


**NASA CONTRACTOR
REPORT**



NASA CR-2490

NASA CR-2490

**ANALYSIS AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN
OF AN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
TRANSPORT FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM**

Ronald Frazzini and Darrel Vaughn

Prepared by

HONEYWELL INC.

Hopkins, Minn.

for Langley Research Center



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16. Abstract The general objective of this program was to perform the analysis and preliminary design of an advanced technology transport aircraft flight control system using avionics and flight control concepts appropriate to the 1980-1985 time period. Specifically, the techniques and requirements of the flight control system were established, a number of candidate configurations were defined, and an evaluation of these configurations was performed to establish a recommended approach. Twenty-four candidate configurations based on redundant integration of various sensor types, computational methods, servo actuator arrangements and data-transfer techniques were defined to the functional module and piece-part level. Life-cycle costs, for the flight control configurations, as determined in an operational environment model for 200 aircraft over a 15-year service life, were the basis of the optimum configuration selection tradeoff. The recommended system concept is a quad digital computer configuration utilizing a small microprocessor for input/output control, a hexad skewed set of conventional sensors for body rate and body acceleration, and triple integrated actuators.					
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FOREWORD

This report covers the work conducted under NASA Contract Number NAS 1-12437, "Analysis and Preliminary Design of an Advanced Technology Transport Aircraft Flight Control System". The program was administered under the direction of the Flight Dynamics and Control Division of NASA-Langley.

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ANALYSIS AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN
OF AN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSPORT
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM

By Ronald Frazzini and Darrel Vaughn


Honeywell Inc.

SUMMARY

The general objective of this program was to perform the analysis and preliminary design of an advanced technology transport aircraft flight control system using avionics and flight control concepts appropriate to the 1980-1985 time period. Specifically, the techniques and requirements of the flight control system were established, a number of candidate configurations were defined, and an evaluation of these configurations was performed to establish a recommended approach.

Twenty-four candidate configurations based on redundant integration of various sensor types, computational methods, servo actuator arrangements and data-transfer techniques were defined to the functional module and piece-part level. Life-cycle costs, for the flight control configurations, as determined in an operational environment model for 200 aircraft over a 15-year service life, were the basis of the optimum configuration selection tradeoff.

The recommended system concept is a quad digital computer configuration utilizing a small microprocessor for input/output control, a hexad skewed set of conventional sensors for body rate and body acceleration, and triple integrated actuators. This configuration is shown in Figure 1 in a simplified system-level block diagram. Characteristics of the recommended system are:



SYSTEM 13A
 QUAD GP/PROCESSOR I/O CROSSFEED
 CONVENTIONAL SENSORS WITH HEXAD BODY SENSORS
 TRIPLE INTEGRATED ACTUATOR
 IN-LINE MONITORED ACTUATORS
 COMPARISON MONITORED BALANCE

Figure 1. - Selected System - Simplified Block Diagram

- Flight reliability: 0.63×10^{-7} probability of failure per flight hour
- System initial cost: \$352,000 per shipset
- System weight: 1069.7 pounds per shipset
- Shop maintenance manhours per flight hour: 0.0215
- Total life cost (15 yr/200 aircraft): \$246 million
- System MTBF: 201 hours

These are only a few of the parameters examined for the study; they and the others employed are discussed fully in the body of the report.

The results of the study show that the most cost-effective flight control system for an ATT aircraft using extensive active control technology can be implemented with the following technologies:

- Computation - general-purpose digital
- Sensors - conventional, gyros and accelerometers
- Actuation - integrated hydraulic packages

The overall computational requirements of the ATT flight control system cannot be cost-effectively achieved with an analog system design. The computation task requires the use of a digital processor. The system requires a high-integrity BIT capability, a capability which is less expensively implemented digitally. These factors allow the required functions to be implemented at minimum life-cycle cost in a general-purpose digital processor.

Conventional spinmotor rate gyros and pendulous force-rebalance accelerometers provide the best solution for meeting the sensing requirements; all are currently used in flight control systems. The use of advanced types of inertial sensors is not indicated because they do not appear cost effective at the precision level needed for control system use (as opposed to the precision level needed for navigation systems).

Hydraulic actuation is projected as superior to other alternates, and the integrated hydraulic package is the most attractive mechanization. It provides the minimum cost per function because a single device accepts electrical command signals and outputs surface position and because it allows simplified monitoring and fault reaction since no intermediate cross-feeds are required.

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

This document reports on the results of a Preliminary Design and Analysis of a Flight Control System for the Advanced Technology Transport (ATT) under NASA contract NAS1-12437. The ATT is an advanced aircraft designed to operate in the 1980's and is a medium-range and payload aircraft aimed at the high-density airline routes. It embodies the full range of current commercial transport flight control capabilities plus a fly-by-wire (FBW) primary flight control system and higher-order control modes (active control techniques-ACT) included to reduce aircraft weight and increase operating efficiency, resulting in significant improvements in operating costs. The airframe used as a basis for this study is the Convair configuration which was established as a model in an earlier study conducted for NASA-Langley.

The objective of this study was to provide a preliminary design of the ATT flight control system which is appropriate to and meets the operational needs for an aircraft entering revenue service in 1980. The FCS study in conjunction with other previous NASA studies forms a total picture of the impact of a FBW/ACT implementation.

The scope of the work performed includes the appropriate trade studies in reliability, complexity, redundancy, maintainability, and cost. This was accomplished by selecting the most promising mechanizations for sensor, actuator, computer, data flow, and other implementations and then configuring a series of candidate systems from these selected components. These candidate systems were then evaluated in trade studies to select a recommended system and present a rationale for its recommendation.

The ATT flight control system (FCS) includes a full set of flight control modes presently utilized in commercial jet transport aircraft, including pilot relief, control wheel steering, area navigation coupling, along with

automatic landing, roll-out and go-around modes. In addition, the ATT FCS includes two highly significant innovations in automatic flight control -- a fly-by-wire (FBW) system which replaces the mechanical coupling to the surface actuators with electrical coupling and higher-level control modes (ACT) which improve passenger comfort and structure fatigue life and at the same time, allow a less expensive airframe with a lower operating cost.

The ACT configured vehicle is a less expensive aircraft to build because structural rigidity and control surface area design requirements can be relaxed, and the operating cost of the aircraft is less because it may be designed to maximize economy.

The FCS candidate systems were designed to the basic requirements mutually defined by NASA-Langley and Honeywell. These requirements included the functional requirements, the flight reliability requirement, the maintainability requirement and the basic tradeoff requirement minimum life-cycle cost where life-cycle cost is the sum of the initial cost and the operating cost or cost-of-ownership.

The candidate system concept tradeoff study utilized life-cycle cost on the following basis. The initial cost portion was generated through a computerized compilation technique which uses a common library of implementation parts (resistors, capacitors integrated circuits, etc.) and with the defined mechanization for each candidate systems, compiles cost and reliability for each. All nonrecurring costs such as design and development are included in the initial cost. The costs and reliability are fed to a computerized model of the operational environment of the ATT in the 1980 - 1985 time frame. This model then outputs the operating cost of each candidate system.

The candidate system concepts were constructed during the technology survey/forecast and component-selection phases of the program. During the technology survey, evaluations of the design and development risk for each technology of interest were made, and only those components with a reasonable forecast for availability in 1978 were carried forward to the candidate

systems. The technology forecast also resulted in projected costs and reliability for each component used to construct the candidate systems.

The "system configuration tree," Figure 2, shows how the candidate systems were constructed. Each level of the system configuration tree is dedicated to an implementation variation such as computer technology or sensor implementations. A total of 24 candidate systems were constructed, 20 candidates initially with four additional candidates (those with an A-suffix) added as greater insight was developed into the tradeoff program. The system configuration tree and the initial life-cycle-cost data allowed the generation of more optimized configurations for study; consequently, the recommended system concept, number 13A, was not one of the initially constructed systems but was a configuration developed using the configuration tree.

In the balance of this report, Sections 2 through 5 provide the fundamental vehicle and control system definition together with anticipated requirements necessary to perform the FCS analysis and preliminary design. Section 2 includes the pertinent characteristics of the ATT aircraft as defined by General Dynamics-Convair. Section 3 contains the flight control system requirements as specified by NASA-Langley, derived from the Convair ATT data, or developed by Honeywell on the basis of previous experience. Section 4 describes FCS capabilities and characteristics assumed and/or defined by Honeywell as a result of the brief analysis and preliminary design effort. Section 5 describes the flight control system preliminary design process including some of the early decisions concerning redundancy and monitoring which established the various candidate configurations. Section 6 combines a technology survey and component tradeoff discussion to present the concepts used to reduce the unmanageable number of possible configurations to a reasonable array for selection of the optimum configuration. Section 7 gives a brief description of each of the candidate configurations and details the manner in which each configuration was mechanized from the piece-part level. Section 8 presents the model of the operational environment, including route structure and maintenance




Figure 2. - System Configuration Tree

philosophy. Section 9 describes the rationale for selection of the recommended configuration. Section 10 provides a detailed description of the mechanization of the optimum configuration. Section 11 includes the study conclusions. Section 12 indicates the recommended areas for further study. Appendix A describes the tradeoff methodology used to provide a consistent evaluation of each configuration. Appendix B is a glossary of terms. Appendix C presents sensitivity studies of the configurations which illustrate the effects of various changes in the mechanization and/or maintenance philosophy.

SECTION 2

VEHICLE DEFINITION

Honeywell has been supplied with reports prepared by General Dynamics-Convair under contract NAS 1-10702 to support this ATT study. The final vehicle configurations recommended in these reports were used to define the basic airframe in the Honeywell study.

Primary Vehicle Characteristics

The two different aircraft configurations shown in Figures 3 and 4 will be developed for the two cruise speeds, mach .90 and .98. The preliminary design of the FCS will be essentially identical for the two aircraft configurations; therefore, all FCS configurations are considered applicable to both vehicle configurations. Other features include:

- Both aircraft configurations will be designed to carry a 40 000-pound payload for a 3000-nautical-mile range.
- Both configurations will have three engines, two wing-mounted and one tail-mounted.
- Only the mach .98 aircraft will have an area-ruled fuselage.
- An economic service life of 15 years is assumed.
- A design fatigue life of 30 years or 120 000 flight hours is assumed.

Vehicle Flight Controls

The characteristics of the Convair ATT design indicate it will require higher level control functions to be integrated into the aircraft structural, aerodynamic and propulsion design. The result of an integrated approach is a vehicle which has reduced weight, improved controllability, ride quality

WING DATA	
AREA =	1970 FT ² (183 m ²)
AR =	9.0
SWEEP =	36° @ c/2
t/c =	14.15% ⊥ c/2 @ MAC




Figure 3. - ATT Mach .90 Configuration

WING DATA	
AREA =	2282 FT ² (212 m ²)
AR =	8.0
SWEEP =	40° @ c/2
t/c =	11% ⊥ c/2 @ MAC




Figure 4. - ATT Mach .98 Configuration

and maneuverability, longer aircraft life and decreased drag. The active control techniques (ACT) offer improved mission effectiveness at a significantly lower operating cost.

Mechanical Flight Control Linkages

It is assumed that mechanical linkages to the control surfaces will not be provided in the ATT because they cannot provide adequate control of the vehicle to assure passenger safety and aircraft structural integrity. Stability augmentation is necessary to maintain a satisfactory stability margin. The fly-by-wire system, consequently, will not be a simple direct electrical link but will require the active elements necessary to provide the higher level control capability.

Control Surfaces

The following control surface configuration, defined in the Convair data and used as a baseline in the FCS study, are shown in Figure 5, a plan form of the mach .98 version:

- Ailerons (mid-span)
- Flaps (inboard) - three-section double-slotted Fowler type
- Flaps (midspan) - three-section double-slotted Fowler type
- Flaps (outboard) - two-section simple hinged type
- Horizontal stabilizer
- Rudder - two-section
- Spoilers (midspan)
- Spoilers (tip)
- Wing flutter suppressor (outboard trailing edge)
- Wingtip flutter suppressor




Figure 5. - Flight Control Surfaces

The lateral control surfaces on each wing are tip spoiler, midspan spoiler and midspan aileron. Any two of these three surfaces shall provide safe control capability.

The directional control is provided by a two-section rudder; either section alone shall provide safe control capability.

Flutter suppression is provided by wingtip and outboard wing trailing-edge surfaces. Flutter control is necessary throughout the ATT flight regime. Both sets of surfaces must be operating to provide safe control capability.

ATT Electrical Power System

The primary electric power is derived from three alternators, one on each engine, feeding three separate and isolated sets of three-phase buses with 115-volt, 400-Hz alternating current. A fourth alternator, identical to those driven by the main engines, is provided on the auxiliary power unit (APU), and it can automatically be switched in to replace any one of the three primary alternators. The primary function of the auxiliary power unit is to furnish power for the aircraft systems on the ground.

Three +28-Vdc buses are independently powered from the three a-c buses by transformer/rectifier sets.

Emergency power is provided to the emergency bus on a short-term basis by a battery and on a long-term basis by a ram air turbine (RAT) driving an alternator. The battery is kept in a fully charged condition by a battery charger from the a-c system. The charger is capable of recharging the battery at the same rate it is discharged.

Operation of the RAT deploy handle places the RAT in the air stream. When deployed, it automatically comes up to speed and supplies three-phase, 115-volt, 400-Hz power.

A special arrangement of the triple engine-driven electrical generation is necessary for quad-redundant FCS configurations. The electrical generation and distribution must be free of bus-to-bus fault propagation and must assume that power bus failures do not occur simultaneously. Figure 6 illustrates such an electrical system which could be utilized for a quad FCS. In this electrical system, the fourth independent bus (capacity of less than 1000 watts) is driven by three common-shaft electric motors, each of which is driven from an independent bus supplied by an engine-driven generator. Each electric motor is capable of driving the fourth bus alternator alone.

The characteristics of the power system described above shall be defined by specifications similar to MIL-STD-704, and, for the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the power system will meet the present requirements of MIL-STD-704.

Since the FCS contains the critical augmented fly-by-wire function, the FCS (utilization equipment) must provide full performance capability for both normal and abnormal electric system operation as defined in the applicable specification.

Flight crew selection of the three primary electrical buses is not required; automatic bus switching following power bus faults will not cause operation outside the normal voltage transient limits. The automatic bus fault monitoring and switching is a function of the electrical power distribution system.

All interrupt and fault sequences on the electrical bus systems are to be considered nonsimultaneous; the probability of simultaneous alternator or power bus faults in a good electrical system is considered insignificant.

ATT Hydraulic System

The recommended ATT hydraulic system consists of three separate, parallel, closed-circuit hydraulic systems, each supplied from three pumps




Figure 6. - Electrical Power System for Quad Fly-by-Wire FCS

as indicated on Figure 7. Six of these pumps are located on the three main-engine accessory gear boxes, and three auxiliary pumps are driven by an electric motor powered from the APU.




Figure 7. - Hydraulic Power System

These three systems are used only for inflight power to the flight control system and nonflight functions such as wheel brakes; separate utility supplies are provided for landing gear and other nonflight control actuators.

FAA-approved Skydrol 500B/Hyjet W/Aerosafe 23000W will be used as the baseline fluid in conjunction with proven seals, shaft materials and valve configurations at 3000 psi. Bulk modulus for analytical purposes is assumed to be 150,000 psi. An all-metal piping system designed for essentially infinite service durability will be used.

Pilot Interface Equipment

The primary controls include the control wheel and column, rudder pedals, and manual trim controls.

The control wheel and column and rudder pedals are assumed to be implemented as displacement devices, with force gradients, viscous damping, maximum travel stops and other feel and harmony characteristics to be defined and built in by the airframe manufacturer.

The control column, wheel and rudder pedals operated by the captain are directly coupled to those controls operated by the first officer through a breakaway linkage. Thus, the command position transducers are synchronized for the two sets of controls except in the event of a control jam.

The only FCS portions of these controls are the redundant control position pickoffs.

No followup servos will be required; parallel motion of the pilot controls for FCS-commanded augmentation and control is not required.

The pitch manual trim will be by beep trim switches on the control wheel; roll and yaw trim will be by control panel trim wheels with position pickoffs.

SECTION 3

FCS REQUIREMENTS

The system requirements to which the ATT flight control is defined, may be divided into five categories:

- Flight safety and reliability
- Maintainability
- Functional performance
- Projected aircraft compatibility
- Pilot interface displays

The requirements in these categories are derived from several sources. The primary source is the statement of work for the analysis and preliminary design of this program. Other requirement sources are the air frame manufacturer's study documentation, existing specifications, data from airlines (particularly United Air Lines), and from exchanges with personnel from NASA-Langley.

Another primary requirement exists: that the recommended system configuration provide the lowest life-cycle cost while meeting the other requirements discussed in this section. The life-cycle cost requirement is the salient trade study quantity and is utilized to make the final decision on a recommended system.

The basic requirement for the ATT FCS is to provide an optimum design for the projected ATT airframe in the 1980-1985 time frame and in the anticipated commercial transport operating environment. The following subsections describe the requirement sets, their source and rationale, any extrapolations considered necessary to present requirements, and, where necessary, the ground rules and computations necessary to describe some requirements.

Flight Safety and Reliability

The program contract requires that system configurations be studied with reliability over the range of 1.0×10^{-7} flight control system function losses per flight hour.

To validate this level, an investigation was made of commercial air-line experience with mechanical primary flight control system reliability. The data obtained from CAB and NTSB sources showed the following:

<u>Period</u>	<u>Accident/failure rate</u>
1952-1959	2.32×10^{-7} /flight hour
1962-1969	1.19×10^{-7} /flight hour

This data confirms the NASA requirements for flight reliability in this range.

To compute the flight reliability for each candidate configuration, certain basic groundrules were used:

- The loss of any class A function is considered to be catastrophic and is to be included in the 10^{-7} -hour goal.
- To assure a worst-case flight reliability computation, the maintenance is considered to be performed only at maintenance stations. Since, in the operational model used, only one of each four stations has maintenance facilities, and, since the average time between stations is 1.6 flight hours and 2.0 operating hours, the time between available maintenance is 8.0 hours operating time.
- Candidate configurations will be eliminated from the study unless they substantially meet the 10^{-7} -hour flight reliability requirement

- Any portion of the FCS which is required for the ACT/FBW functions must tolerate at least three parallel failures before a loss of function occurs. This is to ensure that a single failure occurrence will not cause an aircraft to be grounded between maintenance stations.
- No single-point success paths will be permitted regardless of the reliability level.

To assure flight safety, all candidate configurations will be designed to satisfy the Federal Aviation Regulations for airworthiness of transport aircraft; FAR 25. The FAR paragraphs considered applicable for the FCS are:

- 25. 671: General (control system)
- 25. 672: Stability augmentation and automatic, and power operated systems.
- 25. 1301 Equipment systems and installations
- 25. 1329: Automatic pilot system

The flight control system functions have been subdivided into the following classes, dependent on their flight safety criticality.

- Class A - loss of function is catastrophic (ACT/FBW)
- Class B - loss of function is critical (autoland)
- Class C - loss of function must be fail-safe (cruise and relief modes)

The placement of the various functions and/or modes in the above classes is as follows:

- Class A (ACT/FBW) -
 - Pitch CAS/SAS
 - Roll CAS/SAS
 - Yaw CAS/SAS

- Relaxed static stability
 - Mach trim
 - Wing flutter suppression
 - Manual trim
- Class B (autoland) -
 - Localizer track
 - Glide slope track
 - Flare
 - Rollout guidance
 - Runway alignment
 - Go-around guidance
 - Class C (cruise and relief modes) -

- Pitch attitude hold	- Glideslope capture
- Roll attitude hold	- Altitude hold
- Heading hold	- Altitude select
- Heading select	- Mach hold
- Localizer capture	- Airspeed hold
- Vertical speed hold	- Vertical speed select
- Navigation coupling	

The Class B (autoland) functions will be designed to the safety requirements of the applicable FAR paragraphs previously listed and to the safety requirements of:

Advisory Circular 120-28A, Appendix 1, Para. 6

Advisory Circular 20-57A, Paragraphs 5C and 5D

Generally, the safety design shall be such that the reliability of a catastrophic failure mode during the autoland maneuver is less than 10^{-9} from the minimum alert height (or minimum decision height) to touchdown/rollout.

Maintainability

The maintenance design of the ATT FCS has several facets. First, the unscheduled maintenance rate is a measure of the cost to operate the system. Second, the FCS must be designed for minimum scheduled maintenance, also a cost factor in revenue service. Finally, the capability of the maintenance built-in test assures the full monitoring integrity throughout the operating life of the airplane.

The NASA-Langley statement of work for this study specifies the flight control system unscheduled maintenance rate shall not exceed 0.02 maintenance man hours per flight hour and scheduled maintenance shall not be required more often than every 300 hours of flight. To ascertain the reasonableness of this requirement, maintainability predictions of the AFCS's for DC-10 and L1011 were analyzed. The average maintenance predictions for DC-10 and L1011 flight control systems are:

- On-aircraft - $\frac{\text{MMH}}{\text{FH}} = 0.00066$
- Off-aircraft - $\frac{\text{MMH}}{\text{FH}} = 0.02454$

Based on these predictions it is apparent that the NASA-Langley $\frac{\text{MMH}}{\text{FH}}$ of 0.02 for an AFCS is tighter, but in the same "ball park" as that predicted for the DC-10 and L1011 AFCS's.

The maintenance BIT must be designed to detect a very high percentage of faults which may occur. The maintenance BIT tests may be run prior to flight or during flight or, prior to use of a certain function, such as a preland BIT check before use in an automatic landing. The fault detection capability of Class A and B functions must be greater than 99 percent to

assure the flight safety designed into the redundancy management of the system. The maintenance BIT must also isolate a very high percentage of detected faults to the line-replaceable module. This assures that maintenance is accomplished without costly delays and that the unconfirmed removal ratio remains very low. The ATT FCS is designed to fault isolate more than 95 percent of the detected failures.

Functional and Performance Requirements

The functional capabilities of the defined FCS are described in detail in Section 4, "FCS Functional Capabilities." The FCS has been configured to meet the most probable performance requirements derived from the NASA-Langley SOW, from the airframe manufacturer's ATT reports, and from Honeywell's extensive design experience in the performance areas of interest. Thus, the FCS candidate configurations traded off in the study would meet any probable set of performance requirements which would be generated at the time of airframe definition, and the findings of this implementation study should prove accurate in that time frame.

The functional design is configured to provide a stable airframe with optimized responses to pilot commands from wheels and pedals and, thus, a minimum pilot workload throughout the flight envelope and in all modes. The CCV compromises to the airframe design will be fully compensated by the FCS so that the flight crew will be unaware of any but optimum handling qualities. The functional configuration of the ATT flight control system is based on the aircraft aerodynamic characteristics and the operating flight regimes.

Figures 8 and 9, taken from a General Dynamics-prepared document show that, for cruise candidates, the ATT is statically unstable in pitch. Therefore, pitch-axis augmentation is required. Further, it is not unreasonable to assume that the aircraft is also statically unstable in the yaw axis (no data is given in the above-mentioned report) therefore, yaw augmentation is necessary. The inter-axis relationships would indicate that roll augmentation should also be provided.




Figure 8. - Variation of Aerodynamic Static Margin During Typical Flight Profile




Figure 9. - Longitudinal Short-Period Characteristics

The General Dynamics data indicates the ATT will exhibit wing flutter at cruising speeds with a full fuel load and at less than 400 KIAS for light fuel loads. To achieve safe control throughout the flight regime, flutter control must be provided by the minimum flight control system.

The aerodynamic data further indicate that the aircraft exhibits a pronounced mach tuck condition at cruising speeds. Accordingly, the mach-trim function has been included as a part of the minimum flight control system which must be operating at all times for safe control of the aircraft.

Compatibility Requirements for Projected Aircraft

The projected aircraft involves a number of design considerations unique to the configuration. The most obvious are the number of control surfaces and their effectiveness, the compromises of the CCV, and necessary structural instability suppression. Many other requirements are also important in the system tailoring to the air frame:

- Electrical power generation
- Electrical power bus configuration
- Hydraulic power generation
- Hydraulic power distribution
- Operating environment: temperature, vibration
- Natural hazards: EMI, lightning strike

The impact of the electrical and hydraulic power generation of the projected aircraft is of greatest significance in the various redundancy management arrangements and is described in Section 5, "System Definition and Design Process," and Section 2, "Vehicle Definition."

The operating and natural hazard environments for the FCS are not expected to be significantly different than present-day jet transport aircraft. The reliability of operation in these same environments, however, is dra-

matically different from existing autopilots and stability augmentors because of the CCV/FBW function criticality.

The operating environments for which the candidate configurations are designed are given in Table 1. This table lists the required operating environmental conditions, the TSO required, qualification testing procedures, and additions to the AS402A testing requirements which are considered necessary to assure the necessary hardware quality.

The natural-hazard testing for EMI environments is also included in Table 1. The effects of lightning strike are considered critical to an electrical FBW/ACT aircraft. The candidate configurations are designed to tolerate the power transients of MIL-STD-704 and the conducted transient susceptibility requirements of MIL-STD-461A to assure that the signal circuits will be adequately protected against unexpected induced voltages from lightning strikes. It is also assumed that the aircraft cabling, aircraft bonding, and equipment bonding is in accordance with MIL-B-7087B and MIL-STD-461A.

Because of the criticality of the FBW and ACT functions of the ATT, the lightning-strike hazard has a much greater significance than in contemporary aircraft, and further investigation is recommended in this area.

A discussion of the proposed investigation is given in Section 11, "Further Study."

Mode, Status, and Crew Advisory Displays

All FCS displays and panels with incandescent illumination will be controlled by a "master dim control," and all FCS displays and panels in the glare shield area will have automatic light sensing and dimming.

Panel and display layout and configuration are not defined, but the control, display, and annunciation for current commercial jet transports such as the DC-10 will be included in the FCS implementation. The FCS mode

TABLE 1. - OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Environmental requirements	Minimum testing per FAR para 37.119 Automatic Pilots - TSO-C9C (referencing AS402A dated 2-1-59)	Additions to TSO requirements for ATT AFCS
Dielectric (individual test)	<u>6.1.1</u> Insulation resistance <u>6.1.2</u> Overpotential tests	
<u>3.3.1</u> Low-temp operation	<u>7.1</u> 5-hr + test at -30C (-22F) (controlled environment) or -55C (-67F) (uncontrolled environment).	
<u>3.3.1</u> High-temp operation	<u>7.2</u> 5-hr + test at +50C (122F) (controlled environment) or 70C (158F) (uncontrolled environment).	
<u>3.3.1</u> Extreme Temperature Exposure	<u>7.3</u> 24-hr each of -65C (-85F) and 70C (158F) delay 3 hr and test at room temp.	
<u>3.5</u> Magnetic effect	<u>7.4</u> Panel controllers only; free magnet deflection.	
<u>3.3.2</u> Humidity	<u>7.5</u> One 24-hr period (controlled environment) or five 24-hr periods (uncontrolled environment); 6 hr at 70C (158F) and 95% RH, cool to 38C during remaining 18 hr.	
<u>3.3.3</u> Vibration	<u>7.6</u> Range = 5-500 Hz Max DA = 0.036 inch Max Accel = 10g (wings and tail) 5g (fuselage) 3-axis resonant search then one hour each axis at resonance; 15-min cycles for one hour each axis.	
<u>3.3.5</u> Explosion	<u>7.7</u> Only units in nonpressurized areas of aircraft. Proven explosive mixture SL and at 40,000-ft. Operated 10 times.	
<u>3.3.6</u> Icing	<u>7.8</u> All units mechanically coupled to primary control or trim systems; subject to 5 icing cycles then test performance at -55C (-67F)	
<u>3.3.4</u> Altitude - pressure-temp -1000 ft to 40,000 ft per NACA Report 1235 with temperature of para. 3.3.1 AS402A	No testing requirements.	Test per RTCA document DO-138 paragraph 4.3 (altitude) with the applicable altitudes of Table I of that document.
<u>3.4</u> Radio interference - shall be no interference with other a/c eqpt either radiation or feedback.	No testing requirements.	Test per RTCA document DO-138 with the following paragraphs. 10.0 Conducted voltage transient 11.0 Audio-conducted suscept. 12.0 Audio-mag field suscept. 13.0 RF suscept., rad and cond.
Shock	No testing requirements.	Test per RTCA document DO-138 paragraph 6.0 for both operational and crash safety shocks.
Cooling air	No data.	Use cooling if necessary per ARINC 404.

Note: Underlined paragraph numbers are per AS402A.

status will be displayed; the pilot need not depend on the recognition of mode switch position.

FCS mode changes not made through the normal mode switches must be flashing-light indication. The flashing light may be stopped with a cancel button. These mode changes are those caused by pilot force on the controls, motion of certain controls such as synchronizer wheels, and by fault detection. Mode selection must be nonambiguous using a mode confirmation annunciation as part of the operational status displays. Servo engage currents must be switched by contacts integral with the pilot-actuated lever.

Where advisable, optimum crew action should be annunciated, especially when faults cause reduction of FCS capabilities. This may include flight envelope restrictions, losses of higher-order control modes, or instructions to land immediately for multiple FBW faults.

SECTION 4

FCS FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES

The primary sources for the definition of the system functional capability were the basic NASA requirements and the airframe studies performed by General Dynamics. The system includes stability augmentation of a statically unstable airframe, command control of motion variables, maneuver load control, ride quality control, structural mode control and flutter margin control to the degree required by the airframe study. Further, the SOW requires the functions of fly-by-wire, attitude and heading control, altitude hold, airspeed trim hold, and coupling with various navigation and automated landing and takeoff systems. Other command control modes are required as appropriate, such as flight-path angle and velocity, altitude rate and velocity, and roll rate with attitude hold. Pilot interfaces to allow pilot-computer-control-system communication are required.

System Modes and Functions

The application of advanced technologies to long-range transport aircraft studies performed by Convair Aerospace Division of General Dynamics, were used to define the modes and functions. The modes and functions can be categorized as advanced control concepts or as conventional autopilot/flight director functions. The results of the referenced studies indicate that several advanced control concepts may be applied to future transport aircraft with significant benefits. Advanced control concepts consist of static stability augmentation, active flutter suppression, maneuver load and direct lift control. These concepts were thoroughly investigated in the reference studies, with the sensor requirements and the force and moment producers also being defined. The advanced control concept configurations defined herein, with some refinements, reflect the results of these studies.

Autopilot/flight director modes were not extensively studied in the referenced studies. Rather, it was felt that the modes and functions including Category III autoland, available in today's modern transports (DC-10, L-1011), are adequate for the 1975-1985 time period. The autopilot/flight director modes can be categorized as command control modes, outer-loop modes (inertial and air data), and coupled command modes. These modes and their functions are:

- Command control modes -
 - Control wheel steering (rate commands)
 - Override or supervisory override of O/L modes
 - Turn control

- Outer-loop modes (inertial and air data) -
 - Attitude hold
 - Heading hold
 - Altitude hold
 - Altitude select
 - Vertical speed hold and select
 - Heading select
 - Mach hold
 - IAS hold
 - Flare

- Coupled commands
 - Radio navigation (VOR)
 - ILS -- localizer /glide slope/align/rollout
 - MLS¹
 - Area navigation¹
 - Terminal air traffic control¹
 - Inertial navigation¹

¹ Provisions for coupled signals equivalent to steering commands are included in the baseline implementations.

Flight director modes are included above and on the functional block diagrams; however, the flight director displays and driving electronics were not included as a part of the baseline candidate configurations. Hardware mechanization of the autothrottle function also was not performed as a part of this study.

The basic single-thread baseline functional system, including sensors, panels, actuators, and computation is shown in Figure 10. Signal flow between the various subsystems is indicated in this diagram. System descriptions and related functional block diagrams that formed the basis of the trade-off studies are provided in the following subsections.

Relaxed Static Stability, Mach Trim System

The relaxed static stability, mach trim system block diagram is shown in Figure 11. Pitch rate from a fuselage-mounted rate gyro is fed into a lag network. Scheduling of the lag time constant with static pressure and dynamic pressure is done to match the time constant with the aircraft time constant. Loop gain is also scheduled with the same two parameters.

When in the direct-link or CAS modes, the mach trim system is operative. Mach trim is required in the transonic region to stabilize the unstable trim characteristic. This input is synchronized in all other modes.

Flutter Suppression System

Figure 12 shows the flutter suppression system assumed for the trade-off studies. Right and left wingtip rate gyros measure symmetric torsion. The rigid-body component is subtracted out using a fuselage-mounted gyro. This signal then drives the outboard aileron to damp the symmetric wing torsion.




Figure 10. - Baseline System Functional Block Diagram




Figure 11. - Relaxed Static Stability, Mach Trim System Functional Block Diagram




Figure 12. - Flutter Suppression System Functional Block Diagram

Symmetric wingtip acceleration is measured by right and left wingtip accelerometers and a fuselage accelerometer. These signals are shaped and gain scheduled before driving the wingtip surface. This signal also drives the outboard aileron through a scheduled gain.

Maneuver and Gust Load Alleviation System

The maneuver and gust load alleviation system uses a complement of sensors that include wingtip and midspan accelerometers, a fuselage rate gyro, and wheel-force transducers to drive the stabilizer, outboard spoilers and outboard ailerons. Figure 13 shows the functional block diagram. Gains to all three surfaces are scheduled as a function of dynamic pressure. A crossfeed from the spoilers and aileron to the stabilizer cancels pitching moments from these surfaces. The spoilers are operated from the faired position providing gust alleviation in one direction, whereas the ailerons provide alleviation in both directions.

The ATT study conducted by General-Dynamics indicated that the improvements in ride quality and fatigue life resulting from incorporation of a full-time gust alleviation system did not justify including this feature. The scope of this Honeywell study did not permit a determination of the applicability of the mode. The midspan accelerometers shown in Figure 13 were, consequently, not included in the candidate configuration mechanizations because of their limited and questionable application. The computational requirements of the mode were included, however.

Direct Lift Control

In the autoland, glide slope error, normal acceleration, radio altitude and pitch attitude drive uprigged midspan spoilers. The elevation is driven by the same signal to cancel the pitching moments due to spoiler deflection.




Figure 13. - Maneuver and Gust Load Alleviation System Functional Block Diagram

Yaw-Axis Control

The yaw-axis stability augmentation system (SAS) and autopilot functional block diagram is shown in Figure 14.

Yaw SAS. - The yaw SAS provides both damping of the dutch roll mode and turn coordination during manual and automatic control. Yaw rate is modified by a scheduled gain and passed through a washout to remove the effects of steady-state turns. The signal is summed with lateral acceleration having filtering and gain scheduling. A flap-position sensor provides the discrimination for low-speed/high-speed control law switching. The high-speed yaw SAS control law is modified for slow-speed, lowered-flap conditions by summing yaw rate directly with the shaped roll-attitude twin coordination signal and blending the results with lateral acceleration. The SAS control law switching is required to compensate for the reduced effectiveness of the lateral acceleration turn.

Yaw autopilot. - The yaw-axis autopilot provides the forward slip maneuver and is engaged at the appropriate altitude determined by the radio altimeter signal. Localizer beam deviation and acceleration blended with course error signals augmented by yaw rate are used to provide rudder commands for forward-slip runway alignment maneuvers. Lateral acceleration is fed through a deadband to bias the bank command in such a manner that approaches in exceptionally large crosswinds result in a partially banked and a partially crabbed maneuver.

The roll-out mode is initiated at touchdown. The same control is used during the forward-slip maneuver except that a washout function is switched into the course error computation. Proportional-plus-integral control is used for these two modes.




Figure 14. - Yaw-Axis SAS and Autopilot Functional Block Diagram

Pitch-Axis Control

The pitch-axis functional block diagram (Figure 15) shows that the pitch axis is functionally divided into three parts--pitch command augmentation system (CAS), pitch enroute coupler, and pitch ILS approach/land coupler.

Pitch CAS. - The pitch command augmentation system is the basic mode for manually commanding pitch-attitude changes. Either the pilot or the first officer can change the pitch attitude by commanding aircraft pitch rate proportional to the control column force. If the wheel forces do not exceed a set level, high-passed pitch rate is fed to the elevator. Manual trim capability is provided through the control wheel trim switches.

Pitch enroute coupler. - Included in the pitch enroute coupler discussion are the following modes and functions:

- Pitch attitude hold
- Pitch control wheel steering
- Altitude hold
- Altitude preselect
- IAS hold
- Mach hold
- Vertical speed hold and select

Pitch attitude hold: The pitch attitude-hold mode is the basic pitch-axis mode for both flight director and autopilot. The autopilot attitude control is achieved by synchronization of the attitude occurring at mode engagement if the aircraft is at an attitude less than a maximum limit value. If the mode is engaged with the aircraft in an attitude above the limit value, the aircraft is returned to the limit value, and that attitude is maintained.

This method of autopilot control is accomplished by the use of attitude synchronization. During CAS or CWS maneuvering, the pitch-attitude




Figure 15. - Pitch-Axis CAS and Autopilot Functional Block Diagram

synchronizer is following the aircraft attitude. Upon autopilot engagement or release of CWS forces, the synchronizer is locked, and the attitude existing at that time will be held. By limiting the followup to the required limit values, the aircraft will return to the limit value and hold that attitude upon mode engagement.

Proportional-plus-integral control on attitude error is provided. Adjustments of the attitude reference when going to CWS can also be made.

Pitch control wheel steering: The pitch control wheel steering mode of operation is the basic autopilot mode for manually commanding pitch-attitude changes. Either the pilot or the first officer can change the aircraft pitch attitude by commanding aircraft pitch rate proportional to the control column force. The mode is automatically engaged whenever the control column force exceeds a threshold level. The threshold level is required to alleviate nuisance engagements of the pitch CWS mode when the pilot is resting his hands on the control wheel or using the control wheel for steering in the lateral axis. When the CWS mode is engaged, the pitch attitude is synchronized. When the forces are reduced below the threshold level, the CWS mode is automatically disengaged, and the pitch attitude previously described is engaged.

Altitude hold: The altitude-hold mode of pitch control retains the altitude existing at the moment of mode initiation through the use of a synchronized altitude signal as the control reference. Blended barometric altitude rate is also used for stability and improved short-term or transient control. Normal control wheel steering operation is inhibited during automatic altitude hold. However, control wheel forces greater than the high-level override will disengage the mode. Integral control is provided on the altitude.

Altitude preselect: Altitude preselect is another pitch-control mode that is functionally the same for either autopilot or flight director operation. The mode is engaged, and the desired altitude is manually preselected. Initiation of the mode on the control panel places the autopilot in the arm phase. Maneuvering to the selected altitude is accomplished by control wheel

steering or any other pitch mode. When the altitude error is equal to a pre-determined altitude rate, the capture phase is automatically initiated, and the previously selected mode is disengaged.

The selected altitude is then automatically captured in an exponential flareout maneuver. When the altitude error gets to be less than some pre-determined value, the altitude-preselect mode is automatically disengaged and the altitude-hold mode engaged. The latter mode is then maintained until manually disengaged by the pilot or first officer. Signal shaping, gain scheduling and proportional-plus-integral control are used to achieve precise altitude capture throughout the flight regime.

IAS hold: The IAS-hold is similar to the altitude-hold mode of operation. The control principle of the mode is to retain the IAS value existing at the instant of mode engagement. Like altitude, a synchronized IAS reference is used. Engagement of the mode can only be accomplished by manual initiation of the mode-select button on the integrated control panel. Proportional-plus-integrated control is used for static accuracy. To change the IAS-hold value, the mode has to be disengaged, the airspeed modified, and the mode re-engaged.

Mach hold: The mach-hold mode of control is functionally identical to IAS hold. Engagement of the mode causes the autopilot or flight director command bar to maintain the mach number existing at mode initiation. The reference mach signal is a synchronized mach output. The mode is engaged by initiation of the select button on the panel and disengaged by selecting any other pitch mode or applying a control column force greater than the high-level override value. Like IAS hold, normal CWS is inhibited at mode engagement. Proportional-plus-integral control is used for static accuracy. To change the mach reference, the mode has to be disengaged, the mach modified and the mode re-engaged.

Vertical speed hold and select: In the autopilot vertical speed mode, the aircraft pitch attitude is adjusted to maintain the commanded vertical speed. The commanded vertical speed is derived from the vertical-speed

control on the control panel which is referenced to the altitude-rate signal. Prior to engagement, the vertical-speed control is synchronized to the existing altitude rate.

The vertical speed at mode engagement is referenced vertical speed. Rotation of the vertical-speed control on the control panel will select a new value of vertical speed.

Pitch ILS approach/land coupler. - Two functions are discussed: ILS-MLS approach control and go-around control.

ILS-MLS approach: During the arm phase of this control, any other vertical-path mode can be used for approaching the glideslope beam except altitude preselect. When the glidepath signal from the VHF receiver has decreased to the designated capture level, the capture phase is automatically initiated, and the vertical-path mode used during approach is disengaged. The capture phase of control employs glideslope beam error augmented with a blended altitude rate. By using a bleedoff synchronizer on the glideslope error, the capture maneuver is a smooth exponential maneuver regardless of the flight path prior to engage. When the beam error is less than the designated capture level, the ILS approach track phase is automatically initiated. By use of a limiter-summing technique, the glideslope control law is blended into flare control without the requirement for mode switching. The outputs of a radio altimeter and a normal accelerometer are combined to obtain a blended altitude rate signal. Pitch attitude is also used to provide additional damping. Proportional-plus-integral control is used on the error signal to ensure precise tracking. In addition to driving the elevator and flight director, a command drives up-rigged spoilers for direct lift control.

Go-around: The purpose of the go-around is to quickly arrest the initial descent and to establish the aircraft on a satisfactory climbout path. It is designed for a complete range of initial flight situations in terms of descent rate, airspeed, and aircraft configurations.

The basis of the go-around design approach (Figure 16) is an angle-of-attack command which is a function of vertical speed, forward acceleration, and flap angle. The total command is limited to maintain a desired margin to the stall warning value.

The h-shaping is scheduled such that the α -command decreases as h increases. As a result, the maximum permissible α is commanded during the descent, giving a high-normal acceleration.

The α -command is also modified by forward acceleration. If \dot{u} is positive, the α command is increased, and vice versa. At positive \dot{u} , some of the available power is thereby diverted to assist the gain in height. At negative \dot{u} , the consequent decrease of the α command assists the h-shaping in preventing an excessive dynamic climb, during which a not unsafe, but unnecessarily large, amount of speed might temporarily be lost. An important function of the \dot{u} -term is to augment long-period stability.

The control includes an open-loop, nose-up command which is injected on engagement of the go-around. It assists the arrest of the initial descent but does not affect the course of events in the long term.

Angle-of-attack sensors were not included as a part of the flight control system mechanization. It was assumed that angle-of-attack signals would be available from the stall warning subsystem included as a part of an automatic throttle system.

Roll-Axis Control

The roll-axis functional block diagram (Figure 17) shows that the roll axis is functionally divided into three parts-- roll CAS, lateral enroute coupler and lateral landing coupler.

Roll CAS. - The roll command augmentation system is the basic mode for manually commanding roll-attitude changes. Attitude changes are made




Figure 16. Go-Around Control System Functional Block Diagram




Figure 17. - Roll-Axis SAS and Autopilot Functional Block Diagram

by commanding roll rate proportional to control wheel force. The wheel force must exceed a specified value before the command is effective. A lag filter on roll rate attenuates structural coupling.

Lateral enroute coupler. - Included in the lateral enroute coupler discussion are the following modes and functions:

- Roll attitude hold
- Control wheel steering
- Heading hold
- Heading select
- VOR navigation beam guidance
- Auxiliary navigation

Roll attitude hold: The roll attitude-hold mode is the basic mode of control of the roll autopilot. During pre-engage or CWS maneuvering, the aircraft roll attitude is synchronized.

At autopilot engagement or release of CWS forces, the roll attitude at that time will be the reference. By limiting the maximum reference values, the aircraft will roll back to this value when engaged at a larger value.

Control wheel steering: The roll control wheel steering mode is the basic roll autopilot mode for commanding manual roll-attitude changes. The mode is automatically engaged whenever the control wheel forces exceed the threshold, and the autopilot is engaged. When the forces on the control wheels are below the threshold value, the CWS mode is automatically disengaged, and roll attitude hold or heading hold is engaged as a function of bank.

Heading hold: The heading-hold mode in conjunction with roll attitude hold is the basic mode of control for the roll autopilot. The flight director mode with the autopilot in heading hold is wings-level. The heading-hold reference is a clutched synchro signal from the compass system. For the

autopilot, proportional-plus-integral control provides tight heading hold with no steady-state offset. Gain scheduling with airspeed results in optimum control at all flight conditions. Heading hold will engage only when bank angle is within certain specified values.

The heading-hold mode will disengage if CWS forces exceed the threshold, any other lateral-directional mode is manually engaged, or the capture phase of the directional modes are initiated. As with all clutched signals, engage and disengage operation normally occurs at or near zero, and no special transient alleviation considerations have been incorporated in the mode switching.

Heading select: The heading-select mode is both a flight director and autopilot mode of operation. If either autopilot-engage lever is in the COMMAND position, the aircraft will be smoothly maneuvered to the heading set on the heading-select readout. It will then capture and maintain this selected heading until the mode is disengaged or a new heading is selected. The maneuver during the capture will be limited in bank angle and bank angle rate.

Long-term integration is provided during the "hold" phase to improve the heading track operation. This is automatically engaged whenever the heading error is reduced to a set value.

Selection of another lateral mode or a directional mode with the radio beam captured will automatically disengage the heading select mode.

VOR navigation beam guidance: The VOR mode provides autopilot and/or flight director capture and track of a VOR radio reference. Prior to use, the proper radio frequency and course have to be selected on the applicable selector on the navigational module of the control panel. Beam approach can be made in any of the other lateral directional modes or CWS. At beam interception (beam error is less than 6.5 deg), the approach mode is disengaged, and beam capture and track follows. The particular blend of beam error and course used in this control law results in good beam capture from

virtually any relative heading, followed by a smooth transition from a capture to a tight track phase. Also included in the control sensing and logic is automatic overstation switching. When the logic senses proximity to the transmitting station, the beam error is cut out to avoid the "zone of confusion" while the aircraft maintains the selected course heading. Upon leaving the overstation area, the mode is automatically re-engaged in the track phase. Autopilot maneuvering during the capture phase is limited to bank angle and bank-angle rate. During the track phase, these limits are reduced. The flight director command is limited to the same bank-angle values during manual operation.

As previously indicated, interception of the VOR beam can be made using heading-select, heading-hold, or CWS lateral-directional modes of operation. All modes used for the intercept will be automatically disengaged at initiation of the capture phase except for CWS. The CWS mode can also be used in a supervisory override mode during the automatic capture phase. It is automatically disengaged at the initiation of the track phase.

Auxiliary navigation: This lateral navigational mode will use either inertial navigation or doppler radar as the control reference. Essentially the same control laws and bank limits will be used for capturing and tracking the reference as are used for VOR operation. Of course, the overstation logic will not be required for this mode. The mode is disengaged by the selection of another lateral mode.

Lateral landing coupler. - Two functions are discussed: LOC navigation beam guidance and roll go-around control.

LOC navigation beam guidance (VOR/LOC or ILS): In this mode of operation, the autopilot or flight director display commands capture and track the ILS localizer beam. The mode is initiated by selecting the applicable navigational radio frequency and course and then pressing the VOR/LOC or ILS pushbuttons. Initial mode engagement is in an arm phase in which the heading-hold, heading-select or CWS modes of operation can be used to intercept the localizer beam. When the beam error is less than 2.5 deg, the

capture phase is automatically initiated. As in VOR, the beam-error and course-error signals are blended to give a variable-angle capture which permits approaching the beam from virtually any relative heading. At initiation of the capture phase, the heading modes used for the intercept will be automatically disengaged. If CWS has been engaged, it will remain in effect throughout the capture phase for use as supervisory override. It will be automatically disengaged at the initiation of the LOC track phase. The LOC track phase is automatically initiated when beam error, course error, and bank angle are less than specified values.

