

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

MAY 27, JUNE 1, 2, 1960

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1960

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, *Chairman*

THEODORE FRANCIS GRKEN, ¹ Rhode Island	ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama	BOURKE B. HOKENLOOPER, Iowa
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota	GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana	HOMER E. CAPELLART, Indiana
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon	FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana	JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts	
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee	
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio	
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho	

CARL MARCY, *Chief of Staff*

DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, *Clerk*

¹ Chairman emeritus.

Note.—Sections of these hearings have been deleted in the interest of national security. Deleted material is indicated by the notation “[Deleted].”

FOREWORD

On May 24, 1960, the Committee on Foreign Relations met in executive session and, without objection, agreed to hold hearings with regard to the recent summit conference and events incident thereto.

It was decided that Members of the Senate who were not members of the committee would be permitted to attend the hearings but, according to committee custom, not to question the witnesses. Pursuant thereto various Members of the Senate did attend the sessions as observers.

It seemed to me that it might be useful to the committee members, as well as to the other Members of the Senate, to have the staff compile a background document containing materials relevant to the planned inquiry. Such a compilation was published as a committee print on May 27, 1960, and is also printed herein as appendix 1.

The committee's hearings commenced on May 27 when it heard testimony, both morning and afternoon, from Secretary of State Christian A. Herter. The committee also heard Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on May 31; Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, on June 1; and Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates on June 2.

All of the above hearings were held in executive session. The testimony, however, was subsequently released after the deletion by representatives of the executive branch of that material the publication of which the executive branch believed might jeopardize the national security of the United States. None of the Central Intelligence Agency's testimony is being published. Where the deletions occur is noted in this volume by the designation "[Deleted]".

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman.*

CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword.....	iii
Statement by --	
Bohlen, Hon. Charles E., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.....	3
Dillon, Hon. Douglas, Under Secretary of State.....	3
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L., Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.....	109
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr., Secretary of Defense.....	123
Horner, Hon. Christian A., Secretary of State.....	3
Inserions in the record --	
Statements by Premier Khrushchev since visit to the United States.....	10
Excerpts from National Security Act of 1947 relating to Central Intelligence Agency.....	64
Department of State statement on International Court of Justice contentious cases proposed by the United States against Soviet bloc countries.....	77
Chronology of U-2 incident prepared by Chalmers M. Roberts, the Washington Post.....	163
Speech by Senator Thomas J. Dodd.....	169
Appendix 1: Background documents on events incident to the summit conference:	
1. Premier Khrushchev's remarks on U.S. plane, May 5, 1960.....	175
2. Department of Defense news release, May 5, 1960.....	178
3. Excerpts from transcript of Department of State press and radio news briefing, May 5, 1960.....	178
4. National Aeronautics and Space Administration news release, May 5, 1960.....	180
5. Department of State press release, May 6, 1960.....	181
6. Excerpts from Premier Khrushchev's remarks on U.S. plane incident, May 7, 1960.....	181
7. Statement by the Department of State, May 7, 1960.....	187
8. Text of Premier Khrushchev's speech warning nations with bases used by U.S. planes, May 9, 1960.....	188
9. Statement by the Secretary of State, May 9, 1960.....	193
10. Text of Soviet Union note to the U.S. Government, May 10, 1960.....	195
11. Transcript of President Eisenhower's news conference, May 11, 1960 [excerpts].....	198
12. Account of Premier Khrushchev's informal news conference, May 11, 1960.....	203
13. Text of U.S. note to the Soviet Government, May 12, 1960.....	211
14. Transcript of "ABC's College News Conference" with George V. Allen, Director, U.S. Information Agency, May 15, 1960.....	212
15. Text of Premier Khrushchev's statement at Paris summit conference, May 16, 1960.....	220
16. Text of President Eisenhower's statement following the Paris summit conference meeting on May 16, 1960.....	225
17. Transcript of news briefing with James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President; Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; and Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Paris, May 16, 1960.....	226
18. Communique, May 17, 1960.....	235
19. Transcript of Premier Khrushchev's news conference, Paris, May 18, 1960.....	235
20. Communique of the North Atlantic Council, Paris, May 19, 1960.....	247
21. Remarks of President Eisenhower on his arrival at Andrews Field, May 20, 1960.....	247
22. Address of President Eisenhower, May 25, 1960.....	245
Appendix 2:	
1. Questions raised by Senator Lausche and answers prepared by the Department of State.....	255
2. Pamphlet on Soviet manpower prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency.....	283
Summary index.....	299

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

FRIDAY, MAY 27, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:07 a.m., pursuant to notice, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Green, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams.

Also present: Hon. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State; Hon. Livingston Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency; Hon. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Hon. Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning; Capt. L. P. Gray III, USN, military assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; John P. White, Legislative Management Officer, Department of State.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your willingness to come here today to discuss with the committee the events of recent days and weeks which are related to the collapse of the long-planned summit conference.

Chairman Khrushchev, who for months has promoted a summit conference and invited people throughout the world to believe that an easing of tensions between the free world and the Communist world might be possible, has now dashed those hopes. In a few short hours he destroyed the atmosphere of negotiation which had been built up over long months.

Mr. Secretary, you and the President have been frequent in your warnings in the past that our hopes must not rise too high lest they be dashed to pieces, as they have been, by a swing of the Soviet pendulum.

Despite the fact that there are few in the free world who doubt that the principal onus for the destruction of summit hopes must be borne by Chairman Khrushchev, there are many who believe that our conduct has not been without fault. They believe there are things we might have done, which were not done. They believe there were things which we did, which might better have been left undone—or delayed.

I have long believed that one of the basic strengths of our democracy is found in our capacity of self-appraisal—our ability to be critical, without destroying our unity.

At this particular juncture of history, this committee is confronted with a most difficult task. Without furthering the objectives of the Soviet Union, we must subject our own activities to careful scrutiny to ascertain whether we have conducted ourselves in a way best calculated to promote the interests of this Nation and to preserve the peace of the world.

