46; p. 228, note 5, *supra*.

beyond what the common law permits, and their accompanying obligations depend on the special form of the statutes in each state where such an enactment exists.

§ 223. (b) **Rights as to Surface Waters.**—The rule of the civil law is that every owner of land has a right against his neighbors to have surface water (i. e., not in a fixed stream) flow according to the natural contour of the surface of the land. The upper proprietor has a servitude to let the rain and other surface waters pass naturally from his property upon the field of the lower owner; and the latter has a reciprocal servitude against the former to insist that they shall continue to flow in that manner.¹ But the common-law principle, in this regard, is that “surface water is a common enemy,” which every one may get rid of as best he can, provided he does not directly use it for the injury of his neighbor. The owner of the higher land may retain it on his property, or let it flow to the lower level; and the lower proprietor may either receive it upon his land, or ward it off, by filling in and making his land higher, or by means of embankments or other obstructions.² A few of the states of this country, such as Illinois, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania, have adopted the civil-law doctrine upon this matter;³ while, in England and the rest of the United States, the rule of the common law prevails.⁴

The common-law right of every landowner to ward off and

¹ Walker v. So. Pac. R. Co., 165 U. S. 593, 602; Foley v. Godchaux, 48 La. Ann. 466; La. Code, Art. 656; Rhoads v. Davidheiser, 133 Pa. St. 226.

² Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, 11 Exch. 602, 614; Walker v. So. Pac. R. Co., 165 U. S. 593, 602; Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140; Peck v. Goodberlett, 109 N. Y. 180; Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N. J. L. 351; Cassidy v. Old Colony R. Co., 141 Mass. 174; City of Franklin v. Dudgee, 71 N. H. 186; Sanguinetti v. Peck, 136 Cal. 466.

³ Peck v. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611; Anderson v. Henderson, 124 Ill. 164; Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Iowa, 160; Preston v. Hull, 77 Iowa, 309; La. Code, Art. 656; Foley v. Godchaux, 48 La. Ann. 466; Miller v. Laubach, 47 Pa. St. 154; Rhoads v. Davidheiser, 133 Pa. St. 226.

⁴ Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, 11 Exch. 602, 614; Walker v. So. Pac. R. Co., 165 U. S. 593, 602; Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140; Peck v. Goodberlett, 109 N. Y. 180; Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N. J. L. 351; Jessup v. Bamford B. Co., 66 N. J. L. 641; Cassidy v. Old Colony R. Co., 141 Mass. 174; Byrne v. Farmington, 64 Conn. 367; Chicago K. & N. W. R. Co. v. Steck, 51 Kan. 737; Murphy v. Kelley, 68 Me. 521; Rowe v. St. P. M. & M. R. Co., 41 Minn. 384; Wakefield v. Newell, 12 R. I. 75; Gross v. Lamposas, 74 Tex. 195; Beard v. Murphy, 37 Vt. 99; Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75; Lessard v. Stram, 62 Wis. 112. See Waverly v. Page, 105 Iowa, 225; Sanguinetti v. Peck, 136 Cal. 466.

get rid of, in the best way he can, the surface water which he does not want on his property, is qualified by the requirement that he shall not converge it into a stream and pour it in a flood upon the land of the adjoining proprietor. And *a fortiori* this same requirement is insisted on by the civil law. The lower land may be filled up, or obstructions may be erected, and thus the natural flow of the water reversed; but to do this in such a manner as to create an artificial channel or current upon the adjacent land would be to impose upon it an unnecessary burden.¹ And, therefore, if a railroad company, in the construction of its road, erect a long embankment, through an aperture in which it allows rain water to pour from the higher ground on one side upon the lower land on the other, it is liable in damages to the owner of the lower property for the resulting injury.² But a municipality is not liable for damage caused by the discharge of surface water as the result of its lawful grading of streets.³

§ 224. (c) **Rights as to Percolating and Subterranean Waters.**—Resting on the maxim *cujus est solum ejus est usque ad cælum et ad orcum*, is the well-established rule of both the civil and the common law that one may take, use, and dispose at will of the waters that are in or percolating through his soil and are not in any natural stream.⁴ The water mixed in with one's soil, and not flowing regularly or definitely, is, while there, a part of his land; and he has ordinarily the same dominion over it that he has over the sand, clay, or loam of which his soil is more permanently composed. The decision which established this principle in England was *Acton v. Blundell*;⁵ and the rule itself is often named from that case. It has been

¹ *Hurdman v. Nor. East. R. Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 168; *Walker v. So. Pac. R. Co.*, 165 U. S. 593, 602; *McKee v. D. & H. Canal Co.*, 125 N. Y. 353; *Kelly v. Dunning*, 39 N. J. Eq. 482; *Bates v. Westborough*, 151 Mass. 174; *Osten v. Jerome*, 93 Mich. 196; *Dayton v. Drainage Comm'rs*, 128 Ill. 271; *Rice v. Norfolk*, 130 N. C. 375.

² *Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Miller*, 68 Miss. 760; *Kansas City M. & B. R. Co. v. Lackey*, 72 Miss. 881; *Deigleman v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co.*, 12 N. Y. Supp. 83; *Bedell v. Village of Sea Cliff*, 18 N. Y. App. Div. 261. See *Bowlsby v. Spear*, 31 N. L. J. 351, 353,

per *Beasley, J.*, cited in *Walker v. So. Pac. R. R. Co.*, 165 U. S. 593, 602.

³ *Prime v. City of Yonkers*, 192 N. Y. 105, 110; *Wakefield v. Newell*, 12 R. I. 75.

⁴ *Acton v. Blundell*, 12 M. & W. 324; *Chasemore v. Richards*, 2 H. & N. 168; *Wilson v. New Bedford*, 108 Mass. 261; *Bloodgood v. Ayers*, 108 N. Y. 400; *Bliss v. Greeley*, 45 N. Y. 671, 674; *Roath v. Driscoll*, 20 Conn. 533; *Haldeman v. Bruckhart*, 45 Pa. St. 514; *Buffum v. Harris*, 5 R. I. 243; *Miller v. Black Rock Spring Co.*, 99 Va. 747.

⁵ 12 M. & W. 324.

followed by many adjudications in that country; and by none more fully than by several well-considered recent decisions.¹

In the United States the same principle was recognized and settled as law, even before the decision of *Acton v. Blundell*.² It is here held to include, not only water, but also percolating oil and natural gas.³ Where the owner of a tract of land sold to A the right to draw water from a spring on it, and then sold the land to B, and B dug a well twenty feet from the spring, which cut off A's supply of water from the spring, it was held that A was without remedy.⁴ And, in a case in which A dug in his own land a well for the obtaining of natural gas, and exploded therein nitro-glycerine and thus drew away all the supply of gas from a similar well on B's adjacent property, it was decided that this was *damnum absque injuria* against B and gave him no cause of action.⁵

While there is some conflict of opinions and decisions as to the effects of a malicious intent in so operating in or upon one's own land as to deprive one's neighbors of water, oil, or gas, which they could otherwise enjoy, some states holding that this must not be maliciously done,⁶ yet the view of a majority of the best courts, as declared in the recent and most fully considered cases, is well expressed in *Bradford v. Pickles*⁷ by Lord Halsbury, L. C., who says: "This is not a case in which the state of mind of the person doing the act can affect the right to do it. If it was a lawful act, however ill the motive might be, he had a right to do it. If it was an unlawful act, however good his motive might be, he would have no right to do it. Motives and intentions in such a question as is now before

¹ *Broadbent v. Ramsbotham*, 11 Exch. 602; *Rawstron v. Taylor*, 11 Exch. 369; *Bradford v. Pickles* (1895), App. Cas. 587; *Bradford v. Ferrand* (1902), 2 Ch. 655.

² *Greenleaf v. Francis*, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 117; *Chatfield v. Wilson*, 28 Vt. 49, 54; *Saddler v. Lee*, 66 Ga. 45.

³ *Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt*, 130 Pa. St. 235; *People's Gas Co. v. Tyner*, 131 Ind. 277; *Wagner v. Malory*, 169 N. Y. 501, 505. See *Amsterdam Knitting Co. v. Dean*, 162 N. Y. 278.

⁴ *Bliss v. Greeley*, 45 N. Y. 671, 674; *Ballacorkish Mining Co. v. Harrison*, 5 P. C. 49; *Trout v. McDonald*, 83 Pa. St. 144; *Coleman v. Chadwick*, 80 Pa. St. 81.

⁵ *People's Gas Co. v. Tyner*, 131 Ind. 277, 280. In this case, it is said: "Water, oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, if the analogy be not too strong, as minerals *ferre naturæ*. . . . They belong to the owner of the land, and are a part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape and go into another's land or come under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone."

⁶ *Chesley v. King*, 74 Me. 164; *Roath v. Driscoll*, 20 Conn. 533; *Haldeman v. Bruckhart*, 45 Pa. St. 514; *Redman v. Forman*, 83 Ky. 214; *Springfield Water Works v. Jenkins*, 62 Mo. App. 74.

⁷ (1895), App. Cas. 587.

your lordships seem to me to be absolutely irrelevant." And it was held in that case that the defendant might bore many large wells in his own land, and thus draw the supply of water from plaintiff's wells, although defendant's motive in so acting was evidently to compel the plaintiff, if possible, to purchase his land at a high price, and although the defendant was pumping the water *for the purpose of taking it away from both properties and selling it as merchandise.*¹

The motive — the mental attitude whether benevolent or malevolent — of him who takes percolating water from his own land is, then, as a rule, quite immaterial. But it is now settled in New York that he is liable in damages to his neighbor, whom he injures by so taking it and *leading it away from the land for the purpose of disposing of it as merchandise*, and so preventing it from returning to the soil. It was so decided in *Forbell v. City of New York*,² in which the defendant, by pumping large quantities of water from artesian wells in its own land and taking it by pipes to supply the Borough of Brooklyn with water, greatly decreased the fertility of lands of other owners near the wells. The Court of Appeals says in that case: "In the absence of contract or enactment, whatever it is reasonable for the owner to do with his sub-surface water, regard being had to the definite rights of others, he may do. He may make the most of it that he reasonably can. It is not unreasonable, so far as it is now apparent to us, that he should dig wells and take therefrom all the water that he needs in order to the fullest enjoyment and usefulness of his land as land, either for purposes of pleasure, abode, productiveness of soil, trade, manufacture, or for whatever else the land as land may serve. He may consume it, but must not discharge it to the injury of others. But to fit it up with wells and pumps of such pervasive and potential reach that from their base the defendant can tap the water stored in the plaintiff's land, and in all the region thereabout, and lead it to his own land, and by merchandising it prevent its return, is, however reasonable it may appear to the defendant and its customers, unreasonable as to the plaintiff and the others whose lands are thus clandestinely sapped, and their value impaired." The reason-

¹ See also *Phelps v. Nolen*, 72 N. Y. 39; *Clinton v. Myers*, 46 N. Y. 511; *Ocean Grove Camp M. Ass'n v. Commissioners of Asbury Park*, 40 N. J. Eq. 447; *Chatfield v. Wilson*, 28 Vt. 49;

Walker v. Crouin, 107 Mass. 555, 564; 14 Alb. L. Jour. 61; *Cooley, Torts*, 688, 691.

² 164 N. Y. 522.

ing of this case and also that of *Smith v. City of Brooklyn*, which held the city liable for reducing the flow of a natural stream by pumping water in the same manner and for the same purpose, are affirmed in the later adjudication of *Reisert v. City of New York*.¹ And, similarly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that a landowner must not collect from his own land, and waste, percolating waters, which would otherwise be used for the benefit of the public.²

A landowner must not foul or poison the water percolating through his property, so as to render such water dangerous or deleterious in quality when it reaches the land of a neighboring owner.³

§ 225. *b. Artificial Water Rights.*—The water rights and their attendant obligations thus far discussed are chiefly natural servitudes. The privileges and immunities are reciprocal. They do not present one tenement as wholly dominant, and the other as distinctly and only servient; but they afford cases in which each of the neighboring owners has rights incident to the natural location of their lands. If the owner of two parcels of land, through which a natural stream flows, sell one of them, neither he nor his purchaser will have the right to stop or divert the waters of the stream, against the will of the other.⁴ And, if one of them should change it on his own land and thus keep it flowing for twenty years in a different channel over the other's property, and the latter should during that time use it in its new location for the running of a mill, neither could again change it without the consent of the other.⁵ Since they are dealing with a natural stream, their rights and duties remain reciprocal. A broad and important distinction exists between rights and burdens such as these and the easements which may exist in connection with artificial streams and bodies of water, created for temporary purposes, although the latter may have been enjoyed for more than twenty years.

The rights which one man may have against another, in connection with artificial ponds or streams, are, then, common-law easements, as distinguished from mere natural servitudes. One landowner has the right and the other must endure the bur-

¹ 174 N. Y. 196, 200, s. c. 101 N. Y. App. Div. 93. See *Westphal v. City of New York*, 177 N. Y. 140; § 222, *supra*.

² *Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer*, 93 N. W. Rep. 907; *Barclay v. Abraham*, 121 Iowa, 619.

³ *Hodgkinson v. Enner*, 4 B. & S. 229.

⁴ *Tud. Lead. Cas. R. P.* 111. See *Miller v. Lapham*, 44 Vt. 416; *Hapgood v. Brown*, 102 Mass. 451.

⁵ *Belknap v. Trimble*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 577, 605; *Delaney v. Boston*, 2 Harr. (Del.) 489, 491.

den; and there is no corresponding privilege or advantage operating in the other direction.¹ Thus, if one pump or otherwise draw subterranean waters from his own land, or gather the surface waters into streams, and after making use of them for mining, manufacturing, or other purposes, cause them to flow in a current unto his neighbor's land, he will thus commit a trespass upon that land, unless he has acquired by grant or prescription the privilege of so dealing with the waters. When, however, he has obtained such privilege by one of those methods, there arises thereby no corresponding right, in favor of the lower proprietor, to have the flow of the water continued, no matter how beneficial it may have become to him.] He is simply the servient tenant, who must endure the burden of the artificial stream without thereby acquiring for himself any special correlative rights.² ✓

Easements in artificially produced streams or bodies of water are ordinary forms of that species of incorporeal hereditaments, and are governed by the laws of easements generally, heretofore discussed in full. They may be acquired by either of the forms of grant, or by prescription. One of the most familiar illustrations of them is the easement of drainage, created by implied grant upon the severance of an entire tract of land and sale of one piece, when one of the lots is enjoying the ease or accommodation of being drained over or through the other.³ Another instance is the right of eaves' drip, where a houseowner has acquired the right to let rain water flow from his roof upon his neighbor's lot.⁴ And still another is the easement which one who is mining in his own land may have to get rid of the waste waters by letting them run over the lands of contiguous owners.⁵

¹ There are a few rare cases, in which this is denied. Thus, where one acquired a right to pour water in an artificial channel upon a lower owner's land, it was held, in two cases, that the latter had thereby gained a right on his part to have the stream continue to flow. *Shepardson v. Perkins*, 58 N. H. 354; *Reading v. Althouse*, 93 Pa. St. 400. And see *Bowne v. Deacon*, 32 N. J. Eq. 459.

² *Arkwright v. Gell*, 5 M. & W. 203; *Wood v. Wand*, 3 Exch. 748; *Greatrex v. Hayward*, 8 Exch. 291; *Mayor v. Chadwick*, 11 Adol. & El. 571; *Sampson v. Hoddinott*, 1 C. B. n. s. 590;

Wash. Ease. (4th ed.) 418-427; *Tud. Lead. Cas. R. P.* 120.

³ *Simmons v. Cloonan*, 47 N. Y. 3; *Paine v. Chandler*, 134 N. Y. 385; *Wright v. Williams*, 1 M. & W. 77; *White v. Chapin*, 12 Allen (Mass.), 516; *Leidlein v. Meyer*, 95 Mich. 586; § 139, *supra*.

⁴ *Harvey v. Walters*, 8 C. P. 162; *Keats v. Hugo*, 115 Mass. 204, 216; *Grace M. E. Church v. Dobbins*, 153 Pa. St. 294; *Rose v. Bunn*, 21 N. Y. 275; *Neale v. Seeley*, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 314.

⁵ *Arkwright v. Gell*, 5 M. & W. 203; *Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson*, 113 Pa. St. 126.

CHAPTER XIII.

(4) PROFIT À PRENDRE.

§ 226. Definition and illustrations.	§ 230. Mining rights.
§ 227. <i>Profit à prendre</i> in gross, or as appurtenant to land.	§ 231. Mining laws of this country.
§ 228. How a <i>profit à prendre</i> may be acquired.	§ 232. (a) Discovery of mines.
§ 229. Kinds of <i>profit à prendre</i> .	§ 233. (b) Location of mines.
	§ 234. (c) Annual labor on mines.

§ 226: **Definition and Illustrations.**—A *profit à prendre* is a right to take something of value from the land of another. It is an incorporeal hereditament, since it is a mere *right*; and it differs from an easement, as was above pointed out, in the fact that the latter, which is also a mere right, does not authorize the taking of anything valuable from the servient tenement. The right to reach a highway from my land, by driving with my horse and carriage across the land of my neighbor, is an easement. The right to let my horse pasture on my neighbor's field, and thus to take something from it, is a *profit à prendre*.¹ The term servitude, in its civil-law sense and as ordinarily employed, includes both easement and *profit à prendre*. The latter is that special form of servitude, or right *in alieno solo*, which authorizes the taking of some part of another's soil or its contents, or some of its valuable products.² Other illustrations of it are the right to take marl, loam, peat, gravel, coal, or other minerals;³ the privilege of fishing and

¹ *Rose v. Bunn*, 21 N. Y. 275; *Smith v. Floyd*, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 522; *Livingston v. Ten Broeck*, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 14; *Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 639; *Worcester v. Green*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 425, 429.

² Some authorities, however, define the word *easement* in a sense broad enough to include *profit à prendre*. Post

v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425; *Owen v. Field*, 102 Mass. 90, 103; *Ritger v. Parker*, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 145; *Huff v. McCauley*, 53 Pa. St. 206, 209.

³ *Manning v. Wasdale*, 5 Adol. & El. 758; *Chetham v. Williamson*, 4 East, 469; *Grubb v. Grubb*, 74 Pa. St. 25; *Worcester v. Green*, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 425, 429.

taking away the fish caught,¹ or of shooting and taking away game;² the right to cut and remove wood, and the authority to gather and appropriate the seaweed from the shore of another's land.³ But, since water in its natural conditions is so movable and wandering a thing, it is not treated in this connection as a part of the land or its products; and an established right, which one man may have to take from the land of another either surface water or water percolating or flowing in a natural stream, is usually an easement or form of servitude that is not a *profit à prendre*.⁴

§ 227. *Profit à Prendre*, in Gross or as an Appurtenance to Land. — This form of incorporeal hereditament may be, and frequently is, owned in connection with land (as a dominant estate) and as an appurtenance to the same; or it may be owned as a right in gross. It is probably most commonly found in the latter form. When it is an appurtenance to a dominant estate, it readily passes with a conveyance of the land; and it can not ordinarily be used for any purpose other than for the benefit or convenience of such land. It carries with it practically all the incidents of a common-law easement, with the addition of the right to take something from the servient estate.⁵

¹ *Peers v. Lucy*, 4 Mod. 354, 366; *Turner v. Hebron*, 61 Conn. 175; *Hooker v. Cummings*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 90; *Baylor v. Decker*, 133 Pa. St. 168. The right to fish in navigable waters is common to all, unless some exclusive privilege or franchise has been obtained by grant or prescription. *Carter v. Murcot*, 4 Burr. 2162; *Hooker v. Cummings*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 90; *Weston v. Sampson*, 8 Cnsh. (Mass.) 347; *Chalker v. Dickinson*, 1 Conn. 382; *Phipps v. State*, 22 Md. 380. The right to fish in non-navigable waters belongs *prima facie* to the owner of the land under the water. But, if one own the water distinct from the land beneath it, the right of taking the fish is his, rather than the property of the owner of the land. *Turner v. Hebron*, 61 Conn. 175; *Waters v. Lilley*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145; *Hooker v. Cummings*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 90.

² *Wickham v. Hawker*, 7 M. & W. 63; *Year Book*, 12 Hen. VII. 25; *Year Book*, 13 Hen. VII. 13, pl. 2. *Bingham*

v. Saleme, 15 Oreg. 208; *Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter*, 61 Pa. St. 21, 37.

³ *Hill v. Lord*, 48 Me. 83; *Emans v. Turnbull*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 314; *Sale v. Pratt*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 191; *Church v. Meeker*, 34 Conn. 421. See *St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co.*, 173 N. Y. 149, 162.

⁴ *Manning v. Wasdale*, 5 Adol. & El. 758, 763; *Wickham v. Hawker*, 7 M. & W. 63; *Borst v. Empie*, 5 N. Y. 33; *Goodrich v. Burbank*, 12 Allen (Mass.), 459, 461; *Hill v. Lord*, 48 Me. 83; *Spensley v. Valentine*, 34 Wis. 154. But the right to take water from a closed and retaining receptacle, such as a cistern, may be treated as a *profit à prendre*. *Hill v. Lord*, 48 Me. 83, 99.

⁵ *Douglass v. Kendal*, Cro. Jac. 256; *Bailey v. Stephens*, 12 C. B. n. s. 91, 109; *Huntington v. Asher*, 96 N. Y. 604; *Taylor v. Millard*, 118 N. Y. 244; *Post v. Pearsall*, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425; *Grubb v. Grubb*, 74 Pa. St. 25, 33.

When on the other hand a *profit à prendre* is in gross, it is a personal privilege which does not pass with the transfer of any land, but is in the nature of an individual interest or ownership in the land in which the right exists.¹ As was explained above, an *easement* in gross is treated, in most jurisdictions, as a special, individual privilege, which belongs to the grantee alone and can not be assigned or transferred to another.² But a *profit à prendre* in gross is a distinct, independent object of ownership, which is in its nature assignable, devisable, and inheritable.³ If, for example, A, as an individual and not as the owner of any land, have the right to dig and take coal from the land of B, he does not thereby own any of the coal before he has dug it, but he has an incorporeal right to which attaches all the ordinary incidents of real-property ownership.

§ 228. **How a Profit à Prendre may be acquired.** — A *profit à prendre* may be brought into existence by any of the methods by which common-law easements may be acquired; i. e., by express grant, reservation in a deed of the servient land (which is in reality a form of express grant), implied grant, and prescription.⁴ Such a right may also be dedicated or created by operation of law; but it never exists by nature, nor arises by custom.⁵ When gained by prescription, it is most commonly, though not necessarily, not a right in gross; but an incident to land as a dominant estate;⁶ but, when acquired by any of the other methods, it is most frequently a *profit à prendre* in gross.

§ 229. **Kinds of Profit à Prendre.** — In discussing under the term “common” the chief forms of *profit à prendre* as they existed when he wrote, Blackstone says:⁷ “And hence common is chiefly of four sorts; common of pasture, of piscary, of turbary, and of estovers.

¹ Pierce v. Keator, 70 N. Y. 419.

² § 167, *supra*.

³ Palmer's Case, 5 Coke, 24 b; Wickham v. Hawker, 7 M. & W. 63; Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425, 432; Taylor v. Millard, 118 N. Y. 244; Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.), 459, 461; Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 96. Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21, 39; Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, 500.

⁴ Brady v. Smith, 181 N. Y. 178; Merwin v. Wheeler, 41 Conn. 14, 25; Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145; Littlefield v. Maxwell, 31 Me. 134.

⁵ Gateward's Case, 6 Coke, 59 b; Grimstead v. Marlowe, 4 T. R. 717; Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425; Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145; Perley v. Langley, 7 N. H. 233; Moor v. Cary, 42 Me. 29; Cobb v. Davenport, 33 N. J. L. 223.

⁶ Merwin v. Wheeler, 41 Conn. 14; Littlefield v. Maxwell, 31 Me. 134; Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145; Hinckel v. Stevens, 35 N. Y. App. Div. 5.

⁷ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *32-*35.

“1. Common of pasture is a right of feeding one’s beasts on another’s land: for in those waste grounds, which are usually called commons, the property of the soil is generally in the lord of the manor; as in common fields it is in the particular tenants. This kind of common is either appendant, appurtenant, because of vicinage, or in gross. Common *appendant* is a right belonging to the owners or occupiers of arable land, to put commonable beasts upon the lord’s waste, and upon the lands of other persons within the same manor. Commonable beasts are either beasts of the plough, or such as manure the ground. . . . Common *appurtenant* ariseth from no connection of tenure, nor from any absolute necessity: but may be annexed to lands in other lordships, or extend to other beasts, besides such as are generally commonable; as hogs, goats, or the like, which neither plough nor manure the ground. . . . Common *because of vicinage*, or neighborhood, is where the inhabitants of two townships, which lie contiguous to each other, have usually intercommoned with one another; the beasts of the one straying mutually into the other’s fields, without any molestation from either. . . . Common *in gross*, or at large, is such as is neither appendant nor appurtenant to land, but is annexed to a man’s person; being granted to him and his heirs by deed; or it may be claimed by prescriptive right, as by a parson of a church, or the like corporation sole. This is a separate inheritance, entirely distinct from any landed property, and may be vested in one who has not a foot of ground in the manor. . . .

“2, 3. Common of *piscary* is a liberty of fishing in another man’s water; as common of *turbary* is a liberty of digging turf upon another’s ground. There is also a common of digging for coals, minerals, stones, and the like. All these bear a resemblance to common of pasture in many respects: though in one point they go much further; common of pasture being only a right of feeding on the herbage and vesture of the soil, which renews annually; but common of turbary, and those aforementioned, are a right of carrying away the very soil itself.

“4. Common of estovers or *estouviers*, that is, *necessaries* (from *estoffer*, to furnish), is a liberty of taking necessary wood, for the use of furniture or a house or farm, from off another’s estate. The Saxon word, *bote*, is used by us as synonymous to the French *estovers*: and therefore house-bote is a sufficient allowance of wood, to repair, or to burn in, the

house: which latter is sometimes called fire-bote: plough-bote and cart-bote are wood to be employed in making and repairing all instruments of husbandry; and hay-bote, or hedge-bote, is wood for repairing of hay, hedges, or fences. These botes or estovers must be reasonable ones; and such any tenant or lessee may take off the land let or devised to him, without waiting for any leave, assignment, or appointment of the lessor, unless he be restricted by special covenant to the contrary."

"Of all these rights," says Digby, "by far the most important is the right of common of pasture."¹ But here the form of *profit à prendre* which Mr. Blackstone refers to in the words, "There is also a common of digging for coals, minerals, stones, and the like," is that which needs special discussion, as dealing with the important mining interests of this country.

§ 230. **Mining Rights and Ownerships, in General.** — Since the substances of which the earth is composed may be owned in layers, or *strata*, by different people, so that the property of one in its natural position may be vertically above that of another,² it is often a difficult question whether the sale and conveyance of a so-called mining right gives to the grantee the title to one of these *strata* — a corporeal hereditament — or only an incorporeal right to take minerals from the land of the grantor. When it is the latter, the grantee acquires simply a *profit à prendre*; he does not own any of the coals or other minerals in their natural place in the ground, before he has dug and removed them; and, when he has taken them by virtue of his right to do so, they are not realty, but personal property in his hands — the *proceeds* of his *profit à prendre*;³ whereas, if by the contract he obtain title to a *stratum*

¹ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 192. Mr. Digby shows how the uncultivated land of the township, from being the *common* property of all the townfolk, came, in the process of growth of manors, to be "regarded as the sole property of the lord of the manor and was called the lord's waste, and the old customary rights of the villagers came, as notions of strict legal rights of property were more exactly defined, to be regarded as rights of user on the lord's soil — as *jura in re aliena*. Still the name remained, and attached . . . to the waste

or uncultivated land itself, which was still usually called common land, as if the commoners had rights of property in common over the soil itself, instead of having simply rights *in alieno solo*." See also 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 620-622; Williams, Rights of Common, 37 *et seq.*

² § 209, *supra*.

³ Shep. Touchst. 96; Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. St. 475, 478; Hanley v. Wood, 2 Barn. & Ald. 724. See Vogel v. Webber, 159 Pa. St. 235.

of soil, he at once owns the minerals in it, as corporeal real property, while they are in their natural location in the ground.¹ The solution of the question usually turns on the language of the instrument employed, the guiding principle of construction being that, if the words used import an *exclusive right to take all* the coal or other minerals in certain described land, it is a conveyance of the minerals themselves as corporeal real property in place, but otherwise it is merely a grant of an incorporeal hereditament — a *profit à prendre* in the form of a privilege of taking minerals from another's land.² Thus, in *Huntington and Mountjoy's Case*, the grant was of a right to dig ore in the waste of a manor and to take turfs there sufficient to make alum and copperas; and it was held to convey only an incorporeal hereditament.³ But, where the transfer was of the right to dig coal under the grantor's land, "to any extent," it conveyed the ownership of the coal before it was mined.⁴ And a like result followed where the deed conveyed the exclusive right to search for, dig, and carry away the iron ore and limestone in a certain described parcel of land.⁵ In accordance with the rule that a deed between individuals is to be construed most strongly against the grantor, the later cases, especially in this country, have tended to resolve close questions of this character in favor of the grantee and decide that the ownership of the unmined or unquarried minerals or other substances passes to him.⁶ Such corporeal property is susceptible of subdivision of its ownership; but a *profit à prendre* in minerals — the mere *right* to take them from the land of another, and then own them as personal property — is at common law an entire, indivisible thing, and an attempt by its owner to convey only a part of it extinguishes it altogether.⁷ Some of the most important principles of these forms of *profit à prendre*, as mining rights in the United States, require a further brief discussion.

¹ *Caldwell v. Fulton*, 31 Pa. St. 475, 478.

² *Shep. Touchst.* 96; *Hanley v. Wood*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 724; *Caldwell v. Fulton*, 31 Pa. 475, 478; *Clement v. Youngman*, 40 Pa. St. 341; *Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co.*, 107 Mass. 290; *Silsby v. Trotter*, 29 N. J. Eq. 228.

³ *Godbolt*, 17.

⁴ *Caldwell v. Fulton*, 31 Pa. St. 475, 478.

⁵ *Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co.*, 107 Mass. 290.

⁶ *Ibid.*; *East Jersey Iron Co. v. Wright*, 32 N. J. Eq. 248; *Clement v. Youngman*, 40 Pa. St. 341; *Grubb v. Bayard*, 2 Wall. Jr. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 81; *Bainbridge on Mines, etc.*, 254, 255 (4th ed.), 369.

⁷ *Huntington and Mountjoy's Case*, *Godb.* 17; *Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 639; *Caldwell v. Fulton*, 31 Pa. St. 475, 478.

§ 231. **Mining Laws of this Country.**—By the common law of England, all mines of gold and silver belong to the crown, as an incident or flower of the royal prerogative.¹ In New York, the people, as successors to the rights of the king of Great Britain, became the owners of such mines; (a) and it may

(a) The New York statutes upon this topic have always been similar to those of England. See stat. Feb. 6, 1789; Sess. L. 12, ch. 18; R. S. pt. 1, ch. 9, tit. 11. They are now found in L. 1909, ch. 50, Art. 7, as including Laws 1894, ch. 745, and L. 1902, ch. 503. They declare that, "The following mines are the property of the people of this state in their right of sovereignty: 1. All mines of gold and silver discovered, or hereafter to be discovered, within this state. 2. All mines of other metals, and of talc, mica or graphite, discovered, or hereafter to be discovered, upon any lands owned by persons not being citizens of the United States. 3. All mines of other metals, and of talc, mica or graphite, discovered, or hereafter to be discovered, upon lands owned by a citizen of the United States, the ore of which, on an average, shall contain less than two equal third parts in value of copper, tin, iron and lead, or any of those metals. 4. All mines and all minerals and fossils discovered, or hereafter to be discovered, upon any lands belonging to the people of this state. But all mines, of whatever description, other than mines of gold and silver, discovered upon any lands owned by a citizen of any of the United States, the ore of which upon an average, shall contain two equal third parts or more in value of copper, tin, iron and lead, or any of those metals, shall belong to the owner of such land."

The act authorizes any citizen of the state, who discovers a valuable mine upon the state's land, to work the same for twenty-one years, after giving the proper notice to the Secretary of State, and upon paying a royalty to the state of two per cent of the value of the products when ready for market. It also provides for corporations to be formed for mining purposes and to exercise the right of eminent domain in connection therewith; and

¹ Co. Lit. 4 a; 1 Inst. 4 a; 2 Inst. 572; Case of Mines, Plowd. 313. In the noted case last cited it was said: "The common law, which is founded upon reason, appropriates everything to the person whom it best suits; as common and trivial things to the common people; things of more worth to persons of a higher and superior class, and things most excellent to the person who excels all others: and because gold and silver are the most excellent things which the soil contains, the law has appointed them, as in reason it ought, to the person most excellent, and that is the King." In that case, also, it was decided, by a majority of the twelve judges, that, if any admixture of gold or silver were found in mines of copper, tin, lead,

or iron, the whole belonged to the crown, because the nobler metal attracted to it the less valuable; and, since the king could not hold property jointly with a subject, he therefore took the whole. This latter doctrine, to which a minority of the judges including Plowden himself dissented, was corrected by the statutes 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 30, and 5 Wm. & Mary, ch. 6, which, however, allowed the king to take the proceeds of such mines provided he reimbursed the landowner at specified rates. Lord Coke says that the crown has no right, by virtue of its prerogative, to any other metals than gold and silver, for those are the only metals required for the coining of money for the use of the subjects. 2 Inst. 577. 578.

be safely assumed, in the absence of controlling statutes in any state, that mines of gold and silver are the property of the state in its sovereign capacity.¹ The United States government, however, is the owner of mines of those metals, as well as of all other mines, in its own lands, even though such lands be within the boundaries of one or more of the states. The right to take minerals from this public domain is now fully regulated by the United States statutes, passed May 10, 1872.² And the result of operating under those enactments is that the miner, before obtaining a complete title to the land itself (which he is authorized to go on and do if he wish, but which in many if not most cases he does not do), has a so-called mining claim, which in its legal analysis consists of a *profit à prendre*, including the right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of all the surface embraced within the lines of the land located by him as his claim.³ But, long before there was any national legislation on this subject, systems of local mining regulations, growing out of the necessities of the miners, had been established in the states and territories of the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Slope, where discoveries of rich mineral deposits had brought together large bodies of prospectors. At a meeting of the miners themselves called for that purpose, the district rules and regulations were framed to fit the needs of each particular locality; and these soon became recognized as a part of the law of the community for which they were made.⁴ They were first

it provides that property shall not be interfered with for this purpose, unless so taken, or except by written consent of the owner, or of the commissioners of the land office when the land belongs to the state. As to the rights in general of grantees of mining privileges, see *Marvin v. Brewster Co.*, 55 N. Y. 538.

¹ In most of the charters from the British crown to the colonies, "all mines" were expressly included. In some of them, as in those of New England, there was a reservation of a fifth, or a fourth, of the gold and silver ore; and, subject to this reservation, mines were leased by the colonial governors to those who discovered them. 3 Dane, Abr. 137; 2 Wash. R. P. 5th ed. p. 407 (6th ed. § 1318), p. * 87.

² U. S. R. S. §§ 2318-2346; 23 Stat. L. 24; 26 Stat. L. 321, 1095. But from the operation of these statutes are expressly exempted Alabama, Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, Michigan, Okla-

homa, and Wisconsin. U. S. R. S. § 2345; 19 Stat. L. 529; 22 Stat. L. 487; 26 Stat. L. 1026.

³ *Mannel v. Wulff*, 152 U. S. 505; *Sullivan v. I. S. M. Co.*, 143 U. S. 431; *Noyes v. Mantle*, 127 U. S. 348; *Gwillim v. Donnellan*, 115 U. S. 45; *Belk v. Meagher*, 104 U. S. 279; *Forbes v. Gracey*, 94 U. S. 762.

⁴ "The land department of the government, and this court also, have always acted upon the rule that all mineral locations were to be governed by the local rules and customs in force at the time of the location, when such location was made prior to the passage

developed in California; and its system, which was itself largely borrowed from the Spanish law, furnished the model upon which the systems of other sections were chiefly based.¹ In most of the states and territories, moreover, in which these public lands are situated, there are special legislative enactments, affecting to some extent their mining rights and interests. So that, in many mining districts, there are the provisions of the statutes of the United States, which as far as they go are paramount, the state or territorial legislation, which is second in order of authority, and the local rules and regulations enacted by the miners themselves, which are valid in so far as they are reasonable and do not conflict with the laws of congress, or of the state or territory.² Many mining district organizations, with their special codes of rules, were in existence at the time of the enactment of the national mining law of May 10, 1872, and that law expressly recognized them and authorized their continuance.³ The Federal law and the special miner's regulations apply only to operations for minerals on the public lands of the United States.⁴ The ordinary rules of the common law and the statutes of the respective states and territories define and ascertain the rights and duties of the proprietors of mineral lands which belong to individuals or corporations as private property.⁵

Under the United States statutes, the right beyond the acquisition of which most miners do not go is that of exclusive possession and a *profit à prendre* to take and appropriate the minerals. In acquiring these, the steps are: (a) discovery, (b) location, and (c) the performance of annual labor, commonly called "assessment work." If he desire to acquire complete title to the land itself, the claimant may make entry and purchase of it and then procure a patent from the United States. But there is no requirement that he shall take this last step.⁶ A few words as to each of these steps will suffice.

of any mineral law by congress." *Glacier Mt. S. M. Co. v. Willis*, 127 U. S. 471. See *Miner's Manual*, by Clark, Heltman & Consaul, pp. 18, 19; *Morrison's Mining Rights*, pp. 1-9.

¹ *Henshaw v. Clark*, 14 Cal. 460, 464; *Desloge v. Pearce*, 38 Mo. 588.

² *North Noonday M. Co. v. Orient M. Co.*, 1 Fed. Rep. 522; *Forbes v. Gracey*, 94 U. S. 762; *Upton v. Larkin*, 7 Mont. 449; *Territory v. Lee*, 2 Mont. 124; *Rosenthal v. Ives*, 2 Idaho, 244.

³ U. S. R. S. § 2324; *Min. Man. Clark, Heltman & Consaul*, p. 19.

⁴ U. S. R. S. § 2319; *Henshaw v. Clark*, 14 Cal. 460, 464.

⁵ *Henshaw v. Clark*, 14 Cal. 460, 464; 2 Wash. R. P. (6th ed. § 1319) p. * 87.

⁶ U. S. R. S. §§ 2318-2346; *Min. Man. Clark, Heltman & Consaul*, p. 14. For summary of state requirements, see *Morrison's Mining Rights* (9th ed.), pp. 64-69.

§ 232. (a) **Discovery of Mines.**—The statute of the United States requires that, before the location of a mining claim, a discovery of valuable minerals in the land shall be made.¹ Many of the state and territorial enactments require the discoverer to sink a discovery shaft to indicate generally where his claim is to be located. And, if there be no positive requirement by statute, he must then proceed within a reasonable time to complete the location.² As a matter of practice, though the statutes are silent regarding it, the prospector should indicate his discovery by erecting a stake, or other convenient article, and posting a notice upon it, briefly describing his claim, demanding the time, if any, allowed by the state statute or the local mining rule for perfecting the location, and stating his name and the date.³

§ 233. (b) **Location of Mines.**—There are two distinct species of mines, with the location and claiming of which the statutes deal. One of these is the ordinary *lode* mine. A lode, in the geological sense, is “a fissure in the earth’s crust, an opening in its rocks and *strata* made by some force of nature, in which the mineral is deposited;” but, as used by the acts of congress, the term “is applicable to any zone or belt of mineralized rock lying within boundaries clearly separating it from the neighboring rock.”⁴ The other form is

¹ *Jackson v. Roby*, 109 U. S. 440; *Jupiter M. Co. v. Bodie Const. M. Co.*, 11 Fed. Rep. 666; *Toulumne C. M. Co. v. Maier*, 134 Cal. 583; *Bryan v. McCaig*, 10 Col. 309. “All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become such, under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.” U. S. R. S. § 2319. The miner has a right, under this statute, to enter and prospect on public land of the United States, even though it is claimed by another as agricultural property, provided the final

agricultural entry has not been made and he does not interfere with it for legitimate agricultural purposes nor damage the improvements of such other claimant. *Lentz v. Victor*, 17 Cal. 271; *Clark v. Duval*, 15 Cal. 85; *Atwood v. Fricot*, 17 Cal. 37, 43. But his discovery must be clearly indicated. *Chrisman v. Miller*, 197 U. S. 313.

² *Electro-Magnetic Co. v. Van Auken*, 11 Pac. Rep. 80; *Erhardt v. Boaro*, 113 U. S. 527; *Patterson v. Hitchcock*, 3 Col. 533; *Murley v. Ennis*, 2 Col. 300; *Gleeson v. Martin White M. Co.*, 13 Nev. 442.

³ *Miu. Man. Clark, Heltman & Con-saul*, p. 27, *q. v.* This little book contains much practical and easily accessible information for miners.

⁴ *I. S. M. Co. v. Cheesman*, 116 U. S. 529; *North Noonday M. Co. v. Orient M. Co.*, 1 Fed. Rep. 522; *Buffalo Z. & C. Co. v. Crump*, 70 Ark. 525; *Bainbridge on Mines*, p. 2.

the *placer* mine. By the term placer claim is meant "ground within defined boundaries which contains mineral in its earth, sand, or gravel; ground that includes valuable deposits *not in place*, that is, not fixed in rock but which are in a loose state, and may in some cases be collected by washing or amalgamation without milling;" such as "superficial deposits which occupy the beds of ancient rivers or valleys;" also "deposits of valuable mineral, found in particles in alluvium or diluvium, or in the beds of streams."¹ When it is a *lode* (or vein) claim, the United States statutes permit each claimant to complete his location, when he is not limited by any prior, adverse rights, by staking off, or otherwise plainly marking out, a tract fifteen hundred feet long by six hundred feet wide.² Any markings upon the ground claimed, by which the boundaries may be readily traced, are sufficient.³ Each locator of a *placer* claim is restricted, by the United States statutes, to a plot of land not exceeding twenty acres in area, with the qualification that an association may locate twenty acres for each individual therein and that the maximum area of any one location shall be one hundred and sixty acres; and it is required that the lines of any placer claim shall correspond, as nearly as possible with the lines of the official government surveys, by which its public lands are laid out into townships and sections;⁴ and it is sufficiently definite to indicate the claim by describing it as some legal subdivision of such a section. In other respects (and, when the placer mine is not on land already surveyed, practically in all respects), the requirements as to locating both species of mines are the same.⁵ In locating either form of mine, a designation of more ground than is allowed by law is void only as to the excess.⁶

§ 234. (c) **Annual Labor on Mines.** — The United States statutes further provide that, on each claim located after May

¹ United States *v.* I. S. M. Co., 128 U. S. 673; Reynolds *v.* I. S. M. Co., 116 U. S. 687; Moxon *v.* Wilkinson, 2 Mont. 421; Min. Man. Clark, Heltman & Consaul, p. 33.

² U. S. R. S. § 2320.

³ Jupiter M. Co. *v.* Bodie Const. M. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 666; Walsh *v.* Erwin, 115 Fed. Rep. 531; Warnock *v.* DeWitt, 11 Utah, 324; Emerson *v.* McWhirter, 133 Cal. 510; Union M. & M. Co. *v.* Leitch, 24 Wash. 585; Min. Man. Clark, Heltman & Consaul, p. 28. Summary of states' requirements, Morrison's Min-

ing Rights (9th ed.), pp. 64-69. See Mining Co. *v.* Tunnel Co., 196 U. S. 337.

⁴ U. S. R. S. §§ 2329-2331.

⁵ See McKinley Creek M. Co. *v.* Alaska U. M. Co., 183 U. S. 563; Crane's Gulch M. Co. *v.* Scherrer, 134 Cal. 350.

⁶ Min. Man. Clark, Heltman & Consaul, pp. 33-37, and cases cited. See Clipper Mining Co. *v.* Eli Mining & L. Co., 194 U. S. 220; St. Louis M. Co. *v.* Montana M. Co., 194 U. S. 235.

10, 1872, not less than one hundred dollars' worth of labor shall be performed, or improvements made, during each year; and, on all claims located before that time, ten dollars' worth per year for each one hundred feet in length along the vein.¹ Failure to perform such labor, or make such improvements, does not *per se* cause a forfeiture of the claim. But it makes it subject to relocation by others, if work be not resumed; and, if such relocation be made, forfeiture of the mining rights of the former claimant then results. The construction of the statute, in this respect, is that the rights of one locator are not divested by his failure to comply with this requirement of the act, unless there is some other locator for whose benefit the forfeiture occurs.²

The statute also authorizes the record of the locator's claim and interest, but does not require it for the preservation of his rights.³ It requires the locator to be a citizen of the United States, or one who has duly declared his intention to become a citizen, and outlines in detail the manner of establishing citizenship.⁴ When he has complied with all the requirements of the statute, and with the state and local laws and rules whose more minute provisions may be superadded, the locator of a mining claim has a *profit à prendre* in the privilege, and the exclusive right to the possession of the land. These rights combined, which constitute his claim, afford him more of the ordinary incidents of property than does the mere common-law privilege of taking minerals from the land of another, in that his mining claim is alienable, inheritable, devisable, and may be reached and taken from him by an execution. The *title* to the land remains in the United States, unless he takes the further steps which bring him a patent; but his right and interest constitute "property in the fullest sense of the word," and have incident

¹ U. S. R. S. § 2324. See Morrison's Mining Rights (9th ed.), pp. 72-87.

² *Belk v. Meagher*, 104 U. S. 279; *Calhoun Gold M. Co. v. Ajax Gold M. Co.*, 182 U. S. 499; *Clipper M. Co. v. Eli M. & L. Co.*, 29 Col. 377; *North Noonday M. Co. v. Orient M. Co.*, 1 Fed. Rep. 522; *Jupiter M. Co. v. Bodie Const. M. Co.*, 11 Fed. Rep. 666; *Pharis v. Muldoon*, 75 Cal. 284; *DuPrat v. James*, 65 Cal. 555; *McGinnis v. Egbert*, 8 Col. 41; *Lacey v. Woodward*, 25 Pac. Rep. 785; *Heischler v. McKendricks*, 16 Mont. 211. See *Black v.*

Elkhorn M. Co., 153 U. S. 445; *Wright v. Killiam*, 132 Cal. 56.

³ *Buffalo Z. & C. Co. v. Crump*, 70 Ark.-525; *Payton v. Burns*, 41 Oreg. 430.

⁴ U. S. R. S. §§ 2319, 2324; *Min. Man. Clark, Heltman & Consaul*, pp. 29-32. But the fact that the locator is an alien makes his claim not void, but only voidable; and no one but the government can successfully attack it on that ground. *McKinley Creek M. Co. v. Alaska U. M. Co.*, 183 U. S. 563.

to them all the ordinary rights and duties of property ownership.¹ Thus, he may sue in ejectment or trespass, for a violation of his privileges,² and his interest requires a deed for its transfer.³ His rights carry with them the fullest and most important instance of a *profit à prendre* in this country.

If the locator go on and purchase the land itself in which the mine is located, the mining rights, of course, usually become extinguished or merged in the ownership of the corporeal property.

¹ *Mannel v. Wnlff*, 152 U. S. 505; *Sullivan v. I. S. M. Co.*, 143 U. S. 431; *Forbes v. Gracey*, 94 U. S. 762; *State v. Moore*, 12 Cal. 56, 71; *McKeon v. Bisbee*, 9 Cal. 137. See, also, *Patterson v. Hewitt*, 195 U. S. 309; *East Central Eureka M. Co. v. Central*

Eureka M. Co., 204 U. S. 266; *Farrell v. Lockart*, 210 U. S. 142.

² *Merced M. Co. v. Fremont*, 7 Cal. 317, 326.

³ *McCarron v. O'Connell*, 7 Cal. 152. But see *Black v. Elkhorn M. Co.*, 153 U. S. 445.

CHAPTER XIV.

LICENSES.

§ 235. Definition and distinctions.

§ 236. Express and implied licenses.

§ 237. Licenses naked, and coupled with an interest.

§ 238. Licenses executed, executory, continuously or repeatedly executed.

§ 239. *a.* Licenses wholly executory — Revocation.

§ 240. *b.* Licenses wholly executed — Irrevocable.

§ 241. *c.* Licenses continuously or repeatedly executed.

§ 242. (a) On licensor's land.

§ 243. (b) On licensee's land.

§ 244. How licenses may be revoked.

§ 235. **Definition and Distinctions.** — It has been shown how each of the incorporeal hereditaments discussed in the preceding chapters is a species of real property — an intangible interest, connected or associated with land or corporeal hereditaments. A license, on the other hand, is not *property* at all. It is a mere privilege or permission, which confers no interest in the land over which it exists. It is simply an excuse or justification for doing upon or in connection with another's land something which would otherwise constitute a trespass. Hence the ordinary definition of a license, in this sense, is "an authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon another's land, without possessing any estate therein."¹ "This distinction," says Chancellor Kent, "between a privilege or easement, carrying an interest in land, and requiring a writing within the statute of frauds to support it, and a license which may be by parol, is quite subtle, and it becomes difficult in some of the cases to discern a substantial difference between

¹ Bouvier's L. Dict. "License"; 3 Kent's Com. p. *452; *De Haro v. United States*, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 599; *Wolfe v. Frost*, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 72; *Mumford v. Whitney*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 380. A license is generally created by parol, but occasionally arises

by deed. But a privilege in land, when made in the latter way, is more commonly an easement, an enforceable right. To be a license, it must ordinarily be so formed that while executory it may be freely revoked at the option of the licensor.

them.”¹ The difficulty is in the application of a legal distinction which is in itself clear and unmistakable. An easement, a *profit à prendre*, or a servitude of any kind is an interest, a property right, owned and enforceable against the land. “A license properly passeth no interest, nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an action lawful which without it had been unlawful.”² An ownership of a right of way over another’s field is an easement; and an enforceable right to dig and take away coal from his mine is a *profit à prendre*: but an oral permission to hunt on the land of one’s neighbor, or to prospect upon it for gold, which permission may be revoked at any time, is a license which while unrevoked justifies the act of prospecting or hunting. A license is a privilege which is personal to the licensee and can not be assigned.³ Not being property, its discussion here is logically out of place. But it is, at first sight, so similar to easements and servitudes, that it is generally treated of in connection with them. And the demand for completeness requires a brief examination of it at this point.

§ 236. **Express and Implied Licenses.** — One classification of licenses is into express and implied. The character and operation of the former kind depend, of course, upon the language employed in their creation. Implied licenses to go upon the property of others frequently arise from business or social relationships. People generally have a license to enter a post-office or other public building.⁴ Familiar intercourse between families may establish an implied permission for members of the one to pass over the lands of the other.⁵ “The publican,

¹ 3 Kent’s Com. p. *452.

² Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan’s Rep. 351. For further discussions of the nature of a license, see Greenwood Lake & Port Jervis R. Co. v. N. Y. & G. L. R. Co., 134 N. Y. 435; Cronkhite v. Cronkhite, 94 N. Y. 323; Mendenhall v. Klinck, 51 N. Y. 246; Hodgkins v. Farrington, 150 Mass. 19; Batchelder v. Hibbard, 58 N. H. 269; Motes v. Bates, 74 Ala. 374; Forbes v. Balenseifer, 74 Ill. 183; Parish v. Kaspere, 109 Ind. 586; Cook v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 40 Iowa, 451, 455; Wheeler v. West, 71 Cal. 126.

³ Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375; Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164; Mendenhall v. Klinck, 51 N. Y. 246; Emerson

v. Fisk, 6 Me. 200; Cowles v. Kidder, 24 N. H. 364; Nunnally v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn. 397; Thoemke v. Fiedler, 91 Wis. 386. It has been said that a license may be made assignable by express permission, as where it was expressly declared by the parties that a license to mine might be transferred by deed. Mnskett v. Hill, 5 Bing. N. C. 694. But such a right appears to have sufficient permanency to become in reality a *profit à prendre*.

⁴ Sterling v. Warden, 51 N. H. 217, 231.

⁵ Martin v. Houghton, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 258; Adams v. Freeman, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 408.

the miller, the broker, the banker, the wharfinger, the artisan, or any professional man whatever licenses the public to enter his place of business, in order to attract custom; but when the business is discontinued the license is at an end.”¹ So, if any one sell personal property upon his land to another, he impliedly licenses the latter to enter and remove that which he has bought.²

§ 237. Licenses naked, and coupled with an Interest. — Another and distinct classification of licenses is into those that are naked, or “*mere licenses*,” and those that are coupled with an interest, that is, coupled with an ownership of some interest in the land or of something that is in or on the land. The importance of this distinction arises from the fact that the latter kind of license, whether it be executory or executed, is irrevocable by the licensor alone; while the former kind may often be revoked merely at his option.³ The following and chief portion of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the revocability of naked licenses. But it is to be here emphasized that any license is irrevocable, except with the concurrence of the licensee, when it is annexed to a valid ownership of property on the land in connection with which it exists.⁴ And a familiar illustration of this general rule emerges when one sells personal chattels on his own land, and the purchaser thereby acquires an enforceable license to enter upon it and remove them within a reasonable time after the sale.⁵

§ 238. Licenses wholly executory, wholly executed, and continuously or repeatedly executed. — The most prominent and important classification commonly made of licenses is into executory and executed. In connection with the forms of them,

¹ Gowen v. Phila. Exch. Co., 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 141, 143; Root v. The Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St. 170; Kay v. Pa. R. Co., 65 Pa. St. 273.

² Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 856; Whitmarsh v. Walker, 1 Met. (Mass.) 313, 316; Parsons v. Camp, 11 Conn. 525.

³ Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 856; Wood v. Manley, 11 Adol. & EL 34; Hunt v. Ronsmanier, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 174, 203; United States v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 1 Hughes (Ky.), 138; Metcalf v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 513; Kamphouse v. Gaffner, 73 Ill. 453, 461; Miller v. The State, 39 Ind. 267; Richmond R.

Co. v. Durham & N. R. Co., 104 N. C. 658.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Whitmarsh v. Walker, 1 Met. (Mass.) 313, 316; Nettleton v. Siker, 8 Met. (Mass.) 34; Hill v. Hill, 113 Mass. 103; Parsons v. Camp, 11 Conn. 525; Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan, 330, 351; Marshall v. Green, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 35. See Williams v. Morris, 8 M. & W. 488; Town v. Hazen, 51 N. H. 596; Giles v. Simonds, 15 Gray (Mass.), 441; Pierpont v. Barnard, 6 N. Y. 279; Cool v. Peters B. & L. Co. 87 Ind. 531.

which thus emerge, arise the most difficult questions as to their revocability by the licensor alone.¹ It is apparent, also, upon a moment's reflection, that, when licenses are considered from this standpoint, an intermediate class must exist in which the controversies have arisen when the licenses were partly executed and partly executory. An illustration of this class is presented by the above-cited case of *Giles v. Simonds*,² in which permission to cut down and take away a designated number of trees orally sold to the licensee was sought to be revoked by the licensor after a portion of them had been felled and removed and the residue still remained standing. Another illustration would be an orally given privilege of erecting and living in a house upon another's land.³ It will be found to conduce to clearness of thought and exposition to consider such instances as these as a group by themselves, and, accordingly, to discuss the revocability of licenses, *a*, wholly executory, *b*, wholly executed, and, *c*, continuously or repeatedly executed.

§ 239. *a*. Licenses wholly Executory — Revocation. — A license is wholly executory as long as nothing of that which it authorizes has been done upon or affecting the land with reference to which it was given.⁴ A license to cut certain trees is executory while none of them has been cut; and a license to flow a designated piece of land is executory until, pursuant to such authority, water has been actually flowed upon that specific land. And this is true although the licensee may have performed much labor elsewhere and expended large sums of money in preparing to act on the license; as if, for example, he has erected a dam on his own adjoining property, for the purpose of flowing the water back upon the land of the licensor.⁵ The law is thoroughly settled everywhere, that a license of this kind, — wholly executory, — whether it authorize the act or acts to be performed upon the land of the licensor or upon that of the licensee, may be revoked at the pleasure of the licensor, if the licensee has not expended money nor otherwise mate-

¹ The licensee alone may, at any time, release or abandon his privilege. *Dark v. Johnston*, 55 Pa. St. 164.

² 15 Gray (Mass.), 441. See *Wood v. Leadbitter*, 13 M. & W. 838; *Collister v. Hayman*, 183 N. Y. 250; note on licenses, 49 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 497.

³ *Jamieson v. Millemann*, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 255; *Jackson v. Babcock*, 4

Johns. (N. Y.) 418; *Prince v. Case*, 10 Conn. 375, 378.

⁴ *Hill v. Hill*, 113 Mass. 103; *Dodge v. McClintock*, 47 N. H. 383; *Houston v. Laffee*, 46 N. H. 505.

⁵ *Thompson v. Gregory*, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 81; *Hazleton v. Putnam*, 4 Chand. (Wis.) 117; *Carleton v. Redington*, 21 N. H. 291, 293; *Woodward v. Seeley*, 11 Ill. 157, 165.

rially changed his position upon the faith of such license; i. e., if its abolition will leave the licensee in *statu quo*.¹ And a large majority of the best courts go far beyond this, and hold that such a license is freely revocable by the licensor alone, although the other party may have paid value for it, or, in reliance upon it, may have expended large sums of money or in other ways substantially altered his position.² In the states in which this view prevails, both the courts of law and those of equity sustain it, and refuse to fasten any liability upon the licensor for his act of revocation, on the clear, just principle that to hold otherwise would be, as was said in New York, to allow a mere parol license or oral privilege to create a valid easement or other incorporeal hereditament, thus not only in effect repealing the statute of frauds, but also abolishing the rule of the common law that such an interest in or over land can only be conveyed by a deed.³ In the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, the true and forcible argument for the rule was stated by Chief Justice Beasley as follows: "If a parol license, inefficacious by force of the act, should be rendered efficacious by reason of a losing performance on the side of the licensee, it would be difficult to refuse, on a like ground, to apply a similar quality to a sale of goods equally within the statutory condemnation. . . . The fact is, that a statute which renders legal the revocation of certain classes of contracts is founded on the theory that while, by its force, great losses will

¹ Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 338; Sampson v. Burnside, 13 N. H. 264; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 206; Root v. Wadhams, 107 N. Y. 384; Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289; Parish v. Kaspere, 109 Ind. 586.

² Foot v. New Haven & North Co., 23 Conn. 214, 223; Thompson v. Gregory, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 81; Babcock v. Utter, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 27, 60; Crosdale v. Lanigan, 129 N. Y. 604; White v. Manhattan R. Co., 139 N. Y. 19; Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289; Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray (Mass.), 302; Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533; Seidensparger v. Spear, 17 Me. 123; Foster v. Browning, 4 R. I. 47, 53; Batchelder v. Hibbard, 58 N. H. 269; Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375; Collins Co. v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 239; Jackson & S. Co. v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co., 4 Del. Ch. 180; Carter v. Harlan, 6

Md. 20; Wood v. M. A. L. R. Co., 90 Mich. 334; Lake Erie R. R. v. Kenersly, 132 Ind. 274; St. Louis Nat. Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 112 Ill. 384; Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minn. & St. Louis R. Co., 51 Minn. 304; Pitzzman v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387; Thoemke v. Fiedler, 91 Wis. 386; Beck v. L. N. O. & T. R. Co., 65 Miss. 172; Stewart v. Stevens, 10 Colo. 440; Duke of Sutherland v. Heathcote (1892), 1 Ch. 475. In some of these cases, the license had been partly executed; but the decision was that, in so far as it was *executory* it was revocable, and hence they are authority for the proposition for which they are cited.

³ Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 72, 90; White v. Manhattan R. Co., 139 N. Y. 19; Cronkhite v. Cronkhite, 94 N. Y. 323.

many times fall upon promisees, nevertheless such losses must be endured by such sufferers in order that the mass of the community shall be protected against worse disaster."¹ With the statute of frauds before him, it is the licensee's own folly that he performs labor or incurs expense on the strength of a parol agreement for a right or interest in the land of his neighbor. He is not justified, as a reasonable person, in relying on such a contract; and, therefore, he is not in legal contemplation defrauded when the permission is annulled by the other party.² But, when the licensor has been guilty of conduct such that the revocation of the license would otherwise act as a fraud on the promisee, as when he has made false statements or misrepresentations, other than the promise of the license, which have induced the licensee substantially to change his position, then all the courts are agreed that the license can not be revoked, or at least that it can not be done away with unless the licensee is fully reimbursed or placed in *statu quo*.³ In other words, the principle of the revocability of executory licenses is a rule, not to shield fraud, but in favor of the statute of frauds.⁴

It was early decided in Pennsylvania, however, and the principle has been steadily adhered to there and followed in a few other states, such as Georgia, Iowa, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas, that an executory license becomes irrevocable and in effect transfers an interest in or over the land, by the fact that, in reliance upon the parol promise, the licensee has expended money, or performed labor, and will suffer consequential injury if the license be abrogated.⁵ This is the extreme, so-called equitable view, which subordinates the requirements of the statute of frauds to the apparent demands of the individual case. It is defended by the argument that the

¹ Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289, 296.

² Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838; Crosdale v. Lanigan, 129 N. Y. 604, 610; Desloge v. Pearce, 38 Mo. 588, 599.

³ Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minn. & St. L. R. Co., 51 Minn. 304, 313; Eckerson v. Crippen, 110 N. Y. 585; Cronkhite v. Cronkhite, 94 N. Y. 323, 327; Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31.

⁴ Crosdale v. Lanigan, 129 N. Y. 604, 610; Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289, 296.

⁵ Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 241, 267; Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164; Cleland's App., 133 Pa. St. 189; Winham v. McGuire, 51 Ga. 578; Hiers v. Mill Haven Co., 113 Ga. 1002; Harkness v. Burton, 39 Iowa, 101; Lee v. McLeod, 12 Nev. 280; Moses v. Sanford, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 655; Thomas v. Junction City Irrigation Co., 80 Tex. 550; Clark v. Glidden, 60 Vt. 702; Gilmore v. Armstrong, 48 Neb. 92; Flickinger v. Shaw, 87 Cal. 126.

licensee, by so changing his position, becomes practically a purchaser of the license for a valuable consideration, "and it would be against all conscience to annul it, as soon as the benefit expected from the expenditure is beginning to be perceived."¹ Thus, where the owner of a lot of land had made expensive improvements upon it, on the faith of a mutual understanding that he might use an alley on his neighbor's lot, it was held that he had an irrevocable license for the enjoyment of a way over the alley.² And where two owners had agreed in erecting their houses, on their respective lots, so that one could not reach the upper stories of his house except through a portion of the other's building, it was decided that an irrevocable right of access was thus created.³ In a few of the states this view is adopted by the courts of equity, while rejected by the common-law courts.⁴ But the New York Court of Appeals effectually answers the arguments in favor of making such licenses, merely as such, irrevocable, either in law or in equity, and sustains the opposite rule of England and most of the United States, as follows: "This is plainly the rule of the statute. It is also, we believe, the rule required by public policy. It prevents the burdening of lands with restrictions founded upon oral agreements easily misunderstood. It gives security and certainty to titles, which are most important to be preserved against defects and qualifications not founded upon solemn instruments. The jurisdiction of courts to enforce oral contracts for the sale of land is clearly defined and well understood, and is indisputable. But to change what commenced in a license into an irrevocable right, on the ground of equitable estoppel, is another and quite a different matter."⁵

§ 240. *b. Licenses wholly executed — Irrevocable.* — The statute of frauds does not apply to a license which has been completely carried out and performed. Whether it was given by deed or by oral contract, the execution of it before it is revoked makes it an accomplished act, performed with the valid consent of both parties, to which no statutory prohibition

¹ *Rerick v. Kern*, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 267, 271; *Le Fevre v. Le Fevre*, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 241.

² *Ebner v. Stickter*, 19 Pa. St. 19.

³ *Cleland's App.*, 133 Pa. St. 189.

⁴ *Kamphouse v. Gaffner*, 73 Ill. 453, 461; *Tanner v. Valentine*, 75 Ill. 624; *Johnson v. Skillman*, 29 Ind. 95; *Pit-*

man v. Poor, 38 Me. 237; *Cook v. Prigden*, 45 Ga. 331. See *Babcock v. Utter*, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 27-60; *Wiseman v. Lucksinger*, 84 N. Y. 31.

⁵ *Crosdale v. Lanigan*, 129 N. Y. 604, 610.

can thereafter apply.¹ It is, moreover, a complete excuse and justification to the licensee for what he has done by virtue of its authority. And that is what is meant by the settled rule of law that a wholly executed license is irrevocable; having permitted the act or acts to be done without objection, the licensor can not annul or recall his parol permission so as to hold the licensee as a trespasser.² Thus, if one by license of another, pull down an existing building on the latter's land, or dig and lay an aqueduct in his lot, or cut down and remove trees from his forest, no action will lie for such proceedings, no matter how much the licensor may have been injured thereby.³

§ 241. *c. Licenses continuously or repeatedly executed.*— Many questions have been presented to the courts as to licenses partly executed and partly executory; such, for example, as a permission to flow water unto another's land and to retain it there, or to build a house upon his property and to continue to live in it indefinitely. The same kind of question is presented also by an authority to do several distinct acts on land of another, when some of them have been performed and others are still unexecuted. Unfortunately, some of the highest courts and best writers have spoken of such licenses as these as "executed,"⁴ while others have dealt with them under the simple designation "executory."⁵ They are not entirely within either of those classes. They can be most intelligibly explained, as a class or group by themselves, as *continuously or repeatedly executed* licenses. Our discussion of them falls naturally and logically into two divisions, namely: (a) those continuously or repeatedly executed licenses the performance of which is to take place on the licensor's land, and (b) those continuously or repeatedly executed licenses the performance of which is to take place on the licensee's land.

¹ Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374; Woodbury v. Parsley, 7 N. H. 237; Walter v. Post, 6 Duer (N. Y.), 363.

² Selden v. Del. Canal Co., 29 N. Y. 634, 639; Pratt v. Ogden, 34 N. Y. 20; Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533; Foot v. New Haven & North Co., 23 Conn. 214; Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt. 388; Sampson v. Burnside, 13 N. H. 264; Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838; Smith v. Goulding, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 154.

³ Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375, 378; Pratt v. Ogden, 34 N. Y. 20; Sampson v. Burnside, 13 N. H. 264; Kent v.

Kent, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 569; Fentiman v. Smith, 4 East, 107; Bridges v. Purcell, 1 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 492, 496.

⁴ Crosdale v. Lanigan, 129 N. Y. 604, 610; Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 72, 90; Cleland's App., 133 Pa. St. 189; 2 Wash. R. P. (5th ed.) p. 667 (6th ed. § 844), p. *400; Jones, Ease. § 77, *et seq.*

⁵ Dodge v. McClintock, 47 N. H. 383; Hill v. Hill, 113 Mass. 103; Hetfield v. Cent. R. Co., 29 N. J. L. 571; Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289.

§ 242 (a) Licenses to be continuously or repeatedly executed on the Licensor's Land. — The first of these — the license to be continuously or repeatedly executed on the licensor's land — may be easily and fully treated by being considered as in effect two licenses; the one wholly executed, embracing that part which has been already performed and therefore governed by the principles discussed in section 240 above; the other executory, embracing the other portion and governed by the principles discussed in section 239 above. It follows that such a license is a complete excuse and justification for what has been done pursuant to it before its revocation;¹ that, by the great weight of authority the licensor who has not been guilty of fraud or unfair dealing respecting it may at any time revoke it as to the future and stop further operations under it, no matter how much injury such revocation may cause the licensee,² and that, according to the Pennsylvania doctrine, it has become entirely irrevocable after the licensee has so altered his position upon the faith of it as not to be left substantially in *statu quo* upon the abrogation of the license.³ Thus, under the majority rule, it has been held that a verbal license given to an adjacent proprietor to erect and use a retaining wall upon the licensor's land might be revoked after the wall was erected, and the licensee might be compelled to remove the wall.⁴ But the latter was not liable in damages for having placed it there. And in another case, where the permission was to build a dam on the licensor's land, it was decided that the landowner might at any time compel the removal of the dam from his property, and that its owner was not liable in damages for having built and retained it there nor for its affecting the land during the reasonable time required for its removal after the license was revoked.⁵ But, in applying the Pennsylvania doctrine, it was adjudged that an oral authority to cast sawdust into a stream was wholly irrevocable after the licensee had been led thereby to build his mill in a location different from that which he had originally intended;⁶ and a license to sink

¹ § 240, *supra*.

² § 239, *supra*; *Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Co.*, 133 Ala. 411; *Emerson v. Shores*, 95 Me. 237.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ *Crosdale v. Lanigan*, 129 N. Y. 604; *St. Louis Nat. Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co.*, 112 Ill. 384.

⁵ *Smith v. Goulding*, 6 Cush. (Mass.)

154. Also *Cook v. Stearns*, 11 Mass. 533; *Mumford v. Whitney*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 380; *White v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 139 N. Y. 19; *Lawrence v. Springer*, 49 N. J. Eq. 289; *Batchelder v. Hibbard*, 58 N. H. 269; *Wood v. Mich. Air Line R. Co.*, 90 Mich. 334.

⁶ *Thompson v. McElarney*, 82 Pa. St. 174.

and retain a shaft for mines in the licensor's land was held to be irrevocable after the shaft had been made.¹ It was in deciding a case similar to these last two, that the New York Court of Appeals said: "It is better, we think, that the law requiring interests in land to be evidenced by deed should be observed, than to leave it to the chancellor to construe an executed license" (the license was partly executed) "as a grant depending upon what, in his view, may be equity in the special case."²

§ 243. (b) Licenses to be continuously or repeatedly executed on the Licensee's Land. — A license to be executed upon the licensee's land can exist only in those cases in which its performance will destroy or impair some right owned by the licensor over that land. For, in the absence of such an adverse right, one may do what he pleases on his property without the necessity for any license. Thus, if one have an easement to enjoy for his house light and air over the adjacent lot, such a license may arise in the form of a permission to his neighbor to so build as to shut out such light and air and retain his building in that position. As soon as a license of this nature is either wholly executed, or partly executed by a material change of position on the part of the licensee, it becomes *entirely* irrevocable.³ For the effect of enforcing it is not to *create* or *convey*

¹ *Beatty v. Gregory*, 17 Iowa, 114. Also *Wickersham v. Orr*, 9 Iowa, 253, 260; *Lee v. McLeod*, 12 Nev. 280; § 239, *supra*. Under either of the opposing rules, a license may be revoked by the licensor after practically all the beneficial purposes of its creation have been enjoyed by the licensee. *Allen v. Fiske*, 42 Vt. 462; *Clark v. Glidden*, 60 Vt. 702, 710.

² *Crosdale v. Lanigan*, 129 N. Y. 604, 610. The word "executed," as used in the passage quoted, is explained by the context. It is not meant here to criticize the high tribunal from whose language the quotation is taken; but rather to make the text of this treatise plain. The license, in that case, was an oral permission to build a retaining wall on another's land, and, before the license was attempted to be revoked, the wall had been entirely erected. In a true and literal sense, therefore, the license was executed. It is perfectly clear, however, that the parties to the agreement meant it to include the right to

maintain the wall, for at least a reasonable time after it was finished; for otherwise it would be of no use to the licensee. It was this last named part, this distinctly implied part of the license, that was in reality revoked. The *right to build* was not revoked; for, if that could have been done, the licensor might have sued the licensee and recovered against him in an action for trespass. The *privilege of keeping the wall there in the future*, and that alone, was revoked. It was, in a sense, an "executed" license; but there was a distinct part of it that was *executory*, and the *executory* part alone was revocable. It is believed that a correct understanding of the sense in which the courts have used the terms "executed" and "executory," in treating of the law of licenses, would clarify many opinions and do away with many apparent discrepancies.

³ *Winter v. Brockwell*, 8 East, 308; *Hewline v. Shippam*, 5 B. & C. 221; *Moore v. Rawson*, 3 B. & C. 332; *Morse v. Copeland*, 2 Gray (Mass.), 302; *Pope*

any right or interest in real property, but to *destroy* an existing easement or servitude: and, therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied without in any way contravening the statute of frauds. The impairment or destruction of incorporeal hereditaments is not affected by the statute of frauds, nor by the common-law rule which requires certain interests in real property to be conveyed by deed.¹

§ 244. **How Licenses may be revoked.** — A revocable license may be revoked and terminated by any act of the licensor which prevents, or is inconsistent with, its exercise.² It is revoked by his death, or by his conveyance of the land without excepting or preserving the right, or by the death of the licensee.³ So an action by the landowner against the licensee, for the recovery of damages for its exercise, brings it to an end.⁴

v. O'Hara, 48 N. Y. 446; *Jamieson v. Millimann*, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 255; *Veghte v. Raritan Co.*, 19 N. J. Eq. 142, 153; *Foot v. New Haven & North Co.*, 23 Conn. 214, 223; *Addison v. Hack*, 2 Gill (Md.), 221; *Hazleton v. Putnam*, 3 Chand. (Wis.) 117, 124.

¹ *Ibid.*; *Wolfe v. Frost*, 4 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 72, 90; *Wood v. Leadbitter*, 13 M. & W. 838.

³ *Hodgkins v. Farrington*, 150 Mass. 19, 21; *East Jersey Iron Co. v. Wright*,

32 N. J. Eq. 248; *Winne v. Ulster Co. Sav. Inst.*, 37 Hun (N. Y.), 349.

² *Wood v. Leadbitter*, 13 M. & W. 838; *De Haro v. United States*, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 599; *Emerson v. Shores*, 95 Me. 237; *Eckert v. Peters*, 55 N. J. Eq. 379; *Vandenburgh v. Van Burgen*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 212.

⁴ *Mumford v. Whitney*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 380; *Branch v. Doane*, 17 Conn. 412.

BOOK II.

HOLDINGS OF REAL PROPERTY.

PART I. — ALODIAL HOLDING BEFORE FEUDAL SYSTEM, AND
AFTER REVOLUTION IN UNITED STATES.

PART II. — TENURE — FEUDAL SYSTEM.

PART I.

ALODIAL HOLDING.

CHAPTER XV.

OUTLINE OF THIS BOOK — ANGLO-SAXON HOLDINGS.

§ 245. Introduction — Divisions.	§ 247. Forms of Anglo-Saxon
§ 246. Anglo-Saxon and American holdings.	holdings.
	§ 248. Feudal germs in Anglo-Saxon law.

§ 245. **Introduction — Divisions.**—The forms or kinds of real property having been examined and explained, the next department of our subject is a discussion of the different methods by which they may be held or owned. This will involve historical matter, which is sometimes said to be of little or no importance to the American lawyer. But, in addition to its lending the satisfaction, and utility alike, which thoroughness merely for its own sake brings with the work of every student, a knowledge of the ancient tenures and holdings affords a constant source of enlightenment and assistance in the study of the subsequent and more directly practical portions of real-property law. There are many statutes and forms of modern law that may be largely understood and often applied by him who has no knowledge whence they came. Those who are to know them fully, however, and desire to be able to use them to the best advantage, must frequently go to their beginnings and trace them from their sources. To observe the salient elements of real-property law, as they arose and grew in England during the Anglo-Saxon period; to investigate the important changes and additions, which came about as the result of the Norman Conquest and the vigorous sway of the feudal system; to note the decline of that system, its rejection in America and the restoration here of land holding

to substantially its primitive form, and ultimately to find scattered along through it all the mainsprings of hundreds of leading principles, which are at the basis of this and other great departments of jurisprudence on both sides of the Atlantic, is not merely the work of an antiquarian; it is an absolute necessity to the thorough equipment of a practical American lawyer. The effort is made in this book to present, in as terse a form as is compatible with clearness, the historical matter which explains our holdings of real property and shows the origin and nature of important rules and principles of other branches of the subject. This will be attempted in three chapters, the *first*, or present one, of which deals with Anglo-Saxon holdings, the *second* with the feudal system, and the *third* with holdings in the United States. How the tenure of the county of Kent supplied a natural connection between the holdings to be discussed in the first and third of these chapters is hereafter explained.¹ With that link—or rather chain five centuries long—between them, those holdings are, nevertheless, largely identical; and the chapters which deal with them, though separated by that on the feudal system (which is Part II.), are logically to be thought of together as constituting Part I. of this Book.

§ 246. **Anglo-Saxon and American Holdings.**—There is very little actual knowledge, at the present time, of the system, if there were anything at all that could be called a system, under which land was held by the Teutonic invaders—the Angles, the Saxons, and the Jutes—who wrested England from the Celtic and British tribes and founded the kingdom of Great Britain. There is a similar lack of information as to many of their laws and institutions, which prevailed even down to the Norman Conquest. It is certain, however, that, during the Anglo-Saxon period of English history, much real property was owned and held alodially, that is, “held in absolute ownership, not in dependence upon any other body or person in whom the proprietary rights were supposed to reside, or to whom the possessor of the land was bound to render service.”² An ordinary kind of landed interest was that of such absolute dominion and control, each owner being the entire master of his property, independent of all obligations to render services or

¹ § 246, *infra*.

² Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 12; 2 *Blackst. Com.* p. *105; 3

Kent's Com. p. *488; *Freeman, Norman Conq.* (2d ed.) i. 84.

money payments to any one, except only the three requirements, the *trinoda necessitas*, to which all lands were subject. These were the obligations to render military services for the king (*expeditio*), and to repair bridges, and fortresses (*pontis arcisve constructio*), and were of a political rather than of a proprietary nature.¹ After the Norman Conquest and the general burdening of lands in England with feudal requirements, the Kentishmen struggled persistently, and with a large amount of success (though their lands were brought under the feudal system), for the preservation of this alodial characteristic of their real-property holdings.² And, in the royal charters to most of the American colonies, in after times, reference was made to the holding of lands in the county of Kent, and the same immunities that those lands enjoyed from many of the feudal burdens were assured for the realty here.³ Thus, the county of Kent formed, as it were, a bridge, over feudal eras, between the alodial holdings of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors and the same form of real-property ownership now almost universally prevalent in the United States.⁴

§ 247. **Forms of Anglo-Saxon Holdings.**—The alodial lands of the Saxons were practically co-extensive with their *book-lands* (*booc-land*), or those which had originally been “booked,” or granted, by the king and his council of wise men (*witenagemot* or *witan*), from the common property of the community, to individuals or religious bodies.⁵ The characteristics of such grants depended largely, of course, upon the terms of the charters, or “books,” by which they were made; but these lands were generally, not only held alodially, but also with the right of the owners to will them away, or transfer them to others by act *inter vivos*. They were also inheritable, and, in the absence of special local custom, passed, on the death of the owner intestate, to all of his sons in equal shares.⁶ Another

¹ 1 Stubb's Const. Hist. Eng. pp. 76, 190; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 13; 1 Blackst. Com., p. *263.

² 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 186; 1 Wash. R. P. p. *17, 6th ed., § 55.

³ 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 105, u.; 1 Story, Const. 159. An ordinary expression in those charters, describing the tenure, was: “to be holden of our sovereign lord the king as of his manor of East Greenwich in the county of Kent in the realm of England, in free and common

socage, and not *in capite* or by knight-service.”

⁴ § 288, *infra*.

⁵ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 12.

⁶ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 26; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 60, where it is also said: “It is important to remember that book-land was a clerkly and exotic institution, and that grants of it owe their existence directly or indirectly to royal favor, and throw no light, save incidentally, on the old customary rules of land-holding.”

large portion of the land was called *folk-land*, which was held by virtue of the customary law of the realm, without any written title. It is probable that this kind of property, coming down as it did by custom from ancestor to heir, could not be alienated from the family (or folks) without much difficulty, and there seems to be no evidence that it could be disposed of by will.¹ Large tracts of territory, called *terra regis*, were also held by the king individually. These came, in process of time, to be known as the king's folk-land; and it was, without doubt, the great extent and importance of this domain, with the frequent additions to it from forfeiture and other causes, that ultimately gave emphasis, if not origin, to the fundamental conception of the English feudal system, that all real property was originally vested in the crown.² In the latter part of the Anglo-Saxon period, land was sometimes let out by the owner, to be held of him by another; and it was then styled *laen-land*. It is probable that this arrangement was most frequently made to continue during the life of the holder, though it may sometimes have been for one or more years or even a shorter period.³ Here was the precursor, if not the original, of the relation of landlord and tenant of subsequent centuries.⁴

§ 248. **Feudal Germs in Anglo-Saxon Law.**—It is said by the most recent and careful historians that, toward the close of the Anglo-Saxon era, there are discernible in these forms of land holding the germs and some of the growth of that which was hastened by the Norman Conquest into the fully developed feudal system. There was present the relation of lord and man (closely corresponding originally to the Roman *princeps* and *comes*), and this had in some instances developed into the relation of lord and tenant. Large districts of land were held by great men, such as the kings *thegns*, or by religious institutions, and divided, parcelled out, and controlled by a system similar to that which characterized the manors of the succeeding centuries.⁵ And, at the time of the arrival of William the Conqueror, there were many tillers of the soil, who owed and rendered to superior owners of the land services substantially the same as those which were afterwards incident to the rela-

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 61, 62.

² Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 17, 18.

³ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 61; 1 Kemble, Saxons in Eng.

p. 310; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 16.

⁴ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 49, 50.

⁵ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 19-25.

tion of lord and vassal.¹ "After the Norman Conquest book-land preserved its name for a time in some cases, but was finally merged in the feudal tenures in the course of the twelfth century. The relations of a grantee of book-land to those who held under him were doubtless tending for some considerable time before the Conquest to be practically very like those of a feudal superior; but Anglo-Saxon law had not reached the point of expressing the fact in any formal way. The Anglo-Saxon and the continental modes of conveyance and classification of tenures must have coalesced sooner or later. But the Conquest suddenly bridged a gap which at the time was still well marked. After its work is done we find several new lines of division introduced and some old ones obliterated, while all those that are recognized are deeper and stronger than before. The king's lordship and the hands that gather the king's dues are everywhere; and where they have come the king's law will soon follow."²

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 61.

² 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 62, 63.

PART II

TENURE.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE FEUDAL SYSTEM AND ITS FRUITS.

The Feudal System.

§ 249. Its rise and growth in England.

§ 250. Its nature.

§ 251. Creation of feudal relationship — Terms used.

§ 252. Fealty — Homage — Warranty.

Tenure.

§ 253. Definition of tenure — Classification.

§ 254. 1. Tenure by knight-service.

§ 255. Aids.

§ 256. Relief.

§ 257. Primer seisin.

§ 258. Wardship.

§ 259. Marriage.

§ 260. Fines for alienation.

§ 261. Escheat.

§ 262. Decline and destruction of tenure by knight-service.

§ 263. Grand serjeanty.

§ 264. Frankalmoin.

§ 265. Divine service.

§ 266. 2. Socage — Free and common socage.

§ 267. Incidents of tenure by free and common socage.

§ 268. Petty serjeanty — Burgage — Gavelkind.

§ 269. 3. Villein socage — Unfree tenures.

§ 270. Origin and incidents of tenure by villein socage.

§ 271. 4. Pure villeinage.

§ 272. 5. Copyhold tenure — Its development and nature.

§ 273. Survival of copyhold tenures.

§ 274. Manors.

Descent and Alienation of Realty, as affected by Feuds.

§ 275. Duration of vassal's holding.

§ 276. (a) Descent of feuds.

§ 277. (b) Alienation by will.

§ 278. (c) Alienation by act *inter vivos*.

§ 279. Effects of *Magna Charta* on alienation *inter vivos*.

§ 280. Effects of Statute *Quia Emptores* on alienation *inter vivos*.

§ 281. Statute *De Donis*. Summary as to alienation *inter vivos*.

§ 282. Restrictions on alienation removed by Statute 12 Car. II.

ch. 24 — Present results.

Seisin.

- § 283. Seisin defined and classified.
- § 284. Seisin not allowed to be in abeyance.

- § 285. Only one seisin at a time.
- § 286. Disseisin.
- § 287. Livery of seisin — Grant — Attornment.

The Feudal System.

§ 249. **Rise and Growth of the Feudal System in England.** — Feudalism would have conquered England, even if the Normans had never come. With William I. both conquests were completed quickly. In forms widely divergent in the different countries, the feudal system, which Maine says created a great interruption in the history of jurisprudence,¹ had grown and matured upon the continent much earlier than in the British Isles, — probably because, in all of its phases, it resulted from a coalescence of Teutonic customs and Roman practices, which went on most rapidly where the more cultured and civilized peoples of the remnants of the Western Empire had the greatest influence upon their ruder but stronger northern conquerors.² For at least a century before their taking of England in 1066, the Normans had practised the system of military tenure of lands and enjoyed the services of a body of trained lawyers, skilled in all the subtle reasoning and finesse of the feudal polity.³ These they naturally brought with them to their new dominion. And the full-grown system of the victorious race, converging with the then incipient feudal land tenure of the vanquished, rapidly produced the Anglo-feudalism which has played such a tremendous part in the development of the common law of real property. It would no doubt be erroneous to assume that feudal tenure and its numerous burdens were imposed at any one time upon all the land in England by the fiat of William the Conqueror, powerful ruler though he was, who would brook no *imperium in imperio*; or that it was only by the combination of the two forms of landed proprietorship, existing apart before the battle of Hastings, that there was brought into being, in those troublous times, the English characteristics of the holdings of land from and under a superior owner or lord. Numerous forces, personal, economical, and

¹ Maine's *Ancient Law* (1st Amer. ed.), p. 15.

² Maine's *Anc. Law* (1st Amer. ed.),

pp. 286-294; Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* ch. i. § ii. (pp. 30, 31).

³ Cruise *Dig.* ch. i. §§ 8-12; 1 Poll & Mait. *Hist. Eng. Law*, ch. iii.

political, were there working to make history and institutions rapidly, yet with a permanency which shows the absence of haste.¹ Early in the twelfth century the task had been substantially performed, and practically all the land of England was under the dominion of feudal masters and overlords.² Even earlier than this, during the twentieth year of the reign of William I., he had succeeded in having the domains of many of the Saxon proprietors, who had escaped the sword and the forfeiture of their lands, surrendered to him as feudal lord and then handed back to their owners to be held of him; and when to these acquisitions were added the vast estates which had come to him as the direct result of conquest and the numerous forfeitures which had followed the allegiance of the Saxon noblemen to Harold and his cause, the infeudation of very much of the real property of the kingdom was complete.³ The occasion of this large handing over of their land to the Conqueror by the English landholders was the meeting of the king and his barons and great men at Sarum, in the year 1086, soon after a threatened invasion of the country by the Danes had called for extensive warlike preparations and shown the necessity of a compact military organization ready for quick and compulsory service. The invasion did not take place. But, after the danger which had been imminent was over, it afforded a powerful argument by which William induced the great Saxon proprietors to bring their lands, in form at least (for at first it was probably only meant by them to be a form), under feudal bondage and obligations.⁴ It was upon the heels of the compilation of the great survey of the

¹ See 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 79, 80, where the various elements which produced English feudalism are summarized.

² Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 37-43; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 62.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *49, *50. "The principal agents by which alodial owners of land were turned into feudal tenants were probably *conquest*, and *need of protection*. The lot of the conquered is always hard, and doubtless the alodial holder of land was glad to retain the enjoyment of a portion of his property on such terms as the conqueror chose to impose. The usual conditions were that the old free proprietor should be-

come the 'man' of the conqueror, and should be bound to military service. Moreover, in those troubled times it often became a necessity for the poor alodial holder to enter into the train of retainers of a powerful lord in order to obtain protection; hence the practice of 'commendation,' of becoming the man or vassal of the lord, receiving in return the protection without which the preservation of life and property was impossible. An element in this process was the surrendering of the alodial lands, to be received back under the condition of rendering military or other service." Digby, Hist. Law R. P. ch. i. § ii. (p. 32).

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *49.

realm, called Domesday Book, that this meeting at Sarum was convened. "This," says Blackstone, "may possibly have been the era of formally introducing the feudal tenures by law; and perhaps the very law thus made at the council of Sarum is that which is still extant, and couched in these remarkable words: '*Statuimus, ut omnes, liberi homines fœdere et sacramento affirmant quod intra et extra universum regnum Angliæ Wilhelmo regi domino suo fideles esse volunt; terras et honores illius omne fidelitate ubique servare cum eo, et contra inimicos et alienigenas defendere.*' The terms of this law (as Sir Martin Wright has observed) are plainly feudal: for, first, it requires the oath of fealty, which made, in the sense of the feudists, every man that took it a tenant or vassal; and, secondly, the tenants obliged themselves to defend their lord's territories and titles against all enemies foreign and domestic. But what clearly evinces the legal establishment of this system, is another law of the same collection, which exacts the performance of the military feudal services, as ordained by the general council. '*Omnes comites, et barones, et milites, et servientes, et universi liberi homines totius regni nostri prædicti, habeant et teneant se semper bene in armis et in equis, ut decet et oportet: et sint semper prompti et bene parati, ad servitium suum integrum vobis explendum et peragendum, cum opus fuerit: secundum quod nobis debent de fœdis et tenementis suis de jure facere, et sicut illis statuimus concilium totius regni nostri prædicti.*'"¹ Whether Blackstone be right or wrong in attaching so much importance to this meeting and the statutes which he quotes, it is certain that he was writing of a time when Norman customs and institutions were being pushed with vigor to the front, that England as a nation was then feudal, and that, at least within a very few years thereafter, tenure was a practically universal law of the land.

§ 250. **Nature of the Feudal System.** — The primary object of the feudal system, as it was elaborated in England, was to have all of the king's subjects who could carry arms bound by ties of the strongest self-interest to be ready, at a moment's notice, to form or provide an army for any and all sorts of military service. It did this by making the landowner's holding of his property dependent upon his obligation and readiness to render services to a superior lord. Its fundamental principle was that the king was the owner of all the lands within his

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *49, *50.

realm. He parcelled out large tracts of this property to individuals, or religious bodies, to hold as the vassals or tenants of the crown. These holders in their turn subparcelled, or *subinfeudated*, their respective portions to others below themselves, to hold as their vassals or tenants; and the latter, again, often brought in others as holders under themselves. And so the process of causing one man to be an owner in subordination to another, and the lower of these two to have a tenant under him, and so on down in a series, might be, and frequently was, carried on till between the king, who was the primary and only alodial owner of a tract of land, down to the person who actually held and cultivated or otherwise used it, there was a long chain of persons interested in it, each feudally bound by that interest to those above him and thus ultimately obligated to the crown. At the top of this series is the king, who is designated the *lord paramount*. Those who hold immediately of him, as his tenants, or vassals, are called tenants *in capite*, or in chief. Those at the bottom of the scale, who cultivate or otherwise make actual use of the land, hold *in demesne* as the tenants *paravail*,—the tenants who make the *avail* or profits out of the land itself. And those standing between these last and the king, or lord paramount, are the vassals of those above and the lords of those below themselves. Looked at in the latter light, they are *mesne* or intermediate lords. Thus, if A, the king, grant a piece of land to B, and B parcel out some of it to C who subinfeudates it to D, A is lord paramount; B is his tenant *in capite* and he is also a *mesne* lord, being the immediate lord of C, and C is tenant of B and *mesne* lord of D, who, being as we suppose the cultivator of the land, is the tenant *paravail*. Or, to take an actual case, during the reign of Edward I., Roger of St. German made the proceeds of land at Paxton in Huntingtongshire which he held of Robert of Bedford; the latter held it of Richard of Ilchester, who held of Alan of Chartres, who held of William Le Boteler, who held of Gilbert Neville, who held of Devorguil Balliol, who held of the king of Scotland, who held of the king of England. Roger of St. German, who held the land *in demesne* as tenant *paravail*, looked up to Robert of Bedford as the lord to whom he was immediately responsible, and through him and the other *mesne* lords to the king of England as lord paramount; while the king of Scotland, as tenant *in capite*, looked upward to the king of England, as his only lord,

and downward to Devorguil Balliol as his tenant or vassal.¹ Every such ladder of ownerships — and there was not an acre of land in the kingdom that did not have one of them, with at least two rungs, and often, as in the above illustration, with many more — had connected with it bonds of honor, self-interest, and even self-preservation, which bound the different parts almost indissolubly together.² For the vassal's retention of his land, and therefore in most cases the means of subsistence for himself and his family, depended on his loyalty to his lord and the faithful performance of the services incident to his tenure; while the lord was obligated, by the strongest ties of honor, self-respect, and feudal custom, carefully to look out for the welfare of his tenants. When, therefore, it was determined that the nation should go to war, the king called upon his tenants *in capite* to bring their forces to his service. They made the same demand upon their vassals; and the latter in turn did the same as to the immediate holders under themselves, until every knight and soldier had been reached by the call. Failure of a tenant to obey the summons meant consequent forfeiture of his land; but he knew that faithful performance of that which was properly demanded would result in the continuation of his holding and such protection for himself and his property as his lord could reasonably give. It is readily apparent how such a system, which was the plan of military organization throughout Christendom during five or six of the darkest centuries of the world's history, would provide just such a compact, quickly reached, and easily controlled body of warriors as was demanded in those troubled times for a nation's preservation and welfare.

§ 251. **Creation of Feudal Relationship — Terms used.** — The manner of conveying real property, to be thus held of a superior lord, was by words of pure donation, *dedi et concessi*; and these are still retained as operative words of conveyance in many forms of modern deeds.³ In its original use, before feudalism properly so called had developed, the gift was to be held at the will of the donor, and as found on the continent was called a *precarium*. In process of time, the grant came to be made for a certain and determined period, as for one or more years, and

¹ This illustration is given in 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 233, citing Rot. Hund. ii. 673. See also 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *59, *60; 1 Spence Eq. Jur. 135.

² 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 233.

³ Blackst. Com. p. *53.

later on for the life of the grantor or grantee. In these forms it was ordinarily styled a *beneficium*, or benefice. But, after passing through these transitional stages, and still another period in which it was the well-recognized custom for the land to be granted after the death of the vassal to his son or sons, these interests became inheritable and were so created and transferred that, when the first taker died his heir should have the property in his stead, and upon the death of such heir it should pass to his heir, and so on *ad infinitum*. It then, with this descendible characteristic, came to be denominated a *feud*, *feod*, *fief*, or *fee*.¹ It was through the weakness of Charlemagne's successors that the *beneficium*, which by his time had largely supplanted the *precarium* of the Romans, gradually transformed itself into the hereditary fief, or fee. The process was probably completed on the continent before the Normans invaded England.² But it is safe to say that, in view of this growth of ownership from *precarium* to fee, stress was always laid upon the inheritable quality of the fee or feud; and, therefore, in later centuries when the strength of feudalism was waning, the transition was natural to the meaning of the word fee which it still retains—an estate or interest which may descend from ancestor to heir. To own "in fee" is now to have real property in such manner that the law will cast the title upon the heir of the owner who dies intestate.

The process of bestowing a feud or fee upon a vassal was called a feoffment. The physical act of putting him into possession and enjoyment of the property was frequently spoken of as an *investiture*, which was an open and notorious ceremony in the presence of the other vassals of the same lord as witnesses, consisting often of the lord's taking off his coat and putting it upon the incoming tenant as a symbol of placing on him the ownership of the land. The lord also, in this ceremony, made livery of seisin to the feudatory, which was the act of handing him something connected with the land, such as a stone, or twig, or clod of earth, and stating that he gave it to him in the name of seisin. The other vassals were called upon to observe and take mental note of these performances: and thus "the evidence of property was reposed in the memory

¹ Termes de la Ley, "Feud;" Wright, Ten. 19, 4; Dalrymp. Feud, 199; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 34; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed), p. 67.

² It seems that, about the year

A. D. 1000, they began to be granted in perpetuity, and then took the name of "fueds" or "fees." Irving, Civ. Law, 200; note to 1 Wash. R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 45, *19.

of the neighborhood; who, in case of a disputed title, were afterwards called upon to decide the difference, not only according to external proofs adduced by the parties litigant, but also by the internal testimony of their own private knowledge."¹

§ 252. **Fealty — Homage — Warranty.** — The feudal bond always carried with it the duty of the vassal to take and live up to the oath of *fealty* (or fidelity, *fidelitas*) to his lord. This oath might be taken, in any ordinary form of solemn swearing, either before the lord in person or before his agent or bailiff.² The tenant stood, with his hands on the Gospels, and said: "Hear this, my lord: I will bear faith to you of life and member, goods, chattels, and earthly worship, so help me God and these holy gospels of God."³ The spirit of this oath pervaded all the relations of lord and vassal, and exerted a powerful influence in the legal determination of their reciprocal rights and duties. A similar modern principle, though not a formal asseveration and perhaps not a direct outgrowth of the ancient obligation, is the stringent doctrine, in the law of landlord and tenant, that the tenant is estopped to deny his landlord's title to the demised property.⁴ Although the ancient writers do not so state, there was doubtless added to the form of oath above quoted a saving of the tenant's duty to the king. And certain it is that we find a growing and finally dominant requirement that the king is to be treated as the only *liege* or primary lord, and the ultimate necessity that every male of the age of twelve years and upwards shall swear to him and his heirs, "to bear faith and loyalty of life and limb, of body and chattels and of earthly honor."⁵ Thus arose the oath of *ligeance* or allegiance, which still may be required by the sovereign of every citizen and in theory is taken by all, and which, when thus finally evolved, differs from its progenitor, the oath of fealty, chiefly in the fact that the latter was only required to be taken by a tenant to his immediate lord.⁶

When the property granted to the vassal was a fee or feud

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *53. See 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law, bk. ii. ch. iv. § 2.

² Wright, Ten. 35. Stubbs, Const. Hist. § 462 n.

³ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 298, quoting Bracton, f. 80; Termes de la Ley, "Fealty."

⁴ Blight v. Rochester, 7 Wheat.

(U. S.) 535, 548; Tilton v. Reynolds, 108 N. Y. 558; Bigelow, Estoppel (5th ed.), 506, 510; Smith, Landl. & Ten. 234 note a; 6 Amer. L. Rev. 1, et seq.

⁵ Britton, i. 185; Hale, P. C. i. 62-76; Co. Lit. 65 a.

⁶ 1 Blackst. Com. pp. *366-*368; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 298-300.

of inheritance, the more stringent oath of homage was also usually required. The vassal, kneeling on both knees, ungirt and with his head uncovered, placed his hands between those of the lord, who sat before him, and said: "I become your man" (*devenio vester homo*) "of the tenement that I hold of you, and faith to you will bear of life and member and earthly worship, and faith to you shall bear against all folk who can live and die, saving the faith that I owe to our lord the king." He then received a kiss from the lord.¹ This solemn ceremony, called *homagium*, or manhood, as the oath states, made the vassal the "man" of his lord. It seems to have carried with it more of religious sanctity than did the oath of fealty. Homage was never taken, or "*done*," by any but free men; for the doing of it by a villein or unfree tenant might imply his enfranchisement.² Homage was purely a feudal matter, which has no representative in American law.

One of the most important duties, which the lord, from his position as such even without any formal declaration, owed to his vassal, was that of defending him in possession of the land "against all men who can live and die."³ This protection was what, from the standpoint of the vassal, gave incentive and efficacy to the feudal relationship. It was the *quid pro quo*, which, in "commending" himself to a powerful earl or abbot, he received in exchange for his submission, fealty, homage, and services.⁴ It carried with it the obligation of his superior to give him another tenement of equal value, if he were evicted from the property assigned to him. If a suit affecting the title to the land were brought against the vassal, he *vouched in*, or called in, his lord to defend; the latter, if he did his duty, defended the action; and, if he failed to do so or his efforts in the matter were unavailing, he must compensate the tenant by giving him other real property of equal value. Thus the

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *53, *54; Britton, ii. 37; Littleton, § 85.

² 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 296, 297, 305.

³ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 306; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *57; Wright, Ten. 38.

⁴ "Bracton defines homage thus: Homage is a bond of law (*vinculum juris*) by which one is holden and bound to warrant, defend, and acquit the tenant in his seisin against all men, in return

for a certain service (*per certum servitium*), named and expressed in the gift and *vice versa* whereby the tenant is 'really' bound (*re obligatur*) to keep faith to his lord and do the due service; and such is the connection by homage between lord and tenant that the lord owes as much to the tenant as the tenant to the lord, save only reverence." 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 301.

lord *warranted* his vassals' title.¹ The covenants express or implied, which bear the same name in our modern deeds of conveyance, are the representatives of the ancient warranty. It originated as an incident of feudalism and developed into a contractual obligation of a vendor to his purchaser.²

The other rights, obligations, and burdens, which attended the relationship of lord and vassal, are best understood in connection with the different forms of tenure discussed in the following pages.

Tenure.

§ 253. **Definition of Tenure — Classification.** — It has already been shown that, between the lord and his vassal, the feudal constitution prescribed a *tenure* of some kind for every acre of land in England. In its general sense, tenure may be defined as the holding and manner of holding of lands, tenements, or hereditaments by one person of another.³ It would be idle to attempt to describe all the minor forms of such holdings, which are mentioned by the different authorities, ancient and modern, and to endeavor to harmonize their statements as to the characteristics of the various species of tenure. The truth seems to be that the rights, privileges, duties, and burdens incident to feudalism changed so materially, from century to century and even from generation to generation, that a designated form of tenure often had essentially different characteristics in one age from those which it possessed in another; and the natural tendency of writers to generalize and systematize has often stood in the way of careful observance of these mutations. For examples, knight-service in the reign of Henry II. was materially different from knight-service in the time of Edward I.; and the word socage, about the derivation of which there has been so much heated controversy, was employed during the dark ages to describe many and largely divergent forms of feudal tenure. It is, therefore, sufficient here to explain the fundamental characteristics of the chief classes of tenure of real property that have existed in England. A primary division to be made for this purpose is into *free tenures* and those that were *not free*. The former were such as demanded no services

¹ Wright, Ten. 38; 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 57.

² Wright, Ten. 38; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 306.

³ Wright, Ten. 19-21; 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 59.

from the vassal except those which were honorable or worthy of a free man, as the obligation to serve the lord in war, or to pay him money or other things of value; while the latter required menial labor, such as would be performed only by persons of servile rank, as to plough the lord's field, or to take care of his cattle. Another natural division had regard to the amount and character of the services demanded — whether they were *certain* or *uncertain*. Thus, in each kind of tenure, its incident services were either *free* or *base* and also either *certain* or *uncertain*. In the following discussion, it will more fully appear that these are the true bases of differentiation. Taking them as such, the five chief forms of tenure — chief in the order of their historic and economic importance — are: 1. Knight-service, in which the services were originally free and uncertain; 2. Free and common socage, in which they are free and certain; 3. Villein socage, in which they are base and certain; 4. Pure villeinage, in which they are base and uncertain; and 5. Copyhold, the outgrowth and modern successor of pure villeinage. The historical importance of some of the inferior or subsidiary forms of tenure and their similarity to or outgrowth from the others require them to be discussed in connection with the more important kinds to which they are most nearly related. Therefore, in this chapter, grand serjeanty, frankalmoin, and divine service tenure will be explained immediately after knight-service; and petty serjeanty, burgage, and gavelkind will be discussed in connection with free and common socage.

§ 254. 1. **Tenure by Knight-service.** — Tenure in chivalry, or by knight-service — military tenure (*per servitium militare*) — was the oldest, noblest, most universal and most highly esteemed of all the free lay tenures. The services incident to it were military in character (and, therefore, in those times the most honorable of all forms of secular labor); and, while the number of days per year during which the tenant could be required to perform the warlike duties for his lord soon became limited, the original and fundamental conception of such a holding was that the services were not only *free* in nature but also *uncertain* as to their extent.¹ He who had property under this form of tenure, his holding being as it was entirely military and the general outcome of the feudal establishment in England, was said to have a *proper* feud (*feoda propria*). His in-

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. * 61, * 62; 1 Poll. Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 252, 253.

terest was thus distinguished from the kinds of *improper* feuds (*feodæ improprie*), in which the services were of a peaceful character, such as cultivating the lord's private lands, rendering to him an annual payment in money or in agricultural products, and the like.¹

During the different eras of feudal supremacy, the extent of the required attendance by the vassal upon his lord in the wars varied considerably. Within a century after the conquest, moreover, the system of paying *scutage* to the lord, which was a pecuniary return made by the tenants to enable the lords to hire soldiers in the place of the tenants, became quite prevalent, especially in favor of the king as lord paramount.² But, in its most settled and stable form, tenure by military service called for a knight's fee, or twelve ploughlands,³ for each vassal's use, from the lord; and, in return for the same the vassal's *personal* service upon the lord in military operations for not more than forty days in each year. The value of the land, which should constitute a knight's fee, and probably its territorial extent also, varied greatly from time to time. If any one tenant held more or less than the quantity, which was required at the time to make such a fee, the number of days during which he could be called upon to render military services for his lord was greater or less in proportion.⁴

It was in the working out of the theory of tenure by knight-service in practical military operations, and in supplying the demand of the superiors for complete support and maintenance by their inferiors and dependants, that its inherent weakness and inadequacy, as it was viewed from the lord's standpoint, became apparent, and that stringent measures for the remedy-

¹ Wright, Ten. 32, 33; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *58.

² "Speaking roughly, we may say that there is one century (1066-1166) in which the military tenures are really military, though as yet there is little law about them; that there is another century (1166-1266) during which these tenures will supply an army, though chiefly by supplying its pay; and that when Edward I. is on the throne, the military organization which we call feudal has already broken down and will no longer provide either soldiers or money, save in very inadequate

amounts." 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 252.

³ A ploughland was probably uncertain in extent, being measured rather by value than by quantity of territory. Some, however, have contended that it was a fixed number of acres, the amount being placed by some as low as twenty acres, and by others as high as one hundred and twenty acres. Co. Lit. 69 a. Blackstone tells us that in the reigns of Edward I. and Edward II., the value of a knight's fee was placed at £20 *per annum*. 2 Blackst. Com. p. *62.

⁴ Lit. § 95; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *62, *63.

ing of its defects appeared in the form of numerous exactions of pecuniary returns and services.¹ Few wars could be carried to successful issues with soldiers who would not fight more than forty days in a year. Hence the system of demanding scutage, and its gradual increase to the exclusion of the original plan of the vassal's personal military attendance. No superior lord, who was conversant only with warlike affairs and whose time was wholly spent in matters of arms and chivalry, could in this way provide the necessaries and luxuries demanded by himself and his family. Hence the harsh and intricate laws, which imposed other pecuniary burdens upon the vassals, as incidental appendages and consequences of their holdings, gradually taking definite form and finally becoming inseparably connected with military tenure. These onerous fruits or incidents of knight-service were aids, relief, primer seisin, wardship, marriage, fines for alienation, and escheat. A few words are needed as to each of them.

§ 255. *Aids*. — The fealty and other feudal obligations always due from the vassal would require his purse, as well as his person, to be at the lord's service whenever necessary for the latter's safety or prosperity; and the original conception of aids was simply that this duty of the inferior to the superior should be faithfully and conscientiously performed.² But the unjust exactions, which the lords sought to make, upon the basis of this loose and vague principle, caused the number and forms of these pecuniary returns to be settled by numerous contests and finally to be definitely fixed by statutes. The aids thus determined were money contributions by the tenants for three purposes: (a) to ransom the lord's body if he were taken prisoner; (b) to defray the expenses of conferring the order of knighthood upon his oldest son, and (c) to supply a suitable marriage portion or *dowry* for his oldest daughter. It was declared by *Magna Charta* that none but these three aids should be taken by any inferior lord, and that the king would demand no aids without the consent of parliament.³ But in the subsequent charters this provision was omitted. Aids for various other purposes were then exacted, such as to pay the lord's debts, to stock his farm, to enable him to pay a fine to the king,⁴ etc. But the statute entitled *Confirmatio Chartarum*

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 252-255.

² Glanv. ix. 8.

³ *Magna Charta* (1215), ch. 12.

⁴ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 350.

(1297) again restricted them to the ancient three, and again required that the amount in each case should be reasonable.¹ The statute 1 Westminster (1275)² had already restricted the amount which each tenant should pay to any *mesne* lord, as a marriage portion for his oldest daughter or for the knighting of his oldest son, at twenty shillings; and in 1342 the tenants *in capite* obtained the same statutory restriction against the king.³ The amount of the third ordinary aid, that for the ransoming of the lord from captivity, was left of necessity to be determined from the circumstances of each case.

§ 256. Relief. — The original conception of feudal relationship was that its continuance depended on the volition of both parties to the compact and that, therefore, it would terminate upon the death of either of them.⁴ If the heir of the decedent desired it to be restored, the other party could dictate the terms upon which this might be done. It was also a well-settled custom, while fiefs or feuds were usually voluntary gifts, for the vassal, upon entering into possession of the land, to make a donation of some kind to his lord.⁵ From these sources sprang the relief, or return in money or products of the land, when the tenant of an inheritable fief died, and his heir succeeded as vassal to the position of his ancestor. Because of his death, the property was regarded as falling away from the family of the tenant, and this payment was demanded in order to raise it up again (*relevare* — relief) to the possession and enjoyment of the heir. It was always justly regarded by English tenants as one of the most onerous and oppressive of feudal burdens.⁶ Numerous statutes were enacted to restrict the lords from demanding as a right too much of that which the vassals properly thought should be only a matter of bounty or gracious gift.⁷ And the amount of relief thus at length fixed upon, and generally although not always adhered to, was one hundred shillings for every knight's fee.⁸ This was re-

¹ 25 Edw. I.; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *64.

² 3 Edw. I. ch. 36.

³ 25 Edw. III. stat. 5, ch. 11; 2 Stubbs, Const. Hist. 521.

⁴ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), 317.

⁵ 2 Sulliv. Lect. 124; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *56; Wright, Ten. 15.

⁶ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), 308; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *65.

⁷ From the time of the Conqueror

to that of Henry II., such acts were repeatedly passed and subsequently disregarded by the more powerful lords. William Rufus refused to be bound by such a statute of his father, and it was not until 27 Hen. II. that relief became definitely fixed and acquiesced in by the tenants. 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *65, *66.

⁸ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *66.

garded as equivalent to the first year's income, and was payable within that year, if, at the time of the death of the vassal, his heir were twenty-one years of age.

§ 257. **Primer Seisin.**—This was, in substance, an additional relief which early in English feudal law became restricted to the tenants *in capite*. When such a tenant died leaving an heir who was then of age, the latter must pay to the lord paramount, for the privilege of taking up the inheritance, one year's income of the land, in addition to the ordinary relief, if the land were in possession of the heir, and if it were not, but the heir must wait for possession until the expiration of a preceding life-estate, then one-half a year's income in addition to relief.¹ The history of the development of relief shows that theoretically the intermediate lords had as much *right* to primer seisin as had the king. It was all a matter of gradual adjustment, in the process of which the lord paramount succeeded in acquiring a source of income which the *mesne* lords were obliged to forego.²

§ 258. **Wardship.**—If the feud descended, upon the death of the vassal, to an heir who was under twenty-one years of age if a male, or under fourteen years of age if a female, the lord had the custody of the person of such heir during his or her minority, and the control of and income from the land, without any duty to account for the income to any one.³ He must use the property reasonably, however, and not commit waste upon it; and out of the proceeds thereof he must support and educate the heir, his ward, in accordance with his or her station in life.⁴ The male heir became of age, and the wardship ceased, when he became twenty-one; and he could then recover his land by paying one-half a year's income thereof to the lord. The female heir became of age, and had the same right to recover her land, when she was sixteen. No wardship of a female heir occurred, if she were fourteen or over when her ancestor died. But, if she were under that age at the time of her ancestor's death, the wardship then commenced, and continued until she was sixteen.⁵ The principle on which this right of wardship reposed was that, during the time when the vassal could not in person render military services for the lord, the latter was

¹ Last preceding note.

² 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), 307-318; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *66, *67.

³ 2 Dalrymp. Feud, 44, 45; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *67.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *68, *69.

⁵ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *67; Wright, Ten. 90-92.

entitled to the proceeds of the land with which to supply a substitute. The male tenant became fully capable of rendering those services at the age of twenty-one. The female tenant was capable of marrying at fourteen, and her husband could then perform the services due to the lord.¹

§ 259. **Marriage.** — Growing out of wardship and incident to it was the lord's right to select a proper spouse for his ward, whether male or female. This was designated the right of marriage (*maritagium*, as distinguished from *matrimony*). It continued as long as the wardship, and practically authorized the lord to *sell* his infant vassal in marriage, with the single condition that there should be no disparagement in the match.² If the ward refused to marry the person thus selected, he or she forfeited to the lord the value of the marriage, or what such selected person was willing to pay; and, if the ward married without or against the lord's consent, the forfeiture was double such value.³ This incident of tenure was often a very fruitful source of income to the lords. It and the wardship to which it was incident were regarded by the English tenants as the most unjust and grievous of all the burdens of feudalism.⁴

§ 260. **Fines for Alienation.** — The primal theory of the feudal connection being that of personal obligation, it followed as a logical consequence that neither the lord nor the vassal, without the consent of the other, could alienate his interest and thus bring in a new party to the relation. In order to transfer his rights and duties to another, the lord must have the acquiescence, or *attornment*, of his tenant; and the vassal should not substitute another in his place without the consent of the lord. Whether this theoretical view of the situation

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), 318-329; Wright, Ten. 90-92; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *67-*70. Wardship was regarded by the feudal tenants as one of the greatest hardships which they were obliged to endure. It was an interest for the benefit of the guardian, rather than a trust for the protection and benefit of the ward. It was, therefore, assignable by the lord, and on his death it might be transferred to his personal representatives. (Co. Lit. 86, u. 11.) It remained, as an incident of tenure, until abolished by the statute 12 Car. II. ch. 24.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *70; Wright, Ten. 97; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), 318.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *70; Wright, Ten. 97.

⁴ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), 318-328. In one case the Earl of Warwick obtained £10,000 for his consent to the marriage of his female ward; and for the custody of the lands and person of the heir of Gilbert de Unfranville and his marriage, Simon de Montford gave the king 10,000 marks. Sulliv. Lect. 248; Lord Littleton's Hist. Hen. II. 2 vol. 296.

produced the results which finally emerged, as is thought by some, or whether feuds originally alienable gradually came to be clogged with restrictions in this respect growing out of the power and greed of the lords, as is thought by others, it is certain that the lord was rarely if ever called upon to pay his vassals for an attornment, and that, by the time of the reign of King John, the tenants were ordinarily required to make payments, called *fin*es, to their lords for the privilege of alienating their feuds. By one of the provisions of *Magna Charta* and by the important statute of *Quia Emptores*¹ (18 Edw. I.), all tenants except those *in capite* were relieved of this burden; but since neither of those enactments applied to the vassals who held immediately of the king, *fin*es for the privilege of disposing of their lands were still enforced against them. While, therefore, the lower tenants were thus permitted to alien the whole of their estates, to be held of the same lord of whom they themselves had held, the king's tenants *in capite* must continue to pay *fin*es for this privilege, or take the risk of an absolute forfeiture of their lands. The subsequent statute of 1 Edw. III. ch. 12, forbade forfeiture, even in such instances, and provided that, in case of his tenant's alienation of his feud, the king should only be entitled to a reasonable fine. The construction of this last statute settled it that, for a license to alien, the tenants *in capite* should pay one-third of the yearly value of the land; and, if they presumed to alien without first procuring the king's license, the fine should be a full year's value. While *fin*es, as such, remained as feudal burdens, these continued to be the rules by which they were assessed upon the king's tenant's, while the inferior vassals were permitted after 18 Edward I. to dispose of all their interests without making any such payments. The effects of *fin*es in the gradual development of the right to freely dispose of real property will be noticed hereafter in the discussion of that general topic.²

§ 261. **Escheat.** — Back of the ownership of the vassal was always that of his lord. If the former violated his obligation to the latter, the goods and chattels on his land might be distrained and held by the lord as a pledge for the proper rendering of services by the tenant, and the due performance of his feudal duties. By statutes in the first year of Edward I., the lord was also entitled to seize and hold the land until the

¹ 18 Edw. I. ch. i.

² § 282, *infra*.

tenant's breach of the feudal bond was repaired.¹ And this superiority, which the lord always had over the land, might become a full and complete ownership at any time, if the tenant died without heirs, or if his blood were corrupted by outlawry or felony, so that no one could inherit from him. The land was then said to *escheat* (*excadere*), or fall back to the lord. If the crime by which the inheritable quality of his blood was extinguished were treason, the property was *forfeited* to the king; but, when the tenant was only outlawed or convicted of felony, the king had the ancient right of wasting his lands for a year and a day, and, subject to this right, they escheated to the immediate lord of the felon or outlaw.²

Escheat is the feudal incident of real-property ownership which is most nearly reproduced in American law. Each of the United States retains the original and ultimate property of all lands within its jurisdiction, and takes back to itself all lands the title to which fails because of defect of heirs. While, however, such a passing of title back to the state is here called *escheat*, it is not a surviving element of an otherwise obsolete system; but it is a principle inherent in the state's right of sovereignty, which is similar to the feudal doctrine of the same name, and which has been established as a positive and practically necessary part of modern jurisprudence.³

§ 262. **Decline and Destruction of Tenure by Knight-service.**

—As already explained, the theory upon which this ancient and honorable form of tenure was based was that each holder of land should personally attend and serve his lord in the wars, and be ready, at a moment's notice, to fight, and to continue fighting for at least forty days in each year for every knight's fee, and also to pay, when occasion properly required, the above described pecuniary returns which were incident to his tenure. There was thus to be formed "a national militia composed of barons, knights, and gentlemen, bound by their interest, their honor, and their oaths, to defend their king and country," and for this purpose to rally at the trumpet-call around their respective immediate lords.⁴ But the practice rapidly diverged from the theory. There soon came to be many smaller tenants by knight-service, who did not each own a knight's fee, and

¹ Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I. ch. 4; Statute of Westm. II. ch. 21.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *72; Glanv. vij. 17; Bract. f. 297, b.

³ See § 290, *infra*, and notes.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *75.

who were required to contribute ratably to a sum of money sufficient to hire a soldier or knight to represent in the army the entire knight's fee. There were other tenants who could not personally bear arms, such as females and aged or disabled males; and the line between those who *could not* fight and those who *would not* do so was often very hard to draw. The vassal who held an entire knight's fee, readily concluded that, if his neighbor who owned only one-fortieth of a fee went quit of personal service in the field by the payment of one shilling, he himself should avoid actual warfare by the payment of forty shillings; and the able-bodied tenant, who could fight if he would, naturally considered that he had done his whole duty to his lord if he paid to him as much money as was paid by another holder of an amount of land equal to his own, who was aged or infirm.¹ At first these payments, which were called *scutage*, or *escuage*, in the Norman French, (Latin, *scutagium*), were fixed at such amounts as would actually supply a soldier for each knight's fee, the principle being that, instead of personally supplying one to serve for him as he had formerly sometimes done, the vassal enabled the lord himself to fill his place in the ranks. From this, the step was natural and easy to the mere levying of scutage, at a uniform rate for each levy, upon the vassals, and the taking of the product by the lord for the raising, equipping, and maintaining of such an army as he could therewith procure. The vassal was then often said to hold *by scutage*, to distinguish his tenure from the original form of knight-service; but the only difference between him and the warrior-vassal consisted in their different methods of filling the ranks of the army of their lord.² It is doubtful if scutage could ever be legally levied by any but the king, or (if for a *mesne* lord), by aid of the king's writ; and, after much friction and numerous pledges by the sovereign, and violations of the same, it was settled by statute 25 Edw. I. ch. 5, 6, as indeed it had also been provided by *Magna Charta* with but short-lived

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 272.

² This is the meaning of Littleton's statement, to the effect that tenures by homage, fealty, and escuage were tenures by knight-service Lit. §§ 95-97. "It would seem that the tenants as a body got the better in the struggle, and established the rule that if they did not choose to serve, no worse could

happen to them, than to be compelled to pay a scutage at the rate fixed by royal decree, a sum much less than they would have spent had they hired substitutes to fill their places. In short, 'tenure by knights' service of a mesne lord, became first in fact, and then in law, tenure by escuage." 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 272.

benefit, that the king should take no such payments without the consent of parliament. The scutage, or escuage, thus levied or permitted by the king, with the consent of parliament, was the ground-work of all succeeding subsidies, and of the land tax of later ages. But it differed from a mere pecuniary rent, in that it never was a settled, invariable sum, but depended for its amount and the occasions of its assessment on the exigencies of the times and the special consent of parliament to each levy. As soon as a vassal came to have his land by paying a determined yearly rent, he no longer held by knight-service, but became a socage tenant of some kind.

The consequences of the gradual change of the original form of knight-service, with its close personal bond between lord and vassal, into the hard, unsocial holding by scutage with the other numerous pecuniary burdens, which tended always to increase rather than to diminish, proved to be far more detrimental to the tenant than to his lord. The onerous incidents of his holding were all preserved and often augmented against the vassal, while all the benefits of knightly standing and prestige were swept away. The result was continued and persistent clamor for abolishment or diminution of the burdens under which the landholders were made to groan. And, finally, after numerous palliatives and ineffectual measures, tenure by knight-service, with all its objectional incidents, was entirely abolished by the statute 12 Car. II. ch. 24. During the Commonwealth, all military tenures had been discontinued; and, immediately after the Restoration, this enactment, which Blackstone declares was a greater acquisition to the civil property of the kingdom than even *Magna Charta* itself, turned all tenures into free and common socage, "save only tenures in frankalmoign, copyholds, and the honorary services (without the slavish part) of grand serjeanty." It also did away entirely with scutage, aids, primer seisin, tenancy *in capite*, forfeitures and payments for marriage, and fines for alienation, and retained only those forms of wardship and relief which, as modified and ameliorated, were applicable, as hereafter explained, to tenure by free and common socage. The net result, then, of this sweeping destruction of tenures and their appendages was the preservation of tenures by free and common socage, frankalmoin, copyhold, and grand serjeanty, with escheat and improved and beneficial forms of relief and wardship as their only feudal incidents.

§ 263. **Grand Serjeanty.** — As history advanced, the *servientes* of Domesday Book — those who were connected with the land as *personal* servants of its owner — became the tenants by *serjeanty* in the completed feudal system. The services, which such vassals rendered to their lords, had their foundation in the idea of “servantship” to an immediate master.¹ And, as the grades of the personal attendance came to diverge, some becoming occasional performance of high and honorable offices about the person of the king, and others degenerating into fixed and more humble duties to him personally, or to the person of a *mesne* lord, serjeanties were divided into *grand serjeanty* (*magnum servitium*) and *petit serjeanty* (*parvum servitium*).² Since the services of the latter class were fixed and certain, it was in substance a species of socage tenure, and will be more fully noticed hereafter.³

Tenure by grand serjeanty was the holding of land of the king (or possibly sometimes of a powerful intermediate lord), with the duty to render to him in person, whenever occasion might require, some special honorary service, as to carry his sword or banner in battle, to act as his special chamberlain, forester, or messenger, or to be the king’s butler or champion at his coronation.⁴ Such holdings were very similar to those by knight-service; but, being of a closer personal nature, no scutage ever took the place of the actual services, the tenant could not alien, nor even subinfeudate his land without the lord’s consent, and the pecuniary returns became fixed and determinate much less slowly and definitely than in the case of knight-service.⁵ One of the special forms of grand serjeanty, which is mentioned by Blackstone, was to warn the king’s subjects, by winding a horn, when the Scots or other enemies entered the land. As shown above, the honorary services of grand serjeanty were retained by the statute 12 Car. II. ch. 24.

§ 264. **Frankalmoin.** — Frankalmoin, as a species of free tenure, was one of the most ancient and long-lived of all of these methods of holding property.⁶ It was often spoken of as tenure

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 288–290.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *73, *81; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 290.

³ § 268, *infra*.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *73; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 287.

⁵ Bract. f. 84 b, f. 395; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 290.

⁶ “It was an old Saxon tenure, and continued under the Norman revolution, through the great respect that was shown to religion and religious men in ancient times.” 2 Blackst. Com. p. *102. And, in the third report of

in free alms (*libera elemosyna*), and was the holding from and of a donor by an abbot, prior, church, or other religious corporations, aggregate or sole, and their successors forever, under the obligation of making orisons, prayers, masses, and the like, for the soul of the donor and for the souls of his heirs, dead or alive.¹ These religious ceremonies were indefinite in extent, and in no way enforceable except as the rules or discipline of the church might require their observance. They were of the most honorable and holy nature, and superseded and precluded all requirements for fealty or homage. Gifts in frankalmoin were regarded as made to God. They were, therefore, largely outside of the sphere of merely human justice.² The tenants were bound by the *trinoda necessitas* of repelling invasions and repairing bridges and castles;³ but, if they failed to perform the religious services for the donor or his heirs, there was no remedy except a complaint to the ordinary, or to the visitor of the corporation, for the correction of the wrong. Hence the feature of this sort of honorable tenure, which most attracted the notice of lawyers, was its negative characteristic,—the absence of all services that could be enforced by the secular courts.⁴

§ 265. **Divine Service.**—Frankalmoin tenure, then, may be summarized by saying that the services which it implied were (a) spiritual and (b) indefinite; and therefore they were unenforceable except by the tribunals of the church. When, as in some instances it occurred, the religious personage or institution as tenant was obligated to do some *special* and *certain* service of a spiritual nature, as to sing a specified number of masses, or to distribute in alms a designated sum of money, it was called a tenure by *divine service*. This was still a free holding, but less honorable and dignified than frankalmoin. The lord might distrain, without any complaint to the visitor, if the tenant in divine service failed to duly perform the stipulated services.⁵

From the beginning of the feudal period to the time of Henry VIII. large quantities of the land of England were held

the English Real Property Commissioners (1833), it and tenure by *divine service* were said to be then still in existence. Real Prop. Comm'rs, 3d Rep. 7.

¹ Bract. 207; Lit. §§ 133-135; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *101.

² Bract. f. 12; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 243, 244.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *102.

⁴ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 240-244.

⁵ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *102; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 240. Some instances of tenure by divine service are mentioned in Domesday Book, e. g. ii. 133, 133 b; and it was said to be a still subsisting form of tenure in 1833. Real Prop. Comm'rs, 3d Rep. 7.

by these religious tenures, and especially by the more dignified one of frankalmoin.

§ 266. 2. **Socage**—**Free and Common Socage**.—The sokemen (*sokemanni*) were a class of landholders who are mentioned in Domesday Book as rendering definite agricultural services (services of the plough) for the use of their lands. Their condition was probably described, in a general way, by the word socage. After the conquest, these holders, probably at first in large part because of their insignificance, were the most successful in retaining alodial incidents to their tenures, and preserving them most nearly exempt from feudal burdens. The negative characteristics of their tenures, the features which embodied this comparative freedom from feudal bondage, thus came gradually to give the meaning to the word socage. And hence that word was used to include all holdings, for fixed and certain returns, which were “not spiritual, nor military, nor ‘serviential.’”¹ As a class, with these chiefly negative characteristics, they were the successors of the alodial proprietorships of Anglo-Saxon times. The fixedness of services, making the return to the lord in effect *rent*, and thus distinguishing it from the irregular exactions of scutage and the indefinite duties associated with spiritual holdings, constituted the most prominent feature of all these socage tenures.² When this rent, or render, was of an honorable character, such as the paying of a fixed sum of money every year, or the annual giving of a determined quantity of the fruits and produce of the land, the tenure was by *free and common socage*; when the return to the lord was of a baser nature, as the ploughing of so much land each year, or the personal doing of some other prescribed servile labor, the holding was by *villein socage*, which was one of the unfree tenures.³

§ 267. **Incidents of Tenure by Free and Common Socage**.—Free and common socage, or *free socage* merely, as it is often called, with its services to the lord fixed in amount and free and honorable in character, and on its prominent negative side excluding most of the oppressive and objectionable incidents of feuds, grew in favor and extent and, gradually at first, but quickly after the enactment of the statute 12 Car. II. ch. 24, absorbed or superseded almost every other species of

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 291-295.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *75, *78, *79; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 45.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *79, *98.

tenure. Relieved of practically all the burdens of medieval feudalism, it exists to-day as the almost universal method of holding land in England. Before the statute 12 Car. II. ch. 24, it was subject to aids, primer seisin, and relief; but was free from the oppressive incidents of feudal wardship and marriage, and probably from that of fines, except in cases of tenure *in capite*.¹ The guardian in socage was the oldest male relative, who could not inherit the ward's land; and he was accountable for its profits at the termination of the wardship.² The oath of fealty was always attached to this species of tenure, and sometimes constituted the only service due (for the returns to the lord ranged from such as were merely nominal to such as constituted practically rack-rent), but the oath of homage could not always be required by the lord.³ The effects of the statute 12 Car. II. ch. 24, on this kind of holding were the leaving of the oath of fealty demandable at any time, preserving the fixed rents, escheat, and guardianship in socage as they had formerly existed, and sweeping away all other feudal incidents.⁴ And such is substantially the form in which tenure by free and common socage exists in England at the present time.

§ 268. *Petit Serjeanty — Burgage — Gavelkind.* — Within the sphere of free-socage tenure were included all methods of holding land by honorable and certain rents and duties; among which *petit serjeanty*, *burgage*, and *gavelkind* tenures are to be specially noted. The first of these resembled grand serjeanty, in assuming a close personal relationship to exist between lord and vassal, and making its return or renders to be done for the lord's use about his person; but it became a form of free socage because these returns were a fixed rent, such as the periodical giving to the lord of a sword, a lance, an arrow, or some other implement of war. Such holdings were, as a rule, directly of the king, and were styled *parvum servitium regis*.⁵

Tenure in *burgage* exists where the lands of an ancient borough are held by an established rent payable to the lord. Through all the mutations of feudalism, such holdings of borough houses and lands, being usually small and compar-

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *86-*89; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 47.

² Ibid. And such is the nature of guardianship in socage, at the present time.

³ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 291.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *86-*89.

⁵ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *81, *82.

atively insignificant, continued to exist; and they are still a feature of English tenure. Besides having the ordinary characteristics of socage holding, they were distinctly marked by their subjection to local customs, especially as to dower, the descent of lands, and the disposing of them by will. In some of the boroughs, for example, a widow was dowable of *all* her husband's tenements, and not merely of one-third of them; and the legal title to most of these borough holdings could be devised by will, even before the Statute of Wills, in the 32d year of Henry VIII. made it possible for nearly all real property to be willed away.¹ One of the most remarkable of these local customs was the inheritance of a father's land by his *youngest* son, rather than by his oldest.²

Gavelkind tenure, as a species of free socage, was a conspicuous remnant of Anglo-Saxon liberty, enjoyed chiefly in the country of Kent. The boast, that every child born in Kent was born free, was probably made possible by the persistent early struggles for liberty on the part of its inhabitants, and by its subsequent unrivalled prosperity as a gateway of commerce, which naturally favored the owners and tillers of its soil. And the results of these struggles and influences were that the gavelkind holdings in Kent came the nearest of all tenures to alodial ownership.³ The name of this holding came from its Anglo-Saxon form, in which the payment of *gafol*, or rent, distinguished it from the military tenures. The special customs which belonged to it were that the lands, (a) descended equally to all the sons, (b) could usually be disposed of by will, even before the Statute of Wills, (c) did not escheat in

¹ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 295; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 47.

² Lit. § 165. Littleton tells us that the reason for this custom was because the youngest son, on account of his tender age, is not as capable of taking care of himself as are his brothers. Other writers have ascribed it to the ancient right of concubinage by the lord with his vassal's wife on her wedding night, and the consequent doubt as to the oldest child being the child of her husband. For a discussion of this custom, see Elton, Origins of English History, ch. viii. p. 183.

³ The attempts to explain the com-

parative independence of the Kentish men have been numerous and varied. But the suggestion in the text seems to harmonize most nearly with their known characteristics and position, and with the results of the most recent and thorough historical research. See 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law, p. 272. "Possibly," says Digby, in summing up another theory, "the very fact that the hand of the conqueror fell so heavily and at so early a date on the great men of the country operated to preserve the old customs amongst the poorest freeholders, whose insignificance was their best protection." Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 47, n. 2.

case of attainder and execution for felony, the maxim being "the father to the bough, the son to the plough," and (d) could be aliened by the tenant at the age of fifteen.¹ The first of these characteristics is still a feature of gavelkind lands, as distinguished from other tenures in England.²

§ 269. 3. **Villein Socage — Unfree Tenures.** — Many species of tenure, which were doubtless marked with sufficient clearness in the times when they flourished in full vigor, have greatly puzzled the lawyers of later ages. Of the different forms of unfree tenures, this is particularly noticeable. They were all included within the general term *villeinage*,³ and were readily distinguished from the military holdings, in that their services had nothing to do with warlike operations, but were always humble and base in character, such as personally ploughing the lord's land, doing his chores, or carrying out the dung from his stables. It seems safe to say, also, that the service or return of every unfree holding was *uncertain* in its nature, in the sense that it depended to some material extent upon the will of the lord. Custom, or contract, or both, might fix, — and usually did fix, — the amount of work which the vassal must perform; but if when he went to bed at night he knew that he must spend the morrow in working for his lord, but did not know to what kind of work he might be put, his holding was by villeinage of some kind.⁴ When this uncertainty was so great that the holder of the soil was practically a "serf," annexed to the land and passing with it, and having his services limited in amount by nothing but the customs of the manor, of which customs the lord himself was the ultimate though usually equitable arbiter, the holding was by *pure villeinage*. And when the services were thus uncertain from day to day, but of an amount beyond which the lord could be prevented from

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 84.

² Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 47, n. 2. As to the effects of Kentish tennens on holdings of land in America, see § 246, *supra*.

³ "The name 'villeinage' at once tells us that we are approaching a region in which the law of tenure is, as matter of fact, intertwined with the law of personal status; 'villeinage' is a tenure, it is also a status. On the one hand the tenant in villeinage is normally a villein; the unfree tenements are held by unfree

men; on the other hand, the villein usually has a villein tenement. Then again, the *villanus* gets his name from the *villa*, and this may well lead us to expect that his condition cannot be adequately described if we isolate him from his fellows; he is a member of a community, a villein community," — a villa. 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 358; id. p. 413; § 272, *infra*.

⁴ Bract. lib. iv. cap. 28, fol. 208; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 369-375.

exacting, — and as to such holdings this was true only of lands which had been held of the king, in *ancient demesne*, so-called, since the Conquest, — the tenure was by privileged villeinage, or *villein socage*. The latter of these will be first more fully described.

§ 270. **Origin and Incidents of Tenure by Villein Socage.** — “There is also another kind of villein tenure, which has been held of our lord the king ever since the conquest of England. This is called villein socage, and it is a villein tenure but of a privileged kind. Thus the tenants of the *demesne* of our lord the king have this privilege, that they cannot be removed from the land as long as they are willing and able to render the services which they owe, and villein socmen of this kind are properly said to be bound to the land. Moreover, they render villein services, but the services are fixed and ascertained. Nor can they be compelled contrary to their desire to hold tenements of this kind, and therefore they are called free. Further, they cannot make a gift of their tenements, or transfer them to others by title of gift, any more than pure villeins can, and therefore if the tenements have to be transferred, the tenant surrenders them to the lord or his bailiff, and the lord transfers them to other persons to be held in villeinage.”¹

Tenants of the character thus described by Bracton were those who held in *ancient demesne*, so called, the lands which were actually in the hands of the crown in the times of Edward the Confessor, or William the Conqueror,² and possibly other lands which, subsequently being acquired by the king, were treated in the same way in dealing with this favored class of villein holders.³ It was a general principle of fends that their sale or transfer from one lord to another should not affect the nature of the vassals' holdings. And, therefore, when the king parted with ancient demesne lands thus held of him by villein socage, the same kind of tenure continued under the new lord.⁴ But it was only of such lands that this species of holding existed. If we repeat that, when Bracton says the services were fixed and ascertained, this is to be taken to mean simply that there was always a very reasonable limit to their

¹ Bract. lib. iv. cap. 28, fol. 208.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *99.

³ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 383, 384.

⁴ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 385.

amount, but the tenant must work at the lord's bidding up to that amount; and if we emphasize the fact that such tenants were given a peculiar process, called the "little writ of right close," by which they could prevent the lord from removing them from the land against their will,¹ we summarize the most notable features which distinguished this tenure from that in pure villeinage. On the ancient demesne, then, there were freeholders, villein sokemen, and pure villeins; while on all other lands the tenants were all embraced within the two general classes, freeholders and pure villeins. The tenure of the latter and its important development are to be next examined.

§ 271. 4. **Pure Villeinage.**—The pure villein who was ordinarily in *status* an English "serf," was permitted, like other vassals, to take the oath of fealty, and the customs of the manor always regulated, to some extent, the quantity of services which the lord could require him, as such holder, to perform.² But, if those customs were violated to his injury, the pure villein tenant had practically no remedy; for the only court in which he could be heard was the manor court of his own lord, who had done or permitted the wrong.³ In the last analysis, therefore, his services were not only *base* in character, but also *uncertain* as to both time and quantity. It was a rare circumstance, however, for the lord to break through the manorial customs and exact from his villein more burdensome services than they fairly required.⁴

These lowest holders of land were in early ages either villeins *regardant*, that is, annexed to the land and passing with it, or villeins *in gross* or at large, that is, attached to the person of the lord and transferable by deed from him to another owner.⁵ They were, in a word, the lord's property, recoverable in an action at law if they ran away or were stolen, and unable to leave the land without his permission. The villein's children (called *nativi*) belonged in like manner to the lord; and if a

¹ For a description of this peculiar writ, see 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 386. It was a quickly operating writ; and Britton tells us that the reasons for its existence for the benefit of villein sokemen was that they were the tillers of the king's soil, and disputes about that soil should be settled by rapid and simple processes. Britton, ii. p. 13.

² 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 356 *et seq.*, p. 412 *et seq.*; § 272, *infra*.

³ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 359, 360.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *93; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 361, 362.

⁵ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *93.

female villein (who was called a *neife*) were married without his consent, he had the right to a fine from her father,¹ and an action for damages against her husband for thus taking away his property.² The lord might beat or chastise his villeins with impunity; yet, as the king's subjects, they were given redress for atrocious injuries by him, such as mahem or rape; and he was liable criminally for killing or violently injuring a villein.³ It sometimes happened, even with such servile vassals as these, that their services were all commuted for a fixed rent, while they still remained thus attached to the land.⁴ This was usually among the first steps in the development of their holdings into copyhold tenure,—the species of tenure next and last to be examined.

§ 272. 5. Copyhold, Tenure — Development and Nature. —

When tenure in pure villeinage is said to be unfree, this must be understood as referring distinctively to the *tenure*, and not necessarily describing the personal *status* of the tenant. For, as a matter of fact, throughout all the feudal ages, villein tenements were frequently held, and the services for them were rendered or supplied, by men who were not villeins, but in their persons were free. In process of time, moreover, many of those who themselves had been villeins were emancipated; and yet they and their descendants continued to hold the land in the same manner in which they had held it before obtaining their freedom.⁵ While all these vassals undoubtedly held at first merely at the will of the lord, yet, by the customs which gradually grew up around such holdings in the manors where those customs ultimately became matter of record upon the rolls of the various manor courts or courts baron, the will of

¹ This obligation to pay for the privilege of giving his daughter in marriage was called *merchet*, and it affords an instructive instance of the practical slavery of the pure villein. Speaking of this and similar burdens, Pollock and Maitland say, in their history of English law (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 368: "Our Stukeley *virgater* pays 'merchet,' as best he may, that is to say, if he wishes to give his daughter in marriage he must pay money to the lord, and the amount that he has to pay is not fixed. If he has a foal or calf born of his mare or cow, he must not sell it without the lord's leave. If he has an oak, ash, or

pear-tree growing in his court, he must not fell it, except for the repair of his house, without the lord's leave. When he dies, his widow shall pay a heriot of thirty shillings and be quit of work for thirty days. These are common features, and the *merchet* is of peculiar importance, as will be seen hereafter."

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *93.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *94; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 412, *et seq.*

⁴ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 375.

⁵ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *94, *95.

the lords came to be largely controlled and regulated; and, although there was for a long time no means of enforcing these customs by judicial action against the lord, yet they were deeply rooted in the usages and habits of the people, and any lord who ventured to set them aside and deprive the landholder of their benefit must have been exceptionally grasping and regardless of public opinion.¹ Gradually the king's courts of common law came to recognize and enforce these customs, which had thus grown up within the different manors and were evidenced by the entries on the rolls of the manor courts. And the tenant, who being now free could contend with his lord in any of the king's courts, became thereby enabled, by proving his right by means of a copy of the rolls of the manor court, to retain his land even against the will of his lord.² The copy of those rolls was, therefore, his only muniment of title; and he was accordingly said to have his land by *copyhold tenure*. In brief, then, a copyhold estate may be defined as one which, being originally held in pure villeinage at the will of the lord, came in process of time, by virtue of long continued possession according to fixed customs, to be held by the tenant in spite of any determination of the lord's will, but upon the same services as before and in conformity to the established customs of the manor; the customs being usually proved in the higher court by copy of the rolls of the respective courts baron (manor courts) in which they were entered.³

§ 273. **Survival of Copyhold Tenures.** — Except as they were affected by their special local customs, copyhold tenures came by degrees to have the same characteristics as the free tenures. There is, at the present time, a large though gradually decreasing amount of land in England which is subject to tenure by copyhold. But, of course, villein socage and pure villeinage have long ago disappeared. "It might have been expected," says a recent writer,⁴ "that so anomalous a class of rights as that which constitutes copyhold tenure would before the pres-

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *95-98; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 288, *et seq.*

² "The great step seems to have been the recognition of the right of the tenant in villeinage to maintain an action of trespass against his lord." Digby, Hist. Law P. R. (5th ed.) p. 291. And Digby adds, in a footnote: "It was held in a case reported in the Year Book, 7

Edw. IV. p. 19, that this was the appropriate remedy, and not a writ of subpoena, i. e. an application to the jurisdiction of the chancellor."

³ See Bouvier's Law Dict. "Copyhold;" Burrill's Law Dict. "Copyhold."

⁴ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 294.

ent time have been assimilated to the other forms of property in land. This, however, has not been done. Copyholds might at any period have been enfranchised (or converted into freeholds) by the conveyance of the freehold by the lord to the copyholder, or extinguished by surrender of the copyhold by the tenant to the lord.¹ Various acts have in recent times created facilities for this process by providing means for the assessment and commutation of the lord's rights and otherwise; and at the present day either lord or copyholder may compel enfranchisement by taking the proper steps through the action of the Board of Agriculture."

§ 274. **Manors.** — The different forms of tenure have been above described as separate and distinct. And so they were in theory, and largely so in practice. But the finer distinctions between them varied much in different ages and are often hard to catch even at any given time. One vassal, moreover, might hold various pieces of land by different tenures and of different lords. He could have one parcel of A by free and common socage, another of B by knight-service, another of C by a form of serjeanty; and, even as a free man, he might render or supply servile labor to one of these or to some other lord for land held by an unfree tenure.² The system of feuds was thus more complicated than a discussion of the few forms of tenure which it produced might at first thought indicate. But it was largely saved from intricacy by the division of most of the land into manors, the orderly distribution of the domain within

¹ It is to be again carefully noted that the enfranchisement here mentioned refers to the *tenure* and not to the tenant. The tenants or holders of to-day are all free men; but their copyhold lands are held by a tenure which is designated unfree, because it is the representative of the base tenures of mediæval times. To enfranchise it now would be to make the holding of the land tenure by free and common socage. See *Wappett v. Robinson* (1903), 1 Ch. 135.

² Pollock & Maitland [Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 296] thus describe the holdings of Sir Robert de Aguillon, at the time of his death in 1287: "He held lands in Greatham in Hampshire of the king at a rent of 18s.; he held lands at Hoo in Kent of the abbot of

Reading at a money rent; he held lands at Crofton in Buckinghamshire of William de Say by some service that the jury did not know; he held a manor in Norfolk of the bishop of Norwich by the service of a sixth part of a knight's fee and by castle-guard; he held a manor in Sussex of the Earl of Warenne by the service of one knight; he held a manor in Hertfordshire of the king in chief by the serjeanty of finding a foot-soldier for forty days; he held tenements in London of the king in chief by socage, and could bequeath them as chattels. So we must not think that each man fills but one place in the legal structure of feudalism. In a remote past this may have been so; but it is not so in the age that defines the various tenures."

each of these among the various classes of tenants and the primitive yet systematic administration of their affairs by the manorial courts or courts baron.

A manor was a large tract of land, originally granted by the king to a person of rank, portions of which (*terre tenementales*) were let out by the grantee or *mesne* lord to his vassals.¹ No exact quantity of territory marked the extent of all manors: some were larger, some smaller, but all were extensive and important tracts; each was a unit in the system of agriculture and the management of property, and in each its lord held a court which was called the court baron or manor court.² A greater lord was often the proprietor of more than one of these tracts; and, in addition to a court for each of his manors, he would sometimes have a central court for the principal freeholders of them all.³ Each manor was divided roughly into four parts. (a) The lord kept in his own hands as much land as was reasonably required for the use of himself and his family, his bailiffs and servants. This was his *demesne* land, and on it was located his house or homestead. (b) Another portion was assigned to the freeholders within the manor; i. e. those who held by free tenure, such as knight-service, free socage, etc. (c) Still another part was held and cultivated by the unfree vassals; and, when the land was held by the lord in ancient demesne, some of such vassals were free sokemen, while others were pure villeins. (d) Lastly, there was uniformly a fourth part of the manor which was left waste or uncultivated and used for public roads and pasture lands or commons for the lord and all his tenants.⁴ Doubtless the various tenements of these four distinct legal portions lay intermingled, as convenience or order of distribution might dictate; different portions of the manor would remain waste or uncultivated in different years, and the tenure of a given piece of the land would sometimes change from one kind to another. But, at any point of time, the complete manor had these four clearly distinguished species of tenements.⁵ And, for settling property disputes among his tenants and for redressing misdemeanors and nuisances, the lord's court baron had jurisdiction through-

¹ Bouvier, Law Dict. "Manor."

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *90.

³ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed), p. 597.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *90; 2 Sulliv.

Lect. 62, 63; Wms. R. P. p. *119; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 364.

⁵ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 364.

out the manor. It is from the records of the manorial customs and rights, inscribed upon the rolls of this court, that the copy was obtained, which, as above shown, constitutes the only available evidence of his title for the copyhold owner of land.¹

Not all the lands in England were thus included within manors; but the manor constituted the property and jurisdictional unit of most of the holdings. Manors existed before the conquest. They were then, and for some time during feudal supremacy, largely coincident in extent with the vills (*villas*); and, as time advanced, a process is discernible by which some of them developed ultimately into boroughs of modern times.²

Descent and Alienation of Realty, as affected by Feuds.

§ 275. **Duration of the Vassal's Holding.**—There can be little doubt that in Anglo-Saxon times, when the holdings of land were chiefly alodial, men generally owned them in such a way that they could at pleasure dispose of them by will, or by deed or other act *inter vivos*, and upon the death of their owner intestate they could descend to his heirs at law.³ But the entire theory and structure of the feudal system were opposed to such absolute power of disposition. The lord selected his vassals with special reference to their personal characteristics. He wanted them to be always ready and able to fight for him in the wars, or promptly and faithfully to render the other services which were his due. He therefore naturally objected to the tenant's alienation of his land, without his consent, to a stranger; and he hedged about the right of inheritance with such incidents as relief, primer seisin, wardship and marriage, as a compensation to himself for accepting as tenant a minor heir, who was a female or too young for warfare, in place of the deceased ancestor, who had been a brave and capable knight.

¹ § 272, *supra*. The existence of the manor court was, perhaps, the crucial test of the actual existence of a manor. If there ceased, at any time, to be enough freeholders (at least two) to hold this court, the manor ceased to be. 2 Blackst. Com. p. *90. "We are inclined to think," say Pollock & Maitland [Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 605], "that the mere fact that a certain tract of land or a certain complex of rights was a *manorium* had no immediate legal

consequences. In particular, it seems to us that the men of the time would generally have argued from the court to the manor, rather than from the manor to the court, and would have said, 'A single court is held for it, therefore it is a manor,' rather than 'It is a manor and therefore it has a court.'"

² See 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law, ch. 3, §§ 7, 8.

³ § 247, *supra*.

Hence the completion of our outline of feudal holdings requires a brief discussion of their effects upon (a) the descent of real property from ancestor to heir, (b) its alienation by will, and (c) its alienation by deed or other act *inter vivos*. And, in connection with these, seisin and disseisin of real property must be explained.

§ 276. (a) **Descent of Feuds.** — Although we can not state the exact times when the changes occurred, yet it is certain that, from being in their original form mere precarious holdings (or *benefices*) retained purely at the will of the lord,¹ feudal lands came gradually to be let out for a short fixed period, as for a year at a time; then by degrees they were given over to the tenants for life; and finally, as stress was laid on the hardship of depriving children of that which their father had held as his own, feuds became hereditary and were ordinarily bestowed upon the vassals for themselves and their heirs.² The transfer of tenements thus to a man “and his heirs,” when first employed, was regarded as giving them to him while he lived *and then to his heirs*; and the relief which the heir must pay upon taking up the land after the death of his ancestor was a natural and direct outgrowth of this theory.³ But the later and permanent construction of those words was that they were simply the technical, legal means of indicating that the vassal himself, the first taker to whom the lord gave the land, was to have the perpetual ownership of it, so that, upon his death still owning it, it might descend by operation of law from him to his heirs.⁴ This result emerged in England not long after the Conquest. And there quickly followed upon it the rule of primogeniture, by which in most parts of that country, even down to the present time, the oldest son is the sole heir; while, if there be daughters but no son, they share the property equally, as together constituting the heir of their father.⁵

§ 277. (b) **Alienation by Will.** — The disposition of real property by will, in common-law jurisdictions, and the effects of feudalism upon it may be outlined in six distinct historical periods as follows:

Anglo-Saxon Period. — Before the Norman Conquest, owners of lands *could* will them away at death; and, although

¹ § 251, *supra*.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 55.

³ § 256, *supra*.

⁴ See 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law, ch. 4, §§ 1, 2.