Proportional beam and course error are used to perform smooth beam captures from virtually all angles, with no overshoots and the aircraft always turning towards the runway. When the LOC track-sensing logic is satisfied as described above, the control is changed to beam error and washed-out course error. At touchdown, the outer-loop commands are removed, and the ailerons maintain wings-level during the rollout phase of control.

Roll go-around: The roll go-around mode is inhibited until the glide-path is captured. After initiation of the glideslope track phase, the go-around mode can be engaged. During this go-around mode, the roll control is essentially the same as the localizer approach track control with continued use of proportional-plus-integral beam error and lagged roll attitude augmented by lateral acceleration and yaw rate. The only major difference is that the roll maneuver limits are reduced. As the aircraft approaches the localizer transmitter, the localizer beam guidance signal is removed, and the aircraft continues the go-around, maintaining course (runway) heading.

SECTION 5

SYSTEM DEFINITION AND DESIGN PROCESS

The schedule and magnitude of this study did not permit detailed performance of all of the steps in the normal design process, however, they have been carried out to the extent necessary to present meaningful tradeoffs of the various candidate configurations.

Since the study is concerned primarily with digital mechanizations, the following basic steps for the design and mechanization of a digital flight control system were followed:

- Define FCS requirements
- Prepare functional block diagrams
- Define analytical requirements (transfer functions)
- Determine redundancy approach
- Define discrete difference equations
- Conduct digitization process (compute scaling, word length and iteration frequencies)
- Define computer (concept, speed, memory size)
- Define hardware

The first three steps are applicable to both analog and digital configurations and have been covered in the previous sections. The succeeding steps in the digital design process are briefly discussed here.

Redundancy

Redundant copies, or channels as they are frequently called, can be configured as either independent channels or cross-strapped. "Independent

channels" indicates that there is no interconnection or sharing of control signals between the parallel channels. Cross-strapped means that there are interconnections and signal sharing between the redundant channels. Cross-strapping may be accomplished either by analog crossfeed or intercommunication between processors. Cross-strapping may be used at both the input (sensor signals) and output (servo drive) of the processors or at either point individually.

Redundant organizations can be operated either in an active or an active-standby mode. In the active mode all redundant channels are affecting system responses simultaneously. In the active-standby mode, some of the channels are controlling the system while the others are standing by, ready to assume control in the event one of the controlling elements experiences a fault.

The reliability and fault tolerance of the SAS/FBW portion of flight control systems are more severe than those for outer-loop modes. In fact, a total failure of a pilot relief mode would, at worst, result in an increase in pilot workload. A failure in the FBW portion, on the other hand, would endanger the flight schedule if not the airplane. It was previously pointed out that reliability and fault tolerance are closely related to redundancy. It is conceivable that simplex, or nonredundant, outer-loop mechanizations of some functions are adequate in a configuration that requires high levels of redundancy for inner-loop (SAS/FBW) functions. Configurations of this nature would be desirable in the event that inclusion of the noncritical outer-loop functions in the inner-loop computations, overburdened otherwise adequate machines. Dual levels of redundancy would permit using $N + 1$ smaller, less powerful computers instead of N larger machines in order to provide the N levels of redundancy required of the inner loops. Whether $N + 1$ smaller machines are more advantageous than N larger machines is dependent upon the specific situation. The question cannot be answered in general.

United Air Lines, in an unpublished report assessing the application of advanced technologies to subsonic CTOL transport aircraft, indicates as acceptable, a configuration which would allow dispatch with one channel

inoperative and accommodate a second failure in-flight in a "fail operative" mode. The studies reported in references 3 and 4 are also in general agreement with such a concept. This two-fail-operative criteria has been used in defining the redundancy level to be applied in the candidate configurations.

A redundant system that is required to provide undegraded performance after N identical failures must, as a minimum, have N + M copies of each element that could fail. It is rather obvious the $M \geq 1$. If each copy within a redundant configuration is capable of determining its own fault status autonomously, or if there is no protection required in the event of a subsequent failure, $M = 1$. Otherwise, $M \geq 2$. In this context, the term "autonomous" is taken to mean "without reference to any other device."

In the redundancy equation defined above --

$$N = 2$$

For systems with autonomous fault detection --

$$M = 1 \text{ and } N + M = 3 \text{ channels}$$

For systems without autonomous fault detection:

$$M = 2 \text{ and } N + M = 4 \text{ channels}$$

From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the fault detection methods used are a primary factor in establishing the redundancy concepts to be applied. The following two paragraphs are concerned with the preliminary tradeoffs involving fault detection which affected the candidate configurations.

Comparison fault detection. - The only information that can be determined by comparison of two identical controllers is that one of them is at fault. This, of course, utilizes the single-fault assumption; i. e., no two

failures will occur simultaneously. In order to determine which of the two channels is at fault it is necessary to resort to an arbitrator. The simplest and most straightforward way of obtaining an arbitrator is to simply add another channel and make a three-way comparison. A failure of channel "C" is indicated if a three-way comparison is made among channels A, B and C, with A and B agreeing while A and C and B and C disagree.

The channels can either be comparison monitored in the analog domain or in the digital domain. In many respects, the digital approach is the most attractive even though it requires that some alternate method be utilized to monitor the D/A converters at the output. A straightforward approach to handling this is the wrap-around method wherein the analog output of the D/A converters are treated as though they were analog input signals as well. The analog output voltages are converted back into their digital equivalents via the A/D converters at the input and are compared to their required values digitally.

The digital comparisons on the output of the channels can be either bit-by-bit, or differential. Bit-by-bit comparisons are predicated on the assumption that the outputs will be in agreement except in the case of a fault.

Differential comparisons, on the other hand, do not require perfect agreement between the channels but instead permit a certain amount of skew. This method does not work well if there are integrations in the loop. Digital integrations, unlike their analog counterparts, are drift free. They do not tend to bleed to zero with time. Therefore, digital integration with close but nonidentical inputs will eventually have enough skew in the outputs to exceed any usable differential threshold. Most flight controllers have at least one integrator, which necessitates their having identical inputs. With identical inputs the differential reduces to zero, which permits either a bit-by-bit or a differential comparison. Bit-by-bit comparisons are less complex than differential comparison and are preferred for that reason.

Bit-by-bit comparators are very simple if the channels are run in bit synch with identical inputs and initial conditions. This is because the comparators, which are nothing more than majority (2 of 3) voters, operate on the outputs in a serial fashion. The bits are compared as they are outputted serially rather than en masse on the whole digital word as would be the case with parallel comparators or differential detectors.

There are several techniques available for ensuring that all channels have identical inputs even though the sensors have non-identical outputs due to skew and tolerance effects. The method that is best suited to this configuration, since it can be serially and in a single pass, is median selection.

Autonomous fault detection (in-line monitoring). - Tracer monitoring is a fault detection technique that provides autonomous fault detection. In analog systems, tracer monitoring is usually embodied as a high frequency (i. e., well beyond the control frequency range) tracer signal that is injected at the input to the device or circuit. This technique has been successfully used with both accelerometers and gyros (in the Dyna-Soar FCS) to provide in-line monitoring of the signal pickoff portions of these sensors. Spinmotor rotation detectors of various types have been utilized to assure proper gyro spinmotor operation. Gimbal freedom of both gyros and accelerometers has been determined by including torquers which are "tweaked" at intervals, while normal system operation is discontinued, to produce a predetermined test output. Such techniques may be used with virtually every type of sensor to provide an autonomous fault detection capability. The principal negative aspect to using these techniques is the increased cost.

The tracer monitoring technique may also be used to monitor an analog controller. The tracer signal will undergo a certain amount of attenuation and phase shift as it passes through the analog controller. This attenuation and phase shift can be calculated for a given set of gain conditions.

The integrity of the controller will determine the characteristics of the tracer signal at the output. If the tracer has the proper gain and phase

characteristics at the output, the controller is operating satisfactorily; otherwise, a fault condition is indicated.

The technique has never been successfully used to test an entire analog controller even though it is theoretically sound and has been used to test portions of an analog controller. The reason is twofold:

- Gain and time constant scheduling as a function of flight condition
- Lag circuits

Time constant scheduling is occasionally required even though gain scheduling is by far the most common and easiest to deal with. Scheduling can be either a step function or a continuous change. In either event, the tracer signal detector on the output has to have its go/no-go criteria adjusted according to the same parameters. The detector scheduling information should be acquired independently of that for the controller; otherwise, certain failures in that portion of the system would result in an undetected fault. Some replicated hardware would no doubt be required to furnish this independence.

The lag circuits that are generally prevalent in autopilots are "shorts" to ground for high frequencies. The tracer signal is essentially lost each time a lag circuit is encountered. In order to circumvent this, it is necessary to check the tracer at the lag circuit and reinsert it downstream. This requires several additional detectors and signal inserters and fails to meet the objective of providing an end-to-end test.

While neither of these problems, either singly or together, present insurmountable obstacles, they have been sufficient to discourage wholesale application of tracer monitoring to an entire analog controller. Duplication of some or all of the circuitry with comparison monitoring to determine and identify faults is the usual technique that is employed.

Digital controllers, on the other hand, are quite capable of autonomous fault detection. This is due primarily to two things: The digital computer's

ability to "wear different hats" as a function of time, and the decision-making capability of the computer.

The ability of the computer to "wear different hats" arises from the time-sharing nature of general-purpose machines. The arithmetic and logic unit (ALU) performs all of the various arithmetic and logical functions under control of the program memory. At one instant the ALU will be computing a particular control law; the next instant it could be computing a different control law, or performing some test on an input or output signal, even testing itself, depending upon what the program calls for at that moment.

Autonomous fault detection capability throughout the flight control system would provide two-fail-operational performance with only three identical channels. The possible cost savings in comparison with a quadruple channel configuration are readily apparent and it is obvious that the triple channel in-line monitored configuration must be given serious consideration. Accordingly, seven of the candidate configurations were structured as triple channel in-line monitored systems in order that the benefits and disadvantages of this less complex implementation would become evident in the cost of ownership tradeoff.

The consensus of airline management and aircraft manufacturers (evidenced in informal discussions) is that a quadruple-redundant majority-voting FBW control system is the minimum acceptable at present. Although not specifically stated, there appears to be a general distrust of self-monitoring concepts. This attitude is undoubtedly due to the complete absence of commercially available proven self-monitored sensors and, despite the theoretical proofs, failure to demonstrate 100 percent autonomous fault-detection capability of a digital computer. Consequently, the lack of confidence in triple-redundant in-line monitored configurations indicates a risk factor which must be included in the tradeoff. This was accomplished in the dispatch philosophy described in Section 8.

In-line monitoring of servo actuators is relatively easily accomplished since the input, output and the dynamic response characteristic of a specific

actuator can be well defined. The 100 percent detection of faulty operation in this case is assured by the availability of servo rate and position transducers and hydraulic pressure differential detectors associated with each actuator. This capability of autonomous fault detection in the servo actuator area is generally recognized, and, inasmuch as changing the level of redundancy poses no serious problems, triple-redundant actuators should be considered as a viable alternate element in any configuration.

A discussion of other factors introduced by redundant configurations, such as summing and cross-strapping, is most easily accomplished with reference to the analog servo actuators, as in the next paragraph.

Position- versus force-summed servos. - In force-summed installations the outputs of the redundant actuators are rigidly connected together. The output position will be that at which force equilibrium is established. It is not possible for each channel of a practical controller in a redundant organization to reach its own exact equilibrium due to system tolerances and mistracking among the redundant elements without resorting to some sort of an artifice. If an artifice is not used, the resulting force fight will create a "soft" equilibrium with nothing left for the load. Two of the more common artifices are:

- Use the integral of the differential pressure in each cylinder as a feedback term to cancel tolerance effects between the redundant copies.
- Use a master-slave arrangement where one output will prevail and the others will track it. This amounts to the above method if the differential pressure feedback is omitted in the master.

Position summing is achieved by whiplettes for dual servoes and wobble plates for triplex and beyond. The resulting output position will be the average of all the individual outputs. This type of arrangement does not need an artifice to compensate for tolerances.

Force summing has a definite advantage over position summing in that an abrupt "hardover" failure of one channel cannot propagate to the output if there are at least three actuators in the summation. There will be a significant reduction in the load torque that is available, but a proper design will allow for this. This type of failure will alter the average in a position-summed arrangement and will thus be propagated to the output.

The faulty actuator should be neutralized in a force-summed arrangement when a failure occurs. In the case of a hydraulic servo, this would simply amount to removing its source of pressurized oil and changing the designation of the master in the event that the master failed in a master-slave configuration.

The defective actuator should be centered; i. e., it should be locked into its midpoint position when a failure occurs in a position-summing arrangement. A suitable gain change should then be made in the remaining channels to ensure that the average position will still be the correct position even though the contribution of one of the elements is permanently set to zero.

As far as redundancy requirements are concerned, it is obvious that three channels are sufficient to survive a failure and produce undegraded performance in a force-summed situation -- one to experience the failure, and two to overcome its undesirable effects. This will require that the defective servo be neutralized as soon as possible. An extra channel, with the ability to neutralize it, must be added for each additional failure that must be tolerated. A quadruplex force-summed servo would yield the ability to provide undegraded performance after two identical failures.

A dual configuration with suitable centering and gain changing devices will allow a position-summed servo to provide undegraded performance after a single failure. Triplex redundancy will be adequate to ensure undegraded performance in the presence of two identical failures.


A further discussion of actuator tradeoffs is included in Section 6.

Cross-strapped digital controllers. - Figure 18 illustrates the two methods of cross-strapping -- analog crossfeed and processor intercommunication. The analog crossfeed method provides more success paths at the expense of more interconnecting wires, input buffers and analog-to-digital conversion. Both methods use some form of optimum signal selection of the control signal.


Cross-strapped controllers that use median selection algorithms to obtain the control signal, behave for the most part like force-summed servos. As a minimum, three channels of the controller are required for the concept of median selection to make sense. The major flaw with median selectors is the transient that occurs should the source of the median signal suddenly fail. The median selector will immediately switch to another source. This switching action will allow a transient to occur. The size of the transient will depend upon how far the new median is from the old median.

It is possible to minimize the size of the transient, if not eliminate it entirely, by using equalization similar to that required for force-summed servos. The difference between a particular sensor's value and the median value is used as a feedback term to cancel out skew and tolerance effects. It takes three channels for the median selector, first of all, to compute a median and then to find the new median in the event of a failure. The median selector cannot detect a failure.


There is no clearcut directive as to what should be done about the defective signal when a failure occurs. A primary consideration is whether it should be switched out. If it is switched out, a strategy must be implemented to ensure that three or more inputs remain. If it is to remain as an input a decision must be made as to whether the signal should assume any value it wants, or whether it should be forced to a particular value and what this particular value should be. If it is forced to an extreme value, a subsequent failure can result in the faulty signal being selected as the median. If it is forced to zero, the small signal behavior in the remaining controllers may be erroneous. In general, the decisions made in the above considerations will be dependent upon the application and the user's priorities.



(a) Basic Quadruplex System



(b) Basic Quadruplex System with Sensors Cross-Strapped



(c) Basic Quadruplex System with Multiplexed Data Bus

Figure 18. - Analog Crossfeed and Processor Intercommunication Cross-Strapping Methods

As indicated previously, median selection cross-strapping requires a minimum of three channels to survive a failure in one controller and provide undegraded performance. A minimum of four channels is required to survive two failures. There is no median as such of four signals. What is usually done is to take either the more negative or more positive of the two inner signals. An alternative would be to operate in an active-standby mode until the first failure occurs.

Another method that is commonly used to develop the control signal in cross-strapped controllers is an averaging crossfeed. In this method, each channel accepts inputs from all other channels and computes their average, which is then used as the signal. This is roughly analogous to position-summed servos. A failure transient will be propagated to the output should one of the signal sources suddenly change values. The defective controller must then be neutralized and suitable gain changes made to take up the slack. Only two channels would be required to provide undegraded performance after a signal failure if autonomous fault-detection techniques are utilized. A third channel would allow two failures. An additional channel, bringing the count to 3 and 4, respectively, would be required if comparison monitoring were used for fault detection.

Certain classes of digital controllers develop the control signal in yet a third way. In this method the channels are interconnected, and the resulting signal is derived from a majority vote of all inputs on a bit-by-bit basis. The digital signals bits can only have two values: either a one, or a zero. No other values exist.

To use this method, certain criteria must be satisfied:

- There must be at least three channels in order to get a 2 of 3 (four for a 3 of 4).
- In the absence of failures, all output must normally agree on a bit-by-bit basis.

- The redundant channels must operate in time synchronism to some extent to facilitate bit-by-bit voting.

This method is completely analogous to force-summed servos. Faulty signals (bits) are completely suppressed.

The corrective action that should be taken when a failure occurs is not clearcut. Something must be done to ensure that at least three signals remain if the defective signal source is switched out. If it is allowed to remain as an input, what value should it be allowed (or forced) to assume? A one or a zero? Three channels allow two failures. With four channels the defective channel can be switched out after a single failure, or the four channels can be operated in an active-standby mode.

Non-cross-straped digital controllers. - Failures in a single-channel controller configuration propagate immediately to the servos and behave exactly like servo failures. The discussion with regard to servo failures is directly applicable to controller failures, and the same considerations with regards to fault tolerance and recovery must be made.

Digital controllers with intermediate cross-straps. - Systems with intermediate cross-straps can tolerate more failures before a complete collapse than those without. Failures that can occur on one side of a cross-strap are dissimilar or nonidentical to those on the other side. The cross-strap serves to isolate or insulate one class of failures from another. The presence of an intermediate cross-strap does not in any way alter the redundancy requirements for a system to survive a certain number of identical failures and will not be discussed further in that respect.

The use of intermediate cross-straps does, however, provide additional success paths and consequently, improved operational reliability. This improvement requires increased complexity, and accordingly, increased cost. It is necessary, therefore, in each specific application to make the tradeoffs of cost versus reliability before the optimum configuration can be determined.

For the purposes of this study, configurations without cross-strapping, with analog crossfeed and with digital processor intercommunication were structured in order that the full spectrum be investigated.

Digital Flight Control Sizing

One of the questions which cannot be answered in general is whether a general-purpose (GP) or a special-purpose (SP) machine should be used. The particular situation or application will dictate the most effective implementation. For the purposes of the discussions in the following subsections, a general-purpose (GP) machine is considered to be one that is capable of performing all elements of a flight control system, such as control laws, logic, self-test, etc., by incorporating the proper computer program (software). A special-purpose digital machine is one mechanized and dedicated to a specific function, such as a control transfer function. A digital differential analyzer is an example of this type of machine.

A question that must be addressed in the early stages of configuration definition is the size of the machine. In GP approaches, this means memory size and the data throughput (i. e., the quantity of data that is processed by the computer in a given unit of time). In SP machines it means the number of integrators that will be required and the basic computation rate. Memory size (the number of storage locations required) is approached from several viewpoints. The required storage locations are broken down into arithmetic instructions (adds, subtracts, multiplies, and divides) constants, variables (dedicated scratchpad), housekeeping (miscellaneous) and temporary storage (reusable scratchpad).

The breakdowns are accompanied by "equivalent execution" times. These times were arrived at by expressing all execution times in terms of an equivalent number of adds (timewise). These two tools enable one to determine the power required by a GP machine to perform a particular task. For example, all one has to do is examine the digitizer control system and extract

from it the various computations that will be required. The computations can be translated into storage location count and equivalent execution times. The total storage location count yields the memory size in terms of digital words. The equivalent execution times divided into the available time reveals the maximum permissible add time. These two parameters in general will specify the power that a GP machine must possess.

Transfer function sizing. - Virtually all transfer functions commonly encountered in automatic flight control systems are special cases of the general second-order transfer function

$$G(S) = \frac{as^2 + bs + c}{ds^2 + es + f} = K \frac{s^2 + 2\zeta_1 \omega_1 s + \omega_1^2}{s^2 + \zeta_2 \omega_2 s + \omega_2^2}$$

For example, a high pass

$$G(S) = \frac{bs}{es+f} \quad \text{where } a = c = d = 0 \text{ and } f = 1$$

and a lag

$$G(S) = \frac{c}{es+f} \quad \text{where } a = b = d = 0 \text{ and } f = 1$$

A study of the general transfer function, then, is in effect a study of all subsidiary transfer functions since they can be obtained by forcing certain coefficients to take on specified values.

A number of techniques have been developed over the years for converting continuous transfer functions into discrete difference equations for solution on a GP machine. One of the more popular techniques is a bilinear transformation known as the Tustin method. Its popularity is due to several highly desirable properties:

- Cascade property
- Stability invariance
- D-C gain invariance
- Ease of application and understanding

Conversion methods that cascade have a property such that if the discrete-time transforms of $G(S)$, $G_1(S)$, and $G_2(S)$ are $G(Z)$, $G_1(Z)$, and $G_2(Z)$ respectively and if $G(S) = G_1(S)G_2(S)$, then $G(Z) = G_1(Z)G_2(Z)$. This ability to preserve this continuous-time relationship in the discrete-time domain is very desirable because it permits partitioning the digitized system into several simpler segments. The Tustin conversion method has the cascade property.

Stability invariance is a property such that, if a continuous-time function $G(S)$ is stable (i. e. , all of its poles are in the left half plane), then all the poles of the discrete-time $G(Z)$ will be within the unit circle. In other words, stable functions are transformed into stable functions. The Tustin method always preserves stability.

D-C gain invariance simply means that the steady-state gain in the discrete time domain is equal to that in the continuous-time domain. The Tustin method also has this property.

The Tustin conversion method can be derived as follows: Denote the discrete-time delay variable as Z^{-1} with delay time of T . It can be represented in the continuous-time domain by its (Laplace) transfer function, e^{-ST} . That is $z^{-1} = e^{-ST}$.

The Taylor series expansion of e^{-ST} is given by

$$e^{-ST} = \frac{e^{-ST}}{e^{-ST}} = \frac{1 - \frac{ST + S^2 T^2}{2} + \dots}{1 + \frac{ST}{2} + \frac{S^2 T^2}{8} + \dots}$$

If second- and higher-order terms are neglected, then

$$Z^{-1} = \frac{1 - \frac{ST}{2}}{1 + \frac{ST}{2}}$$

Solving for S yields

$$S = \frac{2}{T} \frac{1 - Z^{-1}}{1 + Z^{-1}}$$

To use the method, one simply makes the substitution for the complex variable S in the transfer function. For example, the expression

$$G(S) = \frac{as^2 + bs + c}{ds^2 + es + f}$$

becomes

$$G(Z) = \frac{a \frac{2}{T} \left(\frac{1 - Z^{-1}}{1 + Z^{-1}} \right)^2 + b \frac{2}{T} \left(\frac{1 - Z^{-1}}{1 + Z^{-1}} \right) + c}{d \frac{2}{T} \left(\frac{1 - Z^{-1}}{1 + Z^{-1}} \right)^2 + e \frac{2}{T} \left(\frac{1 - Z^{-1}}{1 + Z^{-1}} \right) + f}$$

This simplifies to

$$G(Z) = \frac{K_1 + K_2 Z^{-1} + K_3 Z^{-2}}{1 + K_4 Z^{-1} + K_5 Z^{-2}}$$

where

$$K_1 = \frac{4a + 2bT + cT^2}{\Delta}$$

$$K_2 = \frac{2cT^2 - 8a}{\Delta}$$

$$K_3 = \frac{4a - 2bT + cT^2}{\Delta}$$

$$K_4 = \frac{2fT^2 - 8d}{\Delta}$$

$$K_5 = \frac{4d - 2eT + fT^2}{\Delta}$$

T is the sample period and Z^{-1} is the delay variable.

Similar transformations can be made for other continuous-time transfer functions.

The generalized expression can be programmed by recalling that a transfer function is the ratio of the output to the input:

$$G(Z) = \frac{y(z)}{u(z)} = \frac{K_1 + K_2 Z^{-1} + K_3 Z^{-2}}{1 + K_4 Z^{-1} + K_5 Z^{-2}}$$

Solving for $y(z)$

$$y(Z) = K_1 u(Z) + K_2 U(Z) Z^{-1} + K_3 U(Z) Z^{-2} - K_4 y(Z) Z^{-1} - K_5 y(Z) Z^{-2}$$

or

$$y(n) = K_1 u(n) + K_2 u(n-1) + K_3 u(n-2) - K_4 y(n-1) - K_5 y(n-2)$$

This expression can be now programmed directly on a digital computer. An assembly language program that implements this realization follows:

<u>Mnemonic instruction</u>	<u>Argument</u>
LDA	$-k_5$
MPY	$y(n-2)$
STA	TEMP 1
LDA	$y(n-1)$
STA	$y(n-2)$
MPY	$-k_4$
ADD	TEMP 1
STA	TEMP 1
LDA	$u(n-2)$
MPY	k_3
ADD	TEMP 1
STA	TEMP 1
LDA	$u(n-1)$
STA	$u(n-2)$
MPY	k_2
ADD	TEMP 1
STA	TEMP 1
LDA	$u(n)$
STA	$u(n-1)$
MPY	k_1
ADD	TEMP 1
STA	$y(n-1)$

In summary form this amounts to:

- 5 multiplies
- 4 adds
- 1 temporary storage location
- 4 delay variables
- 5 constants
- 13 housekeeping (miscellaneous)

There are 22 instructions that must be executed in this program. Each of the 17 nonmultiply instructions require approximately the same time to execute which will be called an add time. Small airborne computers typically require approximately four times as long to perform a multiplication as they do for an addition. This relationship can be used to express multiplies as equivalent adds, bringing the total execution time to 37 add times. The program has a total memory allocation requirement of 34 instructions.

It should be noted that the above program requires four delay variables to realize a second-order equation. It seems reasonable to suppose that it could be realized with only two delay variables. This is, in fact, the case and there are, perhaps, an unlimited number of two-delay realizations that could be formulated.

The above techniques are used similarly to size other typical transfer function computations.

Six transfer functions are commonly encountered in flight control applications. These transfer functions are listed in Table 2 along with the memory and time requirements for general-purpose implementation and integrator requirements for special-purpose (DDA) machines.

Nine nonlinear functions are commonly encountered in flight control systems. These are listed on Table 3 along with general- and special-purpose machine requirements.

The mode logic sizing calculations are performed by estimating the number of equivalent two-input AND and OR gates employed. The equivalent add times and instruction count are determined from actual coding experience for a typical airborne computer and are listed in Table 4.

TABLE 2. - TRANSFER FUNCTIONS

Function	General-purpose requirements		Special-purpose integrator requirements
	Memory allocation (locations)	Equivalent execution time in adds	
2nd order/2nd order	30	34	7
2nd-order lag	30	34	6
Lead-lag	18	20	4
Lag-lead	18	20	5
Lag	18	19	3
High pass	18	19	2
Integrator	16	16	1

TABLE 3. - NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS

Function	General-purpose requirements		Special-purpose integrator requirements
	Memory allocation (locations)	Equivalent execution time in adds	
Gain schedules	22	6 to 13	1 + ext hdwe
Synchronizer	12	5 to 7	1 + ext hdwe
Backlash	57	16 to 22	Difficult
Limiter	14	5 or 6	1 + ext hdwe
Deadband	10	4 or 5	1 + ext hdwe
Bleed-off/fade-in	41	29 or 31	3 + ext hdwe
Hysteresis switch	37	9 to 11	
Trig and exp functions	8 or 35	7 to 52	1 or 2

TABLE 4. - AND/OR GATE REQUIREMENTS

Function	General-purpose requirements		Special-purpose integrator requirements
	Memory allocation	Equivalent execution time in adds	
Two-input AND gate	4 or 7	4 or 7	Ext hdwe
Two-input OR gate	4 or 7	4 or 7	Ext hdwe

The four-instruction and four-add-time case corresponds to the situation where the gate output is not saved in scratchpad but remains in the accumulator awaiting the next instruction. The second case is when the gate output is saved for use later in the software.

Sampling rates. - An integral part of computer sizing is selection of the sampling rates. A number of "rules of thumb" exist which translate a control frequency into a sampling rate. These rules yield factors of 5 to 20 times the control frequency for the sampling rate. The rule employed here is derived from a consideration of the phase lag introduced by a zero-order hold circuit.

While a great deal of attention is given to the phase characteristics associated with a particular digital mechanization of a transfer function, often little attention is given to the zero-order hold phase. The phase characteristics of a zero-order hold are described by

$$\phi = \frac{f}{f_s} 180^\circ$$

where f_s is the sampling frequency. The maximum phase shift in bending-mode control loops that can be readily compensated for through the addition of lead is 5 deg. Based on this

$$f/f_s = \frac{1}{36}$$

which is the "rule of thumb" that will be used for the ATT sampling rate selection.

From reference 1, the flutter frequency of the ATT is approximately 4 Hz which yields a sampling rate of 144 Hz. With 160 Hz selected as the highest sampling rate requirement, the following rate tree structure was employed:

<u>Rate (Hz)</u>	<u>Function</u>
160	Gust/maneuver load and flutter control
80, 40	Stability augmentation
40, 20	Outer-loop control
10	Mode control

Word length. - Word-length requirements for constant data can be obtained from the transient response requirements of the digital filter. A means for determining suitable transient response for the digital representation of the filter is by an examination of the difference equation roots. A first-order lag of the form $P/(S+P)$ has a transient solution $Y(t) = Ke^{-Pt}$. Let $t = n\Delta t$ and rewrite $Y(t)$ as

$$Y(t) = K e^{-P\Delta tn}$$

The corresponding Tustin equation

$$Y(n) = a Y(n-1) + b[X(n) + X(n-1)]$$

has a transient solution, $Y(n) = K\lambda^n$, where λ is the difference equation root. Hence, ideally $\lambda = e^{-P\Delta t}$.

However, acceptable performance results if $\lambda_2 \leq \lambda \leq \lambda_1$

where:

$$\lambda_1 = e^{-(P - \Delta P)\Delta t}$$

and

$$\lambda_2 = e^{-(P + \Delta P)\Delta t}$$

In order to adjust the root with acceptable accuracy, the constant must be adjustable in steps of $\Delta\lambda$ where:

$$|\Delta\lambda| = \lambda_1 - \lambda_2 = 2e^{-P\Delta t} \sinh \Delta P\Delta t.$$

The size of the minimum step adjustment is the value of the least significant bit of the binary constant word, i. e.

$$|\Delta\lambda| = 2^{-N}$$

Thus

$$2^{-N} = 2e^{-P\Delta t} \sinh \Delta P\Delta t$$

$$N = -\log_2 (2e^{-P\Delta t} \sinh \Delta P\Delta t)$$

To obtain practical meaning from these equations, consider the following example:

$$P = 0.2 \text{ rad/sec}$$

$$\Delta P = .01 \text{ (5\%)}$$

$$\Delta t = 0.00625 \text{ (160 iterations/sec)}$$

then

$$N > -\log_2 (2e^{-0.00125} \sinh (.0000625))$$

$$N > 13.96$$

$$N = 14 \text{ bits}$$


Hence, for a 5-second lag with a 5-percent accuracy requirement on the pole placement, the digital filter equivalent utilizing a sampling rate of 160 per second requires an accuracy of 14 bits for the constant.

The requirements on setting the zeros within a prescribed accuracy are identical to those on setting poles. However, the response error introduced by a misplaced zero is not easily specified since the zeros do not directly alter the time response but rather indirectly alter it through the residues. However, the following general statements apply:

- If a pole and zero are located in proximity, the response error introduced by mislocating the zero is as great as that of mislocating the pole.
- If the frequencies of interest are in the frequency band dominated by the zero (e. g., pseudo differentiation), the error in response introduced by a misplaced zero is the same as for a misplaced pole.

The constant-data word length requirements are related to the transient response requirements whereas the scratchpad and accumulator word length requirements are related to the particular or driven solution. For the sake of simplicity, consider a first-order filter described by the difference equation $Y(n) = a Y(n-1) + b[X(n) + X(n-1)]$, which was the result of applying Tustin's substitution method to a first-order lag. The coefficient b is then given by $b = T/(2\tau + T)$, where T is the sample period and τ is the filter time constant.

For the filter output $Y(n)$ to change, the input $X(n)$ will have to change an amount $b[X(n) + X(n-1)] \geq$ least-significant bit weight of $Y(n)$. Suppose $\tau = 5$ sec and $T = .00625$ and $Y(n)$ is scaled 8 (the binary point has been moved 8 places to the right):



Further, the LSB weight = 2^{-N} units. If the input is a step, the magnitude must be

$$2b X(n) \geq 2^{-N} \text{ where } b = 0.2 / (160 + 0.2) = .001258$$

for a change to take place in the LSB. In terms of the LSB

$$N = -\log_2 [(\% \text{ deadband}) (2b) (2.56)] + 8$$

For 1-percent deadband, the number of magnitude bits is $N \geq 22$.

Based on the 160-Hz sampling rate, a 16-bit constant memory and a 16-bit (32-bit via double precision in the high-iteration loops) scratchpad memory, an accumulator was judged to be adequate and cost effective. Double precision is required in only seven first-order filters in the high-rate loop. This imposes an additional memory requirement of 15 SPAD words (14 filter variables and 1 temporary variable). Additional instruction memory is not required as the double-precision ADD/SUB/LOAD/STORE instructions are used instead of single-precision ADD/SUB/, etc., instructions. This results in a memory increase due to double precision of 240 bits of SPAD. On the other hand, if a 32-bit processor (data words only) is needed, each datum word must be increased by 16 bits. Since 223 SPAD words and 556 constant words are required, an increase of 3570 SPAD bits and 8900 constant bits results. Thus, the 32-bit processor requires 3330 SPAD and 8900 constant bits more than the 16-bit double-precision processor. Assuming semiconductor memory costs of \$.082/SPAD bit and \$.011/constant bit (half the current price in large quantity), the 16-bit double precision approach price is \$2310 less for a four-processor (quad-channel) system, based on memory costs only.

Processor costs will be less for the 16-bit double-precision approach also, particularly if microprogramming is used. For the ATT flight control application, the 16-bit double-precision approach provides significant cost advantages for a fleet of 200 aircraft.

ATT processor sizing. - The time sizing calculations are broken into the functions of

- Analytical computations
- Input/output
- Mode logic

for landing/go around, enroute (outer loops), and the flight-critical system (inner loops).

The time sizing for these systems is tabulated by function in Tables 5, 6 and 7. Redundancy management, on-line/off-line BITE, executive structure and initialization are treated as separate entities.

Redundancy computations in units of add times per sensor input break down as follows:

Dual comparison	4
Triple select86
Quad select	172

Two configurations are sized for a quad system: (1) a two-processor configuration with an IOP (input-output processor) and a CCP (control computation processor), and (2) a single-processor-per-channel configuration.

Using the time information for the enroute and critical systems (Tables 6 and 7), the time sizing is summarized for the IOP and the CCP in Tables 8 and 9. The simultaneous operation of these two modes will result in the maximum computer load. The single-processor time sizing is given in Table 10.

TABLE 5. - LANDING/GO-AROUND TIME SIZING

Analytical computations		
	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Pitch	820	5 340
Roll	820	5 220
Go-around	520	3 500
Totals	<u>2 160</u>	<u>14 060</u>
Input/output (single)		
	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Pitch	60	120
Roll	140	280
Go-around	80	160
Totals	<u>280</u>	<u>560</u>
Mode logic		
	Two-input gates ^a	Adds/sec
Pitch	35	1 520
Roll	35	1 520
Totals	<u>70</u>	<u>3 040</u>
Grand totals	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
	2 440	17 660

^a Ten percent are seven-add time gates

TABLE 6. - ENROUTE SYSTEM TIME SIZING
(OUTER LOOPS)

Analytical computations		
	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Pitch	1 300	11 060
Roll	940	7 180
Yaw	--	--
Totals	<u>2 240</u>	<u>18 240</u>
Input/output (single)		
	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Pitch	240	480
Roll	140	280
Yaw	--	--
Totals	<u>380</u>	<u>760</u>
Mode logic		
	Two-input gates	Adds/sec
Pitch	40	1 720
Roll	40	1 720
Yaw	25	1 075
Totals	<u>105</u>	<u>4 515</u>
Grand totals	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
	2 620	23 515

**TABLE 7. - CRITICAL SYSTEM TIME SIZING
(INNER LOOPS)**

Analytical computations		
	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Pitch CAS	520	3 960
Roll CAS	680	8 040
Yaw CAS	2 200	10 120
Flutter control	2 720	15 200
Gust/maneuver load control	3 520	22 080
Mach trims	110	480
Totals	8 950	59 880
Input (single)		
	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Pitch CAS	240	480
Roll CAS	240	480
Yaw CAS	400	800
Flutter control	160	320
Gust/maneuver load control	960	1 920
Mach trim	10	20
Totals	2 010	4 020
Mode logic		
	Two-input gates	Adds/sec
Pitch	40	1 720
Roll	40	1 720
Yaw	12	560
Totals	92	4 000
Grand total,	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
single input	10 960	67 900

TABLE 8. - IOP TIME SIZING

Function	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Servo output command selection		89 000
Servo monitoring		20 300
Input/output		30 000
Hexad → body rate plus sensor monitoring	2 160	12 000
Bus control		9 600
Executive		2 000
Self test (continuous)		5 000
Totals	2 160	167 900

TABLE 9. - CCP TIME SIZING

Function	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Analytical computations	11 190	78 120
Mode logic		8 515
Executive		4 200
BITE		3 000
Signal select		
Rate sensors (6/chan)		49 333
Accel sensors (6/chan)		39 900
Control pos (6/chan)		30 466
Air data (6/chan)		16 317
Surface pos (13/chan)		63 482
Attitude (3/chan)		14 502
Totals	11 190	307 835

TABLE 10. - SINGLE-PROCESSOR TIME SIZING

Function	Mult/sec	Adds/sec
Analytical computations	11 190	78 120
Input/output	3 850	14 600
Signal select		214 000
Hexad-to-body-axis conversion		20 400
Intercom crossfeed		8 000
Mode logic		8 500
Servo monitoring		20 300
BITE		5 000
Executive		7 200
Totals	15 040	376 120

In the two-computer configuration, all I/O operations are performed by the IOP and the CCP need only to access its scratchpad memory for sensor inputs. Additionally, the IOP performs all the servo monitoring.

From Tables 8 and 9, with a four-to-one ratio of multiply to add time, the IOP throughput is 177 KOPs per second, and the CCP throughput is 353 KOPs per second. The addition of the single-processor time sizing in Table 10 yields a grand-total throughput requirement for the CCP of 435 KOPs per second.

Memory sizing. - The memory size for each function is given in Tables 11, 12 and 13 in terms of instruction, constant and scratchpad memory words. As with the time estimate, the memory estimate, for the most part, is based on actual coding experience with an airborne computer. The BITE, executive, and initialization functions are estimated as a percentage interpolated from existing flight control software.

TABLE 11. - LANDING/GO-AROUND MEMORY SIZING

Function	Instruction	Constant	Scratchpad
Analytical computations			
Pitch	339	58	23
Roll	315	42	29
Go-around	<u>214</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>19</u>
Totals	868	131	71
Input/output (single)			
Pitch	9	3	3
Roll	21	7	7
Go-around	<u>12</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
Totals	42	14	14
Mode logic			
Pitch	306	--	4
Roll	<u>306</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>4</u>
Totals	612	--	8

TABLE 12. - ENROUTE SYSTEM MEMORY SIZING

Function	Instruction	Constant	Scratchpad
Analytical computations			
Pitch	588	99	40
Roll	429	78	28
Gust/maneuver load control	<u>177</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>8</u>
Totals	1 194	211	76
Mode logic	462	--	5
Input/output (single)			
Pitch	36	12	12
Roll	21	7	7
Gust/maneuver load control	<u>15</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
Totals	72	24	24

TABLE 13. - CRITICAL SYSTEM MEMORY SIZING

Function	Instruction	Constant	Scratchpad
Analytical computations			
Pitch CAS	108	16	9
Roll CAS	222	31	10
Yaw CAS	307	48	25
Flutter control	119	19	13
Mach trim	<u>66</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>
Totals	822	130	63
Mode logic	462	16	5
Input/output (single)			
Pitch	18	6	6
Roll	18	6	6
Yaw	30	10	10
Flutter control	6	2	2
Mach trim	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	75	25	25

Redundancy computations require the following memory sizing:

	<u>Inst.</u>	<u>Const</u>	<u>SP</u>
Dual comparison	60	8	--
Triple select	600	60	--
Quad select	1200	120	--

For the two-computer configuration, the memory requirements for the IOP are:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Memory words</u>
Servo output command select	450
Servo monitoring	500
Input/output	315
Hexad → body rate plus sensor monitoring	750
Bus control	250
Executive	285
Self test	<u>750</u>
Total	3300

For the CCP, the requirements are:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Memory words</u>
Analytical computations	3566
Mode logic	1070
BITE	1500
Initialization	753
Executive	491
Signal select	<u>1320</u>
Total	8700

For the single-processor triple-select configuration, the requirements are:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Memory words</u>
Analytical computations	3566
Input/output	315
Mode logic	1070
BITE	2000
Initialization	753
Executive	1776
Signal select	<u>660</u>
Total	10 140

For a quad-select configuration, the total memory requirements are:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Memory words</u>
Analytical computations	3566
Input/output	315
Mode logic	1570
BITE	2000
Initialization	753
Executive	2500 (includes computer intercommunication software)
Quad signal select	<u>1320</u>
Total	12 024

Based on the block diagrams of Section 4 and the selected sample rates, the computer requirements for an ATT quad-select system are 411 KOPs per second with 12,024 words of memory.

Processor sizing is summarized in Table 14.

TABLE 14.- PROCESSOR AND MEMORY SIZING SUMMARY

Function	Maximum time requirement						Memory		
	IOP		CCP		Single processor		IOP	CCP	Single
	Mult/sec	Add/sec	Mult/sec	Add/sec	Mult/sec	Add/sec			
Servo output command selection		89 000					450		
Servo monitoring		20 300				20 300	500		
I/O		30 000			3 850	14 600	315		31.5
Hexad-to-body rate	2 160	12 000			2 160	12 000	750		
Bus control		9 600					250		
Executive		2 000		4 200		7 200	285	491	1 776
Self test		5 000		3 000		5 000	750		2 000
Analytical comps			11 190	78 120	11 190	78 120		3 566	3 566
Mode logic				8 515		8 500		1 500	1 070
Signal select				214 000		214 000		1 320	660
Intercom cross-feed						8 000			
Initialization								753	753
Total	2 160	167 900	11 190	307 835	15 040	376 120	3 300	8 700	10 140

SECTION 6

COMPONENT TECHNOLOGY TRADEOFFS

In compliance with the NASA-Langley Statement of Work, a technology survey was conducted during the initial stages of the study. The survey consisted of a literature search and discussions with experts and specialists in the various implementation areas. The result of the survey was a technology forecast -- essentially a series of decisions regarding the optimal mechanization technology applicable to the ATT FCS for the developmental period of 1978-1980. The technology survey became continuous, extending throughout the study as the preliminary component trade studies were made. This report section describes both the technology survey and the component trade studies as they were performed during the program. The interdependency of the two program tasks became obvious during the course of the study; the technology forecast provided data for the component tradeoffs, and the tradeoffs asked new questions to be answered by the continuing technology survey.

The component areas reviewed in this section include actuators, air data sensors, displays, electronics, inertial sensors and processors. Table 15 summarizes the components and concepts which were included.

ACTUATION STUDY

The following paragraphs describe the actuation technology survey and component tradeoffs performed in the study. These include a brief history of actuation methods for aircraft control surfaces, considerations in the use of various types of actuator implementations and contemporary techniques for the redundancy management of fault-tolerant actuator configurations.

TABLE 15. - TECHNOLOGY SURVEY AREAS

Actuation	Processors	Electronics
Hydraulic Electromechanical Digital versus analog loops Tandem - parallel Summation - force/position Active/active-on-line/standby Servoed pump Integrated versus driver actuator Compared versus self-monitored	General-purpose processors Small Medium Large Memories Semiconductor ROM, PROM, RMM.	Large-scale integ ckts C/MOS P/MOS Ultrasonic inverter Hi-v power transistors Monolithic darlington Stitch wired cards
Displays	Inertial sensors	Air data sensors
Conventional CRT Flat CRT LED Plasma panel Luminescent panel Liquid crystals PLZT	HIGS/MIGS Laser sensor Vibrating wire sensor MHD sensor Electro static gyro Pendulous accelerometer	Conventional capacitive Strain gage Vibrating wire Vibrating diaphragm Digital versus analog Processing

Flight Control Actuator Evolution

Control of the aerodynamic control surfaces on early aircraft required relatively little power. Prior to World War II, the only powered surfaces were the low-authority, low-speed actuation systems required for automatic flight controls. The need for power-assisted and fully-powered aerodynamic control surfaces came with the development of the jet airplane.

As speeds increased, control-surface hinge moments increased, and as vehicle size increased, control-surface areas also increased. The combination made powered surfaces necessary. Military aircraft were the first to feel the need for such devices, and, as vehicle speed range increased, actuator development kept pace.

Aircraft with wide aerodynamic range require actuation systems of flexible performance; at low speeds, the control surfaces must be capable of large deflections with relatively high angular velocities, while at high speeds, correspondingly small deflections and high positional stiffness is required. It is this positional stiffness that makes the hydraulic servoactuator suitable for the task.

This is not to say that other actuation methods have not been attempted; mechanical actuation systems which used clutches driven by engine power takeoff shafts have been evaluated, and electromechanical servosystems have also been analyzed. The former system is difficult to mechanize in redundant form, and redundancy is necessary for reliability. Large electromechanical systems, on the other hand, are severely penalized by weight, heat, and lack of stiffness. The result has been a concentration of effort on the basic hydraulic configuration -- a simple hydraulic cylinder, directly coupled to the aerodynamic control surface.

Hydraulic actuator development. - As control surface power requirements went from moderate to large, hydraulic actuators developed from small boost-type actuators to large, irreversible devices. The boost-type actuators had force feedback systems which allowed the pilot to retain "feel"

of the aerodynamic forces on the control surfaces; this was found to be undesirable for high-speed aircraft due to the high forces involved. An answer was found in the artificial feel system, and irreversible control surface actuators become commonplace.

Further increases in power requirements made the power actuator critical for larger portions of the flight regime, and reliability became a major requirement. In addition to significant advances in the design of cylinders, seals, servovalves and other essential actuator elements, improvements in materials used in their fabrication allowed actuators to be designed for these larger loads, while weighing less than their earlier, less powerful predecessors. To further advance the flight reliability of the critical flight control actuator components, the concept of redundancy was introduced.

Redundant hydraulic actuator designs. - The addition of multiple pumps provided the hydraulic power system with more reliability than the previous single systems, but the full impact of the redundancy concept was not seen until entire hydraulic systems, including the actuator, were made redundant.

Increases in reliability requirements were simply met by the multi-cylinder hydraulic actuator. Two successful configurations evolved: the tandem cylinder and the multiple single cylinders arranged side-by-side along the control surface hinge line. The tandem configuration has been built in dual and triple designs, with the dual being the most popular. Side-by-side configurations have been built with as many as twelve cylinders in integral hinge designs, as well as combinations of tandem and side-by-side applications to achieve "dual-dual" designs.

Further flexibility in overall actuation system concepts is afforded by the use of "split surfaces" -- combinations of parallel, independent surfaces operated by individual (or multicylinder) actuators. In short, the variations of actuator configurations and control surface arrangements are virtually limitless.

Driver or secondary actuator development. - The driver, or secondary actuator, is a device which accepts electric control signals and converts them into force, velocity or position of a mechanical output. The common forms are electromechanical, electropneumatic, or electrohydraulic in operation. The driver is designed to drive the input to the primary actuator which in turn positions the control surface.