I am sure there are some who will feel that any such scrutiny of our own activities can serve no good purpose. As for myself, however, I believe that failure now to review and assess our conduct would be to neglect our responsibility and to lose an opportunity to improve the procedures and the execution of our foreign policy.

I take this occasion, Mr. Secretary, to assure you once again that I am certain there is no intention on the part of any member of this committee to deal with this subject on a partisan basis. We are meeting here not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Members of the Senate who in taking their oaths of office swore, as did you, to uphold the same Constitution.

We are concerned, as you are, that nothing that takes place here in any way damage the conduct of our foreign policy. Above all, we should strive to avoid bitter partisan debate which might prejudice the reasonable and effective conduct of our foreign policy in the future. The motives of participants in events of recent weeks are not at issue. At the same time we seek, as I am sure you do, to conduct this review in such a way that we may learn from the events of the past weeks what we can do to improve our foreign policies and our governmental procedures for their formulation and execution.

I know that the subjects which we will be discussing are most sensitive and delicate. Indeed, we should acknowledge that there is one vast area of executive branch activity which is not subject to the usual type of congressional control, or to the check of public opinion—that is, the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Its operations, as similar activities of all great nations, are divorced and separate from the normal standards and the usual restraints that are characteristic of other governmental operations.

There is no point in our pretending that the black arts of intelligence operations do not now, and have not throughout recorded history, involved violations of every commandment. They do. Lying, cheating, murder, stealing, seduction, and suicide are part of the unpleasant business in which all great nations participate—not because they want to, not because they believe these acts are moral, but because they believe such activities are essential to their own self-preservation. This is one of the ugly facts of life in this world.

Acts of espionage are against the law of this Nation as of all other nations. But these acts nevertheless take place, and it does not promote a clearer understanding of international relations to pretend they do not.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Every member appreciates these facts. We hope that the procedures we have set up for the conduct of these hearings will make it possible for representatives of the executive branch to be candid and

complete because unless there is such candor it is most difficult for the Senate to discharge its responsibilities in the field of foreign policy.

As you know, the committee has agreed that these sessions are to be executive. However, in order to make the maximum amount of information available to the public, which must in the final analysis understand our policies if they are to be supported by the people, we have arranged for a high ranking official of the executive branch to delete from the executive transcript any statements or information which might in any way jeopardize the national security. Should any question arise as to whether such deletions go beyond those necessary to protect the national security, I will appoint a bipartisan subcommittee to consider such questions.

I have urged members to limit their questions to those directly relevant to the recent summit conference and incidents related thereto. Although the committee has not considered fully all witnesses it may wish to hear, I have expressed the personal opinion that there is no occasion for private witnesses to be heard on the matter before the committee.

Finally, as you know, the committee has decided that members should for the first time around, at least, limit their period of questioning to not to exceed 10 minutes each.

FOCUS OF STUDY

It is my hope, Mr. Secretary, that our study can be focused on four principal areas: first, the events and decisions resulting from the U-2 incident; second, the effect of these events and decisions upon the summit; third, the policy of our Government regarding the summit meeting; and fourth, the policy of the United States in the future and possible improvement in the execution thereof.

INTEREST IN HEARING

Mr. Secretary, we have some guests from the Senate who have requested to come as observers. I wish to admonish them that this is an executive session, and that they are not to disclose on their own responsibility anything that takes place in these hearings. I might also call to the attention of the committee that it was noted in the press that Tass, the official governmental news agency of Soviet Russia, was the first applicant to purchase a copy of the transcript which will be later released, so we might keep this in mind. The staff of the committee has compiled a set of background documents on events incident to the summit conference. Those documents will be printed as an appendix to the hearings when they are published.

I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that you proceed with your statement for the information of the committee. The Secretary has a statement prepared which will be the presentation of his point of view.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DOUGLAS DILLON, UNDER SECRETARY, AND HON. CHARLES E. BOHLEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate very much your willingness to allow me to make this statement.

This statement is guided very much as indicated by the chairman in the remarks that he has just made in the next to the last paragraph with regard to divisions; namely, the genesis of the summit; the U-2 incident; the events in Paris and the future.

THE THREAT TO BERLIN

I. The genesis of the summit

In order to understand what happened in Paris, we need to look back over the preceding 18 months.

In November 1958, the U.S.S.R. began a new strategy directed toward altering the situation in Berlin and East Germany in its favor. If the Western Powers refused to give up their present position in Berlin and make West Berlin a so-called free city, the Soviet Union stated its intention to proceed unilaterally at the end of 6 months, turning over full sovereignty to the so-called GDR and thereby confronting the Allies with the alternative of capitulation or resort to force which would be met by Communist force.

Though the strategy as it unfolded proved to be more flexible than its original statement, it is still the official policy of the U.S.S.R. Its force lies in the Soviet ability to threaten Berlin, where we are morally committed, but physically exposed.

The Western Powers, of course, promptly rejected the Soviet proposal and reaffirmed their determination to stand by Berlin.

In the months that followed, while the U.S.S.R. elaborated and pressed its strategy, the Western Powers concerted their plans to meet it. They sought to engage the U.S.S.R. in negotiations, thereby clarifying its intentions and either attaining solutions acceptable to the West, or as a minimum, convincing it that unilateral action against Berlin would not be sound.

ENGAGING THE SOVIET UNION IN NEGOTIATION

It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the U.S.S.R. would negotiate on an acceptable basis. In January 1959 the U.S.S.R. proposed a conference to adopt a peace treaty with the two parts of an indefinitely divided Germany.

The Western Powers continued to maintain that a peace treaty could be negotiated and signed only with a united Germany, hence that the reunification of Germany must be settled first.

They also maintained that the only proper solution for Berlin lay in its becoming the capital of a unified Germany, and therefore, they were unwilling to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue. But the U.S.S.R. had held for some time that reunification was solely the business of the Germans and therefore refused to discuss it.