⁵ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. * 211-* 216; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 421.

there were doubtless some restrictions placed upon their right to do so, such for example as the payment of a heriot to the king for his consent, yet it is now quite well established, especially as to such owners who had large means and high rank, that they more often died testate than intestate as to their property both real and personal.¹

Feudal Period.— Even after feuds came to be heritable, it was thought to be an injustice to the lord that the tenant should devise them to persons who might be wanting in those personal qualities for which he had been chosen as vassal. The heir, the blood relative of the deceased tenant, would probably have some or all of the same characteristics which had commended the tenant himself to the lord. But a devisee of the land might be an entire stranger, possibly an enemy of the lord, or one whom for other reasons he would not willingly accept as vassal. The result was that, except in some favored localities, as in Kent with its gavelkind customs, feudalism soon destroyed the power of every one but the king to will away the complete legal title to lands in England.² But, during the fourteenth century, the system, which was fostered and developed by the courts of equity, of having the legal title to lands and tenements held by one person *for the use* or benefit of another who thus got all the utility and enjoyment of the property, did away with the difficulties which otherwise would have arisen. Equity treated this owner of the use as the real owner of the land, and compelled the holder of the legal title to recognize the use in favor of him to whom it was given and any one to whom he might will it away. And, by the beginning of the fifteenth century, the system was complete whereby an owner of land, who desired to devise it, deeded it away to some one else to hold to his own use, or to the use of any one whom he might designate, and then willed away the *use* which he had thus put at his own disposal. It thus came about that, from the time of the complete introduction of feuds into England to the 27th year of Henry VIII. (1535), when the famous Statute of Uses (hereafter explained) was enacted, the one important method of disposing of interests in real property by will was by the devising of

¹ See 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 320-322; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 13, 15.

² Glanv. vii. 1; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 325-332.

But an interest in real property for merely a term of years, such interest being a *chattel real*, could still be disposed of by will the same as other personal property.

uses in lands which were held for the benefit of the testators and their devisees.¹

Period under Statute of Uses.—The statute of uses, enacted in 1535 (27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10), provided that the legal title should follow the use—that a grant or transfer to A for the use of B should give to B all the ownership including the legal title. And, since under the feudal theory this legal title could not ordinarily be the subject matter of a devise, and it must now follow the use, it was decided that this statute had destroyed all possibility of merely devising the use.² There were practically no wills of realty in England for five years thereafter—until the enactment of the Statute of Wills in the thirty-second year of Henry VIII.

Period under Statute of Wills.—By the statute 32 Hen. VIII. ch. 32, § 1, which was interpreted and explained by that of 34 and 35 Hen. VIII. ch. 5,³ all persons except married women, infants, idiots, and persons of unsound mind were enabled to devise, by will in writing, all their lands held by socage tenure and two-thirds of those held by knight-service. And, by virtue of those acts, testators disposed of such lands by wills—the only requisite of which was that they should be in writing—until the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II. ch. 3 (1677).

Period under Statute of Frauds.—By the last-mentioned act, it was made a necessary condition of a will of real property that it should be signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and with his knowledge and consent, and be attested and subscribed by at least three credible witnesses.⁴ Under this famous statute, real-property wills were made in England and the various states of this country, until modern legislation in each jurisdiction respectively prescribed the requisites of such dispositions of realty.

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *374, *375; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 233-239.

² This was not a necessary decision (if it were even logical) from the wording of the statute and its operation. The courts might logically have held that a testator's will of the use in itself passed nothing but the use, and that then the statute carried the legal title to the devisee. But, as a matter of fact, they decided that, since the legal

title must follow the use, to devise the use was in effect to devise the legal title, and, since this latter was forbidden by the law of feuds, the statute had done away with all wills of interests in realty.

³ The first act was loosely and artificially drawn, and needed the later statute, which was full and explanatory.

⁴ The statute said "three or four credible witnesses," which, of course, meant three or more.

Period under Modern Statutes.—The English statute which now regulates wills of property, both real and personal, went into operation January 1, 1838 (Act of 1 Vict. ch. 26, as modified and explained by 15 & 16 Vict. ch. 24).¹ That of New York took effect January 1, 1830. (a) And so in each state the modern wills legislation particularly prescribes the method by which real property may be devised.

§ 278. (c) *Alienation by Act Inter Vivos.*—It was explained above that, during the Anglo-Saxon period, book-lands were probably freely alienable by deed as well as by will, while the folk-lands were clogged with important restrictions in this respect. It was also shown that the book-lands, with their alodial characteristics, continued to be held as such for some little time after the Conquest; and then came, like all other real property, under the absolute control of the feudal system.² It is now impossible accurately to determine the restrictions which the feudal polity imposed upon the power of the tenants or vassals voluntarily to transfer their holdings and put other owners in the places which they themselves had occupied. But it is certain that, even after the heir's power to obstruct his ancestor's disposition of land was lost,³ the lord could prevent direct alienation which would operate to his detriment.⁴ Being thus hampered in regard to so important an incident of property ownership—the right to dispose of it as they might wish—the vassals early resorted to *subinfeudation* of their

(a) The requirements of the New York Statute as to the execution of wills are quoted p. 106, note (a), *supra*.

¹ The principal requirements of this statute are that the will shall be in writing, signed at the end by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, that his signature shall be acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time, and that the witnesses shall attest and subscribe the will in the presence of the testator.

² §§ 247–249, *supra*.

³ As long as the transfer of real property to one "and his heirs" was regarded as in itself bestowing an interest upon the heirs, they could prevent the ancestor from alienating against their will. The inheritance belonged

already to the heir; and the ancestor could not dispose of it. But when it became settled, as it did even before *Magna Charta*, that a conveyance to A "and his heirs" gave the entire and absolute ownership to A and nothing to his heirs, it followed that they could not place any restrictions upon his alienation of every estate and interest in the land. If he died without having disposed of it, they could inherit it from him; but they could not insist on his keeping it till he died, or for any other period. Bracton, lib. ii. cap. 19, fol. 45; Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 162.

⁴ 1 Poll. & Mait. *Hist. Eng. Law* (2d ed.), pp. 329–340.

tenements; that is they handed them over to others to hold of themselves, while they retained the position of tenants to their original lords. Thus, if A were the lord and B the vassal, and B, desiring to sell his feud, met with objections or restrictions emanating from A, B transferred the property to C to hold of B; and thus C became the vassal of B and not of A, while B, instead of ceasing to have any interest in the land as he would have done if he could have sold it outright, retained his position and obligations in regard to it as the vassal of A.¹ B might treat his entire feud, or any portion or portions of it, in this manner.² Even upon this method of subinfeudating, however, there seem to have arisen by custom some restrictions in favor of the lord. And the statutes hereafter described, which curtailed and ultimately destroyed subinfeudation, at first merely defined and then amplified pre-existing restraints.³

§ 279. **Effects of Magna Charta on Alienation Inter Vivos.** — The difficulty, which subinfeudation was constantly producing or threatening for the lords, was that, while it still left them against their own tenants the rights incident to tenure, such as aids, relief, marriage, wardship, and escheat, it might seriously diminish the value of those rights. If, for example, a tenant by knight-service subinfeudated the tenement to another to hold at a yearly rent of a pound of pepper, and then died leaving an infant heir, his lord, instead of being entitled to enjoy the land itself till such heir became of age, could merely recover from the sub-feudatory a pound of pepper annually during that time. And, if the vassal who had thus subinfeudated died without heirs, his lord, instead of obtaining by escheat the absolute use of the land, received only the rent paid by the subtenant.⁴ The first attempt to obviate such difficulties by statute was made in the *Magna Charta* of 1217, which enacts that "No free man shall henceforth give or sell so much of his land as that out of the residue he may not sufficiently do to the lord of the fee the service which pertains to that fee." If the tenant presumed to convey more than was thus permitted, the excessive gift or sale could be avoided by his lord.⁵

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *91, *92; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 234, 235.

² 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 330.

³ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 343.

⁴ 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 330.

⁵ Charter 1217, ch. 39; Coke, 2d inst. 65.

§ 280. **Effects of the Statute of Quia Emptores on Alienation Inter Vivos.** — But this restriction of *Magna Charta* proving to be vague and unsatisfactory, the entire system of subinfeudation was swept away by the statute of Westminster III., or *Quia Emptores* [18 Edw. I. ch. 1 (1290)], which is a very important landmark of real-property law. It declared that every free man might sell at his own pleasure his lands and tenements, or any part of them, but so that the transferee should hold of the same lord and by the same services and customs, of whom and by which the transferor had held. The services were to be ratably apportioned if only a part of such lands or tenements was sold by the tenant.¹ The statute applied only to the alienation of the entire fee simple — the entire interest or estate — of the land sold; and did not prevent a tenant from creating a species of subtenure by letting out the land for life or any other period shorter than his own interest, retaining for himself the residue of interest, called the “reversion,” and having the person to whom he thus sublet as his own tenant.² Neither did the act apply to the tenants *in capite*; but it, and the subsequent enactments called *Prerogativa Regis* [17 Edw. II. ch. 6 (1324), and 34 Edw. III. ch. 15 (1361)], left it as a part of the king’s prerogative to permit or prevent at will direct alienation or subinfeudation by those who held immediately of him.³ The net result was the effectual checking of all subinfeudation, except such as the king allowed his own tenants to make, and the enabling of all free landholders but those who held directly of the crown absolutely to alienate their entire estates and interests in all or any parts of the tenements which they held in fee simple. The king could still collect fines from his vassals for granting to them the privilege of selling; but the *mesne* lords had no control over alienation of the fee simple by their tenants, except the power to require

¹ See the statute in full in Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) pp. 236–239. “The statute is a compromise; the great lords had to concede to their tenants a full liberty of alienation by way of substitution — substitution even of many tenants for one tenant — and thus incur a danger of losing their services by the process of apportionment; on the other hand, subinfeudation with its consequent depreciation of escheats, wardships and marriages was stopped.”

1 *Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law* (2d ed.), p. 337.

² The words of the statute are: “And it is to wit that this statute extendeth but only to lands holden in fee simple.” See Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 238; 1 Leake, 19, 317; Challis, *R. P.* 18, 20, 30.

³ 2 *Blackst. Com.* pp. *91, *92; 1 *Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law* (2d ed.), p. 337.

that when they sold they should sell outright. This meant that permanent new subtenures could not be made without the king's license: and consequently all manors existing in England at the present time, with the possible exception of a few expressly authorized by the crown, and all holdings in fee simple of any lord other than the king must have been created before the Statute of *Quia Emptores* went into operation.¹

§ 281. Statute De Donis — Summary as to Alienation Inter Vivos.— It is to be added that, five years before the enactment of the last-named statute, estates tail, i. e., interests in land conveyed to one *and the heirs of his body* as distinguished from his heirs generally, were rendered wholly inalienable by the Statute *de Donis Conditionalibus*.² The exact nature of such estates or interests in land, and the operation of the Statute *de Donis Conditionalibus* upon them will be explained hereafter; and how they have since become alienable will be described. But the general effect of that statute is here noted for the sake of completeness in dealing with the question of alienation of real property. And, if now we look at all possible interests in such property immediately after the Statute of *Quia Emptores* took effect, we arrive at the following summary; namely, (1) subinfeudation of tenements held in fee simple was impossible, except by the king's tenants pursuant to his license; (2) all tenements held in fee simple of any one but the king could be freely aliened outright; (3) estates tail could not be aliened at all; (4) all lesser interests in real property, such as estates for life or for terms of years, could be clogged with any reasonable restrictions as to alienation which the parties saw fit to impose.

§ 282. Restrictions on Alienation removed by Statute 12, Car. II. ch. 24 — Present Results. — Since the Statute of *Quia Emptores* became a law, and as one of the logical and necessary consequences flowing from it, it has been impossible in both England and America for any one (except the king), who conveys real property in fee simple, to place any material restriction upon the power of the alienee himself to sell. Thus, the notion, so common to us, that we may dispose when and how we please of lands or tenements which are wholly and abso-

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *92; Wms. R. P. 119, 127; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 235. There have been a few new manors created by special

license from the crown since 1290. Challis, R. P. 19.

² Statute of Westm. II. 13 Edw. I. ch. 1 (1285), which see in full in Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 226-230.

lutely ours, is not an inherent common-law principle that has always operated; but it has its roots in that famous statute made practically necessary by the development of feudalism.

By the death of intermediate lords without heirs, the occasional surrender of their ownership to their superiors, etc., the ladders of feudal tenures gradually lost their rungs and were thus shortened, after the Statute of *Quia Emptores*, until most of the holders of real property came to be the king's tenants in chief.¹ That statute did not operate in favor of these latter; and thus the difficulties of tenure, especially as to those who held by knight-service, were constantly affecting more and more vassals. As soon as he lost the *mesne* lord between himself and the crown and so became a holder *in capite*, the tenant became subject to primer seisin, or fines for alienation, or both, in addition to all the other burdens incident to his tenure. Hence it was that the statute 12 Car. II. ch. 24 (1660), above explained more in detail,² was enacted to abolish practically all of those onerous appendages of the feudal holdings. Since that time alienation in fee simple, by all holders of land, has been substantially unrestricted, except as to the manner in which it must be accomplished. And the uniform method of transfer to-day, in both England and America, as prescribed by the statutes of frauds [based on that of 29 Car. II. ch. 3 (1677)], is by a deed in writing.³ (a)

Seisin.

§ 283. **Seisin defined and classified.** — The feudal idea of seisin is so inwrought into the entire structure of the law of

(a) In New York, the statute, which was formerly 2 R. S. 134, § 6, 135, § 7, and 137, § 2, and is now Real Prop. Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 242, provides that, "An estate or interest in real property, other than a lease for a term not exceeding one year, or any trust or power, over or concerning real property, or in any manner relating thereto, can not be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the person creating, granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent, thereunto authorized by writing. But this section does not affect the power of a testator in the disposition of his real property by will; nor prevent any trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of law, nor any declaration of trust from being proved by a writing subscribed by the person declaring the same."

¹ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 235.

² § 262, *supra*.

³ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 4140, 4143.

real property that it is very difficult to understand and apply the reasoning of the courts, either ancient or modern, upon the subject, without a clear understanding of the unfolding and nature of that idea.¹

When first used in the common law, seisin meant simply and only possession. Before the end of the thirteenth century, it applied to the possession of chattels as well as land. Subsequently its meaning was restricted to the possession of lands and tenements. And finally, as its settled meaning, it came to involve the thought of a *freehold* interest in real property and either the possession or the right to the possession of the same.² When estates in real property are hereafter discussed, the nature of a freehold interest, or "freehold estate," will be fully explained. It will suffice here to say that it is an interest in realty for life or of inheritance. If A have a piece of land to hold during his own life or during the life of B, or for him and his heirs forever, or for him and the heirs of his body, he has a freehold estate in the same. Now, no one can be seised of realty without having either the possession or the unobstructed right to the possession of land, together with the claim therein of a *freehold* estate. When it involves actual possession it is seisin *in fact*; when there is no actual possession, but an unobstructed right to take possession exists, it is seisin *in law*. It is best, therefore, if a set definition be required, to say that seisin is a compound idea, involving seisin in fact and seisin in law: seisin in fact is the actual possession of real property together with the claim of a freehold estate in the same;³ seisin in law is the claim of a freehold estate in, and the present right to the possession of real property, which is not being held adversely by another.⁴ Thus, when one is actually occupying an acre of land, which he claims for his life or for himself and his heirs, he is seised in fact of that land. And when one owns an acre of land, the title to which has descended or been devised to him,

¹ "In the history of our law there is no idea more cardinal than that of seisin. Even in the law of the present day it plays a part which must be studied by every lawyer; but in the past it was so important that we may almost say that the whole system of our land law was law about seisin and its consequences." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 29.

² Lit. 324; Co. Lit. 200 b, 201 a; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 29-39.

³ Co. Lit. 266 b, n. 217; Com. Dig. Seisin, A; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 40.

⁴ Ibid.; 1 Cruise Dig. tit. ii. ch. iii. § 34.

and he claims a freehold estate in it, but he has not yet taken possession of it, and no one is in possession holding adversely to him, he is seised in law of that land. It is thus apparent that seisin is quite different from mere possession. A trespasser, a licensee upon land, or a tenant for years or at will may have possession, and generally does so; but as such a holder he is not seised.¹ The possession of a tenant for years or at will, however, is ordinarily for the benefit of his landlord, the owner of the freehold estate; so that then the latter has the seisin in fact, because he both claims a freehold estate in the property and has possession of it through his tenant.² Incorporeal hereditaments, of course, can not be possessed, or manually held, in the same way as corporeal ones. But the right to receive the income, the rents and profits, from them is treated as equivalent to possession; and he who has this right at present and claims a freehold estate in the easement, franchise, or other kind of incorporeal hereditament, has the seisin thereof.³

¹ "We may say that the *animus* required of the person who is 'seised of free tenement' is the intent to hold that land as though he were tenant for life or tenant in fee, holding by some free tenure." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 40.

² Bract. book ii. ch. ix. fol. 27.

³ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 34, 39. It may be noted here that future interests in real property, such as remainders and reversions, are incorporeal in their nature, and that owners of them are sometimes said to be *seised*. There is no difficulty in understanding this when the preceding estate is only a term of years. Thus, if land be held by A for ten years, then to go to B for life or in fee, A takes possession *for B*; B has, therefore, the possession and the freehold estate, and is seised in fact. But when the first estate is a freehold, there is apt to be ambiguity created by speaking of the owner of the next or future estate as being seised. For, when A owns a piece of land for life, and it is then to go to B and his heirs, if A have possession, it is for himself, and he and not B has the seisin in fact. Yet B is often spoken of, under such circumstances,

as being seised of his future estate in reversion or in remainder. When the word seisin is thus used, it must be understood as employed in a broad, general sense which is closely synonymous with *ownership*. And such a use of the word must not be allowed to cause confusion as to its accurate and technical meaning above explained.

Also, in dealing with estates and interests which were developed under the Statute of Uses, those who have legal estates, either in possession, or in remainder or reversion, provided no one has wrongfully taken the land from them and reduced their interest to a mere right of entry, are often said by the courts and writers to be seised of the property, even though they have no possession. This, again, is a broader and looser meaning of the word than that given in the text; and this general use of it must not be allowed to cause confusion; 2 Prest. Abr. 282; Co. Lit. 266 b; Cook v. Hammond, 4 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 467, 489; 12 Law Quart. Rev. 239, 247. It has proved in some respects unfortunate that these loose and general meanings have been applied by the best writers to the word seisin. But the student will ordinarily avoid

§ 284. **Seisin not allowed to be in Abeyance.**—The common law, unaffected by statute, will never permit the seisin of real property to be lost or in abeyance, for an instant. There must always be some one in being, in whom the seisin resides.¹ This is a very stringent rule, which has often defeated estates and interests that otherwise would have been valid. If, for example, land were conveyed by deed to A for ten years, and then to a child not in being and his heirs forever, the common law would not allow that any interest be thus created for the child: and the reason was that, since A had only an estate for years, he had no seisin; there could be no seisin, of course, in a child not in being; and, therefore, such an arrangement, if allowed to be good, would put the seisin in abeyance until the child came into being.²

§ 285. **Only One Seisin at a Time — Adverse Claimants.**—There can be only one seisin at a time of a piece of real property. When two or more persons are in possession, holding it jointly or in common, the seisin is in all of them considered in law as a unit. When two or more are in possession, claiming freehold estates adversely to one another, the seisin resides in the one of them, if any, who has the *right* to the possession;³ and, if no one of them have any right, in the one who first acquired the possession.⁴ When seisin by any person or class of

uncertainty by regarding the word as used in its strict, technical sense, unless the context shows that it is being employed with a broader and more general signification. It is such a fundamental idea in real-property law that it must be frequently employed; and by most courts and text-writers it is generally used in its original and narrower sense.

¹ This was because there must always be some one, who was a freeholder, to render the services due to the lord; and also because there must always be a freeholder to answer in any real action which might be brought for the recovery of the property. Such an action had to be brought against the immediate freehold owner of the land, and the court writ served upon him was called the *præcipe*, this being the first word of the mandatory part of the writ,—*præcipe quod reddat*, etc. If there could have been any time during which there was no freehold owner

upon whom this writ could be served, the court would have lost jurisdiction of the land during that time. And the requirement that there should always be such an owner and holder was tersely expressed by saying there must always be some one who was “seised to the *præcipe*” of the land. 1 Prest. Est. pp. *208, *255; 1 Atk. Conv. 11. See *Wallach v. Van Riswick*, 92 U. S. 202, 212.

² This example illustrates one of the important common-law rules relating to contingent remainders, which will be fully discussed hereafter. See also 1 Prest. Est. 255.

³ *Barr v. Gratz*, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 213; *Slater v. Rawson*, 6 Met. (Mass.) 439; *Means v. Wells*, 12 Met. (Mass.) 356; *Look v. Norton*, 55 Me. 103; *Monroe v. Luke*, 1 Met. (Mass.) 459, 466.

⁴ But if a person have possession without title, an intent to assert a freehold estate in the land must be proved,

persons is once proved or admitted, it is presumed to continue till the contrary is shown.¹ And, by virtue of modern statutes in most jurisdictions, the rightful owner of land which is unoccupied is deemed to have the possession and seisin thereof, until it is proved that he has been deprived of them by the actual possession and adverse claim of another person.² (a)

§ 286. **Disseisin.**—The act of ousting a person from land and depriving him of seisin is a disseisin. It involves not only dispossession, but also the claim (whether well founded or not) by the disseisor of a freehold estate in the land. It is the act which lays the foundation for the acquisition of title by adverse possession under modern statutes. In the common law, the disseisor, the wrongdoer, while he may be turned out by the rightful owner, either by actual re-entry by the latter or by process of law, has a defeasible title, and for many purposes acts done by him are as effectual as if he were the true owner. The person wrongfully ousted, the disseisee, has only the right to regain his possession and make his title again complete by an action at law or by re-entry. And one of these remedies—that by re-entry, or regaining his possession—is lost by his failure to exercise it in the proper way and within the proper time, or before the seisin passes from the disseisor to his heir by descent, or to any other person by feoffment and livery of seisin.³ The last-named method of transfer will be

(a) The New York statute says: “In an action to recover real property, or the possession thereof, the person who establishes a legal title to the premises is presumed to have been possessed thereof, within the time required by law; and the occupation of the premises, by another person, is deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless the premises have been held and possessed adversely to the legal title, for twenty years before the commencement of the action.” N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 368. See *Deering v. Reilly*, 167 N. Y. 184, 192; *Lewis v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.*, 162 N. Y. 220; *Archibald v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.*, 157 N. Y. 574, 579; *Arents v. L. I. R. Co.*, 156 N. Y. 1, 9; *Doherty v. Matseil*, 119 N. Y. 646; *Yates v. Van De Bogert*, 56 N. Y. 526, 532.

in order to show that he has the seisin. *Bradstreet v. Huntington*, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 402; *Ewing v. Burnett*, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 41, 52.

¹ *Brown v. King*, 5 Met. (Mass.) 173.

² 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1400, 1401.

³ Lit. §§ 385, 414, 417, 422, 593; *Digby*, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp.

108-115. At common law, the disseisee could exercise his right of entry by actually re-entering upon the land; or, if he were prevented from doing this peaceably, by going yearly near the land and asserting his claim. This latter was designated a “continual claim.” If he failed to assert his right in either of these ways, he might lose the power of doing so by the death of the disseisor in

explained in the following section. But it is to be added here that the common-law rules and principles as to disseisin and its effects are now largely modified by statutes, which will be explained in treating of titles to real property.¹

§ 287. **Livery of Seisin — Grant — Attornment.** — The common-law voluntary transfer of seisin of land from one to another was effected by a formal proceeding called “livery of seisin.” The parties went upon the land to be conveyed, and in the presence of the other freeholders (*pares curiæ*) of the manor or of the same lord, the transferor delivered to the transferee, “in the name of seisin of the land,” a twig, stone, piece of turf, or other article taken from the land; or sometimes he took off his coat and placed it upon the purchaser, as a symbol of a clothing of him (*investiture*) with the seisin and ownership of the property.² If for any reason they could not go upon the land, they went within sight of it, and the owner gave the other authority to enter; and this was effectual to pass the seisin and ownership, provided the transferee actually entered upon the land during the lifetime of the transferor.³ This latter method was designated “livery in law,” while the former method, the proceeding upon the land itself, was “livery in fact.”⁴ Either ceremony was ordinarily accompanied by a deed or charter of “feoffment,” as it was called, which attested the livery of

possession or his alienation of his interest; and the disseisee would then be compelled to resort to legal proceedings to regain a complete title. By the death of the disseisor in possession, and the taking of his place by his heir, there was said to be a “descent-cast,” which “toll’d” (or barred) “the entry” by the rightful owner. These technical principles, which are explained in full in the 10th chapter of 3 Blackstone’s Commentaries, gave rise to much litigation and subtle refinement. Most of them were abolished in England by the statute 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 27; and they have been done away with or modified by statutes in this country, so that title is now regained from a disseisor either by actually getting him out and retaking complete possession in a peaceable manner, or by the aid of the court through an action of ejectment.

¹ See preceding note.

² Bract. lib. ii. ch. xviii. fol. 39; Lit. § 59; Co. Lit. 48, 49; 2 Blackst. Com.

pp. * 315, * 316; Thoroughgood’s Case, 9 Coke, 136 b. “Great importance was attached to the notoriety of the transaction. That all the neighbors might know that A was tenant to B, from the fact that open livery of seisin had been made to him, was of the utmost importance to B in order to protect and to enable him to assert his right as lord. For in case of dispute as to the title to the lands, or the right to services, aids, or reliefs, the fact of this open and notorious livery of seisin enabled the lord to appeal to the tribunal before which, since the reforms of Henry II., suits relating to land were commonly decided, — the verdict of twelve *legales homines de vicineto*, who would know themselves or have heard from their fathers the truth of the matter.” Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 147.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 316; also authorities cited in preceding note.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. * 315, * 316.

seisin and stated the purpose, nature, and extent of the transfer. When a deed was thus employed, the entire transaction was known as a feoffment with livery of seisin.¹ And such a transfer, though now almost wholly obsolete, would still be effectual in passing title, in any jurisdiction where it has not been abolished by statute.² (a) Since a feoffment with livery of seisin operated merely by transfer of possession, it might be wrongfully made by one who had rightful temporary possession in behalf of the permanent owner of the land. Hence it was that a tenant for life or for a term of years could disseise the landlord, or succeeding owner of the freehold, by so disposing of the property. His act was known as a tortious feoffment or alienation, which was (and, where statute has not affected it, still is) a cause of forfeiture of the wrongdoer's interest in the property.³

There can be no livery of seisin of things of which there can be no actual manual possession. Therefore incorporeal hereditaments and future interests in corporeal property which the owner can not yet possess have always been incapable of transfer by feoffment and livery. A deed, which is called a "grant," has always been required for their conveyance. Hence the distinction, on which the common law laid much emphasis, between those things which "lie in livery" and those which "lie in grant."⁴ (b) A grant, not involving livery of

(a) In New York, feoffment with livery of seisin was abolished by the Revised Statutes, Jan. 1, 1830. 1 R. S. 738, § 136, which is now Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 241. For an illustration of such a transfer here before that date, see *McGregor v. Comstock*, 17 N. Y. 162, 164, 171. See also *Sparrow v. Kingman*, 1 N. Y. 242, 250, 251; *Varick v. Jackson*, 2 Wend. 158, 203.

(b) The New York statutes have made the grant the broad general form of deed for conveying both corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments; and, where other kinds of instruments are authorized for the transfer of freehold estates, it is declared that they shall be construed as grants. N. Y. Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), §§ 242-246.

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 83-90; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 144, 145.

² In some of the United States, feoffment with livery of seisin is expressly abolished; and in many of them it is declared by statute to be unnecessary. 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1470.

³ Lit. §§ 415, 416, 611; Co. Lit. 223 b, 330 b; Challis, R. P. 68, 110.

⁴ Co. Lit. 9 a, 49 a, 172 a; Shep.

Touchst. 228; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 252-262. The grant of incorporeal hereditaments is a form of contract which was required to be in writing even before any statute of frauds was enacted. The grant has grown in favor in modern law, and, in many jurisdictions, has been made capable of transferring hereditaments, both corporeal and incorporeal, without any livery of seisin.

seisin, could not affect any interest in the property except that of the grantor; and, therefore, it could never take effect as a tortious conveyance.¹ When it was a transfer of the grantor's future interest in land, moreover, it was ineffectual at common law without the consent of the tenant who had the present possession. Thus, if a life tenant, or a holder for a term of years, were in possession of the land, the landlord or owner of the subsequent interest must obtain his consent to a grant of the future or permanent interest in the land. This was called technically an "attornment."² The necessity for it was done away with in England by the statutes 4 Anne, ch. 16, §§ 9, 10 (1706) and 2 Geo. II. ch. 19 (1729), and in most if not all of the states of this country it is likewise abolished by positive legislation.³ (a)

(a) In New York, "An attornment to a grantee is not requisite to the validity of a conveyance of real property occupied by a tenant, or of the rents or profits thereof, or any other interest therein. But the payment of rent to a grantor, by his tenant, before notice of the conveyance, binds the grantee; and the tenant is not liable to such grantee, before such notice, for the breach of any condition of the lease. . . . The attornment of a tenant to a stranger is absolutely void, and does not in any way affect the possession of the landlord unless made either: 1. With the consent of the landlord; or, 2. Pursuant to or in consequence of a judgment, order, or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction; or, 3. To a mortgagee after the mortgage has become forfeited." N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, §§ 248, 224. And see *O'Donnell v. McIntyre*, 118 N. Y. 156; *Austin v. Ahearne*, 61 N. Y. 6; *Fowler's R. P. Law of State of N. Y.*, pp. 496, 458.

¹ Lit. §§ 609, 610; 4 Kent Com. p. *490.

² Lit. §§ 551, 567, 568; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *71, *72; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 346-349.

³ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 2008, 2009. The attornment by a tenant to a stranger might result in a disseisin or

dispossession of the landlord, and therefore often caused much difficulty. But it is now uniformly provided by the above-cited statute that such an attornment shall be void, unless it is made with the express or implied consent of the landlord or reversioner.

CHAPTER XVII.

HOLDINGS OF REAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES.

§ 288. Tenure before the Revolution.

§ 289. Alodial holdings since the Revolution.

§ 290. The state's rights.

§ 291. The Statute of *Quia Emptores*.

§ 288. **Tenure before the Revolution.** — Lands in this country, which were granted by the crown of Great Britain, were held by feudal tenure before the Revolution. They were granted to the colonial proprietors to hold in free and common socage;¹ but, as stated above, in most of the charters reference was made to the tenure that prevailed in the county of Kent; and thus the military and slavish part of feudalism was prevented from ever affecting the lands of the thirteen colonies.² (a) Little but the theory of that system ever operated here. The services reserved consisted for the most part of merely nominal rents, and sometimes there was nothing but the incident of fealty to mark the feudal relation. The burdens of feudalism, therefore, never materially affected real property in America.³

(a) Thus, the habendum clause of such a grant in New York provided that, "the lands shall be held by Palmer, in free and common socage, as of the manor of East Greenwich, in the County of Kent," etc. *Delancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26, 35.

¹ Story, Const. 159; Sulliv. Land. Tit. 35; 2 Sharsw. Blackst. Com. p. 77.

² 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 105, n. See § 246, *supra*.

³ 1 Story, Const. Law, § 172; 1 Gray's Cas. R. P. 407, note. There has been some discussion as to the nature of the king's title to lands which were in possession of the Indian tribes, and as to where the seisin resided before the extinguishment of their possessory right. This has but little bear-

ing, however, on the growth of our law; for it was held that the Indians had no element of title save that of occupancy, and when that was divested the entire system of English tenure was left free to operate. See *Clark v. Williams*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 499; *Martin v. Waddell*, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 367, 409; *Fellows v. Lee*, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 628; *Johnson v. McIntosh*, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 543; *Worcester v. Georgia*, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 515.

§ 289. **Alodial Holdings in most States since the Revolution.**

—The effects which the Revolution and the consequent change of sovereignty from the crown to the people of the state produced upon holdings of land have been the subject of much learned discussion. Professor Gray undoubtedly stated a correct logical conclusion concerning this matter, when he wrote: "It does not seem that so fundamental an alteration in the theory of property as the abolition of tenure would be worked by a change of political sovereignty."¹ And it is certain that in three of the most conservative of the thirteen original states, — New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia, — at least the *theory* of tenure always was retained and still prevails.² But it must be remembered that the feudal system mingled and confused property rights with political authority and responsibilities,³ and that the charters from the king to the colonial proprietors conveyed together, without making any very clear distinctions between them, both governmental jurisdiction and territorial proprietorship. Political sovereignty and overlordship of all their lands were thus confused in the minds of the colonists. They made no clear distinction between the king as a feudal lord and the king as a hated despot. And when the despotism had been thrown off, it was natural for them to assume that the feudalism had been done away with. They had brought with them, it is true, and retained in their systems of jurisprudence, most of the common and statute law of the mother country; but this they would inevitably modify as the nature of the times and the condition of the country required.⁴ And feudalism as a system was out of harmony with the American spirit. We should have expected, therefore, *a priori*, the result that followed, namely, that most of the old states and all of the new ones would declare by positive statute or

¹ Gray, *Perpetuities*, § 22, citing Sharswood, *Law Lect.* viii. 207-232; *United States v. Repentigny*, 5 Wall. 211, 267; 2 *Blackst. Com.* (Sharswood's ed.) p. 77, note, etc.

² 1 *N. J. Gen. Stat.* (1895) p. 879; *Rev. Stat. S. C.* (1873) p. 416; *Georgia Code* (1895), § 3051. In New Jersey, while by the above-cited statute tenure is retained in theory as to most land, yet grants from the state are declared to be alodial. The code of Georgia (§ 3051) says: "The tenure by which

all realty is held in this state is under the state as original owner. It is without service of any kind, and limited only by the right of eminent domain remaining in the state."

³ *Maine Anc. Law* (1st Am. from 5d London ed.), pp. 102, 103.

⁴ *Commonwealth v. Charleston*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 180; *Commonwealth v. Alger*, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53-82; *De Lancey v. Pieppgras*, 138 N. Y. 26, 36. See *Luhz v. Hancock*, 181 U. S. 567; 22 *Lawy. Rep. Ann.* 501.

judicial determination, or would tacitly assume, that all lands within their jurisdictions should be held and owned alodially. In Connecticut, New York, (a) Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and California, and probably in some other states, statutory enactments, some in the form of constitutional provisions and others as ordinary legislative acts, have done away with all feudal incidents and made the lands alodial.¹ In Maryland and Pennsylvania the courts have declared, without the aid of statute, that no tenure exists.² And it seems to be perfectly safe to assert that, in the other states and territories where no affirmative law upon the subject is to be found, it has been assumed, and will always be maintained, that no real property within their jurisdiction is held under any feudal tenure or incidents.³

In a few of the states, however, where all traces of feudalism have long since disappeared, that system continued to

(a) The first constitution of New York (1777), Art. I. § 35, adopted for this state all applicable English statutes and colonial enactments down to April 19, 1775, the date of the battle of Lexington. Const. 1846, Art. I. § 17, Const. 1894, Art. I. § 17. By statute passed Oct. 22, 1779, which was made to relate back to July 9, 1776, all rights formerly held by the king in lands in this state were declared to be vested in the people of the state. The act in relation to tenures, which was passed Feb. 20, 1787, and made to relate back generally to July 4, 1776, abolished all tenures by one citizen or subject of another, and thus left tenure possible only by a subject holding immediately of the state. And the Revised Statutes (Part II. ch. i. tit. 1, § 3) which took effect Jan. 1, 1830, did away with all feudal tenures and made all real property within the state alodial. The constitution of 1846 embodied the results of these enactments in Art. I. §§ 12, 13; and that of 1894, in Art. I. §§ 11, 12, as follows:

"All feudal tenures of every description, with all their incidents, are declared to be abolished, saving, however, all rents and services certain which at any time heretofore have been lawfully created or reserved."

"All lands within this state are declared to be alodial, so that, subject only to the liability to escheat, the entire and absolute property is vested in the owners, according to the nature of their respective estates." See also note on New York manor lands, p. 389, note (a), *infra*.

¹ Conn. Rev. Sts. tit. 18, ch. 6, pt. 1, § 1; N. Y. Const. (1894) Art. I. §§ 10, 11, 12; Va. 10 Hen. St. 50, 64, 65; 1 Lomax, Dig. 539; Ohio, 1 Chase St. 512, 528; Walker, Amer. Law, § 124; Wis. Const. (1848) Art. I. § 14; Minn. Const. (1857) Art. I. § 15; Cal. Civ. Code, § 762; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 400, 401.

² Matthews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J.

(Md.) 443, 451; Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. St. 492. See Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 337.

³ Matthews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443, 451; 4 Kent's Com. pp. *24, *25. But see Sharswood, Law Lect. viii. 207-232; 2 Blackst. Com. (Sharswood's ed.) p. 77, note; Smith, Landl. & Ten. (Amer. ed.) 6, note; Gray, Perpetuities, § 22.

affect some of the real property until a number of years after independence. Thus, in New York, large tracts of land were held as manors, by proprietors under the king, who became *mesne* lords by parcelling out the land as feudal holdings to inferior tenants. The state took the place of the king after the Revolution; but it was not until January 1, 1830, that the last vestige of feudalism was removed from those properties and their tenants or owners came to hold them alodially. (a) So, the

(a) *New York Manor Lands.* — Large tracts of land in New York, especially in the Hudson and Mohawk valleys, were formerly held as manors, subject to manorial rights and duties. Not only agricultural property, but also sections upon which cities and towns have been erected, were embraced within these tracts. Thus, the county of Albany was included within the manor of Rensselaerwyck, which had an area of over 1100 square miles. It is necessary for the examiner of titles in such districts to comprehend that part of the law of New York which has had to deal with these considerable portions of its territory.

These manors were patented by the King of Great Britain, to proprietors, to hold of him by perpetual rent in money or in kind, or they were acquired, to be so held; by the king's confirmations of grants made by the States-General of Holland, while the colony was under their control. Many of the patentees or proprietors were called *patroons*; and for convenience they will all be described by that word in this note. They were tenants *in capite*, and had the ordinary manorial privileges, such as the right to hold a court, award fines, and have waifs, estrays, and deodands.

The patroons subinfeudated their lands in fee simple; and their tenants or vassals, to whom they had thus let the lands to hold of themselves, became the tenants *paravail*. For there is no record of any attempt at further subinfeudation by any of those who held under the patroons. A perpetual rent, in money or in kind, was reserved in these subleases in fee. The rents due from the patroons to the crown, and subsequently to its successor the state, have in general been commuted or released for a gross sum; and the same is true of some of the rents due from the tenants *paravail* to the *mesne* lords, or patroons. But others of the latter kind are still in existence as charges upon the lands.

This system of dealing with real property in New York was attacked, both on behalf of the state claiming title to the lands by escheat, and by those who sought to avoid the rents and services due to the patroons. The chief grounds upon which the attacks were made were that the king had no power to issue such grants, that they had never been confirmed by the colony or state, and that the subinfeudations by the patroons were forbidden and nullified by the Statute of *Quia Emptores*. The first two of these positions were decided to be untenable (*People v. Van Rensselaer*, 9 N. Y. 291); and, while the last objection was at first obviated by holding that the Statute of *Quia Emptores* was never in force in New York (*De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467, 501), it was ultimately settled that that statute has always operated in this state, but that, since it was enacted for the king's benefit, he might waive it, and had in fact waived it in allow-

Virginia statute, which abolished feudal tenures, was not passed until 1779,¹ and that of Connecticut was first enacted in 1793.²

ing the patroons to subinfeudate. But the patroons, who were *mesne* lords, were bound by the statute; and therefore their tenants did not and could not subinfeudate. *Van Rensselaer v. Hays*, 19 N. Y. 68. The outcome, then, of a long line of cases upon these questions is the determination that, before the Revolution, there were three valid interests or ownerships in these manor lands, namely, (1) that of the King of Great Britain, as lord paramount, (2) that of the patroons, as *mesne* lords, and (3) that of the tenants paravail, who held under the patroons.

The first change in this system was brought about by the Revolutionary War, which substituted the people of the state as lord paramount in the place of the king. This was expressly declared to be the result by the statute of Oct. 22, 1779, § 14, which was made to relate back to the ninth day of July, 1776. 1 *Jones & Varick*, 44; *De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467, 503. The next change was that the Statute of Tenures, so called, which was enacted Feb. 20, 1787, abolished military tenures and all their incidents from August 30, 1664, changed all tenures of estates of inheritance into free and common socage from July 9, 1776, put an end to all fental tenure between one citizen and another, and substituted in its place a tenure between each landholder and the people of the state in their sovereign capacity. This did away with the patroons, as *mesne* lords, and caused those who had been their tenants to hold immediately of the state. 1 *Rev. Laws*, 70; *De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467, 503. And, finally, the Revised Statutes, which went into operation Jan. 1, 1830, took away the position of the state as lord paramount, abolished all manorial rights as such, swept away *all* feudal tenures, and made every piece of land within the state alodial, "so that, subject only to the liability to escheat, the entire and absolute property is vested in the owners, according to the nature of their respective estates." *Rev. Stat. Part II. ch. i. tit. 1, § 3*; *N. Y. Const. 1846, Art. I. § 13*; *N. Y. Const. 1894, Art. I. § 2*. In summary, there was never any time in the history of New York when conveyances between individuals could create a tenure, except in this special case of grants, from the crown, of power to erect and maintain manors. As to such manor lands, the crown was superseded by the state on the ninth day of July, 1776, the intermediate lords as such disappeared on the twentieth day of February, 1787, and the state ceased to be the lord, and the lands that had been manorial and feudal became alodial on the first day of January, 1830.

The grants in fee of these manor lands, by the patroons to their tenants, were ordinarily made on two kinds of conditions, namely, (1) restraints on alienation, which provided that the tenants should not sell their lands without paying a fine, or a certain portion of the price, as one-quarter, one-tenth, etc., to the patroons, which latter were called quarter-sales, tenth-sales, etc., and (2) the reservation of perpetual rents, payable in money or in kind. For breach of either of these, the patroon, as grantor, or feoffor, usually reserved the right to re-enter and enforce a forfeiture. The first

¹ *Va. Stat. 1779, ch. 13.*

² *Conn. Stat. Oct. 1793, Stat. 1821, tit. 56, ch. 1, § 1, note.*

§ 290. **The State's Rights.** — The word "alodial" means free from tenure; but it does not imply exemption from govern-

class, "(1)," of these forms of restrictions has been repeatedly held to have been invalid. And the constitutions of the state have explicitly declared that, "All fines, quarter-sales, or other like restraints upon alienation, reserved in any grant of land hereafter to be made, shall be void." Const. 1846, Art. I. § 15; Const. 1894, Art. I. § 14; *De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467, 504. But the second class, "(2)," of conditions — the reservation of rents and services certain — was excepted from the operation of the statutes which destroyed the feudal tenures of the lands (being vested property interests, they must be so excepted under the United States Constitution), and such perpetual rents and conditions, giving rights of re-entry and forfeiture for their non-payment, may still be legally created as to all lands which are not agricultural in character. They could also be legally made as to agricultural lands until 1846, when the constitution of that year provided that, "No lease or grant of agricultural land, for a longer period than twelve years, hereafter made, in which shall be reserved any rent or service of any kind, shall be valid." Const. 1846, Art. I. § 14; Const. 1894, Art. I. § 13. A brief statement is here required, as to the nature of those perpetual rents.

Such of the rents as were reserved by the crown in granting the manors to the patroons were rents-service. The king, becoming as he did the feudal lord, retained the possibility of re-acquiring the lands, if any of the conditions upon which they were granted were broken (this reversionary right in him being called technically a *possibility of reverter*), and the rents reserved by him became incident to this reversionary interest, and were therefore rents-service. See § 102, *supra*. The rights to distrain and to re-enter and take back the property for non-payment, being both implied as incidents to rent-service, passed with these rents to the people of the state, when they acquired the rights and property of the crown on the ninth day of July, 1776. And, for default of payment, and by virtue of the rights so implied and acquired, some of the manor lands were subsequently taken away from their owners and disposed of by the state. *Laws*, 1819, ch. 222; *Laws*, 1824, ch. 225; *Laws*, 1825, ch. 251; *De Lancey v. Piegras*, 138 N. Y. 26, 38-43.

The rents which the patroons reserved, in granting lands in fee to their tenants, were, theoretically at least, of the same character as those reserved by the king — rent-service — if they were created before Feb. 20, 1787, i. e., before the time when the patroons could no longer subinfeudate or stand as *mesne* feudal lords to their tenants. The statute of that date made it impossible for one citizen or subject to reserve for himself any reversionary interest whatever when he conveyed real property in fee simple to another, and, therefore, upon such a conveyance, no rent-service could be reserved. But the rents and services certain, then in existence and owned by the patroons, and those which were subsequently created in conveyances of realty in fee were all recognized and preserved as charges upon the lands, and as practically *rents-charge* they have been sustained and made collectible and enforceable according to the terms of the covenants by which they were created. In a mere rent-charge, as distinguished from a rent-service, no right of distress, or of re-entry, is ever implied by

mental rights and control. Every man holds his real property, however absolute his interest therein, subject to the state's

the law. But, in all cases of the perpetual rents which were created by the patroons, and which have come before the courts, these rights were reserved by express covenants and conditions, if the rents should not be duly paid, or the services duly rendered. And, after some vacillation, the courts decided that such express stipulations were enforceable against the delinquent landowners by the patroons or *by their heirs or assigns*.

There has been much discussion and difference of opinion as to whether the assignees of these rents — the devisees, purchasers, etc., of the original owners — could enforce these covenants and conditions, especially the condition for re-entry upon the land in case the rents were not paid. The difficulty grew out of the ordinary common-law rule that a condition annexed to a conveyance in fee can not be enforced, nor can re-entry be made for its breach, by any one but the grantor or his heirs. *Upington v. Corrigan*, 151 N. Y. 143. It was also strenuously contended that, even as covenants, stipulations for paying such rents, for distress, etc., could not run with the land or with the rent, nor be available to the assignees of either, or enforceable by them. But it has been definitely and wisely decided that such rents, charged upon the land, are incorporeal hereditaments, issuing out of and binding the land, and that, without the aid of any statute, the covenants and conditions affecting them run in both directions, — with the rent in the hands of the assignee, so as to enable him to sue on and enforce the covenants and conditions, and with the land itself in the hands of its purchaser, so as to render him liable to have them enforced against him. *Van Rensselaer v. Hays*, 19 N. Y. 68, 86; *Van Rensselaer v. Read*, 26 N. Y. 558, 570; *Cruger v. McLaurry*, 41 N. Y. 219; *Upington v. Corrigan*, 151 N. Y. 143, 150. All remedy by distress was abolished for the future by statute enacted May 13, 1846 (L. 1846, ch. 274); but the other remedies reserved by the terms of the grant of the rent still remain for the grantee and his heirs and assigns. This statute practically changed these perpetual rents into rents-seck.

These results have been arrived at chiefly as common-law principles affecting the perpetual rents reserved in New York upon grants (or so-called *leases*) of lands in fee. Statutes have also had much to do with them. And, although it is now settled that legislation was not required for the benefit of the assignees of such rents, yet much law has clustered around these statutes, and they should be briefly examined. In 1774 (L. 1774, ch. 14), the colonial legislature passed an act making these rents, arrears of which had not been paid for three years within the twenty years preceding, collectible as were rents reserved on leases for years. This act was a repetition of the English statute 4 Geo. II. ch. 28. By statute, ch. 7, Law of 1788, entitled, "An act to enable grantees of reversions to take advantage of conditions to be performed by lessees," which statute followed the terms of that of 32 Hen. VIII. ch. 34, it was provided that the grantees and assignees of either the lease or the reversion, when the lease was less than in fee, should have the same remedies, by entry, action, distress, or otherwise, as their grantors or lessors had or might have had. And, by ch. 98, Laws of 1805 (April 9, 1805), these provisions were extended as well to grants or leases in fee, reserving rent, as to leases for life or for years.

right of *eminent domain*, and to the right of the government to regulate the use of it by such rules and limitations as the public

This law of 1805 was repealed by Act of April 14, 1860 (L. 1860, ch. 396), as to all conveyances or leases in fee made before April 9, 1805, or after April 14, 1860; but, since the rights of the assignee of a rent-charge did not really depend on that statute (though some early decisions rested upon it, i. e., *Van Rensselaer v. Ball*, 19 N. Y. 100, and see *Van Rensselaer v. Hays*, 19 N. Y. 68; *Cornell v. Lamb*, 2 Cow. 652), but on the common law, the repeal of the statute did not affect those rights. And, even if it could have done so, they have been held to be preserved by section 3 of chapter 274, Laws of 1846, which expressly recognizes the assignees' interests in connection with such leases and rents. All of this legislation, affecting assignees of rents and of the lands out of which the rents accrue, is now summarized in § 223 of the New York real property law (ch. 52, L. 1909), which is as follows: "The grantee of leased real property, or of a reversion thereof, or of any rent, the devisee or assignee of the lessor of such a lease, or the heir or personal representative of either of them, has the same remedies, by entry, action, or otherwise, for the non-performance of any agreement contained in the assigned lease for the recovery of rent, for the doing of any waste, or for other cause of forfeiture, as his grantor or lessor had, or would have had, if the reversion had remained in him. A lessee of real property, his assignee or personal representative, has the same remedy against the lessor, his grantee or assignee, or the representative of either, for the breach of an agreement contained in the lease, that the lessee might have had against his immediate lessor, except a covenant against encumbrances or relating to the title or possession of the premises leased. *This section applies as well to a grant or a lease in fee, reserving rent, as to a lease for life or for years; but not to a deed of conveyance in fee, made before the ninth day of April, eighteen hundred and five, or after the fourteenth day of April, eighteen hundred and sixty.*" Since, as was above explained, it has been held that without the aid of this statute the assignees of both parties to perpetual rents have all the rights and remedies of their assignors, the sentence of the statute which is here printed in italics was not required, and has in fact no operation; and the last clause of that sentence does not interfere in any way with the remedies for the non-performance of the covenants or conditions affecting such rents.

The remedies incident to such rents as these, including the recovery of their fruits or proceeds, are fully discussed in §§ 104, 114, *supra*, and the New York notes thereto. It simply needs to be added here that §§ 2231-2265, N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., which provide summary proceedings for the removal of tenants for years, tenants at will, etc., for non-payment of rent, do not affect these perpetual rents, nor afford any remedy because of non-performance of their accompanying conditions or covenants.

The general results, as to these perpetual rents, may be summarized as follows: As reserved in conveyances of the manor lands, they were valid as rents-service before Feb. 20, 1787, and after that date and until 1846 as rents-charge; the statute of 1846 (ch. 274), which removed the right to distrain for their proceeds, changed them into rents-seck; they may still be reserved as rents-seck in conveyances in fee of land which is not

good may require; and, if the owner of an inheritable interest die without heirs and without disposing of it, it passes by *escheat* to the state. Escheat here, however, has no feudal character, but is a right established in modern jurisprudence, which is similar to the feudal principle of the same name. Each state, *by virtue of its sovereignty*, is deemed to have the original and ultimate property in all the lands within its jurisdiction.¹ (a) So the duty of allegiance to the state, which in feudal times was often confused with fealty, is obligatory upon every citizen; but this has now no necessary connection with the ownership of land.²

§ 291. **The Statute of *Quia Emptores*.**— While feudal tenures continued to exist in this country, the Statute of *Quia Emptores*, which forbade subinfeudation by any but the king's

agricultural; they may be enforced and dealt with by and against the heirs and assignees of the original parties to the contracts or conventions by which they were created; the remedies available to such parties and their heirs and assignees are fully regulated by statutes, which change and ameliorate the common-law rules relating to rent.

The study of the decisions upon the manor lands of New York, and the rents and services associated with them, throws much light on the feudal system, especially in its operation upon the law of real property in this country. Some of such decisions are: *People v. Van Rensselaer*, 9 N. Y. 291; *Van Rensselaer v. Hays*, 19 N. Y. 68; *Van Rensselaer v. Ball*, 19 N. Y. 100; *De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467; *Van Rensselaer v. Dennison*, 35 N. Y. 393; *Van Rensselaer v. Jewett*, 2 N. Y. 135, 141; *Van Rensselaer v. Read*, 26 N. Y. 558; *Van Rensselaer v. Slingerland*, 26 N. Y. 580; *Van Rensselaer v. Snyder*, 13 N. Y. 299; *Van Rensselaer v. Barringer*, 39 N. Y. 9; *Hosford v. Ballard*, 39 N. Y. 147; *Cruger v. McLaury*, 41 N. Y. 219; *Plumb v. Tubbs*, 41 N. Y. 442; *De Lancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26; *Upington v. Corrigan*, 151 N. Y. 143; *Livingston v. Miller*, 11 N. Y. 80; *Cornell v. Lamb*, 2 Cow. 652; *Van Rensselaer v. Jones*, 5 Denio, 449; *Van Rensselaer's Executors v. Gallup*, 5 Denio, 454; *Van Rensselaer v. Bouton*, 3 Keyes, 260; *Van Rensselaer v. Jones*, 2 Barb. 643; *Tyler v. Heidorn*, 46 Barb. 439, 48 N. Y. 671; *Cagger v. Lansing*, 4 Hun, 812, 64 N. Y. 417; *Main v. Davis*, 32 Barb. 461; *Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel*, 24 Barb. 365.

(a) The New York Constitution, Art. I. § 10 (Const. of 1894), declares that, "The people of this state, in their right of sovereignty, are deemed to possess the original and ultimate property in and to all the land within the jurisdiction of the state; and all lands, the title to which shall fail from a defect of heirs, shall revert or escheat to the people." In the former constitutions this was Art. I. § 11.

¹ 3 Kent's Com. pp. *512-*514; 1150; Chase's Blackst. pp. 286, 287, note.
² 2 Kent's Com. pp. *44-*50.

tenants in chief with his permission, was in operation in all the states except South Carolina and probably Pennsylvania.¹ The abolition of feudal tenures, of course, made feudal subinfeudation an impossibility. And hence it has been cogently argued that it is idle to assert that that famous statute still operates in any state but the three in which the theory of feudalism is retained.² So far as the mere letter of the statute and its direct destruction of subinfeudation are concerned, this is unquestionably correct. But, in allowing "every freeman to sell at his own pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of them," the statute, by necessary implication, removed practically all power from a grantor of an estate in fee simple to restrain the right of alienation by his grantee. "The grantor's right to restrain alienation immediately ceased, when the statute put an end to the feudal relation between him and his grantee; and no instance of the exercise of that right, in England, since the statute was passed, has been shown, or can be found, except in the case of the king, whose tenure was not affected by the statute, and to whom, therefore, it did not apply."³ That landmark of legislation, therefore, must be understood to have put two leading negative principles into the law of real property, namely, (a) the forbidding of subinfeudation by any but the king's tenants, and (b) the prohibition of restraints upon alienation in conveyances in fee simple. While the former of these necessarily disappeared with feudal tenures, the latter has remained operative as a powerful factor in the development of American jurisprudence. In some of the states, it has been put into modern statutory form.⁴ (a)

In a word, then, in all of the states of this country except Pennsylvania and South Carolina, the Statute of *Quia Emptores* has always been in force, restraining subinfeudation while feudalism continued, and continually maintaining freedom of alienation of estates in fee simple. But it is to be carefully noted here, that it does not affect in this manner any convey-

(a) The Statute of *Quia Emptores* has always operated as a principle in New York, and is still a part of its law. Const. 1894, Art. I. § 14; *Van Rensselaer v. Hays*, 19 N. Y. 68; *De Lancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26, 39; note on Manor Lands of New York, p. 389, note a, *supra*.

¹ Gray, *Perpetuities*, §§ 26-28.

^{*} N. Y. Const. (1894) Art. I. § 14;

² Gray, *Perpetuities*, §§ 24, 25.

¹ N. J. Gen. Stat. (1895) p. 879; Gray

³ *De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467.

Perpetuities, §§ 20-28.

ances but those in fee simple. He who owns an interest in realty, and carves out of it and conveys away a lesser estate than his own, as one for life or for years, has a reversion left in himself, and, as the owner of such reversion, may curtail or preclude the right of the alienee to dispose of the interest thus conveyed to him.¹

¹ The Statute of *Quia Emptores* itself says: "And it is, to wit, that this statute extendeth but only to lands holden in fee simple, and that it extendeth to the time coming." Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 238; *De Lancey v. Piepgras*, 138 N. Y. 26; *Upington v. Corrigan*, 151 N. Y. 143.

BOOK III.

ESTATES IN REAL PROPERTY.

Treated in

PART I.—AS TO COURTS.

PART II.—AS TO QUANTITY.

PART III.—AS TO NUMBER AND CONNECTION OF OWNERS.

PART IV.—AS TO QUALIFIED OR UNQUALIFIED NATURE.

PART V.—AS TO TIME FOR ENJOYMENT TO BEGIN.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ESTATES. — EXPLAINED AND CLASSIFIED.

§ 292. Estates defined and illustrated.

§ 293. Classification of estates.

§ 292. Estates defined and illustrated. — The interest that one has in lands, tenements, or hereditaments is his *estate* therein. If we use the word “property” here to denote the object of ownership, — the piece of corporeal or incorporeal realty, — the interests which one has in it is his estate, his *status*, condition or circumstances in which he stands with regard to that property.¹ The acre of land, the house and lot, the right of way, or the ferry right is the ultimate real thing, which may be the object of various different interests and ownerships; and in this one thing one man may have an estate for a term of years, another for life, and another in fee simple. It may be owned by a number of people, as joint tenants or tenants in common; one person may have the right to present enjoyment of it, while the interest of another is such that he must wait for his enjoyment of it till some time in the future; the estate of this owner may be certain and absolute, while

¹ The development of “estates” is explained in Maine’s Anct. L. ch. viii. In West’s Symboliography, § 31, it is said: “An estate, *status*, *dominium*, *proprietas*, is that right and power whereby we have the property or possession of things, that is, whereby we be owners or possessors thereof.” The right of one who held land for a term of years gradually strengthened, in the common law, from a mere possession, which the landowner might legally terminate at any moment, to a fixed interest, which the termor could retain for the period designated in the lease, even against the will of the landlord. When the tenant had attained to this last position

with regard to the land, and so had acquired the power, which is still his, of regaining the possession of the specific land leased if he were evicted during the term, he was then, for the first time, said to have an *estate* for years in the land. He had become the owner of something more than a mere contractual right. He had become the owner of an interest in the land itself, a *dominium*, a *proprietas*, which the law recognizes as such and enables him to retain. The study of this matter may aid the student in acquiring a precise idea of this term “estate.” See Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 176–181.

that of the other is conditional or defeasible; one man may have in it an interest which is recognized and protected by a court of law, and the right or estate of another may be such that no cognizance or enforcement of it can be had save in a court of equity. These various interests or *estates* in the property are at once seen to be different from the *holdings* of it, and from the *titles* to it, or the modes by which it may be acquired. A man may be known as owning a certain farm for life, or for himself and his heirs, without regard to how he obtained it, the validity of his title, or whether his holding is alodial or by tenure under a superior lord. His *estate* in the land is a distinct thing, with which the law deals as such. And it is around estates that the greatest part of the law of real property has clustered.¹

The existence of estates in real property is the most important distinguishing feature between it and personalty. While there may be created several separate and distinct interests in one chattel, whether personal or real, this is not commonly done, because the article is only temporary and in a short time will cease to exist. The owner of it is ordinarily thought of and treated as owning absolutely the article, such as his watch, or horse, or plough, and not merely as having an estate therein.² But the law contemplates a parcel of land, or usually a rent-charge issuing out of it, as something which will continue in existence forever, and therefore recognizes the probability as well as the possibility of many and

¹ Originally, and probably as late as the middle of the thirteenth century, the word "estate" was used in England to describe the personal condition of the feudal tenant — his *status*. But, under the feudal system, this personal position was so closely connected with his proprietary rights that the transition to the use of the word to denote his interest in real property was natural and easy. 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), pp. 10-13; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *163. The same word is often popularly employed to denote generally the property which one owns. Thus, a deceased person is said to have left a "large estate," or a "complicated estate;" and executors, administrators, and trustees are said to manage or settle the "estates" entrusted to them. But, in dealing with the law of real property, these meanings

of the word must be disregarded, in most instances, and its meaning must be confined to the interest which one has in lands, tenements, or hereditaments.

² Distinct and separate interests in a personal chattel are sometimes created by a bailment of it; and, by means of subleases, the ownership of chattels real is frequently divided into different parts for different owners. There is no legal prohibition against the creation of many different estates in the same chattel of any kind. 1 Leake, 4; Gray, Perpetuities, §§ 71-97. But the important fact for the lawyer is that, because of the temporary character of personal property, this is not done to any large extent, and rarely causes any of the complicated questions which arise from the existence of numerous estates in real property.

varied estates connected with it and belonging to different owners. The subtle reasoning of feudal and scholastic ages, in dealing with these possibilities, brought into the law of real property many niceties and technical refinements which have never had any material influence upon personalty. The fine distinctions and technical results, however, which are involved in the present law of real property, are always logical; and, as a result of modern statutes, most of them which remain are of practical importance and utility.

§ 293. **Classifications of Estates.**—The vast influence of courts of equity in the moulding of English jurisprudence is most conspicuously manifested in the new species of interests in real property which they have created and preserved. By the operation of the maxim, "Equity follows the law," these new and important interests have generally been made subject to the same incidents and principles that govern the older estates of purely common-law cognizance. It is because those incidents and principles can be most satisfactorily studied as now generally applicable to all estates alike, whether legal or equitable, and because in dealing with the other classifications of estates the equitable interests must be frequently referred to, that it has been decided to depart, in this treatise, from the time-honored custom of discussing estates first with reference to their quantity.¹ Therefore they will be examined in *Part I.*, of this book as divided, with regard to the courts in which they are dealt with, into 1. legal estates and 2. equitable estates. The second basis of classification (*Part II.*) will be with reference to their quantity, or the extent of their owners' interest; the third (*Part III.*), with regard to the number and connection of their owners; the fourth (*Part IV.*), with regard to their qualified or unqualified nature, and the fifth (*Part V.*), with regard to the time when their owners may begin to occupy and enjoy the property or object of ownership. It is believed that this order of discussion will both conduce to clearness and avoid the necessity for repetition to any material extent.

¹ The suggestion is also ventured that, of all the different interests in lands, tenements, and hereditaments, equitable estates, so called, come the nearest to being a distinct species of property, — the nearest to being in and of themselves objects of ownership, as distinguished from the ownership itself.

They can be intelligibly studied alone, without regard to the other forms or classes of estates, the same as can a rent, a franchise, or an easement in gross; and a thorough knowledge of them is of great assistance to the understanding of the other interests in real property.

PART I.

ESTATES CLASSIFIED AS TO THE COURTS THAT RECOGNIZED THEM.

1. LEGAL ESTATES.

2. EQUITABLE ESTATES.

2. EQUITABLE ESTATES.

CHAPTER XIX.

(1) USES.

§ 294. Legal estates distinguished from equitable estates.

§ 295. Prototypes of the use.

§ 296. Growth of the use in the common law.

§ 297. Development of the use into an equitable estate.

§ 298. Early distinctions between a use and a trust.

§ 299. Definition of use and trust.

§ 300. The requisites of a use.

§ 301. Characteristics of the use before the Statute of Uses.

§ 302. The Statute of Uses.

§ 303. How the Statute of Uses was interpreted and construed.

§ 304. How the use was retained under the name of a trust.

§ 294. **Legal Estates distinguished from Equitable Estates.** — The earliest cognizance and control of estates in lands, tenements and hereditaments were, of course, in the courts of common law. Those courts first dealt with interests in realty in a plain, direct manner, suited to the simplicity of the times. And the legal estates, which they knew and protected, are, in the main, the strictly legal estates which are recognized by the courts of law of to-day. They were and are the ordinary, well-known interests in realty, for which the owners have, by and for themselves and without looking to any trustees or other holders for them, their remedies at law for any wrongful taking of or injury to the lands, tenements, or hereditaments. At first such estates answered all the requirements of business and commerce. Before the reign of Edward III., and possibly down to a somewhat later date, they were the only forms

of *estates* in realty, which had been known to any system of law.¹

But the rigidity of procedure of the common-law courts, their strict and inflexible adherence to precedents, the stringency of feudal exactions and the restraining force of a number of acts of parliament gradually impeded the full enjoyment of these legal estates, especially by restricting their alienability and thus impairing their utility as articles to be employed in the growing business of the realm. It was to get rid of these burdens, and in particular to enable the ecclesiastical corporations to evade the Statutes of Mortmain, which forbade them to take title to land, that the system of *uses* and *trusts* grew into prominence and became the most important forms of equitable estates.² And it was to mitigate the hardships, which the inelasticity of common-law procedure placed upon mortgagors of real property, that the so-called equity of redemption was invented and enforced for their benefit, by the Court of Chancery, and grew into the other important form of equitable estates. Each of these species of equitable estates will be separately considered. It will thus appear that the *equitable* estates are (1) *uses*, (2) *trusts*, and (3) *equities of redemption*, and that all other estates — the more ordinary ones, which have not been developed by a court of equity, — are *legal*.

§ 295. *Prototypes of the Use.* — The origin of the *use* in real property has been the subject of much historical research and many learned discussions. Probably it can not be distinctively traced to any one system of early jurisprudence, nor precisely assimilated to any law or custom of any people or peoples other than the Anglo-Saxon race. Rooted in practices which are common to all civilized communities, it grew up in England as a product peculiar to that island. Those practices are the natural and almost necessary employment of agents, confidants, or fiduciary persons of some kind, in holding and managing property. And that product is the vast system of uses and trusts which now involves so important a part of English and American law.

It is because every system of jurisprudence, as soon as it becomes at all complex, will employ agents, third parties and intermediaries of varying types and orders, that so many things

¹ 1 Leake, 7; Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) pp. 43, 60, 315-326.

Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 316; 2 Poll. & Mait. *Hist. Eng. Law* (2d ed.),

² 2 Blackst. *Com.* pp. *268-*272; pp. 228-239.

analogous to the English use are to be found in other bodies of law. A few of those things, which may have supplied suggestions for the originals of our uses and trusts may profitably be noted. One of them was the *usus* of the Roman law, from which it was long thought that the English use took its name. But it is now known that our word is derived from the Latin *opus*, which in old French is *os* or *oes*, and that the earliest transfers of this kind were to one person "*ad opus*" (to the use) of another.¹ The Roman *usus* was simply the right to the natural use of something, owned by another, which right belonged to some definite individual and his family and was as a rule not transferable. The owner held the article so that he who had the *usus* and his family personally might take only so much of the fruits or products as was necessary for their daily consumption. They had no title, either legal or equitable, but only this restricted privilege of enjoying the products of another's property.²

Another suggestion for the originators of the English use may have been found in the Roman idea of *usus-fructus*, which was a right broader than the mere *usus* in that it gave the right to the temporary enjoyment of a thing, without restricting the amount to daily needs, and could be sold or otherwise transferred to another. But the civil law never created any binding obligation in such a case, whereby the owner of the article could be compelled to hold it in trust for the benefit of the usufructuary; and so it did not produce the beneficial results which are caused by our uses and trusts. It made the relation between the parties more like that of a temporary owner—such for example as a life tenant—and the reversioner in fee.³

Probably the most pertinent suggestion and closest analogy furnished by the civil law were found in its *fidei-commissa*. In that law there were many restrictions on successions and legacies. For example, a testator could not will property to one who was not a Roman citizen; nor, after duly devising property to one person, could he ordinarily name another devisee to succeed the one first named; i. e., the first beneficiary must take the absolute legal and beneficial ownership of the property and the testator could control it no further. To avoid such difficul-

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 228.

² Just. Inst. Lib. ii. tit. iv and v.

³ Ibid.; Tompkins & Jenkyn's Modern Roman Law, 173, 174.

ties, there arose the practice, in the later period of the Republic, of a testator "instituting an heir" and at the same time directing him to dispose of all or some of the property in a particular manner. The trust or confidence thus reposed in the designated heir was called *fidei-commissum*.¹ For a long time there was no means of enforcing the performance of these commissions. In the early part of the reign of Augustus, however, that monarch directed the consuls to compel the carrying out of the otherwise imperfect duties thus imposed; and finally a prætor *fidei-commissarius* was appointed to take charge of such trusts and enforce the proper obligations which they had created.² But this system of controlling property by will never resulted, as did the English use, in the creation and control of an equitable estate separate and distinct from the legal title and ownership. It was simply a means of compelling the transfer of the only known estate — the legal one — to the person to whom it justly belonged.³ It was a successful device, however, for avoiding obstacles which the *jus civile* had interposed; and as such it probably afforded an important hint to those who were called upon to surmount the difficulties whereby the common law and statutes impeded certain transfers of lands, tenements and hereditaments.⁴

It is to be added that, in regard to their *res mancipi*, the Romans, before the time of Justinian, made a distinction between legal and beneficial ownership. If such an article were sold, but the ceremony called *mancipatio* did not accompany the transfer, the purchaser obtained only the beneficial interest in it, while the legal title remained in the vendor.⁵ This distinction never affected any interest in land, and it was abolished by Justinian;⁶ but it may have been one of the analogies upon which our uses and trusts depend.

By a method similar to the Roman *fidei-commissum*, the

¹ Just. Inst. Lib. ii. tit. xxiii.

² Gaius, Lib. ii. § 278; Jnst. Inst. Lib. ii. tit. xxiii. §§ 1, 2.

³ The distinctions between the *fidei-commissa* of the civil law and the uses and trusts of the common law are clearly pointed out in McDonough's *Executors v. Murdoch*, 15 How. (U. S.) 367, 407-409.

⁴ Amos on the Science of Jurisprudence, 91. The form of our trusts, which has the closest resemblance to the *fidei commissa* is the giving of prop-

erty to one person in trust to convey or transfer to another. "There can be no doubt of the general proposition that where money is placed in the hands of one person to be delivered to another, a trust arises in favor of the latter, which he may enforce by bill in equity, if not by action at law." *McKee v. Lamou*, 159 U. S. 317, 322.

⁵ Gaius, ii. 40.

⁶ Cod. Lib. vii. tit. 25, *De nudo jure quirritum tollendo*; Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) pp. 316, 317.

Franks of the *lex salica*, who were "one family of our legal ancestors," employed temporary trustees for the purpose of passing property to heirs who could not otherwise be appointed or adopted. The third party, to whom the title was thus passed, was called the "saleman;" and it was his duty, though probably as an imperfect and unenforcible obligation, to hand it over to the purchaser or other rightful owner.¹ But here again there is no evidence of any separation of the title or estate into two distinct parts, the one legal and the other equitable. There was only a means of compelling one holder of property to transfer its title to another person.

In all of these schemes and arrangements, and in all others in which historians have sought for the prototype of the English use, one or both of two characteristics of the latter in its final stage of development are lacking. Those characteristics are (a) that the owner of the use has an *estate*, an interest in the realty held for him, which is something more than a mere right against the person of the holder of the legal title, and which a court of equity will recognize and protect as a distinct and separate ownership; and (b) that he has a complete and adequate means of compelling the exact fulfillment of all the duties and obligations which are imposed upon the holder of the legal title because of the existence of this equitable estate. If these two elements have ever co-existed in any species of real estate other than the English use and trust, it has been for so short a time or in so unimportant a manner that history has lost sight of the fact. It is safe to conclude that uses and trusts, as we know them, are, in the main, original productions of the equity side of our common law. How they were created and developed is next to be examined.

§ 296. **Growth of the Use in the Common Law.** — "A slight but unbroken thread of cases," say Pollock & Maitland,² "beginning while the conquest is yet recent, shows us that a man will from time to time convey his land to another 'to the use' of a third. For example, he is going on a crusade and wishes that his land shall be held to the use of his children, or he wishes that his wife or his sister shall enjoy the land, but doubts, it may be, whether a woman can hold a military fee, or whether a husband can enfeoff his wife." And they proceed

¹ *Lex Salica*, tit. 46, *De adfathamire*; & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. Heusler, *Institutionem*, i. 215; 2 Poll. 230.

² 2 Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 231.

to show how, to such private arrangements, were soon added cases in which lands were given to convents or other religious houses, for special purposes or uses, as “to the use’ of the library or ‘to the use’ of the infirmary;” and how, after the coming to England, in the early part of the thirteenth century, of the Franciscan friars, who could own nothing, much land, as well as other property, was conveyed to the borough communities for the use of the friars. And they add: “It is an old doctrine that the inventors of ‘the use’ were ‘the clergy’ or ‘the monks.’ We should be nearer the truth if we said that to all seeming the first persons who in England employed ‘the use’ on a large scale, were not the clergy, nor the monks, but the friars of St. Francis.”

Thus the employment of an intermediary, to hold the legal title to realty for one who could not personally take and hold it as was desired, came gradually into our law as the requirements for it arose. And when the statutes of *mortmain*, first as chapter 36 of *Magna Charta* (1217), and afterwards as the statute *de religiosis*, 7 Edw. I. (1279), and the statute 13 Edw. I. ch. 32 (1285),¹ had practically prohibited the taking of real property by the great religious houses, the lawyers who were employed by those institutions resorted naturally to this means of serving their clients, and had property conveyed to individuals “for the use” of the ecclesiastical institutions. The religious bodies were thus enabled practically to evade the statutes, and to obtain all the enjoyment of and benefits from the land of which they could not take the legal title.² Although the statute 15 Rich. II. ch. 5, which required all lands held “to the use of religious people or other spiritual persons” to be *amortized* by license from the king or to be disposed of for some other use, practically deprived the ecclesiastical houses of the benefit of this invention; yet their dealings with it naturally led to its employment for many other purposes. Especially during the civil wars between the house of York and that of Lancaster, when the triumph of the wearers of the red rose was followed by attainder of the persons and confiscation of the estates of those who wore the white, and *vice versa*, the use, which was not forfeitable because of treason, became the most common form of property owned by the combatants, while the legal titles to their lands were carefully vested in

¹ See also stat. 34 Edw. I. ch. 3;
² Blackst. Com. pp. *268-*273.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *271-*272;
¹ Spence’s Eq. Jur. 440.

other persons.¹ And, after those wars were over, the use remained and continued to spread, as a favorite species of property, to avoid curtesy or dower, to evade creditors, to impair the remedies of the lord of the fee, etc., until the legal titles to and estates in practically all the real property in England were in one set of persons, while the uses or rights to the beneficial enjoyment of the same were in other individuals or institutions.² Since it had such an origin, and since it was carefully fostered and preserved by the Court of Equity alone — the court of the chancellor who was the “keeper of the king’s conscience” — it has been well said that the parents of the use “were *fraud and fear*, and a court of conscience was the *nurse*.”³

§ 297. **Development of the Use into an Equitable Estate.** — When the use is first noticed in legal records, it appears as a mere *personal confidence* in the one who holds the legal estate and who is called the *feoffee to use*. The beneficiary, the person for whom the property is held and who is called the *cestui que use*, has no legal means of compelling him to carry out the merely conscientious obligation. If, therefore, A were enfeoffed of land, *to the use of B*, or in trust or confidence that B might occupy the property and receive the fruits and profits, no court of that time would prevent A from ignoring B’s rights and appropriating all the land and its products to his own use and enjoyment. Without doubt, such obligations were special favorites of the Church, and were frequently enforced by the authority of the Confessor; but the *cestui que use* was without remedy in any other tribunal.⁴

There was an ancient practice in England for persons aggrieved, when the wrongdoers were too powerful for them, or the common-law courts afforded them no redress or no adequate remedy, to appeal directly to the council or the king for relief.⁵ In the twenty-second year of Edward III., it was ordered that all such applications, which were of grace, should be made directly to the chancellor, or to the keeper of the

¹ 1 Spence’s Eq. Jur. 441.

² Sand. Uses, 17; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Wm. Blackst. 123, 135.

³ Atty.-Gen. v. Sands, Hard. 488, 491; Chudleigh’s Case, 1 Rep. 114, 123; Bacon, Readings upon Statute of Uses, vol. xiv. pp. 301, 302 (Boston ed. 1861).

⁴ “It is true that the ecclesiastical

courts at one time enforced conscientious obligations, entertaining suits *de fidei lesione*, but this jurisdiction is said to have been taken away from them in cases arising between laymen as to civil matters in the reign of Henry III.” Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 315.

⁵ 1 Spence’s Eq. Jur. p. 335.

privity seal.¹ From the practice of receiving such petitions and making decrees upon them grew the “extraordinary jurisdiction” of the chancellor, as distinguished from his pre-existing ordinary jurisdiction, at law; and thus arose and grew the Equity side of the Court of Chancery.² Unhampered by the precedents and technicalities of the older tribunals, this court had power to compel the specific performance of a purely conscientious duty; and it found the use ready for the exercise of that power. During the reign of Richard II., and “at some date later than 1393,” it began to take cognizance of these interests in realty;³ and, bringing the feoffees to uses before the court by means of its writ of *subpœna*, it compelled them to carry out the obligations resting upon their consciences, as by allowing the beneficiaries to hold and enjoy the land, conveying it to them, or doing or permitting such other acts as were expressly or impliedly required by the terms of the creation of the uses.⁴ But when the court of equity thus came forward, as the tribunal in which the *cestui que use* could find redress, it at first refused to issue its *subpœna*, in such a case, against any one but the feoffee to uses personally.⁵ And, while it would intervene to prevent *him* from wrongfully selling the property, or otherwise disposing of it to the injury of the beneficiary, yet, if before such interposition of the court he sold the land, or gave it away, or it descended to his heir, the *cestui que use*, during this period in the development of his interest, could not follow the realty; nor could he enforce his rights in any way against the third party into whose hands the legal estate had thus passed.

The last step in the advancement of the use to an equitable estate was the enlarging of the operation of the *subpœna*, in such cases, so as to reach and control the heir or purchaser of the feoffee to uses and, generally, to compel the observance of the rights of the *cestui que use* and the performance of the obligations in conscience owed to him by the heir, donee, or purchaser of the feoffee to uses, and by all other persons into whose hands the legal estate might come, except those who were disseisors or other adverse holders (i. e., not in privity with the feoffee to uses), or innocent purchasers of the land without

¹ Spence's Eq. Jur. p. 337.

² Select Cases in Chancery (Selden Soc.), pp. xvi. *et seq.*; Kerly, Eq. p. 49.

³ Select Cases in Chancery (Selden Soc.), p. 48.

⁴ 1 Spence, Eq. Jnr. pp. 338, 369; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 325.

⁵ Year Book, 8 Edw. IV. 6; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 326.

notice of the use.¹ This change probably occurred during the reign of Edward IV., or possibly a little earlier. And it was this addition to his remedies that first gave to *cestui que use* an equitable estate in the land — a *status* or position with reference to the land itself, as distinguished from a mere personal confidence in the feoffee to use — the power to follow the property itself along from hand to hand and to enforce his rights against its legal holder for the time being, unless or until it comes into the possession and ownership of one who is an adverse holder or has purchased it for value and without notice of the use. But it was then decided, and has ever since that time been held, that a purchaser of the legal estate, for a valuable consideration and without notice of the use, holds the land free from the obligation to the *cestui que use*.²

In summary, when uses first appeared in England the *cestui que use* had nothing but a personal confidence in the feoffee to uses; later he acquired the power by *subpœna* in equity to compel the feoffee personally while he kept the legal estate to live up to the requirements of that confidence; finally he became enabled to follow the land itself and to compel any one into whose hands it came to live up to the requirements of that confidence, unless or until the legal estate was acquired by one who held it adversely (not in privity with the feoffee to uses) or purchased it in good faith for value and without notice of the use. The courts have uniformly called his interest thus finally evolved an *equitable estate*.

§ 298. **Early Distinctions between a Use and a Trust.** — In the early times of which we have been speaking, there was a clear distinction recognized between a “*use*” and what was then designated a “*trust*.” Both of these grew up at about the same time into equitable estates.³ The foundation principle was the same in each; namely, that the legal estate must be held by one person for the benefit of another who owned the equitable estate. When this holder of the legal estate was nothing but a receptacle for it, and simply retained it generally

¹ Gould v. Petit, temp. Hen. VI. Chancery Calendar, ii. p. xxviii; Saundress v. Gaynesford, temp. Hen. VI. Chancery Calendar, ii. p. xxxviii.; Spence's Eq. Jur. pp. 445, et seq.; Bacon's Law Tracts, 318; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Wm. Blackst. 123, 156.

² Year Book, 5 Edw. IV. 7 b; First

National Bank v. National Broadway Bank, 156 N. Y. 459, 468; Rochester & C. Turnpike Co. v. Parriour, 162 N. Y. 281; Otis v. Otis, 167 Mass. 245.

³ But strictly in point of time the special “*trust*” seems to have first appeared in English law. Sand. Uses, 7.

and permanently, so that the other might have all the control, management, and benefit of the property, the interest of the latter was called a *use*.¹ But when the recipient of the legal estate had some special duty to perform, as for example to care for and manage the property and pay the net proceeds to the beneficiary, the interest of the latter was denominated a *trust*.² Thus the use was permanent and general, the trust temporary and special. Or, as Lord Bacon expressed it: "When a trust is not special nor transitory, but general and permanent, there it is a use."³ The use, as thus differentiated, was the most prevalent form of these interests, and the one most commonly spoken of and dealt with by the Court of Chancery before the enactment of the Statute of Uses in the twenty-seventh year of Henry VIII.⁴

§ 299. **Definition of Use and Trust.**—From the foregoing discussion it appears that a use or trust, as viewed from the standpoint of its owner—the owner of the equitable estate—is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property of which the legal title and estate are in another person;⁵ and that, as regarded more especially from the standpoint of the holder of the legal estate—the feoffee to uses or trustee—it is "an obligation upon a person arising out of a confidence reposed in him to apply property faithfully and according to such confidence."⁶ Lord Coke defined it as, "a confidence reposed in some other, not issuing out of the land, but as a thing collateral, annexed in privity to the estate of the land, and to the person touching the land, for which *cestui que trust* has no remedy but by subpoena in chancery."⁷

Bearing constantly in mind the fact that, as soon as the "remedy by subpoena in chancery" became available against all persons who took the legal estate from, through, or under the original trustee of feoffee to uses with notice of the use or trust, or without paying a valuable consideration, the courts of

¹ Sand. Uses, 3; Bacon, Law Tracts, 306; Delamere's Case, Plowden, 346; Co. Lit. 272 b.

² Sand. Uses, 6; Cornish, Uses, 14; Tud. Lead. Cas. R. P. 255.

³ Bacon's Essay on Uses, 9; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 448; 1 Lewin on Trusts, p. *7; Hutchins v. Heywood, 50 N. H. 491, 497.

⁴ As to this statute and its operation and effects, see §§ 302-304, *infra*.

⁵ Bispham's Principles Eq. § 49; Warner v. McMullin, 131 Pa. St. 370, 381.

⁶ Stair's Institutions of the Laws of Scotland, B. iv. tit. vi. § 2, p. 591, § 3, pp. 592-594.

⁷ Co. Lit. 272 b. For other definitions of uses and trusts, and criticisms of the same, see 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 1, 2; Underhill on Trusts and Trustees (Am. ed.), pp. 1-6.

equity called the interest of the beneficiary an *equitable estate*, and have continuously done so ever since, the elements of this famous definition formulated by Coke may be profitably examined, as revealing the essential characteristics of these forms of equitable interests. The expression, "a confidence *reposed in some other*," means, in the light of modern adjudications, that the holder of the legal estate and the beneficiary can not be *identical*. A may hold land for the use of B, or for the use of A and B; or A and B may hold it for the use of A or B. But if A undertake to hold it for the use of himself alone, the equitable estate is ordinarily merged in the legal.¹

The phrase, "*not issuing out of the land*, but as a thing collateral," distinguishes the use and trust from such interests as mortgages, judgments, terms of years and other liens, claims, and rights, which issue out of the land itself, and are binding in law upon every person into whose hands it may come.² This is further explained by the statement, "annexed in privity to the estate in the land, *and to the person touching the land*," i. e., to the person of the holder of the legal title because he is such holder. A mortgage, or other legal lien or claim, is attached to the land *per se*, regardless of who may be the owner. A use or trust is attached primarily to the *legal owner* of the land, and through him, collaterally, to the land.³ And, if the title leave him and pass to one who does not claim under him, or to one who purchases for value and without notice of the confidence, the use or trust is thereby destroyed.⁴ So, if the trustee be disseised, or if he be turned out of possession by a person having a paramount title, the disseisor or adverse holder is not bound by the trust or confidence because there is no

¹ Goodright *v.* Wells, Doug. 771; Hamwood *v.* Ogländer, 8 Ves. 106, 127; Wade *v.* Paget, 1 Bro. Ch. 363; Woodward *v.* James, 115 N. Y. 346; Carr *v.* Richardson, 156 Mass. 576; Greene *v.* Greene, 125 N. Y. 506; Robertson *v.* Brulatour, 188 N. Y. 301, 317; Matter of Radam M. K. Co., 110 N. Y. App. Div. 329, 330; Merrill *v.* Hayden, 86 Me. 133. It has been held in some cases, and may safely be taken as generally accepted law, that where one of the beneficiaries is sole trustee — as where A is trustee for A and B, his own beneficial interest merges in his legal ownership. Bolles *v.* State Trust Co., 27 N. J. Eq.

308; Woodward *v.* James, 115 N. Y. 346, 357. It has been said by the New York Court of Appeals that "the appointment of the beneficiary as trustee *by the court*, on the death or resignation of the testamentary trustee, does not extinguish the trust." Losey *v.* Stanley, 147 N. Y. 560, 568.

² Lewin on Trusts, p. *15.

³ Finch's Case, 4 Inst. 85; Gilbert on Uses, 429; Reeves *v.* Evans, 34 Atl. Rep. 477 (N. J. Eq.).

⁴ Finch's Case, 4 Inst. 85; Bassett *v.* Nosworthy, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 218, and cases cited; § 247, *supra*.

privity of estate between him and the ousted trustee.¹ In a word, the creation of a use or trust separates the estate into two parts — legal and equitable — and gives to the owner of the equitable estate thus formed the right to enforce his claim against the trustee, or feoffee to uses, and against all persons into whose hands the legal estate may come, except adverse or paramount owners and innocent purchasers for value without notice of the use or trust.

The last clause of Lord Coke's definition — “for which *cestui que trust* has no remedy but by subpoena in chancery” — was, at the time when it was written, an accurate statement of the means by which the owner of the use or trust could enforce his rights and protect his interest, and it clearly expresses the reason for calling such an interest an equitable estate; but, as will be more fully explained hereafter, the result of statutes and of the tendency of all judicial tribunals to follow the correct lead of equity has been to give to other courts considerable cognizance of uses and trusts and important forms of remedies for the owners of these equitable estates.²

Having thus ascertained the nature of a use, as it arose and flourished in early English law, we have next to examine its requisites and chief characteristics, before it was affected by the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10, and the rules and constructions based on that famous enactment.

§ 300. **The Three Requisites of a Use.** — Three things were

¹ 1 Perry on Trusts, § 14; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 445. “All those persons who take under the trustee by operation of law are privies, both in estate and in person, to the trustee. Thus those who take as heirs under the trustee, or as tenants in dower or curtesy, or by extent of an execution, or by an assignment in insolvency or bankruptcy, are bound by the trust. It has been thought that a lord, who takes by an escheat, or by a title paramount, would not be bound by the trust; but the point has not been adjudged.” 1 Perry on Trusts, § 15, citing *Leake v. Leake*, 5 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 361, 366; *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Eden, 177, 203. See also *Otis v. Otis*, 167 Mass. 245; 1 Lewin on Trusts, pp. *15, *16.

² The old court of chancery, as such, no longer exists in England, and

all branches of the High Court take cognizance of equitable rights and remedies. A similar result is produced in most of the states of this country by the amalgamation of the courts by the codes of procedure. But, in England, the Chancery Division is still the proper branch of the court in which to enforce express trusts; and all of the amalgamated courts in the United States have equity sides, or “terms,” to which the cognizance of uses and trusts more especially belongs. See “Supreme Court of Judicature Act,” 36 & 37 Vict. ch. 66; 44 & 45 Vict. ch. 68; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 217, 484, 2988, 3339; *McCartney v. Bostwick*, 32 N. Y. 53, 57; *Kennedy v. Fury*, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 72; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 17. See Underhill, *Trusts & Trustees* (Amer. ed.) pp. 2, 3.

necessary to the existence of a use, namely, (a) a subject-matter, or as it was frequently styled a *use*, in being, (b) a feoffee to uses in being, and (c) a *cestui que use* in being.

(a) No real property, corporeal or incorporeal, except such as was *in esse* at the time and capable of having the seisin thereof, or what answered to the seisin, transferred at once to the feoffee to uses, could be the subject-matter held or conveyed to use.¹ Nothing could be so conveyed or held, whereof the use or enjoyment is inseparable from the possession, such as annuities, commons and ways in gross.² And, while one who was seised of land might grant it to another for the use of a third person for a term of years, yet he who had no interest for himself other than a leasehold for years, since he had no *seisin*, could not so deal with the property.³ But all realty, of which one could have the present seisin whether in possession, reversion, or remainder, and which was not property *quæ ipso usu consumantur*, could be made by him the subject-matter of a use.⁴

(b) All natural persons, who could be feoffees of land at common law, could be feoffees to uses. Even infants and married women, being capable of taking and holding the legal title to realty, were compellable by chancery to hold it as feoffees to the use of other persons.⁵ Corporations were declared to be incapable of holding such a position, chiefly because there were no means of compelling them to recognize the rights of the beneficiary;⁶ and the king was also beyond the reach of such obligations, for "the arms of equity are very short against the prerogative."⁷ But it is now uniformly held that any corporation may be seised to uses, provided that they and their objects are not foreign to the purposes of its own existence.⁸

(c) All persons, whether natural or artificial, who could

¹ Lord Willoughby's Case, W. Jo. 127.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *331; Beaudely v. Brooks, Cro. Jac. 189.

³ Lord Willoughby's Case, W. Jo. 127; Yelverton v. Yelverton, Cro. Eliz. 401.

⁴ Crabb, R. P. §§ 1610, 1611; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *331; 2 Wash. R. P. p. *98; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 52.

⁵ Bac. Read. 58; Crabb, R. P. § 1607; Hill on Trustees, 48; Comm'rs v. Walker, 6 How. (Miss.) 143, 146.

⁶ Plowd. 102; Bacon on Uses, 57; Sugden, V. & P. p. 417.

⁷ Pawlett v. Atty.-Gen., Hard. 465, 467; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 255; Briggs v. Light-Boats, 11 Allen (Mass.), 157.

⁸ Atty.-Gen. v. St. John's Hospital, 2 DeG. J. & Sm. 621; Trustees of Phillips Academy v. King, 12 Mass. 546; Matter of Howe, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 214; Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 422; Perry on Trusts, §§ 42, 43.

hold property at common law, could be *cestuis que use*.¹ But an alien was uniformly forbidden to become *cestui que use* of property of which he was not capable of holding the legal title.² It frequently occurred that real property was conveyed to a feoffee "for the use" of one who was not in being or not yet ascertainable, as for the use of the oldest child of one who had no child, or to the use of the woman who might subsequently become the wife of a designated single man. In such a case, the feoffee took the legal title at once; but, since one of the requisites of a use was wanting, no use existed until the designated beneficiary was in being and definitely ascertained. When the *cestui que use* thus came *in esse*, the use sprang up in his or her favor.³

§ 301. **Characteristics of the Use before the Statute of Uses.** — In those early times the cognizance and control of uses was solely in the Court of Chancery (or Equity). In dealing with them, that tribunal in some respects followed the rules of law, in others departed widely from them. And it was because of the many instances in which it refused to apply those rules to the use that that equitable estate came to be a species of valuable interest, divested of most of the burdens and responsibilities which ordinarily accompany the ownership of property.

The maxim "Equity follows the law" was then not at all fully applied to these interests; and, when it was applied this was done chiefly in holding them subject to the same principles as legal estates in regard to their duration and devolution. Thus, they were descendible in the same manner as legal interests.⁴ And, if A were enfeoffed of a lot of land to the use of B and his heirs, B would thereby acquire an estate in fee simple in the use; if it were to the use of B while he lived, he would take a life estate, and so of an estate for years etc., the words denoting the extent or duration of the interest being given *prima facie* the same effect when applied to a use which they had at law when applied to the legal estate.⁵ It

¹ Sand. Uses, 370; 1 Lewin on Trusts, p. *43; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 60.

² Tud. Lead. Cas. R. P. 254; Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon, 1 Beav. 79; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 64. See Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357.

³ The "springing use," which thus

came into being, and the "shifting use," which was similar to it, are explained hereafter as forms of future estates.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *330; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 454.

⁵ Sugden's Gilbert on Uses, ch. 1, § 2; Year Book, 5 Edw. IV. 7 b.

was not necessary, however, that any technical words of inheritance or limitation, such as "heirs," or "heirs of his body," should be employed to create estates of inheritance in a use,¹ although such words were required in a deed in order to create *legal* estates of inheritance. In dealing with the use, equity carried out the intention of the parties, when it was clearly expressed by any form of words which they chose to employ. And, while technical words would ordinarily be given their technical meaning, this would not be done if a different intent were clearly expressed by the parties to the transaction.² Equity also allowed uses to be disposed of by will,³ although the feudal principles at that time (and until the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII. ch. 1) forbade devises of the legal estates. Thus, if A held land to the use of B and his heirs, while the legal title could not be willed away, yet at B's death B might devise the use to C, and thereafter A would be compelled by the Court of Chancery to hold the land for the use of C or his grantees or devisees. It was by willing away uses in this manner that the prohibition imposed by the feudal system upon devises of real property was largely overcome.⁴ By *act inter vivos*, also, the *cestui que use* could freely sell or otherwise dispose of the use; and he might do this by deed, or writing not under seal, or mere oral instructions to the feoffee to uses.⁵ But, though often in possession of the land, the *cestui que use* could not alien the *legal* estate without the consent of the feoffee to uses, because he had no ownership thereof.⁶

In most other respects, the Court of Chancery departed

¹ 1 Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. ii. §§ 26, 27; Tud. Lead. Cas. R. P. 253; 1 Spence, Eq. Jnr. 452; Cornish, Uses, 19.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *331; 1 Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. ii. §§ 20, 21.

³ Co. Lit. 271 b, Butler's note, 231; Crabb, R. P. § 1616.

⁴ Thus A, owning land of which he wished to dispose by will, would convey it to B to the use of A and to the use also of such persons as A might name in his will as *cestuis que use*. Then A would will away the use, and after A's death B would hold the legal title for the devisees. "Lord Bacon observes that one of the reasons why so much land was conveyed to uses was, because persons acquired by that means the

power of disposing of their property by will; which enabled them to make a much better provision for their families than they could otherwise have done." 1 Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. ii. § 36; Sir Edward Clere's Case, 6 Rep. 17 b; Tud. Lead. Cas. R. P. 268.

⁵ 1 Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. ii. §§ 25-27; Crabb, R. P. § 1614; Cornish, Uses, 19; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 454. It was not until the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II. ch. 3, that a writing was required by law, in disposing of a use or trust *inter vivos*. By § 7 of that chapter, all declarations of trusts or confidences in real property were required to be "*manifested and proved*" by some writing.

⁶ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *331.

from the rules of law in dealing with uses. The use, being a mere impalpable abstraction, could not be affected by the common-law property incidents which grew out of the doctrines of feudal seisin and tenure. Therefore a *cestui que use* could not be disseised or dispossessed of his use by an adverse claimant.¹ Therefore, also, there arose novel and important methods of creating and transferring uses, which will be explained hereafter.² So it was decided that there should be neither curtesy nor dower in a use.³ The lord was not entitled to an escheat on failure of heirs of the *cestui que use*;⁴ nor, except for certain changes introduced by legislation, was the king entitled to any forfeiture of the use for crime,⁵ or the creditor of its owner to reach it for the payment of his debt.⁶

Thus the use was divested of most of the plain and ordinary incidents of real property; and, while it was owned subject to the legal estate resting in the feoffee to uses and affected by legal incidents as against him,⁷ yet its owner could incur debts, commit crimes, secretly sell or encumber his property, or otherwise act in ways unfair or unjust towards others, without fear of any loss or diminution of his use, except by his own voluntary act or the crime, covin, or marriage of the feoffee to uses.⁸ Some of the results of this state of affairs, as expressed by Lord Bacon, were that "A man, that had cause to sue for land, knew not against whom to bring his action, or who was the owner of it. The wife was defrauded of her thirds; the husband of his curtesy; the lord of his wardship,

¹ 2 Wash. R. P. p. *106, par. 26.

² See Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 328-343.

³ "And therefore it became customary, when most estates were put in use, to settle before marriage some joint estate to the use of the husband and wife for their lives; which was the original of modern jointures." 2 Blackst. Com. *p. 331.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *330; Sugden's Gilbert on Uses, ch. i, §§ 2, 5, 6.

⁵ This was remedied by early legislation, such as the statute 21, Rich. II. ch. 3, and the later statute 33 Hen. VIII. ch. 20, § 2, which made uses forfeitable upon attainder for treason. Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. ii. § 31; 3 Inst. 19; Chudleigh's Case, 1 Rep. 114, 121; Tud.

Lead. Cas. R. P. 253; Jackson d. Gratz v. Catlin, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 248, 261.

⁶ Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. ii. § 35. For the law court had no process that could reach it. 2 Blackst. Com. p. *331.

Most of these incidents of ownership — curtesy, liability for debts, etc. — were annexed to the use, or trust, after the Statute of Uses was enacted. See pp. 425, 426, *infra*.

⁷ The use, in this period before the Statute of Uses, was subject to the feudal duties and obligations of the feoffee to uses — to the dower of his wife or to the curtesy of her husband — and to the danger of being forfeited for his treason or felony. Sand. Uses, 67; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 445.

⁸ *Ibid*.

relief, heriot,¹ and escheat; the creditor of his extent for debt; and the poor tenant of his lease."²

Through a series of years, many attempts were made to cure or prevent by statute these mischiefs and hardships. Instances of such attempts were the statutes 50 Edw. III. ch. 6, 1 Rich. II. ch. 9, and 19 Hen. VII. ch. 15, which aimed to enable creditors to take lands held to the use of their debtors; 4 Hen. VII. ch. 17, which sought to restore to the lord his wardships and reliefs in respect to realty held by one for the use of another; and 1 Rich. III. ch. 1, whereby the *cestui que use* was authorized to alien the legal estate in the land without the concurrence or consent of the feoffee to uses.³ But the subtlety of those who were endeavoring to perpetuate secret uses and their fruits was enabled to evade practically all of such enactments. The last one here mentioned — 1 Rich. III. ch. 1 — became of itself a fruitful source of perplexity and confusion. For it enabled the *cestui que use* to sell the legal estate, without depriving the feoffee to uses of the same power which the common law gave to him;⁴ and the result was that they both sometimes sold the land, at about the same time, one to one purchaser and the other to another, and both vendees apparently had perfect titles while claiming adversely to each other.⁵ Finally, such inconsistencies and evasions were sought to be done away with, and the objects of all the prior enactments merged, in the famous "Statute of Uses," 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10, which will be next discussed.

§ 302. **The Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10 (1535).** — After reciting the numerous evils which it was intended to abolish,⁶ the Statute of Uses enacted, in substance, that when-

¹ A heriot was "a customary tribute of goods and chattels, payable to the lord of the fee on the decease of the owner of the land." Bouvier, Law Dict.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *331, *332. These difficulties are stated in detail in the preamble to the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10.

³ See such acts as these more fully set forth and explained in Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. ii. §§ 41-45.

⁴ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 345, note.

⁵ See Bispham's Prin. Eq. Jur. § 53.

⁶ The preamble is long and recites a great variety of abuses which resulted from secret uses, trusts and confidences. Especially it declares that the objects of the enactment were "for the extirping and extinguishment of all such subtle practiced feoffments, fines, recoveries, abuses, and errors heretofore used and accustomed in this realm . . . and to the intent that the king's highness, or any other his subject of this realm, shall not in any wise hereafter, by any means or inventions be deceived, damaged, or hurt by reason of such trusts, uses and confidences."

ever any person should be *seised* of real property to the use of another, the *cestui que use* should have the legal estate and possession *in the same quality, manner, form and condition* in which he had the use.¹ Its object was to do away with uses, by uniting the legal and equitable estates in the *cestui que use* and thus merging the latter estate in the former. The feoffee to uses was made a mere figure-head, from whom the legal estate and possession should pass as soon as the use vested in another person.² In the language of conveyancing, the statute was said to *execute* the use; i. e., it *destroyed* the use by merging it in the legal estate brought over to its owner from the feoffee to uses.³ It did this when the feoffee to uses, or holder of the legal estate, had the *seisin* of the property. And this process of execution was the investing of the *cestui que use* with the legal estate, *in the same quality, manner, form and condition* in which he had the use. Thus, if A were *seised* of one piece of land for the use of B in fee simple, of a second piece for the use of C for his life, of a third for the use of D as long as he should live on the land, and of a fourth for the use of E for ten years provided he did not attempt to assign his interest, the statute would execute all of these uses, and thereby confer the legal estate in the one piece of land upon B in fee simple, in the second piece upon C for his life, in the third upon D as long as he should live on the land, and in the fourth upon E for ten years provided he did not attempt to assign his interest. The statute consisted of thirteen sections, dealt carefully with several important interests much affected by uses, such as the jointure of a wife in lieu of her dower, and, among other consequences, was held to have done away entirely with the power of disposing of interests in realty by will, which power had been theretofore one of the most important results of the employment of uses.⁴ But the main and essen-

¹ Sections 1-3 of the statute; Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) pp. 347-351; Cruise, *Dig. tit. xi. ch. iii. § 4.*

² "The object of the statute was, by joining the possession or *seisin* to the use and interest (or, in other words by providing that all the estate which would by the common law have passed to the grantee to uses should instantly be taken out of him and vested in *cestui que use*), to annihilate altogether the distinction between the legal and beneficial owner-

ship, to make the ostensible tenant in every case also the legal tenant, liable to his lord for feudal dues and services — wardship, marriage, and the rest." Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 346; *Bac. Law Tracts*, 322; *Sand. Uses*, 66, 87; *Wms. R. P.* p. * 159; *Chudleigh's Case*, 1 Rep. 114, 124.

³ 2 *Blackst. Com. p.* * 333; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 53.

⁴ The courts held that, since under the statute the person to whom a use

tial change, which it proposed and of which its other features were incidents or results, was the *execution* of uses as above explained.

§ 303. **How the Statute of Uses was interpreted and construed.** — “The Statute of Uses,” said Lord Bacon, “is the most perfectly and exactly conceived and penned of any law in the books.”¹ But it opposed the current of general opinion and popular demand as to the ownership of real property; and the curious result was that its effects were directly the reverse of its purpose as conceived by its framers and enactors.² By means of it, unexpected forms of secret conveyances were introduced and have continued to be employed down to the present time. These will be hereafter discussed, in the portion of this work which deals with titles and conveyancing. By a strict and almost strained construction of the language of the statute, the old distinction between legal and equitable ownership and estates was also revived; and the use continued to flourish, though under the new name of a trust.³

After the enactment of the statute, the courts of common law, following out its intent, began to take cognizance of uses. Its interpretation and construction were mainly the work of those courts.⁴ Some of the results, at which they arrived, were undoubtedly correct and necessary. Thus, they held that, since the legal estate must leave the feoffee to use the instant he received it, the land could no longer escheat or be forfeited by his act or defect, nor be liable to dower or curtesy because of the seisin of such feoffee, nor be aliened by him discharged of the use. So the interest of the *cestui que use*, since it now included the legal estate, was held to be liable

was devised would acquire the legal estate as soon as he acquired the use, to will away the use was in effect to will away the legal estate. And, as a disposition of the latter by will was forbidden by the feudal law, it was decided that the statute of uses wholly did away with the possibility of devising realty. It would have been equally as logical, if not more so, for the courts to have argued that the will dealt with the use only and the fact that the statute then annexed the legal estate to the use was a result with which the will had nothing to do. The latter course of reasoning would have retained devises

of uses. But it was not adopted; and the result was that there were no wills of realty in England for five years — from the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10 (1535), to the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII. ch. 1 (1540). This fact is said to have been among the causes which led to the insurrection of 1536. 3 Froude's Hist. Eng. 91; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 346, n.

¹ Law Tracts, 324.

² Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 346, 347.

³ 1 Perry on Trusts, § 6.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *333.

to ordinary common-law incidents, such as curtesy, forfeiture for crime, escheat, etc.¹ But the facts that the statute did not produce the results for which it was enacted and that uses continued to flourish, even with renewed vigor, were due to several strict and technical decisions of those same courts of law. Before discussing the three most important of those decisions — *the* three constructions which decided the destiny of uses and trusts — it is to be noted that it was held that the statute did not execute uses limited of copyhold lands,² nor uses of mere chattels,³ nor contingent uses as long as the events had not happened upon which the vesting of the uses depended.⁴

The *first* of the three most important decisions related to uses in estates for years. Since the statute was to operate only where one person was *seised* to the use of another, it was held by the courts of common law that it did not execute any use where the holder of the legal title had no greater interest than an estate for years.⁵ Thus, if land were conveyed to A for ten years, for the use of B for ten years, this use would not be executed, since A had no *seisin* and the case was clearly not within the *letter* of the statute. But it is to be carefully noted that, when the conveyance was to A and his heirs for the use of B for ten years, or to A for life for the use of B for ten years, since in such cases A had the *seisin*, the statute did operate and transfer the legal estate to B, to continue during the same term of years for which he was given the use.⁶

Second. It was further determined, by the common-law courts, that, when the feoffee to uses was required to convey the land, or to receive the rents and profits and pay them over to the beneficiary, or to perform any other active duties in regard to the property, the use, or trust, was not executed by the statute.⁷ Such a settlement made an *active trust*. And it has been uniformly and correctly held that such a trust was not within the *spirit* of the statute.⁸ To have concluded otherwise would often have resulted in taking the management of property from a competent trustee and placing it in

¹ Last preceding note.

² Gilbert, Ten. 170; Co. Lit. 272 a.

³ 1 Perry on Trusts, § 6.

⁴ Sanders, Uses, 240 *et seq.*

⁵ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *336; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 6.

⁶ 2 Prest. Conv. 219; Tud. Lead.

Cas. R. P. 265; Wms. R. P. pp. *184-
*188.

⁷ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *336; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 6; Kay v. Scates, 37 Pa. St. 31, 37; Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 611.

⁸ Pugh v. Hayes, 113 Mo. 424; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 96.

the hands of an infant, a lunatic, or some other incapacitated *cestui que trust*.

Third. The farthest reaching and most strictly technical of these three important adjudications was the decision in *Tyrrel's Case*, to the effect that the statute would not execute a use "limited on a use;" i. e., if a use were created upon a use, the statute would execute only the first use, and would thus vest and retain the legal estate in the first named *cestui que use*.¹ Thus, upon the conveyance of land to A, for the use of B, for the use of C (or in trust or confidence for C), it was decided in this case, by the common-law court, that the statute would immediately transfer the legal estate from A to B and would then cease to operate upon it and leave it in B. And the same result must follow, no matter how many successive uses were declared in the instrument of conveyance. Accordingly, if realty were granted to A for the use of B, for the use of C, in trust for D, in confidence for E, the statute would simply take the legal estate to B, the first-named beneficiary, and there it must remain so far as the statute was concerned. Having operated once, in executing the first use, the force of the statute upon that conveyance was declared to be wholly expended; and it could not affect the other uses or trusts declared. "About the time of passing the Statute of Uses," says Mr. Watkins, "some wise man, in the plenitude of legal learning, declared there could not be a use upon a use. This wise dec-

¹ Dyer, 155. Divested of its technicalities, the effect of the conveyance of the land, by Jane Tyrrel in this case, was that she was to have the legal estate, for the use of her son, for the use of herself during her life, and, upon her death, for the use of her son and the heirs of his body, but if he had no heirs of his body then for the use of his heirs generally. In an opinion of three lines, the court declared that the statute executed the use in the son, that it then ceased to affect the title, and that the legal estate would not be taken from him by any further operation of the statute. "*Use ne poit estre engendre de use*," etc. At no point does English law bear stronger traces of the realistic doctrines of the Schoolmen than in such decisions as that of *Tyrrel's Case*. The mode of thought, which gave rise to such adjudications, has entirely passed

away. It treated the abstract use as a *real thing*, which must have injected into it a substantial seisin before it could be transformed into a legal estate. And the argument was that, when livery of seisin was made to A, for the use of B, for the use of C, there was no seisin given to B by the act of the parties. Nothing but a use was given to him. He held a use for C, but no seisin. When the statute took the seisin and legal estate from A, it took them for B and not for C. This was the same kind of reasoning which led to the doctrine of *scintilla juisis*, hereafter explained in connection with shifting uses. Also 36 Hen. VIII. B. N. C. 284; *Doe dem. Lloyd v. Passingham*, 6 Barn. & Cres. 305; *Reid v. Gordon*, 35 Md. 174, 183; *Croxall v. Shererd*, 72 U. S. 268; *Sanders, Uses*, 276; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 6.

laration, which must have surprised every one who was not sufficiently learned to have lost his common sense, was adopted and still is adopted, and upon it (at least chiefly) has been built up the present system of uses and trusts.”¹ For the courts of equity proceeded at once to declare that, in instances like those above stated, B was bound in good conscience to hold the property in trust for C, and C likewise must hold his equitable interest upon the further confidence or trust, if any, declared in the instrument of conveyance. And those courts proceeded by subpoena, as before the statute, to compel the owner of the legal estate (the one to whom the statute had transferred it—the first-named *cestui que use*—B, in the illustrations above given) and all the other designated beneficiaries to recognize and perform the trusts, duties, and confidences imposed upon them by the terms of the conveyance or settlement.² The use was thus restored, in full vigor, notwithstanding the Statute of Uses; but, in order to retain it, it was now usually necessary to convey the legal estate to one in whom it was not meant to remain, for the use of him in whom it was intended that it should remain, for the use of (or in trust for) the intended beneficiary. For example, if before the statute was enacted it were desired that A should hold a piece of land for the use of B, it was only necessary to convey it “to A for the use of B,” and thereupon A would hold the legal estate and B the equitable. If it were desired to bring about the same result after the statute went into operation, and Tyrrel’s Case had been decided, it could be done by conveying the property “to X for the use of A, for the use of B.” The statute then instantly vested the legal estate in A, and equity compelled him, as before, to hold it for the use of B. The desired effect was directly produced, before the statute was enacted; and afterwards it was produced indirectly by introducing a mere “dummy” as the first feoffee, and saying “to the use” twice. Hence the language of Lord Hardwicke as to the effects of the decision in Tyrrel’s Case: “By this means, a statute made

¹ Watkins, Conv. Introd. xx. “It had been settled before the statute, as a rule of property, that a use could not be raised upon a use.” 1 Perry on Trusts, § 6. The fundamental principle, therefore, upon which was rested the rule in Tyrrel’s Case, was that a use could not exist upon a use, and if such a thing were attempted the second

use was void—that, if land were conveyed to A for the use of B, for the use of C, C got no use, and therefore he had nothing to which the statute could carry the legal title. See citations of preceding note.

² Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581; Wms. R. P. p. *161; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 6.

upon great consideration, introduced in a solemn and pompous manner, by this strict construction, has had no other effect than to add, at most, three words," *to the use*;" to a conveyance."¹ The doctrine of Tyrrel's Case is elementary law in those states of this country in which it has not been changed by statute.² (a)

§ 304. **How the Court of Chancery retained the Use, under the Name of a Trust.** — By the above-explained constructions of the Statutes of Uses, — chiefly by that in Tyrrel's Case, — and by the advantage taken of them by the courts of equity, the use, as such, continued to exist. But if it had been retained with all its objectionable features, which had caused the enactment of the Statute of Uses, there can be no doubt but that legislation would ultimately have swept it entirely out of existence. Therefore it behooved the court of chancery, or equity, which was endeavoring to preserve the use, to so deal with it as to remove the incentives for the enactment of another and possibly a more stringent statute of uses. This was done by giving to the old use a new name, and new and more equitable incidents and characteristics.

The original distinction between a use and a trust has been heretofore explained.³ After the decision in Tyrrel's Case, and the consequent revival of the use, this distinction in nomenclat-

(a) In New York, the rule of Tyrrel's Case has been abrogated since Jan. 1, 1830. The statute, which was formerly 1 R. S. 737, §§ 47, 48, is now § 92 of ch. 52, L. 1909 (Real Prop. Law), and reads as follows: "Every person who, by virtue of any grant, assignment, or devise, is entitled both to the actual possession of real property, and to the receipt of the rents and profits thereof, in law or equity, shall be deemed to have a legal estate therein, of the same quality and duration, and subject to the same conditions as his beneficial interest; but this section does not divest the estate of the trustee in any trust existing on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and thirty, where the title of such trustee is not merely nominal, but is connected with some power of actual disposition or management in relation to the real property which is the subject of the trust." *Wendt v. Walsh*, 164 N. Y. 154. See also note on New York express trusts, at the end of Ch. XXI. *infra*.

¹ *Hopkins v. Hopkins*, 1 Atk. 581; *Wms. R. P.* p. *160; *Digby*, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 372.

² See, for example, *Martling v. Martling*, 55 N. J. Eq. 771, 780; *Cushing v. Blake*, 30 N. J. Eq. 689. In many of the United States, such as Georgia, Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin,

the rule in Tyrrel's Case is abolished by statute; and where the holder of the legal estate is not given any active duty to perform, that estate passes to the ultimate beneficiary named in the grant or devise. 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 1701, 1702.

³ § 298, *supra*.

ure was discarded; and both of these forms of equitable estates were called *trusts*.¹ When, therefore, real property was conveyed to A, for the use of B, for the use of C, B became *trustee* for C, and C, to whom the "second use" was given, was the *cestui que trust*. It then became necessary to make the division, which is still retained, of all express trusts into two classes, namely, active and passive. The passive express trust of to-day is the old use with its new name; and the active express trust is practically the trust so called before the Statute of Uses.

The incidents and characteristics of the use, now called a passive express trust, were also materially changed, by the application to it of the maxim that "equity follows the law."² By this is meant that, as far as their inherent nature will permit, equity applies to these equitable estates those rules of law by which legal titles and interests are regulated.³ Thus, they are descendible, devisable, and alienable in the same manner as legal estates.⁴ They may be reached in equity by creditors for the satisfaction of debts;⁵ in England by virtue of statutes,⁶ and in this country by judicial decisions, they may escheat on the death of their owners without heirs who can inherit them,⁷ and they are forfeitable for treason.⁸ In applying the maxim that equity follows the law, it was soon decided, also, that a husband may have curtesy in the equitable estates owned by his wife, unless on there being conveyed to her for her sole and separate use his marital rights in them are expressly

¹ Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 372.

² *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Wm. Blackst. 123, 155; *Croxall v. Shererd*, 72 U. S. 268, 281.

³ Bispham's *Prin. Eq.* § 38. See *Magniac v. Thomson*, 15 How. (U. S.) 281; *Hedges v. Dixon Co.*, 150 U. S. 182-192.

⁴ *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Wm. Blackst. 155, 161; *Price v. Sisson*, 13 N. J. Eq. 168, 174; *Cornwell v. Orton*, 126 Mo. 355; *Faries' Appeal*, 23 Pa. St. 29; *Fearne, Cont. Rem.* p. 284; 2 *Lewin on Trusts*, p. *823.

⁵ The *cestui que trust* can not hold and enjoy the property freed from the duty of having it applied to the satisfaction of his debts. And this has been the rule of equity, practically ever since the decision in *Tyrral's Case*. Dum-

por's *Case*, 1 Smith's *Lead. Cas.* 119, Judge Hare's note; *Nichols v. Levy*, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 433, 441; *Hallett v. Thompson*, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 583; *Blackstone Bank v. Davis*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 42; *Easterly v. Keney*, 36 Conn. 18, 22; *Taylor v. Harwell*, 65 Ala. 1.

⁶ 47 & 48 *Vict. ch.* 71, § 4.

⁷ *Johnston v. Spicer*, 107 N. Y. 185; *Matthews v. Ward*, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443, 454.

⁸ This is the result of statute in England. 33 *Hen. VIII. ch.* 20. Before this, in all cases of forfeiture, the trustee took the property freed from the trust. *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 *Eden*, 199. In this country, practically the only forfeiture of property is for treason, during the life of the person attainted, and this applies to all kinds of property alike.

excluded.¹ But, when the question arose as the wife's dower in property held in trust for her husband, it was decided that she should not be endowed of such estates, because presumably she was already provided for by a jointure or marriage settlement, and titles would be disarranged by giving her dower.² And such was the law of England, until by the Dower Act of 1834 (3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 105) this anomaly was removed, and dower was added as an incident to equitable estates. In most of the states of this country, a widow has always been dowable out of equitable estates of her husband.³ It is to be added that, in dealing with *executory* trusts, which will be more fully explained hereafter,⁴ and which are trusts in an inchoate condition, with their full quality or duration yet to be determined by the trustee, equity will often refuse to apply the strict rules by which legal estates are governed.⁵

In a general summary, it may be said that, after the decision in *Tyrrel's Case*, the courts of equity retained the old use with the new appellation of a trust, and applied to it the same principles which courts of law apply to legal estates, except that, for a long time they recognized no dower in it, in many instances they refused to follow the law in dealing with executory trusts, and they would not follow the law in cases in which such a course would be inconsistent with the nature of the equitable estate itself, as in the instance of the exclusion of curtesy from a trust for the sole and separate use of a married woman. By these methods, equity retained, moulded, and perfected the different forms of trusts, which now constitute so large and important a part of our real property, and which are next to be classified and discussed.

¹ *Roberts v. Dixwell*, 1 Atk. 607; *Morgan v. Morgan*, 5 Madd. 408; *Cochran v. O'Hern*, 4 W. & S. (Pa.) 95, 99; *Rigler v. Cloud*, 14 Pa. St. 361, 363; *Lewin on Trusts*, pp. *11, *221, *733; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 323.

² *Co. Lit.* 208 a (n. 105); *D'Arcy v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 387; *Mayburry v. Brien*, 15 Pet. (U. S.) 21, 38; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 323.

³ *Shoemaker v. Walker*, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 554; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 318; *Mershon v. Duer*, 40 N. J. Eq. 333; *Stroup v. Stroup*, 140

Ind. 179. See *Phelps v. Phelps*, 143 N. Y. 197; *Nichols v. Park*, 78 N. Y. App. Div. 95. But in Maine and Massachusetts a wife is not dowable of her husband's equitable estates. *Hamlin v. Hamlin*, 19 Me. 141; *Reed v. Whitney*, 7 Gray (Mass.), 533; *Lobdell v. Hayes*, 4 Allen (Mass.), 187.

⁴ § 309, *infra*.

⁵ *Wood v. Burnham*, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 513; *Pillot v. Landon*, 46 N. J. Eq. 310, 313; *Bartlett v. Remington*, 59 N. H. 364; 4 *Kent's Com. p.* *219.

(2) TRUSTS.

CHAPTER XX.

KINDS OF TRUSTS.

§ 305. Classification of trusts.	§ 309. Executed and executory trusts.
§ 306. Trusts, lawful and unlawful.	§ 310. Trusts, <i>a.</i> Express [(a) Active, (b) passive], and <i>b.</i> Implied [(a) resulting, (b) constructive].
§ 307. Trusts, active or special, and passive, simple, or general.	
§ 308. Trusts, private and public, or charitable.	

§ 305. **Classifications of Trusts.** — The different methods of classifying trusts, which have been adopted by courts and text-writers, may often lead to confusion, unless the reader is constantly alert as to the meaning which is to be attached in each case to the terms employed. This is specially true as to the expression “implied trusts.” It is, therefore, necessary, in approaching the discussion of trusts, to explain carefully the meanings of the various kinds of them which are to be described and examined. The divisions and meanings here adopted are believed to be those which are most natural and most commonly accepted and used by the best judges and writers.

§ 306. **Trusts, Lawful and Unlawful.** — One division of all trusts, which practically defines itself, is into *lawful* and *unlawful*. Most trusts are, of course, lawful; that is, they exist for some fair and honest purpose recognized and upheld by law. An illustration of an unlawful trust would be one for some vicious or immoral purpose, or otherwise in violation of public policy or statutes; as a trust to encourage crime, or to violate the excise laws, or the statutes of mortmain, or those in regard to aliens,¹ or the rules hereafter ex-

¹ Bacon on Uses, 9; *Servis v. Nelson*, Mass. 9; *Dunham v. Presby*, 120 Mass. 285.
14 N. J. Eq. 94; *Snell v. Dwight*, 120

plained against perpetuities or accumulations.¹ Equity brought the trust into existence, as a new estate; but no court will uphold it for any illegal purpose.

§ 307. **Trusts, Active or Special, and Passive, Simple, or General.**—As already explained, an active or special trust is one in which something is required to be done by the trustee, in order to carry out the intention of the settler, as to keep the property in repair, to sell or mortgage it, to receive the rents and profits, and to pay them over to the *cestui que trust*, and the like; while a passive trust—or, as it is sometimes called, a simple or general trust—merely vests the legal title in the trustee as a kind of receptacle, but imposes no active duty upon him.² Most of the implied trusts (as the word “implied” is used in this treatise) are passive; while some express trusts are active and others passive. Therefore trusts as active and passive are more fully discussed hereafter, as subdivisions of express trusts.

§ 308. **Trusts, Private and Public, or Charitable.**—Private trusts are those in which the beneficial interests are vested in one or more individuals, or families, who are definitely ascertained, or may be so within a certain time. They must not only be for the benefit of certain and determined individuals; but they are also generally limited in their duration, being restricted in time, by the so-called rule against perpetuities, to a period of not more than a life or lives in being and twenty-one years, and the period of gestation of a child in addition.³ Public or *charitable* trusts are not thus restricted, but have three leading and distinguishing features, namely: *first*, their purpose must be some public utility, and, therefore, they must exist for the benefit of the public generally, or of some considerable portion of it which answers to a particular description;⁴ *second*, their beneficiaries must be indefinite as to the individuals⁵ and *third*, they are not restricted, as to time, by the rule against perpetuities, but

¹ *Central Trust Co. v. Egleston*, 185 N. Y. 23. The rules against perpetuities and accumulations, ch. lxx, *infra*; Gray, *Perpetuities*, ch. iv; Chaplin, *Suspension of Power of Alienation*, ch. ii.

² § 298, *supra*.

³ *Rice v. Barrett*, 102 N. Y. 161; *Manice v. Manice*, 43 N. Y. 303.

⁴ *Doyle v. Whalen*, 87 Me. 414, 425; *Lewin on Trusts*, p. *20; 2 *Perry on Trusts*, § 697.

⁵ *Philadelphia v. Fox* 64 Pa. St. 169, 182; *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539, 550; *Hopkins v. Grimshaw*, 165 U. S. 342, 352.

may be made to continue indefinitely.¹ Charitable trusts will be more fully discussed hereafter, as one of the forms of express trusts.

§ 309. **Executed and Executory Trusts.** — In a broad, general sense, all trusts are executory; that is, there is some duty, either active or passive, for the trustee to perform, or execute. But such is not the meaning of the courts when they speak of an “*executory* trust.” The distinction between such a trust and one which is *executed* has to do rather with the completeness and perfection of their creation by the settler, than with the conduct of the trustee in performing the duties of his office.² An *executed* trust is one so clear and definite, in the terms by which it is created, that the trustee has nothing to do but to carry out literally the requirements and provisions of the instrument.³ The settler, or creator, of such a trust has become “his own conveyancer;” and has made the trustee merely a medium for carrying out his purpose as expressed in the making of the trust.⁴ An *executory* trust, on the other hand, is one in which property is conveyed to a trustee, to be by him settled or conveyed upon other trusts, on the happening of designated events or contingencies; and those other trusts are only outlined, or imperfectly stated, so that the trustee is given a discretion in filling out the details and completing the scheme of the trust. The settler has not become his own conveyancer; but has left it to the trustee and the court to make out his intention from general expressions. It is called executory, not because the work of the trustee in carrying out the trust is to be performed in the future, but because the trust instrument is to be filled out and perfected in accordance with the general instructions of the settler.⁵ Thus, if land be conveyed to A, in trust to manage and pay the net income to B during his life, and at B’s death to divide the *corpus* equally among his children then living, the trust is executed. But if real property be given to A, in trust to settle the same upon B and C and their issue, in case

¹ Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342; Andrews v. Andrews, 110 Ill. 223; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659.

² 1 Perry on Trusts, § 359.

³ Wright v. Pearson, 1 Eden, 119, 125; 4 Kent’s Com. p. *220.

⁴ Edgerton v. Brownlaw, 4 H. L. Cas. 1, 210; Glenorchy v. Bosville, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1, note; Gaylord v.

La Fayette, 115 Ind. 423; Martling v. Martling, 55 N. J. Eq. 771, 780; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R. I. 383.

⁵ Austen v. Taylor, 1 Eden, 361, 366; Neves v. Scott, 9 How. (U. S.) 196, 211; Wood v. Burnham, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 518, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 9; Cushman v. Coleman, 92 Ga. 772.

they intermarry, and nothing more be expressed as to the terms and conditions of such settlement, the trust is executory.¹ In both of these illustrations, the work of the trustee is to be done in the future. But, in the former, he has only to carry out the provisions of a fully declared trust; while, in the latter, he is to participate in moulding and perfecting the trust scheme itself.

The most important practical distinction between executed trusts and those that are executory is that equity strictly follows the law in dealing with the former, but frequently fails to do so in carrying out the latter.² In the one, the rules of law prevail, even though the settler's intention may be thereby defeated; in the other, his intention is sought to be effectuated, even though technical rules of law may be thereby sometimes disregarded.³ If, for example, a lot of land were deeded to A, in trust to manage for B during his life, and at B's death for his children equally, the children would obtain only life estates, since the ultimate gift was not to them and their heirs, and the technical rule of the common law requires the use of the word "heirs," in order to thus convey an interest greater than one for life.⁴ But if the grant or devise were to A in trust to manage for B during his life, and at his death to settle upon his children, the terms of the settlement being left indefinite and not fully prescribed; when the formal instrument, by which this general scheme was to be carried out, came to be drawn, the ultimate settlement would be made upon B's children *and their heirs*, thus giving them absolute estates in fee simple, if this could fairly be regarded as the intention of the grantor or testator.⁵

In dealing with an executory trust, a court of equity is constantly seeking to ascertain and carry out the intention of

¹ Austen v. Taylor, 1 Eden, 361, 366; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; Carney v. Cain, 40 W. Va. 758.

² Wright v. Pearson, 1 Eden, 119; Jones v. Morgan, 1 Brown, C. C. 206; Price v. Sisson, 13 N. J. Eq. 168; Smith's Estate, 144 Pa. St. 428.

³ Ibid. "In practice the chief distinction between an executed and an executory trust lies in the fact that the former executes itself by converting its limitations into the corresponding legal estates, whereas in the latter, the court may direct that form of conveyance or

settlement which will best give effect to the settler's intention, and for this purpose may even disregard the construction the instrument would receive at law." Pilot v. Landon, 46 N. J. Eq. 310, 313.

⁴ Holliday v. Overton, 14 Beav. 467; Lucas v. Brandreth, 28 Beav. 274; Nelson v. Davis, 35 Ind. 474.

⁵ Moore v. Cleghorn, 10 Beav. 423; Watkins v. Weston, 32 Beav. 238; Doe v. Cafe, 7 Exch. 675. See Pitman v. Pitman, 11 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 456, and note.

the settler, even at the expense of hard and rigid principles of law. The evidence of intention is to be gathered, of course, primarily from the entire instrument by which the general scheme is outlined. When, for example, the scheme or general plan is contained in a will, the whole document — including the parts which do not bear directly upon the trust — is to be studied, in the light of the testator's condition and surroundings; and the trust is to be moulded in accordance with the clear intent thus ascertained.¹ But, in shaping an executory trust outlined by a marriage settlement, the court is aided also by the *presumption* that the intention of the settler was to benefit the *issue* of the marriage.² No such presumption exists in the construction of wills; but the intent must plainly appear from the words of the testator.³ There is, indeed, no difference between the rules of interpretation and construction of wills, and those which apply to marriage settlements; the intention alone is sought in both; but in dealing with the latter documents *res ipsa loquitur*, the occasions which give rise to them evince what may be presumed to have been the paramount object of the settlers.⁴ This presumption will readily yield, of course, to a contrary intent clearly expressed in the marriage articles.

When it is said that equity in dealing with an executory trust may disregard technical rules of law, it must not be understood that that court may thereby produce any result that is in itself *illegal*. It simply chooses among possible legal constructions that which most nearly conforms to the expressed or presumed intention of the settler, rather than that which follows hard and fast principles of interpretation. This is apparent from the illustrations already given. And, it is to be added, that in striving to effectuate the wishes of the creator of the trust, even where he has outlined a scheme that is partly illegal, equity will construe the instrument *cy pres*, — as nearly as possible to, — his expressed intention, and will give effect to the legal parts of his plan, if they can

¹ Blackburn v. Stables, 2 Ves. & Bea. 367, 369; Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536; Roe v. Vingut, 117 N. Y. 202, 204; Clark v. Cammann, 160 N. Y. 315, 324; *In re Hammer's Est.*, 158 Pa. St. 632; Adams v. Cowen, 177 U. S. 471.

² Sackville-West v. Holmesdale, L.

R. 4 H. L. 543, 565; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 360-366.

³ Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 366.

⁴ Sackville-West v. Holmesdale, L. R. 4 H. L. 543, 565; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 57.

be properly and fairly separated from the portions which are illegal.¹ Thus, where a devise was made to a trustee, to settle the property upon A for life, and then to his first son for life, and then to that son's son for life, and so on for many generations yet to come into being, it was held that the attempt thus to create life estates for persons not in being was void, because it violated the rule against perpetuities, but that the general scheme of the testator should be effectuated as nearly as possible, by giving trust interests for life to the sons in being, and the ultimate ownership absolutely or in fee simple to their children.² But, when the gift is such that it can not legally be carried out in any form approximating the intention of the settler without contravening some positive statute or rule of law, the entire trust, whether executed or executory, is void.³

§ 310. **Trusts: a. Express; and b. Implied.** — The most important division of trusts is that made in reference to the mode of their creation, into *a.* Express and *b.* Implied.

a. Express trusts are such as are created by the language of the parties. They may arise from explicit statements, whereby the relation of trustee and *cestui que trust* is plainly established, or from expressions of a less certain character, which the courts have uniformly construed as evincing an intent to create a trust.⁴ Some writers, among whom Mr. Perry is prominent, call those trusts *implied*, which are not unequivocally expressed in direct terms, but are to be spelled out by the court "from the whole transaction and the words used."⁵ But this style of nomenclature is opposed by the best courts and the majority of careful writers.⁶ If the maker of the instrument declare the trust by any form of words, it should be called an express trust; and it will be so named in this treatise. Confusion is avoided and a system in harmony with the great weight of authority is produced by classifying as express all trusts which are declared by the words of the parties, whether in explicit terms, or by the employment of such language as will not reveal a trust unless it is carefully

¹ *Humbertson v. Humbertson*, 2 Vern. 737; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 376.

² *Humbertson v. Humbertson*, 2 Vern. 737; *Bailey v. Bailey*, 28 Hun (N. Y.), 603.

³ *Blagrove v. Hancock*, 16 Sim. 371; *Manice v. Manice*, 43 N. Y. 303.

⁴ *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 63.

⁵ 1 Perry on Trusts, § 112.

⁶ *Neal v. Clark*, 95 U. S. 704, 709; *Mulock v. Byrnes*, 127 N. Y. 23; *Cronon v. Cotting*, 104 Mass. 245; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 78.

read in the light of established rules of interpretation and construction. As thus understood, express trusts include those which are *precatory*; that is, those created, not by direct words of command, but by expressions of hope, request, expectation, entreaty, and the like.¹ Charitable trusts, and several other special forms of these equitable estates are also to be examined as species of express trusts. An express trust may be either (a) active or (b) passive.

b. Implied trusts, as the term is generally and more properly employed, are those which arise by implication of equity, either for the purpose of carrying out the presumed *intention* of the parties, or to work out *justice* between them regardless of what their intention may have been. They rest, not upon the wording or construction of any contract or instrument, but upon the acts and transactions of the interested parties. Those which are implied for the purpose of carrying out the presumed *intention* of the parties are (a) *resulting* trusts. And those which are implied to work out *justice*, regardless of what the parties to the transactions may have intended, are (b) *constructive* trusts.²

The ultimate analysis of these various forms of trusts, classified with respect to the mode of their creation, leads to their discussion under two chief divisions and four subdivisions, namely: a. Express trusts, which are, (a) active and (b) passive; b. Implied trusts, which are, (a) resulting and (b) constructive.

¹ Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav. 148, 173; Hill v. Hill (1897), 1 Q. B. 483; Clay v. Wood, 153 N. Y. 134; Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300.

² Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 78; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 26, 27.

CHAPTER XXI.

a. EXPRESS TRUSTS. — THEIR CREATION, REVOCATION, REQUISITES, AND FORMS. — POWERS IN TRUST.

Creation of Express Trusts.

§ 311. Creation of express trusts at common law.

§ 312. Proof required by Statute of Frauds.

§ 313. The statute a rule of evidence.

§ 314. Forms and operation of the statute in the United States.

§ 315. The writing required.

§ 316. Language to be used in creating express trusts.

Direct Words of Trust.

§ 317. Direct words of contract, command, or declaration.

§ 318. *First.* Trusts created on transfer of legal estate.

§ 319. *Second.* By settler making himself trustee.

§ 320. *Third.* Executory agreement or promise to settle property in trust.

§ 321. Revocation of trusts created by direct words.

Precatory Words.

§ 322. Precatory trusts.

§ 323. Intention the chief exponent of precatory trusts.

§ 324. Certainty of beneficiaries.

§ 325. Certainty of subject-matter.

§ 326. Other tests as to precatory trusts.

§ 327. Requisites of express trusts generally.

Kinds of Express Trusts and Trust Interests.

§ 328. Express trusts, active and passive.

§ 329. (a) Active express trusts.

§ 330. (b) Passive express trusts — or uses — when executed.

§ 331. Effects of active trusts becoming passive.

§ 332. Powers in trust.

§ 333. Execution of powers in trust.

Specific Kinds of Express Trusts.

§ 334. Purposes for which express trusts may exist.

§ 335. Spendthrift trusts.

§ 336. Separate use trusts — for married women.

§ 337. Trusts for charities.

§ 338. Definitions and essentials of charitable trusts.

§ 339. *First.* They are for public utility — Purposes included.

§ 340. Religious purposes — Superstitious uses.

§ 341. Educational purposes.

§ 342. Eleemosynary purposes.

§ 343. Governmental purposes.

§ 344. Other charities. *Criterion* as to charitable purpose.

§ 345. *Second.* Indefinite beneficiaries of charitable trust.

§ 346. Degree of uncertainty.

§ 347. The *cy pres* doctrine—Judicial *cy pres*.

§ 348. Prerogative *cy pres*.

§ 349. Approval of judicial *cy pres* in this country.

§ 350. *Third.* Charitable trusts generally unaffected by rules against perpetuities and accumulations.

Creation of Express Trusts.

§ 311. **Creation of Express Trusts at Common Law.** — At common law the most ordinary method of conveying corporeal hereditaments was by means of livery of seisin, frequently accompanied by a deed of feoffment. But the deed, although customarily used, was not necessary. The livery of seisin, in the presence of the witnesses, — the handing over, by the one party to the other, of a stone, twig, clod of earth, or other symbol, either on the land itself, or within sight of it, — was a sufficient ceremony to accompany the oral statement that this was done in the name of seisin and for the purpose of transferring the property.¹ Practically, all authorities are now agreed that any property of which the legal estate could be thus conveyed could be settled to use or in trust by oral statement. Technically, trusts were said to be “averrable;” that is, they could be declared and created by word of mouth.² But the better opinion is that, when a deed was needed for the conveyance of the legal estate, a deed was also requisite to the proper declaration of a trust. Thus, a transfer by covenant to stand seised to uses, which method of conveying the legal estate will be hereafter explained, required a deed for the raising of a use or trust.³ And it seems to be safe to assert, though upon no direct authority, that a writing was necessary to the declaration of a trust in incorporeal hereditaments, because the creation and transfer of legal estates in them must be by deed of grant. And so the law remained until the Statute of Frauds went into operation, in 1677.

§ 312. **Proof required by the Statute of Frauds.** — By the seventh section of the English Statute of Frauds, it was enacted that “all declarations or creations of trusts, or confidences of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be *manifested*

¹ 2 Sand. Uses and Trusts, 1-8; § 287, *supra*.

² Fordyce v. Willis, 3 Bro. Ch. 577, 587; Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 141;

³ 1 Perry on Trusts, § 75.

³ Gilbert on Uses, 270; Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 141; Fordyce v. Willis, 3 Bro. Ch. 577, 587.

and proved by some writing signed by the party who is by law entitled to declare such trust, or by his last will in writing; or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect." The eighth section excepted from the operation of the statute all trusts which arise or result by implication or construction of law; that is, it left all *implied* trusts unaffected by the statute. And the ninth section provided that "all grants or assignments of any trust or confidence shall likewise be in writing, signed by the party granting or assigning the same, or by such last will or devise, or else shall likewise be utterly void and of none effect."¹ Those three sections of the act, then, were made to regulate the proof and transfer of express trusts of real property. All estates for years and leasehold interests, as well as freehold estates, are within the statute; but not mere personal interests or claims in land.² The statute does not affect trusts of personalty;³ and where real property is transferred to a trustee under an oral trust in itself unenforceable because of the statute, if the terms of the agreement be so far performed that the property is converted into personalty, the oral declaration of trust then becomes sufficient, and the trustee can be compelled to carry out its provisions.⁴

§ 313. **The Statute a Rule of Evidence.** — The Statute of Frauds, in this seventh section, as well as in most of its other departments, prescribes a rule of evidence, rather than a requirement as to manipulating property.⁵ It does not demand that trusts of real property shall be *created* by a writing; but enacts that they "shall be *manifested and proved* by some writing." The evidence of the existence of the trust must be written, or the *cestui que trust* is without remedy against the trustee. But, whatever may have been the actual meaning intended by its framers, the uniform construction of this section has been that it does not forbid the *making* of a real property trust by parol.⁶ Such a trust may be brought into

¹ 29 Car. II. ch. 3, §§ 7, 8, 9.

² *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 Myl. & K. 506; *Skett v. Whitmore*, Freem. 280; *Hutchins v. Lee*, 1 Atk. 447; *Bellasis v. Compton*, 2 Vern. 294.

³ *Hirsh v. Aner*, 146 N. Y. 13, 19; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 86.

⁴ *Bork v. Martin*, 132 N. Y. 280; *In re Simond's Estate*, 201 Pa. St. 413; *State v. Rondebush*, 114 Ind. 347; *McCormick H. M. Co. v. Griffin*, 116

Iowa, 397; *Owens v. Williams*, 130 N. C. 165.

⁵ *Hutchins v. Van Vechten*, 140 N. Y. 115, 118; *Craue v. Powell*, 139 N. Y. 379; *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. 696, 707.

⁶ *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. 696, 707; *Randall v. Morgan*, 12 Ves. 67, 74; *Steere v. Steere*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1; *Barrell v. Joy*, 16 Mass. 227; *Hutchins v. Van Vechten*, 140 N. Y. 115; *Martin v. Baird*, 175 Pa. St. 540; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 79.

being by oral contract or settlement, and exist for a time as an unenforcible but otherwise valid arrangement; and a writing may then be executed which will relate back and make the trust enforceable *ab initio* by the *cestui que trust*. Accordingly, in an early case, a testator was held capable of devising by his will, which could not pass real property acquired by him after its execution, his interest as *cestui que trust* in a tract of land, the trust in which was orally created in his favor before the will was executed, although the written acknowledgment of the trust was not made until some time after the will.¹

§ 314. **Forms and Operation of the Statute in the United States.** — In most of the United States, this seventh section of the old English Statute of Frauds has been re-enacted or tacitly adopted. Its phraseology has been changed in a few of the states, so as apparently to require that trusts of real property must be made, or brought into being, by a writing. Thus, in Maine,² Massachusetts,³ Vermont,⁴ Indiana,⁵ and Wisconsin,⁶ the form of the statutes is, in substance, that such trusts shall be "*created and declared*" in writing; while in Illinois, "*declarations or creations of trusts must be manifested and proved*" in writing.⁷ But the view is now generally accepted that such changes of words have not altered the general rule, as settled with reference to the Statute of 29 Car. II. ch. 3, and that, under all of these enactments, a writing will be sufficient to establish a trust in real property, although it is not executed until after the trust is orally created.⁸ The Court of Appeals of New York has declared, however, that, between 1829 and 1860 the statute of frauds of that state did not permit such a trust to "*be created or established except by a deed or conveyance in writing.*" Before January 1, 1830, the form of the New York statute was substantially the same as that of England; and by chapter 322 of

¹ *Ambrose v. Ambrose*, 1 P. Wms. 321. "There is a distinction between an agreement and a trust under the Statute of Frauds, and a trust need not, like an agreement, be constituted or created by writing." Kent, Ch. in *Moran v. Hays*, 1 Johns Ch. (N. Y.) 339, 342.

² Rev. Stats. (1857) ch. 73, § 11.

³ *Jenkins v. Eldridge*, 3 Story (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 181, 294; *Blodgett v. Hildreth*, 103 Mass. 484, 486.

⁴ *Pinnock v. Clough*, 16 Vt. 500, 508.

⁵ Rev. Stats. (1881) § 2969.

⁶ *Begole v. Hazzard*, 81 Wis. 274.

⁷ Rev. Stats. (1877) § 9, p. 522; *Horre v. Ingraham*, 125 Ill. 198.

⁸ *Sheet's Est.* 52 Pa. St 257; *Jaimes v. Hall*, 3 Gray (Mass.), 194; *Browne*, Stat. of Frauds, § 109; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 81.

its laws of 1860, that form was practically restored in New York, and since that time has been continuously retained.¹ (a)

§ 315. **The Writing required by the Statute.** — The writing, required by the statute to “manifest and prove” a trust of real property, must clearly indicate the objects and nature of the trust, the parties to it, the relations which they sustain to one another, and the proportions in which they are to take,

(a) The history of the statute in New York is as follows: “The English statute on this subject (29 Car. II. ch. 3), in its essential features was enacted in this state by the act of Feb. 26, 1787, the 12th section of which provides that ‘all declarations or creations of trusts of any lauds shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party entitled by law to declare the trust.’ Thus the law stood for about forty years, until the general revision of the statutes, when it was changed and made to read as follows: ‘No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not to exceed one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.’ (2 R. S. 135, § 6.) After the revision, a trust of the character claimed by the plaintiff in this case,” (an express trust of realty), “could not be created or established, except by a deed or conveyance in writing. But, by chapter 322 of the laws of 1860, the legislature restored the law to its original condition, by an amendment to the seventh section, substantially providing that a declaration of trust in lands might be *proved* by any writing subscribed by the party declaring the same. It is not now necessary to produce a deed or formal writing intended for the purpose, in order to prove the trust, but letters or informal memoranda signed by the party, and even admissions in a pleading in another action between other parties, if signed by the party with knowledge of its contents, will satisfy the requirements of the statute, if they contain enough to show the nature, character, and extent of the trust interest.” O’Brien, J., in *Hutchins v. Van Vechten*, 140 N. Y. 115, 118. See also *Crane v. Powell*, 139 N. Y. 379; *Bates v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co.*, 130 N. Y. 200; *McArthur v. Gordon*, 126 N. Y. 597. It was said in *Cook v. Barr*, 44 N. Y. 157, that the change in the wording of the statute between 1830 and 1860 did not change the meaning, and that it has always been sufficient in New York to *manifest* and *prove* a trust in writing. But it is to be noted that both this statement and that quoted above from *Hutchins v. Van Vechten* are merely *dicta*, and that there is no actual adjudication upon the question in New York. But the *dictum* of *Hutchins v. Vechten* is to be taken as the stronger, as well as the later, and as probably expressing the law to be hereafter followed.

The statute, substantially in the form quoted by Judge O’Brien in the last-mentioned case, is now § 242 of the Real Property Law, L. 1909, ch. 52.

¹ *Hutchins v. Van Vechten*, 140 N. Y. 115.

and, in general, all the material elements of the contract or settlement.¹ But no particular form of the writing is required. A mere memorandum, an affidavit,² a note at the end of a deed,³ or even a letter, though addressed to some third party, if properly signed and adequately expressing what the trust is, will comply with the requirements of the statute.⁴ When the writing consists of several distinct papers or sheets, and one is properly signed, or *subscribed*, as the statute may require, the generally adopted rule is that there must be in the signed sheet a reference sufficient to identify and connect with it the sheets or portions which are not signed.⁵

In cases in which certain formalities are requisite to the transfer of the legal estate, if a trust be declared by the same instrument, or in the same transaction, those formalities must also be observed in the writing by which the trust is manifested and proved. Thus, in those jurisdictions which require a married woman's deed of real property to be acknowledged separately and apart from her husband, her declaration of a trust in such property must be acknowledged in the same manner.⁶ And when it is sought to convey realty by will, to one person in trust for another, the trust thus *originating* in the will, the instrument must be executed as required by the Statute of Wills of the state in which the land is situated.⁷ But if the trust were created by contract or declaration outside of the so-called will, so that the latter is simply employed

¹ Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696, 708; Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1; Finley v. Isett, 154 U. S. 561; Cook v. Barr, 44 N. Y. 157, 161; Hutchins v. Van Vechten, 140 N. Y. 115, 118; Emerson v. Galloupe, 158 Mass. 146; Taft v. Dimond, 16 R. I. 584; Leslie v. Leslie, 53 N. J. Eq. 275; Martin v. Baird, 175 Pa. St. 540; Salisbury v. Clarke, 61 Vt. 453, 459; Renz v. Stoll, 94 Mich. 377; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 83.

² Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew, 1; Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525.

³ Ivory v. Burns, 56 Pa. St. 300. And see Preston v. Preston, 202 Pa. St. 515.

⁴ Plymouth v. Hickman, 2 Vern. 167; Dale v. Hamilton, 2 Phillips, 266; Hutchins v. Van Vechten, 140 N. Y. 115; Tusch v. German Sav. Bk., 46 N. Y. Supp. 422; Roberts's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 407; Barrell v. Joy, 16 Mass.

227; Larrabee v. Hascall, 88 Me. 511; Cathcart v. Nelson, 70 Vt. 317; Eipper v. Benner, 113 Mich. 75; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 82.

⁵ Denton v. Davis, 18 Ves. 499, 503; Champ v. Marshallsay, 64 L. T. 13; Knowlton v. Atkins, 134 N. Y. 313; McAuley's Est., 184 Pa. St. 124; Eipper v. Benner, 113 Mich. 75; Hauning v. Mueller, 82 Wis. 235; Atwater v. Russell, 49 Minn. 57.

⁶ Graham v. Long, 65 Pa. St. 383, 387; Tatge v. Tatge, 34 Minn. 272.

⁷ Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 141; Stickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. 516; Champ v. Marshallsay, 64 L. T. 13; Thayer v. Wellington, 9 Allen (Mass.). 283; Davis v. Stambaugh, 163 Ill. 557; Chase v. Stockett, 72 Md. 235; 1 Lewin on Trusts, ch. v. § 3; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 89, 90.

as written proof of a trust already in existence, it may satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, although it fail to comply with all the formalities prescribed by the Statute of Wills. If, for example, A deed land to B, who orally agrees that he will hold it in trust for C, B may subsequently manifest and prove this trust by his declaration properly signed, in a writing which he calls his will, but which is invalid as a will, because not executed with the proper statutory formalities.¹ But if A, by his will, attempt to devise land to B, in trust for C, thus seeking to *create* the trust in the will, the entire scheme must fail if the document be not executed in the manner required by the statute of the state in which the land lies.²

An answer in chancery may be a writing sufficient to comply with the statute.³ The courts at one time tended to hold that, if the defendant in a suit in chancery admitted by his answer the existence of the trust, he thereby supplied the statutory requisite, and thus became bound by his admission, even though there was no other written evidence of the trust.⁴ But it is now settled that he may have the benefit of the statute, if he choose to set it up in his answer. Being sued with regard to an alleged trust of which there is no sufficient declaration in writing, he may simply deny its existence by his answer, and at the trial of the case prove his denial by showing that the agreement was by parol; or he may follow the truth of the matter in his answer, by admitting that the agreement or settlement was made, and then successfully claiming that he is not bound by it, because there is no writing which complies with the requirement of the Statute of Frauds.⁵

The construction of the seventh section of the statute has been controlling upon that of the ninth; and it is accordingly

¹ *Leslie v. Leslie*, 53 N. J. Eq. 275, 281; *Keith v. Miller*, 174 Ill. 64; *Hiss v. Hiss*, 228 Ill. 414; *Hill on Trustees*, 61; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 91.

² *Anding v. Davis*, 38 Miss. 574; *Davis v. Stambaugh*, 163 Ill. 557. And see *Kopp v. Gunther*, 95 Cal. 63; *Chase v. Stockett*, 72 Md. 235; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 91-94.

³ *Nab v. Nab*, 10 Mod. 404; *Cozine v. Graham*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 177; *Maccubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 157, 164; *White v. Ross*, 160

Ill. 56; *McVay v. McVay*, 43 N. J. Eq. 47; *Warren v. Tyman*, 54 N. J. Eq. 402; *Patton v. Chamberlain*, 1 Mich. 5.

⁴ *Story's Eq. Plead.* §§ 765-766; *Hampton v. Spencer*, 2 Vern. 288.

⁵ *Dean v. Dean*, 9 N. J. Eq. 425; *Bauk v. Root*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 478; *Davis v. Stambaugh*, 163 Ill. 557; *Myers v. Myers*, 167 Ill. 52; *Billingslea v. Ward*, 33 Md. 48, 51; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 85.

held that the same requirements as to writing apply to an assignment of his interest by the *cestui que trust* as those which govern the evidencing of the trust in the first instance.¹

§ 316. **Language to be used in creating Express Trusts.** — The important requirement as to the use of language in the creation of an express trust is that the intent shall be made plain.² The words trust, trustee, etc., are not necessary.³ Neither are any technical words required. If the settler make his meaning clear, by the use of any form of expression, he accomplishes his purpose. But, when technical words are employed, they are to be given their technical meaning, unless the contrary clearly appears from the context, or unless it is one of the cases of executory trusts heretofore explained.⁴ The declaration of trust may be contained in another instrument than that by which the legal estate is conveyed to the trustee;⁵ or the document by which such declaration is made may consist of several distinct papers, with proper internal reference from the one which is signed to the others.⁶ But the conveyance of the legal estate and the creation of the trust (whether or not the latter is then manifested and proved by a writing) must be simultaneous, or at least in the same transaction. For, if an absolute legal estate be conveyed to one upon whom no fiduciary obligation is imposed at the time, the grantor can not subsequently interfere with the beneficial interest of the grantee by impressing a trust upon the property.⁷

When it is said that any words which clearly indicate an intent to create a trust may be effective in so doing, it must nevertheless be understood that the expression employed must indicate a final, definite purpose, and not merely an inchoate

¹ *Wright v. Wright*, 1 Ves. Sr. 409; *Brydges v. Brydges*, 3 Ves. 120; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 506; 2 Prest. Conv. 368.