Two developments in the field of automatic control initiated the creation of electromechanical and electrohydraulic driver actuators for aircraft. The first was the all-electric autopilot which used a simple electromechanical actuator operating in parallel with the pilot's controls to position the aerodynamic surfaces of the controlled vehicle. As vehicle performance improved, the electrohydraulic actuator was developed to keep pace.

Further increases in aircraft dynamic range made the addition of the second control system necessary; vehicle performance was being extended into the aerodynamically unstable spectrum, so the stability augmentation system (SAS), with its high-performance actuators, was developed. The output of these actuators was combined differentially or in series with the pilot's commands to position the primary surfaces as "power steering" actuation.

Aircraft performance continued to increase; the importance of high-authority SAS and control augmentation systems (CAS), the extension of autopilot functions, and the addition of automatic control for aircraft-mounted armaments showed that the majority of commands into the control surface actuators came from the automatic control channels. It was inevitable that the more simple, higher-performance FBW system should result.

The performance potentials of FBW initiated construction of several demonstration vehicles. These were, for the most part, existing vehicles with mechanical manual systems "adapted" to FBW by the addition of electrohydraulic or electromechanical driver actuators. These actuators were modified redundant CAS actuators with extended output capabilities and added channels so the desired level of redundancy could be achieved.

With continued development, the use of the driver actuator persisted because it enabled the monitoring logic requirements of the driver to be separated from the power-handling capabilities of the primary surface actuator. The mechanical connection became a cross-feed; control channel isolation had no effect on control surface power requirements, and the redundancy level of the surface actuator could be matched to its reliability potential, independent of the number of control channels.

"Integrated" actuator development. - One of the most significant advantage of FBW is the elimination of primary control linkages, rods and cables. In some secondary/primary actuator configurations, this reduction is only partial because of the secondary-to-primary linkages. For this reason, recent efforts have been directed to the development of integrated actuators.

Integrated actuators are primary control surface actuators which are capable of positioning the control surface directly from an electrical command. In some instances, the integrated actuator may contain some form of driver actuator, while others may be a straightforward electrohydraulic servoactuator with integral monitoring elements. In still another form, the integrated actuator may contain its own electrically-powered hydraulic supply; some of these use the controlled-displacement servopump principle.

Implementation Considerations

In considering the approach to mechanizing a FBW actuation system, it might be well to start with the actuation requirement. The FBW actuation system has two major tasks: one is to convert the electric command signal into a hydraulic signal; the second is to amplify that signal into a powerful output which can operate on the intended load. The first task is primarily concerned with the quality of the redundancy control signals, while the second is the ability to handle the load of the aerodynamic surfaces over the entire flight range.

Actuation power selection. - The type of actuator selected for use as a control surface actuator depends on the characteristics of that load. A wide variety of actuation types have been used for various aircraft control applications, but there have been a wide variety of load conditions in the many type of aircraft developed over the years. For the aircraft type under study, the general requirements for the actuators are fairly well known.

Aside from the usual specifics of maximum hinge moment, and velocity, the requirements unique to actuation systems for large, high-speed FBW aircraft are related to static and dynamic stiffness, frequency response, availability in redundant configurations, weight, size, and relative power consumption.

The aerodynamic and structural characteristics of the control surface define the working and limit loads; the relationship between the control surface inertia, aerodynamic hinge moment, surface "flutter" characteristics, and the elasticity of the entire structure, including the actuator compliance, define the system dynamics. In hydraulic actuators, the bulk modulus of the working fluid, in addition to structural compliance, defines actuator stiffness.

In a hydraulic actuator, the effect of this compliance in relation to control surface inertia is shown in Figure 19. It is the objective of most actuator installations to keep the natural frequency of this spring-mass system above the aerodynamic flutter frequency, and to do so means keeping the fluid spring as stiff as possible for a given surface inertia.

Low bulk modulus, or lack of stiffness is a primary fault of pneumatic actuators. It is possible to use a rotary pneumatic motor and some type of gearbox to improve the situation, but such assemblies add a great deal of complexity to redundant systems.

This same difficulty in making the mechanical output of a rotary device redundant is an obstacle to the development of electrical actuators -- which




Figure 19. - Hydraulic Actuator Spring-Mass Analogy

also are encumbered by high control-power requirements, excessive heat dissipation and relatively high weight. The corresponding advantages of the hydraulic actuators are: its ease of configuring into redundant systems, its high force gain and stiffness, and its relatively light weight. These have made it the accepted standard actuator for flight control applications.

In driver actuator applications, the comparison is somewhat different: the input load to a primary surface actuator valve is relatively low, especially for the sizes needed for subsonic aircraft. As a result, the power requirements for a driver actuator are not nearly as severe; the driver only need provide sufficient force to overcome friction, power valve flow forces, and emergency "jam-breaking" forces. As a result, both hydraulic and electric (ac, dc, and stepper motors) are candidate approaches. The advantages of the electric devices lie in their independence of hydraulic power distribution and simplicity of maintenance.

Driver actuator versus integrated actuator. - One of the theoretical advantages of the FBW system is the potential of eliminating all manual mechanical linkages. However, all of the FBW aircraft to date have been vehicles modified for FBW evaluation and, as such, have used driver actuators as an effective method of connecting into the existing manual linkages. In a vehicle designed specifically for FBW, all of the surface actuator input linkages can be eliminated; an example of how this can be done is shown in Figure 20.

Two methods of coupling the driver actuator into the surface actuator are shown -- a position-summed system and a velocity-summed arrangement. In the position-summed configuration, a driver actuator with a relatively long stroke positions the input linkage to a control surface actuator; positional errors move the power servovalve to direct flow into the main cylinder so that zero difference exists between the driver actuator output and the surface actuator output. Note that only one feedback LVDT is required per channel




Figure 20. - Driver/Surface Actuators - Generalized Configurations

In the velocity-summed configuration, the driver actuator moves the spool of the power servovalve directly; its flow powers the main surface actuator, and electrical feedback from the main actuator closes the servo loop. Velocity feedback, in the form of power servovalve spool position, is required to stabilize the loop. Note that the driver actuator only need be a short-stroke device; actually, it could drive the valve spool directly, instead of through a linkage as shown, thereby eliminating all linkages in the actuator package.

The configurations shown in Figure 20 and variations thereof may appear to be integrated actuators, but they are really only driver actuator / surface actuator "packages" wherein both the conventional driver and surface actuator have been combined into a single assembly. Where it is desirable to use a surface-actuator configuration other than the tandem unit shown, the input linkage arrangement may become quite complex, as shown in Figure 21. For example, if three individual surface actuators, distributed along the control surface hinge line are desired, and if a conventional driver actuator is selected to operate them, a number of actuation systems are possible. As shown in Figure 21 (a) each of the three surface actuators may be units with integral power servovalves and feedback linkages. The output from the driver can then be linked to each of the surface actuators. Or each surface actuator may contain one channel of the driver, as shown in Figure 21 (b), and a driver linkage used to synchronize the inputs to the power actuators. Or, as shown in Figure 21 (c), the power servovalves may be packaged with the driver actuator and the surface actuator cylinders hydraulically coupled thereto. Electrical feedback from the surface for each driver channel would then be used in a velocity-summed servosystem.

All of these arrangements require some type of input linkages; in the latter case, the amount used is very small and easily protected, so that configuration would have a very high reliability rating. The other arrangements are susceptible to the usual problems of control linkage. In the second case, the synchronizing shaft could carry substantial loads and be affected by backlash at the pivot points.




Figure 21. - Driver Actuator - Surface Actuator System Mechanizations

A completely integrated actuator can minimize the problems associated with input linkage systems. One basic form of such an actuator is shown in Figure 22. On this surface actuator, the electrohydraulic servovalve controls the flow to the surface actuator -- no input linkages are required, no power servovalve is needed. Miscellaneous components, necessary for monitoring, synchronizing, and bypassing are necessary, but these are easily integrated into the simple, straightforward design. Note that there are no exposed linkages or other elements susceptible to jamming or inadvertent breakage. Because of the simplicity of such actuators, considerable effort is being devoted to their potential use in flight control systems.

Distributed hydraulics and servopump actuators. - Hydraulic actuators, when used in flight control applications, are supplied with fluid from separate, special hydraulic power systems. Because of the importance of the surface actuators in the control of the vehicle, every effort is made to provide them with well-filtered fluid at well-regulated pressures from a system of maximum reliability. The fluids are selected for best overall performance under all conditions, and every effort is made to maintain the integrity of the distribution system.

The fluid used in hydraulic servoactuators must have a number of important characteristics. Besides having the proper viscosity and viscosity index for operating over a wide range of temperatures, it must provide adequate lubricity over those ranges for maximum component life. The bulk modulus, or compressibility, must be such that its effect in the spring-mass system of the aerodynamic control surface is not detrimental. It should have a relatively high specific heat so that the temperature build-up from pressure drops in servovalves and other throttling devices is minimal. In transport aircraft, it is also important that the hydraulic fluid be fireproof; unfortunately, most fireproof fluids in use today subject the valves (and other components where fluid velocity is high) to high rates of erosion. This effect is so severe that servoactuator maintenance schedules are determined by the performance degradation caused by erosion rather than by seal wear or other intuitively-based reasons.




Figure 22. - Single-Channel Integrated Actuator for Constant-Pressure Supply

The operating pressure of the distributed hydraulic system is usually determined by the "weight efficiency" of the specific system. While the weight of the distribution system, pumps, filters, and other elements can be minimized by the use of high pressures, the small cylinder areas associated with these systems can create stiffness problems resulting from low-bulk-modulus fluids. It is important to realize that the relationship between control surface configuration, surface actuation system arrangement, hydraulic power system characteristics, and control system dynamics are very critical. The hydraulic actuator is capable of handling very large aerodynamic loads accurately, but control surface inertia is difficult to handle in large amounts. For this reason, the air frame control surface designer may actually increase actuator power requirements by reducing the aerodynamic load, if that reduction was accompanied by an increase in inertia.

The characteristics of the aerodynamic control surface define the power requirements of its hydraulic actuator -- the aerodynamic hinge moment required for control deflections needed at maximum dynamic pressure determine actuator force. The control-surface rate needed for low-speed maneuvers, such as landing approaches, determines the maximum actuator speed. The product is hydraulic power. Unfortunately, maximum rate is not usually needed when maximum force is, and vice versa. During a landing approach, when control surface hinge moments are minimal, the actuators must consume the maximum amount of hydraulic power, and, because those loads are minimal, all the pressure from the system is converted into heat at the servovalve. Unless the fluid is cooled, the excess heat can destroy various elements in the system and result in failures.

Hydraulic heat is also generated when erosion of the power servovalves becomes excessive -- when the valve lands are so eroded that a continuous "leak" takes place at high pressures. While the fluid is not lost from the closed system, it is heated due to the energy converted from the pressure drop. To prevent this heating, as well as minimize the reduction in performance due to the erosion-generated valve hysteresis, provision must be made to periodically test each actuator for excessive erosion.

The distributed hydraulic system, with its engine-driven pumps supplying fluid at constant pressure, is a design problem; the actuator needs the fluid at full pressure to overcome the aerodynamic hinge moment at maximum "q", but, when maximum actuator velocity is needed, the loads are so low that most of the generated hydraulic power is converted into heat. One possible solution to this problem is the servopump actuator, a schematic of which is shown in Figure 23. In this configuration, a control-surface actuator is supplied with fluid directly from a variable-displacement servopump. The displacement of the pump shown is a function of the angle of the swash plate; when it is vertical (perpendicular to the drive shaft axis), the pistons in the rotating cylinder barrel have no reciprocating motion, and no fluid flow takes place. If the stroking servocylinder should move the swash plate in one direction or the other, fluid will be pumped from one side of the actuator cylinder to the other, and the output piston will move the control surface. An electric motor is used to drive both the servopump and a constant-pressure primary pump which provides fluid for the electrohydraulic servovalve-controlled stroking cylinder and the replenishing valves, which keep the actuation cylinder filled.

The integrated actuator shown also has a pressure transducer for monitoring and synchronizing purposes, and an automatic bypass valve to disengage the cylinder upon failure. Other servoactuator elements, feedback transducers, etc., are also shown.

The servopump is a unique solution to the actuator problem because it has no valves or flow-throttling devices in the power circuit; when the load on the actuator is high, pump pressure is high. Conversely, when the load is low, pump pressure is low, and, used in conjunction with carefully-designed control surfaces, the peak power input will be relatively low. Again, because there is no power servovalve, erosion is minimized.

A servopump, in addition, can always be matched to the load -- the maximum operating pressure can be selected to match the piston area as defined by resonant bulk modulus effects, and the pump flows can then be




Figure 23. - Single-Channel Integrated Actuator with Electrically Driven Servopump

adjusted accordingly. Each surface actuator on a given aircraft could conceivably be operating over a different pressure range.

Maintainability is very good because there are no hydraulic fittings or lines to disconnect: removal of an actuator requires only separation of the mechanical and electrical disconnects. Unfortunately, weight of the electrically powered package is high, and some difficulty has been experienced in obtaining satisfactory frequency response, but current development is expected to solve these problems.

Analog versus digital servo loops. - The objective of this design tradeoff was to evaluate the feasibility and/or utility of a digital servo loop. The primary reason for considering a digital loop was a possible cost/complexity reduction through multiplexed signal transmission. The evaluation addressed not only the all-digital servo loop, but a range of alternatives between digital and analog as defined below:

- All-digital (computation, servo, and digital servo feedback sensors)
- Digital servo loops except for feedback sensors
- Analog servos and electronic computation with digital multiplexed monitoring and equalization
- Analog servo loop with dedicated monitoring logic

It is concluded that an "all-digital" servo loop is not state-of-the-art for ATT actuators due to lack of adequate electronic/electrohydraulic servo loop elements. Additional development of digital valves and feedback encoders is necessary. Further, partial digital servo loops and/or multiplexed monitoring are state-of-the-art but are not cost competitive with analog. Consequently, conventional analog servo loops are recommended for ATT.

Redundancy Management Considerations

All of the actuator approaches described are applicable to redundant systems, but the redundancy management has not been discussed. The factors to be considered in that management are:

- Output summing of driver actuators
- Crossfeed implementation
- Equalization or synchronization
- Monitoring and monitoring logic

Output summing. - The outputs of redundant driver or surface actuators may be summed or combined in several ways: position, velocity, or force. Position summing is illustrated in Figure 24 which shows an arrangement where two or more actuators are interconnected by means of conventional summing linkages. This allows each channel actuator to take a position independent of the other channel positions, and the net output is the average of all the inputs.

There are three inherent weaknesses in such a position-summing system: (1) failure transients from hardover failures in any one channel are simply transmitted through to the output; (2) a failed channel actuator must be disengaged to some predetermined position immediately; the synchronization and velocity control for this disengagement can also cause transients to appear at the output; and (3) the positional gains and authority of the remaining channel actuators must be increased once a failure has been detected and corrected if the output positional relationship is to remain the same. These factors, plus the lack of reliability of the complex linkage have made the position-summing implementation unacceptable to most users.

A variation of position summing is the use of redundant, or "split"




Figure 24. - Position Summing

surfaces with single-channel integrated actuators as shown in Figure 25. Failure of a given channel or actuator requires that the surface be disengaged to a streamline or neutral position. In the case of large, fast vehicles, this centering mechanism can be a heavy, complex mechanism. In addition, partial loss of control-surface area can reduce control capability at approach speeds.

Velocity summing is a method of summing actuators in which the prime mover is a rotary motor; a typical application would be a redundant electromechanical driver actuator as shown in Figure 26. Because the end summation is a form of position summing, the same criticisms that are presented for position summing are applicable here -- gains must be changed, and locking mechanisms must be employed in the individual channels.




Figure 25. - Split Surfaces

Force summing has been the most popular method employed to date; all channel actuators have their output shafts firmly connected together so that the output force is the sum of all the channel actuator forces as shown in Figure 27. While jamming of any single cylinder can result in jamming of the entire driver actuator, the individual pistons are designed with area sufficient to minimize such a possibility. Disengagement of any single cylinder is accomplished by bypassing, and no change in positional gain or authority occurs. Force summing can also be used directly in surface actuators, where the control surface can be built to withstand any channel-to-channel force fights.

Crossfeed and equalization. - While the output of a force-summed driver actuator coupled into the input of a surface actuator is essentially a mechanical crossfeed, it is also advantageous to effect an electrical crossfeed somewhere near the input to the actuator servo loop. This results in all of the channels being commanded by the same signal, and the only interchannel differences are the result of servoactuator errors or failures.




Figure 26. - Velocity-Summed Electromechanical Servoactuator




Figure 27. - Force-Summed Electrohydraulic Driver Actuator

Equalization or synchronization is defined as the technique to make the output of all channel cylinders in an actuator configuration equal. Position-summed systems do not require any equalization because the output from each channel actuator is free to take the position of the input. In a velocity-summed actuator, the difference in the velocity of any two channel motors can be detected and used as an equalizing feedback signal.

In a force-summed actuator some form of equalization must be used which will minimize the effects of interchannel differences. For example: even if identical command signals are used for each channel, minor differences due to feedback nonlinearities valve offsets, etc., can occur and cause channel mistracking.

Hydraulic servoactuators are capable of nearly infinite force gain. By using certain electrohydraulic servovalves, this gain may be reduced to any desired amount; and, in some force-summed driver actuator configurations, the force gain is reduced by an amount sufficient to accommodate the individual channel errors within the maximum output force capabilities of the actuator. The trades associated with this approach are shown in Figure 28. In others, two different force gains are used to provide a "middle-select" function, and the output position is the position of that "mid-value" channel.




Figure 28. - Limits of "Lowered Force Gain" Type Equalization

Reduction in the force gain of a hydraulic driver actuator has some negative aspects: while the load on the driver is normally quite low, widely-variable loads, such as "stiction", friction, power valve flow forces, and power valve "jams" can cause positional errors, so that special interconnects of the monitoring logic must be used. Obviously, reductions in force gains are intolerable for most surface-actuator applications, so this approach is usually limited to driver actuators.

Force-summing can be used in another variation; if one channel is defined as being "active" and (by design) has nearly infinite force gain, the remaining channels can be made to "follow" that active channel by using negative-high-gain force feedback. This is easy to accomplish with pressure transducers in the follower or "on-line" channels. This implementation is described as "active/on-line" and is compared with an "active" implementation in the following paragraph.

Active versus active/on-line actuators. - As a means of implementing the best characteristics of both the active and standby concepts, a force-summed servo configuration as shown in Figure 29 was defined and is referred to as "active/on-line".

One channel operates fully active and at high force gain. The redundant channels are engaged and operated in an active on-line mode. A pressure feedback loop is closed around the actuator electrically through the EHV. This feedback operates functionally as a bypass orifice between the active and on-line channels. Upon failure of the active channel, that valve is disengaged and the piston bypassed. Simultaneously, pressure feedback is switched out from one on-line channel, making that actuator the controlling actuator.

Since the pressure feedback functions to equalize out mistrack error between the active and on-line channel, the authority of the pressure feedback can be limited. In this way the on-line channels will load-share and/or oppose a failed active channel as soon as the limit is exceeded.




Figure 29. - Active/On-Line Actuator Concept Block Diagram

Continuous monitoring of the on-line channels is also an advantage; an in-line monitoring system used with this concept can detect failures in the failed on-line channel and disengage that channel without significant transients.

The pressure feedback is also designed to be frequency selective. The lower-frequency, large-amplitude commands that generate large mistrack errors such as stick inputs are equalized by a high static-pressure gain. Changes resulting from servo loop failures are partially inhibited by the lagged pressure feedback. In this way the on-line channels tend to load-share and will oppose a failure in the active channel. Characteristics of the active/on-line concepts are compared with active redundancy in Table 16.

Mistrack effects in the on-line channels are removed by this same pressure feedback. These channels are fully operable in all other respects and are continuously monitored. Upon failure of the priority or active channel, the pressure feedback is switched off in one of the on-line channels, and that channel becomes the "active" controlling channel. Simultaneously, the active channel is bypassed and disengaged. Electronic switching of the on-line channel occurs almost instantaneously and is not subject to delays associated with solenoid-operated valves.

Active versus standby redundancy. - Another concept adaptable to direct integrated surface actuation and one which is closely related to the active/on-line concept is that of "active/standby". In this system, one channel is also preselected as the active channel, and the remaining channels are held in "standby". While the electrohydraulic servovalves of the standby channels may be operational for monitoring purposes, the actuator cylinders are bypassed to add no load to the system. Equalization is only necessary to minimize switching transients or as an aid in monitoring.

This tradeoff considered active and standby redundancy as applied to driver actuators or power actuators. The general tradeoff considerations for active versus standby are summarized in Table 17.

TABLE 16. COMPARISON OF ACTIVE WITH ACTIVE/ON-LINE REDUNDANCY

Characteristic	Active	Active/on-line
Load sharing	Yes	Yes ^a (high frequencies)
Failure transients reduced by load sharing	Yes	Yes ^a (partial)
Capability to function with an undetected failure	Yes	Yes ^a (degraded performance)
Non-time-critical failure switching	Yes	Yes ^a
Continuous monitoring of redundant channels possible	Yes	Yes
High stiffness possible	No	Yes
Cross-channel equalization eliminated	No	Yes
Capability to bypass jams	No	Yes
Low/lower cost actuator	No	Yes

^a These items are a compromise and do not meet the same level as a fully active system.

TABLE 17. - COMPARISON OF ACTIVE VERSUS STANDBY REDUNDANCY

Characteristic	Driver actuator		Integrated power actuator	
	Active	Standby	Active	Standby
Load sharing	Yes	No	Yes	No
Failure transients reduced by load sharing	Yes	No	Yes	No
Capability to function with an undetected failure	Yes	No	Yes	No
Non-time-critical failure switching	Yes	No	Yes	No
Continuous monitoring of redundant channels possible	Yes	No	Yes	No
High stiffness possible	Adequate	Yes	No	Yes
Cross-channel equalization eliminated	No	Yes	No	Yes
Capability to bypass jams	No	No	Yes	Yes
Low/lower cost servo possible	No	No	No	Yes

A pure standby configuration with a single active channel as applied to ATT has the basic problem of unacceptable failure transients. Because the standby channels are not load-sharing, they cannot oppose a failure in the active channel. Therefore, total and rapid failure detection is required to accomplish transfer. An additional problem is the inability to determine whether or not a standby channel is operable prior to engagement.

The primary reason for considering a standby configuration is the possible circumvention of inaccuracies resulting from summing the active channels. To solve active redundancy problems of "force fight" and "velocity fight", equalization is required which significantly complicates the design. Further, for power actuator applications, standby redundancy offers the potential of a jam-proof valve protection; i. e., jammed valves can be bypassed upon failure.

As a result of the tradeoffs summarized in Table 17, the following conclusions were drawn:

- Pure standby is not satisfactory for the ATT fly-by-wire actuator. The relatively larger failure transients and the use of "hair trigger" monitors and consequent high nuisance trip probability would be unacceptable.
- Implementation of the "integrated actuator" with active redundancy force summing using equalization techniques is not expected to be feasible. High stiffness is not possible.
- Other combinations of active and standby redundancy should be considered to better achieve benefits offered by standby.

Monitoring. - In a redundant actuation system, monitoring of the individual channels is necessary to remove the failed components when a failure occurs. It would be desirable to arrange the system so that the detection of failures is non-time-critical; that is, if a single failure occurs, it will have little or no effect on the system if the failed component is not disengaged.

Should the failure be transient in nature, the component can then resume normal operation when the failure disappears. If the failure is "hard" and remains in a failed state, the monitoring logic will disengage the faulty channel, thus reconfiguring the redundancy set to be ready for any subsequent failures.

Generally speaking, monitoring of the actuation system can be divided into two general types: comparison and in-line monitoring. Comparison monitoring, wherein any one channel is compared to one or more identical parallel channels to determine a failure, requires a minimum of four channels for a dual-fail-operational system. On the other hand, because in-line monitoring can be accomplished wholly within the individual channel, three channels of in-line monitored actuators are adequate for dual-fail-operational performance.

Comparison monitored four-channel systems are applicable to position-summed systems (including split surface configurations), and velocity-summed systems, as well as force-summed drivers. In a position-summed actuation system, the output positions of all of the channel actuators only need be compared to each other, and a failure can be identified (or defined) when a predetermined difference occurs. The same techniques, compared with the individual channel motor velocities, can be used to identify failures in a velocity-summed electromechanical driver actuator.

Force-summed hydraulic driver actuators (with proper equalization techniques applied) are relatively easy to monitor by comparison methods. If the assumption is made that the potential force output of the actuator is large relative to the required loads, then (ignoring the loads) the force produced by any one channel is equal to the sum of the forces produced by all the other channels. It follows then that if a failure should occur in one channel so that all of the other channels disagree with it, the failed channel will produce nearly maximum output force (assuming a relatively high force gain in each of the servoactuator loops). This high force can simply be detected with a pressure switch, eliminating any need for interchannel wiring. Again,

the level to which that pressure switch is set depends on the type of equalization employed; in some systems, an electronic limit on the equalization signal can replace the switch. In most cases, however, the logic must be arranged to negate the identification of a failure if all channels experience a high pressure (such as that needed to break a jammed servovalve loose).

In-line monitoring of an electrohydraulic servoactuator can be accomplished by modeling the servoamplifier, by using a transducer on the spool of the electrohydraulic servovalve, and by load pressure sensing. The relationships between the valve natural frequency and the minimum delay needed to positively identify a failed servovalve is shown in Figure 30 where i_p = positive valve current, i_n = negative valve current, \bar{x}_p = positive spool motion and \bar{x}_n = negative spool displacement.

If the pressure feedback in an active/on-line actuator is properly shaped, the on-line actuators can provide dynamic stiffening of the entire actuation system; this stiffening significantly reduces the magnitude of the transients resulting from a failure. This transient is also reduced by eliminating all hydraulic and mechanical switching elements from the sequence which converts on-line actuator to active -- only the high-gain pressure feedback need be removed in order to accomplish the status change.

In contrast, the active/standby actuation system (which also can use in-line monitoring of the servovalve and amplifier), needs a mechanical shift of hydraulic valves to change the status of a standby channel to active.

The advantage of these in-line monitored systems are that they can meet the failure-mode requirements with only three channels instead of four, and they consequently require only three hydraulic power sources. Because of their insensitivity to load, they can operate directly as integrated surface actuators.

Four actuator channels in a three-engine aircraft. - When it is desirable to use a four-channel FBW system in a three-engined aircraft, some special considerations in hydraulic power distribution must be considered.




Figure 30. - Servo Monitor Minimum Time Delay to Prevent Nuisance Disengagement

If four-channel electrohydraulic driver actuators are desired, it is best from the reliability standpoint to use four separate hydraulic supplies. This number of supplies can be driven by three engines, but the number of pumps per engine becomes formidable; if each system requires two pumps, the net needs are for eight pumps on three engines.

Other solutions to this problem are to use three hydraulic systems for the surface actuators and the same three for three channels of the driver. A small, electrically powered system for the remaining driver actuator channel could be left "off" until a failure of one of the initial three channels was experienced. Or, a fourth hydraulic supply could be "shuttled in" from the known active of the three supplies. This latter solution can be accomplished with miniature motor/pump units if isolation is a firm requirement.

There are many other possibilities because the actual amount of hydraulic power required for operating only one channel of driver actuators is very low -- on the order of 0.1 hp per actuator, which may be compatible with cost-effective hydraulic units.

AIR DATA COMPUTATION

In all probability, air data computation will take place in a digital processor remotely located from the sensor elements. The primary sensor configurations are listed in Table 18. All are presently in use, and it is anticipated that they will continue in usage in the 1980 time period with minor performance improvements.

TABLE 18. - SENSOR CONFIGURATIONS

Component	Comments
Strain gage pressure sensor	<p>Output: Analog, converted to 16 bit digital word in processor electronics</p> <p>Accuracy: 15/32 000 milli-inches hg with temperature compensation</p> <p>Improvements: Direct strain gage heating to eliminate compensation</p>
Vibrating wire pressure sensor	<p>Output: Variable frequency, converted to digital word in processor electronics</p> <p>Accuracy: 15/32 000 milli-inches hg with temperature compensation</p>
Vibrating diaphragm pressure sensor	<p>Output: Variable frequency, converted to digital word</p> <p>Accuracy: 15/32 000 milli-inches hg with temperature compensation</p>
Temperature sensor platinum resistance	<p>Output: Analog, dc converted to 10-11 bit digital word</p> <p>Accuracy: $\pm 0.5^{\circ}\text{C}$</p>
Redundancy:	Multiple sensors and computation electronics as needed
Self test:	High and low end of range limit tests, as well as computation electronics accuracy (stored constants, etc.)
Failure monitor:	High and low end of range test.

DISPLAYS

The problems of limited panel space and increasing workload are relieved by the recent trend toward multimode or time-shared displays. Digitally integrated avionics control-display systems will provide the efficiency and flexibility desirable for the high-performance ATT.

Digital programmable displays and controls are capable of being driven by a digital computer, sensor or programmable memory. The display must be capable of alphanumeric, graphic and TV presentations. The display technologies which appear most promising for the 1978-1980 time span are listed in Table 19.

TABLE 19. - DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES

Component	Comments
Cathode ray tube (analog)	The conventional single beam-yoke type cathode ray tube with analog inductive beam sweep has been one of the most common displays. The analog CRT will undoubtedly be improved in the future; however, it has the disadvantages of high weight, high power dissipation, high volume and low reliability.
Flat-panel display	A flat-panel digital-addressable matrix display appears the most desirable configuration for ATT. It is the most efficient physical package and can readily be integrated with the various other cockpit displays.
Flat CRT	A multiple-beam flat CRT display has been highly developed by Northrup. It is relatively reliable, adaptable to gray scale, color and inherent storage. It is rugged and low-cost; however, it requires too much power to overcome high ambient lighting, needs high voltages, arc suppression and protection.

TABLE 19. - DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES - Concluded

Component	Comments
LED display	A stackable module LED display has been developed by Litton. Its inherent disadvantages include inefficiency in generating light, poor resolution, high power, poor contrast and high cost.
Plasma panel	The "Digivue" plasma panel has been highly developed by Owens-Illinois. The plasma panel is not inherently suitable for vector graphic and pictorial-type displays. The plasma discharge is not throttleable and the resulting color is limited.
Luminescent panels	Electroluminescent panels have had problems with limitation of brightness, short operating life, high voltage, and poor resolution.
Liquid crystals	Liquid crystals require very low power, provide good resolution and have an inherent immunity to variations in ambient light. Its principal disadvantage is a limited operating temperature range of approximately 50°C.

ELECTRONICS

Solid-state electronic component development is presently at a point of very rapid change. The direction of the industry's development thrust may change in the near term and cause large disparities in five-year technology projections. The technology survey represents the best projection following the trends apparent today.

Integrated Circuit Technology

It has been concluded that C/MOS integrated circuit technology is the best suited for the ATT implementation. The present and future state-of-the-art of C/MOS shows that capability of maintaining the pace of TTL in function, complexity and electronic dependability.

The following were the bases for recommending C/MOS over other forms of MOS and TTL.

- The cost of C/MOS is currently somewhat higher than for P/MOS and TTL; however, projections for the 1978-1985 time frame indicate this situation will reverse.
- C/MOS offers development flexibility via a large variety of standard circuits for ease of breadboarding and computer-aided design to facilitate customizing circuitry.
- The alternate applications of SSIC, MSIC or LSIC provide production flexibility.
- C/MOS requires minimum fan-in and fan-out restrictions.
- C/MOS has the lowest power requirements.
- The single operating voltage required by C/MOS simplifies power supplies.
- The transient-tolerant characteristics of C/MOS encourage its application in high-noise environments.
- Multiple sources of C/MOS circuitry are being expanded with extended lists of vendors.

Large-scale integrated circuits. - LSIC provides a system reliability improvement as compared with SSIC and MSIC because of reduced total parts count and minimized interconnections. Volume, weight and cost reductions with LSIC are significant.

P-channel metal oxide semiconductor devices (P/MOS). - P/MOS devices provide the highest-possible-density LSIC packaging. Density is usually limited by the pin-out requirements. P/MOS requires custom design at present as it is not available in standard SSIC and MSIC.

High-Efficiency Line-Operated Ultrasonic Inverter

It is advantageous that each redundant channel of the FCS be supplied by a completely independent ultrasonic power converter which will operate directly off the three-phase line and supply the \pm d-c voltages required. The general circuit approach of using high-frequency power conversion techniques in place of conventional 60-Hz transformer supplies results in reduction in size and weight, high efficiency, lower cooling requirements, improved regulation, higher reliability and possible application of high-frequency-excited sensors. The line-operated ultrasonic inverter is excited from a three-phase line to provide additional reliability through the inherent redundancy of the three-phase source. Single-phase failures do not affect output voltages. Honeywell has used this technique in the Space Shuttle Engine Control program and achieved efficiencies of approximately 80 percent.

High-voltage power transistors. - The current (8 amps) and breakdown rating (700 volts) of new triple-diffused silicon power transistors have drastically improved power switching capability.

Monolithic Darlington power transistors. - The improvement in efficiency offered by high-voltage monolithic Darlington transistor switches such as TRW's SVT6000 makes possible the line-operated inverter.

Stitch-Wired PC Boards

The stitch-wired PC board technique permits component densities equivalent to 8- to 12- layer PC boards. It allows design change and repair flexibility while holding down design, drafting and production tooling costs.

SENSORS

The candidate system concepts require three types of sensors: angular rate, linear acceleration, and position transducers. The position transducers are used for electrical wheel, columns, and pedal-position commands to the FCS and for actuator position feedbacks. While other sensors were considered in the study technology survey, only these three sensor types were applicable to the FCS concepts traded. The attitude sensors and air data sensors are considered to be part of other systems such as the navigation system or the central air data system, and, while these outputs are utilized by the FCS as interfacing sensor data or as computed data, they should be independent of the FCS.

For these same reasons, inertial-quality integrating rate sensors and accelerometers were not advanced into the system concept trade study. It is anticipated that some aircraft-user configurations will not include an inertial navigator as standard equipment. Consequently, a FCS providing inertial-quality rate/acceleration sensing is too capable and unnecessarily expensive for these user configurations. Thus, the concept systems studies require only control-quality sensed data for rate and acceleration.

The following paragraphs describe the various areas of sensor trade-off and the applicable technology survey results.

Position Pickoff Sensors

Several types of position sensors were initially considered for this application:

- A-C linear pickoffs -- "synchros"
- D-C potentiometer pickoffs
- Optical shaft encoders

The use of shaft encoders was rejected because their cost was, at the best, ten times that for a "synchro" pickoff and with inferior reliability. The prime advantage of the encoder, that of not requiring an A/D converter to interface with a digital processor, was of insignificant value in this system because the computation units required A/D converters for other analog sensors.

The use of d-c potentiometer pickoffs was seriously considered because the elimination of the demodulator-amplifiers required with a-c pickoffs appeared advantageous. However, the high initial cost of d-c potentiometer pickoffs, their relatively low reliability due to wearout and frictional polymer buildup, and the problems of fault propagation between multiple users and common-mode voltage offsets, all combined to eliminate them from the trade study sequence.

The a-c linear pickoffs were chosen for all position sensor applications, for wheel, column and pedal position, for actuator position, and for panel inputs such as roll/yaw trim commands.

Angular Rate Sensors

A great number of angular rate sensing concepts were considered in the preliminary survey -- electrostatic, integrating gyros, conventional spring-restrained gyros with ball bearings and with air bearings, magneto

hydrodynamic sensor, vibrating wire rate sensors, and an implementation of the laser rate gyro. Of those surveyed, the most promising sensors for the time frame of interest were the conventional spring-restrained ball bearing rate gyro, the laser rate sensor and the magneto hydrodynamic sensor.

The laser sensor holds promise as a rate sensor because of its very high reliability and lack of wearout characteristics. The laser gyro has been developed basically as a navigation sensor, and the principles of operation and the special implementation considerations are explained in some detail in the Honeywell Document No. 7040-3332 "The Honeywell Laser Gyro", available through the G&AP Division.

The magneto hydrodynamic (MHD) sensor was continued into the trade study because a single sensor senses angular rate about two orthogonal axes. The sensor also projects a very high reliability; presently, however, the slip-ring wearout requires a 1500-hour time between scheduled replacement. The MHD sensor can be rebuilt easily by replacing the sliprings.

The MHD rate sensor is a non-gyro sensor. That is, it does not depend on the momentum of a spinning wheel for its operation. The MHD rate sensor instead uses an angular accelerometer in the form of a torus of liquid metal as its basic sensor. The MHD implementation in the GG2500 sensor is shown in Figure 31 and its theory of operation in Figure 32.

Angular accelerations about an axis normal to the plane of the liquid metal torus result in motion of the case and magnetic field relative to the liquid metal. This disturbance is sensed by measuring the voltage that is generated in the liquid metal moving in the presence of a magnetic field. The science dealing with this phenomenon is called magneto hydrodynamics, and, therefore, the device is referred to as an MHD rate sensor.

The mechanization of the MHD rate sensor includes a technique wherein the liquid metal torus is continuously rotated along a diameter of the torus. This rotation permits the device to measure angular rate instead of




Figure 31. - GG2500 MHD Rate Sensor - Cutaway View




Figure 32. - MHD Theory of Operation

angular acceleration and to sense in two axes instead of in a single axis. With the continuous rotation, each of two input axes is sampled in the positive and negative directions during each revolution.

To obtain further insight into the operation, consider an angular accelerometer which is being rotated at a constant rate, ω_s , about an axis perpendicular to the angular accelerometer input axis. If a rate exists perpendicular to this rotation axis, the instantaneous rate about the angular accelerometer input axis is

$$\omega_o = \omega_x \sin \omega_s t \quad (\text{see Figure 32})$$

The angular acceleration about the input axis, therefore, is

$$\dot{\omega}_o = \frac{d\omega_o}{dt} = \omega_s \omega_x \cos \omega_s t$$

By these means the input rate is changed to a time-varying angular acceleration.

The angular accelerometer used in the MHD device is shown in Figure 33. An annular ring of liquid metal exists between the radially oriented permanent magnet and the magnetic case which provides the magnetic




Figure 33. - Angular Accelerometer

path. A spool of conducting material contacts the liquid metal and encompasses a toroidal tape-wound core. The existence of a rate input results in an oscillation of the magnetic field with respect to the liquid metal. The relative motion generates a voltage in the single turn represented by the liquid metal and conductive spool. This generated voltage induces a corresponding voltage in the secondary winding which is wound about the tape-wound core.

The voltage induced in the liquid metal is

$$E = B l v$$

where

B = flux density

l = length of moving conductor

v = velocity of conductor relative to the magnetic field

In terms of angular velocity

$$e = B l \omega_r r$$

where

r = mean radius of the liquid metal

ω_r = angular velocity of the liquid metal relative to the magnetic field (or sensor case)

To determine the relationship between ω_r and the input angular rate ω_o , the open-loop transfer function for the angular accelerometer is examined:

$$\omega_r = \omega_o \left(\frac{\frac{I}{C} S}{\frac{I}{C} S + 1} \right)$$

where

ω_r = as defined above

ω_o = angular input to case

I = polar moment of inertia of liquid metal

C = damping of liquid metal

In the practical case where $\frac{I}{C} S$ is much greater than one, the quantity within the parentheses is unity to within one part in 10^7 . This means that the input rate and the rate between the magnetic field and the liquid metal are essentially identical and that the liquid metal is motionless about its input axis. Thus, the output of the MHD rate sensor is a true representation of the input rate.

Since the variation of I and C over the operating temperature range has little or no effect on the output, temperature control to hold these parameters is not necessary.

The complete rate sensor consists of the above described angular accelerometer, a synchronous hysteresis drive motor, a two-phase reference generator which permits resolution of the output into its two orthogonal axes, and a slipping assembly to transfer the output signal from the rotating element to the preamplifier mounted within the hermetic seals.

The conventional rate sensor is represented in the trade studies by the Honeywell GG445. The GG445 is one of a family of subminiature devices which has been tested extensively under a wide variety of environmental conditions. These devices have a proven ability to perform as required under temperature extremes of -65°F to 200°F , vibration levels of 20 g and shock levels of 400 g. The GG445 is a spring-restrained, fluid-damped, rate-measuring gyroscope with a synchronous hysteresis a-c spin-motor and an angular variable-differential transformer pickoff. The variable-reluctance pickoff provides high sensitivity, low noise and excellent linearity. This gyro has a simple low-cost self-compensated damper arrangement which maintains the damping ratio within 0.6 ± 0.2 over the required temperature range.

The balance of the rate sensor types surveyed were eliminated from further study either because of very high projected initial cost/cost of ownership, or because of high development risk in the 1978 time frame.

Linear Acceleration Sensors

The technology survey found considerably fewer linear acceleration implementations under development. The ordinary spring-mass accelerometer, either mechanically or magnetically damped, was eliminated because of high cost, low performance, and poor reliability. The pendulous silicon beam-strain gauge accelerometer was rejected for fragility at the low g-levels to be sensed. Pendulous force-rebalance devices were the only type considered suitable, and only the control-quality device was found to have a suitable initial cost/cost of ownership. The inertial-quality pendulous accelerometers were found to be extremely expensive. The sensor chosen as representative of the great number of force rebalance types was the Honeywell GG326. This unit has a high reliability, has no wearout modes, and is fully capable for the functional requirement of the ATT.

The GG326 accelerometer is a conventional force rebalance device with a unique mechanization resulting in low cost and high accuracy with time and environmental exposure. The pendulum and suspension are fabricated from quartz fibers as shown schematically in Figure 34.

A thin film of silver is vapor deposited over the quartz suspension and pendulum. The base of the pendulum operates in a permanent-magnet field, providing a one-turn torque generator. The null detector consists of a light source and a dual silicon photodiode. The p-layer of the silicon p-n junction is divided into two parts by a thin separation. When the base of the pendulum coincides with this separation, the null position is achieved, and the d-c outputs of the dual photodiode are balanced. The servo amplifier used to control the pendulum to the null position is a standard commercial μ A741 integrated circuit. This straightforward amplifier (seven low-power discrete components) is capable of controlling the accelerometer over a range of ± 3 g's.




Figure 34. - GG326 Linear Accelerometer

The operational life of a tungsten filament lamp varies as the 12th power of the excitation voltage. The lamp used in the GG326 is rated for a useful life in excess of 20 000 hours. Severe environmental conditions have been applied to the GG326 accelerometer both in test and in the field with no lamp or suspension failures.

Skewed Sensor Arrays

In system concepts which included a general-purpose digital processor, the use of skewed sensor arrays may provide a significant redundancy management advantage. A digital processor is nearly mandatory because of the difficulty in accurately converting the skewed sensor data to the required orthogonal set for aircraft control in an analog computation implementation. Because of the great advantages of reducing the total sensor count in redundant systems, the skewed sensor arrays were included in the trade study configurations.

Conventional flight control, attitude reference, and inertial systems have normally used orthogonal triads of gyros and accelerometers to obtain


three-axis rate, attitude and/or velocity information. Redundant systems have been mechanized simply by duplicating the triads as necessary. The skewed sensor configurations are based on two assumptions -- that sensed information (angular displacement or acceleration) is equally important from all directions and that sensor accuracy is acceleration- or gravity- independent. Under this assumptions, it can be shown that sensors whose sensitive input axes are placed normal to the faces of regular polyhedra, which divide the 3-space into equal regions, comprise optimum systems.

Expected system accuracy is statistical in nature and improves with the number of sensors employed. System variance or mean radial variance is determined by integrating and averaging the variance over the entire 3-space. For sensors with zero means and with equal variances (σ^2), the mean variance ($\bar{\sigma}_n^2$) of an optimally oriented n sensor array can be shown to be $\bar{\sigma}_n^2 = 3\sigma^2/n$. It can further be shown that n sensors, $n \geq 3$, equally spaced around a cone with central half angle, $\theta = \cos^{-1} 1/\sqrt{3}$ comprise an optimum system in that system variance is minimized. Figure 35 shows examples of these class I arrays. Other minimum-variance arrays may be developed to provide optimum systems which are particularly compatible with certain sensors. The optimum quadrad is ideal for laser gyros since, being half of a regular octad, its normal faces are equilateral triangles. The other half of the octad could be used for placement of accelerometers. Thus, an entire redundant inertial system can be compactly housed in a regular octad configuration.


Table 20 includes a summary of the processing equations and relative accuracy for a large number of optimum arrays.

Skewed redundant sensor arrays offer a number of significant advantages as discussed in the following paragraphs.