The West persisted during February and March in its efforts to get the Russians talking somehow. It proposed a meeting of Foreign Ministers, with the prospect of a possible summit meeting when due preparations had been made. The U.S.S.R. had repeatedly indicated a desire for that summit meeting since 1956. Finally, a compromise agenda, which did not prejudice the substantive views of either side, was adopted for a Foreign Ministers' meeting and a date was set in May shortly before the expiration of the original Soviet deadline for meeting their arbitrary demands on Berlin.

FOREIGN MINISTERS' DEADLOCK

During the intensive preparations for the meeting the Western Powers developed a new version of their basic position regarding Germany, which was submitted at Geneva as the Western peace plan. It consisted in approaching the unification of Germany through a series of stages, thereby offering the U.S.S.R. a chance to adjust its position gradually to the eventual loss of its hold on East Germany which free elections would presumably bring.

The plan showed flexibility and imagination; it appealed to world opinion; but its rejection by the U.S.S.R. was none the less flat.

The U.S.S.R. stuck adamantly to its previously announced proposals for a peace treaty with a divided Germany. Thus, the basic positions remained totally unreconciled.

Finding no progress possible on Germany, the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. explored the possibility of an interim agreement on Berlin which, without contemplating a basic solution of Berlin as a separate issue, would do something to mitigate difficulties which the U.S.S.R. professed to find there. Though some progress was made in this direction, the U.S.S.R. insisted on language which would have implied the eventual erosion of the Western position in Berlin.

Accordingly, despite the labor of 3 months with only one short adjournment, the Foreign Ministers' meeting ended in deadlock.

HIGH LEVEL TRIPS

The failure of the Foreign Ministers' meeting did not result in a war crisis, however, because a parallel train of events had meanwhile brought hope in a different direction. We took the opportunity of Mikoyan's visit to the Soviet Embassy here in January to arrange informal exchanges of views between the Soviet leader and top U.S. officials.

This was followed in June and July by further visits and exchanges of Kozlov to this country and the Vice President to the U.S.S.R. The fact that these visits took place without public incident and made possible somewhat more realistic communication than usual with the Soviet leadership seemed to offer a possibility—only a possibility, of course—that means of avoiding war and eventually getting Soviet-Western relations into somewhat less dangerous shape might be found by developing these informal contacts.

Accordingly the President decided to go ahead with a move which he and his advisers had long had in mind when the time seemed right. He invited Chairman Khrushchev to visit this country, and the visit was announced before the Foreign Ministers ended their Geneva meeting.

During that visit no progress was made, or indeed expected, on resolving outstanding problems, but a somewhat greater degree of mutual understanding was seemingly attained, particularly on the need to settle international questions by peaceful means rather than by force. There was also a suspension, later publicly acknowledged, of whatever was left of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.

PREPARATION FOR THE SUMMIT

After the Khrushchev visit it was judged feasible and desirable by the Western Powers to move toward renewed discussion, this time at the summit. Some flicker of hope for progress on Berlin had appeared at Camp David, whereas Geneva had ended in deadlock. During his American visit Khrushchev had also evinced an interest in the equally vital field of disarmament, and even though disarmament talks were to start in the Committee of Ten at Geneva it was felt that Khrushchev might reserve his constructive moves, if any, for the summit.

Accordingly, after due consultations among the Western heads of government, an invitation to a summit was sent to Khrushchev and accepted by him and after some difficulty over earlier dates the time was finally set for May 16. This move found broad support in Western public opinion.

There ensued an intensive and protracted series of preparations on the Western side, involving repeated meetings not only of the Foreign Ministers and of NATO but even of the heads of government. Within our own Government we also studied most carefully the possibilities of making progress not only on Berlin and Germany but most particularly in disarmament, as well as other aspects of general Soviet-Western relations.

At the December meeting of Western heads of government a consensus emerged that the May summit might well be only one of a series of such meetings, and that it would be largely exploratory. Some modest progress was hoped for, but no major solutions on any front. But if a beginning could be made, the series of talks, possible in a gradually improving atmosphere over the years, might do substantially more.

SUMMIT PROSPECTS DIMMED

In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente." There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-United States cultural agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the Antarctic Treaty.

But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.

Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14

and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation on his speeches available to the committee.

Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight—notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.

The unity of the four Western Powers on Berlin meanwhile presumably signaled to the U.S.S.R. that prospects for eroding the Western position or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin remained slight. President de Gaulle and other leaders were quite firm in discouraging expectations on this front. The NATO Council in Istanbul May 2-4 also reaffirmed the Western position on German reunification and regretted Soviet refusal to discuss specific practical measures of disarmament. Thus as the summit drew near the prospects for important agreement seemed slender, so long as the U.S.S.R. remained committed to driving the Western Powers out of Berlin and to discussing disarmament in terms of general principles rather than concrete steps.

The Western outlook consistently remained, however, that the summit would be worthwhile. It would afford an opportunity for an exchange of views which would clarify each side's position; it might contribute to some reduction of tensions over Berlin and narrow some of our differences on disarmament. It could be at least a small first step in a long process of improving Soviet-Western relations.

U-2 INCIDENT

II. The U-2 incident

On May 1 occurred the unfortunate failure of an intelligence mission. The U.S.S.R. at once seized on it to complicate the approach to the summit. With regard to the role of the U.S. Government in this matter, I cannot hope to improve on the lucid and straightforward account which the President gave to the Nation Wednesday night. I will, therefore, not attempt to go into detail, although I am of course ready to answer questions concerning my responsibilities.

CENTRAL POINTS IN PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNT OF U-2 INCIDENT

Here I would only like to reemphasize four central points which stood out in the President's account:

1. The U-2 program was an important and efficient intelligence effort. We knew that failure of any mission under this program would have serious consequences, but we considered that the great benefit derived justified the risks involved.

2. The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision. Conditions at a later season would have prevented obtaining very important information. There is never a "good time" for a failure of an intelligence mission. We believe it unwise to lower our vigilance because of these political negotiations.