² *Fisher v. Fields*, 10 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 495; *Carpenter v. Cushman*, 105 Mass. 417, 419; *Brown v. Combs*, 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 36; *Porter v. Bk. of Rutland*, 19 Vt. 410; *McAuley's Est.*, 184 Pa. St. 124; *Luco v. De Toro*, 91 Cal. 405.

³ *Shamless v. Welch*, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 279; *Mee v. Gordon*, 187 N. Y. 400, 407; *Packard v. Old Colony R. R.*, 168 Mass. 92, 96; *Fisher v. Fields*, 10 Johns. Ch.

(N. Y.) 495; *Seldon's Appeal*, 31 Conn. 548; *Freedley's Appeal*, 60 Pa. St. 344.

⁴ *Wright v. Pearson*, 1 Eden, 119, 125; § 309, *supra*.

⁵ *Wood v. Cox*, 2 Myl. & Cr. 684; *Inchiquin v. French*, 1 Cox, 1; *Smith v. Attersoll*, 1 Russ. 266.

⁶ See § 315, *supra*.

⁷ *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 141, 145; *Crabb v. Crabb*, 1 Myl. & K. 511; *Ivory v. Burns*, 56 Pa. St. 300, 303; *Brown v. Brown*, 12 Md. 87; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 77.

design, or only an expectation.¹ A purpose or wish to give property, or settle it in trust, in the future, may be very clearly expressed without creating any trust. Thus, where one, at the time when he purchased a parcel of land, made and executed an instrument in which he declared that the purchase was "intended" for another person, it was held that no trust was thereby brought into being. The expression was nothing but the declaration of an incomplete design. The intent was not carried out.² A declaration of an intent to give is not an assertion that the owner holds in trust; but rather the contrary. To raise a trust, he must intend now to hold in trust, or now to convey on a trust to begin at once or in the future.³

There are two chief methods, by which expressions of completed intent to raise trusts may be made; namely, by direct words of *contract*, *command* or *declaration*, and by *precatory* words. These will be discussed in the order named. And in the former is included the subject of *voluntary* declarations of trusts.

Direct Words of Trust.

§ 317. **Trusts created by Direct Words of Contract, Command, or Declaration.** — By clear and explicit statement of intention, whatever may be the form of language employed, trusts may be brought into being, either by will, or by contract or declaration *inter vivos*. The cases of creation and attempted creation of them in this manner may be most readily and logically examined by considering, *first*, those in which the legal estate is fully transferred from the settler or creator of the trust to another person, *second*, those in which the settler makes himself trustee by an unequivocal declaration of trust, and *third*, those in which there is an imperfect or executory agreement or promise to transfer the property, or to hold it in future in trust for another. The last of these classes, including as it does the voluntary executory agreements to settle property in trust, has given rise to much divergence of decisions and opinions.

¹ *Cunningham v. Davenport*, 147 N. Y. 43; *Sheffield v. Parker*, 158 Mass. 330; *Providence Inst. for Savings v. Carpenter*, 18 R. I. 287; *Chaplin on Express Trusts and Powers*, §§ 52, 106.

² *Hays v. Quay*, 68 Pa. St. 263.

³ *Beaver v. Beaver*, 137 N. Y. 59; *Wadd v. Hazelton*, 137 N. Y. 215; *Young v. Young*, 80 N. Y. 422; *Girard Trust v. Mellor*, Appellant, 156 Pa. St. 579, 590.

§ 318. **First, Trusts Created on Transfer of Legal Estate.** — When the owner of property, complying with all the requisites prescribed by common law and statutes, transfers the legal estate therein to another person to hold in trust for a third, the trust will be recognized and enforced by a court of equity, whether or not the grantor or settler received any consideration. The fact of the *completed transfer* is sufficient. The instrument being duly executed and delivered and nothing further remaining to be done by the grantor, deviser, or other settler, the trust is created.¹ The only material questions, which can thereafter arise, are such as relate to the nature and operation of the trust thus created. And such questions must be decided by application of the ordinary rules for the interpretation and construction of the language employed. When the legal estate is such that it can not be effectually transferred, as when it is a mere possibility or reversionary interest, the same *principle* applies, according to the weight of the more recent important authorities; and the trust is created when the owner has done *all that he can do* under the circumstances of the case, by perfecting the transaction of assigning as far as the law permits.² So, if the assignor have only the equitable estate, the legal interest being vested in another who is holding it for him, if he fully assign his own interest in equity for the benefit of a designated beneficiary, a sub-trust is thereby brought into existence in favor of such beneficiary.³ But, in all instances in which the legal estate is not transferred, but the existence of the trust is intended to rest upon the passing over of some other interest, the author of the intended trust must have made as complete an assignment as possible under the circumstances of the case.⁴ Where, for example, the document might have assigned in equity the so-called settler's rever-

¹ Massey v. Huntington, 118 Ill. 80; Boardman v. Willard, 73 Iowa, 20; Westlake v. Wheat, 43 Hun (N. Y.), 77; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 99.

² Kekewich v. Manning, 1 DeG. M. & G. 176, 187; Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 Myl. & K. 36; Roberts v. Lloyd, 2 Beav. 376; Gilbert v. Overton, 33 L. J. Ch. 683; Appeal of Elliott's Ex'rs, 50 Pa. St. 75; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 101; 1 Lewin on Trusts, 58. See earlier cases *contra*, Edwards v. Jones, 1 Myl. & Cr.

226; Meek v. Hattlewell, 1 Hare, 464; Beech v. Keep, 18 Beav. 285; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 101.

³ Collinson v. Patrick, 2 Keen, 123; Tierney v. Wood, 19 Beav. 330.

⁴ *In re* Earl of Lucan, L. R. 45 Ch. Div. 470; Kekewich v. Manning, 1 DeG. M. & G. 176; Wilcocks v. Hannyngton, 5 Ir. Eq. (N. C.) 38, 45; Morgan v. Malleon, 10 Eq. 475; Girard Trust Co. v. Mellor, 156 Pa. St. 579; Hill on Trustees, 140, 141.

sionary interest, but it only purported to create a charge thereon, no trust was thereby brought into existence.¹

§ 319. **Second, Trust created by Settler making Himself Trustee.** — When the settler takes his own property and makes himself trustee of it by an unequivocal declaration of trust, it is equally well settled that an express trust is thereby brought into being, whether or not he receives any consideration for his act.² Such a transaction involves no transfer of the legal estate, except the theoretical transfer which the owner makes from himself as an individual to himself as a trustee. But the matter for careful inquiry here is as to the passing over of the equitable estate. Was an unequivocal declaration made and *delivered* for that purpose? The intent of the declarant, in such a case, is again to be ascertained from a proper interpretation and construction of his language. The question as to the *delivery* of the document, however, is often perplexing.³ For example, A makes and duly executes a deed, in which he declares that he will thereafter hold a designated lot of land in trust for B. How and to whom must it be delivered, in order to become operative? "In no case," says the Supreme Court of New York, "has it ever been held as yet that a party may, by transferring his property from one pocket to another, make himself trustee. In every case where a trust has been established, the party creating it has placed the evidence thereof in the custody of another, and has thereby shown that it was intended to be a completed act."⁴ This is certainly a clear statement of the safer rule of practice — that the declarant must deliver the document, either to the *cestui que trust* himself, or to some third party for him. But, as is suggested by a recent careful writer, it would seem to be a sufficient delivery for him to indicate, in any other clear manner, his intention to make the instrument become operative in his own hands, as by acknowledging it before a notary public, or by placing and retaining it among other valuable and frequently in-

¹ *In re Earl of Lucan*, L. R. 45 Ch. Div. 470; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 67.

² *Donaldson v. Donaldson*, Kay, 711; *Milroy v. Lord*, 4 DeG. F. & J. 264; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 656, 662; *Culbertson v. Witbeck*, 127 U. S. 326; *Stone v. Hackett*, 12 Gray (Mass.), 227; *Janes v. Falk*, 50 N. J. Eq. 468; *Lane v. Ewing*, 31 Mo. 75; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 98.

³ If the instrument be not properly delivered it can not be upheld as a declaration of trust. *Wadd v. Hazleton*, 137 N. Y. 215; *Smith's Est.*, 144 Pa. St. 428; *Soulard's Est.*, 141 Mo. 642; *Wylie v. Charlton*, 43 Neb. 840; *Roberts v. Mullinder*, 94 Ga. 493.

⁴ *Govin v. De Miranda*, 76 Hun (N. Y.), 414, 419

spected papers, or by stating to witnesses that he had delivered it from himself as an individual to himself as trustee, etc.¹ And there is abundant authority to the effect that he need not part with possession of the instrument.²

§ 320. **Third, Executory Agreement or Promise to settle Property in Trust.** — In the third class of cases — those in which there is an imperfect or executory agreement or promise to transfer the property or to hold it in future in trust for another — the element of consideration becomes controlling. For when the promise rests upon a valuable consideration a contract arises, which will be enforced by the courts; but when the declaration or promise is purely voluntary — not based on any valuable consideration — and rests *in fieri*, there is ordinarily nothing to move a court of either law or equity to grant relief. Therefore, where the promise or stipulation is executory or incomplete, the two essentially different groups of cases are those in which valuable considerations exist and those in which such consideration is wanting. The distinction here found, as it is applied to trusts or other equitable interests, is the same as that between gifts and executory contracts at common law. The gift must be perfected by delivery of possession of the subject-matter; while the contract, based on a promise to pay value, can be enforced though no such delivery has been made.³

The instances are, of course, plentiful in which the owner of property has entered into an agreement, in consideration of money or money's worth paid or promised, or of a marriage to be consummated,⁴ to hold such property in trust for another, or to convey it to him in trust for a third party. And in no such a case has a court of equity refused, as between the parties themselves, to declare and enforce a trust

¹ Chaplin on Express Trusts and Powers, § 78. See *Govin v. De Miranda*, 140 N. Y. 474; *Martin v. Funk*, 75 N. Y. 134, 142; *Wadd v. Hazelton*, 137 N. Y. 215.

² *Clavering v. Clavering*, 2 Vern. 473; *Souverye v. Arden*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 240, 256; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 329; *Adams v. Adams*, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 185; *Johnson v. Smith*, 1 Ves. Sr. 314.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 441. See *Sherk v. Endress*, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 255; *Zimmerman v. Streper*, 75 Pa. St. 147;

Kulp v. March, 181 Pa. St. 627; *Westlake v. Wheat*, 43 Hun (N. Y.), 77.

⁴ In speaking of marriage as a valuable consideration, the distinction must always be borne in mind between an existing married relation and the contracting of a marriage as an inducement to some other act or promise. The latter is a valuable consideration, but not the former. *Johnston v. Spicer*, 107 N. Y. 185; *De Barante v. Gott*, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 492; *Chilvers v. Race*, 194 Ill. 71; 18 Amer. Law Rev. 379.

in favor of the promisee or designated beneficiary, upon application being properly made to it for that purpose.¹ Between the parties to the agreement, equitable interests flowing therefrom are as fully protected as are legal rights. But, as will more fully appear hereafter, creditors of the promisor and persons having in the property equitable interests, of which the other parties to the contract have notice, may sometimes prevent the carrying out of such an attempted trust. When an intended trust is not perfectly created, but the incomplete or defective instrument is delivered for value actually advanced or promised, the court will enforce the trust, if enough appear from the document to show what are its terms and who are the parties to be benefited.² "In such cases, effect is given to the *consideration* to carry out the intention of the parties, though informally expressed."³ It is hardly necessary to add that the court will not move to carry out a trust, even where a valuable consideration appears, if its terms and conditions can not be ascertained with sufficient clearness, or the *cestuis que trustent* are not definitely indicated or known.⁴

After some vacillation by the courts, it is now settled in most jurisdictions that an imperfect or executory conveyance or declaration of trust, which is also purely voluntary, will never be aided or enforced in equity.⁵ "I take the distinction to be," said Lord Eldon, "that if you want the assistance of the court to constitute you *cestui que trust*, and the instrument is voluntary, you shall not have that assistance for the purpose of constituting you *cestui que trust*; . . . but if the party has completely transferred stock, etc., though it is voluntary, yet, the legal conveyance being effectually made, the equitable in-

¹ *Baldwin v. Humphrey*, 44 N. Y. 609; *Yong v. Young*, 80 N. Y. 422, 437; *Merrill v. Peaslee*, 146 Mass. 460; *Whitehouse v. Whitehouse*, 90 Me. 468; *Benscotter v. Green*, 60 Md. 327; *Taylor v. Pownal*, 10 Leigh (Va.), 172, 183; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 95. The consideration must be legal and the contract otherwise valid. *Merrill v. Peaslee*, 146 Mass. 460.

² *Livingston v. Livingston*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 537; *Huntley v. Huntley*, 8 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 250; *Young v. Young*, 80 N. Y. 422, 437.

³ 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 95.

⁴ *Dillaye v. Greenough*, 45 N. Y. 438; *Ham v. Van Orden*, 84 N. Y. 257; *Owens v. Owens*, 23 N. J. Eq. 60.

⁵ *Matter of James*, 146 N. Y. 78; *Martin v. Funk*, 75 N. Y. 134; *Minturn v. Seymour*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 497, 498; *Hayes v. Kershaw*, 1 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 258; *Acker v. Phoenix*, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 305; *Matthews v. Hoagland*, 48 N. J. Eq. 455; *Moore v. Moore*, 43 L. J. Ch. 617, 623; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 97; *Pomeroy, Eq. Jur.* § 1148; *Story, Eq. Jur.* § 987.

terest will be enforced by this court.”¹ That is, in a voluntary declaration or settlement in trust, if everything is not done, nothing is done. The court will not compel one, who has merely promised without consideration that he would settle property in trust, to go on and perform that promise against his will. To do so would be to take his property from him by force and *give* it to another.² And, when a person has promised to settle property by his will in favor of mere volunteers, but has died without doing so, equity will afford no assistance to the promisees against the heirs or personal representatives of the deceased promisor.³ So, although the technical rule of law is that a seal imports a consideration, yet it is settled in England that the mere fact that an executory promise to convey property in trust is under seal will not alter the rule as here stated, if as a matter of fact there be no consideration for the promise.⁴ And, while in some of the early cases in this country it was said that the courts would not execute a voluntary executory agreement “*unless it is under seal,*” it is nevertheless safe to say that, at the present time, the rule of America in this regard is in harmony with that of England.⁵

There has been considerable discussion of the question whether or not a contract or promise founded on the meritorious consideration of blood, or on that of an existing relation of marriage, is voluntary, so as to come within the above-stated rule of equity. While Sugden was Lord Chancellor of Ireland, he decided, in the case of *Ellis v. Nimmo*, that a blood relationship was sufficient to move a court of equity to enforce an executory contract to settle property in trust.⁶ He subsequently allowed this decision to be overruled in England.⁷ And the doctrine is now

¹ *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 656; *Yong v. Young*, 80 N. Y. 422; *Wadd v. Hazelton*, 137 N. Y. 215.

² *Yong v. Young*, 80 N. Y. 422, 437.

³ *Warriner v. Rogers*, L. R. 16 Eq. 340; *Morgsn v. Malleon*, L. R. 10 Eq. 475.

⁴ *Hale v. Lamb*, 2 Eden, 292, 294; *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Bro. Ch. 148; *Meek v. Kettlewell*, 1 Hare, 464; *Dillin v. Coppin*, 4 Myl. & Cr. 647; *Dening v. Ware*, 22 Beav. 184.

⁵ So little attention is now paid by our courts to mere formalities, and the formality of a seal has lost so much of

its importance because of statutes, that it would be a construction out of harmony with the present tendency of equity tribunals, which should carry out a voluntary executory agreement simply because it was under seal. But see 1 Perry on Trusts, § 111; *Dennison v. Goehring*, 7 Barr (Pa.), 175; *Caldwell v. Williams*, 1 Bailey Eq. (S. C.) 175; *Mahan v. Mahan*, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 579; *Leeper v. Taylor*, 111 Mo. 312.

⁶ *Lloyd & Gould*, 333.

⁷ *Moore v. Crofton*, 3 Jones & La T. 438, 442. But, even in this case, he still expressed his belief in the soundness of *Ellis v. Nimmo*.

firmly established in that country that not even in favor of a wife or child will the court carry out an executory agreement resting on no valuable consideration; and this is true, whether the attempt be made to have it enforced against the settler himself, or against his heirs or devisees, or against other volunteers who claim under an executed agreement with him.¹ While the authorities in the United States are not entirely harmonious upon this point, yet the strongly prevailing view is in favor of the English rule.² Thus, in New York, the Court of Appeals has recently said: "The general principle is established that in no case whatever will courts of equity interfere in favor of mere volunteers, whether it be upon a voluntary contract or a settlement, however meritorious may be the consideration, and although they stand in the relation of a wife or child."³ In a few of the states, however, such as New Jersey,⁴ South Carolina,⁵ Missouri,⁶ and Kentucky,⁷ the decisions are the other way. Yet, even in the few jurisdictions where a wife or child is thus favored, the rule is said to be confined to those two relationships; and it will not extend its advantages to more remote relatives of the voluntary promissor, such as brothers, sisters, parents, or grandchildren,⁸ nor to illegitimate children.⁹

§ 321. **Revocation of Trusts, which have been created by Direct Words.**— Much diversity of opinion has arisen as to the revocability of a voluntary trust by the settler, after it has once been completely declared or settled. When a valuable consideration exists, no such question can practically arise, because in such a case, a contract having been brought into existence

¹ *Moore v. Crofton*, 3 Jones & La T. 438, 442; *Price v. Price*, 14 Beav. 598; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. 324; *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Cr. & Phil. 138; *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Bro. Ch. 148; *Dillon v. Coppin*, 4 Myl. & Cr. 647.

² *Matter of James*, 146 N. Y. 78, 93; *Wadd v. Hazelton*, 137 N. Y. 215; *Campbell's Est.* 7 Pa. St. 100; *Waterman v. Morgan*, 114 Ind. 237; *McHugh v. O'Connor*, 91 Ala. 243. See 1 Perry on Trusts, § 109; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1148.

³ *Matter of James*, 146 N. Y. 78, 93.

⁴ *Tarbox v. Grant*, 56 N. J. Eq. 199; *Landon v. Hutton*, 50 N. J. Eq. 500. These cases contain valuable discussions of the question.

⁵ *Caldwell v. Williams*, 1 Bailey Eq. (S. C.) 175.

⁶ *Leeper v. Taylor*, 111 Mo. 312.

⁷ *Bright v. Bright*, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 194, 197; *Mahan v. Mahan*, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 579; *McIntire v. Hughes*, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 186. But in most of the cases, in Missouri, South Carolina, and Kentucky, stress has also been laid on the existence of a seal as indicating a consideration.

⁸ *Downing v. Townsend*, Amb. 592; *Buford's Heirs v. McKee*, 1 Dana (Ky.), 107; *Tarbox v. Grant*, 56 N. J. Eq. 199; *Hayes v. Kershaw*, 1 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 258.

⁹ *Fursaker v. Robinson*, Pr. Ch. 475. See *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 329; *Matter of James*, 146 N. Y. 78.

by the meeting of at least two minds, it can not be done away with by the act of one of them alone. When a debtor has made a voluntary assignment of his property in trust for his creditors, a valuable consideration, although a past one, is supplied by the existence of the debts; and, if the creditors have assented to such transfer thereby making it a contract, it has become irrevocable by the assignor.¹ In this country, from the fact of the assignment alone, and in the absence of statutory regulation the assent of the creditors is presumed (unless the contrary is clearly proved²) and thus a contract is held to exist.³ In England it is a question of the intent of the assignor to make a completed assignment. If the language used and circumstances of the case show that he intended the transfer to be final, or if it be proved that the creditors expressly or tacitly consented to the assignment, a contract emerges, irrevocable by the assignor.⁴

When, on the other hand, an *executed voluntary* settlement in trust has been made, may the donor revoke it at pleasure, or in order to reserve that privilege must he have inserted in the settlement an express power of revocation? The correct answer to this much mooted question appears to depend on the intention and motives which gave rise to the settlement. The absence of an express power of revocation, in other words, is not conclusive, but only makes a *prima facie* case of a trust irrevocable by its maker.⁵ When, from all the other circumstances of the case, it does not appear that there was any intent to make an irrevocable settlement, and there was apparently

¹ *Siggers v. Evans*, 32 Eng. L. & Eq. 139; *Walwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Sim. 14, 3 Mer. 707.

² See *Gibson v. Rees*, 50 Ill. 383.

³ *Nicoll v. Mumford*, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 522; *Cunningham v. Freeborn*, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 240; *Pingree v. Comstock*, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 46; *Fellows v. Greenleaf*, 43 N. H. 421; *Read v. Robinson*, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 329; *Tenant v. Stoney*, 1 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 223; *England v. Reynolds*, 38 Ala. 370, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 327. This presumption may be rebutted by the fact that the assignment is not for the benefit of the creditors, or is in an objectionable or unusual form. See 2 Perry on Trusts, § 593.

⁴ *Walwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Sim. 14, 3

Mer. 707; *Harland v. Binks*, 15 Q. B. 713; *Acton v. Woodgate*, 2 Myl. & K. 492, 495; *New v. Hunting* (1897), 1 Q. B. 607, 615; *Synnott v. Simpson*, 5 H. L. Cas. 121, 133. It was said in *Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale*, 3 Sim. 1, that, even after the assignment had been communicated to the creditors, it might be revoked by the debtor. But this is manifestly not now the law of England. See also *Bill v. Cureton*, 2 Myl. & K. 503, 511; *Johns v. James*, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 744.

⁵ See this clearly explained in *Garnsey v. Mundy*, 24 N. J. Eq. 243, 13 Amer. Law Reg. (n. s.) 345, with note; also in 1 Perry on Trusts, § 104 and note.

no motive for making such a binding arrangement, the court may permit the grantor to annul the trust, although no right to do so was expressly reserved.¹ Whereas, if there existed a manifest design to dispose permanently and definitely of the property in trust, or if there appear a clear and sufficient reason for doing so, such, for example, as to provide for an indigent family or to guard against the effects of extravagance or intemperance on the part of the settler, the arrangement will be declared complete and irrevocable, unless there exist an express power of revocation.² In the former case, the absence of both motive and intent to make the trust permanent is *prima facie* evidence of mistake in not reserving the power to revoke; while in the latter no such evidence exists. (a)

Precatory Words.

§ 322. **Trusts created by Precatory Words — Precatory Trusts.** — Precatory trusts are those created by words of prayer, entreaty, request, hope, desire, expectation, and the like, and not of direct command or explicit declaration. They occur almost exclusively in wills, because testators, in preparing their last wills and testaments, are apt to have in mind the times and circumstances under which the documents will be read and put into operation, and to soften their language, accordingly, from that of harsh command to that of request or expectation. Such forms of trusts *may* occur, however, and

(a) In New York, when the settler reserves for his own benefit an absolute power to revoke the trust, "he is to be still deemed the absolute owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the rights of creditors and purchasers are concerned." Real Prop. Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 145; Conkling v. Davies, 14 Abb. N. C. 499, 501; Von Hesse v. MacKaye, 136 N. Y. 114; Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45.

¹ Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243; Doran v. McConlogue, 150 Pa. St. 98, 115; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 255; Farleigh v. Cadmann, 159 N. Y. 169, 172; *In re* Thurston, 154 Mass. 596; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 234; Brannin v. Shirley, 91 Ky. 450; Ewing v. Wilson, 19 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 767. But see Howard v. Howard, 60 Vt. 362; Sargent v. Baldwin, 60 Vt. 17.

² Tucker v. Bennett, L. R. 38 Ch.

Div. 1, 17; Von Hesse v. MacKaye, 136 N. Y. 114; Conkling v. Davies, 14 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 499; Culrose v. Gibbons, 130 N. Y. 447, 452; Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. St. 531; Reidy v. Small, 154 Pa. St. 505; Neal v. Black, 177 Pa. St. 83; New v. Hunting (1897), 2 Q. B. 19; The maker of the trust may also expressly reserve a power to modify the same. Locke v. F. L. & T. Co., 140 N. Y. 146.

are occasionally found, in other instruments.¹ The principle, upon which courts proceed in spelling out trusts from such language, is that, while the form of expression is modified and softened by the testator, his meaning is the same as if he used more explicit and unequivocal words in ordering and directing the disposition of his property.² In every day life, commands of the most emphatic nature are frequently issued in the form of requests. And it is natural that testators should often adopt the same method of giving instructions which are intended to be imperative. The finding by equity of precatory trusts in such instruments is, therefore, simply an application of the fundamental rule of construction of wills — the rule which requires the *intention* of the testator to be ascertained and carried out — whereby forms of express trusts are shown to be created by the testamentary language employed.³ For example, a testator gives property to his wife, with a “request” that out of its proceeds she shall maintain his niece, who has been brought up by him and taught to depend upon him for support; and a court of equity finds, from such language and circumstances, that a trust was *meant* to be impressed upon the property in the hands of the donee.⁴

§ 323. **Intent the Chief Exponent of Precatory Trusts.** — Some writers have laboriously collected long lists of expressions, which have been held in some cases to have created precatory trusts, and other lists of those which have been decided to be insufficient for that purpose.⁵ But, in the light of the most recent adjudications, these are of but little assistance. The question presented, in each case, is that of the interpretation and construction of a will, which is probably different in some respects from every other will. And this requires that the entire document shall be studied and the intention of the testator ascertained, as expressed by the words he has used, according to their ordinary and natural meaning, but possibly

¹ See *Liddard v. Liddard*, 28 Beav. 266; *Verzier v. Convard*, 75 Conn. 1; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 76.

² *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 513, 548; *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. 148, 173; *Mason v. Limbury*, cited in *Vernon v. Vernon*, Amb. 4; *Hill on Trustees* (4th Amer. ed.), p. 73.

³ *Eaton v. Watts*, L. R. 4 Eq. 151, 155;

Young v. Martin, 2 You. & Coll. 582; *Clay v. Wood*, 153 N. Y. 134; *Aldrich v. Aldrich*, 172 Mass. 101; *Eberhardt v. Perolin*, 49 N. J. Eq. 570; *Boyle v. Boyle*, 152 Pa. St. 108.

⁴ *Collister v. Fassitt*, 163 N. Y. 281.

⁵ See 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 112, 113; 1 *Ames, Cases on Trusts*, p. 82 *et seq.*

modified by the context and his situation and circumstances at the time when he used them.¹

As a rule or principle of construction subsidiary to that which requires the testamentary *intent* to be sought, it was at one time held by the English courts, in conformity to the old Roman law, that precatory words in a will were to be taken as *prima facie* imperative, and would raise a trust, unless a contrary intent appeared from the context or circumstances.² But this doctrine has been abolished by recent decisions in England; and it is now firmly established there that such expressions alone do not import a command.³ In the case of *Hill v. Hill*,⁴ decided in 1897, a summary of the rule of construction, which is now controlling, is thus stated by Lord Esher, M.R.: "Words of request in their ordinary meaning convey a mere request, and do not convey a legal obligation of any kind either at law or in equity. But in any particular case there may be circumstances which would oblige the court to say that such words have a meaning beyond their ordinary meaning and import a legal obligation." This is a clear expression of a principle for which some of the English judges had long contended,⁵ but which may be said to have been first thoroughly crystallized into law in the leading case of *In re Adams & Kensington Vestry*.⁶

In the United States, the best decisions of recent years are fully in harmony with the present English rule.⁷ In the Su-

¹ *Colton v. Colton*, 127 U. S. 300, 312; *Clay v. Wood*, 153 N. Y. 134; *Aldrich v. Aldrich*, 172 Mass. 101; *Dexter v. Evans*, 63 Conn. 58; *Eberhardt v. Perolin*, 49 N. J. Eq. 570; *Boyle v. Boyle*, 152 Pa. St. 108; *Murphy v. Carlin*, 113 Mo. 112; 1 Ames, Cases on Trusts, 96, 97; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. *356.

² *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. 148, 173; *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 513; *Hill on Trustees* (4th Amer. ed.), 73. "The wish of a testator," it was said, "like the request of a sovereign, is equivalent to a command."

³ *In re Hamilton* (1895), 2 Ch. 370; *Hill v. Hill* (1897), 1 Q. B. 483; *Booth v. Booth* (1894), 2 Ch. 282; *In re Diggle*, L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 253; *In re Adams & Kensington Vestry*, L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 394; *Adams v. Lopdell*, 25

L. R. Ir. 311; *Atkinson v. Atkinson*, 62 L. T. 735.

⁴ (1897), 1 Q. B. 483.

⁵ See *Hanhury v. Fisher* (1904), 1 Ch. 415; *Lambe v. Eames*, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 597; *Mussoorie Bank v. Raynor*, L. R. 7 App. Cas. 321; *Reeves v. Baker*, 18 Beav. 372; *In re Hutchinson & Tenant*, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 540; *Briggs v. Penny*, 3 MacN. & G. 546; *McCormick v. Grogan*, L. R. 4 H. L. 82; *Parnall v. Parnall*, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 96.

⁶ L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 394; *Brett's Lead. Cas. Eq.* 13.

⁷ *Colton v. Colton*, 127 U. S. 300; *Collister v. Fassitt*, 163 N. Y. 281; *Clay v. Wood*, 153 N. Y. 134; *Post v. Moore*, 181 N. Y. 15, 19; *Matter of Ingersoll*, 131 N. Y. 573; *Phillips v. Phillips*, 112 N. Y. 197; *Brown v. Perry*, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 11, 12; *Aldrich v. Aldrich*,

preme Court of the United States, the subject was exhaustively discussed, in 1888, in the case of *Colton v. Colton*.¹ The testator there gave a large estate to his wife, and said in connection with the gift: "I recommend to her the care and protection of my mother and sister, and request her to make such gift and provision for them as in her judgment will be best." It was held that a trust was thereby created. But the decision was not based alone on the words above quoted, but rather on the conclusion of the court that, in view of the largeness of the estate and the added fact, which was proved, that the testator's mother and sister had only a meagre income of their own, he could not have *intended* to confide solely in his wife's affection for his relatives to determine what she should do for them, but must have *meant* that his language should carry a command.² The same principle of construction has been uniformly recognized in Pennsylvania and Connecticut.³ And in New York,⁴ New Jersey,⁵ Massachusetts,⁶ Indiana,⁷ Iowa,⁸ Missouri,⁹ Virginia,¹⁰ South Carolina,¹¹ and Maryland,¹² such is

172 Mass. 101; *Durant v. Smith*, 159 Mass. 229; *Boyle v. Boyle*, 152 Pa. St. 108; *Good v. Fichthorn*, 144 Pa. St. 287; *Eberhardt v. Perolin*, 49 N. J. Eq. 570; *Dexter v. Evans*, 63 Conn. 58; *Pratt v. Trustees*, 88 Md. 610; *Orth v. Orth*, 145 Ind. 184; *Stivers v. Gardner*, 88 Iowa, 307; *Murphy v. Carlin*, 113 Mo. 112; *Sale v. Thornberry*, 86 Ky. 266; *Arnold v. Arnold*, 41 S. C. 291; *Harrison v. Harrison*, 44 Amer. Dec. (Va.) 365.

¹ 127 U. S. 300.

² It is intimated, in this case, that, if the testator, in giving the same estate to his wife, had made a similar request in favor of their children, there would have been no trust; but the wife would have taken the property absolutely, as in the English case of *In re Adams & Kensington Vestry*. It could then have been safely assumed that the testator *meant* to rely on the mother's natural affection for her children, and therefore did not *intend* to give her a command by the precatory words employed. But such an intent could not be assumed as to his blood relatives who were not hers. This distinction well illustrates the nice discrimination with which the *intention*

of a testator is sought, when he has made use of precatory words.

³ *Pennock's Est.*, 20 Pa. St. 268, 280; *Paisley's Appeal*, 70 Pa. St. 153; *Boyle v. Boyle*, 152 Pa. St. 108; *Murphy's Est.*, 184 Pa. St. 310, 314; *Gilbert v. Chapin*, 19 Conn. 342; *Dexter v. Evans*, 63 Conn. 58.

⁴ *Clay v. Wood*, 153 N. Y. 134; *Collister v. Fassitt*, 163 N. Y. 281; *Matter of Ingersoll*, 131 N. Y. 573; *Matter of Keleman*, 126 N. Y. 73; *Phillips v. Phillips*, 112 N. Y. 197; *Lawrence v. Cooke*, 104 N. Y. 632; *Willets v. Willets*, 103 N. Y. 650, 656; *Foose v. Whitmore*, 82 N. Y. 405; *Brown v. Perry*, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 11, 12.

⁵ *Eberhardt v. Perolin*, 49 N. J. Eq. 570.

⁶ *Aldrich v. Aldrich*, 172 Mass. 101; *Durant v. Smith*, 159 Mass. 229; *Bacon v. Ransom*, 139 Mass. 117.

⁷ *Orth v. Orth*, 145 Ind. 184.

⁸ *Stivers v. Gardner*, 88 Iowa, 307.

⁹ *Murphy v. Carlin*, 113 Mo. 112.

¹⁰ *Harrison v. Harrison*, 44 Amer. Dec. (Va.) 365.

¹¹ *Arnold v. Arnold*, 41 S. C. 291; *Lesesne v. Witte*, 5 S. C. 450.

¹² *Pratt v. Trustees*, 88 Md. 610; *Nunn v. O'Brien*, 83 Md. 198.

undoubtedly the present rule. In a number of the American states, however, such as Maine,¹ Alabama,² and Florida,³ the old Roman rule has been early adopted and never modified. In summary for this country, then, it may be said that, in some of the states, such as those last mentioned, precatory words are words of technical import and without more imply *prima facie* an intent to create a trust; while in the United States Supreme Court and the courts of most of the states, such as those first above mentioned, they are words, not of technical, but of common parlance, and do not raise a trust, unless from the context and the situation and circumstances of the testator it is to be fairly concluded that such was his intention.

The *intention* of the testator, then, the "pole star" for the construction of wills, is the one thing commonly sought for, in determining whether or not a precatory trust has been created. His wish, when clearly ascertained, is to be taken as a command.⁴ But, by the weight of authority, especially as expressed by the most recent decisions on both sides of the Atlantic, a design to raise such a trust shall not be found *prima facie* from the mere use of precatory words, but must be spelled out of the entire document read in the light of the circumstances of the case.⁵ There are several subordinate principles, which are commonly employed in this connection in the effort to ascertain intention. Chief among these is the requirement that there must be certainty as to both the objects and the subject-matter of the trust; that is, the parties who are to take as beneficiaries must be definitely indicated, and the property which they are to take must be clearly specified.⁶

§ 324. **Certainty of Beneficiaries as indicative of Precatory Trusts.** — As to the first of these requirements, it will be hereafter fully explained that certainty in the beneficiary is one of the prime requisites of every private trust.⁷ But if a trust be created by direct, technical words, thereby making it plain be-

¹ Cole v. Littlefield, 35 Me. 439.

² McRee's Adm'r's v. Means, 34 Ala. 349.

³ Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51.

⁴ Perhaps the three typical cases in America may be said to be Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300; Clay v. Wood, 153 N. Y. 134; and Aldrich v. Aldrich, 172 Mass. 101. And all of these are in harmony with the English rule.

⁵ Cases cited above, especially Hill

v. Hill (1897), 1 Q. B. 483; *In re Adams & Kensington Vestry*, L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 394; Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300; Clay v. Wood, 153 N. Y. 134; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 172 Mass. 101.

⁶ Stead v. Mellor, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 225, 227; Briggs v. Penny, 3 MacN. & G. 546; Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1833, and notes.

⁷ § 327, *infra*.

yond question that the trustee is not to take beneficially, and the *cestui que trust* be not clearly pointed out, or, because of his death or inability to take, the primary objects of the settlement fail, the property is held for the benefit of the settler, or, if he be dead, of his heirs or personal representatives; and a resulting trust is thus brought into existence.¹ Whereas, in case of uncertainty of the beneficiary indicated by precatory words, the courts will more readily conclude that no trust whatever was intended, and permit the donee to take the property freed from all fiduciary obligation.² Thus, suppose one lot of land is devised to A, "in trust nevertheless for such persons as are hereafter in this will designated," and no beneficiaries are clearly pointed out by the will; and another lot is devised to A, "hoping and requesting, however, that he will use as much of the income as is necessary for the support of such of his relatives as may be hereinafter named," and no such relatives are definitely named in the will. If these testamentary statements be all the evidence available as to the intended dispositions of the two lots, A will take the former in trust for the heirs of the testator, but will own the latter absolutely for his own benefit. In the one case, it is clear that A is not to take beneficially, and so he is required to hold the property in trust; in the other, the want of certainty is *evidence* indicating that the testator did not really intend to create any trust.³ The distinction thus pointed out is the most important practical one between a precatory trust and a trust made by direct words of command or declaration. In the former, in case of its failure, the donee of the legal estate is the more apt to acquire the property for his own benefit. But, of course, if the creator of

¹ Resulting trusts are such as arise by implication of law, in favor of the grantor or his heirs, or the heirs of a testator, when property has been conveyed to a trustee with the *manifest intention* that he shall not hold it beneficially, and the purpose for which he is to hold is not fully expressed, or for some reason can not be carried out. Such trusts are implied to carry out the presumed intent of the settler. See discussion of them hereafter, Ch. XXII. *infra*.

² *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 10 Ves. 521, 536; *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 542; *Harland v. Trigg*, 1 Bro. C. C. 142; *Hood v. Oglander*, 34 L. J. Ch.

528; *Mussoorie Bank v. Raynor*, L. R. 7 App. Cas. 321; *Giles v. Anslow*, 128 Ill. 187; *Harper v. Phelps*, 21 Conn. 256.

³ Cases cited in last note. In the first of those cases, the Lord Chancellor said: "Wherever the subject to be administered is trust property, and the objects for whose benefit it is to be administered are to be found in a will not expressly creating a trust, the indefinite nature and quantum of the subject, and the indefinite nature of the object are always used by the court as *evidence* that the mind of the testator was not to create a trust."

a trust make it clear, even by the use of precatory words, that he wishes the trustee to hold the property for some one other than himself, *and not to have any beneficial interest therein*, this design will in some way be carried out by the court, even though the primary purpose of the settlement fail, for want of certainty, or for other cause.¹

§ 325. **Certainty of Subject-Matter as indicative of Precatory Trusts.** — Another matter for inquiry, in this connection, to aid in ascertaining the settler's *intent*, is the certainty with which the property or subject-matter is pointed out. When the identity or amount of this is left at all in doubt, and precatory language is employed, the conclusion most naturally and commonly drawn, in the absence of other evidence to the contrary, is that no trust was meant to be created.² Cases of this sort arise, and no trust comes into existence, where the donee is authorized to select the particular piece of land, or the amount of it, and it is fair to conclude from the context that such choice is left entirely to his discretion; ³ or where he is to use up as much of it as he may need or desire and any "surplus," or "residue," is requested to be held for others, or to be divided among them.⁴

§ 326. **Other Tests as to whether or not Precatory Trusts exist.** — A few other principles, upon which courts have laid stress as helping to determine whether or not a precatory trust was designed, may be briefly mentioned. Thus, when the gift is in the first instance absolute and apparently for the donee's own benefit, it will not be cut down to a trust by subsequent precatory words in the will; and especially is this true when other provisions of the will intervene between the gift and the precatory language relating thereto.⁵ So the courts will not

¹ *Ingram v. Fraley*, 29 Ga. 553; *Hill on Trustees* (4th Amer. ed.), 110, and notes; *Hawkins on Wills*, 160.

² *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 513; *Conrnan v. Harrison*, 10 Hare, 234; *Durant v. Smith*, 159 Mass. 229; *Coulson v. Alpaugh*, 163 Ill. 298; *Nunn v. O'Brien*, 83 Md. 198.

³ *Williams v. Williams*, 1 Sim. n. s. 358; *Reeves v. Baker*, 18 Beav. 372; *Hood v. Oglander*, 34 Beav. 513; *Foose v. Whitmore*, 82 N. Y. 405; *Matter of Keleman*, 126 N. Y. 73; *Wyman v. Woodbury*, 86 Hun (N. Y.), 277, 282; *Gilbert v. Chapin*, 19 Conn. 342.

⁴ *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 513; *Clancarty v. Clancarty*, 31 L. R. Ir. 530, 549; *Pennock's Est.*, 20 Pa. St. 268; *Willets v. Willets*, 103 N. Y. 650, 656; *Durant v. Smith*, 159 Mass. 229; *Nunn v. O'Brien*, 83 Md. 198; *Coulson v. Alpaugh*, 163 Ill. 298; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 114, and note, and § 116.

⁵ *Webb v. Wools*, 2 Sim. n. s. 267; *Bardswell v. Bardswell*, 9 Sim. 319; *Wilde v. Smith*, 2 Dem. (N. Y.) 93; *Lawrence v. Cooke*, 104 N. Y. 632; *Clarke v. Leupp*, 88 N. Y. 228; *Brown v. Perry*, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 11, 12;

raise such a trust for a purpose, the carrying out of which they can not compel; as where a devise was to the testator's wife, with a request that out of the proceeds of the property she should support his sister, as long as the two women would live together, the court declared it could not undertake to make them live together, and therefore would not hold that there was any trust.¹ Again, if the words used indicate merely a *purpose* or *motive* in making the gift, rather than a direction as to its use, there will not be any trust. Thus a gift of property to a person, "to purchase a ring," or "to enable him to maintain the children," does not bring into being a trust of any kind.²

There must be, as prerequisites to the existence of a precatory trust, a reasonably clear intent that definitely described property shall be held for the benefit of *cestuis que trustent* who are pointed out with common certainty.

§ 327. **Requisites of Express Trusts generally.** — It has been said that "Three things must concur to raise a trust, — sufficient words to create it, a definite subject, and a certain or ascertained object."³ That is, there must be a sufficient declaration of the trust, in terms either precatory or directly mandatory, the subject-matter must be clearly indicated, and the object or beneficiary must be definitely pointed out. These things must coexist, in order that a trust may come into being. When it has once been created and exists as an interest in real property, its essential features are seen to be the same as those which were heretofore enumerated as belonging to a use; namely, a trustee in being, a *cestui que trust* in being and ascertained, or so described as to be readily ascertainable, and a determined subject-matter *in esse*, to which the trust interest is attached.⁴

The word "*certain*" is very important, in regard to all of these requisites. While uncertainty as to the *individuals* who are to be the beneficiaries is one of the elements of a charitable

Van Dwyne v. Van Dwyne, 14 N. J. Eq. 397; Second, etc. Church v. Desbrow, 52 Pa. St. 219; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 112, and note.

¹ Graves v. Graves, 13 Ir. Ch. 182; Hood v. Oglander, 34 Beav. 513; Harper v. Phelps, 21 Conn. 256. See Phillips v. Phillips, 112 N. Y. 197, 204.

² Apreece v. Apreece, 1 Ves. & Bea. 364; Benson v. Whittam, 5 Sim. 22; Burke v. Valentine, 52 Barb. (N. Y.)

412; Burt v. Herron, 66 Pa. St. 400; Barrett v. Marsh, 126 Mass. 213; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 119.

³ Knight v. Boughton, 11 Cl. & Fin. 513; Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319, 323.

⁴ Phelps' Executor v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69, 77; Rose v. Hatch, 125 N. Y. 427, 431; Greene v. Greene, 125 N. Y. 506, 510; Sherwood v. Amer. Bible Soc., 4 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 227.

trust,¹ yet if in any other form of express trust, as to any of its requisites, or if in a charitable trust as to any requisite except the objects, there be such uncertainty that the court can not surely know who or what is meant, the settlement attempted, or apparently attempted, can not be carried into effect. Either the entire scheme will fail, and there will be no trust at all,² or, if the legal estate pass to one who clearly ought not to hold it for his own advantage, some form of implied trust will arise, either to comply with the presumed intent of the parties or to work out justice regardless of such intent.³ It has already been shown that trusts are more apt to exist by implication, or to *result*, when explicit mandatory statements are used by the settler but uncertainty arises as to the objects to be benefited, than in cases of like ambiguity where the expressions used to create the trusts are precatory.⁴ When doubt springs from the latter source, it frequently causes the court to hold, in its quest for the *intent*, that there is not enough evidence to raise a trust — or rather that the doubt is such as in itself to be *evidence* against the existence of any trust at all — and that the donee takes the property absolutely for his own benefit.⁵

It is a rule which has no exception that, if a trust be once properly created, equity will not allow it to fail for want of a trustee.⁶ When no trustee is properly named, or one who is duly appointed dies, is removed, or becomes incapacitated, the court either ascertains or appoints another, or regards itself as such and executes the trust.⁷ Therefore, a trust rarely fails on account of any difficulty as to the trustee. There is ordinarily a trustee of some kind *in esse*. But, *when the coming of the trust into existence depends on the appointment of a trustee*, as is true of some forms of charitable trusts hereafter explained,⁸ then the failure to name one, or an attempted

¹ See § 308, *supra*, and §§ 345, 346, *infra*.

² *Campbell v. Brown*, 129 Mass. 23; *Hill on Trustees* (4th Amer. ed.), 73, 74.

³ See § 310, *supra*, and § 351, *infra*.
⁴ § 324, *supra*; *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 10 Ves. 521, 536; *Bispham's Priu. Eq.* §§ 75, 76.

⁵ § 324, *supra*.

⁶ *Co. Lit.* 290 b, 113 a; *Dodkin v. Brunt*, L. R. 6 Eq. 580; *Bundy v. Bundy*, 28 N. Y. 410; *McCartee v. Orphan Asy. Soc.*, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 437; *Crocheron v.*

Jaques, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 207; *Story, Eq. Jur.* §§ 98, 976.

⁷ *Bennet v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 316; *Cross v. U. S. Trust Co.*, 131 N. Y. 330, 350; *Kirk v. Kirk*, 137 N. Y. 510, 515; *Cushney v. Henry*, 4 Paige (N. Y.). 345; *King v. Donnelly*, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 46; *Malin v. Malin*, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 625; *Platt v. Vattier*, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 405; *Kerr v. Day*, 14 Pa. St. 114; *Treat's Appeal*, 30 Conn. 113.

⁸ § 346, *infra*.

nomination by words so ambiguous that the court can not ascertain certainly who is meant, will defeat the entire scheme.¹ The court will not let an existing trust terminate for want of a trustee; nor will it bring into being a trust that would otherwise not exist, by creating a trustee, or identifying one from loose, ambiguous, or uncertain expressions.

Any kind of valuable property may be the subject-matter of a trust.² Real property of every sort is that dealt with by the trusts here discussed. The simple requirement is that it shall be definitely pointed out, so that it can be ascertained with certainty by the court. And when this is done, even though the land itself is not within the jurisdiction of the court, a trust thereof can be taken cognizance of and administered, if the court have jurisdiction over the parties. "Equity acts *in personam*."³ And therefore, in the absence of statutory restriction, if it have the parties properly before it, it may administer trusts and fiduciary matters as to property which is situated in a state or country outside of its own jurisdiction.⁴

Kinds of Express Trusts and Trust Interests.

§ 328. **Express Trusts, Active and Passive.** — The distinction between (a) active (or special) and (b) passive (or simple) trusts has been already pointed out.⁵ When the trustee has certain duties to perform, such, for example, as to manage the property for the benefit of other persons, which renders it necessary that the legal estate shall remain in him, the trust is active. Otherwise it is passive; that is, the trustee is merely the receptacle of the legal title; the *cestui que trust* has both the *jus habendi*, or the right to possess and enjoy the property, and the *jus disponendi*, or the right, as he may direct, to compel the trustee to convey the legal estate.⁶ This division

¹ Last preceding note; *Grimes v. Harmon*, 35 Ind. 198; 2 *Perry on Trusts*, § 713.

² 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 67.

³ The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was acquired originally against the person; and an attachment against the *person* has always been its ordinary method of proceeding. *Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster*, 23 N. H. 462; *Hart v. Sansom*, 110 U. S. 151, 154.

⁴ *Penn v. Lord Baltimore*, 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 767; *Vaughan v. Barclay*, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 392; *Mitchell v. Bunch*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 606; *Chase v. Chase*, 2 Allen (Mass.), 101; *Lindley v. O'Reilly*, 50 N. J. L. 636; *Clad v. Paist*, 181 Pa. St. 148; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 71, 72.

⁵ § 307, *supra*.

⁶ *Mills v. Johnston* (1894), 3 Ch. 204; *McCune v. Baker*, 155 Pa. St. 503; 1 *Lewin on Trusts*, p. * 18.

of trusts into those that are active and those that are passive assumes its chief importance as a subdivision of express trusts, because implied trusts are uniformly passive.

§ 329. (a) **Active Express Trusts.** — The purposes for which active express trusts may exist at common law are many and varied, and are discussed hereafter. Such trusts simply need to be mentioned here as a class. And the material and often difficult question is next in order, when and under what conditions do trusts, which are created as active ones, cease to exist because of the fact that they become passive by a change of circumstances and are then executed by the Statute of Uses? If, for example, land be devised to A as an active trustee to manage and pay the net income to B during his life and then to convey the land to C, D, and E, when if ever will the legal estate depart from A (although he fail to convey it), and vest in the beneficiaries, C, D, and E? Before the discussion of such questions, however, a few words are required as to trusts which are passive in their inception.

§ 330. (b) **Passive Express Trusts — or Uses — When Executed.** — A passive express trust is simply and only the old use with a new name — the legal estate is vested in one who has nothing to do but to hold it, for another who has all the management and benefit of the property.¹ When a trust is thus expressly created in the first instance as passive, and there is in its inception no resort to the principle in Tyrrel's Case — no making of it in the form of a use upon a use — in the absence of direct, modern statutory prohibition, it will ordinarily be at once executed by the Statute of Uses.² The mere employment of the word "trust," instead of "use," will make no difference. It is the *use* such as existed in the times of and before the Statute of Uses; and is dealt with as such. In many of the United States, as New York, Indiana, Delaware, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia, the rule in Tyrrel's Case has been entirely abrogated, either by positive statute or judicial determination.³ (a) Indeed, it has been doubted by high

(a) For the New York statute abolishing the rule of Tyrrel's Case, see note (a) to § 331, *infra*.

¹ §§ 303, 304, *supra*.

² *Austen v. Taylor*, 1 Eden, 361; *Wendt v. Walsh*, 164 N. Y. 154; 1 Lewin on Trusts, p. *209.

³ N. Y. Real Prop. Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), §§ 92, 93; *Downing v. Marshall*, 23 N. Y. 366, 379; *Townshend v. Frommer*, 125 N. Y. 446, 456; *Wendt*

authority whether that rule is in force at all in this country.¹ And the general American principle may be stated to be that, whenever the legal estate is expressly given to a trustee, to whom no active duties are assigned, it immediately goes past him and vests in the *cestui que trust* for whose benefit the settlement was ultimately intended. In Missouri, however, and probably in New Jersey, and possibly in a few other states, Tyrrel's Case has been adhered to; and there, if a passive express trust be made in the *form* of a use upon a use, as to A in trust for B in trust for C, the legal estate will not be carried further than to the first-named beneficiary — in the example given, to B — and he will hold as a passive trustee for the other — for C.²

§ 331. **Effects of Active Express Trusts becoming Passive.** — The more difficult question, as above stated,³ is usually presented when a trust which has been once active becomes passive, or when by any means the trustee once active becomes the holder of a mere dry legal estate. Does the trust then cease and the legal estate vest immediately in the beneficiary? It does so in New York and in the few states, such as Wisconsin and Michigan, which have followed New York's advanced form of legislation upon this subject.⁴ In those states a passive express trust can not exist; for, as soon as a trust becomes of that nature, the equitable estate of the ultimate beneficiary is merged in the legal estate which passes to him.⁵ The same position was at one time held by the courts of Pennsylvania, without the aid of any statute.⁶ But they subsequently placed themselves again in line with the English courts and those of the majority of the states of this country.⁷

v. Walsh, 164 N. Y. 154; Ind. Rev. St. (1843) ch. 28; Del. Rev. St. (1829) p. 89, § 1; *Thatcher v. Omans*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 521, 528; *Tucker's Appeal*, 75 Pa. St. 354; *Greenl. Cruise*, Dig. tit. xii. ch. 1, § 4, note.

¹ *Greenl. Cruise*, Dig. tit. xii. ch. 1 § 4, note.

² *Guest v. Farley*, 19 Mo. 147. And see *Croxall v. Shererd*, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 268, 282; *Martling v. Martling*, 55 N. J. Eq. 771, 780; *Price v. Sisson*, 13 N. J. Eq. 168, 173; *Jackson v. Cary*, 16 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 302.

³ § 329, *supra*.

⁴ N. Y. Real Prop. Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), §§ 92, 93; *Townshend v. From-*

mer, 125 N. Y. 446, 456; *Hopkins v. Kent*, 145 N. Y. 363; *Wendt v. Walsh*, 164 N. Y. 154; *Wis. Rev. St.* (1858) p. 529; *Goodrick v. Milwaukee*, 24 Wis. 422, 429; *Backhaus v. Backhaus*, 70 Wis. 518; 2 Mich. Comp. L. (1857) p. 824; *Ready v. Kearsley*, 14 Mich. 215, 228. See also *Murphey v. Cook*, 75 N. W. Rep. (S. D.) 387.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Kuhn v. Newman*, 26 Pa. St. 227; *Bush's Appeal*, 33 Pa. St. 85; *Nagee's Appeal*, 33 Pa. St. 89.

⁷ *Barnett's Appeal*, 46 Pa. St. 392; *Bacon's Appeal*, 57 Pa. St. 504; *Tucker's Appeal*, 75 Pa. St. 354; *Ogden's Appeal*, 70 Pa. St. 501.

These latter tribunals likewise hold that the trust is executed as soon as it becomes wholly passive, when the only reason for the existence of the trustee in the first place was that he might hold the property for the purpose of actively performing some prescribed duty in reference thereto, and no ultimate conveyance or transfer is expressly or impliedly directed.¹ Thus, where land was conveyed to the grantor's wife, in trust to hold and manage for the benefit of their children until the youngest child should become twenty-one years of age, it was held that at the majority of such child the trust terminated and the legal estate vested absolutely in all the beneficiaries.² But when the failure of the statute to execute the trust in the first instance is not due entirely to the active character of the trust, — as, for example, when the trustee is directly ordered to make a conveyance of the legal title after his work of managing for a period is accomplished, — then it is held by the courts of England and most of our states that the fact alone that the trust has ceased to be active does not cause it to be executed by the Statute of Uses.³ In such cases, however, after his active labors are at an end, it is generally the duty of the trustee, upon demand of the *cestui que trust*, to convey the legal title to the latter, or to such person or persons as he shall appoint.⁴ And, a sufficient reason therefore thus appearing, after a great lapse of time and long-continued possession by the equitable owner, and in favor of a just title, equity will presume that the trustee has performed his duty by making such a conveyance.⁵ Thus, where the trustee is expressly ordered to convey upon the happening of a specified event, as when a minor becomes of age, and the beneficiary has been exclusively enjoying the property for a number of years after that time — in one case only about four years — the court presumes a conveyance, though there may be nothing to lead it to suppose that one was ever actually made.⁶ So,

¹ 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 349-351.

² *Sherman v. Dodge*, 28 Vt. 26, 30; *Leonard's Lessee v. Diamond*, 31 Md. 536, 541; *Hill on Trustees* (4th Amer. ed.), 316; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 351.

³ *England v. Slade*, 4 T. R. 682; *Obert v. Bordine*, 20 N. J. L. 394; *Welles v. Castles*, 3 Gray (Mass.), 323; *Hooper v. Felgner*, 80 Md. 262, 271; *Aikin v. Smith*, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 304; *Liptrot v. Holmes*, 1 Kelley (Ga.),

381. And see *Hopkins v. Kent*, 145 N. Y. 363; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 351-355.

⁴ *Dunn v. Wheeler*, 80 Mo. 238.

⁵ *England v. Slade*, 4 T. R. 682; *Angier v. Stannard*, 3 Myl. & K. 566, 571; *Langley v. Sneyd*, 1 Sim. & St. 45.

⁶ *England v. Slade*, 4 T. R. 682; *Wilson v. Allen*, 1 Jac. & W. 591, 611; *Hillary v. Waller*, 12 Ves. 239; *Doe v. Sybourn*, 7 T. R. 2; *Marr v. Gilliam*, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 488.

where land was deeded to trustees, for the purpose of having them partition it and transfer separate pieces to the individual grantors, it was presumed, after long occupation of distinct parcels by the latter, that the trustees had duly made the contemplated conveyances.¹ The three requisites to such a presumption are: *first*, that it shall be supported by some sufficient reason — and long and exclusive possession by the beneficiary, when aided by any other slight circumstances, is one of the best and most common reasons; *second*, that it was the duty of the trustee to make the conveyance; and *third*, that the presumption is in favor of, and not against, a just and proper title.² One can not have the benefit of such a presumption for gaining an unfair or inequitable advantage over an adverse claimant.³

It need hardly be added that, while the trust remains active, in whole or in part, the statute will not execute it, and the courts will ordinarily refuse to presume or order a conveyance from the trustee. Yet, even if some of the purposes of the trust have not been accomplished, or the trust may not have run its full prescribed course, if the *cestuis que trustent* are all in being and under no legal disability, the court, with their consent, may order the trust to be terminated and the legal estate transferred to the rightful owner or owners.⁴ This can not be done, however, in derogation of the wish or intent of the settler of the trust.⁵

The rules above stated, by which the English and most of the American courts determine whether or not a trust that has become passive is to be held to have terminated, or a conveyance of the legal estate to the beneficiaries is to be presumed, are necessarily somewhat vague and indefinite. The time involved in raising such presumptions of conveyances is not necessarily nor usually the same as that of the Statute of Limitations. Sometimes it is shorter, sometimes longer, according as there are or are not other important facts to aid in raising

¹ Jackson v. Moore, 13 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 513, a case decided before the present form of statute on this matter was adopted, — before Jan. 1, 1830; Kimball v. Blanchard, 101 Me. 383; Guild v. Allen, 28 R. I. 430.

² 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 351-355.

³ Doe v. Wrighte, 2 Barn. & Al. 710; Doe v. Cook, 6 Bing. 174, 179; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 355.

⁴ Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen (Mass.), 339; Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. St. 145, 148; Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326; Perry on Trusts, §§ 274, 922.

⁵ Hogan v. Kavanogh, 138 N. Y. 417; Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326; Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169; Douglas v. Cruger, 80 N. Y. 15; Chaplin on Express Trusts and Powers, § 526.

the presumption.¹ All the circumstances of each case are carefully examined; and, in the light of these and by the application of the rules above stated, the trusts are declared to have terminated when such conclusions are just and equitable and aid in the quieting and perfecting of titles. A statutory rule, like that of New York, which instantly terminates an express trust when it ceases to be active, is much more definite and satisfactory. (a)

(a) The New York statute, which is now Real Prop. Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), §§ 90-93, is as follows:—

“§ 90. Every estate which is now” (Jan. 1, 1830) “held as a use, executed under any former statute of the state, is confirmed as a legal estate.”

“§ 91. Uses and trusts concerning real property, except as authorized or modified by this article, have been abolished; every estate or interest in real property is deemed a legal right, cognizable as such in the courts, except as otherwise prescribed in this chapter.”

“§ 92. Every person, who, by virtue of any grant, assignment, or devise, is entitled both to the actual possession of real property, and to the receipt of the rents and profits thereof, in law or equity, shall be deemed to have a legal estate therein, of the same quality and duration, and subject to the same conditions, as his beneficial interest; but this section does not divest the estate of the trustee in any trust existing on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and thirty, where the title of such trustee is not merely nominal, but is connected with some power of actual disposition or management in relation to the real property which is the subject of the trust.”

“§ 93. Every disposition of real property, whether by deed or by devise, shall be made directly to the person in whom the right to the possession and profits is intended to be vested, and not to another to the use of, or in trust for, such person; and if made to any person to the use of, or in trust for another, no estate or interest, legal or equitable, vests in the trustee. But neither this section nor the preceding section of this article shall extend to the trusts arising, or resulting by implication of law, nor prevent or affect the creation of such express trusts as are authorized and defined in this chapter.”

No express trusts, except such as are active, are “authorized and defined” in the chapter which contains these sections, or in any other law of New York. The sections here quoted are the present form of the same statute in substance, which went into operation as a part of the New York Revised Statutes, Jan. 1, 1830 (1 R. S. 727, §§ 45-50). See Fowler's R. P. Law, pp. 232-243.

The results of these enactments are that (1) no passive express trust

¹ 1 Perry on Trusts, § 349. In some instances this time is regulated by special statutes of limitation. Thus, in New York, a trust for the benefit of creditors, except where a different period is fixed by the

trust instrument, or is specially prescribed by law, “shall cease at the expiration of twenty-five years from the time when the trust was created.” See last paragraph to note (a), p. 465, *infra*.

§ 332. **Powers in Trust.** — In order that a trust may exist, the trustee must have the *legal estate* in the property. If there be no legal estate and title for a trustee, there can be no trust.¹ Thus, if land be devised to A to hold and manage for the benefit of B, the legal estate vests in A; and, if anything subsequently occur by which that interest is taken to B, the trust

can exist in New York, but an attempt to create one, which is otherwise legal, vests the legal estate at once in the person who is designated as ultimate beneficiary, *Hopkins v. Kent*, 145 N. Y. 363; *Syracuse Sav. Bk. r. Holden*, 105 N. Y. 415, 418; *Wendt v. Walsh*, 164 N. Y. 154; *Seidlbach v. Knaggs*, 44 N. Y. App. Div. 169; *Ring v. McCoun*, 10 N. Y. 268; and (2) when a trust once active ceases to be so and becomes passive, the legal estate passes instantly to the beneficiary, or person entitled thereto, without any conveyance by the trustee; and this is true whether or not the trustee was ordered by the trust instrument to make a conveyance. *Denison v. Denison*, 185 N. Y. 438, 443; *Ring v. McCoun*, 10 N. Y. 268; *Matter of Brown*, 154 N. Y. 313; *Matter of Tompkins*, 154 N. Y. 634. And see *Matter of Baer*, 147 N. Y. 348. If, for example, property be devised to A, in trust to manage and pay the net rents and profits to B, and on B's death to divide and convey the *corpus* among B's children, as soon as B is dead the children then living have the legal estate absolutely vested in them, without the necessity for any conveyance by A. *Matter of Brown*, 154 N. Y. 313; *Matter of Crane*, 164 N. Y. 71; *Paget v. Melcher*, 156 N. Y. 399. And it seems to be clear in such a case that, since no conveyance by the trustee is necessary to perfect the title, he can not be compelled to convey. *Ring v. McCoun*, 10 N. Y. 268. But see *Anderson v. Mather*, 44 N. Y. 249; *King v. Whaley*, 59 Barb. 71.

These statutes do not vest an estate in the proposed beneficiary, however, if he be incapable of taking a direct grant or devise of the legal title, as, e. g., if he be an alien who could not so take directly. *Beekman v. Bonson*, 23 N. Y. 298, 316. So these statutes do not apply to take the legal estate from the trustee, when he himself has a beneficial interest in the property, either alone or with others. *King v. Townshend*, 141 N. Y. 358, 364; *New York Dry Dock Co. v. Stillman*, 30 N. Y. 174.

In connection with the matter of the termination of a New York express trust by virtue of statute, § 110 of the real property law (L. 1909, ch. 52) is also to be noted. It is as follows: "Where an estate or interest in real property has heretofore vested or shall hereafter vest in the assignee or other trustee for the benefit of creditors, it shall cease at the expiration of twenty-five years from the time when the trust was created, except where a different limitation is contained in the instrument creating the trust, or is especially prescribed by law. The estate or interest remaining in the trustee or trustees shall thereon revert to the assignor, his heirs, devisee, or assignee, as if the trust had not been created." *Kip v. Hirsh*, 103 N. Y. 565, 572; *Hoag v. Hoag*, 35 N. Y. 469; *New York Steam Co. v. Stern*, 46 Hun, 206.

¹ *Govin v. De Miranda*, 140 N. Y. 474, N. Y. 146; *Requisites of Trusts*, § 327, 477; *Locke v. F. L. & Y. Co.*, 140 *supra*.

then instantly terminates.¹ But it frequently happens that a *power* to dispose of property is given to one, to whom no estate or interest is transferred; as, for example, when realty is conveyed to A for his life and B is authorized and empowered to dispose of it after A's death. B has no estate in the land, but only a *power* or authority to dispose of or otherwise deal with it. The donee, or owner of such a right, *may* also have an estate in the property, either for his own benefit or as trustee for another, and so may own the two as separate and distinct things.² This is illustrated by a conveyance of land to A, to hold during his life, either for himself or in trust for others, with power in him to dispose of it by will at his death.³ But the important distinction is that, as donee of a power he does not *have to own* the legal estate, although he *may* own it and also a distinct power; whereas to be trustee he *must have* the legal estate. This is not the proper place for the complete discussion of powers over real property. They are most readily explained hereafter, in connection with future and executory interests in realty. But such powers as partake of the nature of trusts — those which place fiduciary obligations upon the donees, and are consequently called trust powers, or powers in trust — should be briefly noticed here, after our examination of the forms of express trusts.

§ 333. **Executing, or carrying out the Requirements of, Powers in Trust.** — In the early leading case of *Brown v. Higgs*,⁴ Lord Eldon said: "There are not only a mere trust and a mere power, but there is also known to this court a power which the party to whom it is given is entrusted and required to execute; and with regard to that species of power the court considers it as partaking so much of the nature and qualities of a trust, that if the person who has that duty imposed upon him does not discharge it, the court will to a certain extent discharge the duty in his own room and place." That is, a power in trust, in its essential nature, places upon the donee thereof a *duty* to execute it, and thereby to dispose of property, in favor of some person or persons other than himself. An illustration is found in a devise of land to the testator's son, during his

¹ *Wade v. Paget*, 1 Bro. Ch. 363; *James v. Morey*, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 246; *Nicholson v. Halsey*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 417, 422; *Wills v. Cooper*, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 137; *Donalds v. Plumb*, 8 Conn. 446, 453; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 347.

² *Belmont v. O'Brien*, 12 N. Y. 394, 404; *Fincke v. Fincke*, 53 N. Y. 528; *Miller v. Wright*, 109 N. Y. 194.

³ *Smith v. Floyd*, 140 N. Y. 337.

⁴ 8 Ves. 570, 5 Ves. 495.

life, "with the right and privilege of disposing of the same by will or devise to his children, if any he should have."¹ Unless the creator of such a power himself leaves it discretionary with the donee to execute it or not as he may choose, or, in other words, unless the duty is expressly created as an imperfect and unenforcible obligation, equity will compel the donee to perform it, if possible;² or, if he be dead or can not be reached, the court itself will execute the trust power.³ And when the latter course is pursued, if no special scheme of distribution be outlined by the donor, the court follows its maxim, that "equality is equity," and divides the property equally among the designated beneficiaries.⁴

In the last analysis, then, a power in trust involves a form of express fiduciary obligation similar to that of an express trust. The same degree of certainty as to the subject-matter and beneficiaries is required, and equity usually enforces the performance of the obligations alike in both cases.⁵ But the fact is to be again emphasized that the donee, *as such*, of a power in trust never has the legal estate, while there can be no trust, technically so called, without a legal estate vested in a trustee. (*a*)

The purposes for which powers in trust may exist are practically unrestricted, except by local statute, and by the requirement that their execution shall not violate any rule of law or public policy.

(*a*) The New York system of trusts and powers is such that many dispositions of property, which at common law would cause trusts to exist, produce mere powers in trust. See this explained in the note on New York express trusts, at the end of this chapter.

¹ *Smith v. Floyd*, 140 N. Y. 337; *Salisbury v. Denton*, 3 Kay & J. 529; *Glover v. Condell*, 163 Ill. 566.

² *In re Kirwan's Trusts*, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 373; *In re Burrage*, 62 L. T. 752; *Towler v. Towler*, 142 N. Y. 371; *Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Everett*, 40 N. J. Eq. 345; *Osborne v. Gordon*, 86 Wis. 92; *Dick v. Harby*, 48 S. C. 516; *McHan v. Ordway*, 82 Ala. 463.

³ *Ibid.*; 1 *Perry ou Trusts*, § 255.

⁴ *Doyle v. Atty.-Gen.*, 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 195; *Izod v. Izod*, 32 Beav. 242; *Salisbury v. Denton*, 3 Kay & J. 529; *Rorke v. Abraham* (1895), 1 I. R. 334;

Glover v. Condell, 163 Ill. 566. But when a different practical scheme of distribution is set forth by the donor, the court will follow his wishes as far as possible. *Gower v. Mainwaring*, 2 Ves. Sr. 87; *Maberly v. Torton*, 14 Ves. 499; *Bull v. Bull*, 8 Conn. 47; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 255.

⁵ *In re Weeke's Settlement* (1897), 1 Ch. 289; *In re Eddowes*, 1 Drew. & Sm. 395; *Tilden v. Green*, 130 N. Y. 29; *Towler v. Towler*, 142 N. Y. 371; *Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Everett*, 40 N. J. Eq. 345; *Osborne v. Gordon*, 86 Wis. 92.

Specific Kinds of Express Trusts.

§ 334. Purposes for which Express Trusts may exist. — At common law, the only practical restriction upon the purposes for which express trusts can be created and exist is, that they shall not be of an illegal character.¹ Illustrations of purposes for which they are very commonly made are; to sell, and from the proceeds to pay creditors of the settler; to sell, mortgage, or lease to pay legacies or charges; to manage, receive the net income and pay it over to designated persons or apply it to their maintenance and support; to receive the net income and accumulate it for a specified object; to sell and pay the proceeds to the settler; to receive the income and raise therefrom a jointure or marriage portion; to convey to specified persons; to partition; to mortgage or lease, and out of the proceeds to pay the settler's debts; to hold for the sole and separate use of a married woman; to hold and manage for the benefit of a charity, etc. In a few states, of which New York is prominent, the number of purposes for which express trusts in real property are allowed has been materially reduced by statute, and powers in trust have been substituted for those forms which have been abolished.² But this change has not been made with regard to personal property, (a) nor in England and most of the United States with regard to realty.

Of the purposes above enumerated, the trusts for creditors are very important, as comprising assignments and transfers of property in bankruptcy proceedings and the ordinary insolvent and general assignments under state statutes. By the conveyance of the land to the trustee or assignee in bankruptcy or

(a) The five purposes for which express trusts in real property are now permitted in New York are explained in the note at the end of this chapter. But express trusts in personalty may be created for "any purpose not unlawful, subject only to the law of perpetuity." *Matter of Wilkin*, 183 N. Y. 104, 109; *Tabernacle Church v. Fifth Avenue Church*, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 327, 334; *Russell v. Hilton*, 80 N. Y. App. Div. 178, 187. See *Mills v. Husson*, 140 N. Y. 99.

¹ This is true as to both realty and personalty, unless changed by statute. *Matter of Carpenter*, 131 N. Y. 86; *Hirsh v. Auer*, 146 N. Y. 13; *Hagerty v. Hagerty*, 9 Hun (N. Y.), 175; *Tritt v. Crotzer*, 13 Pa. St. 451; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 21.

² See note on New York express trusts, at the end of this chapter; *Backhaus v. Backhaus*, 70 Wis. 518; *Ready v. Kearsley*, 14 Mich. 215, 228; *Murphy v. Cook*, 11 S. D. 47.

insolvency, he acquires it as an active trustee to dispose of according to the statute under which he is acting and to distribute the net proceeds ratably among the creditors of the insolvent or bankrupt.¹ (a)

Trusts to pay legacies, or charges on land such as mortgages, etc., and those to manage the property and to receive and disburse or accumulate income are very common and necessary forms, which are retained even under such restrictive statutes as those of New York.² A few words as to one of the trusts for receiving and disbursing income — the so-called spendthrift trust — are added in the following section. Trusts for the sole and separate use of married women are not now as common as they were before modern legislation had given to *femes covert* the general ownership of their real property, and the complete control of and power over it which they now enjoy in most places. But a brief summary of this kind of express trusts will be found in a subsequent section.³ Trusts for the benefit of charity have been briefly described already, and their distinctive characteristics stated.⁴ They require further discussion in this chapter, as an important species of active express trusts:

§ 335. **Spendthrift Trusts.** — The settler of a trust to receive and disburse income sometimes attempts to prevent the interest of the *cestui que trust* from being aliened by him or reached by his creditors. These arrangements, which have been styled “spendthrift trusts,” have caused much discussion, and contrariety of opinion and decision as to how far such objects can be legally accomplished.

It is absolutely settled in England that neither the alienability of such an equitable estate or interest, nor its availability for the debts of its owner, except when she is a married woman, can in any manner be prevented or taken away. A condition precedent that the provision shall not vest for the beneficiary until his debts are paid, or a condition subsequent

(a) The “General Assignment” Act of New York, the operation of which is, of course, largely superseded by the National Bankruptcy Law now in force, was passed in 1877 (L. 1877, ch. 466), and is now found in N. Y. Consol. Laws, p. 446. Insolvent Assignments, Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2149–2187. See Gerard, Titles R. E. (4th ed.) ch. 31, 32.

¹ The statutes in full upon these subjects should be consulted. See the National Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898; N. J. L. 1899, ch. 54; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. part iv., “Insolvency.”

² N. Y. Real Prop. Law (L. 1896, ch. 547), § 76.

³ § 336, *infra*.

⁴ § 308, *supra*.

that the trust interest shall be divested from him if he become insolvent or indebted and shall then pass over to another, is there valid; and thus the creditors of the intended *cestui que trust* may be prevented from ever reaching the property, because of his never acquiring it or its being taken from him to another. But the principle is unassailable that he can not take and *retain* the property exempt from the rights of his creditors or divested of his own power of disposal.¹

Uniformly in this country, also, conditions preventing the proposed beneficiary from acquiring and keeping the trust estate while he is insolvent, or passing it over to another if he become so, are sustained.² And likewise the general rule throughout the United States, wherever the matter is not affected by statute, is the same as that of England, — the *cestui que trust* can not hold the property for his own enjoyment freed from the duty of applying it or having it applied to the payment of his debts and obligations.³ But in a few of the states, of which Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, and Virginia are examples, and in the Federal Courts, even in the absence of any statutory regulation, property may be settled in trust by one person for the payment of income to another as beneficiary for his life or for a shorter period, so that his creditors can not reach it and he himself can not alien it by way of anticipation. The principle on which this result is based is that the rule of public policy, which requires a man's property to be subject to the payment of his debts, does not go to the extent of giving a creditor a right to complain because his debtor receives a gift from a donor, who, in exercising his absolute right of disposition of the property, has chosen to keep it out of the reach of the creditors of the donee.⁴ In some of the American states, such as New York and New Jersey, this matter is regulated by statute; the favorite form of the enactment being to the effect that where property is given to a trustee by one person to pay the income to another for life, a judgment creditor of the latter may maintain an action in equity to recover the surplus income

¹ *Brandon v. Robinson*, 16 Ves. 429; *Dumpor's Case*, 1 Sm. L. C. 119, note; *Wms. R. P.* p. * 87.

² *Ibid.*; *Nichols v. Eaton*, 91 U. S. 716; *Hallett v. Thompson*, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 583; *Easterly v. Keney*, 36 Conn. 22; *Taylor v. Harwell*, 65 Ala. 1.

³ *Ibid.*; *Warner v. Rice*, 66 Md. 436; *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 386 a, 327 a.

⁴ *Foster v. Foster*, 133 Mass. 179; *Broadway Nat. Bk. v. Adams*, 133 Mass. 170; *Wanner v. Snyder*, 177 Pa. St. 208; *Seitzinger's Est.*, 170 Pa. St. 500; *Roberts v. Stevens*, 84 Me. 325; *Leavitt v. Beirne*, 21 Conn. 8; *Young v. Easley*, 94 Va. 193; *Jarboe v. Hey*, 122 Mo. 341; *Nichols v. Eaton*, 91 U. S. 716; *Potter v. Couch*, 141 U. S. 296.

(both accrued and to accrue in the future) beyond what is necessary for the suitable support and maintenance, according to his station in life, of the *cestui que trust* and those who are dependent upon him.¹ (a) It is safe to add that on neither side of the Atlantic does any court hold that the founder of a trust, by making *himself* the beneficiary, can remove the property from the reach of his creditors either present or future.² In New York, for example, A may settle property in trust for B for life, so that B's creditors can not reach the income suitable for the support of B and those dependent upon him; but if the settlement were by A in trust for himself for life, his creditors could take it all.³

§ 336. **Separate Use Trusts for Married Women.**— Because of the great power and control of a husband over the property belonging to his wife, the method early came into use in England, and was favored and fostered by the Court of Chancery, of making settlements in trust “for the sole and separate use” of married women. This may be done, either by employing the words just quoted, which have come to be the technical form, or by using any equivalent expression, or by otherwise making the trust in such a manner as expressly or by necessary implication to show an intent to exclude the husband's

(a) The New York statute, which was originally 1 R. S. 729, § 57, and is now Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 98, provides that “Where a trust is created to receive the rents and profits of real property, and no valid direction for accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents and profits, beyond the sum necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary, shall be liable to the claims of his creditors in the same manner as other personal property, which cannot be reached by execution.” The “education and support” includes not only that for himself according to his station in life, but also that for the support of his wife, and the education and support of his children, and the maintenance generally of those properly dependent upon him. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1871–1879; *Wetmore v. Wetmore*, 149 N. Y. 520; *Everett v. Peyton*, 167 N. Y. 117; *Sherman v. Skuse*, 166 N. Y. 345. See *Matter of Williams*, 187 N. Y. 286, 288; note on New York express trusts, at the end of this chapter. Also, when income, not less than twelve dollars per week, is due, or to become due, to a debtor, from trust funds, his creditors may reach ten per cent thereof, as it accrues. Code Civ. Pro. § 1391. When the trust is such that the beneficiary may take the *corpus*, his creditors may reach it also. *Ullman v. Cameron*, 186 N. Y. 339, 345.

¹ See *Spring v. Randall*, 107 Mich. 103; *Parker H. & Co. v. Bushnell*, 80 Conn. 233; N. J. Gen. Stat. p. 1424, § 43; *Linn v. Davis*, 58 N. J. L. 29. This statute makes all the income over \$4,000 available for creditors of the *cestui que trust*.

² *Pac. Nat. Bk. v. Windram*, 133 Mass. 175; *Ghormley v. Smith*, 139 Pa. St. 584; *Schenck v. Barnes*, 156 N. Y. 316, 319.

³ *Schenck v. Barnes*, 156 N. Y. 316, 321; *Egbert v. De Solms*, 218 Pa. St. 207.

marital rights as to that property.¹ It is not necessary to name a trustee in such a case. The husband himself may be made trustee, and compelled to manage the property solely for the benefit of his wife; and, when no trustee is named, equity will usually require him to occupy that position.²

After some vacillation, it was settled by the English courts that the wife might dispose of, encumber, or otherwise anticipate a trust interest settled upon her for her sole and separate use.³ And the same view was adopted by most of the American tribunals.⁴ This was apt to restore the husband's beneficial control over the property, through the influence which he could ordinarily exercise over his wife. In order to obviate this difficulty and to make it possible to give property in trust for a married woman so that she could not use or dispose of it in any way for the benefit of her husband, though she might desire to do so, the clause *against anticipation*, so called, was framed by Lord Thurlow, added to the words of such settlements and decided by the courts in both countries to be effective in preventing her disposition of the property so long as she is covert.⁵ In making such a settlement, therefore, the land is disposed of in trust for her, "for her sole and separate use" (or by words of like import), and the statement is added concerning the settlement that it is "*not by way of anticipation.*" With a trust thus made in her favor, she can not dispose of nor encumber her interest in any way during coverture; but at any time when she is discoverd, whether before she has married at all or while she is a widow, she

¹ Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583; Jourdan v. Dean, 175 Pa. St. 599; Duffield's Appeal, 168 Pa. St. 171; Stuart v. Kissam, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 494; Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 48; Lippencott v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 767; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 646-649.

² Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wms. 316; Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528; Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375; Vance v. Nogle, 70 Pa. St. 179; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 647.

³ Taylor v. Meade, 4 DeG. J. & Sm. 597; Wainford v. Heyl, L. R. 20 Eq. 324.

⁴ Ankeney v. Hannon, 147 U. S. 118; Dyett v. Central Trust Co., 140 N. Y. 54; Home Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 32 N. J. Eq. 103; Hulme v. Tenant,

1 Lead. Cas. Eq. (4th. Amer. ed.) 756; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 655-669.

⁵ Hood-Barrs v. Heriot (1896), App. Cas. 174; Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 363; Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291; Bank v. James, 95 Tenn. 8; 2 Lewin on Trusts, p. *781; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 670, 671. The question has been much debated as to the validity of such a clause, in view of the general rule against restraint on the alienation of real property. But in favor of provisions for married women the prohibition against their alienation of separate use estates while covert is everywhere sustained. See Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540; Pritchard v. Bailey, 113 N. C. 521; Bispham's Priu. Eq. § 107; Gray, Perpetuities, §§ 432-437.

may sell, or alienate, or encumber her equitable estate at her pleasure. Whenever she is covert, the clause against anticipation is operative; and it is inoperative whenever she is discovered.¹ In a few of the United States, however, of which Pennsylvania and Massachusetts are the leading ones, no such trust can be effectual, unless made for the benefit of a woman who is covert at the time or who is in "immediate contemplation of marriage"; and in such states it ceases to be a separate use trust as soon as she becomes a widow, and never revives again though she remarry.² As remarked above, in many states this form of express trust is not now so important as it was before modern legislation gave to married women complete or large control over their own property. (a)

§ 337. **Trusts for Charities.** — "It is said that courts look with favor upon charitable gifts, and take special care to enforce them, to guard them from assault, and protect them from abuse. And certainly charity in thought, speech, and deed challenges the admiration and affection of mankind. Christianity teaches it as its crowning grace and glory; and an inspired apostle exhausts his powerful eloquence in setting forth its beauty, and the nothingness of all things without it. Charitable bequests are said to come within that department of human affairs wherein the maxim, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*, has been, and should be applied."³

Without speculating upon the unsettled question of the origin of trusts for charity, or "charitable uses," except to remark that the occasion for and principles of such gifts must arise and grow in every community with the advance of civilization and culture, it is to be first observed that, not only were charitable donations numerous in the medieval history of

(a) In New York, such an express trust comes practically within the *third* class — to apply rents and profits, etc. — (see p. 497, *infra*). But it is clear that discovery does not enable the beneficiary to alienate or encumber her interest, except as she may be effectually authorized to do so by the settler. P. 496, *infra*; *Crooke v. County of Kings*, 97 N. Y. 421, 448; *Ullman v. Cameron*, 186 N. Y. 339.

¹ *Tullett v. Armstrong*, 4 Myl. & Cr. 377; *Shirley v. Shirley*, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 363; *Beaufort v. Collier*, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 487; *Staggers v. Matthews*, 13 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 154. See the English Conveyancing and Property Act of 1881, § 39. *Harrison v. Harrison*, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 418.

² *Moore v. Stinson*, 144 Mass. 594; *Qnin's Est.*, 144 Pa. St. 444, 449; *Denis' Est.*, 201 Pa. St. 616; *Apple v. Allen*, 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 120; *Bispham's Prim. Eq.* § 106.

³ 2 Perry on Trusts, § 687, citing *Saltounstall v. Sanders*, 11 Allen (Mass.), 446, 455.

England, but also, as the Court of Chancery developed and assumed importance, no doubt finding precedents in the Roman law which had carefully fostered charitable devises and bequests from the time when it began to be influenced by Christian teaching,¹ that court quickly took cognizance of such donations, and perfected a scheme for their proper judicial care and administration.² By the time of the beginning of the conflict between Henry VIII. and the pope for ecclesiastical supremacy in England, that scheme had been perfected, and quite a number of cases — records of probably as many as fifty are now extant — had already been taken cognizance of and settled as charities.³ Henry VIII., led by his determination to overthrow the papal influence, abolished many charitable institutions by statutes. It is said that even the great universities were obliged to petition the king, that they might not come within the general words “colleges and fraternities,” as used in those statutes.⁴ But after this struggle was over, and Elizabeth’s claim to the throne was established, and the success of the Reformation was no longer in doubt, the demand for eleemosynary institutions and those for other public utility was soon again manifest. This led to a series of statutes for restoring and encouraging such foundations, which were passed between the first and forty-third years of the reign of Elizabeth.⁵ The last and most important of these is the act of 43 Eliz. ch. 4 (1601), which is known as the Statute of Charitable Uses. The purpose and operation of that enactment was to supply an enumeration and definition of what uses are to be regarded as charitable, to hunt up all existing charities, and to enforce

¹ Domat, Civ. L. bk. 4, tit. 2, § 6; *White v. White*, 1 Bro. Ch. 12; *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539.

² This is shown by the reports of the English commissioners of public records, published in 1827, 1830, and 1832.

³ Commissioners’ reports, mentioned in preceding note. In the litigation over Stephen Girard’s will, this historical question was much discussed; and Mr. Binney, using the above-cited reports, showed clearly that the Pennsylvania Court of Chancery had inherent jurisdiction of the charitable use therein involved, although the *Statute of Charitable Uses* (43 Eliz. ch. 4) was not in force in that state; for this jurisdic-

tion of equity did not originate in that statute. *Vidal v. Girard’s Executors*, 2 How. (U. S.) 127. See also *Tappan v. Deblois*, 45 Me. 122; *Williams v. Williams*, 8 N. Y. 525, 533; *Atty-Gen. v. Moore*, 19 N. J. Eq. 503; *Ould v. Washington Hospital*, 95 U. S. 303; *Stuart v. Easton*, 74 Fed. Rep. 854.

⁴ 33 Hen. VIII. ch. 27; 1 Burnet, *Hist. Reform.*, pp. 346, 347, 404-434; *Comm’rs v. Pemsel* (1891), App. Cas. 531, 543, 581.

⁵ 1 Eliz. ch. 4, §§ 34, 40, 85; 8 Eliz. ch. 11; 14 Eliz. ch. 14; 31 Eliz. ch. 6; 35 Eliz. ch. 3; 39 Eliz. ch. 4, 21; 43 Eliz. ch. 2, 3; *Perry on Trusts*, § 691.

their due and proper administration.¹ It gave a strong impetus to such settlements. But, although it was thought for a long time that the jurisdiction of equity over charitable trusts originated in this statute,² it is now thoroughly settled that such is not the truth of history.³ And, therefore, in those states of this country in which it has not been expressly adopted or re-enacted, trusts for charity are nevertheless fully within the jurisdiction of the courts of equity.⁴

§ 338. **Definitions and Essentials of Charitable Trusts.** — Charity, in its legal sense, always implies *public utility*.⁵ Dealing with the *purpose* rather than with the *motive* of the gift,⁶ such is the conception at the base of the most approved definitions of a charitable use. Lord Camden defined it as, “a gift to a general public use, which extends to the poor as well as to the rich.”⁷ And this definition has met with the approval of the highest authorities.⁸ With perhaps too much stress laid on the mere motive, Mr. Binney, in his noted argument in the Girard Will Case, declared that a charitable donation is “whatever is given for the love of God, or for the love of your neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense — given from these motives and to these ends — free from the stain or taint of every consideration that is personal, private, or selfish.”⁹ In the great leading case of *Jackson v. Phillips*,¹⁰ Mr. Justice Gray

¹ The statute provided for a commission to look after abuses of charities and for proceedings through it for the administration of funds devoted to such purposes. But this method of procedure soon fell into disuse; and proceedings in equity by original bill or petition have continued to be the method of dealing with such gifts. Atty.-Gen. v. Newman, 1 Chan. Cas. 157; *Eyre v. Shaftesbury*, 2 P. Wms. 102, 119; Atty.-Gen. v. Brereton, 2 Ves. Sr. 425; *West v. Knight*, 1 Chan. Cas. 134.

² See *Trustees of Baptist Church v. Hart's Executors*, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 1; 1 Spence's Eq. 589.

³ *Vidal v. Girard's Executors*, 2 How. (U. S.) 127; *Williams v. Williams*, 8 N. Y. 525, 533; *Ould v. Washington Hospital*, 95 U. S. 303; *Stuart v. Easton*, 74 Fed. Rep. 854.

⁴ *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312, 332; *Williams v. Williams*, 8 N. Y. 525; *Pell v. Mercer*, 14 R. I. 412; Hal-

sey v. Convention of Prot. Epis. Church, 75 Md. 275.

⁵ *Coggeshall v. Pelton*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 292, 294; *Perin v. Carey*, 24 How. (U. S.) 465, 506; *Jones v. Williams*, Ambler, 651.

⁶ *Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd*, 120 Pa. St. 624.

⁷ *Jones v. Williams*, Ambler, 651, 652.

⁸ It was adopted as correct by Lord Lyndhurst, in *Mitford v. Reynolds*, 1 Phil. Ch. 185, 191; by Chancellor Kent in *Coggeshall v. Pelton*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 292, 294, and by the Supreme Court of the United States in *Perin v. Carey*, 24 How. (U. S.) 465, 506.

⁹ *Vidal v. Girard's Executors*, 2 How. (U. S.) 127. See *Boyd v. Fire Patrol*, 120 Pa. St. 624; *Ould v. Washington Hospital*, 95 U. S. 303, 311; *Union Pac. R. Co. v. Artist*, 19 U. S. App. 612.

¹⁰ 14 Allen (Mass.), 539, 555.

framed a more complete definition, which has been generally approved and which has the important advantage of stating concisely the classes of purposes or objects for which such donations are made. He said: "A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift to be applied, consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature."¹ The purposes here enumerated may be tersely and generally described by four adjectives, which import public utility, namely: religious, educational, eleemosynary, and governmental.² The gift is also "for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons." And "existing laws" put no time limitation upon such a trust. It is, therefore, to be here repeated that charitable uses or trusts have three leading and distinguishing features, namely: *first*, their purpose must be some public utility, and, therefore, they must exist for the benefit of the public generally, or of some considerable portion of it which answers to a particular description; *second*, their beneficiaries must be indefinite as to the individuals, and *third*, they are not restricted as to time, by the rule against perpetuities, but may be made to continue indefinitely.³ Around these three essential features naturally clusters the discussion of this interesting form of trust, which has occupied so large a share of the attention and employed so much of the best learning and ability of the bench and bar of both England and America.⁴

¹ This is approved in *Newcomb v. Boston Protect. Dep't*, 151 Mass. 215; *Kelly v. Nichols*, 17 R. I. 306, 18 R. I. 82. And it is adopted by the best text-writers. See *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 124; 2 *Perry on Trusts*, § 697.

² In *Commissioners v. Pemsel* (1891), App. Cas. 531, Lord McNachten said: "Charity in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the ad-

vancement of religion, and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads."

³ § 308, *supra*.

⁴ A few of the great leading cases, in which the subject has been exhaustively discussed, are: *Atty.-Gen. v. Baliol Coll.*, 9 Mod. 407; *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 9 Ves. 399, 405; *Atty.-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Co.*, 2 Beav. 313; *Atty.-Gen. v. Glyn*, 12 Sim. 84; *Farquhar*

§ 339. **First. Charitable Trusts are for Public Utility. Purposes included.**—The preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz. ch. 4) contains the following enumeration of uses which are to be regarded as charitable, namely: “The relief of aged, and impotent, and poor people; the maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners; schools of learning; free schools; scholars in universities; houses of correction; repairs of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and highways; the education and preferment of orphans; the marriages of poor maids; supportation and help of tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives; and aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning the payment of fifteenths, setting out of soldiers and other taxes.” While in states which have not substantially re-enacted nor in any way adopted this statute, such as Maine or Pennsylvania,¹ the list here given is not, of course, controlling; yet within the letter or *spirit* of this enumeration are to be found the great mass, if not all, of the donations in trust which have been decided to be charitable. In respect to religious institutions, the *letter* of the statute is most deficient;² and this is probably due to the apprehension on the part of its framers that the reformation might possibly be a failure. But there never has been any room for doubt that gifts for religious objects, as well as practically all others which have since been treated as charitable, are clearly within the *spirit*, or “*equity*” of the Statute of Elizabeth.³ Most of these, though probably not all, are embraced within the four groups indicated by the adjectives above-mentioned, — educational, religious, eleemosynary, and governmental. A few words are required as to each of these.

§ 340. **Gifts for Religious Purposes. Superstitious Uses.**—Gifts for religious purposes are charitable: as for foreign mis-

v. Darling (1896), 1 Ch. 50; *Whicker v. Hume*, 7 H. L. Cas. 124; *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539; *Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs*, 2 How. (U. S.) 127, 128; *Phila. v. Girard's Heirs*, 45 Pa. St. 9, 27; *Magill v. Brown*, *Brightly* (Pa.), 347, 350; *Hopkins v. Grimshaw*, 165 U. S. 342; *Fontain v. Ravenel*, 17 How. (U. S.) 369, 387; *Loring v. Marsh*, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 337; *Bascom v. Albertson*, 34 N. Y. 584; *Williams v. Williams*, 8 N. Y. 525; *Kinnard v. Miller's Ex'rs*, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 107; *Almy v. Jones*,

17 R. I. 265. See *Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead*, 125 N. Y. 581; *Tilden v. Green*, 130 N. Y. 29; *Dwight Charity Cases*.

¹ *Tappan v. Deblois*, 45 Me. 122; *Brooks v. City of Belfast*, 90 Me. 318; *Whitman v. Lex*, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 88.

² It will be noticed that no religious object is mentioned, in the list quoted, except the “repairs of . . . churches.”

³ 2 Perry on Trusts, § 701; *White v. White* (1893), 2 Ch. 41.

sions;¹ for the advancement of Christianity among infidels;² "for the service of my Lord and Master";³ for the benefit of ministers of the Gospel;⁴ for distributing Bibles and religious books and tracts;⁵ for the poor and the service of God;⁶ and the like.⁷

When a trust of this general character runs counter to the English ecclesiastical law, it is there condemned as a "superstitious use."⁸ All such donations, as, for example, for praying for souls of the dead, maintaining *obit* lamps, etc., which were contrary to the tenets of the established church, were formerly condemned.⁹ But the English courts are now much more liberal in this respect,¹⁰ although they still set aside so-called charitable schemes which clearly attack or oppose the religious policy of the realm; as, for example, a devise or bequest for the re-establishment of the supremacy of the pope.¹¹ In this country, where religious liberty is guaranteed by the Constitutions,¹² no trust is ever successfully attacked merely on the ground that it is a superstitious use.¹³ But some gifts, which have a religious aspect, are declared to be void, not because they are superstitious, but because they are deemed

¹ *Bartlett v. King*, 12 Mass. 537; *Fairbanks v. Lamson*, 99 Mass. 533; *Bridges v. Pleasants*, 4 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 26.

² *Atty.-Gen. v. William & Mary's Coll.*, 1 Ves. 243.

³ *Going v. Emery*, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 107; *Powerscourt v. Powerscourt*, 1 Moll. 616.

⁴ *Atty.-Gen. v. Gladstone*, 13 Sim. 7; *Grieves v. Case*, 4 Bro. Ch. 67; *Cory Universalist Soc. v. Beatty*, 28 N. J. Eq. 570.

⁵ *Atty.-Gen. v. Stepney*, 10 Ves. 22; *Bliss v. Amer. Bible Soc.*, 2 Allen (Mass.), 334; *Pickering v. Shotwell*, 10 Pa. St. 23; *Church v. Hinton*, 92 Tenn. 188.

⁶ *Farquhar v. Darling* (1896), 1 Ch. 50; *People v. Cogswell*, 113 Cal. 129.

⁷ *In re Hunter* (1897), 2 Ch. 105; *Rosf's Charity* (1899), 1 Ch. 21; *In re Scowcroft* (1898), 2 Ch. 638; *Teele v. Bishop of Derry*, 168 Mass. 341; *McAlister v. Burgess*, 161 Mass. 269; *Christ Church v. Trustees*, 67 Conn. 554; *Alden v. St. Peter's Parish*, 158 Ill. 631; *Mack's Appeal*, 71 Conn. 122.

⁸ This doctrine originated in the statute 1 Edw. VI. ch. 14. See *De Themmines v. De Bonneval*, 5 Russ. 288; *Doe v. Hawthorn*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 96; *Briggs v. Hartley*, 14 Jur. 683.

⁹ *De Themmines v. De Bonneval*, 5 Russ. 288; *Atty.-Gen. v. Baxter*, 1 Vern. 248, 2 Vern. 105, 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 96, pl. 9; *Da Costa v. De Pas, Ambler*, 228; *Finley v. Hunter*, 2 Strob. Eq. 208.

¹⁰ *Atty.-Gen. v. Pearson*, 3 Mer. 353; *Atty.-Gen. v. Cock*, 2 Ves. Sr. 273; *Atty.-Gen. v. Hickman*, 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 193; *Reichenbach v. Quin*, 21 L. R. Ir. 138; *Schouler, Petitioner*, 134 Mass. 426; *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312; 1 Ames on Trusts (2d ed.), 211.

¹¹ *De Themmines v. De Bonneval*, 5 Russ. 288.

¹² *Cooley, Const. Lim.* 575.

¹³ *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312; *Teele v. Bishop of Derry*, 168 Mass. 341; *Hoeffler v. Clogan*, 171 Ill. 462; *Seibert's Appeal*, 19 Pa. St. 49; *Sherman v. Baker*, 40 Atl. Rep. 11 (R. I.). See this matter further discussed, § 345, *infra*.

to violate some *American* principle of morality or public policy.¹ Thus, a trust for the benefit of an infidel society, or to encourage immoral, so-called religious rites, will not be sustained.² In the discussion of the uncertainty of the objects of a charitable use, it will also be shown hereafter that some trusts of the kind which have been held to be superstitious in England have failed in this country, because, being created in form as charities and only sustainable as such, they have been decided to be wanting in some of the requisites of such gifts.³

§ 341. **Gifts for Educational Purposes.** — Gifts for educational purposes are charitable: as to establish Inns of Chancery for the prosecution of the study of law;⁴ for the foundation of a fellowship in a college or university;⁵ to create a "change of sentiment" in regard to slavery, or other matters, which means to educate;⁶ for the cultivation of art, or instruction in the mechanical arts;⁷ to advance learning;⁸ for the support of schools, libraries, or literary institutions,⁹ and all similar foundations which aim at public intellectual advancement, and not merely private education.¹⁰

§ 342. **Gifts for Eleemosynary Purposes.** — Gifts for purely eleemosynary purposes are charitable: as those for hospitals, "homes," and asylums;¹¹ for the widows and orphans of a parish;¹² for the relief of Indians;¹³ to suppress and abolish

¹ *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312; *In re Zimmerman's Will*, 50 N. Y. Supp. 395; *Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church*, 104 Ala. 327; *Moran v. Moran*, 104 Iowa, 216; *McHugh v. McCole*, 97 Wis. 166; *Harrison v. Brophy*, 59 Kan. 1.

² *Zeisweiss v. James*, 63 Pa. St. 465; 1 *Ames on Trusts* (2d ed.), 211.

³ § 345, *infra*.

⁴ *Smith v. Kerr* (1902), 1 Ch. 774.

⁵ *Rex v. Newman*, 1 Lev. 294; *Atty.-Gen. v. Bowyer*, 3 Ves. 714.

⁶ *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539, 552; *George v. Braddock*, 45 N. J. Eq. 757.

⁷ *Almy v. Jones*, 17 R. I. 265; *People v. Cogswell*, 113 Cal. 129.

⁸ *Whicker v. Hume*, 7 H. L. Cas. 124; *Stevens v. Shippen*, 28 N. J. Eq. 487; *Taylor v. Bryn Mawr*, 34 N. J. Eq. 101.

⁹ *Dairy v. Inhab. of Natick*, 10 Allen (Mass.), 169; *Episcopal Academy v.*

Phila., 150 Pa. St. 565; *Phila. v. Overseers*, 170 Pa. St. 257; *Baley v. Umatilla Co.*, 15 Oreg. 172; *Miller's Ex'rs v. Commonwealth*, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 110, 116.

¹⁰ *In re Douglas*, L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 472, 479; *Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs*, 2 How. (U. S.) 127; *Penn's Hospital v. Delaware*, 169 Pa. St. 305; *Clement v. Hyde*, 50 Vt. 716; *Halsey v. Convent P. E. Church*, 75 Md. 275; *Miller v. Atkinson*, 63 N. C. 537; *Barkley v. Donnelly*, 112 Mo. 561.

¹¹ *Atty.-Gen. v. Vint*, 3 DeG & Sm. 704; *Atty.-Gen. v. Kell*, 2 Beav. 575; *McDonald v. Mass. Hospital*, 120 Mass. 432.

¹² *Atty.-Gen. v. Comber*, 2 Sim. & St. 93; *Towle v. Nesmith*, 69 N. H. 212; *Sheldon v. Stockbridge*, 67 Vt. 299; *Trim's Estate*, 168 Pa. St. 395; *Hoffen's Estate*, 70 Wis. 522.

¹³ *Magill v. Brown*, Brightly (Pa.), 347. See *Matter of Shattuck*, 193 N. Y.

vivisection;¹ for taking care of domestic animals;² to suppress the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors,³ etc.⁴

§ 343. **Gifts for Governmental Purposes.** — Gifts for lessening the burdens of government are charitable: as for erecting and maintaining public buildings or other institutions;⁵ laying out, making, and keeping in repair streets, parks, and docks;⁶ for "repairs of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, . . . sea-banks, and highways;"⁷ to discharge a tax on the community;⁸ to supply water to the inhabitants of a town,⁹ or to build for it a botanical garden.¹⁰

§ 344. **Other Charities. Criterion as to Charitable Purpose.** — There are, in addition to these four classes, a few instances of donations which have been held to be charitable, but are difficult to classify. Illustrations are trusts "for charitable purposes;"¹¹ for such charities as the trustees shall think proper;¹² for charitable and religious objects,¹³ and similar provisions in which general public benefit is manifestly intended, but the more particular nature of the gift is not indicated.¹⁴ The character of such a gift as charitable must be clear, or it will not be upheld.¹⁵ Thus a trust for "philan-

¹ *In re Foveaux Cross* (1895), 2 Ch. 501.

² *In re Douglas*, L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 472; *Univ. of London v. Yarrow*, 1 DeG. & J. 72.

³ *Haines v. Allen*, 78 Ind. 100.

⁴ See also *Nash v. Morely*, 5 Beav. 177; *Davis v. Inhabitants*, 154 Mass. 224; *Hayes v. Pratt*, 147 U. S. 557; *Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead*, 125 N. Y. 581, 582, 126 N. Y. 651; *Strong's Appeal*, 68 Conn. 527; *Benrhaus v. Cole*, 94 Wis. 617; *Wood v. Paine*, 66 Fed. Rep. 807.

⁵ *Coggeshall v. Pelton*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 292; *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539, 556.

⁶ *Atty.-Gen. v. Heelis*, 2 Sim. & St. 67; *Howse v. Chapman*, 4 Ves. 542; *Mowry v. City of Providence*, 10 R. I. 52; *Smith's Estate*, 181 Pa. St. 109.

⁷ Preamble to statute, 43 Eliz. ch. 4.

⁸ *Atty.-Gen. v. Bnshby*, 24 Beav. 299.

⁹ *Jones v. Williams*, Ambler, 651.

¹⁰ *Townley v. Bedwell*, 6 Ves. 194. Also, on the general topic of public improvement, see *Johnston v. Swann*, 3 Madd. 457; *Beaumont v. Oliveira*, L. R.

4 Ch. 309; *In re Lord Stratheden* (1894), 3 Ch. 265; *Bartlett, Petitioner*, 163 Mass. 509; *Phila. v. Keystone Battery A*, 169 Pa. St. 526; *Hamden v. Rice*, 24 Conn. 350; *State v. Griffith*, 2 Del. Ch. 392; *Stuart v. Easton*, 39 U. S. App. 238.

¹¹ *Schouler, Petitioner*, 134 Mass. 426.

¹² *White v. Ditson*, 140 Mass. 351; *Jemmit v. Varrel*, Ambler, 585.

¹³ *Baker v. Sutton*, 1 Keen, 224; *Saltonstall v. Sanders*, 11 Allen (Mass.), 446, 454; *Treat's Appeal*, 30 Conn. 113; *Farquhar v. Darling* (1896), 1 Ch. 50.

¹⁴ See *Commissioners v. Pemsel* (1891), App. Cas. 531, 583; *In re Cranston* (1898), 1 Ir. R. 431; *George v. Braddock*, 45 N. J. Eq. 757, in which a gift was upheld for disseminating the doctrines of Henry George; *Webster v. Wiggins*, 19 R. I. 73, a donation for erecting working-men's dwellings; *Laue v. Eaton*, 69 Minn. 141; *Pack v. Shanklin*, 43 W. Va. 304; *Meeker v. Pnyallup*, 5 Wash. St. 759; 24 Amer. Law Rev. 489; 30 Cent. Law Jour. 334; 38 Alb. Law Jour. 369.

¹⁵ *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 9 Ves.

thropic" purposes (which might or might not be for any public benefit), or for *private* benevolence, is not charitable.¹ There has been considerable divergence of opinion as to whether or not the word "benevolent" will be, under any circumstances, a proper description of a charitable purpose.² (a) The better view appears to be that it will be so, when there is nothing to the contrary in the context.³ A devise for "charitable and benevolent" purposes has generally been sustained as charitable in this country;⁴ although the opposite conclusion has been reached in some cases in England.⁵ The true test, with regard to the purpose of the gift, is probably that suggested by Sir Wm. Grant, in the case of *Morice v. The Bishop of Durham*,⁶ namely: whether or not, consistently with the apparent intention of the donor, the property can be applied to a purpose not charitable; if it can, the trust will not be administered as a charity.⁷ Because of their failure to conform to this *criterion*, such donations as the following have been held to be not charitable: "to secure the passage of laws granting women the right to vote and hold office;"⁸ "for the political restoration of the Jews to Jerusalem;"⁹ for purchasing and presenting a cup "to encourage yacht-racing;"¹⁰ to keep a supply of corn in London for the market;¹¹ for charitable "*or other*" purposes.¹² So, if the arrangement be

(a) The New York statute authorizes such gifts for "religious, educational, charitable, or *benevolent* uses." Real Prop. L. § 113; p. 501, *infra*.

399, 404; *Atty.-Gen. v. Soule*, 28 Mich. 153, 156; *Darcy v. Kelley*, 153 Mass. 433.

¹ *In re Macduff* (1896), 2 Ch. 451; *Farquhar v. Darling* (1896), 1 Ch. 50; *Ommanney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260; *Chamberlain v. Stearns*, 111 Mass. 267.

² See 2 Perry on Trusts, § 712, and note.

³ *Miller v. Rowan*, 5 Cl. & Fin. 99; *Goodale v. Mooney*, 60 N. H. 528, 535; *People v. Powers*, 147 N. Y. 104, 110; *Saltonstall v. Sauders*, 11 Allen (Mass.), 446, 468, 470; *Livesey v. Jones*, 55 N. J. Eq. 204, 205, 56 N. J. Eq. 453; *Murphy's Estate*, 184 Pa. St. 310.

⁴ *Saltonstall v. Sanders*, 11 Allen (Mass.), 446, 468; *Murphy's Estate*, 184 Pa. St. 310. See *Murdock v. Bridges*, 91 Me. 124; *Mass. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Boston*, 142

Mass. 24; *Chamberlain v. Stearns*, 111 Mass. 267.

⁵ *Williams v. Kershaw*, 5 Law Jur. (N. S.) Ch. 84; *Ommanney v. Butcher*, 1 Turn. & Russ. 260. See *Norris v. Thompson*, 19 N. J. Eq. 307; *Saltonstall v. Sanders*, 11 Allen (Mass.), 446, 462; *Boyle on Charities*, pp. 286-290.

⁶ 9 Ves. 404.

⁷ Also *Darcy v. Kelley*, 153 Mass. 433; *Rotch v. Emerson*, 105 Mass. 431.

⁸ *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539, 571; *Bacon v. Ransom*, 139 Mass. 117, 119.

⁹ *Habershon v. Vardon*, 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 228.

¹⁰ *Jones v. Palmer* (1895), 2 Ch. 649.

¹¹ *Atty.-Gen. v. Haberdashers' Co.*, 1 Myl. & K. 420.

¹² *Ellis v. Selby*, 1 Myl. & Cr. 286, 299; *Chamberlain v. Stearns*, 111 Mass.

the outcome of a contract, or statute, or business enterprise, *and* not a gift, it can not produce a charitable use or trust.¹ And, of course, a gift which violates the law of the land, or the principles of morality, can not be sustained because it purports to be charitable. Illustrations are found in attempted beneficences which violate local statutory restrictions as to the kind or amount of property which a testator may devote to charitable purposes.² Thus, in New York the general restriction is that one who dies leaving husband, wife, parent, or child surviving shall not dispose of more than half of his or her property to charitable institutions. (*a*)

(*a*) The general statute of New York, which applies to *all* societies, associations, and corporations of the character therein named, is Laws of 1860, ch. 360, which provides as follows: "No person having a husband, wife, parent, or child, shall, by his or her last will and testament, devise or bequeath to any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious, or missionary society, association, or corporation, in trust or otherwise, more than one-half of his or her estate, after the payment of his or her debts." In addition to this general act, there is a number of special statutes, each of which prescribes how kinds of corporations therein specified may be formed, and restricts the amount of a testator's property which a corporation so organized can take by his or her will, if he or she leave surviving a wife, child, or parent (or a husband according to some of these statutes), to one-half, or one-quarter, of his or her net estate; and also requires, as a prerequisite to the taking of that amount, that the will shall have been made at least two months before the testator's death. Such are L. 1848, ch. 319, § 6; L. 1903, ch. 623; L. 1865, ch. 366, § 6, ch. 267, § 7, and ch. 343, § 5; L. 1886, ch. 236, § 7; L. 1887, ch. 315, § 5, and ch. 317, § 7. See *Stephenson v. Short*, 92 N. Y. 433; *Matter of Lampson*, 161 N. Y. 511; *Pearson v. Collins*, 113 App. Div. 657, *aff'd* 187 N. Y. 530; *Smith v. Havens Relief Fund Soc.*, 118 App. Div. 678, *aff'd* 190 N. Y. 557; *Matter of Strong*, 121 App. Div. 112, 114. Thus,

267; *Farquhar v. Darling* (1896), 1 Ch. 50; 28 Amer. Law Reg. (n. s.) 185. A trust for preparing or maintaining a monument, tomb, vault, or burial ground is charitable, if it be in connection with a church or religious society, or some public institution; but not if made solely for the benefit of the donor or of a definite number of individuals or families. *Hopkins v. Grimshaw*, 165 U. S. 342, 352; *Nauman v. Weidman*, 182 Pa. St. 263; *Bronson v. Strouse*, 57 Conn. 147; *Kelly v. Nichols*, 18 R. I. 62; *Ford v. Ford*, 91 Ky. 572. See *Matter of Shattuck*, 193 N. Y.

¹ *Swift v. Beneficial Soc.*, 73 Pa. St.

362; *Brendle v. German Reformed Cong.*, 33 Pa. St. 415, 419; *World's Columbian Exposition*, 18 U. S. App. 42, 163.

² See N. Y. L. 1860, ch. 360; *Allen v. Stevens*, 161 N. Y. 122; *In re Hoffner's Estate*, 161 Pa. St. 331; *McClellan v. Wade*, 41 Pa. St. 266; *Taylor v. Mitchell*, 57 Pa. St. 209; *Reynolds v. Bristow*, 37 Ga. 283. For the English statutes of *mortmain* restricting gifts to religious corporations, see 2 Jarman on Wills, pp. 200-224; 2 Redfield on Wills (2d ed.), pp. 508-516; *Tudor on Charities*, 93, 101. Those statutes are not in force in this country.

§ 345. **Second. The Beneficiaries of Charitable Trusts must be Indefinite as to the Individuals.**—Indefiniteness in its objects is the second distinctive feature of a charitable use. It is not sufficient here to say, as do some writers, that the *cestuis que trustent* may be uncertain. They *must* be uncertain and indefinite, or the trust will be private. No matter how numerous the recipients may be, an establishment for them as known and determinate individuals is private and not public.¹ Thus, a trust to maintain a school, which is not free, but for the benefit of particular individuals and their families;² or a fund if property be devised for charitable purposes, and one of them be an institution incorporated under L. 1848, ch. 319, as amended by L. 1903, ch. 623, and the testator or testatrix leave husband, wife, parent, or child surviving, not more than one-half of his or her property can thus pass to all of the charitable institutions, and if he leave wife, parent, or child surviving, the attempted gift to the corporation organized under L. 1903, ch. 623, must fail if the will were not executed at least two months before the testator's death. If an attempt be made to give more than is permitted by the statutes to a number of charities, the gifts will not fail entirely; but the amount which can be legally given will be distributed *pro rata* among them. *Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary*, 95 N. Y. 166; *Jones v. Kelly*, 170 N. Y. 401. L. 1860, ch. 360, applies to secret gifts, as where on the face of the will the property is given to the executor absolutely, but he is told orally by the testator how to apply it to charity. *Edson v. Bartow*, 154 N. Y. 199. Any one who may be benefited thereby may have the advantage of these statutes or may waive that advantage; it is not restricted to husband, wife, parent, and child. *Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College*, 185 N. Y. 485, 491. It was decided in *Allen v. Stevens*, 161 N. Y. 122, 148, that when the gift is "not to a 'society, association, or corporation in trust or otherwise,' but instead to trustees" for such institution, it is not within the prohibition of the statute, L. 1860, ch. 360. In so far as they relate to personalty, these statutes apply only to domestic wills, i. e., wills made by persons domiciled in New York, the provisions of which wills are to be executed within that state. *Dammert v. Osborn*, 140 N. Y. 30, 40; *Hope v. Brewer*, 136 N. Y. 126; *Cross v. U. S. Trust Co.*, 131 N. Y. 339. See *St. John v. Andrews Institute*, 191 N. Y. 254. When a corporation has all the property that it is authorized to hold, so that it can not *hold* any more, it can not *take* any more, even for the purpose of passing it at once to other beneficiaries. *Matter of McGraw*, 111 N. Y. 66, 136 U. S. 152.

¹ *Bullard v. Chandler*, 149 Mass. 532, 540; *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312, 330; *Burke v. Roper*, 79 Ala. 138, 142; *State v. Griffith*, 2 Del. Ch. 392. "In order that there may be a good trust for a charitable use, there must always be some public benefit open to an indefinite and vague number; that is, the persons

to be benefited must be vague, uncertain, and indefinite, until they are selected or appointed to be the particular beneficiaries of the trust for the time being." 2 *Perry on Trusts*, § 710.

² *Blandford v. Fackerell*, 4 Bro. Ch. 394.

raised by an association by payment of subscriptions or dues for the exclusive use of its own members, however many they may be, is not charitable in its nature.¹ But a settlement of property for the perpetual use of a designated church, school, or hospital, is to be carried out as a public trust, because the members, scholars, or inmates, who are to be thereby assisted, are unascertainable as to who they are to be in the future.² This is the fundamental and logical distinction, as applied to some extent in this country, between the cases which have sustained gifts for uses of the kind called superstitious in England, and those in which such gifts have been overthrown. For it is held by some, probably the majority of our courts, including those of New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, that trusts for the purpose of having masses or prayers said for the souls of the dead, keeping *obit* lamps burning, etc., are charitable, because they are to be regarded as beneficial to all who may take part in the ceremonies, or hear or see them;³ while in a few other states, among which Alabama is prominent, it is decided that such uses are private, being, it is there said, designed in substance for the benefit of the specified dead persons alone, and that, therefore, when they are attempted to be made to run on perpetually or for a time longer than that permitted by the rule against perpetuities, which a private trust can not legally do, they must be declared void.⁴

§ 346. Degree of the Uncertainty. — As to the *degree* of uncertainty which may legally characterize charitable uses, there is much confusion in the cases.⁵ But the principle deducible from the large majority and weightier of them, which is also supported by the better reasoning, is that, while the individual

¹ *Coe v. Washington Mills*, 149 Mass. 543; *Stratton v. Physio-Medical College*, 149 Mass. 505; *Babb v. Reed*, 5 Rawle (Pa.), 151. Compare *Union Pac. R. Co. v. Artist*, 60 Fed. Rep. 365.

² Last two preceding notes; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 732.

³ *Hoeffler v. Clogan*, 171 Ill. 462; *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312; *In re Zimmerman's Will*, 50 N. Y. Supp. 395; *Teele v. Bishop of Derry*, 168 Mass. 341; *Schouler, Petitioner*, 134 Mass. 426; *Kerrigan v. Tabb*, 39 Atl. Rep. 701 (N. J. Ch.); *Sherman v. Baker*, 40 Atl. Rep. 11 (R. I.); *Seibert's Appeal*, 19 Pa. St. 49.

⁴ *Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church*, 104 Ala. 327; *McHugh v. McCole*, 97 Wis. 166; *Harrison v. Brophy*, 59 Kan. 1; *Moran v. Moran*, 104 Iowa, 216.

⁵ This will appear from the reading of a few such cases as *White v. Fish*, 22 Conn. 31; *Grimes v. Harmond*, 35 Ind. 198; *Green v. Allen*, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 170, and *Holland v. Peck*, 2 Ired. Ch. (N. C.) 255, which dealt with gifts to known charities such as it would seem ought to have been sustained; but in all of which it was held that the attempted donations failed because of vagueness and uncertainty.

beneficiaries must be indefinite, either the institution or class to which they are to belong, either in being or to come into being, must be pointed out with sufficient certainty, so that it can come into court and move for the administration of the trust,¹ or there must be a general charitable purpose manifested, and a trustee or trustees appointed, ready and willing to act and authorized to select the specific charitable object or objects to which the property shall be applied.² Thus, it is settled that, if a donor give property in trust to establish and maintain a specified school or hospital, but appoint no competent trustee, the settlement being in other respects valid, upon the application of the designated school or hospital the court will appoint a trustee and compel the employment of the property in the manner intended.³ So, by the weight of the authorities, though here the cases diverge,⁴ when property is conveyed to competent and willing trustees, simply "for charitable purposes," or for such charitable purposes as they may select, and no institution is indicated as the recipient and as the *alma mater*, refuge, or home of the indefinite individuals to be helped, the court of equity will see that the gift is properly administered.⁵ And it need hardly be added that when a willing and capable trustee is named, and also the specific church, school, or other institution is pointed out, the court will take cognizance of the trust.⁶ But when neither of these

¹ Atty.-Gen. v. Garrison, 101 Mass. 223; Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N. Y. 254; Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29; Parker v. May, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 326, 341; Cottman v. Grace, 41 Hun (N. Y.), 345; Ireland v. Gerahty, 11 Biss. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 465; Lewin on Trusts, p. *665; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 732.

² Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen (Mass.), 446; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557; Everett v. Carr, 59 Me. 325, 334; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 414; Miller v. Atkison, 63 N. C. 537; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 720.

³ Here it does not need the appointment of a trustee to bring the trust into existence; and equity will not allow the valid trust to fail for want of a trustee. Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass. 400; Reeve v. Atty.-Gen., 3 Hare, 191; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 99; Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299.

⁴ See next preceding note but one.

⁵ Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557, 567. In Livesey v. Jones, 55 N. J. Eq. 204, 56 N. J. Eq. 453, a gift to "humanity's friend . . . B, to use and expend the same for the promotion of the religious, moral, and social welfare of the people in any locality, whenever and wherever he may think most needful and necessary," failed, not because of the trustee's power to select, but because "social" objects might not be charitable. Pulpit v. African Church, 48 Pa. St. 204; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen (Mass.), 446; Everett v. Carr, 59 Me. 325, 334; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 414; Treat's Appeal, 30 Conn. 113; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana (Ky.), 354, 366. See Matter of Shattuck, 193 N. Y.

⁶ Authorities cited in preceding section, as to purposes of charitable trusts; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 698-705.

exists — no trustee, or none who is capable and willing to act, is appointed, and, while a charitable purpose is expressed, no specific organization or organizations are selected from the world of charity, — the attempted trust must fail, unless it can be supported by some local statute, or by some power which does not reside in any court as a *judicial* tribunal.¹ In England the Chancery Court's prerogative *cy pres* jurisdiction, which does not exist in this country, and which is explained hereafter,² may avail for the administration of this vague form of gift for charity generally. And it seems to be evident that chapter 701 of the Laws of 1893 of New York (now § 113 of Real Prop. Law, L. 1909, ch. 52), is an illustration of a local statute by virtue of which it could be sustained and administered by equity.³ For that act provides that no conveyance or devise for such purpose, which is valid in other respects, is "to be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries;" and that, when no trustee is named, the attorney-general shall represent the beneficiaries and enforce the trusts by proper proceedings. There are perhaps intimations opposed to the view of this statute here expressed.⁴ But when the act is looked at in the light of the litigation which led up to it, especially the contest over the Tilden will,⁵ the conclusion appears to be clear that the legislative intent was to do away entirely with all difficulties of that character in connection with charitable trusts.⁶ This New York statute is more fully examined hereafter.⁷ It restored charitable uses in New York after they had been discarded for upwards of a century.

§ 347. **The Cy Pres Doctrine. Judicial Cy Pres.** — As an

¹ *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36; *Paice v. Canterbury*, 14 Ves. 370; *The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States*, 136 U. S. 1; *Everett v. Carr*, 59 Me. 325, 334; *Boyle on Charities*, 241; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 128.

² § 348, *infra*.

³ The treatment of gifts for charity in New York has been unique. It is explained in the note on New York express trusts, at the end of this chapter.

⁴ *Dammert v. Osborn*, 140 N. Y. 30, 43. See *Fowler, Charitable Uses, Trusts & Donations*, pp. 104-106.

⁵ *Tilden v. Green*, 130 N. Y. 29.

⁶ The statute is very liberally construed in *Allen v. Stevens*, 161 N. Y. 122. And the decision in *Rothschild v. Schiff*, 188 N. Y. 321, 327, points strongly to the conclusion here ventured. "Where a trust fund is by a will dedicated to the purposes contemplated by the act, then the act by express terms gives to the Supreme Court control over it and the attorney-general, representing the beneficiaries, can enforce the trust by proper proceedings before the court." *Chase, J., in Matter of Shattuck*, 193 N. Y.

⁷ Note at end of this chapter.

emphatic illustration of the maxim, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*, the peculiar principle known as the *cy pres* doctrine sometimes operates to aid in determining the class or classes of the beneficiaries of a charitable use. That doctrine, with the limitation placed upon it in this country, which makes it merely a rule of construction, is as follows: when a gift is made for a charitable use, which is lawful and valid at the time of the execution of the instrument creating it, and, while indicating the general nature and purpose of the trust, the donor has not expressed any intention to restrict it to any particular institution or object alone; and afterwards the scheme outlined by him becomes illegal or impracticable because of a change of the law or circumstances, a court of equity, looking at his general charitable design, and seeking to ascertain and accomplish what he would have done had he lived to know of the change of law or circumstances, does not allow the trust to fail, or result to his heirs, but applies the property as nearly as possible (*cy pres*) in the manner and for the particular objects mentioned in the instrument. Such instruments are ordinarily wills; and the change of law or circumstances usually occurs after the death of the testator.¹ For example, in *Jackson v. Phillips*,² a case which did much to elucidate this doctrine and the principles generally of charitable uses, a gift was made by the will of Francis Jackson to trustees, for the purpose of having books and papers circulated, speeches and lectures delivered, and such other means employed "as in their judgment will create a public sentiment that will put an end to negro slavery in this country," and also for "the benefit of fugitive slaves escaping from the slave-holding states." Slavery in this country was abolished after the testator's death, but before the litigation over his will had terminated. The trust could not be carried out precisely as directed. But what the testator really wanted, under the changed condition of affairs, could be practically effectuated by the court; the people in

¹ *Jackson v. Phillips*, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539, 586; *The Late Corp. of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States*, 136 U. S. 1, 140 U. S. 665, 150 U. S. 145; *Hopkins v. Grimshaw*, 165 U. S. 342, 353; *Minot v. Baker*, 147 Mass. 348; *Atty-Gen. v. Briggs*, 164 Mass. 561; *Amory*

v. Atty-Gen., 179 Mass. 89; *Women's Church Ass'n. v. Campbell*, 147 Mo. 163; *Hannen v. Hillyer* (1902), 1 Ch. 876; *N. Y. Laws*, 1893, ch. 701, as amended by *N. Y. L.* 1909, ch. 52, § 113; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 128.

² 14 Allen (Mass.) 539.

America for whom his bounty was designed could still be thereby benefited. The matter was referred to a master in chancery to devise a scheme *cy pres* for the application of the property; with the result that it was ultimately settled in trust for the New England Branch of the Freedmen's Union Commission. A similar case in England is that of the Attorney-General *v. Ironmongers' Co.*,¹ which is generally mentioned as the "Ironmongers' Case." There the gift in question was to trustees to apply to the redemption of British slaves in Turkey and Barbary. After some years there ceased to be any British slaves in those countries to redeem. The fund having then accumulated for a long time, the court, upon the application of the attorney-general, ordered the income to be applied *cy pres* to a number of other charities as nearly as possible like those mentioned in the will. As stated above, the doctrine invoked in such cases is a *rule of construction of wills*, applied by courts of equity in favor of charitable donations. The judgments are judicial acts, determining what is the intention or probable intention of the testator.² Therefore, if, from the language employed, and all the circumstances of the case, it seem probable that the donor had no ulterior purpose in case of the failure of his directly expressed intent, the charity must fail if that intent can not be strictly carried out.³ "If the construction shows that the fund was to be employed in the way pointed out forever, *and in no other way*, then all *cy pres* construction must fail."⁴

¹ 2 Beav. 313, Cr. & Ph. 308. See also the Baliol College Case, Atty.-Gen. *v. Baliol Coll.*, 9 Mod. 407; Atty.-Gen. *v. Glasgow Coll.*, 2 Collyer, 665, 1 H. L. Cas. 800; Atty.-Gen. *v. Glyn*, 12 Sim. 84.

² *In re St. Stephens*, L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 492; *In re Villers-Wilkes*, 72 L. T. Rep. 323; *White v. White* (1893), 2 Ch. 41; *Lorings v. Marsh*, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 337; *The Late Corp. of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States*, 136 U. S. 1; 140 U. S. 665; *Young v. Commissioners*, 51 Fed. Rep. 585; *Barnard v. Adams*, 58 Fed. Rep. 313; *Darcy v. Kelley*, 153 Mass. 433; Atty.-Gen. *v. Briggs*, 164 Mass. 561; *Doyle v. Whalen*, 87 Me. 414; *Adams Female Academy v. Adams*, 65 N. H. 225; *Hay-*

den v. Conn. Hospital, 64 Conn. 320; *Kelly v. Nichols*, 18 R. L. 62; *Campbell v. Kansas City*, 102 Mo. 326; *Women's Church Ass'n v. Campbell*, 147 Mo. 163; *Duke on Uses*, 624; 8 *Harvard Law Rev.* 69.

³ *Teele v. Bishop of Derby*, 168 Mass. 341; *MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City*, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 671; Atty.-Gen. *v. Hurst*, 2 Cox, 364; *Carter v. Balfour*, 19 Ala. 814; 2 *Perry on Trusts*, § 726. So if special confidence be placed in trustees named, and they die or become incapacitated without executing the trust, it must fail. *Fontain v. Ravenel*, 17 How. (U. S.) 369, 382; *Zeisweiss v. James*, 63 Pa. St. 465.

⁴ *Per Lord Brongham*, in Atty.-Gen. *v. Ironmongers' Co.*, 2 Myl. & K. 576.

§ 348. **The Cy Pres Doctrine. Prerogative Cy Pres.** — Applied thus as merely a liberal rule of construction — and in this country such only is its application — the *cy pres* doctrine is a beneficent and commendable principle. It is well that equity thus sees to it “that property devoted to a charitable and worthy object, promotive of the public good, shall be applied to the purposes of its dedication, and protected from spoliation and from diversion to other objects.”¹ But a practice, which is unfortunately called by the same name and is at first sight similar to this, has prevailed in England in such a manner as to cause some adverse criticism of the *cy pres* doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic. That practice is the application of what has been called the *prerogative cy pres* doctrine, to distinguish it from the judicial *cy pres* above described.² Much of the prerogative power of the king, as *parens patriæ* was delegated, under the sign manual of the crown, to the Court of Chancery; and included within this is the authority to regulate and administer a charitable use, even for a purpose *entirely different* from that contemplated by the settler, or when the attempted gift is in itself incomplete, impracticable, or even illegal. Under this sweeping authority, for example, the court took a gift declared to be for a Jews’ synagogue, which under the law of England was illegal, and applied it to the benefit of a foundling hospital.³ This was not an attempt to carry out testamentary intent, though it professed to be such, but an exercise of arbitrary administrative power such as no court in this country could ever possess. “From a few grotesque cases like this,” says Mr. Perry, “discredit has been thrown upon the whole doctrine of *cy pres*.”⁴ The clear distinction, however, between the English *prerogative cy pres*, as an administrative power

¹ Per Justice Bradley, in the *Mormon Church Case*, *The Latter Day Corp., etc. v. United States*, 136 U. S. 1, 51.

² 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 718, 727; Story’s Eq. Jur. § 1168; Bispham’s Prin. Eq. § 128.

³ Story’s Eq. Jur. § 1168; 1 Amer. Law Reg. (n. s.) 400, 401.

⁴ 2 Perry on Trusts, § 728. The fact that both forms of *cy pres* were administered by the same court — the Court of Chancery — led to confusion, which it took some time to remove. “I have

conversed with many persons upon it,” said Lord Eldon, “and I have found great difficulty in the mind of every person I have consulted; but the general principle thought most reconcilable to the cases is, that when there is a general indefinite purpose not fixing itself upon any object, the disposition is in the king by sign-manual; but where the execution is to be by a trustee with general or some objects pointed out, then the court will take the administration of the trust.” *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36.

there delegated to the Court of Chancery, and the *judicial cy pres*, as a rule of construction applied by courts of equity both there and here, has come to be generally understood; and the former criticisms of the latter kind of *cy pres*, which resulted chiefly from a failure to apprehend that distinction, have consequently lost most of their force.¹ When the gift, as originally made, is legal and feasible, and no intent is manifested to restrict it to the one special charity named, and yet it can not be literally applied to that particular charity, it is well that our courts of equity can save the property for some kindred public beneficence. And this will be done, even when there is in the will a residuary clause which might otherwise include the property in question, unless the testator has made clear his wish that on failure of the particular charity it shall fall into the residuum.²

§ 349. **Approval of Judicial Cy Pres in this Country.** — The judicial *cy pres* doctrine has met with general, though not universal, favor in the United States. It was at one time apparently repudiated by the Supreme Court of the United States,³ but is now adopted by that tribunal.⁴ The courts of Massachusetts have upheld and most lucidly explained it;⁵ and those of the other New England states and New Jersey have generally followed in their lead.⁶ In Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Texas, and Wisconsin, it has been expressly repudiated.⁷ Before 1893, it could not

¹ Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539; Mormon Church Case, 136 U. S. 1, 51; White v. White (1893), 2 Ch. 41; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 723-728; Bispham's Prin. Eq. §§ 128, 129.

² Mayor of Lyons v. Advocate General of Bengal, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 91; Ironmongers' Co. v. Atty.-Gen., 10 Cl. & Fin. 908.

³ Fountain v. Ravenel, 17 How. (U. S.) 369.

⁴ The Late Corp. of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 150 U. S. 145; Lorings v. Marsh, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 337; Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 353.

⁵ Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539; Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364; Darcy v. Kelley, 153 Mass. 433; Atty.-Gen. v. Briggs, 164 Mass.

561. Compare Teele v. Bishop of Derry, 168 Mass. 341.

⁶ Doyle v. Whalen, 87 Me. 414; Howard v. Amer. Peace Soc., 49 Me. 288, 302; Adams Female Academy v. Adams, 65 N. H. 225; Brown v. Concord, 33 N. H. 285, 296; Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241; Hayden v. Conn. Hospital, 64 Conn. 320; Kelly v. Nichols, 18 R. I. 62; MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbyterian of Jersey City, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 671, 677.

⁷ Trustees v. Jackson Square Church, 84 Md. 173; Halsey v. Couvent P. E. Church, 75 Md. 275; Provost of Dumfries v. Abercrombie, 46 Md. 172; Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 1; Gallego's Ex'rs v. Atty.-Gen. 3 Leigh (Va.), 450; Mong v. Roush, 29 W. Va. 119; Johnson v. Johnson, 92 Tenn. 559; Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's

operate as a principle of construction in New York, because charitable uses were not permitted.¹ But it probably returned with the restoration of that form of trust in 1893; and it was specifically recognized and regulated by statute in 1901.² (a) Some doubts have been expressed by the courts of New Jersey as to its existence in that state.³ But it seems to be safe to conclude that it is an operative rule there,⁴ and in the other states of the Union, except as above specified.⁵

Similar to the *cy pres* doctrine is another principle for the disposition of charitable funds, that, unless the testator's intention is clearly to the contrary, if the fund from any cause produce more income than is specifically devoted to the designated charity, the surplus will not result to the settler's heirs, but will also be devoted to the same or a similar charitable object.⁶ But the context and circumstances must always be first carefully weighed, to make sure that the testator has not expressed a contrary intention.⁷

§ 350. **Third. Charitable Trusts generally unaffected by Rules against Perpetuities and Accumulations.** — The rule against perpetuities, which at common law forbids the tying up of property or taking it out of the market for more than any number of lives in being, and twenty-one years and a fraction over (the

(a) After being disallowed in New York at least after 1829, and probably after 1788, the *cy pres* doctrine was explicitly restored by L. 1901, ch. 291, amending the act which restored charitable uses (L. 1893, ch. 701, now L. 1909, ch. 52, § 113). The *cy pres* principle is thus authorized to be applied by order of the Supreme Court, "provided, however, that no such order shall be made without the consent of the donor or grantor of the property, if he be living." The statute was amended and put into its present form by chapter 144 of the laws of 1909. See also note on New York express trusts, at the end of this chapter.

Catholic Church, 104 Ala. 327; Heidenheimer v. Bauman, 84 Tex. 174; McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166; Fuller's Will, 75 Wis. 431; *In re Hofen's Estate*, 70 Wis. 522.

¹ Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584; Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332.

² N. Y. L. 1901, ch. 291.

³ Thomson's Ex'rs v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489, 522; Atty.-Gen. v. Moore's Ex'rs, 19 N. J. Eq. 503.

⁴ Livesey v. Jones, 55 N. J. Eq. 204, 56 N. J. Eq. 453.

⁶ Cases cited in preceding notes on

the *cy pres* doctrine; Perry on Trusts, §§ 728, 729, and notes; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 130.

⁶ Thetford School Case, 8 Rep. 130 b, by the name of which this principle is generally known. Atty.-Gen. v. Dean of Winsor, 8 H. L. Cas. 369; Atty.-Gen. v. Wax Chandlers' Co., L. R. 8 Eq. 452; Mayor of Beverly v. Atty.-Gen., 6 H. L. Cas. 310; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 1; Hill on Trustees, 129; 2 Redfield on Wills, 796.

⁷ Coe v. Mills, 149 Mass. 543; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 725.

fraction being limited by the period of gestation of a child), has been already mentioned as restricting the operation of private trusts.¹ The discussion of that rule in detail is best postponed to a subsequent chapter. It will suffice here to emphasize the fact that charitable trusts are not ordinarily affected by that rule. Where no statute prevents, they may continue perpetually for the raising of income and disbursing it for public utility, or for accumulating income for any length of time and then applying the accumulations to charitable objects.² This is a very essential feature, which gives much of their effectiveness to most charitable donations. In New York, the statute forbids accumulations for charity.³

If, however, a charitable devise be made to precede or follow a private trust or other private gift, the rule against perpetuities may interfere with the working out of the scheme in whole or in part.⁴ Thus, when a private trust is attempted to be made for longer than the legal period, and provision is added for a charitable use to follow it, since the first part is invalid, and the other depends upon it, the entire scheme must fail.⁵ Again, if a trust for charity be made, to continue during lives not yet in being, and a private gift follow, although the charity may be sustained, since there is nothing illegal ahead of it, the rest of the attempted settlement will be inoperative.⁶ But a charitable donation, with no other gift preceding it, may be made to begin at any time in the distant future.⁷ And a fund may be made to shift from one charity to another in the future, no matter how remote.⁸

¹ § 308, *supra*; Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 20; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 384.

² Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 355; St. Paul's Church v. Atty.-Gen., 164 Mass. 188; Abend v. End Fund. Commission, 174 Ill. 96; Andrews v. Andrews, 110 Ill. 222; Sellers Church's Petition, 139 Pa. St. 61, 67; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659; Brown v. Meeting St. Baptist Soc., 9 R. I. 177; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 384; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 736, 737.

³ St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 278; pp. 498, 501, *infra*.

⁴ Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 355; *In re* Tyler (1891), 3 Ch. 252; *In re* Bowen (1893), 2 Ch. 491; *In re* Nottage (1895), 2 Ch. 649; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659; Alden v.

St. Peter's Parish, 158 Ill. 631; Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366; Duggan v. Slocum, 92 Fed. Rep. 806, 808.

⁵ Company of Pewterers v. Christ's Hospital, 1 Vern. 161; Atty.-Gen. v. Downing, Ambler, 550; Post v. Rohrbach, 142 Ill. 600; Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 355.

⁶ Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 355; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659; Alden v. St. Peter's Parish, 158 Ill. 631.

⁷ Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 355; Atty.-Gen. v. Downing, Ambler, 550; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 99; Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 328, 336.

⁸ Leming's Estate, 154 Pa. St. 209; McDonogh's Ex'rs v. Murdock, 15 How.

NEW YORK EXPRESS TRUSTS.

Until January 1, 1830, the law of uses and trusts as above explained prevailed in New York, in all respects except as to gifts for charity. On that day, the Revised Statutes, the preparation of which was begun by revisers appointed in 1827, and which were enacted by the legislature of 1829, went into operation. These made many important changes in the New York law of real property, most of which have proved beneficial. But probably in no other department of the state's jurisprudence were the alterations effected by them so radical and far-reaching as in that of uses and trusts. The objects of those alterations, as stated by the revisers in their report to the legislature, were to remove as far as possible the inconveniences which had grown up around these forms of interests as they were dealt with by courts of equity, — especially the difficulties arising out of the existence of both a legal estate and an equitable one in the same piece of property, — and yet to retain the old system for cases in which "the purposes of the trust require that the legal estate shall pass to the trustee," or in which justice or the best interest of the parties concerned can be thereby most fully and fairly subserved. In their efforts to produce these results, the revisers found it necessary to retain unchanged all the species of implied trusts except one. The modifications which they made in that one will be explained hereafter in discussing the first form of resulting trusts.

Dividing all express trusts into their two natural classes, — (a) active and (b) passive, — they abolished the latter class entirely, retained four kinds or groups of the former class, and changed all other forms of other wise valid, active, express trusts, except those four, into *powers in trust*. Each of these statutory modifications of the express trusts requires a more detailed discussion. And this will include a fuller explanation of the vicissitudes through which charitable uses and donations have passed in New York.

1. *Passive Express Trusts are wholly Abolished.* — For, said the revisers: "They answer no end whatever but to facilitate fraud, to render titles more complicated, and to increase the business of the Court of Chancery. They are, in truth, *precisely what uses were before the Statute of Uses, and are liable to many of the same objections.* Formal" (passive express) "trusts we, therefore, propose to abolish by converting those which now exist into legal estates and prohibiting their creation in the future. This is substantially to carry the Statute of Uses into effect according to its original intention." This purpose was carried out by the statutes which were 1 R. S. 727, §§ 45–50, and which are now Real Prop. Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), §§ 90–93, and are quoted in full in note (a), § 331, *supra*. But it is to be carefully noted that these statutes abolished passive express trusts, not by declaring attempts to create them to be illegal, improper, or a nullity, but by vesting the legal estate in the person designated as the ultimate beneficiary, — by *executing* the use, and the use upon a use, if one be made, and the use upon that, if such subsequent use exist, and so on to the person or persons who are the real beneficiaries. In other words, these

(U. S.) 367, 415; Storrs' Agr. School v. 17 R. I. 265; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 736, Whitney, 54 Conn. 342; Almy v. Jones, 737.

statutes have overcome the effect of the decision in Tyrrel's Case, and execute all the uses (or passive express trusts) attempted to be made, whether they are first, second, third, or more remote. Thus, if land be conveyed to A, in trust for B, to the use of C, the statute passes the legal estate to C; and A and B get nothing: and a transfer to A, for the use of B, for the use of C, in trust for D, for the benefit of E, gives the legal estate to E, and nothing to A, B, C, or D. *Denison v. Denison*, 185 N. Y. 438, 443; *Wendt v. Walsh*, 164 N. Y. 154; *Hopkins v. Kent*, 145 N. Y. 363; *Townshend v. Frommer*, 125 N. Y. 446, 456; *Woerz v. Rademacher*, 120 N. Y. 62, 67; *Syracuse Sav. Bk. v. Holden*, 105 N. Y. 415; *Mott v. Ackerman*, 92 N. Y. 539; *Adams v. Perry*, 43 N. Y. 487; *Fisher v. Hall*, 41 N. Y. 416; *Downing v. Marshall*, 23 N. Y. 366, 379; *Matter of Gawne*, 82 App. Div. 374; *Knight v. Weatherwax*, 7 Paige, 182.

2. *Of the Active Express Trusts, Four purposes or groups were retained in 1830, to which a fifth one was added in 1893; and the rest, when otherwise valid, are changed into powers in trust.* — The object of the revisers was that there should be no express trusts in real property, except where it is necessary for the protection of those interested that the title or possession shall be vested in a trustee. "Where no such necessity exists," say the revisers (as where the trust is to convey, or to make partitions, etc.), "it is obvious that without giving any estate to the trustee, the trust may as well be executed as a power." See *Clapp v. Byrnes*, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 284, 292; *Heermans v. Robertson*, 64 N. Y. 332. That is, there is not to be a legal estate separate from the beneficial enjoyment of the property, where this can be properly avoided, but in such cases trust duties in connection with the land are to be performed by the donee of a power in trust, who as such donee has no title or estate. The statute, which in 1830 was 1 R. S. 728, § 55, and is now Real Property Law (L. 1896, ch. 547), § 76, accordingly provides that: "An express trust may be created for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To sell real property for the benefit of creditors; (2) To sell, mortgage, or lease real property for the benefit of annuitants or other legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon; (3) To receive rents and profits of real property, and apply them to the use of any person, during the life of that person, or for any shorter term, subject to the provisions of law relating thereto; (4) To receive the rents and profits of real property, and to accumulate the same for the purposes, and within the limits prescribed by law." These four purposes do not embrace charitable uses. But the statute, which was originally L. 1893, ch. 701, and is now Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 113, provides for, (5) A trust "for religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses." And by the statute, 1 R. S. 729, §§ 58, 59, as it was in 1830, which is now Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 99, it is enacted that, "Where an express trust relating to real property is created for any purpose not specified in the preceding sections of this article" (§ 113, which restored charitable uses, being a later amendment, is treated as though it were a preceding section), no estate shall vest in the trustees; but the trust, if directing or authorizing the performance of any act which may be lawfully performed under a power, shall be valid as a power in trust, subject to the provisions of this chapter. Where a trust is valid as a power, the real property to which the trust relates shall remain in or descend to the persons otherwise entitled, subject to the execution of

the trust as a power." The statutes do not specify or limit the purposes which are lawful as powers in trust, except by showing that they include those for which active express trusts were valid under the common law, and which are not embraced within the *five express trust purposes* still permitted. *Downing v. Marshall*, 23 N. Y. 366, 380; *Read v. Williams*, 125 N. Y. 560, 569; *Reynolds v. Denslow*, 80 Hun, 359. In all cases of doubtful construction, — where it is not practically certain that one of the five express trust purposes is intended, — the courts lean towards a power, rather than a trust. *Steinhardt v. Cunningham*, 130 N. Y. 292, 300; *Cassagne v. Marvin*, 143 N. Y. 292; *Forster v. Winfield*, 142 N. Y. 327; 332; *Bates v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co.*, 130 N. Y. 200. See *Robinson v. Adams*, 81 N. Y. App. Div. 20. A few remarks are needed, which apply to all of the five groups of express active trusts; and then each of those groups is to be briefly considered.

The better and more consistent view is that the legislature did not first abolish all express trusts and then create *de novo* five groups, which must rest entirely upon the statutes for their authority and precedents; but it retained in the first instance four groups (and subsequently restored a fifth), which were known and favored at common law, and converted the others into powers in trust. Therefore, except in so far as they are positively modified by the statutes, those trusts which remain are to have their effect and operation determined by the principles of the common law. *Leggett v. Perkins*, 2 N. Y. 297, 307; *Boese v. King*, 78 N. Y. 471, 478; *Downing v. Marshall*, 23 N. Y. 366, 377. But see *Hawley v. James*, 16 Wend. 61, 148. Again, in the third (3) and fourth (4) groups one of the expressed purposes of the trusts is that the trustee may collect the rents, profits, and income of the property. If a trust of the first (1) or second (2) group be attempted to be made by *devise* for the purpose of selling or mortgaging the property, it results only in a power, unless the trustee is also authorized to collect the rents and profits until the sale or mortgage is made. Such is the effect of the statute, which in 1830 was 1 R. S. 729, § 56, and is now Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 97, and which is as follows: "A devise of real property to an executor or other trustee, for the purpose of sale or mortgage, where the trustee is not also empowered to receive the rents and profits, shall not vest any estate in him; but the trust shall be valid as a power, and the real property shall descend to the heirs, or pass to the devisees of the testator, subject to the execution of the power." *Heermans v. Robertson*, 64 N. Y. 332; *Heermans v. Burt*, 78 N. Y. 259; *Knox v. Jones*, 47 N. Y. 389. Therefore, in order to create one of these first four active express trusts, the purpose must be one of those prescribed by the statute, and executors as trustees under the first (1) and second (2) groups, and all trustees under the third (3) and fourth (4) groups, must have authority to receive the rents and profits of the property. *Holly v. Hirsch*, 135 N. Y. 590; *Brewster v. Striker*, 2 N. Y. 19; *Cooke v. Platt*, 98 N. Y. 35; *Tobias v. Ketcham*, 32 N. Y. 319. The statute (in 1830, 1 R. S. 729, § 60, now Real Prop. Law, § 100) also declares that: "Except as otherwise prescribed in this chapter, an express trust, valid as such in its creation, shall vest in the trustee the legal estate, subject only to the execution of the trust, and the beneficiary shall not take any legal estate or interest in the property, but may enforce the performance of the trust." See *Marx v. McGlynn*,

88 N. Y. 357; *Bennett v. Garlock*, 79 N. Y. 302, 317; *Van Cott v. Prentice*, 104 N. Y. 45, 53; *People ex rel. Short v. Bacon*, 99 N. Y. 275; *Marvin v. Smith*, 46 N. Y. 571; *Briggs v. Davis*, 21 N. Y. 574, 577; *De Graw v. Classon*, 11 Paige, 136, 140. But the trustee himself takes no greater interest in the property than is necessary to perform the requirements of the trust. Thus, if the trust be for the life of A, on A's death the property freed from the trust to pass to B, the estate of the trustee is only during the life of A. *Losey v. Stanley*, 147 N. Y. 560, 568; *Matter of Brown*, 154 N. Y. 313; *Matter of Tompkins*, 154 N. Y. 634; *Brown v. Richter*, 25 N. Y. App. Div. 239; *Knowlton v. Atkins*, 134 N. Y. 313, 317; *Townshend v. Frommer*, 125 N. Y. 446, 455; *Manice v. Manice*, 43 N. Y. 303, 363. The statute also adds (*Real Prop. Law*, §§ 101, 102, formerly 1 R. S. 729, §§ 61, 62): "The last section" (§ 100 which vests the entire trust interest in the trustee, as shown above) "shall not prevent any person, creating a trust, from declaring to whom the real property, to which the trust relates, shall belong, in the event of the failure or termination of the trust, or from granting or devising the property subject to the execution of the trust. Such a grantee or devisee shall have a legal estate in the property, as against all persons, except the trustees, and those legally claiming under them." "Where an express trust is created, every legal estate and interest not embraced in the trust, and not otherwise disposed of, shall remain in or revert to, the person creating the trust or his heirs." The alienability of express trusts of the third (3) and fourth (4) groups is restricted by §§ 103-107 *Real Property Law*, which were formerly 1 R. S. 730, §§ 63-65, and L. 1895, ch. 886. These statutes provide that, "The right of a beneficiary of an express trust to receive rents and profits of real property and apply them to the use of any person can not be transferred by assignment or otherwise, but the right and interest of the beneficiary of any other trust in real property may be transferred." § 103; *Dyett v. Central Trust Co.*, 140 N. Y. 54, 65; *Metcalf v. Union Trust Co.*, 181 N. Y. 39; *Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co.*, 186 N. Y. 127. "If the trust is expressed in the instrument creating the estate, every sale, conveyance, or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust, except as provided in this section, shall be absolutely void." § 105. But the trustee may lease the property for not longer than five years at a time without permission of the court; and, for reasons shown which convince the court that it is for the best interest of the estate or beneficiary, he may be empowered by it to lease for a longer term than five years, or to mortgage or sell the trust property or any part of the same. § 106. The procedure, upon the application for such authority, is prescribed by § 107. When the property is sold, § 94 of the statute now provides for investing the proceeds, when proper, in the stocks and bonds, or either, of a corporation, formed or to be formed for that purpose. A beneficiary's trust interest which he may alien [i. e., in a trust of the first (1) or second (2) group] may be reached in equity by his creditors. But, as heretofore explained, the income of a beneficiary of one of the third (3) or fourth (4) groups can not be taken for his debts, except so much thereof as is not needed for the education and support of himself and those dependent on him, and except that ten per cent of his income of not less than twelve dollars per week may be reached, as explained in note (a), § 335, *supra*. The importance of these express trusts calls for a brief, separate discussion of each of the above-named five groups:—

(1) *A trust*, "To sell real property for the benefit of creditors."—An assignment for the benefit of creditors makes a trust of this class. It must

be absolute and imperative in character, vesting no discretion in the trustee, except as to the time and manner of selling. And the direction to sell must be the primary, if not the sole, purpose of the transfer. *Steinhardt v. Cunningham*, 130 N. Y. 292, 300; *Henderson v. Henderson*, 113 N. Y. 1, 11; *Woerz v. Rademacher*, 120 N. Y. 62; *Cooke v. Platt*, 98 N. Y. 35. See New York General Assignment Act of 1877 (L. 1877, ch. 466, now found in R. S. 9th ed. p. 2429), and treatises on general and insolvent assignments.