Reliability. - The skewed redundant strapped-down array is an efficient means for increasing reliability. The desired reliability level dictates the number of sensors which must be used in a system. The dual (or triple)




(a) ORTHOGONAL TRIAD



(b) TETRAD (OCTAHEDRON)



(c) PENTAD



(d) HEXAD
(TWO ORTHOGONAL TRIADS)

Figure 35. - Class I Optimum Arrays, Equally Spaced on a 54.75-deg Cone

TABLE 20. - PROCESSING EQUATIONS AND ACCURACY SUMMARY






Array (Top View)	Processing Equations			Relative Accuracy
	p-Axis	q-Axis	r-Axis	
 <p>Tetrad</p>	- All Sensors Operating -			$\frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma^2} = \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma^2} + \frac{\sigma_v^2}{\sigma^2} + \frac{\sigma_w^2}{\sigma^2} + \frac{\sigma_x^2}{\sigma^2} \right]$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma^2}}$
	$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{4} (u-w)$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{4} (u+v+w+x)$	$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{4} (x-v)$	
	- Sensor u removed, (et cyclic for v, w, x) -			$\frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{4} \right)$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{4}} = 0.500$
	$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{4} (v+x-2w)$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2} (v+x)$	$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{4} (x-v)$	$\frac{2}{3} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{2}{3} + \frac{2}{3} + \frac{2}{3} \right)$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{2}{3}} = 1.225$
 <p>Class I Pentad</p>	- All Sensors Operating -			$\frac{1}{5} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} \right)$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{5}} = 0.775$
	$\frac{(1+\cos 36^\circ) \left[u - \frac{w+x}{2} \right] + (1-\cos 72^\circ) \left[u - \frac{v+y}{2} \right]}{\frac{3}{4} \sqrt{6}}$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{5} (u+v+w+x+y)$	$\frac{\sin 36^\circ (x-w) + \sin 72^\circ (y-v)}{5/\sqrt{6}}$	
	- Sensor u removed, (et cyclic for v, w, x, y) -			$\frac{8}{10} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{8}{10} + \frac{8}{10} + \frac{8}{10} \right)$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{8}{10}} = 0.949$
	$\frac{v+y-w-x}{4/\sqrt{6} (\cos 36^\circ + \cos 72^\circ)}$	$\frac{\cos 36^\circ (v+y) + \cos 72^\circ (w+x)}{2/\sqrt{3} (\cos 36^\circ + \cos 72^\circ)}$	$\frac{\sin 38^\circ (x-w) + \sin 72^\circ (y-v)}{5/\sqrt{6}}$	
	- Sensors v and y removed, (et cyclic for w and x, etc.) -			$1.305 = \frac{1}{3} (0.69 + 1.06 + 2.17)$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{1.305}{3}} = 1.484$
	$\frac{u - \frac{1}{2}(w+x)}{\sqrt{2}/\sqrt{3} (1 + \cos 36^\circ)}$	$\frac{\frac{1}{2}(w+x) + u \cos 36^\circ}{1/\sqrt{3} (1 + \cos 36^\circ)}$	$\frac{w-x}{4/\sqrt{6} \sin 36^\circ}$	
- Sensors w and x removed, (et cyclic for x and y, etc.) -			$3.09 = \frac{1}{3} (4.71 + 3.74 + 0.83)$	
$\frac{u - \frac{1}{2}(v+y)}{\sqrt{2}/\sqrt{3} (1 - \cos 72^\circ)}$	$\frac{\frac{1}{2}(v+y) - u \cos 72^\circ}{1/\sqrt{3} (1 - \cos 72^\circ)}$	$\frac{v-y}{4/\sqrt{6} \sin 72^\circ}$		
 <p>Class II Pentad</p>	- All Sensors Operating -			$\frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma^2} = \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma^2} + \frac{\sigma_v^2}{\sigma^2} + \frac{\sigma_z^2}{\sigma^2} \right]$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma^2}}$
	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{10} (u-w)$	$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{10} (u+v+w+x) + \frac{3}{5} z$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{10} (x-v)$	
	- Sensor x removed, (et cyclic for u, v, w) -			$\frac{291}{320} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{291}{320} + \frac{291}{320} + \frac{441}{320} \right)$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{291}{320}} = 1.000$
	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{10} (u-w)$	$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{8} (u+w) + \frac{3}{4} z$	$\frac{7/2 (u+w) - 16v + 3/2 \sqrt{6} z}{16 \sqrt{6}}$	
	- Sensor z removed -			$\frac{8}{10} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{8}{10} + \frac{8}{10} + \frac{8}{10} \right)$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{8}{10}} = 0.9526$
	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{10} (u-w)$	$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{4} (u+v+w+x)$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{10} (x-v)$	
- Sensors z and w removed, (et cyclic for z and x, etc.) -			$\frac{8}{5} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{8}{5} + 3 + \frac{8}{5} \right)$ $\frac{\sigma_u}{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{8}{5}} = 1.238$	
$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{10} (2u-v-x)$	$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{2} (v+x)$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{10} (x-v)$		
- Sensors w and x removed, (et cyclic for w and u, etc.) -			$\frac{18}{15} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{18}{15} + 1 + \frac{18}{15} \right)$ * neglecting the 2 cases below.	
$\frac{1}{\sqrt{5}} (\sqrt{6} u - z)$	z	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{5}} (z - \sqrt{6} v)$		
If sensors u and w are removed, there is no p-axis data. (If v and x, no r-axis data.)				-

TABLE 20. - PROCESSING EQUATIONS AND ACCURACY SUMMARY - Concluded

Array (Top View)	Processing Equations			Relative Accuracy	
	p-Axis	s-Axis	r-Axis		
<p>Class I Hexad</p> 	- All Sensors Operating -				
	$\frac{2(u-y) + (x-v) + z-w}{2\sqrt{6}}$	$\frac{u+v+w+x+yz}{2\sqrt{5}}$	$\frac{(w-v) + (z-x)}{2\sqrt{2}}$	$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right)$	$\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{5}{2}} = 0.707$
	- Sensor y removed, (et cyclic for w, z, etc.) -				
	$\frac{2u - (v+w)}{\sqrt{6}}$	$\frac{4u+7(v+w)+3(x+z)}{8\sqrt{5}}$	$\frac{2(z-x) + (w-v)}{3\sqrt{2}}$	$\frac{323}{432} - \frac{1}{3} \left(1 + \frac{13}{16} + \frac{5}{9} \right)$	$\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} = 0.8647$
	- Sensors u and y removed, (et cyclic for w and z, v and s) -				
	$\frac{(x-v) + (z-w)}{2/3\sqrt{6}}$	$\frac{s+w+x+v}{4/3\sqrt{5}}$	$\frac{(w-v) + (z-x)}{2\sqrt{2}}$	$\frac{11}{12} - \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{3}{2} + \frac{3}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right)$	$\left. \begin{aligned} &\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} \cdot \left[\frac{1}{5} \cdot \frac{11}{12} + \frac{2}{5} \right] \\ &= \frac{8731}{11,816} - \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{81}{121} + \frac{27}{32} + 1 \right] \\ &= \frac{8731}{11,816} + \frac{2}{5} \cdot \frac{11}{30} \Bigg)^{1/2} \\ &= 1.026 \end{aligned} \right\}$
	- Sensors v and w removed, (et cyclic for y and z, etc.) -				
	$\frac{s+x+4u-6y}{11/3\sqrt{6}}$	$\frac{u+3y+2x+2z}{8/3\sqrt{5}}$	$\frac{s-x}{\sqrt{2}}$	$\frac{43}{30} - \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{3}{2} + \frac{3}{2} + 2 \right)$	
	- Sensors w and z removed, (et cyclic for s and u, etc.) -				
	$\frac{x-v+2(u-y)}{5/3\sqrt{6}}$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2} (s+v)$	$\frac{u+y-(v+z)}{\sqrt{2}}$		
- Sensors u, v, w removed, (et cyclic for x, y, z) -					
$\frac{1}{\sqrt{6}} (s+x-3y)$	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{5}} (s+x+y)$	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (s-x)$	$\frac{\sigma_s^2}{\sigma^2} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{\sigma_p^2 + \sigma_s^2 + \sigma_r^2}{\sigma^2} + \sigma_c^2 \right)$	$\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{5}{2}}$	
- Sensors v, y, w removed, (et cyclic for y, w, z, etc.) -					
$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{2} (2u-x-z)$	$\sqrt{5} (x+z-u)$	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (s-x)$	$\frac{13}{2} = \frac{1}{3} (9+9+1)$	$\left. \begin{aligned} &\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} \cdot \left[\frac{1}{10} + \frac{2}{10} + \frac{13}{10} \right] \\ &+ \frac{8}{10} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \Bigg)^{1/2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{31}{10}} \\ &= 1.760 \end{aligned} \right\}$	
- Sensors v, w, z removed, (et cyclic for y, s, u, etc.) -					
$\frac{\sqrt{6}}{4} (u-y)$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2} (u+y)$	$\frac{3u+y-4x}{2\sqrt{2}}$	$\frac{13}{2} - \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{3}{2} + \frac{3}{2} + \frac{13}{2} \right)$		
<p>Class II Hexad (Dodecahedron)</p> 	- All Sensors Operating -				
	$\frac{2u+C72^\circ(v+y)+C36^\circ(w+z)}{\sqrt{11}}$	$\frac{2}{3} + \frac{\sqrt{5}}{10} (u+v+w+x+y)$	$\frac{S36^\circ(x-w)+S72^\circ(y-v)}{\sqrt{5}}$	$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right)$	$\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} = 0.707$
	- Sensor z removed -				
	$\frac{(1+C36^\circ) \left[u - \frac{w+x}{2} \right] + (1-C72^\circ) \left[u - \frac{v-y}{2} \right]}{3/2\sqrt{5}}$	$\frac{u+v+w+x+y}{\sqrt{5}}$	$\frac{S36^\circ(x-w)+S72^\circ(y-v)}{\sqrt{5}}$	$\frac{2}{3} - \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right)$	$\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} = \frac{2}{3} = 0.816$
	- Sensors u and s removed -				
	$\frac{v+y-w-x}{4/\sqrt{5} (C36^\circ+C72^\circ)}$	$\frac{C36^\circ(v+y)+C72^\circ(w+x)}{2/\sqrt{5} (C36^\circ+C72^\circ)}$	$\frac{S36^\circ(x-w)+S72^\circ(y-v)}{\sqrt{5}}$	$1 - \frac{1}{3} \left(1 + \frac{3}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right)$	$\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} = 1$
	- Type I triad, Sensors s, v, and y removed -				
$\frac{2u-w-x}{4/\sqrt{5} (1+C36^\circ)}$	$\frac{w+x+2C36^\circ u}{2/\sqrt{5} (1+C36^\circ)}$	$\frac{w-x}{4/\sqrt{5} S36^\circ}$	$1.361 - \frac{1}{3} \left[0.572 + 1.769 + 1.807 \right] = 1/2 (5 - \sqrt{5})$	$\left. \begin{aligned} &\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma} \cdot \sqrt{5} \\ &= 3.610 - \frac{1}{3} \left[3.925 + 6.230 + 0.691 \right] = 1/2 (5 + \sqrt{5}) \\ &= 2.236 \end{aligned} \right\}$	
- Type II triad, Sensors s, w, and x removed -					
$\frac{2u-w-y}{4/\sqrt{5} (1-C72^\circ)}$	$\frac{v+y-2C72^\circ u}{2/\sqrt{5} (1-C72^\circ)}$	$\frac{y-v}{4/\sqrt{5} S72^\circ}$			

redundancy of a five- (or six-) sensor array may be necessary to achieve the prescribed reliability level. Since the effective redundancy of dual or triple orthogonal sets may be achieved with pentad or hexad arrays which require fewer sensors, the overall system reliability is improved by the deletion of these relatively less reliable devices.

Fault detection and isolation. - Three non-coplanar sensors are necessary to provide full three-axis information in our three-dimensional space. Addition of a fourth sensor, not aligned with any of the other three, to complete a tetrad, provides fault-detection capability. This configuration, however, is insufficient to provide fault isolation; that is, a fault can be detected by noting a disagreement among the outputs of the sensors, but the failed sensor cannot be identified.

The addition of a fifth sensor completes a pentad, no three sensors of which are coplanar, which can provide positive fault isolation as well as detection, by using a voting technique among the ten triads. That is, assuming failure of a single sensor, the four triads not involving the faulty sensor will continue to show agreement, while the other six which involve the faulty sensor will not. The same technique can be used to detect but not isolate a second sensor failure.

The addition of a sixth sensor can provide two levels of fault-isolation capability, if desired. Although not required for fault isolation of a single failure, the addition of a sixth sensor to form a hexad provides greater accuracy and more reliable single-fault isolation capability since, in effect, the outputs from 20 triads are compared and averaged in the parity and processing equations. These computational techniques also permit the detection and isolation of the second sensor failure in the hexad configuration. A third sensor failure will be detected but cannot be identified.

Accuracy. - Expected system accuracy is statistical in nature and improves with the number of sensors employed. The relative improvement per added sensor diminishes as the number of sensors increases. The greatest reduction in mean variance, 25 percent, is realized in going from a

triad to a tetrad. Adding a fifth and sixth sensor results in a further reduction in mean variance by 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively. The relative accuracy of a number of typical redundant arrays is shown in Figure 36.

When performing an accuracy analysis, consideration must be given to the mean variance of the remaining arrays after one (or more) sensors have been removed from the various optimum arrays. In establishing system configurations, consideration must also be given to the relative computational difficulty in processing the sensor data of the various truncated arrangements as well as the original arrays.

Size and weight. - The strapped-down array offers a smaller and lighter configuration than other sensor groupings. This is particularly true in comparison with gimbaled configurations such as have been commonly used in inertial systems. Redundant sets of orthogonal triads also suffer in comparison with the skewed array, as the array requires fewer sensors on a more compact mounting assembly, which requires less machining.

PROCESSORS

General-purpose processor capabilities anticipated in the 1978-1980 time period were forecast for use as inputs to the overall ATT system configuration tradeoff task. Potential system configurations were reviewed to provide the general sizing requirements for use in the processor survey. Configurations considered ranged from the large central processor type to the small distributed processor type, covering a very wide range of throughput capability. Sizing estimated for the ATT FCS functions indicated a total throughput requirement in the area of 500-600 KEOP and memory capacity of 10-12K words, somewhat dependent on the redundant system configuration. The approach taken in the technology survey was to estimate processor capability expected to be available in 1978 consistent with the above requirements. Several key groundrules were established prior to conducting the survey, as follows:




Figure 36. - Relative Accuracy of Redundant Arrays

The processor design must be relatively well proven, at least to the operating production prototype stage. Development of a general-purpose processor simultaneously with that of an advanced technology flight control system was considered to be an undesirable and unnecessary risk. Due to the complexities of the production process, this is particularly true for processors employing nonstandard LSI circuits. Production status is preferred in this case.

The rate of change of processor speed improvement observed in the past ten years will not hold for the next four to five years, particularly for the smaller machines implemented in LSI technology. In the last several years, integrated circuit vendors have emphasized application and marketing in contrast to development. New market areas such as the calculator, electronic watches, automotive electronics, point-of-sale terminals, etc., have captured the interest of the vendors due to the very high volume in these commercial applications. These markets require low-cost circuits and, consequently, integrated circuit developments are expected to be directed toward reducing cost rather than improving speed.

Destructive-readout (DRO) memories, (e. g., conventional coincident current core) are not considered suitable for production flight control system use due to the permanent alteration of program resulting from a transient during memory operations.

Processor Trends

Two different trends appear in current processor developments, dependent on the use of LSIC (large-scale integrated circuits). Several currently available processors use LSIC extensively to provide considerable computing power in a small package at low cost. Typically, this class of processor is intended for high-production-volume applications and low production cost is a major objective. Custom MOS circuit technology, requiring less chip area and lower power per function than bipolar, is used to obtain low cost. Unfortunately, MOS circuits are slower than bipolar and speed is

less despite use of parallel arithmetic and general register architectures. Since low cost is anticipated to have the highest priority in the application of such processors, computing speed increase by 1978 is expected to be limited to no more than a two-fold improvement.

A different class of airborne processor currently available or under development is that of a relatively "large", fast, sophisticated machine, as would be required for total aircraft avionic system processing. Here, the overall computing capability has a higher priority than low cost. Total production volume is expected to be much lower since this processor is not suitable for commercial applications. To achieve speed, bipolar circuit technology is used. Since this processor will have low-volume production, LSIC use will be limited to "standard circuits". The cost of custom bipolar LSIC is not warranted. Throughput on the order of 800 to 1000 KEOP is anticipated for this class of processor by 1978. Cost will be significantly higher than for the MOS LSIC processors.

The MOS LSIC processors are expected in two capability or "size" brackets, termed "medium" and "small" in this study. A medium processor, using a 16-bit word length and full parallel arithmetic, can be packaged on a single PC board and is expected to provide 300 to 400 KEOP throughput. The small processor can be packaged on a partial PC board and is expected to provide 150 to 200 KEOP throughput.

Processors with throughputs between the "large", "medium", and "small" ranges above are not expected to be available in the 1978 time span. Processor design objectives are to produce maximum machine capability consistent with the general application range and circuit technology used.

Some combinations of serial-parallel arithmetic and bipolar technology might be used to produce a processor with an intermediate throughput in the area of 500 KEOP but, the market for such a machine appears very limited. With a limited market, a custom-designed processor would not be cost effective, and consequently custom-designed processors, tailored to a specific task such as ATT FCS, are not considered.

Projected Processor Characteristics

General processor characteristics are summarized in Table 21. Detailed characteristics are provided in the following paragraphs.

TABLE 21. - CENTRAL PROCESSORS CONSIDERED

Central processor	Capability (KEOP)	Cost	Word length	Physical characteristics
Small	150- 200	\$2000	16 bits (selectable in 4-bit slices)	Partial PC board LSI
Medium	300- 400	\$3000	16 bits	1 PC board - LSI
Large	800-1000	\$8000	32 bits, floating point	Multiple PC board SSI, MSI, LSI mix

Large processor. - A large airborne processor with throughput on the order of 800 to 1000 KEOP is anticipated by 1978. The general market objective is for a central processing machine implying a sophisticated design. The large processor itself, exclusive of I/O and memory, will utilize a mix of SSI, MSI, and LSI standard bipolar circuits mounted on six PC boards. Production volume is anticipated to be relatively small, resulting in high unit cost -- approximately \$8000 each (exclusive of memory and I/O). Projected characteristics of the large processor are as follows:

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Rationale</u>
General-purpose	
Microprogrammed	To provide application flexibility and optimization.
Speed of 800 to 1000 KEOP	Based on minimum operation times of: Add - 1 μ sec Mult- 4 μ sec
Parallel operation	Provided to achieve speed.

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Rationale</u>
ROM/PROM instruction and constant and CMOS variable memory	Semiconductor memory is relatively cheap, NDRO, and available in alterable form.
General register architecture	Provides high-speed inter-register operations.
Indexing	Reduces memory requirements.
16- and 32-bit word length	16-bit adequate for most flight control operations; 32 bit used for high frequency loops, navigation, floating point, etc.
Fixed and floating-point ² arithmetic	Floating-point provided to reduce programming costs.
Direct memory access (DMA)	Reduces I/O load on processor time.
Mix of some LSIC, MSIC, & SSIC on multiple PC boards	Limited production volume and speed requirements will limit use of LSIC.

Medium processor. - A medium airborne processor with throughput on the order of 300 to 400 KEOP is anticipated by 1978. LSI MOS circuits will be used extensively to provide low cost and single-PC-board packaging. The medium-size processor speed forecast was obtained by extrapolating current LSI machine capabilities to 1978. Honeywell currently manufactures such a processor. As originally designed, a throughput of 200 KEOP was provided. Throughput of 300 to 400 KEOP is expected, however, as a result of upgrading the circuit process technology and the use of new architectures. A large production volume is expected, providing a capable processor at low unit cost -- approximately \$3000 exclusive of memory and I/O. Projected processor characteristics are:

² Flight control applications, including the ATT, do not require floating point. However, this class of machine probably will incorporate it since it is to be designed for limited-quantity applications where the nonrecurring cost of software is a significant part of program cost.

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Rationale</u>
General-purpose	
Speed of 300 to 400 KEOP	Based on minimum operation times of: Add - 2.5 μ sec Mult - 10 μ sec
Parallel operation	To obtain maximum speed limited by circuit technology.
ROM/PROM instruction and constant and CMOS variable memory	Semiconductor memory is cheap, NDRO, and available in alterable form.
16-bit word length	Suitable for flight control (bit slice technology may be provided permitting word length adjustment).
Fixed-point arithmetic with double-precision instructions	Suitable for flight control and other similar control tasks with double precision used in some portions.
Direct memory access (DMA)	Reduces I/O load on processor time.
LSI circuits packaged on a single printed circuit board	Honeywell HDC-310 employs MOS LSI circuits on a single 6.2 x 6.5-in. printed circuit board.

Small processor. - A small processor with throughput of 150 to 200 KEOP is anticipated by 1978. LSI MOS circuits will be used extensively to provide very low cost; packaging will be on a partial PC board. The small processor forecast was obtained by extrapolating from current production-status LSIC microprocessors, the National GP/CP being most representative. The GP/CP has recently gained production status in limited temperature range (0° to 70°C) form. The basic 16-bit processor, exclusive of memory, requires five LSI circuits (four 4-bit ALUs and one CROM) and additional buffering circuitry. The current instruction repertoire does not include wired MPY and DIV. National anticipates improvements in the next several years in the following areas:

- Wired MPY, DIV, and other logical instructions via an additional CROM (the GP/CP is microprogrammed via the CROM).

- A general speed increase of 40 to 80 percent over the current GP/CP processor.
- A temperature range capability suitable for airborne application via screening.

Microprocessors of this type will be applied in a wide variety of products, resulting in large production volume and low cost. Unit costs of approximately \$2000 are anticipated, including the screening necessary to obtain circuits suitable for aircraft environments. Projected processor characteristics are as follows:

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Rationale</u>
General-purpose Microprogramming	For application flexibility. Based on min. operation times of: Add - 5 μ sec Mult. - 20 μ sec
Parallel operation ROM/PROM instruction and constants and CMOS variable memory Indexing	Provided for speed Semiconductor memory is cheap, NDRO, and available in alterable form. Expands limited direct addressing range (256 words); saves memory
16-bit word	Bit slice technique permits word lengths in increments of 4 bits; 16 is appropriate for most flight control tasks.
Fixed-point arithmetic	Processor oriented toward "low-cost" market; thus, floating point not justifiable.
LSI, MSI, and SSI circuits packaged on a partial printed circuit board.	

Incremental Versus Whole-Word Processor Implementation

This subsection discusses relative suitability of incremental and whole-word, general-purpose computers for flight control. Results of a study comparing a digital differential analyzer versus a general-purpose computer for a typical fly-by-wire control system are included.

The conventional digital differential analyzer (DDA) has long been considered the most likely candidate for computation of flight control equations.

DDAs are particularly well suited for transfer function computations that require high iteration rates. They are not well suited to engage logic and fault detection. Both of these functions are more practically attained via additional hard-wired logic.

For engage logic, an implementation of the equations describing the mode-engage criteria is required as normally encountered in conventional analog autopilots.

Fault detection in DDAs is analogous to that for an analog configuration; i. e., comparison monitoring is the most feasible technique. Two channels provide the ability to detect a fault, and three enable identifying the faulty channel and suppressing effects of the fault itself.

Transfer function sizing rules for special-purpose machines herein, are restricted to integrator realizations that can be used on conventional DDAs. Figure 37 illustrates the integrator realization and DDA map for the second-order/second-order transfer function and five of its more common special cases.

The DDA maps shown in Figure 37 presume that multiplications by constants will be done with integrators. The general approach requires that they be included even though it is possible, under special circumstances, that some of them will not be required. Thus, the realizations in Figure 37 should be considered an upper bound.

GENERALIZED TRANSFER FUNCTION		STATE DIAGRAM REALIZATION	CONVENTIONAL DDA REALIZATION
NAME	EQUATION O/i		
2ND ORDER/2ND ORDER (NOTCH)	$\frac{S^2 + b(1-a)S + bc}{S^2 + bs + bc}$	$\frac{d^2x}{dt^2} = bi - b \frac{dx}{dt} - bcx$ $0 = i - a \frac{dx}{dt}$	
2ND ORDER LAG	$\frac{a}{S^2 + abs + ac}$	$\frac{d^2x}{dt^2} = ai - ab \frac{dx}{dt} - acx$ $0 = x$	

Figure 37. - Integrator Realization of Transfer Functions

GENERALIZED TRANSFER FUNCTION		STATE DIAGRAM REALIZATION	CONVENTIONAL DDA REALIZATION
NAME	EQUATION $O/I =$		
LEAD/LAG	$\frac{S + a(b+1)}{S + a}$	<p>$\frac{dx}{dt} = a(i-x); \quad O = bx + i$</p>	<p>$(i-x)dt$ $a(i-x)dt = dx$ bdx O</p>
LAG/LEAD	$\frac{\frac{c}{a}S + 1}{\frac{S}{a} + 1}$	<p>$\frac{dx}{dt} = a(i-x); \quad O = (1-c)x + ci$</p>	<p>$(i-x)dt$ $a(i-x)dt = dx$ $(1-c)dx$ cdi O</p>
LAG	$\frac{a}{S + a}$	<p>$\frac{dx}{dt} = a(i-x) \quad O = x$</p>	<p>$(i-x)dt$ $a(i-x)dt = dx$ O</p>

Figure 37. - Continued

GENERALIZED TRANSFER FUNCTION		STATE DIAGRAM REALIZATION	CONVENTIONAL DDA REALIZATION
NAME	EQUATION $O/I =$		
HIGH PASS	$\frac{s}{s+a}$	<p>$\frac{dx}{dt} = a(i-x)$ $O = i-x$</p>	

Figure 37. - Concluded

The six transfer functions that are commonly encountered in flight control applications are listed in Table 2 along with the memory and time requirements for general-purpose implementation and integrator requirements for special-purpose (DDA) machines.

There are nine nonlinear functions that are commonly encountered in flight control systems. These are listed in Table 3 along with general- and special-purpose machine requirements.

Gain schedules are not as easy to implement on special-purpose (DDA) machines as they are on general-purpose machines. In fact, they cannot be implemented using integrators alone, just as is the case with analog computers. In analog computers, special devices such as diode slope generators, relay switches, threshold detectors, etc., must be utilized to build special nonlinear gain control elements. The most straightforward way to mechanize this sort of nonlinearity would be to modify the constant in a constant multiplier. Almost all DDAs have a feature that permits this sort of operation. The exact method used depends upon the particular DDA model involved. About all that can be said in way of a general rule is that some additional hardware will be required. If the decision elements are built into the integrators, then additional integrators will be required.

The DDA integrator realization of a synchronizer is shown in Figure 38.




Figure 38. - Integrator Realization of a Synchronizer

This type of synchronizer can be mechanized on a DDA using one integrator plus a means of performing the switching operation. The differential equations describing the synchronizer are:

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = \begin{cases} \theta - x & \text{if not engaged.} \\ 0 & \text{if engaged} \end{cases}$$
$$\epsilon = \theta - x$$

These synchronization equations are readily implemented in a general-purpose computer.

It is fairly simple to implement the limiter function on a general-purpose digital computer. Diode limiters are quite common on analog computers. Once again, through, DDAs are a different situation. It is necessary to resort to some special devices in order to implement this function on a DDA. A threshold (or level detector) device is required to prevent the output register incrementing (or decrementing) once another register has exceeded the threshold. Each limiter will probably require either an additional integrator or additional hardware, or both, depending upon the method used to implement the threshold device.

The deadband function has the same problems associated with it for DDA implementation as did the limiter. A threshold-sensing device capable of controlling the incrementing (or decrementing) of another device must be used. This amounts to either additional hardware and/or at least one additional integrator for each deadband function. Deadbands are readily implemented in general-purpose computers.

The fade-in/bleed-off function can be implemented on a DDA by using a switching device to control the input, and three integrators to product the lag. The switching device will require additional hardware under control of the engage circuitry. A block diagram of a DDA realization of this function is shown in Figure 39. These functions are readily implemented in general-purpose computers.




Figure 39. - Fade-In/Bleed-Off DDA Realization

The hysteresis function has much the same problem with DDA implementation as do other nonlinear functions. Some additional hardware and/or integrators will be required to provide the decision elements. This function can be implemented on an analog computer with positive feedback operational amplifiers and on general-purpose computers.

Trigonometric and exponential functions can be implemented with ease on both general-purpose machines and on DDAs. The implementation of these functions on DDAs has been treated extensively in elementary treatises on DDAs and is not repeated here. An exponential function can be implemented with one integrator, while a sine, cosine, or tangent function requires two integrators.

Engage logic is a chore for both general-purpose and DDA computers. Neither machine is particularly suited to the task. It is cumbersome and tedious to handle engage logic on general-purpose machines with standard instruction repertoires. DDAs are generally not capable of handling this sort of a problem. Those that are include a lot of additional special-purpose hardware, which, of course, indicates how engage logic must be handled on

a DDA, i. e. , by adding additional hardware. If the same additional hardware were added to a general-purpose machine type configuration or if logic-oriented instructions are provided, a simpler engage logic structure would emerge.

It is interesting to compare a DDA configuration with a GP approach. This can be done by utilizing previous results of a fairly detailed, DDA mechanization study for an arbitrary triple fly-by-wire system. Figure 40 illustrates the arbitrary FBW system that was used in the study. The pertinent data for a comparison has been reproduced from that study.


Figure 40 indicates that the following functions per branch are required:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
First-order lags	6
First-order/second order	3
Second order/second order	3
Gain Schedules	3
Median selects/fault detect	8
Branch balancing	8

The sizing rules that have been developed were used to translate these requirements into memory and computation time requirements for the GP computer and integrators, etc. , for the DDA. The hardware for the two mechanizations is summarized in Table 22.

The following observations can be made:

- The GP machine is cheaper because it has fewer parts and fewer subassemblies. Both the parts cost and the assembly labor will be less.
- The GP machine is more reliable. Fewer parts imply lower MTBF.



MS - MEDIAN SELECT
 BB - BRANCH BALANCE
 CBM - CROSS BRANCH MONITOR

Figure 40. - FBW Computer Block Diagram - Three Channels, One Branch

- The GP machine requires 50 percent more power.
- Both machines require about the same volume. The special purpose required 5 by 6 by 4.25 in. (128 in³) and the GP requires 6.25 by 6.25 by 3.75 in. (146 in³).

TABLE 22. - COMPUTER HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS

Hardware	General-purpose	Special-purpose
LSI chips	42	32
Hybrid chips	2	45
Bipolar T ² L chips	134	533
Bipolar linear chips	15	9
Discretes	396	334
Chassis parts:		
Capacitors	10	2
Transformers	1	
Resistors	10	
Stand mtg semiconductors	28	
Other		8
Total nonchassis	589	953
Total chassis	49	10
PWBs	8	14
Power (total, watts)	34.1	23

It must be noted that the FBW configuration used in the above comparison does not include any nonlinear functions. The ATT flight control system, on the contrary, includes a large number of nonlinear functions, and, consequently, a DDA configuration would be at a more severe disadvantage in comparison with a GP configuration.

It is estimated that 1978-80 general-purpose airborne computers will have speed sufficient that all input/output and processing operations can be updated at an adequate rate (40 to 160 iterations per second) with an adequate margin for program growth. This compares with the 20 to 100 ips rate of some current incremental computers. It should be noted that, although the

incremental machines are cycling faster than the proposed rate for the forthcoming general-purpose machines, their effective bandwidth is less since the incremental computer is slew-rate-limited and thus requires two to five iterations to generate the equivalent of an "exact solution" following a transient input.

A significant advantage of a wholeword over an incremental computer relates to the wholeword machine's ability to perform logic decisions associated with AFCS mode control, redundancy management, interchannel and I/O communication, and BITE functions in software. The incremental machine, on the other hand, requires a considerable amount of special-purpose hardware for these purposes, which is difficult to modify once installed.

It appears at this time that the incremental machine will continue to possess some advantage in the ease and facility of incorporating program modifications and changes; however software verification can be performed more comprehensively and with greater facility on a wholeword machine.

The inclusion of redundancy management decision making, as well as off-line and on-line BITE, in wholeword machine software makes it possible to consider a very high level of monitoring and BITE integrity. The incremental machine, however, is not fitted for this type of application.

Possibly the most important influence on the tradeoff of incremental versus wholeword machines is the direction taken by the electronics industry. Industry is placing primary emphasis, including product development funding, on state-of-the-art advancement of wholeword general-purpose processors for a wide range of commercial applications. Accordingly, the use of special-purpose computers is receiving less consideration in forthcoming technology.

These reasons were considered to be sufficiently compelling to eliminate the study effort necessary to define the unique computing modules necessary for a DDA-type processor as one of the ATT candidate FCS configurations.

MEMORY

Core, plated wire and semiconductor memories comprise the chief hardware mechanizations available for digital flight control applications. Table 23 compares the basic characteristics of these memories. Figure 41 shows normalized projected cost curves based on high-volume production.

Magnetic memories (core and plated wire) provide convenient reprogramming, an essential characteristic during the system development phase or for applications which require frequent program changes. Once past the development phase, flight control applications require changes infrequently. Indeed, a memory which cannot be altered as a result of transient improper processor operation is preferred.

Due to the advantages of semiconductor memories, primarily low cost, they are preferred for production flight control systems. Typically, semiconductor memories employ read-only-memories (ROM) for instruction and constant data storage and read-write memories (RAM) for variable data. In ROMs, memory content is determined in the manufacturing process and cannot be changed.

Several semiconductor vendors manufacture programmable read-only-memories, (PROMs) which permit writing data permanently into the memory after manufacture. Read mainly memories (RMMs) which may be reprogrammed any time, are produced by several vendors, and under development by others. Typically, these memories are used as ROMs in actual processor operation; reprogramming is accomplished via special "write" hardware not included in the operational system. Packaging density and manufacturing costs equivalent to current ROMs are anticipated for the PROM memories by 1978. Consequently, these memories were considered optimum for the ATT flight control system configuration trade study.

TABLE 23. - MEMORY CHARACTERISTICS

Type of memory	Type of construction	Read/write characteristics	Physical characteristics
Core	Ferrite cores threaded with 2, 3, or 4 conductive wires	Destructive readout; nonvolatile; reprogrammable; random access	Higher weight and power
Plated wire	Thin film of magnetic material over small conductive wires	Nondestructive readout; nonvolatile; reprogrammable; random access	Low power; faster than core
Semiconductor	Bipolar or MOS (metal oxide semiconductor) semiconductor material	Nondestructive readout; nonvolatile (instructions and constants); programmable (PROM); reprogrammable (RMM); random access	Lightweight, low power faster than core or plated wire (access times of 0.5 μ sec anticipated)




Figure 41. - Memory Cost Comparison

SIGNAL FLOW TRANSMISSION

The computer in a digital flight control system processes digital signals and issues digital commands. The signals are a measure of activity within the analog world. The commands, in turn, require some response in the analog world. The discrete digital controller operates upon an alien environment. At some point in the process, a sensor information conversion from analog to digital data is required; likewise, a conversion from digital commands back to analog responses is required.

The point of the foregoing discussion is that at present the DFCS has to interface with an all-analog world. The balance of the discussion will be concerned with means of gathering and delivering these analog signals to the computer within the DFCS in a compatible form. The inverse operation at the output must be considered also. There are basically two ways that this can be handled.

- Each analog signal can have a dedicated, hardwired transmission line connecting the sensor or servo to the autopilot unit. This is the way analog autopilots are configured. This method is called hardwiring.
- Analog signals can be grouped or assembled at one or more remote locations and then sent to the autopilot unit along a common bus. This method is called multiplexing.

Completely hardwired configurations have several drawbacks. Perhaps foremost is the large wire bundles that result. These bundles become almost unmanageable in cross-strapped redundant systems. In this type of system, every copy of every signal is connected to each channel of the redundant autopilot. A quadruplex system, for example, would as a base require a quantity of wires equal to four times the combined number of signal sources and servos. In addition to these, a number of supporting wires such as fault announcing, for detection logic interconnects, etc., must be added.

Another drawback in use of hardwiring in redundant systems is the resulting multiple connectors required. Increased cost, increased space and decreased reliability are the primary concerns caused by additional connectors, and these are highly significant effects.

In a highly sophisticated multiplexed configuration the quantity of wires can be reduced to one transmission bus per channel of the replicated system. This potential reduction in the quantity of aircraft wires is perhaps the chief reason for employing a multiplexed configuration. It must be noted, however, that multiplexed systems do use hardwiring techniques also, particularly, at input and output interfaces. By judicious grouping of sensors and actuators, the impact of this hardwiring may be greatly reduced.

Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM)

In FDM systems, each signal to be processed is assigned a carrier frequency. This frequency is then modulated about its nominal or center value as a function of the amplitude of the analog signal being processed. This is often handled with a voltage controlled oscillator (VCO). When the analog signal is at its highest plus value, the VCO will be at its highest frequency. When the analog signal is at null, the VCO will be at its center value. Likewise, when the analog signal is at its maximum minus value, the VCO will be at its lowest value. The accuracy of this sort of an arrangement is highly dependent upon the linearity of the VCO and the accuracy of its nominal frequency.

Each analog signal will have its own VCO with its own unique center frequency. There must be enough spread in the center frequencies to avoid all possibility of overlap. The outputs of these VCO's are combined into a mixer and ported onto a single transmission line. Band separation filters are used at the other end to recover the various carrier frequencies. Each carrier is then detected by some suitable means to extract the analog signal content.

Time Division Multiplexing (TDM)

In TDM systems, each analog signal is assigned a time-slot and is transmitted as sampled data. A commutating device is then used to assign the bus to each of the analog signals during its time-slot. No two analog signals will ever have access to the bus simultaneously. This is in sharp contrast to FDM, where all signals are transmitted simultaneously and continuously.

The options available to the FDM system designer are limited when compared to those of a TDM system designer. Once the decision to go FDM has been made, about all that remains to be decided are the frequency modulation technique to be used and the demodulation technique. This does not carry over to TDM, however.

In TDM systems, one of the first decisions to be made is the type of modulation to be used. Some of the more common options are:

- Amplitude Modulation, where the analog signal, or some constant times it, is simply connected to the transmission bus during that signal's time slot.
- Pulse Width Modulation (PWM), where the analog signal is "digitized" by encoding its value into the width or duration of a pulse of constant amplitude. When that particular signal's time slot comes up, a pulse of the correct "width" will be transmitted along the bus.
- Pulse Code Modulation (PCM), where each analog signal is converted to a digital word of a suitable number of bits. When the appropriate time slot comes along, the digital coded word will be transmitted as a train of uniform pulses with some rule to distinguish "ones" from "zeroes."

Another decision to be made is the bus allocation of commutation strategy. There are basically two types:

- Sequentially, where time slots are assigned according to some fixed, periodic algorithm.
- Demand, where time slots are assigned on a demand or request basis. Some master device must create this demand.

In the first case, all signals will be ported onto the bus and transmitted irrespective of whether they are required by the autopilot for the mode presently being controlled. In the latter case, the autopilot will limit its requests to the required signals only.

Another decision to be made is the method of data identification. If sequential bus assignment is chosen, there are basically two methods of identification that can be used:

- Time-slot, where the receiver computes the same bus allocation algorithm as the sender. Signals are identified by their time slot assignments.
- Coded, where each different signal has its own unique identifying label that is transmitted along with the data.

If demand bus assignment is chosen, the data identification is restricted to the latter since there is no algorithm to be duplicated.

The type of transmission method, parallel or serial, must also be selected. In the parallel case, all bits that make up a multiplexer word are assigned their own individual transmission line and are transmitted simultaneously. However, the analog signals would still be sampled and transmitted according to their time-slots.

In the serial case, all of the bits that make up a multiplexer word are transmitted consecutively on the same transmission line. In other words, the bits that go to make up a multiplexer word are assigned bit-time-slots within the time-slots corresponding to each of the various analog signals. This is accomplished by a device that shall be called a parallel-to-serial converter. The receiver at the other end must perform the inverse operation to reconstruct the multiplexer word from the individual bits. This is accomplished by a device that will be called a serial-to-parallel converter.

It is obvious that the serial method requires considerably fewer wires. The exact number cannot be specified for a general situation. This savings must be paid for by adding the parallel-to-serial and serial-to-parallel converters and the corresponding reduction in the amount of data that can be transmitted within the same time period.

Optimum criteria for an airborne multiplexing configuration were established as a result of Air Force Contract F33615-69-C-1574. The results of this study were reported in Document AFFDL-TR-70-80, dated June 1970 and entitled "Research Into the Definition and Demonstration of an Optimum Solid State Switching and Multiplexing System for Use in a Fly-by-Wire Flight Control System," by Mrazek, et al. The results of that study that are of interest here are as follows:

- 1) TDM should be used rather than FDM
- 2) PCM type of modulation should be used
- 3) Data identification should be via a label rather than by time-slot.
- 4) While the subject was not specifically discussed, it may be deduced from the report that serial transmission is preferred to parallel.

Global Versus Dedicated Busses

The above results establish some significant bench marks. At the same time, a major tradeoff consideration still remains. That is, should the multiplex bus be global or dedicated. Global, as the name suggests, means it covers the entire universe or airplane in this case. Dedicated means its use will be restricted to those devices to which it is dedicated.

Flight control systems are not the only ones that stand to reap potential benefits from multiplexed configurations. For example, some other systems that could also profit are the navigation system, the flight director system, etc. If all of these systems are combined onto a common multiplex bus with all units accessible by all other units, a global bus would result. If, on the other hand, items peculiar to the navigation system are the only ones that are on a particular bus, then it would be called a dedicated bus. The flight director system could have its own dedicated bus as well as the flight control system or the navigation system. The decision as to which is best, global or dedicated, is beyond the scope of this effort. However, some factors that would impact that decision are outlined below.

Dedicated busses can be operated either sequentially or on a demand basis. Global busses usually have a special device which acts as a master traffic controller. The traffic controller would, no doubt, operate in some sequential fashion but would require the other devices to essentially respond on demand.

Global busses are more prone to time saturation than are dedicated busses. A given bus design has a certain channel capacity or the ability to handle a certain number of transactions in the available time. Global busses have more transactions to handle than dedicated busses. Furthermore, the larger number of variables require longer labels to provide unique identification. For example, 8 variables require 3 bits while 16 variables require 4 bits. Global busses then not only have more, but also longer words to handle than do dedicated busses and will be more prone to exceed the channel capacity.

Global busses have more terminals or ports and hence more opportunity for line jamming or other catastrophic failures. If the navigation system had its own dedicated bus, it would not be possible for a failure in, say, the navigation system to migrate or propagate into the flight control system. The same level of assurance would be more difficult to obtain in a global configuration.

Each bus, whether it is global or dedicated, requires a traffic controller. The total amount of electronics would likely be less if a global bus were used than it would if the global structure were to be partitioned into several dedicated structures. There certainly would be a savings in the traffic controller hardware.

A number of the alternate methods of signal flow transmission were considered in the various candidate configurations. For instance, configuration 1 is a completely hardwired system whereas configuration 3 is a fully multiplexed arrangement. Other configurations use data bus techniques only for intercommunication between processors. Where the signal transmission method was assumed to have a significant effect on the tradeoff, the configuration description in Section 7 includes some discussion of the pertinent features.

SECTION 7

CANDIDATE CONFIGURATIONS

Section 5 described many of the tradeoffs considered involving different sensor, computation, actuator, redundancy, crossfeed and data transmission alternatives. Obviously, consideration of all of the possible combinations and permutations of even the remaining (and most likely) alternatives would have been an impossible task. Consequently, 24 configurations were defined by applying the results of the component tradeoffs in the most probable combinations. The relationship of these candidate configurations may be seen in Figure 42, the candidate configuration tree.

It is the main purpose of this section to briefly describe each configuration which was ultimately input to the life-cycle cost computations and subject to the tradeoffs for selection of the optimum configuration. The numbers included in the lower tier of blocks on Figure 42 denote the designation for the specific configuration defined by following the branches from the top of the diagram downward. This system designation number will be used consistently throughout the remainder of the report.

The redundancy and crossfeed concepts applied are primary characteristics in the description of each configuration. The same two factors, together with component failure rates, primarily define the operational reliability of each configuration. It is convenient and rational, therefore, to also include the operational reliability in the capsule configuration definitions contained in this section.

OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY

A determination of operational reliability, including a success path diagram, was prepared for each candidate configuration. The rationale used in performing these calculations is provided in the following paragraphs.




Figure 42. Candidate Configuration Tree

System Reliability

System reliability was computed in terms of the system probability of failure for each of the system configurations proposed. This allows a direct comparison of each configuration's reliability against the reliability goal of 1×10^{-7} failures per flight hour. For the purposes of this study, an operating time of eight hours was used in the reliability calculations to represent the approximate operating time of a commercial aircraft between stations with repair capability.

Reliability success path block diagrams were drawn for each of the systems studied, where each block represents a major flight control function. The diagrams depict the level of redundancy, if any, employed for each function and note the necessary number of channels that must operate for system success, depending on the type of redundancy monitoring employed.

Failure rates in percent per 1000 hours were assigned to each block as determined by the GEMM program employed in this study. These failure rates were derived from Honeywell standard piece part failure rates and commercial airline operational data.

A probability of failure was calculated for each redundant function configuration based on the binomial expansion formula of $(R+Q)^N$ which assumes an exponential failure distribution where $R=e^{-\lambda t}$ and $Q=1-R$. A total system probability of failure (Q) was then determined by summing the subsequent series strings of failure probabilities. This could be done because, for small probabilities of failures, $Q \approx \lambda t$. Therefore, $Q_{TOTAL} = (\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 + \lambda_3 + \dots + \lambda_n)t$ or, in this case, $Q_{TOTAL} = \lambda_1 t + \lambda_2 t + \lambda_3 t + \dots + \lambda_n t$.

The advantage of this approach to reliability prediction, where small failure probabilities are encountered, is that the reliability of a system is based on the summation of what are essentially failure rates rather than the product of a series of ten or more 9's behind the decimal point. Also, the relative contribution of each function to the system reliability can readily be seen when expressed in terms of negative powers of ten (Q).

The probability of failure per flight hour over the eight-hour period was calculated as 1/8 of the system probability of failure for eight hours.

Assumptions and Approximations

Assumptions. - Assumptions used in the reliability calculations were:

- All channels are failure free and fully operational at dispatch (i. e., perfect preflight and/or inflight testing).
- Perfect failure monitoring and channel switching is provided by the failure monitors.
- System probability of loss of system function denotes flight safety and does not consider the effects of flights which may be aborted if one or more redundant channels become nonoperational during the eight-hour day.
- Redundant channels are truly redundant in the sense that there are no significant single elements that will compromise the calculated reliability of a redundant configuration. Examples are: common electrical power and hydraulic sources, a single control surface, a single electronic component failure that will cause a monitor to trip, etc.
- All functions and flight axes are equally critical to flight safety. No reliability emphasis was placed on particular control axis or function being more critical than any other axis or function.

Approximations. - Approximations employed in the reliability analysis were:

- The failure rates of the three control panels were divided between each computer channel to reflect potential control panel failure contributions to each channel.

- Intercom, input/output, and data bus systems were similarly configured in the success path diagrams as representing a method of interconnecting redundant channels. The failure rate assigned to the circuitry of this function, in each case, was equally divided between that channel's sensor elements and actuator elements to approximate the effect of losing an entire channel should a failure of this function occur.
- In each case, the portion of the digital computer that provided the intercom, input/output, or data bus functions was estimated as having one-third of the total computer failure rate. The remaining two-thirds of the total failure rate was assigned to the computational functions.

Satisfaction of Requirements

Five configurations, 1, 2, 12, 16 and 19, were found to be clearly below the 1×10^7 flight hours per function loss requirement and were ruled out of serious consideration. Three other configurations, 4, 7 and 7A, were slightly less than the requirement but would not be eliminated from consideration by this deviation alone.

CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTIONS

The 24 flight control configurations selected as trade study candidates are described in this subsection. Block diagrams, success path diagrams and other illustrations are included where pertinent.

Configuration 1

The initial and baseline configuration mechanized for this study is an analog primary flight control system (Figure 43) which provides the functions listed and described in Section 4. The flight critical fly-by-wire functions




Figure 43. Configuration 1 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram

(Class A) are performed in four identical comparison-monitored channels which provide a two-fail-operational capability. The autoland (Class B) and outer-loop modes (Class C) are mechanized in a dual-dual arrangement.

Quadruple sets of conventional, body rate, body acceleration, wingtip rate, wingtip acceleration and command sensors are fed into each quad computation channel where an optimum signal select is performed on each signal type to assure similar inputs to each computation channel. Downstream of the analog control law computation, a comparison of the four-channel output command signals is performed to detect faults, and the selected commands are crossed to the appropriate servo amplifiers.

Each of the 13 control surfaces is driven by a driver-power actuator set as shown in Figure 44. The four-channel driver assembly is force-summed, using pressure feedback for equalizing and monitoring. The driver assembly is mechanically linked to three power actuators. These surface actuators are either three separate, side-by-side cylinders or a simple triple-tandem power actuator with the drivers integrally mounted, depending on the surface size and configuration. The triple-tandem actuator configuration used on small surfaces must provide the required hinge moment and yet be of a size and weight within the capability of maintenance personnel. Maintenance time studies are based on the use of modular construction, particularly in the driver.

Primary hydraulic power is supplied by three dual-pump supplies (two pumps on each of the three engines), and a fourth supply is used only for the fourth channel of the driver actuators. The driver actuators require only a very low-power, low-volume supply; it may be a separate "standby" supply which is electrically or shuttle-valve powered.

The operational reliability for configuration 1 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 45. A probability of loss of FCC function of 1.7×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour flight period was established for configuration 1. This is not within the specified requirement.




Figure 44. - Configuration 1 Control Surface Actuators - Quad-Driver and Triple-Surface (91 cylinders)

Configuration 2

Configuration 2 is a hybrid configuration, included because it represents an intermediate between full analog and full digital mechanization of the flight control system. It provides a triple-channel implementation of the FCS with a two-channel analog implementation of only the flight-critical functions as shown in Figure 46.

The two analog channels are intended primarily as backup for the flight-critical functions and are on standby except in the event of a second digital channel failure.

In the digital portion of the mechanization, quadruple sets of conventional body rate, body acceleration, wingtip rate, wingtip acceleration and command sensor signals are crossfed in analog form into the triple-medium processor computation channels. A signal select is performed on each signal type to assure similar inputs to each channel. Autoland and enroute mode computations are performed in each processor. Full processor output crossfeed is provided in analog form.

The use of analog crossfeeds, comparison monitoring and less extensive self-test in the triple-redundant configuration permits accommodation with medium processors. The computational operations are essentially identical to those in configuration 6, described later.

A three-channel integrated actuator arrangement as shown in Figure 47 is used. For a three-engine vehicle, this combination is undoubtedly the simplest arrangement. Integrated actuators are variations of two forms: three single integrated units in parallel on a surface, or a triple-tandem assembly of three integrated single-actuator sections. This latter configuration is most advantageous on smaller surfaces where a tandem design does not become unmanageable in maintenance because of its size.