3. Initial statements by the U.S. Government properly sought first of all to protect the pilot, his intelligence mission, and everything connected with it that might still be kept secret. But when it became clear that plane and pilot were in Soviet hands we believed the Congress and the American people should be given the facts. Thus up to May 7 U.S. statements followed the general line of the cover story, and thereafter were adjusted to the situation as it developed.

4. Since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case. Announcement of its discontinuance was withheld until the President could convey the fact personally in Paris.

Based on these four points, I believe most Americans will agree that the main course of our actions, given what we knew at any particular time, was sound. In particular, I have doubts that any alteration in the language of U.S. statements would have made any difference in the arbitrary Soviet demands which followed.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ARRIVAL IN PARIS

III. The events in Paris

I should like to give you an account of the major developments at Paris. I shall be as brief as possible, since the details have been widely publicized. But I would like to tell you of those events which in my opinion had a determinant effect there, and particularly those which influenced the decisions of the President.

On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13, there was already considerable speculation at the news that Mr. Khrushchev was arriving in Paris on Saturday rather than on Sunday, the day on which the President and Mr. Macmillan were due to arrive.

Mr. Khrushchev's statement on arrival at Orly Airport gave no indication of his subsequent position. It was mild in character and conveyed the distinct impression that he would proceed with the summit conference despite the U-2 incident. Subsequent events showed that this was deliberately designed to conceal his real purpose.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S CALLS ON PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

On Sunday at 11 a.m., at his request, Mr. Khrushchev, accompanied by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky—which is in itself an unusual procedure which I shall revert to later—called on President de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace.

During this meeting he left with President de Gaulle a memorandum setting forth the conditions which would have to be met by the United States before Khrushchev would be prepared to attend a summit conference. The French delegation provided a copy of this memorandum to the American delegation early that afternoon. The memorandum was subsequently presented by Mr. Khrushchev, without change, as the opening part of his statement to the Four Power meeting on Monday morning, May 16.

After visiting President de Gaulle Sunday morning, Khrushchev called on Prime Minister Macmillan at 4:30 p.m. on the same day and read the same statement of position to him.

The copy of the statement received from the French delegation was, of course, the subject of immediate consultation with the President and with members of the American delegation as to its significance and meaning.

BINDING NATURE OF DECISIONS MADE PRIOR TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW

It was our general conclusion, subsequently borne out by the facts, that the position and totally unacceptable demands set forth in this document had been drawn up in Moscow prior to Mr. Khrushchev's departure. In this sense it represented a fixed Soviet governmental position from which even Mr. Khrushchev would not have the authority to depart while in Paris.

I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive changes in these positions apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could be undertaken.

PRESIDENT'S POSITION AT FIRST CONFERENCE MEETING

I should like to emphasize the opinion which was thus unanimously arrived at in the American delegation, since it bore directly upon the position which the President took at the meeting on Monday morning.

It was out of the question, of course, that there should be any acceptance by the President of the humiliating and arrogant conditions of Mr. Khrushchev. We had very much in mind, however, the importance of showing the world that it was Mr. Khrushchev, and not one else, who was placing this summit conference in peril.

The President, therefore, decided before the Monday meeting that the proper course of action, consonant with the great responsibility which he bore and the seriousness of the issues which were to have been discussed at the conference, was for him not to engage in vituperation with Mr. Khrushchev but to demonstrate the restraint and dignity which was incumbent upon the office he holds and which befitted the leader of a great country.

FIRST MEETING OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE—ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUSPENSION OF U-2 FLIGHTS

In connection with this decision, the President resolved to announce to the conference his previously taken decision to suspend further flights of U-2 aircraft over the Soviet Union.

Although the original intention had been to restrict the first meeting of the conference at the summit to the chiefs of state and heads of government and to their interpreters, the President, on learning that Mr. Khrushchev wished to bring Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky, asked Secretary Gates and myself to accompany him to this meeting.

I do not need to describe this meeting in detail beyond saying that Mr. Khrushchev read a statement which, with interpretation, took

fully an hour. He read this entire statement from a prepared text before him. The first part of this statement was the memorandum which he had left with President de Gaulle, plus certain additions which were in the same vein as regards the United States and which referred to Soviet willingness to hold a summit conference within 6 to 8 months. The major addition was the cancellation of the invitation to the President to visit the Soviet Union.

Apart from his statement, which was made public, the President only once joined in the ensuing discussion—in order to make clear to Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues that the suspension of the U-2 flights was not merely for the duration of the conference, but for as long as he was in office.

The balance of the discussion at this meeting, which I should point out was the only one during the entire period in Paris at which the Soviets were present, was largely devoted to attempts by President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan to dissuade Mr. Khrushchev from the irrevocable step of publishing his abusive statement, whose unacceptable conditions would render impossible any conference at the summit, and to Khrushchev's adamant insistence that he would publish this statement and do so at a time of his own choosing. The meeting broke up on the basis of a suggestion by President de Gaulle that the conferees should reflect on this matter for 24 hours and then examine the situation.

BINDING NATURE OF DECISIONS MADE PRIOR TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW

This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Moscow. It is significant in this connection that the statement he issued later that day, Monday, May 16, which was identical with the one he had made at the conference, took no cognizance whatsoever of the discussion at the conference, and in particular of the President's statement concerning the suspension of U-2 overflights.

FINAL PROCEEDINGS IN PARIS

Secretary HERTER. The rest of the proceedings in Paris were anti-climactic. It was apparent to all the Western representatives that there was no possibility of a summit conference short of a changed position on Mr. Khrushchev's part. On Monday, Mr. Macmillan visited Mr. Khrushchev in a fruitless effort to persuade him to withdraw his impossible demands.

On that same day, President de Gaulle decided, with the agreement of the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, to call a session of the summit conference for 3 p.m. on Tuesday, May 17, which was after the 24-hour recess which he had proposed on Monday. He sent invitations in writing to the three other participants.

The President, in accepting, made clear his view that acceptance by the Soviet representative would mean that the Soviets had abandoned the demands which the President had previously found completely unacceptable.