(2) *A trust, "To sell, mortgage, or lease real property for the benefit of annuitants or other legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon."* — In comparing this with the first group, it will be observed that the only trust that can be made for the benefit of creditors is one to sell, unless their claims are charged upon the land, as in the form of a mortgage, judgment, or other lien. *Darling v. Rogers*, 22 Wend. 483; *Hawley v. James*, 16 Wend. 61, 149; *Irving v. De Kay*, 9 Paige, 521, 529. Payments to volunteers — annuitants and other legatees — may await the possibly slower process of raising money by mortgage or lease. The primary, if not the only, purpose of this second form of trust must be to sell, mortgage, or lease for one or both of the two purposes specified by the statute. *Heermans v. Burt*, 78 N. Y. 259, 265; *Russell v. Hilton*, 80 N. Y. App. Div. 178. If the trustee be instructed to lease the land, or continue an existing lease, and apply the rents to the payment of an existing mortgage or other lien on the land, this is invalid, since it orders an accumulation for a purpose not authorized by the statute. *Hascall v. King*, 162 N. Y. 134. See also the discussion, in this note, of the fourth group of active express trusts (4), *infra*. If the trustee be directed or authorized to lease for one of the purposes permitted by the statute, he may make a lease for any reasonable length of time required for the proper performance of the trust, even though the term of such lease be longer than the time during which the trust is to continue. *Bennett v. Garlock*, 79 N. Y. 302; *Matter of McCaffrey*, 50 Hun, 371; *Greason v. Keteltas*, 17 N. Y. 491; *Taylor on Landlord and Tenant*, §§ 130-132; *Wood on Landlord and Tenant*, §§ 165-167.

(3) *A trust, "To receive rents and profits of real property, and apply them to the use of any person, during the life of that person, or for any shorter term, subject to the provisions of law relating thereto."* — The life "of any person" is here mentioned as though only one person were intended. But such a trust may continue during the lives of not more than two persons in being at the time of its creation, i. e., in being when the deed is delivered, if it be made by deed, or when the testator dies, if by will. Thus, the trust may be to receive the rents and profits and apply them to the use of A while he lives, and then to the use of B while he lives; or to the use of A and B during their joint lives, and then to the use of the survivor of them during the rest of his life. Or there may be a valid trust to receive the rents and profits, while A and B or either of them lives, and apply them to the benefit of any number of designated persons during that period. So, of course, the trust may be to apply the income to the use of A until he is forty years of age, if he live that long, or for any other portion of one or two lives. But, since ordinarily in such cases neither the beneficiary, nor the trustee, nor both together, can sell the property during the period prescribed by the trust, the tying up of the property in this way, or

this suspension of the power of alienation, is not allowed to transcend the period of two lives in being. *Manice v. Manice*, 43 N. Y. 303; *Smith v. Secor*, 157 N. Y. 402; *Allen v. Allen*, 149 N. Y. 280. It was at one time supposed by some that this form of trust was designed merely for persons who were legally incapable of managing their own affairs. But, while such persons are of course very frequently the beneficiaries, it was long ago settled that such trusts may exist for persons *sui juris* and legally capacitated to act for themselves. *Leggett v. Perkins*, 2 N. Y. 297, 308, 321; *Moore v. Hegeman*, 72 N. Y. 376, 384; *Gott v. Cook*, 7 Paige, 521, 538. This is the species of trust by which settlements for married women are frequently made in New York. *L'Amoreaux v. Van Rensselaer*, 1 Barb. Ch. 34, 37; p. 473, note (a), *supra*.

(4) *A trust, "To receive the rents and profits of real property and to accumulate the same for the purposes, and within the limits, prescribed by law."*—The "limits, prescribed by law," to a trust of this character are that it can not begin before the birth of the beneficiary, and must begin within or at the expiration of not more than two lives in being when it is created; it must terminate at or before the expiration of his minority, and if it be directed to continue for a period beyond his minority, it is void only as to the time beyond such minority; it can not be for the benefit of any person other than the child by whose minority it is measured, nor even for a charity. Real Prop. Law, § 61; *Pray v. Hegeman*, 92 N. Y. 508; *Manice v. Manice*, 43 N. Y. 303, 375; *Smith v. Parsons*, 146 N. Y. 116, 120; *Cook v. Lowry*, 95 N. Y. 103; *Hascall v. King*, 162 N. Y. 134; p. 492, *supra*.

(5) *A trust "for religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses."*—The English Statute of Charitable Uses (43 Eliz. ch. 4) was abrogated in New York by the Law of 1788, ch. 46. 2 Jones & Varick, 282; *Levy v. McCartee*, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 102, 110; *Beekman v. Bonsor*, 23 N. Y. 298, 307. Before that time, although there were very few charitable foundations in the state, those which did exist were governed by the rules and principles of trusts for charity, as these had been developed and explained by the English courts. It was believed, without question, at that time, that those rules and principles were wholly based upon the Statute of Elizabeth. And, therefore, after much vacillation by the courts, the final judicial opinion is that the repeal of that statute is conclusive evidence of an intention on the part of the legislature to abolish for New York the entire English law of charitable uses. *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312, 334; *Bascom v. Albertson*, 34 N. Y. 584, 601; *Levy v. Levy*, 33 N. Y. 97, 112; *Yates v. Yates*, 9 Barb. 324; *Ayres v. M. E. Church*, 3 Sand. Ch. 351. The Revised Statutes (Jan. 1, 1830) provided for only the four groups of express trusts heretofore explained in this note. And the question was very soon mooted whether or not they had left or created any room for charitable uses. In a line of decisions, of which *Williams v. Williams*, 8 N. Y. 525, is the chief, and which were supported by the opinions of such jurists as Chancellors Kent, Jones, and Sandford, it was held that the English system of charities, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over them became the law of New York on the adoption of the Constitution of 1777, and that neither the repeal of the Statute of Elizabeth nor the operation of the Revised Statutes of the state had done away with that law or system. *Coggeshall v. Pelton*, 7 Johns. Ch. 292; *McCartee v. Orphan Asylum*, 9 Cow. 437, 451; *Shotwell Executor v. Mott*, 2 Sand. Ch. 46; *Hornbeck's*

Ex'r v. American Bible Soc., 2 Sand. Ch. 133; *Trustees of N. Y. Protestant Episcopal School v. Davis*, 31 N. Y. 574, 589; *Iseman v. Mayers*, 26 Hun, 651, 657. But subsequently judicial opinion on these matters turned the other way; and, after oscillating for several years, was completely reversed. In 1873, the Court of Appeals announced that the long controversy was definitely settled, and that the system of charitable uses, as it existed in England, had disappeared from the jurisprudence of New York on the first day of January, 1830, if not before. *Bascom v. Alberton*, 34 N. Y. 584; *Holmes v. Mead*, 52 N. Y. 332; *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312, 336; *People v. Powers*, 147 N. Y. 104. See also *Downing v. Marshall*, 23 N. Y. 366; *Levy v. Levy*, 33 N. Y. 97, 134; *Ayres v. Trustees of M. E. Church*, 3 Sand. Ch. 351.

Beginning probably as far back as the Law of 1784, chapter 18 (1 Greenleaf's Laws, 71; 1 Jones & Varick, 104), which was an act to enable religious institutions to appoint trustees who should become *bodies corporate*, the state of New York was, in the mean time, developing a distinct scheme for the manipulation of charitable gifts; which scheme, although essentially as ancient as the charities created before there were any statutes of mortmain, and although it was completed here as a system in 1830, was not thoroughly understood until many years after the Revised Statutes became operative. The basal idea of this substituted policy was *corporate charity*, — the making of charitable gifts to corporations so organized, or to be so organized, as to accomplish the desired objects, rather than to trustees for the purposes intended. Thus, when the property was designed for religious purposes, it was to be given directly to a church corporation, or other religious corporate entity, and not to trustees to hold and manage for such institution; and when it was intended for purely eleemosynary purposes, it was to be given to some incorporated asylum, hospital, or the like, and not to individuals in trust for the same. And if the desired charity were not already in corporate form, there were to be directions in the instrument of gift for having it made so, within the time permitted by the statutes (two lives in being), and then transferring to it the donated property. These gifts were then sustained upon the theory of the absence of a technical trust, and the absolute ownership of the property by the charitable corporation. *Bird v. Merkle*, 144 N. Y. 544; *Riker v. Lee*, 115 N. Y. 93, 133 N. Y. 519; *Cottman v. Grace*, 112 N. Y. 299, 306; *Wetmore v. Parker*, 52 N. Y. 450; *Bascom v. Alberton*, 34 N. Y. 584, 609; *Levy v. Levy*, 33 N. Y. 97, 124. The corporation must fulfill the purposes of its existence; and it owed to the state a fiduciary obligation to do so. The state so far forth insured the performance of the wish of the donor, by its laws relating to the administration of corporate property. There was, therefore, in every such charity a trust relationship, consisting of the duty of the corporation properly to administer its funds; and the individuals who were to be the ultimate beneficiaries were necessarily indefinite. *But the donor created no trust.* He gave his property absolutely to a definitely described and known corporation. The duty and the trust were impressed upon the gift by the state. The time of the existence of the beneficence of the donor, moreover, must depend on that of the corporation, which might or might not be perpetual. Thus the donor must choose a definite object to which to give both the legal and equitable estates, and could not always make his charitable donation to last forever. *Fosdick v. Town of*

Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 582, 595; Matter of Ingersoll, 131 N. Y. 573; Bird v. Merkle, 144 N. Y. 544; Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312; Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584. He might pass the property to the definite object, by means of a power in trust reposed in a third party, such, for example, as an executor, provided he required the power to be executed within the time permitted by the statutes — two lives in being. Thus, he could authorize his executors to distribute the property among known and clearly described existing charities, *Power v. Cassidy*, 79 N. Y. 602, or to have a corporation formed, within two lives in being, for definitely described charitable objects, and then to convey the property absolutely to such corporation. *Tilden v. Green*, 130 N. Y. 29. It was required that the corporations to so take and hold, whether directly from the donor or through the act of the donee of a power in trust, should be so definitely and unmistakably pointed out by the instrument, that they could come into court as unquestionably the only beneficiaries intended and move it to compel the transfer of the property to them. *People v. Powers*, 147 N. Y. 104; *Tilden v. Green*, 130 N. Y. 29; *Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead*, 125 N. Y. 582, 591. Therefore the *cy pres* doctrine had no application to such gifts. It was repeatedly declared that that doctrine did not exist in either of its forms in the state of New York. *Owens v. Miss. Soc. M. E. Church*, 14 N. Y. 380; *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312, 330; *Cottmann v. Grace*, 112 N. Y. 299, 306; *Hillen v. Iselin*, 144 N. Y. 365, 374. But if the beneficiary were explicitly indicated, and the settlement otherwise properly made, it was not allowed to fail because of any non-appointment or absence of a trustee or donee of a power in trust. The court, on application of the beneficiary, would follow the legal estate, and see that it was disposed of as required by the donor. *Downing v. Marshall*, 23 N. Y. 366, 382; *Kirk v. Kirk*, 137 N. Y. 510, 514; *Woodward v. James*, 115 N. Y. 346, 357; *Rose v. Hatch*, 125 N. Y. 427; *Greene v. Greene*, 125 N. Y. 506.

The difficulties with the scheme for charitable donations, as thus developed in New York, were that it was too rigid and narrow, and too obscure. Testators were constantly desiring and endeavoring to put into operation charitable plans which were not included within its narrow limitations. The provisions of the Revised Statutes themselves did not explain it with any degree of exactness. The best legal minds were long in doubt and perplexity as to what could be done, and what was forbidden, in the way of foundations for charity. The result was the failure of many beneficent schemes for the public good, which might otherwise have flourished forever in this state. See *Dammert v. Osborn*, 140 N. Y. 30, 43. Some of the conspicuous instances of those abortive attempts to benefit the public are shown in the following cases, namely: *Levy v. Levy*, 33 N. Y. 97; *Bascom v. Albertson*, 34 N. Y. 584; *White v. Howard*, 46 N. Y. 144; *Holmes v. Mead*, 52 N. Y. 332; *Holland v. Alcock*, 108 N. Y. 312; *Tilden v. Green*, 130 N. Y. 29; *People v. Powers*, 147 N. Y. 104; *Fairchild v. Edson*, 154 N. Y. 199. In *People v. Powers*, 147 N. Y. 104, as an illustration, the gift was to the executor named in the will, "to dispose of among the charitable and benevolent institutions or corporations in the city of Rochester, as he shall choose, and in such sums and proportions as he shall deem proper." Since all kinds of charitable institutions in Rochester, whether incorporated or not, came within the meaning of this language, it was decided that the beneficiaries were

clearly too indefinite—there being no fixed charity or class of charities which could undeniably maintain that they alone were intended as donees—and therefore the entire scheme must fail. This case was distinguished from the quite similar one of *Power v. Cassidy*, 79 N. Y. 602, in which a gift was sustained for the charitable Catholic institutions of the city of New York, because it was shown that all such Catholic institutions in New York City were incorporated and therefore definitely known and ascertained. In the more noted case of *Tilden v. Green*, 130 N. Y. 29, the *thirty-fifth* and *thirty-ninth* paragraphs of the will of Samuel J. Tilden were particularly in question. By the thirty-ninth paragraph and first part of the thirty-fifth, the property was given to the executors, with instructions that, during the lives of the testator's nephew and niece, or that of the survivor of them (two designated persons in being), they should cause to be formed a *corporation*, to be known as the "Tilden Trust," for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a free public library in the city of New York, and should then transfer the donated property to it, for that purpose. It was declared by the Court of Appeals that, had he stopped there, Mr. Tilden would have made a valid gift of the property, amounting to \$3,000,000, for the "Tilden Trust," yet to come into being. The settlement would have come squarely within the then existing New York scheme for charitable foundations. But the substance of the latter part of the thirty-fifth paragraph of the will was that, if, in the judgment of the executors, it were not best to apply all or any of the fund to the "Tilden Trust," then, in their discretion, they might use any part or all of the same for such other charitable purposes as in their judgment would be "most widely and substantially beneficial to the interests of mankind." It was held that all of those two paragraphs of the will must be read together, and could not be taken separately as constituting two distinct provisions; and that, as so read, they authorized the executors, in their discretion, to give the property to *any* charity or charities in the world, of which the "Tilden Trust" might or might not be one. Testing such a settlement as a trust, it was clearly not within the purview of any of the four active express trusts permitted by the Revised Statutes. Tested as a power in trust, it must fail because of the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries. The scheme was wholly inconsistent with the New York policy as to charities, and, therefore, invalid.

Because of the constantly recurring frustrations of large and splendid devises and bequests for public beneficence, and in particular as an outcome of the overthrow of the Tilden Will, the unfortunate policy, which had existed in New York for at least over half a century without being understood, was abandoned, in 1893, in favor of the restoration of charitable uses as the *fifth* (5) group of active express trusts, as it may be properly styled. This was accomplished by chapter 701 of the Laws of 1893, which is entitled, "*An Act to regulate gifts for charitable purposes.*" In so far as it deals with conveyances and devises of real property, that statute has been re-enacted as §113 of the Real Property Law. But the following quotation is the complete act, as dealing with all kinds of property, and as amended by the law of 1901, ch. 291, with reference to the *cy pres* doctrine.

"Section 1. No gift, grant, bequest, or devise to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses, which shall, in other respects, be valid under the laws of this State, shall or be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries

thereunder in the instrument creating the same. If in the instrument creating such a gift, grant, bequest, or devise, there is a trustee named to execute the same, the legal title to the lands or property given, granted, devised, or bequeathed for such purposes shall vest in the trustee. If no person be named as trustee, then the title to such lands or property shall vest in the supreme court.

"2. The supreme court shall have control over gifts, grants, bequests, and devises, in all cases provided for by section one of this act. Whenever it shall appear to the court that circumstances have so changed since the execution of an instrument containing a gift, grant, bequest, or devise to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses as to render impracticable or impossible a literal compliance with the terms of such instrument, the court may, upon the application of the trustee or of the person or corporation having the custody of the property, and upon such notice as the court shall direct, make an order directing that such gift, grant, bequest, or devise, shall be administered or expended in such manner as in the judgment of the court will most effectually accomplish the general purpose of the instrument, without regard to and free from any specific restriction, limitation, or direction contained therein; provided, however, that no such order shall be made without the consent of the donor or grantor of the property, if he be living.

"3. The attorney-general shall represent the beneficiaries in all such cases, and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the courts."

The statute was amended, and put into its present form, by chapter 144 of the laws of 1909.

Construing this statute liberally, in view of the mischiefs which it was manifestly made to remedy, and with special reference to the purpose for which by its title it is declared to have been enacted, — "*to regulate gifts for charitable purposes,*" — the Court of Appeals has decided that it restored to New York the former and English system of trusts for charity, with their three distinctive characteristics, namely, that the purposes are for public utility, — religious, educational, eleemosynary, or governmental, — they may continue perpetually, and their beneficiaries must be indefinite. *Allen v. Stevens*, 161 N. Y. 122; *Matter of Griffin*, 167 N. Y. 71, 77. And see *Johnston v. Hughes*, 187 N. Y. 446; *Dammert v. Osborn*, 140 N. Y. 30, 43. But a trust to *accumulate* income for a charity is still invalid. *St. John v. Andrews Institute*, 191 N. Y. 254, 278; pp. 492, 498, *supra*. It is believed, also, as heretofore stated (§ 346, *supra*), that this statute authorizes greater indefiniteness in the beneficiaries than is permitted by the unaided rules of equity. For, by those rules alone, a gift would be invalid if made for general, unidentified, charitable purposes, without the appointment of any trustee to select the specific class of beneficiaries. § 346, *supra*, and authorities there cited. But, by virtue of this statute, it would seem clearly to be the duty of the Attorney-General in such a case to apply to the Supreme Court for the appointment of a trustee, and the duty of the court then to appoint a trustee and order him to select the charity and apply to its use the donated property. Looking at the difficulties which gave rise to the statute, and in particular at the defect in the Tilden Will, this seems to be a logical, if not a necessary, conclusion. But this point remains to be definitely settled by the court of last resort.

Rothschild *v.* Schiff, 188 N. Y. 327, 331; Matter of Shattuck, 193 N. Y. 446; p. 486, *supra*. See Dammert *v.* Osborn, 140 N. Y. 30, 43, 141 N. Y. 564; Allen *v.* Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122; Matter of Griffin, 167 N. Y. 71, 77; People *v.* Powers, 147 N. Y. 104; Butler *v.* Trustees, 92 Hun, 96, 101. Before this statute took effect, it was also settled that a gift to or for an unincorporated charitable association could not be sustained, either as a trust or a power. But it is quite clear that, while the law of New York, differing from that of many other states, is still that the legal estate can not be validly given to an unincorporated institution, in trust or otherwise (Mount *v.* Tuttle, 183 N. Y. 358; Fralick *v.* Lyford, 107 App. Div. 543, aff'd 187 N. Y. 524; Catt *v.* Catt, 118 App. Div. 742. *Contra*, American Bible Society *v.* American Tract Society, 62 N. J. Eq. 219; MacKenzie *v.* Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 677, 685; Yard's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 98. See Rine *v.* Wagner, 135 Iowa, 626; Guild *v.* Allen, 28 R. I. 430); yet, as to donations *in trust* for unincorporated institutions, this difficulty was removed by ch. 701, L. 1893, and they may now be beneficiaries of such gifts. Murray *v.* Miller, 178 N. Y. 316, 321; Downing *v.* Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366; Shipman *v.* Rollins, 98 N. Y. 311, 326, 327; White *v.* Howard, 46 N. Y. 144; Vander Volgen *v.* Yates, 3 Barb. Ch. 242, 9 N. Y. 219; Congregational Unitarian Soc. *v.* Hale, 29 N. Y. App. Div. 396.

For the restrictions as to the amount of property which a testator may give to charity by will, see § 344, note (a), *supra*.

b. IMPLIED TRUSTS.

• CHAPTER XXII.

(a) RESULTING TRUSTS.

§ 351. Nature and classification of implied trusts.

§ 352. Resulting trusts. Groups.

a. *Trusts resulting from Payment of Purchase Money.*

§ 353. Reasons for and requisites of such trusts.

§ 354. Purchase money paid as such.

§ 355. Trust must result when purchase money is paid.

§ 356. All or aliquot part of purchase price must be paid.

§ 357. Proof of such trusts.

§ 358. Title taken in name of child or wife.

§ 359. Circumstances which may rebut these ordinary presumptions.

§ 360. Statutory abolition of this resulting trust.

β. *Following Trust Funds.*

§ 361. Trusts resulting from purchase of property with trust funds.

§ 362. Property held in fiduciary capacity.

§ 363. Property traced and identified.

§ 364. Rights of innocent purchasers for value.

γ. *Trusts resulting from Failure of Declaration or Object.*

§ 365. Essentials and evidence of such trusts.

§ 366. Effects of residuary clauses in wills.

§ 367. Gifts for charity not apt to cause such resulting trusts.

§ 368. General gift, or gift for specific purpose, as causing such a trust.

δ. *Trusts resulting from Conveyances not expressing any Consideration or Use.*

§ 369. Reasons for such trusts.

§ 370. They arose only from absolute common-law conveyances.

§ 371. Such trusts not now favored.

§ 372. Execution of resulting trusts.

§ 351. **Nature and Classification of Implied Trusts.** — Trusts which arise by implication of law are expressly excepted from the operation of the statutes of frauds of England¹ and the various states of this country.² They are raised and carried into effect, when they are necessary to the production of the

¹ Stat. 29 Car. II. ch. 3, § 8.

² N. Y. Real Prop. Law (L. 1909,

ch. 52), § 242 ; Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1710.

best and most equitable results for the interested parties; and, therefore, no requirement as to written proof is allowed to stand in the way of their establishment and operation.¹ In some instances, trusts are implied by equity for the purpose of affording a remedy to injured parties who have *no* redress at law; they are implied in other cases, in order to produce *better* interests and remedies than the law courts can give. They are always the outcome of the courts' endeavor to work out the most complete justice. But under some circumstances, as, for example, where relief is asked for on the ground of fraud, this result is sought to be produced without regard to what the parties to the transaction may have had in mind at the time; while under other circumstances, of which an attempted trust not completely expressed by the instrument is an illustration, the effort of the court is to work out the presumed intention of the parties. In the former class of cases, the trusts are called *constructive*; in the latter *resulting*, or sometimes *presumptive*. The division, however, of all implied trusts into these two classes — *resulting* and *constructive* — is chiefly for convenience in investigation and discussion. Courts and statute makers do not always observe closely the distinction between them, which is here pointed out.² When a trust of either form is found to exist, the ordinary remedy for the *cestui que trust* is a conveyance of the property to himself from the trustee, or a judgment or decree of the court vesting the legal estate in him, or declaring it to be so vested without any conveyance. And it is the remedy or redress with which the parties, courts and law-makers alike are chiefly concerned. Therefore, trusts which arise from fraud or unfair dealing are sometimes spoken of as *resulting*; and the expression, "constructive trusts," is now and then used to include trusts which "result" according to the intention of the parties. But the division here made is the ordinary and logical one; and it affords the best basis for the examination of all the implied trusts. The order in which the two classes will be discussed is, (a) Resulting trusts, in this chapter, and (b) Constructive trusts, in the next.

¹ 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 85, 86, 124, and notes.

² 1 Perry on Trusts, § 124; Albright v. Oyster, 140 U. S. 493; Dana v. Dana,

154 Mass. 491; Barnes v. Thuet, 116 Iowa, 359; Preston v. Preston, 202 Pa. St. 515; N. Y. Real Prop. Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 94.

§ 352. **Resulting Trusts — Groups.** — All the forms of resulting trusts may be conveniently discussed under four headings or groups, namely: *a.* Where the purchase price of property is paid by one person, but the title is taken in the name of another; *β.* Where the holder of trust funds buys property with them and takes title in his own name, without expressing any trust — following trust funds; *γ.* Where a conveyance is made in trust, but the trusts are not declared, or are not wholly declared, or wholly or partly fail; *δ.* Where a transfer of property is made without consideration and without expressing any use or purpose for which the grantee or donee is to take. It will appear in the discussion that the second of these groups is, in reality, a subdivision of the first. But it also has some important distinctive features, which entitle it to be treated separately.¹

Resulting trusts are the modern outgrowth of the ancient resulting uses, through the Statute of Uses and its constructions. The same general principles which gave rise to and governed resulting uses have raised and regulated resulting trusts. It will, therefore, conduce to brevity and clearness to discuss both of those equitable estates together, for they are in all essential features the same, and to point out in passing any of the ways in which they have differed. And it will be observed that it is only in treating of the last, or fourth, group of resulting trusts that any such differences will have to be noted.

a. Trusts resulting from Payment of Purchase Money.

§ 353. **Reason for and Requisites of such Trusts.** — Equity presumes, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that he who pays for property intends to become its owner.² Therefore, when A pays the purchase price of a lot of land, and the title is taken in the name of B, or of B and C either jointly or successively, the land is ordinarily held by him or them in

¹ Some writers make more classes of resulting trusts, some less. Thus, in *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 148, 150, Lord Hardwicke placed them in not more than three groups. Mr. Perry makes five classes. 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 125. And in 2 *Lomax*, Dig. 200, no less than thirteen divisions are attempted. But all forms of resulting trusts, properly so

called, are embraced within the four groups here described. See *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 79.

² 2 *Story's Eq. Jur.* § 1201; *Bostleman v. Bostleman*, 24 N. J. Eq. 103. "And this rule," says Mr. Perry, "is vindicated by the experience of mankind." 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 126.

trust for A.¹ This is implied from the acts of the parties, and illustrates the most prominent form of resulting trusts. The requisites to its existence are that the whole, or some aliquot part, of the purchase money shall be paid, *as such*,² at or before the time of the purchase, or as a part of the same transaction, by one who does not take the legal estate; as a general rule, that he who so pays shall not be the husband or father of the one who takes the legal title, and that no other circumstances shall indicate an intention on the part of the purchaser to make a gift of the property to the other party. Where these essentials coexist, a trust will be implied in any jurisdiction, except in a few states, such as New York, Michigan, and Wisconsin, where this particular form of resulting trust has been abolished by statute.³ Each of these requisites requires a brief explanation.

§ 354. **The Purchase Money must be paid, as such.** — It must be shown that his funds, in whose favor such a trust is claimed, were employed as such in the purchase.⁴ Accordingly, if one hand money or other funds to his agent with instructions to purchase real property, and the agent buy land therewith, taking title in his own name, a trust results in favor of the principal.⁵ But when an agent, who is employed to purchase realty, not only takes the conveyance in his own name, but also pays the purchase price out of his own funds, whether the principal has advanced money to the agent for that purpose or not, no trust results in favor of the latter.⁶

¹ *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 92; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. (4th Eng. ed.) 203, which is the leading case; *Sayre v. Townsend*, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 647; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 582; *Kendall v. Mann*, 11 Allen (Mass.), 15; *Beringer v. Lutz*, 188 Pa. St. 364; *Bickel's Appeal*, 86 Pa. St. 204; *Stratton v. Dialogue*, 14 N. J. Eq. 70; *Cecil Bank v. Snively*, 23 Md. 253, 261; *Moss v. Moss*, 95 Ill. 449; *Carter v. Challen*, 83 Ala. 135; *O'Connor v. Irvine*, 74 Cal. 435; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 126, and cases cited; 2 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1201; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 80; 89 Law Times, 152.

² See following notes, to the discussion of each of these requisites.

³ See § 360, *infra*.

⁴ *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 405, 408; *Kinimel v. Smith*,

117 Pa. St. 183, 192; *Fox v. Peoples*, 201 Pa. St. 9; *Jacksonville Nat. Bk. v. Beesley*, 159 Ill. 120; *Furber v. Page*, 143 Ill. 622.

⁵ *Church v. Sterling*, 16 Conn. 388; *Robb's Appeal*, 41 Pa. St. 45; *Frank's Appeal*, 59 Pa. St. 190, 194; *Sanfoss v. Jones*, 35 Cal. 481; *Malloy v. Malloy*, 5 Bush (Ky.), 464.

⁶ *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Eden, 515; *James v. Smith* (1891), 1 Ch. 384; *Whiting v. Dyer*, 21 R. I. 85; *Levy v. Brush*, 45 N. Y. 589; *Fox v. Peoples*, 201 Pa. St. 9; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 135; *Hill on Trustees*, 96; *Sugden, V. & P.* 703. But there are a few decisions in which the opposite view has been taken upon this particular point. See *Follansbe v. Kilbreth*, 17 Ill. 522; *Chastain v. Smith*,

So, when the owner of the money advances it as a loan to the other party, and does not deal with it *as his own purchase money*, no resulting trust can arise.¹ If in instances like those last mentioned any trust at all exist, it must arise as an express trust from the agreement of the parties; and must, therefore, be manifested and proved in writing as required by the Statute of Frauds.²

· § 355. **Trust must result when Purchase is made.**—Such a resulting trust must arise, if at all, at the time when the purchase is made; and all of the consideration, upon the payment of which it is sought to be based, must have been advanced or secured at or before the time of such purchase.³ A payment made after the conveyance, and as a distinct transaction, can not impliedly raise a trust. A purchaser's interest in real property, having once vested absolutely and free from any trust, can not be cut down, and he can not be placed in a fiduciary position in regard to it, merely by the subsequent payment of value to him.⁴

30 Ga. 96; *Hidden v. Jordan*, 21 Cal. 92; *Vallette v. Tedens*, 122 Ill. 607; *Bryan v. McNaughton*, 38 Kan. 98.

¹ *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Eden, 515, 1 Cox, 15; *Crop v. Norton*, 9 Mod. 233; *Aveling v. Knipe*, 19 Ves. 441, 445; *White v. Carpenter*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 217; *Wheeler v. Kirtland*, 23 N. J. Eq. 13, 22; *Kegerreis v. Lutz*, 187 Pa. St. 252; *Jacksonville Bank v. Beesley*, 159 Ill. 120, 125; *Milliken v. Ham*, 36 Ind. 166; *Beecher v. Wilson & Co.*, 84 Va. 813; *Hodges v. Verner*, 100 Ala. 612; *Gibson v. Toole*, 40 Miss. 788. "On the other hand, if one should advance the purchase money and take the title to himself, but should do this wholly on the account and credit of the other, he would hold the estate upon a resulting trust for the other. And if partly on the account and credit of another, he would hold as trustee *pro tanto*." 1 Perry on Trusts, & 133 and cases cited, especially *Aveling v. Knipe*, 19 Ves. 441; *Lounsbury v. Purdy*, 18 N. Y. 515; *Marvin v. Brooks*, 94 N. Y. 71. But where a purchase is made on the credit of two persons, and the money is paid by only one of them, there is no resulting trust.

Brooks v. Fowle, 14 N. H. 248; *Walsh v. McBride*, 72 Md. 45. See *Butler v. Rutledge*, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 4.

² *Gibson v. Foote*, 40 Miss. 788, 792; *Kingsbury v. Burnside*, 58 Ill. 310, 328; *Farnham v. Clements*, 51 Me. 426; *Dyer v. Dyer*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. pp. *203, *216. But see *Harrold v. Lane*, 53 Pa. St. 268; *Hall v. Congdon*, 56 N. H. 279; *Brotherton v. Weathersby*, 73 Tex. 471; *Robbins v. Kimball*, 55 Ark. 414.

³ *Dusie v. Ford*, 138 U. S. 587, 592; *Ryder v. Loomis*, 161 Mass. 161; *Champlin v. Champlin*, 136 Ill. 309; *Osgood v. Eaton*; 62 N. H. 512; *Collins v. Carson*, 30 Atl. Rep. (N. J. Eq.) 862; *Levy v. Evans*, 57 Fed. Rep. 677; *Coons v. Coons*, 106 Va. 572; *Moore v. Moore*, 74 Miss. 59; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 133.

⁴ Cases cited in last note. But if the note of the purchaser be agreed on when the deed passes, and be delivered the next day, or soon after, under such circumstances that it can be treated as a part of the transaction of purchasing the land, it will be sufficient to raise a resulting trust. See *Kline v. McDonnell*, 62 Hun (N. Y.), 177.

§ 356. All, or Aliquot Part, of Purchase Price must be paid. — Again, the payment must be of the whole or some definite or aliquot part of the purchase price. And it must be paid as the price of the whole or of that particular part of the property purchased.¹ In a number of cases, the courts have declared that no trust will result from the payment of purchase money, unless the entire price is advanced by him who claims to be *cestui que trust*.² But it seems to be clear that this means the entire price of that which he means to purchase, whether it be a whole tract of land or a distinctly specified but undivided portion of such tract.³ Thus, if A pay \$10,000 as the entire consideration for an acre of land which is deeded to B, and \$5,000 as the entire consideration for one-half of another acre which is deeded to C upon his paying \$5,000 for the other half, B takes the one acre wholly in trust for A, and C holds an undivided one-half of the other acre in trust for A.⁴ But if A hand to B \$5,000 with which to purchase for A a lot of land, whether specified or not, and B purchase the land for \$10,000, or any amount over \$5,000, paying the additional consideration out of his own funds, then, according to the great weight of authority, no trust arises in favor of A.⁵ In the case last supposed, A may have a lien on the land for the \$5,000 of his money which went into the purchase price;⁶ but, since that sum was not advanced for the aliquot part of the land which it purchased, he is not a *cestui que trust* of any portion of the land. But in Pennsylvania, and possibly a few other jurisdictions, a trust may result in favor of any one whose funds pay for any aliquot

¹ Sayre v. Townsend, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 647; Burke v. Callanan, 160 Mass. 195; Baker v. Vining, 30 Me. 121, 127; Dudley v. Bachelder, 53 Me. 403; O'Donnell v. White, 18 R. I. 659; Wheeler v. Kirtland, 23 N. J. Eq. 13; 22; Reed v. Reed, 135 Ill. 482; Stephenson v. McClintock, 141 Ill. 604; Reynolds v. Morris, 17 Ohio St. 510; Olcott v. Bynum, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 44; Allen v. Caylor, 120 Ala. 251.

² Dudley v. Dudley, 176 Mass. 34; Schierloh v. Schierloh, 148 N. Y. 103; Bryant v. Allen, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 500; Stambaugh v. Luug, 232 Ill. 373; Coleman v. Parran, 43 W. Va. 737. See Woodside v. Hewell, 109 Cal. 481.

³ See cases cited in last two preced-

ing notes. Also McGowan v. McGowan, 14 Gray (Mass.), 119; Buck v. Warren, 14 Gray (Mass.), 122; Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 N. J. Eq. 549, 561; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 132.

⁴ Cases cited in last three preceding notes.

⁵ Schierloh v. Schierloh, 148 N. Y. 103; Dudley v. Dudley, 176 Mass. 34; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 132, and cases cited.

⁶ Leary v. Corvin, 181 N. Y. 222, 229; Schierloh v. Schierloh, 148 N. Y. 103; Bryant v. Allen, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 500; Coleman v. Parran, 43 W. Va. 737; Woodside v. Hewell, 109 Cal. 481.

part of land, although they were not advanced for that part, or were used without his knowledge or consent.¹

It follows, from the principles already explained, that, when the purchase money is ratably contributed by several, and the title taken in the name of one of them, or to a stranger, a trust results to them in proportion to the amount advanced by each.² And in some cases, where there was no clear proof of how much was paid by each, it has been presumed that their contributions were equal.³ So, if the payment be made by one, or ratably by two or more, and the title be taken by them and others, or entirely by others who pay nothing, trusts result proportionately for those who make the payments.⁴

§ 357. **Proof of Such Trusts.** — Trusts of this character may be established by any kind of competent evidence, oral or written.⁵ But the requisites here explained must be clearly proved as facts, or no such presumption will be indulged. When the evidence is conflicting or uncertain, no trust will be declared.⁶ Therefore, while parol evidence is admissible even against the answer in chancery of the nominal pur-

¹ *Beringer v. Lutz*, 188 Pa. St. 364; *Kennedy v. McCloskey*, 170 Pa. St. 534. And see *Rouchefoucauld v. Boustead* (1897), 1 Ch. 196, 206, which partly overrules *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Eden, 515; *Price v. Reeves*, 38 Cal. 457; *Sanfoss v. Jones*, 35 Cal. 481; *Malloy v. Malloy*, 5 Bush (Ky.), 464.

² *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 405, 410; *Union College v. Wheeler*, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 585; *Warren v. Tynan*, 54 N. J. Eq. 402; *Morey v. Herrick*, 18 Pa. St. 123, 129; *Kelly v. Kelly*, 126 Ill. 550; *Hughes v. White*, 117 Ind. 470; *Case v. Codding*, 38 Cal. 191, 193; *Fulton v. Jansen*, 99 Cal. 587; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 132; *Hill on Trustees*, 149. But Lord Hardwicke thought that probably the application of the rule was restricted to a single purchaser. *Crop v. Norton*, 9 Mod. 233. And such were the decisions of a few early cases. See *Bernard v. Bougard*, Harr. Ch. (Mich.) 130, 143; *Coppage v. Barnett*, 34 Miss. 621.

³ *Shoemaker v. Smith*, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 81; *Edwards v. Edwards*, 39 Pa. St. 369, 386.

⁴ *Rigden v. Walker*, 3 Atk. 731, 735;

Botsford v. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 405; *Quackenbush v. Leonard*, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 334; *Jackson v. Moore*, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 706; *Buck v. Swazey*, 35 Me. 41; *Purdy v. Purdy*, 3 Md. Ch. 547; *Hall v. Young*, 37 N. H. 134; *Clark v. Clark*, 43 Vt. 685; *Case v. Codding*, 38 Cal. 191.

⁵ Such trusts are expressly excepted out of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II. ch. 3, § 8. It is clear that this was simply in affirmance of the general law; and, since the statutes of frauds of our states do not include implied trusts, they may be established by parol. See Judge Story's opinion in *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 Sumn. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 173, 187; *McGuire v. Ramsey*, 4 Eng. (Ark.) 518, 525.

⁶ *Oyster v. Albright*, 140 U. S. 493, 515; *Howland v. Blake*, 97 U. S. 624; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 582; *Beringer v. Lutz*, 179 Pa. St. 1; *Martin v. Baird*, 175 Pa. St. 540; *Baker v. Vining*, 30 Me. 121, 127; *McGinnis v. Jacobs*, 147 Ill. 24; *Jacksonville Nat. Bk. v. Beesley*, 159 Ill. 120; *Pillars v. McConnell*, 141 Ind. 670; *Reed v. Painter*, 129 Mo. 674; *Woodside v. Hewell*, 109 Cal. 481; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 137.

chaser, or against the express statements of the deed to him, the testimony to raise a trust against him in such a case must be very clear and strong.¹ The presumption that the parties intended a trust to arise from the payment of purchase money is always rebuttable; and circumstances which show that such was not their intention may also be established by oral testimony as well as by written evidence.² Some of the most important of such circumstances remain to be discussed.

§ 358. **Title taken in Name of Child or Wife.**—When the one who pays the purchase price is the husband or father of the nominal purchaser, or stands *in loco parentis* to him, equity presumes that the payment is a gift to the wife, or an advancement to the child, as the case may be; and therefore no trust ordinarily results from such a transaction.³ The relation between the parties precludes the presumption of a resulting trust, because it is a fair and proper inference that the husband or person standing in the position of parent intends by his purchase to perform the legal or moral obligation of support and maintenance which arises from the relationship.⁴ This clear exception to the general rule as to resulting trusts thus arises from and rests upon the obligation of husband or parent. Therefore, the general rule, and not the exception, applies when one brother, for example, pays for property conveyed to another; and a resulting trust arises,⁵ unless circumstances are proved to have placed him who so pays the consideration in substantially the position of a parent to his brother.⁶ So, if the father

¹ *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 582; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 187; *Moore v. Moore*, 38 N. H. 382; *Byers v. Ferner*, 216 Pa. St. 233; *Pinney v. Fellows*, 15 Vt. 525; *Peabody v. Tarbell*, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 226, 232; *Neyland v. Benby*, 69 Tex. 711.

² *Zimmerman v. Barber*, 176 Pa. St. 1; *Swinburne v. Swinburne*, 28 N. Y. 568; *Blodget v. Hildreth*, 103 Mass. 484, 487; *Bush v. Stanley*, 122 Ill. 406; *Salisbury v. Clarke*, §1 Vt. 453; *Kline v. Ragland*, 47 Ark. 111; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 83.

³ *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swanst. 13, 17; *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swanst. 594, 597; *Christy v. Courtenay*, 13 Beav. 96; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 187; *Partridge v. Havens*, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 618; *Kern*

v. Howell, 180 Pa. St. 315; *Hallenback v. Rogers*, 57 N. J. Eq. 199; *Wolters v. Shraft*, 69 N. J. Eq. 215; *Doyle v. Sleeper*, 1 Dana (Ky.), 531, 536; *Olipant v. Leversidge*, 142 Ill. 160; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 143-149; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 84; *Hill on Trustees*, 97. But where an insane parent paid, the child, taking the title, held in trust. *Couch v. Harp*, 201 Mo. 457.

⁴ *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 92; *Long v. King*, 117 Ala. 423; *Smithsonian Institution v. Meech*, 169 U. S. 398; *Walston v. Smith*, 70 Vt. 19.

⁵ *Maddison v. Andrews*, 1 Ves. Sr. 57; *Edwards v. Edwards*, 39 Pa. St. 369; *Hudson v. Wright*, 204 Mo. 412.

⁶ *Bosworth v. Hopkios*, 85 Wis. 50.

be living and able to support the child, a trust will result in favor of the mother who pays for property bought in the child's name. But when the father is dead, or for any other reason the support of the child has devolved upon the mother, her purchase of land for him is presumed to be an advancement.¹ By the weight of authority, also, a purchase in the name of an illegitimate child is *prima facie* an advancement, and raises no trust.² And the prevailing view is now in favor of the same conclusion, when realty is bought by a parent in the joint names of himself and a child or children.³

§ 359. **Circumstances which may rebut these Ordinary Presumptions.** — The relationships of husband and wife and parent and child supply most of the cases in which trusts do not arise from the purchase of property by one person in the name of another; and such cases are commonly said to make *the* exception to the general rule. But it must be remembered that all resulting trusts rest upon *rebuttable presumption*, and that therefore other circumstances may frequently be proved to show that no trust should exist. When, for example, the conveyance is made to some one other than the real purchaser in order to hinder creditors, or to defeat their rights, or for any other illegal or unfair purpose, equity will decline to enforce for the wrong-doer the trust which would otherwise exist.⁴ And when the parties expressly stipulate that the payment is a gift to the nominal purchaser,⁵ or a loan to him;⁶ or a different trust is expressly declared in writing,⁷ or it is agreed

¹ *Currant v. Jago*, 1 Coll. C. C. 261, 263; *Lamplugh v. Lamplugh*, 1 P. Wms. 111; *Jackson v. Feller*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 465; *Robert's Appeal*, 85 Pa. St. 84.

² *Beckford v. Beckford*, Loft. 490; *Soar v. Foster*, 4 Kay & J. 152; *Kimmel v. McRight*, 2 Barr (Pa.), 38. But not to the illegitimate child of a legitimate child. *Tucker v. Burrow*, 2 Hem. & M. 515, 525.

³ *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swanst. 594, 599; *Williams v. Williams*, 32 Beav. 370; *Kingdon v. Bridges*, 2 Vern. 67. See also, as to other relationships, where one nevertheless has stood *in loco parentis* to the other, *Ebrand v. Dancer*, 1 Cas in Chan. 26; *Richardson v. SeEVERS*, 84 Va. 259; *Baker v. Leathers*,

3 Ind. 558; *Batstone v. Salter*, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 431.

⁴ *Proseus v. McIntyre*, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 424, 425; *Ford v. Lewis*, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 127; *Sell v. West*, 125 Mo. 621; *Hubbard v. Goodwin*, 3 Leigh (Va.), 492; *Zundell v. Gess*, 73 Tex. 144; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Eq. 549, 562.

⁵ *Groves v. Groves*, 3 Y. & J. 163, 172; *Hunt v. Moore*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 1; *Robles v. Clark*, 25 Cal. 317; *Zimmerman v. Barber*, 176 Pa. St. 1; *Ward v. Ward*, 59 Conn. 188; *Morris v. Clare*, 132 Mo. 232, 236.

⁶ See § 354, *supra*.

⁷ *Anstee v. Brown*, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 448; *Clark v. Burnham*, 2 Story (U. S.

that he shall receive from the property something inconsistent with a trust,¹ the court will of course refuse to raise any trust by implication.²

Similarly, the presumption of an advancement or a gift to wife or child may be readily overcome by clear evidence to show the court that a trust should exist.³ Thus, a conveyance to a wife for the purpose of defrauding creditors of the husband, who pays the consideration, will raise a trust in favor of those creditors.⁴ Payment for property taken by a child will not be an advancement, if it be understood that he shall hold it for the parent who makes the payment.⁵ And where a husband paid for land, which he caused to be conveyed to his wife upon her agreeing orally that at her death she would devise it to the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, it was held after her death intestate, and upon clear proof of the facts, that her heirs had the legal estate in the land in trust for that institution.⁶

§ 360. **Statutory Abolition of this Resulting Trust.** — In a few of the United States, where express trusts are much curtailed by statute, the perfecting of the general legislative scheme has required the abolition of the form of resulting trust now under consideration. For where, as for example in New York, a passive express trust in real property is no longer permitted, the policy of the statute could otherwise be evaded by having no trust whatever declared by the parties, but letting equity raise a resulting trust (which is passive in its nature) upon the purchase price being paid by the intended *cestui que trust* and the conveyance being taken in the name of the intended trustee. Hence this form of trust, *as a secret resulting trust*, has been

Cir. Ct.), 1; *Alexander v. Warrance*, 17 Mo. 228, 230.

¹ *Dow v. Jewell*, 21 N. H. 470.

² See also *Willis v. Willis*, 2 Atk. 71; *Farrell v. Lloyd*, 69 Pa. St. 239, 247; *Salisbury v. Clarke*, 61 Vt. 453; *Bush v. Stanley*, 122 Ill. 406; *Kline v. Ragland*, 47 Ark. 111; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 140.

³ *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 92; *In re Whitehouse*, L. R. 37 Ch. Div. 683, 685; *Jackson v. Matsdorf*, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 91; *Jaquith v. Mass. Bap. Convention*, 172 Mass. 439; *Shepherd v. White*, 10 Tex. 72; *Bruce v. Slemph*, 82

Va. 352; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 145-147; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 84.

⁴ *Belford v. Crane*, 16 N. J. Eq. 265; *Adams v. Collier*, 122 U. S. 382, 391; *McCartney v. Bostwick*, 32 N. Y. 53; *Pierce v. Hower*, 142 Ind. 626; *Cleghorn v. Oberualte*, 53 Neb. 687; *Smith v. Willard*, 174 Ill. 538; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 149.

⁵ *Devoy v. Devoy*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 403; *Stone v. Stone*, 3 Jur. (n. s.) 708.

⁶ *Smithsonian Institution v. Meech*, 169 U. S. 398; *Jaquith v. Mass. Bap. Convention*, 172 Mass. 439; *Hollenback v. Rogers*, 57 N. J. Eq. 199.

done away with by the statutes of New York,¹ (a) Massachusetts,² Michigan,³ Wisconsin,⁴ Illinois,⁵ Kansas,⁶ In-

(a) This New York statute was originally 1 R. S. 728, §§ 51-53. With the sentences somewhat transposed and altered, but without change of meaning, it is now Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 94, and reads as follows: "A grant of real property for a valuable consideration, to one person, the consideration being paid by another, is presumed fraudulent as against the creditors, at that time, of the person paying the consideration, and, unless a fraudulent intent is disproved, a trust results in favor of such creditors, to an extent necessary to satisfy their just demands; but the title vests in the grantee, and no use or trust results from the payment to the person paying the consideration, or in his favor, unless the grantee, either, 1. Takes the same as an absolute conveyance, in his own name, without the consent or knowledge of the person paying the consideration, or, 2. In violation of some trust, purchases the property so conveyed with money or property belonging to another."

This statute saves the rights of creditors of the actual purchaser, and compels him to be just before he is generous. It appears at first sight to do away with all possibility of a resulting trust for his benefit, except where the purchase is made with his funds, in violation of some trust, or without his consent or knowledge. But, whenever A takes title to land for which B pays the consideration, and subsequently, in violation of the express or tacit understanding between the parties at the time of the purchase, A attempts to hold the property for his own benefit, or otherwise to ignore B's moral rights, the courts, because of the attempted fraud, at once raise, against A, a trust which is in reality constructive (growing as it does out of fraud) and therefore not within the letter or spirit of the statute. "It seems to be a well-settled rule of law in this state," says Van Brunt, P. J., "that, unless it appears that the person paying the consideration has consented to an unconditional and absolute conveyance of the property to another, without any recognition or intimation in respect to his rights, the statute in question will not protect the attempted fraud; and it is further held that no presumption can be indulged to support such a defence." *Church of St. Stanislaus v. Allgemeine Verein*, 31 App. Div. 133, affirmed without opinion in 164 N. Y. 606. In that case, the plaintiff, a church society which was not incorporated, took title to land in the name of the defendant; and after the church's incorporation demanded a conveyance to itself. The defendant having refused to convey, the action was brought, with the result that the conveyance was decreed. And, besides the above-quoted statement, Presiding Justice Van Brunt facetiously remarked that the statute was not intended to enable one church organization to defraud another. In the earlier case of *Jeremiah v. Pitcher*, 26 App. Div. 402, affirmed without opinion in 163 N. Y. 574, a real estate dealer, desir-

¹ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 94.

² *Foster v. Durant*, 2 Gray (Mass.), 538; *Glidewell v. Spangh*, 26 Ind. 319.

³ *McCreary v. McCreary*, 90 Mich. 478; *Barnes v. Munro*, 95 Mich. 612;

Connolly v. Keating, 102 Mich. 1; *Tiffany v. Tiffany*, 110 Mich. 219.

⁴ *Bosworth v. Hopkins*, 85 Wis. 50; *Strong v. Gordon*, 96 Wis. 476.

⁵ *Pope v. Dapray*, 176 Ill. 478.

⁶ *Gee v. Thrailkill*, 45 Kan. 173.

diana,¹ Minnesota,² Kentucky,³ California,⁴ and perhaps some other states.⁵ But exceptions are expressly made by these statutes in favor of those who are creditors of the real purchaser at the time of the purchase; and also in favor of such purchaser himself, when without his knowledge or consent his funds are used in buying property in the name of the nominal purchaser.⁶ The courts, moreover, generally restrict the operation of such statutes to what would otherwise be secret trusts, — to cases in which one person knowingly and

ing to trade in land free from the dower right of his wife, who was insane, purchased it in the name of his daughter, who orally agreed to convey it to him, or according to his directions, upon his demand. The plan was successful in preventing any dower right from attaching to the property. *Phelps v. Phelps*, 143 N. Y. 197. But, in the action brought to establish a trust in his favor, it was held that the property was his and the daughter could not hold it to the exclusion of him, the real purchaser. To the same effect are *Smith v. Balcom*, 24 App. Div. 437, 441; *Schultze v. Mayor*, 103 N. Y. 307, 311; *Wood v. Rabe*, 96 N. Y. 414; *Fairchild v. Fairchild*, 64 N. Y. 471; *Robbins v. Robbins*, 89 N. Y. 251. Thus, while the primary and original purpose of this section of the New York Statutes of Uses and Trusts was to prevent the indirect creation and existence of what would be in effect passive express trusts, the courts have thrown the safeguard of a wise construction around it, and so prevent it from becoming an instrument of fraud or injustice. But they follow the statute strictly, where it appears that no injustice will be done. See *Fagan v. McDonnell*, 115 App. Div. 89, aff'd 191 N. Y. 515; *McCartney v. Titsworth*, 119 App. Div. 547. The courts also raise a trust, notwithstanding the statute, where it appears, from the instrument of conveyance, or from other clear and explicit evidence, that such was the intention of the parties, — cases in which the transaction is relieved from the effects of a secret trust. *Woerz v. Rademacher*, 120 N. Y. 62. See the text further, as to such statutes. Also *Schierloh v. Schierloh*, 148 N. Y. 103; *Bork v. Martin*, 132 N. Y. 280; *Niver v. Crane*, 98 N. Y. 40; *Reitz v. Reitz*, 80 N. Y. 538; *Brown v. Cherry*, 57 N. Y. 645; *Marvin v. Marvin*, 53 N. Y. 607; *Everett v. Everett*, 48 N. Y. 218; *Foote v. Bryaut*, 47 N. Y. 544, 548; *McCartney v. Bostwick*, 32 N. Y. 53; *Siemon v. Schurck*, 29 N. Y. 598; *Lounsbury v. Purdy*, 18 N. Y. 515; *Gilbert v. Gilbert*, 2 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 256; *McCahill v. McCahill*, 71 Hun, 221; *Hubbard v. Gilbert*, 25 Hun, 596; *Sayre v. Townsend*, 15 Wend. 647, 649; *Russell v. Allen*, 10 Paige, 249; *Tracy v. Tracy*, 3 Bradf. 57. The rights of creditors of the real purchaser, in such cases, are discussed in connection with constructive trusts, § 400, *infra*.

¹ *Toney v. Wondling*, 138 Ind. 228; *Glidewell v. Spaugh*, 26 Ind. 319.

² *Durfee v. Pavitt*, 14 Minn. 424; *Haaven v. Hoass*, 60 Minn. 313.

³ *Martin v. Martin*, 5 Bush (Ky.), 47; *Watt v. Watt*, 39 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 48.

⁴ *Smith v. Mason*, 122 Cal. 426.

⁵ See *Graham v. Selbie*, 8 S. D. 604; *Brock v. Brock*, 90 Ala. 86; *Ward v. Ward*, 59 Conn. 188; *Harris v. Dougherty*, 74 Tex. 1.

⁶ See last preceding eleven notes.

intentionally purchases property in the name of another, who is guilty of no fraud, and who takes and holds the legal estate in the manner intended by the parties.¹ The letter of the statute is not permitted to be used as an instrument of fraud.² Thus, where such statutes exist, if A intentionally buy land in the name of B, there is no dower or curtesy right in such land for the wife or husband of A,³ and subsequent creditors or purchasers of A can not reach it, because A has no estate in it, either legal or equitable;⁴ but the creditors of A, who are such at the time of A's purchase, may reach it in equity as held by B in trust for the payment of their claims.⁵ But if the purchase in B's name be intended for the benefit of a partnership of which he is a member,⁶ or if when he takes the title B agree even orally to convey it to A, the real purchaser, upon A's demand, the statute can not be invoked to enable B to appropriate the property to his own use and thus to defeat the rights of A, or those of the partnership, as the case may be.⁷ In such cases, notwithstanding the letter of the statute, the courts raise what is technically a *constructive* trust (since it is implied regardless of B's intention), and thus prevent the perpetration of a fraud.⁸ Of course, in states which have such statutes, all purchases by parents or husbands in the names of wives or children come within the general rule of the statutes, and do not have to be treated as exceptions — the nominal purchasers are the actual owners.

¹ McArthur v. Gordon, 126 N. Y. 597; Smith v. Balcom, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 437, 441; Gage v. Gage, 83 Hun (N. Y.), 362; Bullenkamp v. Bullenkamp, 54 N. Y. Supp. 482; Pope v. Dapray, 176 Ill. 478, 484.

² Church of St. Stanislaus v. Allgemeine Verein, 31 N. Y. App. Div. 133, aff'd 164 N. Y. 606; Schultze v. Mayor, 103 N. Y. 307, 311; Woerz v. Rademacher, 120 N. Y. 62; Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414; Bitter v. Jones, 28 Hun (N. Y.), 492; Smith v. Balcom, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 437, 441; Jeremiah v. Pitcher, 26 N. Y. App. Div. 402, aff'd 163 N. Y. 574; Pope v. Dapray, 176 Ill. 478, 484; Smith v. Mason, 122 Cal. 426.

³ Phelps v. Phelps, 143 N. Y. 197.

⁴ Ibid.; Moore v. Williams, 55 N. Y.

Super. Ct. 116; Linsley v. Sinclair, 24 Mich. 380.

⁵ See the wording of the statutes themselves.

⁶ Fairchild v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471. See Moore v. Williams, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 116; Greenwood v. Marvin, 111 N. Y. 423; Traphagen v. Burt, 67 N. Y. 30; Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1; Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589.

⁷ Church of St. Stanislaus v. Allgemeine Verein, 31 N. Y. App. Div. 133, aff'd 164 N. Y. 606; Smith v. Balcom, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 437; Jeremiah v. Pitcher, 26 N. Y. App. Div. 402, aff'd 163 N. Y. 574; Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414, 425; Schultze v. Mayor, 103 N. Y. 307, 311.

⁸ See discussion of constructive trusts arising from fraud or attempted fraud, § 395, *infra*.

β. Following Trust Funds.

§ 361. **Trusts resulting from Purchase of Property with Trust Funds.** — The equitable principle, on which depends the kind of resulting trust already discussed, is that he whose funds pay the price should be the owner of the property purchased. The second form of resulting trust rests upon the same principle; and is, in the last analysis, a subdivision of the first. It is the class of cases in which a trustee, or other person who holds funds in a fiduciary capacity, purchases property with them and takes the title in his own name. The essence of such a transaction is that the *cestui que trust*, the real owner of the funds employed, pays the consideration for the property, and the title is taken in the name of the other, the fiduciary party.¹ The nominal purchaser is accordingly presumed to have *intended* to purchase the property for the benefit of the trust estate; and a trust results in favor of the real purchaser, the owner of the purchase price.² Trust funds may thus be followed into any property into which they have been converted or invested by fiduciary holders.³ It is because of the importance of the doctrine of “following trust funds” that this second group of resulting trusts, though really a subdivision of the first, is separately discussed. And that doctrine, tersely stated, is that a *cestui que trust*, or other person whose funds have been in the hands of a fiduciary holder, can follow them and appropriate to himself the specific funds, or the property into which they have been changed, together with the increased value of such property, provided such trust funds can be clearly ascertained, traced, and identified, and the rights of an innocent purchaser for value without notice have not intervened.⁴ The requisites here, which demand

¹ *Gale v. Harby*, 20 Fla. 171; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 127.

² “The right has its basis in the right of property, and the court proceeds on the principle that the title has not been affected by the change made of the trust funds.” *Peckham, J.*, in *Holmes v. Gilman*, 138 N. Y. 369. And see *American Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher*, 145 N. Y. 552; *Converse v. Sickles*, 146 N. Y. 200; *Union Stock Yards Bk. v. Gillespie*, 137 U. S. 411; *Comm. Bk. of Pa. v. Armstrong*, 148

U. S. 50; *Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bk. v. King*, 57 Pa. St. 202; *Standish v. Babcock*, 52 N. J. Eq. 628; *Preston v. Preston*, 202 Pa. St. 515; *Barnes v. Thuet*, 116 Iowa, 359; *In re Hallett’s Estate*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696.

³ *Holmes v. Gilman*, 138 N. Y. 369; *Nat. Bk. v. Ins. Co.*, 104 U. S. 54; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 127.

⁴ Cases cited in last two preceding notes; *Turner v. Sawyer*, 150 U. S. 578; *Riddle v. Whitehouse*, 135 U. S. 621; *Warren v. Union Bank*, 157 N. Y. 259;

discussion, are that the funds shall have been expended or disposed of by one who held them in a fiduciary capacity, that they can be traced and identified, and that the property sought to be taken has not come into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value without notice of the rights of the claimant.

§ 362. **Property held in Fiduciary Capacity.** — It may be stated generally that, for the purpose of implying a trust of this kind, courts of equity will treat the relation as fiduciary wherever one person holds money or other property which *ex equo et bono* should be handed over to another, or held or used for his benefit. Illustrations of persons occupying such positions are trustees,¹ executors or administrators,² guardians,³ directors or trustees of a corporation,⁴ the committee of a lunatic,⁵ an agent entrusted with money or other property of his principal to hold or disburse,⁶ a husband who employs his wife's funds in the purchase of land,⁷ and parents, partners, or co-tenants of whom one or more expend money belonging to the others or to all together.⁸ So,

Darrow *v.* Calkins, 154 N. Y. 503; Roca *v.* Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182; Hatch *v.* National Bk., 147 N. Y. 185; Cole *v.* Cole, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 37; Little *v.* Chadwick, 151 Mass. 109; Kennedy *v.* McCloskey, 170 Pa. St. 354; Jones *v.* Elkins, 143 Mo. 647; Kintner *v.* Jones, 122 Ind. 148; Moore *v.* Hamerstag, 109 Cal. 122; Story's Eq. Jur. §§ 1258, 1259; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 86.

¹ Oliver *v.* Piatt, 3 How. (U. S.) 333, 401; Day *v.* Roth, 18 N. Y. 448; McLarren *v.* Brewer, 51 Me. 402; Lathrop *v.* Gilbert, 10 N. J. Eq. 344; Standish *v.* Babeock, 52 N. J. Eq. 628; McArthur *v.* Robinson, 104 Mich. 540; Harrisburg Bk. *v.* Tyler, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 373; Pugh *v.* Pugh, 9 Ind. 132.

² Buck *v.* Urich, 16 Pa. St. 499; Claussen *v.* Le Franz, 1 Clarke (Ga.), 226; Dodge *v.* Cole, 97 Ill. 338; Phillips *v.* Overfield, 100 Mo. 466; Harper *v.* Archer, 28 Miss. 212.

³ Schlaefer *v.* Corson, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 510; Bancroft *v.* Cousen, 13 Allen (Mass.), 50; Durling *v.* Hammar, 20 N. J. Eq. 220; Turner *v.* Petigrew, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 438; Hughes *v.* White, 117 Ind. 470; Alspaugh *v.* Adams, 80 Ga. 345.

⁴ Church *v.* Sterling, 16 Conn. 388; Palmetto Lumber Co. *v.* Risley, 25 S. C. 309; Church *v.* Wood, 5 Hamm. (Ohio) 283.

⁵ Reid *v.* Fitch, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 399; Hammett's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 337.

⁶ Day *v.* Roth, 18 N. Y. 448; Bank *v.* King, 57 Pa. St. 202; Church *v.* Sterling, 16 Conn. 388; Wynn *v.* Sharer, 23 Ind. 573.

⁷ Methodist Church *v.* Jaques, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 450, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 77; Dickenson *v.* Codwise, 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 214; Barron *v.* Barron, 24 Vt. 375; Lathrop *v.* Gilbert, 10 N. J. Eq. 344; Jones *v.* Elkins, 143 Mo. 647.

⁸ Robinson *v.* Robinson, 22 Iowa, 427; Moore *v.* Scruggs, 131 Iowa, 692; Eastham *v.* Roundtree, 56 Tex. 110; Robarts *v.* Haley, 65 Cal. 397, 402; Rector *v.* Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276, 291; Monroe Cattle Co. *v.* Becker, 147 U. S. 47; Kennedy *v.* McCloskey, 170 Pa. St. 354; Virginia Coal Co. *v.* Kelly, 93 Va. 332; Moore *v.* Hamerstag, 109 Cal. 122; Brundy *v.* Mayfield, 15 Mont. 201; Union Nat Bk. *v.* Goetz, 138 Ill. 127; Carley *v.* Graves, 85 Mich. 483; Story's

a clerk in a bank, and probably one in any ordinary clerical position, who purchases land with his employer's funds, holds it in trust for the employer.¹ And one who knowingly takes property from a person, who has purchased it with stolen funds, holds it in trust for the rightful owner.² But where one, who has property of another, does not hold it in any fiduciary capacity, as, for example, when he is holding adversely and treating it as his own with apparent cause, his purchase of realty or other property with it raises no trust.³

§ 363. **Property traced and identified.**—The principle involved in this class of trusts applies, not only to purchases with fiduciary funds, but also to assignments, deposits in bank, etc.,—to all cases generally in which the fiduciary holder has disposed of property which can still be identified in the possession of one who is not an innocent holder for value and without notice.⁴ The requirement that it shall be traced and identified is complied with if it can be found included in some particular property, fund, or account, no matter through how many changes it may have passed in reaching that position.⁵ When, therefore, a trustee mixes trust money with his own property, as by purchasing land with it and money of his own, and the specific land so purchased is known, he holds the proportion of it, which

Eq. Jur. §§ 1258-1359; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 127.

¹ Bank of Amer. v. Pollock, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 215; Newton v. Porter, 5 Lansing (N. Y.), 416; Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 387; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 128.

² Matter of Carin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 262, 303; Price v. Brown, 98 N. Y. 388, 395; Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133; Hoffman v. Carrow, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 285.

³ Ensley v. Ballentine, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 233. And see Parsons v. Pheasant, 134 Mass. 109; Dana v. Dana, 154 Mass. 491; Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U. S. 478; *In re Brown's Estate*, 210 Pa. St. 493; Peterson v. Boswell, 137 Ind. 211; Silvers v. Potter, 48 N. J. Eq. 539; Heiskell v. Trout, 31 W. Va. 810.

⁴ Amer. Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher, 145 N. Y. 552; Converse v. Sickles, 146 N. Y. 200; Warren v. Union Bank, 157 N. Y. 259; Hatch v. National Bk., 147 N. Y. 184; Matter of Hicks, 170

N. Y. 195; Welch v. Polley, 177 N. Y. 117; Comm. Bk. of Pa. v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50; Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass. 109; Farmers' and Mechanics' Bk. v. King, 57 Pa. St. 202; Ennor v. Hodson, 134 Ill. 32; Carley v. Graves, 85 Mich. 483; Crumrine v. Crumrine, 50 W. Va. 226. Some of these cases, and those cited in the other notes on this section, were the outcome of positive fraud, and the trusts raised were therefore *constructive*; but they are cited to complete a general view of the doctrine of "following trust funds."

⁵ Accordingly, when property to which such a trust attaches is sold by a sheriff on execution against the holder, and the money deposited in bank in the sheriff's account, the *cestui que trust* can follow it and claim the proceeds out of that account. *In re Hallett's Estate*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696; Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182, 200; Amer. Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher, 145 N. Y. 552.

the trust fund so used bears to the entire purchase price, for his *cestui que trust*; ¹ and, if the trustee can not clearly prove how much of his own money was used in the purchase, the *cestui que trust* may take it all. The doctrine of confusion of goods in effect applies, in such a case as the latter, to the detriment of the trustee.² This is the rule generally recognized and followed in both England and America; although it has been held in a few such instances that the *cestui que trust* had only a lien upon the land for the amount of his property which was used in its purchase.³ Of course, when all of a piece of property can be identified as bought with trust funds, it all belongs to the *cestui que trust*, even though its value may greatly exceed the value of those funds. "The court proceeds on the principle that the title has not been affected by the change of the trust funds, and the *cestui que trust* has his option to claim the property and its increased value as representing his original fund."⁴ But when the fiduciary holder has so inextricably mixed the trust property with his own or other persons' funds that it can not be identified in any form, or can only be said to make some unknown part of his *general* estate, or he has so disposed of it that it can not be found as such in any form, all possibility of

¹ *In re Hallett's Estate*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696; *Jones v. Elkins*, 143 Mo. 647; *Turner v. Sawyer*, 150 U. S. 578; *Rector v. Gibbon*, 111 U. S. 276; *Ennor v. Hodson*, 134 Ill. 32; *Vanatta v. Carr*, 229 Ill. 47; *Carley v. Graves*, 85 Mich. 483; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 127, 128

² *Frith v. Cartland*, 34 L. J. Ch. 301; *Ex parte Dale*, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 772; *In re Hallett's Estate*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696; *People v. City Bk. of Rochester*, 96 N. Y. 32; *Comm. v. McAllister*, 28 Pa. St. 480; *McLarren v. Brewer*, 51 Me. 402; *Sherwood v. Cent. Mich. Sav. Bk.*, 103 Mich. 109; *Hill on Trustees*, 148, note.

³ See *In re Hallett & Co., Ex parte Blane* (1894), 2 Q. B. 237; *Schierloh v. Schierloh*, 148 N. Y. 103; and discussion in *In re Hallett's Estate*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696. In the case last cited, in which a trustee converted the property into cash and deposited it in bank together with some of his own money, Sir George Jessel, M. R., said, in presenting a strong argument for the raising of a trust from such circumstances:

"Supposing the trust money were one thousand sovereigns, and the trustee put them into a bag, and, by mistake, or accident, or otherwise, dropped a sovereign of his own into the bag, could anybody suppose that a judge in equity would find any difficulty in saying that the *cestui que trust* has a right to take one thousand sovereigns out of the bag." And it is to be added that, not only could he take the one thousand sovereigns (which even a lien would enable him to do), but if the entire contents of the bag had increased in value, he could take his proportion of the larger mass, which is the advantage due to his trust position. Thus, if the value had doubled, he could take out two thousand sovereigns and the trustee two; while, if he were relegated to the position of a mere lienor, he could take only his original one thousand sovereigns (with possibly interest added), and the other party would own the residue.

⁴ *Holmes v. Gilman*, 138 N. Y. 369; *Standish v. Babcock*, 52 N. J. Eq. 628.

raising a trust because of it is at an end;¹ and the *cestui que trust* has simply a personal remedy against the trustee.

§ 364. **Rights of Innocent Purchasers for Value.** — Finally, if in the process of changing form or possession the fund come into the hands of one who pays value for it without notice of the rights of him who claims it as *cestui que trust*, no resulting trust can arise against it in such hands. Thus, if after buying land with trust funds the trustee sell it to such a purchaser, the right of the *cestui que trust* against that land terminates.² He can follow the proceeds in the possession of the trustee, if he can find them. But, otherwise, his only remedy is a personal one against the trustee. This inability to follow any longer the land is simply one of the instances of the general rule as to innocent purchasers without notice, which has been heretofore explained³ and is further discussed hereafter, in treating of constructive trusts.⁴

γ. *Trusts Resulting from Failure of Declaration or Object.*

§ 365. **Essentials and Evidence of Such a Trust.** — “There is no equitable principle more firmly established,” says Mr. Hill, “than that where a voluntary disposition by deed or will is made to a person as trustee, and the trust is not declared at all, or is ineffectually declared, or does not extend to the whole interest given to the trustee, or it fails either wholly or in part by lapse or otherwise; the interest so undisposed of will be held by the trustee, not for his own benefit, but as a resulting trust for the donor himself, or for his heir-at-law or next of kin, according to the nature of his estate.”⁵ To bring a resulting trust of real property, then, within this third class, a conveyance *without consideration* is made to one, who is clearly intended to hold in trust and not for his own benefit, and either

¹ *Freiberg v. Stoddard*, 161 Pa. St. 259, 261; *Little v. Chadwick*, 151 Mass. 109; *Dana v. Dana*, 154 Mass. 491; *Cole v. Cole*, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 37; *Slater v. Oriental Mills*, 18 R. I. 352; *Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders*, 87 Wis. 237; *Cecil Nat. Bk. v. Thurber*, 8 U. S. App. 496; *Farwell v. Kloman*, 45 Neb. 424; *Blake v. State Sav. Bk.*, 12 Wash. 619; *Ferchen v. Aradt*, 26 Oreg. 121; *Silvers v. Potter*, 48 N. J. Eq. 539; *Heiskell v. Trout*, 31 W. Va. 810. Thus, if the trustee put the property in his own bank, with his own funds, and

then draw down the account below the amount of the trust fund, and then add to the account trust moneys of third parties, the means of identification fails and the trust ceases. *Cole v. Cole*, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 37.

² *Cornell v. Malthy*, 165 N. Y. 557; *Anderson v. Blood*, 152 N. Y. 285. See *Cornfeld v. Tauenbaum*, 176 N. Y. 126; §§ 406-409, *infra*.

³ §§ 297, 299, *supra*.

⁴ §§ 406-409, *infra*.

⁵ Hill on Trustees, 113, 114.

the purposes of the transfer are left wholly or partly undeclared, or the purpose expressed wholly or partly fails and can not be carried out.¹

When one pays value for property conveyed to him, it is conclusively presumed, in the absence of clear expressions to the contrary, that he takes it for his own benefit.² Therefore, trusts of this group must come within the sphere of voluntary conveyances. And wills, of course, supply more numerous illustrations of these than do deeds. The transfer being found to be a *gift*, by either will or deed, if it further appear that some or all of the property was not intended for the nominal donee, or can not be used as the settler designed, a trust results, as to all or some of it, as the case may be.

It is a question of evidence, to be decided upon consideration of all the circumstances of each case, whether or not the donee was intended to take the property beneficially.³ And many refined distinctions have been made in efforts to ascertain this intention.⁴ Thus, when the gift is to the wife, child, heir, or other close relative of the donor,⁵ or to an infant or other person who is incapable of executing a trust,⁶ or with expressions of affection or kindness towards the donee,⁷ these are "circumstances of evidence" which militate against the presumption of any resulting trust. But such circumstances count for little against clear and direct expressions of the settler's intent.⁸ Accordingly, where a testator gives real property to his executors as trustees, "*upon a trust to pay debts*," and at the time of his death he owes no debts, the executors take it as a resulting trust for his heirs;⁹ while if only some of it be needed for the payment of his debts, the residue

¹ O'Connor v. Gifford, 117 N. Y. 275; Mosher v. Funk, 194 Ill. 351; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 150-160.

² Ridout v. Dowding, 1 Atk. 419; Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk. 188; Kerlin v. Campbell, 15 Pa. St. 500; Anderson v. Blood, 152 N. Y. 285.

³ Walton v. Walton, 14 Ves. 318, 322; Hill v. Bishop of London, 1 Atk. 619; Starkey v. Brooks, 1 P. Wms. 390; Huggins v. Yates, 9 Mod. 122.

⁴ Perry on Trusts, §§ 151-153.

⁵ Jennings v. Selleck, 1 Vern. 467; Hayes v. Kingdom, 1 Vern. 33; Christ's Hospital v. Budgin, 2 Vern. 683; Rogers

v. Rogers, 3 P. Wms. 193; Randall v. Bookey, 2 Vern. 425.

⁶ Blinkhorn v. Feast, 2 Ves. Sr. 27; Williams v. Jones, 10 Ves. 77.

⁷ Cook v. Hutchinson, 1 Keen, 42; Rogers v. Rogers, 3 P. Wms. 193; Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 542, 555; Wood v. Cox, 2 Myl. & Cr. 684, 692.

⁸ King v. Dennison, 1 Ves. & Bea. 260, 275; King v. Mitchell, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 326, 349.

⁹ King v. Dennison, 1 Ves. & Bea. 260, 272; Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, 10 Ves. 522; Gloucester v. Wood, 1 H. L. Cas. 272; Schmucker's Est. v. Reed, 61 Mo. 592.

results to his heirs.¹ So, when a devise is made to A, "upon the trusts hereafter to be declared," and no trust is ever declared, or those declared do not exhaust the property, a resulting trust arises in favor of the devisor's heirs.² And when a gift is made for a purpose that is illegal, or otherwise void or ineffectual, as if it violate some statute or positive rule of law,³ or when the designated *cestui que trust* dies before the testator and the attempted gift lapses, a resulting trust comes into being.⁴

§ 366. **Effects of Residuary Clauses in Wills.** — If a will contain a general residuary clause, a *legacy* given by the will on a trust that fails does not form a resulting trust, but passes to the residuary legatee;⁵ except in the case where the trust legacy itself forms a part of the residuary estate.⁶ But, at common law, when *real property* was devised upon a void trust, or one that failed, it did not pass under any residuary clause in the will, but a trust in it resulted to the heirs of the testator.⁷

¹ King v. Dennison, 1 Ves. & Bea. 260; McElroy v. McElroy, 113 Mass. 509. See Irvine v. Sullivan, L. R. 8 Eq. 673; Downer v. Church, 44 N. Y. 647; Schmucker's Est. v. Reed, 61 Mo. 592; Heidenheimer v. Bauman, 84 Tex. 174.

² London v. Garway, 2 Vern. 571; Sidney v. Shelley, 10 Ves. 363; Atty.-Gen. v. Windsor, 8 H. L. Cas. 369; Pratt v. Sladden, 14 Ves. 193, 198; Mence v. Mence, 18 Ves. 348; Sturtevant v. Jaques, 14 Allen (Mass.), 523, 526; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, 388; Schmucker's Est. v. Reed, 61 Mo. 592.

³ Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 204; Carrick v. Errington, 2 P. Wms. 361; Johnson v. Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 305; Edson v. Bartow, 154 N. Y. 199, 768; St. Paul's Church v. Atty.-Gen., 164 Mass. 188; Rudy's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 359; Farrington v. Putnam, 90 Me. 405; Heiskell v. Trout, 31 W. Va. 810; Lusk v. Lewis, 32 Miss. 297.

⁴ Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Bro. Ch. 503; O'Connor v. Gifford, 117 N. Y. 275, 281; Haskins v. Kendall, 158 Mass. 224; Harker v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch. 72; Bond v. Moore, 90 N. C. 239. So, in case of an insufficient declaration of an intended trust, or a failure of its purpose for any other reason, as by the dissolution of the corporation for which it was

made, a trust of this kind is generally the outcome. Williams v. Kershaw, 5 Cl. & Fin. 111; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, 388; Coburn v. Anderson, 131 Mass. 513; King v. Mitchell, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 326; Gumbert's Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 496; Jenkins v. Jenkins University, 17 Wash. 160; Hill on Trustees, 116; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 159, 160.

⁵ Dawson v. Clarke, 15 Ves. 409, 417; Marsh v. Wheeler, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 156; Woolmer's Estate, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 477; Pool v. Harrison, 18 Ala. 515.

⁶ Skrymsher v. Northcote, 1 Swanst. 566; Leake v. Robinson, 2 Meriv. 363, 392; Smith v. Cooke (1891), App. Cas. 297; Floyd v. Barker, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 480; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 160.

⁷ The reason for this lay in the common-law rules, which required a *definite and specific description* of real property intended to be disposed of, and that the testator should be *seised* of it at the time when he made the will, and remain continuously and uninterruptedly so seised until he died. A residuary gift, disposing generally of what was left of a testator's property at the time of his death, after all other gifts made by the will had been satisfied, could not comply with these requirements. 2 Blackst.

In England, New York, (a) New Jersey, Maine, and some other states of this country, the rule in this regard has been made uniform for both kinds of property, by statutes which make lapsed legacies and lapsed devises alike pass to a general residuary donee, unless a different intent appears from the language of the will.¹

§ 367. **Gifts for Charity not apt to cause such Resulting Trusts.**—Another qualification, to be noted, to the class of resulting trusts now under consideration, is that, when the object of an attempted trust is charitable, a resulting trust does not so readily arise as when the specified object is a private trust.² This is because the *cy pres* doctrine can usually be applied to fix the destination of charitable gifts, even though the exact purposes intended may not be clearly indicated, or may wholly or partly fail.³ A private trust must be carried out as directed, or not at all. But, as already explained, when property is given for a *general charitable* purpose, but the particular object is not clearly specified, or if specified can not be realized in just that manner, or does not exhaust the entire fund, the general scheme ordinarily can and will be carried out by the court. Therefore, there is less apt to be property to result in trust in this latter class of gifts than in those that are private. But

(a) The New York statute, 2 R. S. 57 (Decedent Est. L. § 14), § 5, provides that, "Every will that shall be made by a testator, in express terms of all his real estate, or in any other terms denoting his intent to devise all his real property, shall be construed to pass all the real estate, which he was entitled to devise, at the time of his death." And of this the Court of Appeals says: "The common-law rule that lapsed devises do not fall into the residue, but go to the heirs as undisposed of by the will, was done away with in New York by 2 R. S. 57, § 5; and there is now no difference between lapsed devises and lapsed legacies, as it respects the operation upon them of a general residuary clause." *Cruikshank v. Home for the Friendless*, 113 N. Y. 337; *Onderdonk v. Onderdonk*, 127 N. Y. 196; *Youngs v. Youngs*, 45 N. Y. 254; *Van Kleeck v. Dutch Reformed Church*, 6 Paige, 600, 20 Wend. 457.

Com. p. *513; 4 Kent's Com. 541; Year Book, 44 Edw. III. p. 33; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 385; Van Kleeck v. Dutch Reformed Church, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 600, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 457; *Hayden v. Stoughton*, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 528.

¹ 7 Wm. IV. and 1 Vict. ch. 26, § 24; 2 N. Y. R. S. 57 (R. S. 9th ed. p. 1876), § 5; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 2822;

Cruikshank v. Home for Friendless, 113 N. Y. 337; *Molineux v. Reynolds*, 54 N. J. Eq. 559; *Merrill v. Hayden*, 86 Me. 133; *Brigham v. Shattuck*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 306; *Clapp v. Stoughton*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 463.

² *Thetford School Case*, 8 Rep. 130 b; *Moggridge v. Thackwell*, 7 Ves. 36; § 347, *supra*.

³ §§ 347, 349, *supra*.

even when real property is given to trustees for a charitable object, if it be clearly for a specified particular object only, and that object can not be carried out, the trustees will take the property upon a resulting trust for the settler or his heirs.¹

§ 368. **General Gift, or Gift for Specific Purpose, as causing Such a Trust.** — A distinction is also to be noticed between a gift in trust for a particular purpose, whether public or private, and a gift to one, apparently for his own benefit, but having a duty, or *charge*, impressed upon it for some specified purpose, as, for example, to pay the settler's debts. In the former case, a trust results in the surplus, after the particular purpose is accomplished,² while, in the latter case, the surplus belongs to the donee.³ The difficulty often is to determine, from the evidence, into which of these types a given case falls. Vice-Chancellor Wood's oft-quoted rules upon this matter are as follows: "1st, where there is a gift to A, to enable him to do something, where he has a choice whether he will do it or not, then the gift is for his own benefit, the motive why it is given to him being stated; 2d, where you find the gift is for the general purposes of the will, then the person who takes the estate cannot take the surplus, after satisfying the trust, for his own benefit; and 3d, where a charge is created by the will, the devisee takes the surplus for his own benefit, no trust being implied."⁴

δ. Trusts resulting from Conveyances not expressing any Consideration or Use.

§ 369. **Reasons for Such Trusts.** — After uses became a prominent feature of real property, the conveyance of land by its owner to some other person, to hold to the use of such owner, was so ordinary a transaction that the courts came to regard all transfers of the legal estate, by common-law conveyances, where no consideration was expressed and no use de-

¹ Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 353; Coe v. Mills, 149 Mass. 543. And see §§ 347, 349, *supra*.

² King v. Dennison, 1 Ves. & Bea. 260, 272; McElroy v. McElroy, 113 Mass. 509; Smith v. Abbott (1900), 2 Ch. 326.

³ Hill v. Bishop of London, 1 Atk. 619; Dawson v. Clarke, 18 Ves. 247; Irvine v. Sullivan, L. R. 8 Eq. 673;

Downer v. Church, 44 N. Y. 647; George v. Grose (1900), 1 Ch. 84.

⁴ Barrs v. Fewkes, 2 Hem. & M. 60. And see Saltmarsh v. Barrett, 29 Beav. 474; Ellcock v. Mapp, 3 H. L. Cas. 492; Cooke v. Stationers' Co., 3 Myl. & K. 262; Hale v. Horne, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 112; Shaeffer's Appeal, 8 Pa. St. 38; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 152; Hill on Trustees, 119; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 88.

clared, as intended for the use of the transferor, who was commonly called the *feoffor*.¹ That is, a use resulted to him who made a common-law conveyance to a stranger, without expressing any consideration or any other use.² And if he declared a use as to part of the property or estate, and not in the residue, the use in such residue resulted to him. Or, as Lord Coke expressed it, "*so much of the use as the owner of the land does not dispose of remains in him.*"³ This doctrine was not altered by the Statute of Uses. And when the use reappeared as a trust, after the decision of Tyrrel's Case, the same doctrine remained as the foundation of the class of resulting trusts, which forms the fourth and last group of such trusts for our consideration.⁴ Probably it was to prevent any possible operation of this principle that the custom arose of reciting a consideration of one dollar in quit-claim deeds, whether any consideration is paid or not; for such a recital can not be rebutted by extraneous evidence, for the purpose of raising a resulting use or trust and thus nullifying the effect of the deed.⁵

§ 370. They arose only from Absolute Common-Law Conveyances. — Resulting trusts of this group must arise, if at all, from common-law forms of conveyance, such as feoffments, grants, releases, etc., and not from those kinds of deeds and transfers which arose and operated under the Statute of Uses; for the latter always contain a declaration of the use for which the conveyance is made.⁶ No resulting trust would be implied, moreover, even from a common-law conveyance, when it was to the wife or a child of the grantor; for the *good* considera-

¹ Bacon on Uses, 317; Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. 4, § 16 *et seq.*; Hill on Trustees, 196; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 161.

² "For where there is neither consideration, nor declaration of use, nor any circumstance to show the intention of the parties, it cannot be supposed that the estate was intended to be given away." Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. 4, § 16.

³ Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. 4, § 17.

⁴ Cruise, Dig. tit. xii. ch. 1, § 52; Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 92; Hayes v. Kingdome, 1 Vern. 33; Van der Volgen v. Yates, 9 N. Y. 219, 223; Botsford v. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 405; Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525, 538.

⁵ Riley v. Riley, 83 Hun (N. Y.), 398; Weiss v. Heitcamp, 127 Mo. 23; Bobb v. Bobb, 89 Mo. 411; Graves

v. Graves, 29 N. H. 129; Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Me. 410, 420; Thomas v. McCormick, 9 Dana (Ky.), 108. But it has also been held that a mere nominal consideration, of which one dollar is the common illustration, i. e., a consideration not being anything substantial as compared with the value of the property, will not prevent a resulting trust, as distinguished from the old resulting use, from being raised by equity. 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 467; Hill on Trustees, 107, note; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 161; 2 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 1421.

⁶ Cruise, Dig. tit. xi. ch. 4, § 16; Coffey v. Sullivan, 63 N. J. Eq. 296; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 162. For the forms of common-law conveyances, see 2 Blackst. Com. p. *309 *et seq.*

tion arising from the relationship was enough to cause the presumption that the grantee was meant to take beneficially.¹ So, very slight evidence of intent would be sufficient in any case to rebut this weak presumption that there was a trust for the grantor. For example, it was declared that the mere existence of the duties which rested upon a grantee of a temporary interest, such as one for life or for a term of years, was enough to indicate a beneficial transfer to him, and so to overcome the presumption of a resulting trust.²

§ 371. **Such Trusts are not now favored.** — It is apparent, from the foregoing paragraphs, that the resulting trust of this fourth class never rested on anything but a very slight presumption, which could be readily rebutted by a little evidence of the grantor's different intention. It was simply a rule which placed a light burden upon a grantee, to show that a voluntary conveyance was meant to be beneficial to himself.³ In most jurisdictions, this light burden has been shifted by the modern rule; and, by the weight of authority to-day, if the instrument of conveyance be perfectly executed and intended to operate at once, no resulting trust will arise from the mere facts alone that it is voluntary and expresses no consideration and declares no use.⁴ But the addition of very slight evidence will raise a resulting trust in favor of the grantor or his heirs.⁵ And in a few states, such as Indiana,⁶ Tennessee,⁷ and Nevada,⁸ and also in England as would appear from the more recent decisions,⁹ the old rule is still retained.

§ 372. **Execution of Resulting Trusts.** — It should be here repeated that, when a remedy is sought, any of the forms of resulting trusts is commonly executed, and the *cestui que trust*

¹ Spirett v. Willows, 3 DeG. J. & S. 293; Spicer v. Ayers, 2 N. Y. Super. Ct. 626; Donnica v. Coy, 28 Mo. 525. This is the same principle as that which gives rise to the exception to the first class of resulting trusts above discussed.

² Castle v. Dod, Cro. Jac. 200; 1 Prest. Est., p. *292; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 452; 2 Rolle, Abr. 781, F.

³ Bacon on Uses, 317.

⁴ Rogers v. New York & Texas Land Co., 134 N. Y. 197; Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 84 Hun (N. Y.), 482; Lovett v. Taylor, 54 N. J. Eq. 311; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 168 Mass. 488; Steuerson v. Crapnell, 114 Ill. 19; Tillaux v.

Tillaux, 115 Cal. 663. And see Larnon v. Knight, 114 Ill. 232, 236; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 162.

⁵ Clavering v. Clavering, 2 Vern. 473; Edwards v. Culbertson, 111 N. C. 342; Graff v. Rohrer, 35 Md. 327; Hill on Trustees, 170.

⁶ Giffen v. Taylor, 139 Ind. 573; Myers v. Jackson, 135 Ind. 136.

⁷ Nashville Trust Co. v. Lammon, 36 S. W. Rep. (Tenn.) 977.

⁸ Bowler v. Curler, 21 Nev. 158.

⁹ *In re* Duke of Marlborough (1894), 2 Ch. 133; Rochefoucauld v. Boustead (1897), 1 Ch. 196. Compare Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 469, and Leman v. Whitley, 4 Russ. 423.

thus obtains his redress, by a conveyance of the legal estate to him from the trustee; or satisfaction is given to him by a judgment or decree of the court vesting the legal estate in him, or declaring it to be so vested, without any conveyance.¹ But, when the trustee has reasonably incurred any expense in caring for the property or dealing with it, he is ordinarily entitled to be reimbursed, and may hold the legal estate until justice is thus done to him.²

¹ *Millard v. Hathaway*, 27 Cal. 119.

² *Malroy v. Sloans*, 44 Vt. 311.

CHAPTER XXIII.

(b) CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

§ 373. Constructive trusts.
Groups.

a. Constructive Trusts arising from Actual Fraud.

§ 374. Trusts *ex maleficio*.

§ 375. Transfer of legal estate obtained by actual fraud.

§ 376. Elements of such fraud.

§ 377. Transfer of legal estate prevented by fraud.

§ 378. Trusts arising from crime.

β. Constructive Trusts arising from Presumptive Fraud.

§ 379. Nature and causes of such trusts.

§ 380. (α) Fraud presumed from nature of transaction. Inadequacy of purchase price.

§ 381. Sale of expectant interest by heir or reversioner.

§ 382. Other cases of such fraud.

§ 383. (β) Fraud presumed or apprehended from relation or circumstances of parties.

§ 384. Mental weakness: drunkenness: duress: undue influence.

§ 385. Confidential relations.

§ 386. Trustee and *cestui que trust*.

§ 387. Trustee's purchase of trust property.

§ 388. Trustee's purchase of encumbrances: his renewal of lease.

§ 389. Conclusion as to trustee and *cestui que trust*.

§ 390. Attorney and client.

§ 391. Guardian and ward.

§ 392. Parent and child.

§ 393. Other close relations.

§ 394. Promoters and directors of corporations.

§ 395. Purchase under contract or promise to convey.

§ 396. Gifts from fraudulent taker.

§ 397. Remedy.

§ 398. (γ) Fraud presumed or declared to exist as affecting third parties.

§ 399. Fraud on purchasers.

§ 400. Fraud on creditors.

§ 401. Fraud on marital rights.

§ 402. Fraud on powers.

γ. Constructive Trusts that arise in the Absence of Fraud.

§ 403. Foundation and forms of such trusts.

§ 404. Contracts for purchase and sale of real property.

§ 405. Legal estate taken without value and without notice.

§ 406. *Bona fide* purchaser for value without notice.

§ 407. *First* — Notice.
 § 408. *Second* — Valuable consideration.
 § 409. *Third* — Time of notice and payment.

§ 410. Seeing to application of purchase money.

§ 411. Equitable mortgages and liens.

§ 373. **Constructive Trusts — Groups.** — Constructive trusts, or those which are implied by equity without regard to the intent of the parties,¹ arrange themselves naturally into three chief groups or divisions, namely: *a.* Constructive trusts arising from *actual fraud*, i. e., from direct facts or circumstances of imposition or unfair dealing, *β.* Constructive trusts arising from *presumptive fraud*, i. e., fraud inferred or apprehended by equity from the nature of the transaction or the relations of the parties, or as affecting third parties, and *γ.* Constructive trusts arising in the absence of fraud, which are raised by equity as affording the best remedies and working out the most substantial justice for the interested parties.² An illustration of the first of these groups is where, by false statements intentionally made to deceive the owner of land, one induces him to transfer the legal estate in the property;³ the second group is illustrated by a transaction between a trustee and his *cestui que trust*, whereby the former seeks to acquire for his own benefit the property which he was holding for the latter;⁴ and a common illustration of the last group is supplied by every ordinary contract for the purchase and sale of real property, for while such a contract is running and until the deed is delivered, the party who has agreed to sell holds the land as a constructive trustee for him who has agreed to purchase.⁵ Courts of

¹ See distinction between constructive trusts and resulting trusts, § 351, *supra*.

² See Lord Hardwicke's classification of fraud in *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 1 Atk. 301, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 541; 1 Perry on Trusts, ch. vii.; Story's Eq. Jur. § 258. This classification has been much criticised by distinguished authorities, especially in regard to its division of fraud into actual or "legal" and constructive or presumed. *Derry v. Peek*, L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337, 346; *Angus v. Clifford* (1891), 2 Ch. 449; *Joliffe v. Baker*, L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 255, 271; *Bokee v. Walker*, 14 Pa. St. 139, 141; *Pollock on Contracts*, 480.

But it is clear and practical and supported by the authority of such names as *Story* and *Lord Hardwicke*.

³ *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. 125; *Ahrens v. Jones*, 169 N. Y. 555; *Grove v. Kane*, 195 Pa. St. 325; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 171.

⁴ *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 234; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252; *Morse v. Hill*, 136 Mass. 60; *Ryle v. Ryle*, 41 N. J. Eq. 582; *Adams v. Cowen*, 177 U. S. 471.

⁵ *Green v. Smith*, 1 Atk. 572; *Williams v. Haddock*, 145 N. Y. 144, 150; *Potter v. Jacobs*, 111 Mass. 32; *Reed v. Lukens*, 44 Pa. St. 200; *Roberts v. Nor. Pac. R. Co.*, 158 U. S. 1.

equity take cognizance of the first of these groups, because the remedy thus afforded through the medium of a trust is ordinarily better than any that can be obtained from the common-law courts. The second group springs from a species of fraud which is solely of equitable cognizance, for in courts of law fraud must always be clearly proved and will never be *presumed*.¹ The constructive trusts of the third group afford scope for some of the most interesting and important equitable remedies, such as the specific performance of contracts, and several forms of relief by injunction.² Each of these divisions or groups of constructive trusts is to be separately discussed.

a. Constructive Trusts arising from Actual Fraud.

§ 374. **Trusts ex Maleficio.** — Trusts *ex maleficio* — arising from *actual fraud*, i. e., from circumstances of direct imposition or unfair dealing — come into being because by such means either a conveyance of property has been obtained, or an intended conveyance or transfer has been prevented. In either case, the wrong intended or perpetrated is best obviated or redressed by treating the person who would otherwise profit thereby as a constructive trustee for the injured party. Thus, where A by false statements induces B to deed land to him for little or no consideration, he will hold it in trust for B.³ And when an heir inherits realty from his ancestor, because he fraudulently induced the latter to abstain from willing it away to another person, he takes the legal estate in trust for such injured person, who should rightfully have been the devisee of the same.⁴

§ 375. **Transfer of Legal Estate obtained by Actual Fraud.** — Whenever by actual fraud one is induced to part with the legal title to or estate in his property, he has a remedy at law in an action for damages;⁵ and, in holding the wrong-doer to be a constructive trustee, equity assumes jurisdiction concurrently with law, but affords a different kind of redress.⁶ While it

¹ Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 198.

² Quigley v. Gridley, 132 Mass. 35, 40.

³ Tyler v. Black, 54 U. S. 230; Boyce v. Grandy, 28 U. S. 210; Ahrens v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 171.

⁴ Middleton v. Middleton, 1 Jac. &

W. 94, 96; Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 621, 638; Fischbeck v. Gross, 112 Ill. 208; Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. St. 432; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 181.

⁵ Boyce v. Grandy, 28 U. S. 210, 220.

⁶ Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174, 182; Bacon v. Bronson, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 194, 201.

seems to be clear, however, that in the absence of statutory prohibition the latter court *may* take cognizance of all such cases of fraud and raise constructive trusts,¹ yet in practice it does so only when there is no full and adequate remedy in any other tribunal.² When damages in money, for example, will amply repay the injured party for his loss, as is ordinarily the case in a contract of sale, mortgage, or warranty of personal property, he is left to his redress at law.³ But, since each piece of real property has and must retain a situation different from every other piece, and therefore its loss by fraud may not be computable in terms of money, on application to equity by one who has been defrauded of such property, that court will uniformly raise a constructive trust in his favor. And, on demand by the beneficiary, the constructive trustee will be compelled to re-convey the land and account for its profits while he held it, or a re-conveyance will be declared by the court.⁴

This is true except in cases in which there has been fraud in obtaining a will. Courts of probate have always had complete jurisdiction of wills of personalty; and by modern statutes that jurisdiction has been generally extended over wills of realty.⁵ And the validity of a will of realty could always be determined, and complete justice ordinarily done regarding the same, in the common-law courts. Therefore, the rule has become well settled that equity will not usually interfere to raise a trust or to set aside a transfer because of the procuring of a will by fraud.⁶ But even here, when the wrong-doer has obtained by

¹ *Evans v. Bicknell*, 6 Ves. 174, 182; *Russell v. Farley*, 105 U. S. 433; *Bacon v. Bronson*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 194; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 625.

² *Buzard v. Houston*, 119 U. S. 347.

³ *Newham v. May*, 13 Price, 749, 751; *Buzard v. Honston*, 119 U. S. 347; *In re Sawyer*, 124 U. S. 200, 213; *Force v. City of Elizabeth*, 27 N. J. Eq. 408.

⁴ *Earl of Bath's Case*, 3 Ch. Cas. 55, 56; *Neville v. Wilkinson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 543, 596; *Tyler v. Black*, 54 U. S. 230; *Ahrens v. Jones*, 169 N. Y. 555; *Williams v. Vreeland*, 29 N. J. Eq. 417; *Henschel v. Mamero*, 120 Ill. 660; *Sohler v. Sohler*, 135 Cal. 323.

⁵ In the old Probate Courts of England (the so-called Ecclesiastical Courts), a will of real property could not be probated, and a will which disposed of both realty and personalty could be probated

as to the personalty only. This has been universally changed by statute, so that both species of will are required to be probated. But in a few states of this country, such as New York and New Jersey, the validity of a devise of real property may be tested over and over again in the common-law court, even after the will has been duly probated. N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2626-2628; *Corley v. McElmeel*, 149 N. Y. 228; *Allaire v. Allaire*, 37 N. J. L. 312; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 182. In New York, however, its validity or invalidity may now be settled once for all by an action in the Supreme Court, at any time within two years after probate. N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 2653 a; *Dobie v. Armstrong*, 160 N. Y. 584.

⁶ *Allen v. McPherson*, 1 H. L. Cas. 191; *Roberts v. Wynne*, 1 Ch. Rep. 125;

his attempted fraud a particular devise or bequest in a will otherwise valid, as by orally promising to hold it for another, and subsequently attempting to ignore such promise;¹ or has fraudulently procured a will giving him an interest in real property which can not be reached by any real action, as when it is only a remainder or reversion of which he can not take present possession,² equity will prevent a fraud by treating him as a trustee for the party who should rightfully have the property.³

§ 376. **Elements of Such Fraud.** — In order to establish a trust against one who by actual fraud has obtained the legal estate from the rightful owner, all the elements of the wrongful act must be proved, in substantially the same manner as in an action in tort for fraud in a court of common law. The complainant might elect to sue in tort and recover pecuniary damages. Instead of doing so, he goes into equity for a different and for him a better remedy; and there he proves the six requisites to the existence of actual fraud. These are, that the defendant made a representation which in spirit and essence was false, and that he did so either by expressing an untruth (*expressio falsi*)⁴ or by suppressing the truth (*suppressio veri*), as by remaining silent when it was his duty to speak;⁵ that he made such representation with wrongful and fraudulent intent, which fact may be proved by showing that he made it knowing it to be false, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it was true or false;⁶ that he made it with

Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485; *Farrell v. O'Brien*, 199 U. S. 89, 103; *Colton v. Ross*, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 396; *Anderson v. Anderson*, 112 N. Y. 104, 114; *Kalish v. Kalish*, 166 N. Y. 368; *Tonnele v. Wetmore*, 124 N. Y. App. Div. 686, 694; *Adams v. Adams*, 22 Vt. 50; *Garland v. Smith*, 127 Mo. 583; *Langdon v. Blackburn*, 109 Cal. 19. In a few early English cases, the opposite view was held. See *Mandy v. Maundy*, 1 Ch. Rep. 66; *Welby v. Thornagh*, Pr. Ch. 123; *Goss v. Tracy*, 1 P. Wms. 287. But now the rule as stated in the text is everywhere settled. See also 1 Perry on Trusts, § 182; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 199.

¹ *Kennell v. Abbott*, 4 Ves. 802; *Matter of Will of O'Hara*, 95 N. Y. 403; *Church v. Ruland*, 64 Pa. St. 432; *Gilpatrick v. Glidden*, 81 Me. 137.

² *Brady v. McCosker*, 1 N. Y. 214; *Clarke v. Sawyer*, 2 N. Y. 498. See *Anderson v. Anderson*, 112 N. Y. 104, 113-116.

³ Cases cited in last two preceding notes; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 182; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 199.

⁴ See *Le Lievre v. Gould* (1893), 1 Q. B. 491, 498; *Kountze v. Kennedy*, 147 N. Y. 124.

⁵ *Broderick v. Broderick*, 1 P. Wms. 238; *Boyce v. Grandy*, 28 U. S. 210; *Atwood v. Small*, 6 Clark & Fin. 232; *Brownlie v. Campbell*, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 925; *Schumaker v. Mather*, 133 N. Y. 590; *People v. Peckens*, 153 N. Y. 576, 592. See 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 171-177.

⁶ *Derry v. Peek*, L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337, 374; *Angus v. Clifford* (1891), 2 Ch.

intent that it should be acted on, or with reasonable ground to believe that it would be acted on;¹ that it was acted on by the complainant, who under the circumstances was justified as a reasonable person in so acting;² that the statement was material—a substantial moving cause of the complainant's conduct,³ and that it has caused pecuniary damage as a proximate result, or will do so unless the relief prayed for—the establishment of a constructive trust and the consequent disposition of the property—is granted by the court.⁴

All of these elements of actual fraud have been fully discussed and explained by the courts. Thus, it is settled that the false representation may be made by words written or spoken, by signs, gestures, or other acts, or by remaining silent or passive when one is under a duty to act or speak. Such a duty arises whenever a fiduciary relation exists between the parties;⁵ and also generally in the case of a latent defect in the thing involved, of which defect one party is aware, and which he believes the other party does not know of and

449; *Edington v. Fitzmaurice*, L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 459; *Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v. Bamford*, 150 U. S. 665; *Lamberton v. Dunham*, 165 Pa. St. 129; *Hadcock v. Osmer*, 153 N. Y. 604; *Nash v. Minnesota Title Co.*, 163 Mass. 574; *Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 214*; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 174; *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 73, 74; 1 *Story's Eq. Jur. §§ 192, 193*. When he who makes the representation fairly and honestly believes in its truth, he is not guilty of fraud. *Angus v. Clifford* (1891), 2 Ch. 449; *Nash v. Minnesota Title Co.*, 163 Mass. 574; *Kountze v. Kennedy*, 147 N. Y. 124; *Honston v. Thornton*, 122 N. C. 365.

¹ "Where a party intentionally or by design misrepresents a material fact, or produces a false impression in order to mislead another, or to entrap or cheat him, or to obtain an undue advantage of him—in every such case there is positive fraud in every sense of the term; there is an evil act, with an evil intent, *dolum malum, ad circumviendum.*" 1 *Story's Eq. Jur. §§ 192, 193*; *Hickey v. Morrell*, 102 N. Y. 454.

² *Atwood v. Small*, 6 Cl. & Fin. 232,

336; *Redgrave v. Hurd*, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 1, 13; *Hickey v. Morrell*, 102 N. Y. 454; *Brown v. Leach*, 107 Mass. 364; *Clark v. Everhart*, 63 Pa. St. 347; *Pratt v. Philbrook*, 33 Me. 17; *Parker v. Hayes*, 39 N. J. Eq. 469; *Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 215*.

³ *Pulsford v. Richards*, 17 Beav. 87, 96; *Arnison v. Smith*, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 348; *Strong v. Strong*, 102 N. Y. 69; *Levick v. Brotherline*, 74 Pa. St. 149, 157; *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 73, 74; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 175.

⁴ *Smith v. Kay*, 7 H. L. Cas. 750, 775; *Clarke v. White*, 37 U. S. 178; *Wells v. Waterhouse*, 22 Me. 131; *Taylor v. Guest*, 58 N. Y. 262; *Hotchkin v. Third Nat. Bk. of Malone*, 127 N. Y. 329; *Branham v. Record*, 42 Ind. 181; *Rogers v. Higgins*, 57 Ill. 244; *Marr's Appeal*, 78 Pa. St. 66, 69; *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 94.

⁵ *Bulkley v. Wilford*, 2 Cl. & Fin. 102; *Brownlie v. Campbell*, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 925; *Pidcock v. Bishop*, 3 Barn. & Cr. 605; *Bennett v. Judson*, 21 N. Y. 238; *Paddock v. Strobridge*, 29 Vt. 470; *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 95; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 178.

can not with due diligence discover.¹ The representation made in either of these ways must be of some material *fact*, and not merely as matter of opinion or judgment.² The vendor may praise the property to be sold, or *puff* its value, or depreciate the worth of what is offered in exchange, without being guilty of fraud. But if he misrepresent a fact, as by stating that the house is newer than he knows it to be, or by failing to reveal the truth known to himself as to the recent removal therefrom of a smallpox patient, he is guilty of the act which constitutes the first of the above-stated requisites of actual fraud.³ So, the other party must have fairly or justifiably relied upon the representation as a fact.⁴ If he knew or honestly believed it to be false,⁵ or made inquiries for himself and ascertained that it was not true,⁶ or if it were so plainly absurd, indefinite, or impossible that no reasonable man could be expected to rely upon it,⁷ one of the requisites to this kind of fraud would be lacking. In a word, it is not a case to call for equitable relief on the ground of actual fraud, unless there are alleged and proved all the elements of that wrong, in the manner more fully explained in the books on fraud, as the basis of an action in tort.⁸

§ 377. **Transfer of Legal Estate prevented by Fraud.** — In cases, moreover, where conveyances or other transfers of legal interests have been prevented by fraud, constructive trusts will be declared in favor of those who ought rightfully to have the property.⁹ Thus, if an heir inherit land because by false re-

¹ *Hill v. Gray*, 1 Stark. 434; *Keates v. Cadogan*, 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 318; *Squire v. Whitton*, 1 H. L. Cas. 333; *Leake on Contracts*, 199. See *Laidlaw v. Organ*, 15 U. S. 178.

² *Southern Construction Co. v. Silva*, 125 U. S. 247; *Sawyer v. Prickett*, 86 U. S. 146; *Hadcock v. Osmer*, 153 N. Y. 604; *Watts v. Cummins*, 59 Pa. St. 84; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 207.

³ *Ferson v. Sanger*, 1 Wood & M. 138, 146; *Lowndes v. Lane*, 2 Cox, 363; *Tyler v. Black*, 54 U. S. 230; *Rush v. Vought*, 55 Pa. St. 437; *Cesar v. Karutz*, 60 N. Y. 229; *Daly v. Wise*, 132 N. Y. 306; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 173.

⁴ *Atwood v. Small*, 6 Cl. & Fin. 232, 336; *Redgrave v. Hurd*, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 1, 13; *Hickey v. Morrell*, 102 N. Y. 454; *Parker v. Hayes*, 39 N. J. Eq. 469.

⁵ *Hough v. Richardson*, 3 Story (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 659; *Veasey v. Doton*, 3 Allen (Mass.), 380; *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 75.

⁶ *Jennings v. Broughton*, 17 Beav. 234; *Redgrave v. Hurd*, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 1, 13; *Clark v. Everhart*, 63 Pa. St. 347; *Pratt v. Philbrook*, 33 Me. 17.

⁷ *Derry v. Peek*, L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337; *Bligh v. Samson*, 137 Pa. St. 367, 376; *Irving v. Thomas*, 18 Me. 418; *Savage v. Jackson*, 19 Ga. 305.

⁸ Exhaustive discussions of these elements are to be found in works on "Fraud" and "Torts."

⁹ *Middleton v. Middleton*, 1 Jac. & W. 94, 96; *Oldham v. Litchford*, 2 Vern. 506; *Mestaer v. Gillespie*, 11 Ves. 621, 638; *Jenkins v. Eldredge*, 3 Story (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 181; *Church v. Ruland*, 64 Pa. St. 432; *Cowperthwaite*

presentations he induced his ancestor to abstain from devising it to other persons, he will hold it in trust for those who would otherwise have been the devisees.¹ So, if heirs or devisees fraudulently prevent a testator from charging his property with legacies or annuities, they will take it burdened with a trust in favor of the intended annuitants or legatees.² And whenever one wrongfully intercepts a gift or contemplated transfer, which is designed for another, by promising directly or indirectly that he will hand it over to that other, he takes it in trust for the intended beneficiary.³ Equity will raise a trust to frustrate fraud, whether it springs from negation or positive act; and where that court finds one holding the legal estate or interest in property, which *ex equo et bono* he ought not to retain, it will convert him into a trustee for those to whom such property rightfully belongs.⁴

§ 378. **Trusts arising from Crime.** — It is in conformity to this general principle that constructive trusts are sometimes raised against those who seek to retain property obtained by them because of accident or the honest mistake of others.⁵ And, at the other extreme, it is the same principle which sometimes makes a thief or felon a trustee of that which he has obtained by his crime.⁶ Accordingly, it is held in England, New

v. Bank, 102 Pa. St. 397; *Whitehouse v. Bolster*, 95 Me. 458; *Fischbeck v. Gross*, 112 Ill. 208; *Scheffermeyer v. Schaper*, 97 Ind. 70.

¹ *Middleton v. Middleton*, 1 Jac. & W. 94, 96; *Dutton v. Poole*, 2 Lev. 211; *Reech v. Kennegal*, 1 Ves. Sr. 123; *McGowan v. McGowan*, 14 Gray (Mass.), 119.

² *Chamberlain v. Chamberlain*, Freeman, 34; *Hugnenin v. Beasley*, 14 Ves. 273, 290; *Thynn v. Thynn*, 1 Vern. 296; *Hoge v. Hoge*, 1 Watts (Pa.), 163, 213. See *Matter of Will of O'Hara*, 95 N. Y. 403; *Amherst College v. Rich*, 151 N. Y. 282; *Fairchild v. Edson*, *Edson v. Bartow*, 154 N. Y. 199; *Edson v. Parsons*, 155 N. Y. 555; *Oliffe v. Wells*, 130 Mass. 221, 224.

³ *Barrow v. Greenbough*, 3 Ves. 152; *Podmore v. Gunning*, 7 Sim. 644; *Miller v. Pearce*, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 97; *Hoge v. Hoge*, 1 Watts (Pa.), 163, 213. See *Kine v. Farrell*, 71 N. Y. App. Div. 219.

⁴ Cases cited in preceding notes on this section; *Wallgrave v. Tebbs*, 2 Kay & J. 313; *Matter of Will of O'Hara*, 95 N. Y. 403; *Amherst College v. Rich*, 151 N. Y. 282; *Fairchild v. Edson*, *Edson v. Bartow*, 154 N. Y. 199; *Whitehouse v. Bolster*, 95 Me. 458; *Tucker v. Phipps*, 3 Atk. 359; *Eyton v. Eyton*, 2 Vern. 380; *Gaines v. Hennen*, 65 U. S. 553; *Ward v. Webber*, 1 Wash. (Va.) 274; *Schultz's Appeal*, 80 Pa. St. 396.

⁵ *Bingham v. Bingham*, 1 Ves. Sr. 126; *Pusey v. Desbouvrie*, 3 P. Wms. 316; *Midland Gt. West. R. Co. v. Johnson*, 6 H. L. Cas. 798, 811; *Fry v. Lane*, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 312; *Goode v. Riley*, 153 Mass. 585; *Short v. Currier*, 153 Mass. 182.

⁶ *Nebraska Nat. Bk. v. Johnson*, 51 Neb. 546; *Grouch v. Hazlehurst L. Co.*, 16 So. Rep. (Miss.) 496. See *Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong*, 117 U. S. 591; *Ellerson v. Westcott*, 148 N. Y. 149, 153.

York and a few other states in this country, that a person who kills another in order to procure the latter's estate by descent or devise can not take the property; or, if he take it at all, he holds it in trust for the innocent and rightful owners.¹ In other states, such as Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Illinois, it is held that the crime does not affect the will or the rules of descent, but that the punishment of the murderer is to be inflicted solely by the criminal law.² While the latter of these views is perhaps the more technically accurate, the former seems to accord better with good morals and to be the more likely to produce the best equitable results.³

β. Constructive Trusts arising from Presumptive Fraud.

§ 379. **Nature and Causes of Such Trusts.** — In going beyond the scope of courts of law in regard to fraud, and presuming its existence under some circumstances, equity has recognized three additional forms of that wrong as causing constructive trusts. These are, (*α*) fraud presumed from the intrinsic nature of the transaction, (*β*) fraud presumed from the relations of the parties to the transaction, and (*γ*) fraud presumed or declared to exist as affecting third parties.⁴ It is in dealing with constructive trusts arising from these species of fraud that the beneficent and practically exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity comes specially into play. The first group (*α*) may be illustrated by a conveyance of land for a grossly inadequate consideration,⁵ the second (*β*) by a gift of a trust interest from *cestui que trust* to trustee,⁶ and the third (*γ*) by a voluntary conveyance of property in fraud of creditors.⁷

§ 380. (*α*) **Constructive Trusts arising from Fraud presumed from the Intrinsic Nature of the Transaction—Inadequacy of Pur-**

¹ *Cleaver v. Mutual Res. F. L. Ass'n* (1892), 1 Q. B. 147; *Riggs v. Palmer*, 115 N. Y. 506; *Lundy v. Lundy*, 24 Can. Supr. Ct. 650; 36 Amer. Law Reg. n. s. 227; 41 Cent. Law Jour. 377.

² *Skellenberger v. Ransom*, 41 Neb. 631, 31 Neb. 61; *Carpenter's Estate*, 170 Pa. St. 203; *Holdom v. Ancient Order of U. W.*, 159 Ill. 619; *Owens v. Owens*, 100 N. C. 240; *Deen v. Millikin*, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 357.

³ See 36 Amer. Law Reg. n. s. 227; 41 Cent. Law Jour. 377; *Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong*, 117 U. S. 591, 597.

⁴ *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 1 Atk. 301, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 541; *Story, Eq. Jur.* § 258; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 205. This group may include some cases of *actual* fraud. They are placed here, somewhat illogically perhaps, but for convenience of treatment.

⁵ *Osgood v. Franklin*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1; *Rosevelt v. Fulton*, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 129; *Byers v. Surget*, 60 U. S. 303; *Gifford v. Thorn*, 9 N. J. Eq. 702.

⁶ *Adams v. Cowen*, 177 U. S. 471, 482, 484.

⁷ *Twyne's Case*, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 1; *Means v. Dowd*, 128 U. S. 273.

chase Price.—In *Chesterfield v. Janssen*,¹ Lord Hardwicke described one kind of fraud as that which is “apparent from the intrinsic value and subject of the bargain, such as no man in his senses, and not under delusion, would make on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man would accept on the other.” An instance of such a bargain is a conveyance of property for a grossly inadequate consideration—for a price so small as to “shock the conscience” of the court²—for a compensation whose unfairness is “so gross and manifest that it is impossible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it.”³ Mere inadequacy of consideration alone, where it is not unconscionably great and startling, will not cause a constructive trust to be raised on the presumption of fraud. Courts of equity, as well as those of law, will leave capable contracting parties free to reap advantage or suffer loss from an ordinary bargain.⁴ But when the insufficiency of the consideration is so manifest and glaring as to be in itself from a fair point of view an evidence of fraud, it will be so treated; and upon the presumption thus caused a constructive trust will emerge. Such cases are rare. But the instances are numerous in which other suspicious circumstances, though slight, when added to the fact of inadequacy of consideration, have given rise to constructive trusts.⁵ Thus, when the vendor who is not fairly paid is in pecuniary distress at the time of

¹ 1 Atk. 301, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 155, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 541.

² *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 234, 246; *Underhill v. Horwood*, 10 Ves. 209; *Horsey v. Hough*, 38 Md. 130; *Osgood v. Franklin*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1; *Medical College Laboratory v. New York University*, 178 N. Y. 153; *Eyre v. Potter*, 56 U. S. 42, 60; *Howard v. Edgell*, 17 Vt. 9; *Booker v. Anderson*, 35 Ill. 66.

³ Lord Thurlow, in *Gwynne v. Heaton*, 1 Bro. Ch. 8. And see *Hamet v. Dundass*, 4 Barr (Pa.), 178; *Gifford v. Thorn*, 9 N. J. Eq. 702; *Phillips v. Pullen*, 45 N. J. Eq. 830; *Brown v. Hall*, 14 R. I. 249; *Taylor v. Atwood*, 47 Conn. 498; *Case v. Case*, 26 Mich. 484; *Garrett v. Kan. City Coal Min. Co.*, 113 Mo. 330; *Boyce v. Fisk*, 110 Cal. 107.

⁴ *Harrison v. Guest*, 6 DeG. M. & G. 424, 8 H. L. Cas. 481; *Cockell v. Taylor*, 15 Beav. 103; *Erwin v. Parham*,

53 U. S. 197; *Slater v. Maxwell*, 73 U. S. 268; *Seymour v. Delancy*, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 445; *Lee v. Kirby*, 104 Mass. 420; *Hemingway v. Coleman*, 49 Conn. 390; *Cummings's Appeal*, 67 Pa. St. 404; *Phillips v. Pullen*, 45 N. J. Eq. 830; *Cooper v. Reilly*, 90 Wis. 427; *Wood v. Craft*, 85 Ala. 260.

⁵ *Gwynne v. Heaton*, 1 Bro. Ch. 8; *James v. Morgan*, 1 Lev. 111; *Byers v. Surget*, 60 U. S. 303; *Eyre v. Potter*, 56 U. S. 42; *Hume v. United States*, 132 U. S. 406; *Osgood v. Franklin*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1; *Hodgson v. Farrell*, 15 N. J. Eq. 88; *Phillips v. Pullen*, 45 N. J. Eq. 830; *Taylor v. Atwood*, 47 Conn. 498; *Brown v. Hall*, 14 R. I. 249; *Howard v. Howard*, 87 Ky. 616; *Galbraith v. McLaughlin*, 91 Iowa, 399. And in some extreme cases, law courts have granted relief on this ground. *Hume v. United States*, 132 U. S. 406.

his sale,¹ or is weak-minded² or very ignorant,³ or has been to some extent under the authority or domination of the purchaser,⁴ such a trust will readily be declared. Clear evidence of such circumstances readily shifts the burden of proof and fastens a trust upon him who has obtained large value for small consideration, unless he clearly convinces the court that no fraud of any kind was practised.⁵

§ 381. **Sale of Expectant Interest by Heir or Reversioner.** —

Where one holds a temporary interest in property, such as a life estate or an estate as tenant for years, and another expects to obtain the land as heir and reversioner or remainderman, a sale, by the latter, of such future estate is looked upon with suspicion by a court of equity; and, if the consideration be inadequate, a constructive trust may be accordingly declared against the purchaser.⁶ The prospective heir is regarded as probably acting at a disadvantage, in that distress or need of present income may cause him to part with his inheritance for less than its fair value. It is clearly against public policy to permit others to take advantage of such circumstances.⁷ This class of cases, therefore, is simply one of the instances of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph — fraud is presumed, and a constructive trust raised from the inadequacy of price, coupled with the fact that the

¹ *Cockell v. Taylor*, 15 Beav. 103; *Warfield v. Ross*, 38 Md. 85.

² *Clarkson v. Hanway*, 2 P. Wms. 203; *How v. Weldon*, 2 Ves. Sr. 516; *Allore v. Jewell*, 94 U. S. 506; *Rumph v. Abercrombie*, 12 Ala. 64; *Mann v. Betterley*, 21 Vt. 326.

³ *Pickett v. Loggon*, 14 Ves. 215; *Wood v. Abrey*, 3 Madd. 417; *Cookson v. Richardson*, 69 Ill. 137; *McKinney v. Pinkard*, 2 Leigh (Va.), 149; *Esham v. Lamar*, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 43.

⁴ *Gibson v. Jeyes*, 6 Vcs. 267; *Brooks v. Berry*, 2 Gill (Md.), 83; *Griffith v. Godey*, 113 U. S. 89, 95.

⁵ Cases cited in last five notes, *supra*; *Hardy v. Dyas*, 203 Ill. 211; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 187; 1 *Sug. V. & P.* (8th Am. ed.) 119; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 219.

⁶ *Gowland v. De Faria*, 17 Ves. 20; *James v. Kerr*, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 449; *Wright v. Wright*, 51 N. J. Eq. 475; *Chambers v. Chambers*, 139 Ind. 111.

⁷ *Earl of Aylesford v. Morris*, 8 Ch. Rep. 484, 490; *O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke*, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 814, 834; *Fry v. Lane*, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 312, 320; *Savery v. King*, 5 H. L. Cas. 627; *Varick v. Edwards*, 1 Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 382; *Powers' Appeal*, 63 Pa. St. 443; *Wright v. Wright*, 51 N. J. Eq. 475; *Larrabee v. Larrabee*, 34 Me. 477; *Butler v. Duncan*, 47 Mich. 94; *McClure v. Raben*, 133 Ind. 507. The presumption being thus in favor of the heir, *because of his position*, the rule is the same when he is of full age. It is based, not upon any personal disability on his part, but upon the assumed stress of circumstances which causes him to sell his patrimony. *Davis v. Marlborough*, 2 Swanst. 113, 146; *Addis v. Campbell*, 4 Beav. 401. By some the rule is said to grow out of the assumption that such a transfer is a fraud on the ancestor. See *Varick v. Edwards*, 1 Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 382, 402.

subject-matter is the vendor's patrimony or expectancy. The courts have vacillated considerably in dealing with transfers like these. Some of the American decisions go to the extent of practically declaring such a sale by an heir, during the life of his ancestor, or the continuance of the temporary holding, to be void.¹ But the recent cases are much more liberal in dealing with these transactions.² On both sides of the Atlantic, the conclusion now appears to be that the burden rests on the purchaser of such an interest to show fairness and good faith on his part; and, this being proved by reasonably clear evidence, he may retain the property freed from any trust.³ When the father or ancestor joins with the heir in making the sale, or otherwise assists him in the transaction, or when the price received is substantially adequate, no trust will arise unless actual fraud or unfair dealing is proved.⁴

§ 382. Other Instances of Fraud presumed from the Nature of the Transaction are found in contracts tainted with usury,⁵

¹ *Boynton v. Hubbard*, 7 Mass. 112; *Poor v. Hazleton*, 15 N. H. 564; *Davidson v. Little*, 22 Pa. St. 245, 252; *McClure v. Raben*, 133 Ind. 507; *Hale v. Hollon*, 90 Texas, 427.

² *Kuhn's Appeal*, 163 Pa. St. 438; *Whelen v. Phillips*, 151 Pa. St. 312; *Clendening v. Wyatt*, 54 Kan. 523; American note to *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. p. *541.

³ *Aylesford v. Morris*, 8 Ch. Rep. 484; *Fry v. Lane*, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 312, 321; *James v. Kerr*, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 449, 460; *Wright v. Wright*, 51 N. J. Eq. 475; *Chambers v. Chambers*, 139 Ind. 111; *Hale v. Hollon*, 90 Texas, 427. By the English statute 31 & 32 Vict. ch. 4, it is provided that no fair and *bonâ-fide* purchase of any reversionary interest in either realty or personalty shall be set aside merely on the ground of inadequacy of consideration. But it is held that this enactment still leaves the Court of Chancery free to set aside such transfers, where it can find any evidence of unfair dealing; and thus conveyances by heirs of their expectancies are retained under its protection. *Miller v. Cook*, L. R. 10 Eq. 641; *James v. Kerr*, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 449, 460; *Rees v. De Bernardy* (1896), 2 Ch. 437.

⁴ *O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke*, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 814, 828; *Fitch v. Fitch*, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 480; *Nimmo v. Davis*, 7 Texas, 26; 1 Sngd. V. & P. 427. So conveyances of this kind in terminating disputes in families and making settlements are favored. *King v. Hamlet*, 2 Myl. & K. 456; *Kenney v. Tucker*, 8 Mass. 143; *Powers' Appeal*, 63 Pa. St. 443. But see *Needles v. Needles*, 7 Ohio St. 432. But mere knowledge or assent on the part of the ancestor, who does not join in the transaction nor assist in it in any way, does not seem to be sufficient to rebut the presumption of fraud or prevent the establishment of a constructive trust. Note to *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. p. *541; *Aylesford v. Morris*, 8 Ch. Rep. 484, 491. See *Fry v. Lane*, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 312, 321; *McClure v. Raben*, 133 Ind. 507; *Hale v. Hollon*, 90 Texas, 427.

⁵ *Aylesford v. Morris*, 8 Ch. Rep. 484; *Barrow v. Rhineland*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 550; *Williams v. Fitzhough*, 37 N. Y. 444; *Buckingham v. Corning*, 91 N. Y. 525; *M. K. & T. Trust, Co. v. Krumseig*, 40 U. S. App. 620; *Munford v. McVeigh*, 92 Va. 446; *Sporrer v. Eifler*, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 633.

wagering contracts,¹ marriage brokerage contracts,² and conveyances or transfers, or agreements to make them, upon considerations or arrangements which would result in illegal restraint of marriage,³ or of trade,⁴ or in the improper procurement of public office,⁵ or which would in any other manner violate sound principles of law or public policy.⁶ Proceeding upon the general maxim, *ex turpi causâ non oritur actio*, both courts of law and those of equity refuse to enforce such agreements when executory.⁷ And when the outcome of any one of them has been the acquisition of the legal title to property, the retention of which would amount to the carrying out of such an illegal transaction or design, equity treats him who thus holds the title as a constructive trustee for the person or persons to whom it should rightfully belong.⁸ Placing these improper contracts and transfers under the general head of fraud in its broad, comprehensive sense, that

¹ Rawden v. Shadwell, Ambler, 269; Stat. 8 & 9 Vict. ch. 109, § 18; Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336; Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1; Lynch v. Rosenthal, 144 Ind. 86; Dauler v. Hartley, 178 Pa. St. 23.

² These are agreements made for negotiating marriages, and in most jurisdictions are held to be fraudulent and void. Cole v. Gilson, 1 Ves. Sr. 503; Dnval v. Wellman, 124 N. Y. 156; White v. Nuptial Benefit Union, 76 Ala. 251; Story, Eq. Jur. § 263.

³ Scott v. Tyler, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. p. *144, and note; Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89, 96; Smythe v. Smythe, 90 Va. 638; Bispham's Prin. Eq. §§ 225-227.

⁴ Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181; Nordenfelt v. The Maxim, etc. (1894) App. Cas. 535; United States v. Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 346; United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211; People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582; Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473; Cohen v. Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., 166 N. Y. 292; Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J. Eq. 370, 372; Trenton Potteries v. Oliphant, 56 N. J. Eq. 680; Chicago Gas L. Co. v. People's Gas L. Co., 121

Ill. 530; Harrison v. Glucoae Co., 116 Fed. Rep. 304, 309; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 228.

⁵ Chesterfield v. Janssen, 1 Atk. 301, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. p. *541; Basket v. Mass., 115 N. C. 448; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 229.

⁶ Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, L. R. 12 Eq. 604; Brown v. Peck, 1 Eden Ch. 140; Matter of Haight, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 310; Goodrich v. Tenney, 144 Ill. 422; Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26; Lum v. McEwen, 56 Minn. 278.

⁷ "The authorities from the earliest time to the present unanimously hold that no court will lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of an illegal contract. In case any action is brought in which it is necessary to prove the illegal contract in order to maintain the action, courts will not enforce it, nor will they enforce any alleged rights directly springing from such contract. In cases of this kind the maxim is *Potior est conditio defendentis*." McMulleu v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639, 654; Peters v. Mortimer, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 279; Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N. Y. 348, 362; Snell v. Dwight, 120 Mass. 9; Scott v. Brown (1892), 2 Q. B. 724, 730.

⁸ Authorities cited in preceding notes on illegal contracts.

court affords the most adequate remedy for the injured party by raising in his favor a constructive trust. For the wrongdoing trustee is then compelled to re-convey the property, or the procedure by which he acquired it is declared to be null and void and set aside; and thus the legal estate is vested in the rightful owner.¹ In the absence of any controlling statute (*a*), and pursuant to the maxim, "he who seeks equity must do equity," the party who obtains such redress is also required to place the other party as nearly as possible *in statu quo*; as, for example, by repaying the principal of a usurious loan with legal interest upon the same.²

§ 383. (*β*) **Constructive Trusts arising from Fraud presumed or apprehended from the Relations or Circumstances of the Parties.** — Whenever the condition or position of one of the parties to a transaction is such that the other may have acquired an unfair advantage more easily than in ordinary cases, a court of equity will investigate the whole matter with scrupulous care, and readily presume fraud, unless its absence is clearly proved.³ Also, in order to prevent the possible though hidden or undiscoverable perpetration of such a wrong, that court will sometimes, under circumstances of this nature, declare a constructive trust to exist, without directly presuming any fraud.⁴ Apprehension of

(*a*) In New York, it is provided by statute that the "borrower" of money upon usurious interest may have redress in equity, without paying back or tendering any of the consideration received. R. S. 9th ed. p. 1856 (1 R. S. 772), § 8; L. 1909, ch. 25, § 377. But this statute, being in derogation of sound equitable principles, is very strictly construed. And any one other than the "borrower" personally must do equity, by restoring the amount of the loan with legal interest, in order to obtain relief. Such is the devisee or heir of the borrower, who has secured the loan by a usurious mortgage. The devisee, heir, or other holder of the land who thus takes it subject to the mortgage, must pay or tender the principal of the debt with legal interest, in order to obtain an equitable decree for the cancellation of the mortgage. *Buckingham v. Corning*, 91 N. Y. 525.

¹ That is, the ordinary equitable remedy of restitution is granted, § 373, *supra*.

² *Walker v. Dalt*, 1 Ch. Cas. 276; *Buckingham v. Corning*, 91 N. Y. 525; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 222.

³ In *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, Lord Hardwicke said that the "third species of fraud may be presumed from the circumstances and condition of

the parties contracting; and this goes further than the rule of law, which is, that fraud must be proved, not presumed." *Hoghton v. Hoghton*, 15 Beav. 278; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 49 U. S. 183; *Union Pacific R'way v. Harris*, 158 U. S. 326; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 194; 2 *Story, Eq. Jur.* § 239.

⁴ *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252, 259; *Moore v. Moore*, 5

fraud is the *causa ultima* of all constructive trusts which arise merely from the relations or circumstances of the parties. In some cases it exists *only as an apprehension*, while in others it becomes so strong as to merge into a *presumption*. Thus, when a trustee purchases the trust property at his own sale of the same, a constructive trust is ordinarily declared in order to *prevent* possible fraud, because of the aversion of equity to letting a trustee occupy a position in which he might so easily commit fraud without fear of detection;¹ while a gift of land from a client to his attorney, who is conducting legal proceedings relative to such land, is *presumed* to be fraudulent and becomes the basis of a constructive trust.² Since the shadow of the same wrong falls through the windows of Equity athwart all such cases, and they all involve the same kinds and classes of parties, logically they are all to be discussed in the same chapter.

§ 384. **Mental Weakness, Drunkenness, Duress, Undue Influence.** — One of the clearest groups of instances of this character is that of contracts between parties, one of whom is affected by mental weakness, intoxication, undue influence, duress, fear, apprehension, or extreme distress.³ Mere weakness of intellect alone, when there is no confidential relation between the contracting parties and they deal "at arm's length," is not a sufficient ground for the interference of equity;⁴ nor is a state of drunkenness, which does not make the person substantially *non compos mentis*.⁵ But when

N. Y. 256; *People v. Open Board of Stock Brokers' Building Co.*, 92 N. Y. 98; *Scholle v. Scholle*, 101 N. Y. 167; *Corbin v. Baker*, 167 N. Y. 128; *Yeackle v. Litchfield*, 13 Allen (Mass.), 417, 419; *Rich v. Black*, 173 Pa. St. 92, 99; *Beckley v. Schlag*, 46 N. J. Eq. 533; *Taylor v. Calvert*, 138 Ind. 67; *Fox v. Macreth*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 115, note; *Hill on Trustees*, 248, note; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 94.

¹ See cases cited in last preceding note, also § 387, *infra*.

² *Holmes v. Loynes*, 4 DeG. M. & G. 270; *Morgan v. Minot*, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 638; *Newman v. Payne*, 2 Ves. 199, 200; *Greenfield's Est.*, 14 Pa. St. 489, 506; § 390, *infra*.

³ *Ralston v. Turpin*, 129 U. S. 663; *Neilson v. McDonald*, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 201, 210; *Oak v. Dustin*, 79

Me. 21; *Hill on Trustees*, 156; *Co. Lit.* 447 a.

⁴ *Osmond v. Fitzroy*, 3 P. Wms. 129; *Hyer v. Little*, 20 N. J. Eq. 443; *Lozear v. Shields*, 23 N. J. Eq. 509; *Aiman v. Stout*, 42 Pa. St. 114; *Ex parte Allen*, 15 Mass. 58; *Mann v. Betterly*, 21 Vt. 326; *Rogers v. Higgins*, 57 Ill. 244, 247; *Stiner v. Stiner*, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 643. But, of course, a very great lack of mental ability, such as results in idiocy or insanity, renders the contract void, or at least voidable, in any court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter.

⁵ *Gore v. Gibson*, 13 M. & W. 623; *Cory v. Cory*, 1 Ves. Sr. 19; *Selah v. Selah*, 23 N. J. Eq. 185; *Gombault v. Public Adm'r*, 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 226; *Fluck v. Rea*, 51 N. J. Eq. 233; *In re Schusler's Est.*, 198 Pa. St. 81.

one of the parties is so intoxicated or so mentally deficient as to lead the court to believe that he probably does not know what he is doing, the presumption is against the other party to the contract; and he must fairly clear himself of all imputation of fraud, or have a constructive trust raised against the property which he has acquired by the transaction.¹ And, as was explained heretofore,² mental incapacity much less than this, from whatever cause it may proceed, and whether temporary or permanent, may be enough to raise such a trust, when it is coupled with the fact of inadequacy of consideration, or there are other slight circumstances indicating that the stronger mind may have taken an unfair advantage of the weaker.³ So, not only those grosser forms of duress for which there is a remedy in a court of law, — duress of imprisonment, or *per minas*, or by threats against life or limb,⁴ — but also the more subtle duress of the volition, called “equitable duress,” and such influence as is “undue,” which without direct force or bodily constraint compels a person to do something that he does not wish to do, will move a court of equity to imply a constructive trust in his favor;⁵ “for in cases of this sort he has no free will, but stands *in vinculis*.”⁶ “As between parties occupying no relation of confidence in or toward each other, or of control by reason of position, employment, or otherwise, undue influence can rarely be imputed without showing some degree of fear, or threats, or advantage taken of position, or unfair practices

¹ *Gore v. Gibeon*, 13 M. & W. 623; *Johnson v. Mellicott*, 3 P. Wms. 130, note; *Thackrah v. Haas*, 119 U. S. 499; *Selah v. Selah*, 23 N. J. Eq. 185; *Mansfield's Case*, 12 Rep. 123; *Howe v. Howe*, 99 Mass. 88; *Helbreg v. Schumann*, 150 Ill. 12; *Hill on Trustees*, 46.

² §§ 380-382, *supra*.

³ *Allore v. Jewell*, 94 U. S. 506, 511; *Griffith v. Gody*, 113 U. S. 89, 95; *Ralston v. Turpin*, 129 U. S. 663; *Dundee Chem. Works v. Connor*, 46 N. J. Eq. 576; *Borden v. White*, 44 N. J. Eq. 291; *Raw v. Von Zedlitz*, 132 Mass. 164; *Churchill v. Scott*, 65 Mich. 465; *Yount v. Yount*, 144 Ind. 133; *Stepp v. Frampton*, 179 Pa. St. 284; *Highberger v. Stiffer*, 21 Md. 338; *Brice v. Brice*, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 533, 549; *Maggini v. Pezzoni*, 76 Cal. 631; *Jones v. Thompson*, 5 Del. Ch. 374; *Rees v. De Ber-*

nardy (1896), 2 Ch. 437; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 190, 191; *Hill on Trustees*, 155.

⁴ *Ripley v. Gelston*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 201; *Guillaume v. Rowe*, 94 N. Y. 268; *Elliott v. Swartwout*, 35 U. S. 137; *Fairbanks v. Snow*, 145 Mass. 153; *Heaps v. Dunham*, 95 Ill. 583; *Motz v. Mitchell*, 91 Pa. St. 114; 1 *Blackst. Com.* p. *131.

⁵ *Williams v. Bayley*, L. R. 1 Eng. & Ir. App. 218; *Eadie v. Slimmon*, 26 N. Y. 9; *McCandless v. Engle*, 51 Pa. St. 309; *Dolliver v. Dolliver*, 94 Cal. 642; *Bryant v. Peck & Co.*, 154 Mass. 460; *Bell v. Campbell*, 123 Mo. 1; *Fry v. Lane*, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 312, 322; *Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Belliwith*, 55 U. S. App. 113; *Jones v. A. & V. R. Co.*, 72 Miss. 22.

⁶ 2 *Story, Eq. Jur.* § 239.

or persuasion, involving in some degree a species of fraud. But when any of these elements enter into and constitute part of the circumstances attending a transaction, and controlling the will of a party making a deed or other contract, courts of equity have long been accustomed to give relief.¹

§ 385. **Confidential Relations.** — But the most numerous and important groups of cases, in which constructive trusts are brought into being in the manner now under discussion, are those in which some confidential relation exists between the contracting or interested parties. Such are the relations between trustee and *cestui que trust*, guardian and ward, attorney and client, parent and child, husband and wife, principal and agent, directors of a corporation and the corporation itself and its stockholders, minister or priest and parishioner, tenants in common, joint-tenants, or other co-owners of property, employer and employee, partners, and the like. Equity looks with suspicion upon agreements and transactions between such persons; and, when the outcome is that he in whom the confidence is reposed acquires property from or through the other, frequently either the arrangement is wholly set aside without proof, or the burden of showing the fairness of the contract is thrown upon him who has acquired the legal estate, or, if he fail to prove this, he is declared to hold the property as constructive trustee for the other party.² Each of the most important of these relations requires a separate discussion. There are three of them to be first discussed, the existence of either of which alone is sufficient to create a presumption against the fiduciary party who seeks to acquire for his own benefit the property affected by the trust or confidence. These are the relations of trustee and *cestui que trust*, guardian and ward, and attorney and client. The other confidential relations above stated call for careful scrutiny by the court; and, while neither of them alone will ordinarily be ground for implying a trust,

¹ Per Smith, J., in *Eadie v. Slimmon*, 26 N. Y. 9, 11; *Adams v. Irving Nat. Bk.*, 116 N. Y. 606; *Peyser v. Mayor*, 70 N. Y. 497, 501; *Osborn v. Robbins*, 36 N. Y. 365; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* 230; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 192.

² "The ground of this rule is, that the danger of allowing persons holding such relations of trust and influence with others to deal with them is so

great that the presumption ought to be against the transaction, and the person holding the trust or influence ought to be required to vindicate it from all fraud, or to continue to hold the property in trust for the benefit of the ward, *cestui que trust*, or other person holding a similar relation." 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 194.

yet, with other suspicious circumstances though often very slight, they will give rise to such an implication.

§ 386. **Trustee and Cestui que Trust.** — The trustee of an active trust, because of his control of the property and superior knowledge concerning it, usually has an important advantage over the beneficiaries. His position also naturally gives to him an ascendancy and influence over their minds, which is apt to be powerfully available in his favor. Therefore, when he purchases a beneficial interest in the property from the *cestui que trust*, or obtains a gift of it *inter vivos* from him, it is presumed in equity that these advantages have been unfairly utilized;¹ and the burden is accordingly placed upon the purchaser or donee to prove that he dealt honestly and in perfect good faith, and that the other party acted freely, and was fully and fairly informed of all the circumstances, such as the value of the property, present or prospective, the conditions and rights of all the parties, and all other matters by which the transaction was affected, or could reasonably be expected to be influenced.² In other words, such a sale or gift shifts the ordinary burden of proof. And when the vendor or donor comes into equity, praying that a constructive trust in the property be declared in his favor on the ground of fraud, he succeeds, unless the donee or vendee clearly proves that the entire transaction on his part was fair, open, and above-board. In order that the transfer shall stand, the court must be convinced that no special knowledge of the trustee, nor any ignorance or disability on the part of the *cestui que trust*, nor any influence unduly exercised by the former over the latter, materially affected the gift or sale.³

These things can be most easily proved by the trustee, other circumstances being the same, when he has purchased the

¹ *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 234; *Dougan v. McPherson* (1902), App. Cas. 197; *Adams v. Cowen*, 177 U. S. 471, 484; *Goldsmith v. Goldsmith*, 145 N. Y. 313; *Ryle v. Ryle*, 41 N. J. Eq. 582; *Wright v. Smith*, 23 N. J. Eq. 106; *Smith v. Townshend*, 27 Md. 368; *Fox v. Macreth*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 115, note; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 195; *Hill on Trustees*, 158.

² Cases cited in last preceding note; *Spencer's Appeal*, 80 Pa. St. 317, 332; *Cadwallader's Appeal*, 64 Pa. St. 293; *Smith v. Drake*, 23 N. J. Eq. 302;

Yonge v. Hooper, 73 Ala. 119; *Cole v. Stokes*, 113 N. C. 270; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 237.

³ *Mott v. Mott*, 49 N. J. Eq. 192, 199; *Hammell v. Hyatt*, 59 N. J. Eq. 174; *Coombe's Ex'r v. Carthew*, 59 N. J. Eq. 638; *Wright v. Smith*, 23 N. J. Eq. 106; *Graves v. Waterman*, 63 N. Y. 657; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252, 258; *Miggett's Appeal*, 109 Pa. St. 520; *Darlington's Estate*, 147 Pa. St. 624; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 195; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 237.

realty for a full and adequate consideration. And, the less the purchase price in proportion to the fair market value of the property, the greater, as a rule, is the burden of proof which rests upon him. Hence, that burden is heaviest in case of a gift *inter vivos*, a pure gratuity from the beneficial owner, who is living and might personally enjoy the property if he did not give it away.¹ It is natural and right that the presumption against the freedom and fairness of a gift under these conditions should be very strong. Still it is well settled that the trustee, in such a case, by affirmatively showing absolute good faith and fair dealing on his own part, full disclosure by him of all the attending facts and circumstances, and complete freedom, and facility of action on the part of the *cestui que trust* who had independent advice, may establish his right to retain the property for his own benefit.²

When, on the other hand, the *cestui que trust* by his will makes a devise or legacy to his trustee, it is decided by most of the authorities that, while the relationship of the parties is a circumstance of suspicion to be given due weight in a contest over this provision of the will, yet it is not in and of itself sufficient to shift the burden of proof upon the donee by creating a presumption of fraud against him.³ The *cestui que trust* at his death *must* let the property pass over to some one. And it is not unnatural, when he himself can no longer enjoy its benefits, that he should desire to give it to one who has shown him-

¹ Adams v. Cowen, 177 U. S. 471; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 256; Green v. Roworth, 113 N. Y. 462; Ten Eyck v. Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341, 353; Gibbs v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 67 How. Pr. 207; Haydock v. Haydock, 34 N. J. Eq. 570; Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 DeG. M. & G. 133, 137; Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278; Morley v. Longhman (1893), 1 Ch. 736; Taylor v. Taylor, 49 U. S. 183; Wistar's Appeal, 54 Pa. St. 60, 63; Davis v. Strange, 86 Va. 793; Soberanes v. Soberanes, 97 Cal. 140; Ross v. Conway, 92 Cal. 632.

² Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N. Y. 91, 100; Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y. 154; Matter of Will of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516, 522; Nesbit v. Lockman, 34 N. Y. 167; Al-leard v. Skinner, L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 145; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 195; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 231.

³ Bancroft v. Otis, 91 Ala. 279; Eastis v. Montgomery, 93 Ala. 293; Matter of Will of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516; Loder v. Whelpley, 111 N. Y. 239, 250; Matter of Cornell, 43 N. Y. App. Div. 241, aff'd 163 N. Y. 608; *In re Adams' Estate*, 201 Pa. St. 502; Scattergood v. Kirk, 195 Pa. St. 195; Harp v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459; Mackall v. Mackall, 135 U. S. 167, 172, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 582. *Contra*, i. e., that such relations between testator and beneficiary do change the burden of proof. Hegnoy v. Head, 126 Mo. 619; Griffin v. Diffendorfer, 50 Md. 466. And see Kischman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214; Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399; Fulton v. Andrews, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 448, 461; Tyrell v. Painton (1894), Prob. 151, 157.

self to be an honest and capable trustee. Besides, the donees under a will are usually not present when it is executed; and it would be unreasonable to place upon them the burden of proof concerning a matter of which they may have no knowledge, and possibly no means of acquiring knowledge.¹ A mere passive or dry trustee, moreover, since his position gives him no advantage over the beneficiaries, may take by any form of purchase or donation from them, without thereby occasioning a presumption of fraud or a constructive trust.²

§ 387. **Trustee's Purchase of Trust Property.** — The basal principle, which operates in shifting the burden of proof as here explained, is that a trustee shall not use his position to make any profit for himself out of the trust estate.³ An expression of the same principle, even more emphatic, occurs when a trustee with power to sell the trust property executes the power and purchases at his own sale. For, with the apprehension of fraud in the background, but without actually presuming its existence, a court of equity, at the option of the *cestui que trust*, and for the purpose of keeping its favorite, the trustee, aloof from a position where he could so easily commit undiscoverable wrong, will treat him as still holding the property in trust for the same beneficiary or beneficiaries as before.⁴ This it will do whether the purchase is at private sale or public auction,⁵ directly by the trustee himself or indirectly through the medium of one or more third parties.⁶ And the same stringent rule applies to every one, whether technically called

¹ Bancroft v. Otis, 91 Ala. 279; Matter of Will of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516.

² Parkes v. White, 11 Ves. 209, 226; Inlow v. Christy, 187 Pa. St. 186, 191. See Fletcher v. Bartlett, 157 Mass. 113.

³ Hill on Trustees, 159; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. (4th Am. ed.) 62 Amer. note.

⁴ Downes v. Grazebrook, 3 Mer. 200; Farrar v. Farrar, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 395, 409; Dougan v. McPherson (1902), App. Cas. 197; Davone v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252; De Caters v. Le Ray De Chaumont, 3. Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 178; Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 548; Dodge v. Stevens, 94 N. Y. 209; Amherst College v. Rich, 151 N. Y. 282, 340; Kahn v. Chapin, 152 N. Y. 305, 309; Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224; Yeackel v. Litchfield, 13 Allen (Mass.), 417, 419;

Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass. 60; Rich v. Black, 173 Pa. St. 92, 99; Taylor v. Calvert, 138 Ind. 67; Scott v. Umbarger, 41 Cal. 410, 419; Fox v. Mackreth, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 115; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 195.

⁵ Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 678, 680, 13 Ves. 601; Davone v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252; Boernum v. Schenck, 41 N. Y. 182; Adams v. Cowen, 177 U. S. 471; French v. Pittsburg Vehicle Co., 184 Pa. St. 161, 163; Ives v. Ashley, 97 Mass. 198; Broder v. Conklin, 121 Cal. 282.

⁶ Moore v. Moore, 5 N. Y. 256; People v. Open Board of Stock Brokers, Building Co., 92 N. Y. 98; Bassett v. Shoemaker, 46 N. J. Eq. 538; DeCelis v. Porter, 59 Cal. 464; Gibson v. Barbour, 100 N. C. 192.

trustees or not, such as executors, administrators, mortgagees, attorneys, agents, and the like, who assume to buy property for themselves, under circumstances fiduciary or confidential which impose upon them the duty of acting disinterestedly for others.¹ Thus, where a son was employed as agent by his father to buy land at the sale on foreclosure of a mortgage held by the latter, and the *maximum* price which he should bid was fixed at \$15,000, a purchase of it by him, or for him through a third party, for \$16,000, was held to be in trust for the father and his heirs at their election.² The agent, being in the affair to act for the benefit of another, could not use his position to his own advantage, if the principal chose to treat the transaction as his own.³ So a conveyance by an executor, acting under a power of sale in the will, to a person having the same surname as himself, and a deed for practically the same consideration as the other from such person to the executor within four days thereafter, both instruments being recorded at substantially the same time, were held to be facts sufficient to justify one in refusing subsequently to complete a contract to purchase from the executor individually, on the ground that he held the land as a constructive trustee for his original beneficiaries.⁴ In this class of cases there is more than the mere shifting of the burden of proof upon the fiduciary. Having acted without any authorization from the court, he is not even permitted to prove, against the wish of the beneficiaries, that he has fairly acquired the trust property for himself; but they, at their own election and without more, may fasten a constructive trust upon it in his hands.⁵

This absolute right of the *cestuis que trustent* may of course be waived or relinquished by them,⁶ or lost by their laches or by lapse of time.⁷ And, where the trustee has an interest of

¹ *Adams v. Cown*, 177 U. S. 471; *Hill on Trustees*, 428, and notes; 1 *Perry on Trusts* § 195, and notes.

² *Moore v. Moore*, 5 N. Y. 256.

³ *Moore v. Moore*, 5 N. Y. 256, 261; *Morse v. Hill*, 136 Mass. 60; *Bassett v. Shoemaker*, 46 N. J. Eq. 538.

⁴ *People v. Open Board of Stock Brokers B'ld'ng Co.*, 92 N. Y. 98.

⁵ *Campbell v. Walker*, 5 Ves. 678, 680; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 252, 259-261; *Moore v. Moore*, 5 N. Y. 256, 261; *Fulton v. Whitney*, 66 N. Y. 548; *Scholle v. Scholle*,

101 N. Y. 167, 171; *Ives v. Ashley*, 97 Mass. 198; *Bassett v. Shoemaker*, 46 N. J. Eq. 538; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 94; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 195.