The integrated actuators operate in the active/on-line mode using in-line monitoring techniques. Hydraulic power is supplied from three dual-pump




Figure 46. - Configuration 2 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram
(typical Class A functions)




Figure 47. - Configuration 2 Control Surface Actuators - Triple-Integrated (39 cylinders)

supplies in a straightforward arrangement; no additional supplies are needed for "monitoring" channels. The flow capacity of each supply, however, must be adequate for full control.

The operational reliability or probability of loss of the FCS function was established to be equal to 1.95×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 48. This value is not within the specified range.

Configuration 3

Configuration 3 was selected and designed to be representative of the Air Force Digital Avionics Integrated System (DAIS) concept. Since DAIS is currently in the system architecture development stage, configuration 3 represents one possible implementation of DAIS. One exception has been taken to the DAIS groundrules; namely, the multiplex terminal units (MTUs) do not include 32-word storage as required by the preliminary Air Force bussing standard.

The basic redundancy of the flight-critical functions in configuration 3 is shown in Figure 49. This configuration uses quadruple conventional sensors and command pickoffs.

One channel of the quad configuration employing large processors, bidirectional data buses, and comparison monitoring is shown in Figure 50.

As shown, the data bus connects the elements of the flight control system. Remote terminals are situated at strategic locations to minimize the number of terminals, A/D-D/A converters, etc. For ATT, these locations were established by the physical proximity of sensors. For example, the controls-group sensors are all located in the flight deck area, permitting relatively short-run cabling between the actual sensor and the remote terminal which services it. The remaining remote terminals are as indicated. Crossfeed is accomplished by crossfeeding the data buses at the input to





Figure 48. - Configuration 2 Success Path Diagram



- AVIONICS SYSTEM INCLUDES-
- NAVIGATION-INERTIAL, RNAV, HDG, COURSE ERROR, HDG PRESELECT, VOR, VERT SPD ERROR, ALT PRESELECT ERROR
 - AUTOLAND-RADIO ALT, G/S ERROR, LOC ERROR, GOAROUND ALPHA
 - MISC-ATTITUDE, FLAP

Figure 49. - Configuration 3 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram




Figure 50. - Configuration 3 Digital Computation
(one of four channels)

the computer LRUs. Processor I/O is accomplished via the bus control/ interface unit (BCIU). Each BCIU provides the capability to control only one bus while "listening" to all buses, thereby effecting the desired sensor cross-feed. Sensor selection is accomplished via software in each processor. Processor outputs are also intercommunicated via the busses, permitting each processor to perform comparison monitoring of all processor outputs. The majority opinion of the processors is used to effect channel disengagement by the actuators.

A block diagram of the MTU is shown in Figure 51. As mentioned previously, with the exception of the 32-word buffer storage, this design is compatible with the preliminary Air Force bussing standard. The MTU serves as a standard bus interface device. Subsystems, such as the sensors, interface with the MTU via subsystem interface units (SSIU). A SSIU designed to handle analog inputs and outputs is shown in Figure 52. In this SSIU, all analog inputs and outputs are updated at a fixed rate in a fixed sequence independent of bus controller demands. Digital values representing each input are stored in the appropriate location in the 32-word RAM. When the MTU indicates receipt of a bus request, the specified RAM location is "read" and made available to the MTU for transmission on the bus. Similarly, when the MTU receives a datum word on the bus, the word is presented to the SSIU for storage in the RAM. The SSIU then converts the word to analog form, updating the sample and hold output circuit at the next time slot assigned that particular RAM location.

The bus control interface unit (BCIU) is diagrammed in Figure 53. As indicated, the BCIU provides control over one bus by the associated processor while listening to all buses. Control is provided directly under program control via the processor direct I/O (DIO) port. "Listening" is accomplished via the DMA port without interrupting the program.

In the DAIS concept, only flight-critical functions are to be performed in the quad-redundant flight control processors. Non-flight-critical functions are to be performed in dual-redundant avionics processors, necessitating a




Figure 51. - Configuration 3 Multiplex Terminal Unit (MTU)




Figure 52. - Configuration 3 Analog Subsystem Interface Unit (SSIU)




Figure 53. - Configuration 3 Bus Control Interface Unit (BCIU)

dual-to-quad bus interface. Such partitioning is also used in this configuration. A dual-to-quad bus interface is diagrammed in Figure 54. A "large" processor, loaded approximately 46 percent, is used in this configuration, somewhat larger than in the configuration 9 crossed system due to the additional bus control functions.

Configuration 3 utilizes the same actuator arrangement as configuration 6.

The operational reliability of configuration 3 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 55. A probability of loss of FCS function equal to 0.37×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period was established.

Configuration 4

The efficiencies possible with an integrated flight management system in which common sensors provide necessary inputs for both the flight control and inertial navigation have been widely heralded. The possibility of utilizing a single digital computer as the computational element for both functions has also been proposed for many applications. The possibilities inherent within such an arrangement were deemed of sufficient interest to justify implementing this concept as one candidate configuration.

Mechanization of this configuration in a manner which would allow a meaningful tradeoff was found to be considerably more troublesome than was first apparent. The basic redundancy of a fly-by-wire flight control system appears not to be completely in accord with that necessary for an inertial navigation system. Quadruple redundancy inherent in the hexad sensor group is applicable for both functions, but, when considered for computation channels, an excessive redundancy level for inertial navigation purposes appears. The cost of inertial-quality sensors is considerably greater than the cost of control-quality sensors, and, consequently, adjustments were required to permit comparison with the other candidates. The following ground rules were adopted for this mechanization.




Figure 54. - Configuration 3 Dual-to-Quad Bus Interface

- Computational capacity for the INS was not included.
- Costs for six body accelerometers of a control quality were used.
- Cost of the inertial-quality body gyros was based upon 50 percent of the actual estimated cost. (Assuming 50% shared by INS)

The computation portion of this configuration is based on quadruple large processors with analog crossfed inputs and comparison monitoring as was used in configurations 6 and 7.

The actuator drive signals are crossfed to a triple-integrated actuator set on each control surface. This actuator set is the same as used in configuration 2.

The operational reliability of configuration 4 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 56. A probability of loss of FCS function equal to 1.07×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period was established.

Configuration 5

Configuration 5 consists basically of quadruple-isolated computational channels using large central processors as shown in the functional redundancy block diagram for the flight-critical functions, Figure 57.

A single sensor and command signal set is inputted without crossfeed to each large processor. One of the four channels is shown in Figure 58.

Where incompatible interfaces exist, as for the triple and dual sensor groups, all sensor channels are provided to each processor channel. This assures that a single fault in a dual sensor set will not result in two flight-critical processor channels tracking together with different outputs with respect to the other two processor channels. This configuration uses the large processor loaded approximately 52 percent. As indicated, servo amplifiers providing analog servoloop closure and a power supply are included in the computer LRU.




Figure 56. - Configuration 4 Success Path Diagram




Figure 57. - Configuration 5 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram




Figure 58. - Configuration 5 Digital Computation (one of four channels)

A detailed block diagram of the configuration is shown in Figure 59. I/O functions are generally performed under program control. For analog inputs, the processor I/O command specifies the required signal and initiates the A/D conversion. The processor extracts the digital value representing the selected signal when the conversion is complete. For analog outputs, the processor output command specifies the desired output sample and hold circuit and initiates D/A conversion of the output value. Discrete inputs and outputs are processed as individual bits packed in words. Serial digital outputs are converted from parallel to serial form and then gated out through the serial output bus specified by the processor output command. Since the air data and panel digital inputs are received asynchronously with respect to the processor, they are stored in memory through the DMA port when received.

Each serial bus terminates in a receiver and a word assembly register. Labels, included with the words, are used by the DMA control logic along with the receiving channel designation to specify the proper memory address for each newly received word. The power supply provides regulated voltages, sensor excitation, etc., to all elements of its channel. Since in-line monitoring is used, extensive self-test (BITE) features have been incorporated. Dual input paths are provided for analog signals, enabling detection of input path failures by the processor. Discrete input paths are stimulated, under processor control, to both "1" and "0" states to detect failures. Outputs are "wrapped around" for comparison of "intended" versus "actual" output values by the processor, thereby testing both the output and input path used to effect "wraparound". Processor loading and memory estimates reflect the additional computations necessary to accomplish self-test.

Landing and enroute mode computations are performed by the isolated and inline monitored computational channels in the same manner as the flight-critical functions.

The hydraulic supply and actuator configuration used is identical to that utilized by configuration 1.




Figure 59. - Configuration 5 Detailed Block Diagram (one of four channels)

The operational reliability or probability of loss of the FCS function was established to be $.05 \times 10^{-7}$ per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 60.

Configuration 6

The basic redundancy of the flight-critical functions in configuration 6 is shown in the block diagram of Figure 61. This configuration uses quadruple conventional sensors and commands.

One channel of the quad configuration using the large processor, analog crossfeeding and comparison monitoring is shown in Figure 62. As indicated, a full crossfeed for all sensor signals is provided at the input to the computer LRU. Additionally, a full processor output crossfeed is included in analog form. Dedicated signal selectors and comparison monitors are included in each computer LRU. I/O differs from configuration 1 in that more input paths are required to effect sensor crossfeed and that less extensive self-test is provided. A detailed block diagram is provided in Figure 63. A large processor, loaded approximately 56 percent, is used.

Landing and enroute mode computations are performed in a dual-dual comparison monitored arrangement.

Each of the 13 control surfaces is driven by a quadruple integrated actuator set. These surface actuators are either of two basic potential mechanizations -- two dual-tandem integrated actuators or four single-channel integrated actuators.

Operation of all four actuation channels is a version of the active/online mode; the pressure feedbacks are so shaped that full hinge-moment power is available from two channels when needed.

Hydraulic power supply becomes a problem; four full-capacity supplies are required, although the size of each would be somewhat less than




Figure 60. - Configuration 5 Success Path Diagram




Figure 61. - Configuration 6 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram




Figure 62. - Configuration 6 Digital Computation (one of four channels)




Figure 63. - Configuration 6 Detailed Block Diagram (one of four channels)

systems using three sources. The fourth supply is most readily provided by pumps driven by redundant electric motors.

The operational reliability for configuration 6 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 64. A probability of loss of the FCS function of 0.85×10^{-7} per flight over an eight-hour flight period was established.

Configuration 7

Configuration 7 uses quadruple conventional sensors analog crossed to large processors. The sensor and computational sections are identical to configuration 6. The description is, therefore, also applicable to this configuration.

In this case, the actuator drive signals are crossed to a triple integrated actuator set on each control surface. This actuator set is the same as was used in configuration 2.

The operational reliability for configuration 7 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 65. A probability of loss of FCS function of 1.08×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour flight period was established.

Configuration 7A

Based on configuration 7, configuration 7A replaces the conventional gyros in each location with a laser gyro. This was done primarily as a reference point for cost comparison, since the item used is a higher-priced, navigation-grade sensor with performance characteristics beyond that necessary for body rate and flutter sensing.




Figure 64. - Configuration 6 Success Path Diagram




Figure 65. - Configuration 7 Success Path Diagram

The probability of loss of FCS function for this configuration is essentially the same as for configuration 7.

Configuration 8

The basic redundancy of the flight-critical function in configuration 8 is shown in Figure 66. This configuration uses quadruple conventional sensors and command pickoffs.

A primary feature of the configuration is the autonomous I/O crossfeed by independent small processors. Quadruple medium processors perform the control computation.

One channel of the small I/O processor unit (IOPU) and a medium control computation processor unit (CCPU) interface is shown in Figure 67. Crossfeed is provided at the IOPU/CCPU interface via bidirectional buses. Comparison monitoring is employed for failure detection; each CCPU compares the signals transmitted from the four different IOPUs, and each IOPU compares signals received from the four different CCPUs. For a more detailed description, see Section 10, "Selected System Description".

The operational reliability or probability of loss of FCS function was established to be 0.16×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 68.

Configuration 9

The basic redundancy of the flight-critical functions in configuration 9 is shown in the block diagram of Figure 69. This configuration uses quadruple conventional sensors and command pickoffs.

One channel of the quad configuration using large processors, processor-to-processor intercommunication for crossfeed, and comparison




Figure 66. - Configuration 8 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram




Figure 67. - Configuration 8 Digital Computation (one of four channels)




Figure 68. - Configuration 8 Success Path Diagram




Figure 69. - Configuration 9 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram

monitoring is shown in Figure 70. With the exception of the triple-redundant attitude signals, sensors are provided only to the computer LRU in the same channel; i. e., sensor crossfeed is not provided at the input to the computer LRU. However, crossfeed is provided via intercommunication between processors. This form of crossfeed has been termed "pseudo crossfeed" in that, given all processors operating properly, full sensor crossfeed is provided. However, in the event of a processor failure, the sensors in the failed processor channel are no longer inputted. A detailed block diagram of configuration 9 is provided in Figure 71. With the exception of slight differences in the number of input paths, addition of the intercommunication paths, and self-test features, the I/O is like that of configuration 5. A large processor, loaded approximately 44 percent is used.

All autoland and enroute mode computations are performed in quadruple.

This configuration uses the same actuator arrangement as configuration 6.

The operational reliability or probability of loss of FCS function was established to be 0.26×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 72.

Configuration 9A

Configuration 9A is identical to configuration 9, except, like 7A, replaces all conventional gyros with laser gyros.

Configuration 10

Configuration 10 utilizes quadruple conventional sensors with each set inputted independently to a large processor. Pseudo crossfeed is provided by




Figure 70. - Configuration 9 Digital Computation (one of four channels)




Figure 71. - Configuration 9 Block Diagram (one of four channels)




Figure 72. - Configuration 9 Success Path Diagram

intercommunication between processors. The sensor and computational sections are identical to configuration 9.

The actuator drive signals are supplied to a quad driver-triple power actuator set on each control surface. This actuator set is the same as used in configuration 1.

The operational reliability for configuration 10 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 73. A probability of loss of FCS function of 0.26×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour flight period was established.

Configuration 11

Configuration 11 is another variation of the basic configuration 9. A set of six magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) gyros is used to replace the body rate sensors. Since the MHD gyro is a two-axis device, six gyros mounted in two three-gyro orthogonal sets provide the same information as twelve conventional gyros in four three-gyro orthogonal sets. Single-axis conventional gyros are used in the wingtip location because (1) there is no requirement for a two-axis device in this application, and (2) this location is subject to extreme environmental conditions and vibration modes.

Quadruple conventional accelerometer and command pickoff signals provide isolated inputs to the large processor channels. Pseudo crossfeed is provided by intercommunication between processors. The computational section and actuator set are identical to configuration 9.

The operational reliability of configuration 11 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 74. A probability of loss of FCS function of 0.25×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period was established.




Figure 73. - Configuration 10 Success Path Diagram





Figure 74. - Configuration 11 Success Path Diagram

Configuration 12

The basic redundancy of the flight-critical functions in configuration 12 is shown in Figure 75. This is a triple-redundant inline monitored configuration without crossfeed in which each channel is essentially identical to the individual channels of configuration 5. Triple-redundant conventional sensors and command pickoffs are used.


One of the three computational channels is shown in Figure 76. A large processor, loaded approximately 52 percent is used. Since the single-channel electronics are nearly identical to those of configuration 5, no additional block diagrams are included. All autoland and enroute mode computations are performed in triplicate.

This configuration drives the control surfaces through the minimum acceptable actuator set (Figure 77). This actuator set uses triple-integrated actuators to drive the horizontal stabilizer, upper rudder, lower rudder, wingtip flutter control surface and the outboard trailing edge flutter suppression. Dual-tandem integrated actuators are used to drive the midspan ailerons, tip spoilers and midspan spoilers. Dual-redundant actuators are adequate for these surfaces because they are all basically used for roll control, and it was determined by General Dynamics that operation of any two out of the three surfaces sets will allow retention of safe aircraft control.

The operational reliability or probability of loss of FCS function was established to be 1.47×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 78. This value is not within the specified range.

Configuration 13

Figure 79 shows the basic redundancy of the flight-critical functions of configuration 13. This configuration uses quadruple conventional sensors,



- HORIZ STAB - TRIPLE INT. ACT.
- TIP SPOILER - DUAL INT. ACT.
- MIDSPAN SPOILER - DUAL INT. ACT.
- MIDSPAN AILERON - DUAL INT. ACT.
- UPPER RUDDER - TRIPLE INT. ACT.
- LOWER RUDDER - TRIPLE INT. ACT.
- TIP SURFACE - TRIPLE INT. ACT.
- OUTBOARD TRAIL. EDGE - TRIPLE INT. ACT.

TRIPLE DIGITAL LANDING MODE COMPUTATIONS
 TRIPLE DIGITAL ENROUTE MODE COMPUTATIONS

Figure 75. - Configuration 12 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram




Figure 76. - Configuration 12 Digital Computation (one of four channels)




Figure 77. - Configuration 12 Control Surface Actuators - Minimum Acceptable Set




Figure 78. - Configuration 12 Success Path Diagram




Figure 79. - Configuration 13 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram

a small-processor I/O section, a medium-processor control computation section and a triple-integrated actuator set.

The sensor and computational sections are identical to configuration 8. The description of these sections is applicable, and the more detailed description in Section 10, "Selected System Description" also provides additional definition. A triple-integrated actuator set identical to that used in configuration 2 operates each of the 13 control surfaces.

The operational reliability of configuration 13 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram shown in Figure 80. A probability of loss of FCS function of 0.62×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period was established.

Configuration 13A

The quadruple redundant orthogonal sets of body rate and acceleration sensors are replaced by a single hexad body rate and acceleration group in this variation of configuration 13. A complete description is given in Section 10, "Selected System Description".

Configuration 14



The basic redundancy of the flight-critical functions in configuration 14 is shown in Figure 81. This is a triple-redundant in-line monitored large processor configuration with pseudo crossfeed via processor intercommunication. Triple-redundant conventional sensors and command pickoffs are used.

One of the three computational channels is shown in Figure 82. Since in-line monitoring is used, extensive self-test features are incorporated as in configurations 5 and 12. A detailed block diagram is provided in Figure 83. The large processor in each channel is loaded 66 percent, reflecting inclusion of both self-test and three-channel signal selection computations.

0 20 180 180

100 100 100 100

100 100 100 100



THE I/O PROCESSOR FAILURE RATE HAS BEEN DIVIDED BETWEEN THE 11 INPUT AND 10 OUTPUT GROUPS TO APPROXIMATE THE EFFECT OF LOSING A WHOLE CHANNEL SHOULD AN I/O PROCESSOR FAIL. 1/248 HOURS/1000HRS = 0.58% /1000HRS
 1- I/O - 1/3100 COMPUTER ASSY + COMPUTER LOGIC AND POWER - H/L/S
 1- PROC - 2/3100 COMPUTER ASSY + COMPUTER LOGIC AND POWER - 28.29

Figure 80. - Configuration 13 Success Path Diagram




Figure 81. - Configuration 14 Functional Redundancy Block Diagram




Figure 82. - Configuration 14 Digital Computation (one of three channels)




Figure 83. - Configuration 14 Detailed Block Diagram (one of three channels)

The actuator arrangement used is the same as for configuration number 12.

The operational reliability or probability of loss of the FCS function was established to be 0.05×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 84.

Configuration 14A

This system is based on configuration 14, and replaces all gyros with MHD gyro configurations. Again, this was done to provide a cost data point. The MHD gyro provides two-axis sensing in a single package, thus reducing the total number of system components. This is a prime factor in reducing total life-cycle cost.

Configuration 15

Configuration 15 presents a minor actuator modification to configuration 14. Consequently, the sensor and computational description for configuration 14 is fully applicable for this case.

This is a triple-redundant in-line monitored large processor configuration with intercom crossfeed. A triple-integrated actuator set for each control surface is an obviously consistent and ideally matched arrangement for the tri-jet aircraft. A description of the triple integrated actuator is included as part of the configuration 2 discussion.

The operational reliability or probability of loss of FCS function was established to be 0.5×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 85.




Figure 84. - Configuration 14 Success Path Diagram




Figure 85. - Configuration 15 Success Path Diagram

Configuration 16

Configuration 16 is another variation of the basic concept presented with configuration 14. In this case, the sensor configuration is modified, but the computation and actuator description included for configuration 14 is pertinent.

The high initial cost of body rate sensors in redundant orthogonal sets is an obvious area for cost improvement. The use of skewed sensor sets to reduce the total number of sensors is an attractive possibility. This configuration was mechanized as a pentad of in-line monitored conventional gyros, thus saving four gyros per system in comparison with a nominal triple-orthogonal set using nine gyros. Section 6 considers a number of the aspects of skewed sensor arrays. The accuracy improvement possible through averaging techniques is another advantage of such a configuration.

The operational reliability or probability of loss of FCS function was established to be 9.2×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 86. This value is not within the specified range.

Configuration 17

Configuration 17 is another variation of the basic concept presented with configurations 4, 6 and 7. In this case, a different control surface actuator arrangement is considered. The sensor and computation description included in the configuration 6 discussion is applicable.

This configuration uses quadruple conventional sensors analog crossed to large processors. Mechanization with a four-driver-actuator/three-power-actuator arrangement on each control surface is fully consistent with the three-engine aircraft. Such an actuator mechanization was incorporated in configuration 1. It should be noted that this arrangement does provide an




Figure 86. - Configuration 16 Success Path Diagram

additional analog crossfeed at the driver actuator summing linkage to the power actuators.

The operational reliability for configuration 17 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 87. A probability of loss of FCS function of 0.8×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour flight period was established.

Configuration 18

This dual/triple-channel configuration is shown in Figure 88.

Triple-redundant conventional sensors and command pickoffs are used. Flight-critical functions are performed in the triple-channel medium-size processors. Non-flight-critical functions are performed in the dual-channel medium-size processors. Each processor controls its own I/O functions as well as performing the required flight control computations. Sensor signal crossfeed is accomplished via the pseudo crossfeed technique with processor intercommunication paths.

Inline monitoring is used for both flight-critical and non-flight-critical functions. A detailed block diagram of the flight-critical processor and I/O is provided in Figure 89. Operation is generally similar to other configurations. Unidirectional buses are included to provide transmission of signals from the non-flight-critical processors. Since inline monitoring is employed, extensive self-test features are included. A medium processor, 98 percent loaded, is used for the flight-critical computations.

A detailed block diagram of the non-flight-critical processors and I/O is provided in Figure 90. Overall operation is similar to other configurations. Since inline monitoring is used, extensive self-test features are included. A medium processor loaded 66 percent is used for the non-flight-critical computations.




Figure 87. - Configuration 17 Success Path Diagram




Figure 88. - Configuration 18 Digital Computation




Figure 89. - Configuration 18 Detailed Block Diagram - Flight-Critical Processor (one of three channels)




Figure 90. - Configuration 18 Detailed Block Diagram - Non-Flight-Critical Processor (one of two channels)

The actuator arrangement used is the same as configuration number 12.

The operational reliability or probability of loss of FCS function was established to be 0.13×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 91.

Configuration 19

This configuration consists basically of triple-isolated computational channels using large central processors fed by conventional sensors. It is essentially identical to quadruple-channel configuration 5, except for the redundancy; therefore, the configuration 5 description is applicable.

The actuator configuration, includes a triple-driver-actuator/triple-power-actuator set on each control surface.

The operational reliability for configuration 19 was determined with the aid of the success path diagram of Figure 92. A probability of loss of FCS function of 1.7×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour flight period was established. This value is not within the specified range.

Configuration 20

The sensor and computation sections of configuration 20 are identical to configuration 18. The description of these sections is, consequently, directly applicable.

A triple-driver-actuator/triple-power actuator arrangement is used in this configuration. An identical actuator arrangement is used in configuration 19. It is also similar to the quad-driver/triple-power actuator arrangement used in configuration 1, except for the reduction in redundancy level.




Figure 91. - Configuration 18 Success Path Diagram




Figure 92. - Configuration 19 Success Path Diagram

The operational reliability or probability of loss of the FCS function was established to be 0.13×10^{-7} per flight hour over an eight-hour period using the success path diagram shown in Figure 93.

HARDWARE MECHANIZATION

The tradeoff methodology defined "cost-of-ownership" to be the primary factor for selection of the optimum configuration in this study. Consequently, it was necessary to use a consistent method to define the mechanization cost for each configuration.

The cost of parts, components, etc., used in this study are strictly-best engineering estimates. They have not been reviewed nor approved by Honeywell production or pricing departments. They include extrapolation to the 1978 time period but should not be construed to represent either present or future Honeywell component prices. Since the same parts and prices are used throughout the study, comparisons should be valid.

The cost, weight and reliability values for hydraulics and sensors used in the life cycle cost calculations are given in Table 24.

The cost, weight and reliability values for the computational electronics were determined by building up each configuration from component piece parts as described in the following paragraphs.

Sixty different electronic modules were defined to provide the functions included in the analytical block diagrams of Section 4. These 60 modules include both analog and digital types. Only a part of the modules defined were used in any one configuration.




Figure 93. - Configuration 20 Success Path Diagram

TABLE 24. - COST, WEIGHT AND RELIABILITY FOR HYDRAULICS AND SENSORS

Component	Cost, \$	Weight, lbs	MTBF, hrs
Conventional gyro	800	0.3	10 000
Laser gyro	2250	6.2	30 000
MHD gyro (two-axis)	900	0.2	25 000
Conventional accelerometer	800	0.25	20 000
Single-surface power actuator	1500	11.0	100 000
Single driver actuator	1000	3.0	48 000
Single-integrated power actuator	2500	14.0	75 000

Twenty modules were used to mechanize the electronics portions of configurations 8, 13, and 13A (the most promising of the 24 configurations studied). The number of times the various functions (or modules) were used in a particular configuration was input to a computer program to sum up the numbers of each part, cost and requisite printed circuit board area. The resultant information, together with appropriate schematics and configuration hardware mechanization definitions, was input to the GEMM cost-of-ownership computation.

The 20 modules are listed below along with figure references to their respective computer-printed parts lists and applicable circuit diagrams.

- Demod excitor (Fig. 94, 95)
- D-C analog input (Fig. 96, 97)
- Discrete input (Fig. 98, 99)
- A-C analog input (Fig. 100, 101)

- A/D converter (Fig. 102)
- I/O control (Fig. 103, 104, 105)
- DMA control (Fig. 106, 107)
- NRZ receiver (Fig. 108, 109)
- NRZ register (Fig. 110, 111)
- Manchester transmitter-receiver (Fig. 112, 113)
- Sample/hold (Fig. 114, 115)
- Processor cards (small) (Fig. 116)
- Processor cards (medium) (Fig. 117)
- Memory board (Fig. 118, 119)
- Synchronizing logic (Fig. 120, 121)
- Servo amplifier (Fig. 122, 123)
- Discrete output (Fig. 124, 125)
- Discrete output (power) (Fig. 126)
- Power supply (Fig. 127)
- Chassis parts (Fig. 128)

An electronics piece-part catalog, shown in Figure 129, was established in a computer program. The piece parts in this catalog were used to mechanize the electronic modules in accordance with the schematics and parts lists. The parts lists and piece-part catalog include failure rates in percent per 1000 hours, cost in dollars and mounting area in square inches.

FUNCTION** DEMOD EXCITOR

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	IC	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
MC1539	IC	OP AMP	1	.03000	3.75000	.24800
2N2222A		TRANS	1	.01300	.35000	.09300
2N2907A		TRANS	1	.01300	.22000	.09300
1N4531		DIODE	2	.01800	.05600	.14000
RL07		RESISTOR	3	.01500	.42000	.21000
RN55		RESISTOR	7	.03500	2.45000	.50400
CK06		CAP	2	.00600	.84000	.12000
SOLDER CONNECT			48	.00048	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =			17			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =				.13048		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =				8.09		
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =			1.40800			

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 3
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 51
 FR = .39144
 COST = 24.26
 AREA = 4.22400

Figure 94. - Demod Excitor Parts List Printout




Figure 95. - Demod Excitor Circuit Diagram

184
 100
 800
 100
 100

FUNCTION** DC ANALOG INPUT		ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3		SYSTEM NO. 8		
PART NUMBER		PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
LM101A	IC	OP AMP	1	.03000	40.00000	.24800
LM110	IC	OP AMP	2	.06000	40.00000	.49600
1N4531		DIODE	2	.01800	.05600	.14000
RC07		RESISTOR	3	.00300	.10500	.21000
RN55		RESISTOR	83	.41500	29.05000	5.97600
CK06		CAP	4A	.14400	20.16000	2.88000
SN5400	IC		3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000
SN5402	IC		1	.03000	2.10000	.54000
SN5404	IC		1	.03000	2.65000	.54000
DG506	IC		3	.12000	180.00000	3.84000
SOLDER CONNECT			426	.00426	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =			147			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =				.94426		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =			320.42			
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =			16.49000			

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 2
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 294
 FR = 1.88852
 COST = 640.84
 AREA = 32.98000

Figure 96. - D-C Analog Input Parts List Printout




Figure 97. - D-C Analog Input Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** DISCRETE INPUT

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
2N2222A	TRANS	8	.10400	2,80000	.74400
2N2907A	TRANS	1	.01300	,22000	.09300
1N75X - 1N96X	DIODE	8	.12800	1,60000	.56000
1N4531	DIODE	48	.43200	1,34400	3.36000
RC07	RESISTOR	26	.02600	,91000	1.82000
RL07	RESISTOR	96	.48000	13,44000	6.72000
RW79	RESISTOR	1	.01000	,36000	.20300
SN5401 IC		2	.06000	4,20000	1.08000
SN5406 IC		8	.24000	21,20000	4.32000
SN5442 IC		1	.04000	13,00000	.54000
8T8PF IC		1	.04000	28,00000	.54000
RELAY		1	.04000	4,10000	0.00000
SOLDER CONNECT		559	.00559	0,00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		201			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			1.61859		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =		91.17			
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =		19.98000			

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 2
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 402
 FR = 3.23718
 COST = 182.35
 AREA = 39.96008

Figure 98. - Discrete Input Parts List Printout




Figure 99. - Input and Signal Conditioning Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** AC ANALOG INPUT *5

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER		PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
LM110	IC	OP AMP	1	.03000	20,00000	.24800
3N179		DIODE	21	.31500	129,15000	1.95300
1N4531		DIODE	2	.01800	.05600	.14000
RN55		RESISTOR	44	.22000	15,40000	3.16800
CK06		CAP	23	.06900	9,66000	1.38000
1510		CAP	21	.06300	3,15000	5.25000
SN5400	IC		1	.03000	2,10000	.54000
SN5402	IC		1	.03000	2,10000	.54000
SN5404	IC		1	.03000	2,65000	.54000
DG506	IC		2	.08000	120,00000	2.56000
10030771		XFORMER	21	.21000	126,00000	5.25000
SOLDER CONNECT			474	.00474	0,00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =			138			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =				1.09974		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =				430.27		
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =				21.56900		

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 2
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 276
 FR = 2,19948
 COST = 860.53
 AREA = 43.13800

Figure 100. - A-C Analog Input Parts List Printout




Figure 101. - A-C Analog Input Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** A/D CONVERTER

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART	
MA741	IC	OP AMP	1	.03000	1.05000	.24800
LM111	IC	OP AMP	1	.03000	28.00000	.24800
LM118	IC	OP AMP	2	.08000	64.00000	.49600
2N2222A		TRANS	14	.18200	4.90000	1.30200
2N2907A		TRANS	26	.33800	5.72000	2.41800
1N75X - 1N90X		DIODE	3	.04800	.60000	.21000
1N427A		DIODE	1	.01600	11.50000	.07000
1N4531		DIODE	10	.09000	.28000	.70000
RC07		RESISTOR	12	.01200	.42000	.84000
RL07		RESISTOR	49	.24500	6.86000	3.43000
RN55		RESISTOR	12	.06000	4.20000	.86400
CK06		CAP	8	.02400	3.36000	.48000
CSR13		CAP	1	.00300	.42000	.47900
SN5400	IC		2	.06000	4.20000	1.08000
SN5401	IC		7	.21000	14.70000	3.78000
SN5404	IC		2	.06000	5.30000	1.08000
SN5410	IC		1	.03000	2.10000	.54000
SN5442	IC		2	.08000	26.00000	1.08000
SN5473	IC		1	.04000	2.75000	.54000
SN5443	IC		2	.08000	9.44000	1.08000
SN54174	IC		2	.08000	15.90000	1.08000
SN4266	IC		3	.12000	22.35000	1.62000
UG506	IC		1	.04000	60.00000	1.28000
SOLDER CONNECT			690	.00690	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =			163			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =				1.96490		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =				294.05		
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =				24.94500		

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 163
FR = 1.96490
COST = 294.05
AREA = 24.94500

Figure 102. - A/D Converter Parts List Printout

FUNCTION** I/O CONTROL

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
RL07	RESISTOR	3	.01500	.42000	.21000
CK06	CAP	3	.00900	1.26000	.18000
SN5400	IC	5	.15000	10.50000	2.70000
SN5403	IC	6	.18000	12.60000	3.24000
SN5404	IC	5	.15000	13.25000	2.70000
SN5410	IC	3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000
SN5420	IC	2	.06000	4.20000	1.08000
SN5442	IC	6	.24000	78.00000	3.24000
SN5473	IC	3	.12000	8.25000	1.62000
SN5475	IC	4	.16000	16.84000	2.16000
RT80F	IC	5	.20000	140.00000	2.70000
SOLDER CONNECT		555	.00558	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =			45		
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =				1.37958	
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =				291.62	
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =				21.45000	

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 2
TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 90
FR = 2.75916
COST = 583.24
AREA = 42.90000

Figure 103. - I/O Control Parts List Printout




Figure 104. - I/O Control Logic




Figure 105. - Avionics/Flight Control Bus Interface

FUNCTION** DMA CONTROL

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
1N4531	DIODE	3	.02700	.08400	.21000
RN55	RESISTOR	4	.02000	1.40000	.28800
CK06	CAP	4	.01200	1.68000	.24000
SN5400	IC	5	.15000	10.50000	2.70000
SN5403	IC	2	.06000	4.20000	1.08000
SN5404	IC	3	.09000	7.95000	1.62000
SN5442	IC	1	.04000	13.00000	.54000
SN5493	IC	2	.08000	9.44000	1.08000
SOLDER CONNECT		204	.00204	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		24			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			.48104		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =			48.25		
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =			7.75800		

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 2
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 48
 FR = .96288
 COST = 96.51
 AREA = 15.51600

Figure 106. - DMA Control Parts List Printout




Figure 107. - DMA Control Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** NRZ RECEIVER		ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3		SYSTEM NO. 8		
PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN.N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART	
MA741 IC	OP AMP	1	.03000	1.05000	.24800	
2N2222A	TRANS	1	.01300	.35000	.09300	
2N2907A	TRANS	1	.01300	.22000	.09300	
1N75X - 1H96X	DIODE	2	.03200	.40000	.14000	
RN55	RESISTOR	15	.07500	5.25000	1.08000	
SN5400 IC		1	.03000	2.10000	.54000	
SN5404 IC		1	.03000	2.65000	.54000	
SOLDER CONNECT		82	.00082	0.00000	0.00000	
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		22				
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			.22382			
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =		12.02				
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =		2.73400				

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 22
 FR = .22382
 COST = 12.02
 AREA = 2.73400

Figure 108. - NRZ Receiver Parts List Printout




Figure 109. - NRZ Receiver Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** NRZ REGISTER - 32 BIT		ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3		SYSTEM NO. 8		
PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART	
1N4531	DIODE	1	.00900	.02800	.07000	
RN55	RESISTOR	2	.01000	.70000	.14400	
CK06	CAP	3	.00900	1.26000	.18000	
SN5400	IC	3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000	
SN5401	IC	8	.24000	16.80000	4.32000	
SN5404	IC	2	.06000	5.30000	1.08000	
SN5495	IC	8	.24000	88.00000	4.32000	
SN54122	IC	1	.03000	5.69000	.54000	
SOLDER CONNECT		320	.00320	0.00000	0.00000	
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		328				
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			.69120			
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =		124.08				
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =		12.27400				

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 28
 FR = .69120
 COST = 124.08
 AREA = 12.27400

Figure 110. - NRZ Register Parts List Printout




Figure 111. - NRZ Register Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** MANCHESTER TRANS-RCVR		ASSEMBLY	CHANNEL 3	SYSTEM NO. 8		
PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART	
RC07	RESISTOR	6	.00600	.21000	.42000	
SN5400	IC	3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000	
SN5401	IC	6	.18000	12.60000	3.24000	
SN5402	IC	3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000	
SN5404	IC	3	.09000	7.95000	1.62000	
SN5410	IC	3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000	
SN5420	IC	1	.03000	2.10000	.54000	
SN5473	IC	5	.20000	13.75000	2.70000	
SN5493	IC	2	.08000	9.44000	1.08000	
SN54127	IC	1	.03000	3.89000	.54000	
SN54198	IC	3	.12000	42.87000	1.62000	
SN55109	IC	1	.04000	6.15000	.54000	
SOLDER CONNECT		446	.00446	0.00000	0.00000	
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		37				
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			1.05046			
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =			117.86			
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =			17.16000			

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 13
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 481
 FR = 13,65598
 COST = 1532.18
 AREA = 223.08000

Figure 112. - Manchester Transmitter-Receiver Parts List Printout




Figure 113. - Manchester Transmitter-Receiver Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** SAMPLE/HOLD

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
MA741	OP AMP	1	.03000	1.05000	.24800
LM110	OP AMP	1	.03000	20.00000	.24800
2N2907A	TRANS	1	.01300	.22000	.09300
2N4392	TRANS	1	.07100	1.43000	.09300
1N457	DIODE	1	.01600	.16000	.07000
RC07	RESISTOR	6	.00800	.28000	.56000
CK06	CAP	1	.00300	.42000	.06000
10031474-104	CAP	1	.02400	2.44000	.20000
SOLDER CONNECT		56	.00056	0.00000	0.00000

TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS = 15
 TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE = .19556
 TOTAL FUNCTION COST = 26.00
 TOTAL FUNCTION AREA = 1.57200

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 13
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 195
 FR = 2.54228
 COST = 338.00
 AREA = 20.43600

Figure 114. - Sample/Hold Parts List Printout




Figure 115. - Sample/Hold Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** PROCESSOR (SMALL) ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3 SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
2N2222A	TRANS	4	.05200	1.40000	.37200
2N2907A	TRANS	4	.05200	.88000	.37200
RN55	RESISTOR	12	.06000	4.20000	.86400
PROCESSOR-MEM	(SMALL)	2	7.00000	4000.00000	43.20000
SOLDER CONNECT		48	.00048	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		22			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			7.16448		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =				4006.48	
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =					44.80800

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 22
FR = 7.16448
COST = 4006.48
AREA = 44.80800

Figure 116. - Processor Cards (Small) Parts List Printout

FUNCTION** PROCESSOR CARDS ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3 SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
PROCESSOR (MED)	CARD	1	4.50000	3000.00000	21.60000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		1			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			4.50000		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =				3000.00	
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =					21.60000

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 1
FR = 4.50000
COST = 3000.00
AREA = 21.60000

Figure 117. - Processor Cards (Medium) Parts List Printout

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
2N2369A	TRANS	1	.01300	.10000	.14200
2N5845	TRANS	1	.07100	.86000	.04000
2N6667	TRANS	1	.07100	.93000	.04000
1N4454	DIODE	2	.03200	.18000	.14000
RC07	RESISTOR	6	.00600	.21000	.42000
RC29	RESISTOR	1	.00100	.03700	.12800
CK06	CAP	6	.02400	3.36000	.48000
CSR13	CAP	4	.01200	1.68000	1.91600
10034812	CAP	1	.04000	8.00000	8.00000
SN5401 IC		1	.03000	2.10000	.54000
SN5402 IC		2	.06000	4.20000	1.08000
SN5404 IC		5	.15000	13.25000	2.70000
SN5410 IC		1	.03000	2.10000	.54000
SN54107 IC		1	.03000	3.89000	.54000
SN54153 IC		1	.04000	5.47000	.54000
SN54155 IC		1	.04000	7.02000	.54000
SN54160 IC		2	.08000	37.60000	1.08000
SN54160 IC		2	.08000	8.84000	1.08000
HM5305 IC	PROM	21	.84000	1260.00000	11.34000
HM523 IC	RAM	16	.64000	560.00000	8.64000
HDI-6000-2 IC		4	.16000	54.40000	2.16000
SOLDER CONNECT		851	.00851	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		82			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			2.45851		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =			1974.23		
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =		42.08600			

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 4
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 328
 FP = 9.83404
 COST = 7896.91
 AREA = 168.34400

Figure 118. - Memory Board Parts List Printout




Figure 119. - Memory Board Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** SYNCHRONIZING LOGIC		ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3		SYSTEM NO. 8		
PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN.	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART	
SN5400	IC	3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000	
SN5404	IC	1	.03000	2.65000	.54000	
SN5420	IC	1	.03000	2.10000	.54000	
SN5473	IC	2	.08000	5.50000	1.08000	
SN54122	IC	1	.03000	5.69000	.54000	
SOLDER CONNECT		112	.06112	0.00000	0.00000	
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		8				
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			.26112			
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =		22.24				
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =		4.32000				

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 8
 FR = .26112
 COST = 22.24
 AREA = 4.32000

Figure 120. - Synchronizing Logic Parts List Printout




Figure 121. - Synchronizing Logic Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** SERVO AMPLIFIER

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QTY	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
4A741	IC	1	.03000	1.05000	.24800
2N2222A	TRANS	1	.01300	.35000	.09300
2N2907A	TRANS	2	.02600	.44000	.18600
2N4392	TRANS	1	.07100	1.43000	.09300
3N179	DIODE	2	.03000	12.30000	.18600
1N457	DIODE	1	.01600	.16000	.07000
RN95	RESISTOR	15	.07500	5.25000	1.08000
CK06	CAP	3	.00900	1.26000	.18000
151J	CAP	2	.00600	.30000	.50000
8T93	IC	1	.04000	28.00000	.54000
SOLDER CONNECT		90	.00090	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		29			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			.31690		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =			50.54		
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =			3.17600		

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 13
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 377
 FR = 4.11970
 COST = 657.02
 AREA = 41.28808

Figure 122. - Servo Amplifier Parts List Printout




Figure 123. - Servo Amplifier Circuit Diagram

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
2N2907A	TRANS	13	.16900	2.86000	1.20900
RC07	RESISTOR	50	.05000	1.75000	3.50000
CK06	CAP	4	.01200	1.68000	.24000
SN5400	IC	3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000
SN5404	IC	1	.03000	2.65000	.54000
SN5475	IC	4	.16000	16.84000	2.16000
8196	IC	3	.12000	84.00000	1.62000
SOLDER CONNECT		301	.00301	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		78			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			.63401		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =		116.06			
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =		10.88900			

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 3
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 234
 FR = 1.90203
 COST = 348.24
 AREA = 32.66700

Figure 124. - Discrete Output Parts List Printout




Figure 125. - Discrete Output Circuit Diagram

FUNCTION** DISCRETE OUTPUT (POWER) ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN.	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
2N4903	TRANS	13	.92300	36.92000	20.80000
1N645	DIODE	13	.11700	.97500	.91000
RC07	RESISTOR	50	.05000	1.75000	3.50000
CK06	CAP	4	.01200	1.68000	.24000
SN5400 IC		3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000
SN5404 IC		1	.03000	2.65000	.54000
SN5475 IC		4	.16000	16.84000	2.16000
RT9C IC		3	.12000	84.00000	1.62000
SOLDER CONNECT		327	.00327	0.00000	0.00000

TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS = 92
 TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE = 1.50527
 TOTAL FUNCTION COST = 151.11
 TOTAL FUNCTION AREA = 31.39000

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 91
 FR = 1.50527
 COST = 151.11
 AREA = 31.39000

Figure 126. - Discrete Output (Power) Parts List Printout

FUNCTION** POWER SUPPLY

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	IC	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
MA741	IC	OP AMP	1	.03000	1.05000	.24800
2N1613		TRANS	1	.01500	.34000	.14200
2N2222A		TRANS	6	.07800	2.10000	.55800
2N2905A		TRANS	1	.01300	.24000	.14200
2N2907A		TRANS	15	.19500	3.30000	1.39500
2N3019		TRANS	1	.01300	.25000	.14200
2N3696		TRANS	1	.01300	3.18000	.19000
2N3980		TRANS	2	.02600	4.50000	.18600
2N4234		TRANS	1	.01300	1.44000	.14200
2N4898		TRANS	1	.07100	2.81000	.75000
2N4901		TRANS	1	.07100	3.03000	1.60000
2N4910		TRANS	2	.14200	5.10000	1.50000
2N5067		TRANS	1	.07100	2.70000	1.60000
2N5683		TRANS	1	.07100	18.50000	1.60000
1N645		DIODE	31	.27900	2.32500	2.17000
1N75X - 1N96X		DIODE	13	.20800	2.60000	.91000
1N1183		DIODE	4	.06400	7.20000	1.80000
1N3999		DIODE	1	.01600	10.95000	.19000
1N4531		DIODE	7	.06300	.19600	.49000
1N4990		DIODE	17	.83300	12.41000	4.25000
RC07		RESISTOR	42	.04200	1.47000	2.94000
RC20		RESISTOR	2	.00200	.07400	.25600
RL07		RESISTOR	26	.13000	3.64000	1.82000
RN55		RESISTOR	17	.08500	5.95000	1.22400
RN60		RESISTOR	3	.01500	1.11000	.38100
RT22		RESISTOR	3	.01500	3.90000	1.20000
RW70		RESISTOR	6	.06000	2.04000	.60600
RW79		RESISTOR	6	.06000	2.16000	1.21800
RL20		RESISTOR	8	.04000	.96000	1.00000
CK06		CAP	20	.06000	8.40000	1.20000
CSR13		CAP	5	.01500	2.10000	2.39500
CU13		CAP	7	.16800	9.17000	4.55000
1500		CAP	3	.00900	.45000	.13500
SN5400	IC		3	.09000	6.30000	1.62000
SN5404	IC		1	.03000	2.65000	.54000
SN5406	IC		1	.03000	2.65000	.54000
SN54122	IC		1	.03000	5.69000	.54000
BT80F	IC		4	.16000	112.00000	2.16000
10030697		XFORMER	1	.14500	46.45000	0.00000
SOLDER CONNECT			704	.00704	0.00000	0.00000

TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS = 267
 TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE = 3.47804
 TOTAL FUNCTION COST = 301.38
 TOTAL FUNCTION AREA = 44.33000

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 267
 FR = 3.47804
 COST = 301.38
 AREA = 44.33000

Figure 127. - Power Supply Parts List Printout

FUNCTION** CHASSIS PARTS

ASSEMBLY CHANNEL 3

SYSTEM NO. 8

PART NUMBER	PART NAME	QUAN,N	N*FAILURE RATE	N*COST RATE	N*AREA/PART
RC20	RESISTOR	1	.00100	.03700	.12800
CM07	CAP	1	.02400	1.50000	.50000
10034012	CAP	5	.20000	40.00000	40.00000
24E2ACT	XFORMER	1	.10000	20.30000	0.00000
RELAY		1	.04000	4.10000	0.00000
EMI FILTER		2	.03600	8.88000	0.00000
SOLDER CONNECT		30	.00030	0.00000	0.00000
TOTAL FUNCTION PARTS =		11			
TOTAL FUNCTION FAILURE RATE =			.40130		
TOTAL FUNCTION COST =		74.82			
TOTAL FUNCTION AREA =		40.62800			

NUMBER OF TIMES FUNCTION USED = 1
 TOTAL ASSEMBLY PARTS FOR THIS FUNCTION = 11
 FR = .40130
 COST = 74.82
 AREA = 40.62800

Figure 128. - Chassis Parts List Printout

Part Description	Rel	Cost	Area
1 NA741	IC 140P AMP	.03000	1:05000 .24800
2 LM101A	IC 140P AMP	.03000	40.00000 .24800
3 LM110	IC 140P AMP	.03000	20.00000 .24800
4 LM111	IC 140P AMP	.03000	28.00000 .24800
5 LM118	IC 140P AMP	.04000	32.00000 .24800
6 MC1539	IC 140P AMP	.03000	3:75000 .24800
7 2N930	3TRANS	.01500	.20000 .09300
8 2N1613	3TRANS	.01500	.34000 .14200
9 2N2222A	3TRANS	.01300	.35000 .09300
10 2N2369A	3TRANS	.01300	.10000 .14200
11 2N2432A	3TRANS	.01300	1.25000 .14200
12 2N2905A	3TRANS	.01300	.24000 .14200
13 2N2907A	3TRANS	.01300	.22000 .09300
14 2N2946A	3TRANS	.01300	4:00000 .14200
15 2N3019	3TRANS	.01300	.25000 .14200
16 2N3716	3TRANS	.01300	13.55000 .14200
17 2N3896	3TRANS	.01300	3.18000 .19000
18 2N3980	3TRANS	.01300	2.25000 .09300
19 2N4234	3TRANS	.01300	1.44000 .14200
20 2N4392	3TRANS	.07100	1:43000 .09300
21 2N4898	3TRANS	.07100	2.81000 .75000
22 2N4901	3TRANS	.07100	3:03000 1.60000
23 2N4903	3TRANS	.07100	2.84000 1.60000
24 2N4910	3TRANS	.07100	2.55000 .75000
25 2N5067	3TRANS	.07100	2.70000 1.60000
26 2N5683	3TRANS	.07100	18.50000 1.60000
27 2N5845	3TRANS	.07100	.86000 .04000
28 2N6067	3TRANS	.07100	.93000 .04000
29 3N179	4DIODE	.01500	6.15000 .09300
30 SN5430	IC 14	.03000	2.10000 .54000
31 1N457	2DIODE	.01600	.16000 .07000
32 1N645	2DIODE	.00900	.07500 .07000
33 1N75X - 1N96X	2DIODE	.01600	.29000 .07000
34 1N827A	2DIODE	.01600	11.50000 .07000
35 1N1183	2DIODE	.01600	1.80000 .45000
36 1N3611	2DIODE	.01600	.35000 .04600
37 1N3994	2DIODE	.01600	10.95000 .19000
38 1N4454	2DIODE	.01600	.09000 .07000
39 1N4531	2DIODE	.00900	.02800 .07000
40 1N4998	2DIODE	.04900	.73000 .25000
41 SPARE 41	0DIODE	-0.00000	-0.00000 -0.00000
42 RC07	2RESISTOR	.00100	.03500 .07000
43 RC20	2RESISTOR	.00100	.03700 .12800
44 RL07	2RESISTOR	.00500	.14000 .07000
45 RN55	2RESISTOR	.00500	.35000 .07200
46 RN60	2RESISTOR	.00500	.37000 .12700
47 RT22	2RESISTOR	.00500	1.30000 .40000
48 RW7U	2RESISTOR	.01000	.34000 .10100
49 RW79	2RESISTOR	.01000	.36000 .20300
50 RL20	2RESISTOR	.00500	.12000 .12500
51 PROCESSOR-MEM	-(SMALL)	3.50000	2000.00000 21.60000

Figure 129. - Electronic Piece-Part Catalog Printout

Part Description	Rel	Cost	Area	
52 CK06	2CAP	.00300	.42000	.06000
53 CM07	2CAP	.02400	1.50000	.50000
54 CSR13	2CAP	.00300	.42000	.47900
55 CU13	2CAP	.02400	1.31000	.65000
56 1500	2CAP	.00300	.15000	.04500
57 1510	2CAP	.00300	.15000	.25000
58 MS39006	2CAP	.02400	4.00000	1.50000
59 10034012	2CAP	.04000	8.00000	8.00000
60 10031474-104	2CAP	.02400	2.44000	.20000
61 PROCESSOR (MED) -0CARD		4.50000	300.00000	21.60000
62 SN5400 IC 14		.03000	2.10000	.54000
63 SN5401 IC 14		.03000	2.10000	.54000
64 SN5402 IC 14		.03000	2.10000	.54000
65 SN5403 IC 14		.03000	2.10000	.54000
66 SN5404 IC 14		.03000	2.65000	.54000
67 SN5406 IC 14		.03000	2.65000	.54000
68 SN5410 IC 14		.03000	2.10000	.54000
69 SN5420 IC 14		.03000	2.10000	.54000
70 SN5426 IC 14		.03000	2.83000	.54000
71 SN5442 IC 14		.04000	13.00000	.54000
72 SN5473 IC 14		.04000	2.75000	.54000
73 SN5475 IC 14		.04000	4.21000	.54000
74 SN5493 IC 14		.04000	4.72000	.54000
75 SN5495 IC 14		.03000	11.00000	.54000
76 SN54107 IC 14		.03000	3.89000	.54000
77 SN54122 IC 14		.03000	5.69000	.54000
78 SN54153 IC 14		.04000	5.47000	.54000
79 SN54155 IC 14		.04000	7.02000	.54000
80 SN54174 IC 14		.04000	7.95000	.54000
81 SN54180 IC 14		.04000	18.80000	.54000
82 SN54198 IC 14		.04000	14.29000	.54000
83 SN55109 IC 14		.04000	6.15000	.54000
84 SN8266 IC 14		.04000	7.45000	.54000
85 58H90 IC 14		.04000	4.42000	.54000
86 DG506 IC 14		.04000	60.00000	1.28000
87 8T80F IC 14		.04000	28.00000	.54000
88 8T90 IC 14		.04000	28.00000	.54000
89 MM5305 IC 14PROM		.04000	60.00000	.54000
90 IM6523 IC 14RAM		.04000	35.00000	.54000
91 HDI-6600-2 IC 14		.04000	13.60000	.54000
92 DG508 8 INPUT 14MULTIPLEX		.04000	32.00000	1.28000
93 10030697 6XFORMER		.14500	46.45000	0.00000
94 10030771 6XFORMER		.01000	6.00000	.25000
95 24E28CT 6XFORMER		.10000	20.30000	0.00000
96 RELAY 6		.04000	4.10000	0.00000
97 EMI FILTER 2		.01800	4.44000	0.00000
98 PROCESSOR CARD -0		3.00000	1354.00000	21.60000
99 SOLDER CGNNECT -0		.00001	0.00000	0.00000
		-0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00000

Figure 129. - Concluded

SECTION 8 OPERATIONAL MODEL

To complete the required life-cycle cost study, a model was developed to depict the operational environment. This included route structure, average flight times, total operating time, maintenance facilities, test and repair philosophy, and other factors associated with daily airline operation.