Mr. Khrushchev did not show up at the appointed time for the Tuesday meeting. After a great deal of telephoning between the Soviet Embassy and the French Foreign Office it became clear that he was refusing to attend a summit conference and would only join in what he termed a preliminary meeting to ascertain if conditions could be created for a summit conference. By this reference to "conditions" he obviously meant the acceptance by the United States of all of the conditions he had set forth previously, and indeed he so stated in a written communication to President de Gaulle later that same day.

THE TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE

In the light of Mr. Khrushchev's refusal to attend the summit conference, except on terms which all three Western representatives deemed unacceptable, the three Western heads of government met briefly at 9:30 p.m., on May 17 to approve the final tripartite communique, a copy of which I should like to insert in the record, at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it may be done.

(The tripartite communique referred to appears on p. 235 of appendix 1.)

TRIPARTITE MEETINGS TO ASSESS SITUATION

Secretary HERTER. Thus the summit conference was ended by Soviet intransigence before it began, without addressing the great international issues with which it was supposed to deal.

The following day, Wednesday, May 18, was marked by tripartite meetings of the Western heads of government and their foreign ministers to consider the situation. In these meetings we sought to analyze the reasons for the Soviet attitude, prospects for the future, and the measures that the three Western Powers might adopt.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S PARIS PRESS CONFERENCE

This day was also marked by Mr. Khrushchev's press conference, which was fully reported by press, television, and radio. It was apparently an unparalleled performance of vituperation, abuse, and loss of temper. It should be noted, however, that despite the apparently uncontrolled nature of his remarks and actions at this press conference, Mr. Khrushchev was very careful not to commit himself to any specific course of action in the international field.

ANALYSIS OF SOVIET ACTION

We have naturally given a great deal of thought to the reasons for this extraordinary action by the Soviets in coming all the way from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose of sabotaging the conference.

I should like to say right off that there are many obscure aspects of this Soviet behavior and that we do not know all considerations and factors which went into its determination. We probably never shall. I hardly need to emphasize here to the members of this committee the complete secrecy in which decisions are arrived at in the Soviet Government and in the hierarchy of the Communist Party, which is the effective ruler of that country. It is only possible to try to deduce

from Soviet actions, after they are taken, the considerations which brought them about. What I give you now, therefore, is at best a tentative estimate of why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an estimate which may have to be revised in the light of further information and future events.

DECISION TO WRECK CONFERENCE MADE PRIOR TO KHRUSHCHEV'S DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW

There is one thing, however, that can be regarded as certain: This is that the decision to wreck the conference was made prior to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow. At no point during his stay in Paris—neither when he disclosed his true intentions to General de Gaulle at 11 a.m. on Sunday the 15th nor subsequently—did Khrushchev deviate one inch from his demands that the United States (1) denounce the overflights, (2) apologize to the Soviet Union, (3) punish these flights. Neither the statement made by the President at the one meeting held on Monday nor the serious and responsible efforts of General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr. Khrushchev before and after the President's announcement of suspension of flights could persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction from his behavior in Paris that he had no authority to modify his position to any significant degree.

SIGNIFICANCE OF GROMYKO AND MALINOVSKY ACCOMPANYING KHRUSHCHEV

The fact that he was accompanied everywhere, and literally everywhere, by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky is an interesting sidelight on this point. There is much speculation as to this change from his previous attitude during his visits both to the United States and France, when he insisted upon having meetings alone with the President and with President de Gaulle, with only interpreters present. The best guess as to the significance of this new factor is that (1) in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it was considered desirable to have some tangible evidence of Soviet armed strength in the person of Marshal Malinovsky. Secondly, Gromyko and Malinovsky would be able to testify upon return to Moscow that he had stuck strictly to the agreed position.

DECISION TO CANCEL INVITATION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER; SOVIETS' EXTREME POSITION

It also seems certain that the decision to cancel the invitation to the President was made before Khrushchev left Moscow.

As to what led the Soviets to this extreme position, in regard to the summit meeting which had previously appeared so much desired by Mr. Khrushchev, we enter into the realm of pure speculation, as I indicated earlier. The most we can hope to do in the absence of reliable information is to evaluate the elements and factors which appear to have entered into this decision. I shall try to list them briefly.

SIGNIFICANCE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S DOUBTS OF SUMMIT SUCCESS ON
SOVIET TERMS

1. There was considerable indication, particularly during April that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likelihood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evidence of Western determination and unity on this point in speeches and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech on April 25, he not only reiterated with the utmost finality his position on Berlin, including his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German regime, but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the summit. By this of course he meant success on Soviet terms.

SOVIET HIERARCHY'S VIEWS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AND U-2
INCIDENT

2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there are a number of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particularly his overpersonalization and in Communist eyes over-commitment through personal visits to the United States and France, was arousing at least serious questioning if not opposition to the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the Chinese Communists found a sympathetic response among some of his associates, and very probably among the Soviet military.

3. It was against this background that the U-2 incident occurred.

WEIGHING THE FACTORS RESULTING IN CONFERENCE DISRUPTION

A combination of these three factors in our judgment is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris conference. To determine how each of these factors should be weighed is, for the moment, beyond our reach.

The U-2 incident was most certainly seized upon and magnified beyond its true proportions as a justification for this decision. It is debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise another pretext for so radical and violent a position.

It might well be that a lack of success at the summit would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, from his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference.

BASIC MISCALCULATION IN SOVIET THINKING

It may seem incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby incurring worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of unity and purpose among not only the Western Powers represented there but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere.

I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Soviet's thinking.

Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped--and this explains his early arrival in Paris--to divide the allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he had set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the United States bearing responsibility for the rupture before world opinion.

His plans miscarried because our two allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States and refused to be parties to Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely where it belongs--on his own shoulders.

This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is strongly supported by the attack which he made at his press conference on General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan for what he termed their lack of objectivity, lack of will and subservience to the allied relationships--in other words, in plain English, for their solidarity with the United States, their loyalty to our common purpose, and their refusal to play the Soviet game.