⁶ *Hoyt v. Latham*, 143 U. S. 553; *Hammond v. Hopkins*, 143 U. S. 224; *Harrington v. Erie Co. Savings Bk.*, 101 N. Y. 257; *Yeackel v. Litchfield*, 13 Allen (Mass.), 417, 419; *Ives v. Ashley*, 97 Mass. 198; *Plucker v. Teller*, 174 Pa. St. 529; *Pearce v. Gamble*, 72 Ala. 341; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 197. See *Kullman v. Cox*, 167 N. Y. 411.

⁷ *Kahn v. Chapin*, 152 N. Y. 305;

his own to protect by bidding at the sale of the trust property, as, for example, where he has an individual part ownership therein, and he makes special application to the court for permission to buy for himself, which, upon the hearing of all those who are interested, or their being given their day in court and full opportunity to be heard, is duly granted, "then he can make a purchase which is valid and binding upon all the parties interested, and under which he can obtain a perfect title."¹ But a constructive trust may fasten upon his purchase, if he fail to comply exactly with all these requisites. He can not, for instance, rely on the formal leave to buy which is usually given to all the parties by the decree in a foreclosure or partition suit.² His application must be *special*, and with everybody in court who could have any ground to object. "The³ power resides in the court to relieve from the rule."⁴ And it has been held in New York, by a decision, which if it does not undermine the principle of protection to the beneficiaries may at least break down some of its fortifications, that, if every one in interest be thus specially brought before the court, it may grant such relief *by confirming a purchase by a trustee*, who had a personal interest to protect, but who did not obtain before the sale any judicial authorization to bid in his own behalf.⁵

When a sale has been honestly made to an outside party, the trustee acting *bona fide* may, thereafter, validly purchase from or through him without any sanction of the court.⁶ And it is held by the United States Supreme Court, and in some states, though strongly denied in others,⁷ that he may pur-

Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224; Hopper v. Hopper, 79 Md. 400; Harrison v. Manson, 95 Va. 593; Thompson v. Hartline, 105 Ala. 263; Darling v. Potts, 118 Mo. 506; Barber v. Bowen, 47 Minn. 118; *In re Boles & British Land Co.* (1902) 1 Ch. 244; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 94.

¹ Scholle v. Scholle, 101 N. Y. 167, 172; Corbin v. Baker, 167 N. Y. 128, 133; Colgate's Executor v. Colgate, 23 N. J. Eq. 372; Markle's Estate, 182 Pa. St. 378; Boswell v. Coaks, L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 302, 310; Farmer v. Dean, 32 Beav. 327; 1 Perry on Trusts (5th ed.), § 195, note (a).

² Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 548; Torrey v. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 649; Boswell v. Coaks, L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 302, 310.

³ Authorities cited in last two preceding notes. If they use trust funds in the purchase, the profit of a resale belongs to the *cestui que trust*. Eaker's Appeal, 120 Pa. St. 33.

⁴ Corbin v. Baker, 167 N. Y. 128, 134.

⁵ Corbin v. Baker, 167 N. Y. 128. See Kullman v. Cox, 167 N. Y. 411; Kirsch v. Tozier, 143 N. Y. 390.

⁶ Welch v. McGrath, 59 Iowa, 519. And see Patterson v. Leming, 118 Pa. St. 571; Stewart v. Fellows, 128 Ill. 480. But, of course, such transactions are scrutinized by the courts with the most rigid care; and it must be very clear that the trustee was not personally interested in the first purchase.

⁷ Marshall v. Carson, 38 N. J. Eq. 250; Hill on Trustees, 160, 250.

chase directly at the sale when it is not by or for him, but by some independent party, as when it is made pursuant to an adverse judgment or decree.¹

§ 388. **Trustee's Purchase of Encumbrance — Renewal of Lease in his own Name.** — As one who occupies a fiduciary position can not acquire a clear title to the trust property, except under such circumstances as those explained in the preceding paragraph, so he can not obtain for his own benefit, save under like conditions, any claim, encumbrance, or outstanding lien against or interest in that property.² Being trustee, he must act wholly for the trust. Many other illustrations of this salutary principle are supplied by the authorities. But the only one which needs to be added here is that of a renewal of a lease in his own name by one who holds it in a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary capacity. Such renewal enures to the benefit of the *cestui que trust*, or other party beneficially interested in the original leasehold.³ In the famous "Rumford Market Case,"⁴ it was so decided, although the trustee, who ultimately took the new lease in his own name and ostensibly for his own benefit, at first attempted to obtain a renewal expressly for the benefit of the *cestuis que trustent*, who were infants, and the landlord refused to grant it in that form, because, under the circumstances, he would then have had no means of enforcing payment of the rent. And, in cases like that of "The Hoffman House," in New York,⁵ where one partner has endeavored for himself alone to renew a lease owned and controlled by the

¹ Allen v. Gillett, 127 U. S. 589; Fisk v. Sarber, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 18; Bruner v. Finley, 187 Pa. St. 389; Hall v. Bliss, 118 Mass. 554. But here again it must be perfectly clear to the court that the trustee has acted in entire good faith, and not availed himself of any advantage growing out of his position. See Mullen v. Doyle, 147 Pa. St. 512; Marshall's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 234.

² Parkist v. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 394; Dickey's Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 218, 247; Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 475; Wellford v. Chancellor, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 39. See Kennedy v. De Tafford (1896), 1 Ch. 762.

³ Keech v. Sandford, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 44; Hill v. Hill, 3 H. L. Cas. 828; Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123, 84

N. Y. 556; McGuire v. Devlin, 158 Mass. 63; Jones's Estate, 179 Pa. St. 36; Wood v. Irwin, 163 Pa. St. 413, 414; Petrie v. Badenoch, 102 Mich. 45; Crone v. Crone, 180 Ill. 599. And this principle applies to all cases in which, by virtue of the existence of the original lease, a renewal has been obtained by one person to the detriment of another who had an interest in the same. *In re Lulham*, 53 L. J. Ch. n. s. 928, 931; Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123, 84 N. Y. 556.

⁴ Keech v. Sandford, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 44, called the Rumford Market Case, because the lease was of the market-place of that name.

⁵ Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123, 84 N. Y. 556.

firm, he has uniformly been held, on application of the other members, to be a constructive trustee for all the partners.¹ This application of the principle, which forbids a trustee to profit by his position, is uniformly adhered to on both sides of the Atlantic.² But an exception appears under circumstances such as arose in Pennsylvania, where a landlord refused to renew a lease of a colliery unless there was taken with it another colliery, the leasing and operating of which would call for the outlay of large additional sums of money. The first lease — of the one colliery — being held by a trustee, it was decided that he acted properly in refusing to risk the trust moneys in the larger enterprise. And he having taken the new and more extensive lease with his own funds, and the entire transaction being proved to be fair and *bona fide*, it was held that no trust was to be raised by equitable construction against him.³ It follows that, where the lease can not be renewed and held for the *cestuis* without running counter to the well-settled principles which govern the conduct of trustees, the fiduciary holder is free from the operation of the rule which would otherwise preclude him from taking a renewal for his own benefit.

§ 389. **Conclusion as to Trustee and Cestui Que Trust.** — The cases here given, in which equity raises constructive trusts because of the apprehension of fraud, are simply the most important instances of the operation of a general rule. And that rule makes the court quick to afford a remedy, through the medium of such a trust, whenever one party occupies a position towards another which would enable him readily to commit fraud without likelihood of detection. It applies, not only to the technical position of trustee and *cestui que trust*, but also, to a greater or less degree, according to the closeness of the confidence, to all the fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary relationships discussed in this chapter.⁴

¹ See also *In re Lulham*, 53 L. J. Ch. n. s. 928; *Palmer v. Young*, 1 Vern. 276; *Winslow v. Tighe*, 2 Ball & B. 195; *Featherstonough v. Fenwick*, 17 Ves. 298; *Crone v. Crone*, 180 Ill. 599; *Keech v. Sandford*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 44, Amer. note.

² Authorities cited in last three preceding notes.

³ *In re Markle's Estate*, 182 Pa. St. 378.

⁴ *Turner v. Sawyer*, 150 U. S. 578; *Van Horne v. Fonda*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 388, 409; *Tanney v. Tanney*, 159 Pa. St. 277; *Fellows v. Loomis*, 170 Pa. St. 415; *Hyndman v. Hyndman*, 19 Vt. 9; *McHan v. Ordway*, 76 Ala. 347. And see *Stevens v. Reynolds*, 143 Ind. 467; *Kennedy v. De Trafford* (1896), 1 Ch. 762.

§ 390. **Attorney and Client.** — The operation of the rules above discussed is so strong between attorney and client, because of the powerful influence which the former is supposed to exercise over the mind of the latter, that it has been said, in some cases, that they can not make any valid contract between them concerning the subject-matter of the litigation or proceeding in which the attorney is acting.¹ This is probably too extreme a statement.² But a gift *inter vivos* of such property from client to attorney, or a purchase of it by the latter, whether directly from the client or at a judicial or official sale, places upon him the heaviest possible burden of proof short of that which is absolutely prohibitory.³ A client may give property to his attorney *by will* without thereby alone causing any presumption of fraud.⁴ They may fairly contract with each other concerning property over which the attorney as such is exercising no control or influence; and so they contract as strangers.⁵ And after the relation has ceased, and its influence can no longer be supposed to be operative, they can deal with each other at arms' length.⁶ Thus, they may so deal when the attorney has ceased to act as such for his former client and is suing him for fees, or, as a creditor, is otherwise pressing him.⁷ But when it is at all probable that the confidential position

¹ *Wright v. Proud*, 13 Ves. 136, 138; *Holman v. Loynes*, 4 DeG. M. & G. 270; *Tyrrell v. The Bank of London*, 10 H. L. Cas. 26; *Frank's Appeal*, 59 Pa. St. 190; *Roby v. Colehour*, 135 Ill. 300; *Rogers v. Marshall*, 3 McCrary (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 76.

² *Liles v. Terry* (1895), 2 Q. B. 679; *Nesbit v. Lockman*, 34 N. Y. 167, 169; *Whitehead v. Kennedy*, 69 N. Y. 462, 466; *Story*, Eq. Jur. § 311.

³ *O'Brien v. Lewis*, 9 Jur. (n. s.) 528; *Newman v. Payne*, 2 Ves. 199; *Liles v. Terry* (1895), 2 Q. B. 679; *Nesbit v. Lockman*, 34 N. Y. 167; *Matter of Demarest*, 11 N. Y. App. Div. 156; *United States v. Coffin*, 83 Fed. Rep. 337; *Mott v. Harrington*, 12 Vt. 199; *Smith v. Brotherline*, 62 Pa. St. 461; *Trotter v. Smith*, 59 Ill. 240; *Donohoe v. Chicago Cricket Club*, 52 N. E. Rep. (Ill.) 351. It is said by some authorities that a gift of this character is absolutely void. See *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 236, citing *Greenfield's Est.*, 14 Pa. St. 489, 506; *Morgan v. Minott*,

L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 638. But in New York, and probably in most jurisdictions, the courts have not gone so far. "I find no case in this state which holds the presumption of fraud or undue influence to be so strong in law, that it cannot be overcome by evidence." *Nesbit v. Lockman*, 34 N. Y. 167, 169; *Whitehead v. Kennedy*, 69 N. Y. 462; *Barnard v. Gantz*, 140 N. Y. 249; *Herr v. Payson*, 157 Ill. 244; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 202.

⁴ *Hindson v. Weatherill*, 5 DeG. M. & G. 301; *Bancroft v. Otis*, 91 Ala. 279; *Matter of Will of Smith*, 95 N. Y. 516; § 386, *supra*.

⁵ *Bellew v. Russell*, 1 Ball & B. 96, 104; *Edwards v. Meyrick*, 2 Hare, 60; *Montesquieu v. Sandys*, 18 Ves. 302.

⁶ *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 120, 127; *Smith v. Brotherline*, 62 Pa. St. 461. See *Troxell v. Silverhorn*, 45 N. J. Eq. 330.

⁷ *Johnson v. Fesemeyer*, 3 DeG. & J. 13; *Smith v. Brotherline*, 62 Pa. St. 461.

may have operated to the advantage of the attorney, even though as such attorney he had no direct control of the property, the *onus* of proving the most absolute fairness and good faith is imposed upon him.¹ The same is true as to counsellors, solicitors, and legal advisers generally, while they are acting for their clients *as clients*.² And, as above shown, if being authorized to sell their clients' property, they purchase for their own benefit, in the absence of such circumstances as would enable a technical trustee to so purchase, the beneficiaries may, at their option, have the sale set aside through the medium of a constructive trust.³

§ 391. **Guardian and Ward.** — While two persons stand towards each other in the relation of guardian and ward, it is practically impossible for any contract of either gift or sale to take place between them, which may not be repudiated by the ward simply on the ground of his infancy.⁴ But, during this period, the guardian may sometimes seek to acquire the ward's property through a sale or other transfer by himself, or by some other person acting under an authority given by deed or will, or by some competent court. Such a transaction can rarely stand, if the ward proceed properly to have it set aside because of presumed fraud.⁵ It produces one of the most difficult cases of all those in which a fiduciary purchaser or donee attempts to avoid a constructive trust by proving fairness. And, when he pays very little or no consideration, he generally can not succeed.⁶ In some states the purchase by a guardian of his ward's real property is declared by statute to be absolutely void, and his act of so purchasing a misdemeanor.⁷ (a)

(a) The provision of the New York Code is: "A commissioner, or other officer making a sale, as prescribed in this title, or a guardian of an

¹ *Henry v. Raiman*, 25 Pa. St. 354; *Hockenbury v. Carlisle*, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 348, 350; *Beedle v. Crane*, 91 Mich. 429; *Place v. Hayward*, 117 N. Y. 487, 496.

² But when they are consulted simply as friends, or in some capacity other than that of legal advisers, the rule does not apply. *Devinney v. Norris*, 8 Watts (Pa.), 314; *Bank v. Foster*, 8 Watts (Pa.), 304; *Dobbins v. Stevens*, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 13.

³ § 387, *supra*.

⁴ *Dawson v. Massey*, 1 Ball & B. 219, 226; *MacGreal v. Taylor*, 167 U. S.

688; *Green v. Green*, 69 N. Y. 553; *Sparman v. Keim*, 83 N. Y. 245, 250; *Bool v. Mix*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119.

⁵ *O'Donoghue v. Boies*, 159 N. Y. 87; *Farmer v. Farmer*, 39 N. J. Eq. 211; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 200.

⁶ *Dawson v. Massey*, 1 Ball & B. 219, 226; *Farmer v. Farmer*, 39 N. J. Eq. 211. And see *Huguenin v. Basely*, 14 Ves. 273, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 556; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 234.

⁷ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1679; *Boyer v. East*, 161 N. Y. 580; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 2617.

When the guardianship has terminated, but its influence over the mind of the erstwhile ward may fairly be supposed to continue, conveyances by him to the guardian, and settlements of the estate between them are looked upon with suspicion by courts of equity; and a constructive trust arises unless the transferee proves clearly that there was no fraud, undue influence, or unfair dealing in the transaction.¹ The burden rests heavily upon the party who has recently had the power and ascendancy over the other, which is ordinarily produced by such a relationship.² Not until it is fair to assume that that influence has worn away, or it is proved as a fact that it no longer exists, can they be said to deal with each other at arms' length. The smaller the consideration and the more recent the termination of the guardianship, the heavier the burden of proof.³ And, when the transfer is *inter vivos* and purely gratuitous, immediately after the ward has become of age, the presumption of fraud is almost though not absolutely conclusive.⁴ When

infant party to the action, shall not, nor shall any person for his benefit, directly or indirectly, purchase, or be interested in the purchase of, any of the property sold; except that a guardian may, where he is lawfully authorized so to do, purchase for the benefit or in behalf of his ward. The violation of this section is a misdemeanor; and a purchase made contrary to this section is void." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1679; formerly 2 R. S. 326, § 58. This section is in the "title" of the code, which relates to actions concerning real property. It is entitled, "Purchases by certain officers prohibited. Penalty." And it is held not to apply to guardians generally, such, for example, as a guardian in socage, but only to guardians *ad litem* — those who, being appointed by the court, become its officers for the purpose of the respective actions. *Boyer v. East*, 161 N. Y. 580. When a guardian *ad litem* purchases realty affected by the action for which he was appointed, the burden is on him, in order to avoid the effect of the statute, of proving that he bought for the benefit of his ward. If he fail to prove this, his purchase is void, and the act of purchasing a misdemeanor. *O'Donoghue v. Boies*, 159 N. Y. 87, 102.

¹ *Dawson v. Massey*, 1 Ball & B. 219, 226; *Wright v. Proud*, 13 Ves. 136; *Hatch v. Hatch*, 9 Ves. 291; *Bostwick v. Atkins*, 3 N. Y. 53; *Strauss v. Bendheim*, 162 N. Y. 469; *Somes v. Skinner*, 16 Mass. 348; *Says v. Barnes*, 4 S. & R. (Pa.) 112; *Richardson v. Linney*, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 571; *Waller v. Armistead*, 2 Leigh (Va.), 11; *McKonkey v. Cockey*, 69 Md. 286; *Garvin v. Williams*, 50 Mo. 206.

² *Hatch v. Hatch*, 9 Ves. 292, 297;

Pierce v. Waring, 1 P. Wms. 120, n.; *Whitman's Appeal*, 28 Pa. St. 348; *O'Donoghue v. Boies*, 159 N. Y. 87.

³ "Nothing can be allowed to stand that proceeds from the pressure of the relation of guardian and ward fresh upon the mind of the ward." 1 Perry on Trusts, § 200.

⁴ *Dawson v. Massey*, 1 Ball & B. 219, 226, and other cases cited in last four preceding notes.

the gift is by will, however, the rule is the same as in the case of trustee and *cestui que trust*, i. e., while the relationship is an important item of evidence and the cause of suspicion and careful scrutiny by the court, it is not in itself sufficient to shift the burden of proof upon the donee.¹

§ 392. **Parent and Child.** — The law favors proper family settlements and arrangements.² It is assumed, too, that the influence naturally existing between parent and child will be more apt to be employed for fair and equitable results than will that between guardian and ward.³ The burden of proof, therefore, is not shifted by the mere fact that a parent buys property from his child, or receives it as a gift from him, or that it passes by either of these methods to the child from the parent. The presumption is in favor of the validity of the transfer.⁴ But the closeness of the relationship and the opportunities which it affords for unfair dealing are circumstances of suspicion, which cause the court of equity to scrutinize the transaction very carefully. And when other circumstances, though slight, indicate that fraud or undue influence may have been employed, the additional fact that this relation exists between the parties will readily result in a decision against the transaction.⁵ Thus, the fact that the parent is old and feeble and has come to rely to some extent upon the child;⁶ or, on the other side, that the child is inexperienced, and in other matters has been unfairly treated by the parent, or that the transfer is very detrimental to the child,⁷ will be enough to shift upon the donee the burden of overcoming the presumption of fraud and a constructive trust. The same rule applies between children and all those who stand *in loco parentis* to

¹ § 386, *supra*; Bancroft v. Otis, 91 Ala. 279; Matter of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516; *In re Adams' Estate*, 201 Pa. St. 502.

² Hartopp v. Hartopp, 21 Beav. 259; Hoblyn v. Hoblyn, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 200; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 201.

³ Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 241, 253; Matter of Will of Martin, 98 N. Y. 193; *In re Bndlong's Will*, 126 N. Y. 423; Crothers v. Crothers, 149 Pa. St. 201; Francis v. Wilkinson, 147 Ill. 370; Millican v. Millican, 24 Tex. 426.

⁴ Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17, 24; Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 241, and other cases cited in preceding note. But some of the modern English cases favor

the shifting of the burden of proof by the mere existence of this relationship. See Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750; Baker v. Bradley, 7 DeG. M. & G. 597; Readdy v. Pendergast, 55 L. T. Rep. 767; Bainbrigge v. Browne, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 188.

⁵ Taylor v. Taylor, 49 U. S. 183; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249; Bergen v. Udall, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 9; Miller v. Simonds, 72 Mo. 669.

⁶ Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 201.

⁷ Taylor v. Taylor, 49 U. S. 183; Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 201.

them.¹ And, in a greater or less degree, according to the nearness and intimacy of kinship, it affects all close family relationships.²

§ 393. **Other Close Relations.** — The foregoing discussion shows the general principle at the foundation of constructive trusts raised upon the presumption or apprehension of fraud growing out of the relation or connection between the parties. Trustee and *cestui que trust*, attorney and client, guardian and ward, where that relation still subsists or has but recently terminated, — these are the parties between whom such a trust will be readily interposed, simply because of the existence of the relationship.³ Like the relation of parent and child, the other close connections and associations are circumstances of suspicion and items of evidence, which call for careful scrutiny and cause courts of equity to look at the transactions “with a jealous eye;” but they do not generally, when unaided by proof of other facts of suspicion, give rise to constructive trusts. Of course, the closer such persons stand to each other, and the more intimate their association, the greater is the aid which their relationship gives to those who seek to impugn their transactions. Husband and wife, principle and agent, steward and employer, minister and parishioner, confidential medical adviser and patient, promoters and directors of corporations and the corporations and their stockholders, partners, tenants in common, and many others come within the operation of this general rule.⁴

§ 394. **Promoters and Directors of Corporations** have furnished some prominent instances of the working of the principle. Thus, in *Tyrrell v. The Bank of London*,⁵ one, who was already interested with others in organizing a bank, purchased land, a part of which he subsequently sold to the new company (of which he had become a director), at a price materially larger than that paid by himself. It was held that, since his relation

¹ *Archer v. Hudson*, 7 Beav. 551; *Maitland v. Irving*, 15 Sim. 437.

² *Harvey v. Mount*, 8 Beav. 439; *Sears v. Shafer*, 6 N. Y. 268; *Smith v. Smith*, 134 N. Y. 62; *Kennedy v. Kennedy*, 2 Ala. 571; *Hewitt v. Crane*, 2 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 159.

³ §§ 386, 390, 391, *supra*.

⁴ *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 14 Ves. 273; *Sheffield Society v. Aixlewood*, L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 412; *Ahearns v. Hogan*,

1 Drury, 310; *Richardson v. Green*, 133 U. S. 30; *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 131 N. Y. 101; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 71 N. Y. 154; *McClellan v. Grant*, 83 N. Y. App. Div. 599; *Bud C. & I. Co. v. Humes*, 157 Pa. St. 278; *Wickersham v. Crittenden*, 93 Cal. 17; *Jacobs v. Lude-mann*, 137 Cal. 176; *McKee v. Griggs*, 51 N. J. Eq. 178; *Hill on Trustees*, 547; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 204.

⁵ 10 H. L. Cas. 26.

to the corporation was fiduciary at the time of his purchase, and he had concealed from it the fact of his own gain in the transaction, he held that gain as its constructive trustee.¹ This, it seems, will not be the result, in the absence of actual fraud, if the promoter purchase the land and own it *before* he becomes in any way interested in the corporation.² But even in such a case a trust will arise against him, if in selling to the company he make any false representation as to what he paid for the property.³

§ 395. Purchases under Contract or Promise to Convey.—

Another important group of such cases embraces those transactions in which confidential agents or other fiduciary parties acquire property, which they have orally agreed to purchase for persons already owning some interest either in the land itself or in its purchase money; and then seek to avail themselves of the statute of frauds⁴ as an excuse for not performing their agreements. Equity will not permit that statute to be thus used as an instrument of fraud.⁵ And, in favor of such an interested party, it will raise a constructive trust in the land so bought. Thus, if a person buy realty under an oral agreement to convey all or part of it to one who already has an interest therein, such as a mortgagor whose land is being sold on foreclosure, or a part owner of property sold for partition, equity will hold the purchaser a trustee for him who has such interest.⁶ So, when the contracting parties are partners, and the partnership funds are used in payment, or those funds are so employed by one partner even without the knowledge of the other, or if each of the parties contribute a definite portion of the purchase money

¹ See also Archer's Case (1892), 1 Ch. 322, 341; McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. R. Co., 146 U. S. 536, 565; Brewster v. Hatch, 122 N. Y. 349; Ex. Mission Land & Water Co. v. Flash, 97 Cal. 610, 634; Russel v. Fuel Gas Co., 184 Pa. St. 102; Donner v. Donner, 217 Pa. St. 37; Collins v. Case, 23 Wis. 230, 16 Amer. Law Rev. 671.

² Erlanger v. New Sombbrero Phosphate Co., L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1218, 1236; Ladywell Mining Co. v. Brookes, L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 400; Milwaukee Cold Storage Co. v. Decker, 40 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 837; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 239.

³ Ex. Mission Land & Water Co. v. Flash, 97 Cal. 610; McGourkey v. T. & O. Cent. R. Co., 146 U. S. 536, 565.

⁴ The fourth section of the English statute, or its equivalent here, which requires such agreements or some note or memorandum thereof to be in writing. 29 Car. II. ch. 3, § 4; N. Y. L. 1896, ch. 547, § 224; Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 4140.

⁵ Maddison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467, 474; Bork v. Martin, 132 N. Y. 280; Traphagen v. Burt, 67 N. Y. 30; Wainwright v. Talcott, 60 Conn. 43; Adam's Eq. 46.

⁶ Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307; Peck v. Peck, 110 N. Y. 64; Cook v. Cook, 69 Pa. St. 443; Kent v. Dean, 128 Ala. 600; Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444; Mackay v. Martin, 26 Tex. 57. See Ellis v. Cole, 188 N. Y. 395.

or other consideration before the land is bought, a constructive trust will arise against the purchaser who seeks to hold the property as exclusively his own.¹ But beyond this equity adheres to the statute of frauds; and, where the contracting parties are strangers, will not enforce an oral agreement to convey realty to one who has no existing interest in it at the time of its purchase by the other party, and who has done no act of part performance and has parted with nothing of value pursuant to his contract with the purchaser.²

§ 396. **Gifts from Fraudulent Taker.** — It is to be added that, if one claim as a gift property coming to him through another's practices which are actually fraudulent, or for any cause are presumed to be so, he holds it constructively in trust for the rightful owner. Under such circumstances, said Chief Justice Wilnot, in *Bridgman v. Green*, "Let the hand receiving the gift be ever so chaste, yet if it comes through a polluted channel, the obligation of restitution will follow it."³ Being once touched by the fraud, the land can not be cleansed from the defilement until the injured party has obtained his redress, or the property has come into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value without notice of the wrong.⁴

§ 397. **Remedy.** — In all these cases of constructive trusts, whether established by proof of actual fraud or raised by presumption of equity, the injured party may have a reconveyance of the property, if it be still in the hands of the trustee; or, when it has passed beyond the reach of such redress, he may have an accounting and damages against the wrong-doer.⁵

¹ *Collins v. Carsons*, 30 Atl. Rep. (N. J. Eq.) 162; *Everly v. Harrison*, 167 Pa. St. 355; *Cushing v. Danforth*, 76 Me. 114; *Bryan v. McNaughton*, 38 Kan. 98; *Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk*, 35 Me. 383; *Aborn v. Searles*, 18 R. I. 357; *Reorganized Church v. Church of Christ*, 60 Fed. Rep. 937; *Barton v. McGrader*, 69 Miss. 462. But it is held in some states that the whole of the purchase money must be advanced before the purchase, by one who claims the benefit of such a trust. *Schierloh v. Schierloh*, 148 N. Y. 103; *Bryant v. Allen*, 54 N. Y. App. Div. 500; *Dudley v. Dudley*, 176 Mass. 34.

² *Levy v. Brush*, 45 N. Y. 589; *Emerson v. Galloupe*, 158 Mass. 146; *Fox v. Peoples*, 201 Pa. St. 9; *Nestal v. Schmidt*, 29 N. J. Eq. 458; *Ostheimer v. Single*,

68 N. E. Rep. 231 (N. J. Ch.); *Davis v. Davis*, 216 Pa. St. 228; *Lancaster Trust Co. v. Long*, 220 Pa. St. 499; *Taylor v. Boardman*, 24 Mich. 287; *Robbins v. Kimball*, 55 Ark. 414; *Minot v. Mitchell*, 30 Ind. 228; *Barden v. Harlley*, 112 Wis. 74; *Burden v. Sheridan*, 36 Iowa, 125; *James v. Smith* (1891), 1 Ch. 384.

³ 2 Ves. Sr. 627.

* *Bassett v. Nosworthy*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1, and notes; *Anderson v. Blood*, 152 N. Y. 285; notes, §§ 297, 364, *supra*.

⁵ *Ex parte Reynolds*, 5 Ves. 707; *Fox v. Mackreth*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. p. * 115; *Jackson v. Walsh*, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 407, 415; *Robbins v. Bates*, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 104; *Sohler v. Sohler*, 135 Cal. 323; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 239.

§ 398. (γ) **Constructive Trusts arising from Fraud presumed or declared to exist as affecting Third Parties.**—In many instances in which real property is conveyed or transferred in such a manner as to injure the rights of third persons not parties to the transactions, statutes or common-law rules or both, afford substantial remedies, without calling for any trust or any application to a court of equity. That court, however, will take cognizance of such cases and grant relief through the medium of a constructive trust, the foundation of which is fraud actual or presumed. And suits in equity, upon this theory of a trust, are now the most ordinary methods of procedure for the redress of such grievances. The important groups of fraud which give rise to them are fraud on purchasers, fraud on creditors, fraud on marital rights and fraud on powers. A few words as to each of these will be sufficient.

§ 399. **Fraud on Purchasers.**—If the owner of land make a voluntary conveyance of it to one person,—i. e., a conveyance without any valuable consideration,—and then convey it to another person for value, the first taker is readily presumed to be a fraudulent holder in trust for the second purchaser. This was the rule in equity even before the matter was affected by legislation.¹ By the statute of 27 Eliz. ch. 4, which was made perpetual by the act of 39 Eliz. ch. 18, § 31, it was enacted that any conveyance, lease, or other transfer of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, for the purpose of defrauding and deceiving persons who shall purchase the same for valuable consideration, “shall be deemed, only against such persons, to be wholly void, frustrate, and of none effect.” This statute has been substantially re-enacted or tacitly adopted in all the states of this country.² And it affords a solid base for a constructive trust, when the defrauded purchaser for value seeks his remedy in equity.³

There is, however, a radical distinction between the English construction of this statute and its construction in America. In England the purchaser or encumbrancer for value can have the other taker declared a trustee, and his acquisition of the property nullified, even though the former when he purchased

¹ *Perry-Herrick v. Attwood*, 2 DeG. & J. 21; *Lloyds Bk. Limited v. Bullock* (1896), 2 Ch. 192, 198; *Davis v. Bigler*, 62 Pa. St. 242, 247; *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 227; *May, Fr. Conv.* 3.

² 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 4592.

³ *Ellison v. Ellison*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. p. * 245, and notes; *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 264, 279.

had notice of the voluntary conveyance.¹ The theory is that, since the voluntary transfer is made void by the statute, it may be disregarded by a subsequent purchaser for value from the same grantor.² It is essential that such subsequent purchase shall be from the same grantor. An heir or devisee can not defeat his ancestor's or testator's voluntary conveyance, by merely selling the same land for value to one who has notice.³ And when a voluntary taker has conveyed to another person for value, the latter may hold the property against a subsequent purchaser from the original grantor.⁴ In this country, a purchaser or encumbrancer for value, who has notice of a prior transfer of the land without value, takes subject to the rights of the voluntary grantee, unless the latter was privy to an intended wrong; and this is true whether the two conveyances were made by the same person or by different persons.⁵ In New York, and possibly in some other states, the statute expressly declares that this shall be the effect of such notice.⁶ (a) The fact, moreover, that most conveyances and encumbrances,

(a) This statute, first enacted in 1787, and taken from 27 Eliz. ch. 4, was contained in 2 J. & V. 88, § 3, and 2 R. S. 134, §§ 1, 2; and now, in Real Prop. L. § 262, reads as follows: "A conveyance of an estate or interest in real property, or the rents and profits thereof, and every charge thereon, made or created with intent to defraud prior or subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers, for a valuable consideration, of the same real property, rents, and profits, is void as against such purchasers and encumbrancers. Such a conveyance or charge shall not be deemed fraudulent in favor of a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer, who, at the time of his purchase or encumbrance, has actual or legal notice thereof, unless it appears that the grantee in the conveyance, or the person to be benefited by the charge, was privy to the fraud intended." The last sentence of this statute was first added in 2 R. S. 134, § 2. See *Matter of Jacobs*, 98 N. Y. 98; *Mosley v. Mosley*, 15 N. Y. 334; *Jackson v. Garnsey*, 16 Johns. 189; *Ames v. Blunt*, 5 Paige, 13; *Jackson v. Cadwell*, 1 Cow. 622; *Youngs v. Carten*, 1 Abb. N. C. 136; *Becknell v. Lancaster Ins. Co.*, 1 T. & C. 215, 58 N. Y. 677; *Ten Eyck v. Witbeck*, 135 N. Y. 40.

¹ *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Bro. Ch. 148; *Doe v. James*, 16 East, 212; *Hill v. Bishop of Exeter*, 2 Taunt. 69; *Buckle v. Mitchell*, 18 Ves. 100, 111; *Gooch's Case*, 5 Rep. 60. See *Sterry v. Arden*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 261, 268.

² Cases cited in last preceding note; *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 264, 279.

³ *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 229.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Bassett v. Nosworthy*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1, and notes.

⁵ *Cathcart v. Robinson*, 30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 264, 279; *Verplanck v. Sterry*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 536; *Roberts v. Anderson*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 371; *Lancaster v. Dolan*, 1 Rawle (Pa.), 231; *Mayor v. Williams*, 6 Md. 235, 242; *Keeling v. Hoyt*, 31 Neb. 453; 4 Kent's Com. p. *463 *et seq.*

⁶ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 262; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 4592.

in this country are recorded, and thereby constructive notice of them is given to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, makes it very rare that constructive trusts arise here because of such fraud on purchasers of real property. Still the principle is here, and has been applied in some cases in which purchasers, mortgagees, etc., for value have had no notice, by record or otherwise, of prior conveyances to voluntary grantees.¹

§ 400. **Fraud on Creditors.**— Upon the principle that a man must be just before he is generous, the owner of property is forbidden to give it away so as to impair the rights of his creditors. This has been always true, of course, as a working principle in both law and equity.² But, probably because of the frequent attempts to violate it, and the difficulties thrown in the way of its enforcement, statutes were passed in very early times, and have been re-enacted and rigidly enforced on both sides of the Atlantic, for the protection of creditors against such covinous transfers. Usually the best remedy for a creditor, in these cases, is in equity, on the theory that the holder of the legal estate is his constructive trustee.³

Beginning as early as Edward III.,⁴ these enactments culminated in England in the celebrated statute of 13 Eliz. ch. 5, which, after reciting that feoffments, gifts, grants, etc., had been contrived of malice, fraud, covin, etc., “to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors or others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts,” etc., provides in substance that every transfer of lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, and chattels, or any of them, for any such intent or purpose, shall be utterly void, as against the person and his heirs, successors, etc., whose actions, suits, debts, etc., are or might be thereby disturbed,

¹ Cases cited in last three preceding notes. Voluntary conveyances are good between the immediate parties. But courts will not ordinarily aid any one to enforce an executory agreement to make a voluntary settlement or transfer. *Matter of James*, 146 N. Y. 78, 93; *Wadd v. Hazleton*, 137 N. Y. 215; *Pomeroy*, Eq. Jur. § 1148; *Story*, Eq. Jur. § 987. See *Tarbox v. Grant*, 56 N. J. Eq. 199; *Landon v. Hutton*, 50 N. J. Eq. 500; *Lawrence v. Lawrence*, 181 Ill. 248; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 109.

² Notes to *Twyne's Case*, 1 *Smith's L. C.* 1, 33; *Clements v. Moore*, 73 U. S. 299; *Cadogan v. Kennett*, 2 *Cowp.* 432. See *Davis v. Schwartz*, 155 U. S. 631,

639; *Dearing v. McKinnon, etc. Co.*, 165 N. Y. 78, 90.

³ *Twyne's Case*, 1 *Smith's L. C.* 1, 33, 49; *Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp*, 1 *DeG. M. & G.* 495, 500; *Hendricks v. Robinson*, 2 *Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)* 283; *Weed v. Pierce*, 9 *Cow. (N. Y.)* 722; *Cook v. Johnson*, 12 *N. J. Eq.* 51; *Athey v. Knotts*, 6 *B. Mon. (Ky.)* 24; *People's Bk. v. Loeffert*, 184 *Pa. St.* 164, 172; *Botsford v. Beers*, 11 *Conn.* 370.

⁴ *Stat.* 50 *Edw. III. v. 6*; *Stat.* 3 *Hen. VII. ch. 4*; *Stat.* 2 *Rich. II. ch. 3*; notes to *Twyne's Case*, 1 *Smith's L. C.* 1, 33.

hindered, delayed, or defrauded. Such is now, also, the statutory law in most, if not all, of the United States.¹ (a)

The conveyances, which are thus rendered voidable, are those which are made with *fraudulent intent*.² If the motive which actuated both parties to the transaction can be shown to have been to hinder, delay, or otherwise injure creditors of the grantor, those creditors may treat the grantee as their constructive trustee, and have the deed to him set aside, even though he paid value, either in part or in full, for the property.³ The cases, however, in which such relief is most readily obtainable, are those in which the conveyances are voluntary, or for small or inadequate consideration. Hence these proceedings

(a) The New York statute, which was 2 R. S. 137, § 1, taken from Jones and Varrick's revision of 1786-87 (2 J. & V. 88), in its turn taken from 13 Eliz. ch. 5, is now Real Prop. L. § 263, which provides that "A conveyance or assignment in writing or otherwise, of an estate, interest, or existing trust in real property, or the rents or profits issuing therefrom, or a charge on real property, or on the rents or profits thereof, made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, or other persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, or a bond or other evidence of debt given, suit commenced, or decree or judgment suffered, with the like intent, is void as against every person so hindered, delayed, or defrauded." See also §§ 264-268; L. 1897, ch. 417, §§ 7, 24-29; L. 1902, ch. 528; *Dearing v. McKinnon*, etc. Co., 165 N. Y. 78; *Manning v. Beck*, 155 N. Y. 577; *Bristol v. Hull*, 166 N. Y. 59; *First Nat. Bk. v. Miller*, 163 N. Y. 164; *Beuerlien v. O'Leary*, 149 N. Y. 33; *Murphy v. Briggs*, 89 N. Y. 446; *Commercial Bk. v. Sherwood*, 162 N. Y. 310; *Billings v. Russell*, 101 N. Y. 226; *Neuberger v. Keim*, 134 N. Y. 35; *Jacobs v. Morrison*, 136 N. Y. 101; *Seymour v. Wilson*, 19 N. Y. 417; *Galle v. Tode*, 148 N. Y. 270; *Metcalf v. Moses*, 161 N. Y. 587; *Albany Co. Sav. Bk. v. McCarthy*, 149 N. Y. 71; *Matteson v. Palser*, 173 N. Y. 404; *Jenkins v. Good C. & M. Co.*, 56 App. Div. 573, aff'd 168 N. Y. 679; *Masch v. Grauer*, 58 App. Div. 560; *N. Y. Co. Nat. Bk. v. Amer. Surety Co.*, 69 App. Div. 153.

¹ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 263, see also §§ 264-268; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 4591, 4593; 2 *Kent's Com. p.* *440; *National Bankruptcy Act of 1898*, ch. 111, §§ 3, 60, 67.

² *Zoeller v. Riley*, 100 N. Y. 102; *Metcalf v. Moses*, 161 N. Y. 587; *Werner v. Zierfuss*, 162 Pa. St. 360; *Fidler v. John*, 178 Pa. St. 112; *Stewart v. Exch. Bank*, 55 N. J. Eq. 795; *Bouquet v. Heyman*, 50 N. J. Eq. 114; *Bump, Fraud. Conv.* § 594.

³ *Twyne's Case*, 1 *Smith's L. C.* 1, 33; *Holmes v. Penney*, 3 *Kay & J.* 90,

99; *Zerbe v. Miller*, 16 Pa. St. 488, 497; *Gable v. Columbus Cigar Co.*, 140 Ind. 563; *Beasley v. Bray*, 98 N. C. 266; *Beidler v. Crane*, 135 Ill. 92, 96. The fraudulent purpose of the debtor is properly imputed to the creditor, if he passively accepted the advantage of the debtor's wrong-doing, as by letting him fraudulently confess judgment, etc. *Metcalf v. Moses*, 161 N. Y. 587; *Greenwald v. Wales*, 174 N. Y. 140. See *Carr v. Briggs*, 156 Mass. 78; *Bump, Fraud. Conv.* 197; *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 200.

are frequently spoken of as made to set aside "voluntary conveyances in defraud of creditors."¹ In the last analysis, every transfer of property for less than its value is voluntary in character; there is a gift of so much as it is worth over and above the consideration. The greater this difference between the price paid and the value, the more readily may the vendor's creditors set aside the conveyance. But even the fact that the transfer is wholly a gift is not, of itself, sufficient to prove fraud.² The question is one of fact, to be determined from evidence of the circumstances of each case.³ A man may, for example, make a valid gift to his wife, or to a relative or friend, if he do not thereby materially impair his means of paying all his debts.⁴ But if such disposal of his property leave him insolvent, it is difficult and usually impossible for him to prove against his creditors that it was not fraudulent.⁵ The *criterion* appears to be whether or not the "donor has, at the time, the pecuniary ability to withdraw the amount of the donation from his estate without the least hazard to his creditors, or in any material degree lessening their prospects for payment."⁶ A *bona fide* alienation for value, on the other hand, may be sustained, even when made by an insolvent grantor,⁷ and the value may be a past consideration.⁸ Thus, in the ab-

¹ Authorities cited in last three preceding notes.

² *Townsend v. Westcott*, 2 Beav. 340; *Sexton v. Wheaton*, 21 U. S. (8 Wheat.) 229; *Nattingly v. Nye*, 75 U. S. 370; *First Nat. Bk. v. Miller*, 163 N. Y. 164, 167. In order to render a voluntary conveyance void as to subsequent creditors, there must be affirmative evidence that it was made to defraud them. *Nattingly v. Nye*, 75 U. S. 370; *Buckley v. Duff*, 114 Pa. St. 596; *Todd v. Nelson*, 109 N. Y. 316; *Bouquet v. Heyman*, 50 N. J. Eq. 114.

³ *First Nat. Bk. v. Miller*, 163 N. Y. 164, 167; *Bristol v. Hull*, 166 N. Y. 59, 66; *Batavia v. Wallace*, 102 Fed. Rep. 243; *Jones v. Simpson*, 116 U. S. 609; N. Y. L. 1896, ch. 457, § 229; *Twyne's Case*, 1 Smith's L. C. 33, 37, 40.

⁴ *Hopkins v. Randolph*, 2 Brock. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 132; *Casey v. Davis*, 100 Mass. 124, 130; *Dawson v. Waltemeyer*, 91 Md. 328; 2 *Bigelow on Fraud*, 393.

⁵ *Metcalf v. Moses*, 161 N. Y. 587; 2 *Kent's Com.* 441.

⁶ *Jenkyn v. Vaughan*, 3 *Drew.* 419, 425; *Thompson v. Webster*, 4 *Drew.* 628; *Kent v. Riley*, 14 *Eq.* 190; *Bump, Fraud. Conv.* 291.

⁷ *Clements v. Moore*, 73 U. S. 299, 312; *Galle v. Tode*, 148 N. Y. 270; *Hancock v. Elmer*, 61 N. J. *Eq.* 558; *De Hierapolis v. Reilly*, 44 N. Y. *App. Div.* 22; *Skirm v. Rubber Co.*, 57 N. J. *Eq.* 179; *Beasley v. Bray*, 98 N. C. 266; *Van Baalte v. Harrington*, 101 *Mo.* 602.

⁸ *Commercial Bk. v. Sherwood*, 162 N. Y. 310; *Huntley v. Kingman*, 152 U. S. 527, 532; *Dodge v. McKeelinie*, 156 N. Y. 514, 520; *Rep. Chemical Co. v. Victor Co.*, 101 *Fed. Rep.* 948. But see *Nat. Bankruptcy Act*, 1898, ch. 111 a, 2; *West Co. v. Lea*, 174 U. S. 590; *Goldman v. Smith*, 93 *Fed. Rep.* 182; *Nat. Bk. & Loan Co. v. Spencer*, 53 N. Y. *App. Div.* 547; *Snell's Eq.* 68.

sence of positive statutory restrictions such as insolvent or bankrupt laws, a debtor, acting in good faith, may exhaust his assets in paying only one or a few of his many creditors; or he may use them in paying a just claim that has become barred by the statute of limitations.¹ It suffices, if he satisfy a present moral obligation, which is founded upon an antecedent legal obligation.³ So, he may validly convey his property for money, or money's worth, or a marriage contracted as a *quid pro quo* for the transfer, — these being the three forms of valuable considerations. When such a consideration is proved, and no fraudulent intent is established, the transaction is sustained.²

The immediate parties to transactions which are fraudulent against creditors can not have them set aside, nor have any trusts founded upon them, because they can not take advantage of their own wrong.³ But the statutes give the remedy to creditors and *others* who may be injured by the transaction. All persons are thus included who have claims against the donor or grantor which ought to be satisfied out of his property.⁴ Such, for examples, are a person entitled to a penalty against him under the usury law,⁵ a party with a claim in tort against him for injury to person or property,⁶ and his wife suing for divorce and alimony.⁷ Not only those who are creditors of the grantor or donor at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, but, by the weight of authority, also, those subsequent creditors, whose rights are impaired by the transfer, may have the transaction declared fraudulent and set aside in their favor. Such are those cases in which one about to enter upon a hazardous financial enterprise, or to go into uncertain or reckless speculation, disposes of his property by voluntary settlement, and then by such business or speculative operations incurs debts which his remaining assets will not discharge.⁸

¹ Bump, Fraud. Conv. 249, 250.

² Clemens v. Moore, 73 U. S. 299, 312; Galle v. Tode, 148 N. Y. 270; Delaney v. Valentine, 154 N. Y. 692, 704; Hiller v. Jones, 66 Miss. 636; Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 261; Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 489; Bank v. Read, 131 Mo. 553; Snell's Eq. 68.

³ Blystone v. Blystone, 51 Pa. St. 373; Bonsteel v. Sullivan, 104 Pa. St. 9; Barwick v. Moyse, 74 Miss. 415; Harvey v. Varney, 98 Mass. 118; Wilt-
sie on Mortgage Foreclosure, § 356.

⁴ Twyne's Case, 1 Smith's L. C. 1, 33, and notes.

⁵ Heath v. Page, 63 Pa. St. 108.

⁶ Jackson d. Van Buren v. Myers, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 425; Bigelow v. Cassidy, 26 N. J. Eq. 557; Thorg v. Leibrecht, 56 N. J. Eq. 499; Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 90. And see Craft v. Schlag, 61 N. J. Eq. 567; Jackson v. Seward, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 67.

⁷ Byrnes v. Volz, 53 Minn. 110; Houseman v. Grossman, 177 Pa. St. 453.

⁸ Neuberger v. Keim, 134 N. Y. 35; Guy v. Craighead, 46 N. Y. App. Div.

It is required in England, and in most of the states of this country, that, before a proceeding in equity can be sustained to overthrow a conveyance as a fraud on creditors, the claimant must have obtained a judgment at law for his demand, and had execution on the same returned wholly or partly unsatisfied.¹

§ 401. **Fraud on Marital Rights.** — If a man or woman about to marry make a voluntary conveyance of property in such manner as unfairly to deprive the intended wife or husband of a legal interest, which otherwise would have come into existence by the marriage, this constitutes a fraud, on the ground of which equity will declare a constructive trust against the alienee and in favor of the injured spouse.² Modern legislation, giving to married women large control over their property, has made cases of this kind less frequent than they formerly were. For many of them were brought against wives, who on the eve of marriage secretly disposed of lands in defraud of the intended husbands;³ and there is no fraud in their aliening property before marriage, which they can readily dispose of during coverture so as to exclude all marital rights in the same.⁴ But wherever the law is still such that marriage gives to husband or wife a right or interest in the other's property which that other alone can not take away, as is still true of the wife's dower right in New York, New Jersey, and most of the older states, a secret voluntary disposition of such property just before the marriage will readily cause a constructive trust.⁵ A transfer will be good and unassailable, however, if

614; *Marshall v. Roll*, 139 Pa. St. 399; *Jones v. Light*, 86 Me. 437; *Kinsey v. Feller*, 51 Atl. Rep. (N. J.) 485; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 245. And any transfer, once shown to be fraudulent, may be attacked by subsequent creditors, as well as by those who were creditors at the time. *Marshall v. Roll*, 139 Pa. St. 399; *Jones v. Light*, 86 Me. 437.

¹ *Southard v. Benner*, 72 N. Y. 424; *Fruit Co. v. Buck*, 52 N. J. Eq. 219, 229; *Wait, Fraud. Conv.* §§ 73-88. See *Neresheimer v. Smith*, 167 N. Y. 202. While, in England, only lien creditors can attack fraudulent donations after the donor's death; in this country all kinds of creditors have, after his death, practically the same rights that belonged to them while he was living. *Story, Eq. Jur.* §§ 375, 376; *N. Y. Pers. Prop. L.* § 19.

² *Strathmore v. Bowes*, 1 Lead. Cas.

Eq. 405; *Hunt v. Matthews*, 1 Vern. 408; *England v. Downs*, 2 Beav. 522; *Cheshire v. Payne*, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 618; *Hinkle v. Landis*, 131 Pa. St. 573; *Tyler v. Tyler*, 126 Ill. 525; *Alkire v. Alkire*, 134 Ind. 350; *Nichols v. Nichols*, 61 Vt. 426; *Beers v. Beers*, 79 Iowa, 555; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 213.

³ *Strathmore v. Bowes*, 1 Lead. Cas. *Eq.* 405; *England v. Downs*, 2 Beav. 522, 528; *Chambers v. Crabbe*, 34 Beav. 457; *Williams v. Carle*, 10 N. J. Eq. 543; *Tucker v. Andrews*, 13 Me. 124; *Kline v. Kline*, 57 Pa. St. 120; *Ferebee v. Pritchard*, 112 N. C. 83; *Murray v. Murray*, 90 Ky. 1; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 253. See *Matter of Kidd*, 188 N. Y. 274, 278.

⁴ *Wrigley v. Swainson*, 3 DeG. & Sm. 458; *Cole v. O'Neil*, 3 Md. Ch. 174.

⁵ Authorities cited in last three preceding notes.

made for a valuable consideration,¹ or with the acquiescence or knowledge of the other party, no matter how short a time before the marriage such knowledge may have been acquired;² and the party who alleges that it is fraudulent must prove either an actual wrongful intent against him or her, or that the transaction was of such a character that fraud must reasonably be presumed.³ The fact that the intended spouse did not know of the existence of the property fraudulently disposed of before the marriage will not change the result, if it can be shown that the gift was made for the purpose of preventing any marital right from attaching to the land.⁴

On the same principle, if a husband, pending a divorce suit brought by his wife, dispose of property in order to avoid payment of alimony, a trust will attach to it for such claim as the court may award to her against the husband.⁵ So, all ante-nuptial settlements are closely scrutinized by the courts; and when they are greatly disproportionate, or are not proved to be just and equitable, a constructive trust is readily declared in favor of the injured party.⁶

§ 402. **Fraud on Powers.** — A power affecting real property is the right to dispose of a *use* therein, or in many states, by virtue of modern statutes, to dispose of the legal estate.⁷ (a)

(a) "In New York, a power is an authority to do an act in relation to real property, or to the creation or revocation of an estate therein,

¹ *Blanchet v. Foster*, 2 Ves. Sr. 264. See *Atty.-Gen. v. Jacobs-Smith* (1895), 2 Q. B. 341; *Newstead v. Searles*, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 320, n.; *Green v. Goodall*, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 404. A conveyance made before the treaty of marriage is commenced is not fraudulent. *Bliss v. West*, 58 Hun (N. Y.), 71.

² *St. George v. Wake*, 1 Myl. & K. 610; *Fletcher v. Ashley*, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 332; *Cheshire v. Payne*, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 618. And the same is true though the husband, who thus acquires notice, is an infant at the time. *Slocombe v. Glubb*, 2 Bro. C. C. 545.

³ *England v. Downs*, 2 Beav. 522; *St. George v. Wake*, 1 Myl. & K. 610; *Bliss v. West*, 58 Hun (N. Y.), 71.

⁴ *Goddard v. Snow*, 1 Russ. 485; *Logan v. Simmons*, 3 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 487. See *Downes v. Jennings*, 32 Beav.

290; *St. George v. Wake*, 1 Myl. & K. 622; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 213.

⁵ *Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp*, 1 De G. M. & G. 495; *Krupp v. Scholl*, 10 Pa. St. 193; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 213.

⁶ *Graham v. Graham*, 143 N. Y. 573; *Lovesey v. Smith*, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 655. And see *Clark v. McMahon*, 170 Mass. 91; *Hussey v. Castle*, 41 Cal. 239; *Nance v. Nance*, 84 Ala. 375; *Kinne v. Webb*, 54 Fed. Rep. 34; *Synge v. Synge* (1894), 1 Q. B. 466.

⁷ A power, says Chancellor Kent, "is the mere right to limit a use; and the appointment in pursuance of it is the event on which the use is to arise." 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *316. Employing the same form of expression, a power, as created by many modern statutes, may be defined as the right to limit (dispose of) a legal estate. See 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 1650, 1651.

Thus, land may be granted or devised to A for such uses as B shall appoint; or, now by statute, B may be given the power of disposing of a *legal estate*, which is allowed in the mean time to descend to heirs, or is given temporarily to A, it being intended that the execution of the power shall take the property from the heirs or from A and pass it on to other persons. The subject of powers is discussed at length hereafter.¹ It is sufficient for explanation here to add that he who confers a power is called the donor, the one to whom it is given the donee, and the act of executing it an appointment.² Under the common-law system, when an appointment is made, by giving the use to some one, the Statute of Uses then transfers to the appointee the legal estate, "in the same quality, manner, form, and condition" in which he is given the use.³

A fraud on a power is its improper execution, or other unfair dealing concerning it, so as to injure those who should justly be the beneficiaries of the appointment.⁴ Thus, if land were devised to A for life, with power in B to dispose of the residue of the use (or the legal estate) among A's three children, and B should appoint all or the greater part of it to one of the three, who paid him a bribe for so doing, or should give it to one whom he could unduly influence to convey it to himself, this would be a fraud on the power, which would enable the other two children of A to have a constructive trust fastened upon the property in the hands of the appointee.⁵ This they might do also, if the donee in any way dishonestly executed the power, though the appointee had no knowledge of the fraud, and even though the donor of the power consented to the improper appointment.⁶ The creation of the power con-

which the owner, granting or reserving the power, might himself lawfully perform." New York Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), § 131, which in substance was formerly 1 R. S. 732, § 74.

¹ See also explanation of powers in trust, § 332, *supra*.

² In some states, he who confers the power, whether by deed or will, is called the "grantor," and he to whom it is given, the "grantee." See N. Y. L. 1896, ch. 547, § 112; Fowler's N. Y. Real Prop. Law, p. 321.

³ § 302, *supra*.

⁴ Lane v. Page, Ambler, 233; Aley v. Belchier, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 377; Marsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594, 601.

⁵ Duke of Portland v. Topham, 11 H. L. Cas. 32; Wellesley v. Mornington, 2 Kay & J. 143; Marsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594, 601; *In re Kirwan's Trust*, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 373.

⁶ Marsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594, 601; Lee v. Fernie, 1 Beav. 483; Duke of Portland v. Topham, 11 H. L. Cas. 32; *In re Perkins* (1893), 1 Ch. 283. See Smith v. Somes (1896), 1 Ch. 250.

fers rights upon those who should properly be the recipients of benefit from its execution ; and it is a fraud on the power to so deal with it as to impair those rights.¹

Constructive trusts and other *media* of redress arising from fraud on powers have been much more numerous in England than in this country, owing to the frequent employment of powers there in arranging marriage settlements. But the equitable principles governing the matter are the same in both countries.² “A person having a power must exercise it *bona fide* for the end designed.”³ And if he so deal with it for his own benefit, or even for the benefit of a stranger, as to work injustice towards the legitimate beneficiaries, a constructive trust will readily fasten upon the property.⁴

γ. Constructive Trusts that Arise in the Absence of Fraud.

§ 403. **Foundation and Forms of such Trusts.** — On the broad foundation of the maxim, “Equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done,”⁵ constructive trusts emerge, without the existence or presumption or even the apprehension of fraud, whenever they are requisite to the working out of the best measures of justice between the parties. For it is upon the basal theory of the existence of a trust that the most ancient equitable remedies, as well as those that are the farthest reaching and most beneficent, such as specific performance of contracts, injunction, and accounting, have been originated and enforced.⁶ And, for the purpose of the remedy, the operation of the maxim frequently calls into being trusts which were not within the contemplation of the parties, and in connection with which there is not even the shadow of fraud.⁷ It would be futile to attempt to enumerate all of such cases. Probably some of them have not yet been brought before any

¹ Duke of Portland *v.* Topham, 11 H. L. Cas. 32 ; Lee *v.* Fernie, 1 Beav. 483.

² See Williams's Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 249 ; Rowley *v.* Rowley, Kay, 242 ; Turner's Estate, L. R. 28 Ch. Div. 205 ; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 211, 212, 254 ; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 257.

³ Aley *v.* Belchier, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 377.

⁴ Marsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594, 601 ; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 211.

⁵ Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 44 ; Fonbl. Eq. Tr. B. 1, ch. 6, § 8.

⁶ Green *v.* Smith, 1 Atk. 572 ; Williams *v.* Haddock, 145 N. Y. 144, 150 ; 1 Spence, Eq. 108, 645 ; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 479.

⁷ Authorities cited in last preceding note. Also Teneick *v.* Flagg, 29 N. J. L. 25 ; Quigley *v.* Gridley, 132 Mass. 35, 39 ; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 231.

court. The principle, which deals with them as they arise, is that a trust will exist when it ought to do so in order to produce substantial justice. The discussion of a few of the most important instances of its application will suffice. Such are the constructive trusts which accompany contracts for the purchase and sale of real property; those which attach to land in the hands of one who has taken the legal estate from a wrongdoer without paying value and without notice of the fraud; and those which exist in the form of vendors' or vendees' liens, equitable liens for money loaned upon the faith of real estate security, and the like, and which are also treated hereafter as forms of equitable mortgages.

§ 404. **Contracts for the Purchase and Sale of Real Property.**

—“The general rule in regard to contracts for the sale of land is that the owner of the real estate from the time of the execution of a valid contract for such sale is to be treated as the owner of the purchase money, and the purchaser of the land is treated as the equitable owner thereof.”¹ After such a contract is made, a short time usually elapses before the deed is delivered and the legal estate is passed to the vendee. In the mean time the title to the realty is examined by or for the purchaser. During this period, the intended vendor holds the land in trust for the intended vendee; and the latter is constantly said by the best courts, as is virtually done in the above quotation, to hold the purchase money in trust for the former.² It is necessary to the existence of a trust, however, that there be a definite and ascertainable fund or property as the subject-matter.³ The land contracted to be sold is always such; but how, it has been pertinently asked, can the proposed vendee hold the purchase money in trust in cases such as frequently arise in which he has no purchase money at the time, or at least none distinctively set aside as the fund with which he is to perform his part of the contract? The answer is that, when courts use expressions like that above quoted, they do so with primary reference to the *remedy*, for which constructive trusts are implied,—the land is literally held in trust for the contracting purchaser; and he is to be treated, so far as the

¹ Williams v. Haddock, 145 N. Y. 144, 150.

² Green v. Smith, 1 Atk. 572; Dexter v. Stewart, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 52; Matter of Davis, 43 N. Y. App. Div. 331; Roberts v. Nor. Pac. R. Co., 158

U. S. 1, 10; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 163 U. S. 564, 600; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 231.

³ 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 67-72; §§ 300, 327, *supra*.

remedy against him is concerned, as if he actually had a fund of money distinctively set aside in trust and devoted to the purpose of buying the land. Therefore, the remedy of each against the other, in case of failure duly to perform the contract, is a specific performance suit — that ancient equitable redress (which is essentially an injunction to prevent the threatened violation of a trustee's duty¹), whereby the delinquent vendor is compellable to convey the land and pay any proximate damages caused by his default, or the vendee is required to take title to the realty and to pay to the vendor the purchase price and any proximate damages occasioned by his attempted breach of the contract.²

The trust in real property, growing out of the contract for its purchase and sale, continues to exist until either the contract is executed by the delivery and acceptance of the deed, or is mutually abandoned by the parties, or the realty passes from the intended vendor to one who purchases it in good faith, for a valuable consideration and without notice of the trust.³ Upon the death of the contracting vendor, the legal estate passes to his heirs or voluntary devisees burdened with the trust. And if, pending the contract, he wrongfully convey it to a third party, who has notice of the rights of the intended vendee, the purchaser holds it in trust for the latter.⁴ Also, by the weight of authority, if during this period the property be destroyed or injured, by fire or other cause, without the fault

¹ Willard's Eq. Jur. p. * 261.

² *Green v. Smith*, 1 Atk. 572; *Union Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago*, etc. R. Co., 163 U. S. 564, 600; *Williams v. Haddock*, 145 N. Y. 144; *O'Connor v. Felix*, 147 N. Y. 614; *Higgins v. Eagleton*, 155 N. Y. 466; *Reed v. Lukens*, 44 Pa. St. 200; *Fry on Specific Performance*, § 1. While the theory of this remedy is the existence of a trust which should be enforced, the primary reason for its adoption by equity was because of the inadequacy of the redress at law in such cases; that redress being ordinarily only damages for breach of contract. Specific performance "prevents the intolerable travesty of justice involved in permitting parties to refuse performance of their contracts at pleasure by electing to pay damages for their breach." *Union Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago*, etc. R. Co., 163 U. S. 564, 600. It might be argued that, technically, as soon as any contract to sell and purchase real prop-

erty raises a use or trust in favor of the proposed vendee, it should be executed by the Statute of Uses and no subsequent deed should be necessary. But, aside from the effect of the opposite intention of the parties so clearly shown by the contract itself by its fixing the time for the delivery of the deed, that statute does not affect the *implied* trust. The legal estate remains in the proposed vendor until the conveyance is made by the parties.

³ *Wythes v. Lee*, 3 Drew. 396; *Dinn v. Grant*, 5 DeG. & Sm. 451; *Ten Eick v. Simpson*, 1 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 244. And see, as to rights of innocent purchasers for value without notice, §§ 406-409, *infra*.

⁴ *Barker v. Hill*, 2 Ch. Rep. 113; *Orlehar v. Fletcher*, 1 P. Wins. 737; *Moore v. Crawford*, 130 U. S. 122, 133; *Roberts v. Nor. Pac. R. Co.*, 158 U. S. 1; *Matter of Davis*, 43 N. Y. App. Div. 331; *Borie v. Satterthwaite*, 180 Pa.

of the vendor, the loss falls on the vendee; and he can not defeat, because of it, an action for the purchase price or the specific performance of the contract.¹

§ 405. **Legal Estate taken without Value and without Notice.** — A *bona-fide* purchaser for value, without notice of the wrong on the part of the vendor, may acquire title to property unaffected by any trust. The absence of valuable consideration is looked upon by equity, however, as equivalent to notice. And, therefore, however innocent of fraudulent intent or actual knowledge of any wrong may be a mere donee, or voluntary taker, of property, he takes it subject to any outstanding trust or equity by which it may be affected.² He may clear himself from all possible imputation of fraud; yet he holds the land as a constructive trustee for those to whom it rightfully belongs. It is proper at this place to notice, more fully than has yet been done in this treatise, the facts which must co-exist in order that a grantee may avoid this difficulty — that he may be an innocent purchaser for value without notice.

§ 406. **Bona-fide Purchase for Value without Notice.** — Three things must concur to make one an innocent purchaser for value without notice of any outstanding trust or equity which may attach to the property.³ *First.* He must buy without notice of the fraud, trust, or equity. *Second.* He must purchase for a valuable consideration. *Third.* In most states he must pay *all* of the consideration, and acquire the legal estate before receiving *any* notice of the fraud, trust, or equity. The last of these requisites is chiefly explanatory of the other two, but it conduces to clearness to discuss it separately.

§ 407. **First. Notice** is “legal cognizance of a fact.” Positive knowledge is, of course, such cognizance; and this constitutes *actual notice*.⁴ A purchaser may be bound by such notice as this, either if he personally have the knowledge, or if

St. 542; *Haughwout v. Murphy*, 22 N. J. Eq. 531; *Gloucester G. & Q. Co. v. Russia Co.*, 154 Mass. 92; *Fry on Specific Performance*, § 135; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 231; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 365.

¹ *Paine v. Meller*, 6 Ves. 349; *Sewell v. Underhill*, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 92, 93; *Clarke v. Long Is. R. Co.*, 126 N. Y. App. Div. 282; *Reed v. Lukens*, 44 Pa. St. 200; *Snyder v. Murdock*, 51 Mo. 175; 15 *Harvard Law Rev.* 733. See *Thompson v. Gould*, 20 Pick. (Mass.)

134; *Phinizy v. Guernsey*, 111 Ga. 346; *Gould v. Murch*, 70 Me. 288.

² *Le Neve v. Le Neve*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 35, note; *Pye v. George*, 1 P. Wms. 128; *Ten Eyck v. Witbeck*, 135 N. Y. 40; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 241.

³ *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 263.

⁴ *Harper v. Ely*, 56 Ill. 179, 194; *Mayor v. Williams*, 6 Md. 235; *Jones v. Van Dosen*, 130 U. S. 684, 691; notes to *Le Neve v. Le Neve*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 35.

it can be proved to have been at the time in the mind of his attorney or other agent who was properly acting for him in carrying through the purchase.¹ And it is now agreed, by practically all the courts, that notice to such agent or attorney binds the principal, if it were acquired in the very transaction of buying the land, or in some other transaction sufficiently recent and important so that it is reasonable to assume that it was present in the agent's mind at the time of the purchase.² But knowledge so brought home to the agent is not notice to his principal, if it were such that the agent had no legal right to reveal it to the principal, or if the former were engaged in connection with the purchase in a scheme to cheat or defraud the latter.³

Again, the information which is open to a purchaser by virtue of the proper record of a deed of the land, or a mortgage or other encumbrance thereon (the record being pursuant to the statute which authorizes or requires the same), or by the proper filing and indexing of a statutory lien or notice, such as a mechanic's lien or notice of the pendency of an action affecting the title to or possession of the land, is also such cognizance, whether or not the purchaser actually know of the existence of the record or of the filing; and this is *constructive notice*.⁴ Such notice is now generally the result of positive statutes.⁵ But equity has always recognized the principle that, except as modified by statute, the mere pendency of an action or suit affecting realty is notice to purchasers and

¹ *Le Neve v. Le Neve*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 35; *Astor v. Wells*, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 466; *Denton v. Ontario Co. Nat. Bk.*, 150 N. Y. 126; *Hovey v. Blanchard*, 13 N. H. 145.

² *Dresser v. Norwood*, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 466; *Blackburn v. Vigers*, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 531; *The Distilled Spirits*, 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 356, 366; *Constant v. Univ. of Rochester*, 111 N. Y. 604; *Slattery v. Schwannecke*, 118 N. Y. 543; *McCutchen v. Dittman*, 164 N. Y. 355; *Willard v. Denise*, 50 N. J. Eq. 482; *Hart v. Farmer's Bk.*, 33 Vt. 252; *Sheridan v. Briggs*, 53 Mich. 569, 572. See *dictum* in *McIntire v. Pryor*, 173 U. S. 38, 52, that other transaction must have been "for the same principal."

³ *Kettlewell v. Watson*, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 685, 707; *Henry v. Allen*, 151 N. Y. 1; *Benedict v. Arnoux*, 154 N. Y.

715, 728; *Amer. Surety Co. v. Pauly* (No. 1), 170 U. S. 133, 156; *Indian Head Bank v. Clark*, 166 Mass. 27; *Cole v. Getzinger*, 96 Wis. 559; *Gunter v. Scranton I. H. & P. Co.*, 181 Pa. St. 327; *United States Security Co. v. Cent. Nat. Bk.*, 185 Pa. St. 586, 600. See *New York University v. Loomis Laboratory*, 178 N. Y. 137.

⁴ *Carpenter v. Dexter*, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 513, 532; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 270.

⁵ *New York L.* 1896, ch. 547, §§ 240-247; *N. Y. Code Civ. Pro.* §§ 1670-1673; *Fowler's Real Prop. L. of N. Y.* pp. 544-562; *Gen. Stat. N. J.* pp. 855, 856, 882; *1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 1610-1632. It has been held that such record once properly made, though thereafter destroyed, is constructive notice. *Tucker v. Shaw*, 158 Ill. 326.

encumbrancers thereof of all the rights that the parties to the litigation may thereby establish.¹ And the equitable doctrine of constructive notice, independent of legislation, is still more forcibly illustrated by the rule, well settled in many states, that actual and open possession of real property *under* an unrecorded deed or encumbrance is constructive notice of all the interest and rights which the person in possession is able to establish under such deed or encumbrance.² If, therefore, A, relying wholly on what appears upon the official records, buy land of which B is at the time holding actual, open, and visible possession under an unrecorded conveyance or mortgage, he is bound by notice of all B's rights in the property.³

Lastly, as to kinds of notice, when the purchaser or his agent acquires knowledge of facts, which should lead him as a reasonable person to suspect the existence of the outstanding trust or equity, and to make inquiry concerning it, and it can be proved that if he properly made the inquiry or investigation he would thereby obtain knowledge of the facts concerning such trust or equity, then he has notice of it whether he make such investigation or not; and this is *presumptive* or *implied notice*,⁴ which

¹ Sorrell v. Carpenter, 2 P. Wms. 482; Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 566; Cook v. Mancius, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 89; Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680, 693; Armstrong v. Ashley, 204 U. S. 272, 280; Turner v. Haupt, 53 N. J. Eq. 526; Snively v. Hitechew, 59 Pa. St. 49; Adams's Doct. Eq. 157. He who purchases property affected by such litigation buys with notice of all the rights established by the litigation, whether or not any formal notice of its existence is filed. But the statutes of most states abolish this general doctrine of *lis pendens*, and require as notice of an action a formal written document, made as prescribed by the statute, and duly filed and indexed. See statutes cited in last preceding note.

² Phelan v. Brady, 119 N. Y. 587; Smith v. Reid, 134 N. Y. 568; Marden v. Dorthy, 160 N. Y. 39, 52; Kirby v. Talmadge, 160 U. S. 379; Essex Co. Bank v. Harrison, 57 N. J. Eq. 91; Scott v. Gallagher, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 333. *Contra*, Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 34; Boggs v. Anderson, 50 Me. 161;

Harris v. Arnold, 1 R. I. 125; Bush v. Golden, 17 Conn. 594. And, wherever possession is treated as notice, it must be actual, visible, and open occupation. Holland v. Brown, 140 N. Y. 344; Cornell v. Maltby, 165 N. Y. 557; Reagle v. Reagle, 179 Pa. St. 89; Hodges v. Amerman, 40 N. J. Eq. 99; Batavia v. Wallace, 78 Fed. Rep. 448; McAlpine v. Resch, 82 Minn. 523. Possession is not notice of rights by virtue of any instrument under which the possession was not taken or is not being clearly held. Gibson v. Thomas, 180 N. Y. 483.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ Le Neve v. Le Neve, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 35, note; Kettlewell v. Watson, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 704; Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Holland v. Brown, 140 N. Y. 344; Kirsch v. Tozier, 143 N. Y. 390; Anderson v. Blood, 152 N. Y. 285; Cornell v. Maltby, 165 N. Y. 557; Macon v. Mullahy, 145 Ill. 383; Bailey v. Galpin, 40 Minn. 319; Westinghouse v. German Nat. Bk., 188 Pa. St. 630; Swasey v. Emerson, 168 Mass. 118; Batavia v. Wallace, 102 Fed. Rep. 240, 244; Foxworth v. Brown, 114 Ala. 299.

is often classified as a form of actual notice.¹ Its two elements are, the existence of the trust or other right against the land, and knowledge by or notice to the purchaser sufficient to cause him, as a reasonable person, to institute an investigation, which, if properly prosecuted, would give him actual knowledge of the trust or right.² Thus, if a recorded deed in the chain of the title to the land refer to another deed or mortgage of the same property, although such other document is not recorded, this is notice to the purchaser or encumbrancer of all the rights in the land which a careful investigation would reveal as belonging to the beneficiaries of the mortgage or deed so indicated.³ And when one who is about to buy land is informed from a credible source that the vendor is going to sell it in order to defraud specific equitable lienors or creditors, he purchases with notice of the equities of all such persons, which a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed.⁴ (a)

(a) In New York, presumptive notice, as explained in the text, does not apply to the rights of creditors at large of the vendor, "having no special lien or equity," nor to purchases and sales of commercial paper, and probably not to those of other personal property. Without discussing this large subject here in detail, it may be stated briefly that (1) A purchaser of personal property, in order to be affected by notice of fraud on the part of his vendor, or any trust or equity attaching to the subject-matter, must have *actual* notice — knowledge or its equivalent by himself or his agent, *Parker v. Conner*, 93 N. Y. 118, 127, and the same rule is shown in that case to be followed in England; (2) A purchaser of realty is not affected by the rights of "creditors at large, having no special lien or equity," unless he has actual knowledge of such rights, or its equivalent, *Parker v. Conner*, 93 N. Y. 118, 125; *Stearns v. Gage*, 79 N. Y. 102; *Bush v. Roberts*, 111 N. Y. 278; *Jacobs v. Morrison*, 136 N. Y. 101; *Wilson v. Marion*, 147 N. Y. 589, and (3) A purchaser of realty, who has knowledge sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry as to any outstanding equity or specific lien or right, has notice of it if by reasonable investigation he could acquire actual knowledge of the same, *Williamson v. Brown*, 15 N. Y. 354; *Ten Eyck v. Witbeck*, 135 N. Y. 40; *Anderson v. Blood*, 152 N. Y. 285. "It is the duty of the purchaser of real estate to investigate the title of his vendor, and to take notice of any adverse rights or equities of third

¹ See *Flagg v. Mann*, 2 Sumn. (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 486, 556; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 268; *Pomeroy's Eq. Jur.* § 753.

² *Cornell v. Maltby*, 165 N. Y. 557; *Jacobs v. Morrison*, 136 N. Y. 101; *Wilson v. Marion*, 147 N. Y. 589; *Pomeroy's Eq. Jur.* § 784; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 223.

³ *Sweet v. Henry*, 175 N. Y. 268; *Howard Ins. Co. v. Halsey*, 8 N. Y.

271; *Cambridge Valley Bk. v. Delano*, 48 N. Y. 326; *Reed v. Gannon*, 50 N. Y. 345; *Dingley v. Bon*, 130 N. Y. 607; *Gerard on Titles to Real Estate* (4th ed.), p. 664.

⁴ *Williamson v. Brown*, 15 N. Y. 354; *Anderson v. Blood*, 152 N. Y. 285; *Milliken v. Graham*, 72 Pa. St. 484; *Cox v. Miller*, 23 Ill. 476; *Story, Eq. Jur.* § 400 b.

It is to be added that, if a purchaser in good faith acquire the legal estate for value and without notice, so that he holds free and clear of the outstanding trust, he may convey as good a title to any one who has either kind of the above-described forms of notice,¹ provided the latter has not before owned the land bound by the notice.² Thus, if A own the legal estate as a constructive trustee, and convey to B, who pays a valuable consideration and buys in good faith without notice of the trust, B may transfer a clear title to C, and C to D, etc., although all these latter are notified of the trust. Otherwise B might occupy the anomalous position of having an unassailable title, which he could not sell free and clear after the facts concerning the trust became notorious.³ But, since A has already been bound by the notice, he could not re-acquire the land freed from it, no matter how perfect might be the title of his immediate vendor.⁴

§ 408. **Second. Valuable Consideration.** — A valuable consideration here means something of worth, as money, money's equivalent, or marriage (marriage in the sense of the entering into the married state, and not an existing condition or *status* of being married), which is "the real inducement of the grant."⁵

persons which he has the means of discovering and as to which he is put on inquiry. If he makes all the inquiry which due diligence requires, and still fails to discover the substantial right, he is excused; but if he fails to use due diligence, he is chargeable, as matter of law, with notice of the facts which the inquiry would have disclosed. . . . The questions in such cases are first, whether the facts were sufficient to put the party on inquiry; and second, did he fail to exercise due diligence in making the inquiry? An affirmative answer to these two questions charges the party with notice as matter of law; but the notice, in all such cases to be found in the books, relates to some actual outstanding title, lien, or equitable interest." *Per* Rapallo, J., in *Parker v. Counner*, 93 N. Y. 118, 124.

¹ *Bumpus v. Platner*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 213; *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87; *Logan v. Eva*, 144 Pa. St. 312; *Rutgers v. Kingsland*, 7 N. J. Eq. 178, 658; *Bassett v. Nosworthy*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1, 33, note; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 222.

² *Taylor v. Russell* (1891), 1 Ch. 8, 27; *Bovey v. Smith*, 1 Vern. 149; *Clark v. McNeal*, 114 N. Y. 287; *Church v. Ruland*, 64 Pa. St. 432, 441; *Logan v. Eva*, 144 Pa. St. 312, 321; *Williams v. Williams*, 115 Mich. 477; *Cassidy v. Wallace*, 102 Mo. 575, 581. See N. Y. L. 1897, ch. 612, § 97.

³ *Bumpus v. Platner*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 213.

⁴ See last two preceding notes. "Whenever the chain of conveyances reaches an innocent purchaser for value, who takes the legal title, the doctrine of notice no longer applies." *Biopham's Prin. Eq.* § 265, citing *Demarest v. Wynkoop*, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 129, 147.

⁵ *Ten Eyck v. Witbeck*, 135 N. Y. 40, 47. These three terms, "money, money's equivalent, or marriage" are here used as a terse summary of all those things that are a right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment,

In this connection, it is to be distinguished, not only from a good or meritorious consideration, but also from one that is merely *nominal*, such as one dollar, or any small sum, which is insignificant in comparison with the fair market value of the land, and is clearly not the actual moving cause of the conveyance. When such small sums are paid for properties worth vastly more, the transaction is generally in substance a gift — a transfer growing out of close relationship, or love and affection, or other actual consideration which is only “good,” and the amount recited in the deed, as one dollar, five dollars, and love and affection, etc., is nominal and not valuable.¹ In *Ten Eyck v. Witbeck*,² for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that a father’s deed to his daughter, of land worth twenty thousand dollars, for ten dollars, actually paid, and her agreement to hold the property in trust for her mother and brothers and sisters, was not made for a valuable consideration. In the opinion it was said: “We think it would be a perversion of language to say that a father, who had conveyed to a daughter property of the value of twenty thousand dollars for no greater sum than ten dollars paid, had sold the property to this child, or that she had bought it of him. The transfer would be recognized by the popular, as well as the judicial mind, as possessing all the essential qualities of a gift.”³ Any amount of money, however small, is in itself, of course, valuable. But when it bears no reasonable proportion to the fair market price of the land, and so is not “the real inducement of the grant,” it is only nominal; and the grantee does not occupy the position of an innocent purchaser for value. And even where the parties regard and treat a nominal sum as *the* consideration, its gross inadequacy is usually sufficient in itself to put the purchaser on inquiry as to any outstanding trust or equity in fraud of which the sale is being made, and so to prevent him from being an *innocent purchaser without notice*.⁴

loss, change of position, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undergone by the other. *Currie v. Misa*, 10 Ex. 153, 162; *Bassett v. Nosworthy*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 5, 103–109; *City R. Co. v. Citizens St. R. Co.*, 166 U. S. 557, 566; *Corle v. Monkhouse*, 50 N. J. Eq. 537, 540; *Chilvers v. Race*, 196 Ill. 71; *Steele v. Steele*, 75 Md. 477; *Selman v. Lee*, 69 Ky. 215, 222; *Anson on Contracts*, p. * 83.

¹ *Ibid.*; *Doe v. Routledge*, 2 Cowp. 705; *Metcalf v. Pulvertoft*, 1 Ves. & Bea. 180, 183; *Murray v. Ballou*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 566; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 220.

² 135 N. Y. 40.

³ *Per* Maynard, J., at p. 44.

⁴ *Wagstaff v. Read*, 1 Ch. Cas. 156; *Bullock v. Sadlier*, Amb. 763, 764. Effects of inadequacy of consideration, § 406, *supra*. It is for this reason that

In some of the United States, moreover, such as New York, Vermont, Maryland, Michigan, and Arkansas, a conveyance of land to a creditor of the grantor, made only in satisfaction of or on account of the previously existing indebtedness, while good between the parties to the deed, does not make the grantee, as to outside claimants or lienors, an innocent purchaser for value. In order to occupy that position, he must give a *present* valuable consideration, advanced specially for the property.¹ The United States courts, however, and probably a majority of those of the states, take the opposite view and treat a conveyance or mortgage to individual creditors of the grantor or mortgagor, when properly made for the purpose of satisfying or reducing the debt, as putting them in the position of purchasers for value.² But, with the exception of Pennsylvania, and possibly one or two other states, this position is not accorded anywhere to assignees in insolvency or trustees in bankruptcy; but such takers, who acquire the land for pre-existing debts and not for themselves, but for others, are treated as mere volunteers.³

§ 409. **Third. Time of Notice and Payment.** — Notice to the vendee, at any instant before he has actually obtained his conveyance and paid the consideration in full, prevents him from being an innocent purchaser without notice. If he acquire notice after the deed has been delivered and accepted, but before payment of the entire purchase price, or after part or all of the consideration has been paid, but before the conveyance has passed, and then he complete the purchase, he takes the land subject to the interest or equity of which he thus obtained

a trustee can not convey a valid title to a purchaser from him for a nominal consideration. *Shriver v. Shriver*, 86 N. Y. 575.

¹ *Bay v. Coddington*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 34; *Rodgers v. Bonner*, 45 N. Y. 379; *Barnard v. Campbell*, 58 N. Y. 73; *Amer. Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher*, 145 N. Y. 552; *Poor v. Woodburn*, 25 Vt. 234; *Ringgold v. Bryan*, 3 Md. Ch. 488; *Ames Iron Works v. Kalamazoo Pulley Co.*, 63 Ark. 87; *Schloss v. Feltns*, 103 Mich. 525; *Starr v. Stevenson*, 91 Iowa, 684.

² *Bayley v. Greenleaf*, 20 U. S. (7 Wheat.) 46; *Bnghman v. Central Bk.*, 159 Pa. St. 94; *Goodwin v. Mass. L. & T. Co.*, 152 Mass. 189, 199; *Nat. Revere*

Bk. v. Morse, 163 Mass. 383; *Longdale Iron Co. v. Swift's Iron Works*, 91 Ky. 191; *Koch v. Roth*, 150 Ill. 212; *Heitzfeld v. Bailey*, 103 Ala. 473; *Moore v. Holcombe*, 3 Leigh (Va.), 597; *Titcomb v. Wood*, 38 Me. 561; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 239.

³ *Donaldson v. Farwell*, 93 U. S. 631; *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. 87, 100; *Chapman v. Tanner*, 1 Vern. 267; *Goodwin v. Mass. Loan Co.*, 152 Mass. 189, 199; *Belding v. Frankland*, 8 Lea (Tenn.), 67; *Burnett v. Bealmear*, 79 Md. 36; *Amer. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Fancher*, 145 N. Y. 552. See *Bnghman v. Cent. Bk.*, 159 Pa. St. 94; *Longdale Iron Co. v. Swift's Iron Works*, 91 Ky. 191; *Chance v. McWorter*, 26 Ga. 315.

cognizance. This is the law as settled in England and most of the United States.¹ But, for the amount of money or other value actually paid before he acquired any notice, he has on the land a lien superior to the outstanding trust or equity of which he was notified.² And, in some of the American states, such as Missouri, California, and probably Pennsylvania, he is held to be a *bona-fide* purchaser for value of that proportion of interest in the realty which the amount of consideration paid by him before receiving notice bears to the entire contractual purchase price.³ Thus, if A, who had agreed to buy a lot of land from B for \$15,000, should receive notice, after taking the deed and paying only \$5,000 of the consideration, that B in selling would violate a trust in favor of C, A would own, independent of the trust, one-third of the land, if it were situated in Pennsylvania; while, if it were New York realty, he would simply have a valid lien on it for the \$5,000.⁴

It is to be reiterated here that one who can not establish all the requisites to a *bona-fide* purchase for value is usually a trustee to some extent of the land that he has bought; and, when he can prove all of them except the payment of a valuable consideration, the trust does not arise from any fraud on his part, either actual or presumed.⁵ (a)

§ 410. **Seeing to Application of Purchase Money.** — So careful were courts of equity of the rights of a *cestui que trust*, that they early required a purchaser from a trustee, who sold pursuant to a valid power, not only to be sure that the conveyance was properly and fairly made, but also to see to it that the purchase money was duly appropriated to the purposes of the trust. This is known as the doctrine of “seeing to the appli-

(a) “An implied or resulting trust shall not be alleged or established, to defeat or prejudice the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice of the trust.” N. Y. L. 1909 (Real Prop. L.), ch. 52, § 95, which was formerly 2 R. S. 728, § 54. See also N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 104. *Wood v. Robinson*, 22 N. Y. 564, 567; *Siemon v. Schurch*, 29 N. Y. 598, 613; *Baker v. Bliss*, 39 N. Y. 70.

¹ *Tourville v. Naish*, 3 P. Wms. 307; *Bassett v. Nosworthy*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1, 35, 77, note; *Murray v. Ballou*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 566; *Patton v. Moore*, 32 N. H. 382; *Florence v. Zeigler*, 58 Ala. 221; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, § 221.

² *Weaver v. Barden*, 49 N. Y. 286, 293; *Sargent v. Eureka S. P. Co.*, 46 Hun (N. Y.), 19, 21; *Warren v. Wilder*, 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 757, 759.

³ *Juvenal v. Jackson*, 14 Pa. St. 519; *Paul v. Fulton*, 25 Mo. 156; *Davis v. Ward*, 109 Cal. 186; *Florence v. Zeigler*, 58 Ala. 221. See *Hanghouth v. Murphy*, 21 N. J. Eq. 118, 121.

⁴ Last two preceding notes.

⁵ § 405, *supra*.

cation of the purchaser money.”¹ It was a natural outgrowth of the equitable theory that the land belonged to the beneficiary of the trust. Hence the purchaser must either pay the money to him, and obtain his valid receipt for the same, or, if, as was generally the case, this could not be done because of the incapacity of the *cestui* or otherwise, he must, if reasonably practicable, see that it was actually and properly applied for his benefit.² If the vendee failed to do his duty in this respect, however innocent and *bona fide* might otherwise be his purchase, he held the realty as a constructive trustee for the original beneficiaries.³

This principle has never been enforced in such a manner as to place an unreasonable burden upon the purchaser. When, therefore, the trust is so general or uncertain in character that it would cause great inconvenience to the vendee to follow the disposition of the purchase price, as, for example, in a trust to pay all the creditors of the settler, or to hold and apply the income to life beneficiaries, no court ever requires more than a *bona-fide* payment to the trustee.⁴ The rule is never applicable except to a well-defined and limited trust, such as one to sell and pay all the proceeds at once to a designated person, or to deposit them in a specified bank, or to pay one or two defined debts which are all that can participate in the fund.⁵

In England this doctrine or principle was abolished by statute in 1859;⁶ and the same result has been reached, either by statutes or by positive adjudications in most if not all of the states of this country.⁷ The general form of such statutes is that, “A purchaser who shall actually and in good faith pay a sum of money to a trustee, which the trustee as such is

¹ 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 789, 790; Elliot v. Merryman, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. p. *59, and notes.

² Weatherby v. St. Giorgio, 2 Hare, 624; Clyde v. Simpson, 4 Ohio St. 445; Foster v. Day, 27 N. J. Eq. 599.

³ 2 Perry on Trusts, § 790.

⁴ Stronghill v. Anstey, 1 DeG. M. & G. 635; Conover v. Stothoff, 38 N. J. Eq. 55; Turner v. Hoyle, 95 Mo. 337; Hughes v. Tabb, 78 Va. 313; 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 794, 795.

⁵ Clyde v. Simpson, 4 Ohio St. 445; Elliot v. Merryman, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. p. *52, note.

⁶ 22 & 23 Vict. ch. 35, § 23; 23 &

24 Vict. ch. 145, § 29; 44 & 45 Vict. ch. 41, §§ 36, 71.

⁷ N. Y. L. 1896, ch. 547, §. 88; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1723; Woodward v. Jewell, 140 U. S. 247; Austin v. Hatch, 158 Mass. 198; Ind. etc. R. Co. v. Swannell, 157 Ill. 616; McArthur v. Robinson, 104 Mich. 540; Bank v. Looney, 99 Tenn. 278; Nat. Bk. of Com. v. Smith, 17 R. I. 244. “It may be stated that the strict English common-law rule is not favored by the American courts, although, in the absence of statutory regulation, they apply the doctrine in cases where it can not be avoided.” 2 Perry on Trusts, § 798.

authorized to receive, shall not be responsible for the proper application of the money, according to the trust.”¹ (a)

§ 411. **Equitable Mortgages and Liens.**— Whenever the owner of real property holds it subject to an outstanding lien or right which can be enforced only in equity, he is in a general sense a trustee for the benefit of the owner of such right. Many more instances might be given of the application of this broad principle. But it is enough here to add that some writers place equitable mortgages so called under the head of constructive trusts. Such are vendor’s liens, vendee’s liens, interests arising from the deposit of title-deeds as security for loans, etc. But these will be better understood as discussed hereafter in connection with mortgages, to which topic they more appropriately belong.

(a) This is the New York form, which adds: “And any right or title derived by him from the trustee in consideration of the payment shall not be impeached or called in question in consequence of a misapplication by the trustee of the money paid.” N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52 (Real Prop. Law), § 108, which was formerly 2 R. S. 730, § 66. *Belmont v. O’Brien*, 12 N. Y. 394; *Thomas v. Evans*, 105 N. Y. 601, 615; *Dyett v. Central Trust Co.*, 140 N. Y. 54, 69; *Knoch v. Van Bermuth*, 144 N. Y. 643, 645. But the purchaser must, at his peril, take notice of the power of sale and of any defect therein. If he have anything whatever to make him know or surmise that a breach of trust is being committed or intended, or that the power is not being properly executed, he loses the benefit of the statute. *Kirsch v. Tozier*, 143 N. Y. 390; *First Nat. Bk. v. Nat. B’way Bk.*, 156 N. Y. 459, 468; *Moore v. Amer. L. & T. Co.*, 115 N. Y. 65, 79; *Benedict v. Arnoux*, 7 App. Div. 1; *Champlin v. Haight*, 10 Paige, 274.

NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY TRUSTS.

The preceding notes have explained the special features of the New York system of trusts. These may be profitably summarized here as follows:—

1. All passive express trusts are abolished; and an attempt to create such an interest, otherwise valid, vests the legal estate in the ultimate beneficiary or beneficiaries.

2. For the purpose of preventing as far as possible all separation of the legal and equitable estates, all forms of active express trusts except five are converted into mere powers in trust. The grantee, as such, of a power in trust does not hold the legal estate (as does a trustee), but it usually vests, together with the equitable interest, in the beneficiaries of the power. The four forms of active express trusts which were at first retained (and in which, of course, the trustee has the legal estate), are: “(1) To sell real property for the benefit of creditors; (2) To sell, mortgage, or lease real property, for the benefit of annuitants or other legatees, or for

¹ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 108.

the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon; (3) To receive the rents and profits of real property, and apply them to the use of any person, during the life of that person, or for any shorter term, subject to the provisions of law relating thereto; (4) To receive the rents and profits of real property, and to accumulate the same for the purposes, and within the limits prescribed by law." And to these was added a fifth form of active express trust in 1893, in the restoration of (5) the charitable use or trust. See note at end of Chapter XXI., pp. 493-503, *supra*.

3. All the four classes of resulting trusts, except one, are left substantially unaffected by the statutes. The one affected is that which is generally discussed as the first form — where the purchase price of real property is paid by one person and the legal estate is taken in the name of another. No trust now arises in New York, in such a case, unless it must be implied in order to prevent a fraud. § 360, note (a), *supra*.

4. The constructive trusts, as worked out and implied by equity, are left practically unaffected by the statutes. Beyond the provision that a *bona-fide* purchaser need not see to the application of the purchase money (§ 410, note (a), *supra*) no one of the groups, classes, or forms is abolished; and, in so far as legislation has dealt with them, it has been for the purpose and with the result of making them more definite and certain.

The chief statutes that affect New York trusts in real property are now grouped in the Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), §§ 90-117.

CHAPTER XXIV.

(3) EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.

§ 412. Its development in connection with mortgages.

§ 413. Its nature and extent.

§ 412. **Development of Equity of Redemption in Connection with Mortgages.**— A real estate mortgage is in form an absolute conveyance, accompanied by a clause of defeasance to the effect that if money be paid or some other act or condition be performed on or before a designated day,—called the “law day,”—the conveyance shall become null and void, but otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. Before equity took any cognizance of such a contract, the courts of common law gave it a strict and rigid construction, and sustained a forfeiture of the mortgagor’s land if he let the law day pass without duly performing the condition. It was in the process of ameliorating the hardships thus frequently inflicted on mortgage borrowers that the courts of equity invented and carefully fostered the third form of equitable estate,—the “equity of redemption,”—the interest remaining in the mortgagor in consequence of the right being accorded him of redeeming the land from the mortgage, *after the law day*, by paying the principal of the debt and all accrued interest and costs down to the date of such payment. Many and varied attempts have been made by mortgagees to have this equitable right contracted away by mortgagors. But, acting on their maxim “once a mortgage always a mortgage,” the courts of equity have steadily and successfully resisted all such efforts. A fuller account of their strenuous enforcement of that maxim and their development of the modern mortgage is given hereafter.¹ It is sufficient here to state briefly the nature of the resultant equity of redemption.

§ 413. **Its Nature and Extent.**—The equity of redemption of a mortgagor still exists, as strictly and properly an equit-

¹ Chapter XXVI. *infra*.

able estate, in England, Massachusetts, and the New England states generally. In those jurisdictions, the mortgagee owns the *legal estate* in the land; and all the remaining interest, which continues even after the law day until the mortgage is foreclosed or otherwise done away with, is the mortgagor's equitable estate. Such an interest, as will be hereafter more fully explained,¹ is subject to dower, curtesy, liability for debts of its owner and *in equity* to the incidents generally of landed property ownership. The process of evolving the modern mortgage has been carried to such an extent in the other American states that the mortgagor retains the *legal estate* in the land, the mortgagee has only a lien (which is personal property), and so no equity of redemption properly so called exists. But that form of estate, as it still remains in England and New England, is here described for the sake of completeness, and is to be understood as included with the uses and trusts when general mention is hereafter made of "equitable estates."

¹ Last preceding note.

PART II.

ESTATES CLASSIFIED AS TO THEIR QUANTITY.

1. FREEHOLD.

2. LESS THAN FREEHOLD.

1. FREEHOLD ESTATES.

(1) FREEHOLD ESTATES OF INHERITANCE — FEES.

CHAPTER XXV.

QUANTITIES OF ESTATES.

§ 414. Estates freehold and less than freehold.

§ 415. Freehold estates of inheritance.

§ 414. **Estates Freehold and Less than Freehold.** — The most extensive classification of estates in real property is with reference to their quantity, or duration. Their primary division, from this point of view, is into, 1, *Freehold estates* and 2, *Estates less than freehold*.¹

1. Originally denoting merely the holding of something by a free man, "freehold" gradually came to be used to describe estates that are either heritable, or for life.² An interest that may be inherited is a fee of some kind. And for at least seven centuries the common-law meaning of "freeholder" has been one who owns realty for life or in fee.³ His interest is "an estate of inheritance or for life in real property, whether it be a corporeal or incorporeal hereditament."⁴ Thus, estates, to A during his own life, to A while B lives, to A and the heirs of his body, to A and his heirs so long as they continue to live on the land, to A and his heirs forever, are all freeholds. Such estates, moreover, are the only ones of which seisin, in its

¹ See § 71, *supra*.

² Lit. § 57; 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 357.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Blackst. Com. p. *104, Christian's note.

ordinary technical sense, can be predicated; and, as their name indicates, the feudal law, at least in its original ideal conception of them, allowed none but free men to hold them.¹ Tersely, then, a common-law freehold estate is one of which a *free man* may be *seised, for life or in fee*.² Negatively considered, it is an estate that is not measured by any definite space of time, such as days, months, or years, and does not depend on the will of any one other than its owner.³ It is in this negative aspect largely that it stands out distinct from estates less than freehold.

2. An estate less than freehold is one which, in contemplation of law, is not so great or important as a life estate. Such are all interests in real property, which are measured by any definite period of time, however long or short, as hours, days, weeks, months, or years; and all those that depend for their continuance on the will of any persons other than their owners. Illustrations are, an estate to A for five years (or for any number of years, or days, or other interval measured by a definite space of time), and to A as tenant at the will of his landlord, or during the will of himself and his landlord.⁴ These forms of interests, which always involve the relation of landlord and tenant, are of much later development than are the freeholds.⁵ Perhaps it was because tenants of realty, in the times when their law was a-making (from the twelfth century downward), were accustomed to spend large amounts of their *capital* in purchasing and speculating with these temporary interests, that they came to treat them *as capital* and to describe them as *chattels*.⁶ Certain it is that these lesser estates have ultimately

¹ Challis, R. P. 6; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 161.

² Sometimes the expression "freehold estate" is restricted to mean only an estate for life; and "the freehold" is thus frequently employed, as distinguished from the fee, or estate of inheritance. Co. Lit. 266 b, Butler's notes; 1 Leake, Land Law, 43.

³ "We may well find that a man holds land and that there is no taint of villeinage or unfreedom in the case, and yet that he has no freedom and is not a freeholder. These terms have begun to imply that the tenant holds heritably, or for life. Perhaps we shall be truer to history if we state the doctrine in a negative form: — these terms

imply that the tenant does not hold merely at the will of another, and that he does not hold for some definite space of time: a tenant at will is not a freeholder, a tenant for years is not a freeholder." 1 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 357.

⁴ See § 73, *supra*; § 561, *infra*.

⁵ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 176, 244.

⁶ *Ibid.*; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 106-117. Speaking of purchases of wardships and comparing them with purchases of leaseholds, the writers last cited (p. 116) say: "Is there any economic reason for this assimilation of a term of years to a wardship, and for the treatment of both of

come to be regarded as so far inferior to the freeholds that, whereas a freeholder owns a real-property interest which may last for life or descend to his heirs, the interest of a tenant who has only an estate less than freehold is a mere chattel, a part of his personal property.¹ The growth and great importance of this distinction will more fully appear hereafter — in the discussion of estates for years. It will suffice here to reiterate that estates less than freehold embrace, besides (1) estates for years which are *chattels real*, three forms of *chattel interests*, namely, (2) estates from year to year, including those from month to month, from week to week, etc., (3) estates at will, and (4) estates at sufferance.²

With emphasis laid on the radical distinction between freehold estates and those less than freehold, the summary of the order in which they are to be discussed in this treatise is, 1. *Freehold estates*, which are (1) fees and (2) life estates, 2. *Estates less than freehold*, which are (1) estates for years, (2) estates from year to year, (3) estates at will and (4) estates at sufferance. (a)

§ 415. **Freehold Estates of Inheritance.** — Dividing the freehold estates, as already explained, into (1) those of inheritance and (2) those not of inheritance — fees and life estates — the first of these present the interests of largest extent. They are

(a) In New York, with respect to their quantity, “Estates in real property are divided into estates of inheritance, estates for life, estates for years, estates at will, and by sufferance. . . . Estates of inheritance and for life shall continue to be termed estates of freehold; estates for years are chattels real; and estates at will or by sufferance continue to be chattel interests, but not liable as such to sale on execution.” Real Prop. L. (L. 1909, ch. 52) §§ 30, 33, originally 1 R. S. 722, § 1, 5. Practically these are merely terse groupings of common-law classes of estates. This division of the estates less than freehold is more fully examined hereafter. See § 561, *infra*.

them as bequeathable chattels? We believe that there is, namely, the investment of capital, and by the way we will remark that the word *cattallum*, if often it must be translated by our *chattel*, must at others be rendered by our *capital*. . . . Now it is very natural that a man who invests a round sum should wish for a power of bequest. The invested sum is an utterly different thing from the landed estate which he would desire to keep in his family. And then, as to the

term of years, we believe that in the twelfth century and yet later, this stands often, if not generally, in the same economic category. It is a beneficial lease bought for a sum of ready money; it is an investment of capital, and therefore for testamentary purposes it is *quasi cattallum*.”

¹ Bract. bk. ii, ch. ix. fol. 27; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *143.

² § 73, *supra*.

capable of descending from ancestor to heir by the law of descent. They are interests that may endure forever. And although any individual owner can not enjoy them, of course, for longer than during his life, yet they are vastly greater than his life in their own duration or capability of duration.¹ Such an estate, when it is not only capable of perpetual duration but is also devoid of any defeasible, conditional, or determinable characteristic, so that its owner has an absolute dominion of an endless interest, is a fee simple. It is an estate to one and his heirs forever.² On the other hand, an estate of inheritance, which is not thus absolute but is defeasible or determinable because of some condition, qualification, or restriction, so that while it may continue indefinitely beyond the life of its owner yet he may not have an absolute dominion of an endless interest, is a qualified fee. Such is an estate to A and the heirs of his body, or to A and his heirs provided they do not sell intoxicating liquor on the premises, or to A and his heirs so long as they live on the land, or to A and his heirs till they cease to live there and then to B and his heirs. These latter are fees, which may descend to heirs; but they are qualified fees because they may not last forever.³ Dividing, therefore, the fees or estates of inheritance into their two natural classes, *a. Fee simple* — the highest and greatest in quantity, an absolute dominion of an endless interest, and *b. Qualified fees* — determinable estates of inheritance which may not amount to absolute dominion of endless interests; the former of these is to be first explained; and then the latter are to be discussed in their four divisions of (a) fee tail, (b) fee on condition, (c) fee on limitation, and (d) fee on conditional limitation.⁴

¹ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 72, note 9.

² § 72, *supra*.

³ Various adjectives, such as limited, base, restricted, determinable, qualified, etc., have been used by different writers to describe the fees which are not fees simple. For the sake of clearness, the word qualified is exclusively employed in this treatise to describe them as a large and distinct group. The expres-

sion "base fee" is frequently, and perhaps most accurately, used to denote only a fee tail. See 1 Prest. Est. pp. *25-*60; Chase's Blackst. pp. 293, 294; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 224.

⁴ Brief descriptions and illustrations of these four forms of qualified fees are given at pp. 86, 87, *supra*. They are fully explained, in connection with qualified estates generally, in ch. IV, *infra*.

CHAPTER XXVI.

a. ESTATES IN FEE SIMPLE.

§ 416. Meanings of fee — Fee simple.

§ 417. Nature of estate in fee simple.

§ 418. Use of "Heirs" in creating or transferring fee simple — Words of limitation.

§ 419. Common-law exceptions to requirement of the word "Heirs."

§ 420. Statutory changes as to

use of "Heirs," or other words of inheritance.

§ 421. Alienability of estates in fee simple can not be materially restricted.

§ 422. Use and enjoyment of estates in fee simple may be restricted.

§ 423. Estates in fee simple have ordinary incidents of real property interests.

§ 416. Meanings of Fee — Fee Simple. — The word "fee" is primarily synonymous with "feud" or "fief." To hold in fee meant originally to hold as the feudal vassal of another. But, after all the land in England except that retained personally by the king came to be held by tenure, and lawyers ceased to discuss whether or not it was so held, fee gradually acquired its present, secondary meaning of an estate of inheritance. And such is now its uniform signification in the common law.¹ Since the end of the thirteenth century, it has also been settled that such an estate, when unrestricted and indefeasible, shall be denominated a fee simple, or by some authorities a fee simple absolute.² But the word "absolute" adds nothing to the expression "fee simple"; and to-day the single word "fee," when no adjective or qualification is used, is commonly employed to mean a fee simple. When any other kind of fee is meant, this appears from some restrictive word or explanatory context.³ The estate, then, which is

¹ Lit. § 1; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *105, *106; p. 344, *supra*.

² 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 13, 19. "Of fee simple," says Lord Coke, "it is commonly holden that there be three kinds, viz., fee simple absolute, fee simple conditional,

and fee simple qualified, or a base fee." 1 Inst. 1, b. He thus uses *fee simple* in the sense in which *fee* alone is now commonly employed.

³ Ibid.; Cruise, Dig. tit. i. § 42; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 162.

greatest in quantity — the entire and absolute interest and property in the land — is the *fee simple*, sometimes though not now commonly styled a *fee simple absolute*, and ordinarily denoted by the single word *fee* when used without any qualification. (a)

§ 417. **Nature of Estate in Fee Simple.** — It is because the lawyer contemplates an acre of land, or generally any other piece of real property (object of ownership), as something which will continue in existence forever, that estates in these things form the subject-matter of so much law. Endless duration, and consequently endless varieties of interests, are incidents of most real objects. And he who owns the limitless interest in one of those objects has an estate in it in fee simple.¹ An unbroken straight line, stretching from the property away to infinity, conceived of as time is frequently imaged, may be suggested as the most adequate symbol of this greatest of estates.² Such a concept will clarify many problems of real property law.³ Definite or finite pieces of that line, to any number, may be cut off and dealt with — many lesser interests, such as life estates or estates for years, may be carved out of the endless one, the fee simple — yet the residue remains infinite in extent — is still a fee simple.⁴ “An estate in fee simple is the entire and absolute interest and property in land; from which it follows that no one can have a greater estate. So that whenever a person grants an estate in fee simple, he cannot make any further disposition of it, because he has already granted

(a) The New York statute declares that, — “An estate of inheritance continues to be termed a fee simple, or fee, and, when not defeasible or conditional, a fee simple absolute, or an absolute fee.” Real Prop. L. (L. 1909, ch. 52) § 31, originally 1 R. S. 722, § 2. But, as at common law, so here still, notwithstanding the statute, the expressions “fee” (when unrestricted), “fee simple” and “fee simple absolute” have all the same meaning; and they all stand opposed to a qualified fee. *Jackson v. Van Zandt*, 12 Johns. 169, 177; *Lotz v. Wykoff*, 2 N. Y. 355, 357.

¹ Lit. § 11; 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 104.

² “Proprietary rights in land are, we may say, projected upon the plane of time. The category of quantity, of duration, is applied to them. The life tenant’s rights are a finite quantity; the fee tenant’s rights are an infinite,

or potentially infinite, quantity; we see a difference in respect of duration, and this is the one fundamental difference.” 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 10.

³ See § 861, *infra*.

⁴ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 11.

away the whole interest; consequently nothing remains in him."¹

§ 418. Use of "Heirs" in creating or transferring Fee Simple — Words of Limitation. — An estate in fee simple is one generally conveyed to a person "and his heirs," or, as the usual form is, to him "and his heirs forever." The essential word here is "*heirs*," in the plural number. And in the ordinary common-law creation or transfer of such an estate no synonym, no expression of intent, no circumlocution can supply its place.² Thus, a deed of land to A, simply, or "to A and his heir" (using the word "heir" in the singular),³ or "to A and his children or issue," or "to A forever," or "to A in fee simple," or "to A and his children, descendants, relatives, successors, executors, administrators and assigns forever," transfers to A only a life estate, and not a fee of any kind, unless he can base his claim to the greater interest on some statutory abolition or change of this stringent demand for "heirs."⁴ The reason for so strict a requirement is found in the growth of the power to alienate realty in feudal times. The transfer of tenements to one "and his heirs," when first employed, was regarded as giving them to him during his life, and then to his heirs. And, in order to sell them, he must get the consent of his heirs, apparent, or presumptive.⁵ But as early at least as the first part of the thirteenth century this restraint had disappeared; and the use of the word "heirs" in giving a man an estate had assumed the legal aspect which still belongs to it — had come to indicate that he to whom the land was thus conveyed was to have the perpetual ownership of it, so that he might dispose of it without asking the consent of any heir, and so that, upon his death still owning it, it might descend by operation of law from him to his heirs.⁶ The phraseology to one "and his heirs" had not changed; its meaning had changed. And, accordingly, the common-law

¹ Cruise, Dig. tit. i. § 44; Lott v. Wykoff, 2 N. Y. 355, 357; Haynes v. Bowen, 42 Vt. 686.

² Co. Lit. s b, 42 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *107; Wms. R. P. pp. *144, *145; Adams v. Ross, 30 N. J. L. 505; Morrison v. Schorr, 197 Ill. 554.

³ Ibid.; 2 Prest. Est. p. *8. And, although this has been questioned, it seems still to be the rule, at least with the exception of cases in which "heir" is shown to be used in the sense of

"heirs." See 4 Kent's Com. p. *6, note (b).

⁴ Clearwater v. Rose, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 137; Miller v. McAlister, 197 Ill. 72; Sedgwick v. Laffin, 10 Allen (Mass.), 430; Trusdell v. Lehman, 47 N. J. Eq. 218; Oyster v. Knull, 137 Pa. St. 448; Chew v. Kellar, 171 Mo. 215; Holland v. Keyes, 24 R. I. 289.

⁵ See § 276, *supra*.

⁶ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 13.

judges have continuously insisted that the word "heirs," and ordinarily no other form of word or words, shall be requisite to the creation or transfer of an estate in fee simple.¹ A conveyance to a man "and his *right heirs*," frequently mentioned in the older books and cases, is the same as to him "and his heirs."² It is to be noted with care, as explaining much of the law of estates, that the word "heirs," thus used in its general sense, does not indicate that the heir or heirs of the grantee or donee take any interest in the property by or through the instrument of transfer; but it is the technical, legal term necessary to express the fact that the donee or grantee himself takes *all* the interest in fee simple — a grant "to A and his heirs" gives nothing to A's heirs, but all to A.³ The formal expression of this historical and important result is that "heirs" so employed is a word of *limitation*, and not of *purchase*.⁴ It explains, defines, or outlines, and in that sense *limits*, the estate of the donee or grantee — the estate of A in the above illustration — and gives to *him* a fee. If his heirs ever obtain it, they will not do so as *purchasers* in this transaction, this grant or gift to him; but by descent from him at the time of his death, by another transaction, the operation of law in casting it upon them as his heirs. In the meantime, since it is all his, he may dispose of it if he wish, so that they may never obtain it at all. A few comparative illustrations may help to emphasize this far-reaching distinction.⁵ A deed of land "to A and B" transfers a part of it to each of them; and both take their interests by *purchase* through the deed. A devise "to A and his children" gives a share of it to A and a share to each of his children as *purchasers*. So, a grant of

¹ Last five preceding notes.

² Co. Lit. 22 b.

³ "One of the first points about which the law has to make up its mind is as to the meaning of a gift to a man 'and his heirs.' The growing power of alienation has here raised a question. Down to the end of the twelfth century the tenant in fee who wished to alienate had very commonly to seek the consent of his apparent or presumptive heirs. . . . But early in the next century this restraint silently disappeared. The tenant in fee could alienate the land away from his heir. This having been decided, it became plain that the words

'and his heirs' did not give the heir any rights, did not decree that the heir must have the land. They merely showed that the donee had 'an estate' that would endure at least so long as any heir of his was living." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 13.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *107; 1 Prest. Est. p. *264; 4 Kent's Com. p. *215; Bisson v. West Shore R. Co., 143 N. Y. 125, 130; Cole v. Lake Co., 54 N. H. 242, 279; Lavis v. Sturgeon, 198 Ill. 520.

⁵ This is the principle of the famous rule in Shelley's case, which is explained in connection with contingent remainders, §§ 892-896, *infra*.

realty to "A and his brothers," "to A and his partners," etc., in and of itself causes each of the grantees named to own an interest in it by *purchase*.¹ But, in the one unique case where "heirs" as such are nominally grantees or donees, they are not so in fact, they take nothing by the deed or devise; and a transfer "to A and his heirs" gives all to A and nothing to his heirs, and simply uses the latter word to indicate that fact — to designate the infinite *limitation* of A's fee simple.² Of course, this effect is not given to the word "heirs," when it is not used in its technical sense, as meaning *all* those blood-relatives of the grantee or donee, whether near or remote, who could inherit real property from him.³ Thus, a grant or devise "to A and his heirs," where the context shows, as it now and then does in wills, and sometimes in other instruments, that the meaning is "to A and his *children*," or to him and certain known nephews, etc., so that "heirs" is employed simply as *personæ designatæ*, gives only a part of the entire estate to A, and the residue to the other donees thus indicated. In such cases, which are infrequent, "heirs" is a word of purchase.⁴

§ 419. **Common-law Exceptions to Requirement of the word "Heirs."**—Upon the general rule, however, that the word "heirs" is necessary to create an estate in fee, several exceptions have been engrafted by the common law. And, *first*, in construing wills, since the primary quest is for the testator's intention, if it appear from the language employed that it was desired by him that the devisee take a fee, that quantity of estate will pass, though the word "heirs" be omitted.⁵ But the courts will not strain after a fee even in a will; and they give the devisee no more than a life estate, unless the language of the instrument itself shows the greater interest to be clearly intended.⁶ Besides expressions which directly state that intention, such for example as a devise to one "in fee simple," or

¹ See, also, title by purchase explained, § 995, *infra*.

² Last two preceding notes.

³ "A class or denomination of persons to take in succession, from generation to generation." 1 Prest. Est. p. *264; 4 Kent's Com. p. *215.

⁴ Luddington v. Kime, 1 Ld. Raym. 203; De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566, 572; Bisson v. West Shore R. Co., 143 N. Y. 125, 130.

⁵ Co. Lit. 9 b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *108; Holdfast v. Marten, 1 T. R. 411; Barber v. Pittsburgh, etc. Railway, 166 U. S. 83; Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Cal. Rep. (N. Y.) 345; Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629; 2 Sharsw. & Budd, Lead. Cas. R. P. pp. 57-73.

⁶ Ibid.; Wright v. Page, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 204; Jackson v. Wells, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 222; 4 Kent's Com. p. *7; 2 Jarm. Wills, ch. xxxiii.

“forever,” or “absolutely,” or of all the testator’s estate, or of all his property,¹ a gift by will of realty accompanied by an absolute power of disposition in the donee, or requiring unlimited control of the property to insure its adequate enjoyment, transfers a fee simple.² Thus, a devise of wild or timbered land, which a life owner ordinarily can not enjoy without committing waste by cutting off the timber, confers this greatest of estates.³ And so does a devise of realty, with a charge on it of a designated amount of money to be paid by the donee *personally*; for, if he had no more than a life tenancy, he might not be able to get that amount out of the property during the continuance of his estate.⁴ But a mere charge on the *property* devised, and not on the beneficiary personally, does not show that his estate is intended to be a fee.⁵ *Second*, in transfers of realty to corporations, whether made by deed or will, the word “heirs” is not necessary to pass a fee simple. This is because a corporation has no heirs; and also because a corporation aggregate, which is the only kind recognized in this country, is regarded by the common law as having perpetual existence, and so a life estate for it is an endless interest, a fee simple.⁶ A conveyance to a corporation sole, in England, is made to it “and its successors,” in order to confer a fee. And in practice both there and here, though without any legal requirement, the same expression is used in transfers in fee simple to all kinds of corporations.⁷ *Third*, in the absence of a contrary intent clearly evinced, a trustee takes as great

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *108; *Bridge-water v. Bolton*, 6 Mod. 106, 109; *Barber v. Pittsburgh, etc. Railway*, 166 U. S. 83, 100; *Newkerk v. Newkerk*, 2 Cai. Rep. (N. Y.) 345; *Jackson v. Merrill*, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 185; *Lincoln v. Lincoln*, 107 Mass. 590; *Forsaith v. Clark*, 21 N. H. 409; *Arnold v. Lincoln*, 8 R. I. 384.

² Co. Lit. 9 b; *Barford v. Street*, 16 Ves. 135; *Terry v. Wiggins*, 47 N. Y. 512; *Taggart v. Murray*, 53 N. Y. 233, 238; *Kelley v. Meins*, 135 Mass. 231; *Second Ref. Presby. Ch. v. Disbrow*, 52 Pa. St. 219; *Markillie v. Ragland*, 77 Ill. 98.

³ *Sargent v. Towne*, 10 Mass. 303. As to what constitutes waste, and how readily such lands as these are wasted, see § 552, *infra*.

⁴ *Doe v. Richards*, 3 T. R. 356; *Wright v. Page*, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 204, 231; *Jackson v. Merrill*, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 185, 190; *Parker v. Parker*, 5 Met. (Mass.) 134; *King v. Cole*, 6 R. I. 584; *Funk v. Eggleston*, 92 Ill. 515; *Cruise, Dig. tit. xxxviii. ch. 13, §§ 28, 33*.

⁵ *Wright v. Page*, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 204, 231; *Jackson v. Bull*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 148; *Cruise, Dig. tit. xxxviii. ch. 13, §§ 31-33*.

⁶ Co. Lit. 9 b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *109; *Wilkesbarre v. Wyoming Hist. Soc.*, 134 Pa. St. 616; *Wilcox v. Wheeler*, 47 N. H. 488.

⁷ *Ibid.*; 2 Prest. Est. pp. *6, *43; 4 Kent’s Com. p. *7; *Overseers of Poor v. Sears*, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 126.

an interest in the property as he needs in order to perform the requirements of the trust, and no more. Therefore, the word "heirs" is not demanded to give him a fee simple, if his duties require him to own so great a legal estate; and the mere use of that word does not confer on him a fee when it is not requisite to the due performance of his trust.² This exception is to be carefully understood as applying only to the interest of the trustee, — to the legal estate in his hands. The common-law rule requiring "heirs" to transfer a fee applies to most equitable estates, including those of *cestuis que trustent*, of executed trusts at least, as well as to most legal estates.³ *Fourth*, joint tenants whose co-ownership of the real property is in fee simple may, by mere releases to each other in which the word "heirs" is not employed, obtain a divided piece for each, to be thereafter owned separately in fee simple.⁴ And the same is true of a partition by judicial proceedings among any kind of co-owners.⁵ But, because tenants in common do not each own all the property (as in theory of law joint tenants do), but each owns only an undivided interest, if they voluntarily partition it without the judgment or decree of any court, the common law requires the use of "heirs," in order that each may obtain a fee in the parcel thus assigned to him.⁶ *Fifth*, the once-used but now discarded forms of transferring real property by means of fines and common recoveries, which will be explained hereafter, operated to transfer a fee without the use of "heirs."⁷ And legislative grants, and

¹ See p. 496, *supra*.

² *Ibid.*; *Hopkins v. Grimshaw*, 165 U. S. 342, 352; *Losey v. Stanley*, 147 N. Y. 560, 567; *Crane v. Bolles*, 49 N. J. Eq. 373; *Dorr v. Clapp*, 160 Mass. 538; *Phillips v. Swank*, 120 Pa. St. 76; *Hawkins v. Chapman*, 36 Md. 83; *West v. Fitz*, 109 Ill. 425; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 312-320.

³ *Lucas v. Brandreth*, 28 Beav. 274; *McElroy v. McElroy*, 113 Mass. 509; 1 *Lewin on Trusts*, p. *109. But, of course, the word "heirs" is not needed in creating a trust implied by law. And in executory trusts, and according to some authorities in most trust interests, the general rule requiring "heirs" to convey a fee is much relaxed by the common law. See *Ball v. Woolfolk*, 175 Mo. 278 *Fisher v. Fields*, 10 Johns.

(N. Y.) 495; 1 *Perry on Trusts*, §§ 357-359; § 309, *supra*.

⁴ *Co. Lit.* 9 b; 2 *Prest. Est.* pp. *56, *58, *62; 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *7.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ 2 *Prest. Est.* pp. *56, *58. It is more fully explained hereafter (§ 673) that each of several joint tenants in fee simple is seised of the entire property in fee simple; and therefore a release to him by the others of any part of it, though "heirs" be omitted from the instrument, leaves him still seised, but now absolutely and alone, of that part in fee simple. This is not true of tenants in common; but each of such owners is seised of an undivided interest only.

⁷ 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *7; § 1174, *infra*.

conveyances by the crown or state generally, may now do the same when such an intent is clear.¹ And, *lastly*, rather by way of qualification than exception to the general rule, it is to be noted that, when a deed which omits "heirs" refers back to another deed in the chain of title and purports to convey the same interest that it conveyed, and the latter deed contains the word "heirs" and so transferred a fee, the former does the same, because it incorporates the latter into itself.² It is to be added also that, when the word "heirs" is omitted from an instrument because of fraud or mistake, and no adverse rights of innocent purchasers or encumbrancers for value have intervened, a court of equity may reform it, by spelling that word into its proper place in the instrument.³

§ 420. **Statutory Changes as to Use of "Heirs" or Other Words of Inheritance.** — In England and most of the states of this country, statutes have done away with the necessity for the use of the word "heirs" in creating or conveying an estate in fee simple.⁴ By devise in nearly all the states, and in a large majority of them by deed, the entire estate of the grantor or testator passes, unless an intent to transfer a lesser interest appears expressly or by necessary implication.⁵ Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and South Carolina are among the few states that have made this change as to wills, but not as to deeds.⁶ Of course, none of these statutory modifications are or could be retroactive. And, therefore, the examiner of title must note the time of the change in the place where the land is situated, and insist in the ordinary case on evidence of the use of the word "heirs," to show that a fee was created or granted before that date. (a)

(a) The New York Revised Statutes (1 R. S. 748, §§ 1, 2) reversed the common-law presumption, as it is explained in the text that the statutes

¹ Rutherford *v.* Greene's Heirs, 15 U. S. (2 Wheat.) 196.

² Co. Lit. 9 b; 2 Prest. Est. p. *2; Lemon *v.* Graham, 131 Pa. St. 447; Evans *v.* Brady, 79 Md. 142.

³ Glenorchy *v.* Bosville, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 20, note; Chamberlain *v.* Thompson, 10 Conn. 243; McMillan *v.* Fish, 29 N. J. Eq. 610; Vickers *v.* Leigh, 104 N. C. 248; Bispham's Prin. Eq., §§ 468, 469.

⁴ 1 Vict. ch. 26, § 28; 44 & 45 Vict. ch. 41; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52,

§ 240; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1474, 2808.

⁵ Ibid.; Crain *v.* Wright, 114 N. Y. 307, 310; Davis *v.* Ripley, 194 Ill. 399; Griffiths *v.* Griffiths, 198 Ill. 632; Yocum *v.* Siler, 160 Mo. 281; Sears *v.* Ackerman, 138 Cal. 583; Whitfield *v.* Garriss, 131 N. C. 148.

⁶ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1474, 2808; Feit *v.* Richard, 64 N. J. Eq. 16; Akl *v.* Bosler, 175 Pa. St. 526; *In re* Bella's Est., 176 Pa. St. 122; Dougherty *v.* Wellinger, 207 Pa. St. 601.

§ 421. **Alienability of Estates in Fee Simple can not be materially Restricted.** — It is because an estate in fee simple is all the interest in the property — the straight line of ownership stretching away to infinity — and there can be nothing beyond, that logically, and in most cases actually, he who disposes of it can place no restraint on its subsequent alienation. He parts with all that he has, and therefore his control over it should cease.¹ It has been heretofore explained, as a historical fact, that this result emerged out of and superior to the feudal restrictions, chiefly by virtue of the statute of *quia emptores*.² That famous legislative landmark not only forbade subinfeudation, except by the king's tenants and with his consent, but it also removed practically all power from a transferor of an estate in fee simple to restrict the right of alienation by his transferee.³ And therefore the statement is generally true, except perhaps in the few jurisdictions in which the statute of *quia emptores* is not in force, that the owner of such an estate must have the right to dispose of it when and how he may please.⁴ He can not, for example, be prohibited from selling it without the consent of his grantor; nor can he be required, when he sells, to pay any portion of his purchase price as a fine or other

of so many states have done; and accordingly, since January 1, 1830, a grantor or testator is regarded as conveying all the estate he has, unless he indicates a contrary intent. The present form of the statute is as follows: — "The term 'heirs,' or other words of inheritance, are not requisite to create or convey an estate in fee. . . . Every instrument creating, transferring, assigning, or surrendering an estate or interest in real property must be construed according to the intent of the parties, so far as such intent can be gathered from the whole instrument, and is consistent with the rules of law." Real Prop. L. § 240; *Guernsey v. Guernsey*, 36 N. Y. 267, 268; *Heath v. Barmore*, 50 N. Y. 302, 306; *Crain v. Wright*, 114 N. Y. 307. But in practice nearly every grantor, intending to convey a fee, still employs the word "heirs," conveying to the grantee "his heirs and assigns forever." And, although it might be omitted with impunity, the word "heirs" is inserted in the short forms of deeds and mortgages which since 1890 have been prescribed by the statutes. Real Prop. L. § 258.

¹ Co. Lit. 223 a; *In re Rosher*, 26 Ch. Div. 801; *Potter v. Couch*, 141 U. S. 296, 315; *Van Rensselaer v. Hays*, 19 N. Y. 68; *Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Grace Church*, 53 N. J. Eq. 413; *Cushing v. Spalding*, 164 Mass. 287; *Ricks v. Pope*, 129 N. C. 52; *Prey v. Stanley*, 110 Cal. 423.

² § 280, *supra*.

³ *Ibid.*; § 291, *supra*.

⁴ Last three preceding notes. The formal statement of this radical principle is that attempted restrictions on the alienation of an estate in fee simple are void, because repugnant to the nature of the estate.

return to his grantor.¹ Neither can real property be given to one in fee simple so that it can not be legally taken from him involuntarily, as for example on execution for the payment of his debts.²

So far as legal estates in fee simple are concerned, this important incident is so absolute that its few exceptions, made by some courts, are to be treated as departures, dictated by expediency or local requirement in particular instances.³ Thus, because of the vital interest which a church society or organization has in the character and personnel of its pewholders, it has been permitted to grant a pew right in fee simple and validly to restrict or forbid the alienation of that right by the grantee.⁴ So, while an attempted prohibition against the transfer of an interest in fee simple to any one other than a designated person or number of persons, or for a very long time, is void practically everywhere; yet it has been held by some courts, though strongly denied by others, that restrictions preventing sales to one or more certain persons named, or for a short *reasonable* time, as for example until the grantee becomes twenty-five years of age, should be enforced.⁵

Equitable estates in fee simple are also generally subject to this stringent principle which forbids restraints on their alienability.⁶ But, in favor of effectual settlements in trust for married women, courts of equity, since the beginning of the

¹ *In re Rosher*, 26 Ch. Div. 801, 806; *De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467; N. Y. Const. (1894), Art. I, § 14; Gray, *Restraints on Alienation*, §§ 25, 55.

² *In re Dugdale*, 38 Ch. Div. 176; *Hahn v. Hutchinson*, 159 Pa. St. 133; *Van Osdel v. Champion*, 89 Wis. 661.

³ But see 1 Prest. Est. pp. *477, *478, "The right of alienation is an inherent and inseparable quality of an estate in fee simple. In a devise of land in fee simple, therefore, a condition against all alienation is void, because repugnant to the estate devised. For the same reason, a limitation over, in case the first devisee shall alien, is equally void, whether the estate be legal or equitable." *Potter v. Couch*, 141 U. S. 296, 315.

⁴ *French v. Old South Society*, 106 Mass. 479. So, a grant by the state or federal government, to incapacitated persons, such as improvident Indians

for example, may restrain the grantee's power of alienation. *Schrimscher v. Stockton*, 183 U. S. 290, 294. See *Aylward v. O'Brien*, 160 Mass. 118.

⁵ In favor of the validity of such restrictions as these when *reasonable*, see *Attwater v. Attwater*, 18 Beav. 330; *Cowell v. Springs Co.*, 100 U. S. 55, 57; *Ex parte Watts*, 130 N. C. 237; *Wallace v. Smith*, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 139; *Winsor v. Mills*, 157 Mass. 362; Lit. § 361; Co. Lit. 223; 1 Prest. Est. pp. *477, *478. *Contra*, *Barnard's Lessee v. Bailey*, 2 Har. (Del.) 56; *Good v. Fichthorn*, 144 Pa. St. 287; 4-Kent's Com. p. *131.

⁶ *Potter v. Couch*, 141 U. S. 296, 315; *Sears v. Choate*, 146 Mass. 395; *Taylor v. Harwell*, 65 Ala. 1. But see *Goe's Estate*, 146 Pa. St. 431; *Claffin v. Claffin*, 149 Mass. 19; *Gunn v. Brown*, 63 Md. 96.

nineteenth century,¹ have permitted separate use estates to be made for them in fee with the addition of the enforceable "clause against anticipation." And, as heretofore explained, this restriction is effectual in England, and most of the states of this country, whenever and so long as the beneficiary is under coverture.² So, charitable trust interests, as heretofore explained, may be made in fee simple and inalienable.³ In some states, such as New York, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, where the statutes prevent an express private trust from being made in fee, of course no question as to restraining alienation of such an interest can be material.⁴ And all implied trusts are everywhere alienable, for in raising them the law does not imply any restriction.

The alienability of estates less than a fee may generally be restrained or prevented;⁵ and, of course, the contingent nature of any interest may render its disposition impossible for a time, as for example where a remainder in fee or of any lesser estate is devised to an unborn person, and so can not be aliened while that person is not in existence. But he who lives and certainly owns a fee simple must ordinarily own it together with the absolute power of alienation. (a)

(a) In New York, before the adoption of the constitution of 1846, provisions were frequently placed in conveyances of estates in fee, as well as in those for years or for lives, by which the grantees or lessees were restrained from conveying their interests without paying to their grantors or lessors a designated portion, as one-fourth, one-eighth, etc., of the purchase money received on such re-sales. These were called quarter sales, eighth sales, etc. Those restrictions were held to be valid, as affecting life estates and estates for years; but it was ultimately decided that they were invalid, as to estates in fee simple. *De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467, which is good law on this point, though overruled (by *Van Rensselaer v. Hays*, 19 N. Y. 68) in so far as it held that the statute of *quia emptores* was not operative in New York; *Overbagh v. Patrie*, 8 Barb. 28, aff'd 6 N. Y. 510. All such clogs on alienation of fees simple are now expressly prohibited by a constitutional provision, which was first adopted in 1846, and reads as follows: "All fines, quarter sales, or other like restraints upon

¹ Soon after the decision of *Pybus v. Smith* (1796), 3 Bro. C. C. 340, in which it was held that without any clause against anticipation she might encumber her separate use estate. *Parkes v. White*, 11 Ves. 221; 2 *Lewin on Trusts*, p. *781.

² § 336, *supra*.

³ § 350, *supra*.

⁴ See § 963, *infra*.

⁵ *Anderson v. Anderson*, 164 Pa. St. 338; *Lewis v. Lewis*, 74 Conn. 630; 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *131, note 1. But this is denied, as to life estates, by some authorities. See *Pritchard v. Bailey*, 113 N. C. 521; *Case v. Green*, 78 Mich. 540; 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *131, note 1; *Gray, Restraints on Alienation* (2d ed.), §§ 140, 269.

§ 422. **Use and Enjoyment of Estates in Fee Simple may be Restricted.** — On the other hand, the enjoyment and use of property conveyed in fee simple may be validly limited, so long as it is left reasonably useful to its owner for the purposes for which it was transferred to him. Covenants against nuisances, so-called, forbidding designated kinds of trade or business on the land, and restrictions as to the nature or location of buildings to be erected are prominent and frequent examples of such restraints.¹ Many concrete illustrations of these have been heretofore given, in the discussion of equitable easements.²

It is obvious that, accurately speaking, limitations on the use of realty by one who has an estate in fee simple must be in the form of covenants, rather than conditions. For, when a condition subsequent is annexed to an estate conveyed to one and his heirs, his interest becomes a fee on condition, and not a fee simple.³ A grant of land to A and his heirs, with a *covenant* in the deed that intoxicating liquor shall not be sold on the premises, gives him a fee simple restricted as to its use. But a grant to him, *on condition* that no intoxicating liquor shall

alienation, reserved in any grant of lands hereafter to be made, shall be void." Const. of 1894, Art. 1, § 14. With the statute of *quia emptores* and this positive constitutional declaration both in force, there can be no doubt of the general alienability of estates in fee simple in New York.

¹ Trustees *v.* Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. *v.* Brennan, 148 N. Y. 661; Cowell *v.* Spring Co., 100 U. S. 55; Bronson *v.* Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 118 Mass. 156; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. *v.* Priest, 131 Ind. 413. A form of a stringent covenant of this character is as follows: "And the party of the second part, for himself, his heirs and assigns, doth hereby covenant to and with the said parties of the first part, their successors and assigns, and with the owners for the time being of the adjacent lots jointly and severally, that neither the said party of the second part, nor his heirs or assigns, shall or will, at any time hereafter, erect any building within forty feet of the front part of the premises, except of brick or stone, with roofs of slate or metal, and will not erect or permit upon any part of said premises, any slaughter-house, smith-shop, forge, furnace, steam

engine, brass foundry, nail or other iron factory, or any manufactory of gun-powder, glue, varnish, vitriol, ink, or turpentine, or for the tanning, dressing, or preparing of skins, hides, or leather, nor any brewery, or distillery, nor any stable of any kind, coal yard, meat shop, tallow chandlery, or any manufactory of glass or petroleum, or any cooper's, carpenter's or cabinet maker's shop, or any establishment for keeping skins, sugar refinery, bakery, drinking or lager beer establishment, circus, menagerie, public show or exhibition of animals, railroad depot or stable, car, engine or tenement house, nor any other noxious or offensive thing, trade or business." Such restrictions are very common in deeds of city lots. They are further discussed hereafter, in the chapter on covenants in deeds.

² §§ 148-152, *supra*.

³ §§ 82, 83, *supra*.

ever be sold on the land, gives him a fee on condition and not a fee simple.¹ Hence, while it is everywhere held that any such condition as the latter is valid, provided it does not practically destroy all utility of the land;² yet it is clear that, in its very nature, it can not be a restriction on an estate in fee simple.

§ 423. **Estates in Fee Simple have all ordinary Incidents of Real-Property Interests.**—Since a fee simple is the largest possible interest, it has all the positive incidents and its owner has all the rights and privileges, that may be associated with any estate in real property. Therefore, subject to any restrictions under which he may have taken it, and subject also to the mandate of the maxim *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*, its owner when in possession may use it for any purpose and in any manner that he may choose;³ he may cut timber, open and work mines, cultivate the soil even to exhaustion, build or pull down houses, commit waste, or injure or destroy any part of it as he may please.⁴ Not only does he have the right to sell or otherwise to dispose of it as a whole, but he may grant or convey out of it any inferior interests, such as estates for years, for life, or in tail.⁵ He may devise it by his will, or let it descend to his heirs on his dying intestate. If he leave no lineal descendant, it may be inherited by his collateral or remote relatives, according to the rules of descent.⁶ And when he dies owning it, intestate and without heirs, it escheats to the crown in England, and in this country to the state.⁷ The wife of an owner in fee simple, who is seised of it, has dower in the property; and the husband of such an owner has curtesy.⁸ This greatest of estates may be reached on execution for the debts of its owner; and after his death it may be sold to pay them, by judicial decree.⁹ It may be disposed of by the public authorities for the

¹ *Ibid.*; § 711, *infra*.

² *Cowell v. Spring Co.*, 100 U. S. 55; *Plumb v. Tnbbs*, 41 N. Y. 442; *Trustees of Union College v. City of New York*, 173 N. Y. 38; *Smith v. Barrie*, 56 Mich. 319; *Sheppard's Touchst.* 129, 131.

³ *Duke of Norfolk v. Arbutnot*, 4 C. P. Div. 290; *Booth v. R. W. & O. T. R. Co.*, 140 N. Y. 267; *Bates v. Holbrook*, 171 N. Y. 460; *Westcott v. Middleton*, 43 N. J. Eq. 478; *Garland v. Towne*, 55 N. H. 55.

⁴ *Ibid.*; 3 Blackst. Com. p. *223;

Wms. R. P. p. *79; 1 Leake, Land Law, 15.

⁵ Wms. R. P. p. *79; Greenl. Cruise, Dig. tit. i. §§ 44-50.

⁶ Lit. §§ 1, 2; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *208-*237; § 91, *supra*; §§ 985-987, *infra*.

⁷ §§ 261, 290, *supra*.

⁸ See dower and curtesy defined, p. 88, *supra*, and discussed, ch. xxx-xxxiv, *infra*.

⁹ But, in most states, the personal property of the debtor must be first exhausted. P. 9, *supra*; 3 Freeman, Executions, § 372 *et seq.*

payment of taxes, water rents, or assessments. And, when needed for public purposes, it may be taken by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.¹ In a word, it is the greatest of all the estates and has all the positive incidents of any estate.

¹ § 180, *supra*.

CHAPTER XXVII.

b. QUALIFIED FEES.

§ 424. Meaning and kinds of qualified fees.

(a) *Estates in Fee Tail.*

§ 425. Fee conditional, at common law.

§ 426. The statute *de donis conditionalibus*.

§ 427. Fee tail, or estate tail — Result of the statute *de donis*.

§ 428. Estates tail at first inalienable — Injurious results.

§ 429. How estates tail were made alienable.

§ 430. Requisites and kinds of estates tail.

§ 431. Incidents of estates tail.

§ 432. Estates tail at present in England and in the United States.

(b) *Estates in Fee on Condition.*

§ 433. Nature and creation of fees on condition.

§ 434. Distinctive features of fees on condition.

(c) *Estates in Fee on Limitation.*

§ 435. Nature and creation of fees on limitation.

§ 436. Distinctive features of fees on limitation.

(d) *Estates in Fee on Conditional Limitation.*

§ 437. Nature and creation of fees on conditional limitation.

§ 438. Distinctive features of fees on conditional limitation — Common-law objection to such fees.

§ 424. **Meaning and Kinds of Qualified Fees.** — It has been shown how the word "heirs" came to be ordinarily required by the common law in creating or transferring an estate in fee simple.¹ Apace with this requirement, grew the custom of giving realty to one and a designated class of his heirs, as for example to him "and the heirs of his body"; and also of placing other restrictions or limitations on the extent of his fee, as by giving it to him "and his heirs so long as they continue to live there," or to him "and his heirs provided they consent to live there."² Thus there came to be recognized and employed fees, estates of inheritance, which are not fees

¹ § 418, *supra*.

² 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.) pp. 16, 17. Leake, Land Law,

35; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 263-265.

simple, not absolute and indefeasible — less than the straight line of ownership stretching away to infinity — interests greater than life estates, because they can descend to heirs and the word “heirs” is usually requisite at common law to their creation or transfer, and yet interests that are not necessarily of endless duration. Various adjectives, such as “base,” “determinable,” “conditional,” “limitational,” “qualified,” have been employed by different writers to describe some or all of these lesser fees.¹ And the early jurists frequently speak of them as “fees simple conditional,” “fees simple qualified,” etc.² It will conduce to clearness here to describe them all, as is uniformly done in this treatise, by the expression, used in a general sense; “qualified fees.”³

The fourfold division of these “qualified fees” is into (a) Fees conditional at common law, which by virtue of the statute *de donis conditionalibus* became fees tail, (b) Fees on condition, (c) Fees on limitation, or collateral limitation, and (d) Fees on conditional limitation. The first of these four groups, the fee tail, is to be explained in this chapter. The other three are then to be briefly described; but their more complete discussion is postponed to the chapter on qualified estates in general.⁴

(a). *Estates in Fee Tail.*

§ 425. **Fee Conditional, at Common Law.** — During the first years of the thirteenth century, at the time when the grantee of an estate “to himself and his heirs” had first acquired the power of disposing of the property to the exclusion of his heirs, an ancient but previously little employed

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *109; 1 Prest. Est. p. *24; 4 Kent's Com. pp. *9-12; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 162-172; Gray, Perpetuities, §§ 32-36; Leonard v. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96, 98; Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 285; First Universalist Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 174; Ohlfield v. Curtis, 229 Ill. 139; North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178.

² Co. Lit. 18 a; Idle v. Cooke, 2 Ld. Raym'd, 1148, 1194; Willion v. Berkley, 1 Plowd. 223, 245.

³ This use of the word “qualified,” to describe generally all the fees that are not fees simple, is adopted for the sake of perspicuity; and it is clearly recognized as not in harmony with all

the authorities. A “qualified fee,” in its narrower sense, means for many writers the same as a fee on limitation, or on “collateral” or “special” limitation as hereafter explained. 4 Kent's Com. p. *9; 1 Prest. Est. p. *28; Gray, Perpetuities, § 32. But, since even the most accurate authors do not agree here in their nomenclature, confusion may be avoided by employing the word “qualified” to describe generally all the lesser or restricted fees, and then denoting each of them separately by a different and well recognized name. See Chase's Blackst. p. 294, note; ch. lv, *infra*.

⁴ Ch. lv, *infra*.

form of gift of realty to one "and the heirs of his body," or to him and his wife "and the heirs of their bodies," became prevalent and popular.¹ Since a donee in fee simple had now the ability to prevent the property from ever going to his heirs, or back to the donor, it was sought, by this other form of gift to make a lesser kind of fee, and so to provide certainly for the issue of a marriage, or the restoration of the land to the donor in case of the extinction of the donee's descendants.²

The manifest intent of a landowner of that time, who created such an estate — who gave, for example, the land to his son "and the heirs of his body" — was that it should be held and enjoyed by the donee without any power of alienation; at his death it should descend to his issue, if any, and to their issue in succession, to be owned in the same way; and, if he left no issue or his descendants ever ceased to exist, it should revert to the donor or his heirs. The donee and his posterity, as long as any of them survived, were to be indissolubly united with the land. During that time, it was to be taken out of the market — rendered absolutely inalienable.³ But the judges frustrated this design by their construction of such gifts. They held that the donee, at any time, even before he had a child, might sell the property in such manner as to bar his issue from ever acquiring it, though subject to revert to the donor or his heirs on the ultimate extinction of the donee and his issue.⁴ And then they added the curious decision that, *as soon as a child was born to the donee*, he might even dispose of the property in fee simple and thus bar from ever acquiring it, not only his own issue, but also the donor and his heirs. The birth of his issue did not *per se* cause the donee to own it in fee simple. But such birth made him capable of alienating, encumbering, or forfeiting it in fee simple. Thus, if land were given to A "and the heirs of his body," he did not have it in fee simple, nor would the birth of his issue in itself cause him to do so; but after such birth he could sell it in fee simple, raise money upon it and encumber it in fee simple, or

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *110; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 16, 17; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 21.

² Ibid.

³ Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. i. § 4; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 223. The opposite construction which was adopted by the courts, says the Statute *de donis*,

was "contrary to minds of the givers, and contrary to the form expressed in the gift." Stat. Westm. II. (13 Edw. I.) ch. 1.

⁴ Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. i. § 6; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 17.

have it taken from him in fee simple by forfeiture for his misconduct.¹

The reason for this latter and apparently anomalous decision of the courts is doubtless twofold. They favored free alienation, and resisted its suspension as being against public policy.² And they probably looked upon a gift to one "and the heirs of his body" as in substance the same as a gift to him "and his heirs forever, *on condition* that he have issue of his body."³ Therefore, they treated the estate as a *fee conditional*, and so named it.⁴ While, then, the birth of his issue alone did not confer on its owner an absolute fee simple, it did enable him to make it a fee simple by selling it, and immediately buying it back if he chose. And, of course, it quickly became customary for the owner of a fee conditional — an estate to him "and the heirs of his body" — as soon as he had a child born, to grant it to some one from whom he immediately took a reconveyance to himself in fee simple.⁵ Thus, all the purposes of the donor, in placing restrictions upon the fee by limiting it to the heirs of the body of the donee, could be and usually were frustrated as soon as issue was born to the latter.

It is to be carefully noted, however, that this fee conditional would remain such, unless its owner alienated, forfeited, or encumbered it in fee simple after he had issue. If he did neither of these things, it could not pass at his death to any heirs except those of his body. And, therefore, if he retained it as a fee conditional and died without issue, or his issue ever became extinct without having aliened it in fee simple, the property reverted in fee simple to the donor or his heirs.⁶ It was a "fee conditional" which could be transformed into a fee simple after the birth of its owner's issue; but failure thus to transform it left it still conditional, so that at the extinction of such issue the condition was broken and the property might revert.

§ 426. **The Statute De Donis Conditionalibus.** — The courts' odd construction of estates in fee conditional, running counter as it did to the intentions of settlers, produced two results

¹ Co. Lit. 19 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *110; Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. i. § 5; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 223; Croxall v. Shererd, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 268, 284.

² 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 18, 19; § 956, *infra*.

³ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 18; Willion v. Berkley, 1 Plowd. 223, 245.

⁴ Last three preceding notes.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *111; Digby, Hist. Law. R. P. (5th ed.) p. 223.

especially abhorrent to the great landowners, the *domini capitales*. It prevented them from perpetuating property in their own families — from indissolubly uniting the land and their descendants. And it deprived the feudal lords of what otherwise would have been their reversionary interests in case of failure of issue of the donees: for, if A made a feoffment to B and the heirs of his body, B, by selling the land in fee as soon as he had a child, could prevent it from reverting to A on failure of B's descendants. In order to remove these difficulties, the famous statute *de donis conditionalibus* (or, more briefly, *de donis*, 13 Edw. I. ch. 1, A.D. 1285) was passed. It declared, in effect, that thereafter the will of the donor of such an estate should be observed; so that, among other things, they to whom the property was given should have no power to alienate it, but it must descend to their issue so long as any existed, and on failure of such issue at any time must revert to the donor or his heirs.¹ Thus the nobility and great landed proprietors were to be enabled to enforce continued ownership of the land by their families as long as their descendants survived, and to insure its ultimate return to the donors or their heirs on failure of such descendants. This made a radical change in the estate to one "and the heirs of his body," which theretofore had been known as a fee conditional. And the courts soon changed its name; and ever since then it has been called a "fee tail," or an "estate tail."²

¹ The statute spoke of gifts to a man and his wife and the heirs of their two bodies, and of gifts to one and the heirs of his body; and recited the evils attendant on the manner in which such donations were construed by the courts. And it then provided that the alienation of these fees conditional "should not defeat the devolution of the estate to the heir, but that in the event of the tenant of a conditional estate alienating, the heir on the decease of his ancestor might recover the estate from the feoffee, or any person claiming under him. It was further provided that when the tenant had made a feoffment in fee, having had issue born, who had subsequently died, the original donor (or lord) might recover the land from the feoffee by the same form of remedy as he might have employed be-

fore the Statute to recover land which his tenant had conveyed away for an estate in fee without having had issue born." Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) pp. 223, 224.

² "It seems that the term *fee tail* was already in use before the statute was passed: it occurs in the statute (c. 4) though not in the famous first chapter. We have found it on a roll slightly older than the statute; De Banco Roll, Mich. 11-12, Edw. I. m. 70 d: 'Emma non habuit . . . nisi feodum talliatum secundum formam donationis praedictae.' At any rate it was in common use within a very few years afterwards." 2 Poll. & Mait. *Hist. Eng. L.* (2d ed.) p. 19, note 6. See 1 Spence, *Eq. Jur.* p. 21; Barringt. *Stat.* 113.

§ 427. **Fee Tail, or Estate Tail — Result of the Statute De Donis.** — Before the statute *de donis* was enacted, the donor of a fee conditional retained no estate in the land, no right or interest of which he could dispose; but he had only a possibility of obtaining such a right or interest, after the death of the donee and all his descendants, if the land had not been alienated in fee simple by them.¹ The donee took the fee; and the donor had only a *possibility* of reacquiring the property. This was changed by the statute *de donis* by its preventing the donee from alienating the land in fee simple. His descendants would become extinct at some time in the future, and then the property must revert to the donor or his heirs. Therefore, the donor had now more than a mere possibility of regaining it; it was sure to return to him or his heirs, and his interest had become by force of the statute a *reversion*, a future estate which if he chose he could convey and vest in another person.² The interest of the donee, as it had been before the statute, was accordingly decided to have been curtailed by the passing of the statute. He now owned a lesser fee than he had owned before. His interest had become one cut off from the original fee simple of the donor. And, therefore, it was called a “fee tail,” or “estate tail,” *feudum talliatum*, a portion of an estate, *taillé* — cut off — from the fee simple.³ Thus, if A owned an estate in fee simple, and conveyed the land to B and the heirs of his body, a fee tail, a part of the fee simple, became B’s; and the residue, the reversion in fee simple, was A’s. In technical language, B had an estate tail in possession, and A had an estate in fee simple in reversion expectant upon the determination of the fee tail.⁴ And so the estate tail took its position as an interest intermediate between a life estate and a fee simple. And a grant or devise to A for life, and then to B and the heirs of his body, and then to C and his heirs forever, came to produce three distinct and well recognized interests — a life estate for A, a fee tail for B, and an ultimate fee simple for C.⁵

§ 428. **Estates Tail at First Inalienable — Injurious Results.** — Among the chief purposes and effects of the statute *de donis*

¹ Fearn, Cont. Rem. p. 381, Butler’s note; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 225, 226.

² Ibid.; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *112; § 89, *supra*.

³ Ibid.; Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. i.

§§ 9–12; Willion v. Berkley, 1 Plowd. 223, 251.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 226.

was the taking of the fee tail out of the market, by making it inalienable in the hands of the donee and his descendants. "The statute *de bonis* was made in the reign of a prince who, from the great number and excellence of his laws, has justly acquired the title of the English Justinian. It is, therefore, highly probable that he was induced by some motives unknown to modern times to give his assent to a law, which, by allowing the nobility to entail their estates, made it impossible to diminish the property of the great families, and at the same time left them all means of increase and acquisition."¹ The operation of the statute was enlarged, rather than restricted, by the construction of the judges. Wherever, by any form of words, direct or indirect, the intention was expressed that the property was to descend to the heirs who should be the issue of the body of the donee — technically, whenever both words of *inheritance* and words of *procreation* were employed — the estate was held to be a fee tail, practically inseparable from the first taker and his descendants.² And the landed proprietors proceeded rapidly to tie up in this manner most of the real property in the realm.³

As time went on, the injurious effects of such restrictions were more and more apparent. Children, whose parents could not disinherit them, became disobedient; farmers were deprived of their leases at the death of their immediate landlords, because the latter could not lease such interests for longer than their own lives; creditors were defrauded of their debts, because estates tail could not be charged with their payment; latent and forgotten entails were frequently produced to deprive purchasers of titles for which they had fairly paid; and even treason, it is said, was encouraged, because estates tail could not be forfeited for a longer time than during the life of the tenant.⁴ The industry and commerce of the nation were being vastly impaired by these restricted fees and their resulting inconveniences. These evils, says Lord Coke, were

¹ Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. i. § 11. From the fact that the existence of an estate tail thus made the property inalienable, the word "entail" has come to be used often in a popular sense to describe the taking of property out of the market — rendering it inalienable — in any manner. Trusts, powers, and future interests may be so made as to do this to some extent at the present time. See

ch. lxx, *infra*. But an estate tail does not now do so, because, as explained in the next section, its owner may convey the land in fee simple.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *115; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 249.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *16; Wms. R. P. p. *44; Digby, Hist. R. P. (5th ed.) p. 252.