The following subsections describe the operational model and the data used as inputs to the support and operational cost tradeoff studies. The sources of the model included the airframe and airline ATT study results, present procedures used for the DC-10, and projected changes in the environment for the 1980 time period.


A single route was used, since it was felt that an average operational time based on intercity distances would be an adequate tradeoff base for the flight control system.

Most of the data supplied was used as input to the GEMM (Generalized Electronics Maintenance Model) program. This is an Army-developed, life-cycle cost program which was used to provide support cost analysis for the ATT study. The program is briefly described in Appendix A.

Operational Characteristics

The following operational characteristics were used in the study:

- Average flight length of 1.6 hours plus 0.2 hour of ground operation from engine start to takeoff decision speed and 0.2 hour of ground operation from touchdown to engine shutdown. A 0.4-hour through-stop time was assumed. Figure 130 shows a typical flight profile.
- Average of five flights per day



SEGMENT "A" - INCLUDES ENGINE START, TAXI AND PRE-TAKEOFF CHECKS, LINEUP AND TAKEOFF TO DECISION SPEED.
 SEGMENT "B" - INCLUDES A 20 MINUTE THRU-STOP OR A 30 MINUTE TURN-AROUND.

Figure 130. - Operational Flight Profile

- A maximum capacity of 200 passengers per flight
- A fleet of 200 aircraft
- An average of 14 operating hours per day.
- An average time between major scheduled stops with depot or main-base repair capability of 8 hours. This was based on the assumption that, out of the 48 cities in the route structure of Figure 131, 25 percent will have turnaround station, or well-stocked line station capability. This amounts to 12 stations where LRU replacement can be obtained. The other 75 percent of the stations are called through stations and are assumed to have no repair capability. In other words, if a system sustains a first failure at or enroute to some station where repair is not available, it must be capable of continuing on the designated route on the strength of the redundant systems until a repair station is reached. This philosophy is based on the assumption that the logistics costs for the support of a complex system which is essential to the aircraft operation would be prohibitive if every landing site had even minimum system-repair capability. It was also assumed that the airline schedules allow the one stop at a repair facility in each 8-hour time period.
- An economic life of the equipment of 15 years.

Maintenance Support Assumptions

The maintenance facilities and general support assumptions used in the study are described in the following paragraphs.

Maintenance shop capabilities. - It was assumed that four levels of repair are utilized as shown in the diagram of Figure 132. The first of these is a major LRU replacement capability at selected scheduled stops called line stations. That is, items of control hardware essential to continuation of the flights are available as stockage.




Figure 131. - Route Structure




Figure 132. - Maintenance Flow Diagram

The repair process at the line-station level consists of employing the built-in test equipment to isolate the fault to the LRU level. This identification is assumed to be 95 percent effective for digital equipment and 75 percent effective for purely analog gear.

Two choices are then available. The faulty LRU may be replaced, the system retested, and operation continued, or the replacement may be deferred if the fault is noncritical (leaving the system fail-operational) and no replacement exists. The deferral may continue until a stop where a greater replacement capability exists (a turnaround station) or until a failure occurs which does not leave a fail-operational capability. As mentioned above, at least 12 scheduled stops were assumed to have LRU replacement capability. This was a sensitivity variable in the cost analysis. The turnaround station was considered to be the second level of maintenance. It was assumed that this shop capability was available for 16 hours a day, seven days per week.

The third level of maintenance support exists at a well-equipped turnaround station or the main base and consists of a module or card replacement capability where a failure is detected by automated test equipment. This card or module is pulled from the LRU, replaced with a functioning item from stock and the LRU retested. The failed item is then either sent to the fourth level or thrown away, depending on its cost.

The fourth level is a piece-part replacement capability which exists in the same facility and, in fact, utilizes the same test equipment as the third level through the use of special adaptors (as shown in Table 25) for the cards and modules. Tests using standard laboratory equipment such as meters, oscilloscopes are also completed. Once the failed part is identified, the module is given to a technician for removal and replacement with a functioning part.

It was assumed that four shops existed which could perform the third and fourth level of maintenance and that these shops operate 8 hours per day, seven days per week.

TABLE 25. - MAJOR GSE COMPONENT LISTING (example)

	AT HONEYWELL				AT MDC	Total Qty.
	D & E Lab	Prod. AFS	Prod. Roseville	Aero School	Service Center	
UG2297AA01 Automatic Interface Station	2 3	(2) (2)+1				2 3
UG2304AA01 Manual Interface Station	6 5	(1) (1)	(1)		(1)	6 5
UG2303AA01 Instrument Bay	8	(3) (4)	(1)		(1)	8 8
UG2296AA01 Computer and Measurement Console		2 3				2 3
UG2295AA01 Central Computer Station		1*				1*
UG2301AA01 Disc Memory		1*				1
UG2321AA01 System Mockup Bench	2			(1)	(1)	2
UG2320AA01 FEB Adapters, Set of 23		1				1
UG2318AA01 Card Adapters, Set of 54	2	(1)			(1)	2
UG2319AA01 Adapter - BG1034 Computer	3	(1)			(1)	3
UG2319AB01 Adapter - BG1035 Computer	3	(1)			(1)	3
UG2319AC01 Adapter - BG1036 Computer	3	(1)			(1)	3
UG2319AD01 Adapter - BG1037 Computer	3	(1)			(1)	3
UG2319AE01 Adapter - CG1022 Panel	2		(1)		(1)	2
UG2319AF01 Adapter - LG1024 Transducer	1	(1)			1	2
UG2319AG01 Adapter - CG1023 Panel	2		(1)		(1)	2
UG2319AH01 Adapter - CG1025 Panel	2		(1)		(1)	2
UG2319AI01 Adapter - CG1025 Panel	2		(1)		(1)	2
UG2319AJ01 Adapter - CG1026 Panel	2		(1)		(1)	2
UG2319AK01 Adapter - LG1025 Sensor	1	(1)			1	2
UG2319AL01 Adapter - GG1016/GG1017 Accelerometer	1	(1)			1	2
UG2319AM01 Adapter - GG1018 Gyro	1	(1)			1	2
UG2322AA01 Test Set - Burn-In		1				1
DIT-M-CO Adapter		1				1
Special Maintenance Tools - Set						

1 Indicates number of items required but available for transfer from D&E Lab quantity

* Available from current programs

Qty for rates thru 11/month

Qty for rates over 11/month

Maintenance manpower. - Two skill levels were used for all maintenance actions. While there may be a greater number of skill levels involved, it was felt that two would give a sufficiently wide salary spread for the assumed repair actions. The tasks assigned are summarized as follows:

- Skill Level 1 -
 - Equipment checkout using BITE
 - LRU removal and replacement
 - Selected LRU test
 - Failed part removal and replacement

- Skill Level 2 -
 - Complex LRU test and module replacement
 - Module-and card-level testing and failed-part identification
 - Hydraulic component test and failed-part identification

A productivity factor of 75 percent was applied to the maintenance personnel, such that 6 hours of an 8-hour work period are productive hours when maintenance and repair work are actually being accomplished.

The cost to train each skill level was placed at \$1000. This was based on salary and overhead for a 2-1/2 to 3-week training period for an experienced technician. A retraining period of every 2.5 years was applied.

The salaries for each skill level are:

- Level 1. \$8 500/year
- Level 2. \$12 500/year

Test equipment. - Beside the BIT equipment, three basic types of test equipment were defined. The first of these is an automated device used for the LRU and module testing and subsequent fault isolation. The necessary adapters are assumed to be part of the equipment. The cost of this equipment was placed at \$100 000 per unit.

The second type of equipment is a manual set used for general check-out of hydraulic equipment including pumps and servo actuators. Loose meters, scopes and other small items of equipment are lumped in this category. This equipment is assumed to cost \$40,000 per group.

The third type is a specialized piece of equipment for testing of rate gyros and is assumed to cost \$20,000.

Stockage levels. -- Required stockage was broken into two major groups -- initial provisioning stock and reorder stock. Initial provisioning stock consists of nonrepairable stock and repairable stock (i. e., that stock which is not classed as "throwaway").

Nonrepairable stockage includes three classes of items:

- Initial-issue quantity -- This hardware is placed in the field concurrently with the introduction of the system.
- Order-ship quantity -- This is the stockage necessary to fill the stockage pipelines and is based on the component turnaround time.
- Replacement quantity -- This is the nonrepairable stock located at the depot that is used for backup and replacement as equipment is used.

For repairable stockage, there is no need for initial-issue stockage or replacement stockage since the item is not lost to the system except through attrition. Stockage required for repairable items would be similar to order-ship stock to fill the pipeline while repair is being implemented.

Reorder stock is based on the equipment MTBFs and is the replacement quantities used during the life of the systems. Stockage is based on the MTBF associated with the various components, modules and parts. In addition, operating time, repair times, checkout times, turnaround times, and order-ship times are used. Furthermore, a safety factor was applied in the form of confidence levels of the normal statistical distribution which was one

of the cost variables in a portion of the study. The nominal value is 1.65 times the standard deviation, or a 95 percent confidence level.

Publication cost. - The publications associated with the flight control system operation and repair covered the operation of the test equipment and description of repair procedures. The following cost assumptions are applicable:

Cost per page for any publication	\$150
Number of pages for total system checkout	50
Number of pages for isolation to component	15
Number of pages for isolation to module	15/component
Number of pages for isolation to part	5/module

Transportation and requisition time between maintenance levels. - The cost of transporting various items of equipment from level to level was computed on the basis of equipment weight and a shipping cost per pound per mile of approximately \$.004. The time of transportation between the line and depot levels was assumed to be 12 hours.

Requisition times for parts, modules and components from the depot level to the organizational level was assumed to be on the order of 8 hours, while requisitioning within a given depot was assumed to be less than 1.0 hour.

Waiting times for maintenance. - The time associated with the waiting period before maintenance begins is:

Line and turnaround stations	0.1 hr
Turnaround station and main base (module replace)	120 hrs
Turnaround station and main base (part release)	120 hrs

The turnaround times for the various modules and components are computed as a function of transportation times, waiting times, probability of having spare parts on hand, and mean times to repair for the necessary module.

Control Hardware Testing, Maintenance Assumptions and Requirements

The flight equipment was sized to include BIT which was assumed to satisfy the fault-isolation requirements. This includes isolation of a faulty LRU with 95 percent accuracy (assuming digital equipment) and a faulty LRU with an effectivity of 95 percent. Total checkout time at the system level using BIT equipment was assumed to be 0.3 hour.

The requirement concerning LRU fault isolation means that, given a failure, the BIT equipment will indicate the faulty LRU 95 percent of the time. The capability of correcting a faulty LRU means that the LRU which is substituted for the faulty LRU will not exhibit the same failure for a period of at least 10 days. The failure rate of the BIT equipment was lumped with the flight control equipment.

Off-aircraft maintenance assumptions indicate that: (1) replacement of the indicated failed module will produce a functioning LRU in 95 percent of all cases, (2) replacement of the indicated failed piece parts will result in a working module in 95 percent of all cases, and (3) tests performed on all modules will assure that the LRUs which utilize the modules will test within specification limits in 99 percent of all cases. These figures are an indication of the repair efficiency.

Mean time to test, replace and repair faulty LRUs on the aircraft are summarized in Table 26 for typical electronic equipment. Hydraulic equipment in the form of actuators may vary from 0.5 to 1.0 hour. Off-aircraft mean time to repair estimates for various types of components are:

TABLE 26. - PRELIMINARY QUANTITATIVE ON-AIRCRAFT
MAINTAINABILITY DATA

Line-replaceable unit	Restorative maintenance task description	Flight line maintenance level		
		Maintenance manhours per task (MMH)	Personnel	
			Number	Skill level
Computer unit	Test	0.030	1	Basic
	Remove and replace LRU	0.065	1	Basic
	Checkout	0.030	1	Basic
Rate gyro assembly	Test	0.030	1	Basic
	Remove and replace gyro assembly	0.100	1	Basic
	Checkout	0.030	1	Basic
Linear accelerometer assembly	Test	0.030	1	Basic
	Remove and replace accel assembly	0.030	1	Basic
	Checkout	0.030	1	Basic
Control wheel sensor	Test	0.030	1	Basic
	Remove and replace LRU	0.165	1	Basic
	Checkout	0.030	1	Basic
Panel (contains replaceable modules) Pitch coarse select control module Flight director control module Directional guidance control module Pitch guidance control module Autothrottle control module	Test	0.030	1	Basic
	Remove and replace LRU	0.120	1	Basic
	Checkout	0.030	1	Basic

Note: Since only one person is required per task, MMH per task equals elapsed time.

$$\text{Mean time to repair (MTTR)} = \frac{31.146}{235.47} \quad 0.132 \text{ hours} = 7.9 \text{ minutes}$$

Maximum predicted repair time for 90 percent of on-aircraft tasks = 2 MTTR = 15.8 minutes

Flight controller panel	0.625 hr
Mode select panel	0.675 hr
Altitude and airspeed mode control panel	0.625 hr
Computers	0.75 hr
Gyro package (three elements)	0.75 hr
Hydraulic servo single-surface actuator	7.0 hrs
Dual tandem surface actuator	10.0 hrs
Cabling	7.6 hrs
Single driver actuator	6.0 hrs
Single integrated power actuator	7.0 hrs
Control wheel sensing	0.4 hr

These times are assumed to include fault diagnosis, replacement time, retest and recalibration. The individual modules making up the component are each assumed to have repair times commensurate with the type of module, i. e., electronic board 1.4 hours, accelerometer 10.0 hours, panel modules 0.6 to 1.2 hours and individual gyro 11.8 hours.

Section 3 specified the overall system requirements for maintainability. In summary, they are:

- Unscheduled aircraft maintenance rate of 0.02 MMH/FH.
- Scheduled maintenance periods at greater than 300 hour intervals, if necessary.
- Off-aircraft repair time per failure of 5.35 hours.
- An on-aircraft repair time per failure of 0.143 hour excluding hydraulic elements.
- Mean time to check out equipment on aircraft of 0.30 hour.

The piece parts utilized in the study were assigned two levels of failure rates to determine the effect on mean time to first failure and total system

repair costs. This was done for one of the final system candidates. If overhaul was required, the costs were included and the improved failure rate utilized.

Obviously, as redundancy is increased, the total number of parts increases, and the probability of experiencing a part failure increases. If the assumption is made that maintenance must be performed at the time the failure occurs, maintenance costs would grow unnecessarily. Consequently, some deferral assumptions were made. A discussion of this and the effects on cost and "dispatch reliability" appears later in this section.

Some consideration was made of "throwaway" maintenance concepts. The basis of the evaluation was a comparison of the cost of a new module, compared to the cost of fixing the failed unit. The GEMM program has the capability of considering this type of maintenance as one of many alternates.

System Reliability Considerations

The reliability goal for the system was established in the range of 1×10^{-7} failure per flight hour based on an 8-hour operational interval. In addition, a scheduled maintenance period was established at 300-hour intervals or greater, if it is necessary. The existence of a scheduled maintenance period was included in the reliability analysis since it affects the overall system MTBF.

It was assumed that the maintenance or overhaul actions performed during these scheduled maintenance periods bring the system to "like-new" condition. In addition, it was assumed that replacement upon failure and subsequent successful system checkout yields "like-new" condition. These assumptions are implicit in the use of the exponential failure rate which shows no wear-out characteristics. Some preliminary electronic part failure rates are shown in Table 27.

TABLE 27. - HONEYWELL PIECE-PART FAILURE RATES

Part	Failure rate (percent per 1000 hours)
Capacitor, fixed, ceramic	0.003
Capacitor, fixed, electrolytic-TA, foil	0.005
Capacitor, fixed, electrolytic-TA, solid	0.009
Capacitor, fixed, electrolytic-TA, wet-slug	0.043
Capacitor, fixed, glass dielectric	0.002
Capacitor, fixed, metallized paper dielectric	0.014
Capacitor, fixed, mica dielectric	0.003
Capacitor, fixed, paper dielectric	0.010
Capacitor, fixed, plastic dielectric	0.020
Gear train, no load, per mesh	0.022 *
Gear train, loaded, per mesh	0.054 *
Integrated circuit, analog or digital	0.01
Motor	0.720 *
Reactor	0.013
Relay armature, general-purpose, per coil	0.116
Plus, per contact pair, % per 1000 on/off cycles	0.026
Resistor, fixed, composition	0.001
Resistor, fixed, film	0.005
Resistor, fixed, wirewound	0.010
Resistor, thermal	0.006
Resistor, variable	0.080
Diode, controlled rectifier	0.154
Diode, silicon	0.009
Diode, voltage reference	0.016
Diode, voltage regulator	0.016
Diode, switching	0.009
Diode, tunnel	0.095

* These failure rates assume scheduled maintenance

TABLE 27. - HONEYWELL PIECE-PART FAILURE RATES - Concluded

Part	Failure rate (percent per 1000 hours)
Diode, stabistor	0.011
Diode, dual	0.015
Diode, quad	0.022
Diode, photo	0.180
Switch, rotary	0.117
Switch, sensitive	0.099
Switch, thermostatic	0.218
Switch, toggle	0.187
Synchro, control transformer	0.263 *
Transformer, 1-watt or more	0.145
Transformer, less than 1-watt	0.084
Transistor, field-effect	0.015
Transistor, silicon, dual	0.078
Transistor, silicon, general-purpose	0.013
Transistor, silicon, power	0.071
Gyro, GNAT	10.0 *
Accelerometer	5.0 *
Laser gyro	3.3 *
MHD gyro	4.0 *
Single-surface actuator	1.0 *
Single-driver actuator	1.54 *
Single-channel integrated power actuator	1.33 *

* These failure rates assume a scheduled maintenance

Operational reliability. - System reliability was computed in terms of the system probability of failure for each of the system configurations studied. This allowed a direct comparison of each configuration's reliability against the reliability goal of 1×10^{-7} failure per flight hour. For the purposes of this study, an operating time of 8 hours was used in the reliability calculations to represent the approximate operating time of a commercial aircraft between stations with repair capability.

Reliability success path block diagrams were drawn for each of the systems studied (see Section 7) where each block represents a major flight control function. The diagrams show the level of redundancy employed for each function, if any, and note the necessary number of channels that must operate for system success, depending on the type of redundancy monitoring employed.

Failure rates in percent per 1000 hours were assigned to each block as determined by the GEMM program employed in this study. These failure rates were derived from Honeywell standard piece-part failure rates and commercial airline operational data.

A probability of failure was calculated for each redundant function configuration based on the binomial expansion formula of $(R+Q)^N$ which assumes an exponential failure distribution where $R=e^{-\lambda t}$ and $Q=1-R$. A total system probability of failure (Q) was then determined by summing the subsequent series strings of failure probabilities. This could be done because, for small probabilities of failures, $Q = t$. Therefore, $Q_{total}=(\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 + \lambda_3 + \dots + \lambda_n)t$ or in this case, $Q_{total} = \lambda_1 t + \lambda_2 t + \lambda_3 t + \dots + \lambda_n t$.

The advantage of this approach to reliability prediction, where small failure probabilities are encountered, is that the reliability of a system is based on the summation of what are essentially failure rates rather than the product of a series of ten or more 9's behind the decimal point. Also, the relative contribution of each function to the system reliability can readily be seen when expressed in terms of negative powers of ten (Q).

The probability of failure per flight hour over the 8-hour period was calculated as 1/8 of the system probability of failure for 8 hours.

Component reliability. - Since certain of the system elements are subject to wearout, the resulting required maintenance action has a direct bearing on system reliability and maintenance costs, particularly since many of these elements may be present due to redundancy. These elements are the hydraulic actuators and gyro elements. The electronic components were assumed to have only random failure characteristics. The overhaul intervals for these wearout items were obtained from actual suppliers.

Costs were also obtained and, with the time interval, formed an input to the GEMM program included in the total life-cost evaluation. The individual reliability figures used reflected the overhaul action. The values used were:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Repair Time</u>	<u>Interval</u>
Actuators	\$ 80	7.0 hrs	1500 hrs
Gyros	\$1827	11.8 hrs	2500 hrs

Repair and fault isolation efficiency. - It was assumed that the requirements for LRU fault-isolation and fault-correction effectively could be handled as nonperfect repair. An incremental failure rate factor, which is the ratio of total repair actions to the number of good repair actions, was applied; the equation for failure rate then became

$$\lambda_a = N\lambda g \frac{n}{n_g}$$

where

N = number of components

g = exponential failure rate

n = total repair actions

n_g = total successful repair actions

The equation may be rewritten as

$$\lambda_a = \frac{N\lambda_g}{n_g/n}$$

where n_g/n becomes a "repair efficiency". This could then be related to the fault isolation and repair effectivity. This relationship was assumed as follows:

$$n_g/n = N_f N_R$$

where

N_f = LRU fault isolation accuracy (95%/100)

N_R = LRU repair effectivity (95%/100)

The new λ_a could now be utilized in the system in a manner similar to the normal exponential failure rates. This λ_a affected both system reliability and maintenance costs as determined by the GEMM program.

Initial Costs

Three major cost areas were considered. Support costs are those which incur to the owner in the operation of the system, and they were in part computed by the GEMM program. The other two cost items are production costs and research and development which were broken down in the following manner.

Research and development. - The elements of the R and D costs are:

- Design and development
 - Preliminary analysis
 - System mechanization and specs
 - Detail design
 - Layout and drawing
 - Structural analysis

- Thermal analysis
- Travel
- Engineering material purchase
- Administration
- Lab testing

- Reliability requirements and analysis
- Quality assurance
- Maintainability
- In-plant test equipment and facilities
- Data preparation and transmittal
- Vendor support

Production. - The major items of production cost are:

- Material purchase
- Assembly
- Inspection and quality control
- Acceptance testing
- Packaging and shipping

Many of these items remained fixed for each system considered in the trade study. Those items sensitive to system design were adjusted prior to inclusion in the tabulation in the GEMM program. Piece-part costs are dependent on reliability levels, burn-in requirements, availability, and handling. Complexity, number of parts, handling, and skill level required for assembly are some factors affecting the assembly costs.

Operations Costs Due to Delays, Diversions and Cancellations.

A major item considered in the life-cycle cost analysis was that cost attributed to an out-of-service aircraft due to failures in the flight control equipment. The dispatch philosophy adopted for the ATT Study provided that the aircraft may take off providing a further failure in a flight-critical system may be sustained and still result in an operational capability.

With the above philosophy as a ground-rule, certain system mechanizations are subject to high delay costs. This includes triple-redundant systems with comparison monitoring (since two of three channels must operate for proper system operation) and all dual- or single-thread systems. Quad- and higher-level redundancy satisfies the requirement, since two or more failures may be sustained and leave the system operational. In other words, an aircraft may be dispatched with one failure, since a second failure could be sustained while leaving an operational system.

One class of triple-redundant systems also theoretically meets the above requirements. In-line monitoring of each channel allows two of the three channels to fail and leaves the third channel to complete the scheduled flight. Or, an aircraft could be dispatched with one failure. There are, however, serious doubts concerning the capability of in-line, or "self"-monitoring to identify all failures. Opinion solicited from both airlines and airframe manufacturers reflect this concern. United Airlines, in the report summarizing their ATT work (ref. 3) specify quad, comparison-monitored techniques on their minimum equipment list.

In applications where self-monitoring is applied to non-flight-critical elements, such as outerloop, or SAS computations where primary flight control is mechanical, the confidence is sufficient.

Where the primary flight control is fly-by-wire, a greater confidence level is necessary, and comparison monitoring techniques provide this level. Consequently, where utilization of in-line monitoring for triple systems was considered, a dispatch cost consistent with the triple, comparison monitored systems was applied.

To derive equations that allowed a consistent application of dispatch costs to the various systems, the operational profile was re-examined. Figure 133 shows the profile; "A" represents that leg of the operation where maintenance is available. If a "dispatch"-type failure occurs somewhere in the 11.2-hour span, a delay occurs since no maintenance is available. If the aircraft is in-flight, either a diversion occurs or the plane proceeds to its designated terminal where it then becomes a delay or cancellation while waiting for the proper maintenance.




Figure 133. - Daily Operational Profile

Of the 11.2 hours, 6.4 or 57 percent are flight hours, and 4.8 or 43 percent are on-ground hours. The inflight failures are, at worst, diversions, while those on the ground are either cancellations or delays. This categorization is a gross simplification of a problem which is unique with each failure, and an effort to obtain real cost information from airlines for these specific occurrences met with problems of definition. Consequently, for the study, data was obtained from reference which defined specific costs for the occurrence in question. These are

Delays (1 to 3 hours)	\$ 1000 = C_{DY}
Diversion	\$2750 = C_{DV}
Cancellation	\$9000 = C_C

The probability of a failure occurring in a triple system which would cause it to be fail-catastrophic rather than fail-operational is the probability of failure of one or more channels, or

$$P_{T_3} = 3(1 - e^{-\lambda ct})e^{-2\lambda ct} + 3(1 - e^{-\lambda ct})^2 e^{-\lambda ct} + (1 - e^{-\lambda ct})^3$$

where

P_{T_3} = probability of failure of one or more channels

λc = failure rate of one channel

t = assumed operations average time

For a four-channel system, the following equation applies:

$$P_{T_4} = 6(1 - e^{-\lambda ct})^2 e^{-2\lambda ct} + 4(1 - e^{-\lambda ct})^3 e^{-\lambda ct} + (1 - e^{-\lambda ct})^4$$

where P_{T_4} = probability of failure of two or more channels.

This assumes a four-channel comparison-monitored system where two channels may fail and still leave the system in a fail-operational state. The average time of 5.6 hours is assumed, since the failure may occur anywhere in the 11.2-hour operational period.

As one further refinement, it was assumed that only a third of the on-ground failures would result in cancellations, the balance being delays. The total cost equation may then be summarized as follows:

$$C_F = (365 P_T) [(.57) (C_{DV}) + (\frac{.43}{3}) (C_C) + \frac{2}{3} (.43) C_{DY}]$$

$$C_F = [1.15 \times 10^6] P_T$$

where C_F = \$/aircraft/yr

For a triple system, the equation yields a failure incidence per year of between 8 and 10; a quad system yields 0.2 to 0.4 incident per year.

The effects of the above costs are reflected in the tabulation in Section 10.

SECTION 9

OPTIMUM CONFIGURATION SELECTION

The groundrules for selecting the optimum configuration were well defined by two sentences in the NASA contractual statement of work:

"Flight safety and economic operation are required for the operational success of a flight control system. Therefore, reliability, maintainability and cost are primary factors in considering design alternatives."

A significant part of the effort on the study was, consequently, devoted to definition of a tradeoff methodology which would provide a consistent means for evaluation and selection of the optimum configuration. This methodology, described more fully in Appendix A, is based on "life-cycle costs", required to meet the fundamental requirements of function, reliability and maintainability. By making all comparisons against a common element (cost), and without deviation from the fundamental requirements, a truly unbiased trade-off is achieved.

Life-Cycle Cost Determination

The life-cycle cost determination integrates the effects of configuration size, complexity and reliability with an assumed route structure and maintenance philosophy. The latter two factors make up the operational model defined in Section 8.

The actual computation of the life-cycle costs for each configuration was largely performed with the GEMM computer program described in Appendix A.

The detailed electronics parts list was converted to modules which were assembled into standard ATR boxes. Gyro and accelerometer elements

were assembled as component packages, and estimates were made for the interconnecting cabling, and cockpit panels and sensors.


The data obtained from the above sizings included cost to the module level, or part level where applicable, mean time to repair estimates, number of parts per module, number of modules per component, weight, and module size. With the modules and components defined, the level of manpower skills, publications, and test equipment necessary to accomplish repair may be assigned.

Other data used is outlined in Section 8. This includes items such as total operating hours, number of line and main-base stations, part reliability, waiting time for maintenance, and average intervals between stops with maintenance capability.

The predominant life-cycle cost is the replacement stock necessary due to failures and wearout; consequently, the item most affecting total cost is component MTBF. With the assumption of improved BIT due to digital computation and with the utilization of ATE, projected manpower costs reduced significantly.

Life-cycle cost contributions break down as follows:

- Design and development
- Production
- Stockage (material)
- Maintenance manpower
- Training
- Inventory management
- Transportation
- Publications
- Overhaul
- Operating dispatch costs



Total support cost

Production Costs

Evaluations of the cost trade study were accomplished through the use of comparison plots of the given system configurations. A common denominator of system production cost was utilized to provide a continuous reference parameter.

Production costs were broken down into the following elements:

- Electronics
- Hydraulics
- Gyros
- Accelerometers
- Miscellaneous

The percentage contribution of each of these elements is shown in Figure 134 for the 24 configurations considered. Using system 13 as an example, the contribution of each of the elements to the total life-cycle cost were extracted from the GEMM program run and compared with the percentage breakdown of production costs. This comparison is shown in Table 28.

TABLE 28. - LIFE-CYCLE AND PRODUCTION COST COMPARISON

Item	Percent of Production Cost	Percent of Life-Cycle Cost
Electronics	58.6	33.8
Gyros	6.1	29.6
Accelerometers	4.7	11.7
Hydraulics	27.4	23.3
Miscellaneous	<u>3.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>
	100.0	100.0




Figure 134. - System Cost Breakdown

Note from Table 30 that even though electronics is close to 59 percent of the production cost, it represents roughly 34 percent of the life-cycle cost. The opposite trend is true for gyros, which represent 6 percent of the production cost but close to 30 percent of the life-cycle cost.

A breakdown of estimated dollar amount production costs by system element for all 24 system configurations studied is given in Table 29.

Support Costs

Support costs are normally shown in terms of dollars per flight hour. The items include everything except design, development and production costs. Besides the support elements previously listed under life-cycle costs, the estimated cost due to delay for each system has been added as described in the operational model discussion in Section 8. Figure 135 shows system support costs as a function of production costs based on the assumed average of 8 flight hours out of 14 operating hours per day, or a flight-hour-to-operating-hour ratio of 1.75. On the basis of support cost, configuration 13A is the minimum-cost system.

To indicate the effects of the delay cost and the impact of the dispatch philosophy on triple-redundant systems, the costs are again compared in Figure 136 where all costs due to dispatch delays are removed.

System Mean Time to Failure Incidents (MTBF)

MTBF, in hours, defines the time between any failure in the system, and does not represent loss of function. It is computed by a sum of all part failure rates, then converted to hours. Figure 137 shows the MTBF for each system, again referenced to system production cost. The triple systems are clearly superior because of the lower total number of parts in each system. From system MTBF, mean time between unscheduled removals (MTBUR) may be computed by applying, in part, the probability of false no-go factor (i. e.,

TABLE 29. - PRODUCTION COST BREAKDOWN

System type	System no.	System element costs (\$)					Total, K\$
		Elect.	Hyd	Gyro	Accel	Misc	
Triple	12	169 626	82 500	17 875	14 410	8 922	293.5
	14	173 526	82 500	17 875	14 410	8 922	297.2
	14A	173 526	82 500	10 115	14 410	8 922	289.5
	15	173 526	97 500	17 875	14 410	8 922	312.2
	16	173 526	82 500	13 120	14 410	8 922	292.5
	18	184 363	82 500	17 875	14 410	9 039	308.2
	19	169 626	110 500	17 875	14 410	8 922	321.3
Quad	1	264 814	107 250	21 800	17 600	11 154	422.6
	3	265 438	130 000	21 800	17 600	5 000	443.2
	4	227 914	97 500	24 000	14 800	10 600	374.8
	5	220 098	107 250	21 800	17 600	11 154	381.1
	6	227 914	130 000	21 800	17 600	11 154	408.5
	7	227 914	97 500	21 800	17 600	10 600	376.0
	7A	227 914	97 500	45 000	17 600	10 600	399.2
	8	211 438	130 000	21 800	17 600	11 154	392.0
	9	207 746	130 000	21 800	17 600	11 154	388.3
	9A	207 746	130 000	45 000	17 600	11 154	411.5
	10	207 746	98 875	21 800	17 600	11 154	354.2
	11	207 746	130 000	14 710	17 600	11 154	381.2
	13	211 438	97 500	21 800	17 600	10 600	358.9
	13A	211 438	97 500	15 300	14 800	10 600	352.4
17	227 914	107 250	21 800	17 600	11 154	385.7	
Trip-dual	20	184 363	84 500	17 875	14 410	9 039	310.2
Quint	2	283 006	97 500	27 250	22 000	13 850	443.6




Figure 135. - System Support Cost as a Function of Production Cost - Dispatch Delay Costs Included




Figure 136. - System Support Cost as a Function of Production Cost - Dispatch Delay Costs Removed




Figure 137. - Mean Time Between Failure Incidents, Including False No-Go's

the number of times a part is removed when in fact, no failure has occurred). This constant has been established at 0.95. Another component of MTBUR is the probability of the repaired item not having to be returned within a short time for the same failure. This constant is also 0.95. The probability of a system failure indication due to faulty built-in test equipment was established at 0.99. Combining these constants yields approximately 0.9 as a constant multiplying factor on MTBF to yield MTBUR.

System MTBF is computed from part failure rates and is an output of the GEMM program. The component MTBF values generated are then used in the system process diagrams to compute operational reliability. The success diagrams and the resulting system reliabilities are given for each configuration in Section 7. A summary plot is shown in Figure 138.

Seven of the candidate configurations fall above the 1×10^{-7} limit. However, systems 4 and 7 are extremely close, and all but system 16 are within a reasonable range of 1×10^{-7} failures per flight hour.

System 16 is identical to system 14 with the exception of the pentad gyro configuration, which obviously has a significant deteriorating effect on system reliability.

System Maintenance Manhours and Test Equipment

The second major requirement of the system following operational reliability was a maintenance-manhour-to-flight-hour ratio of 0.02. This ratio is very sensitive to flight-hours assumed as well as to the ratio of operating hours to flight hours.

For each system, maintenance manhours were computed as a function of the system MTBF, MTBUR, and mean-time-to-repair estimates at each repair level. Figure 139 is a plot of on-aircraft manhours for each system, while Figure 140 is the equivalent off-aircraft estimate.




Figure 138. - Operational Reliability versus Production Cost




Figure 139. -- Total-Fleet On-Aircraft Maintenance Manhours




Figure 140. - Total-Fleet Off-Aircraft Maintenance Manhours

On-aircraft maintenance times are roughly proportional to the actuator type and configuration employed. Off-aircraft times reflect gyro and electronics repair times unless the driver-power actuator combination is used. The repair decision portion of the GEMM program indicated that the cheaper policy would be to repair the driver portions on-site, rather than sending them back for repair at the manufacturer, or other repair facility. All other actuators were repaired or replaced off-site; consequently, the maintenance is tabulated as a portion of the dollar cost for support rather than in the total manpower requirements.

When each of these values is ratioed to the total flight hours, the plot of Figure 141 is obtained. The on-aircraft ratio is plotted against the off-aircraft ratio, and the line representing the maximum acceptable ratio is given. This line is dependent on the operating-hour-to-flight-hour ratio assumed and represents the sum of the on-and off-aircraft values. For the 1.75 ratio used in this study, based on 14 operating hours, system 13A has a total MMH/FH ratio of .0289. When the DC-10 goal of 1.25 is utilized (based on 14 operating hours), the MMH/FH ratio drops to .0206, or close to the desired value, as shown in Figure 141. The DC-10 goal is realistic for the ATT, and, as such, system 13A complies with the requirements. Any operating-to-flight-hour ratio may be observed, since maintenance manhours were computed on the basis of 14 operating hours.

A scheduled maintenance interval of greater than 300 hours was imposed. For any system studied, the actuators required a scheduled maintenance interval of approximately 1500 hours and the conventional gyros 2400 hours. Costs due to the overhaul actions were estimated and included in each GEMM run. The total overhaul costs were less than 0.2 percent of the life-cycle costs.

Test equipment costs were also included and were dominated by the ATE equipment. One complete test set appears at each main-base-level repair facility, and the full price was assessed even though 100 percent utilization of the equipment is not achieved. The contribution to total life-cycle cost was less than 0.3 percent for all systems considered.




Figure 141. - Maintenance Manhours per Flight Hour

System Weight

The approximate weight for each system is shown in Figure 142. The spread is primarily sensitive to whether the configuration is quad or triple and to the actuator configuration. A weight breakdown for each system is given in Table 30.

Summary

Table 31 summarizes the pertinent data developed in the trade study and life-cycle cost analyses for all 24 candidate configurations. Analysis of this data during the tradeoff revealed that configuration 13 was one of the better systems and that application of a hexad sensor array should result in a further improvement in life-cycle costs.

Figure 143 shows the trend of life-cycle costs for each of the configurations considered. It is apparent that configuration 13A, a digital, quad-redundant system, provides the minimum life-cycle cost, and, since it satisfies the system requirements, it is the recommended configuration.

A comparison of system 13A with other top candidates is shown in Figure 144. Included are analog quad (system 1) and triple digital (system 14) configurations; all have conventional sensors rather than laser or MHD devices.

A breakdown of system 13A life-cycle costs by element is shown in Table 32. Table 33 is a total cost summary for system 13A.

With reference to the support cost indicated in Table 33 it is useful at this point to compare costs projected by reference-2. Based on Chapters 22 and 27, ATA equipment definitions, and an extrapolation from DC-8 experience, UAL has estimated a cost of \$6.75 per flight hour based on 10 flight hours per day. When referenced to 8 flight hours per day this figure becomes \$9.45. Table 35 indicates a cost of \$12.85 per flight hour. Since the UAL estimate was direct maintenance cost, the comparable system 13A figure




Figure 142. - System Weight as a Function of Production Cost and Configuration

TABLE 30. - SYSTEM WEIGHT BREAKDOWN

System type	System no.	System element					Total
		Elec.	Hyd.	Gyro	Accel.	Misc.	
Triple	12	117.1	462	15	9.4	305.4	900.1
	14	129.7	462	15	9.4	305.4	912.7
	14A	129.7	462	6.5	9.4	305.4	913.2
	15	129.7	546	12	9	303.6	996.7
	16	129.7	462	11	9.4	305.4	917.7
	18	146	462	15	9.4	309.4	944.0
	19	117.1	546	15	9.4	305.4	993.1
Quad	1	253.9	416	19	15	401	1260.9
	3	174.7	728	19	15	88	1024.7
	4	165.5	546	48.2	13	395	1113.7
	5	148.3	416	19	15	401	1155.3
	6	165.5	728	19	15	401	1334.5
	7	165.5	546	19	15	341	1092.5
	7A	156.3	546	140	15	341	1213.5
	8	153.1	728	19	15	401	1317.7
	9	155.5	728	19	15	401	1318.5
	9A	155.5	728	140	15	401	1439.5
	10	155.5	728	19	15	401	1084.5
	11	155.5	728	10	15	401	1309.5
	13	153.1	546	19	15	341	1075.7
13A	153.1	546	13	11	341	1069.7	
17	165.5	416	19	15	401	1178.5	
Trip-dual	20	146	377	12	9	309.4	859.0
Quint	2	215.5	546	25	20	462	1268.5

TABLE 31. - SYSTEM DATA SUMMARY

System type	System no.	MTBF (hrs)	On - A/C MMH/FH (OH/FH = 1.25)	Off - A/C MMH/FH (OH/FH = 1.25)	On - A/C MH/Main act	Off - A/C MH/Main act	MTBUR (hrs)	Test equip cost (K\$)	System weight, (lbs)	System production cost (K\$)	Reliability (Fail/FH $\times 10^{-7}$)	D&D plus prod cost (M\$)	Total support (M\$)	Support cost (OH/FH = 1.75) (\$/FH)	Material cost/repair (\$)	Total life-cycle cost (M\$)
Triple	12	238.8	.00419	.0114	.720	1.955	214.9	534.6	900.1	293.5	1.47	74.30	96.12	20.51	1275	259.3
	14	229.1	.00438	.0120	.723	1.991	206.2	534.6	912.7	297.2	0.05	75.05	99.29	21.89	1264	266.9
	14A	306.3	.00326	.0105	.718	2.32	275.7	523.9	913.2	289.5	0.05	73.49	79.06	16.93	1328	221.9
	15	225.0	.00445	.0124	.722	2.00	202.5	537.8	996.7	312.2	0.50	78.05	104.14	22.64	1302	276.5
	16	252.2	.00402	.0115	.732	2.09	227.0	531.3	917.7	292.5	9.2	74.10	91.75	20.06	1280	250.0
	18	193.1	.00562	.0151	.781	2.11	173.8	535.6	944.0	308.2	0.13	77.24	107.9	24.84	1157	294.9
	19	197.7	.00505	.0345	.72	4.92	177.9	780.6	993.1	321.3	1.70	79.87	112.97	25.12	1220	300.1
Quad	1	133.8	.0084	.0420	.778	3.89	120.1	783.6	1260.9	422.6	1.70	100.12	159.57	18.27	1050	259.7
	3	144.7	.0074	.0179	.774	1.87	130.2	541.5	1024.7	443.2	0.37	104.24	172.37	19.95	1410	279.0
	4	196.5	.0057	.0158	.800	2.24	176.9	536.6	1113.7	374.8	1.07	90.56	131.51	15.17	1438	223.3
	5	164.1	.0068	.0366	.773	4.13	147.8	781.5	1155.3	381.1	0.05	91.89	145.16	16.87	1202	239.1
	6	154.6	.00702	.0184	.782	2.05	139.2	556.9	1334.5	408.5	0.85	97.29	148.17	17.14	1345	245.5
	7	159.7	.00686	.0174	.789	2.00	143.7	549.0	1092.5	376.0	1.08	90.79	135.96	15.74	1210	228.7
	7A	178.7	.00605	.0165	.781	2.12	160.9	542.0	1213.5	399.2	1.08	95.43	162.90	18.78	1632	259.9
	8	173.4	.00616	.0158	.770	1.97	156.0	556.6	1317.7	392.0	0.16	94.00	138.27	15.97	1330	233.9
	9	161.0	.00669	.0175	.775	2.03	144.9	556.1	1318.5	388.3	0.26	93.30	150.20	17.10	1380	243.5
	9A	180.4	.00609	.0166	.790	2.15	162.4	549.6	1439.5	411.5	0.26	97.80	174.70	19.97	1823	272.5
	10	147.0	.00763	.0488	.774	4.95	132.5	895.5	1084.5	354.2	0.26	86.43	156.57	17.44	1289	243.0
	11	190.6	.00574	.0161	.788	2.22	171.6	546.3	1309.5	381.2	0.25	91.84	131.66	14.76	1542	223.5
	13	179.7	.0060	.0149	.766	1.92	161.7	549.1	1075.7	358.9	0.62	87.39	119.71	13.84	1328	208.6
	13A	201.6	.00532	.0153	.722	2.23	181.4	552.7	1069.7	352.4	0.63	86.10	111.32	12.85	1244	198.6
17	148.9	.00757	.0394	.774	4.04	133.8	784.9	1178.5	385.7	0.80	92.74	158.06	18.10	1167	250.8	
Trip-dual	20	198.5	.00503	.0252	.723	3.60	178.7	671.1	859.0	310.2	0.13	77.64	107.70	24.46	1178	292.1
Quint	2	128.9	.00856	.0218	.795	2.02	116.0	569.7	1268.5	443.6	1.95	106.22	168.88	19.28	1083	278.1




Figure 143. - Life-Cycle Costs as a Function of System Production Cost Including Operational Delays

- 1 ANALOG QUAD
 14 DIGITAL TRIPLE
 13A DIGITAL QUAD - MEDIUM PROCESSOR - SMALL PROCESSOR - SKEWED HEXAD SENSORS
 4 DIGITAL QUAD - LARGE PROCESSOR - SKEWED HEXAD SENSORS
 8 DIGITAL QUAD - MEDIUM PROCESSOR - SMALL PROCESSOR




Figure 144. - Comparison of Major Systems

TABLE 32. - SYSTEM 13A LIFE-CYCLE
COST BREAKDOWN

Item	Cost (M\$)
Design and development	15.60
Production	70.49
Stockage	105.07
Test equipment	0.55
Maintenance manpower	0.85
Training	0.03
Inventory management	1.29
Transporation	3.13
Publications	0.13
Overhaul	0.27
Dispatch	1.22
Total life-cycle cost	198.62

TABLE 33. - SYSTEM 13A
COST SUMMARY

Item	Cost
Life-cycle cost (M\$)	198.623
Support cost ^a (\$/flt hr)	12.85
Material cost ^a (\$/flt hr)	11.99
Total cost (\$/aircraft/yr)	66,200
MTBF (hrs)	201.635
Total repairs (\$)	48 272
Reliability (failure/flt hr)	0.63×10^{-7}
System production cost (\$)	352,438

^aOH/FH = 1.75

would be \$12.09 per flight hour, which reflects only material and manpower dollars from Table 35. Thus, the UAL number is about 22 percent less than that determined for system 13A.