SIGNS OF NO RADICAL ALTERATION IN SOVIET POLICY

IV. The future

What conclusions should we draw for the future?

I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical alteration in Soviet policy, though we can expect the continuance of a propaganda effort designed to split off the United States from its allies. This conclusion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris statements, including those at his press conference. It is supported, somewhat more specifically and definitely, by the statements which he made in Berlin on his way home.

We must remember, however, that, given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any statement about a phase of Soviet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future.

Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disappointed by the fact that the summit conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends, as I have indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Provisionally, however, I conclude that the implication for U.S. policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort. Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our

readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober and rational manner.

We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures, not only in Berlin but also elsewhere. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pressures.

FRESH REALIZATION OF THE DANGERS WE FACE

Among the lessons of Paris, the most important for the free world, including ourselves, it seems to me, is fresh realization of the dangers we face and consequent need for closing of ranks and moving ahead with our own and our allies' programs for strengthening the free world. We came back from Paris with a keener sense of what it means to have allies, and I am sure that our alliances will take new life from this experience.

At the same time I would stress equally the need to expand imaginatively and generously our collaboration with the newly developing countries.

On both accounts, I hope the Congress will give wholehearted support to our mutual security programs as authorized by this committee, which are now more important than ever.

SEEKING TO MAKE PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

We must continue, as the President has said, to seek in a businesslike way to make progress on outstanding problems with the Soviet Union. We intend to go ahead with existing negotiations, to stand by our commitments, and to foster open communication and peaceful exchanges. Above all, we shall not cease from the most determined, patient, resourceful endeavor to find ways to bring the arms race under control and thus to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over mankind.

MAINTAINING A VIGILANT, CALM, AND RESOLUTE POSTURE

I believe in this period it is incumbent upon us, all of us, to keep a calm and steady gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions, statements, and attitudes which might tend unnecessarily to increase international tension. If such an increase is to occur, it should be clearly the fault of the Soviets and we should not do them the favor of providing pretext for action by them which would have this effect.

We should not define as "hard" or "soft" our attitude or policy toward the Soviet Union. To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from the grim reality that confronts us, but even more to plunge us inevitably into fruitless and damaging domestic recrimination. We must now, as in the future, maintain a vigilant, calm, and resolute posture and, insofar as it lies in our power to do so, be accurate in our estimates and effective in our actions.

I would close in expressing the hope that we will not become so fixed in preoccupation with the Soviet challenge as to lose sight of our own constructive purposes—which are larger and more important than merely resisting or reacting to external threats. We have our own vision of the future toward which we want to see the world evolve. We have our own programs for helping to bring that

future about—for holding high the light of freedom, for sharing its message and rewards with emerging nations, for trying to create an international community in which the rule of law will replace the rule of force. It is to these programs that our talents and energies should be rededicated in the uncertain times that lie ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Reporter, I have the documentation mentioned by the Secretary on page 4, which will be inserted in the record at this point. They are the various documents and speeches.

(The documentation referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENTS BY KHRUSHCHEV SINCE VISIT TO UNITED STATES

[Compiled by the Department of State]

The following is a collection of public statements made by Khrushchev from the time of his departure from the United States until May 5, 1960, which are offensive or threatening in nature vis-a-vis the West, particularly the United States. The statements are arranged under the following headings: (1) Berlin-Germany; (2) United States and Western policy; (3) the summit; (4) comments on West during Asian tour. They have been extracted from the following statements and speeches:

Speech in Moscow, upon return from United States, September 28, 1959.

Speech in Vladivostok, October 8, 1959.

Speech to Supreme Soviet, October 31, 1959.

Speech to Soviet journalists, November 14, 1959.

Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959.

Speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.

Letter to Chancellor Adenauer, January 28, 1960.

Speech to Indian Parliament, February 11, 1960.

Speech at Delhi civic reception, February 12, 1960.

Speech at Bihlil, February 15, 1960.

Speech at Calcutta dinner, February 15, 1960.

Speech at Jogjakarta, February 21, 1960.

Speech to Indonesian Parliament, February 26, 1960.

Press conference at Jakarta, February 29, 1960.

Press conference at Jakarta, March 1, 1960.

Speech at press luncheon, March 25, 1960.

Speech in Rheims, March 29, 1960.

Press conference at Rambouillet, April 2, 1960.

Speech in Moscow, upon return from France, April 4, 1960.

Speech in Baku, April 25, 1960.

It should be noted that this collection does not include private statements and criticisms of West Germany. On occasion, Khrushchev has been especially offensive and threatening in private talks. The Federal Republic and Chancellor Adenauer personally were the chief targets of offensive public statements on Khrushchev's part during this period. Beginning with his November 14 speech to Soviet journalists, Khrushchev launched a vigorous campaign of slander against the FRG and Adenauer designed to discredit them and isolate the FRG from the West. At times these public statements were truly scurrilous, likening the Chancellor to Nazis, to Hitler, calling him senile, etc.

It is also important to note that in his December 1 speech in Budapest, after a lapse of 3½ months, Khrushchev renewed his threat of a separate peace treaty without any provocation on the part of the West. Apparently Khrushchev then concluded that the West would go ahead with a summit conference and that it was therefore timely to begin exerting pressure on the West on the key issue of Berlin. Moreover, Khrushchev's threat of a separate treaty, in terms of the consequences for the allied position in Berlin, became more explicit and menacing with each succeeding major speech after the December 1 speech, culminating in his April 25 Baku speech threat that the allies would thereby not only be deprived of a legal basis for maintaining access, but would have no right to maintain troops in Berlin.

BERLIN-GERMANY

"The only way [to settle the Berlin problem] is to sign a peace treaty with Germany, and we have submitted a proposal to that effect. There is no evading a peace treaty for anyone, if the other countries on whom the signing of a peace treaty depends stand for peace and coexistence. The vestiges of World War II must at long last be removed, since they constitute a source that nourishes the instigators of a third world war. We are not forcing a solution of the West Berlin problem in point of time; we are setting no deadlines, issuing no ultimatums; but at the same time we shall not slacken our efforts to come to terms with our allies.