“attempted and endeavored to be remedied at divers parliaments, and divers bills were exhibited accordingly (which I have seen), but they were always on one pretence or another rejected.”¹ The feudal aristocracy would not consent to any repeal or modification of the statute *de donis*. And so for nearly two hundred years its injurious results continued.

§ 429. **How Estates Tail were made Alienable.**—It was not until the decision of *Taltarum's Case*² (12 Edw. IV. (1473)), that the grievances flowing from the statute *de donis* were removed. The court, by an unparalleled instance of judicial legislation,³ decided in that case that the owner of an estate tail, notwithstanding the statute, might dispose of the property in fee simple by means of a “common recovery.” This was a collusive and fictitious proceeding, which was thus applied by the judges to bar entails and so to get rid of glaring evils left unremedied by parliament.⁴ The procedure may be here sufficiently explained by a terse illustration. A, the owner of an estate tail has agreed to sell the land to B in fee simple, but can not do so directly because of the prohibition of the statute *de donis*. B, alleging that the land is his own, brings an action against A to obtain it in fee simple. A comes into court and alleges that C gave it to him in fee tail *with a warranty*, and that by virtue of the warranty it is C's duty to defend the action. C is thus called in, or “vouched in,” as warrantor, accepts the challenge, and is substituted as defendant instead A.⁵ An “imparlance,” an adjournment of the case, is then

¹ Mildmay's Case, 6 Rep. 40 a.

² Year Book, 12 Edw. IV. pl. 25, f. 19. This important case, which indirectly settled the result stated in the text, is explained by Mr. Digby, Hist. Law. R. P. (5th. ed.) pp. 255-258.

³ Mr. Spence says that the judges did this “in the exercise of their Pre-torian authority.” 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. p. 143.

⁴ Perhaps the common recovery had been employed for this purpose before. But *Taltarum's Case* gave it emphasis as the means of effectually disposing of an estate tail, so as to bar the heirs of the tenant and the remainderman or reversioner and his heirs. Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th. ed.) p. 254.

⁵ C who came to be known as the “common vouchee,” might or might

not be the actual donor, with warranty, of the land in fee tail to A. Usually he was not. But the fact that he confessed that he was the warrantor was sufficient for this collusive action. Then the subtle effects of a warranty of an estate of inheritance came into play, whereby the warrantor, if duly notified and “vouched in” to resist an adverse claimant, must defend the title of his warrantee, or if he fail successfully to do so must recompense the warrantee for his loss of the land. The obscure doctrine of warranty, as affecting the heirs both lineal and collateral of the warrantor, is hereafter explained. It suffices here to note that, C being treated in the common recovery as the owner of the property in fee simple in remainder or reversion and failing to defend the ac-

taken; and, when the matter is again called in court, C makes default, and B obtains judgment that he owns the land in fee simple. Judgment is also awarded to A against C, for the value of the land which A has thus lost because of C's default. This latter judgment is practically ineffectual, because C is an irresponsible person (usually the crier of the court), chosen as such to be one of the *dramatis personæ* of this proceeding which is understood by the court and all the interested parties to be collusive.¹ In the meantime, B has paid A for the land the price agreed on between them. And thus A has been enabled to convey to B in fee simple the land which A owned in fee tail. For the courts held that this common recovery barred A and his heirs and the donor and his heirs of all interests in the property.²

A shorter but less effective mode of disposing of estates tail was subsequently resorted to, by the employment of a *fine*, a judicial proceeding long known and used in the common law, but declared by the statute *de donis* to be ineffectual to bar or transfer such estates. After some vacillation, it was settled by the Statute 32 Hen. VIII. ch. 36 (1540), that, by this form of action, the owner of a fee tail might so dispose of it as to bar, not the ultimate reversioner or remainderman in fee simple, but only his own issue.³ A fine may also be briefly illustrated:

tion as required by his warranty, both he and his heirs (and they stood for and bound by this proceeding the actual donor and his heirs) were divested of all interest in the land. The warranty of the ancestor was binding on the heir, and its breach precluded them. It had been early attempted by owners in tail to alienate their estates by simply making use of that principle — merely by selling *with warranty*. But, after the decision of Taltarum's Case, this was abandoned in favor of the more thorough transfer afforded by a common recovery. 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *300-303; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 312; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 251, 252.

¹ This is an attempt to describe, in terse, 20th century language, a mediæval lawsuit which was often long and cumbersome and generally very expensive. The vouchee, C, might and frequently did vouch in another as *his war-*

rantor, and he another, and so on; so that he who ultimately assumed the defense and then made default might be the third or fourth vouchee. Most commonly, perhaps, he was the third; for at this one the fictions were thought to have been carried far enough to make the legal farce complete as a bar to everybody. The common recovery is described with elaboration by Mr. Cruise, Dig. tit. xxxvi. See, more tersely, 2 Blacket. Com. pp. *357-360; Wms. R. P. pp. *44-46; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 253-258.

² Ibid. In theory at least, all other claimants had been given their "day in court," and had failed to establish or defend their claims successfully against the adverse demandant, B. And B had the solemn judgment of the court, made matter of record there, that the land belonged to him in fee simple.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *118; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. p. 143.

A, the owner of an estate tail has agreed to sell the land to B. B, alleging that he owns it, begins an action against A to obtain it. As soon as both parties are before the court, they ask for leave to compromise their supposed dispute. This being granted, they state to the court the terms of their compact; and the *finalis concordia* is entered into between them, noted and made matter of record, whereby B's ownership of the land is admitted and established.¹ B has paid A for the property, in the meantime. And thus B has acquired a perfect title, against A and his issue, though not against the donor of the fee tail or his heirs.²

It is marvelous that, for over three centuries, these cumbersome and expensive proceedings—of which the common recovery, being the more technical and complete, was the more frequently employed—were the only methods of alienating an estate tail. At length, in 1834, parliament intervened, abolished fines and common recoveries by the Statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. ch. 74, and, by the same law, provided a method by which the owner of an estate in fee tail, by a deed enrolled in Chancery within six months after its execution, may alienate the property in fee simple or otherwise. A similar policy has been followed

¹ Like the explanation of a common recovery, given above, this is an attempt to describe, in the language of to-day, a technical and expensive procedure of the middle ages. The fine is doubtless much older than the common recovery, though not applied till later to bar entails. 2 Coke, Inst. 511. The proceeding took its name from the final concord, which put an end (*finem*) to the genuine or collusive (usually) litigation. The bar of the heirs of the tenant in tail was not complete, however, until they had had a year and a day from the ending of the suit in which to file their adverse claims. This time was afterwards extended indefinitely, and finally restricted to five years. And they who did not make their claim within that time were said to be barred by "fine and non-claim." Blackst. Com. pp. *348-*356; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 95-106; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 105-108; Cruise, Dig. tit. xxxv.; Roseboom v. Van Vechten, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 414, 420. Equitable estates tail could be alienated and barred by fines and com-

mon recoveries, the same as legal estates tail. And the procedure was the same as to both kinds of estates. Sugden's Gilbert, Uses & Trusts, p. 33.

² "The virtues of a fine, in the three points of view we have examined it, namely, to extinguish dormant titles, to bar the issue in tail, and to pass the interest of *femes covert*; these constitute the more peculiar qualities, on account of which it is most usually, if not always, resorted to." The agreement, or *final concord*, "being reduced to writing, was enrolled among the records of the court, where it was preserved by the proper officer; by which means it was not so liable to be lost or defaced as a charter of feoffment; and being a record, would at all times prove itself. It had also another advantage; that being substituted in the place of the sentence which would have been given, in case the suit had not been compounded, it was held to be of the same nature, and of equal force, with the judgment of a court of justice." Roseboom v. Van Vechten, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 414, 421.

in this country, although fines and common recoveries were recognized in the early history of some of the colonies and states.¹ And now, in the few states where the fee tail is retained, an ordinary deed by the owner in tail is sufficient to convey the property in fee simple.² (a)

§ 430. **Requisites and Kinds of Estates Tail.**—The most ordinary and appropriate expression, for creating or conveying an estate tail is, to one “and the heirs of his body.” Thus are employed both the word of *inheritance*, “heirs,” and words of *procreation*, “of his body.” These are the technical, common-law requisites to the production of such an interest. The word “heirs” must still be used; unless the case is within one of the exceptions, heretofore discussed, in which that word is not necessary in creating a fee simple;³ and such an exception affecting a fee tail most frequently appears in devises by will.⁴ And the words “of his body,” or some equivalent expression—words of procreation—clearly evincing a restriction of “heirs” to his lineal descendants, must be employed.⁵ Thus, except in a will in which the intent to give a fee tail is made clear,⁶ or except as the result of positive statute or special rule, a grant to a man “and his issue,” or to him “and the issue of his body,” or to him “and his seed,” or “descendants,” gives him a life estate only.⁷ While a conveyance to one “and his heirs

(a) In New York, fines and common recoveries were retained, even after estates tail were abolished (in 1782). 1 Greenl. L. 377; 1 R. L. (1813) 358; *Roseboom v. Van Vechten*, 5 Denio, 414; *Lion v. Burtis*, 20 Johns. 483, 490; *Jackson ex. dem. Watson v. Smith*, 13 Johns. 426; *Van Ness v. Gardiner*, 1 Cai. Cas. 59. And an instance of a fine levied as late as 1827 is presented in *McGregor v. Comstock*, 17 N. Y. 162. They were abolished by the Revised Statutes in 1830. 2 R. S. 134, § 136.

¹ *Ibid.*; *McGregor v. Comstock*, 17 N. Y. 162; *Lyle v. Richards*, 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 322; *Hawley v. Inhab. of Northampton*, 8 Mass. 3; *Frost v. Clontman*, 7 N. H. 9; *Croxall v. Shererd*, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 258, 283.

² 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 1313 (c); 4 *Kent's Com. p.* *497, note (b). See 1 *Wash. R. P.* (6th ed.) p. 87, note 5; *McGregor v. Comstock*, 17 N. Y. 162; *Lawrence v. Lawrence*, 105 Pa. St. 335; *Collamore v. Collamore*, 158 Mass. 74; *Jillson v. Wilcox*, 7 R. I. 515.

³ § 419, *supra*.

⁴ *Co. Lit.* 20 a; 2 *Blackst. Com. p.*

*115; 2 *Prest. Est. p.* *396; *Adams v. Ross*, 30 N. J. L. 505.

⁵ *Co. Lit.* 20 b; 2 *Blackst. Com. p.* *115; *Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. i.* § 22; *Doe v. Smeddle*, 2 *Barn. & Ald.* 126; *Norris v. Beyea*, 13 N. Y. 273, 280; *Smith v. Scholtz*, 68 N. Y. 41, 59; *Nightingale v. Burrell*, 15 *Pick. (Mass.)* 104.

⁶ *Co. Lit.* 27 a; 2 *Blackst. Com. p.* *115; *Cruise, Dig. tit. xxxviii. ch. xii.* §§ 1-12; *Denn v. Slater*, 5 *Term Rep.* 335; *Cuffee v. Milk*, 10 *Met. (Mass.)* 366; *Cooper v. Cooper*, 6 R. I. 261; *Doty v. Teller*, 54 N. J. L. 163.

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Co. Lit.* 13 a, 20 b.

who shall be his issue," or to him "and his descendants as his heirs," conveys an estate tail, since there is the necessary restriction of his heirs to those descended from himself.¹

The conception being fixed in the legal mind of a fee limited to a specific class of heirs, and of that limitation produced by the addition of words of procreation to the technical word of inheritance "heirs," it was natural that that mind should proceed to invent further restrictions as to the heirs who might inherit. Hence the different kinds or classes of estates tail. They are either *general* or *special*. "Tail-general is where lands and tenements are given to one, and the *heirs of his body begotten*: which is called tail-general, because, how often soever such donee in tail be married, his issue in general by all and every such marriage is, in successive order, capable of inheriting the estate tail, *per formam doni*. Tenant in tail special is where the gift is restrained to certain heirs of the donee's body, and does not go to all of them in general. And this may happen several ways. I shall instance in only one; as where lands and tenements are given to a man and the *heirs of his body, on Mary his now wife to be begotten*: here no issue can inherit, but such special issue as is engendered between them two; not such as the husband may have by another wife; and therefore it is called special tail. And here we may observe, that the words of inheritance (to him and his heirs) give him an estate in fee: but they being heirs *to be by him begotten*, this makes it a fee-tail; and the person being also limited, on whom such heirs shall be begotten (*viz., Mary his present wife*), this makes it a fee-tail special. Estates in general and special tail, are farther diversified by the distinction of sexes in such entails; for both of them may either be in tail *male* or tail *female*. As if lands be given to a man and his *heirs male of his body begotten*, this is an estate in tail male general; but if to a man and the *heirs female of his body on his present wife begotten*, this is an estate tail female special. And in case of an entail male, the heirs female shall never inherit, nor any derived from them; nor, *e converso*, the heirs male, in case of a gift in tail female."²

¹ Ibid.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *113-*115. Also, Lit. §§ 14, 16, 21-25; 2 Prest. Est. pp. *397-*405. See Pelham-Clinton v. Newcastle (1902), 1 Ch. 34.

When land is given at common law

to a man and the heirs of his body to be begotten on a designated wife, and she dies before him without issue, he has an "estate tail after possibility of issue extinct." Since, then, he can have no issue which can inherit the

§ 431. **Incidents of Estates Tail.**—How estates tail became alienable, first by means of common recoveries and fines, and ultimately by virtue of statute, has been already explained. The owner of such an interest may now readily convey the property in fee simple.¹ If he fail to do so, however, and die leaving heirs of his body, they take it, not properly by descent from him, but by virtue of the original gift to him “and the heirs of his body”; they take *per formam doni*, as it is said, by substitutional gift from the original donor.² For this reason, and also because generally the statutes only authorize alienation *inter vivos*, the fee tail remains undeviseable, as at common law.³ Its owner must complete the alienation of the property in fee simple while he lives; or at his death it will pass *per formam doni* to his issue if any; or, there being no such issue, it will revert to the original donor or his heirs.⁴ Neither can the tenant in tail, except by virtue of statute, encumber the property with his debts for a period longer than his life.⁵

A tenant in tail has the same right to use the property that he would have if he owned it in fee simple. He is not bound to regard the interest of any succeeding owner; but may commit waste on the land if he choose.⁶ He is not required to pay off encumbrances, nor except in special cases to keep down the interest on them. When, however, he discharges an encumbrance either wholly or partly, he is presumed to do so in favor of the estate; and he can not charge against the estate the amount so paid, unless he takes an assignment of the claim or otherwise

land—the only wife by whom such issue could have been born being dead—this interest must terminate at his death; it is, therefore, in substance only a life estate; and it is so treated by the law, except in the single fact that he is not liable for waste. Lit. §§ 32-34; Co. Lit. 27 b; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *124-126.

The common law also presents a few instances of a “quasi entail,” in which real property is given to A and the heirs of his body during the life of B. This does not make an estate tail, since not being an estate of inheritance it is unaffected by the statute *de donis*. If A died before B and left issue, and no statute affected the matter, such issue as “special occupants” would take the property during the rest of B’s life. See *Dillon v. Dillon*, 1 Ball & B. 77;

Allen v. Allen, 2 Dru. & War. 307; *Grey v. Mannoek*, 2 Eden. 339; § 443, *infra*.

¹ § 429, *supra*.

² Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. ii. § 18; 1 Leake, Land Law, p. 63; *Jones v. Jones*, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 281.

³ Co. Lit. 111 a; Cro. Eliz. 805; *Wms. R. P. p.* *56; *Theological Seminary v. Wall*, 44 Pa. St. 353.

⁴ *Ibid.*; Bac. Abr. tit. Estates in Tail (D).

⁵ Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. ii. §§ 29-34; *Jenkins v. Keymes*, 1 Lev. 237; *Wharton v. Wharton*, 2 Vern. 3, and note; *Waters v. Margerum*, 60 Pa. St. 39.

⁶ Co. Lit. 224 a; 4 Kent’s Com. p. *18; *Jervis v. Bruton*, 2 Vern. 251; *Farabow v. Green*, 108 N. C. 339. See *Matthews v. Hudson*, 81 Ga. 120.

shows an intent to keep it alive in his own favor.¹ The wife of an owner of an estate tail, who is seised of the property, has dower in it; and the husband of such an owner has curtesy; these rights being incident to a fee tail the same as to a fee simple.²

Ordinarily, if two estates in one piece of real property come into the same hands at the same time and in the same right, the lesser is "merged," or destroyed, by the greater. Thus, if the owner of a life estate purchase the fee simple or the fee tail in the land in reversion, the life estate is usually merged in the fee; and, if one person acquire both an estate for years and a life estate, the latter may merge the former.³ But in order to prevent evasion of the statute *de donis*, it was early decided, and has uniformly been held, that, if one person acquire both the fee simple and the fee tail in the same piece of land, no merger occurs, but he continues to own the two interests separate and distinct.⁴ To have held otherwise would have been to nullify the statute *de donis*, because then the tenant in fee tail could have destroyed it and rendered the property freely alienable simply by purchasing the reversion in fee simple.⁵

§ 432. **Estates Tail at Present in England, and in the United States.**—Estates tail are retained in England, and are largely used in making marriage and family settlements.⁶ A quite ordinary disposition of land there, for illustration, is to a husband for life, and then to the oldest son of the marriage in fee tail, and if he die without issue to the next son in fee tail, and so on, and to the daughters ultimately if there be no sons or all of them die without issue. There is generally also a provision for the support of the wife and daughters out of the income of the property.⁷ The result is that, after the oldest son becomes twenty-one years of age, he may alien all or any part of the property in fee simple (with the consent of his father, the life owner, if still living),⁸ and then it may be re-purchased and

¹ Cruise, Dig. tit. ii. ch. i. §§ 40-42; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 210.

² Co. Lit. 224a; Scribner on Dower, ch. i. §§ 2, 3.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *177; Cruise, Dig. tit. viii. ch. ii. §§ 36-42.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *178; Roe v. Baldwere, 5 T. R. 104, 110; Wiscot's Case, 2 Rep. 61. Pool v. Morris, 29 Ga. 374.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *In re Fothergill's Estate* (1903), 1 Ch. 149; *Milbank v. Vane* (1893), 3 Ch. 79; Wms. R. P. pp. *50, *51.

⁷ This is substantially the form of a "strict settlement," so-called. 1 Leake, Land Law, p. 335; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 358, note; 3 Wash. R. P. Appendix A.

⁸ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 254.

settled again; and this may occur at the time of the marriage of the oldest son, or at such other time and in such manner as circumstances may require or the parties may choose. The property is most commonly re-settled as before, and so retained continuously in the same family.¹

Estates tail were brought to this country by the colonists, and retained until after the Revolution, together with the power of barring them by fines and common recoveries.² Such interests, however, do not adjust themselves so readily to American land law as to that of England. Legislation and adjudication, in dealing with them and the fee conditional out of which they arose by force of the statute *de donis*, have produced at least five different results in the United States. *First*, in one or two states, such as South Carolina, the statute *de donis* has never been in force, and estates in fee conditional at common law still exist.³ *Second*, more states (but much less than the majority), of which Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Delaware are examples, have the fee tail substantially as it exists in England, but employ it less, and by statutes permit its owner to convey the property in fee simple.⁴ *Third*, in a few other states, such as Connecticut and Ohio, a conveyance to A and the heirs of his body gives A a fee tail while he lives, and a remainder in fee simple to his issue.⁵ *Fourth*, in some states, among which are New Jersey, Illinois, Arkansas, and Colorado, such a conveyance—to A and the heirs of his body—gives a life estate to A, and a remainder in fee simple to his issue or heirs.⁶ *Fifth*, but most of the states, New York,

¹ "Primogeniture, therefore, as it obtains among the landed gentry of England, is a *custom* only, and not a right; though there can be no doubt that the custom has originated in the right, which was enjoyed by the oldest son, as heir to his father, in those days when estates tail could not be barred." Wms. R. P. p. *51.

² 4 Kent's Com. p. *14; § 429, *supra*, and notes.

³ Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S. C. 545; Mattison v. Mattison, 65 S. C. 345; Holman v. Wesner, 67 S. C. 307. See Pierson v. Lane, 60 Iowa, 60; Jordau v. Roach, 32 Miss. 481, 617.

⁴ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1313 (c); Whittaker v. Whittaker, 99 Mass. 366; Coombs v. Anderson, 138 Mass. 376;

Collamore v. Collamore, 158 Mass. 74; Lippitt v. Hnston, 8 R. I. 415, 424; Sutton v. Miles, 10 R. I. 348; *In re* Tillinghast, 25 R. I. 338; Canlk's Lessee v. Caulk (Del.), 52 Atl. Rep. 340. See Ralston v. Truesdell, 178 Pa. St. 429; Simpson v. Reed, 205 Pa. St. 53.

⁵ Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2952; St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 407; Ohio Rev. Stat. § 4200; Phillips v. Herron, 55 Ohio St. 478, 489.

⁶ 1 N. J. Gen. Stat. (1895) p. 1195, § 11; James v. Du Bois, 16 N. J. L. 285; *In re* Dowe, 68 N. J. Eq. 11; Hurd's Rev. Stat. Ill. (1899) p. 403, § 6; Peterson v. Jackson, 196 Ill. 40; Spencer v. Spruell, 196 Ill. 119; Ark. Dig. Stat. (1894) § 700; Mills' Stat. Col. (1801) § 432. And see Chew v. Kellar,

Pennsylvania, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, Georgia, and California being prominent illustrations, have abolished the fee tail by making it a fee simple in the first taker — have made a conveyance to A and the heirs of his body give to A an estate in fee simple.¹ (a) And it seems to be safe to assume that,

(a) In New York, estates tail were abolished, by being converted into fees simple, on the 12th day of July, 1782. L. 1782, ch. 2, improved by L. 1786, ch. 12, passed February 23, 1786. The effect was that a conveyance of real property to A and the heirs of his body gave him an estate in fee simple; and any attempt of the donor to give it over to another on any contingency was then void. Thus, if the grant were “to A and the heirs of his body, but if A die without issue then to B and his heirs,” the attempted gift over to B was void and A took the fee simple absolutely. Thus the law remained until January 1, 1830. The Revised Statutes (1 R. S. 729, §§ 3, 4), which then took effect, provided substantially the same on this matter as the present law, which is Real Prop. L. § 32, and which reads as follows: “Estates tail have been abolished; and every estate which would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law of this State, as it existed before the twelfth day of July, seventeen hundred and eighty-two, shall be deemed a fee simple; and if no valid remainder be limited thereon, a fee simple absolute. Where a remainder in fee shall be limited on any estate which would be a fee tail, according to the law of this State, as it existed previous to such date, such remainder shall be valid, as a contingent limitation on a fee, and shall vest in possession on the death of the first taker, without issue living at the time of such death.” The last sentence quoted changed the effects of such a gift as that above described for A and B. And since January 1, 1830, therefore, a conveyance being made “to A and the heirs of his body, but if A die without issue then to B and his heirs”; if A die leaving issue at the time of his death, such issue take the property in fee simple; but if A leave no issue at the time of his death, it goes to B or his heirs in fee simple. And it is, of course, still true that a conveyance merely “to A and the heirs of his body” gives A an indefeasible fee simple. *Jackson v. Van Zandt*, 12 Johns. 169; *Lion v. Burtiss*, 20 Johns. 483; *Lott v. Wykoff*, 2 N. Y. 355; *Lytle v. Beveridge*, 58 N. Y. 592; *Buel v. Southwick*, 70 N. Y. 581; *Nellis v. Nellis*, 99 N. Y. 505, 511; *Matter of Moore*, 152 N. Y. 602, 608; *Harriot v. Harriot*, 25 App. Div. 245; *Van Rensselaer v. Kearney*, 52 U. S. (11 How.) 297.

171 Mo. 215; *Summet v. City Realty & B. Co.*, 106 S. W. Rep. 614 (Mo.); *Garth v. Arnold*, 115 Fed. Rep. 468. In New Jersey, while a conveyance to A and the heirs of his body gives A only a life estate, yet the husband or wife of A has curtesy or dower in the property. *James v. Du Bois*, 16 N. J. L. 285; *Redstrake v. Townsend*, 39 N. J. L. 372; *Weart v. Cruser*, 49 N. J. L. 475; *In re Dowe*, 68 N. J. Eq. 11.

¹ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 32; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1313; 4 Kent's Com. p. *14; *Jackson v. Van Zandt*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 169; *Matter of Moore*, 152 N. Y. 602; *Kimmel v. Shaffer*, 219 Pa. St. 375; *McIlhinny v. McIlhinny*, 137 Ind. 411; *Chamberlain v. Runkle*, 28 Ind. App. 599; *Davis v. Davis*, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1132; *Ewing v. Shropshire*, 80 Ga. 374.

where the statutes are silent and the matter has not been before the courts, estates tail will never be recognized; but a conveyance to one and the heirs of his body will give him a fee simple.¹ Especially is this probable in such states as Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington, where by statutes, as in many other states, words of inheritance are not necessary for the creation or transfer of a fee.²

(b). *Estates in Fee on Condition.*

§ 433. **Nature and Creation of Fees on Condition.** — Conditions affecting real property interests may be either precedent or subsequent; and these two forms produce materially different kinds of estates.³ The former kind causes the estate to be future and contingent until, if ever, the designated event occurs. Thus, a conveyance "to A and his heirs, provided, however, that he is not to own it until he marries B," gives him a contingent estate in fee simple, which will become absolute and indefeasible upon his marrying B.⁴ The full discussion of this form of condition belongs to the chapters on future estates.⁵ The latter kind, the condition subsequent, which is the kind most ordinarily thought of when an estate in fee on condition is mentioned, lets the ownership and enjoyment of the property become vested, but makes it subject to be diminished or defeated by the happening of a subsequent event.⁶ Such a contingency, annexed to an estate granted to one and his heirs, or so conveyed to him that otherwise he would have a fee simple, makes a fee on condition. An illustration is furnished by a deed of land "to A and his heirs, but if he marry B then to him for his life only," or by a devise "to A and his heirs, provided, however, that they shall lose it if they sell intoxicating liquor on the premises."⁷

This species of qualified fee, then, is produced by the use of hypothetical or conditional words, such as "if," "but if," "provided that," "if so be," "upon condition," "provided, however,"

¹ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1313 (D); 4 Kent's Com. p. *14.

² 2 Gen. Stat. Kan (1897) p. 599, § 2; Comp. Stat. Neb. (1899) § 4143; Hill's Ann. Laws Or. § 3005; Ballinger's Ann. Code, Wash. § 4525; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 240.

³ See §§ 714, 715, *infra*.

⁴ See *Weston v. Foster*, 7 Met.

(Mass.) 297; *Nevins v. Gourley*, 95 Ill. 206; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *154.¹

⁵ Ch. lxii-lxv, *infra*.

⁶ Co. Lit. 201 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *154.

⁷ Lit. § 325; *Trustees of Union College v. City of New York*, 173 N. Y. 38; *Lake Superior, etc. Co. v. Cunningham*, 155 U. S. 354.

etc.¹ These terms differ from what may be called limitational expressions, in that they never indicate the running along of time, but simply refer to the happening or not happening of some uncertain event.²

§ 434. **Distinctive Features of Fees on Condition.** — The important, distinctive characteristic of a fee on condition subsequent is that the mere breach of the condition does not in itself defeat nor diminish the estate. It simply gives to the grantor, or his heirs, or their successors in interest, the right to re-enter and take back the property; and this latter act, or its equivalent, must be done before the title of the holder on condition is divested.³ Thus, if land be conveyed to A and his heirs on condition that they continue to live there, he does not lose it merely by ceasing to live there; but for such a breach the grantor may re-enter and thus defeat the estate.⁴ These two events — breach of the condition and re-entry or its equivalent — must occur before such an estate is destroyed. And, when both have occurred, the property goes back to the grantor or his heirs or successors in interest *ab initio*; that is, they reacquire the property in the same plight as if the estate on condition had never existed, and all the liens and interests which the holder on condition may have created are thereby entirely swept away.⁵ In a word, a fee on condition is an estate to one and his heirs, created by hypothetical or conditional expressions, and such that in order to its being defeated both breach of the condition and re-entry by the grantor or his heirs or successors in interest are necessary. It is sufficient to explain it thus far at this place. The characteristics of all forms of estates on condition are discussed in a subsequent chapter.⁶

(c). *Estates in Fee on Limitation.*

§ 435. **Nature and Creation of Fees on Limitation.** — A fee on limitation (or collateral, or special, limitation, as it is more commonly described) is one made by the use of words denoting dura-

¹ Lit. §§ 328-331; *Portington's Case*, 10 Rep 35 a, 41 b; *Stanley v. Colt*, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 119; *Langley v. Chapman*, 134 Mass. 82.

² §§ 711, 723, *infra*.

³ *United States v. Tenn. & C. R. Co.* 176 U. S. 242; *United States v. Loughrey*, 172 U. S. 206; *Fonda v. Sage*, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 109; *Upington v. Corrigan*, 151 N. Y. 143; *Osgood v. Abbott*,

58 Me. 73; *Bowen v. Bowen*, 18 Conn. 535; *Green v. Pettingill*, 47 N. H. 375.

⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵ *Moore v. Pitts*, 53 N. Y. 85; *McKelway v. Seymour*, 29 N. J. L. 321; *Winnepesaukee C. M. Ass'n v. Gordon*, 67 N. H. 98; *Co. Lit.* 201 a, n. 84; 1 *Prest. Est.* p. *46.

⁶ Ch. IV, *infra*.

tion of time, such as "while," "during," "so long as," and the like — expressions that are translations of *donec*.¹ Words of inheritance are first employed (where necessary) to create a fee; and then it is added that the estate is to continue during the running along of some designated period or series of occurrences. Illustrations are, a transfer of property "to A and his heirs *while* they continue to live there"; "to William Penn and his heirs *so long as* the waters of the Delaware River shall flow," and "to B and his heirs *until* C returns from Rome."² The distinction in form between such fees and the fees described in the preceding section — made by hypothetical or conditional expressions — is plainly apparent.³

§ 436. **Distinctive Features of Fees on Limitation.** — The important, distinctive characteristic of a fee on limitation is that it ends naturally and instantly at the expiration of the period indicated in its creation; and no re-entry by any one is needed to bring it to a termination. The property then returns, or reverts, of itself to the donor or his heirs or successors in interest.⁴ Thus, when land is granted "to A and his heirs while they live there," the title in fee simple goes back at once to the grantor on A's moving away from the land; and if A convey property "to B and his heirs until C returns from Rome," it reverts to A on the instant of C's return.⁵ In a word, a fee on limitation is one made to continue during the running along of some specified period; and is such that, at the expiration of that period, the property is to return naturally and without any other act to its original owner or his successors in interest. Estates on limitation generally are also more fully discussed in a subsequent chapter.⁶

(d). *Estates in Fee on Conditional Limitation.*

§ 437. **Nature and Creation of Fees on Conditional Limitation.** — A fee on conditional limitation is made by conveying property to one person in fee, and then declaring that on the

¹ Co. Lit. 214 b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *155; 1 Prest. Est. p. *28; Crabb, R. P. § 2135.

² *Ibid.*; Chase's Blackst. p. 294; Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280, 285.

³ Portington's Case, 10 Rep. 35 a, 41 b; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St. 335, 340; Shep. Touchst. p. *125; §§ 723-726, *infra*.

⁴ Last two preceding notes.

⁵ *Ibid.*; 1 Prest. Est. pp. *42-*44, *440; Leonard v. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96; First Univ. Soc. of N. Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171; Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90; Morris C. & B. Co. v. Brown, 27 N. J. L. 13.

⁶ Ch. Iv, *infra*.

happening of some designated event it shall depart from him and go over to another person in fee. When the event occurs, the land is not to return to its original owner or his successors in interest, but is to go over, or *shift*, to a third party.¹ The words which denote this may be either conditional or limitational in form; and the result will be the same. Thus, either a grant of land "to A and his heirs, but if he cease to live there then to B and his heirs"; or a devise of realty "to A and his heirs so long as they remain tenants of the manor of Dale, and on their ceasing to be such tenants to B and his heirs," makes a fee on conditional limitation.² When such an interest as this is properly created, the happening of the designated event terminates the estate of the first holder; and the title to the property passes in fee simple to the other person, without any entry or other act, either by him, or by the grantor or his heirs.³

§ 438. **Distinctive Features of Fees on Conditional Limitation — Common-Law Objection to Such Fees.** — The important, distinctive characteristic of a fee on conditional limitation is the fact that a third party is to take the property on the happening of the designated event. When a fee is on *limitation*, the occurrence of the event alone takes it back to the grantor, or to his heirs or successors in interest; when it is on *condition*, such occurrence and re-entry by the grantor, or his heirs or successors in interest, take it back to them; when it is on *conditional limitation*, such occurrence *per se* takes it over to some other person or persons.⁴

The fee on conditional limitation was objectionable to the common-law courts; because it involved an attempt of the grantor, after giving a fee simple to one person, to take it from him in the future and bestow it on another. A fee, declared the judges, could not be thus limited, or "mounted" on a fee.⁵ The efforts of lawyers and landowners to overcome this difficulty have given rise to some of the nicest and most technical results in the law of real property.⁶ These are explained hereafter, in discussing shifting uses and executory devises — the two methods whereby estates on conditional limitation could be brought into being before they were allowed by modern

¹ Cruise, Dig. tit. xvi. ch. ii. § 30; Chase's Blackst. p. 294, n.; Brattle Sq. Church v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.), 142; Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280.

² Ibid.; §§ 726, 727, *infra*.

³ Ibid.; §§ 726, 727, *infra*.

⁴ Chase's Blackst. p. 294, n.; 1 Prest. Est. pp. *39-*60; §§ 727-730, *infra*.

⁵ Co. Lit. 271 b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *334; Cruise, Dig. tit. xvi. ch. ii. § 29; Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280.

⁶ § 730, *infra*.

statutes.¹ And it will be sufficient here to note that, by those two methods, and, as the result of legislation in most jurisdictions, by means of any ordinary form of conveyance also, a fee on conditional limitation may now be created.² (a)

(a) In New York, since January 1, 1830, it has been possible to make a fee on conditional limitation freely, by either devise or deed. Before that date, it could be made only by devise, or by a deed which created it in the form of a shifting use. The statutes, which were originally 1 R. S. 725, §§ 24, 27, and are now Real Property Law (L. 1909, ch. 52), §§ 50, 53, provide as follows: — "Subject to the provisions of this article, . . . a fee or other lesser estate may be limited on a fee, on a contingency which, if it should occur, must happen within the period prescribed in this article." . . . "A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which if it happens, will operate to abridge or determine the precedent estate; and every such remainder shall be a conditional limitation." The word "remainder" is here employed in a broad, general sense. And the "provisions of this article" mean the provisions which forbid too great a suspension of the absolute power of alienation of the property. These are explained hereafter. Ch. lxx, *infra*. It is sufficient at this point to note that such estates have been possible, made by any ordinary form of conveyance, since January 1, 1830. See *Hatfield v. Sneden*, 54 N. Y. 280; *Embury v. Sheldon*, 68 N. Y. 227; § 729, note (a), *infra*.

¹ §§ 728-729, *infra*.

N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, §§ 50, 53; 1
Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1424, 1426.

² Stat. 40 and 41 Vict. ch. 33; Digby,
Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) pp. 362, 382;

(2) FREEHOLD ESTATES NOT OF INHERITANCE — LIFE ESTATES.

CHAPTER XXVIII

NATURE AND KINDS OF LIFE ESTATES.

§ 439. General nature of life estates.

§ 440. Classification of life estates.

§ 439. **General Nature of Life Estates.**— Among the most ancient forms of interests in realty are the life estates.¹ The *beneficium*, or benefice, of early feudalism has been heretofore noticed, as a grant for the life of the grantor or grantee.² Greater interests, the fees, were developed in time; but the life ownerships remained; and they have always been treated as worthy of a free man, just as they were in their original form. They are the least of the freehold estates. He who owns a piece of land for life is as truly a freeholder as is he who owns a piece in fee simple.³ Indeed, the word “freehold” has sometimes been used to describe a life interest merely, as distinguished from a fee.⁴ But this meaning of the word is not now common, in this country at least; and where it is found the context usually makes it clear.⁵ (a) The life-owner — or life-tenant, as he is commonly styled⁶ — moreover, has more than the mere usufruct of the land; he owns

(a) In New York, “Estates of inheritance and for life, shall continue to be termed estates of freehold; estates for years are chattels real; and estates at will or by sufferance, continue to be chattel interests, but not liable as such to sale on execution.” Real Prop. L. § 33, originally 1 R. S. 722, § 5.

¹ Wms. R. P. p.*17.

² § 251, *supra*.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *120; Cruise, Dig. tit. iii. ch. i. § 1.

⁴ Bracton, f. 17 b. Smith, Real & Pers. Prop. p. 123.

⁵ In this narrow sense it is more frequently used in England than in this country. Smith, Real & Pers. Prop. p. 123. See 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1310.

⁶ “And it is to be understood that there is a feoffor and feoffee, donor and donee, lessor and lessee. Feoffor is properly where a man enfeoffes another in any lands or tenements in fee simple, he which maketh the feoffment is called the feoffor, and he to whom the feoffment is made is called the feoffee. And the donor is properly where a man giveth certain lands or tenements to another in taile, he which maketh the

it in freehold as truly as does the fee-owner thus own his interest.¹ The fundamental difference between his interest and a fee simple is in quantity — one is finite, the other infinite; one is a straight line of ownership stretching away to infinity, the other a straight line of ownership measured by a life or by lives.² The life estates are the freeholds not of inheritance.

The expression "life estates" is to be thought of as comprising a well-defined class of interests, some of which may not continue during any specified life or lives, but all of which are freehold estates not of inheritance. Any estate that *may* last for a life or lives, that is not inheritable, and that is not at will nor for any fixed period of time, is placed in this category.³ For example, an interest granted to a widow so long as she remains unmarried, or to a man while he continues to live in a certain house, or to A until a designated tree falls, is a life estate.⁴ A woman, having land during her widowhood, may terminate her ownership, by marrying, the day after she acquires it; yet, for the twenty-four hours during which it is hers, she has a life estate, subject to all the principles, rights, and duties of life interests in realty.⁵ The indefinite duration of the estate and the fact that it may continue for life place it within that class.

§ 440. **Classification of Life Estates.** — Life estates are classified, according to the manner in which they are created, into *a*, Conventional life estates, or those made by act, contract, or convention of the parties; and *b*, Legal life estates, or those made by operation of law. *a*. As appears from the preceding section, the first of these groups, the conventional life estates, are naturally subdivided into: (a) An estate to

gift is called the donor, and he to whom the gift is made is called the donee. And the lessor is properly where a man letteth to another lands or tenements for terme of life, or for terme of years, or to hold at will, he which maketh the lease is called lessor and he to whom the lease is made is called lessee." Lit. § 57; Wms. R. P. p. * 22.

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 8.

² "Proprietary rights in land are, we may say, projected upon the plane of time. The category of quantity, of duration, is applied to them. The life-tenant's rights are a finite quantity; the fee-tenant's rights are an infinite, or

potentially infinite, quantity; we see a difference in respect to duration, and this is the one fundamental difference." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 10.

³ Co. Lit. 42 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *121; *Hewlins v. Shippam*, 5 B. & C. 221; *McArthur v. Scott*, 113 U. S. 340, 377.

⁴ *Ibid.*; 4 Kent's Com. p. *26; *People v. Gillis*, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 201; *Mansfield v. Mansfield*, 75 Me. 509; *Hayward v. Kinney*, 84 Mich. 591; *Sims v. Gay*, 109 Ind. 501.

⁵ Such interests are life estates on limitation.

one for his own life, illustrated by an estate to A *as long as he lives*; (b) An estate *per autre vie*, or to one person during the life of another, illustrated by an estate to X *as long as Y lives*; and (c) An estate for an uncertain period, which is not inheritable nor at will and may last for life, illustrated by an estate to X *while a designated tree shall stand*, or to Y *so long as he continues to live on the land*.¹ These may be combined or modified in various ways, as will more fully appear hereafter; but they are all of the ultimate, logical classes of conventional life interests. Of these three forms, the estate *per autre vie* is regarded as the smallest; and it has always been treated as the least of all the freehold interests.² b. All the legal life estates arise — are implied by law — from the relationship of husband and wife. They are: (a) Curtesy — the life interest of a husband in all the real property of which his wife was beneficially seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture, provided a child was born of the marriage, born alive during the life of the wife and capable of inheriting the property; (b) Dower — the life interest of a wife in one third of the real property of which her husband is beneficially seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture; (c) Jointure — a provision or settlement of property by or for a husband upon his wife, to be taken by her in lieu of dower; and (d) Estates during marriage — estates, exclusive of curtesy, dower, and jointure, which husband and wife have in each other's real property during coverture; such, for example, as the husband's common-law interest in, and right to the income from, his wife's real property during the married life.³

In the discussion of these life interests, a chapter will first be devoted to the creation and distinctive features of those that are conventional. Then a separate discussion will be given to the special characteristics of each of the four legal life estates. And, finally, the rights and duties incident to all life tenancies, however created, will be explained. Some of the most interesting of all legal questions are presented by these lesser forms of freehold estates in real property.

¹ Lit. § 56; Co. Lit. 42 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *121; Cruise, Dig. tit. iii. ch. i. §§ 3-8.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *121; Wms. R. P. pp. *17, *22; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. p. 144; Rosse's Case, 5 Rep. 13 a.

³ An estate tail after possibility of issue extinct has been grouped with

the legal life estates. "This estate is of an amphibious nature, partaking partly of an estate tail and partly of an estate for life." 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *124, *125; Cruise, Dig. tit. iv. It is of very little practical importance in this country; and is sufficiently explained in the note to § 430, *supra*.

CHAPTER XXIX.

a. CONVENTIONAL LIFE ESTATES.

§ 441. Forms of conventional life estates — Merger.

§ 442. (a) Estates for one's own life.

§ 443. (b) Estates *per autre vie*.

§ 444. (c) Estates for uncertain periods, which are not inheritable nor at will, but may last for life.

§ 441. **Forms of Conventional Life Estates — Merger.** — The three forms of conventional life estates — for one's own life, for the life of another, and for an uncertain period which is not inheritable nor at will but may last for life — have been briefly described and illustrated. These may exist separately, and generally do so; or they may be combined and so may make special forms of life interests. Thus, real property may be conveyed to A for the term of his own life and the life of B; in which case A's interest will continue until both he and B are dead, for he has one estate of freehold to last during the two lives and the life of the survivor.¹ So, an estate may be conferred upon A during the lives of B and C; and this will continue during the life of the survivor of B and C, unless a contrary intent is expressed. And an estate may be made to last during the *joint* lives of B and C, so that it will terminate at the death of that one of them who dies first.² At common law, estates measured by any number of lives in being may be created by any of these forms of expression; and they will fall within the category of conventional life estates.³ They are simply measured by, or associated with, more lives than one. They are subject to the same legal rules and principles as are the simpler forms of estates for life. (a)

(a) In New York, the number of possible, successive life estates, one in remainder after the other, is practically restricted to two — for two persons in being — by the statute which declares that: "Successive estates for life

¹ Rosse's Case, 5 Rep. 13 a.

² 1 Leake, Land Law, p. 190.

³ Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas.

1; 1 Vernon's Case, 165; Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372.

If a person obtain by separate transactions two distinct life estates in the same land, one for his own life and the other *per autre vie*, since the former is regarded as the greater, it merges and destroys the latter, unless a contrary intent is expressed. Thus, if A who owns a lot of land for his own life should acquire B's life interest in the same lot and fail to express an intention to hold them separate, he would have only the estate for his own life.¹ "But this doctrine . . . does not prevent the creation of *one* estate in a person with the several connected limitations, *both* for his own life and the lives of others; and if he dies before the other persons on whose lives the estate depends, the estate continues, as in the ordinary case of an estate *per autre vie*."² That is, as above illustrated, an estate, created by one transaction, to A for his own life and for the life of B, endures as long as either of them lives.

These special and rare combinations of life estates having been noticed, the way is cleared for a brief, separate discussion of each of the primary forms of conventional life estates — (a) the estate to one for his own life, (b) the estate *per autre vie*, and (c) the estate for an uncertain period, which is not inheritable nor at will but may last for life.

§ 442. (a) **Estates for One's Own Life.** — Of course, the most natural method of giving one a life estate is by conveying the property to him "for his life," or by using equivalent words. And usually when the expression employed does not clearly specify the life by which the interest is to be measured, as when for example the grant is made by an owner in fee, to one "for life," it is held that the grantee's life is meant.³ This is because an estate for the grantee's own life is more valuable to him than an estate for the life of another; and the instrument

shall not be limited, except to persons in being at the creation thereof; and where a remainder shall be limited on more than two successive estates for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled thereto, shall be void, and on the death of those persons, the remainder shall take effect, in the same manner as if no other life estates had been created." — A conveyance to A for life, then to B for life, then to C for life, and then to D and his heirs (A, B, C, and D being all in being) gives a life estate to A, a life estate to B, and a fee simple to D, but nothing to C. Real Prop. L. § 43, originally 1 R. S. 723, § 17. See *Purdy v. Hayt*, 92 N. Y. 446; *Woodruff v. Cook*, 61 N. Y. 638; *Matter of Moore*, 152 N. Y. 602; § 873, note (a) *infra*; § 962, note (a), *infra*.

¹ Bowles' Case, 11 Rep. 83 b; Co. Lit. 41 b. See § 431, *supra*; § 866, *infra*.

² 1 Leake, Land Law, p. 190.

³ *Shaner v. Wilson*, 207 Pa. St. 550; Co. Lit. 42 a; 1 Leake, Land Law, p. 191; Page on Wills, § 570.

is construed most strongly against the grantor.¹ But, when one who himself owns only a life estate or a fee tail transfers the land to another for life without designating whose life, it is taken to mean the life of the grantor, because otherwise it might result in an attempt to interfere with the rights of the succeeding owner.²

At common law, moreover, as was explained in discussing estates in fee simple,³ a mere conveyance of realty by an owner in fee, without using words of inheritance (heirs) or restricting the estate in time, gives to the grantee or devisee a life estate only — a grant or devise “to A,” or “to A forever,” or “to A and his assigns,” made by a fee-owner (other than the owner of a fee tail) confers upon A an estate during his own life.⁴ But, here too, when the grantor has only a life estate or a fee tail, such a grant makes an estate merely for the life of the grantor.⁵ By modern legislation generally, and, in some states where the statutes are silent, by the courts’ construction, this common-law creation of life estates is abolished; and he to whom real property is conveyed takes all the interest of the grantor or testator, unless an intent to transfer a different estate is clearly expressed.⁶ (a)

Estates for one’s own life may also arise by implication of law, especially in the construction of wills. Thus, if A devise land to his heir “after the death of B,” since no one but A’s heir can take the property except through the will, and his rights are postponed till the death of B, it is held that A meant a gift of the property to B for his life.⁷ So, when A devises realty to C “after the death of my heir D,” he gives to D by implication an estate during D’s own life.⁸

In summary, it may be said that an estate for one’s own life

(a) In New York, this change, as to both wills and deeds, took effect January 1, 1830. See this explained at § 420, note (a), *supra*.

¹ *Ibid*.

² *Ibid*.; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *121; Broom, Leg. Max. p. *458.

³ § 418, *supra*.

⁴ Co. Lit. 42 a; 2 Jarm. Wills, p. 1131; 1 Leake, Land Law, p. 191; *In re Sanford* (1901), 1 Ch. 939; *In re Sunderland’s Estate*, 203 Pa. St. 155; *Morrison v. Schorr*, 197 Ill. 554.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ This is especially true as to transfers by will. N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52,

§ 240; Stat. 1 Vict. ch. 26, § 28; 44 & 45 Vict. ch. 41; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1474, 2808; 1 Sharsw. & B. Lead. Cas. R. P. p. 145 *et seq*; § 420, *supra*.

⁷ But, if the gift were to a stranger to the testator, after the death of B, no such implication would arise, for the property would then go to the testator’s heir during B’s life. 1 Jarm. Wills, pp. *466, *475.

⁸ *Ibid*. See *Anderson v. Anderson*, 191 Ill. 100.

is the courts' favorite among the conventional life estates; and such an interest will emerge whenever a life estate is created by the parties, expressly or by implication, and is not otherwise moulded by special circumstances or declaration of intent.

§ 443. (b) **Estates Per Autre Vie.**—It is probable that the estate *per autre vie* (for another's life) originated in assignments by life owners of their interests to other persons.¹ A, holding land for his own life, would transfer it to B; and so B would become the owner of an estate during the life of A. Such interests may be created, either in that manner, or by express conveyance of real property to one person during the life of another.² The person whose life is thus made to measure the duration of the estate is called *cestui que vie*.

The most distinctive common-law feature of estates *per autre vie* was their capability of giving rise to title by occupancy. For, if the owner of such an interest died before *cestui que vie*, there was ordinarily no one who had any absolute right to the property during the rest of the latter's life. "It did not revert to the grantor, though it formerly was supposed so to do; for he had parted with all his interest, so long as *cestui que vie* lived: it did not escheat to the lord of the fee, for all escheats must be of the absolute entire fee, and not of any particular estate carved out of it; much less of so minute a remnant as this: it did not belong to the grantee; for he was dead: it did not descend to his heirs; for there were no words of inheritance in the grant: nor could it vest in his executors; for no executors could succeed to a freehold."³ Neither could it be devised by his will.⁴ If, then, the conveyance of the life estate had been simply to A during the life of B, and A died before B, the person who could first acquire possession of the land after A's death would own it for the rest of B's life, and was called a "general occupant." But if the land had been conveyed to A *and his heirs* during the life of B, and A died before B, A's heirs would take it for the residue of B's life as "special occupants." That is, whenever the life tenant died before *cestui que vie*, title by occupancy would pass to some person, who took possession of the land, during the rest of the life of *cestui que vie*; it would be "special occupancy" if by right arising

¹ Challis, R. P. p. 43.

² Co. Lit. 41 b; Cruise, Dig. tit. iii. ch. i. § 3; 4 Kent's Com. p. *25.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *259; Co. Lit. 41 b.

⁴ The power to devise it was not given by the statute of wills; but this was corrected by the statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, ch. 3. § 12. See history of alienation by will, § 277, *supra*.

from the words of the conveyance *per autre vie* that person were the heir of the deceased life owner ; otherwise it would be "general occupancy."¹

General occupancy was abolished in England by the statute of frauds,² which in this respect was substantially re-enacted by the statute 14 Geo. II. ch. 20, and again by the Wills Act, 1 Vict. ch. 26. These statutes provide that an estate *per autre vie* may be devised by its owner, and that, if not so devised, and in the absence of any *special* occupancy, it shall pass to his executors or administrators and become assets in their hands in the same manner as his personal property. Thus, it is a freehold estate while he lives, and, if not disposed of by his will, nor taken by any special occupant, it becomes a chattel real, a part of his personal assets, after his death.³ In many of the United States, legislation has gone even farther than this, and abolished both forms of occupancy.⁴ In most of the states where this has occurred, such for example as New York, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, an estate *per autre vie*, whether conveyed to one and his heirs or otherwise, is a freehold only during the life of the grantee or devisee; and after his death it is a chattel real — an estate to A, or to A and his heirs, for the life of B, is a life estate while both A and B live; but if A die before B, it becomes a chattel real in the hands of A's executors or ad-

¹ Co. Lit. 41 b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *259. But where the king had the reversion no occupancy was allowed, "because *mulum tempus occurrit regi*; nor could there be any general occupancy of incorporeal hereditaments, because of these there could be no physical possession." Ibid.; Cruise, Dig. tit. iii. ch. i. §§ 43, 44.

A special occupant does not take the property by descent, since the interest of his ancestor being only a life estate is not inheritable. It is the fact that he is *heir* that enables him to take by purchase by virtue of the words of conveyance *per autre vie* to his ancestor *and his heirs*. Yet the ancestor may bar the right of the heir by alienation of the entire estate *per autre vie*. 2 Blackst. Com. p. *260; Challis, R. P. pp. 288-290. See §§ 91, 92, *supra*.

There has been some discussion, resulting in no absolute decision, as to whether, if property were conveyed to

A and his executors or administrators during the life of B, A's executors or administrators could take it as special occupants. This has become merely an academic question, since the statute of frauds; for if A should die before B and not will away the life interest, in England his executors or administrators would take it anyhow, either as special occupants or by virtue of the statute; and in this country the result would be the same, except as it might be affected by local legislation. See Co. Lit. 41 b; Cruise, Dig. tit. iii. ch. i. §§ 49-56, tit. xxviii. ch. 2, § 7; Challis, R. P. p. 289; Atkinson v. Baker, 4 T. R. 229; Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. 425; legislation settling the matter, explained in the following paragraph of this section.

² 29 Car. II. ch. 3, § 12.

³ Stat. 1 Vict. ch. 26, § vi.

⁴ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1310, 1335.

ministrators.¹ (a) In other states, of which Massachusetts and North Carolina are illustrations, it is retained as a freehold interest, and made descendible to the heirs of its owner in case he dies before *cestui que vie* without willing it away — an estate to A, or to A and his heirs, for the life of B, is not only a freehold for A while both he and B live, but it remains a freehold for A's heirs or devisees in case he dies before B.² The general result, also, of the statutes in this country is that the owner of an estate *per autre vie*, who dies before *cestui que vie*, may will it away, whether it thus passes as a freehold interest as it must in some of the states, or as a chattel real as it must in others.³

Because of the temptation for the owner of an estate *per autre vie* to conceal the death of *cestui que vie*, and thus to prolong his own holding of the property, it was provided by the statute 6 Anne, ch. 18, that the owner of any subsequent inter-

(a) In New York, "An estate for the life of a third person, whether limited to heirs or otherwise, shall be deemed a freehold only during the life of the grantee or devisee; after his death it shall be deemed a chattel real." Real Prop. L. § 34, originally 1 R. S. 722, § 6, which followed closely 1 R. L. 365, § 4, and part of the statute 14 Geo. II. ch. 20, § 9. Therefore, on the death of the owner of such an estate while *cestui que vie* is living, the property passes, as a chattel real, to the executors or administrators of the deceased, and becomes assets of his estate, in the same manner as his personal property. An estate *per autre vie* has probably always been devisable in that state, and was expressly declared to be so by L. 1813, ch. 23 (1 R. L. 365, § 4). *Gillis v. Brown*, 5 Cow. 388; *Wright v. Trustees of M. E. Church*, 1 Hoffm. Chan. 201, 225; *Crooked Lake Nav. Co. v. Keuka Nav. Co.*, 37 Hun, 9, 13; *Powell on Devises*, p. 138.

At common law, an estate *per autre vie* could be validly measured by any number of lives in being — it could be given to A during the lives of B, C, D, E, etc., and the survivors and survivor of them as long as any of them should live. But the practical effect of the New York statutes is to restrict its duration to not more than two lives in being; for "When a remainder is created on any such life estate, and more than two persons are named as the persons during whose lives the life estate shall continue, the remainder shall take effect on the death of the two persons first named, as if no other lives had been introduced." A conveyance to A during the lives of B, C, D, and E, with remainder to X and his heirs, gives to A an estate *per autre vie* measured by the lives of B and C only, and a remainder to X to be taken in possession by him when B and C are both dead. Real Prop. L. § 45, originally 1 R. S. 724, § 19. See § 962, note (a) *infra*.

¹ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 34; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1310.

² Mass. Gen. Stat. (1882), ch. 125, § 1; *McBryde v. Patterson*, 78 N. C. 412.

³ Last three preceding notes; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 2630; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) p. 108 (p. *94), note.

est dependent on the life of another person may obtain from the court of chancery an order for the production of such person; and, if he be not produced as required by the order, may take possession of the property as if such person were dead.¹ And by the act of 19 Car. II. ch. 6, the absence of *cestui que vie* for seven years, without being heard from or accounted for, raises a presumption of his death, in any action or judicial proceeding concerning the property, in which his death comes in question. Such statutes as the latter are common in the United States.² (a)

§ 444. (c) **Estates for Uncertain Periods, which are not Inheritable nor at Will, but may last for Life.** — It is to be reiterated and emphasized here that such interests as these are life estates. Indefinite duration that may be during a life, incapability of being inherited, and indeterminability merely at will usually place an ownership of realty within the category of life interests.³ Such are estates, to A while he continues to live on the land, to a man and his wife during coverture, to a widow so long as she remains unmarried, to B until he ceases to carry on a specified business, to X while a designated tree stands, and to Y during his residence abroad.⁴ Though such an ownership may quickly terminate because of the happening of the specified event, it is a life estate, governed by all the rules and principles of life estates, as long as it continues.⁵

In treating of this class of life estates, Coke and Littleton make the following distinctions, which still exist. "If a man make a lease of a manor that at the time of the lease made is worth £20 *per annum* until £100 be paid, in this case, because

(a) The New York statute provides that: "A person upon whose life an estate in real property depends, who remains without the United States, or absents himself in the state or elsewhere for seven years together, is presumed to be dead in an action or special proceeding concerning the property in which his death comes in question, unless it is affirmatively proved that he was alive within that time." Code Civ. Pro. § 841; Matter of Board of Education of New York, 173 N. Y. 321, 323; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Brennan, 12 App. Div. 103, 108.

¹ Wms. R. P. p. *21; 1 Leake, Land Law, p. 196.

² N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 841; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 2510.

³ § 439, *supra*.

⁴ Hewlins v. Shippam, 5 B. & C. 221; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 377; Evan's Appeal, 51 Conn. 435;

People v. Gillis, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 201; Miller v. Gilbert, 144 N. Y. 68; Hayward v. Kinney, 84 Mich. 591; Fuller v. Wilbur, 170 Mass. 506; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *121; 4 Kent's Com. p. *26.

⁵ Such interests are life estates on limitation.

the annual profits of the manor are uncertaine, he hath an estate for life, if livery be made, determinable upon the levying of the £100. But if a man grant a rent of £20 *per annum* until £100 be paid, there he hath an estate for five years, for there it is certain, and depends upon no uncertainty. . . . If a man by his will in writing devise his lands to his executors for payment of debts and until his debts be paid ; in this case the executors have but a chattell, and an uncertaine interest in the land until his debts be paid ; for if they should have it for their lives, then by their death their estate should cease, and the debts unpaid.”¹ That is, in such cases, whenever the period of holding is uncertain, it is a life estate ; except that a gift to executors, who as such can not take a freehold, until testator’s debts or specified debts are paid, gives only a chattel and not a life interest.²

¹ Co. Lit. 42 a.

² Ibid. ; Cruise, Dig. tit. iii. ch. i. § 8 ; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 223.

b. LEGAL LIFE ESTATES.

CHAPTER XXX.

(a) CURTESY.

§ 445. Origin and meaning of estates by curtesy.

§ 446. Definition, requisites, and forms of curtesy.

§ 447. First — Lawful marriage.

§ 448. Second — Beneficial seisin by the wife of an estate of inheritance during the coverture.

§ 449. The wife's seisin — Seisin in fact — How far required.

§ 450. The wife's estate may be either legal or equitable.

§ 451. The wife's estate must be one of inheritance.

§ 452. The wife must be beneficially seised.

§ 453. The wife's seisin and ownership must be continuous and uninterrupted.

§ 454. The wife's seisin and ownership must not be defeated by a paramount claim or title — Curtesy in qualified fees.

§ 455. Third — Birth of issue, alive, during the lifetime of the mother, and capable of inheriting the property.

§ 456. Fourth — Death of the wife.

§ 457. Curtesy initiate.

§ 458. Curtesy consummate.

§ 459. How curtesy may be barred or forfeited.

§ 460. Curtesy in the United States.

§ 445. **Origin and Meaning of Estates by Curtesy.** — Originating probably in the husband's right of guardianship — guardianship of the children of the marriage, and in its earliest form guardianship of both the wife and the children¹ — his interest in her estates of inheritance, after the birth of living issue of the marriage, came to be known as an estate "by the law of England,"² and later "by the curtesy (*curialitas*, *courtesie*, civility, concession, or favor) of England";³ because, although a similar right existed in other countries such as

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 414.

² The husband was *tenens per legem Angliæ*. Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 174.

³ "This right bears two curious names. The husband becomes tenant 'by the law of England' and tenant

'by the curtesy of England.' The latter phrase seems to be much the newer of the two. We do not read it in Latin records; it seems to make its first appearance in the French Year Books of Edward I's age." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 414.

Normandy, Scotland, and Ireland,¹ yet in England it was the broadest and fullest in its extent and so was thought of by lawyers as a "courteous" gift or "special favor" of English law.² The Norman husband would lose his curtesy, his *veufeté* (*viduitas*) as it was there called, if he married again;³ the English husband would not. Scottish law gave him "curtesy" (*curialitas*, curiality) only in lands which his wife had inherited;⁴ English law gave him curtesy in all her estates of inheritance, no matter how acquired by her. In England, this interest belonged to a second husband, as well as to a first; and it deprived the lord of all right of wardship as long as it continued.⁵ It was not of feudal origin, but it availed for the time being to set aside this one of the most oppressive of feudal rights — the lord's right of wardship.⁶ The husband who had curtesy took *all* his wife's realty for *all* his life. English jurists knew that this was a peculiarly extensive right, believed that it had its origin in some "specialty," and naturally called it an estate, or tenancy, "by the curtesy of England."⁷ It has there retained that name. And in this country it is described as the husband's "curtesy," or his "estate by the curtesy," or his "tenancy by the curtesy."⁸ As a right, more or less extensive, in the wife's estates of inheritance, it is possibly as old as the sources of Anglo-Saxon law.⁹

§ 446. **Definition, Requisites and Forms of Curtesy.**—Curtesy has been heretofore defined as the life interest of a husband in all the real property of which his wife was beneficially seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture, provided a child be naturally born of the marriage, born alive and capable of

¹ Co. Lit. 30 a; Wright, Ten. pp. 192, 193; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *126; Hale, Hist. Com. L. p. 180.

² This seems to be the natural and logical explanation of the phrase. And it is the one strongly contended for by Pollock & Maitland. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed. vol. ii.) pp. 414, 415. The same learned writers opposed the view, held by many, that the word "curtesy" is connected with *curia*, and indicates the attendance of the husband as tenant of the land at the lord's court, for he undoubtedly did this before the birth of issue as well as after; and they treat as possible, though without any very good authority, the explanation of the

"mirror" that the right of curtesy was granted to husbands by the "curtesy" of Henry I. See Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 174; Mirror (Seld. Soc.), p. 14; 1 Kerr, R. P. §§ 708, 709.

³ Somma, p. 307.

⁴ Fraser, Law of Husband & Wife (2d ed.), p. 1123.

⁵ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 414, 416.

⁶ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *126; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 416.

⁷ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 416.

⁸ 4 Kent's Com. pp. *27-*29.

⁹ Grand Coustumier, ch. 121; Lit. § 35.

inheriting the property.¹ There are here involved four requisites, three of which are essential to the existence of curtesy initiate, and all of which must exist in order to give curtesy consummate. They are: *First*, lawful marriage; *Second*, beneficial seisin by the wife of an estate of inheritance during the coverture; *Third*, birth of issue, alive, in the lifetime of the mother, and capable of inheriting the property; *Fourth*, death of the wife.² These are to be explained in the order stated. And, in the discussion, the nature of the two stages or forms through which a husband's curtesy may pass will be more fully examined.

For, as already intimated, after the requisite birth of issue he has curtesy *initiate* in his wife's estates of inheritance, while she is still living; and when she dies leaving him surviving, the fourth essential having thus occurred, his life interest becomes complete as curtesy *consummate*.³ No act or ceremony of any kind, by the husband or any one else, is needed to make this change on the death of the wife. Curtesy consummate, which is *the* important form of this interest and the form generally meant when no qualifying word is used, then instantly devolves upon him by operation of law; and no disclaimer on his part, short of an actual release, will prevent it from vesting in him.⁴ It is thus importantly different in its development from a widow's dower interest, since she has no estate in her husband's real property until her third has been set off and assigned to her after his death.⁵

The requisites of curtesy, as here stated, need not all exist at the same time. Proof that all have existed is sufficient to establish the right.⁶ Thus, if the wife become seised of land during the coverture, and then sell it or become disseised of it, and subsequently her first child of that marriage be born, the husband becomes entitled to curtesy in that land.⁷ And when the only child of the marriage dies before its mother has seisin of any realty, its father may have curtesy in the property of

¹ § 72, *supra*.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *127, *128; Cruise, Dig. tit. v. ch. i. § 4; Ferguson v. Tweedy, 43 N. Y. 543, 548; Comer v. Chamberlain, 88 Mass. 166, 169.

³ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *127; Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 74, 95; Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 77, 83; Phillips v. Farley, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2201.

⁴ *Ibid.*; Jones v. Davies, 5 H. & N. 766; Witham v. Perkins, 2 Me. 400; Ball v. Woolfolk, 175 Mo. 378.

⁵ See § 464, *infra*.

⁶ Co. Lit. 29 b; Paine's Case, 8 Rep. 34; Comer v. Chamberlain, 88 Mass. 166, 169.

⁷ *Ibid.*; Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow (N. Y.) 74, 95.

which she thereafter becomes seised of an estate of inheritance.¹

§ 447. **First — Lawful Marriage.**— A marriage is lawful, for this purpose, when it is either absolutely valid and unassailable, or merely voidable but not avoided during the life of the wife.² When a so-called marriage is absolutely null and void, as for example in a clear case of incest, there is, of course, no curtesy.³ But when it is only voidable, as in the case of one of the parties being under the age of consent at the time of its solemnization, there may be curtesy unless the marriage is set aside before the wife's death. A merely voidable marriage can not be annulled after the death of either spouse.⁴

The validity of a marriage is usually determined by the *lex loci contractus*. The generally accepted principle of private international law is, a marriage valid where entered into is valid everywhere.⁵ But some exceptions to this rule have been dictated by public policy. Thus, a marriage clearly incestuous by the positive law of the state in which the land is situated must be there declared void;⁶ and so in most places must a marriage which is bigamous or polygamous, though it was valid where contracted.⁷ And, of course, a clear local statute, or rule of law, determines the validity of a marriage as affecting the right to curtesy in real property in the state or country in which it exists.⁸

§ 448. **Second — Beneficial Seisin by the Wife of an Estate of Inheritance during the Coverture.**— The essentials of the wife's seisin and ownership of real property, in order that the husband may have curtesy in it, are first to be briefly noted; and then a distinct section is to be devoted to the fuller discussion of each of them. The common law requires that her seisin shall be *in fact* (or in deed) and not merely *in law* — entry on the property, when possible, must be made or continued during cover-

¹ *Ibid.*; 4 Kent's Com. p. *27.

² Co. Lit. 30 a; 2 Burns, Eccl. Law, p. 501; Cruise, Dig. tit. v. ch. i. § 5.

³ *Turner v. Meyers*, 1 Hag. Con. 414; *McIlvain v. Scheibley*, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 942. See *Price v. Price*, 124 N. Y. 589; § 469, *infra*.

⁴ Last two preceding notes.

⁵ Story, Conflict of Laws, §§ 110, 112; Bishop, Mar. & Div. § 390; 19 Amer. Law. Reg. N. S. 219.

⁶ *Ibid.*; *Sutton v. Warren*, 10 Met. (Mass.) 451; *McIlvain v. Scheibley*, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 942.

⁷ *Fenton v. Reed*, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 53; *Price v. Price*, 124 N. Y. 589; *Rawson v. Rawson*, 156 Mass. 578.

⁸ Last three preceding notes; Chase's Blackst. pp. 143-148 and notes. Before the year 1907, such a local rule was illustrated by the English prohibition against an Englishman's marriage of his deceased wife's sister, even in a foreign country. *Brooks v. Brooks*, 9 H. L. Cas. 193. But that law was abolished in 1907, by Stat. 7, Edw. VII. ch. 47.

ture.¹ The estate in the property of which she is thus seized may be either legal or equitable.² It must be an estate of inheritance.³ She must be seized beneficially — for her own benefit, and not as holder for another.⁴ Her seisin must be continuous and uninterrupted — not broken in upon at her death by the seisin of another person.⁵ And, finally, her seisin and ownership must not be defeated by a paramount claim or title.⁶ Each of these requisites has presented to the courts some nice and interesting questions.

§ 449. **The Wife's Seisin — Seisin in Fact — How far Required.**— The common law gave to a husband the right to the possession and enjoyment of all his wife's real property during the coverture. It was his fault, therefore, if she remained seized in law only, and did not acquire seisin in fact, of any of her realty which he could possess or enjoy. His failure to assert his marital rights in this matter was laches on his part, and might also be contributory to the loss of her title because of disseisin and adverse possession by another person. For these reasons, and also it was said, because there could be no curtesy in interests which were not inheritable, and no one could inherit real property except from an ancestor who was seized in fact; the common law required the wife to be seized in fact, during the coverture, in order to give curtesy to the husband.⁷ In applying this requisite, however, it must be remembered that one is seized in fact of an incorporeal hereditament, or of an equitable interest, who owns in it a freehold estate and is in actual receipt of the income and profits;⁸ that possession of a tenant for years or at will is ordinarily deemed to be the possession of his landlord;⁹ and that a vendee of the husband — one who had purchased his right to enter upon the wife's land — could make her seisin become one in fact by tak-

¹ § 449, *infra*.

² § 450, *infra*.

³ § 451, *infra*.

⁴ § 452, *infra*.

⁵ § 453, *infra*.

⁶ § 454, *infra*.

⁷ Co. Lit. 29 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *127, *128; Cruise, Dig. tit. v. ch. i. § 6; Churchill v. Onderdonk, 59 N. Y. 134; Boylston v. Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 521; Borland's Lessee v. Marshall, 2 Ohio St. 308; Eager v. Furnivall, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 115. "Actual seisin or actual possession, as distinguished from con-

structive possession or possession in law, has been defined to be one based upon an actual entry on the land and one which requires or gives an occupation as a demonstrative thing." Carr v. Anderson, 6 N. Y. App., Div. 6, 10. See § 283, *supra*.

⁸ P. 380, *supra*; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; Withers v. Jenkins, 14 S. C. 597.

⁹ Bract. book ii. ch. ix. fol. 27. Rowan v. Lytle, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 616; Landon v. Townshend, 129 N. Y. 166.

ing possession of that land during her coverture.¹ And if a wife acquire realty through a conveyance operating by virtue of the statute of uses, and no one be holding it adversely to her, she is regarded as seised of it in fact, although neither she nor any one else for her may have taken actual possession.² And wherever her seisin can thus be regarded as existing in fact (or in deed as it is sometimes called) it is sufficient for purposes of curtesy.³ The chief cases, therefore, if not the only ones, in which the common law denied this estate to the husband because the wife though seised during the coverture was not adequately seised, were those in which her title was not wholly complete until she became seised in fact by means of entry on or enjoyment of the property, either by herself or by some one else for her benefit. Such instances arose when real property, which descended or was devised to her, was left vacant and unoccupied during her coverture and ownership.⁴

In a few of the more conservative states of this country, such as New York and Kentucky, the common-law requirement of seisin in fact as a prerequisite to curtesy still obtains.⁵ Most of the states in which curtesy now exists permit the seisin to be either in fact or in law, provided there was no adverse possession.⁶ And some courts, of which those of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Connecticut are representatives, have gone so far as to give curtesy in lands which the wife owned in fee and on which she had a right of entry during coverture, although throughout all

¹ *Vanarsdall v. Fauntleroy*, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 401. So, seisin by her guardian is sufficient. *Powell v. Gossom*, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 175.

² *Adair v. Lott*, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 182; *Carpenter v. Garrett*, 75 Va. 129; *Barr v. Galloway*, 1 McLean (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 476. For description of conveyance operating by virtue of the Statute of Uses, see §§ 1050-1054, *infra*.

³ Last three preceding notes.

⁴ *Jackson v. Johnson*, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 74, 98; *Adair v. Lott*, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 182; *Collins v. Russell*, 96 N. Y. App. Div. 136. And see *Ferguson v. Tweedy*, 43 N. Y. 543; *Wass v. Buckman*, 38 Me. 360; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 328.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Neely v. Butler*, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 48, 49 Ky. 48; *Powell v. Gossom*, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 179. In New York, "it was said by Judge Bronson in *Adair v. Lott* (3 Hill 182) that this doctrine"

(requiring the wife to have actual possession when possible) "did not apply where a wife took by deed, but did apply where she took as heir or devisee." *Carr v. Anderson*, 6 N. Y. App. Div. 6, 10. And such seems still to be the rule in that state. See *Pond v. Bergh*, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 140; *Ferguson v. Tweedy*, 43 N. Y. 543; *Boylston v. Wheeler*, 61 N. Y. 521; *Collins v. Russell*, 184 N. Y. 74, 76.

⁶ *Davis v. Mason*, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 503; *Mercer's Lessee v. Selden*, 42 U. S. (1 How.) 137; *Martin v. Trail*, 142 Mo. 85; *Day v. Cochran*, 24 Miss. 261; *Mettler v. Miller*, 129 Ill. 630; *Luttrell v. Reynolds*, 63 Ark. 254; *Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 173, § 3*; *Doe d. Childers v. Bumgarner*, 53 N. C. 297; *Den d. Hopper v. Demarest* 21 N. J. L. 525; *Carpenter v. Garrett*, 75 Va. 129.

the time of her married life and ownership they were in the adverse possession of another.¹

In no jurisdiction can the husband have curtesy, if the wife have neither seisin nor right of immediate entry. Therefore it is that, when she owns only a reversion or remainder after a preceding *freehold* estate, he can have no curtesy.² If, for example, land be conveyed to A for life, remainder to B and her heirs, B's husband can take no curtesy if she die while A is still living and enjoying his life estate. For A has the seisin; and B has neither seisin nor right of entry.³ If, however, the conveyance be to A for ten years (or any other term — less than freehold), remainder to B and her heirs, her husband may have curtesy; because A has no seisin, but he holds as tenant of B, and she is seised of an estate of inheritance.⁴

§ 450. **The Wife's Estate may be either Legal or Equitable.** — Before the statute of uses there was no curtesy in a use or other equitable estate.⁵ But after that statute had sought to destroy uses and, chiefly through the decision in Tyrrel's case, they had been retained and called passive express trusts, the courts of Chancery, applying to them quite fully the maxim "Equity follows the law," allowed curtesy in them and ultimately in all the forms of equitable estates.⁶ The husband of her, who during the coverture owns in fee an equitable interest in real property — a use, a trust, or an equity of redemption — and is enjoying the income therefrom, may have his curtesy in that property.⁷ And it hardly needs to be added that curtesy

¹ *Stoolfoos v. Jenkins*, 8 S. & R. (Pa.) 167; *Borland's Lessee v. Marshall*, 2 Ohio St. 304; *Merritt's Lessee v. Horne*, 5 Ohio St. 307; *Bnsh v. Bradley*, 4 Day (Conn.), 298; *Kline v. Beebe*, 6 Conn. 494. And see *Mettler v. Miller*, 129 Ill. 630.

² Co. Lit. 29 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *127; *Doe v. Rivers*, 7 T. R. 272; *Stoddard v. Gibbs*, 1 Sumn. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 263; *Ferguson v. Tweedy*, 43 N. Y. 543; *Collins v. Russell*, 184 N. Y. 74; *Shores v. Carley*, 8 Allen (Mass.), 425; *Orford v. Benton*, 36 N. H. 395; *Cox v. Boyce*, 152 Mo. 576; *Ward v. Ward*, 74 Cir. Ct. App. 146; *Watkins v. Thornton*, 11 Ohio St. 367; *Todd v. Oviatt*, 58 Conn. 174; *Planter's Bank v. Davis*, 31 Ala. 625.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *De Grey v. Richardson*, 3 Atk. 469; *Rowan v. Lytle*, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 616;

Landon v. Townsbend, 129 N. Y. 166; *Lowry's Lessee v. Steele*, 4 Ohio, 170; *Carter v. Williams*, 43 N. C. 177; *Malone v. McLaurin*, 40 Miss. 161.

⁵ *Digby*, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 328; p. 417, *supra*.

⁶ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *333; *Watts v. Ball*, 1 P. Wms. 109; *Morgan v. Morgan* 5 Madd. 408; *Sweetapple v. Bindon*, 2 Vern. 536; *Davis v. Mason*, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 503; *Adair v. Lott*, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 182; *De Camp v. Crane*, 19 N. J. Eq. 166; *Hart v. Chase*, 46 Conn. 207; *Tillinghast v. Coggshall*, 7 R. I. 383; *Gatewood v. Gatewood*, 75 Va. 407; *McTigue v. McTigue*, 116 Mo. 138; 1 Roper, *Husb. & Wife*, p. 18; 2 Roper, *Husb. & Wife*, p. 20; § 303, *supra*.

⁷ *Ibid.* Even when real property is settled for the sole and separate use of a woman, her husband may have curtesy

is permitted in all realty of which the wife is properly seised of a legal estate of inheritance.¹

§ 551. **The Wife's Estate must be One of Inheritance.** — The husband may have curtesy if the wife own a fee of any kind; but not if her interest be of a lesser quantity. An estate that is not inheritable — a life estate, or one that is less than freehold — can have no such incident.² For, curtesy being regarded as a continuation of the wife's inheritance, it is necessary that, the instant the husband takes as tenant by the curtesy, the inheritance subject to his interest shall be capable of descending from the wife to her heirs. And this can occur only when she owns a fee.³ When she has a fee simple, he may acquire, of course, a complete curtesy interest. And the same is true when she has a fee tail, even though for other purposes and because of the failure of her issue her interest terminates at her death.⁴ In the other qualified fees there may be curtesy, subject, however, to be terminated in some instances as explained hereafter.⁵

§ 452. **The Wife must be Beneficially Seised.** — In order that the husband may have curtesy, the wife must have the property for her own benefit.⁶ If she hold it as trustee for another, or if she acquire it merely as a medium or conduit to pass it to

in it, unless a contrary intent is clearly shown in the settlement. *Appleton v. Rowley*, 8 Eq. 139; *Cooper v. Macdonald*, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 288; *Richardson v. Stodder*, 100 Mass. 528; *Luntz v. Greve*, 102 Ind. 173; *Cushing v. Blake*, 29 N. J. Eq. 399, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; *Bennet v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 316; *Pool v. Blakie*, 53 Ill. 495; *McCulloch v. Valentine*, 24 Neb. 215; 4 Kent's Com. p. *31; § 336, *supra*. But in West Virginia there is no curtesy initiate in a separate use estate. *Guernsey v. Lazear*, 51 W. Va. 328. It has generally been held, however, that curtesy may be shut out from such an estate, by an intent expressed in the instrument of settlement; but such an intent must be clearly expressed. *Rigler v. Cloud*, 14 Pa. St. 361; *Meacham v. Bunting*, 156 Ill. 586; *Mason v. Deese*, 30 Ga. 308; *Chapman v. Price*, 83 Va. 392; *Grimball v. Patton*, 70 Ala. 626; *Cushing v. Blake*, 30 N. J. Eq. 689; *McBreen v. McBreen*, 154 Mo. 323; *Ege v. Medlar*, 82 Pa. St. 100.

¹ When a legal estate in fee is conferred on the wife, an attempt in its settlement to deprive the husband of curtesy is void. *Mildmay's Case*, 6 Rep. 40; *Mullany v. Mullany*, 4 N. J. Eq. 16; *Clancy, Rights of Women*, p. 191.

² *Sumner v. Partridge*, 2 Atk. 47; *Barker v. Barker*, 2 Sim. 249; *Mullany v. Mullany*, 4 N. J. Eq. 16; *Phillips v. La Forge*, 89 Mo. 72; *Graves v. Trueblood*, 96 N. C. 495. See *Lamb v. Lamb*, 14 N. Y. Supp. 206; *Haynes v. Bourn*, 42 Vt. 686; *Ward v. Ives*, 75 Conn. 598; *Waller v. Martin*, 106 Tenn. 341.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Paine's Case*, 8 Rep. 36 a; *Holden v. Wells*, 18 R. I. 802; *Hay v. Mayer*, 8 Watts (Pa.), 203; 4 Kent's Com. p. *32.

⁵ See § 454, *infra*.

⁶ *Chew v. Commissioners*, 5 Rawle (Pa.), 160; *Norton v. McDevit*, 122 N. C. 755. See *Bennet v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 318; *Bartlett v. Tinsley*, 175 Mo. 319.

a third person, her husband can have no curtesy.¹ So, the husband of a mortgagee as such is not entitled to his curtesy, even in states where a mortgage is a conveyance of the land, unless the mortgage has subsisted so long as to create a bar to the equity of redemption; for "the rights existing in, or flowing from, the mortgagee, are subject to the claims of the equity of redemption, so long as the same remains in force."²

When a wife is properly seised in fee of a piece of land for her own benefit, it matters not how long or short her actual ownership may be, so far as curtesy is concerned. So owning it, if she purchase it one minute and sell it the next, or if she die after having it thus for only an instant, his right may attach.³ If beneficial to her, her seisin may be instantaneous, and yet be sufficient for curtesy. Hence, this distinction is to be noted: a husband has no curtesy in land which his wife holds in fee for a long time, but for the benefit of another, or for the purpose of deeding it to another; but he may have curtesy in realty which she holds for herself, though she fails to own it long enough for her to have any actual enjoyment.⁴ An ordinary illustration of an instantaneous seisin not wholly beneficial is the wife's purchase of a piece of land, and receipt of the deed, and her giving back a mortgage on the property for all or a portion of the purchase money. This is treated, in most states, as constituting but a single transaction; and the husband's curtesy is subject to the mortgage.⁵

§ 453. **The Wife's Seisin and Ownership must be Continuous and Uninterrupted.**—The meaning of this requirement is that the wife must own the property and be seised of it in such manner that, at her death, it might pass instantly to her heirs or devisees, but for the husband's intervening right. If this could not occur, but the seisin is to pass to another for a time

¹ *Ibid.*; *Welch v. Chandler*, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 420; *Gritten v. Dickerson*, 202 Ill. 372; *McClure v. Fairfield*, 153 Pa. St. 411.

² 4 Kent's Com. p. *32; *Foster v. Dwinel*, 49 Me. 44; *Moore v. Esty*, 5 N. H. 479; §§ 760, 761, *infra*.

³ In a dower question in Wales, it was found by a jury that, where father and son were hanged at the same time and from the same cart, the son who appeared to struggle the longer had outlived the father; and so the widow of the son was entitled to dower in land

which they descended from the father to the son — the son was *beneficially* seised in fee during the short time that he outlived his father. Cro. Eliz. 503; *Chase's Blackst.* p. 315.

⁴ Last four preceding notes; § 459, *infra*.

⁵ And the same is true as to dower, when the husband so purchases the real property. *Boies v. Benham*, 127 N. Y. 620, 624; *Brackett v. Baum*, 50 N. Y. 8; *Smith v. McCarty*, 119 Mass. 519. And see §§ 489, 777, *infra*.

after her death, her seisin is not continuous; and her husband has no curtesy even though she may own the fee. If, for example, A, the owner of a piece of land in fee simple, were to convey it to B for her life, remainder (vested) to C for his life, and then A were to die intestate leaving B as his only heir, A's reversion in fee would descend to B, and she would thus become the owner of the land in fee, but subject to the life estate of C. Thus, the land would belong to B for life, then to C for life, and then to B in fee. B would be seised, since she had the life estate, and she would own the fee; but the property would not pass to her heirs or devisees immediately on her death, since at that time C could take it for his life; B's seisin and ownership would not be continuous, and her husband could have no curtesy in that land.¹ The result would be different, if, with no other change in this illustration, the estate to C were given for a term of years instead of for life. The land would then belong to B for life, then to C for (say) ten years, and then to B in fee; B would become seised continuously of the entire fee simple, since C owning only an estate less than freehold could have no seisin; and B's husband could take curtesy, subject to the right of C to hold the land as his tenant for ten years after B's death.²

This demand for continuity of the wife's seisin and ownership has given rise to some nice though logical distinctions, which can not be thoroughly apprehended until contingent remainders and the law of merger are understood.³ It is sufficient here to note that at common law the demand is absolute. Any arrangement which will cause the seisin to pass to a stranger to the wife (one who is not her heir or devisee) at her death will preclude the right of curtesy.⁴ The niceties and subtleties arise from the effort to determine whether or not a grant or gift of an intervening estate, similar to that conferred on C in the above illustration, will have that effect. And enough of subsequent discussions may be here anticipated to say that, when such intervening estate is a contingent remainder between the two vested ones of the wife, and it and they

¹ *Colson v. Colson*, 2 Atk. 246; *Crabb*, R. P. §§ 1100-1102; *Wash. R. P.* (6th ed.) § 339; 1 *Fearne*, Cont. Rem. p. 29.

² *Landon v. Townshend*, 129 N. Y. 166; *Chaplin*, Landl. & T. § 593.

³ The rule in *Shelley's Case* is also

frequently brought into requisition, at common law, in settling such questions. See § 895, *infra*.

⁴ Last two preceding notes; *Davis v. Mason*, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 503; *Mettler v. Miller*, 129 Ill. 630.

are not created by the same will, the contingent remainder is defeated and destroyed by the merger of her two vested interests; and so her seisin and ownership are continuous.¹ Thus, if A were to convey land to B for her life, remainder for life to C, a young man, if he live to be fifty years of age, and then A were to die intestate leaving B as his only heir, B, inheriting the reversion in fee, would become the owner of the entire, uninterrupted estate in fee simple, C's contingent remainder for life would be destroyed by the merger of B's two vested estates — would be squeezed out from between them — and B's husband could have curtesy in the land.² The courts would never permit this curious result to accrue, but would keep the two vested estates apart and preserve the intervening contingent estate and so prevent curtesy from attaching, if all the estates were created by the same will — if a testator were to devise land to B, a married woman, for life, remainder for life to C, a young man, if he live to be fifty years of age, remainder to B and her heirs forever. The law's great deference to the wish of a testator preserves C's contingent remainder in such a case.³ And in some instances, the courts have done the same where the three successive estates were all created by the same deed.⁴ But when the two vested estates come separately and by different events, whether by act of the parties or by operation of law, to the same married woman, so that their merger will give her a fee, any intervening contingent interest will be ordinarily destroyed by their merger, her seisin and ownership will thus become continuous, and her husband may have curtesy.⁵

§ 454. **The Wife's Seisin and Ownership must not be defeated by a Paramount Claim or Title — Curtesy in Qualified Fees.**— A destruction of the wife's seisin and estate by a paramount claim, whether it occurs during her life or after her death, defeats curtesy, of course, just as it defeats her interest. When, for illustration, her seisin was tortious, because gained by her act of disseisin, or under a defective title, and it is defeated by an eviction under a judgment upon a title paramount, his claim of right must fall with hers.⁶ This result is

¹ Archer's Case, 1 Rep. 66; Plunket v. Holmes, 1 Lev. 11; Cruise, Dig. tit. v. ch. ii. § 24; Crabb, R. P. §§ 1100, 1101.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Hooker v. Hooker, Cas. Lee temp. Hardw. 13.

⁵ Last eight preceding notes. See § 867, *infra*.

⁶ Co. Lit. 241; 1 Atk. Conv. p. 255
1 Roper, Husb. & W. pp. 36, 42.

very clear, both on principle and from the authorities. In its light, the right to curtesy in the different kinds of fees may perhaps be most clearly discussed.

As already explained, an estate in fee simple owned by the wife is clearly sufficient to confer curtesy upon the husband. And the same is true of an estate in fee tail, even though the wife die without leaving any issue living at the time of her death.¹

In a fee on condition subsequent, which requires for its destruction both a breach of the condition and re-entry by the grantor or his heirs,² there may be curtesy; and if those two events do not concur for the destruction of the fee, the curtesy may continue during the life of the husband. But if the grantor or his heirs re-enter for breach of the condition, the entire estate is thereby defeated *ab initio*, and with it all curtesy disappears — if land be conveyed to a married woman and her heirs provided no intoxicating liquor is sold thereon, her husband has curtesy, which will be defeated by the sale of such liquor on the land and re-entry by the grantor or his heirs for this breach of the condition.³

The nature and duration of curtesy in an estate in fee on limitation (called also “collateral limitation”)⁴ presents a question not settled by the decisions. The weight of the opinions of the best judges and text writers, in this country at least, is that curtesy may attach to such an interest, but subject to be terminated by the event which ends the fee on limitation — that, if land be conveyed to a married woman and her heirs so long as no intoxicating liquor is sold thereon, her husband has curtesy which will be defeated *ipso facto* by the sale of such liquor on the land.⁵ But the strong view of some good authorities is that curtesy may be had absolutely in such an estate, so as not to be defeated by the running out of the limitation — that, in the last illustration, curtesy once attached would continue during the husband’s life, even though intoxicating liquor was sold on the premises.⁶

¹ § 451, *supra*.

² § 179, *infra*.

³ “For the donor reassumes his prior and paramount title, and all intermediate rights and encumbrances are destroyed.” 4 Kent’s Com. p. *33; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 323; 1 Scribner, Dower, p. 291; *Dictum* in Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 280.

⁴ See §§ 723, 726, *infra*.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 241 a, Butler’s note, 170; 1 Atk. Conv. p. 255; Prest. Abst. iii. p. 384; 1 Scribner, Dower, p. 297.

⁶ See *Buckworth v. Thirkell*, 3 Bos. & P. 652; *Odom v. Beverly*, 32 S. C. 107; *Park on Dower*, pp. 172, 186; Chase’s Blackst. p. 309, note 4.

According to the great weight of authority, there may be curtesy in a fee on conditional limitation, which is such that the fee may pass to another on the death of the wife; and this estate of the husband is not defeated by the happening of the event which so transfers the fee at her death — if land be conveyed to a married woman and her heirs, but if she die without issue living at her decease it is to go over to X and his heirs, her husband has curtesy if the other requisites concur, even though she leaves no issue surviving her — if X acquire the fee because she dies without leaving any living issue, he takes it subject to the life estate of her surviving husband.¹ There is no harmony among the authorities as to the reason for this generally accepted result. Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation — which is adopted by the New York Court of Appeals² — is that a fee on conditional limitation, not being known to the early common law but originating in the doctrines of shifting uses and executory devises, and now being freely sanctioned in many states by statutes,³ presented to the courts when curtesy was demanded in it a question novel and unaffected by the rule of *stare decisis*; and the courts, regarding the seisin of such an interest as not ending but merely shifting from one fee owner to another, preferred to give to such a fee the favored incidents of curtesy and dower. Chancellor Kent says of such a fee that the event “merely shifts the estate from one person to another, and leaves the prior seisin undisturbed. The limitation over takes effect, and the estate next in expectancy vests without entry, and the curtesy is preserved.”⁴ And

¹ *Buckworth v. Thirkell*, 3 Bos. & P. 652, note; *Moody v. King*, 2 Bing. 447, holding the same as to dower; *Hatfield v. Sneden*, 54 N. Y. 280; *Evans v. Evans*, 9 Pa. St. 190, also a dower case; *McMasters v. Negley*, 152 Pa. St. 303; *Welch v. Brimmer*, 169 Mass. 214, 215; *Webb v. Trustees, etc.*, 90 Ky. 117; *Withers v. Jenkins*, 14 S. C. 597; *Kennedy v. Kennedy*, 29 N. J. L. 185, dower; *Co. Lit.* 241 a, *Butler's note*, 170; 3 *Prest. Abst.* pp. *372, *384; 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *33, note; *Roper, Hush. & W.* pp. 36–42. For opposing *dicta* and discussions, see *Webster v. Ellsworth*, 147 Mass. 602; 2 *Sugden, Powers*, p. 31; *Park, Dower*, pp. 177–183; 1 *Scribner, Dower*, pp. 297–320.

² *Hatfield v. Sneden*, 54 N. Y. 280.

³ See §§ 727, 730, *infra*.

⁴ 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *33. He speaks of the estate as a “limitation”; but the estate designated in this treatise and many others as a “conditional limitation” is meant. His reasoning, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would give curtesy in an estate on conditional limitation, even though it were such that the event might occur to shift the fee from the wife to another before her death. But probably no actual decision has ever gone that far. The statements of the law uniformly restrict the right of curtesy in such fees to those in which the event which is to shift the fee must occur if at all at the time of the death of the wife.

Mr. Washburn, supported by the New York decision of *Hatfield v. Sneden*,¹ after explaining that curtesy may be readily defeated in estates on condition or limitation — estates “determinable by a limitation which operates to defeat her estate at common law” — adds, as an accurate summary certainly of the results: “But if the limitation over be by way of springing use or executory devise which takes effect at her decease, thereby defeating or determining her original estate before its natural expiration, and substituting a new one in its place, which could not be done at common law, the seisin and estate which she had . . . will give the husband curtesy.”² And he might have added that the same reasoning is applied, and the same result attained, where by virtue of modern statutes estates in fee on conditional limitations are now permitted to be made freely and directly by deed and without resort to the doctrines of springing uses or executory devises.³

§ 455. **Third — Birth of Issue, Alive, during the Lifetime of the Mother, and Capable of Inheriting the Property.**—The third requisite of curtesy, in the absence of statutory change, is issue of the marriage, born alive, during the lifetime of the mother, and capable of inheriting the property in which the curtesy is claimed.⁴ The old common law is said to have demanded, as proof that the child was born alive, that it should be heard to cry, within four walls—“*ipse postmodum, exae prolem suscitaverit, cujus clamor auditus fuerit inter quatuor parietes.*”⁵ This special, strong proof of life is not now demanded, however; but any other clear evidence will suffice.⁶ And although the primitive notion of curtesy was a continuance of the wife’s inheritance, given to the husband for the benefit of the issue of the marriage, yet it was soon settled that the length of the

¹ 54 N. Y. 280.

² 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 326.

³ Such statutes are now found, both in England and in the United States generally. See § 730, *infra*.

⁴ Co. Lit. 29 b, 30 a; Lit. § 52; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *127, *128; Cruise, Dig. tit. v. ch. i. § 15; *Heath v. White*, 5 Conn. 228; *Phillips v. Farley*, 23 Ky. L. 2201; *Day v. Cochran*, 24 Miss. 261. Therefore, the adoption of a child is not sufficient to comply with this requisite of curtesy. *Murdock v. Murdock*, 74 N. H. 77.

⁵ The idea probably arose from this

clause, used in a writ in the eleventh year of Henry III. 1 Kerr, R. P. § 749. “This quaint demand for a cry within the four walls is explained to us in Edward I’s day as a demand for the testimony of males — the males who are not permitted to enter the chamber where the wife lies, but stand outside listening for the wail which will give the husband his curtesy.” 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 418; Cruise, Dig. tit. v. ch. i. § 16.

⁶ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *127; Cruise, Dig. tit. v. ch. i. § 16.

child's life is immaterial, provided it is born alive; and its death before that of its mother does not take away the right to curtesy.¹

The requirement that the child be born during the life of the mother arises from the fact that the husband must be able to take possession of the property, as tenant by the curtesy consummate, instantly on the death of the wife. Otherwise it may descend absolutely to her heirs, and they ought not to be deprived of any part of it because of a subsequent birth of issue.² Therefore, when the wife dies in labor, and thereafter the child is taken from her by the Cæsarean operation, though it may live, the husband is not entitled to curtesy;³ "because the childe was not born during the marriage, nor in the life of the wife, but in the meane time her land descended, and in pleading he must alledge that he had issue during the marriage."⁴

Since curtesy is a continuance of the wife's inheritance, the child must also be capable of inheriting the property in which the curtesy is claimed. Ordinarily, of course, it is so capable. But, where estates tail are still retained, if lands were conveyed to a woman and the heirs *male* of her body, her husband could have no curtesy therein if only *female* issue were born; because such issue could not inherit those lands.⁵ Estates tail special are the only forms of fees that sometimes can not be inherited by the legitimate issue of their owners.

In a number of the United States, such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Nebraska, and Oregon, the requisite of issue of the marriage, in order to give the right to curtesy, has been abolished.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1090; *Bender v. Terwilliger*, 48 N. Y. App. Div. 371; *Goff v. Anderson*, 91 Ky. 303. The two cases last cited discuss well the evidence and proof that the child is born alive. Where a statute makes marriage of parents legitimize their issue born before marriage, such issue fulfils this requirement as to curtesy. *Hunter v. Whitworth*, 9 Ala. 965.

² Co. Lit. 29 b; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *127, *128. See *Marsellis v. Thalhimer*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 42; *Ryan v. Freeman*, 36 Miss. 175; *Cleghorn v. Burrows* (1895), 2 Ch. 497.

³ *Ibid.* When the operation is performed during the life of the mother,

now one of the common practices in "laparotomy," and sbe and the child both live, the husband, it seems, is entitled to his curtesy. Wharton's Law Lexicon, "Cæsarean Operation"; Bouvier's Law Dict., *ibid.*

⁴ Co. Lit. 29 b.

⁵ Lit. § 52; Co. Lit. 29 b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *128; *Cruise*, Dig. tit. v. ch. i. § 19. "In gavelkind lands, a husband may be tenant by the curtesy, without having any issue." 2 Blackst. Com. p. *128.

⁶ *Dubs v. Dubs*, 31 Pa. St. 154; *Ohio Rev. Stat.* (1880) § 4176; *Bruner v. Briggs*, 39 Ohio St. 478; 2 Mich. Comp. L. ch. 89, § 30; *Neb. Comp.*

§ 456. **Fourth—Death of the Wife.**—The fourth and last requisite to a complete title to curtesy is the death of the wife, leaving the husband surviving.¹ This means her natural death, in this country, since here civil death even where recognized does not divest nor change property rights.² It has been already explained that at her death leaving him surviving his curtesy initiate instantly changes into curtesy consummate, that this occurs by operation of law, and that no formality or ceremony of any kind is needed to confer on him the latter interest as an absolutely vested life estate.³ A few words are called for as to the nature of each of these forms of curtesy.

§ 457. **Curtesy Initiate.**—After the birth of issue and while the wife is still living, the husband has curtesy initiate in the real property of which she is properly seised during the coverture—he has this interest after the first three of the four requisites to curtesy, as above explained, have occurred.⁴

At common law, unaffected by married women's legislation, this curtesy initiate is a freehold (for his life) estate in the realty;⁵ an interest, which he has power to convey,⁶ which may be reached by judgment and sold on execution against him,⁷ for which he may sue alone and in his own right if it be wrongfully injured or taken from him,⁸ and of which he can not be legally deprived even by the state without due process of law and the payment of just compensation.⁹ By some prominent courts it has been said that he is seised of this interest in the right of his wife and jointly with her, so that if he be disseised the statute of limitations runs against her as well as against him while

Stat. (1881) ch. 23, § 29; *Forbes v. Sweesy*, 8 Neb. 520; Oreg. Gen. L. ch. XVII. tit. II. § 30.

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *128; *Cruise*, Dig. tit. v. ch. 1, § 24.

² *Avery v. Everett*, 110 N. Y. 317; *Woolridge v. Lucas*, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 49. At common law, her civil death formerly made curtesy become consummate. 1 Blackst. Com. p. *132; *Bract*. fol. 301 b, 421 b.

³ § 446, *supra*.

⁴ § 446, *supra*.

⁵ Co. Lit. 30 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *128; *Foster v. Marshall*, 22 N. H. 491; *Stewart v. Ross*, 50 Miss. 776; *Lancaster Co. Bk. v. Stauffer*, 10 Pa. St. 398; *Breeding v. Davis*, 77 Va. 639.

⁶ *Jackson v. Jackson*, 144 Ill. 274;

Stewart v. Ross, 50 Miss. 776; *Boykin v. Rain*, 28 Ala. 332; Co. Lit. 30 a.

⁷ And no disclaimer of curtesy by the husband can defeat this right of his creditors. *Van Duzer v. Van Duzer*, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 366; *Watson v. Watson*, 13 Conn. 83; *Canby's Lessee v. Porter*, 12 Ohio, 79; *Bozarth v. Largent*, 128 Ill. 95; *McCaskill v. McCormac*, 99 N. C. 548; *Day v. Cochran*, 24 Miss. 261. See *Ball v. Woolfolk*, 175 Mo. 378; *Staples v. Brown*, 13 Allen (Mass.), 64.

⁸ *Shortall v. Hinckley*, 31 Ill. 219; *Costello v. Grand Trunk R. Co.*, 70 N. H. 403.

⁹ *Jackson v. Jackson*, 144 Ill. 274; *Compare Hitz v. National Met. Bk.*, 111 U. S. 722.

they are both living.¹ But the opposing view, which appears to be the better and is certainly the more prevalent, is that he is seised of common-law curtesy initiate in his own right, and therefore while he is living adverse possession of the land by a stranger does not affect the reversionary interest of the wife.²

In many of the states of this country, of which New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and probably New Jersey are illustrations, the "Married Women's Acts," which give wives such sweeping control over their own property, have reduced curtesy initiate, in realty acquired by wives since those acts, from a vested interest to a mere *status*, "a simple possibility or expectancy like that of an heir apparent."³ As such, it may be modified or taken away at will by the state; the wife, the owner of the fee, may curtail or destroy it by her own act alone; it can not be separately mortgaged or transferred; and the husband's creditors can not reach it for payment of their claims.⁴ It is only the husband's chance of acquiring a life interest in his wife's real property, in case it is not lost or disposed of by her.

§ 458. **Curtesy Consummate.**—On the death of the wife leaving the husband surviving, curtesy becomes *ipso facto* consummate by operation of law; and therefore the husband can not, by disclaimer or otherwise, refuse to accept it and thus cause the estate to remain in any other person.⁵ Having thus acquired it as an interest to continue during his own life, he has it the same as he would own any other life estate, and subject to the same incidents, rights, and duties as those that belong to life estates in general.⁶ Thus, he may sell it, encumber it,

¹ *Melvin v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals, etc.*, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 161; *Kittridge v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals, etc.*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 246; *Coe v. Wolcottville Mfg. Co.*, 35 Conn. 175; *Guion v. Anderson*, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 298, 325; *Weisinger v. Murphy*, 2 Head (Tenn.), 674. See *Jones v. Coffey*, 109 N. C. 515.

² *Foster v. Marshall*, 22 N. H. 491; *Dawson v. Edwards*, 189 Ill. 60; *Shortall v. Hinkley*, 31 Ill. 219; *Stewart v. Ross*, 50 Miss. 776; *Dyer v. Wittler*, 89 Mo. 81; *Co. Lit.* 30 a, 124 b, 351 a. See *Coe v. Wolcottville Mfg. Co.*, 35 Conn. 135; *Ball v. Woolfolk*, 175 Mo. 378; *Jackson v. Johnson*, 5 Cow. (N. Y.)

74; *Den d. Fagan v. Walker*, 27 N. C. 634.

³ *Albany Co. Sav. Bk. v. McCarty*, 149 N. Y. 71, 85; *Staples v. Brown*, 95 Mass. 64; *Doyle v. Am. Co.*, 181 Mass. 139; *Williams v. Baker*, 71 Pa. St. 476; *Curry v. Bott*, 53 Pa. St. 400; *Porch v. Fries*, 18 N. J. Eq. 204; *Breeding v. Davis*, 77 Va. 639; *Walker v. Long*, 109 N. C. 510.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Myers v. Hansbrough*, 202 Mo. 495; *Lloyd v. Planters' Mut. Ins. Co.*, 80 Ark. 486.

⁵ *Watson v. Watson*, 13 Conn. 83; *Witham v. Perkins*, 2 Me. 400.

⁶ *Cruise, Dig. tit. v. ch. ii. § 26.*

or lose it for his debts.¹ He has emblements and estovers; and he must keep down encumbrances and not commit waste.² He does not lose it because of any second or subsequent marriage.³

§ 459. **How Curtesy may be Barred or Forfeited.**—At common law, when all four of the requisites of curtesy can be established, no act or wrong on the part of the wife, either alone or in conjunction with other persons than the husband, can bar or defeat that right.⁴ In England, by virtue of the Married Women's property act of 1882, the wife may now freely deprive the husband of all curtesy, by disposing of her property either by will or by act *inter vivos*.⁵ And, since so many modern statutes in this country have conferred on her similar powers,⁶ the subject of what acts or omissions on the part of the husband will cause him to forfeit curtesy has become far less important than it formerly was. It is, therefore, sufficient here to state briefly the modes of barring curtesy at common law. Generally speaking, dower also may be barred for the same reasons; and since these must be fully discussed in connection with that subject, and the principles and results are substantially the same as to both dower and curtesy, reference may be had to the modes of barring dower for a fuller explanation of common-law barring of curtesy.⁷

These common law causes for forfeiting or defeating curtesy (and dower) are: an absolute divorce, for the fault or misconduct of either spouse;⁸ estoppel by deed — his uniting with her in her conveyance or mortgage of the property, or making a separate conveyance of his curtesy to her alienee;⁹ estoppel *in pais* — the precluding of himself by his conduct to claim curtesy against her alienee;¹⁰ a paramount ownership, by which

¹ *Bozarth v. Largent*, 128 Ill. 95; *Stanley v. Bonham*, 52 Ark. 354; *Deming v. Miles*, 35 Neb. 739.

² Ch. xxxviii, *infra*; *Barnsdall v. Boley*, 119 Fed. Rep. 191.

³ By the custom of Normandy, and in gavelkind lands, he did lose it by a subsequent marriage. *Cruise*, Dig. tit. v. ch. ii. § 26.

⁴ *Den d. Camp v. Quinby*, 3 N. J. L. 540; *Huston v. Seeley*, 27 Iowa, 183; *Clay v. Mayr*, 144 Mo. 376.

⁵ *Hope v. Hope* (1892), 2 Ch. 336.

⁶ See § 460, *infra*.

⁷ *Infra*.

⁸ *Barrett v. Failing*, 111 U. S. 523;

Burgess v. Muldoon, 18 R. I. 607; *Wheeler v. Hotchkiss*, 10 Conn. 225. See *Wait v. Wait*, 4 N. Y. 95; *Pullen v. Pullen*, 52 N. J. Eq. 9; *Meacham v. Bunting*, 156 Ill. 586; *Doyle v. Rolwing*, 165 Mo. 231. A purchaser of the husband's curtesy initiate does not lose it because of a subsequent divorce. *Gillespie v. Worford*, 2 Coldwell (Tenn.), 632.

⁹ *Hayden v. Peirce*, 165 Mass. 359; *Baker v. Baker*, 167 Mass. 575; *Haines v. Ellis*, 24 Pa. St. 253; *Campbell v. McBee*, 92 Va. 68.

¹⁰ See 2 *Scribner, Dower*, pp. 266-273.

her title also is defeated;¹ the taking of the property by eminent domain, or for taxes, etc., by the state;² the statute of limitations, running in favor of an adverse holder of the land;³ and a contract between husband and wife, usually made just before marriage, by which he expressly waives and relinquishes all right of curtesy in her realty.⁴ Also, if he were an alien, the common law would give him no curtesy;⁵ and if he attempted by a common-law transfer to convey his curtesy lands in fee, he forfeited the interest that he owned;⁶ but practically curtesy will not be forfeited anywhere to-day for either of these two causes.⁷ Neither did his eloping and living in adultery ever bar curtesy,⁸ although by the statute of Westminster II, Chapter 34, this wrong if committed by the wife was made a cause of forfeiture of her dower.⁹

§ 460. **Curtesy in the United States.** — Much legislation has affected this legal life estate of the husband. There may now be said to be, in general, as the outcome of statutes and common-law principles, four different groups or classes of states, within all the members of each of which curtesy has been treated in substantially the same manner.

In the *first* of these groups, which includes, for examples, New Hampshire and Vermont, common-law curtesy, practically unaffected by statutes either directly dealing with it or in the form of married women's legislation, is still retained.¹⁰ And it is to be carefully noted again that, in such jurisdictions, the wife can not alienate or encumber her property so as to interfere with the husband's interest — if he can establish the requisites above explained, and he has done nothing to bar his right, he may have curtesy, not only in the realty as to which she dies seised and intestate, but also in that which she disposed of before her death or which she may attempt to will away from him.¹¹

¹ § 453, *supra*. See *Harvey v. Brinbin*, 143 N. Y. 151.

² *Jackson v. Jackson*, 144 Ill. 274; § 505, *infra*.

³ *Crow v. Kightlinger*, 25 Pa. St. 343; *Shortall v. Hinkley*, 31 Ill. 219, 227.

⁴ *Luttrell v. Boggs*, 168 Ill. 361; *McBreen v. McBreen*, 154 Mo. 323; *Charles v. Charles*, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 486; *White v. White*, 20 N. Y. App. Div. 560.

⁵ *Foss v. Crisp*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 121.

⁶ *French v. Rollins*, 21 Me. 372; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 350.

⁷ §§ 500, 1092, *infra*.

⁸ *Greenl. Cruise*, Dig. tit. v. ch. ii. § 33, & note.

⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰ N. H. Pub. Stat. (1891) p. 546, § 9; Vt Stat. (1894) § 2542; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3301 (A).

¹¹ See *Den d. Camp v. Quinby*, 3 N. J. L. 540; *Huston v. Steele*, 27 Iowa, 183; *Clay v. Mayr*, 144 Mo. 376.

The *second* group embraces those few states, such as Delaware and Virginia, and perhaps New Jersey, in which while curtesy is retained and the wife can not preclude the husband from acquiring it in realty of which she *dies* seised, yet, by virtue of the married women's legislation, she may bar or diminish his curtesy by conveying or encumbering her property during her lifetime. She can not will it away from him. Her alienation alone *inter vivos* is a bar. But, if he can establish the four requisites, his right to curtesy is absolute in the real property of which she dies seised—curtesy consummate in such property is left intact, while curtesy initiate is reduced to a mere chance or possibility.¹

In the *third* group, which is large and comprises such states as New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Missouri and Wisconsin, curtesy is also retained; but, by virtue of the married women's statutes, it may be defeated or diminished by the wife's act alone, either by conveyance, mortgage, or other transfer or encumbrance during her life, or by means of her will. She can bar his curtesy by her act *inter vivos* or by her will. His curtesy initiate is thus reduced to a mere chance or possibility; and he has no curtesy consummate except in real property of which she *dies* seised and which she does not will away from him.² (a) The English law of curtesy is now substantially the same as in this group of states.³

(a) In New York, curtesy has always existed, and was expressly reserved in the early statutes, L. 1782, ch. 2; 1 R. L. 52, § 4; 1 R. S. 754, § 20, now a part of Deced. Est. L. § 80. The married women's legislation of 1848 (L. 1848, ch. 200) enabled the wife to defeat the husband's curtesy, by her conveyance of the property by deed; and that of 1849 (L. 1849, ch. 375) gave her full power to bar his curtesy by her will. The net result is that the only property in which he can have curtesy is that of which she dies seised and which she does not devise to another. Therefore, curtesy initiate "consists simply of a *status*, which is never a vested right and is not separately alienable during coverture, but may be modified or annulled at any time before it becomes consummate by the death of the

¹ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3301; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 354, note; *Porch v. Fries*, 18 N. J. Eq. 204 (see *dicta*, in New Jersey, in *Hall v. Otterseon*, 52 N. J. Eq. 522, 526; *Folwell's Case*, 67 N. J. Eq. 570, 574, reversed on other grounds in 68 N. J. Eq. 728); *Moore v. Darby*, 6 Del. Ch. 193; *Breeding v. Davis*, 77 Va. 639.

² 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 354,

note; 1 Kerr, R. P. §§ 828-832; *Hatfield v. Sneden*, 54 N. Y. 280; *Harvey v. Brisbin*, 143 N. Y. 151; *Comer v. Chamberlain*, 6 Allen (Mass.), 166; *Sill v. White*, 62 Conn. 430; *McMasters v. Negley*, 152 Pa. St. 313; *Commissioners etc. v. Directors of Poor*, 169 Pa. St. 116; *Kingsley v. Smith*, 14 Wis. 390; *Neelly v. Lancaster*, 47 Ark. 175.

³ *Hope v. Hope* (1892), 2 Ch. 336.

The *fourth* group comprises those states in which curtesy is wholly abolished. This statutory change has been made in many states, among which are Maine, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Kansas, Iowa, Georgia and Florida.¹ In some of these, such as Illinois and Kansas, the husband is given an estate similar to the wife's dower;² in others, such as Louisiana, Texas and Washington, the "community system," by which husband and wife hold land together, supersedes both curtesy and dower;³ and in quite a number, other special, local forms of rights are given to husband and wife in each other's property in lieu of dower or curtesy or both.⁴

wife. . . . While merely initiate it is not an estate, but a simple possibility or expectancy like that of an heir apparent. Either may be destroyed at will by the owner of the fee." *Albany Co. Sav. Bk. v. McCarty*, 149 N. Y. 71, 85. Curtesy consummate, acquired after the wife dies without disposing of the property, is an ordinary legal life estate. *Adair v. Lott*, 3 Hill, 182. For the married women's legislation, and its construction, especially as affecting curtesy, see L. 1848, ch. 200; L. 1849, ch. 375; L. 1860, ch. 90; L. 1862, ch. 172; L. 1867, ch. 782; L. 1884, ch. 381; L. 1887, ch. 537; L. 1890, ch. 51, 284; L. 1892, ch. 594; L. 1909, ch. 19, §§ 50, 51, 56; *Hatfield v. Sneden*, 54 N. Y. 280; *Bertles v. Nunan*, 92 N. Y. 152; *Harvey v. Brisbin*, 143 N. Y. 151; *Albany Co. Sav. Bk. v. McCarty*, 149 N. Y. 71; *Wells v. Betts*, 45 App. Div. 115; *Spindler v. Gibson*, 75 App. Div. 444; *Valentine v. Hutchinson*, 43 Misc. 314.

¹ 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 354, note; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3202, 3301. See *Ex parte Watts*, 130 N. C. 237.

² *Ibid.*; *Jackson v. Jackson*, 144 Ill. 274.

³ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3400-3405; §§ 691, 692, *infra*.

⁴ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3202, 3301; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 354, note; 1 Kerr, R. P. §§ 828-832.

(b) DOWER.

CHAPTER XXXI.

HISTORY, NATURE, FORMS AND REQUISITES OF DOWER —
QUARANTINE.

§ 461. Growth, and early forms, of dower interests.

§ 462. Definition, incident, forms and requisites of dower.

§ 463. The widow's quarantine.

Nature of dower, in its different forms or stages.

§ 464. Its three stages or forms.

§ 465. First — Inchoate right of dower.

§ 466. Second — Dower after husband's death, but before assignment.

§ 467. Third — Dower after assignment.

Requisites of Dower.

§ 468. The requisites restated.

§ 469. First — Lawful marriage.

§ 470. Second — Beneficial seisin by the husband of an estate of inheritance during the coverture.

§ 471. The husband's seisin may be either in law or in fact.

§ 472. The husband's seisin of equitable estates — Dower in equitable estates.

§ 473. Third — Death of the husband.

§ 474. Fourth — The estate of inheritance of the husband must be one which the issue of the marriage, if any, may by possibility inherit.

§ 461. **Growth, and Early Forms, of Dower Interests.** — Marriage, in any civilized community, is naturally accompanied by gifts of property, from husband to wife, or from wife to husband, or both. Dower, as it developed in England, was, of course, one of the outgrowths of this custom, but an outgrowth the exact process of which the most thorough investigation by historians and jurists has failed to make clear.¹ Tacitus noticed the contrast of Roman Law and Teutonic custom, in that the former had the wife bring a *dowry* to the husband, while in the latter the husband conferred a gift, *dower*, on the wife.² The "bride price" of the early Germanic tribes, the price paid by the intended husband to the family of the intended bride,³ came to be followed by the

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 225, 226; 1 Scribner, Dower, p. 1.

² Germania, ch. 18.

³ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 127. This custom is very ancient.

“morning gift,” a present of lands or chattels from husband to wife on the morning after the marriage; and the latter was employed generally by the German races, and quite commonly in England in Anglo-Saxon times.¹ Feudalism, in dealing with such rights, “gave an air of novelty to an old institution.”² And common-law dower comes down to us with features which those ancient Teutonic forms of gift here mentioned, whether they were its progenitors or not, did not possess. Thus, “it seems probable that in early times, if there was nothing in the form of the gift to the contrary, the wife might, notwithstanding the marriage, alienate the property so given to her. This power of disposing of the dower, if it existed, had ceased in Glanvill’s time.”³ By the law of that age, the man was required to endow the woman, by a gift of realty made *ad ostium ecclesiae*, at the church door — at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. He might specify the amount which he gave, and this could be less than one third of the realty which he then owned; but if he failed to name the amount, it was such third. If he gave more than the third, it was cut down to that share at his death.⁴

Dower *ad ostium ecclesiae*, then, was at least a prominent and important form of such right in our early law.⁵ A similar form was dower *ex assensu patris*, which was a gift to the wife at the church door, made by the husband out of lands belonging to his father and with the latter’s consent.⁶ And the other three kinds, of which Littleton tells us, and which took part in the struggle for permanency in early feudal times, were: dower by special custom, of which dower in gavelkind lands, being one half during the life of the wife, is an illustration; the common-law dower, which is to be explained in detail; and dower *de la plus belle*, which was her endowment in some cases of the fairest portion of the property held by her as guardian in socage of the minor son of herself and her deceased husband.⁷ The

Crabb. Hist. Eng. L. pp. 79, 80. In pleading for Jacob’s daughter Dinah, Shechem said to Jacob and his sons: “Ask me never so much dowry and gift, and I will give according as ye shall say unto me: but give me the damsel to wife.” Genesis xxxiv, 12.

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 425; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 128.

² 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 425.

³ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 129.

⁴ Ibid.; Lit. § 39.

⁵ Ibid.; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) pp. 374, 375.

⁶ Lit. §§ 40, 51; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. 1, § 28.

⁷ Lit. § 51; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *132. “Dower *de la plus belle* was where the

common-law dower, to be next defined, outlived all the other forms; and is the kind now universally meant when "dower" simply is mentioned. It is the only kind that exists in the United States.¹

§ 462. **Definition, Incident, Forms and Requisites of Dower.** — Dower has been heretofore defined as, the life interest of a wife in one third of the real property of which her husband was beneficially seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture.² It carries with it, as an appendage or incident, the widow's quarantine — her right to reside in the husband's chief house for forty days (or some other period fixed by statute) after his death, and in the meantime to have her reasonable sustenance out of his estate.³ Dower begins, as an inchoate right, as soon as the husband is seised of the property during the coverture; at his death leaving her surviving it becomes a chose in action, a right to compel the heir of the husband or other owner in fee to assign or admeasure her third, her dower land, and give her possession; and, when such assignment is properly made, it is a legal life estate in the property so allotted.⁴ There are always three requisites to the existence of dower, two of which are essential to it as an inchoate right; and all of which must exist in order to give dower consummate, the legal life estate or the right to sue for the same. These are: *First*, lawful marriage; *second*, beneficial seisin by the husband of an estate of inheritance during the coverture; *third*, death of the husband. And a *fourth*, strict requisite, though now of practical application in only a few states, is that the estate of inheritance of the husband shall be one which the issue of the marriage, if any, may by possibility inherit.⁵ These features of dower — quarantine, forms and requisites — are to be discussed in the order here briefly stated.

§ 463. **The Widow's Quarantine.** — Her one-third interest in

husband held a portion of his lands by knight service, and a portion in socage, and died leaving a widow and a son within the age of fourteen years, and the lord of whom the land was held in knight's service entered upon that portion as guardian in chivalry during the nonage of the infant, and the widow entered upon and occupied the residue as guardian in socage. If, in such case, she brought a writ to be endowed of the whole premises, she was compelled to endow herself *de la plus beale*; that is

to say, of the fairest portion of the tenements held by her as guardian in socage." 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. 1, § 29.

¹ 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. 1, § 30.

² § 72, *supra*.

³ § 463, *infra*.

⁴ It thus differs essentially from curtesy, which has only two forms, initiate while the wife is living and consummate after her death. See §§ 457, 458, *supra*; §§ 464-467, *infra*.

⁵ Lit. § 53; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *129-131; 4 Kent's Com. p. *36.

her husband's realty and her right of quarantine at his death make the sum total of the wife's common-law rights and estates growing out of his ownership of real property. Her quarantine, which was sanctioned if not originated by *Magna Charta*,¹ is her right to occupy the chief house (residence) of her husband, and to be supported therein out of his personal property for forty days after his death.² It is the duty of the heir, or other owner of the fee, to admeasure and assign her dower lands within this period.³ This appendage to dower is an emphatic right at common law. And, by the statutes in this country, it or a similar right is uniformly retained where dower still exists. In a few states, the period is extended, being made in some as long as a year, and in others caused to continue until her dower land is actually assigned.⁴ (a)

A widow has no right of quarantine in any property of which she is not dowable. The husband's chief residence, for this purpose, means the principal house in which he resided and which he so owned in fee that out of it she might take dower.⁵ If for any cause this house be uninhabitable at the

(a) In New York, the statute, which is substantially the same as in *Magna Charta*, declares that, "a widow may remain in the chief house of her husband forty days after his death, whether her dower is sooner assigned to her or not, without being liable to any rent for the same; and in the mean time she may have her reasonable sustenance out of the estate of her husband." Real Prop. L. § 204, which was 1 R. S. 742, § 17, and 1 R. L. 56. This gives the widow the same right as does the English law with the aid of *Magna Charta*. It assures to her, for forty days, her reasonable sustenance, and a shelter from which the heir of the husband can not expel her during that time. *Siglar v. Van Riper*, 10 Wend. 414; *Jackson v. O'Donaghy*, 7 Johns. 247. It seems that, if she accept a provision in her husband's will, in lieu of dower "and all statutory allowances," she waives her quarantine. *Matter of Mersereau*, 38 Misc. 208. See also, *Bogardus v. Trinity Church*, 4 Paige, 178, 198; *Yates v. Paddock*, 10 Wend. 529; *Johnson v. Corbett*, 11 Paige, 265; *Voelckner v. Hudson*, 1 Sandf. 215; *Matter of Wachter*, 16 Misc. 137.

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *134; 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 422.

² The word "quarantine" is "made use of in law to signify the number of forty days, whether applied to this occasion, or otherwise." 2 Blackst. Com. p. *134. It "corresponds to the German *Dreissigste*, the widow's month." 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. L. (2d ed.) p. 422, note 5. It includes her consumption of such personalty as she reasonably

requires. *Matter of Wachter*, 16 N. Y. Misc. 137, 140.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. 3, §§ 3, 4.

⁵ Therefore the right can not attach to land of which the husband had only a leasehold, nor to any of his personal property. *Voelckner v. Hudson*, 1 Sandf. 215; *Pizzala v. Campbell*, 46 Ala. 35; *Harrison v. Boyd*, 36 Ala. 203.

time of his death, she may have it made suitable for her residence, at the expense of his estate.¹ (Modern statutes usually permit her to occupy it by a tenant, if she choose.² She need make no repairs during her quarantine, nor is she required to pay any taxes, assessments or other expenses.³) Her right is purely personal, and can not be taken by an execution against her.⁴ If she re-marry or vacate the premises within the period, she forfeited her quarantine at common law;⁵ but it is at least doubtful if such is the law in this country.⁶

Nature of Dower in its Different Forms or Stages.

§ 464. **Its Three Forms or Stages.** — It has been explained that the wife's dower right and interest may pass through three stages or forms: *First*, it is an inchoate right, while both husband and wife are living and he is properly seised of the realty; *second*, when he dies leaving her surviving, it becomes a chose in action, a right to sue for the assignment or admeasurement of her dower land; *third*, after her portion is properly assigned, she has a legal life estate therein.⁷ Each of these forms or stages requires a brief separate discussion.

§ 465. **First — Inchoate Right of Dower.** — As soon as there is a concurrence of marriage and proper seisin of the husband, the wife has an inchoate right of dower. This does not amount to an estate, or title; and it is not property.⁸ It is a contingent right, a possibility or chance of acquiring dower land by outliving the husband; and yet it is a valuable, subsisting, separate and distinct right, which is entitled to protection, and for which in many jurisdictions she may have a separate

¹ *Nelson v. Barnett*, 123 Mo. 564.

² *Craige v. Morris*, 25 N. J. Eq. 468; *Oakley v. Oakley*, 30 Ala. 131; *White v. Clarke*, 7 T. B. Monr. (Ky.) 641. See *Casteel v. Potter*, 176 Mo. 76; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. 3, § 9.

³ *Spinning v. Spinning*, 41 N. J. Eq. 427; *Graves v. Cochran*, 68 Mo. 74.

⁴ *Carnall v. Wilson*, 21 Ark. 62; *Doe d. Cook v. Webb*, 18 Ala. 814.

⁵ *Co. Lit.* 32 b, 34 b; 1 *Roper, Hnsb. & W.* p. 388.

⁶ See *Doe d. Sheldon v. Carroll*, 16 Ala. 148; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. 3, § 16.

⁷ § 462, *supra*; 1 *Scribner, Dower*,

ch. 31; *Sherman v. Hayward*, 98 N. Y. App. Div. 254.

⁸ *Johnston v. Vandyke*, 6 McLean (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 422; *Richards v. Bellingham Bay Land Co.*, 54 Fed. Rep. 209 (C. C. A.); *Moore v. The Mayor*, etc., 8 N. Y. 110; *Clifford v. Kampfe*, 147 N. Y. 383; *Flynn v. Flynn*, 171 Mass. 312; *Wheeler v. Kirtland*, 27 N. J. Eq. 534; *Virgin v. Virgin*, 189 Ill. 144; *Stitt v. Smith*, 102 Minn. 253; *Bonfoey v. Bonfoey*, 100 Mich. 84; *Reiff v. Horst*, 55 Md. 42; *Smith v. Howell*, 53 Ark. 279; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. 1, §§ 5, 6.

action.¹ It is "as much entitled to protection as the vested rights of the widow."² It is so far substantial, and so attached to the land, that its existence constitutes an encumbrance on the title within the covenant against encumbrances or of warranty.³

Not being a vested interest or right, according to the view of most courts, it may be changed, or taken away, or diminished, by the legislature at pleasure.⁴ And, since it is not property, the wife is not entitled to compensation from the state or other institution that properly takes the land by the power of eminent domain, or acquires it by dedication for public use.⁵ So, she can not transfer this right to one who owns or acquires no other interest in the realty, even though her husband join with her in the conveyance.⁶ Nor can it be

¹ *Ibid.* In the first of these cases, McLean, J., said: "It is not easy to define the right of dower before the death of the husband. . . . It is not only an inchoate right, but contingent. It depends upon the death of the husband. . . . Until the death of the husband, the right—if it may be called a right—is shadowy and fictitious, and, like all rights which are contingent, may never become vested." In *Clifford v. Kampfe*, 147 N. Y. 383, Judge Haight said: "Being inchoate and contingent, her interest does not amount to an estate or title, and yet she has an interest which attaches to the land as soon as there is a concurrence of marriage and seisin. . . . The inchoate right of dower is a valuable, subsisting, separate and distinct interest, which is entitled to protection, and for which the wife may maintain a separate action." It is difficult to define this incipient right accurately and comprehensively. But such statements as these seem to be the best judicial utterances as to its nature. See *Atwood v. Arnold*, 23 R. I. 609; *Higgins v. Ormsby*, 156 Ind. 82; *Mason v. Mason*, 140 Mass. 63, where it is called "a vested right of value"; *Elmendorf v. Lockwood*, 57 N. Y. 322; *Mills v. Van Voorhies*, 20 N. Y. 412; *Venable v. W. W. R. Co.*, 112 Mo. 103; *In re Alexander*, 53 N. J. Eq. 96; *McArthur v. Franklin*, 16 Ohio St. 193; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. 1, §§ 13–20.

² *Campbell v. Ellwanger*, 81 Hun (N. Y.), 259. See *Newhall v. Lynn Savings Bk.*, 101 Mass. 431.

³ *Shearer v. Ranger*, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 447; *Harrington v. Murphy*, 109 Mass. 299; *Jones v. Gardner*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 266; *Carter v. Denman's Executors*, 23 N. J. L. 260; *Russ v. Perry*, 49 N. H. 547; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. 1, § 3.

⁴ *Randall v. Kreiger*, 90 U. S. (23 Wall.) 148; *Richards v. Bellingham Bay Land Co.*, 54 Fed. Rep. (C. C. A.) 209; *Jackson v. Edwards*, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 391, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 498; *Virgin v. Virgin*, 189 Ill. 114; *Meliset's Appeal*, 17 Pa. St. 449; *Weaver v. Gregg*, 6 Ohio St. 547; *Lee v. Lindell*, 22 Mo. 202. Compare, *Higgins v. Ormsby*, 156 Ind. 82; *In re Alexander*, 53 N. J. Eq. 96.

⁵ *Moore v. Mayor, etc.* 8 N. Y. 110; *Flynn v. Flynn*, 171 Mass. 312; *French v. Lord*, 69 Me. 537; *Venable v. W. W. R. Co.*, 112 Mo. 103; *Duncan v. City of Terre Haute*, 85 Ind. 104. Compare, *Wheeler v. Kirtland*, 27 N. J. Eq. 534; *In re Central Park Extension*, 16 Abb. Fr. (N. Y.) 69; *Royston v. Royston*, 21 Ga. 161; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. 1, §§ 8–20.

⁶ *Moore v. Mayor, etc.* 8 N. Y. 110; *Mason v. Mason*, 140 Mass. 63; *Reiff v. Horst*, 55 Md. 47. But she may release it to an owner or purchaser of the freehold, or to one who has owned the land subject to her dower and has con-

reached by an execution against her, nor by a creditor's bill,¹ nor by a mechanic's lien though filed for improvements for which she had agreed to pay.²

But, because it is a substantial right entitled to protection, it attaches to the compensation paid the husband when the property is taken for public purposes;³ it gives her a right to redeem from a mortgage on the land when it is not duly cut off by a foreclosure of such mortgage;⁴ and, by the rule of many decisions, it attaches to any surplus that may go to the husband when it is properly removed from the land by such a foreclosure.⁵ Likewise, if the land subject to dower be sold in a partition suit or other judicial proceeding, which results in a conveyance of the property free of her dower claim, she is entitled to have one third of the share of the proceeds which comes to her husband so secured, that she may be sure of the income for the rest of her life after his death, on that third (dower) in case she outlives him.⁶ The relinquishment of her inchoate right of dower to a purchaser or encumbrancer of the land is a valuable consideration for a contract between him and her.⁷ And she may have her redress

vayed it with a warranty. *Ibid.*; *Harriman v. Gray*, 49 Me. 537; *Chicago Dock Co. v. Kinzie*, 49 Ill. 289; § 503, *infra*.

¹ *Sherman v. Hayward*, 98 N. Y. App. Div. 254.

² *Johnston v. Dahlgren*, 14 N. Y. Misc. 623.

³ That is, she can require one third of what is paid to him to be so invested or held that, after his death, if she survive him, she may obtain the income on that third for the rest of her life. *In re New York and Brooklyn Bridge*, 27 N. Y. Supp. 597, 75 Hun, 558; *Simar v. Canaday*, 53 N. Y. 298. See *Citizens' Savings Bk. v. Mooney*, 26 N. Y. Misc. 67; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 2793, subd. 3.

⁴ *Campbell v. Ellwanger*, 81 Hun (N. Y.), 259.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Vartie v. Underwood*, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 561, 564; *Brackett v. Baum*, 50 N. Y. 8, 11; *Hawley v. Bradford*, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 200; N. Y. Gen. Rules Prac. No. 64; *Vreeland v. Jacobus*, 19 N. J. Eq. 231; *De Wolf v. Murphy*, 11 R. I. 630; *Mandel v. Mc-*

Clave, 46 Ohio St. 407; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. 23, §§ 26-30; § 480, *infra*. *Contra*, *Kauffman v. Peacock*, 115 Ill. 212; *Newhall v. Lynn Savings Bk.*, 101 Mass. 431; *Cook v. Dillon*, 9 Iowa, 412; *Dean v. Phillips*, 17 Ind. 409.

⁶ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1570, 1571; *Race v. Gilbert*, 102 N. Y. 300; *Jordan v. Van Epps*, 85 N. Y. 427; *Jackson v. Edwards*, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 386; *Warren v. Twilley*, 10 Md. 39; *Greiner v. Klein*, 28 Mich. 12; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. 16, §§ 18-33; 2 id. ch. 1, § 6. *Contra*, *Lee v. Lindell*, 22 Mo. 202; *Weaver v. Gregg*, 6 Ohio St. 547. In cases in which the inchoate right of dower thus attaches to money or proceeds, it may, with the consent of all the parties, be paid in a gross sum as computed by use of the mortality and annuity tables. *Jackson v. Edwards*, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 386, 408; *Bartlett v. Van Zandt*, 4 Sandf. ch. (N. Y.) 396. 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. 1, § 6.

⁷ *Motley v. Sawyer*, 38 Me. 68; *Bullard v. Briggs*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 533; *Nims v. Bigelow*, 45 N. H. 343.

when the husband, either alone or in conjunction with others, attempts to deprive her of this right, by alienation of the land or otherwise.¹

While at common law she could not sue alone for the enforcement or protection of her inchoate dower right, and her only way of relinquishing it was by means of a fine levied in connection with her husband,² yet modern statutes generally have enabled her to transfer or release it by deed to an alienee of the property;³ and, in the more liberal code states of this country, she may sue alone for its protection when necessary, even though she must make her husband a defendant in the action.⁴ But she can not anywhere sustain an action for the enjoyment of her dower while inchoate, nor to prevent waste of the land, nor to recover its possession from an adverse holder.⁵

§ 466. **Second — Dower after Husband's Death, but before Assignment.** — After the death of her husband, but before the assignment of her dower third, the widow owns a chose in action, which is a vested right, not subject to be abrogated or modified at pleasure by the state.⁶ It is property, which can not legally be taken from her by the power of eminent domain without just compensation.⁷ But it is not yet an estate or interest in the real property. It is a mere right to sue some one, usually the heir or devisee of the husband, to acquire such an estate.⁸

As the owner of this chose in action, the widow, it seems, was always able to maintain a suit to protect the land which her husband had owned from injury by the heir or other per-

¹ *Clifford v. Kampfe*, 147 N. Y. 383; *Burns v. Lynde*, 6 Allen (Mass.), 305; *Bonfoey v. Bonfoey*, 100 Mich. 82; *Kelly v. McGrath*, 70 Ala. 75.

² 2 Blackst. Com. p. *137; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. 12, § 2; *Park, Dower*, § 193.

³ 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. 12.

⁴ *Mills v. Van Voorhies*, 20 N. Y. 420; *Clifford v. Kampfe*, 147 N. Y. 383; *Madigan v. Walsh*, 22 Wis. 478.

⁵ *Taylor v. Laurence*, 148 Ill. 388; *Miller v. Pence*, 132 Ill. 149; *Boling v. Clark*, 83 Iowa, 481; *Phelps v. Phelps*, 143 N. Y. 197; *Durham v. Angier*, 20 Me. 242; *McArthur v. Franklin*, 16 Ohio St. 193; *Williams v. Williams*, 89 Ky. 381.

⁶ *Strong v. Clem*, 12 Ind. 37; *Barbour v. Barbour*, 46 Me. 9; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. ii. § 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shipman*, 119 N. Y. 325.

⁸ *Van Name v. Van Name*, 23 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 247; *Wade v. Miller*, 32 N. J. L. 296; *Weaver v. Sturtevant*, 12 R. I. 537; *Best v. Jenks*, 123 Ill. 447; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. ii. §§ 4-25. Therefore, she has no right of entry during this stage of her dower claim. *Ibid.*; *Heisen v. Heisen*, 145 Ill. 658; *Johnson v. Shields*, 32 Me. 424; *Hildreth v. Thompson*, 16 Mass. 191; *Park, Dower*, § 334. See article in 61 Alb. L. J. 283.

sons.¹ And her right could now be released to the owner of the fee, and so extinguished.² But, at common law, she could not assign it to any one else;³ nor could it be taken on execution against her.⁴ A court of equity, however, would generally recognize and enforce her transfer of it, and allow it to be reached by a creditor's bill for the payment of her debts.⁵

In a number of the states of this country, such as New York, Missouri and Minnesota, the statutes which make choses in action freely assignable have been held to reach to the widow's dower right in this stage of its development. In such jurisdictions, it may be transferred by her, so that her purchaser may sue in his own name for its recovery; and it may be reached by attachment or taken on execution against her.⁶ But, in other states, of which Maine, Rhode Island, Illinois and Arkansas are illustrations, even though their statutes as to assignment of choses in action are liberal, it is still held that at law the widow's dower right before admeasurement of her third is so purely personal that she can not transfer it to a stranger to the title, nor have it taken from her *in invitum* for her debts.⁷

§ 467. **Third — Dower after Assignment.** — The different methods of assigning dower —admeasuring the widow's third and giving her possession —are to be explained hereafter.⁸ When the assignment is made and she has taken possession, and so she is enjoying the benefit of her dower property, she has a freehold interest therein, an estate for her own life.⁹

¹ Shepard v. Manhattan R. Co., 117 N. Y. 442; Rogers v. Potter, 32 N. J. L. 78; Hoxsie v. Ellis, 4 R. I. 123; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 484.

² Elmendorf v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y. 322; Sloniger v. Sloniger, 161 Ill. 270; Saunders v. Blythe, 112 Mo. 1; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xii. §§ 51, 52.

³ Jackson v. Vanderheyden, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 167; Leavitt v. Lamprey, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 382; Union Brewing Co. v. Meier, 163 Ill. 424; Johnson v. Shields, 32 Me. 424; Carnall v. Wilson, 21 Ark. 62; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. ii. §§ 33-36.

⁴ Aikman v. Harsell, 98 N. Y. 186; Gooch v. Atkins, 14 Mass. 378; Rausch v. Moore, 48 Iowa, 611; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. ii. §§ 26-32.

⁵ Tompkins v. Fonda, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 448; Potter v. Everitt, 42 N. C. 152; Boltz v. Stolz, 41 Ohio St. 540;

2 Scribner, Dower, ch. ii. §§ 37-41. See Payne v. Becker, 87 N. Y. 153; McMahan v. Gray, 150 Mass. 291; Harper v. Clayton, 84 Md. 346.

⁶ Payne v. Becker, 87 N. Y. 153; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shipman, 119 N. Y. 324; Higgins v. McConnell, 130 N. Y. 482; Latourette v. Latourette, 52 N. Y. App. Div. 192; Cassity v. Pound, 167 Mo. 605; Dobberstein v. Murphy, 64 Minn. 129; Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. 37; Serry v. Curry, 26 Neb. 353.

⁷ Field v. Lang, 87 Me. 441; Ritt v. Dodge, 20 R. I. 133; Union Brewing Co. v. Meier, 163 Ill. 424; Sloniger v. Sloniger, 161 Ill. 270; Weaver v. Rush, 62 Ark. 51; Francis v. Sandlin, 150 Ala. 583; Pacific Bank v. Hannah, 32 Cir. Ct. App. 522.

⁸ Ch. xxxiii. *infra*.

⁹ Rowley v. Poppenhager, 203 Ill. 434; Park, Dower, § 339.

This interest, it is to be reiterated, is conferred upon her by operation of law. And, no matter how late she may be in acquiring it, it is treated when obtained by her as a *continuation of her deceased husband's estate*. Her title relates back to his death and is a continuation of his title.¹ Therefore, though the husband's heir or devisee enters on all his lands and holds seisin of them for some time after his death, as soon as she takes possession of her third her seisin defeats and destroys *ab initio* the seisin of such heir or devisee as to that portion, and he is thereafter to be treated as never having been seised thereof.² She gets dower from her husband by operation of law, and the law treats her seisin and his as one and continuous.³

Because of this principle, he who admeasures the dower land is the mere instrument or medium, through whom in contemplation of law the deceased husband makes the assignment. The heir does not give her any dower. The husband gives it to her, and the heir's hand in measuring it off is the hand of the husband. The property thus passes to her for life, and is then to revert to the husband's heir or devisee or his successor in title.⁴ There is no privity of estate between her and such reversioner.⁵ Both of them derive title from the husband, but neither of them from the other. He simply acted for the husband in staking off her property for her. Therefore, the assignment of dower is not a valuable consideration for any promise made by the dowager to him who makes the assignment.⁶ And, by virtue of the requirement as to a remainder that it and the preceding particular estate on which it depends must be created in one and the same transaction,⁷ if the heir assign dower to the widow, and by the same deed or transaction attempt to grant to another person a remainder dependent on her life estate and to take effect at her death, it has been de-

¹ Co. Lit. 339 a; *Lawrence v. Brown*, 5 N. Y. 394; *Windham v. Portland*, 4 Mass. 348. 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxx, § 2.

² *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 241 a; *Lawrence v. Brown*, 5 N. Y. 394; *Powell v. Monson*, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 368; 4 Kent's Com. pp. *62, *69.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*; Park, *Dower*, § 341.

⁵ *Adams v. Butts*, 9 Conn. 79. "Although, in point of tenure, a dowress holds of the heir, yet in point of title

she is *in* of the lands assigned to her, by her husband, and not by the person making the assignment." 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxx. § 2. See also *id.* § 5, which shows that the matter of tenures here mentioned is unimportant in this country.

⁶ Park, *Dower*, § 341; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxx. § 2.

⁷ See this requisite explained at § 89 (2), *supra*, and more fully at § 871, *fourth, infra*.

clared that no remainder is thereby created, because the dower interest, the particular estate so-called, is not really created in that transaction but is given by the husband as at the time of his death — the husband gives the dower, and no one else can give a valid, common-law remainder to take effect at its termination.¹

Requisites of Dower.

§ 468. **The Requisites restated.** — The three ordinary requisites of dower, as heretofore stated, are: *First*, lawful marriage; *second*, beneficial seisin by the husband of an estate of inheritance during the coverture; *third*, death of the husband; and *fourth*, as a strict requisite, though now of practical application in only a few states, that the estate of inheritance of the husband shall be one which the issue of the marriage, if any, may by possibility inherit.² Each of these requisites calls for a brief discussion.

§ 469. **First—Lawful Marriage.** — This requisite is in every respect the same, as to both dower and curtesy. And it is sufficient here to refer back to the discussion of it in connection with curtesy.³ In terse summary, the marriage must be either absolutely valid and unassailable; or, being voidable, must not be avoided during the life of the husband; and its validity or invalidity is generally to be determined by the law of the place at which it is solemnized.⁴ (a)

(a) In New York, before January 1, 1902, a marriage was not required to be ceremonial. A common-law marriage, clearly proved, was valid. *Hynes v. McDermott*, 82 N. Y. 41, 46, 91 N. Y. 451; *Hayes v. The People*, 25 N. Y. 390; *Fenton v. Reed*, 4 Johns. 52. See *Lauderdale Peerage Claim*, 17 Abb. N. C. 439; *Rose v. Clark*, 8 Paige, 574, 579. But, since that time, by virtue of L. 1901, ch. 339 (now in Domestic Relation Law, L. 1909, ch. 19, §§ 10-25), a marriage which is not ceremonial is required to be evidenced by a writing executed at the time, subscribed by the parties and at least two witnesses, stating the residences of them all, ac-

¹ *Park, Dower*, §§ 340, 341; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xxx. § 2; 1 *Wash. R. P.* (6th ed.) § 486. The widow owning her dower and the heir his reversion, the latter, of course, may sell his reversion as such. And, undoubtedly, if he clearly showed an intent to convey what he owned, his deed, in most jurisdictions to-day, would transfer the reversion, although he called it a remainder.

See *Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. R. Co.*, 12 N. Y. 121, 129; *Heath v. Barmore*, 50 N. Y. 302, 306; *Eckman v. Eckman*, 68 Pa. St. 460; *Ward v. Wooten*, 75 N. C. 413; *Horton v. Sledge*, 29 Ala. 478.

² § 462, *supra*.

³ § 447, *supra*.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Olmsted v. Olmsted*, 190 N. Y. 458, 467.

§ 470. **Second — Beneficial Seisin by the Husband of an Estate of Inheritance during the Coverture.** — With two exceptions, all the elements of this requisite are also the same in regard to both dower and curtesy. The two exceptions are: that, while the wife must ordinarily be seised in fact (or in deed) in order that the husband may have curtesy,¹ the law has never insisted on such a seisin by the husband in order to give the wife dower, but has been satisfied for this purpose with his seisin either in law or in fact;² and that dower in equitable estates was permitted later and has been allowed less fully and with more qualifications than curtesy in the same kinds of interests.³ These distinctions are to be discussed more fully in the next two sections. In all other respects, it is sufficient here to refer back to the discussion of this requisite in connection with curtesy.⁴ And, subject to the explanations there given, it may be stated: that the husband's estate must be one of inheritance — a fee of some kind;⁵ that he must be seised beneficially, and not merely in trust for another, nor as only a conduit to pass the property to another;⁶ that his seisin and ownership must be

known so as to entitle it to be recorded, and duly recorded within six months after its execution. The age of legal consent, for both sexes, is eighteen years. Domestic Relation Law, § 4; *Conte v. Conte*, 82 App. Div. 335.

When the marriage is illegal and void, no matter how innocent the parties may be, there is no dower. *Price v. Price*, 124 N. Y. 589; *Olmsted v. Olmsted*, 190 N. Y. 458, 467. But, while one who has been divorced in New York for his own adultery is forbidden (except in certain cases stated in the statute) to marry again in that state during the life of the one from whom he was so divorced, and if he attempt to do so the marriage is void and his act bigamy (Domestic Rel. L. § 8-2 R. S. 144, § 49), yet, if he go to another state or country and contract a marriage that is valid there, such marriage is recognized in New York, and the second wife may have dower. *Thorp v. Thorp*, 90 N. Y. 602; *Van Voorhis v. Brintnall*, 86 N. Y. 18.

¹ § 449, *supra*.

² See § 471, *infra*.

³ See § 472, *infra*.

⁴ §§ 448-453, *supra*.

⁵ § 448, *supra*. It is provided by statute in Massachusetts that estates for one hundred years or more, of which fifty years or more remain unexpired, are subject to dower. Such estates for years are declared by the statute to be freeholds. Mass. Rev. Laws, ch. 129, § 1.

⁶ § 452, *supra*. Therefore, there is

no dower in realty which before the marriage the husband contracted to sell. For he thereby becomes a trustee of such property. § 404, *supra*; *Hunkius v. Hunkins*, 65 N. H. 95; *Chapman v. Chapman's Trustees*, 92 Va. 537; *Aaron v. Bayne*, 28 Ga. 107. His contract to purchase realty, on the other hand, makes him *cestui que trust* of the property; and dower attaches to this equitable interest. § 472, *infra*.

continuous and uninterrupted — not broken in upon at his death by the seisin of another person;¹ and that his seisin and ownership must not be defeated by a paramount claim or title.² In the preceding discussion of these matters in referenee to curtesy, *mutatis mutandis*, the law on the same matters will be found in regard to dower. Thus, it being decided that there may be complete curtesy in a fee on conditional limitation,³ by a parity of reasoning that is practically absolute, it must be decided that there may be complete dower in the same kind of a fee. And, it being held that the husband of a trustee has no curtesy,⁴ it logically follows that the wife of a trustee has no dower. And the cases on both dower and curtesy, in referenee to the matters discussed in this paragraph, are cited interchangeably.

§ 471. **The Husband's Seisin may be either in Law or in Fact.** — The common law ordinarily gives no curtesy to a husband in property of which the wife was not seised in fact, because it is due to his laches or default that she is not so seised wherever such seisin is possible: he might give her seisin in fact, at any time during the coverture, by entering on or occupying the property.⁵ But this reasoning does not apply to the wife as a claimant of dower. The law gives her no authority to confer seisin in fact on him. And, if such seisin were essential to dower, he might often deprive her of this right by failing to enter on lands of which he was only seised in law. Therefore, as a requisite to dower, his seisin may be either in fact or in law. It is enough that he is seised in either manner during the coverture.⁶

The typical case usually mentioned of seisin in law is that of an heir, on whom the title to real property has descended, against whom the land is not adversely held by another, but who has not yet taken possession.⁷ His widow may have dower in such property.⁸ And it seems to be safe to state generally that, as the result of the modern operation of deeds as well as wills in passing complete titles in fee without livery of seisin,⁹ he is

¹ § 453, *supra*.

² § 453, *supra*.

³ § 453, *supra*.

⁴ § 452, *supra*.

⁵ § 449, *supra*.

⁶ Co. Lit. 31 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *131; Green v. Liter, 12 U. S. (8 Cranch) 229, 247; Durando v. Durando, 23 N. Y. 331; Phelps v. Phelps, 143 N. Y.

197; Atwood v. Atwood, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 283; Mann v. Edson, 39 Me. 25; Barnes v. Raper, 90 N. C. 189.

⁷ § 283, *supra*.

⁸ Co. Lit. 31 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *131; 2 Crabb. R. P. § 1124; Cruise, Dig. tit. vi, ch. i, § 20; Dunham v. Osborne, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 634.

⁹ See §§ 1039, 1041, *infra*.

sufficiently seised, for the purposes of his wife's dower, who owns real property in fee, while no one else is holding and claiming it in fee adversely against him, whether he acquired it by inheritance, or deed, or will, or any other mode of purchase.¹ And he is sufficiently seised who is a disseisor — who holds and claims land in fee adversely to the rightful owner,— his widow may have her dower, against all persons except such rightful owner after he regains his seisin by entry or suit.²

But, of course, he has no seisin who is a disseisee — against whom an adverse holder is claiming to own the property in fee. And the wife of a disseisee, who does not regain his seisin during the coverture, has no dower, unless she acquires it by virtue of some statute.³ In England and a few of the United States, such as Virginia and Kentucky, it is now provided by statute that a widow shall be dowable of lands which her husband owned in fee during the coverture, although he was disseised and had only a right of action or entry.⁴

§ 472. **The Husband's Seisin of Equitable Estates — Dower in Equitable Estates.**— From the time of the enactment of the statute of uses, curtesy has been allowed in equitable estates.⁵ But, as heretofore explained, when the question arose in England as to dower in such interests, it was decided that it could not be permitted in them, because presumably the widow was already provided for by a jointure or marriage settlement, and titles would be disarranged by giving her dower also.⁶ And this restriction was extended to all the kinds of equitable estates — uses, trusts, and equities of redemption.⁷ Such was the law of that country, until the Dower Act of 1834 (3 and 4 Wm. IV. ch. 105) removed this anomaly and added dower as an incident to all equitable estates. In most of the United States, a widow

¹ *Green v. Liler*, 12 U. S. (8 Cranch) 247; *Jackson v. Waltermire*, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 353; *McIntyre v. Costello*, 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 369; *Griggs v. Smith*, 12 N. J. L. 22; *Blood v. Blood*, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 80; *Farwell v. Rogers*, 99 Mass. 33; *Mann v. Edson*, 39 Me. 25; *Gordon v. Dickison*, 131 Ill. 141; *Bartlett v. Tinsley*, 175 Mo. 319; *Day v. Solomon*, 40 Ga. 32; *Barnes v. Raper*, 90 N. C. 189; *Tate v. Jay*, 31 Ark. 579; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1400, 1401.