Further details on the system 13A selection rationale and a description of the various components (LRUs) and computational operations proposed for system mechanization are provided in Section 10, "Selected System Description."


SECTION 10
SELECTED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The recommended ATT flight control system, concept 13A, is a quad digital computer configuration employing a small microprocessor for input/output control, a hexad skewed set of conventional sensors for body rate and body acceleration, and triple-integrated actuators.

Reinforcing and complementing the concept's generally excellent showing in the life-cycle cost tradeoffs discussed in Section 9 were the following factors:

- A digital system provides the best system mechanization when compared with analog and hybrid systems.
- Use of a small I/O processor allows use of a medium-sized control processor and significantly reduces costs.
- A 450- to 500-KOP central processor is needed for the ATT FCS.
- Quad-redundant sensors and electronics coupled with triple actuators are required to meet system requirements at minimum cost.
- Conventional sensors and actuators provide adequate performance for the ATT.

A simple block diagram of the recommended configuration is shown in Figure 145.



SYSTEM 13A
 QUAD GP/PROCESSOR I/O CROSSFEED
 CONVENTIONAL SENSORS WITH HEXAD BODY SENSORS
 TRIPLE INTEGRATED ACTUATOR
 IN-LINE MONITORED ACTUATORS
 COMPARISON MONITORED BALANCE

Figure 145. Selected System (13A) Functional Block Diagram

Line-Replaceable Units (LRUs)

The following paragraphs describe the physical characteristics of the major units defined to mechanize the recommended configuration. The Advanced Technology Transport flight control system consists of 57 major LRUs of 10 different types.

Input/output processor units (4). - Each processor unit processes all pitch, roll and yaw inputs and outputs associated with a particular channel, providing multiplexed analog to digital and digital to analog conversions. Each I/O processor unit is interconnected with all four control computation units but is completely independent of the other three I/O processor units. The I/O processor units, being identical, are completely interchangeable, thereby reducing spares and provisioning requirements. The heart of each device is the small processor described in Section 6. A detailed description of the I/O processor unit operation is included later in this section.

Control computation processor units (4). - Each control computation processor unit is interconnected with all four I/O processor units and, consequently, is provided with digitally crossed signals from the full quadruple sets of sensors. Optimum signal selection and control law computation are the primary tasks of this device. The control computation units are again identical and completely interchangeable to reduce provisioning requirements. A medium-sized processor with characteristics defined in Section 6 is the computational element in each device. There is no direct intercommunication between the four control computation units. A detailed description of the control computation unit operation is included later in this section.

Flight guidance control panel (1). - The flight guidance control panel provides FCS control and display functions for both the captain and first officer. Selection of control parameters (e. g. , altitude) and flight modes typify the control functions provided. Automatic mode transitioning (e. g. , from capture to track mode) typifies the display functions provided.

Maintenance assessment panel (1). - The maintenance assessment panel (MAP) provides central control and display of the FCS self-test functions.

Status panel (1). - The status panel displays FCS operational status information to the captain and first officer.

Hexad body sensor unit (1). - The hexad body sensor unit incorporates six conventional spring-restrained rate gyros and six quartz-fiber pendulum-type accelerometers mounted in a common casting at appropriate skew angles. The package also includes six independent sensor power supplies which are excited via crossed protected lines from the four main power buses.

Flutter sensor unit (2). - Each flutter sensor unit contains four conventional spring-restrained rate gyros and four quartz-fiber pendulum-type accelerometers. One unit is mounted in each wingtip of the aircraft.

The device includes four independent sensor power supplies, each excited directly from one of the four main power buses.

Control wheel sensors (2). - The control wheel sensors employ silicon strain gages mounted on a beam spring force sensor to sense pitch and roll wheel forces. The units are similar to current DC-10 control wheel sensors.

Rudder pedal sensors (2). - The rudder pedal sensors employ silicon strain gages mounted on a beam spring force sensor to sense rudder pedal forces.

Integrated actuator units (39). - Integrated control surface actuators are mounted in triple-redundant configurations driving each control surface. These units are described in detail in Section 6.

Summary. - Physical characteristics of the LRUs and the total FCS are presented in Table 34.

TABLE 34. - SELECTED SYSTEM PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Unit	Quantity	Size (in.)	Weight (lbs)		Power dissipation (watts)	
			Unit	Total	Unit	Total
Input/output processor unit	4	5 x 20 x 7.6	13.2	52.8	80	320
Control computation processor unit	4	7.5 x 20 x 7.6	19.2	76.8	120	480
Status panel	1	5 x 5.6 x 7.6	2.5	2.5	15	15
Flight guidance control panel	1	3.9 x 12.0 x 23.5	18	18	35	35
Maintenance assessment panel	1	5.75 x 5.6 x 7.6	3	3	22	22
Hexad body sensor unit	1	8 x 8 x 16	12	12	36	36
Flutter sensor unit	2	6 x 5.2 x 8.0	7	14	24	48
Control wheel sensors	2	1.5 x 3.3 x 6.0	2.0	4	1	2
Rudder pedal sensors	2	1.5 x 3.3 x 3.0	1.0	2.0	0.5	1
Integrated actuator	39		14	546		

Operational Reliability

The success path diagram shown in Figure 146 was used to determine the operational reliability for configuration 13A. A probability of loss of FCS functions of 0.63×10^{-7} per flight hour over an 8-hour flight period was established for this configuration.

Construction

The packaging philosophy is based on the use of 6-1/4-inch-square printed circuit cards with the NAFI-style blade-type connector plugging into a metal base plate having wire-wrap interconnections. The wire-wrap wiring extends from the base plate to the test connectors on the front of the chassis and to connectors on the rear of the chassis. Where power and ground require heavier wire, stranded leadwire with conventional crimp or solder terminations is used. The printed circuit cards are primarily double-sided cards with components mounted on one side to facilitate flow soldering. The integrated circuits used are primarily in the dual in-line package (DIP) which is mounted directly to the card in plated-through holes. The cards are keyed to assure proper location within the chassis. This circuit card packaging, as well as the chassis and wiring approach, have been proven in commercial applications such as the DC-10 DADC and PAFAM.

Functional Operation

The functional operation of the system is detailed in the following paragraphs. Both the redundancy and functional complexity of the recommended configuration are shown in Figure 147.

Hexad body sensor unit. - The mounting of six conventional spring-restrained rate gyros and six flight-control-quality accelerometers in a skewed orientation is an unconventional concept which is not used in analog systems but is made feasible by digital computational capabilities.




Figure 147. - Selected System LRU-Level Block Diagram

Angular rate and linear acceleration information with respect to all three body axes is available from this configuration. The three-axis angular rate data is necessary for flight control application. Commonly only normal and lateral acceleration data is provided for flight control use; however, the availability of longitudinal acceleration data at essentially no additional cost will undoubtedly result in updated implementation which utilizes this information for flight control and/or engine control modes.

The skewed hexad arrangement provides two-fail-operational reliability in a most efficient manner since the change in level of redundancy from single-channel to quadruple-channel is achieved with only an increase from three orthogonal sensors to a total of six in the skewed sensor array.

The redundancy level improvement is obtained with a minimum decrease in maintenance reliability.

Full crossfeed of sensor signals is desirable to improve operational reliability, since possible success paths are increased. The hexad arrangement minimizes the number of inputs for full crossfeed; consequently, the analog-to-digital input and signal-selection capacity required is minimized in the processor.

The skewed orientation approach permits use of averaging techniques to improve effective sensor accuracy. The reduction in sensor numbers, results in efficiencies in system volume, weight, power required and interconnecting cables.

Since the orientation of the sensor array is fixed and determined by the alignment of the mounting, the processing equations involve primarily multiplication by constant matrices which are easily entered in the computer memory. Very little of the computational capability of the machine is tied up processing this data.

Flutter sensor unit. - The wingtip-located flutter sensor units provide single-axis angular rate and linear acceleration information. Multi-axis sensors such as the magneto-hydrodynamic gyro and skewed arrays are, consequently, not appropriate for this application.

This location is also subject to environmental extremes and possible high vibration levels. The low-risk conventional spring-restrained rate gyro and pendulous quartz-fiber accelerometer were selected as the most satisfactory devices.

Computational Operations

The two-processor-per-channel configuration provides the best fit between estimated processor computing power and ATT computational requirements. In this configuration, shown in single-channel form in Figure 148, general input/output (I/O) processing is handled by a small processor (IOP) while the bulk of the flight control system computation is performed in a medium-size control computation processor (CCP). This basic task partitioning scheme provides several advantages:

- Lower overall cost through efficient use of the less expensive small- and medium-size processors.
- High-volume production base through microprocessor technology; processors are standard with long-term availability.
- Increased system reliability through excellent interchannel crossfeed capability at the IOP/CCP interface.
- Reduced maintenance requirements by functional separation into simpler processors.




Figure 148. - Selected Computation Configuration

Processor descriptions. - In the functional partitioning adopted in this configuration, specific computational tasks are assigned to each processor permitting an optimal fit. Tasks assigned to the IOP are:

- All input/output functions, including A/D and D/A conversion, multiplexing, de-multiplexing, bus control, etc.
- Selection of CCP-generated servo command signals for final output to servos.
- Detection and isolation of CCP failures via comparison monitoring of the servo commands.
- Detection of servo failures via modeling of the servo.
- Failure reporting to the status panel.
- Sensor, actuator, and IOP maintenance tests via interfaces with the maintenance panel.

Specific tasks assigned to the CCP are:

- All flight control computations, e. g. , filtering, shaping, mode determination, etc.
- Selection of sensor and other signals transmitted by the IOPs.
- Detection and isolation of IOP signal failures via comparison monitoring.
- CCP maintenance tests, including independent interfaces with maintenance panel.
- Failure reporting via independent interfaces with the status panel.

In a multiple-computer configuration, processor intercommunication is a significant consideration in overall system design. Intercommunication

must meet the information transfer requirement without imposing undue load on the processors. In the selected configuration, intercommunication is provided by serial, bidirectional buses under control of the IOPs. Manchester biphasic coding is used to minimize transients. The processor-to-processor interface, inherent in this configuration, also provides a convenient point to incorporate channel crossfeed. The impact of crossfeeding on aircraft wiring and hardware complexity is minimized.

A power supply is provided for the electronics in each channel. Regulated power is then fed to all elements of each channel. A detailed block diagram of a single-channel IOP and its electronics is provided in Figure 149. Virtually all of the flight control system I/O functions are processed under program control of the IOP. The total single channel I/O complement is summarized as follows:

Analog a-c sensor signals (e. g. , vehicle attitude)	43
Analog d-c sensor signals (e. g. , vehicle acceleration)	17
Discrete inputs (e. g. , localizer valid)	47
Digital inputs (e. g. , air data)	1
Analog outputs (e. g. , servo position command)	13
Discrete outputs:	
Servo engage	13
Sensor self-test stimulation	35
Digital output, status panel	1
Bidirectional bus interfaces (mode panel, maintenance panel, four CCPs)	6

Of the above, most are processed directly under program control. For example, when normal acceleration is required, the IOP executes a "select normal accelerometer and initiate A/D conversion" command. The I/O control logic interprets this command, selects the normal accelerometer in the d-c conditioning and multiplex block, and causes the A/D converter to begin conversion. The IOP then proceeds to other tasks returning when the conversion is complete to extract the digital representation of normal acceleration contained in the converter register. A similar process is used for a-c




Figure 149. - Selected System Small Processor (IOP),
Block Diagram (one of four channels)

signals. Digital servo command outputs are converted and then reconstituted into a continuous signal via sample and hold circuits which approximate zero-order holds. Discrete inputs are level shifted to logic levels and interrogated by the IOP as specific bits packed into 16-bit words in the discrete input multiplex block. Discrete outputs, representing servo engage commands and sensor stims, are packed as bits in 16-bit words, stored in output registers, and level shifted to the required interface level (typically 28 Vdc). Digital air data are brought directly into the IOP memory. The air data are transmitted to the IOP in serial form; each word contains a label used by the DMA control logic to generate the IOP memory address corresponding to the air datum word. Bidirectional bus inputs from the CCPs are handled in a similar fashion. Each word contains a label generated by the CCP, which, with the receiving channel label bits, specify the appropriate IOP memory address.

The status panel and bidirectional bus digital outputs are handled under IOP program control. Due to the limited address field anticipated in the IOP instruction word, two IOP output commands are required. The first output provides the label for the intended output word; the second provides the datum word. The I/O control logic and output shift register assemble the data and label bits and control serial transmission through the transmitter(s) specified by the address field in the second IOP output instruction.

Effective loading of the A/D-D/A, bidirectional buses, IOP, and CCP memory are obtained by reviewing the overall I/O task. Total I/O requirements, including sampling rates, are listed in Table 35. The table indicates that 6420 A/D-D/A operations in the IOP and 7260 bus word transmissions are required per second. If the IOP and CCP operate asynchronously, these rates must be increased by five to reduce the variable "staleness" of information to 20 percent of the overall sampling period. This would result in an A/D-D/A conversion period of $31\ \mu\text{sec}$; i. e., the converter must complete one conversion every $31\ \mu\text{sec}$. To achieve this in airborne converter hardware, two or three converters are required. Additionally, the IOP would be forced to operate in $31\text{-}\mu\text{sec}$ time "chunks", effectively saturating it and precluding other tasks. Since it is readily achieved on a frame (each 160th second) basis, synchronization is incorporated in this configuration.

TABLE 35. - TOTAL I/O SIZING

Signal group	Number of Signals	Type	Rate (s/s)	End user	A/D-D/A load (conv/sec)	Bus load (wds/sec)	Comment
Trim inputs	6	A/D	10	CCP	60	60	
Control inputs	6	A/D	40	CCP	240	240	
Rate and acceleration (hexad)	12	A/D	80	CCP	960	960	
Surface position	8	A/D	40	CCP	320	320	
Surface rate and ΔP	16	A/D	40	IOP	640	---	Used in IOP
Surface position	5	A/D	160	CCP	800	800	
Surface rate and ΔP	10	A/D	80	IOP	800	---	Used in IOP
Wingtip rate and acceleration	4	A/D	160	CCP	640	640	
Servo commands	8	D/A	40	IOP	320	640	CCP \rightarrow IOP (request and response)
Servo commands	5	D/A	160	IOP	800	1600	CCP \rightarrow IOP (request and response)
Servo command bite	13	A/D	20	IOP	260	---	Used in IOP
Outer-loop signals	29	A/D	20	CCP	580	580	
Discrete inputs	4 wds	Dig	10	IOP and CCP	---	40	
Discrete inputs	1 wd	Dig	40	IOP	---	---	Used in IOP
Discrete outputs	3 wds	Dig	10	IOP and CCP	---	60	CCP \rightarrow IOP (request and response)
Air data inputs	3 wds	Dig	10	CCP	---	30	
Panel inputs	3 wds	Dig	10	CCP	---	30	
Panel outputs	3 wds	Dig	10	IOP	---	60	CCP \rightarrow IOP (request and response)
Miscellaneous digital intercommunication	10 wds	Dig	80	IOP and CCP	---	1200	IOP \leftrightarrow CCP
Total					6420	7260	

An A/D-D/A conversion time of $80\mu\text{sec}$ is readily obtained in airborne hardware. This includes multiplex switch settling, amplifier slew, actual conversion, hold circuit charging and all other parameters necessary to effect complete signal selection and conversion. Based on the $80\text{-}\mu\text{sec}$ time, the converter is occupied in the analog I/O process for approximately 50 percent of each second. The remaining time, plus the time available while awaiting conversion completion, is sufficient for the IOP to perform other tasks such as servo monitoring and CCP monitoring.

Bus load is readily estimated based on the 7260-word transmissions per second estimated. For a 1-MHz bit rate and a 26-bit word (16 data, 9 label, 1 parity), effective bus load is approximately 21 percent; thus, bus loading imposes no constraint in this configuration.

CCP memory tie up, due to direct memory access (DMA) associated with intercommunication, warrants investigation. Since each CCP must receive signals from four IOPs the total number of DMA operations is 24 320 per second. Based on a memory tie up interval (processor dead time) of $1\mu\text{sec}$ per DMA operation, a total dead time of 2.4 percent results. This is a maximum as some DMA operations will occur during the arithmetic portion of the longer instructions (i. e., MPY) and thus be transparent to CCP operation.

Synchronizing logic is incorporated to synchronize the IOPs with the CCPs. Four sync signals are transmitted (one from each CCP) to the IOPs. The signals are voted to develop one sync signal used as a "halt exit" (HEXO) interrupt to the IOP. Validity signals are used to disengage sync signals which occur too early or too late with respect to the other sync signals. Since the CCPs are synchronized on a frame basis, the four CCP-to-IOP sync signals will occur essentially simultaneously in normal operation.


Self-test of the servo amplifier and servo engage output is included in the IOP electronics. This is accomplished by "wrapping the servo amp outputs around" as analog inputs for testing in the IOP. A similar "wrap around" technique is used for the servo engage discretes. A serial redundant switch

is included in the servo engage functions to assure disengagement in the event of failure of the output electronics. The IOP is estimated to be 89 percent loaded and requires approximately 3.3K total memory.

A detailed block diagram of the CCP and associated electronics is provided in Figure 150. Consistent with the task-partitioning philosophy of this configuration, little I/O is included. Bidirectional transmitter/receivers are provided for each CCP/IOP bus and for the CCP/maintenance panel bus. All bidirectional buses communicate directly with the CCP memory through the DMA control logic and port. Each word contains a label which is used by the control logic to specify the appropriate memory address. When a signal is requested from the CCP by the IOP, the label portion of the word is recognized as an output command, rather than as an input. The label specifies the desired parameter and the data bits are unused. The DMA control logic extracts the specified word from memory and provides it, labeled, on the appropriate bus. Output to the status panel is accomplished by the DMA I/O control logic on command from the CCP. Status panel words are extracted from memory and shifted out on the unidirectional bus to provide failure reporting. The CCP, a medium size processor, is approximately 88 percent loaded and requires approximately 8.7 K of total memory.

Monitoring Operation. - The monitoring configuration provides inflight failure detection and disengagement of the affected actuators. Monitoring is accomplished by comparing signals among channels. For example, the sensors and IOPs are monitored by the CCPs. Each CCP receives inputs from each of the IOPs, compares each input with the others in the redundant set, and selects the optimum input value.

Similarly, each IOP receives servo command signals from each of the CCPs, compares each with the others in the redundant set, and selects the optimum value for output to the servo. The IOP performs self-test of the servo output electronics. When a failure affecting continued servo operation is detected in any of these areas, the affected servo is disengaged. Since both the associated IOP and the majority opinion of the CCPs may disengage the servo, high monitoring integrity is achieved.



- △ - FUNCTION REQD BY DMA I/O CONTROL LOGIC
- RECOGNIZE WD RECEIPT FROM IOPU & MAINT PANEL
 - DECODE LABEL PORTION TO DETERMINE IF DATA REQUEST (TO BE TRANSMITTED BACK TO IOPU OR PANEL ASAP) OR DATA TO BE STORED IN CCPU
 - EXTRACT SPECIFIC WD ADDRESS FROM LABEL FIELD OF INCOMING WD & MODIFY AS APPROPRIATE TO DISTINGUISH SAME WD ADDRESS FROM DIFFERENT CHANNELS
 - IF RECEIVED WD IS FOR CCP, EFFECT STORAGE IN CCP MEMORY
 - IF RECEIVED WD IS DATA REQUEST, EXTRACT DATA FROM SPECIFIED ADDRESS & TRANSMIT BACK TO IOPU OR PANEL
 - ON CCP COMMAND (DIRECT I/O) EXTRACT SPECIFIC WD (~3) & TRANSMIT TO STATUS PANEL

Figure 150. - Selected System Control Computation Processor (CCP) Block Diagram

Actuator arrangement. - A triple-integrated actuator arrangement operates each of the 13 control surfaces. Operation in the active/on-line mode uses in-line monitoring techniques. Hydraulic power is supplied from three primary dual-pump sources. The flow capacity of each supply is adequate for full control of the vehicle.

A switched crossfeed from the four-channel I/O processor unit to the three-channel actuator sets accomplishes the redundancy-level change. The output section of the fourth IOP is on standby (no output to the servo actuators) until a failure in one of the IOPs is detected. At that time, the fourth IOP will be switched in place of the failed unit.

Maintenance test operation. - The maintenance test configuration provides maintenance test capability to detect and isolate failures of the IOP, CCP, sensors, and actuators. Maintenance test functions may be initiated via switches on the IOP front panel, the remote maintenance assessment panel, or as followup action after detecting an inflight failure. Self-test is accomplished under program control by the processors and includes the tests described in the following paragraphs.

Processor Tests. - Sample problems requiring all processor functions are performed with known inputs. Results are compared with a predetermined requirement to assure proper processor operation.

Memory tests. - Data memory is tested via summing of memory content and comparing results against predetermined requirements. For variable-data memory, termed scratchpad memory, known values (e. g., all "1"s) are first loaded into all variable memory locations such that a unique result will be obtained unless a memory failure has occurred. Instruction memory is tested via distribution of the self-test programs in all semiconductor memory devices to provide detection of massive device failures (e. g., output line stuck at "1"). Additionally, instruction memory parity is incorporated as part of inflight monitoring to detect individual bit failures when the instruction memory is accessed.

I/O tests. - The various types of I/O functions are tested via several techniques. Discrete inputs are tested by stimulating the input circuits to each binary state ("0" and "1") independently under processor control. The processor then checks for the appropriate binary value when the "stimmed" word is read. Servo command outputs are tested via returning the output signal, in analog form, back as a single-path d-c input. The processor then simply compares a known digital output value (which was converted to analog form in the output circuitry) with the corresponding measured input value. This form of test detects converter and multiplexer failures as well as sample-and-hold output failures. Servo engage discrete output circuitry is tested in a similar manner, i. e., by returning the discrete outputs back as self-test discrete inputs with processor comparison of the measured inputs versus the generated outputs. Bidirectional bus input/output circuitry is tested in a "wrap-around" manner as follows: The processor performs a unique output operation which loads the output register. As the parallel to serial register is shifted out, it provides a serial output gated into the one of the serial input paths, thus providing an input to the processor. Performing this operation with known values enables processor comparison of the initial values with the resulting input value. Thus failures in these paths may be detected. When the IOPs and CCPs are interconnected as in the normal aircraft installation, bus circuitry is further tested by transferring known data from one unit to the other and back, enabling thorough testing of this function.

Miscellaneous tests. - Additional tests are incorporated to assure proper operation. Typical of these are measurements of known voltages to further test the A/D converter and power supplies, testing of the redundant solenoid-engage switching used to assure actuator disengagement, etc.

SECTION 11 CONCLUSIONS

The trade study data generated during the course of this program leads to a number of significant conclusions. These conclusions, while being subject to various study assumptions and having a high sensitivity to the 1978 time frame, provide an insight into the concept and mechanization needs of an advanced complex flight control system and are discussed in the following paragraphs.

General

The results of the study show that the most cost-effective flight control system for an ATT aircraft using extensive active control technology can be implemented with the following technologies:

- Computation - general-purpose digital
- Sensors - conventional, gyros and accelerometers
- Actuation - integrated hydraulic packages

The overall computational requirements of the ATT flight control system cannot be cost-effectively achieved with an analog system design. The computation task requires the use of a digital processor. The system requires a high-integrity BIT capability, a capability which is less expensively implemented digitally. These factors allow the required functions to be implemented at minimum life-cycle cost in a general-purpose digital processor.

Conventional spinmotor rate gyros and pendulous force-rebalance accelerometers provide the best solution for meeting the sensing requirements; all are currently used in flight control systems. The use of advanced

types of inertial sensors is not indicated because they do not appear cost effective at the precision level needed for control system use (as opposed to the precision level needed for navigation systems).

Hydraulic actuation is projected as superior to other alternates, and the integrated hydraulic package is the most attractive mechanization. It provides the minimum cost per function because a single device accepts electrical command signals and outputs surface position and because it allows simplified monitoring and fault reaction since no intermediate crossfeeds are required.

Specific

Processors. - A small I/O processor coupled with a medium-sized control computation processor provides the optimum computing configuration. While meeting the ATT reliability and maintainability goals, this configuration provides the lowest overall costs, including initial acquisition as well as maintenance costs, throughout aircraft life. This lowest cost results from high utilization of hardware resources. Since the various computation configurations employ similar hardware technologies, overall cost tends to be proportional to hardware complexity, the least complex being the least costly.

Greater processor efficiency is achieved with the recommended configuration than in the other configurations. The total flight control tasks were found to exceed the throughput capability of the medium processor. Performing I/O, servo monitoring, and processor output selection in a separate I/O processor "unloads" the medium processor, thus providing an overall efficient fit. Despite an increase in the total task, due to the additional interface between the processors and duplication of maintenance test functions in two processors, resource utilization is higher than in the single-large-processor configurations. It should be emphasized that this conclusion is predicated on a 1978 design, with the processor capability projected for that time period.

Sensors. - Conventional body-rate sensors mounted in a hexad configuration provide a benefit in reduction of support costs since six less gyros are needed to produce the body-rate information. The application of the hexad-configured gyro is well documented in terms of computation necessary to extract the orthogonal body rates and the effective redundancy obtained. Calculations of operational reliability, comparing the conventional gyro in an orthogonal, quad-redundant configuration to the hexad gyro, show negligible change, both yielding a system reliability of approximately 0.63×10^{-7} failures per flight hour for an 8-hour time period.

The decrease in production cost due to the application of the hexad technique amounts to approximately 2 percent. The reduction in life-cycle costs however, is nearly 5 percent. This ratio is due to the significant contribution (about 30 percent) of gyros to the total life-cycle cost, while the contribution to production cost is only 6 percent. Consequently, reduction of the number of gyros wherever possible, or an increase in the MTBF-to-cost ratio, is a prime area concern for redundancy life-cycle costs.

Comparison monitoring. - Comparison monitoring techniques enjoy a high confidence level for sensors and computation functions because they are presently utilized for the most critical function similarly implemented in current commercial transport application - the automatic all-weather landing system. Even in the autoland system, the most distrust evidenced by some airframe manufacturers is in the self-monitored sections - the localizer and glideslope receivers. The self-monitored air data computers are not used for autoland functions below the decision height.

This lack of acceptance of self-monitoring is particularly significant in the ATT fly-by-wire system which eliminates the proven mechanical primary flight control equipment and does not include a mechanical backup. Opinion solicited from both airlines and airframe manufacturers indicate that the required confidence level for inline monitoring will not have been proven in time for the ATT aircraft. United Airlines has reflected this view in their ATT minimum equipment list by specifying quad comparison-monitored channels.

It is concluded that even though the fault-detection capability of self-monitored sensors and computation can be designed to approach that of the comparison-monitored sensors and computation, the lack of operational proofing and the unfavorable confidence level in the industry will not allow the full economic advantage of its utilization in the time frame or operational environment of the ATT.

Dispatch criteria. - Because of the costs associated with flight delays and flight cancellations, a primary driving force in determining redundancy level requirements is the "critical dispatch equipment" groundrule. The study shows that flight-critical sensors and electronics must be quad redundant to avoid severe cost penalties in operational use.

The primary dispatch criteria is that the flight systems must be capable of sustaining a failure and remaining completely operational. This criteria eliminates the dispatch of triple systems which have experienced a failure, since a second failure in a comparison monitored system renders it inoperable. The system would then have to wait for repairs, which significantly increases the life-cycle costs. Until inline monitoring techniques are thoroughly proven 100 percent effective, the use of quad comparison-monitored sensors and electronics as a minimum-equipment item will be required. The quad equipment may be dispatched with a failure, thus eliminating the need to provide high-level maintenance capability at most stops and reducing the probability of delay and its associated costs.

Actuators. - The recommended actuator configuration for the ATT aircraft is triple, integrated inline monitored sets. Each set is fail-operational for two failures and will operate with a single surviving actuator in a set.

The advantage of triple, inline monitored actuator sets is very significant in life-cycle cost, in aircraft weight, and in requirements for multiple independent hydraulic power and distribution systems. Inline monitoring is not acceptable for sensors and computations as previously stated. The

reasons that inline monitoring is favored for the actuation are first, the actuator closed loop can be easily modeled using input valve current, actuator velocity and actuator position. By comparing the actuator loop with its model, a very precise monitor can be constructed. Second, the inline actuator monitor has been used in several current military aircraft, both transport type and fighters. Honeywell has successfully used inline servo monitors on the C-5A Galaxie, the F14 Tomcat, the X-15 adaptive system and the J37 Viggen. For these reasons, the design and development risk is considered minimal for application to the ATT.

Because of the short stroke and relatively small surface moments on the wingtip flutter suppression surface, this actuator may be a triple-tandem assembly for minimum cost, retaining a reasonable weight and volume for maintenance. The other control actuators are recommended as triple-parallel, since the stroke and force requirements require separation of each actuator; a tandem package would be too large and heavy for maintainability.

Life-cycle cost elements. - The dominant life-cycle cost elements are associated with the sensors and actuators. Although the initial production costs are dominated by the electronics, the improvement experienced in digital circuit reliability has significantly reduced its cost of ownership.

The results show that the electronics represent around 60 percent of the production cost and actuators and sensors 38 percent. When reflected as life-cycle support costs, the contribution of each of these classes of parts is essentially reversed. Electronics support costs represent approximately 34 percent and actuators and sensors around 65 percent. The most dramatic effect is due to the gyros, representing 6 percent of the production cost and 30 percent of the total support costs. The percentage differences are:

	<u>Percent of Production Cost</u>	<u>Percent of Support Cost</u>
Electronics	58.6	33.8
Gyros	6.1	29.6
Accelerometers	4.7	11.7
Hydraulics	27.4	23.3
Miscellaneous	<u>3.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>
	100.0	100.0

Redundancy management. - Redundancy management requires a significant portion of the computation load. Even though the signal-select algorithm requires less than 200 add times per signal selection, the total signal-select function consumes nearly 50 percent of the computational time for a quad-redundant system due to the number of sensors and the iteration rates required.

A quad system employs 11 sensor sets and 13 sets of actuator feedback signals on which the signal select must act. The flight control system employs five sample rates, 160, 80, 40, 20 and 10 Hz. The flutter suppression is computed at the highest rate, and mode logic, for the most part, at the lowest rate.

The 160-Hz rate path does signal select on the 4 wingtip sensors. Hence, the total signal select time for this path alone is $(4 \times 160 \times 176)$ 113 KOPs per second. The remaining paths 80, 40 and 20 Hz consume 88 KOPs per second for a total of 201 KPSs per second; the signal select for a quad redundant system consumes nearly 20 percent more time. This points up the need for careful analysis and selection of the signal-select algorithm.

Computer requirements. - When addressing the question of computer requirements for the ATT, the key elements leading to an answer which yields a low-risk and yet cost-effective machine are:

- The ATT is considered to be a production aircraft.
- A 1978 go-ahead is assumed.
- Conventional frequency shaping will be used for the control laws.

Based on these elements, it was concluded that a medium-speed, 16-bit fixed-point arithmetic machine with a double-precision mode will do the control computation task. For a large-volume production aircraft, computer cost becomes an important factor. This points to a machine which will have sufficient throughput and an adequate instruction repertoire but which does not include features such as indirect addressing and floating-point arithmetic which are primarily programming aids that add to the production hardware costs.

With a 1978 go-ahead date, it is most unlikely that sophisticated control techniques employing matrix operations will be employed; rather the control law computations will utilize conventional digital frequency-shaping techniques. With the exception of the 160-Hz sample rate for the flutter mode and the gust maneuver load control, a fixed-point, 16-bit machine is satisfactory. For the high-rate computations, 24 bits are required to reduce the deadbands to a satisfactory level; however, the cost-effective solution is the use of double-precision arithmetic for the 160-Hz rates.

C-MOS circuitry. - The use of C-MOS circuit technology is anticipated due to a number of advantages associated with it:

- Low power dissipation resulting in lower operating temperatures and improved reliability
- Excellent noise immunity

- Adequate speed
- Single supply voltage
- Availability in a variety of logic functions with two or more sources
- Increasing acceptance and application implying continued availability through the ATT lifetime

The semiconductor manufacturers have begun to exploit significant new market areas in high-volume commercial electronics; the small calculator, automotive electronics, and wrist watches exemplify a few. As a result, the semiconductor manufacturers' direction appears to be one of further developing such markets and increasing production capacity to meet the demand. The manufacturers have expressed little interest in low-volume custom LSI production, particularly where airborne environmental requirements are imposed. Consequently, custom LSIC are not expected to be available. A possible exception to this is the processor itself. Since processors are general-purpose devices applicable to many different systems, high-volume production and second sourcing are anticipated for custom processor LSIC chips. For these reasons, it is projected that the ATT flight electronics will be largely based on use of the C-MOS standard circuits.

Semiconductor memories. - Semiconductor memories provide several advantages:

- Low cost
- Low power
- High packaging density
- Nondestructive readout (ROM and PROM)
- Fixed program content (some types may be altered via special loading devices)

The last of these, fixed content, is an advantage in that inadvertent and permanent modification cannot occur as a result of transient or improper processor operation which "rewrites" a portion of the program and appears as a permanent failure of the affected channel. However, it is advantageous only if few program changes are required. Following certification, changes are not anticipated for the ATT flight control system. By using alterable memories (core, plated wire or alterable semiconductor) during the precertification stages, the advantages offered by semiconductor memories can be realized in the ATT flight control system.

Memory circuit technology will be a mix of C-MOS, N or P-MOS, and bipolar. Scratchpad memory will use C-MOS RAM circuits which provide adequate speed and require very low power. The bulk of the instruction and constant memory will use C-MOS ROMS which provide the same advantages as the C-MOS RAMS. Standard PROMS (bipolar, N-MOS, or P-MOS) will be used for low-volume customer options or where infrequent changes occur.

SECTION 12

FURTHER STUDIES

During the conduct of this study several items arose which were considered at a level consistent with the scope of the study, but which are deserving of analysis in greater depth. Some of these items may be under study for military and space applications, but these studies may not fully evaluate the problems unique to commercial air service and their applicability to the ATT.

The areas in which further study appears to be the most fruitful are redundancy management, engine-flight control integration, pilot interface and natural hazards. Each of these items are suggested for further study as defined in the following paragraphs.

Flight Control/Propulsion Control Integration for Fuel Conservation

In view of a continued shortage of fuel and an associated price rise for the quantity available, it is worthwhile to consider fuel-management techniques for an ATT-type vehicle.

Energy conservation for various military-class aircraft has been a subject of several studies which resulted in the prediction of significant fuel and/or time savings, or range extension. At present, effort is being expended toward the realization of an algorithm allowing an on-line, real-time energy management computation.

The means by which the aircraft resources are most effectively used is through flight path optimization. There may be several criteria for the optimization -- minimum time-to-climb, minimum fuel, etc. Optimal flight paths are described usually as mach-altitude schedules, the development of which has been the subject of Honeywell studies investigating propulsion

management systems for military aircraft. For a commercial vehicle, bounded by given climb, cruise and descent boundaries, the schedules must be modified, thereby not yielding the most optimum path but the optimum yield within the constraints.

The advent of digital control, both for the flight control system, and for propulsion control yields some potential benefits. Certainly, the communication between the fuel management autopilot and propulsion control is made more efficient. Indeed, some of the computational load for optimization may be borne by each of the control-oriented machines.

Furthermore, some optimizing may be done within the engine itself using limited search techniques. The projected ATT engine with the potential of a movable exhaust nozzle, inlet variable geometry, and variable fan geometry provides parameters needed to accomplish some propulsion system optimization.

The propulsion control computer allows communication with the autopilot in terms of thrust, rather than throttle angle. In addition, there is the potential of the propulsion computer having the capability of engine performance prediction over the anticipated flight regime. This type of information is used as input to the optimum flight path computation.

Some potential areas of study relating to the commercial aircraft energy conservation problem are as follows:

- The effect of the limited flight boundaries on commercial aircraft, and the excess fuel consumption due to these paths.
- Examination of off-design point effects, such as cold and hot day operation, and the compensating benefits a system might achieve.
- Determination of the mode, such as altitude or mach hold, in which the fuel management approach might best be implemented.

- Determination of those variables, such as the geometry within the engine, which provides the most influence on the fuel optimization problem.
- Generation of propulsion system performance model utilizing characteristics already associated with the propulsion control system.
- A cost study to determine the overall savings potential obtained through the application of energy conservation techniques.

Redundancy Monitoring Techniques

The ATT requires a Flight Control System which is fail operational through a second failure, to meet the dispatch requirements of the airlines for a Fly-by-Wire system.

To attain the required operational capability it is necessary to employ redundant channels and monitoring to determine the failure status of each channel. There are two monitoring techniques to fulfill the fault detection needs. First, is comparison monitoring which depends on the comparison of at least three operating redundant channels to make a decision. The second is in-line or self-monitoring which relies on the ability of a single channel to perform a 100 percent effective self-test.

The use of self-monitored computers and sensors is not accepted by the users as a proven concept for flight control critical functions on a commercial air transport. This lack of confidence on the part of the users is due to the absence of operational experience and supporting analytical data and proofs.

It is suggested that further studies be made to provide, at least in part, the analysis required to prove the effectiveness of in-line monitoring and thus, gain the cost advantages inherent in this monitoring technique. This should include analysis of low cost methods to improve processor,

memory and I/O self-tests and methods for failure modes analysis which give confidence in the analytical results.

Redundancy Management/Signal Select

A key element in the redundancy management of digital flight control systems is the signal-select algorithm. Currently employed algorithms have been digitizations of techniques employed with analog systems, and, consequently, in a multiple-channel digital system, the signal-selection task represents a significant amount of the total computation time. By taking advantage of the unique features of a digital computer, it should be possible to develop signal-select algorithms with reduced time requirements and still retain the desired fault-suppression characteristics of signal selection.

A popular signal-select technique is median select. The corresponding digital algorithm for median select require 86 add times per signal per iteration for triple signal-select and 172 add times per signal per iteration for a quad signal-select. Thus, the impact of using 20 signals sampled at 40 iterations per second yields the following computer through-puts in KOPs per second:

Triple select	68.8 KOPs/sec
Quad select	137.6 KOPs/sec

These numbers represent a substantial portion of a small or medium processor time load, as much as 50 percent using the quad select algorithm. Although a small reduction in time could be achieved by improving the time efficiency of the algorithm, the fundamental difficulty results from the fact that the function is a digitization of an analog implementation.

The selection of a signal-select algorithm is an integral part of the overall signal-select philosophy. The signal-select concepts, such as voting or median select, are the essence of the signal-select algorithm. Developing

a signal-select philosophy tailored to the memory storage and arithmetic capability of a digital processor should yield an algorithm which requires considerably less computation time than the current algorithms. This effort is considered to be of considerable significance in the development of future multiple-channel digital flight control systems and is recommended for further study.

Natural Hazards/Lightning Strike

The effect of lightning strike on an electrical fly-by-wire aircraft becomes very critical, especially in passenger aircraft. The candidate system concepts were all designed to meet the requirements of MIL-STD-461A which has been considered adequate for flight control design in commercial transports. New design guidelines are needed, however, for electric fly-by-wire, and some very interesting work is under way. The General Electric High Voltage Laboratory is surveying lightning strike results in the Airline Lightning Strike Reporting Project, and Lightning Transients Research, Inc., is assisting in the development of design guidelines for the B1 bomber. These and other similar work should be investigated and the applicable results evaluated for the ATT.

The generation of design guidelines for the ATT would require the consideration of special treatment for cabling the ATT FCS. Because the FCS wiring will be present in so many parts of the aircraft, due to electrical data transmission rather than mechanical transmission, and because of the higher-order mode implementation and the consequent multiplicity of surfaces and sensors, protection would be very extensive if required. The protection normally considered from the aircraft skin should be considered for its effectiveness throughout the airframe wherever FCS wiring is projected.

Pilot Interface/Annunciation and Displays

As automatic control systems have become more complex, the pilot interface has become more sophisticated, allowing the pilot to be aware of the system status. An example of this trend is the use of word-message-mode annunciators presently implemented on the DC 10 for the flight guidance and control which are especially oriented toward the autoland maneuver.

The pilot interface with a system such as the ATT FCS, with its unique requirements and advanced functional requirements is considerably more demanding than those previously encountered. The scope of the present study did not permit an in-depth examination of what should be displayed or what strategies would be appropriate for display generation. Electronic displays themselves warrant further investigation and should be considered candidates for future ATT work.

The use of electronic attitude indicators (EADI), multifunction displays (MFD), and other advanced display techniques should significantly enhance the pilot interface and provide a reduced crew workload.

APPENDIX A

STUDY METHODOLOGY

The system tradeoffs were based on the total life-cycle cost for the flight control system as determined in an operational environment defined by Section 8. By making all tradeoffs against a common element (cost), and without deviation from basic performance requirements, a true tradeoff is achieved, since the analyst is forced to evaluate every decision factor against the common element. A set of minimum requirements was evaluated for each function or mode. For example, the fly-by-wire functional reliability was established considerably higher than the functional reliability for relief modes.

Final system selection was on the basis of various life-cycle cost elements generated by the GEMM program (ref. 1). This computer program was designed to simulate a logistical support system for purposes of early system evaluation. A more detailed program description appears later in this appendix.

Included in the major tradeoff parameters were research and development costs, production costs, support costs, and operating costs. The support-cost determination integrates the effects of system size, complexity and reliability with an assumed route structure and maintenance philosophy. This cost is computed utilizing the GEMM program. The research, development and production costs are generated as a function of the design concept, i. e., functions, module count, different types of boards, development required, new tooling and other equipment parameters. Although the physical characteristics such as volume and power have an influence on operating costs, all systems were relatively close to one another with one exception. This comparison was consequently disregarded for tradeoff purposes.

The design requirements for the above studies are defined in Sections 3 and 4 which provide block diagrams and performance requirements for the functions to be included in the study. The mechanizations to be evaluated are

based on redundant integration of various sensor types, computational methods, servoactuator configurations and data-transfer methods. The various candidate configurations to be evaluated will be reasonable extrapolations of advanced techniques estimated to be available and applicable in the 1978-1985 time span.

Study Process

The study process generally adhered to is shown in Figure A1, and the following paragraphs provide some definition to each of the study steps. Figure A2 defines the system elements.

Technology survey. - The results of the technology survey were a starting point for the trade studies. Electronic circuitry, sensors, hydraulic system concepts and digital processors were identified as probable hardware items available for the 1978 time period.

Component definition and characteristics. - From the technology survey, the components most likely to be utilized in the stated time period were defined in terms of their size, weight, power consumption, and mean time to failure. As used in this study, component relates to times such as digital processor, an analog computer, a gyro package, or an air data computer.

Piece part definition and characteristics. - Also from the technology survey, the individual piece-part items such as resistors, integrated circuits, position sensors, pressure sensors, gear trains, transformers or individual gyro elements were defined in terms of their cost, reliability, size and weight.

Functional requirements. - The functional requirements are the basic vehicle performance, maintainability and reliability requirements that all candidate systems must meet.




Figure A1. - Study Flow Path




Figure A2. - Terminology Definition

The modes which are necessary to the control mechanization are listed and include, for example, stability augmentation, flutter suppression and load alleviation modes.

Functional block diagrams. - Based on the functional requirements, functional block diagrams were prepared depicting the control modes to be mechanized. Section 4 contains the block diagrams used for the system study.

Mode reliability. - At this point in the study, the reliability apportionment for each of the control modes was established based on the functional requirements. This apportionment was weighted according to the importance of the mode to safety of flight. All systems had to meet 1×10^{-7} failures per hour as a minimum requirement.

Subsystem reliability requirements. - With the mode reliability apportionment known, the subsystems comprising the mode may be assigned a reliability. A subsystem is defined as consisting of several components connected together to perform a given task. An example may be the redundant configuration of servoactuators and necessary driving electronics to close a local servo loop. The component reliability was computed as part of the GEMM program and was based on piece-part reliability data.

Computational sizing. - The functional block diagrams in Section 4 defined the modes and functions to be included in all candidate configurations. The computational capability required to implement a nonredundant single-channel flight control system providing these modes and functions was then determined. This included instruction sizing, timing requirements and memory capacity definition. The additional capabilities necessary to implement redundant channels were then added to the basic control law computation. This includes redundancy management and signal-select processes.

Subsystem tradeoff and definition. - At this point, the various subsystems designed to accomplish the control mode function were examined, and those which provided the best combinations were selected. The results of this

level of study were then used in a number of candidate systems.