"If we try all means and they do not lead to the desired results, we shall have no other way out except signing a peace treaty with whichever of the two German states wants it. And in such a case we shall bear no responsibility for the refusal to sign the peace treaty. It will be borne by those who had an unreasonable approach to the solution of this problem, who did not take the road of easing tension in relations between states but, on the contrary, wanted to preserve the dangerous source threatening the outbreak of a third world war * * *

"We are doing our utmost to make the Soviet proposals acceptable. We do not impose them, but wish to reach agreement through negotiations, though we have every right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany does not wish to sign a peace treaty.

"We have before our eyes the example of the United States of America, which has signed a peace treaty with Japan without us. However, it cannot be held that one side can unilaterally sign treaties while the other cannot, though a peace treaty with Japan was signed earlier to its detriment. * * *

"The liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin will undoubtedly be conducive to this [improving relations]. We wish to reach agreement with all our former allies. This is why we do not fix any time limits. We want the solution of this question to improve, not worsen, our relations. The Soviet Government is ready to try out any conceivable peaceful means to secure a reasonable solution of the German problem, to promote the improvement of the international atmosphere, and to create conditions for disarmament and the establishment of eternal peace on earth for the sake of mankind's happiness.

"But if we do not meet with understanding, if the forces backing Chancellor Adenauer obstinately insist on the 'positions of strength' policy, we shall have no other choice left but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The Soviet Union does not intend to connive with those who are for the continuation of the 'positions of strength' policy. We and our allies would readily sign a treaty with West Germany, but if we do not succeed in this, we shall be compelled to sign a unilateral treaty with the GDR." (Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959. Khrushchev's first public threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR after his U.S. visit.)

"The Soviet Government considers that a peaceful settlement with Germany is an urgent international question, a question of the very foremost importance. We shall make every effort to have this question solved at last. We sincerely strive to find a solution for the German question together with our allies in the struggle against Hitler Germany. We consider that along with this the question of West Berlin too will be settled on an agreed basis. If, however, all our efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states fail to be crowned with success after all, the Soviet Union, and other willing states, will sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the consequences proceeding from this." (Khrushchev Supreme Soviet speech, January 14, 1960.)

"But what if we do not meet understanding? Could it be that we should live forever without a peace treaty, and forever resign ourselves to an abnormal situation in West Berlin?

"Of course, we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a situation. If the Soviet Union does not meet understanding it will have no other recourse but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the ensuing consequences, including those for West Berlin. That treaty would settle the frontier questions of Germany with the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic. With the signing of a peace treaty it would be clear to all that to strive to alter the existing frontiers means nothing else but to bring matters to a war. We shall not abet aggressive forces which cherish the dream of pushing German frontiers

to the east. If some states refuse to sign a peace treaty it will also be clear to all what they stand for: peace or war, for relaxation of tension and friendly relations or for cold war." (Letter to Adenauer, January 28, 1960.)

"AP CORRESPONDENT. Did you actually say that you will insist on a Western withdrawal from West Berlin regardless of the concessions they may make to Russia's position on disarmament? Did you make this statement to President Gronchi of Italy?"

"KHRUSHCHEV. The question is put in a not too correct way. The Western powers are allegedly to make concessions to the Soviet Union on questions of safeguarding peace, while we are to make concessions to the West with regard to Berlin. This is incorrect. These are two independent questions, each of which requires a separate solution.

"Is it only the Soviet Union and the socialist countries that are interested in disarmament, in safeguarding peace? All the peoples are interested in safeguarding peace. This is why it is necessary to consider the disarmament question and solve it in a way beneficial for all countries, for all the peoples, for the cause of peace.

"The question of West Berlin is entirely different. This is a question whose solution has been dragged out for 15 years since the end of the war. How much longer can we wait? A summit conference will meet shortly to strengthen peace, but the leftovers of the last war have not been done away with yet. This situation contradicts commonsense. This is why we shall strive to wipe out the hangovers of war, shall try to convince our allies of the last war to sign a peace treaty with the two existing German states. If they fail to understand this need or if they realize it but refuse to agree, then we shall sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

"When a peace treaty with the GDR is signed, all the consequences of the war against Germany will cease to exist on the territory of the GDR and with regard to West Berlin as well. West Berlin is on the territory of the GDR." (Djakarta press conference, February 20, 1960.)

"Question of FRANCE-SOIR correspondent MICHEL GORDET. 'You are regarded as an advocate of peaceful coexistence and territorial status quo between East and West. If this really is so, why do you question the status quo in Berlin where the military positions of the Western powers are weak?"

"* * * If all our possibilities are exhausted and our aspirations not understood, we shall unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR. This will settle the problems connected with the liquidation of the remnants of the war in the territory of the GDR which will sign the peace treaty with us; the problem of liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin will also be settled.'" (Diplomatic Press Association luncheon in Paris, March 25, 1960.)

"We are doing and shall continue to do our utmost to achieve understanding for our policy and to secure the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. I repeat, we shall do our utmost to this end. If the Western powers do not understand our peace-loving position, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR." (Rheims luncheon, March 29, 1960.)

"Fontaine of LE MONDE. Mr. Chairman, you more than once intimated that the Soviet Union would sign a separate treaty with the GDR if the summit meeting did not lead to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Could you say more precisely to what extent such a treaty would affect the communications between the Western garrisons in Berlin and West Germany?"

"KHRUSHCHEV. If we do not meet with understanding on the part of the leaders of those countries with which the Soviet Union fought against Hitler Germany, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR alone. However, this is very undesirable for us; we should not like to do so. But if there is no other way out, we--and not only we but a number of other countries that fought against Nazi Germany--will be impelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR alone, and all rights arising from the surrender of Nazi Germany would then become invalid on the entire territory under the sovereignty of the GDR. Hence, all countries now having garrisons in West Berlin on the basis of the surrender and defeat of Nazi Germany, would lose all rights connected with the occupation of the city. We have declared this more than once and we also reaffirm this today." (Rambouillet press conference, April 2, 1960.)