² *Park, Dower*, § 37; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. iv. §§ 8-10.

³ Last two preceding notes; *Phelps*

v. Phelps, 143 N. Y. 197; *Poillon v. Poillon*, 90 N. Y. App. Div. 71; *Ellis v. Kyger*, 90 Mo. 600; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 46 N. C. 430; *Cruise*, Dig. tit. vi. ch. i. §§ 20-23.

⁴ Stat. 3 and 4, Wm. IV. ch. 105; *Challis*, R. P. p. 281; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3211; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xii. §§ 18-21.

⁵ § 303, *supra*.

⁶ § 304, *supra*.

⁷ *Dixon v. Saville*, 1 Bro. C. C. 326; *Mayburry v. Brien*, 40 U. S. (15 Pet.) 21; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1130; 4 Kent's Com. p. *43.

is dowable out of the equitable estates of her husband.¹ And in quite a number of them this is expressly provided for by statute.² (a) Therefore, it may now be stated, as a general proposition, that the husband's seisin, in order to give dower, may be of either a legal or an equitable estate.³ Bearing in mind the require-

(a) In New York, before the Revised Statutes took effect (Jan. 1, 1830), there was no dower in equitable estates. *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige 451, 452; *Manhattan Co. v. Evertson*, 6 Paige, 457; *Germond v. Jones*, 2 Hill, 569; 4 Kent's Com. p. *43. But, taking a liberal view of the general provision of those statutes (1 R. S. 740, § 1; now Real Prop. L. § 190),—"A widow shall be endowed of the third part of all the lands whereof her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance, at any time during the marriage,"—and of the reservation of a widow's dower in lands contracted to be purchased by the husband, whose interest thus acquired is sold for the payment of his debts after his death (2 R. S. 112, §§ 71, 72; now superseded by Code Civ. Pro. § 2783), and of the provision making a deed, by a sheriff, of an execution debtor's land who dies before the expiration of the time to redeem, pass his interest subject to his widow's dower (2 R. S. 374, §§ 63, 64; now Code Civ. Pro. § 1473), the courts have decided that, since Jan. 1, 1830, there has been dower in an equitable estate in fee, provided the husband died seised thereof. *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 451, 453, 456; *Starhuck v. Starbuck*, 62 App. Div. 437; *Matter of McKay*, 5 Misc. 123. And see *Nichols v. Park*, 78 App. Div. 95; *Poillon v. Poillon*, 90 App. Div. 71. The only equitable estates, however, of which one can be seised in fee, in this state, are the interests of the beneficiaries of implied (resulting and constructive) trusts. For passive express trusts are abolished (p. 493, *supra*); no private express trust can exist in fee (pp. 494-498, *supra*); and a mortgagor owns not a mere equity, but the legal estate in the property (§ 757, *infra*). Therefore, the summary of the law in this state, on this matter, is that the equitable estates of which a widow may be endowed are the interests, as *cestui que trust*, in the implied trusts of which the husband dies seised in fee. But he may deprive her of dower in these by disposing of them before his death. *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 451, 453; *Hicks v. Stebbins*, 3 Lans. 39; *Nichols v. Park*, 78 App. Div. 95.

¹ § 304, *supra*; *Davis v. Green*, 102 Mo. 170; *Robinson v. Miller*, 40 Ky. 88; *Fortune v. Watkins*, 94 N. C. 304; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xx. § 11. *Contra*, in Maine and Massachusetts. *Hamlin v. Hamlin*, 19 Me. 141; *Reed v. Whitney*, 7 Gray (Mass.), 533; *Lobdell v. Hayes*, 4 Allen (Mass.), 187; *Simonds v. Simonds*, 112 Mass. 164. But, as the cases last cited show, an exception to the common-law rule is made in Massachusetts, and the widow is dowable of lauds which the husband had contracted to buy, when he dies before completing the purchase. *Reed v. Whitney*, 7 Gray

(Mass.), 533; *Shearer v. Shearer*, 98 Mass. 117. See *Goodheart v. Goodheart*, 63 N. J. Eq. 746.

² 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3212; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xx. §§ 11-44.

³ Last two preceding notes. Seisin of an equitable estate, as here employed, means the ownership of it in freehold (and the freehold must be a fee, to give dower) coupled with the right to the enjoyment of the income. He who is the contractual vendee of a piece of land in fee, for example, has such seisin. See next succeeding note; also § 283, *supra*.

ment that his ownership, whether legal or equitable, must be in fee, a good and frequently cited illustration of an equitable estate out of which dower may be had is the husband's interest as beneficiary of a constructive trust in a piece of land which he has contracted to purchase in fee, but the legal estate in which has not yet been conveyed to him.¹ And another, of course, is his interests as *cestui que trust* in property which another person as a constructive or resulting trustee is holding for him.²

The two things, to be noted carefully in regard to dower in equitable estates, are: that the husband must have a clear equitable interest, and not merely an indefinite moral right, or claim which cannot be enforced as such;³ and that, in most states, it is held that the husband alone may deprive his wife of dower in an equitable estate, by disposing of it or suffering it to be taken from him before his death — that she has dower in those equitable estates only of which he *dies* seised.⁴

The first of these is true, of course, as to legal and equitable estates alike. There is no dower when the husband is not seised of one or the other of these. But a mere moral claim, whether real or supposed, is so apt to be confused with an equitable estate, that the matter requires emphasis here. Thus, in New York, where the statute precludes the existence of a resulting trust from the fact that one person voluntarily pays the purchase money for real property and takes the title in the name of another, it was held that the wife of such a purchaser had no dower right whatever; and this was because, no matter how strong might be his moral right against the vendee, he had no estate legal or equitable in the land.⁵

¹ § 404, *supra*; Church v. Church, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 434; Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27; Tink v. Walker, 148 Ill. 234; Bunting v. Foy, 66 N. C. 193; Hutchinson v. Alberding, 112 N. W. Rep. 647 (Iowa); 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xx. §§ 37-44. Some courts hold that the widow can have no dower, in such cases, unless the husband has paid *all* the purchase money before his death, so that he has a "perfect equity." Walters v. Walters, 132 Ill. 467; Harrison v. Boyd, 36 Ala. 203; Morgan v. Smith, 25 S. C. 337. But, in most states, the widow is given dower in the proportionate part of the land, for which he had paid before his death. Church v. Church, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 434; Wil-

liams v. Kierney, 6 N. Y. St. Rep. 560; Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27; Bowen v. Lingle, 119 Ind. 560; Klutts v. Klutts, 58 N. C. 80; Caroon v. Cooper, 63 N. C. 386; Thompson v. Cochran, 26 Tenn. 72; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xx. §§ 37-44.

² Ch. xxii. xxiii. *supra*; Otway v. Hudson, 2 Vern. 583; Yeo v. Mercereau, 18 N. J. L. 387; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xx. § 11 *et seq.* The subject of dower in connection with mortgages, and the mortgagor's interest is discussed at § 480, *infra*.

³ Next succeeding note.

⁴ Second succeeding note.

⁵ Phelps v. Phelps, 143 N. Y. 197. See Nichols v. Park, 78 N. Y. App. Div.

The second thing above mentioned, that the husband alone may deprive his wife of dower in his equitable estates, is *the* distinctive characteristic of dower in such interests. Emphasis will be hereafter laid on the fact that generally common-law dower can not be barred or defeated, except by some act or acquiescence of the wife or widow.¹ But, because of the less definite nature of equitable estates, and probably more clearly because of the late attaching of dower to them at all, the courts, with only one or two exceptions, have permitted the husband alone to defeat her dower in them; and have settled it that she shall have dower in no equitable interests except such as the husband is seised of in fee at the time of his death.²

§ 473. **Third — Death of the Husband.**—The third and ordinarily the last requisite of dower is the death of the husband, leaving the wife surviving. This means his natural death, as is true of the death of the wife in order to perfect the right to curtesy.³ It has been already explained that his death causes her right to become a chose in action, and that she may subsequently acquire a life estate in the real property by the admeasurement and assignment of her dower third.⁴

§ 474. **Fourth — The Estate of Inheritance of the Husband must be One which the Issue of the Marriage, if Any, may by possibility Inherit.**—This requisite generally exists if the other requisites of dower exist. To establish a dower right it is not required, as it is to sustain a claim to curtesy, that there shall be issue born of the marriage. It is not even necessary that the wife be able to bear issue.⁵ And almost everywhere it is true to-day that the legitimate issue of any lawful wife may inherit any inheritable estate of her husband, its father. But wherever estates tail are still recognized, it is possible for a man to own an estate tail special, such that the issue of himself and his wife can not inherit it. Thus, if land be there conveyed to A and the heirs of his body by his wife Mary, and after Mary's

95; Poillon v. Poillon, 90 N. Y. App. Div. 71; Stroup v. Stroup, 140 Ind. 179, 185.

¹ § 496, *infra*.

² Hawley v. James, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 451, 453; Mills v. Van Voorbis, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 133, 135; Starbuck v. Starbuck, 62 N. Y. App. Div. 437; Nichols v. Park, 78 N. Y. App. Div. 95; Pritts v. Ritchey, 29 Pa. St. 71; Rands v. Kendall, 15 Ohio, 671; Building L. & W. Co. v.

Fray, 96 Va. 559. *Contra*, Lawson v. Morton, 6 Dana (Ky.), 471; Tenn. Code, § 2398. See 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xx. §§ 45-49.

³ See § 456, *supra*.

⁴ § 464, *supra*.

⁵ Co. Lit. 40 a, 40 b; Roll. Abr. 657. But the common law gave her no dower, if she were under the age of nine years. 2 Blackst. Com. p. *131; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. § 4.

death he marry Jane, Jane can have no dower in that land, because it can not be inherited by her issue.¹ This is the only kind of estate as to which this requisite is important; for in all other instances it is sure to be complied with, if the other requisites of dower exist.² And so it may be disregarded in all places where estates tail are abolished.

¹ Lit. § 53; 2 Blackst. Com. p. * 131; Northcut v. Whipp, 51 Ky. 65; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. §§ 2, 3.
Ancotts v. Catherich, Cro. Jac. 615.
See Spangler v. Stanler, 1 Md. Ch. 36;

² Ibid.

CHAPTER XXXII.

PROPERTY OF WHICH A WIDOW IS DOWABLE.

§ 475. Special kinds of interests affecting dower.

§ 476. No dower in real property held in joint tenancy.

§ 477. Dower in real property held by tenants in common.

§ 478. Dower in partnership real property.

§ 479. Dower in exchanged real properties.

§ 480. Dower claims in mort-

gages, and mortgaged real property.

§ 481. Dower in real property subject to judgments or other liens.

§ 482. Dower in future estates.

§ 483. Dower in incorporeal hereditaments.

§ 484. Dower in mines and quarries.

§ 485. Dower in wild lands.

§ 486. Dower rights in crops.

§ 475. **Special Kinds of Interests affecting Dower — and Curtesy.** — It has been repeatedly stated, as to both curtesy and dower, that they require for their existence beneficial seisin of an estate of inheritance during the coverture. To such an interest these legal life estates may usually attach as incidents. But some estates of inheritance may be beneficially owned, in such a manner as to preclude dower or curtesy either wholly or partially. Such, for illustrations, are estates owned in joint tenancy, partnership estates, and estates in lands exchanged for other lands. These forms of interests, and others about which interesting questions as to dower and curtesy have arisen, now require discussion. The rules as to dower in them will ordinarily apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to curtesy in them also. And so they were not specially dealt with in the chapter on curtesy. They will be discussed with special reference to dower; and what is said may be understood as applying to curtesy also, unless something to the contrary is stated.

§ 476. **No Dower in Real Property held in Joint Tenancy.** — The right of survivorship, which belongs to joint tenancy, prevents dower from attaching.¹ And this is true even as to the

¹ "The reason for this diversity is for that the joint tenant, which surviveth, claimeth the land by the feoffment, and

by survivorship, which is above the title of dower." Co. Lit. 37 b; Lit. § 45; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvi. § 1; Brough-

wife of one of the owners, who sells his interest and so severs the joint tenancy: the purchaser acquires title free of the vendor's wife's dower.¹ The wife or widow of the last survivor, however, may have dower, in case the joint ownership is not dissolved and one outlives all the others; because, as soon as all his fellow owners are dead, that one ceases to be a joint tenant and becomes an owner in severalty.² So, of course, if in any manner, whether by partition or otherwise, one of them acquire an interest in the property, other than as joint tenant, his wife may have dower in that interest.³ In several states of this country, such as Ohio, South Carolina, Georgia, and Texas, the right of survivorship among joint tenants has been abolished, or has never existed; and consequently dower may there attach to their estates.⁴

§ 477. **Dower in Real Property held by Tenants in Common.** — In tenancy in common there is no right of survivorship, to preclude dower.⁵ Dower may, therefore, attach to the undivided interest of a husband.⁶ If, for example, a man own in fee an undivided one fifth of a piece of land, as tenant in common with others, his wife has dower in that portion — a one fifteenth of the entire property for her life.⁷ And if partition be made among the co-owners, the wife of each will have dower in the distinct parcel allotted to him in severalty; unless she can prove that the partition was fraudulent as against her, in which case she may take dower as if no partition had occurred.⁸

ton v. Randall, Cro. Eliz. 503; Mayburry v. Brien, 40 U. S. (15 Pet.) 21. This principle is retained by the Dower Act of England. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 105, § 2. See joint tenancy explained, §§ 672, 673, *infra*.

¹ *Ibid.*; Babbitt v. Day, 41 N. J. Eq. 392; Cooper v. Whitney, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 95, 101; Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xii. § 33; Park, Dower, § 40. But if the joint tenant, who does not sell, be left sole-seised of his portion of the property, his wife, of course, may have dower in that portion. See next succeeding note.

² 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1131; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xii. § 33; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 370.

³ Last three preceding notes. And see § 477, *infra*.

⁴ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1371; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvi. §§ 10-12; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 857, note; § 673, *infra*.

⁵ See tenancy in common explained, §§ 684-687, *infra*.

⁶ Lit. §§ 44, 45; Sutton v. Rolfe, 3 Levinz, 84; Reynard v. Spence, 4 Beav. 103; Totten v. Stuyvesant, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 500; Jackson v. Edwards, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 498; Lloyd v. Conover, 25 N. J. L. 47, 52; Cook v. Walker, 70 Me. 232; Whitney v. Whitney, 45 N. H. 311; Lee v. Lindell, 22 Mo. 202.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ The presumption of fairness in the partition is stronger, of course, when it is made by judicial proceedings, than when it is a partition out of court. Wilkinson v. Parish, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 653; Totten v. Stuyvesant, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 500; Jordan v. Van Epps, 85 N. Y. 427; Greiner v. Klein, 28 Mich. 12; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvi. § 13. See Mosher v. Mosher, 32 Me. 412; Lee v. Lindell, 22 Mo. 202; Holley v. Glover, 36 S. C. 404; Gaffney v. Jefferies, 59 S. C. 565. When the land is sold pursuant

§ 478. **Dower in Partnership Real Property.** — “So long as the partnership affairs remain unsettled, like all other assets of the firm, its real estate is equitably pledged to creditors and liable to be absorbed and disposed of in the process of liquidating the firm debts and satisfying the claims of the respective parties as against each other. . . . Widows are not dowable in real estate so situated.”¹ And this is true, whether the realty thus held — acquired with partnership funds for partnership purposes — is regarded as converted into personalty so far only as the partnership affairs require (which is the general view in this country), or as held as a trust fund for paying its debts and settling its accounts.² But, after these purposes are accomplished, any surplus of such realty is owned by the partners as tenants in common, and their wives have dower in their portions respectively.³ Such are the generally accepted results as to dower in connection with partnership real property, whether title is taken in the name of the firm, or in the names of all the partners individually, or by one or more of them for the benefit of the firm.⁴ It has been held in some cases, however, that the partners may agree, expressly or impliedly, that lands so owned shall be considered as converted into personalty for all purposes, and so may shut out from it all dower rights.⁵ And, on the other hand, where it is treated not as partnership realty, but wholly as a tenancy in common by persons who happen to be partners, so that it is collateral to the partnership, there may be complete dower rights in it, independent of partnership debts, even though it is bought with partnership funds.⁶

to a judgment or decree in a partition suit, in which the wife was properly made a party, she is usually given dower in the portion of the proceeds which passes to her husband. *Ibid.*; § 465, *supra*. See N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1553, 1567-1576; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xvi. §§ 18-33.

¹ *Riddell v. Riddell*, 85 Hun (N. Y.), 482, citing *Greenwood v. Marvin*, 111 N. Y. 423; *Fairchild v. Fairchild*, 64 N. Y. 471; *Sage v. Sherman*, 2 N. Y. 417.

² See § 695, *infra*, and next succeeding note.

³ *Clay v. Freeman*, 118 U. S. 97; *Hauptmann v. Hauptmann*, 91 N. Y. App. Div. 197; *Dyer v. Clark*, 5 Met. (Mass.) 562; *Campbell v. Campbell*, 30 N. J. Eq. 415; *Mowry v. Bradley*, 11 R. I. 370; *Willet v. Brown*, 65 Mo. 138; *Trowbridge v. Cross*, 117 Ill. 109; *Gris-*

som v. Moore, 106 Ind. 296; *Paige v. Paige*, 71 Iowa, 318; *Hill v. Cornwall*, 95 Ky. 512; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxvi. Compare, *Parrish v. Parrish*, 88 Va. 529; *Hughes v. Allen*, 66 Vt. 95.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 451, 457; *Coster v. Clarke*, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 428; *Park, Dower*, § 106; *Story, Partnership*, §§ 92, 93. But, where the contract makes him who takes the title debtor to the others for their proportion of the purchase price, his wife may have dower, but not the wives of the others. *Ibid.*; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxvi. § 20.

⁵ *Mallory v. Russell*, 71 Iowa, 63; *Lowe v. Lowe*, 13 Bush (Ky.), 688; *Greene v. Greene*, 1 Ohio, 535; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxvi. § 5.

⁶ *Ratcliffe v. Mason*, 92 Ky. 190;

§ 479. **Dower in Exchanged Real Properties.** — Since a wife has dower generally in all the real properties of which her husband is properly seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture,¹ it follows that when during the marriage he sells one piece of land of which he is so seised, and with the proceeds purchases another piece of which he becomes seised in the same manner, and then he sells that and buys another, and so on, and she does nothing to bar her right, she may have dower in them all, no matter how short his ownership of each parcel.² (But if, instead of thus selling one piece and buying another, he “exchange” one for the other, in the technical, common-law sense, she can not have dower out of both, but after his death may elect out of which to be endowed.³) She may have dower from both, unless the trade is such a technical exchange, “a mutual grant of equal interests, the one in consideration of the other,” —⁴ the estates transferred the one for the other must be equal in quantity, not necessarily of value, but of *interest*, a fee simple for a fee simple, a fee tail for a fee tail, etc.⁵ In several states of this country, of which New York and Wisconsin are illustrations, statutes, so far declaratory of the common law, require this election in case of exchanged real properties, and forbid the widow to take dower out of both parcels; and then they provide, as a matter in addition to the common-law rules, that the widow shall be conclusively deemed to have chosen to be endowed of the realty *received* by her husband in exchange, unless within a designated time, usually one year, she affirmatively elects otherwise.⁶ (a)

(a) The New York statute declares that, “If a husband seised of an estate of inheritance in lands, exchanges them for other lands, his widow shall not have dower of both, but she must make her election, to be endowed of the lands given, or of those taken, in exchange; and if her election be not evinced by the commencement of an action to recover her dower of the lands given in exchange, within one year after the death of her husband, she is deemed to have elected to take her dower of the lands received in exchange.” Real Prop. L. § 171, originally 1 R. S. 740, § 3. As explained in the text, the first part of this statute is declaratory of the

Ware v. Owens, 42 Ala. 212; Perin v. Megibben, 53 Fed. Rep. 86 (C. C. A.); Hale v. Plummer, 6 Ind. 121; Wheatley v. Calhoun, 12 Leigh (Va.), 264.

¹ § 462, *supra*.

² *Ibid.*; § 496, *infra*.

³ Co. Lit. 31 b; Stevens v. Smith, 4 J. J. Marsh (Ky.), 64; Wilcox v. Ran-

dall, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 633; De Witt v. De Witt, 202 Pa. St. 255.

⁴ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *323.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Mosher v. Mosher, 32 Me. 412; Cass v. Thompson, 1 N. H. 65.

⁶ N. Y. Real Prop. L. § 171; Wis. Ann. Stat. § 2159 *et seq.*; Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 489, note.

§ 480. **Dower Claims in Mortgages, and Mortgaged Real Property.** — It has been explained that there is no curtesy in a mortgage, even in those states in which the first mortgagee has the legal estate in the land.¹ The same is true of dower. Under no theory of a mortgage, does the wife or widow of a mortgagee as such have dower.² (a)

It is almost universally recognized, on the other hand, that there may be dower in the mortgagor's interest in real property;³ and this is true whether he is regarded as owning the legal estate, which is the theory of New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, and many other states, or whether he has only an equitable interest, an equity of redemption, which is the theory of England, Maine, Massachusetts, and several other states.⁴ In many instances, mortgaged property is subject to dower as if

common law; the latter part is new. See also Reviser's Note to 1 R. S. 740, § 3; *Wilcox v. Randall*, 7 Barb. 633; *Huntington v. Huntington*, 9 Code Civ. Pro. Rep. 182. There is no provision for her to obtain an extension of time to make her election, as there is when she is given a jointure during marriage, or before marriage without her consent, or a testamentary provision is made for her by the husband in lieu of dower. See § 521, note (a), *infra*.

(a) In New York, this is expressly declared by the following statute: — "A widow shall not be endowed of the lands conveyed to her husband by way of mortgage, unless he acquires an absolute estate therein, during the marriage." Real Prop. L. § 195, originally 1 R. S. 741, § 7. In this state, a mortgage is only a lien on the real property, both before and after the debt is due, and even though the mortgagee as such takes possession of the land. *Kortright v. Cady*, 21 N. Y. 343, 365; *Trimm v. Marsh*, 54 N. Y. 599; § 757, *infra*. This was practically settled before the first enactment of this statute. Revisers' notes to 1 R. S. 741, § 7; *Coles v. Coles*, 15 Johns. 319; *Jackson v. Willard*, 4 Johns. 41. The last clause of the statute means, of course, that there is dower in favor of the mortgagee's wife, if he acquire the mortgagor's interest, the legal estate in the land by foreclosure or otherwise, at any time during the coverture. Given the New York theory of a mortgage, this statute is simply and plainly declaratory of the natural, common-law rules as to the existence of dower in the mortgagee's interest.

¹ § 452, *supra*.

² §§ 755, 762, *infra*; *Foster v. Dwinel*, 49 Me. 44; *Reed v. Shepley*, 6 Vt. 602; *Kortright v. Cady*, 21 N. Y. 343, 364, 365; 4 Kent's Com. p. *43.

³ *Coles v. Coles*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 319; *Mills v. Van Voorhies*, 20 N. Y. 412; *Brackett v. Baum*, 50 N. Y. 8; *Boies v. Benham*, 127 N. Y. 620; *Snow v. Stevens*, 15 Mass. 278; *Manning v. Laboree*, 33 Me. 343; *Wade v. Miller*,

32 N. J. L. 296; *Cox v. Garst*, 105 Ill. 243; *Jones v. Bragg*, 33 Mo. 337; *Daniel v. Leitch*, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 195; 4 Kent's Com. pp. *44, *45; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxiii. §§ 1, 2; § 472, *supra*. In England there was no dower in equities of redemption, until the Dower Act, 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 105; § 472, *supra*.

⁴ *Ibid.*; §§ 756, 758, *infra*.

no mortgage existed. } Such is the case, for example, in a common-law state, when a married man, owning unencumbered real property, mortgages it without his wife's joining in the instrument or doing any other act to affect her dower right.¹ But there are four classes of mortgages, which take precedence of the claim of dower of a wife or widow, and leave her right to attach subject to the mortgage — to attach to that interest only which remains to the husband after the satisfaction of the mortgage debt out of the land. These, as claims which naturally and fairly should be first satisfied, are: (a) those mortgages which were made and became liens on the land before the marriage of her who demands dower in it as the property of her husband; ² (a), (b) those which were already liens on the land when it was acquired by the husband; ³ (c) those which were given by the husband, when he bought the property, in whole or part payment of the purchase money; ⁴ (b) and (d) those made by the husband or his successors in interest, in which the wife voluntarily joined for the purpose of releasing her dower, or in favor of the holders of which she voluntarily gave in any manner a release of her dower right, or estopped herself to deny the existence of such a release.⁵

When, as belonging to one of these classes, a mortgage thus has priority of the dower of the wife or widow of the owner of the land, her right in the land itself may be completely barred and removed by a foreclosure of the mortgage, by a proper proceeding to which she is duly made a party.⁶ And, in some

(a) For the New York statute, providing for dower as here stated, in such cases, see § 777, note (a), *infra*.

(b) For the New York statute, providing for dower as here stated, in such cases, see § 777, note (b), *infra*.

¹ House v. Jackson, 50 N. Y. 161; Sutherland v. Sutherland, 69 Ill. 481; Grissom v. Moore, 106 Ind. 296; Grady v. McCorkle, 57 Mo. 172; 4 Kent's Com. p. * 50; § 777, *infra*.

² Coles v. Coles, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 319; Kursheedt v. Union Dime Sav. Inst., 118 N. Y. 358; Virgin v. Virgin, 189 Ill. 144; 4 Kent's Com. p. * 50.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Stow v. Tift, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 458; Boies v. Benham, 127 N. Y. 620, 624; Hinds v. Ballou, 44 N. H. 619; Jones v. Parker, 51 Wis. 218; Rhea v. Rawle, 131 N. C. 453; Groce v. Ponder,

63 S. C. 162; 1 Jones, Mortg. (3d ed.) p. 371, note 1.

⁵ Nelson v. Brown, 144 N. Y. 384, 389; Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219, 222; Boornm v. Tucker, 51 N. J. Eq. 135; Sarver v. Clarkson, 156 Ind. 316; 4 Kent's Com. p. * 51; §§ 503-505, *infra*.

⁶ Stow v. Tift, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 458; Nelson v. Brown, 144 N. Y. 384, 389; Swan v. Wiswall, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 126; Andrews v. Stelle, 22 N. J. Eq. 478; Watts v. Julian, 122 Ind. 124; Wiltsie, Mort. Forecl. §§ 135, 136; § 743, *infra*.

states where the mortgagor has only an equitable estate, an equity of redemption, it has been decided that his wife's dower may be defeated also by a foreclosure during his lifetime, to which she is not made a party, or by any other disposition of his equitable estate before his death.¹ This is in harmony with the general rule above stated, that a widow is not dowable of any equitable estates except those of which her husband dies seised.² In most places, and especially in those states in which a mortgagor retains the legal estate, and in which in order to deprive his wife of dower by foreclosure not only must the mortgage be prior in right to her dower but she must also be made a party to the foreclosure proceedings, it is generally provided by statute, or declared by the courts in the absence of statute, that she shall be endowed of the surplus moneys coming to her husband after satisfaction of the claims which had precedence of her dower in the land.³ (a)

When a mortgage, which has priority over a wife's dower, is discharged by her husband, or by his personal representatives

(a) The New York statutes, after providing that a purchase money mortgage shall take precedence of the purchaser's wife's dower, continue: — "Where, in a case specified in the last section, the mortgagee, or a person claiming under him, causes the land mortgaged to be sold, after the death of the husband, either under a power of sale contained in the mortgage, or by virtue of a judgment in an action to foreclose the mortgage, and any surplus remains, after payment of the money due on the mortgage and the costs and charges of the sale, the widow is nevertheless entitled to the interest or income of one-third part of the surplus for her life, as her dower." Real Prop. L. § 194, originally 1 R. S. 741, § 6. The effect of this statute and the adjudications, taken together, is to give the wife or widow dower in the surplus moneys, whenever the result of foreclosing a mortgage, whether in court or by advertisement under a power of sale contained in the mortgage (see §§ 835, 837, *infra*), is to bar her of dower in the land. Revisers' Note to 1 R. S. 741, § 6; *Matthews v. Duryee*, 45 Barb. 69; *Vartie v. Underwood*, 18 Barb. 561; *Denton v. Nanny*, 8 Barb. 618; *Blydenburgh v. Northrop*, 13 How. Pr. 289; *Brackett v. Baum*, 50 N. Y. 8, 11; *Boies v. Benham*, 127 N. Y. 620; Gen. Rules Prac. No. 64.

¹ *Heth v. Cocke*, 1 Rand. (Va.) 344; *Folsom v. Rhodes*, 22 Ohio St. 435; *Riddick v. Walsh*, 15 Mo. 519; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxiii. §§ 30, 33; 4 Kent's Com. p. *45.

² § 472, *supra*.

³ *Mills v. Van Voorhies*, 20 N. Y. 412; *De Wolff v. Murphy*, 11 R. I. 630; *Vreeland v. Jacobus*, 19 N. J. Eq. 231; *Cook's Executor v. Cook's*

Administrator, 20 N. J. Eq. 375; *Unger v. Leiter*, 32 Ohio St. 210; N. Y. Real Prop. L. § 194, as to sale on foreclosure after husband's death; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3216; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxiii. § 30. See *Newhall v. Lynn Saw. Bk.*, 101 Mass. 428; *Schmitt v. Willis*, 40 N. J. Eq. 515; *Sarver v. Clarkson*, 156 Ind. 316; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 377, 479; § 465, *supra*.

after his death, the obstacle in the way of his widow's right is thus removed, and she may accordingly have dower as if the mortgage had never been on the land.¹ And the same result follows, when one, who has purchased the mortgaged land from the husband subject to her dower, discharges the mortgage pursuant to the terms of the contract of purchase, or with full knowledge of her dower claim.² But, when such a purchaser discharges the mortgage in ignorance of her rights, or under such other circumstances that it would be unjust to him to give her dower out of all the value of the land, equity in his favor will compel her to be endowed only of the residue over and above the mortgage debt, as if the mortgage were still in existence as a claim prior to her own.³ A concrete illustration of the working of this equitable rule is given hereafter, in discussing the discharge of mortgages by merger or extinguishment.⁴ When other persons, such as the heirs, or devisees, of the husband, or their successors in interest, discharge the mortgage after his death, the widow is ordinarily required to contribute her *pro rata* share of the amount paid.⁵

§ 481. **Dower in Real Property Subject to Judgments or other Liens.** — Because no act of the husband, either alone or with others, without the wife's concurrence, can defeat dower, his creditors, who have not reduced their claims to judgment nor otherwise made them liens on his land before his marriage, must, in the absence of statutory modifications, hold them subordinate to her dower right.⁶ Like mortgage claims, these other liens, such as docketed judgments, mechanics' liens, attachment liens, etc.⁷ (other than rights of the state or general government, which may shut out dower as elsewhere explained),⁸ are inferior to dower and must yield to the widow's superior right,

¹ *Wedge v. Moore*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 8; *Norris v. Morrison*, 45 N. H. 490; *Selb v. Montagne*, 102 Ill. 446; *Hitchcock v. Harrington*, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 290; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxiv. §§ 42-50. See § 817, *infra*; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxiii. §§ 37-51.

² *Ibid.*; *McCabe v. Swap*, 14 Allen (Mass.), 188; *Thompson v. Heywood*, 129 Mass. 401; *Everson v. McMullen*, 113 N. Y. 293; *Hatch v. Palmer*, 58 Me. 271.

³ *Forbes v. Moffatt*, 18 Ves. 384; *James v. Morey*, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 246; *Carlton v. Jackson*, 121 Mass. 592;

Hinds v. Ballou, 44 N. H. 619; *Mallory v. Hitchcock*, 29 Conn. 127; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 407.

⁴ § 822, *infra*.

⁵ *Swaine v. Perine*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 482; *Burnet v. Burnet*, 46 N. J. Eq. 144; *Norris v. Morrison*, 45 N. H. 490; *Selb v. Montagne*, 102 Ill. 446; § 798, *infra*.

⁶ § 496, *infra*; *Grady v. McCorkle*, 57 Mo. 172; *Owen v. Slatter*, 26 Ala. 547.

⁷ Such liens, most of which are statutory, are explained hereafter.

⁸ § 506, *infra*.

unless they have a natural and fair priority, by having attached first to the property, or by reason of her estoppel to demand precedence of her dower. Therefore, liens that are on the land before the marriage, or before the husband acquires it, or as to which the wife in some manner waives or relinquishes her dower, take priority, and leave her dower to attach to the residue after they are satisfied.¹ And, as dower may be completely removed from the land by the proper foreclosure of a mortgage to which the dower is subordinate, so it may be divested by the due enforcement of any of these other liens to which it is inferior.² And the wife's or widow's right may attach to the surplus, in the same manner as after the satisfaction of a mortgage.³ So, the discharge of these liens removes the obstacle to dower, and lets it attach to all the realty, under substantially the same circumstances as those above explained in reference to mortgages.⁴

§ 482. **Dower in Future Estates.** — Questions as to dower (or curtesy) in future estates — in reversions, remainders, and executory interests⁵ — are readily answered by remembering and emphasizing two of the absolute requisites of dower. These are that the husband must be *seised* during coverture, and that he must be seised of *an estate of inheritance*.⁶ If, therefore, a piece of land be owned by A for life, and by B as remainderman or reversioner in fee, there is no dower in it for the wife of either of them; for A has the seisin but no estate of inheritance, and B has the estate of inheritance but no seisin. Neither of them has both requisites; and so neither wife has any dower.⁷ If, on the other hand, realty be owned by A for a term of years and by B as reversioner or remainderman in fee, B's wife has a dower right therein; because he has

¹ Sandford *v.* McLean, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 117; Robbins *v.* Robbins, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 174; Trustees, etc. *v.* Pratt, 10 Md. 5; Brown *v.* Williams, 31 Me. 403; Roan *v.* Holmes, 32 Fla. 295; Brown *v.* Bronson, 35 Mich. 415; Nutter *v.* Fouch, 86 Ind. 451; 4 Kent's Com. p. *50; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxviii. §§ 29–33, ch. xxix. § 45. But in Pennsylvania dower is subordinate to the husband's debts. Directors of Poor *v.* Royer, 43 Pa. St. 146; Lazear *v.* Porter, 87 Pa. St. 513; Porter *v.* Lazear, 109 U. S. 84.

² Ibid.; § 480, *supra*.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.; § 822, *infra*.

⁵ See these explained at §§ 88, 89, *supra*, and, ch. lx. *infra*.

⁶ § 446, *supra*.

⁷ Duncomb *v.* Duncomb, 3 Lev. 437; Durando *v.* Durando, 23 N. Y. 331; Leach *v.* Leach, 21 Hun (N. Y.), 381; Collins *v.* Russell, 184 N. Y. 74; Baker *v.* Baker, 167 Mass. 575; Kenyon *v.* Kenyon, 17 R. I. 539; Kirkpatrick *v.* Kirkpatrick, 197 Ill. 144; Von Arb *v.* Thomas, 163 Mo. 33; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xv. § 1.

not only an estate of inheritance, but also the seisin, which, though livery of it were made to A the tenant for years, can not reside in A but goes past him to B the freeholder.¹ The formal statement of the result, which thus becomes apparent, is that there is no dower in a reversion or remainder after a preceding freehold estate; but after an estate less than freehold there may be dower in a remainder or reversion in fee.² And even where the future estate follows a freehold interest, if the later terminate during the coverture so that the husband becomes the owner of a present estate in fee, his wife's dower right, of course, at once attaches.³ Thus, when land is owned by A for life and by B as remainderman in fee, and A dies while B is still living and owning the remainder, B's wife acquires dower in the property immediately on A's death. And the same is true if B purchase A's interest, or in any other manner become the owner of the present estate in fee.⁴

In the discussion of future estates hereafter, it is shown that the only forms of them, of which the owners can ever be said in any proper sense to be seised, are vested remainders and reversions. There is no seisin of contingent or executory interests.⁵ Therefore, the summary as to dower in future estates is that it does not attach to any of them, as such estates, except a vested remainder or reversion which is not preceded by any freehold particular estate.⁶

§ 483. **Dower in Incorporeal Hereditaments.** — Incorporeal hereditaments owned by the husband in fee, and of which he has seisin (by means of his enjoyment of the income)⁷, are in their inherent nature subject to dower. Thus, there is dower in a perpetual rent, or a franchise, or a *profit à prendre*, or any other servitude that is not appurtenant to a dominant corporeal tenement.⁸ These are real interests, which stand out by themselves

¹ Ibid; Co. Lit. 32 a; Bates v. Bates, 1 Ld. Raym. 326; Boyd v. Hunter, 44 Ala. 705; Weir v. Tate, 39 N. C. 264; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. § 5.

² Last two preceding notes; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xv.

³ Last three preceding notes.

⁴ Ibid.; House v. Jackson, 50 N. Y. 161; Powers v. Jackson, 57 N. Y. 654. See Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. St. 309; Eldredge v. Forrestal, 7 Mass. 253.

⁵ § 283, *supra*; §§ 883, 912, 913, *infra*.

⁶ As to when a present and future

estate, both coming into the same hands at the same time and in the same right, will merge and so give a present estate in fee to which dower may attach, see §§ 457, 470, *supra*.

⁷ § 283, *supra*.

⁸ Co. Lit. 22 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *132; Chaplin v. Chaplin, 3 P. Wms. 229; Bedlow v. Stillwell, 158 N. Y. 292; Williams v. Cox, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 178; Chase's Case, 1 Bland. Ch. (Md.) 227; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. x. § 3.

and may have such rights attached. But in technical, common-law easements, which are always appurtenant to dominant corporeal property, there can be no right to dower, apart from the land to which they are appurtenant. They must adhere to the land; and a widow could not take a third of one of them distinct therefrom.¹ So, in case of a lease for years, she can have no dower in the rent, except as she may be endowed of the landlord's reversion and take her share of the rent as incident thereto.² In a word, dower naturally belongs to incorporeal hereditaments; but no widow can have dower in one of them, as a distinct entity, when it itself must remain appurtenant to corporeal property.

§ 484. **Dower in Mines and Quarries.** — In mines and quarries owned by the husband in fee, which were opened and worked during his life, his widow is entitled to dower, whether they are within his land or the land of another.³ She may work to exhaustion an open mine, set out to her as part or all of her dower property; and like any other life owner, she may do the same as to such a mine in that portion of her husband's land assigned to her for dower.⁴ But she is also precluded, as are other life tenants, from opening any new mine in her dower property.⁵

§ 485. **Dower in Wild Lands.** — The common law denied widows dower in wild and uncultivated wood and forest lands, because the wood must be removed from them in order to make them of any benefit to a life owner, and the cutting of it to the extent necessary for this purpose would constitute waste.⁶ The law is generally the same in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, unless the wild land is used in connection with

¹ *Wyman v. Oliver*, 75 Me. 421; *Chouteau v. M. P. R. Co.*, 122 Mo. 375; 1 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. x. § 3.

² *Ibid.*; *Co. Lit.* 22 a; *Stoughton v. Leigh*, 1 Taunt. 402; *Herbert v. Wren*, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 378; *Williams v. Cox*, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 178; *Moriarta v. McRea*, 45 Hun (N. Y.), 564; *Weir v. Tate*, 39 N. C. 264; *Duncan v. Navassa Phosphate Co.*, 137 U. S. 647; 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *40; 1 *Wash. R. P.* (6th ed.) § 383.

³ *Stoughton v. Leigh*, 1 Taunt. 402; *Coates v. Cheever*, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 460; *Sayers v. Hoskinson*, 110 Pa. St. 473; *Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Min. Co.*, 33 N. J. Eq. 603; *Billings v. Taylor*, 10

Pick. (Mass.) 460; 1 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. x. §§ 4-10. See *Black v. Elkhorn Min. Co.*, 163 U. S. 445.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Priddy v. Griffith*, 150 Ill. 560; *Clift v. Clift*, 87 Tenn. 17; § 555, *infra*.

⁵ Last two preceding notes. But in Michigan, by statute, the widow may have dower in a mine not yet opened. *In re Seager*, 92 Mich. 186. A mine is opened and worked when any part of it is opened and worked. See *Billings v. Taylor*, 10 *Pick.* (Mass.) 460; *Coates v. Cheever*, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 460; *Moore v. Rollins*, 45 Me. 493; *Lenfers v. Henke*, 73 Ill. 405.

⁶ *Bract.* § 315.

improved realty for the supplying of timber, fuel, etc., for the reasonable enjoyment of the farm.¹ But, throughout the rest of this country, there is generally dower in such lands; because, under the liberal rules as to a life-tenant's removal of timber in most of our states, they can be reasonably enjoyed without the commission of waste.²

§ 486. **Dower Rights in Crops.**—The annual crops, as well as those that are perennial, growing on land when it is assigned to a widow for her dower, belong to her, and not to the personal representatives of her husband.³ The common law gave her this right, as an appendage to her dower interest; and then, in compensation to her husband's estate, forbade her representatives to take any emblements from the land after her death, but gave all the crops growing there at the time of her death to the succeeding owner of the land.⁴ The Statute of Merton, ch. II, changed this latter rule, however; and ever since then her representatives have been allowed to take the emblements, the "away-going" annual crops, growing on the land at the time of her death. The net result is, in favor of dower, that she owns the annual crops—the crops which are the result of annual cultivation—at both ends of her ownership of the property. She may have those that are growing there when she takes the land; and her personal representatives may bring to maturity, and harvest as a part of her estate, or she may bequeath by her will, those that are growing there at the time of her death.⁵

¹ And some of the states so provide by statute. See *White v. Willie*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 143; *Webb v. Townsend*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 21; *Conner v. Shepherd*, 15 Mass. 164; *Ford v. Erskine*, 50 Me. 227; *Fuller v. Watson*, 7 N. H. 341; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3219; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. x. §§ 11-20.

² *Walker v. Schuyler*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 480; *Jackson v. Sellick*, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 262; *Brown v. Richards*, 17 N. J. Eq. 32; *Brayton v. Jordan*, 24 R. I. 6; *Allen v. McCoy*, 8 Ohio, 418;

Schnebly v. Schnebly, 26 Ill. 116; *Chapman v. Schroeder*, 10 Ga. 321; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. x. §§ 21-24.

³ 2 Co. Inst. 81; *Kain v. Fisher*, 6 N. Y. 597, 598; *Parker v. Parker*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 236.

⁴ Bract. §§ 2, 96; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxx. § 18.

⁵ Last two preceding notes; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxx. §§ 15-20. For the subject of emblements, as belonging to life tenants generally, see §§ 542-546, *infra*.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

ASSIGNMENT OF DOWER.

§ 487. Meaning of assignment — When to be made.

§ 488. By whom dower should be assigned.

§ 489. Procedure to compel assignment of dower.

§ 490. Demand for dower before suit.

§ 491. Methods of assigning dower — Effects.

§ 492. Assignment of dower, of common right.

§ 493. Assignment of dower, against common right — Equitable assignment — Statutory assignment.

§ 494. Dower is one-third, in value — How ascertained.

§ 495. Damages for detention of dower.

§ 487. **Meaning of Assignment — When to be made.** — Since a widow's dower interest is her life estate in one-third of the real property of which her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance during the coverture, and she is not given the right to choose the third for herself, there must be an admeasurement and assignment — a clear designation for her of her portion and putting her in possession — before she can own any dower land distinctly as such. This "assignment" of dower should be made during her quarantine.¹ She is entitled to it immediately on the death of her husband; and, if her third be not set out to her during the forty days of her quarantine, she may have an action for its recovery.² The nature of her proceeding for that purpose is explained hereafter.³

§ 488. **By Whom Dower should be assigned.** — The tenant of the freehold, the person who holds a present freehold interest in the property subject to the dower claim, is the one who should make the assignment.⁴ And he is usually the heir, devisee, or alienee of the husband. It is not necessary, however, that such tenant be the rightful owner. The principle is that the widow should not be delayed in acquiring her dower land;

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *135; 4 Kent's Com. p. *63; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1140; § 463, *supra*.

² *Ibid*.

³ § 489, *infra*.

⁴ Cruise, Dig. tit. vi. ch. 3, § 3.

and an assignment made by the freehold tenant, in itself proper, should be upheld.¹ Therefore, a disseisor, abator, or intruder may effectually set out her dower, if he make such an assignment as the rightful owner had he been in possession might have been compelled to make.² So, an infant, who is tenant of the freehold, may assign dower, subject to correction by the court if he make a mistake against his own interest.³ And, in most jurisdictions, the guardian of such an infant may make a valid assignment.⁴ And, for the same reason, if either of two or more joint tenants, or it would seem either of any other kind of co-owners, assign dower in the manner in which they were all compellable to assign it, it will be good as against them all.⁵

§ 489. **Procedure to compel Assignment of Dower.**—The history of dower litigation presents at least six methods by which widows have sued for their thirds. The first two of these are by the old common-law writs, the third by ejectment, the fourth by procedure in the probate court, the fifth by suit in equity, and the sixth by action under the modern codes.

The common-law procedure is either by writ of right of dower, or by writ of dower *unde nihil habet*. The former is for the recovery of the residue of her interest when some part of it has been already assigned; and the latter for her entire dower, none of which she has yet obtained.⁶ These were two of the four real actions retained in England by the repealing act of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 27, § 36. And the procedure by writ of dower *unde nihil habet* is still substantially in use in a number of the states of this country.⁷ If the demandant succeed in this action, she is entitled to a writ directed to the sheriff requiring him to admeasure her dower on the land and deliver possession to her.⁸ This remedy is not ordinarily as satisfactory as that in equity.

¹ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. iv. §§ 8–10.

² He must be in possession, claiming title, and must make the assignment without fraud or covin. *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 35 a, 357 b; Cruise, Dig. tit. vi. ch. iii. § 4.

³ *Young v. Tarbell*, 37 Me. 509; *McCormick v. Taylor*, 2 Ind. 336; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *136; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. iv. § 11. See, *contra*, *Bonner v. Peterson*, 44 Ill. 253.

⁴ *Curtis v. Hobart*, 41 Me. 230; *Young v. Tarbell*, 37 Me. 509; *Boyers v. Newbanks*, 2 Ind. 388. *Contra*,

Heisen v. Heisen, 145 Ill. 658. At common law, a guardian in socage could not assign dower, but a guardian in chivalry might do so. Co. Lit. 35 a; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. iv. § 6.

⁵ Co. Lit. 35 a; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1142. 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. iv. §§ 13–15.

⁶ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. v. § 2; Stephens on Pleading, pp. *9, *10.

⁷ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. vi.; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3274.

⁸ For detailed description of the procedure, see 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. v.

The action of ejectment has been, ever since it arose as a remedy, a means by which a widow could recover her dower land already assigned to her but held adversely by another person. And this was its only use in acquiring dower at common law.¹ In some of the United States, it has been so extended in its operation as to enable her to proceed in this manner to compel the assignment.² But whenever he whose duty it is to assign dower is not in actual possession of the land, this mode of procedure is ineffectual; and therefore it is not always as satisfactory a remedy as a suit in equity.³

Many of our state statutes have provided for summary proceedings, usually in the probate court, for the admeasurement of dower.⁴ This is quite satisfactory in places where the statute authorizes such court to decide as to the widow's title, in case it is disputed. But where this power is not conferred by legislation on the probate tribunal, it can only determine what part of the property she may have as dower, if she be entitled to any dower at all; and the entire matter of her right and title may have to be determined in another court.⁵

Starting as a remedy auxiliary to that at law, by removing the impediments to a complete determination of the case, granting discovery, etc., dower suits in equity were gradually extended in their scope until they came to be the most efficacious means of redress for the claimants.⁶ This mode of procedure, which is now recognized everywhere as concurrent with that at law,⁷ has all the advantages of the legal remedies and avoids most of their disadvantages. Especially, it enables the claimant to reach equitable estates as well as the purely legal ones which are alone recognized by law; it retains the matter until all questions and difficulties are settled in the one suit, and so it avoids a multiplicity of actions; it affords complete means of discovery of the property, and obtaining an account of the *mesne* profits; and it enables all the interested parties to be brought in and given their day in court.⁸ Except in states

¹ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. ii. § 18.

² 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. vi. §§ 16, 17.

³ *Ibid.*; Stephens on Pleading, p. *11; Ellis v. Ellis, 4 R. I. 110; Ellicott v. Mosier, 7 N. Y. 201.

⁴ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3272, 3273.

⁵ *Ibid.*; French v. Crosby, 23 Me. 276; Sheafe v. O'Neil, 9 Mass. 9; Parks v. Hardey, 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 15;

Matter of Watkins, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 245.

⁶ 4 Kent's Com. p. *71; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 495; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. vii. §§ 1-15.

⁷ *Ibid.*; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3274.

⁸ Bispham's Prin. Eq. §§ 496-500; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. vii. §§ 1-15.

where positive statutes intervene, it is the method most commonly resorted to for the compulsory assignment of dower.¹ The proceeding is commenced by bill or petition; and, when the claimant's right has been established, the assignment is effected by a master in chancery or commissioners appointed for that purpose, who, acting as ordered by the court, set out her share by metes and bounds and deliver possession to her. When the court confirms their report of these proceedings, the assignment of her dower becomes complete.²

The action for dower under the modern codes, which combine the practice of law with that of equity, proceeds substantially the same as any other action.³ It is a remedy usually based on that of equity, but with the addition of some important modifications and advantages. Thus, the statutes usually provide that a fixed annual sum of money may be awarded to the widow, and made a charge on the realty, where it is impracticable to give her a specific third of the land. They also authorize her to file a consent to receive a gross sum in lieu of dower, and provide for the filing of a consent by the defendant to pay such sum, which the court is to determine by a reference or otherwise; and usually also they prescribe proceedings, after the filing of such a consent by the plaintiff, for a sale of all or some of the property to obtain such sum, or for a transfer of a part of it to her in fee simple in part settlement or settlement in full of her dower claim.⁴ (a)

(a) In New York, from the earliest times, a widow might proceed for the recovery of her dower by a writ of dower *unde nihil habet*; and this kind of action was recognized by the statutes of 1787 and the Revised Laws of 1813. R. L. p. 57, § 3. By the Revised Statutes (Jan. 1, 1830), the action of ejectment was substituted for the more ancient procedure. 2 R. S. 303, 343, § 24. By virtue of those statutes, also, she could proceed by petition, for the admeasurement of her dower, in the Supreme Court, or a County Court, or the Surrogate's Court, in the county in which the land was situated. 2 R. S. 488, § 1. And her remedy in equity, if she chose that preferable method, was always recognized. *Badgley v. Bruce*, 4 Paige, 98; *Hazen v. Thurber*, 4 Johns. Ch. 604; 4 Kent's Com. pp. *71, *72. 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. vi. § 16, ch. vii. § 11, ch. viii. §§ 2-11.

The former Code of Procedure, §§ 307, 455, provided for dower actions. And the present Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 1596-1625, regulates them somewhat more in detail. This code remedy, which is *the* present mode of suing for dower, is based on the procedure in equity, but adds several

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* §§ 501, 502;

2 *Scribner, Dower*, §§ 16-47.

³ 7 *Enc. Pl. & Pr.* p. 171.

⁴ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1617-1624;

1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 3274-3276.

See 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. viii.

§ 490. **Demand for Dower before Suit.**—The common law does not require a widow to make a demand for her dower, as a prerequisite to her suit for its recovery.¹ But, since statutes have given her the ability to recover damages for the wrongful withholding of her dower land, it is in many cases necessary for her to make a demand before suing, in order that she may recover such damages against the alienee of the husband or of the husband's heirs.² (a) In some states, moreover, statutes preclude the recovery of any dower unless it has been demanded before suit.³ It is best, of course, in all cases, to make demand for the dower, before proceeding in court for its recovery.

The statutes do not prescribe any special requisites of such a demand. It must describe the property and the claim with sufficient certainty; and must be made personally on the tenant of the freehold if he can be reached.⁴ But, as a rule, neither the notice of the demand, nor the authority of any agent who may make it, is required to be in writing.⁵ In some

important advantages to that procedure. Thus, it provides that the plaintiff may make and file a written consent to receive a gross sum in full satisfaction and discharge of her right of dower; that the defendant may then apply to the court for leave to pay such sum; and that the court may proceed, by reference or otherwise, to ascertain the value of her dower right, and to fix the amount to be paid, and may order that sum to be paid and received in satisfaction of the dower claim. §§ 1617, 1618. It further provides that, when the plaintiff thus consents to receive a gross sum, and a distinct parcel of the land can not be laid off for her without material injury to the parties, the court may order a sale of the land, and the payment of a gross sum to her out of the proceeds; or, when she so consents and the court decides that it is best, a distinct parcel of the land may be ordered to be transferred to her in fee simple, in whole or part satisfaction of her dower claim. §§ 1619–1624. See *Robinson v. Govers*, 138 N. Y. 425; *Freeman v. Ahearn*, 64 App. Div. 509; *Everson v. McMullen*, 45 Hun, 578.

(a) In New York, when a widow sues for dower in land of which her husband died seised, and the action is against any person other than the heir, she can not recover damages also, except from the time when she demanded her dower. Code Civ. Pro. § 1600. And see § 495, *infra*.

¹ 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. vi. § 1.

² *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 32 b; *Hitchcock v. Harrington*, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 290; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1600; *McClanahan v. Porter*, 10 Mo. 746; *Roan v. Holmes*, 32 Fla. 302.

³ 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. vi. § 2.

⁴ *Bear v. Snyder*, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 592; *Haynes v. Powers*, 22 N. H. 590; *Luce v. Stubbs*, 35 Me. 92; *Parker v. Murphy*, 12 Mass. 485.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 32 b; *Watson v. Watson*, 10 C. B. 3; *Lothrop v. Foster*, 51 Me. 369.

states, no action can be commenced until a designated time after the demand is effectually made.¹

§ 491. **Methods of Assigning Dower — Effects.** — When the assignment is made by legal process, it is always to be done “of common right.” For there are two methods of assigning dower, the one “of common right,”² and the other “against common right.”³ The former mode consists in giving to the widow, out of the real property of which her husband was seised during the coverture, the specific interest which she can insist on having and can compel the heir or other assignor to give, and which he can insist on her accepting in satisfaction of her dower claim — her one-third, for her life, of the lands, tenements, and hereditaments themselves that are subject to her dower.⁴ Thus, if the husband had owned a thirty-acre tract of land, all of uniform quality and value, an assignment of common right would result in her being given possession of ten of those acres to hold and enjoy during the residue of her life. This is done without any contract with her, or other formality on her part; simply by the admeasurement of her third, by the officer or other person whose duty it is to do so, and giving her possession. The law confers upon her the interest thus set out.⁵ Assignment of dower “against common right,” on the other hand, is always the result of a contract with her, whereby she accepts some interest or property other than that which she could legally demand. It is not the law that transfers to her such an interest, but an agreement between her and the tenant of the freehold; and by her contract she accepts it in lieu of her legal right.⁶ For example, if the husband had owned a thirty-acre tract of land, an assignment against common right would result from her contract with his heir, whereby she acquired a rent out of that land, or the ownership in fee or otherwise of another piece of land which had never belonged to her husband, or any other property real or personal that she was willing to accept in lieu of her specific legal dower interest.⁷ Dower of common right is her legal claim, perfected by law without her act; dower against common right is her contract acquisition in lieu of that which the law would otherwise have given.

¹ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. vi. §§ 2-4.

² Or, “according to common right.”

³ Or, “not according to common right.” 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 456;

2 Scribner, Dower, ch. iv. §§ 16-22.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. i. § 2.

⁶ Last three preceding notes.

⁷ Co. Lit. 34 b; Tnd. Lead. Cas. R. 17. p. *52; Haugh v. Peirce, 97 Me. 281.

For the widow, perhaps the most important practical difference between these two ways of satisfying her demand for dower is in the results for her in case she loses, because of defect of title, that which has been assigned. When the assignment is of common right, if the title fail to all or part of that which is thus given to her by operation of law and without any agreement on her part, she may have a new assignment from the realty which the husband did actually own in fee.¹ But, if she lose because of invalid title all or some of the property that she consents to have assigned to her against common right, she has no redress in a further claim for dower. And this is because she is bound by her contract, relinquishing her specific legal dower interest for that which she received instead.² The failure of the title, in such cases, may often give her a right of action against him who made the assignment; as when, for example, he has defrauded her, or given her a warranty deed of the land; but her acceptance of an assignment against common right effectually terminates her dower claim.³

§ 492. **Assignment of Dower, of Common Right.**—Dower of common right must always be set out by metes and bounds — by measuring off one-third of the specific land and giving the widow possession — whenever this is practicable and fair.⁴ And in the parcel so admeasured she must be given a life estate, without any condition, exception, or reservation. A condition or restriction attempted to be annexed to her interest is void.⁵ If the husband died seised of two or more distinct tracts of land, and his heir or devisee still hold them all, it is not now generally held necessary that she receive by metes and bounds one-third of each parcel, though the common law gave her dower from each piece;⁶ but the sheriff, or heir, or other assignor, may fairly transfer to her out of one or more of them

¹ *French v. Pratt*, 27 Me. 381; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxix. § 1. And, if the heir lose, because of defective title, all or some of the property left to him after the assignment, he has a right against her to a new assignment. *Singleton's Heirs v. Singleton's Executors*, 5 Dana (Ky.), 87; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 478.

² *Scott v. Hancock*, 13 Mass. 162; *Mantz v. Buchanan*, 1 Md. Ch. 202; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxix. § 4.

³ *Ibid.* See 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxix. §§ 4-9.

⁴ Lit. § 36; *Cruise, Dig. tit. vi. ch. iii, § 6*; *Smith v. Smith*, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 313; *Pierce v. Williams*, 3 N. J. L. 281; *Skolfield v. Skolfield*, 88 Me. 258; *Sanders v. McMillan*, 98 Ala. 146.

⁵ Co. Lit. 34 b, n. 217; *Cruise, Dig. tit. vi, ch. iii, § 14*; *Bullock v. Finch*, 1 Rolle, Abr. 682; *Austin v. Austin*, 50 Me. 74, 77.

⁶ See 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxi. §§ 17-20.

a quantity equal in value to one-third of them all.¹ But when the parcels are held separately, as by several grantees of the husband, dower of common right must ordinarily be set out from each piece.²

It is often impracticable, or would be unjust, because of the nature of the property or the way in which it is owned, to assign dower by metes and bounds. This is true, for example, when the property consists of a mill which should be managed as an entire business establishment, or a dwelling house from which one-third can not fairly be allotted, or a single ferry right, or mine, or right of way; or when the land is owned, subject to the dower right, by two or more persons as joint tenants or tenants in common. In such cases, the dowager may be granted a proportionate part of the rents, profits, or income, as one-third of the net returns from the ferry,³ or every third net toll dish from the mill;⁴ or she may be given the right of occupation and enjoyment for one-third of the time;⁵ or some similar special arrangement may be made which shall assure to her during her life one-third of the net profits.⁶ Her dower of common right is to be set out by metes and bounds if possible and just; otherwise she is to have one-third of the net returns in the best and most practical manner.

§ 493. **Assignment of Dower, against Common Right — Equitable Assignment — Statutory Assignment.**— Dower assigned against common right, being the outcome of an agreement by which the widow accepts something other than her specific dower interest,⁷ must result from a contract sufficient to release and bar such specific interest. The contract, therefore, must

¹ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxi. §§ 17-20; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3277.

² Droste v. Hall, 29 Atl. Rep. 437; Park, Dower, 282; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxii. §§ 2-4. Where, however, part of the husband's land was aliened by him subject to dower, especially when he sold with warranty, the widow's dower should be set out from the residue, of which he died seised, if that be sufficient. Wood v. Keyes, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 478; Lawson v. Morton, 6 Dana (Ky.), 471; Raynor v. Raynor, 21 Hun (N. Y.), 36, 40.

³ Stevens v. Stevens, 3 Dana (Ky.), 371.

⁴ Perkins, § 415; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1154.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Last three preceding notes; Cruise, Dig. tit. vi. ch. iii. §§ 6-12; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxiii. These principles have received special attention in assigning dower in mines; in which the widow is entitled to one-third by metes and bounds if practicable, otherwise to one-third of the net income, or even to a larger share of other realty instead of any specific mining right. Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Tannt. 402; Billings v. Taylor, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 450; Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. (N. Y.), 460; Lanfers v. Henke, 73 Ill. 405.

⁷ § 491, *supra*.

be made by deed, or other instrument in writing complying with the requirements of the statute of frauds, by which her absolute legal right in the property of her husband is effectually released.¹ Otherwise, although the contract might be good in itself, it would not be a valid assignment and satisfaction of dower. When it is sufficient as a transfer of property to her and a release by her, it terminates all her right in her husband's realty, even though she thus receive much less in value than her specific dower interest.²

By the doctrine of equitable conversion, money or other personal proceeds of land sold is sometimes regarded as realty, and so is subject to the dower right which had attached to the land conveyed.³ Such often, for example, are the surplus moneys arising from the foreclosure of mortgages, or some or all of the proceeds of sales of realty in partition, or of sales for the payment of decedents' debts.⁴ Courts of equity early assigned dower in such personal funds, by allotting to the widow annual interest on one-third thereof;⁵ and this is the method still in force, except as modifications are made by agreement of the parties or by virtue of statutes.⁶ And, according to the weight of authority, this is the only method in which the court unaided by statute is absolutely authorized to proceed in such cases.⁷ But the parties, if all are of age and competent, may agree that a gross sum shall be paid to the widow as representing her dower interest.⁸ The proper computation of such a sum is made by finding the present worth of an annuity of one-third of the annual interest on the fund that is subject to the dower, for the period of the expectation of life of the dowager as shown by the mortality tables. Thus, if the fund were \$30,000 on which, therefore, interest at (say) five per cent would be \$1,500 per year, and the mortality tables showed her expectation of life to be eighteen years, the gross sum representing her dower

¹ Co. Lit. 34 b. n. (9); Vernon's Case, 4 Rep. 1; Roper, Husband and Wife, 377, 410; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. iv. §§ 28-30.

² Co. Lit. 32 b; Jones v. Brewer, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 314.

³ § 42, *supra*.

⁴ *Ibid.*; Higbie v. Westlake, 14 N. Y. 281; Wood v. Powell, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 318; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1567-1569, 2795, 2800.

⁵ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxiii. §§ 13-18.

⁶ Last two preceding notes; Higbie v. Westlake, 14 N. Y. 281; Hinchman v. Stiles, 9 N. J. Eq. 361; Harrison's Executors v. Payne, 32 Gratt. (Va.) 387; Beavers v. Smith, 11 Ala. 20.

⁷ *Ibid.*; Herbert v. Wren, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 369, 381.

⁸ *Ibid.*; Robinson v. Govers, 138 N. Y. 425, 428.

interest would be the present worth of an annuity of \$500 for eighteen years.¹

In many of the United States, the statutes facilitate the computation and settlement of dower claims for gross sums of money or amounts of other property. And, where one-third of the realty subject to dower can not be readily allotted, these commonly provide a means for selling the property and making an apportionment of its proceeds.² (a)

§ 494. **Dower is One-third, in Value — How ascertained.**— A widow's dower interest is one-third *in value*, and not merely one-third in territorial extent, of the real property which is subject to her claim. The assignment must be so made that this value shall be set out for her in a beneficial manner; and this means that the *productive* value is to be considered, and she is to have such a share as will produce one-third of the income fairly obtainable from all the property out of which she is dowable.³

In estimating values for this purpose, the two settled rules of the early common law were: (1) if the husband died seised of the property, so that it was held by his heir or devisee or his successor in interest, the value should be taken as of the time of the assignment, and so she should have her third of the benefit of any increase in value, whether from natural or artificial improvements, after her husband's death, and should lose her third of any decrease after that time, whether this came about naturally or from any neglect or waste by the tenant of the freehold;⁴ and (2) if before the husband's death he had alienated the property subject to her dower, so that he did not die seised of it, the value should be taken as of the time of the alienation⁵— against the heir or devisee or his purchaser she took one-third

(a) For the New York statutes providing for such sales and apportionment, see note (a), § 489, *supra*.

¹ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxiv.; 2 Dembitz, Land Titles, p. 834, n.

² N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1617-1625; 1 Stim, Amer. Stat. L. § 3276.

³ Co. Lit. 32 a; White v. Story, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 543, 547; Leonard v. Leonard, 4 Mass. 533; Skolfield v. Skolfield, 88 Me. 258; Fuller v. Conrad's Admr., 94 Va. 233; Scribner, Dower, ch. i. §§ 20, 21, ch. xxi. §§ 37, 38.

⁴ Co. Lit. 32 a; Powell v. Monson, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 347; Hale v.

James, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 258, 260; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218; Husted's Appeal, 34 Conn. 488; McClanahan v. Porter, 10 Mo. 746; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxi. §§ 30-33.

⁵ Perkins, § 328; Hargrave, Co. Lit. 32 a, note 8; 4 Kent's Com. p. *65; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxii. §§ 5-7; Hale v. James, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 258; Humphrey v. Phinney, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 484; Turner v. Kuehne, 64 Atl. Rep. 478 (N. J. Eq.).

of the present value at the time of assignment, even though there had been great advance or decrease in values, or erection or destruction of expensive buildings, or other improvements, after the husband's death; against the alienee of the husband or the successor in title of such alienee she took as much of the property as was equal to one-third of its value at the time of the husband's alienation, regardless of any improvement or deterioration between then and the time of the assignment.¹ There have been much discussion and criticism of these two rules; and the decisions concerning them in the different states are now widely divergent. The general outcome, however, may be summarized as to each of them in a separate paragraph.

(1) *When the husband died seised of the property*, so that his heir or devisee or his successor in title is the tenant of the freehold, the rule of England and many of the states of this country, such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Missouri, is still that of the early common law—the widow shares in all the increase and participates *pro rata* in all the decrease, down to the time of the assignment, from whatever cause these changes in value may have occurred.² The dower is to be set out from the estate as it then is, without regard to past values. And, when the result is a loss to the widow because the property has been injured since the husband's death, her proper remedy, if any, is not in any increase of dower, but in an action for damages against the wrong-doer.³ But in some of the United States, of which New York and Ohio are examples, while a widow takes the risk of depreciation in value after her husband's death and before assignment, and shares *pro rata* in any natural increase—in the unearned increment—during that time, the statutes or decisions preclude her from sharing in the artificial erections and improvements made during that period.⁴ Thus, she gains by an advance in values due to the

¹ Last two preceding notes.

² Perkins, § 521; *Doe v. Gwinnell*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 688; *Catlin v. Ware*, 9 Mass. 218; *Parker v. Parker*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 236; *Thompson v. Morrow*, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 289; *Husted's Appeal*, 34 Conn. 488; *McClanahan v. Porter*, 10 Mo. 746; *Price v. Hobbs*, 47 Md. 386. See *Powell v. Monson*, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 347; *Wolfe v. Larison*, 163 Ill. 552; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxi. §§ 30–32.

³ When the heir has wasted the prop-

erty after the husband's death, this seems to be the logical and proper procedure, though Judge Story doubted her right to such remedy. 1 Roper, *Husband and Wife*, 349; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1136; *Campbell v. Murphy*, 2 Jones, Eq. (N. C.) 357. See *Doe v. Gwinnell*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 682; *Powell v. Monson*, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 347, 368; *Sanders v. McMillan*, 98 Ala. 149.

⁴ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1609; Rev. Stat. Ohio (1891), § 5716; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxi. § 34.

growth of the city or an improvement in the neighborhood; but not by the addition of a dwelling house or a mill erected after her husband's death.¹(a) And in a third class of states, such as New Hampshire and Kentucky, the value of the property is taken at the time of the husband's death, and she can not share in any subsequent improvements whether natural or artificial.²

(2) *When the husband did not die seised of the property*, so that his alienee or the survivor in title of such alienee is the tenant of the freehold, the English rule now estimates dower according to the value of the property at the time of the assignment, and thus gives to the widow the benefit of all improvements made by the husband's alienees.³ In this country, the uniform rule is that the widow is not entitled to share in the benefit of such improvements; and the general statement of the law is that the computation of her dower, in realty aliened by her husband during the coverture, is to be made by giving her one-third of its value *at the time of the alienation*.⁴ Such is the language of the decisions of many of the states. And New York, (b) New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Missouri may be mentioned as examples.⁵ In some of the cases, however, while the general

(a) The New York Code prescribes that the commissioners who admeasure dower "must take into consideration any permanent improvements made upon the real property, after the death of the plaintiff's husband, or after the alienation thereof by him; and, if practicable, those improvements must be awarded within the part not laid off to the plaintiff; or, if it is not practicable so to award them, a deduction must be made from the part laid off to the plaintiff, proportionate to the benefit which she will derive from so much of those improvements as is included in the part laid off to her." Code Civ. Pro. § 1609, subd. 2.

(b) N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1609, quoted in last preceding New York note.

¹ *Ibid.*

² N. H. Pub. Stat. (1891) p. 516; Gen. Stat. Ky. (1881) p. 530, § 1; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxi. § 34.

³ *Doe v. Gwinnell*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 682; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxii. § 5-17.

⁴ *Humphrey v. Phinney*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 484; *Walker v. Schuyler*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 480; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1609; *Catlin v. Ware*, 9 Mass. 218; *Van Dorn v. Van Dorn*, 2 Penning (N. J.), 513; *Thompson v. Morrow*, 5 Serg. & R. 289; *Westcott v. Campbell*, 11 R. I. 378; *Allen v. McCoy*, 8 Ohio, 418; *Sanders v. McMillan*, 98 Ala. 144; *McClanahan v. Porter*, 10 Mo. 746; 1

Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3279; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxii. §§ 18-26.

⁵ *Ibid.* The reason assigned for this rule by Sir Matthew Hale is, "that the heir is not bound to warrant, except according to the value of the land at the time of the feoffment; and if the widow were to recover according to the improved value, the feoffee would not have a complete remedy against the heir, which would not be reasonable." Hargr. Co. Lit. 32 a, note 8; *Walker v. Schuyler*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 480, 484. But this reasoning, though not the rule, is questioned by Justice Story in *Powell v. Monson*, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 347-369.

rule is recognized which protects the alienee against her claim to artificial improvements made by him, yet the value of the property is taken at the time of the assignment, so far as other changes — natural decrease or unearned increment — are concerned.¹

§ 495. **Damages for Detention of Dower.**— Prior to the statute of Merton, which was enacted before the courts of equity had assumed jurisdiction of dower suits except in special cases, a widow could not obtain damages for the past detention of her dower.² That statute gave her the right to recover damages against the heir or abator or his or their assigns, for wrongfully withholding her dower *in property of which her husband died seised*.³ The law judges construed the statute strictly, and so enabled the defendant, by pleading that he had always been ready to make the assignment, to succeed in the action for damages, unless the widow proved that she had demanded her dower.⁴ The equity tribunals, however, proceeding on the theory that he who had actually received the widow's share of the rents and profits of the premises held it in trust for her, gave her relief although she had not made a formal demand.⁵ And, unhindered by legal technicalities, she may now have in courts of equity an accounting against the husband's heir or devisee, or his successor in interest; and in some of them the same remedy is afforded even against the husband's alienee or his successor in interest.⁶

In most of the states of this country, legislation, based on the statute of Merton, provides for recovery of damages by the widow for the wrongful detention by any one of her dower in real property of which the husband died seised; ⁷ and in a few of them, such as New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Rhode

¹ See *Boyd v. Carlton*, 69 Me. 200; *Summers v. Babb*, 13 Ill. 483; *Johnston v. Van Dyke*, 6 McLean (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 422; *Powell v. Monson*, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 347; *Beavers v. Smith*, 11 Ala. 20; *Tod v. Baylor*, 4 Leigh (Va.), 498; *Strayer v. Long*, 86 Va. 557; *Scott v. Ashlin*, 86 Va. 581.

² Co. Lit. 32 b; *Johnson v. Thomas*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 377, 384; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxv. § 1.

³ 20 Hen. III. ch. i.

⁴ At law, if this plea of *tout temps prist* were not interposed, or if she proved a demand, she was entitled to recover

the value of the use of one-third of the premises from the time of the death of her husband. *Dobson v. Dobson*, Cas. temp. Hardw. 19; *Johnson v. Thomas*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 377, 384.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Shields v. Hunt*, 39 N. J. Eq. 485; *Slatter v. Meek*, 35 Ala. 528; *Campbell v. Murphy*, 55 N. C. 357; 4 Kent, Com. pp. *70, *71.

⁶ *Ibid.*; *Sellman v. Bowen*, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 50; *Beavers v. Smith*, 11 Ala. 32; *Badgley v. Bruce*, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 98, 100; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 498.

⁷ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3278; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxv. § 5.

Island, and Illinois, it permits such recovery against the husband's alienee or his successor in interest.¹ The ordinary rule is that, against the husband's heir or devisee, or his or their successors in interest, the damages are to be estimated from the time of the husband's death to the time of trial or judgment; while against the husband's alienee, when allowed, they are to be estimated from the time when she demands dower to the time of trial or judgment.² But, by local statutes, such as that of New York which prescribes three different periods, applicable to different cases of detention of dower, (a)

(a) In New York, the Statute of Merton, as to damages for detention of dower, was substantially adopted by L. 1787, ch. 4. This, with slight modifications, was re-enacted by the Revised Statutes of 1830; 1 R. S. 742, § 19; and so the law stood until the adoption of §§ 1600-1603, Code Civ. Pro., in 1880. By virtue of those sections, the widow's damages for wrongful detention of her dower are one-third of the annual value of the *mesne* profits of the property, with interest; but they do not include anything for the use of permanent improvements made after the death of the husband, or after alienation by him in cases in which he did not die seized of the property. In no case can such annual value for more than the six years before its recovery be obtained. Subject to this limitation, the rules for measuring the period for which the damages are to be computed are as follows: (1) when the husband died seized of the property, and the action is against his heir, the period is from the husband's death to the time of trial or application for judgment, as the case may be; and, if the heir alien the property before she obtains dower, the period for her recovery of damages against him, and for which she may have an action separate from her dower action, is from the husband's death to the time of such alienation; (2) when the husband died seized of the property, and the action is against any person other than his heir — as a devisee or his alienee, or the alienee of the heir — the period is from the time when she demanded her dower of the defendant to the time of trial or application for judgment, as the case may be; (3) when the husband did not die seized of the property, so that her action is against the husband's alienee or his successor in interest, the period is from the commencement of the action to the time of trial or application for judgment, as the case may be. The Code provides that, in either of these cases, the recovery is to be had in her action for dower, except that when the heir has aliened the property after the husband died seized of it she may have a separate action against the heir as stated above. But, in equity, though she die before completing her dower action (or probably even if she die before beginning it), and so her

¹ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1601; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxv. § 7.

² 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3278; Jackson v. O'Donaghy, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 247; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1600-1603; Armstrong v. Union College, 55 N. Y. App. Div. 302, 306; Whitaker v. Greer,

129 Mass. 417; Wells v. Beall, 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 468; Beavers v. Smith, 11 Ala. 20; Martin v. Martin, 14 N. J. L. 129; Munger v. Perkins, 62 Wis. 499; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 469; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxv. § 20, 21.

these computations are often materially modified.¹ The damages thus allowed are one-third of the *mesne* profits of the property with interest, “(after deducting outgoings) and such additional sum as will compensate the widow for any further loss she may have sustained by reason of the detention of her dower.”²

When a widow dies, her dower as such terminates, of course; for it is only a life interest. And any pending action merely for its recovery thereupon abates.³ But if, pursuant to statute, the parties to the action have agreed that she shall receive a gross sum in satisfaction of her claim, and a decision fixing the amount has been made by the court before her death, her representatives may recover the same, though she dies before the formal entry of judgment.⁴ So, as to damages for the wrongful detention of her dower, the common-law courts have generally agreed that, since the dower itself is the principal thing and the damages are the incident, her death before admeasurement terminates all right to both.⁵ But “in the English equity courts the rule is well established, that the omission to obtain an actual assignment of dower will not affect the right of the widow, while living, to obtain payment of *mesne* profits in equity, nor deprive her personal representatives of them in the event of her death.”⁶ Her right to the damages is in conscience the same, whether or not she has obtained an actual assignment of dower; and her death should not deprive her, or her representatives, of that which should therefore be treated as a vested interest.⁷ Such is the conclusion, also, of perhaps most of the equity tribunals of this country in

dower interest ends, her representatives may, nevertheless, recover the damages which had accrued before her death. *Johnson v. Thomas*, 2 Paige, 377; *Armstrong v. Union College*, 55 App. Div. 302, 310; *Gorden v. Gorden*, 80 App. Div. 258; *Kyle v. Kyle*, 67 N. Y. 400; *Witthaus v. Schack*, 31 Hun, 590, 595, 38 Hun, 560, 565; *Price v. Price*, 54 Hun, 349, 351. See the last paragraph of this section of the text.

¹ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxv. §§ 20-34.

² 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxv. § 8; N. Y. Code, Civ. Pro. § 1600; *Johnson v. Thomas*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 377, 384; 4 Kent's Com. p. * 65.

³ *Mordant v. Thorold*, 1 Salk. 252; *Howell v. Newman*, 59 Hun (N. Y.), 538; *Mingay v. Lackey*, 142 N. Y. 449; *Hildreth v. Thompson*, 16 Mass. 191;

Parks v. McClellan, 44 N. J. Law, 552; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxv. §§ 50-53.

⁴ *Robinson v. Govers*, 138 N. Y. 425.

⁵ *Kyle v. Kyle*, 67 N. Y. 400, 405;

Atkins v. Yeomans, 6 Met. (Mass.) 438; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxv. §§ 50, 51.

⁶ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxvi. § 21.

⁷ *Hamilton v. Mohun*, 1 P. Wms. 118, 122; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1208; 1 Roper, Husb. & W. 455.

which the question has arisen.¹ And in some of the states it is so fixed by statutes.² Some of the American courts, however, have decided the other way.³ And most of them, that permit damages to be recovered after her death, do so more readily in a suit for dower and damages which was commenced before she died.⁴ "The conclusion of the whole matter," says McClennan, J., in a carefully prepared opinion, "is that the representatives of a deceased widow may recover the *mesne* profits of her dower interest in lands of which her husband died seised, although she may have died before such dower was assigned, especially if suit was brought by her for that purpose in her lifetime."⁵

¹ Johnson v. Thomas, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 377; Armstrong v. Union College, 55 N. Y. App. Div. 302, 313; Paul's Ex'rs v. Paul, 36 Pa. St. 270; Harper v. Archer, 28 Miss. 212; Steiger's Adm. v. Hillen, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 121; Politt v. Kerr, 49 N. J. Eq. 65; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxvi. § 22.

² 60 Ohio Laws, p. 10; Rev. Stat.

Mo. (1879) § 2231; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxvi. § 22.

³ Roan v. Holmes, 32 Fla. 295; Atkins v. Yeomans, 6 Met. (Mass.) 438; Tuck v. Fitts, 18 N. H. 171; Rowe v. Johnson, 19 Me. 146; Turney v. Smith, 14 Ill. 242.

⁴ Last preceding note but two.

⁵ Armstrong v. Union College, 55 N. Y. App. Div. 302, 315.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

HOW DOWER MAY BE LOST OR BARRED.

§ 496. Generally, no bar of dower in legal estates, except by the wife's act or consent, or by an act of sovereignty — Methods of barring.

§ 497. Dower barred by elopement and adultery of the wife.

§ 498. Detinue of charters, as barring dower.

§ 499. Treason or felony of the husband, as a bar of dower.

§ 500. Alienism, as bar of dower.

§ 501. Former destruction of dower by the widow's attempt to dispose of more than her life estate.

§ 502. First — Divorce, as a bar of dower.

§ 503. Second — Dower barred by release — Estoppel by deed.

§ 504. Third — Dower barred by judgment or decree — Estoppel of record — Foreclosure.

§ 505. Fourth — Dower barred by estoppel *in pais*.

§ 506. Fifth — Dower barred by eminent domain, or other exercise of sovereignty.

§ 507. Sixth — Dower barred by lapse of time — Statute of limitations.

§ 508. Seventh — Dower barred by paramount title or interest — *Dos de dote peti non debet* — Dower in qualified fees.

§ 509. Eighth — Dower barred by jointure — Provisions in lieu of dower.

§ 496. **Generally, no Bar of Dower in Legal Estates, except by the Wife's Act or Consent, or by an Act of Sovereignty — Methods of Barring.** — Common-law dower, whether inchoate or consummate, is a vested right or interest, which is not destructible by any act by or against the husband.¹ "The law," said Lord Bacon,² "favoreth life, liberty, and dower."³ The statute of Westminster II. emphasized that favor;³ and subsequent legislation has frequently reinforced the common law in the same manner.⁴ Therefore, wherever

¹ *Benson v. Scot*, 3 Lev. 385, 386; *House v. Jackson*, 50 N. Y. 161, 165; *Palmer v. Palmer*, 162 N. Y. 131; *Sutherland v. Sutherland*, 69 Ill. 481; *Grisson v. Moore*, 106 Ind. 296; *Rose v. Rose*, 63 N. C. 391; 4 Kent's Com. p. *50. A few cases have found an apparent exception to this rule in instances in which the husband has dedicated land for public use. See *Venable v. Wabash R. Co.*, 112 Mo. 121; *Baker*

v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 122 Mo. 396; *Park, Dower*, 246. But the better view opposes even this exception. *Nye v. Taunton Branch R. Co.*, 113 Mass. 277. See 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxix.

² 4 Bacon, Works, 345.

³ 13 Edw. I. ch. 4.

⁴ N. Y. 1 R. S. 742, § 16; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 203; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3213, 3244, 3249; *Clifford v. Kampfe*, 147 N. Y. 383, 385.

this emphatic principle has not been abrogated or modified by positive statute, it is still true, as to legal estates, that, when the wife's dower right has once attached to property by virtue of the concurrence of coverture and the husband's proper seisin in fee, that right can not be defeated nor impaired by any act, deed, conveyance, or mortgage, executed or performed by him alone or in connection with others, without her consent, nor by any judgment or decree confessed by or recovered against him, nor by his laches, default, covin, or crime.¹ If the husband's estate be defeasible, its destruction, of course, may defeat her dower *ab initio*²; the state may take her dower, and while it is inchoate may do so without compensation;³ the loss of the husband's merely equitable estate in realty before his death, whether by his own act or otherwise, will ordinarily deprive her of dower in that interest;⁴ in England the Dower Act of 1834, restricted her interest to realty of which the husband *dies seised*;⁵ and, in some of the states of this country the English statute is substantially followed, while in others all dower rights and interests as such have been entirely taken away.⁶ But the common law of probably most of the United States unswervingly retains dower in absolute legal interests to which it has once validly attached, unless it is taken or destroyed by sovereign authority, or divested by some act or acquiescence of the wife or widow.⁷

¹ Last three preceding notes; *Elmendorf v. Lockwood*, 57 N. Y. 322, 324; *Learned v. Cutler*, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 9; *Maxon v. Gray*, 14 R. I. 641; *Grady v. McCorkle*, 57 Mo. 172; *Scott v. Lane*, 109 N. C. 154; *McMahon v. Russell*, 17 Fla. 698; *Jewett v. Feldheiser*, 68 Ohio St. 523; *Chrisman v. Linderman*, 202 Mo. 605; *Martin v. Abbott*, 95 N. W. Rep. 356 (Neb.); 1 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xxix. §§ 1-3. The husband's conveyance of land before marriage, so that she will get no dower in it, is not a fraud on her dower right, if she marry with notice of such conveyance. *Daniher v. Daniher*, 201 Ill. 489, § 401, *supra*.

² *Warner v. Van Alstyne*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 513, 515; *Hammond v. Pennock*, 61 N. Y. 145; *Hinchliffe v. Shea*, 103 N. Y. 153; *McClure v. Fairfield*, 153 Pa. St. 411. But the defeating of his estate must be *bona fide*, and not by fraud or collusion with the husband, in

order to defeat dower. Stat. 2 Westm. ch. 4; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 3249; 4 *Kent's Com.* p. *48.

³ § 506, *infra*; § 465, *supra*.

⁴ *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 318, 453, 454; *Nichols v. Park*, 78 N. Y. App. Div. 95, 99; § 472, *supra*.

⁵ Stat. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 105; *Greenwood v. Greenwood* (1892), 2 Ch. 295.

⁶ 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 3202 (B), 3202 (E), 3105 (A), 3109; *Mathews v. Mathews*, 141 Mass. 511; *Hunkins v. Hunkins*, 65 N. H. 95; *Sutton v. Askew*, 66 N. C. 172; *Flowers v. Flowers*, 89 Ga. 632; *Beard v. Knox*, 5 Cal. 253.

⁷ Sixth note above. In New Jersey, if he devise his property away from her, she loses dower unless she files a dissent. *Gen. Stat.* p. 1278, § 16. But she can not be affected thus by his transfer *inter vivos*. *Ostheimer v. Single*, 68 Atl. Rep. 231 (N. J. Eq.).

And when there is no such act or acquiescence on her part, whereby her claim is directly released or she is estopped to assert it, the fact that a purchaser from the husband buys for value and without notice of her right does not deprive her of dower.¹

Therefore, a discussion of the different methods of barring dower, otherwise than as the result of local statute, is an examination of the means by which this vested right or interest is done away with, either by authority of the state, or because of the wrongful conduct, release, estoppel, laches, or other act or acquiescence, of the wife or widow. This discussion will embrace five ways of barring dower, which have been known to the law but are not now generally or fully recognized, namely; by the wife's eloping and living in adultery; because of her detinue of charters; because of her husband's treason or felony; because she was an alien; and by her attempt to dispose of more than her life estate in the property. And the discussion will then deal with the eight methods of barring dower, which are still generally retained. These are: *First*, divorce; *second*, release — estoppel by deed; *third*, judgment or decree — estoppel of record; *fourth*, estoppel *in pais*; *fifth*, eminent domain, or other exercise of sovereign authority; *sixth*, the statute of limitations; *seventh*, paramount title or interest; *eighth*, jointure. These will be discussed in the order here mentioned.

§ 497. **Dower Barred by Elopement and Adultery of the Wife.** — Because the common law refused to treat a wife's violation of her marriage vows as a bar to dower,² it was enacted by the statute of Westminster II³ that, if a woman voluntarily clope from her husband and live with an adulterer, she shall lose her dower, unless thereafter her husband is voluntarily reconciled to her. This means, in the first place, that, either of her own free will, whether with or without the consent of her husband, she is to go away from him and his real property, or, if forcibly taken, she is thereafter to remain away voluntarily;⁴ and, in

¹ Williams v. Lambe, 3 Bro. Ch. 264; Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383; Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. St. 308; Mitchell v. Farrish, 69 Md. 235; Cruize v. Billmire, 69 Iowa, 397.

² Co. Lit. 32 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *130; Cruize, Dig. tit. vi. ch. iv. § 4.

³ 13 Edw. I. ch. 34.

⁴ The wife's absence from her husband must be voluntary. If the hus-

band and wife voluntarily separate, or he "bargains and sells" her to the adulterer, and she goes willingly and lives in adultery, this is sufficient as a bar. 2 Inst. 435, 436; Coot v. Berty, 12 Mod. 232; Hethrington v. Graham, 6 Bing. 135; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 193, 195; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xviii. §§ 1-4, 7, 8.

the second place, that while so remaining away she is knowingly to commit adultery.¹ Elopement alone, or commission of adultery without eloping, will not affect her dower right.²

That statute is still in force in England.³ And in a few of our states, such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Missouri, Kentucky, Virginia, and North Carolina, it has either been directly re-enacted or adopted by the courts as the law.⁴ But the generally prevailing doctrine in this country is otherwise; and the reason seems to be the conclusion that, since adultery has uniformly been made a ground for absolute divorce and such a divorce defeats dower, the husband should pursue that remedy if he desire the wife to lose dower because of such misconduct on her part.⁵

§ 498. **Detinue of Charters, as Barring Dower.** — The plea of *detinue of charters* was frequently resorted to, in the ancient English practice, to defeat or postpone the dower of a widow who was alleged to be withholding from the heir the title deeds of the property, so that he could not identify and admeasure her dower land.⁶ While this is still a possible bar in England, it is rarely if ever employed; and in this country, because of the uniform reordering of title deeds and the consequent ease with which the property of the husband may be identified, it is wholly obsolete.⁷ It is simply mentioned here for the sake of completeness.

§ 499. **Treason or Felony of the Husband, as a Bar of Dower.** — By the early common law, the wife of a man attainted of treason or felony could not be endowed.⁸ This restriction seems

¹ If she believe her husband is dead and that she is lawfully married to the other man, or if he force her against her will, her cohabitation with him is not a bar to dower. *Green v. Harvey*, 1 Roll. Abr. 680; Co. Lit. 32 b; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xviii. § 3; *Payne v. Dotson*, 81 Mo. 145. Nor is dower defeated by the husband's abandonment of the wife, or his driving her away, and her subsequent commission of adultery. *Reel v. Elder*, 62 Pa. St. 308; *Walters v. Jordan*, 35 N. C. 361; *Rawlins v. Buttlet*, 1 Houst. (Del.) 224; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xviii. § 5.

² Last two preceding notes.

³ *Woodward v. Dowse*, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 722.

⁴ 2 N. J. Gen. Stat. p. 1278, §§ 14,

15; *Reel v. Elder*, 62 Pa. St. 308; Ohio R. S. (1890) § 4192; Mo. R. S. (1889) § 4532; *Wilson v. Craig*, 175 Mo. 362; Gen. Stat. Ky. (1881) p. 528. § 3, p. 373, §§ 13, 14; Va. Code (1891), p. 616, § 7; *Walters v. Jordau*, 35 N. C. 361; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3246.

⁵ *Reynolds v. Reynolds*, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 193, 196; *Van Cleef v. Burns*, 118 N. Y. 549, 552; *Lakin v. Lakin*, 2 Allen (Mass.), 45; *Littlefield v. Paul*, 69 Me. 527; *Bryan v. Batcheller*, 6 R. I. 543; *Smith v. Woodworth*, 4 Dill. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 584; *Rawlins v. Buttlet*, 1 Houst. (Del.) 224; *Chase's Blackst.* p. 313.

⁶ 9 Co. 18 a, 18 b, 110 a; *Perkins*, §§ 356-360.

⁷ 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. vi. § 58.

⁸ "To the intent, says Staunforde,

still to prevail in England, as to treason, except in some special cases.¹ But it has never been adopted as a part of the law of this country.²

§ 500. **Alienism, as a Bar of Dower.** — Dower, being given by operation of law, could not belong to an alien, except by virtue of statute; for the common law would confer no real property right upon an alien.³ Positive legislation, however, has now made it the rule, both in England and in this country generally, that, if an alien woman be naturalized, or become a citizen, as she does by marriage to a citizen, she will be entitled to dower.⁴ An alien woman, moreover, who is the wife of an alien, may now have dower and all other property rights freely in England;⁵ and such also is the statutory law of many if not most of the United States.⁶ But in some states, as for example New York, in order for such a wife to have dower, the husband must have declared his intention to become a citizen, or she must be a citizen of a state or nation, such as England for example, which confers on citizens of the United States full privileges of taking, acquiring, holding, and conveying real property within its domain.⁷ (a)

(a) In New York, the first statute that gave alien wives a dower right was chapter 49 of the laws of 1802. *Sutliff v. Forgey*, 1 Cow. 89, 95, 97, 5 Cow. 713. And, by the Revised Statutes of 1830 (1 R. S. 740, § 2), the resident widow of an alien husband might take dower in his property. See also 1 R. S. 720, §§ 15, 16. But these provisions were partial or of limited scope; and, as affected by L. 1825, p. 427 (1 R. S. 720, §§ 16-19), which required an alien, in order to hold real property free from the rights of the state, to file a deposition of his or her intention to become a citizen, they were declared to mean that, while the legislation had "conferred a right of dower on the resident alien widow of an alien purchaser," it had "denied the same right to an alien widow of either a natural born or naturalized citizen, unless she file the proper deposition"—of her intention to become a citizen. *Connolly v. Smith*, 21 Wend. 59, 62; *Curriu v. Finn*, 3 Denio,

that if the love of a man's own life cannot restrain him from such atrocious acts, the love of his wife and children may; though Britton gives it another turn: viz., that it is presumed the wife was privy to her husband's crime." 2 Blackst. Com. p. *130.

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *131; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxix. §§ 46-50.

² *Palmer v. Horton*, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 27; *Sewall v. Lee*, 9 Mass. 363; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxix. §§ 51-54.

See *Wallach v. Van Riswick*, 92 U. S. 202; *Pike v. Wassell*, 94 U. S. 711.

³ Co. Lit. 31 b, 32 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *131; 4 Kent's Com. p. *36.

⁴ Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. ch. 66; 33 Vict. ch. 14, § 2; U. S. R. S. § 1994; *Kelly v. Owen*, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 496.

⁵ Stat. 33 Vict. ch. 14, § 2.

⁶ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 6017; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. ix. §§ 5-52.

⁷ *Ibid.*; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, §§ 10, 13, 14.

§ 501. **Former Destruction of Dower by the Widow's Attempt to dispose of more than her Life Estate.** — Like any other life owner, a widow at common law, having had her dower land set out for her, forfeited it by making a common-law conveyance (feoffment and livery of seisin, or fine, or common recovery) of it in fee.¹ This harsh rule was emphasized by the statute of Gloucester, 6 Edward I. ch. 7. She could validly transfer her own interest or less; and her attempted conveyance of more, by a deed operating not by the common law but under the statute of uses, as a deed of bargain and sale or lease and release, would simply carry over her dower estate, and work no forfeiture.² The general use of the last-named forms of deeds, the abolition of the common-law modes of trans-

229, 231. So the law stood until 1845, when by the general act of that year (ch. 115, L. 1845), the wives of any alien residents of the state, seized of real property, were given dower therein, whether such wives were aliens or citizens. *Goodrich v. Russell*, 42 N. Y. 177, 181. By the federal statute of 1855 (U. S. R. S. § 1904), marriage to a citizen *ipso facto* naturalizes an alien woman, and of course entitles her to dower; and so the right to dower of women whose husbands, seized in fee of realty, were citizens or resident aliens was made complete. The same is still true as to all wives of citizens. But by the codification of 1909 (Real Prop. L. §§ 12, 13), after the provision is re-enacted for the filing by a resident alien of his intention to become a citizen (§ 12), it is said: "If a person who has filed such a deposition dies within six years thereafter, and before he is admitted to citizenship, his widow is entitled to dower in his real property," etc. And by ch. 593, L. 1897, it is declared that, "Any citizen of a state or nation which, by its laws, confers similar privileges on citizens of the United States, may take, acquire, hold and convey lands or real estate within this state in the same manner and with like effect as if such person were, at the time, a citizen of the United States; provided, however, that nothing in this act contained shall affect the rights of the State in any case in which proceedings for escheat have been or may be instituted before the passage of this act." Now Real Prop. L. § 10.

The net result, at present, is that dower may belong to any wife who is a citizen of the United States, or whose husband is an alien resident who within six years past has declared his intention to become a citizen, or who is herself a citizen of a state or nation (such as England for example), which, by its laws, confers full rights to own real property on the citizens of the United States. See, also, *Wright v. Saddler*, 20 N. Y. 320, 328; *Goefroy v. Riggs*, 133 U. S. 258, 266. General discussion of rights of aliens, 1092, *infra*.

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *274. "Such an alienation, according to the law of feuds, amounted to a renunciation of the feudal relation, and worked a forfeiture of the vassal's estate to the per-

son entitled to the inheritance in reversion or remainder." 4 Kent's Com. p. *82.

² Co. Lit. 329a; 4 Kent's Com. p. *83.

fer, and the express provisions of statutes, both in England and in many of the United States, have now entirely done away with this cause of forfeiture.¹ And the uniform rule of to-day is, that a widow's attempted alienation in any manner of a greater interest than her life estate results in nothing more than a conveyance of that which she owns.²

The methods of barring dower, which were once in force but now operate only a little or not at all, having been considered, the way is cleared for the discussion of those methods which are still generally recognized wherever common-law dower is retained. As was heretofore stated, these ordinary modes of defeating dower will also operate, *mutatis mutandis*, to bar or defeat curtesy, where common-law curtesy not destructible by any act or omission of the wife is still in existence.³

§ 502. **First — Divorce, as a Bar of Dower.** — While, as an essential to dower in legal estates, the common law does not require the husband to be seised of the land at the time of his death,⁴ it does demand that the claimant of dower shall have been his wife at that time.⁵ Therefore, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, an annulment of the marriage, or a divorce *a vinculo, for any cause*, bars dower.⁶ The local statutes that modify this rule, contain, of course, various special provisions; but their general result is to retain dower for women who are divorced because of misconduct of their husbands and not for any fault of their own.⁷ Some of the statutes, such as those of Massachusetts, Maine, and Michigan, so declare, by explicitly retaining dower, either when the divorce is for *any* wrong on the part of the husband, or when it is for some specifically mentioned misconduct by him, such as adultery;⁸ and a few of these permit dower to be assigned immediately after such a divorce, without waiting till he is dead.⁹

¹ 8 and 9 Vict. ch. 106, § 4; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 245; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1402; McKee v. Pfout, 3 U. S. (3 Dallas) 486; Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 272, 285; Mason v. Mason, 140 Mass. 63.

² Ibid.

³ § 459, *supra*.

⁴ § 468, *supra*.

⁵ Co. Lit. 32 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *130; 4 Kent's Com. p. *54; Bishop, Mar. & Div. §§ 661, 662.

⁶ Ibid.; Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 523; Pullen v. Pullen, 52 N. J. Eq. 9;

Price v. Price, 124 N. Y. 589; Hood v. Hood, 110 Mass. 463; Fletcher v. Monroe, 145 Ind. 56.

⁷ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 196; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3246.

⁸ 2 Mass. Rev. L. (1902) p. 1356, § 24; How. Stat. (Mich.) § 6246; Harding v. Alden, 9 Me. 140; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3246 (C).

⁹ Ibid.; Davol v. Howland, 14 Mass. 219; Percival v. Percival, 56 Mich. 297; Neb. Comp. Stat. ch. 25, § 23; Tatro v. Tatro, 18 Neb. 395.

Other statutes, of which those of New York, Illinois, and Arkansas are illustrations, merely declare that a wife shall not be endowed in case of a divorce dissolving the marriage for her misconduct;¹ but this form is generally construed, like the other, to mean that dower is not divested by a divorce obtained because of the husband's fault.² In favor of dower, moreover, it is held in New York that a divorce, no matter where obtained, will not defeat dower in real property of which the husband was seised during the coverture, unless it is an absolute divorce procured against her for such misconduct on her part as would be a ground for a judgment of such divorce in a New York court;³ and this means, in a word, that no woman's dower that has once attached to New York realty is barred by any divorce, other than one that is absolute and duly granted against her because of her *adultery*.⁴ (a) And this is true, even if she marry again.⁵

(a) The New York statute declares that, "In case of a divorce, dissolving the marriage contract for the misconduct of the wife, she shall not be endowed." Real Prop. L. (L. 1909, ch. 52) § 196, which was originally 1 R. S. 741, § 8. As stated in the text, "misconduct," as here employed, means adultery and nothing else; since adultery is the only ground for an absolute divorce in New York. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1756-1761.

In this state, as elsewhere, an annulment of a marriage which was void or voidable, a setting of it aside and making it void *ab initio*, as distinguished from a divorce for a cause arising after marriage, defeats all right to dower, no matter for whose fault or disability the judgment or decree is granted; for it shows that there was no effectual coverture, no valid marriage. *Price v. Price*, 124 N. Y. 589. A valid marriage, on the other hand, or a voidable one that is never avoided *ab initio*, gives a dower right, which is not affected by a subsequent dissolution either for any misconduct of the husband, or for any misconduct of the wife other than adultery. Such a marriage may be effectually dissolved, by the judgment of a competent court of another state, for some statutory cause for absolute divorce other than adultery; and full faith and credit must be given by New York to the judgment thus rendered, by recognizing the parties as no longer husband and wife. U. S. Cont. Art. iv. Sec. i; *Atherton v. Atherton*, 181 U. S. 155. But such a divorce, not being for the wife's adultery, does not bar her dower in New York. *Van Cleef v. Burns*, 118 N. Y. 549, 133 N. Y. 540.

It is to be added that, in order to bar dower in New York, a foreign di-

¹ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 196; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3246 (C); *Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick*, 197 Ill. 144; *Wood v. Wood*, 59 Ark. 441.

² *Wait v. Wait*, 4 N. Y. 95; *Price v. Price*, 124 N. Y. 589, 599; *Meacham v. Bunting*, 156 Ill. 586; *Kirkpatrick v.*

Kirkpatrick, 197 Ill. 144. But see *Wood v. Wood*, 59 Ark. 441.

³ *Van Cleef v. Burns*, 118 N. Y. 549, 133 N. Y. 540.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Van Voorhis v. Brintnall*, 23 Hun, 260, reversed on other grounds, 86 N. Y. 18.

Since a divorce *a vinculo* terminates the coverture, and since one of the absolute essentials of dower is seisin of the property by the husband during coverture, it follows that the woman can have no dower in realty not acquired by the man until after such a divorce.¹ This clear proposition is not affected by the statutes that retain dower after an absolute divorce for the husband's misconduct — dower is *retained* in realty owned by him before the divorce; it is not annexed to any property thereafter acquired.²

It is to be added, also, that a partial divorce — *a mensa et thoro* — since it does not dissolve the marriage contract, does not bar dower.³ In some states, by virtue of statutes, as hereafter explained, such a separation makes possible a release of dower by the wife to the husband.⁴ But a divorce, in order to be of itself a bar of dower, must be absolute.⁵

§ 503. **Second — Dower barred by Release — Estoppel by Deed.** — By far the most extensively employed means of barring dower is by the wife joining with the husband in conveying the property. The only regular way of doing this in England, before the dower act of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 105 (1834), was by

voice, even for the cause of the wife's adultery, must be one which the New York courts are required to recognize as valid; and that a divorce rendered in another state where the parties were not *bona fide* domiciled, when there was no personal service of the court's process on the defendant and no personal appearance of the defendant within the state rendering the judgment, is not recognized in New York. *Williams v. Williams*, 130 N. Y. 193; *McGoun v. McGoun*, 19 App. Div. 368; *Andrews v. Andrews*, 188 U. S. 14. See *Atherton v. Atherton*, 181 U. S. 155; *Haddock v. Haddock*, 201 U. S. 562. It is also explained, in a note to this section of the text, that, if a wife obtain a decree of absolute divorce against the husband, in another state, though in such a manner that it is void or voidable by him, she will not be heard to impeach it in New York, for the purpose of obtaining dower in realty acquired by him after such decree was rendered. *Starbuck v. Starbuck*, 173 N. Y. 503.

¹ *Máynard v. Hill*, 125 U. S. 190, 214; *Matter of Estate of Ensign*, 103 N. Y. 284, 288; *Nichols v. Park*, 78 N. Y. App. Div. 95, 99.

² *Ibid.* And, if the wife obtain a decree of absolute divorce against the husband, but in such manner that it is void or voidable as to him, and he might have it set aside or ignore it in a state other than that in which it was granted, yet she will not be heard to impeach it, for the purpose of obtaining dower in realty acquired by him after such decree

was rendered. *Starbuck v. Starbuck*, 173 N. Y. 503. See *Atherton v. Atherton*, 180 U. S. 155; *Haddock v. Haddock*, 201 U. S. 562.

³ *Co. Lit.* 32 a; *Day v. West*, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 592; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 93 N. C. 418; *Jarnigan v. Jarnigan*, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 292; *Rich v. Rich*, 7 Bush (Ky.), 53. And see *Payne v. Dotson*, 81 Mo. 145; *Halm v. Bealor*, 132 Pa. St. 242.

⁴ § 503, *infra*.

⁵ Last preceding note bnt one.

the husband and wife together levying a fine or suffering a common recovery;¹ but, as the result of that statute, the husband alone, by deed, or devise, or declaration in his will, may now deprive the wife of all dower interest. Fines and recoveries were never employed, to any extent at least, for the purpose of barring dower in this country;² but, from the earliest times, the ordinary method has been for the wife to release her dower by deed, to the husband's purchaser, and usually by uniting with the husband in his deed.³ "It is almost a matter of course, in this country, for the wife to unite with her husband in all deeds and mortgages of his lands."⁴ The release so made operates as an *estoppel by deed* against the wife or widow.⁵ And, according to what appears to be the weight of authority, it also operates, to the extent intended, as did the ancient fine for which it is the American substitute, as a release, as to all persons and for all purposes, and so in favor of all who have or acquire interests in the land, whether or not they claim as or through the person to whom the deed was made.⁶ Thus, her uniting properly with the husband in conveying his equity of redemption subject to a mortgage releases his dower in favor of the mortgagee, although he is not a party to the transaction and his mortgage was a claim inferior to her dower before such conveyance.⁷ But, in some states, such as Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, her release by deed is treated strictly as an estoppel, available only to him to whom it is made or to those who claim through him.⁸ Under either theory, of course,

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *137; Cruise, Dig. tit. vi. ch. iv. § 13; 4 Kent's Com. p. *51. In England, before the dower act of 1834, several complicated and abstruse methods of settling property, with powers or trusts annexed, were resorted to for the purpose of precluding dower. They are briefly explained in 4 Kent's Com. pp. *51, *52. See 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xii. §§ 1-7.

² 4 Kent's Com. p. *59; Elmendorf v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y. 322, 324.

³ A custom of London allowed dower to be barred by a deed of bargain and sale executed by husband and wife. The system employed in the United States has been said by some to have originated in that custom. Chase's Case, 1 Bland. Ch. (Md.) 206, 229; "Collection N. Y. Hist. Soc." for 1821, p. 347. By others it is believed to have taken its rise in Massachusetts,

from the colonial act of 1644. Powell v. Monson, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 347; 4 Kent's Com. p. *59; 1 Greenl. Cruise, Dig. p. 202, § 14.

⁴ 4 Kent's Com. p. *60.

⁵ Elmendorf v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y. 322; Witthaus v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 332, 338; French v. Lord, 69 Me. 537; Boorum v. Tucker, 51 N. J. Eq. 135; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. §§ 21-32.

⁶ Elmendorf v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y. 322, 325, 327; Witthaus v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 322, 338; Boorum v. Tucker, 51 N. J. Eq. 135, 52 N. J. Eq. 587; Johnson v. Van Velsor, 43 Mich. 208; Morton v. Noble, 57 Ill. 176; Fletcher v. Shepherd, 174 Ill. 262. See 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. § 32.

⁷ Ibid.; Hoogland v. Watt, 2 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 148. *Contra*, Littlefield v. Crocker, 30 Me. 192.

⁸ Robinson v. Bates, 3 Met. (Mass.)

when the husband's deed in which she united is void, or is set aside or superseded, so that it becomes inoperative, as for example when it is avoided by his creditors as a fraud on them, the release is ineffectual and her dower is not barred.¹

While the wife's dower is inchoate, it can not be released to a stranger to the title; the release, to be effective, must be to one who has or by the same transaction is acquiring a freehold interest in the property.² She unites with the husband in his conveyance; or he and she subsequently join in a deed releasing her dower to the purchaser or his successor in interest;³ and, in a few states, such as New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Alabama, she may make a separate valid release to such purchaser or successor, without the concurrence or consent of the husband, and either at or after the time of the husband's conveyance.⁴ But her attempt to release or convey her inchoate right of dower to a stranger, while the husband retains the freehold estate, is everywhere a nullity.⁵ After the death of the husband, she may release her dower interest to an owner of the freehold, whether or not her third has been assigned;⁶ after

40; *Littlefield v. Crocker*, 30 Me. 192; *French v. Lord*, 69 Me. 537; *Dearborn v. Taylor*, 18 N. H. 153.

¹ *Sanford v. Ellithorp*, 95 N. Y. 48, 51; *Hinchliffe v. Shea*, 103 N. Y. 153; *Wilkinson v. Paddock*, 57 Hun (N. Y.), 191, aff'd 125 N. Y. 748; *Richardson v. Wyman*, 62 Me. 280; *Stinson v. Sumner*, 9 Mass. 143; *Ridgway v. Masting*, 23 Ohio St. 294; *Bohannon v. Combs*, 97 Mo. 446.

² *Merchants' Bank v. Thomson*, 55 N. Y. 7, 12; *Witthaus v. Schack*, 105 N. Y. 333, 336; *Mason v. Mason*, 140 Mass. 63; *Penfold v. Warner*, 96 Mich. 181; *Johnson v. Smith's Adm'r*, 70 Ala. 108; § 462, *supra*. She may release to one who has bought from the husband, and conveyed with a warranty, since he is in privity as to the title by virtue of his warranty. *Chicago Dock Co. v. Kinzie*, 49 Ill. 289.

³ *Powell v. Monson*, 3 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 347; *Malloney v. Horan*, 49 N. Y. 111, 117; *Marvin v. Smith*, 46 N. Y. 571; *Witthaus v. Schack*, 105 N. Y. 332; *French v. Peters*, 33 Me. 396; *Burge v. Smith*, 27 N. H. 332; *Ulp v. Campbell*, 19 Pa. St. 361; *Fletcher v. Shepherd*, 174 Ill. 262; 2 *Scribner*,

Dower, ch. xii. §§ 8-22. In states in which she must unite thus with the husband in order to convey her interest in realty, if he die and she marry again, the second husband must join in the deed of release of her dower in the first husband's property. *Ibid.*; *Osborn v. Horine*, 19 Ill. 124. See *Fletcher v. Shepherd*, 174 Ill. 262.

⁴ *Merchants' Bank v. Thomson*, 55 N. Y. 7, 12; *Savage v. Crill*, 19 Hun, 4, aff'd 80 N. Y. 630; N. J. Gen. Stat. p. 854, § 9; R. I. Pub. Stat. (1882) p. 423, §§ 11, 12; *Fowler v. Chadima*, 134 Iowa, 210; *Dooley v. Greening*, 201 Mo. 343; Ala. Code, § 1509; *Callahan v. Nelson*, 128 Ala. 671; *Skinkel's Assignees v. Bristow*, 95 Ky. 84; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 3245; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. §§ 18-22.

⁵ Last three preceding notes; *Sherman v. Hayward*, 98 N. Y. App. Div. 254, 256; § 465, *supra*.

⁶ *Bostwick v. Beach*, 103 N. Y. 414; *Freiot v. La Fontaine*, 16 N. Y. Misc. 153; *Thatcher v. Howland*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 41; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 3245; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. §§ 51, 52.

her life interest has been assigned to her, she may convey it to a stranger to the title, as may any other life owner;¹ and, as was heretofore explained, the liberal statutes of many states permit her to assign to a stranger the chose in action for recovery of her third, which she owns after the husband's death and before her dower land is admeasured.²

The two essentials of a woman's personal release of dower by deed are, that she shall be under no disability to make it, and that it shall be properly executed. When the wife is an infant, or insane, or otherwise incapacitated, there is, of course, no common-law way of divesting her of dower; and no court has inherent authority to grant relief, in such cases, when the husband desires to sell his real property.³ But now, in most jurisdictions, statutes provide for a judicial proceeding to remove the dower encumbrance from realty alienated by the husband; and this results generally in a release by the wife's committee or a special guardian appointed for that purpose by the court, who, pursuant to the court's order made when it is decided to be for the wife's advantage, unites with the husband in the conveyance, or gives a separate release to his purchaser.⁴ A proper execution of the deed by the wife herself, when she is under no disability, requires, in many if not most states, the insertion in the instrument of apt words to indicate her intent to relinquish dower;⁵ and an acknowledgment of the deed by her before a commissioner of deeds or other proper officer, which acknowledgment is required in some states, such as New Jersey, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Missouri, to accompany as at common law her privy examination separately and apart from her husband.⁶ The demand for such separate examination and acknowledgment, however, has been removed by the legislation

¹ *Ibid.*; § 539, *infra*.

² § 466, *supra*.

³ *Priest v. Cummings*, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 617, 631, 20 Wend. 338; *Matter of Dunn*, 64 Hun (N. Y.), 18; *Cason v. Hubbard*, 38 Miss. 35; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. §§ 31-35.

⁴ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2348, 2351, 2355, 2356, 2358, as amended by L. 1893, ch. 639; N. J. Gen. Stat. p. 1281; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. §§ 31-35.

⁵ *Hall v. Savage*, 4 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 273; *Lufkin v. Curtis*, 13 Mass. 223; *Lothrop v. Foster*, 51 Me. 367; *Davis v. Jenkins*, 93 Ky. 353; 2

Scribner, Dower, ch. xii. §§ 27, 28. See *Johnson v. Montgomery*, 51 Ill. 185; *Burge v. Smith*, 27 N. H. 332.

⁶ 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 6500, 6501, 6504; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xiii. §§ 1, 2; N. J. Gen. Stat. p. 854, § 9; *Sheppard v. Wardell*, 1 N. J. L. 452; *Churchill v. Monroe*, 1 R. I. 209; *Currie v. Page*, 2 Leigh (Va.), 620; *McDowell v. Little*, 33 Mo. 523; *Grove v. Todd*, 41 Md. 633; *Danglarde v. Elias*, 80 Cal. 65; *Hollingsworth v. Flint*, 101 U. S. 591. See *Lake v. Gray*, 30 Iowa, 415; *Stidham v. Matthews*, 29 Ark. 650.

of many of the states.¹ (a) And in quite a few of them, of which New York, New Hampshire, and Illinois are illustrations, it is no longer required that the deed in the execution of which she unites, if it be in itself a proper grant or release, shall explicitly refer to her dower, or even that her name shall appear in the body of the instrument.² None of the courts require that dower be mentioned *eo nomine* in the deed;³ but many of them, unaided by statutes, insist, as already stated, that it shall describe her as a party and contain apt and adequate words to show that she intends to release dower.⁴ It is generally held that, without express statutory authorization, she can not give a valid power of attorney to another person to act for her in releasing dower.⁵ But several states, such as New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, have statutes which permit her to give such a power.⁶

(a) In New York, before 1771, a wife's deed, it seems, did not have to be separately acknowledged, to bar dower. *Van Winkle v. Constantine*, 10 N. Y. 422; *Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay*, 4 N. Y. 9; *Hardenburgh v. Lakin*, 47 N. Y. 109, 113. But such acknowledgment was required by the act of Feb. 16, 1771. 2 *Van Schaick*, N. Y. L. 611, 765. And so the requirement was until 1879.

It was held that after the married women's legislation of 1848 (L. 1848, ch. 200) such a woman could convey her separate estate without any acknowledgment. *Wiles v. Peck*, 26 N. Y. 42, 46; *Yale v. Dederer*, 18 N. Y. 265, 271; *Hulse v. Bacon*, 26 Misc. 455, aff'd 40 App. Div. 89; *Richardson v. Pulver*, 63 Barb. 67; *Allen v. Reynolds*, 36 N. Y. Super. Ct. 297. The same rule, however, does not seem to have applied to a release of dower, to which the Revised Statutes of 1830 (1 R. S. 758, §§ 10, 11), following the act of 1771, required a privy examination and separate acknowledgment, except when she was not a resident of the state. This was changed by L. 1879, ch. 249, as amended by L. 1880, ch. 300, which enabled her to execute and acknowledge all deeds the same as if she were a *femme sole*. The last mentioned statute, as Real Prop. L. (L. 1909, ch. 52) § 302, now reads as follows: "The acknowledgment or proof of a conveyance of real property, within the State, or of any other written instrument, may be made by a married woman the same as if unmarried."

¹ *Ibid.*; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, §§ 302, 303; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) note.

² *Gillilan v. Swift*, 14 Hnn (N. Y.), 574; *Platt v. Finck*, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 312, 315; *Burge v. Smith*, 27 N. H. 332; *Johnson v. Montgomery*, 51 Ill. 185; *Fletcher v. Shepherd*, 174 Ill. 262; *Dundas v. Hitchcock*, 53 U. S. (12 How.) 256, 267.

³ *Learned v. Cutler*, 18 Pick. (Mass.)

9; *Jones v. City of Des Moines*, 43 Iowa, 209; *Smith v. Handy*, 16 Ohio, 119; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. § 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*; fourth note, above.

⁵ *Lewis v. Coxe*, 5 Harrington (Del.), 401; *Sumner v. Conant*, 10 Vt. 9; *Dawson v. Shirley*, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 531; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. § 23.

⁶ N. Y. L. 1896, ch. 547, § 187, originally L. 1893, ch. 599; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. § 23.

And in New York the attorney in fact may be her husband himself, if she so desire.¹ (a)

The common-law prohibition of a wife's release of dower to her own husband is to be here emphasized.² Wherever the husband alone can not bar dower, this restriction is generally retained as a rigid rule — the requisites of dower existing, that right attaches to the realty so long as it is owned by the husband.³ Statutes have slightly modified this emphatic principle in some of the United States.⁴ Thus, in New York and Michigan, after a divorce has occurred, whether it is total or partial, she may release directly to him her dower in all the real property that he then owns or may subsequently acquire.⁵ (b) In New York, also, the wife may release to the husband all her right in connection with his interest in realty ordered to be sold in a partition suit;⁶ (c) and, if he and she

(a) It was settled in New York, by the case of *Wronkow v. Oakley* (133 N. Y. 505), that, by virtue of the statute, L. 1878, ch. 300, a wife could release dower through a power of attorney, given to her husband or to a third party. Therefore the act of 1893 (ch. 599) merely gave expression to the law as it then already existed. That act, now Real Prop. L. § 207, declares that, "A married woman of full age may release her inchoate right of dower in real property by attorney in fact in any case where she can personally release the same." *Platt v. Finck*, 60 App. Div. 312.

(b) This New York statute provides that, "A woman who is divorced from her husband, whether such divorce be absolute or limited, or granted in his or her favor, by any court of competent jurisdiction, may release to him, by an instrument in writing, sufficient to pass title to real estate, her inchoate right of dower in any specific real property theretofore owned by him, or generally in all such real property, and such as he shall thereafter acquire." Real Prop. L. § 206, which was L. 1892, ch. 616, repealing and superseding L. 1890, ch. 502.

(c) The New York Code Civ. Pro., after providing for a sale of realty in a partition suit, as the outcome of a proper report of the commissioners or referee, says, at § 1571: "A married woman may release to her husband

¹ *Wronkow v. Oakley*, 133 N. Y. 505; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 207; *Platt v. Finck*, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 312.

² *Guidet v. Brown*, 3 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 295; *New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mayer*, 14 Daly, 318, aff'd 108 N. Y. 655; *Hendricks v. Isaacs*, 117 N. Y. 411, 416; *Rowe v. Hamilton*, 3 Me. 63; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. § 43.

³ *Ibid.*; *Wightman v. Schliefer*, 45 N. Y. St. Rep. 698; *Wilber v. Wilber*,

52 Wis. 298; *Pillow v. Wade*, 31 Ark. 678; *House v. Fowle*, 20 Or. 163. See §§ 505, 513-516, *infra*, as to how she may sometimes be estopped, by her contracts with her husband, or with him and others, to claim dower.

⁴ 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xii. §§ 43-48.

⁵ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 206; *Bechtel v. Barton*, 147 Mich. 318.

⁶ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1571.

voluntarily partition between them real property owned by them as joint tenants, tenants in common, or tenants by the entirety, she may effectually release to him, in the partition deed, her dower in the portion that thus goes to him in severalty, and he may likewise release to her his curtesy in the portion that thus goes to her in severalty.¹ (a)

§ 504. **Third — Dower barred by Judgment or Decree — Estoppel of Record — Foreclosure.**— A judgment or decree of a competent court may establish the inability of a woman to obtain dower, which otherwise might have been hers, whenever the circumstances are such that she is duly bound by the judicial proceedings; and thus her dower may be barred by estoppel of record.² Judgments divesting her husband's title *ab initio*,³ and foreclosure of mortgages, or enforcement of other liens, which are superior in right to her dower claim,⁴ are illustrations of such estoppels.⁵

When, in a proceeding to which the wife is a party, it is judicially determined that the husband never owned the real property, she is of course precluded from acquiring any dower

her inchoate right of dower, in the property directed to be sold, by a written instrument, duly acknowledged by her and certified, as required by law with respect to the acknowledgment of a conveyance to bar dower; which must be filed with the clerk. Thereupon, the share of the proceeds of the sale, arising from her contingent interest, must be paid to her husband."

(a) The New York Domestic Relation Law, L. 1909, ch. 19, after providing (§ 51) that a married woman may freely take, hold, convey and deal with property, both real and personal, the same as if she were single; and may freely contract with her husband, except that they can not contract to alter or dissolve the marriage, or to relieve him of his liability to support her, adds: (§ 56) "Husband and wife may convey or transfer real or personal property directly, the one to the other, without the intervention of a third person; and may make partition or division of any real property held by them as tenants in common, joint tenants or tenants by the entireties. If so expressed in the instrument of partition or division such instrument bars the wife's right to dower in such property, and also, if so expressed, the husband's tenancy by curtesy." See L. 1887, ch. 537. This states the only circumstances under which, in New York, a woman can release dower to her own husband, so that, while they remain husband and wife, and continue to live together as such, he may own the real property free and clear of her dower right.

¹ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 19, §§ 51, 56.

² 1 Greenleaf, Ev. §§ 522-532; Chase's Stephen's Dig. L. Ev. Art. 41 and notes; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxviii. §§ 29-33.

³ § 509, *infra*.

⁴ Brackett v. Banm, 50 N. Y. 8; § 777, *infra*.

⁵ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. §§ 21-23.

therein.¹ And, likewise, when under a judgment against the husband a former owner of the land or his heirs or successors in interest re-enter and regain the land because of breach of a condition subsequent annexed to the husband's title, the latter's interest is destroyed *ab initio* and his wife's dower is defeated in that property.² In such cases, the judgment estops the wife or widow to assert that her husband ever had any seisin or title in the real property thereby affected.

It has been heretofore explained that the four kinds of mortgages that uniformly have precedence over dower are, those made by husband and wife together or as to which she directly releases her dower, those on the land before the marriage, those on the land before it is acquired by the husband, and purchase money mortgages given by the husband.³ Either of these forms of mortgage, existing as a lien on the land, leaves the dower claim of the landowner's wife in the equity of redemption so-called — in the residuary value of the land over and above the mortgage lien.⁴ Thus, if the value of the land be \$20,000, and the mortgage be for \$12,000, the dower attaches to the remaining \$8,000 worth.⁵ If such a mortgage be properly foreclosed and the wife duly made a party to the suit, thus giving her her day in court to redeem the land from the mortgage if she choose, her dower becomes wholly barred by the judgment of foreclosure and the consequent disposition of the land.⁶ When such a mortgage is foreclosed and she is not duly made a party to the suit, her right to redeem is unaffected thereby, and she may proceed to exercise that right even while her husband is still living.⁷ The foreclosure of any other kind of mortgage —

¹ House v. Jackson, 50 N. Y. 161, 165; McClure v. Fairfield, 153 Pa. St. 411; Glos v. Gerrity, 190 Ill. 545; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1177. But the recovery against the husband by such a claimant, in order to bar dower, must be *bona fide*, and not the result of any collusion with the husband or any fraud or crime on his part. The common-law demand to this effect has been enforced by the statutes Westm. II. ch. 4, and by several statutes in this country. N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 203; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3249; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxix. § 8.

² Emerson v. Harris, 6 Met. (Mass) 475; Beardslee v. Beardslee, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 324; 4 Kent's Com. p. *49; 1

Scribner, Dower, ch. xiv. § 3; § 508, *infra*.

³ § 480, *supra*.

⁴ *Ibid.*; § 777, *infra*.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Matthews v. Duryee, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 69; Pitts v. Aldrich, 11 Allen (Mass.), 39; Nottingham v. Calvert, 1 Ind. 527; Shope v. Schaffner, 140 Ill. 470; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxiii. §§ 31-34.

⁷ Bell v. Mayor, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 49; Haldane v. Sweet, 55 Mich. 196. She may have an action, if necessary, to redeem, under such circumstances; and in such action, she may, on application of the defendant, be required to elect between receiving payment in full

any mortgage inferior in right to her dower claim— can not affect her dower, even though she be made a party to the suit,¹ unless she acquiesce in so being made a party and consent to the disposition of the property free of her dower.² In summary, therefore, it may be said that, in order by foreclosure of a mortgage to bar dower without the consent or acquiescence of its owner, the mortgage must be one of those which have priority over the dower and the wife must be properly made a party to the foreclosure suit.³ And even when the dower is subordinate to the mortgage, and she is a party to a foreclosure after her husband's death (and in many states, such as New York and New Jersey, before his death), she is given dower in the surplus proceeds of the sale of the property.⁴ This is expressly provided for by statutes in several states, such as New York, (a) Massachusetts, and Michigan.⁵

(a) The New York statute provides that "Where, in a case specified in the last section, the mortgagee, or a person claiming under him, causes the land mortgaged to be sold, after the death of the husband, either under a power of sale contained in the mortgage, or by virtue of a judgment in an action to foreclose the mortgage, and any surplus remains, after payment of the money due on the mortgage and the costs and charges of the sale, the widow is nevertheless entitled to the interest or income of one-third part of the surplus for her life, as her dower." N. Y. Real Prop. L. (L. 1909, ch. 52) § 194, which was originally 1 R. S. 741, § 6. See *Brackett v. Baum*, 50 N. Y. 8; *Matthews v. Duryee*, 45 Barb. 69; *Vartie v. Underwood*, 18 Barb. 561; *Blydenburgh v. Northrop*, 13 How. Pr. 289. And the same right for the widow, in case of a sale of the husband's real property after his death for the payment of his debts, is given by Code Civ. Pro. § 2800. And rule No. 64 of the General Rules of Practice does the same for her when his realty is sold for the payment of his debts before his death.

for her dower interest (on her releasing it) and redeeming the land by paying the mortgage debt in full if the defendant will not consent to pay for her dower interest. *Mackenna v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 184 N. Y. 411.

¹ *Merchants' Bk. v. Thomson*, 55 N. Y. 7; *Fern v. Osterhout*, 11 N. Y. App. Div. 319; *Walsh v. Wilson*, 130 Mass. 124; *Dillman v. Will Co. Nat. Bk.*, 138 Ill. 282.

² *Ibid.*; § 480, *supra*.

³ Last four preceding notes.

⁴ *Hawley v. Bradford*, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 201; *Hinchman v. Stiles*, 9 N. J. Eq. 361; *Mandel v. McClave*, 46 Ohio St. 407; *Burrall v. Bender*, 61 Mich.

608; *Duncan v. City of Terre Haute*, 85 Ind. 104; *Venable v. Wabash, etc. R. Co.*, 112 Mo. 103; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xxiii. §§ 24, 25. The rule of some states, which gives her this right though the foreclosure is before the husband's death, is just and reasonable. N. Y. Gen. Rules of Practice, No. 64; *In re Central Park Extension*, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 69; *Wheeler v. Kirtland*, 27 N. J. Eq. 534; *Nye v. Taunton Branch R. Co.*, 113 Mass. 277; *Newhall v. Lynn*, F. C. S. Bk., 101 Mass. 428; *Kaufman v. Peacock*, 115 Ill. 212.

⁵ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 194; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 2800; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3216.

The foreclosure or proper enforcement of any other lien, which is superior to dower, such as a judgment docketed against the husband before the marriage, or a mechanic's lien already on the land when he acquired it, will in like manner bar dower, if the wife be duly made a party to the proceedings.¹ And, likewise, her dower claim will then attach to any surplus moneys, after such prior liens are discharged. This latter result arises because such moneys are treated as converted back into realty, so far as her right is concerned.

It is the fact that the wife's dower is subordinate to the mortgage, or other lien, in the enforcement of which the judgment or decree is obtained, that lays the foundation for the estoppel of record in such cases as those discussed in this section. And the principle is to be here again emphasized, that, except as the result of special local law, such as that of Pennsylvania for example,² dower can not be affected by any indebtedness of the husband alone, contracted during coverture, or not reduced to judgment or otherwise made a lien on his land before the marriage though contracted before that time.³

§ 505. **Fourth — Dower Barred by Estoppel in Pais.** — Not only by her deed, or by judgment or decree against her, may a wife or widow be estopped to assert her dower claim, but also by her conduct, or sometimes by her acquiescence — matter *in pais* — she may also be estopped.⁴ It should be reiterated here that, in order to produce an estoppel *in pais* against her, four elements or circumstances must be established; namely, that she made a representation to the effect that she did not have or did not claim to have any dower; that this was done with intent, or reasonably presumable intent, that another should act on it; that such other did act on it; and that it would result in damage to him to have the representation successfully denied.⁵ The most important features to consider in dealing here with these elements are, her representation, and the fact that it is acted on reasonably by some one interested in the title to the land in which her dower is sought to be claimed.

¹ Sandford v. McLean, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 117; Brown v. Williams, 31 Me. 403; Brown v. Bronson, 35 Mich. 415; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxviii. §§ 29-33. See Sarver v. Clarkson, 156 Ind. 316.

² In Pennsylvania, a wife's dower right is always subordinate to all her husband's debts, and so it is defeated by the judgments or decrees obtained upon them. Directors of Poor, etc. v. Royer,

43 Pa. St. 146; Porter v. Lazear, 109 U. S. 84.

³ Taylor v. Fowler, 18 Ohio, 567; Nutter v. Fouch, 86 Ind. 451; Butler v. Fitzgerald, 43 Neb. 192; Roan v. Holmes, 32 Fla. 295; § 496, *supra*.

⁴ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. §§ 34-47; next six succeeding notes.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Stephen's Dig. L. Ev. Art. 102; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. §§ 34-47.

If, therefore, a wife state, or in any manner represent, to a purchaser of real property from her husband, or an encumbrancer of that property, that she is not his wife, or will not claim dower in the property conveyed, and the encumbrancer or purchaser reasonably act on such representation in loaning his money or acquiring the title, her dower is thereby barred in favor of his interest in the property.¹ And the same is true, as to the representations made by a widow, when her deceased husband's property is being purchased or encumbered.² So, when the husband's real property is sold and the wife knowingly receives or retains the proceeds, or her share thereof, she makes a representation to the purchaser by inducing him to acquiesce in her retention of such proceeds, and thereby estops herself to claim dower in the realty.³

The representation made by the owner of dower may not only be direct and positive, but it may result from her conduct known to the purchaser or encumbrancer.⁴ It has been accordingly held that her desertion of her husband and marriage to another man precludes her from setting up dower against one who, with knowledge of the facts, purchased real property from her (first or real) husband.⁵ And some cases have even gone to the extent of holding that, where the husband openly lived with another woman as his wife and his real wife knowing of this made no objection and failed to assert any claim in his property before his death, the latter was barred of dower in land which he had conveyed during his wrongful cohabitation.⁶

Since the law greatly favors dower, however, mere silence on the part of the wife or widow, where no duty to speak rests upon her, will not constitute such a representation as to cause a bar of dower by estoppel.⁷ To produce such a bar, she must either do some unequivocal act, or remain silent when it is her clear duty to speak.⁸ Accordingly, when she stands by and

¹ *Deshler v. Beery*, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 300; *Wright v. De Groff*, 14 Mich. 164; *Sweeney v. Mallory*, 62 Mo. 485.

² *Ibid.*; *Dougrey v. Topping*, 4 Paige (N. Y.), 94; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xi. § 36.

³ *Wood v. Seely*, 32 N. Y. 105; *Reed v. Morrison*, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 18; *Simpson's Appeal*, 8 Pa. St. 199; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xi. § 40.

⁴ Last three preceding notes.

⁵ *Lewis v. Parrett*, 37 N. E. Rep. 330 (Pa.).

⁶ *Gilbert v. Reynolds*, 51 Ill. 513. *Contra*, *Martin v. Martin*, 22 Ala. 86; *Reel v. Elder*, 62 Pa. St. 308; *Cruise v. Billmire*, 69 Iowa, 397.

⁷ *Lawrence v. Brown*, 5 N. Y. 394; *Sip v. Lawback*, 17 N. J. L. 442; *Owen v. Slatter*, 26 Ala. 547. Compare *Jefferies v. Allen*, 34 S. C. 189; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xi. § 42.

⁸ *Ibid.*; *Martin v. Martin*, 22 Ala. 86. "There must be some unequivocal act on her part which would either render a claim of dower on her part clearly

sees her husband's property sold to a stranger and remains passive, the purchaser takes the property subject to her dower.¹ And even when she herself, by virtue of an order of the court, has sold land as her husband's administratrix, and has said nothing about her own right in it, it has generally been held that her dower interest was not precluded.² When, however, she is the trustee of the purchaser of her husband's realty, or stands in a fiduciary relation to such purchaser, so that the relationship *per se* or any other circumstance of the case makes it her duty to reveal to him all the facts that she knows concerning the title, her silence when she has an opportunity to speak produces an estoppel *in pais* and deprives her of dower.³

Instances of the form of estoppel now under consideration are found, also, in those cases in which a married woman's ancestor has conveyed her property with covenant (such as that of warranty) which she as his heir, having received assets from him, is bound to make good, and where she herself has conveyed her husband's realty with warranty. In order to avoid circuity of action, the courts have denied dower in property that has come through such an ancestor and is affected by such a covenant.⁴ This latter form of estoppel is in one view more nearly an estoppel by deed; but, being applied as it is by the courts to prevent circuity of action, it may be mentioned here for the sake of completeness.

§ 506. **Fifth — Dower Barred by Eminent Domain, or Other Exercise of Sovereignty.** — In the reign of Henry III., the Great Charter of King John was so amended as to preclude a wife from taking dower in a castle belonging to her husband and used or designed for warlike operations.⁵ Here we see foreshadowed the rule, subsequently followed without serious question by both the English and the American courts, which removes all right of dower from property passing from a hus-

unjust, or subject her to damages equal to its value if claimed, where the court, to avoid circuity of action, would refuse the claim." 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 435.

¹ Hunt v. Reilly, 24 R. I. 68; Madson v. Madson, 69 Minn. 37.

² Sip v. Lawback, 17 N. J. L. 442; Lawrence v. Brown, 5 N. Y. 394; Owen v. Slatter, 26 Ala. 547.

³ Last four preceding notes; 2 Scrib-

ner, Dower, ch. xi. § 37; §§ 386-389, *supra*.

⁴ Torrey v. Minor, 1 Smedes & M. Ch. (Miss.) 489; Usher v. Richardson, 29 Me. 415; Russ v. Perry, 49 N. H. 547; Rosenthal v. Mayhugh, 33 Ohio St. 155; Magee v. Mellon, 23 Miss. 585; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. §§ 21, 22. Compare, Marvin v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 571; Jackson v. Vanderheyden, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 167.

⁵ 2 Co. Inst. 17.

band to the crown, or state, or municipality, or corporation, or other institution taking it by virtue of the authority of the state.¹

It has been heretofore explained that, since an inchoate right of dower is not property, but only a *status* of the wife or a chance to acquire property in the future, the state may take it without being required by its constitution to make compensation to the wife.² It is, accordingly, held everywhere that property taken by eminent domain during the life of the husband is acquired free and clear of the wife's dower.³ And this is true, whether the power is exercised by the state directly, or by one of its departments or instrumentalities, or by a railroad company or other corporation or institution on which the right of eminent domain has been conferred.⁴ After the death of the husband, the widow's dower interest, having then become property, must of course be paid for, if taken by any of these methods.⁵ Again, if the husband dedicate land to the state, or to a city, or to a railroad company, for public or quasi-public purposes, even though in that case the passing of the land from him is not *in invitum*, the wife is thereby deprived of her dower.⁶ It is the public purpose, and not the manner of passing of property, that is kept constantly in mind by the courts in such cases. So, when real property is sold because of non-payment of taxes, assessments, water rates, or other public charges made liens thereon, it is necessarily conveyed free of all dower rights and interests.⁷ A state and its departments must have, and do exercise, a right to shut out dower in all such instances.⁸

¹ 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxvii. § 1.

² § 565, *supra*.

³ *Moore v. City of N. Y.*, 8 N. Y. 110; *Matter of New York & Bklyn. Bridge*, 89 Hun (N. Y.), 219. *French v. Lord*, 69 Me. 537; *Duncan v. City of Terre Haute*, 85 Ind. 104.

⁴ *Ibid.*; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxvii. § 6.

⁵ §§ 177-180, *supra*.

⁶ A conveyance to a railroad company, for example, of a right of way through the grantor's land, and of as much land adjacent to such way as may be necessary for the construction of the road, is a dedication to public use, and the grantor's widow is deprived of dower in the land so conveyed, though she did not join in the deed. *Venable v. Wabash R. Co.*, 112 Mo. 103; *Baker v. Atchison & T. R. Co.*, 122 Mo. 396.

"The rule fairly deducible from these authorities would seem to exclude dower in all cases where lands are dedicated to the public for a legitimate purpose, and the public have acquired a right to the enjoyment thereof, or where they are lawfully appropriated in virtue of the right of eminent domain. The reasoning of the courts appears to apply as well where lands are granted and used for public parks, public libraries, or other public use in a like character, as where they are devoted to the purposes of a market place or a public highway."

1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxvii. § 7.

⁷ *Jones v. Devore*, 8 Ohio St. 430; *Bidwell v. Greenshield*, 2 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 427; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xi. § 33.

⁸ Last two preceding notes.

The apparent injustice to a wife, in having her inchoate right of dower taken from her without compensation in either of these cases, is obviated by her compensatory right in all, or some portion, of the proceeds of the property. Thus, when the husband's realty is taken by eminent domain, or conferred upon the public by dedication, the compensation paid to him is equitably converted (or reconverted) into realty, so that she may assert her dower right against it as between herself and her husband.¹ And the same is true as to any surplus moneys received from a sale of lands for taxes or other public charges.² Her right in such moneys, as representing the real property taken, has been heretofore explained.³

§ 507. **Sixth — Dower Barred by Lapse of Time — Statute of Limitations.** — Strictly at common law, there is no time limit on the right of a widow to claim dower in the real property of which her husband was properly seised during the coverture. The general statutes of limitations, moreover, which confer title on a disseisor after a designated period of adverse holding of the land (usually twenty years), are declared in some states not to apply to a widow's dower not yet assigned, because, the widow never having been seised, he who holds the property is not actually a disseisor as to her. In other words, in such jurisdictions the tenant of the freehold, who has refused or failed to admeasure her dower land, has no adverse possession against her except as his holding is made adverse by positive statutes.⁴ But, in other states, the general statute of limitations applies to her demand of dower.⁵ By the Statute 3 and 4, Wm. IV. ch. 27, it is expressly provided that the widow's dower shall be barred by her failure successfully to assert her right within twenty years after the death of her husband. And the same form of statute is found in most of the American states, but with some differences as to the periods.⁶ Thus, in Kansas the

¹ Matter of New York & Bklyn. Bridge, 75 Hun, 558, 89 Hun (N. Y.), 219; Citizens' Sav. Bk. v. Mooney, 26 N. Y. Misc. 67; Wheeler v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 534. See Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383.

² 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xx. §§ 2, 5; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 449.

³ § 504, *supra*.

⁴ Conover v. Wright, 6 N. J. Eq. 613; Care v. Keller, 77 Pa. St. 487; Durham v. Angier, 20 Me. 242; Long v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 107 Mo. 298; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 449.

⁵ Jones v. Powell, 6 Johns Ch. (N. Y.) 194; Miller v. Pence, 132 Ill. 151; Barnard v. Edwards, 4 N. H. 107; Barksdale v. Garrett, 64 Ala. 280. Where no statute applies, the widow's long delay in suing for her dower may, on the ground of her laches, preclude her from obtaining relief in equity. Barnard v. Edwards, 4 N. H. 107; Gilbert v. Reynolds, 51 Ill. 513; Barksdale v. Garrett, 64 Ala. 280.

⁶ 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xx.; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3271. For a few instances of retention of the common-law

period is only five years; in Georgia seven; in Alabama, in favor of the husband's alienee, only three years;¹ while in New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and most of the states it is twenty years.² (a).

It has been logically held that, since the widow's claim of dower is essentially against the land rather than against the tenant of the freehold, the statutory periods run, and her action for dower becomes barred, even though such tenant is out of the state a part or all of the time designated by the statute.³

The general rule is that the statute of limitations can not begin to run against a woman's claim of dower until after the death of her husband.⁴ But it is to be carefully noted, that, if anything occur to give the wife an immediate cause of action based on her dower right, even while her husband is

(a) The New York statute is as follows: "An action for dower must be commenced by a widow, within twenty years after the death of her husband; but if she is, at the time of his death, either: 1, within the age of twenty-one years; or 2, insane; or 3, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution upon conviction of a criminal offence, for a term less than for life: the time of such a disability is not a part of the time limited by this section. And if, at any time before such claim of dower has become barred by the above lapse of twenty years, the owner or owners of lands subject to such dower, being in possession, shall have recognized such claim of dower by any statement contained in a writing under seal, subscribed and acknowledged in the manner entitling a deed of real estate to be recorded, or if by any judgment or decree of a court of record within the same time and concerning the lands in question, wherein such owner or owners were parties, such right of dower shall have been distinctly recognized as a subsisting claim against said lands, the time after the death of her husband, and previous to such recognition by judgment or decree, is not a part of the time limited by this section." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1596, which was originally 1 R. S. 742, § 18. This statute has been quite strictly construed. And it has been held that, even though the owner of the land subject to the dower is out of the state during most or all of the twenty years after the husband's death, the widow's dower becomes barred in that period. Her action for dower is against the land. The owner can be served by publication, and so § 401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which suspends the running of the statute in most cases when the defendant is out of the state, does not apply. *Wetyen v. Fick*, 178 N. Y. 223. See *Kyle v. Kyle*, 67 N. Y. 400; *Gerard*, *Titles to R. E.* (4th ed.) p. 151.

rule see *Chew v. Farmers' Bank*, 2 Md. Ch. 231; *Simonton v. Houston*, 78 N. C. 408; *Spencer v. Weston*, 1 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) 213.

¹ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3271.

² *Ibid.*; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1596; *Wetyen v. Fick*, 178 N. Y. 223.

³ *Wetyen v. Fick*, 178 N. Y. 223.

⁴ *Durham v. Angier*, 20 Me. 242; *Kyle v. Kyle*, 67 N. Y. 400, 407; *Moore v. Frost*, 3 N. H. 126; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xx. § 28.

living, the ordinary statute of limitations may run against such cause of action and so bar all her dower right and interest, though some or all of the period be during the life of her husband.¹ This is clearly illustrated by the foreclosure of a mortgage which is superior to her dower right (such as a mortgage on the husband's land before her marriage, or a purchase money mortgage given by him),² and a failure of the plaintiff properly to make her a party to the action. Such a foreclosure leaves her the right to redeem the land from the mortgage indebtedness, and makes the purchaser as to her a mortgagee in possession.³ The statute of limitations then at once begins to run against her equity of redemption, and in favor of the purchaser; and if she fail to exercise her right to redeem within the statutory period thereafter, usually twenty years, such right, and consequently all her dower claim in the property, are forever barred.⁴ And this will be true whether or not her husband is still alive.⁵ The cases that have involved this result have thus far dealt with mortgages; but the principle must be the same as to the foreclosure of a mechanics' lien, or judgment, or any other lien or claim which takes precedence of the wife's dower.

§ 508. **Seventh — Dower Barred by Paramount Title or Interest — *Dos de dote peti non debet* — Dower in Qualified Fees.** — As is true in regard to any interest or claim in real property, so a dower right may be defeated wholly or partially, or postponed, by a paramount ownership.⁶ The instances in which this occurs are naturally divided into three groups, namely; those cases in which the husband's assumed title and ownership are wholly or partly defeated; those in which a prior dower right stands in the way of a subsequent one; and those which present important questions arising from the nature of the fee owned by the husband. Each of these groups is to be briefly discussed.

When the husband's seisin and title are defeated, either before or after his death, by a paramount claimant and owner, even though the husband thought that he owned the land, her dower falls with his interest.⁷ So, if the husband's realty be

¹ *Mackenna v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 184 N. Y. 411; *Campbell v. Ellwanger*, 81 Hun, 259, and cases cited.

² For the four classes of mortgages that have priority over dower, see § 480, *supra*.

³ *Mackenna v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 184 N. Y. 411.

⁴ Last three preceding notes.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1177.

⁷ *Emerson v. Harris*, 6 Met. (Mass.)

sold on execution resulting from an indebtedness incurred and made a lien on the land before the marriage, or incurred by both the husband and the wife so as to become a lien on the land, or accruing because of an indebtedness of the husband's ancestor from whom he inherited the land, the wife's dower is thereby defeated.¹ And, when the husband's real property is conveyed either by him or by some other person as the donee of a power emanating from a donor who held the land free of all dower right, the purchaser acquires it unaffected by the wife's dower.² As will be more fully explained hereafter, the execution of such a power makes the title thereby acquired relate back to the creation of the power, and thus it goes around and shuts out all subsequently accruing claim of dower.³ These are the most conspicuous instances of the destruction or barring of dower by paramount title. It hardly needs to be added that, if by any of these or similar means any part of the husband's realty is taken from him, or from his apparent successors in interest, her dower is proportionately reduced.⁴

Dos de dote peti non debet. This rule — that dower shall not be sought out of dower — solves many conflicting claims of different widows in the same pieces of real property.⁵ She whose right first accrues may insist that it shall not be interfered with by her whose right is subsequent;⁶ and the heirs of the husband, whose widow is demanding dower, may frequently prevail against her by proving that the existence of a prior dower interest prevented her husband from acquiring such a seisin as is requisite to the validity of her claim.⁷ One or both

475; McClure v. Fairchild, 153 Pa. St. 411; Glos v. Gerrity, 190 Ill. 545; 2 Crabb, R. P. § 1177; 4 Kent's Com. p. *48.

¹ Sandford v. McLean, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 117; Brown v. Williams, 31 Me. 403; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 8 Pa. St. 126; Greene v. Greene, 1 Ohio, 541; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xxxviii. §§ 29-33. Compare Green v. Causey, 10 Ga. 435. But sale on execution, on a debt incurred by the husband alone, during coverture does not affect dower. Martin v. Abbott, 95 N. W. Rep. 356 (Neb.); Jewett v. Feldheiser, 68 Ohio St. 523; § 496, *supra*.

² Ray v. Pung, 5 B. & Ald. 561; Greene v. Greene, 1 Ohio, 541; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 8 Pa. St. 126; Weir v.

Tate, 39 N. C. 264; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xiv. §§ 9-12.

³ § 940, *infra*.

⁴ Last four preceding notes. The taking of the property from the husband must be *bona fide*, in order to bar or diminish dower. When it is by collusion with him, it leaves the wife's dower unaffected. Stat. Westm. ii. ch. 4; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 203; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3249; 4 Kent, Com. p. *48; § 496, *supra*.

⁵ Glanv. Lib. 6 ch. 16; Co. Lit. 31 a; 4 Dane, Abr. 671; Bac. Abr. Dower & Jointure, E.

⁶ *Ibid*.

⁷ Co. Lit. 31 a; Safford v. Safford, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 259; McLeery v. McLeery, 65 Me. 172; next two succeeding notes.

of these two propositions — that a subsequent claim of dower shall not intrude on a prior one, and that the existence of the prior interest may preclude such seisin as is requisite to the subsequent dower — supply the explanations of the questions presented by the two kinds of cases which naturally emerge from the maxim *dos de dote peti non debet*.¹ Each of those kinds of cases can be best understood by a brief illustration.

First — A and B are ancestor and heir, or devisor and devisee, and both are married. A dies, leaving a widow; and a piece of land that A owned in fee simple descends, or is devised, to B. B acquires it, subject to the dower of A's widow, which is accordingly assigned to her. Subsequently B dies, and his widow demands dower in the same property. She must be endowed out of the two-thirds left after the assignment of dower to A's widow; that is, B's widow acquires a life interest in two-ninths of the entire piece.² The essential feature of this illustration is the fact that, when dower was assigned to A's widow, her title related back to the death of A and was a continuation of his.³ Therefore, B was never seised of the portion of the land admeasured to and held by A's widow, and though A's widow die before B's, B's widow can never have any more of the land for her dower.⁴ A's widow's dower was always in the way of the dower of B's widow, so long as A's widow lived; and the existence of the first dower, actually assigned, prevented B from having such seisin as could ever afford dower in his wife in that part of the property.⁵ It is to be carefully noted that an actual *assignment* of her dower to the older widow, before the assignment of that of the younger, is essential to this result. The mere existence of an unenforced right of dower in A's widow does not affect the dower of B's

¹ The last of these two propositions is another method, and perhaps a clearer one in this connection, of stating the rule that there can be no dower in a reversion or remainder after a prior freehold estate, because the husband who owns such a future interest has no seisin. § 482, *supra*. "Dower ought not to be sought out of dower" — is an old and familiar maxim of the law, so closely related to the law excluding dower from reversionary estates, that it is difficult to separate them." 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xv. § 7.

² Co. Lit. 31 a; Dunham v. Osborn,

1 Paige (N. Y.), 634; Durando v. Durando, 23 N. Y. 331; Leavitt v. Lamprey, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 382; Eldredge v. Forrestal, 7 Mass. 253; Reitzel v. Eckard, 65 N. C. 673; 1 Scribner, Dower, ch. xv. §§ 7-22.

³ §§ 464, 467, *supra*.

⁴ Last preceding note but one; Howells v. McGraw, 97 N. Y. App. Div. 460, 464, a case of curtesy, but resting on the same principle; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 161; McLeery v. McLeery, 65 Me. 172; Stahl v. Stahl, 114 Ill. 375.