Systems mechanization and candidate definition. - The results of the various subsystem trade studies were used to devise 24 candidate systems. The functional paths developed were utilized in a number of the candidate system combinations. The various systems are described in Section 9.

Reliability success diagrams. - Based on the system mechanization, success-path diagrams were derived for each candidate system.

System maintainability definition. - The overall system maintenance man hours per flight hour along with the system reliability, form two of the major design parameters that are specified as basic fundamental requirements. Maintenance parameters were computed in the GEMM program based on individual module and component estimates.

Weight and size definition. - With the candidate system mechanization known along with the characteristics of the components which comprise each system, the major physical parameters were determined. The size and weight parameters are broken down to the major package level including items such as actuators, computers, gyro packages, display packages and inertial measurement units. The GEMM program provides weight down to the module level to determine transportation costs.

Cost summaries. - Four major cost items were derived from study data: research and development costs, support costs, production costs and operation costs attributable to the system mechanization.

Research and development cost: These costs were developed from past experience associated with similar systems. The mechanization, redundancy management, state of sensor development, and built-in-test implementation are examples of the items influenced by these costs.

Production cost: This cost is primarily related to the quantity of hardware per system, the handling processes necessary, and level of automated equipment and associated personnel skill levels required.

Support costs: Support costs were computed by the GEMM program. The data inputs and outputs are described in detail in a later paragraph. The results were tabulated in Section 10.

Operations cost: These are costs attributed to aircraft delays and cancellations due to problems with the flight control hardware. It is coupled to the system's redundancy level, and its mean time to first failure characteristic. These costs were fully described in Section 8 as part of the operational model.

Airline operations. - This was primary input to the study program. The parameters defined here include some of the following items as examples:

- Airline route structure
- Average operating times
- Average flight distance
- Depot shop locations
- Depot shop capabilities
- Test equipment requirements
- Manpower skills required
- Scheduled maintenance assumptions
- Logistics considerations
- Stockage levels
- Publications.

These, and other operational parameters were obtained primarily from present practice on vehicles such as the DC-10. It is thought that this will

closely represent the airline practice in the 1980 to 1985 time period. The operations structure is defined in detail in Section 8 of this report. All of the parameters listed form inputs to the GEMM program.

System selection. - The cost data from the above calculations were then summarized along with the research and development, production, and GEMM-computed costs in tables provided in Section 9. Due to the assumption that all systems are designed to meet the minimum performance requirements, the minimum-cost system was considered the "best" choice of the candidates available. Plots of the summary cost data are provided in Section 9.

GEMM Program

General Description. - The prime output of the ATT study was a trade study which compared the cost of ownership for the various systems considered. It was intended that this study be sensitive to the cost, complexity, and reliability of individual circuit boards and nonelectronic components.

The Army-developed GEMM (Generalized Electronics Maintenance Model) computer program provided the level of detail necessary to evaluate this somewhat subjective item. The GEMM model was designed to simulate the army logistics support system for the purpose of early evaluation of candidate system designs. With some minor changes, it was felt that the airline structure was suitably represented since the equations used are generalized maintenance and stockage formulas. The intent was to "provide management with the capability to study the interaction of the many elements of equipment design and logistics support and the effect that each element has on life cycle support costs and operational availability". A complete description, with equations, appears in reference 1 from which the following comments were excerpted.

The GEMM model belongs to that class of mathematical models normally referred to as a "support" model. A support model is a representation of an actual support system. This representation may be accomplished in a

number of ways but the most common means is by simulation or mathematical equations or a combination of both. Some support models can be exercised by hand, but in most cases support models are computerized.

For the most part, GEMM utilizes mean value for input data. This type of data is available or may generally be obtained within the maintenance structure. GEMM does, however, consider confidence limits for stockage based on the Poisson distribution.

Again, to be realistic, GEMM is compatible with the actual maintenance structure. Data such as number of equipments in the structure, the number of organizational, direct, general and depot support shops, etc., are required by GEMM. Decisions made by the model are based on life-cycle support costs.

The GEMM model is not a compilation of sophisticated mathematical manipulations. It makes use of standard methods of determining logistics support requirements. The attribute of GEMM is not its utilization of complex computer-oriented operations research techniques but the speed with which it performs previously manual calculations and the integration of design and logistics variables to provide a total-picture approach to design and logistics decision-making.

The effect that changes in spares policy, manpower, test equipment, etc., will have on the support system life-cycle cost and the equipment operational availability can be shown over a wide range of values. Likewise, the effect of design changes in reliability and maintainability can be assessed and reliability-versus-maintainability tradeoffs can be performed. These investigations can be accomplished using estimated and predicted values to assist in the decision-making in the early design stages before equipment design stages before equipment design and logistics policy have been firmly definitized.

The speed with which GEMM can be exercised on the computer permits sensitivity analysis yielding instantaneous evaluation of alternative solutions. Many iterations of the input data may be accomplished such as different MTBFs,

MTTRs, stockage confidence levels, and other input variables. This sensitivity analysis permits detailed analysis of the effect of design and logistic parameters on life-cycle support costs. Sensitivity analysis can be used to pinpoint system parameters that will have a significant impact on life-cycle support costs in order to "zero-in" on these critical factors.

Furthermore, the model can be exercised with updated information, as performance data becomes available, to verify earlier decisions. The maintenance philosophy of fielded equipment can be analyzed to determine if certain changes might yield a more cost-effective support system.

Four categories or echelons of maintenance are defined for the study. These are organizational support, direct support, general support, and depot support. Table A1 defines the action occurring at each of these levels as it pertains to the ATT study.

The GEMM model is not constrained to the general maintenance organization shown in Table A1. It has the flexibility to investigate various structures. To accomplish this variation of structure, it is necessary to identify several maintenance actions without restricting the echelon at which they could occur.

The maintenance actions are: check out equipment (COE), fault isolate to component (FIC), fault isolate to module (FIM), fault isolate to part (FIP), throwaway module (TAM), throwaway component (TAC), and throwaway equipment (TAE). COE is the only restricted action, and it must be accomplished at organizational support. COE is the action required to determine that the equipment has failed. FIC is the maintenance action that is required to fault isolate the failed equipment down to the component level (i. e., to locate the failed component), and it can occur at any one of the four echelons.

Correspondingly, FIM is the action required to locate the failed module, and FIP is the action required to locate the failed part. It is assumed that the actions must be performed in sequence; i. e., before FIP can be performed it is necessary to perform COE, FIC, and FIM respectively.

TABLE A1. - LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE

Category	Organizational maintenance	Direct support maintenance	General support maintenance	Depot maintenance
Level	1	2	3	4
Done where	On aircraft	On aircraft and airport dock	In maintenance shop	In maintenance shop
Done by whom	Line maintenance personnel, level 1	Line maintenance personnel, level 1	Shop repair personnel, level 2	Shop repair personnel, level 2
Basis	Utilize BITE and checkout equipment	Identify failed component and replace (LRU)	Identify failed module and replace	Identify failed part and replace
Type of work done	Inspection, servicing adjustment, minor repair	Inspection, servicing, adjustment monitor repair, LRU replacement	Inspection, complicated adjustment, use of automated test equipment, major repair, circuit-card-level replacement	Inspection, most complicated adjustment, repair and replace, major overhaul, circuit-card repair, hydraulic repair

For the most part, the straightforward four-level maintenance structure will be utilized; however, some throwaway maintenance policies will be considered.

Inputs to program. - The GEMM model utilizes mean values for inputs in order to reduce the magnitude of the data-collection effort. Also, to further minimize data gathering, the number of data inputs is held to the absolute minimum commensurate with the level of detail provided by the GEMM program. The general data requirements for GEMM include:

- Reliability and maintainability information
- Research and development costs
- Maintenance structure
- Test equipment
- Personnel
- Attrition factors
- Transportation
- Publications
- Stockage information
- Economic life

Reliability and maintainability information is required for the end item and for each component, module and part class within the end item. To reduce data collection for individual pieceparts, they will be structured into what will be called part classes.

This structuring will place parts of similar cost and MTBF into one class which will conserve program data card and execution time. Wherever a part does not logically fit, a part class will be assigned to that part alone. With the parts failure rate given, the module, component and end-item mean time to first failure will be computed.

The operational profile for the equipment under consideration must be entered into the model. The profile includes such information as hours of operation per day of the equipment, number of days per year of operations, and restrictions on maintenance shops such as number of shifts, hours per shift, number of shop operating hours per year, etc.

Maintenance structure information is required, such as the number of organizational shops supported by one direct support shop, the number of direct support shops per general support shop, etc. Also, distances between shops, and number of equipments supported per shop are other examples of structure data requirements.

Test equipment and maintenance personnel requirements are needed as inputs to the model. Test equipment information is input by type and cost, and maintenance personnel are described by skill-level type and pay allowance per year.

Attrition factors are input to the model to reflect damage and other nonoperational failure. Transportation information includes distances between shops, as mentioned previously, the cost per pound per mile for transportation, and the weights of the modules, components and the end item.

Stockage information includes the array of confidence levels to be investigated, the turnaround times, order-ship times and the length of the replenishment periods. Also included is the cost of the spares. And, a final input is the economic life to be considered for the equipment under study.

These inputs have been discussed in general categories. Table A2 provides a more detailed listing of input data requirements.

TABLE A2. - GEMM INPUT REQUIREMENTS

1. Number of components in equipment
2. Number of classes of parts in equipment
3. Number of modules in each component
4. Number of each part class in each module
5. Reliability information based on equipment operating hours for each part class
6. Mean-time to check-out the equipment
7. Mean-time-to-repair information based on active repair time (fault diagnosis + replacement time + retest and recalibrate time):
 - a. Mean-time-to-repair the equipment
 - b. Mean-time-to-repair each component
 - c. Mean-time-to-repair each module
8. Cost of the equipment
9. Cost of the components
10. Cost of the modules
11. Average cost of each part class
12. Number of different types of test equipment required to perform all maintenance functions
13. Test equipment required to check-out equipment
14. Test equipment required to fault isolate to the component
15. Test equipment required to fault isolate to the module
16. Test equipment required to fault isolate to the part
17. Cost for each type of test equipment
18. Number of different types of manpower skill levels
19. Skill level required for check-out-equipment
20. Skill level required for fault isolation to component
21. Skill level required for fault isolation to module
22. Skill level required for fault isolation to part
23. Cost for each type of skill level (per year)
24. Weight of the equipment
25. Weight of each component
26. Weight of each module.
27. Number of equipments serviced per shop at each maintenance level

TABLE A2. - GEMM INPUT REQUIREMENTS - Concluded

28. Number of maintenance shops at each maintenance level in the force structure
29. Distance in miles between each maintenance level (between Org and DS, DS, and GS, GS and Depot, also Org and GS, Org and Depot, DS and Depot)
30. Cost per pound per mile for transportation (between the different shops)
31. Requisition time for a part from the depot if part out of stock at level (L) where L can be Org, DS and GS and Depot
32. Requisition time for throwaway module from Depot if module out of stock at level (L) where L can be Orgn, DS, GS, and Depot
33. Requisition time for throwaway component from Depot if component out of stock at level (L) where L can be Orgn, DS, GS, and Depot
34. Requisition time for spare equipment from the Depot
35. Number of days per year that maintenance shops at each level operate
36. Number of days per year of operation of the equipment
37. Operating hours per day of the equipment
38. Confidence limits for stockage of parts, modules, components, and the equipment
39. Probability of false-no-go
40. Attrition factor
41. Requirements objective period
42. Stockage objective periods between levels
43. Order and shipping times between levels
44. Turnaround times for modules between levels
45. Turnaround times for components between levels
46. Economic life
47. Cost to train each skill-level type
48. Turnover time for manpower
49. Percentage factor of total stockage cost for inventory management
50. Fraction mean-time-to-repair reduced if maintenance is accomplished at the depot level
51. Total cost of research and development
52. Publication information

Outputs from the program. - The life-cycle support costs form an important category of output information. The support costs are divided into the following factors:

- Test equipment cost
- Spares and repair parts cost
- Personnel costs
- Transportation cost
- Training costs
- Inventory management costs
- Publications cost
- Research and development costs
- Production cost

The maintenance allocation for repair of all modules, components, and the end item is an output of GEMM. Any module or component that should receive throwaway maintenance is indicated along with the level at which throwaway should take place.

The requirements for stock, test equipment and maintenance personnel is presented in the output. The stockage requirements are shown as the quantity required for each level of maintenance. The test equipment requirements at each level are presented by type of test equipment and quantity required. The skill level designation for the maintenance personnel and the quantity that is required at each level of maintenance is indicated. The outputs for test equipment and personnel are presented on a per-shop basis.

Derivation of key equations. - The following discussion concerns the derivation of key relationships that are utilized internally within the calculation portion of GEMM. The key equations will be presented in the following order: Annual Maintenance Manhour, Test Equipment Requirements, Manpower Requirements, Transportation and Stockage Requirements, Inventory Management and Training. These are reproduced in part from reference 4.

Annual maintenance manhour calculations: The Annual Maintenance Manhour computer subroutine is exercised for each module and component and for the equipment to determine the Annual Maintenance Manhour (AMMH)

requirements for maintenance. The AMMH is defined as the number of failures per year multiplied by the mean time to repair (MTTR) per failure, or

$$\text{AMMH} = (\text{number of failures/year}) (\text{MTTR/failure}).$$

In more detail, this equation becomes,

$$\text{AMMH} = \frac{(\text{operating hours/day} \times \text{operating days/year}) (\text{MTTR/failure})}{\text{Mean-time-between failure (MTBF)}}$$

Test equipment calculations: The routine that calculated test equipment requirements makes use of the AMMH information to calculate the test equipment required for each module, component and the equipment. The test equipment required for the unit under test (UUT), whether it be module, component or equipment, is defined as the AMMH for the UUT divided by the number of shop hours available per year. The equation for this becomes,

$$\text{Test equipment of type I per shop} = \frac{(\text{AMMH of UUT}) \times N}{\text{Shop hours available/year}},$$

where N = total number of UUTs per shop.

$$\text{In more detail, TE(I) per shop} = \frac{(\text{AMMH of UUT}) (\text{UUTs/shop})}{(\text{Operating hours/shop} \times \text{operating days/year})}$$

and the total test equipment requirement for type I in the maintenance structure is:

$$\text{Total test equipment I} = \text{TE(I)/shop} \times \text{number of shops/maintenance structure.}$$

These calculations are performed for the checkout and repair of the equipment being studied and for the repair of each module and component within the equipment. The test equipment requirements are summed over all the UUTs (modules, components and the equipment) to get the total test equipment required for full equipment repair capability.

Maintenance manpower calculations: The equations for the calculation of maintenance manpower requirements are derived in a similar manner using the AMMH values for the UUT. In equation form

$$\text{MOS (I)} = \frac{(\text{AMMH of UUT})}{(\text{MOS hours available})}$$

or

$$\text{MOS (I) per shop} = \frac{(\text{AMMH of UUT}) (\text{UUTs/shop})}{(\text{Operating hours/shop} \times \text{operating days/year} \times \text{PF})}$$

where PF = productivity factor.

The productivity factor indicates the percentage of the time the repairman is productive when he is available. And for the total force structure this becomes,

$$\text{Total MOS (I)} = \text{MOS (I)/shop} \times \text{number of shops/maintenance structure.}$$

Stockage calculations: Stockage calculations are based on the initial provisioning period of six months, for the initial provisioning stock, and on the consumption rate for reorder stock. The model calculates stockage requirements similarly to the way it is now done manually.

There are two types of initial provisioning stockage: nonrepairable stock and repairable stock. Nonrepairable stock is stockage for items that are not repaired such as parts and throwaway items, i. e., throwaway modules, throwaway components and throwaway equipments. Repairable stock is stockage for items that are repaired such as repairable modules, components, and/or end items.

For nonrepairable stockage, three classes are calculated for initial provisioning:

- Initial-issue quantity
- Order-ship quantity
- Replacement quantity.

Initial-issue quantity is the issue of stock that is placed in the field concurrently with the initial deployment of an equipment. Order-ship stockage is the stock that is necessary to fill the stockage pipe-lines and is based on the turnaround time. Finally, the replacement quantity is the nonrepairable stock located at the depot that is utilized as backup or replacement stock for the field stockage as it is used up.

For repairable stock there is no need for initial issue stockage or replacement stockage. Since the item in question is repairable, it is not lost to the system when a failure occurs. The only stockage that is required is pipeline stock which is used to replace the failed item while it is being repaired (turned around). This stockage is analogous to order-ship stockage for nonrepairables.

The first step in the derivation of the equation to calculate initial-issue stock is to determine the number of failures within a 15-day period.

$$\text{Failures/15 days} = \text{operating hours/day} \times \text{number of days/year} \\ \times 0.04 \text{ mean-time-between-failure (MTBF)}$$

This mean demand per shop for the stockage objective (B) is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Mean demand} = \text{failures/15 days} \times \text{number of uses/equipment} \\ \times \text{number of equipments/shop} \times B,$$

where B = number of 15-day periods in stockage objective which is defined as the amount of time for which a maintenance level is allowed to stock.

Thus, the stock required for a given protection level (K) at a particular support shop becomes,

$$\text{Initial-issue stock} = \text{mean demand} + K (\text{mean demand})^{1/2}$$

The total stock required for the entire force structure is therefore,

Initial-issue stock/force structure = initial issue/shop x number
of shops in maintenance structure.

Combining these three types of stockage, the initial provisioning quantity for nonrepairables becomes,

Total initial provisioning/force structure = initial-issue stock/maintenance structure.

+ order-ship/stock maintenance structure.

+ replacement stock/maintenance structure.

As mentioned previously, only pipeline stockage is required for repairables as compensation for the turnaround time necessary to affect a repair on a failed item. The equation for calculating the mean demand for pipeline stockage per shop is:

Mean demand = failures/15 days x turnaround time x number of
uses/equipment x number equipment/shop.

For a given protection level K, the pipeline stockage is:

Pipeline stockage = mean demand + K (mean demand)^{1/2} per shop.

The total stock required for the entire airlines maintenance structure is:

Pipeline stockage/maintenance structure = pipeline stock/shop x shops/
maintenance structure.

Reorder stockage is calculated for both repairables and nonrepairables, and is based on the consumption rate. For nonrepairables the reorder stockage is equal to the number of failures expected in the force structure and the

life cycle plus those failures which will be caused by attrition. Reorder stockage for repairables is simply the number of failures caused by attrition as all other failures are corrected by repair rather than replacement action.

Inventory management calculations: Inventory management costs for stockage inventories are calculated by the use of an inventory factor. This inventory is a percentage of the total stockage costs over the life cycle being considered.

The initial provisioning quantity minus the amount consumed during the initial provisioning period is maintained throughout the life cycle, and reorder stock is requisitioned for each year after the initial provisioning period as stock is consumed. An average reorder stockage is considered since the stock is not on hand for the entire period. This average is approximated by one-half of the total reorder stock since theoretically, at the beginning of each year there will be a large quantity of reorder stock on hand and at the end of the year there will be none. Thus, the reorder stock divided by two is the average reorder quantity on hand during the year. The formula yielding the inventory management cost is:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Inventory management cost} \\ \text{for life cycle} \end{array} = \begin{array}{l} \text{Initial provisioning quantity} \times \text{cost of} \\ \text{stock} \times \text{inventory factor} \times \text{economic life} \end{array}$$

Maintenance training calculations: Training costs reflect the number of maintenance personnel required, the type of MOS and the turnover rate of maintenance types. The formula for maintenance training is:

$$\text{Training costs} = \text{number of MOS type} \times \text{cost of training per MOS type} \times \text{life cycle (years)/turnover rate}$$

Publications cost calculation: Publications cost are calculated for the checkout equipment, fault-isolate-to-component, fault-isolate-to-module and fault-isolate-to-part maintenance functions. In general,

Publications cost = cost per page x number of pages required for specific maintenance action.

Research and development cost: This is the total cost of research and development and is an input into the model. It is useful for sensitivity to reflect changes in research and development cost when equipment design and failure rates are changed.

Production cost: This is simply an estimate of the total production costs including the cost of prime equipment.

Overhaul costs: Overhaul costs are considered using a time-between-overhaul (TBO) and a cost per overhaul as input information. Overhaul costs may be considered for modules, components and the end-item. The equation for overhaul cost is:

Cost of overhaul = equipment life cycle/TBO x cost per overhaul.

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

- A -

Access time. - Generally, the time interval between a request for the content of a location in a memory device and the delivery of this information (read operation); also time between command to store data in a memory location and the completion of the storage (write operation). Access time is thus the sum of the waiting time and the transfer time. For random access storage devices, the access time is essentially constant.

Accumulator. - A register (or registers) and associated equipment in the arithmetic unit of a computer in which are formed the results of various arithmetic and logical operations, such as addition, subtraction, (complementing), and shifting (multiplication).

ACT. - Abbreviation for active control techniques.

Actuator. - A device which converts an electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic or mechanical signal to a mechanical output using electric, pneumatic, hydraulic or mechanical energy. It may include amplifiers, valves, clutches, gears, motors, pumps, transducers, etc., packaged within the same assembly.

Accuracy. - The degree of freedom for error of a quantity, as distinguished from precision.

A/D. - Abbreviation for analog/digital.

Address. - A specific location in the computer (usually a memory location) where data or instructions are stored.

Address modification. - The changing of the address portion of a computer word before the instruction is executed by the use of index registers, indirect addressing, or other techniques.

Alphanumeric. - A symbolic code that contains both alphabetic characters (letters) and numeric characters (digits). Alphanumeric codes generally include additional characters such as commas, periods, ampersand, mathematical characters, etc.

Analog/digital (A/D) converter. - A device for converting an electrical analog signal to a corresponding digital data word.

Architecture. - The conceptual and functional structure of the computer system, excluding the equipment internal organization and detailed implementation. Multiple implementations are possible for most architectural specifications.

Arithmetic unit. - The portion of the computer that performs the arithmetic and logical operations.

Assembly language. - A computer language which permits the writing of symbolic addresses (such as X or A1) for absolute binary addresses (such as 01100 or 11010) and also the writing of symbolic operation codes (such as ADD or SUB) instead of binary machine operation codes (such as 111 or 011). One assembly language statement normally translates into one machine instruction.

Assembly program. - A computer program which translates a program written in an assembly language into a machine language program.

Availability. - Probability that a device or system is functioning properly during specific time periods. Availability depends on the time to detect faults and repair or reconfigure as well as MTBF.

Base. - See radix.

Base register. - A register containing an address which is modified by the contents of an address field in an instruction to determine the effective address. It is also used to retain linkage addresses for subroutine entry and return. A base register generally contains a complete address that is modified by a displacement location in the instruction (see index register).

BCD. - Abbreviation for binary coded decimal.

Binary. - Pertains to a number system based on the radix 2. Two symbols are used, usually 1 and 0.

Binary coded decimal (BCD). - Pertains to an encoding technique whereby each of the decimal digits 0 through 9 is represented by a unique group of binary digits.

BIT. - Abbreviation for built-in test. May include both software or hardware.

Bit. - Abbreviation for binary digit. A bit is a single character in a binary number and has the value of 0 or 1.

Buffer. - A temporary storage device used to make possible transfer between two devices whose input and output speeds are not matched.

Bulk modulus. - The compressibility, or hydraulic spring rate, of a fluid. Expressed in psi (lbs/sq. in) and generally decreased with an increase in temperature.

Bus. - A common path for transfer of information between several sources and several destinations.

Bypass valve. - Means for short-circuiting the flow around a cylinder or motor so that its output may be nullified.

Byte. - A group of binary digits which are handled as a unit. Generally, a word composed of an integral number of bits.

- C -

CCV. - Abbreviation for control configured vehicle.

Centralized. - Refers to a computer system organization in which all computational tasks are performed by a general-purpose computer (see dedicated).

Channel. - Usually a transfer path for specific I/O data.

Chip. - A single monolithic semiconductor element. A chip may be in the form of an IC, MSI, or LSI device or a transistor.

CMOS. - Abbreviation for complementary metal oxide semiconductor.

Code. - An arrangement of basic symbols to convey a system of notation for example, to use binary 1 and 0 symbols for generating computer codes such as BCD, octal, etc.

Compiler. - A computer program which translates a compiler language program into a machine language program.

Compiler language. - A procedure-oriented computer programming language such as FORTRAN, JOVIAL, PL/1 or SPL. A single compiler language statement is generally translated into several machine instructions.

Complement. - A number of quantity that is derived from another number or quantity by subtraction in accordance with special rules. Complements are used in computers to represent negative numbers and to perform subtraction by addition.

Computer. - A machine which is able to perform sequence of arithmetic and logical operations upon information. A digital computer uses integers to express all variables and quantities of a problem, whereas an analog computer calculates by using physical analogs of the variables. In the latter, a one-to-one correspondence exists between each numerical quantity occurring in the problem and varying physical measurement (e. g. , voltage level).

Control unit. - A major functional unit of a computer that is the traffic controller of the system. It produces timing, control, and command signals for execution of the computer program. It causes all elements to function together as an integrated system.

Core memory. - A memory device consisting of an array of ferromagnetic cores. Generally, each core stores a single binary digit; the direction of magnetic polarization determines whether the bit is a 0 or 1.

Cycle time. - The time interval required to perform a complete "read" cycle for a memory, or the minimum time interval between the starts of successive accesses to a storage location.

Cylinder. - The usual output member of a hydraulic or pneumatic actuator, containing a piston (or diaphragm) and having a fixed, or limited stroke.

- D -

D/A. - Abbreviation for digital/analog.

Data memory. - See variable memory.

Data word. - A computer word containing an ordered set of bits used to represent a data quantity.

Dedicated. - Refers to a computer system organization consisting of multiple computers, each of which is permanently assigned to a single computational function. The individual computers are usually small, special-purpose devices. (see centralized).

Destructive readout (DRO). - Refers to memories in which the read process destroys the information in the storage medium. If the information is to be retained, it must be temporarily stored in an external register (the memory buffer register) and then rewritten into the memory.

Diagnostic routine. - A routine or special program designed to check out computer operations. These programs usually isolate and indicate malfunctioning areas of a computer, and designate the specific faults. Machine diagnostic programs check the computer itself, and program diagnostics verify the software.

Differential pressure sensor (ΔP sensor). - An instrument for measuring the difference between the pressures existing on either side of a piston in a cylinder. It can have an electrical, mechanical hydraulic, or pneumatic output which is of some mathematical relationship to the differences in the pressures sensed.

Digital. - Representation of a quantity using digits or discrete steps.

Digital/analog (D/A) converter. - A device for converting a digital value to a corresponding electrical analog output signal.

Digital strut. - A series-connected group of cylinders (usually hydraulic) arranged in binary-coded output stroke capability and each having an associated valve connected so that each may be capable of going to either of two positions. The output position of the strut is the digital sum of the individual cylinders (bits).

Discretes. - Output control levels generated by the computer or input control levels interpreted by the computer. Discretes are constrained to binary values (i. e., 0 or 1), and generally indicate the occurrence of a specific event in the system of the state of some particular device or switch.

Direct memory access. - Refers to a type of I/O channel which permits data transfer directly between memory and external devices under external device control.

Double precision. - Refers to the use of two data words to represent a single number, thereby gaining increased precision.

Driver actuator. - An actuator, usually having redundant inputs, with relatively low output power capability and used primarily to position the input of larger, or power, actuators.

- E -

EHV. - Abbreviation for electro-hydraulic valve.

Electrohydraulic servovalve. - A device for controlling the flow or pressure of a hydraulic fluid with an electrical signal; flow or pressure (or a specified combination) is usually proportional to input current.

EMI. - Abbreviation for electromagnetic interference.

Engage valve. - A device for initiating the operation of a hydraulic or pneumatic actuator by electrical, mechanical, hydraulic or pneumatic signal. In addition to controlling the supply of power fluid into the actuator, it may include bypass and other special purpose valving. Operation usually refers to "off" mode upon removal of control signal.

Error. - A miscalculation in the program being executed by the computer; either is not expected or an incorrect result is computed. Both types of errors may be caused at once by some faults.

Error-detecting codes. - Codes wherein data words contain additional checking bits to allow detection of errors that occur in data handling, and often to determine which bit is in error. Many coding techniques for adding redundancy digits are in use and differ in their ability to detect and/or correct multiple errors.

Executive. - A supervisory program which allocates the processor resources among programs and controls the peripherals to be employed for a specific program.

- F -

Failure. - A malfunction caused by component failure or degradation. Failures are considered "hard" if the malfunction is continuous or "intermittent" if it only occurs occasionally. An intermittent failure is typified by a soldered joint which opens momentarily under vibration and temperature stress.

Fault. - The deviation of a logic variable from its prescribed value. Most faults will cause an error. A transient fault is a temporary logic deviation caused by an intermittent component failure or by external interferences (e. g., power supply irregularities or EMI). A permanent fault is the result of a hard component failure.

Fault tolerance. - Ability of a computer to execute error-free programs in the presence of a fault. Fault tolerance in digital computers is achieved by means of protective redundancy, and must be qualified by the classes of faults that are tolerated and the parts of the computer in which they may occur.

Fixed memory. - See read-only memory.

Fixed point. - Referring to the representation of a number by a single set of digits with a constant implied location of the radix point.

Floating point. - Referring to the representation of a number by two sets of numbers, one containing the mantissa and the other the location of the radix point.

Functional test. - A test designed to check out the operation of the system hardware.

- G -

Gate. - A circuit which has the ability to produce an output that is dependent upon a logical function of the inputs; e. g., an AND gate has an output when all inputs assume a logical ONE or TRUE state.

- H -

Hexadecimal. - Pertains to a number system with a radix of 16. The hexadecimal system is convenient for compactly representing a binary number by dividing it into 4-bit bytes.

- I -

IC. - Abbreviation for integrated circuit.

Index register. - A separate register whose contents is used to modify an explicitly specified address without changing the program in memory. It generally contains a count which is added to the address in the instruction itself or in the instruction plus an extension register, as distinguished from a base register which generally contains a complete address. Index registers are often used to provide loop control in iterative programs and to designate return addresses at the conclusion of subroutines.

Indirect addressing. - Designating an address that contains the location of the desired operand.

Input/output (I/O). - All information transmitted between the computer and its interfacing systems.

Instruction. - A set of characters in a computer that specified an operation to be performed by the computer and usually the location or value of some of the operands and/or results.

Instruction repertoire. - The set of instructions which can be performed by a particular computer.

Instruction word. - A computer word containing an instruction.

Integrated actuator. - The electrohydraulic servovalve, hydraulic amplifiers, surface actuator, and associated functions are integrated in a single package. No input linkages are required.

Integrated circuit (IC). - An electronic circuit which is fabricated in an integrated process and which is capable of performing the functions of a conventional circuit composed of discrete components such as transistors, resistors, diodes, etc.

Interface. - The matching circuitry required to allow the transmission of data between two devices.

Interrupt. - An externally or internally generated signal that interrupts the current sequence of the program being performed and causes a new sequence to be performed.

I/O. - Abbreviation for input/output.

- L -

Large-scale integration (LSI). - The fabrication of more than 100 integrated logic gates together in one assembly.

Logic levels. - The nominal voltage levels which are used to represent binary 0 or 1 in logic circuits. For instance, in commercial resistor-transistor-logic (RTL) circuits, the levels are generally 0 and +2.5 V; in diode-transistor-logic (DTL) circuits, they are generally 0 and +3.5 V.

LVDT. - Linear variable differential transformer; a transducer providing an electrical output (ac) whose phase and amplitude is proportional to the direction and amplitude of the physical position of the sensing element.

LSI. - Abbreviation for large-scale integration.

- M -

Machine language. - Coded instructions in binary digit form for use in the computer.

Magnetic core. - A ferromagnetic ring or core used to store a bit of data.

Masking. - Denotes the selection of particular bits of a computer word.

Mean time between failures (MTBF). - Reciprocal of the average rate of failure of a piece of equipment. MTBF is a frequently used measure of a computer's reliability, but to be meaningful a quoted MTBF must be accompanied by a full description of the assumptions and conditions used in the calculation.

Medium scale integration (MSI). - The fabrication of 25 to 100 integrated logic gates together in one assembly.

Memory protect. - The technique for sensing potential power failures and preventing the loss of data in the memory and in critical registers.

Memory word. - An ordered set of bits in the computer's primary storage device. It can contain either data words or instructions words.

MHD. - Abbreviation for magneto hydro-dynamic.

MOS. - Abbreviation for metal-oxide-semiconductor.

MOSFET. - Abbreviation for metal-oxide-semiconductor-field-effect-transistor.

MSI. - Abbreviation for medium-scale integration.

MTBF. - Abbreviation for mean time between failures.

Multicomputer. - A computer configuration having two or more sets of memories and processors, which are generally assigned different tasks. A multicomputer is distinguished from a multiprocessor in that the processors do not share memories.

Multilayer. - Printed circuit board construction technique whereby the wiring is in the form of etched lines and where many layers make up the complete board unit. Interconnection between layers is performed normally by plated-through holes.

Multiplexed data. - Data from several devices which have been combined to be transmitted through a single channel, either by interleaving them or by sampling them in sequential order.

Multiprocessor. - A computer configuration having two or more processors which share memory or memories and I/O.

- N -

NDRO. - Abbreviation for nondestructive readout.

Nondestructive readout (NDRO). - Refers to memories from which information can be read without destruction of any word in the storage device.

Nonvolatile. - Refers to memories which do not lose their information contents when power is removed.

Numerical control (N/C). - The system of controlling (usually) machine tools with a numerical (digital) signal. Actuation can use electrical, hydraulic or pneumatic power and can be controlled, read, signalled and/or computed electrically, optically, pneumatically or hydraulically and usually in some combinations of these methods.

- O -

Octal. - Pertains to a number system with a radix of 8. The octal system is convenient for compactly representing a binary number by dividing it into 3-bit bytes.

One's complement. - The complement of a binary number obtained by changing each 1 to 0 and each 0 to 1. An alternate method is to subtract the number from all ones.

Operand. - Data used in an operation.

Operation. - The arithmetic, logic, or transfer action that the computer performs as a result of interpreting a single instruction.

Overflow. - A condition that occurs when a computation produces an answer that exceeds the storage capacity of a register.

- P -

Parallel. - Refers to the simultaneous transmission and/or processing of all bits of a word via a separate line or channel for each bit.

Parity check. - A method for checking the validity of a binary word or byte. The check is usually made by use of a parity bit suffixed to the original word, which indicates whether the sum is odd or even. This technique can be used to generate more complete checks.

Peripheral. - Refers to equipment external to the computer but directly associated with the I/O section, such as magnetic tape transports or paper tape punches and readers.

Plated-wire. - A type of film memory where information is stored in a thin magnetic film deposited over the bit wire.

PMOS. - Abbreviation for p-channel metal oxide semiconductor.

Position transducer. - A device for producing an electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic or mechanical output signal as a function of input position. Potentiometers, LVDTs, fluidic sensors, and springs are examples.

Precision. - The degree of discrimination with which a data quantity is represented. For instance, a two-digit decimal number discriminates among 100 possible values. Precision should be distinguished from accuracy.

Pressure transducer. - A device for providing an electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic or mechanical output signal as a function of input hydraulic or pneumatic pressure.

Processor. - That portion of a computer that consists of control and arithmetic units. The basic I/O interface is often included.

Program. - A sequence of instructions and necessary numerical constants that will cause the computer to operate on a given problem.

Program memory. - That portion of the computer memory which is used for storage of program instructions and constants. It may be either "read-only" or read-write, as distinguished from the variable memory which is always read-write.

PROM. - Abbreviation for programmable read only memory.

- R -

Radix. - The base number of a number system. Example: 2 in binary, 10 in decimal, 8 in octal, 16 in hexadecimal, etc.

Random access. - Refers to a storage device in which the time necessary to "access" any memory location is constant and independent of the relative locations of the last addressed location and the next location to be addressed. Magnetic core memories have this characteristic while drum memories do not. In the latter, physical location influences the amount of delay of access.

Read. - To sense and transfer information contained in memory to another storage or operating register of the computer.

Read-only. - Refers to a memory device that outputs a selectable word, but this word cannot be altered by the processor during its operation.

Read-write. - Refers to a memory device which can be both read from and written into during normal operation.

Reconfiguration. - Reorganization of the computer into a new system without the failed part. Sometimes the computing capacity of the system is reduced by reconfiguration, and the fault is thus only partially tolerated. Partial fault tolerance is sometimes referred to as graceful degradation.

Recovery. - The actions necessary to maintain information continuity in a computer system following a transient error or reconfiguration.

Redundancy. - The use of additional circuits and/or components that would not be needed in a "perfect" system, but which serve to provide fault tolerance in a real system.

Register. - A device for temporarily storing a single word in preparation for operating on it. It may store data, instructions, memory addresses, or any other ordered set of bits. Usually it can be loaded or emptied very quickly.

Reliability. - The probability that a piece of equipment or system will perform as specified for a given period of time when used in the specified manner.

Repertoire. - See instruction repertoire.

ROM. - Abbreviation for read only memory. This memory requires a non-destructive readout.

Scaling. - Multiplying variables by an appropriate constant (the scale factor) to allow their representation in a given fixed-point numerical system.

Scratchpad memory. - A high-speed (generally small) memory which can be directly addressed by the processing circuitry.

Secondary actuator. - See driver actuator.

Self-test. - A test exercised by the computer itself, designed to check its functional operation.

Serial. - Refers to the sequential transmission and/or processing of the bits of a word through a single line or channel.

Serial-parallel. - Refers to the simultaneous transmission and/or processing of bits in a byte through parallel lines or channels. The transmission or processing of a complete word requires several sequential bytes. This type of data flow is a combination of serial and parallel operations.

Servoactuator. - An actuator which normally operates in the closed loop of a servomechanism; includes actuation elements plus feedback devices and proportional input devices such as servovalves, etc.

Servovalve. - A device for proportionally controlling the flow and/or pressure in a hydraulic or pneumatic servosystem. Control may be electrical (see electrohydraulic servovalve), hydraulic, pneumatic or mechanical.

Shift. - Moving the characters of a unit of information column-wise right or left from one storage cell to another, usually in a register. For a number, this is equivalent to multiplying or dividing by a power of the base of the notation.

Simulation. - The process of modeling or logically duplicating a system by programming its features on a general-purpose computer.

Single-point failure. - A potential failure point in a redundant control or actuation system which can ultimately cause a failure in all channels of the system.

Software. - All of the computer programs written for use in a computer system. Support software includes assembly programs, compilers, utility routines, etc. Operational software refers to flight programs, test programs, etc.

SPAD. - Abbreviation for scratch pad memory.

Static redundancy. - The use of massive replication of each component or circuit to two or more copies, which are permanently connected and powered. A component failure or logic fault is instantaneously and automatically masked by the presence of the redundant copies of the same item.

Stepper motor. - A motor which moves a predictable portion of its total motion potential when provided with an input command or pulse. Used extensively in point-to-point N/C machine tool systems.

Subroutine. - A subprogram that can be part of another routine. Subroutines can be closed, which means they are stored in one place and accessed by other programs when needed, or open which means they are inserted each time they are used.

- T -

Temporary memory. - The part of memory which contains data to be processed or computational results. Sometimes called the data memory, it provides read-write storage.

Throughput. - The total flow of useful information through a computer during some given period of time.

Translate. - To convert one type of language (special codes, other machine languages, etc.) to another language suitable for operations within the computer.

TTL. - Abbreviation for transistor-transistor logic.

Two-address. - Signifies that two addresses are contained in each instruction. For example, the address of one operand and the address of the next instruction.

Two's complement. - The complement of a binary number found by changing each 1 to 0 and adding 1 to the number

- V -

Variable memory. - That portion of the computer memory which is used for storage of temporary data or computational results. It is always a read-write memory, as distinguished from the program memory which is often "read-only."

Volatile. - Refers to a memory which loses its information contents when power is removed.

- W -

Word. - A series of bits of prescribed length which is treated by the computer circuits as a unit. The word is the basic format in which the computer transmits information. Ordinarily a word is treated by the control unit as an instruction and by the arithmetic unit as a data quantity.

Word length. - The number of bits in a word. Word lengths may be fixed or variable depending on the particular computer.

Write. - To store information into the system memory from the input data or from an operating register of the system.

APPENDIX C

SYSTEM SENSITIVITY STUDIES

The candidate configurations allow the examination of processor, gyro, or actuator changes while other system components remain fixed. In addition, other items of system operation may be varied to determine effects on life-cycle cost. These include amount of stock on hand, component repair turnaround time, and repair time improvement.

Effect of Processor Change

Figure C1 shows the effect on several system parameters produced by different processor configurations. Comparison of systems 6 and 8 shows the changes from a large-processor to a multiple-processor concept. Included in the change, however, is a decrease in the amount of crossfeed and the method of handling it, i. e., analog and digital.

The change from 6 to 9 reflects an increase in intercom capability, as well as improved actuator comparison monitoring, still maintaining the large processor. System 3 reflects the impact of the data bus or multiplex concept. This requires a significant increase in electronics with a reduction in cabling.

Effect of Actuator Configuration Change

Figure C2 shows a given processor and sensor configuration with three different actuator concepts. The triple-integrated actuators are less expensive simply because there is less hardware. This is basically the same reason for the difference between the quad-integrated and driver-power concepts. The driver-power set requires four drivers and three power actuators, while the integrated actuator set requires one of each for a total

SYSTEM 6 QUAD, LARGE PROCESSOR, ANALOG CROSSFEED, COMP MONITOR
 SYSTEM 9 QUAD, LARGE PROCESSOR, INTERCOM, COMP MONITOR
 SYSTEM 8 QUAD, MEDIUM PROCESSOR, SMALL PROCESSOR I/O, COMP MONITOR
 SYSTEM 3 QUAD, LARGE PROCESSOR, DATA BUS, IN LINE MONITOR

QUAD CONVENTIONAL SENSORS QUAD INTEGRATED ACTUATORS




Figure C1. - Effect of Processor Change

SYSTEM: QUAD, ANALOG CROSSFEED, COMPARISON MONITOR
 LARGE DIGITAL PROCESSORS.

SYSTEM 7 TRIPLE INTEGRATED ACTUATORS
 SYSTEM 6 QUAD INTEGRATED ACTUATORS
 SYSTEM 17 QUAD DRIVER-POWER COMBINATION




Figure C2. - Effect of Actuator Configuration Change

of four. Note, however, that the difference lies in the life-cycle costs, since a production cost comparison shows the driver-power set to be more desirable.

Effect of Gyro Configuration Change

Figures C3, C4 and C5 show the relationship among several gyro configurations. Some of these are not recommended as possible configurations, but are provided simply as data points. These are the complete substitution of laser and MHD gyros for conventional gyros in all places including flutter-rate sensing. The requirements at these locations do not justify the additional cost.

Figure C3 shows the effect of going to a pentad configuration for body rates using conventional sensors. While the life-cycle costs decrease, due to the reduction of hardware, the operational reliability becomes completely unacceptable.

System 14A exhibits the change due to the direct substitution of MHD gyros for all conventional gyros. While not indicating much change in production cost or in operational reliability, the life-cycle cost impact is significant. This is due primarily to the two-axis capability of each gyro unit, and the consequent reduction of hardware.

Figure C4 shows the effect of the change from conventional quad sensors to skewed hexad accelerometers, and skewed hexad laser gyros. This is shown by comparing systems 7 and 4, which does not represent a significant life-cycle cost saving and, in addition, shows a sizeable decrease in operational reliability. The direct one-to-one replacement of laser for conventional gyros shows a significant life-cycle cost increase.

Figure C5 again shows a one-for-one conventional-to-laser-gyro replacement and, again, exhibits a marked increase in life-cycle cost. The

SYSTEM: TRIPLE, INTERCOM, IN LINE MONITORING, MINIMUM INTEGRATED ACTUATORS,
TRIPLE LARGE PROCESSORS

SYSTEM 14 TRIPLE CONVENTIONAL SENSORS
SYSTEM 14A MHD GYROS IN TRIPLE CONFIG (ALL PLACES)
SYSTEM 16 SKEWED PENTAD CONVENTIONAL GYROS (BODY ONLY)




Figure C3. - Effect of Gyro Configuration Changes -
Systems 14, 14A and 16

SYSTEM: QUAD, CROSSFED CHANNELS, COMPARISON MONITOR, TRIPLE INT ACTUATORS
QUAD LARGE DIGITAL PROCESSORS

SYSTEM 7 CONVENTIONAL QUAD SENSORS
SYSTEM 7A LASER GYROS IN QUAD CONFIGURATION (ALL PLACES)
SYSTEM 4 SKEWED HEXAD ACCEL & LASER GYROS (BODY ONLY)




Figure C4. - Effect of Gyro Configuration Changes -
Systems 7, 14 and 4

SYSTEM: QUAD, INTERCOM CHANNELS, COMPARISON MONITORING
 QUAD INTEGRATED ACTUATORS, QUAD LARGE PROCESSORS

SYSTEM 9 CONVENTIONAL QUAD SENSORS

SYSTEM 9A LASER GYRO'S IN QUAD CONFIGURATION (ALL PLACES)

SYSTEM 11 6 MHD GYRO'S IN QUAD CONFIGURATION (BODY ONLY, NOT SKEW)




Figure C5. - Effect of Gyro Configuration Changes -
 Systems 9, 9A and 11

direct substitution of MHD gyros for the conventional body-rate gyros (not skewed) proves far more beneficial, however. This again is due to the two-axis capability, and the subsequent reduction of hardware.

Table C1 summarizes the above data by indicating a percentage change from the noted reference.

TABLE C1. - PERCENT CHANGE IN LIFE CYCLE COST FOR CONFIGURATION CHANGE

	Quad int		Triple int
Actuator configuration (driver power off)	-1.5		-9.0
	Skew hexad conv accel laser gyro (body only)	Quad conv accel MHD gyro (body only)	Quad conv accel laser gyro (all places)
Gyro and accel configuration (quad conv ref)	-2.2	-7.0	+12.0
	Skew pentad conv accel conv gyro (body only)		Triple conv accel MHD gyro (all places)
Gyro and accel configuration (triple conv ref)	-6.2		-16.9

Maintenance Sensitivities

Several parameters associated with the maintenance policy are of interest. The first is the effect of a reduction in repair turnaround time. The GEMM program input was changed to reflect a 15 percent reduction in turnaround time for which a 0.06 percent reduction in life-cycle cost was indicated. Associated with this, a 20 percent reduction in mean repair time

was implemented with a resulting 0.02 reduction in life-cycle cost. Even considering both of these parameters added together, the resulting cost saving is less than 0.1 percent.

A measure of improvement may be obtained by an increase in electronic part MTBF. The indicated failure rates were modified to high-reliability levels wherever this was applicable and data existed. This causes the initial total system production cost to increase by 3.4 percent, with a 2.0 percent reduction in life-cycle cost. In terms of dollars, this is roughly a 1.8-M\$ increase for the 200 systems against a projected 3.9-M\$ saving in total life cost. This reflects a factor of 1.15 improvement in system MTBF.

Significant cost savings could be realized with improvements in sensor and actuator MTBF; however, the failure rates used for these items are thought to be representative of conventional technology by the anticipated ATT time period. In addition, advanced technology sensors are included in the study.

A further parameter of interest is the effect of the stockage level maintained to assure a spare part being on hand at a repair shop, when the repair is needed. Variation of this "confidence" level from 99 to 80 percent reduces the life-cycle cost by 1 percent as shown in Figure C6 for system 13. The mean downtime, however, increases significantly and is plotted in Figure C6.

There is some point at which increasing mean downtime would cause an increase in dispatch cost; however, this crossover point was not computed. This was due to the relatively small cost to achieve the proper stockage level and the fact that sensitivity studies of that type were not a prime study requisite.




Figure C6. - Life-Cycle Cost and Downtime versus Stockage Level - System 13

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