⁵ *Ibid*.

widow.¹ But the somewhat anomalous rule is settled that, if after the death of both husbands B's widow have her dower assigned first, while it must yield (one-third) to A's widow when her dower is thereafter assigned, yet if A's widow die before B's the latter may then successfully demand her original third of the entire tract.² When, however, A's widow has her dower assigned first, whether before or after the death of B, her seisin relates back to the death of her husband, and so precludes B's widow from ever acquiring dower from more than two-thirds of the entire tract of land.³

Second — A and B are vendor and vendee, and both are married. A conveys the land to B, without A's wife doing anything to release her inchoate right of dower. B owns the land and is seised of it subject to the inchoate right of dower in A's wife and the inchoate right of dower of his own wife. A dies, and one-third of the land is assigned to his widow for her dower. Subsequently, B dies and his widow demands dower in the same property. She must accept one-third of the portion left after assignment of the dower to A's widow; that is, B's widow gets a life interest in two-ninths of the entire piece.⁴ But in this case, and here is where it differs radically from the case stated in the preceding paragraph, B was seised of the entire piece of property before A died, and the inchoate right of dower of B's wife attached to it all, subject, however, to the dower right of A's wife. The only obstacle in the way of the claim of B's wife is the dower of A's wife. Therefore, when A's widow dies, B's widow may have a new assignment and acquire enough additional to make one-third of the entire property.⁵ The difference between this case and that in which A and B were ancestor and heir, or deviser and devisee, is thus apparent.⁶

As in the preceding illustration, so here, where there are

¹ *Ibid.*; *Null v. Howell*, 111 Mo. 273; *Robinson v. Miller*, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 284. For cases in which a judgment or decree has been held to be equivalent to an assignment, see the next paragraph of the text.

² "The reason of this diversity" — to use the quaint language of Coke — is because the junior widow "had in it an estate for term of *her* life, and the estate for the life of the grandmother is lesser in the eye of the law as to her than her own life." 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. § 11; *In re Cregier*, 1 Barb. Ch.

(N. Y.) 598; *Reitzel v. Eckard*, 65 N. C. 673; *Steele v. La Frambois*, 68 Ill. 456.

³ Last four preceding notes.

⁴ Co. Lit. 31 a; *Durando v. Durando*, 23 N. Y. 331; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. §§ 7-22. First note of preceding paragraph.

⁵ Co. Lit. 31 a, b; *Bustard's Case*, 4 Co. Rep. 122 a; *Stahl v. Stahl*, 114 Ill. 375.

⁶ *Ibid.*; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. §§ 23-26.

two widows thus successively claiming dower in the same property, the prior claim will not interfere with the subsequent one, unless there has been an assignment of dower to the former claimant.¹ But where an actual assignment is impracticable, or suspended for a time for the adjustment of different rights, as for example for proceedings in partition, foreclosure proceedings, etc., the judgment or decree of a competent court, declaring a widow actually entitled to dower land, has been ordinarily treated as equivalent to a specific admeasurement of such land.² It is also to be noted that, if the first claimant of dower release her interest at such time and in such manner as to let the husband of the second claimant become properly seised, the prior dower right is thus removed as an impediment to the subsequent one.³ And in conclusion it is to be observed that the same principles here explained are to be applied, in determining the successive rights of any two or more of the wives or widows demanding dower in the same piece of realty.⁴

Dower in qualified fees. In fees that are not absolute and unqualified, paramount rights frequently exist which may be applied to bar dower. These have been heretofore explained in the discussion of the kinds of interests in which curtesy or dower may exist,⁵ but they may also be advantageously summarized here. Dower attaches, of course, to an estate in fee simple or fee tail. In an estate in fee on condition there is no dower (nor curtesy) that will survive a breach of the condition and re-entry by the grantor or his heirs.⁶ In a fee on limitation there is no dower (nor curtesy) that will survive the happening of the event which terminates the limitation.⁷ In a fee on conditional limitation there may be dower (or curtesy) for

¹ Fourth note, above.

² *Dunham v. Osborn*, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 634; *Safford v. Safford*, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 259; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. §§ 12-14.

³ *Elwood v. Klock*, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 50; *Atwood v. Atwood*, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 283; 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. §§ 21, 22.

⁴ "If A sells to B, and B to C, and C to D, and D to E, and the husbands all die, leaving their respective wives living, the widow of A is entitled to be endowed of one-third of the estate; the widow of B is entitled to be endowed of one-third of what remains, after deducting the dower of the first wife; the

widow of C, of one-third of what remains after deducting the dower of the wives of A and B; and so on to the wife of D. And if we suppose the estate to consist of nine acres, the wife of A would be endowed of three acres; the wife of B, of two acres; the wife of C, of one acre and a third; and the wife of D, of one-third of the remaining two acres and two-thirds." Reeves' *Domestic Relations*, 58; 4 Kent's *Com.* p. *64, note (f); 1 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. § 20.

⁵ §§ 453, 468, *supra*.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

the wife (or husband) of the first owner, and the happening of the event and the shifting of the property to the second owner do not interfere with such dower (or curtesy) — such a right exists in the wife or husband of the first owner of a fee on conditional limitation, in the same manner as if it were a fee simple.¹

§ 509. **Eighth — Dower Barred by Jointure — Provisions in Lieu of Dower.** — A jointure, or other provision in lieu of dower, may result in a complete bar of all dower interest under some circumstances, and under others it may put the widow to her “election” between the attempted gift and her dower claim. The next succeeding chapter is devoted to a discussion of these methods of affecting the property rights of a wife or widow; and, therefore, nothing is called for here beyond the terse statement that one of the methods of losing or destroying dower is by means of a gift, or settlement, or provision, to take its place.

¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER XXXV.

(c) JOINTURE — PROVISIONS IN LIEU OF DOWER.

§ 510. Nature and kinds of jointure.

First — Legal Jointure — Before Marriage — After Marriage.

§ 511. Development of legal jointure.

§ 512. Requisites of legal jointure — as a complete bar to dower — to require the widow to elect between it and dower.

Second — Equitable Jointure — Before Marriage — After Marriage.

§ 513. Development of equitable jointure.

§ 514. Requisites and distinctive characteristics of equitable jointure.

§ 515. Jointure in the United States — Usually equitable in form.

§ 516. Failure of jointure or provision for wife — Forfeiture.

Third — Testamentary Provision in Lieu of Dower.

§ 517. General nature and effects of such a gift.

§ 518. A gift by will to testator's wife is presumed to be bounty.

§ 519. How the husband's intent to require an election may be shown.

§ 520. Widow's election between dower and a settlement in lieu thereof — Requisites.

§ 521. Time within which the widow may elect.

§ 522. How the widow's election must be made — How evidenced.

§ 523. Effects of the widow's election between dower and a settlement or testamentary gift.

§ 524. Summary, as to provisions in lieu of dower.

§ 510. **Nature and Kinds of Jointure.** — The employment of a provision, made by or on behalf of the husband for the wife, to take the place of dower, is almost as old as common-law dower itself. Such a provision is ordinarily called a jointure. Taking advantage of uses, English husbands began early to deprive their wives of dower; and then the parents or relatives of prospective brides retaliated by demanding settlements. Those settlements developed, first into legal jointures, and subsequently they took also the form of equitable jointures; and lastly, husbands resorted to wills, testamentary provisions, to interfere wholly or partly with their wives' endowments.¹ A somewhat comprehensive view of the outcome requires discussions of, *First. Legal Jointure — Before Marriage — After*

¹ 4 Kent, Com. pp. *54-*59; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. 15; *infra*, residue of this chapter.

Marriage; *Second.* Equitable Jointure — Before Marriage — After Marriage; *Third.* Testamentary Provisions in Lieu of Dower. These will be dealt with in the order named.

First. Legal Jointure — Before Marriage — After Marriage.

§ 511. **Development of Legal Jointure.**—Soon after uses were employed generally in England, prospective husbands began to convey their property before marriage, to other persons, to hold for the use of such husbands after marriage. And, since it was then held that there was no dower in a use, this method of dealing with the property effectually barred wives of all interest in their husband's realty.¹ The parents or other relatives of the prospective wives soon commenced to demand that some compensatory provision should be made for the women about to marry. This demand was complied with by settlements, ordinarily of real property, made before the marriage. The intended husband conveyed some of his realty to a feoffee, for himself and his intended wife jointly, for life or in fee tail; the provision being inserted in the instrument, or implied by law if not so inserted, that the ultimate ownership should belong to the survivor, at least for life.² This custom of conveying *jointly* gave the name to the settlement.³ It was soon held, also, that a provision for the intended wife alone, to take effect in possession at the death of the husband, would accomplish the same result. And the name "jointure" was retained for all of the provisions for the wife, thus made, whether settled on her alone, or on him and her jointly.⁴

In preparing the Statute of Uses (27 Henry VIII. ch. 10),⁵ it was plainly apparent to its framers that, since its purpose was to execute all uses and thus to restore the legal estates to those who owned the uses, the husbands, who had provided for their wives by jointures before marriage, would by virtue of the statute regain their legal estates; the wives would thereupon become entitled to dower in those estates; and thus the wives

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *331, *332; § 301, *supra*.

² Vernon's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 1; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 331.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ A jointure was defined by Sir Edward Coke as "A competent livelihood of freehold in the wife of lands and

tenements to take effect in profit or possession presently after the death of the husband for the life of the wife at least." Co. Lit. 36 b; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 552, n.; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xv. §§ 1, 2.

⁵ See § 302, *supra*.

would be doubly provided for, receiving, as they would, both jointure and dower.¹ In order to obviate this inequality, it was provided by section 4 of the statute of uses that any wife, on whom a jointure had been properly settled before marriage as required by the statute, should be thereby deprived of dower in all the remaining real property of her husband.² And sections 5 and 7 of the statute further enacted that, in case such settlement were made during coverture, she might elect between it and dower, as is hereafter more fully explained; and that if she were evicted or otherwise deprived of her jointure or any part thereof, she should be entitled to be endowed to an extent to compensate her for the loss.³ Thus legal jointure, as it was thereafter recognized and employed in England, originated in the so-called statute of jointures, which comprises sections 4, 5, and 7 of the statute of uses.⁴

§ 512. **Requisites of Legal Jointure — as a Complete Bar to Dower — to Require the Widow to Elect Between it and Dower.** — The settlement on the intended wife, in order to comply with the requirements of the statute of jointures, might be made either by the prospective husband, or by some other person for him.⁵ The amount or proportion of property so to be bestowed upon her is not designated by the statute. This could be controlled, of course, by the woman before marriage, by her refusal to marry if the settlement were not adequate. There are however, five absolute requisites to such jointure. These are: *First*, the property settled shall be real — lands, tenements, or hereditaments; *Second*, the settlement must be so made as to take effect in possession immediately on the death of the husband — she must be enabled to begin to occupy and enjoy the land at his death, if not before; *Third*, it must be for her life at least — a greater estate would answer the requirement of the statute, but an estate for years, or other interest less than one measured by her own life, would not do so; *Fourth*, the legal estate and interest in the land must be given directly to her, and it would not suffice to settle it in trust for her; *Fifth*, in the instrument of conveyance, it must be clearly declared that the provision is in full settlement and satisfaction of her dower.⁶

¹ § 302, *supra*; Vernon's Case, 1 Co. Rep., 1 b, 2 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *137.

² *Ibid.*; Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 351.

³ Digby, Hist. Law R. P. (5th ed.) p. 352.

⁴ Last three preceding notes; 2

Scribner, Dower, ch. 1, 2, 26; 1 Roper, *Husb. & W.* 462.

⁵ *Drury v. Drury*, 2 Eden, 39.

⁶ *Co. Lit.* 36 b; Vernon's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 1; *Vance v. Vance*, 21 Me. 364; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xv. §§ 7-25.

A settlement or jointure that fulfilled all these requirements might become an absolute bar to dower, or result in giving her an election, according to the time when the settlement was made. If it were properly made before marriage, and with her knowledge or reasonable notice of its existence, it became an absolute bar to dower.¹ If, on the other hand, the husband made the settlement during the coverture, then, as provided by Section 7 of the statute, she might elect after his death to accept the jointure and relinquish dower, or to insist on her dower right and give up the proffered jointure.² It may be noted here generally that, except as the result of special local statute, any settlement or attempted jointure made during coverture does not produce an absolute bar to dower, but only gives the widow a right to elect between it and dower.³ The nature and requisites of such election, whenever it belongs to her, are more fully explained hereafter.⁴

The fact is to be emphasized that legal jointure, as thus developed and still applied in England, if properly made before marriage, is an absolute bar to dower, without any act or consent on the part of the wife other than her marriage with knowledge or means of knowledge of the existence of the settlement.⁵ In a few of the American states, such for example as Maryland and Vermont, it is still possible to deprive her of dower in this manner.⁶ But in most of the states, as is hereafter more fully explained, her express and unequivocal consent to a settlement is usually an added prerequisite to its becoming an absolute bar.⁷ (a)

(a) The New York Statute of Jointures is as follows: — “Where an estate in real property is conveyed to a person and his intended wife, or to the intended wife alone, or to a person in trust for them or for the intended wife alone, for the purpose of creating a jointure for her, and with her assent, the jointure bars her right or claim of dower in all the

¹ Such a jointure for an infant wife, it seems, must be fair and reasonable. “A pocket jointure, made upon a woman without her privity, or upon an infant with her privity but without the interposition of parents or guardians, would be such an evidence of fraud as would be sufficient to condemn it.” *Drury v. Drury*, *Wilmot's Opinions*, 177, 194, 202, 2 *Eden*, 39; *Vernon's Case*, 4 *Co. Rep.* 1; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xv. § 30

² *Ibid.*; *Digby, Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 352.

³ *Ibid.*; *McCartee v. Teller*, 2 *Paige* (N. Y.), 556.

⁴ § 520, *infra*.

⁵ Last four preceding notes.

⁶ *Md. R. L.* (1884) Art. 50, § 226; *Vt. R. L.* (1884) § 2219; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 3241; *Vance v. Vance*, 21 *Me.* 364.

⁷ *N. Y. L.* 1909, ch. 52, §§ 197-199; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 3241; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xv. § 31.

Second. Equitable Jointure—Before Marriage—After Marriage.

§ 513. **Development of Equitable Jointure.** — Nothing but real property can be the subject matter of legal jointure.¹ After the advantages of such settlements had been for some time appreciated in England, a demand naturally arose for similar adjustments with the use of other forms of property, and ultimately the Court of Chancery permitted dower to be precluded by settlements of either realty or personalty, made upon the woman with her consent properly evidenced.² In the famous case of *Drury v. Drury*,³ it was decided that an annuity of £600, conferred by an intended husband upon the infant woman whom he was about to marry, and made with the consent of herself and her father, resulted in equity in a complete bar of her dower in the husband's real property; and from the time of that adjudication equitable jointure has been firmly established.⁴ Such jointure is a means of barring dower,

lands of the husband. The assent of the wife to such a jointure is evidenced, if she be of full age, by her becoming a party to the conveyance by which it is settled; if she be a minor, by her joining with her father or guardian in that conveyance." "Any pecuniary provision, made for the benefit of an intended wife and in lieu of dower, if assented to by her as prescribed in the last section, bars her right or claim of dower in all the lands of her husband." "If, before the marriage, but without her assent, or, if after the marriage, real property is given or assured for the jointure of a wife, or a pecuniary provision is made for her, in lieu of dower, she must make her election whether she will take the jointure or pecuniary provision, or be endowed of the lands of her husband; but she is not entitled to both." Real Prop. L. §§ 197-199, which were formerly 1 R. S. 741, §§ 9-12. See *Akin v. Kellogg*, 119 N. Y. 441; *Lee v. Tower*, 124 N. Y. 371. The contract must be in writing. And, because of the close confidential relations of the parties, it will be examined by the courts with the most careful scrutiny. There must be a valuable consideration for her release of dower, and full disclosure to her of the facts relating to the intended husband's property, and absolute fairness on his part. *Graham v. Graham*, 143 N. Y. 573; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 71 N. Y. 154; *Sheldon v. Bliss*, 8 N. Y. 31; *Mundy v. Munson*, 40 Hun, 304; *Crousne v. Quinn*, 14 Abb. N. C. 9, note. And see *Zachmann v. Zachmann*, 201 Ill. 380; *West v. Walker*, 77 Wis. 577; *Moran v. Stewart*, 173 Mo. 207.

¹ § 512, *supra*.

² 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xv. §§ 33-35.

³ 2 Eden, 39.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Caruthers v. Caruthers*, 4 Bro. Ch. 500; *Hervey v. Hervey*, 1

Atk. 562, 563; *McCartee v. Teller*, 2

Paige (N. Y.), 511; *O'Brien v. Elliot*,

15 Me. 125; *Colbert v. Rings*, 231 Ill.

404; *Andrews v. Andrews*, 8 Conn. 79;

4 Kent, Com. p. *55.

recognized in equity, and given general effect also by the fact that, when the settlement is properly made, that court will issue an injunction when needed to restrain the enforcement in law of any claim to dower in the husband's real property.¹

As in the case of legal jointure, so in that of equitable jointure, one of two results may emerge according to the time of the settlement. If properly made before marriage, it is a complete bar to dower, being made so by an injunction if necessary as above explained.² If made during coverture, it puts the widow to her election, practically in the same manner as does a legal jointure made during coverture.³

§ 514. **Requisites and Distinctive characteristics of Equitable Jointure.** — The two essential elements of distinction, between legal jointure and equitable jointure, are that the latter may employ property that is not real, and it requires the express assent of the woman.⁴ This assent may be made by her becoming a party to the instrument creating the jointure; and in some states, such as New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin, the statute requires that it shall be so made;⁵ or it may be made by her proper execution and delivery of another instrument for that purpose, or by some unequivocal act indicating her intention.⁶ When she is an infant, the consent may be executed for her by her father or guardian.⁷

Since equitable jointure was created somewhat in derogation of the strict requirements of the statute of jointures, it has always been carefully safeguarded by the court that brought it into being. Because of the close confidential relation existing between the contracting parties, moreover, it has always been required that the settlement, in order to be a complete bar to dower, shall be fair, adequate, and with the full knowledge and

¹ *Ibid.*; 1 Roper, *Husb. & W.* 486; Atherly, *Marriage Settlements*, p. 553.

² Last preceding note.

³ Last preceding section; *Vernons' Case*, 4 Co. Rep. 1; *Gosling v. Warburton*, Cro. Eliz. 128; *McCartee v. Teller*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 511, 556; *Newly v. Cox*, 81 Ky. 58; *Butts v. Trice*, 69 Ga. 74; *House v. Fowle*, 20 Or. 163; N. Y. L. 1896, ch. 547, § 179; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3243; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. §§ 26, 27. See *Hitner's Appeal*, 54 Pa. St. 110; *Garbut v. Bowling*, 81 Mo. 214; *Lively v. Paschal*, 35 Ga. 218.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Drury v. Drury*, 2 Eden, 39; *Caruthers v. Caruthers*, 4 Bro. Ch. 500; 4 Kent, Com. p. *55.

⁵ N. Y. L. 1896, ch. 547, §§ 177, 178; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3241, 3242.

⁶ 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. §§ 30-32.

⁷ *Corbet v. Corbet*, 1 Sim. & St. 612; *McCartee v. Teller*, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 511; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 197; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3241 (3); 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xv. §§ 67-81.

voluntary acquiescence and assent of the prospective wife.¹ If it do not constitute a fair consideration for her attempted release of dower, the release can be set aside; and if the man fail to make full disclosure to her of the purpose and effects of the contract, it is ineffectual.²

§ 515. **Jointure in the United States Usually Equitable in Form.**—In most of the states of this country, the statutes which provide for jointures authorize a settlement of either real property or personalty, or prescribe generally any consideration satisfactory to the woman, and require her to unite in the instrument of settlement, or to express her assent in some other unmistakable manner.³ (a) Thus, the form of the ordinary American jointure is usually equitable; but the effect of the statute is generally that the jointure can be enforced as a bar to dower in both law and equity, so that an injunction is not demanded when she seeks dower at law.⁴ It is frequently stated by statute or adjudication that a “provision,” or “settlement,” or “gift” may be accepted by the woman in lieu of dower, etc., and the word jointure is omitted; but the effect of such statutes is the same as that of enactments which directly declare that the provisions shall constitute jointures.⁵

§ 516. **Failure of Jointure or Provision for Wife — Forfeiture.**—When the settlement in lieu of dower, whether in form a legal or an equitable jointure, fails wholly or partly, the widow ceases to be bound thereby, and her right of dower

(a) The New York statute provides that:—“The assent of the wife to such a jointure is evidenced, if she be of full age, by her becoming a party to the conveyance by which it is settled; if she be a minor, by her joining with her father or guardian in that conveyance.” Real Prop. L. § 197. See N. Y. note to § 514, *supra*.

¹ Wilmot's Opinions, 194, 202; Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y. 154; Graham v. Graham, 143 N. Y. 573, 577; Moran v. Stewart, 173 Mo. 207; Zachmann v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380; West v. Walker, 77 Wis. 577.

² *Ibid.* But it has generally been held in England that she is bound by her contract, though the amount of the settlement be inadequate. Dyke v. Rendall, 2 De Gex M. & G. 209; Cruise, Dig. tit. vii. ch. i. § 27. By the weight of authority in this country, if the husband fail to perform his part of the agreement, it does not bar dower. Sheldon v. Bliss, 8 N. Y. 31; Sargent v.

Roberts, 34 Me. 135; Johnson v. Johnson, 23 Mo. 561. Compare Freeland v. Freeland, 128 Mass. 509. See Andrews v. Andrews, 8 Conn. 79; Forwood v. Forwood, 86 Ky. 114.

³ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, §§ 197-199; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3241-3243; 4 Kent, Com. pp. *55-*57; 2 Scribner, Dower, § 36.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*; Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y. 154; Jenkins v. Holt, 109 Mass. 261; Worrell v. Forsyth, 141 Ill. 22; Culbertson v. Culbertson, 37 Ga. 296; Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 532.

revives *pro tanto*.¹ If, therefore, for any fraud or misrepresentation of the husband or other party she be able to set aside the jointure, she is at once restored to her dower right.² It has been said in a well-written opinion in New York that, if she be induced by fraud to accept a jointure worth less than her dower, she may 1, keep what she got and sue for damages; or, 2, sue in equity to rescind the contract, offering to restore what she has received; or, 3, after the husband's death, sue for the admeasurement of her dower.³ This is simply a type of her remedies recognized in most jurisdictions.

On the other hand, in most states she may forfeit her jointure (without regaining dower) by her own act, waiver, or acquiescence. This law is frequently put into such a statutory form as the following: "Every jointure, devise and pecuniary provision in lieu of dower is forfeited by the woman for whose benefit it is made, in a case in which she would forfeit her dower."⁴ (a) And the property designated in the jointure agreement or settlement goes to those to whom it would otherwise have gone on the ending of her interest therein by her death.⁵

Third. Testamentary Provision in Lieu of Dower.

§ 517. **General Nature and Effects of Such a Gift.**—It was explained above that, in the absence of statutory change, no act or omission on the part of the husband alone can bar dower.⁶ It follows that a devise or bequest by the husband, when unaffected by statute, can not absolutely deprive the widow of her dower interest. The most that it can accomplish is to cause her to make an election between her dower and the

(a) This is from the New York statute, which continues, — "and on such forfeiture, an estate so conveyed for jointure, or devised, or a pecuniary provision so made, immediately vests in the person or legal representatives of the person in whom they would have vested on the determination of her interest therein, by her death." Real Prop. L. § 202, which was originally 1 R. S. 742, § 15. See *Forrest v. Forrest*, 3 Bosw. 661, 695.

¹ Stat. of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII. ch. 10, § 7; *Drury v. Drury*, 2 Eden, 39; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3248; *Garrard v. Garrard*, 7 Bush (Ky.), 436; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xv. §§ 82-89.

² *Ibid.*; *Graham v. Graham*, 143 N. Y. 573; *Moran v. Stewart*, 173 Mo. 207.

³ *Spannocchia v. Loew*, 87 Hun (N. Y.), 167, 172.

⁴ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 202; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3247.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ § 496, *supra*.

testamentary provision.¹ Therefore, the two most prominent inquiries which arise from a gift to a wife in her husband's will are, did he intend to make the gift in lieu of dower, so that she should not take both, but must elect; and, if he did so intend, how shall her election be made and evidenced? The requirement of an election on her part, when the husband so intends, arises from the principle, now recognized in both law and equity, that a person can not claim a benefit under an instrument, such as a will, and also disappoint the maker of the instrument by opposing or contravening its terms.²

§ 518. **A Gift by Will to Testator's Wife is presumed to be Bounty.** — Both at common law and by the great majority of statutes, a testamentary gift made by a husband to his wife is presumed to be a pure gift, and not intended to be taken in lieu of dower.³ The English Dower Act, 3 and 4 Wm. IV. ch. 105, and the statutes of a few of the United States, such as Massachusetts, Maine, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, and North Carolina, have changed this general rule, so that a devise to a widow, and in some states any gift by the will of her husband, will defeat her dower, or will compel her to elect between it and dower, unless a contrary intention is declared by the will.⁴ In a few states, of which New Jersey and Delaware are illustrations, she can not be put to an election by a testamentary provision, unless it is a devise and the intent to give it in lieu of dower is clear.⁵ In most jurisdictions, however, the common-law rule, as above stated, still prevails; and the husband must make his intention clear, in order to require his widow to elect between dower and his testamentary gift.⁶ (a)

(a) In New York, the statute declares that, — "If real property is devised to a woman, or a pecuniary or other provision is made for her by

¹ Vernon's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 1, 4 a; Gosling v. Warburton, Cro. Eliz. 128; Lee v. Tower, 124 N. Y. 371; Matter of Gorden, 172 N. Y. 25; Chapin v. Hill, 1 R. I. 446; Bubier v. Roberts, 49 Me. 460; 4 Kent, Com. p. *58.

² Ibid.; Beetson v. Stoops, 91 N. Y. App. Div. 185, 189; Bispham's Prin. Eq. § 295; 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 496.

³ Birmingham v. Kirwan, 2 Sch. & Lef. 444; Herbert v. Wren, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 370; Horstmann v. Flege, 172 N. Y. 381, 384; Closs v. Eldert, 30

N. Y. App. Div. 338; Van Arsdale v. Van Arsdale, 26 N. J. L. 404; Nelson v. Pomeroy, 64 Conn. 257; Durfee, Petitioner, 14 R. I. 47; Halferty v. Scarce, 135 Mo. 428; *In re* Gotzian's Estate, 34 Minn. 159; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3244; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvi. §§ 2, 3.

⁴ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3244; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvi. §§ 110-113.

⁵ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3244 (B).

⁶ Last preceding note but two. The gift is conclusively presumed to be

§ 519. **How the Husband's Intent to Require an Election may be shown.**—In those states, such as New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and the large majority of the United States, in which the husband must manifest a clear intent in order to put his widow to her election, he may do this in express words, or by reasonably necessary implication from all the language of his will.¹ Where he directly states that the devise or bequest is in lieu of dower, or uses an equivalent expression, there can be, of course, no doubt, and she must make her election. In the absence of such explicit statements, there must be a clear implication that he intended the gift to take the place of dower. Such an implication most ordinarily arises when there is a manifest incompatibility between the gift and dower, or when her taking dower would be clearly inconsistent with the scheme of the will.² Thus, if the husband give a part of his property to the wife, and all the residue of his realty to others "free from all encumbrances," she is put to her election.³ A devise of his real property, to her and others in equal shares, has sometimes been held to require her to elect.⁴ And she is put to her elec-

will in lieu of her dower, she must make her election whether she will take the property so devised, or the provision so made, or be endowed of the lands of her husband; but she is not entitled to both." Real Prop. L. § 200, which was originally 1 R. S. 741, § 13. Under this statute, the husband's intention to have her elect must be clear, or she will take both dower and the gift. His intent, however, need not be expressly stated. It may be manifested by any provision wholly inconsistent with a claim of dower. *Vernon v. Vernon*, 53 N. Y. 351; *Asche v. Asche*, 113 N. Y. 232; *Lee v. Tower*, 124 N. Y. 371; *Nelson v. Brown*, 144 N. Y. 384, 390; *Matter of Gorden*, 172 N. Y. 25; *Horstmann v. Flege*, 172 N. Y. 381, 384; *Flynn v. McDermott*, 183 N. Y. 62; *Closs v. Eldert*, 30 App. Div. 338; *Matter of Zahrt*, 94 N. Y. 605, 609. Her right thus to elect is purely personal; and on her death without electing, though within the year, and though an action by her to set aside the will is then pending, the right to a legacy given to her by the will in lieu of dower vests in her personal representatives. *Flynn v. McDermott*, 183 N. Y. 62.

bounty, unless the will specifically declares otherwise, or to give dower "would disturb other provisions of the manifest scheme of the will." *Horstmann v. Flege*, 61 N. Y. App. Div. 518, 172 N. Y. 381, 384; *Flynn v. McDermott*, 183 N. Y. 62.

¹ *Ibid.*; N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 200; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3244.

² *Inclendon v. Northcote*, 3 Atk. 430, 437; *Asche v. Asche*, 113 N. Y. 232; *Nelson v. Brown*, 144 N. Y. 384, 390;

Closs v. Eldert, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 338; *White v. White*, 16 N. J. L. 202; *Nelson v. Pomeroy*, 64 Conn. 257; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xvi. §§ 84-106.

³ *Kimbel v. Kimbel*, 14 N. Y. App. Div. 570; *Vernon v. Vernon*, 53 N. Y. 351.

⁴ *Foster v. Cook*, 3 Bro. C. C. 347; *Closs v. Eldert*, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 338; *Conner v. Watson*, N. Y. App. Div. 54; *Lee v. Tower*, 124 N. Y. 371; *Colgate v. Colgate*, 23 N. J. Eq. 372. Compare,

tion when, after a fair provision for her by the will, the residue of his property is devised absolutely to his children, or to other people dependent upon him for support.¹ But his mere use of precatory words in making the gift to her, such as a request or a suggestion that she relinquish dower; or his devise to her of a part of the lands out of which her dower would be claimed; or his gift of realty to her for her life or during her widowhood, though the value be greater than her dower; or the gift to her of an annuity, or rent charged on his realty; in the absence of more explicit declaration on his part, does not ordinarily put her to an election, but constitutes bounty, over and above her dower interest.²

§ 520. **Widow's Election between Dower and a Settlement in Lieu thereof — Requisites.** — Before a widow can be required to make an election between dower and a gift or settlement, she must have full knowledge and information as to the nature, extent, and value of her husband's property, and of all other facts and circumstances which might affect her choice.³ If she be deprived of such information, and ignorantly make her election, she may subsequently retract, restore what she has received, and insist on the admeasurement of her dower.⁴ This means that she must have full knowledge of the *facts*. Her ignorance of her legal rights, growing out of the facts, will not ordinarily excuse her act or afford her a right to retract.⁵

Not only may the widow elect between dower and the gift, as above explained, but, where a devise is made to her of lands out of which she is dowable, she may elect in which capacity to

In re Hatch, 62 Vt. 300; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. 502; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvi. §§ 92-94.

¹ *Herbert v. Wren*, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 370; *Alling v. Chatfield*, 42 Conn. 276; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvi. § 102.

² *Miller v. Miller*, 22 N. Y. Misc. 582; *Lawrence v. Lawrence*, 2 Vern. 365; *Lefevre v. Lefevre*, 59 N. Y. 434; *Lewis v. Smith*, 9 N. Y. 502; *Dangherty v. Dangherty*, 69 Iowa, 677; *Evans v. Webb*, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 424; *Horstmann v. Flege*, 172 N. Y. 381; *Adsit v. Adsit*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 448; *Birmingham v. Kirwan*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 444. See *Konvalinka v. Schlegel*, 104 N. Y. 125; *White v. White*, 16 N. J. L. 211; *In re Franke*, 97 Iowa, 704; *Nelson v. Brown*,

144 N. Y. 384. And for a detailed discussion of such instances, see 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvi.

³ *Newman v. Newman*, 1 Bro. C. C. 186; *Woodburn's Estate*, 138 Pa. St. 606; *Stone v. Vandermark*, 146 Ill. 312. She may have a bill in equity to ascertain those facts and circumstances. 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvii. § 1.

⁴ She *must* restore what she has received as gift or settlement. *Ibid.*; *Macknet v. Macknet*, 29 N. J. Eq. 54; *Simonton v. Houston*, 78 N. C. 408; *Dabney v. Bailey*, 42 Ga. 521.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Light v. Light*, 21 Pa. St. 407; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.*, §§ 186, 187. See *Sopwith v. Maughan*, 30 Beav. 235; *Spread v. Morgan*, 11 H. L. Cas. 602.

take that portion which otherwise would have come to her as dower.¹ Thus, if the husband devise all or most of his realty to her, and die owing debts by which she is not bound, such, for example, as an indebtedness on a mortgage made by him alone during coverture, then, by the weight of authority, she may choose one-third of his real property as dower and thus acquire it free of his debts, and take the residue as a gift under the will and therefore subordinate to the claims of his creditors.²

The widow's right to elect between dower and a gift or settlement in lieu thereof is purely personal to her. When she dies or becomes permanently incapacitated before making the choice, neither her personal representative nor any one else can elect for her; and, in the majority of states, the gift takes effect.³ If, however, she be an infant, and therefore a ward of the court, the court may make the election for her.⁴

§ 521. **Time within which the Widow may Elect.**—There is no common-law time limit on the right of a widow to elect between dower and a testamentary gift. But the courts of equity, and now in most instances even those of law, will presume, after the husband has been dead for a long time and the widow has not demanded dower, that she has chosen the gift.⁵ And in several cases it has been held that her right of election terminates in a reasonable time after the death of the husband.⁶ In probably a majority of the American states, the time for her to elect is now fixed by statute.⁷ Thus, in New York she is conclusively presumed to have chosen the gift in lieu of dower, unless she enters on her dower land or brings an action for its recovery within one year after the husband's death, or within

¹ *Lewis v. Smith*, 9 N. Y. 502, 512; *Mitchell v. Mitchell*, 8 Ala. 414.

² *Ibid.*

³ So emphatic is the law in insisting that this right of election shall remain personal that, even if the widow has brought an action to set aside her husband's will on the ground that it is not properly executed, and has died before the suit was completed, her personal representatives are entitled to the legacy given in lieu of dower. *Flynn v. McDermott*, 183 N. Y. 62; *Doty v. Hendrix*, 16 N. Y. Supp. 284; *Sherman v. Newton*, 6 Gray (Mass.), 307; *Crozier's Appeal*, 90 Pa. St. 384; *Heavenridge v.*

Nelson, 56 Ind. 90. See *Camardella v. Schwartz*, 126 N. Y. App. Div. 334; *Brown v. Hodgdon*, 31 Me. 65.

⁴ *Streatfield v. Streatfield*, Cas. temp. Talb. 176; *Davis v. Page*, 9 Ves. 350. And for details of election, see 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvii.

⁵ 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 513.

⁶ *Reed v. Dickerman*, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 146; *Noel v. Garnett*, 4 Call (Va.), 92. See *Zimmerman v. Lebo*, 151 Pa. St. 345; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvii. §§ 27-32.

⁷ 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 3264, 3265; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvii. §§ 15-26.

such extended period as a competent court may have granted her for good cause shown by her as designated by the statute.¹ (a) Substantially the same limitation is found in Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. In Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, and North Carolina, she is required to make her election within six months after the probate of her husband's will, and in Vermont, within eight months; or she is conclusively presumed to have taken the gift in lieu of dower.² Such legislation, where found, has as a rule the force of an absolute statute of limitations, which bars her dower in the time designated, unless she can avoid its effect by the force of some provision in the statute itself.³

(a) The New York statutes, after providing, in two sections, for a widow's election when a settlement in lieu of dower is made on her during coverture, or before marriage without her assent, or by a testamentary gift, continue: — "Where a woman is entitled to an election, as prescribed in either of the last two sections, she is deemed to have elected to take the jointure, devise, or pecuniary provision, unless within one year after the death of her husband she enters upon the lands assigned to her for her dower, or commences an action for her dower. But, during such period of one year after the death of her said husband, her time to make such election may be enlarged by the order of any court competent to pass on the accounts of executors, administrators, or testamentary trustees, or to admeasure dower, on an affidavit showing the pendency of a proceeding to contest the probate of the will containing such jointure, devise or pecuniary provision, or of an action to construe or set aside such will, or that the amount of claims against the estate of the testator can not be ascertained within the period so limited, or other reasonable cause, and on notice given to such persons, and in such manner, as such court may direct. Such order shall be indexed and recorded in the same manner as a notice of pendency of action in the office of the clerk of each county wherein the real property or a portion thereof affected thereby is situated." Real Prop. L. § 201, which was at first 1 R. S. 742, § 14, and was amended to its present form by L. 1890, ch. 61. The latter act added the right to have the time extended by the court. This statute is a positive statute of limitations, which must be pleaded in order to be available. Before the amendment of 1890, there was no way of having the time extended, even for fraud in preventing her from ascertaining the facts on which her election should depend. *Evans v. Ogsbury*, 2 App. Div. 556; *Akin v. Kellogg*, 119 N. Y. 441; *Jones v. Fleming*, 104 N. Y. 418; *In re Zahrt*, 94 N. Y. 605; *Chamberlain v. Chamberlain*, 43 N. Y. 424; *Lee v. Timken*, 10 App. Div. 213.

¹ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 201.

² 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3265; 2 Scribner, Dower, ch. xvii. § 16.

³ *Akin v. Kellogg*, 119 N. Y. 441; *Jones v. Fleming*, 104 N. Y. 418, 432; *Evans v. Ogsbury*, 2 N. Y. App. Div.

556; *Lee v. Timken*, 10 N. Y. App. Div. 213. See N. Y. L. 1890, ch. 61, providing for extension of her time to elect, by order of court; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3265. Therefore, where the statute of limitations must be pleaded in

§ 522. **How the Widow's Election must be made — How Evidenced.** — The statutes, which require an election by the widow, ordinarily prescribe how it shall be made and evidenced.¹ Thus, in New York she is deemed to have elected to take the provision in lieu of dower, unless within the prescribed time "she enters upon the lands assigned to her for her dower, or commences an action for her dower."² (a) When the statute is silent as to the mode of her election, the requirement is that it shall be unequivocal, and that the evidence of it shall be clear and satisfactory.³ The strong tendency of the statutes and courts is to give effect to the husband's will, and to make his testamentary gift take the place of her dower, unless she acts in such manner as to leave no reasonable doubt of her election to the contrary and clear evidence is produced of such action on her part.⁴ In the absence of positive statutory requirement, her election may be shown by acts *in pais*, as for example by her retention of possession of the land settled upon her, as well as by matter of record or her direct declaration.⁵

§ 523. **Effects of a Widow's Election between Dower and a Settlement or Testamentary Gift.** — If, being put to an election, the widow choose and obtain dower, it follows, of course, that she relinquishes and loses all right to its attempted substitute. If she choose the gift, it follows, with equal certainty, that she forfeits her dower. And in most jurisdictions her dower is thereby barred, not only in the real property of which her husband died seised, but also in that which he conveyed during coverture without her uniting in the conveyance or otherwise relinquishing at that time her inchoate right.⁶ In Pennsylvania, however, and perhaps in a few other states, it is held that her elec-

(a) See last preceding New York note.

order to be available as a defense, this statute must be pleaded by those claiming the husband's real property against her. *Ibid.*, especially *Evans v. Ogsbury*, 2 N. Y. App. Div. 556. If the widow let the prescribed time elapse, without making any choice or taking any other steps, she can not recover her dower on the ground that she was misled or defrauded as to its value. *Akin v. Kellogg*, 119 N. Y. 441; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 3265-3267.

¹ 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 3265-3267; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xvii. §§ 15-36.

² N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 201.

³ *Akin v. Kellogg*, 119 N. Y. 441; *Chamberlain v. Chamberlain*, 43 N. Y. 424; *Bradford v. Kents*, 43 Pa. St. 474; *Thompson v. Hoop*, 6 Ohio St. 480; 4 *Kent, Com.* pp. *58, *59.

⁴ Last three preceding notes.

⁵ *Ibid.*; 2 *Scribner, Dower*, ch. xvii. §§ 27-36.

⁶ *Steele v. Fisher*, 1 *Edw. Ch. (N. Y.)* 435; *Buffinton v. Fall River Nat. Bk.*, 113 *Mass.* 246; *Chapin v. Hill*, 1 *R. I.* 446; *Allen v. Pray*, 12 *Me.* 138; *Fairchild v. Marshall*, 42 *Minn.* 14.

tion to take a testamentary gift does not bar her dower claim in any real property, except that of which her husband died seised.¹

A widow, who accepts any provision by her husband in lieu of dower, is regarded as a purchaser of that provision.² Therefore, while all of the husband's property may ordinarily be reached by his creditors, yet she may insist that all of his gifts merely voluntary shall fail, and the money or land designed for them be taken by his creditors, before the property so given to her shall be available for the payment of his debts.³ Hence it is that, if the gift be in the form of a bequest and the husband's assets be insufficient to pay all his gifts, her provision is not usually required to abate with the other legacies, but may be fully paid if the assets be sufficient, even though the result may be that the other legatees obtain nothing.⁴

It is to be added that, generally, as the outcome of both statutes and decisions, if a testamentary gift in lieu of dower, like any other jointure, be defeated by paramount title or other cause after the widow's election to take the gift has been made, her election is thereby nullified; and, in the absence of counter-acting equity, her right to dower out of her husband's realty is restored.⁵

§ 524. **Summary as to provisions in Lieu of Dower.** — The foregoing discussion of jointure may be summarized as follows: *First*, a legal jointure properly made before marriage, where still recognized, is an absolute bar of dower; *second*, a legal jointure, made during coverture, puts the wife to her election be-

¹ *Borland v. Nichols*, 12 Pa. St. 38; *Higginbotham v. Cornwell*, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 83. See *Westbrook v. Vanderburgh*, 36 Mich. 30.

² *Flynn v. McDermott*, 183 N. Y. 62; *Hathaway v. Hathaway*, 37 Hun (N. Y.), 265; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xvii. §§ 59-64. See *Tracy v. Murray*, 44 Mich. 109.

³ *Ibid.*; *Isenhardt v. Brown*, 1 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 411; *Taylor's Estate*, 175 Pa. St. 60; *Bray v. Neill*, 21 N. J. Eq. 343; *Lord v. Lord*, 23 Conn. 327; *Steele v. Steele*, 64 Ala. 438.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Borden v. Jenks*, 140 Mass. 562; *Security Co. v. Bryant*, 52 Conn. 311; *Moore v. Alden*, 80 Me. 301; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xvii. §§ 59-64. But where, as now in England, a hus-

band may deprive his wife of dower by selling his land or willing it away from her, his legacy to her, though expressly declared to be in lieu of dower, stands on the same plane as other legacies and abates with them. *Duret v. Charriere* (1896), 1 Ch. 912.

⁵ § 516, *supra*; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 3248; *Akin v. Kellogg*, 119 N. Y. 441; *Hone v. Van Schaick*, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 221; 2 Scribner, *Dower*, ch. xvii. §§ 56-58; *Hastings v. Clifford*, 32 Me. 132; *Osmun v. Porter*, 39 N. J. Eq. 141. But she can not be restored to dower simply because her chosen gift proves to be of less value than dower would have been. *Lee v. Tower*, 124 N. Y. 370, 375.

tween the attempted settlement and dower; *third*, an equitable jointure made before marriage is an absolute bar to dower in equity, and may be enforced as such a bar by an injunction preventing a suit at law for the recovery of dower, and now in many states of this country is available directly in both law and equity to preclude all dower claim; *fourth*, an equitable jointure made during coverture puts the wife to her election; and *fifth*, a testamentary provision in lieu of dower must be clearly expressed, in most states, as intended to preclude that interest, or this must be shown by reasonably necessary implication, and then such a gift puts the wife to her election; and *finally*, when the wife has an election between dower and a provision made in lieu thereof, she is quite commonly required to indicate and enforce her choice of dower within a prescribed time, or be conclusively presumed to have accepted the provision made for her to take its place.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

(d) ESTATES DURING MARRIAGE — HOMESTEAD.

Estates during Marriage.

§ 525. Common-law rights of spouses in each other's realty.

§ 526. The wife's rights in equity.

§ 527. Married women's statutory separate estates.

§ 528. Conveyance of spouse's realty — Conveyance between them.

§ 529. Statutory life estates.

Homestead.

§ 530. Its origin and two-fold nature.

§ 531. Who entitled to homestead — For whose benefit.

§ 532. Character, amount, and time of exemption.

§ 533. Debts excluded—Form and notice of such exclusion.

§ 534. Termination of homestead rights.

§ 535. Conclusion as to kinds of life estates.

Estates during Marriage.

§ 525. **Common-Law Rights of Spouses in Each Other's Realty.** — Outside of a wife's rights by virtue of the somewhat shadowy doctrine of reasonable parts, which during the feudal period of English jurisprudence gave her a share of her husband's personality,¹ the only interest in his property conferred upon her by the common law was dower.² This latter, as a legal life estate, has been already discussed.³ The husband, however, had important common-law rights in the property of his wife. By virtue of the marriage, all her personal property in possession became his, and all her choses in action which he reduced to possession during the coverture; while choses in action, not reduced to possession in her lifetime, belonged to him as her administrator if as such he took them into his possession.⁴ All her chattels real became his to use and enjoy for the period of their married life, and to dispose of and hold the proceeds if he alienated them during the coverture.⁵ But if she outlived him,

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *492, *493, *495; Schouler on Wills, § 14.

² Ibid.; Schouler on Wills, §§ 15-19.

³ Ch. xxxi-xxxiv. *supra*.

⁴ Chase's Blackst. p. 154; 2 Kent, Com. pp. *130-*143.

⁵ Ibid. They were also liable for his debts; but he could not will them away. Co. Lit. 351 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *434.

and her chattels real had not been disposed of, they became absolutely hers.¹ In all her freehold estates in possession he acquired the absolute usufruct, possession, and control during the coverture, with power to sell the life interest that thus became his, and with such an ownership in the freehold during their joint lives that it might for that period be taken from him, on execution.² In her future estates, however, of which she did not become seised during the coverture — her reversions or remainders after freehold estates, or her executory interests — he acquired no rights whatever by virtue of the marriage.³

The interest of the husband in his wife's real property, being an estate during coverture and for an uncertain period which might last for his life, is therefore properly grouped with the life estates.⁴ In acquiring it, he did not become sole seised of the property during the coverture, but the seisin was in him and her jointly. His sole interest and rights were in the possession, rents, profits, and income during the coverture.⁵ He could not have compensation for any improvements made by him upon the lands, because he was regarded as making them for the benefit of his wife.⁶ He was liable for waste, and must take care of the property the same as any other life owner.⁷ Being seised, however, jointly with his wife, he would lose all interest, if before a child was born the property were forfeited because of her treason or felony.⁸ His estate so held, as heretofore stated, merged into and became an estate by curtesy after the birth of a child in the manner already explained.⁹

Since the common law regarded the possession and usufruct of the wife's real property as belonging absolutely to the husband, but the title and seisin as being vested in both of them, it followed that a suit for the rents and profits, or any possessory action, as for waste, or for use and occupation of the land by

¹ *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 46 b, 300 a; *Moody v. Matthews*, 7 Ves. 174; *Riley v. Riley*, 19 N. J. Eq. 229; *Allen v. Hooper*, 50 Me. 371; *Barron v. Barron*, 24 Vt. 375; *Lawes v. Lumpkin*, 18 Md. 334; *Schouler on Wills*, § 45.

² Co. Lit. 351 a, 325 b; *Robertson v. Norris*, 11 Q. B. 916; *Barber v. Root*, 10 Mass. 260; *Payne v. Parker*, 10 Me. 181; *Eaton v. Whitaker*, 18 Conn. 222; *Van Note v. Downey*, 28 N. J. L. 219; *Wms. R. P. p. * 223.*

³ § 482, *supra*; *Shores v. Carley*, 8 Allen (Mass.), 425.

⁴ Last preceding note but one; *Roper, Husb. & W. 3.*

⁵ *Polyblank v. Hawkins*, 1 Doug. 329; *Melvin v. Proprietors, etc.*, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 161; *Nicholls v. O'Neil*, 10 N. J. Eq. 88.

⁶ § 549, *infra*.

⁷ §§ 551-553, *infra*.

⁸ Co. Lit. 351 a; 1 *Bright, Husb. & W. 13.*

⁹ §§ 446, 455, *supra*.

another, during coverture, should be brought by the husband alone;¹ but a suit for any injury to the inheritance, any wrong that would make the property less valuable after the coverture was ended, must be brought by him and her jointly.² The fact that their seisin was thus united gave rise to the ordinary rule that a conveyance of real property in fee to husband and wife makes them tenants by the entirety, and not technically joint tenants, tenants in common, or any other kind of co-owners.³ The forms of co-ownership, and the characteristics of them, which may still be held by husband and wife, are explained hereafter.⁴ It will suffice, at this point, simply to remark that, notwithstanding the extent to which legislation has enabled married women to deal with their own property, yet, in the absence of positive statute to the contrary, tenancy or ownership by the entirety still exists in England and most of the states of this country.⁵

§ 526.—**The Wife's Rights in Equity.**—Because of the great control and sometimes unfair disposition of the wife's property by the husband, the court of equity early required, when the husband was seeking in that tribunal to perfect his possession and use of her property, that there should be an adequate settlement made out of it for the support of her and her children. This is designated her "equity to a settlement."⁶ It was originally said to be based on the maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity." But in the leading case of *Elibank v. Montolieu*,⁷ it was settled that, even though the husband himself is not seeking a remedy, she may affirmatively apply to a court of equity, when circumstances so require, and have settled on her a fair share of the property for the support of herself and her children. The wife's right to a settlement has always been treated as personal, and therefore not enforceable by her children or heirs after her death.⁸ If obtained during her life,

¹ *Decker v. Livingston*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 479; *Clapp v. Inhabitants of Stoughton*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 463; *Mattocks v. Stearns*, 9 Vt. 326; 2 Kent, Com. p. *131.

² *Polyblank v. Hawkins*, 1 Doug. 329; *Melvin v. Proprietors, etc.*, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 161; *Nicholls v. O'Neill*, 10 N. J. Eq. 88; *Took v. Glascock*, 1 Ed. Saunders, 253, note.

³ *Thornley v. Thornley* (1893), 2 Ch. 229; *Bertles v. Nunan*, 92 N. Y. 152;

Buttler v. Rosenblath, 42 N. J. Eq. 651; § 688, *infra*.

⁴ §§ 688-690, *infra*.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ *Elibank v. Montolieu*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 486; *Kenny v. Udall*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 464; *Page v. Estes*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 269; *Barron v. Barron*, 24 Vt. 375; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 633; *Bispham, Prin. Eq.* § 96; 2 Kent, Com. p. *139.

⁷ 5 Ves. 737, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 486.

⁸ *Ibid.*; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 627; *Bispham, Prin. Eq.* § 113.

and not disposed of, it belongs to them, of course, after her death.¹

Not only did the courts of equity work out this important advantage of a settlement for the wife, but, in several other instances also, they bestowed property rights upon her, such as law would not recognize. Thus, her separate use estate, already explained in the discussion of trusts, arose from the same fundamental requirement that created her equity to a settlement.² When, moreover, the wife was an infant and so a ward of court, or when, by the husband's misconduct or total insolvency, the means of her support were vanishing, or when she was abandoned by him, or otherwise treated with signal unfairness, the equity tribunals would intervene and compel an adequate settlement upon her, even out of the property that had belonged to him individually.³

The principles at the foundation of these equitable interests and estates of a wife are as fully recognized in this country as in England.⁴ Thus, her equity to a settlement, wherever the husband can obtain the control of her property, is sustained in every state except New Hampshire and North Carolina.⁵ But the demand for the application of these salutary rules has been largely superseded by the married women's legislation, which has so materially increased her control and enjoyment of her own property. Those important changes are next to be briefly explained.

§ 527. **Married Women's Statutory Separate Estates.**—Legislative enactments in most if not all of the United States have resulted in doing away with the husband's marital rights in all the real property owned by the wife before marriage. She now retains such realty free from his debts and control, and can deal with it generally in the same manner as if she were still a single woman.⁶ In a large majority of the states also, statutes have given to married women absolute right to possession and control of their realty acquired or owned during

¹ *Ibid.*

² § 336, *supra*.

³ 2 Perry on Trusts, § 627; Bispham, Prin. Eq. § 113.

⁴ § 336, *supra*; Bispham, Prin. Eq. §§ 110-113.

⁵ Howard v. Moffatt, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 206; Page v. Estes, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 269; Tucker v. Andrews, 13

Me. 124; Short v. Moore, 10 Vt. 446; Parsons v. Parsons, 9 N. H. 309; Lassiter v. Dawson, 2 Dev. Eq. (N. C.) 383; Bispham, Prin. Eq. § 110.

⁶ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 19, §§ 50, 51, 56, 59; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 6420. But see Weber v. Tanner, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1107; Dietrich v. Hutchinson, 73 Vt. 134.

the coverture.¹ In a few of them, of which New York, (a) Maine and Connecticut are examples, a wife may even deprive her husband of curtesy, by granting the real property during coverture, or devising it away from him at her death.² (a) The

(a) In New York, before the Revised Statutes took effect (Jan. 1, 1830) a married woman held and dealt with real property substantially as at common law, the custom of London having been adopted, permitting her to convey by a deed in which her husband joined. See New York note as to barring dower by deed, § 503, *supra*. The Revised Statutes practically left her *status* as to conveying by act *inter vivos* unchanged (see Macqueen, *Husb. & W. Ch.* III. pt. 2), although by 1 R. S. 732, § 80, 735, § 110, and 736, § 117, which are now combined in § 142 of the Real Property Law, there probably was intended some restriction as to the husband's curtesy right in property which she was authorized to convey by virtue of a power. The last-named section states that, "A general and beneficial power may be given to a married woman, to dispose, during her marriage and without concurrence of her husband, of real property conveyed or devised to her in fee." See *Leavitt v. Pell*, 25 N. Y. 474, 478. The Revised Statutes certainly did not enlarge a wife's ability to devise her realty; but, recognizing her capacity to execute a power by her will, they required her, of course, to deal with such powers only in the forms into which they had been remodelled by the statutes themselves. See *Beardsley v. Hotchkiss*, 96 N. Y. 201; *Wadhams v. American Home Missionary Soc.* 12 N. Y. 415. The net result was that her control and power of disposal of her realty were possibly restricted, rather than increased, by the legislation of 1830; and so her *status* in this particular remained until 1848. Beginning with Ch. 200 of the Laws of 1848, relative to her deeds, and Ch. 375 of the Laws of 1849, relative to her wills, statutes from time to time, as was heretofore explained (New York note to § 460, *supra*), have placed a married woman in a better position with regard to her real property than that which is occupied by a married man; for, while he can not bar her dower in his realty without her act or acquiescence, she can sell or devise any or all of her property, free and clear of his curtesy and of all of his rights of every kind. This ability is now found in the following codification of the various acts by which it has been produced: "Property, real and personal, now owned by a married woman, or hereafter owned by a woman at the time of her marriage, or acquired by her as prescribed in this chapter, and the rents, issues, proceeds and profits thereof, continues to be her sole and separate property as if she were unmarried, and is not subject to her husband's control or disposal nor liable to his debts." . . . "A married woman has all the rights in respect to property, real or personal, and the acquisition, use, enjoyment, and disposition thereof, and to make contracts in respect thereto with any person including her husband, and to carry on any business, trade or occu-

¹ *Ibid.*; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* §§ 6421, 6422; *Aldrich v. Mnrhead*, 101 U. S. 397; *Bertles v. Nunan*, 92 N. Y. 152; *Mygatt v. Coe*, 152 N. Y. 457; *Stratton v. Bailey*, 80 Me. 345; *Hunter's Appeal*, 40 Pa. St. 194; *Libby v. Chase*,

117 Mass. 105; *Levi v. Earl*, 30 Ohio St. 147; *Martin v. Remington*, 100 Wis. 540; *Robinson v. Queen*, 87 Tenn. 445; *Wells v. Batts*, 112 N. C. 283.

² N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 19, §§ 50, 51; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 6421.

only advantage in the wife's real property in such states, of which she may not legally deprive the husband if she will, is his right to live with her upon the property if she live there, or enjoy its income jointly with her as her husband.¹ In other words, the married women's statutes affecting her property rights have not gone to the extent of interfering with their family relationship. In some of the American states, of which Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Missouri are illustrations, while the wife's use and enjoyment of her property during the coverture are made absolute, she is not authorized to dispose of it, while her husband lives, without his concurrence or consent.²

§ 528. **Conveyance of Spouses' Realty — Conveyances between Them.**—It has been heretofore explained that, as unaffected by statute, the real property of the husband can not be sold free and clear of his wife's dower, without some act or acquiescence on her part; that at common law the only method of conveying her realty was by the joinder of him and her in a fine or common recovery, and that it required modern statutory law, following a custom of London, to enable her to deed away her realty.³ Most statutes of to-day now authorize her to convey her real property; and in many of the states she may do this, and give a good title, without any act or acquiescence of her husband.⁴

pation, and to exercise all powers and enjoy all rights in respect thereto and in respect to her contracts, and to be liable on such contracts, as if she were unmarried; but the husband and wife can not contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve the husband from his liability to support his wife." Domestic Relation Law (L. 1909, ch. 19, Con. L. c. 14), §§ 50, 51. For a résumé of the various statutes here combined and the leading cases which have construed them, see New York note as to Curtesy, § 460, *supra*.

¹ Reagle v. Reagle, 179 Pa. St. 89; Cole v. Van Riper, 44 Ill. 58; Snyder v. The People, 26 Mich. 106; Stewart, Hush. & W. § 233.

² Cole v. Van Riper, 44 Ill. 58; Cook v. Walling, 117 Ind. 9; Weber v. Tanner, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1107; Dietrich v. Hutchinson, 73 Vt. 134; Sutton v. Casseleggi, 77 Mo. 397; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 6421; Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 133. In New Jersey, a wife, it seems, may convey her realty by deed or act *inter vivos* with the consent of her husband though he does not join in the deed; but, if she die seised of it, she can not will it away

from him at her death, so as to deprive him of curtesy consummate. Vreeland v. Ryno, 26 N. J. Eq. 160; Middleton v. Steward, 47 N. J. Eq. 295; Colgan v. Pellens, 48 N. J. L. 27, 49 N. J. L. 694; Folwell's Case, 67 N. J. Eq. 570, 574, reversed on other grounds in 68 N. J. Eq. 728. See § 459, *supra*.

³ §§ 496, 503, *supra*.

⁴ Last four preceding notes. A distinction has frequently been made in the forms of the legislation as follows: When the statement of the statute is that the married woman may hold, or possess, or enjoy, real property as if she

✓ It was also a common-law rule that husband and wife could not convey real property directly from one to the other.¹ A court of equity would sometimes sustain such a transaction, when justice so demanded.² But a transfer by both of them to a third party as an intermediary, and a conveyance by him to the spouse who was intended to acquire the realty, were, and in the absence of positive statute still are, the one ordinary means of passing realty between husband and wife.³ In a few of the United States, legislation has now gone to the extent of permitting a transfer of realty directly between husband and wife. Such statutes are found in New York, (a) Maine, Minnesota, and Iowa, and perhaps in a few other states.⁴ And where these exist, it is held that a deed *delivered* by the husband to the

(a) In New York, this statute first took effect June 6, 1887, and was Ch. 537, L. 1887. It is now found as § 56 of the Domestic Relations Law (L. 1909, Ch. 19) as follows: "Husband and wife may convey or transfer real or personal property directly, the one to the other, without the intervention of a third person; and may make partition or division of any real property held by them as tenants in common, joint tenants, or tenants by the entireties. If so expressed in the instrument of partition or division, such instrument bars the wife's right to dower in such property, and also, if so expressed, the husband's tenancy by curtesy." See *Jones v. Jones*, 40 Misc. 360; *Hulse v. Bacon*, 26 Misc. 455, 457, 40 App. Div. 89.

were single, she is not thereby impliedly authorized to dispose of it without her husband's consent. But when the form of the statute is that she may convey, or dispose, or alienate, the property as if she were single, no act on his part is requisite to her transfer of a valid title. This distinction is simply an application of the general rule of construction of married women's legislation; and that rule is, generally, that any right which such a woman acquires by statute over her property must be given plainly and in unequivocal terms. *Naylor v. Field*, 29 N. J. L. 287; *Moore v. Cornell*, 68 Pa. St. 320; *Beal v. Warren*, 2 Gray (Mass.), 447. And see *Hatfield v. Sneden*, 54 N. Y. 280; *Bertles v. Nunan*, 92 N. Y. 152.

¹ *White v. Wager*, 25 N. Y. 328; *Shepard v. Shepard*, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 57; *Luntz v. Greve*, 102 Ind. 173; 1 *Blackst. Com. p. *442*; 1 *Roper, Husb. & W.* 53. "But the husband may do this by means of the statute of uses, by conveying to another to the use of the wife, or

by a covenant with a third person to stand seised to her use." 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 530; *Voorhees v. Presbyterian Church*, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 103; *Martin v. Martin*, 1 Me. 394. For explanation of the conveyances by means of uses here mentioned, see §§ 1051-1054, *infra*.

² *Jones v. Clifton*, 101 U. S. 228; *Moore v. Page*, 111 U. S. 117; *Hunt v. Johnson*, 44 N. Y. 27, 37; *Vought v. Vought*, 50 N. J. Eq. 177; *Jones v. Obenchain*, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 259; *Turner v. Shaw*, 96 Mo. 22; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 531.

³ Last two preceding notes; *Jackson v. Stevens*, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 110; *Jewell v. Porter*, 31 N. H. 34; *Gebb v. Rose*, 40 Md. 387; *McMillan v. Chee-ney*, 30 Minn. 519.

⁴ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 19, § 56; *Savage v. Savage*, 80 Me. 472; *Wilder v. Brooks*, 10 Minn. 32; *Robertson v. Robertson*, 25 Iowa, 350; *Walker v. Long*, 109 N. C. 510; *Bubier v. Roberts*, 49 Me. 460.

wife, after the taking effect of the statute, passes the title properly, although the deed was drawn and executed before the statute was enacted.¹

§ 529. **Statutory Life Estates.**—Comparatively recent legislation has added some interests, in quite a true sense to be styled estates, to the list that was made by the common law. These are homestead rights and interests, and community ownerships. They cluster around the married relationship, though the former does not necessarily arise therefrom. Community property, an outgrowth of civil-law rules as recognized and somewhat modified by statutes in a few of the Southern and Western states, calls for its discussion in connection with that of other co-ownerships of realty.² Homestead and exemption rights and interests, though not always constituting life estates, may be examined as well here as anywhere in this treatise.

Homestead.

§ 530. **Its Origin and Two-fold Nature.**—Homestead and exemption laws, resting as they do entirely on statutes, demand but a very brief discussion in a treatise of this character. The statutes themselves are to be consulted for details.³ There are in this country two materially different forms of "homestead" legislation; one the federal law, and the other the statutes of the several states. The former provides for the acquisition of land for a homestead, and incidentally exempts it from the debts of the homesteader *before he acquires his patent*;⁴ the latter authorize the head of a family to designate property (when acquired, or as already owned) as a homestead; and so to exempt it from his *future* debts.⁵ Thus, so far as their relieving property from debts of its owner is concerned, the state statutes begin where the federal statute ends.

The Revised Statutes of the United States⁶ authorize the head of a family, or a person twenty-one years old, who is a citizen of the United States or has filed a declaration of his intention to become such, to "acquire not more than one hundred and sixty acres of land by occupying and inhabiting" it, or a portion of it, for five years; or he may gain it sooner by

¹ As to effect of delivery of a deed, see § 1109, *infra*.

² § 691, *infra*.

³ See N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1397-1404; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 83-87.

⁴ U. S. R. S. § 2296.

⁵ § 533, *infra*.

⁶ U. S. R. S. §§ 2289-2317.

making certain prescribed payments.¹ During its acquisition and before the patent (deed from the government) issues, such property is not liable for debts of the homesteader.² Within that time, also, it is made exempt from state taxation. But it may be mortgaged as soon as the right to the patent is complete.³ When the patent issues to the owner, the federal exemption terminates. And from that time onward, but not before, it becomes possible for any existing state homestead law to affect the property.⁴

The several state homestead and exemption statutes, while varying in detail, agree substantially in authorizing a householder, or head of a family, to designate realty of a prescribed value as a homestead; and thereafter to continue to own it free from liability for his debts (except some privileged kinds); subject to pass to his widow (and sometimes the surviving husband) and children with the same exemption in their favor, such exemption usually to continue during the life of the widow or the minority of the youngest child; liable to be lost as a homestead interest by improper use or letting to others; and subject to have such right waived, abandoned, or disposed of, in favor of creditors or some classes of creditors.⁵ The following brief discussion is restricted to these points of resemblance among the various local statutes. (*a*)

(*a*) The New York homestead statutes declare that, "A lot of land, with one or more buildings thereon, not exceeding in value one thousand dollars, owned, and occupied as a residence, by a householder having a family, and heretofore designated as an exempt homestead, as prescribed by law, or hereafter designated for that purpose, as prescribed in the next section, is exempt from sale, by virtue of an execution, issued upon a judgment, recovered for a debt contracted after the thirtieth day of April, 1850; unless the judgment was recovered wholly for a debt or debts, contracted before the designation of the property, or for the purchase-money thereof. But no property heretofore or hereafter designated as an exempt homestead, as prescribed by law, or by the next section, shall be exempt from taxation, or from sale for non-payment of taxes or assessments."

"In order to designate property, to be exempted as prescribed in the

¹ U. S. R. S. §§ 2289-2291; *Clark v. Bayley*, 5 Or. 343; *Seymour v. Sanders*, 3 Dill (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 437; *Jarvis v. Hoffman*, 43 Cal. 314.

² U. S. R. S. § 2296; *Luhrz v. Hancock*, 181 U. S. 567; *Miller v. Little*, 47 Cal. 348.

³ *Carroll v. Safford*, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 441; *Nycum v. McAllister*, 33 Iowa, 374.

⁴ U. S. R. S. § 2296; *Hesnard v. Plunkett*, 6 S. D. 73. As to acquisition generally of land from the United States, by "public grant," and under the federal homestead law, see § 1065, *infra*.

⁵ These matters are more fully explained in the next succeeding four sections of the text.

§ 531. Who entitled to Homestead — For whose Benefit.—

The state statutes declare that this right shall belong to “a householder having a family,” or to the “head of a family,” or they use expressions of similar import; and some of them give the right to any resident of the state.¹ The test generally ac-

last section, a conveyance thereof, stating, in substance, that it is designed to be held as a homestead, exempt from sale by virtue of an execution, must be recorded, as prescribed by law; or a notice, containing a full description of the property and stating that it is designed to be so held, must be subscribed by the owner, acknowledged or proved, and certified, in like manner as a deed to be recorded in the county where the property is situated; and must be recorded in the office of the clerk of that county, in a book kept for that purpose, and styled the ‘homestead exemption book.’”

“A lot of land, with one or more buildings thereon, owned by a married woman, and occupied by her as a residence, may be designated as her exempt homestead, as prescribed in the last section; and the property so designated is exempt from sale, by virtue of an execution, under the same circumstances, and subject to the same exceptions, as the homestead of a householder, having a family.”

“The exemption, prescribed by the last three sections, continues, after the death of the person in whose favor the property was exempted, as follows:

“1. If the decedent was a woman, it continues, for the benefit of her surviving children, until the majority of the youngest surviving child.

“2. If the decedent was a man, it continues, for the benefit of his widow and surviving children, until the majority of the youngest surviving child, and until the death of the widow.

“But the exemption ceases earlier, if the property ceases to be occupied, as a residence, by a person for whose benefit it may so continue, except as otherwise prescribed in the next section.” Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1397-1400. It is also provided that temporary suspension of residence, for not more than a year, shall not destroy the homestead right; and that, if the property chosen exceed one thousand dollars in value, that much of the value in it may nevertheless be treated as a homestead; also that the homesteader may cancel the exemption, by a notice made and recorded in the same manner as that by which it was created; and the method of disposing of property when it exceeds a thousand dollars in value, and parcelling the proceeds among the creditors and those having the homestead rights, is carefully prescribed. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1401-1404. This statute is fairly and liberally construed, in harmony with its humane and remedial purpose. *Stewart v. Brown*, 37 N. Y. 350. Accordingly, a debtor can not waive the exemption by a prospective agreement. *Kneettle v. Newcomb*, 22 N. Y. 249. But the exemption is from debts contracted; and not from other obligations, as for torts, or the costs of an action. See *Schouton v. Kilmer*, 8 How. Pr. 527; *Robinson v. Wiley*, 15 N. Y. 489; *Crawford v. Lockwood*, 9 How. Pr. 547; *Peck v. Ormsby*, 55 Hun, 265; *Lathrop v. Singer*, 39 Barb. 396.

¹ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1397; *Calhoun v. Williams*, 32 Gratt. (Va.) Sproul v. McCoy, 26 Ohio St. 577; 18; *Dawley v. Ayers*, 23 Cal. 108;

cepted by the courts, as to who is the head of a family, is that this means one under a legal or moral duty to support a person or persons living with him.¹ Such is a husband living with his wife, though they have no children; or a son living with and supporting his mother; or a brother his sister; or a woman caring for and living with her illegitimate child.²

With substantial uniformity, the statutes extend the favor of this exemption, not only to the homesteader himself while he lives, but also to his widow, so long as she survives him and remains unmarried, and to his minor children while the youngest is under twenty-one years of age;³ and in a number of states, a surviving husband is given the same rights in the homestead property of the wife, who even during coverture is authorized to acquire a separate homestead.⁴

§ 532. **Character, Amount and Time of Exemption.**—Estates, both legal and equitable, are usually entitled to be brought under these exemptions, and this whether they are in fee, for life, or for years.⁵ Equities of redemption are included, and even rights emanating from contracts to purchase realty.⁶ Interests in partnership property, as a rule, can not be designated as homesteads, nor can remainders or reversions after freehold interests.⁷ In some states, a very beneficent addition is found, in the form of exemptions, in favor of surviving wife

Linton v. Crosby, 56 Iowa, 386; *Waples*, *Homest. ch. 3*; *Thomp. Homest. & Exemp.* 39, 52.

¹ *Moyer v. Drummond*, 32 S. C. 165; *Bank of Versailles v. Guthrey*, 127 Mo. 189; *Blackwell v. Broughton*, 56 Ga. 390; *Lane v. Phillips*, 69 Tex. 240; *Thomp. Homest. & Exemp.* 46. See *Whalen v. Cadman*, 11 Iowa, 226; *Powers v. Sample*, 72 Miss. 187.

² *Ibid.*; *Kitchell v. Burgwin*, 21 Ill. 40; *Cox v. Stafford*, 14 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 519; *Pierce v. Kusic*, 56 Vt. 418; *Marsh v. Lazenby*, 41 Ga. 153; *Miller v. Finegan*, 26 Fla. 29; *Greenwood v. Maddox*, 27 Ark. 649; *Ellis v. White*, 47 Cal. 73. But ordinarily it does not include a person having no one dependent on him, and simply living with hired servants. *Ellis v. Davis*, 90 Ky. 183; *Calhoun v. McLendon*, 42 Ga. 405; *Whitehead v. Nickelson*, 48 Tex. 517.

³ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1400; 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 87; *Fleetwood*

v. Lord, 87 Ga. 592; *Hoppe v. Fountain*, 104 Cal. 94; *Thomp. Homest. & Exemp.* 454, 476.

⁴ 1 *Stim. Amer. Stat. L.* § 87; *Stults v. Sale*, 92 Ky. 5; *In re Lamb's Estate*, 95 Cal. 397; *Hall v. Fields*, 81 Tex. 553. In New York, a married woman may acquire a homestead, which will enure to the benefit of her surviving children till the youngest is twenty-one; but there is no provision in favor of any surviving husband. N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1399, 1400.

⁵ *Bartholomew v. West*, 2 Dill. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) 293; *Doane v. Doane*, 46 Vt. 485; *McKee v. Wilcox*, 11 Mich. 358; *Maatta v. Kippola*, 102 Mich. 116; *Allen v. Hawley*, 66 Ill. 164; *Alexander v. Jackson*, 92 Cal. 514; *Tyler v. Jewett*, 82 Ala. 93; *Waples, Homest.* 108.

⁶ *Ibid.*; *Fyffe v. Beers*, 18 Iowa, 11; *Cheatham v. Jones*, 68 N. C. 153.

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Drake v. Moore*, 66 Iowa, 53; *Howell v. Jones*, 91 Tenn. 402; *Kingsley v. Kingsley*, 39 Cal. 665.

or minor children, of property not made a homestead during the life of the father or husband. This has been designated probate homestead.¹

The amount of property which may be thus withdrawn from creditors varies, of course; one thousand dollars worth, as in New York, being about an average amount.² It is usually held that, in estimating the value, improvements on the land shall be included; and it is quite generally insisted that the piece to be taken as a homestead shall be one connected piece or tract, and not made up of separated parcels.³

√The gist of these exemptions is to provide a home for a debtor and his family. Therefore, the ordinary time for their continuance is during his life, and the life of his surviving widow or while she remains unmarried, and the minority of the youngest child.⁴ And in some of the laws, which authorize a married woman to acquire a homestead, a surviving husband is given the same right during his life.⁵

§ 533. **Debts excluded — Form and Notice of such Exclusion.** — Most debts of a homesteader, contracted after the property is duly designated and noticed as a homestead, can not reach such property for their payment. The exceptions, called privileged debts, are carefully specified by the statutes; and generally include obligations incurred for all or some portion of the purchase money of the homestead property, taxes, assessments, and sales for taxes and assessments; also quite usually debts contracted for improving the property or for removing encumbrances therefrom.⁶ Notice to those who may become

¹ *Mercier v. Chace*, 9 Allen (Mass.), 242; *Lindsey v. Brewer*, 60 Vt. 627; *Atkinson v. Atkinson*, 40 N. H. 249; *Norris v. Morrison*, 45 N. H. 490; *Howell v. Jones*, 91 Tenn. 402; *Steiner v. McDaniel*, 110 Ala. 409.

² N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1397, 1402, 1403; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 83; *Vanstory v. Thornton*, 110 N. C. 10; *Thomp. Homest. & Exemp.* 100.

³ *Ibid.*; *Adams v. Jenkins*, 16 Gray (Mass.), 146; *Trne v. Morrill*, 28 Vt. 672; *Reynolds v. Hull*, 36 Iowa, 394; *Bunker v. Locke*, 15 Wis. 635. Some statutes specify particularly means of ascertaining value, and make careful distinction between urban and rural properties in this particular. *Frost v. Rainbow*, 85 Iowa, 289; *Bassett v.*

Messner, 30 Tex. 604. See *Bank v. Gale*, 42 Vt. 27; *Mayho v. Cotton*, 69 N. C. 289; *Hodges v. Winston*, 95 Ala. 514.

⁴ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1400; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 87; *Kerley v. Kerley*, 13 Allen (Mass.), 286; *Hoppe v. Fountain*, 104 Cal. 94; *Jones v. Gilbert*, 135 Ill. 27; *Wilson v. Proctor*, 28 Minn. 13; *Dayton v. Donart*, 22 Kan. 256; *Hunter v. Law*, 68 Ala. 365; *Thomp. Homest. & Exemp.* §§ 569-579; *Waples, Homest. ch.* 21.

⁵ *Henson v. Moore*, 104 Ill. 403; *Burns v. Keas*, 21 Iowa, 257; *Ellis v. Davis*, 90 Ky. 183; *In re Armstrong's Est.* 80 Cal. 71.

⁶ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1397; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 83; *Titus v.*

creditors after the property has become a homestead is required in some states, as for example in New York, to be given by deed, or written notice, duly acknowledged and recorded; in other jurisdictions, actual occupancy of the property as a home for the owner and his family is sufficient.¹ Perhaps the prevailing theory of the statutes is that open, continued occupancy by a family is sufficient notice of homestead rights; but the safe form of law is that which requires record of written notice.²

The property to be held as a homestead may be selected by the homesteader, and indicated by residence or notice as above stated; and it is usually provided that, when the specific piece of land so chosen exceeds in value the authorized amount, that much may be deducted and retained, practically as equitably converted back into realty, for the benefit of the homesteader, out of the larger amount obtained from the sale of the land for payment of his debts.³

§ 534. **Termination of Homestead Rights.**—The favor conferred by these important statutes may be lost by abandonment, or waiver, or alienation of the property specifically free of the claim. Failure to occupy the land as a home, continued for the prescribed period, as in New York for over one year, causes its loss by abandonment.⁴ Obtaining or designating another piece of property for a homestead does the same; and so ordinarily does leasing all or any portion of it for business purposes, or letting it out for any purpose that tends to indicate a relinquishment of it as a home.⁵ The homesteader may waive the exemption, either entirely, or in favor of specific debts when they are contracted.⁶ The most careful statutes require this to be done by the recording of a notice similar to that by which

Warren, 67 Vt. 242; Hensey v. Hensey, 92 Ky. 164; First Nat. Bk. v. Bruce, 94 Cal. 77; Griffin v. Treutlen, 48 Ga. 148; Thomp. Homest. & Exemp. § 253.

¹ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1398; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 86; McMonegal v. Wilson, 103 Mich. 264; Titman v. Moore, 43 Ill. 169; Drake v. Root, 2 Colo. 685; Gregg v. Bostwick, 33 Cal. 220; Thomp. Homest. & Exemp. §§ 198, 199.

² *Ibid.*

³ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1402, 1403; Amphlett v. Hibbard, 29 Mich. 298; Miller's Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 300; Mayfield v. Maasden, 59 Iowa, 517.

⁴ In New York, because of injury to or destruction of the dwelling house. N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1400, 1401; Loveless v. Thomas, 152 Ill. 479; Corey v. Schuster, 44 Neb. 269; William Deering & Co. v. Beard, 48 Kan. 16; Thomp. Homest. & Exemp. § 218.

⁵ Foster v. Leland, 141 Mass. 187; Drury v. Bachelder, 11 Gray (Mass.), 214; Cahill v. Wilson, 62 Ill. 137; Herick v. Graves, 16 Wis. 163; Davis v. Andrews, 30 Vt. 678; Locke v. Rowell, 47 N. H. 46; Kaes v. Gross, 92 Mo. 647.

⁶ Hutching v. Huggins, 59 Ill. 29; Ferguson v. Kumler, 25 Minn. 183; Webster v. Trust Co., 93 Ga. 278; Thomp. Homest. & Exemp. § 384.

the exemption is acquired.¹ But, in the absence of such positive legislation, the waiver may be accomplished by agreement with the creditor in the act of creating the debt, the debtor's wife usually being required to join in the agreement.²

Where written recorded notice of relinquishment of the right is not demanded by the statute,³ it may be disposed of in the process of selling the homestead property.⁴ Where this is possible, and it is so in most states, the statute generally requires the wife of a homesteader to unite with him in the conveyance, or to express clearly in writing, or in some other way designated by the statute, her relinquishment of her interest in the homestead land.⁵

These few general statements, as to homestead and exemption laws and interests, are probably all that can be of service in a work of this character. Full discussions of the statutes and their constructions may be found in such treatises as Thompson on Homestead and Exemption Laws, Waples' on Homestead and Exemptions, and Smyth on Homestead and Exemptions; and in the treatment of the subject in the American and English Encyclopædia of Law, and in The Cyclopædia of Law.

§ 535. **Conclusion as to kinds of Life Estates.** — In this chapter, some estates have been referred to which are not necessarily for life. The proposition is generally true, however, that most of the interests created by operation of law or statute from the married relationship — curtesy, dower, jointure, estates during marriage and homestead — are life estates; and the discussion of those that may extend to greater length, such as some forms of jointure for example, logically belongs with the treatment of life interests. All the life estates, both conventional and legal, have now been explained, so far as their origin and general character are concerned. It simply remains to discuss, with regard to all of them, the rights and duties of life owners of real property. Those matters are the topics of the following chapter.

¹ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1404; Thomp. Homest. & Exemp. § 384.

² Ibid.; Beecher v. Baldy, 7 Mich. 488; Crum v. Sawyer, 132 Ill. 443; Littlejohn v. Egerton, 76 N. C. 468.

³ See N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1404; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 85.

⁴ Ibid.; Burnside v. Terry, 51 Ga. 186; Gilbert v. Cowan, 3 Lea (Tenn.), 203; Fishback v. Lane, 36 Ill. 437; Thomp. Homest. & Exemp. § 401.

⁵ Ibid.; Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106; Wallace v. Insurance Co., 54 Kan. 442; Lamb v. Shays, 14 Iowa, 567; Poland v. Vesper, 67 Mo. 727.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF LIFE TENANTS — ESTOVERS — EMBLEMMENTS — WASTE.

§ 536. Nature of life estates — Rights and duties of their owners are relative.

Rights of Life Tenants.

§ 537. Life tenant's rights in general.

§ 538. Life tenant's right to the use and enjoyment of the property — Apportionment of rent.

§ 539. Life tenant's right to alienate all or part of his interest.

§ 540. Common-law forfeiture because of life tenant's attempted alienation of more than his own estate.

§ 541. A life tenant's estovers.

§ 542. Life tenant's emblements.

§ 543. *First*, the estate of him who obtains emblements must ordinarily be of uncertain duration.

§ 544. *Second*, the crops to be taken as emblements must be the result of annual cultivation.

§ 545. *Third*, emblements do not belong to a life tenant who terminates his own estate.

§ 546. *Fourth*, emblements belong to the life tenant who substantially causes the crop to begin to grow.

Duties of Life Tenants.

§ 547. A life owner's four duties.

§ 548. A life tenant must protect and not deny or impair the succeeding owner's title.

§ 549. A life owner must keep encumbrances from increasing against the property.

§ 550. A life tenant must make substantial repairs — Improvements made by him.

§ 551. A life tenant must abstain from committing waste.

Waste.

§ 552. Waste defined and explained.

§ 553. Kinds of waste.

§ 554. How waste may be committed.

§ 555. *First*, waste affecting the soil or things that it contains.

§ 556. *Second*, waste affecting trees — Natural products of the soil.

§ 557. *Third*, waste affecting artificial erections on the land.

§ 558. Remedies for waste.

§ 559. Conclusion as to freehold estates.

§ 536. **Nature of Life Estates — Rights and Duties of their Owners are Relative.** — A life owner, or life tenant as the law frequently designates him, has more than a mere *jus in re aliena* — more than a *usufruct* of the land.¹ From the time

¹ 2 Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2d ed.), p. 8.

when history gives us the first glimpses of him, he has been regarded as an *owner* of the land, — a temporary owner, it is true, but nevertheless an owner.¹ Proprietary rights in realty have always been projected by the common law upon the plane of time. And, if we treat the fee simple as extending over that plane in an infinite straight line, the life owner's interest is simply a small piece of that line. The *quantum* of his estate is finite. That of the fee-simple owner is infinite.² The life tenant, as has been heretofore explained, is a freeholder. He has a legally protected seisin. He is the representative of the land in common-law litigation. It was only by gradual stages that his obligations to the succeeding owner, as they are now recognized, such, for example, as his liability for waste, were fully developed.³ The life tenant, therefore, as distinguished from a mere possessor or usufructuary, must be understood in discussing his rights and duties as an owner, one to whom belongs a definite portion of the infinite straight line of ownership of the property.

But, standing thus as a temporary proprietor, the life tenant becomes obligated, as the common law unfolds, to recognize, to conserve, and in large degree to defend the interests of succeeding owners. These duties flow directly between the life owner and the reversioner, because of the fealty which the feudal system imposes upon the former; and derivatively between the life owner and the remainderman, who, through the rights derived from previous owners or through the provisions of statutes, was gradually made able to enforce them.⁴ Therefore, with natural, inherent rights to deal with and dispose of his interest as an owner, the life tenant holds those rights and that interest in a position somewhat subordinate to the succeeding owner, whose correlative rights he must respect. The solutions of questions as to such a temporary owner's dealing with the land will ordinarily be found in these general principles. The further discussion of them calls for a division of the topics into, *first*, rights of life tenants; and *second*, duties of life tenants.

¹ *Ibid.*; Digby, *Hist. Law R. P.* (5th ed.) p. 28, note 1.

² 2 *Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law* (2d ed.), pp. 8-10.

³ *Ibid.*; §§ 72, 415, *supra*.

⁴ *Co. Lit.* 143a, 298a; *Delaney v.*

Fox, 2 C. B. N. S. 768; *Goode v. Gaines*, 145 U. S. 141; *Hall v. French*, 165 Mo. 430; *Anderson v. Messinger*, 77 C. C. A. 179; 1 *Prest. Est.* pp. *45-*59, *207, *208; 2 *Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law* (2d ed.), pp. 6-8; §§ 866, 872, *infra*.

Rights of Life Tenants.

§ 537. **Life Tenant's Rights in General.** — As a temporary owner of the real property, with the general powers over it which flow from such ownership qualified as they are by his relation to the succeeding tenants, the life tenant has rights that may be grouped conveniently under four heads or classes. These are: his right to use and enjoy the land; his right to alienate or dispose of all or part of his interest; his right to estovers; and his right to emblements. A brief discussion of each of these is required.

§ 538. **Life Tenant's Right to the Use and Enjoyment of the Property — Apportionment of Rent.** — Subject to the law's prohibition of waste,¹ the tenant for life may have all the use and enjoyment of the property, in the condition in which he receives it, that he can reasonably obtain during his ownership. Thus, he may cultivate it and take the crops. He may lease it out, for his entire period or less, and obtain the rents, profits, and income. And when he is the temporary proprietor of realty held under a lease made by a former owner, and so is occupying by another's act the position of landlord to the lessee, he may collect and retain all the rents and services from such lessee during the continuance of his own estate.²

It has been heretofore explained that, if a lease for years be for such a term that a life tenant is the landlord during a part of the time, and on his death another will become the landlord, any rent moneys or returns becoming due after the death of the life tenant, though they partly accrued before that time, would belong at common law entirely to the succeeding landlord.³ Thus, when A was tenant and B was his first landlord during B's life, and after B's death C, as the fee owner, became his landlord, rent money, becoming due after B's death for a period during a part of which B had lived, would all be collected and retained by C at common law.⁴ As was heretofore explained, this unfairness in result has been uniformly done away with by modern statutes; and the representatives of the life owner, after his death, may recover from the succeeding

¹ For discussion of waste as an injury to the "inheritance" or succeeding interest, see §§ 551-558, *infra*.

² 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *122, *123; Wms. R. P. pp. *23-*25. The limita-

tions of a life owner's right to use the land are found in the law of "waste," q. v. §§ 551-558, *infra*.

³ § 110, *supra*.

⁴ *Ibid*.

landlord the proportionate amount of the money thus paid, which is represented by the period during which the life owner was landlord.¹ Thus the right of the life tenant to the apportionment of rents has been made by modern legislation one of his very material interests.

§ 539. **Life Tenant's Right to alienate All or Part of his Interest.** — Being the owner of a temporary interest, a life tenant, when not restricted by the terms of the conveyance to him, may transfer or mortgage that interest or any part thereof.² But in this connection it must always be borne in mind that one can not sell what he does not own. The life tenant, of course, can not alienate the property in fee. Thus, if land be owned by A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, a purchaser who desires to acquire the fee must obtain a conveyance from both A and B. All that A can dispose of, without B's concurrence or assistance, is that finite portion of the line of ownership which is represented by his life.³ He may alienate all of this, or he may lease it temporarily, or he may grant it to another during such other's life, or he may convey it to one and the heirs of his body and so create a *quasi* estate tail as heretofore explained.⁴

¹ Ibid. For general discussion of apportionment of rent, see §§ 110, 118, *supra*.

² Jackson v. Van Hoesen, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 325; Criswell v. Grumbling, 107 Pa. St. 408; Ridgely v. Cross, 83 Md. 161; 1 Cruise, Dig. tit. iii. ch. i. § 32.

³ Ibid.; Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 N. Y. 41; Brustman v. Motrie, 118 N. Y. App. Div. 395; Dickinson v. Blake, 116 N. Y. App. Div. 545; McDonald v. Woodward, 58 S. C. 554.

⁴ § 430, *supra*. When a life tenant conveys his entire interest, he thus brings into being an estate *per autre vie*, § 443, *supra*. Thus, if A, holding land for his own life, transfer it to B, he, of course, makes B the owner of it during the life of A. This is a very ordinary method of bringing an estate *per autre vie* into existence. When a life owner leases his interest, thus creating, for example, an estate for five or ten or fifty years, he does so subject to his own limitations; and the interest of the tenant for years must terminate at the

death of the life owner, though the time designated in his lease has not expired. It is for this reason that the custom arose in the common law of adding to the interests of life owners powers to make leases for definite periods, usually twenty-one years, that should continue though the lessors died. Thus, if land were conveyed to A for his life without any added power, and A leased it for ten years, and died eight months thereafter, the lease would immediately terminate on A's death. But if A were given in addition to his life estate a power to make leases, say for twenty-one years at a time, and he leased for ten years by virtue of his power, the lease would continue and make the lessee the tenant of the subsequent owner of the land, even though A died at the end of eight months, or at any time within the ten-year period of the lease. A power to lease so given to a life tenant, or other temporary owner, is a power appendant. For explanation of such powers, see § 924, *infra*.

§ 540. **Common-Law Forfeiture because of Life Tenant's Attempted Alienation of more than his own Estate.** — At common law, an attempt by a life tenant to convey the real property in fee by a common law method of transfer, i. e., by feoffment and livery of seisin, or by fine or common recovery, was regarded both as a renunciation of the feudal connection between him and the lord of the fee, and as divesting the seisin of the rightful succeeding owner and turning it into a mere right of entry on the part of the latter. Therefore, such a tortious conveyance by the life tenant produced a forfeiture of his own estate.¹ A transfer merely by lease, however long, did not produce this result, because it did not interfere with the seisin;² nor did a conveyance by an instrument operating by virtue of the statute of uses, and without transmutation of possession, such as a deed of bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised, or lease and release.³

These rules and results were highly technical. And, while in theory they may be found still operating in a few jurisdictions where corrective legislation has not been passed, yet in England, by virtue of the Statute 8 & 9 Vict. ch. 106, sec. 4, in New York, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, and most of the American states by positive legislation, and in practically all others by tacit acquiescence of their courts, they have been substantially abolished.⁴ And the one working principle of to-day is that he who owns any temporary estate, whether for life, or years, or otherwise, transfers simply what he owns, though by his instrument he essays to convey a greater interest.⁵ (a)

(a) In New York, the common-law rule as to tortious conveyances existed until it was abolished by the Revised Statutes, Jan. 1, 1830. The statute, in its present form, declares that, — “A conveyance made by a tenant for life or years, of a greater estate than he possesses, or can lawfully convey, does not work a forfeiture of his estate, but passes to the grantee all the title, estate, or interest which such tenant can lawfully con-

¹ Lit. §§ 415, 416; Co. Lit. §§ 251, 252; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *274, *275. See § 287, *supra*.

² *Ibid.*; Locke v. Rowell, 47 N. H. 46.

³ Jackson v. Mancius, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 357; Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270, 285; Stevens v. Winship, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 318; 4 Kent, Com. p. *84. For description of such conveyances, and how they operate, see §§ 1052-1054, *infra*.

⁴ N. Y. L. 1909, ch. 52, § 245; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1402; McKee v. Pfout, 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 486; Hurd v. Cushing, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 169; Quimby v. Dill, 40 Me. 528; Hotel Co. v. Marsh, 63 N. H. 230; Middleton v. Dougherty, 46 N. J. L. 350; Smith v. Cooper, 59 Ala. 494; Wms. R. P. p. *146; 4 Kent, Com. p. *83; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 232, note 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*

The grantor of a life estate may validly restrict its alienation. He may, for example, successfully provide that the life interest shall terminate if its owner should attempt to convey or encumber it, or if it be attached, or be sought to be taken away from him on execution by his creditors.¹ And it has been heretofore shown how spendthrift trusts, and trusts for the sole and separate use of married women, and some statutory trusts, such as the third and fourth forms of active express trusts of New York, may validly restrain the alienability of life interests.² It is simply to be added here that the only limitation, on the part of the grantor, to restrain the alienability of life estates, has been enunciated in the rule, that he can not successfully provide merely that an attempt by the life owner to sell or encumber his interest shall be void — he can not so fix it that the life estate must remain intact, free from alienability; for that would be repugnant to the nature of the estate.³

§ 541. **Life Tenant's Estovers.** — Estovers, or "botes" in Anglo-Saxon, are such and so much wood or timber as life tenants and other temporary owners, such as tenants for years or from year to year, have a right to take from the land when needed for one or more of three purposes. Those purposes are indicated by the names given to the three kinds of botes, which are, house-bote or fire-bote, hay-bote or hedge-bote,⁴ and plough-bote. The first of these is wood taken from the land sufficient for repairing the houses and burning as fuel. The second is wood taken for the suitable repairing of the hedges, gates, or fences upon the property. And the third is wood for repairing ploughs and other agricultural imple-

vey." Real Prop. L. (L. 1909, ch. 52) § 247, which was originally 1 R. S. 739, § 145. Even before 1830, a conveyance by a tenant by curtesy, in order to work a forfeiture, must have been by feoffment and livery of seisin. *Jackson v. Mancius*, 2 Wend. 357. See *Thompson v. Simpson*, 128 N. Y. 270; *Moore v. Littel*, 41 N. Y. 66, 78; *Sparrow v. Kingman*, 1 N. Y. 242; *Grout v. Townsend*, 2 Hill, 554.

¹ *Lockyer v. Savage*, 2 Stra. 947; *Nichols v. Eaton*, 91 U. S. 716; *De Peyster v. Michael*, 6 N. Y. 467, 491; *Jackson v. Silvernail*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 278; *Gray, Restr. Alien. Prop.* §§ 78-89. But one who grants an estate to himself for life can not take away his own right to alienate. *Gray, Restr. Alien. Prop.* §§ 90-99. See *Schenck v. Barnes*, 156 N. Y. 316.

² §§ 335, 336, and note p. 496, *supra*.

³ *Hallett v. Thompson*, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 586; *Bramhall v. Ferris*, 14 N. Y. 41, 44; *Todd v. Sawyer*, 147 Mass. 570; *Hahn v. Hutchinson*, 159 Pa. St. 133; *Bridge v. Ward*, 35 Wis. 687; *Gray, Restr. Alien. Prop.* § 134.

⁴ The Anglo-Saxon word "hay" means hedge. 2 Blackst. Com. p. *35.

ments to be used upon the land.¹ The privilege of a life tenant to take enough timber for these purposes is as old as the common-law recognition of his estate, and is found in modern law substantially as it has always existed.²

The kinds of wood that may be taken for these purposes have been carefully designated in England; and, without so much exactness, are subject to some limitations in the United States. In the mother country, the maxim early arose and has since existed that "Oak, ash and elm are timber throughout the realm"; and such wood especially is entitled to be protected and preserved. Wood, other than timber, can be taken without such careful restriction, and the law of estovers applies primarily to timber only.³ In this country this distinction has not been recognized, and all kinds of wood are treated substantially alike in applying the law of estovers.⁴ On both sides of the Atlantic, the life owner must not cut down living trees, when there is sufficient deadwood for his purposes; he must not destroy fruit trees nor those that are ornamental, nor take wood of a superior quality when that of an inferior quality on the land will suffice; he must not fell more than is needed; and if he do so he will be guilty of waste.⁵ He is also guilty of waste, probably everywhere, when he allows the fences or a house on the land unreasonably to go to decay, and then for the purpose of repairing cuts more wood than would otherwise have been needed.⁶ So, he is not permitted to take wood to make improvements or additions which he is not legally required as life owner to make.⁷ And if, under the guise of estovers, he cut wood for the purpose of selling it or exchang-

¹ Co. Lit. 41 b, 53 b; 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *35, *122; Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 227; Van Deusen v. Young, 29 N. Y. 9; Padelford v. Padelford, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 152; Smith v. Jewett, 40 N. H. 530; Walters v. Hinchins, 29 Ind. 136.

² Ibid.; 4 Kent, Com. p. *73.

³ Co. Lit. 53 a; Honywood v. Honywood, L. R. 18 Eq. 306, in which oak, ash, and elm are said to make timber only when they are twenty years or more of age and not too old to be usable wood. Dashwood v. Magniac (1891), 3 Ch. 306.

⁴ Livingston v. Reynolds, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 122; Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 227; Sayers v. Hoskin-

son, 110 Pa. St. 473; Webster v. Webster, 33 N. H. 26; Davis v. Clark, 40 Mo. App. 515; Keeler v. Eastman, 11 Vt. 293; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 351. The extent to which trees may be cut by a life owner is further discussed, *infra*, under the subject of waste.

⁵ Doe d. Foley v. Wilson, 11 East, 56; Sarles v. Sarles, 3 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 601; Van Deusen v. Young, 29 N. Y. 9, 30; Bellows v. McGinnis, 17 Ind. 64; White v. Cutler, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 248; 1 Willard, R. P. 76; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. §§ 351-353.

⁶ Ibid.; Co. Lit. 53 b.

⁷ Ibid.; Miller v. Shields, 55 Ind. 71. . .

ing it for other timber, though he use the latter for repairs on the land, he is guilty of waste.¹

The right to estovers is an important incident of life estates, and as such is assignable, or transferable, or capable of being encumbered therewith. But it can not be separated from the principal property to which it attaches and assigned as a distinct interest.²

§ 542. **Life Tenant's Emblements.** — Not only may the owner of a life estate take from the land the annual crops which he brings to maturity during his life, but also, after his death, or at the prior termination of his estate by an event the time of which was uncertain, he or his personal representatives are entitled to crops of that nature which are growing there at that time. Such crops are designated "emblements";³ and in some jurisdictions, such as England, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, where the right to them is extended by special custom, they are denominated "away-going crops."⁴ A life tenant's interest in such crops not only permits him or his representatives, as the case may be, to take them after his death, but also includes the privilege of going on the land and doing all that is necessary to bring them to maturity and harvest them.⁵ This is not an absolute ownership or tenancy of the land after the life owner's death, but simply the right of using and dealing with the property as far as is reasonably necessary to produce and take away the annual crops.⁶ The right of emblements presents a very definite branch of law, which may be summarized by describing its four requisites. These are: *First*, the estate of him who obtains emblements must be uncertain in duration; *second*, the crops must be the result of annual cultivation; *third*, the estate must not terminate by the act or will of its owner; and *fourth*, he to whom the emblements are to belong must have been the substantial cause or producer of the crop. A few words as to each of these requisites.

¹ *Simmons v. Norton*, 7 Bing. 640; *Robinson v. Kime*, 70 N. Y. 147; *White v. Cutler*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 248; *Miles v. Miles*, 32 N. H. 147; *Armstrong v. Wilson*, 60 Ill. 226; *Davis v. Clark*, 40 Mo. App. 515.

² Co. Lit. 54 b; *Roberts v. Whiting*, 16 Mass. 186; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 253.

³ Co. Lit. 55 b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *122; *Graves v. Weld*, 5 B. & Ad. 105; *Stewart v. Dougherty*, 9 Johns.

(N. Y.) 108; *Reiff v. Reiff*, 64 Pa. St. 134; *Thornton v. Burch*, 20 Ga. 791; 4 Kent, Com. p. *122.

⁴ *Wigglesworth v. Dallison*, 1 Doug. 205; *Shaw v. Bowman*, 91 Pa. St. 414; *Van Doren v. Everitt*, 5 N. J. L. 528; 4 Kent, Com. p. *73, note (d).

⁵ Co. Lit. 56 a; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *122; *Forsythe v. Price*, 8 Watts (Pa.), 282.

⁶ *Ibid.*

§ 543. **First. The Estate of him who Obtains Emblements must Ordinarily be of Uncertain Duration.** — If a temporary owner of real property know the exact time when his tenancy is to terminate, it is his own folly if he begin to raise a crop that can not mature before that time; and therefore he is not entitled to any interest in that crop after his estate ends.¹ But the owner of an estate uncertain as to time — an interest which normally will terminate by the act of God, or the act of some person other than its owner — not being able to know whether or not the crop will mature before the expiration of his tenancy, is generally entitled to emblements.² Typical of such an interest is a life estate.³ And others are those from year to year and at will, when not terminated by act or wrong of the tenant.⁴ But a tenant at sufferance, though holding a precarious interest, has never been allowed emblements; and this is because of the unimportant character of his estate.⁵ In England, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, and possibly one or two other states, a special custom has been recognized whereby tenants for years are given the right of emblements. The products which such owners take after their leases expire, in those jurisdictions specially, are designated “away-going crops.”⁶

§ 544. **Second. The Crops to be taken as Emblements must be the Result of Annual Cultivation.** — The distinctions between *fructus naturales* and *fructus industriales* have been heretofore explained.⁷ *Fructus industriales* — crops which are the result

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *145; Whitmarsh v. Cutting, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 360; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180; Chesley v. Welch, 37 Me. 106; Kittredge v. Woods, 3 N. H. 503; Carmine v. Boweu, 104 Md. 198; 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 534. But even such a tenant, independent of special custom, may have emblements when his estate is prematurely terminated without his act or fault. Ibid.; 4 Kent, Com. p. *73.

² Co. Lit. 55 b; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *122; Graves v. Weld, 5 B. & Ad. 105; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180; Bradley v. Bailey, 56 Conn. 374; Keays v. Blinn, 234 Ill. 121; Hawkins v. Skegg, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 31; Reilly v. Ringland, 39 Iowa, 106; 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 534.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Co. Lit. 55 b, 56 a; Kingsbury v.

Collins, 4 Bing. 202; Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24; Samson v. Rose, 65 N. Y. 411; Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43; Brown v. Thurston, 56 Me. 126; Howell v. Schenck, 24 N. J. L. 89; 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. §§ 534, 535.

⁵ Ibid.; Doe d. Bennett v. Turner, 7 M. & W. 226; Miller v. Cheney, 88 Ind. 466, 470; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 259.

⁶ Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 1 Doug. 205; Van Doreu v. Everitt, 5 N. J. L. 528; Shaw v. Bowman, 91 Pa. St. 414; Templeman v. Biddle, 1 Harr. (Del.) 522; Foster v. Robinson, 6 Ohio St. 90; 4 Kent, Com. p. *73, note (d); 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 538. Compare Harris v. Carson, 7 Leigh (Va.), 632; Howell v. Schenck, 24 N. J. L. 89.

⁷ §§ 51-53, *supra*.

of annual cultivation, such as corn, peas, beans, or potatoes, are those which may be successfully claimed as emblements.¹ This means ordinarily, of course, that they are crops which require the planting of the seeds each year; but this is not always essential. Hops, for example, will grow from old roots year after year without the necessity of annual planting, but no material crop can be obtained from them without careful cultivation.² A life owner who cultivates these may have emblements, and it is the fact of his *annual cultivation* that gives the right.³ This cultivation, moreover, must have for its sole object the production of a crop for that one year. It must not be designed permanently to improve or enhance the value of the land. If the tree, bush, or vine be one which after being planted will of itself bear successive crops for years, the planting is naturally calculated to increase the value of the realty itself; the product of any one year can not then be said essentially to owe its existence to labor expended during that year, and the right of emblements does not attach. In a word, the crop, whether or not its seeds have to be planted annually, must depend absolutely on annual cultivation, and the only purpose and effect of that cultivation must be to produce the crop for that year alone.⁵

§ 545. **Third. Emblements do not belong to a Tenant who terminates his Own Estate.**—The ending of his interest by the act of God, or the act of some person other than himself, is the third essential of a life owner's emblement.⁶ If he culpably commit suicide while the crop is growing, or forfeit his estate, he loses all interest therein. And a woman, who holds an estate during her widowhood, forfeits her annual crop by remarrying before its maturity.⁷ This principle applies, not only to the life owner himself, but also to his assignee of the growing crop; and, therefore, if he sell only the corn standing in the field and commit suicide before it is ripe, his purchaser

¹ 1 Rolle, Abr. 726, ch. 9; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 256; Stewart v. Doughty, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 108; Reiff v. Reiff, 64 Pa. St. 134.

² Co. Lit. 55 b, note; Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & C. 832; State v. Moore, 11 Ired. (N. C.) 70; Florida Sawmill Co. v. Parrish, 46 So. Rep. 461 (Ala.); Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N. C. 63; 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 534, note 1.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. Therefore, there is no right to emblements in a crop of blackberries, even in the year in which the bushes are planted. Sparrow v. Pond, 49 Minn. 412. See Hetfield v. Lawton, 108 N. Y. App. Div. 113.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *123; 4 Kent, Com. p. *73.

⁷ Ibid.; Dehow v. Colfax, 10 N. J. L. 128.

loses all interest therein.¹ But the assignee or sub-lessee of the life tenant's estate in the land is not affected by this stringent rule.² Thus, when A owns a farm for his life and sells his life interest to B, who is raising corn or beans or potatoes thereon, B has the emblements, though A voluntarily takes his own life. And when a woman, holding land during her widowhood, sublets it to one who plants corn upon it, the latter may harvest and own the corn, though the widow remarry before it is ripe.³ But he who thus holds the land can have no emblements, if he participate in the act or cause that terminates the estate.⁴

§ 546. **Fourth. Emblements belong to the Life Tenant who substantially causes the Crop to begin to grow.** — No amount of preparation of the ground by a life owner will entitle his representatives to emblements, if the seeds be not planted or the crop be not growing at the time of his death.⁵ But when his labor has already put the seeds into the ground, or results in the cultivation of the vines (as for example those of hops growing up from old roots), in such manner that a valuable crop will naturally develop, he has then laid the foundation for emblements.⁶ This is the chief principle that decides contests, among successive temporary owners of land, during the growth of an annual crop. Suppose, for example, that A, a life tenant, prepares the soil for the planting of corn, but dies before the seeds are in the ground. B, a succeeding life owner, plants the seeds and dies soon after. C, the next owner for life, cultivates the corn but dies just before it is ripe. The right of emblements belongs to the representatives of B, because at the time of his death he already had the crop a-going.⁷ Likewise, if A fix stakes and begin to cultivate hop vines growing from old roots, and then death terminates his estate, his representatives are entitled to emblements, no matter how many successive temporary owners may follow before the crop is matured; because, at the time of A's death, the crop was already growing.⁸

¹ *Ibid.*; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 264.

² *Oland v. Burdwick*, Cro. Eliz. 460; *Davis v. Eyton*, 7 Bing. 154; *Debow v. Colfax*, 10 N. J. L. 128. See *Oland's Case*, 5 Co. Rep. 116 a.

³ *Ibid.*; *Bittinger v. Baker*, 29 Pa. St. 36; *Davis v. Eyton*, 7 Bing. 154; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *124.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Co. 2 Inst. 40; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 258.

⁶ *Ibid.*; *Reeder v. Sayre*, 70 N. Y. 180; *Price v. Pickett*, 21 Ala. 741; 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 537, note.

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Stewart v. Doughty*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 108; *Gee v. Young*, 1 Hayw. (N. C.) 17.

⁸ *Ibid.* Last preceding section but one.

It is to be here noted that the right of emblements, arising from and existing as an incident to a life ownership, is a personal privilege of the tenant; and it passes at his death, not to his heirs, but to his personal representatives — his executors or administrators.¹

Duties of Life Tenants.

§ 547. **A Life Owner's Four Duties.** — Because he is holding and owning temporarily the property the infinite fee ownership of which is in another, a life tenant must so deal with it as not to injure the interest of that other.² A fee owner in possession is bound practically by no law of user, excepting that of the maxim, *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*.³ But when A holds a piece of land for life and B is the succeeding owner, B has a right to demand from A that, at A's death, the land shall come to B with the title unimpaired and a value unreduced by anything that A has done, omitted, or allowed.⁴ The ramifications of this general proposition may be set forth in an examination of the four important duties of a life tenant; namely, to protect and not to deny or impair the succeeding owner's title; to keep down encumbrances; to make substantial repairs; and to abstain from committing waste. Each of these requires a separate discussion.

§ 548. **A Life Tenant must protect, and not deny or impair, the Succeeding Owner's Title.** — A common-law real action lay only against the freeholder in possession. On him the primary writ, or *praecipe*, must be served.⁵ And, if he were a life owner, it was his duty to defend the title successfully, or to vouch in the reversioner or remainderman to do so. If he failed to do this, and the demandant succeeded in the action, the life owner had violated his duty to his successor in interest.⁶ This matter is to-day largely obsolete learning; for now practically the only action for the recovery of land is ejectment, or a substituted statutory action, and the fee owner is normally brought into the suit by the plaintiff in the case, and the action affects the interests of none but those who are parties and their privies.⁷ But, going hand in hand with the old common-law

¹ § 542, *supra*.

² § 536, *supra*.

³ §§ 181, 425, *supra*.

⁴ 2 Crabb, R. P. §§ 1037-1042; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 236-246; §§ 548-550, *infra*.

⁵ § 294, *supra*, note 1.

⁶ 1 Prest. Est. pp. *206-*208; Termes de la ley, "Aid."

⁷ 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 27, § 36; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1496-1531; *Lo'ye v. Emerson*, 48 Ill. 160; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 236.

rule, was the demand, which found its original conception though not its origin in fealty (and though no longer feudal still exists) that the life owner shall protect the reversioner's title, and not do nor permit anything that will cause its impairment.¹

§ 549. **A Life Owner must keep Encumbrances from increasing against the Property.**—The encumbrances and pecuniary burdens which affect real property may be divided, for the purpose of explaining a life tenant's duties, into two classes—those that accrue periodically, such for example as taxes and interest on mortgages, and the imposition of which does not improve the land nor benefit its owner; and those that are imposed less regularly, such as assessments for public improvements and the principal indebtedness on mortgages, the placing of which as burdens on the realty results in either a benefit thereto or an advantage to its owner. For convenience, we may speak of the first group as periodical charges, and of the second group as beneficial charges.

Periodical charges.—It is the duty of the life owner to defray all of these. He must pay the taxes and water rates from year to year; and the interest on mortgages, and other liens, as it becomes due from time to time.² So far as the public charges on the property are concerned, the succeeding owner has always been able to enforce this obligation, either by standing ready to purchase the property, freed of the life interest, when it was sold because of their non-payment, or by maintaining an action against the delinquent life owner after such a sale. Thus, if taxes be left unpaid and the property be sold by public authority for their payment, the remainderman or reversioner may purchase it at the sale and so protect his own interest.³ But the payment of interest on mortgages or other liens is, at common law, a duty of imperfect obligation on the part of the life tenant. If the succeeding owner himself discharge it, it is a voluntary payment which he can not recover against the prior tenant. Therefore, in many states, statutes have enabled him to pay

¹ *Delaney v. Fox*, 2 C. B. n. s. 768; *Goode v. Gaines*, 145 U. S. 141; 1 *Prest. Est.* pp. *206-*208; § 866, *infra*.

² *Frewen v. Law Life Ins. Soc.* (1896), 2 Ch. 511; *Cogswell v. Cogswell*, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 231; *Stevens v. Melcher*, 152 N. Y. 551; *Deraismes v. Deraismes*, 72 N. Y. 154; *Plympton v. Boston*, 106 Mass. 544; *Varney v. Stevens*, 22 Me. 331; *Thomas v. Thomas*,

17 N. J. Eq. 356; *Ivory v. Klein*, 54 N. J. Eq. 379; *Jenks v. Horton*, 96 Mich. 13; *Bowen v. Brogan*, 119 Mich. 218; *Hagan v. Varney*, 147 Ill. 281; 2 *Perry on Trusts*, § 552.

³ *Burhans v. Van Zandt*, 7 N. Y. 523; *Dunn v. Snell*, 74 Me. 22; *Foley v. Kirk*, 33 N. J. Eq. 170; *Watkins v. Green*, 101 Mich. 493; 1 *Wash. R. P.* (6th ed.) § 243.

such charges from time to time when due and not paid by the life tenant, and then to have an action for the recovery of the amounts so paid against the latter who should have discharged them in the first place.¹ (a)

Beneficial charges. An assessment for public improvement, or other charge made by proper authority for something done that is advantageous to the land, is commonly designated a "betterment charge."² The principal sum obtained for a mortgage or other lien on the land, which was put there as an advantage at the time to its owner, is an encumbrance of the same general character. Such charges against the property, if allowed to remain, will produce interest periodically, which must be kept down by the life tenant as above explained.³ The payment of the *principal* of such beneficial charges will be of advantage to both the life tenant and the succeeding owner. Therefore, they must contribute ratably to their liquidation.⁴ The rule for computing such contributions, as ultimately worked out practically everywhere, is based on the advantage which the payment will afford to the life owner. That advantage will arise from his being relieved of the payment of interest for the rest of the time of the duration of his estate. Hence, his share is the present worth of an annuity of the amount of the yearly interest on the encumbrance, to run for the probable period of his estate, as indicated by the mortality tables adopted and used in the place where the real property is situated.⁵ (b) And the

(a) A New York statute provides that, "Whenever the real estate held by any person or persons for life shall be incumbered by mortgage or other lien, the interest on which should be paid by the life tenant, and such life tenant shall neglect or refuse to pay such interest, it shall be lawful for the remainderman to pay such interest and to recover the amount so paid, together with interest thereon from the time of such payment, in an action against such life tenant whose duty it was to have paid such interest." N. Y. L. 1909, Ch. 52, § 269.

(b) In New York, the "Carlisle" mortality table is now adopted by

¹ N. Y. Real P. L. § 269; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 552; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 239-241, and notes.

² They are charges for improvements which enhance the value of the property. 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 239; Sedgwick & W. Tr. Title, ch. 26; 2 Kent, Com. p. *335, notes.

³ Fifth note, *supra*.

⁴ Cogswell v. Cogswell, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 231; Plympton v. Boston, 106 Mass. 544; Thomas v. Thomas, 17 N. J.

Eq. 356; Bowen v. Brogan, 119 Mich. 218; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 487.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Thomas v. Evans, 105 N. Y. 601; Outcalt v. Appleby, 36 N. J. Eq. 73; Kocher v. Kocher, 56 N. J. Eq. 545; Reyburn v. Wallace, 93 Mo. 326; Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 140; Keniston v. Gorrell, 74 N. H. 53; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 240, 241; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 487-488 a; 4 Kent, Com. pp. *74, *75; 2 Crabb, R. P. §§ 1037-1039.

residue of the payment is to be made by the succeeding owner or owners.¹ If, for example, the encumbrance which is wholly paid consists of a mortgage for ten thousand dollars, drawing interest at five per cent per annum, the share chargeable to the life tenant is the present worth of an annuity of five hundred dollars (the interest per year on the mortgage), during the number of years of life which the mortality tables ascribe to him.² The contributions here explained are ordinarily required, whenever any betterment or permanent charge is thus to be paid in whole or in part; but one exception seems clearly to arise, when the benefit of the payment will presumably not endure for the property longer than during the life of the temporary owner. In such a case, the *onus* of the entire debt is upon him.³

§ 550. **A Life Tenant must make Substantial Repairs — Improvements made by him.** — Theoretically the reversioner or remainderman is entitled to receive the property, after the termination of the life owner's estate, in as good condition as when it came into the latter's possession, subject to necessary wear and tear or deterioration by time. This is the practical rule of law, at least in the United States generally. And this means that the tenant must keep the buildings, fences and other erections on the land in substantially as good condition as they were when they came to him. Otherwise, he is guilty of permissive waste.⁴ There is no duty on him to add any

Rule No. 70 of the General Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court. Formerly, the Northampton tables, so-called, were employed. But the rule was amended to its present form on the 24th day of October, 1905. And, while in terms it speaks only of computing share of income, it clearly applies in the same way to the determination of payments required to be made. A table of comparison of the Carlisle and other mortality tables is given in Bender's Lawyers' Diary and Directory for 1905, pp. 301-303.

¹ *Ibid.*; Cairns v. Chabert, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 312; Plympton v. Boston, etc., 106 Mass. 544.

² Judge Story's rule for this computation is put in the following somewhat vague language: "The tenant shall contribute beyond the interest in proportion to the benefit he derives from the liquidation of the debt, and the consequent cessation of the annual payments of interest during his life (which, of course, will depend upon his age and the computation of the value of his

life)." 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 487, discussed in 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 241.

³ *Hitner v. Ege*, 23 Pa. St. 305; *Wordin's Appeal*, 71 Conn. 531; *Reyburn v. Wallace*, 93 Mo. 326.

⁴ See the subject of permissive waste discussed, § 553, *infra*. In England, it is held that a life tenant, who holds under a lease, is not liable for mere permissive waste: and perhaps the same rule applies there to all life tenants. *In re Cartwright*, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 532; *In re Hotchkys*, L. R. 32 Ch. Div.

value to the property; and, ordinarily, when he does make improvements, he can not charge against the succeeding owner any portion of their cost or value.¹ A life tenant, however, is entitled to finish a building which the preceding owner had commenced, and to charge against the reversioner or remainderman a proportionate share of the expense, to be computed by the use of the mortality and annuity tables in the same manner as their respective contributions towards permanent charges.² And also it has been said that, in equity at least, if a life tenant act *bona fide* in the belief that he owns the fee simple and make improvements on the land, he may recover from the succeeding owner the latter's proportionate share of the cost of such additions.³ The basal principle of all these rules is the law's determination to adjust, fairly and ratably, the charges and expenses accruing against real property which belongs to successive owners.

§ 551. **A Life Tenant must abstain from committing Waste.** — The failure of a life tenant to make substantial repairs is now usually regarded as waste; and his voluntary injury of the property constitutes the same kind of wrong. It is clearly his duty to refrain from producing or permitting such injury. This is expressed by the statement that he must abstain from com-

418. And the same seems to be the rule in some states here. *Richards v. Torbert*, 3 Houst. (Del.) 172; *Harvey v. Harvey*, 41 Vt. 373. But the American rule, in general, is as stated in the text.

Schulting v. Schulting, 41 N. J. Eq. 130; *Wilson v. Edmonds*, 24 N. H. 517; *Stevens v. Rose*, 69 Mich. 259; *Brough v. Higgins*, 2 Grat. (Va.) 408. *Miller v. Shields*, 55 Ind. 71; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 288-294.

¹ "In most of the states, statutes, known as 'Occupying Claimants' Acts,' or 'Betterment Acts,' have been passed, allowing one in adverse possession of another's land, under color of title, who has made improvements in good faith, to recover their value, either by its assertion in an action by the owner to recover the land, or by a direct proceeding for that purpose." 1 Tiffany, *Modern Law R. P.* § 241, citing 16 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of L. 79 *et seq.*; *Sedgwick & W. Tr. Title Land*, ch. 26; 2 Kent, Com. 335, note. But such legislation, not having any express provision to

that effect, does not enable a life owner to recover for any improvements, which he has made without any agreement with succeeding owners for compensation. *Sohier v. Eldredge*, 103 Mass. 345; *Datesman's Appeal*, 127 Pa. St. 348; *Hagan v. Varney*, 147 Ill. 281; *Miller v. Shields*, 55 Ind. 71; *Killmer v. Wuchner*, 79 Iowa, 722; *Bond v. Godsey*, 99 Va. 564; *Trimmier v. Darden*, 61 S. C. 220; *Falck v. Marsh*, 88 Wis. 680; *Moore v. Simonson*, 27 Or. 117; *Wms. R. P.* p. *29.

² *Parsons v. Winslow*, 16 Mass. 361; *Sohier v. Eldredge*, 103 Mass. 345; *Broyles v. Waddel*, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 32. See preceding section and notes.

³ *Plimpton v. Plimpton*, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 458; *Barrett v. Stradi*, 73 Wis. 385; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1241. Compare *Bohn v. Hatch*, 133 N. Y. 64, 68; *King v. Thompson*, 34 U. S. (9 Pet.) 204; *Taylor v. Kemp*, 86 Ga. 181; *Henry v. Brown*, 99 Ky. 13; *Nineteenth & Jefferson St. Presby. Ch. v. Fithian*, 29 S. W. Rep. 143 (Ky.); § 47, *supra*.

mitting waste. Most temporary owners are bound by the same requirement; and therefore the following discussion of the law of waste, though made here in completing the examination of the incidents of life estates, is to be taken as applicable to the duties of temporary owners in general.

Waste.

§ 552. **Waste defined and explained.**—Waste is an unauthorized act or omission of a life tenant, or other temporary holder, which causes a diminution in value of the property as it will pass to the succeeding owner—an injury to the inheritance, the subsequent interest.¹ It was at one time held in England that a mere change in the character of property, such that its identification by the succeeding owner might be endangered, even though such change produced an actual enhancement in value, constituted waste. And when the result was an actual betterment of the property, it was sometimes spoken of as “meliorating waste.”² But this view is now practically discarded in England; and it has never obtained any foothold in the United States.³ When, moreover, the detriment to the property is merely trifling, so that only nominal damages could ever be obtained for it, the judgment in an action based upon it is usually for the defendant, on the theory that it is not really waste.⁴ The nature of the property, the condition of the locality, and all the surrounding circumstances are taken into account in determining whether or not the interest of the succeeding owner has been injuriously affected.⁵ And so, tersely and practically, the waste of to-day, and especially in this country, may be said to be, substantial injury to the interest of a succeeding owner.⁶

§ 553. **Kinds of Waste.**—The primary division of the kinds

¹ 2 Blackst. Com. p. *122; *Winship v. Pitts*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 262; *Pyncheon v. Stearns*, 11 Met. (Mass.) 304; *Clemence v. Steere*, 1 R. I. 272; *Proffitt v. Henderson*, 29 Mo. 325.

² Co. Lit. 53a, 53b; *Simmons v. Norton*, 7 Bing. 640; *Kerr on Injunctions*, 239.

³ *Doherty v. Allman*, 3 App. Cas. 709, 725; *Winship v. Pitts*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 262; *McGregor v. Brown*, 10 N. Y. 114; *Melms v. Pabst Brewing*

Co., 104 Wis. 7; *Lunn v. Oslin*, 96 Tenn. 28; *Taylor, Landl. & T.* § 345.

⁴ *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 54a; *Grubb v. Burlington*, 5 B. & Ad. 507.

⁵ And it is often a question of fact for a jury whether or not the act complained of has caused any real injury to the land. *McGregor v. Brown*, 10 N. Y. 114; *Drown v. Smith*, 52 Me. 141; *King v. Miller*, 99 N. C. 583.

⁶ Last three preceding notes.

of waste is into *voluntary* and *permissive*; and the third form, which is a sub-head of the former, is *equitable* waste. A word as to each of these.

Voluntary waste, as the expression implies, includes any positive or direct act, which diminishes the value of the property for a succeeding owner. Tearing down buildings, unwarrantably cutting timber, and removing the fertile soil from the farm are illustrations.¹

Permissive waste is the negative side of the injury under discussion. Failure properly to guard a fire, which therefore causes damage, letting buildings go to decay, and suffering strangers to despoil the property are illustrations.² In England there has always been some question as to whether or not life owners could be held responsible for such permissive deterioration, on the ground of waste; or whether, in order to be so held, they must be expressly bound by covenant to prevent the injury.³ But the cases are quite clear, in this country, in holding the life owner responsible for permitting such a diminution of value.⁴ It is the duty of the temporary holder to protect the property against trespassers and outside parties, and his failure to do this reasonably is permissive waste,⁵ But he is not liable for injury or destruction caused, without any negligence on his part, by the act of God, or the public enemy, or by operation of law.⁶ Neither, according to the weight of authority, is he responsible for loss occasioned by an accidental fire, not in any way attributable to his own negligence.⁷

¹ Co. Lit. 53 a; *Bonnett v. Sadler*, 14 Ves. 526; *Agate v. Lowenbein*, 57 N. Y. 604; *Chase's Blackst.* p. 304, note; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 348.

² Co. Lit. 53 a; *Lothrop v. Thayer*, 138 Mass. 466; *In re Steele*, 19 N. J. Eq. 120; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 349.

³ Co. Lit. 53, 53 a; *Harnett v. Maitland*, 16 M. & W. 257; *Leach v. Thomas*, 7 C. & P. 327; *In re Hotchkys*, L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 418; *Davies v. Davies*, L. R. 38 Ch. Div. 499; *In re Cartwright*, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 532; *Leighton v. Leighton* (1896), W. N. 162.

⁴ *Snydam v. Jackson*, 54 N. Y. 450; *Schulting v. Schulting*, 41 N. J. Eq. 130; *Wilson v. Edmunds*, 24 N. H. 517; *Stevens v. Rose*, 69 Mich. 259; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 349. See *Richards v.*

Torbert, 3 Houst. (Del.) 172; *Harvey v. Harvey*, 41 Vt. 373.

⁵ Co. Lit. 54 a; *Attersoll v. Stevens*, 1 Taunt. 198; *Manchester B. W. Co. v. Carr*, L. R. 5 C. P. Div. 507; *Austin v. Hudson Riv. R. Co.*, 25 N. Y. 334; *Dix v. Jaquay*, 94 N. Y. App. Div. 554; *Moore v. Townshend*, 33 N. J. L. 284; *Fay v. Brewer*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 203; *Wood v. Griffin*, 46 N. H. 230; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 349.

⁶ But he must not permit it to remain in ruins. *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 53 a; *Saner v. Bilton*, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 815; *United States v. Bostwick*, 94 U. S. 53; *Earle v. Asbogast*, 180 Pa. St. 409.

⁷ Last preceding note; *Sampson v. Grogan*, 21 R. I. 174; *Nave v. Berry*, 22 Ala. 383. See *Lothrop v. Thayer*, 138 Mass. 466.

But he is liable for any damage to the inheritance, caused by his negligence.¹ These propositions are to be understood with the qualification that, in the absence of modifying contract or statute, the temporary owner does not commit permissive waste merely by allowing the property to remain substantially in the condition in which it comes to him. He is not required, for example, to put a roof on a house that was roofless when his estate began; nor need he fertilize and make productive a field that was sterile at the beginning of his estate.²

Equitable waste is a voluntary injury for which, originally, at least, there was no remedy except in a court of equity. In the law of life estates, it may be described as such an injury as will be enjoined and remedied in equity, when committed or attempted by a life tenant who holds the property "without impeachment of waste."³ Amenability of life owners to an action for waste came by gradual development, largely as the result of statutes, in the English law; and, as that development went on, the custom arose of occasionally having property conveyed to one for life, by an instrument which specifically stated that he should hold it "without impeachment of waste" (using these words or their equivalent) i. e., without being subject to an action for damages for any injury that he might inflict on the land — substantially that he might deal with it as if he owned it in fee simple.⁴ The courts of law adhered strictly to the terms of such a provision; and refused any remedy to succeeding owners, no matter how aggravating the injury inflicted by the temporary holder upon the property.⁵ But the rule soon became different in equity; and that tribunal proceeded to grant an injunction against the wrong-doing temporary owner, though he were apparently protected by the provision that he should hold "without impeachment of waste," whenever he was found greatly injuring the property to the lasting detriment of subsequent interests.⁶ The waste thus being com-

¹ Last five preceding notes; *Robinson v. Wheeler*, 25 N. Y. 252; *Warder v. Henry*, 117 Mo. 530.

² Co. Lit. 53 a; 2 Roll. Abr. 818, 1, 1; *Snydam v. Jackson*, 54 N. Y. 450.

³ See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 915; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 434.

⁴ *Bowles' Case*, 11 Co. Rep. 79; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 434.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ In the pioneer case of *Vane v. Lord*

Barnard, 1 Salk. 161, 2 Vern. 738, a fine estate containing Raby Castle had been conveyed to Lord Barnard for his life, "without impeachment of waste," remainder in fee to his nephew, Mr. Vane. Lord Barnard began to despoil the castle by taking out the windows, removing the lead from the roofs, etc.; and Vane, finding himself without remedy at law, applied for an injunction, which was granted. Thus was

mitted by him, unremediable at law but subject to be restrained by equity, was therefore naturally designated "equitable waste."¹ The law applicable to such waste has been uniformly recognized in England;² and, while it has been very little called into requisition in this country, because the remedies at law have generally been made very broad and efficacious, yet, as a definite equitable principle, it has been as thoroughly recognized here as in England.³ Where the succeeding owner's interest is being permanently injured, especially by an act which does the temporary owner no good, and there is no remedy at law, equity will intervene, and is then said to prevent equitable waste.⁴ Not only life tenants, but other holders of property, which may ultimately go over to other persons, may be restrained from the commission of such waste. Thus, a tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct, and the owner of a fee on conditional or executory limitation, subject to pass by a future event to another person, have been enjoined from the commission of such waste upon the land.⁵

§ 554. **How Waste may be Committed.**—The essential nature of waste, and how it may be committed, may be best understood by dealing with it in three divisions, namely: *First*, as affecting the soil itself, or things that it contains; *second*, as affecting the natural or perennial products of the soil; and *third*, as affecting the artificial erections on the land. These will be examined in the order here named.

§ 555. **First—Waste affecting the Soil or Things that it Contains.**—A temporary owner may take from the soil, for the purpose of repairing the structures on the land, as much clay, stone, or other building material as is necessary.⁶ He has this right the same as his right of estover; but, if he

put on a permanent foundation the salutary doctrine of equitable waste. The twin leading case with this one is *Garth v. Sir John Hind Cotton*, 3 Atk. 751, 1 Lead. Cases Eq. 806.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Peirs v. Peirs*, 1 Ves. Sr. 521; *Baker v. Sebright*, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 179; *Weld-Blundell v. Wolseley* (1903), 2 Ch. 664.

³ *Hawley v. Clowes*, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 122; *Clement v. Wheeler*, 25 N. H. 361; *Fifer v. Allen*, 228 Ill. 507; *Belt v. Simkins*, 113 Ga. 894; *Stevens v. Rose*, 69 Mich. 259; *Wiley v. Wiley*,

95 N. W. Rep. 702 (Neb.); *Crowe v. Wilson*, 65 Md. 479; *Crawford v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp.*, 77 S. C. 81.

⁴ Last four preceding notes; *Brigham v. Overstreet*, 128 Ga. 447; *Pavkovich v. Southern Pac. R. Co.*, 150 Cal. 39.

⁵ *Williams v. Day*, Ch. Cas. 32; *Turner v. Wright*, 2 De G. F. & J. 234; *Abraham v. Bubb*, 2 Free. Ch. 53; *Fifer v. Allen*, 228 Ill. 507.

⁶ *Co. Lit.* 53 b; *Coates v. Cheever*, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 460; *Reed v. Reed*, 16 N. J. Eq. 248; *Potomac Dredging Co. v. Smoot*, 69 Atl. Rep. 507 (Md.).

depreciate the value of the property for the succeeding owner by removing these substances from the land to a greater extent than is needed for repairs, he is guilty of waste.¹ So, in the absence of express authority, he must not open new mines, wells, or quarries (such as oil wells, for example), nor reopen these, if having been once used they have been abandoned, or closed by the prior holder, in such manner as to show that the land is to be employed for another purpose.² But a life owner may continue to work, even to exhaustion, mines, wells, or quarries, which are already open and being used at the time of the beginning of his estate, or which having once been opened have never been closed or discontinued in such manner as to indicate an intent not to have them worked again. And, in operating an open mine, he may sink new shafts and make additional openings into the same vein; though he is not authorized to open up any new veins.³

It is waste for a life tenant to remove the fertile top soil from a farm, or to fail properly to fertilize it, or not to rotate his crops, or in any other manner to misuse it as arable land, or to omit to deal with it as required by the rules of good husbandry.⁴ His removal of manure, made on the land from its own products, is ordinarily treated as waste.⁵ And so is his taking away of the marl, loam, or gravel, which added materially to the permanent value of the land.⁶

§ 556. **Second — Waste affecting Trees — Natural Products of the Soil.** — The life owner's removal of fruit trees, or trees designed and still useful for ornament or shade, everywhere constitutes waste.⁷ As a general rule, it may be further said

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*; *Saunders' Case*, 5 Co. Rep. 12 a; *In re Chaytor* (1900), 2 Ch. 804; *Marshall v. Mellon*, 179 Pa. St. 371; *Harlow v. Lake Superior Co.*, 36 Mich. 105; *Owings v. Emery*, 6 Gill (Md.), 260; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 280. See *Gannon v. Peterson*, 193 Ill. 372.

³ *Ibid.*; Co. Lit. 54 b; *Clavering v. Clavering*, 2 P. Wms. 388; *Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Co.*, 33 N. J. Eq. 603; *Moore v. Rollins*, 45 Me. 493; *Billings v. Taylor*, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 460; *Sayers v. Hoskinson*, 110 Pa. St. 473; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 346.

⁴ *Brown v. Crump*, 6 Taunt. 300; *Powley v. Walker*, 5 T. R. 373; *People v. Alberty*, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 161; *Sarles*

v. Sarles, 3 Sand. Ch. (N. Y.) 601; *Hubble v. Cole*, 85 Va. 87; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 356.

⁵ Cases cited, § 54, *supra*; *Heald v. Builders' Ins. Co.*, 111 Mass. 38; *Perry v. Carr*, 44 N. H. 118; *Lewis v. Jones*, 17 Pa. St. 262; *Taylor v. Newcomb*, 123 Mich. 637.

⁶ Last preceding note but one. See *Tucker v. Linger*, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 18; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 432.

⁷ Co. Lit. 53 a, b; *Phillips v. Smith*, 14 M. & W. 589; *Hawley v. Wolverton*, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 522; *Duncombe v. Felt*, 81 Mich. 332; *Calvert v. Rice*, 91 Ky. 533; *Silva v. Garcia*, 65 Cal. 591. So, as a general rule is the cutting of wood to sell. *McGregor v. Brown*, 10 N. Y.

that it is waste for him to cut down any other kind of living tree, to an extent greater than is authorized by his right of estovers.¹ This restriction, however, is subject to modifications by special circumstances or local requirements. Thus, in England, as has been already explained, "Oak, ash and elm are timber throughout the realm," though it has sometimes been added that they became timber only after twenty years of growth; and a life tenant must not cut these at all, at any rate when there is any other wood on the property available for estovers. And he must not remove other kinds of wood, beyond estovers, in such quantities or manner as to injure the inheritance.²

In this country the distinctive importance of "oak, ash and elm" has never been recognized. All trees of value are protected by the rules against waste; and the one working principle is to designate as waste any removal of growing wood from the property, beyond the right of estovers, which injures the succeeding interest.³ The needs of a new country, its rapid development, and the demand for wood to aid its growth, have made most of the courts somewhat lenient in regard to waste in this respect; and they give to life tenants, as a rule, the benefit of any doubts as to the injurious effects of their taking of wood.⁴ The decisions have often been colored by the local conditions. Thus, in some places it benefits the property to remove the wood from it and turn it into arable land; and such a removal is clearly not waste.⁵ And the courts will be slow to interfere

114; *Morehouse v. Cotheal*, 22 N. J. L. 521; *Lester v. Young*, 14 R. I. 579; *Smith v. Smith*, 105 Ga. 106; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. §§ 352, 353.

¹ § 541, *supra*; *Perrot v. Perrot*, 3 Atk. 94; *Dashwood v. Magniac* (1891), 3 Ch. 306; *Mooers v. Wait*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 104; *Torry v. Black*, 58 N. Y. 185.

² § 541, *supra*; Co. Lit. 53 a; *Honywood v. Honywood*, 18 Eq. 306; *Berriman v. Peacock*, 9 Bing. 386; *Dashwood v. Magniac* (1891), 3 Ch. 306.

³ § 552, *supra*. In the New England courts, this rule has been enforced quite strictly, and with more tendency perhaps to follow the English lead than is found in the other states. *White v. Cutler*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 248; *Chase v. Hazelton*, 7 N. H. 171; *Ford v. Erskine*, 50 Me. 227.

⁴ *Sayers v. Hoskinson*, 110 Pa. St. 473; *Drown v. Smith*, 52 Me. 145; *Keeler v. Eastman*, 11 Vt. 293; *Clemence v. Steere*, 1 R. I. 272; *King v. Miller*, 99 N. C. 583; *Dawson v. Coffman*, 28 Ind. 220; *Wilkinson v. Wilkinson*, 59 Wis. 557; 4 Kent, Com. p. * 76; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. §§ 350-353.

⁵ *Ibid.*; *Gardiner v. Deering*, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 573; *Loomis v. Wilbur*, 5 Mason (U. S. Cir. Ct.), 13; *Jackson v. Brownson*, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 227; *Findlay v. Smith*, 6 Munf. (Va.) 134; *Webster v. Webster*, 33 N. H. 25; *McCracken v. McCracken*, 6 T. B. Monr. (Ky.) 342; *Lynn's Appeal*, 31 Pa. St. 44; *Davis v. Gilliam*, 40 N. C. 308; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 432.

with the taking of timber from the soil which a life tenant holds, when in any view of the case his act is not detrimental to a succeeding owner of the property.¹

§ 557. **Third — Waste affecting Artificial Erections on the Land.** — Since the doctrine of meliorating waste has become obsolete, a life tenant everywhere has been permitted to remove, or to fail to repair, any buildings that are useless or a positive detriment to the property; and, in the absence of positive restraining contract, his alteration of a structure, in such manner as not to cause any injury to the succeeding owner, is nowhere treated as waste at the present time.² So a temporary owner is not liable for the natural deterioration of the buildings, caused by his reasonable use. And the same is true as to the permanent fixtures and appliances annexed to or used in association with a house.³ But here the limit of his warrantable enjoyment of these structures is reached. He must not completely remove, nor so materially alter as to impair, a house or other artificial erection on the property.⁴ And, while the English courts have generally looked to an express covenant on which to base an action for his failure to repair such structures, the American tribunals uniformly treat his failure to repair them properly as permissive waste.⁵

A life tenant's erection of a new building upon the land, or his construction of an addition to an old one, has presented some interesting questions; and has brought out, especially in America, the fundamental principles of the law of waste. The construction of a new house upon the land, in such manner as to add permanent value, is certainly not waste. Neither is the erection of a structure which will be useless to the succeeding owner and have to be removed by him, if the materials of which it is built will sell for enough to pay for removing it and restoring the property to its original condition. But if a new building be so placed on the land that a following owner will

¹ Last two preceding notes; *Winship v. Pitts*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 262; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. §§ 345, 353.

² § 552, *supra*; *Doherty v. Allman*, 3 App. Cas. 709; *Winship v. Pitts*, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 262; *Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co.*, 104 Wis. 7; *Bewes, Waste*, 11.

³ *Ibid.*; *Saner v. Bilton*, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 815; *Klie v. Van Broock*, 56 N. J. Eq. 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Co. Lit.* 53 a; *United States v. Bostwick*, 94 U. S. 53; *Agate v. Lowenbein*, 57 N. Y. 604; *Chalmers v. Smith*, 152 Mass. 561; *McCullough v. Irvine*, 13 Pa. St. 438; *Davenport v. Magoon*, 13 Or. 3; *Dooly v. Stringham*, 4 Utah, 107; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. § 348.

⁵ *Ibid.*

naturally remove it, and the removal will be an expense for which the materials will not compensate, its erection and retention on the property constitute waste. These distinctions were carefully made by Chancellor Walworth, in the leading case of *Winship v. Pitts*,¹ which early placed the American law of waste on a true and substantial foundation.

It is to be noted that, in any case of injury which in itself would constitute waste, the temporary owner who causes it avoids all difficulty, and precludes any successful action against him for it, in either law or equity, by making full repairs and restoration before the termination of his own estate.²

§ 558. **Remedies for Waste.** — The common-law remedies for waste were a writ of prohibition to prevent a threatened injury, and a writ of waste to recover damages for the wrong actually done. These were available, however, against no temporary holders of the realty, except owners of dower or curtesy interests, and guardians in chivalry. The common-law theory was that, if a remedy for waste were to be enforceable against any other tenant, it should be stipulated for by express covenant in the instrument by which he obtained his estate.³

This inequality of redress was done away with, partly by the statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III. ch. 23, § 2 (1267), which extended the writ of waste against temporary owners generally; and more fully by the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I. ch. 5 (1278), which reiterated and completed the provisions of the former enactment, provided for recovery of treble damages for the injury, and added a writ for the reversioner or remainderman to enforce a forfeiture of the place wasted.⁴ The latter

¹ 3 Paige (N. Y.), 262. See also § 552, *supra*; *Clemence v. Steere*, 1 R. I. 272; *Beers v. St. Johns*, 16 Conn. 322; *Bewes, Waste*, 134 *et seq.*; 1 Taylor, Landl. & T. §§ 345, 348; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 286.

² Co. Lit. 53 a; *Jackson v. Andrew*, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 431; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 312.

³ 2 Co. Inst. 299; 2 Blackst. Com. p. *283; *Chipman v. Emeric*, 3 Cal. 273; *Moore v. Townshend*, 33 N. J. L. 284. In the action commenced by the writ of waste, the plaintiff, if successful, recovered compensatory damages, and if desired the appointment of a keeper of the property was made to prevent further injury. *Ibid.*; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 295, 297.

⁴ "The expression of the statute is, he shall forfeit the *thing* which *he* hath wasted; and it hath been determined that under these words the *place* is also included. And if waste be done *sparsim*, or here and there, all over a wood, the whole wood shall be recovered; or if in several rooms of a house, the whole house shall be forfeited; because it is impracticable for the reversioner to enjoy only the identical places wasted, when lying interspersed with the other. But if waste be done only in one end of a wood (or perhaps in one room of a house, if that can be conveniently separated from the rest), that part only is the *locus vastatus*, or thing wasted, and that only shall be forfeited to the reversioner." 2 Blackst. Com. pp. *283, *284.

statute is the foundation of most of the positive legislation affecting waste in this country.¹ But, following the lead of the courts in disliking forfeitures, the statutes of probably a large majority of the United States have simply prescribed for recovery of damages (frequently treble), and have not provided for any termination of the temporary owner's estate on the ground of waste.²

The writ of waste is now abolished in England, and an action on the case, for waste committed, has been substituted.³ In most of the states of this country the same change has occurred, either by positive legislation or by the decisions of the courts.⁴ This form of procedure is, of course, a common-law remedy; and its application to the redress of the wrong of waste is easy and usually efficacious. In a number of the code states, the statutes simply declare, in language similar to that of the Statute of Gloucester, that damages (sometimes treble) may be recovered in an action for waste. Such are the provisions, for example, of the codes of New York, (a) Missouri, and

(a) The New York Code declares that "An action for waste lies against a tenant by the curtesy, in dower, for life, or for years, or the assignee of such a tenant, who, during his estate or term, commits waste upon the real property held by him, without a special and lawful written license so to do; or against such a tenant, who lets or grants his estate, and, still retaining possession thereof, commits waste without a like license."

"An heir or devisee may maintain an action for waste, committed in the time of his ancestor or testator, as well as in his own time. The grantor of a reversion may maintain an action for waste committed before he aliened the estate."

"If the plaintiff recovers in an action for waste, other than an action brought as prescribed in the next section" (the next section relates to actions between co-owners), "the final judgment must award to him treble damages. Where the action is brought by some one next entitled to the reversion, and it appears, in like manner, that the injury to the estate in reversion is equal to the value of the tenant's estate or unexpired term, or that it was done maliciously, the final judgment must also award to the plaintiff the forfeiture of the defendant's estate and the possession of the

¹ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1651-1669; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. §§ 1332, 1343, 3231, 3208. The question, whether or not the old English statutes — Marlbridge and Gloucester — as such, are in force in any state of this country, is little more than academic; for a remedy for waste is uniformly provided, as hereafter explained. See *Dozier v. Gregory*, 46 N. C. 100; *Thackeray v. Eldigan*,

21 R. I. 481; 4 Kent, Com. pp. *81, *82.

² *Ibid.*

³ 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 27, § 36 (1833); *Greene v. Cole*, 2 Saund. 252; *Wms. R. P. p.* *24.

⁴ Last preceding note but one; *McCullough v. Irvine*, 13 Pa. St. 438; *Moore v. Townshend*, 33 N. J. L. 284; *Sackett v. Sackett*, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 309; *Randall v. Cleaveland*, 6 Conn. 328.

Wisconsin.¹ The demand for treble damages and forfeiture is now quite commonly discarded; and where retained these severe penalties are generally reserved for waste which is malicious or intentionally wrong.²

Two requirements, logical but unfortunate, interfered with the practical utility of the common-law action for waste, and have sometimes, though not generally, been carried over and applied in the action of trespass on the case, for waste committed. These were the requirements that there should be privity of estate between him who committed the waste and the succeeding owner of the freehold, in order to enable the latter to maintain the action; and that there must not exist between these parties' interests in the land any intermediate freehold estates — the plaintiff in the action must be a privy of the defendant, and must also own the next immediately succeeding freehold estate.³ These difficulties are now generally removed by statutes, even in jurisdictions in which the courts have not discarded them, in applying the action on the case for waste committed.⁴ (a)

place wasted." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1651, 1652, 1655; and further generally as to waste see §§ 1653, 1654, 1656–1659, 1664–1669; *Danziger v. Silberthan*, 21 N. Y. Civ. Pro. Rep. 283. The jury determine the actual damages; and, when proper, judgment is entered for the plaintiff for three times the amount of the verdict. The damages fixed by the jury are to compensate for all the injury resulting to the land — the difference in its value to the plaintiff before and after being wasted. *Evans v. Keystone Gas Co.*, 148 N. Y. 112; *Argotsinger v. Vines*, 82 N. Y. 308; *Dwight v. E. C. & N. R. R. Co.*, 132 N. Y. 199; *Connor v. State*, 152 N. Y. 9; *Jutte v. Hughes*, 67 N. Y. 267; *Francis v. Schoellkopf*, 53 N. Y. 152; *Goldschmidt v. Mayor*, 14 App. Div. 135; *Chaplin, Landl. & T.* §§ 304–320.

(a) In New York, this is accomplished by the Code provision as follows: "A person, seized of an estate in remainder or reversion, may maintain an action founded upon an injury done to the inheritance, notwithstanding any intervening estate for life or for years." N. Y. Code Civ. Pro.

¹ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1651; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1332.

² N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1655, 1658; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L., § 1332 (B); 4 Kent, Com. p. *81.

³ Co. Lit. 53 b, 218 b; Com. Dig. "Waste"; *Walker's Case*, 3 Co. Rep. 23; *Bates v. Shraeder*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 260. He must also have a *vested* future estate, and not merely a contingent or executory right or interest. And the latter is usually a requirement still, in any action at law on the ground of

waste. N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1665; *Freer v. Stotenbur*, 2 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 189; *Hunt v. Hall*, 37 Me. 363; *Sager v. Galloway*, 113 Pa. St. 500.

⁴ N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. § 1665; 1 Stim. Amer. Stat. L. § 1353; *Freer v. Stotenbur*, 2 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 189; *Robinson v. Wheeler*, 25 N. Y. 252; *Foot v. Dickinson*, 2 Met. (Mass.) 611; *Chase v. Hazelton*, 7 N. H. 171; *Dupree v. Dupree*, 49 N. C. 387; 2 Taylor, Landl. & T. §§ 687–690.

Because of the technicalities and oftentimes inadequacies of the common-law procedure, the courts of equity early intervened, by an injunction, to prevent threatened waste, or to stop actual and continuing injury; and this remedy has come to be a favorite and probably most frequently applied procedure in cases of waste.¹ Not only will equity grant an injunction in proper instances, but also, in order to do complete justice, it will award damages for injury already done.² This form of redress is primarily applicable, of course, to voluntary waste, and not to that which is merely permissive; though in some special instances it has been made available against the latter form of the wrong.³ An injunction may be obtained by any succeeding owner, to restrain actual continuing injury, or to prevent that which is threatened, though no privity exists between him and the wrongdoer, and generally though an intervening estate of freehold is between the interests of the two parties.⁴ It may also be granted, even when another remedy is given by statute.⁵ But equity will not intervene when the injury is only slight or immaterial, and no greater damage is threatened, or when there is a complete and adequate remedy at law.⁶ It is,

§ 1665. See also §§ 1664, 1666, 1669; *Dix v. Jaquay*, 94 App. Div. 554; *Ottinger v. N. Y. El. R. Co.*, 15 N. Y. Supp. 18; *Robinson v. Wheeler*, 25 N. Y. 252; *Thompson v. Manhattan R. Co.*, 130 N. Y. 360; *Freer v. Stotenbur*, 2 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 189; *Macy v. Met. El. R. Co.*, 59 Hun, 365, aff'd 128 N. Y. 624; *Bouton v. Thomas*, 46 Hun, 6; *Chaplin, Landl. & T.* §§ 312-315.

¹ *Birch-Wolfe v. Birch*, 9 Eq. 683; *Kane v. Vanderburgh*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 11; *Watson v. Hunter*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 169; *Westmoreland Nat. Gas. Co. v. DeWitt*, 130 Pa. St. 251; *Fortescue v. Bowler*, 55 N. J. Eq. 721; *Camp v. Bates*, 11 Conn. 51; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 431.

² *Sir Hugh Cairns's Act*, 21 & 22 Vict. ch. 27; *Seagram v. Knight*, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 628; *Phillips v. Thompson*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 150; *Kempshall v. Stone*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 193; *Klie v. Van Broeck*, 56 N. J. Eq. 18; *Armstrong v. Wilson*, 60 Ill. 226; *Story, Eq. Jur.* §§ 517, 518, 917; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* §§ 477, 478.

³ *Cannon v. Barry*, 59 Miss. 289; *Powys v. Blagrave, Kay*, 495; *Bispham's Prin. Eq.* § 432.

⁴ *Williams v. Bolton*, 3 P. Wms. 268, note; *Garth v. Sir John Hind*

Cotton, 1 Ves. Sr. 546; *Jones v. Hill*, 7 Taunt. 392; *Kane v. Vanderburgh*, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 11; *Story, Eq. Jur.* § 913; *Chaplin, Landl. & T.* § 315.

⁵ *Harris v. Thomas*, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 18. See *Cutting v. Carter*, 4 Hen. & M. (Va.) 424; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) § 307.

⁶ *Hext v. Gill*, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 699; *Atkins v. Chilson*, 7 Met. (Mass.) 398; *Leighton v. Leighton*, 32 Me. 399. See *Livingston v. Reynolds*, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 115; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.) §§ 308, 309; 2 *Taylor, Landl. & T.* §§ 690, 691. The distinction has been formulated by the Maryland Court of Chancery, and undoubtedly is good law everywhere, that an injunction will be refused to a succeeding owner between whom and the tenant committing the waste there is no privity, unless the in-

of course, within the sphere of "equitable waste," as above explained, that the form of remedy here under discussion is most absolutely demanded, and most thoroughly satisfactory when invoked.¹

§ 559. **Conclusion as to Freehold Estates.** — Estates of freehold — the fees and the life estates — the discussion of which is here brought to a close, were *the* estates of feudalism and the early common law, acquiring their name from the fact that they were the only interests worthy of a freeman's attention; and, being also the only forms of ownership of which seisin can be predicated, they have always stood out as the most prominent things in the law of real property. A long stretch of history is to be closed, and a great mass of feudal principles and deductions is to be left behind, in passing over to the estates less than freehold and the law of landlord and tenant, which are next to be investigated.

jury is irreparable; but that, in cases where privity exists between the parties to the suit, the court will be quicker to grant an injunction, regardless of how adequate or inadequate may be the

remedy at law. *Georges Creek Co. v. Detmold*, 1 Md. Ch. 371. See *Wash. R. P.* (6th ed.) § 309.

¹ § 553, "third," *supra*.