"We shall do everything to solve this question [German peace treaty] on a basis acceptable to the Western powers. But if our efforts are fruitless, then the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. And we are sure that all those who understand the necessity of removing the abnormal situation in the center of Europe will sign it along with the Soviet Union.

"We are also convinced that, despite the efforts of Chancellor Adenauer, the Western powers, sooner or later, will arrive at the same conclusion we have. Life itself will compel them to understand that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states is the only correct solution insuring normal conditions of peace and tranquility in Europe." (Lening Stadium speech on return from France, April 4, 1960.)

"So that nobody should have any illusions, I would like to state sincerely and directly: those who think this, and those who are going to follow such a policy, are going to be disappointed. The Soviet Government, for its part, will do everything to make our position clear, and will spare no effort to convince our partners of the need to conclude a peace treaty and set up a free city in West Berlin. But if, in spite of all our efforts, the Western powers show themselves unwilling to seek together with the Soviet Union an agreed solution of the question of a peace treaty, and, contrary to common sense, ignore this question, then we shall of course go our own way and will conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

"I think that the Soviet Union will not be alone in concluding this peace treaty. Along with us, it will be signed by many other states which are also convinced of the need for a peaceful settlement with Germany.

"The supporters of an aggressive course where the socialist countries are concerned often reason that allegedly even after the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR, the three Western powers would retain the right as before to the maintenance of their troops in West Berlin. I must say that this is an incorrect interpretation, and a policy which is based on such calculations is doomed to failure.

"It is generally known that the signing of a peace treaty will put an end to those conditions which were brought about by the capitulation of the country. Therefore, when a peace treaty is signed with the GDR, on the whole territory which is controlled by the government of this state, the conditions brought about by the surrender will no longer obtain. Thus in relation to this territory, the rights which the Western powers obtained as a result of the surrender of Hitlerite Germany will also lose effect, including the right to the further maintenance of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

"Some politicians say that they, allegedly, do not recognize the GDR, and therefore they do not want to have anything to do with it. It even gets to the point where they call for insuring the stay of the troops of the three powers in West Berlin, and their rights in relation to that city, as based on the surrender and with the aid of force.

"I must warn such hotheads, that when appeal is not made to right and law, when force is invoked, it is natural that force should be opposed by the force of the other side, a force which will rest on law, on right, and will consequently win the moral support of all countries. It cannot be otherwise.

"Our policy is based on concrete conditions. The Soviet Government is guided by the good intentions of liquidating the remnants of World War II, of removing the occupation regime in West Berlin, and of giving West Berlin the status of a free city. Contrary to the assertions of unscrupulous propaganda in the West, nobody intends to encroach upon the freedom, property, and rights of the inhabitants of West Berlin. They will be given every opportunity and every condition for a free choice of the political and social system they desire.

"But West Berlin lies within the territory of the GDR, and obviously when a peace treaty is signed, the GDR will exercise sovereign rights over its entire state territory. If, therefore, the Western powers should not wish to sign a peace treaty with the GDR, that would not preserve for them the rights on whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air." (Khrushchev speech at meeting in Baku, April 25, 1960.)

U.S. AND WESTERN POLICY

"There are forces in the U.S. which are acting against us, against the easing of tension, and for the continuation of the cold war. To shut one's eyes to this

would mean showing weakness in the struggle against these evil forces, against these evil spirits.

"* * * I have gained the impression that there are forces in the United States which act not in the same direction as the President. These forces want a continuation of the cold war and the armaments race. Whether these forces are big or small, influential or not influential, whether the forces which support the President can win—and he is supported by the absolute majority of the U.S. people—are questions to which I would not hasten to give a final answer." (Speech in Moscow, upon return from U.S. visit, September 28, 1959.)

"Some militant American generals are trying to frighten us. They are making many speeches with threats against us * * *. I have already said many times that to make militant speeches in our day, when terrible means of destruction have been created, is an extremely dangerous business." (Speech in Vladivostok, October 8, 1959.)

"However, the most bellicose leaders in the West cannot in any way give up the old methods. Echoes of the past are still heard here and there. Take for example the lamentable decision of the U.S. Congress to hold a so-called 'captive nations week' and to offer prayers for their liberation."

"* * * Herter and Assistant Secretary of State Dillon in speeches began something in the nature of psychological attack against the Soviet Union, trying deliberately to distort the character of relations between our country and China * * *. I do not know how it sounds in English, but in Russian attempts of this kind may be called 'bovine logic.'" (Speech to Supreme Soviet, October 31, 1959.)

"Our policy is not a position of strength policy * * *. By the way, I shall reveal—and let people abroad know it, I am making no secret of it—that in one year 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in a factory we visited. This represents millions of tons in terms of conventional explosives. You can well imagine that if this lethal weapon is exploded over some country there will be nothing left there at all." (Speech to Soviet Journalists, November 14, 1959.)

"During our talks in Washington I told Mr. Eisenhower that his position differed from mine, of course. I was authorized by the Soviet Government, in conformity with the desire of our people, to immediately sign an agreement on disarmament * * *. I believe that the President also wants this, but apparently he cannot do it because there are still strong quarters in the U.S. that oppose disarmament. We must not be deceived in this respect. Yesterday I read Mr. Nelson Rockefeller's statement * * *. But Messrs. Imperialists, if you try to return to the positions of the cold war, Rockefeller will not save you, just as Dulles could not save you." (Speech to Soviet Journalists, November 14, 1959.)

"Even now the enemies of socialism are not abandoning their plans for smashing the socialist camp and are, of course, looking for the weak links in it. They want to rout the socialist countries one by one. We must bear this in mind, because it is real, and we must do everything to deprive our enemies of these hopes, to thwart these hopes." (Speech to Hungarian Party Congress, December 1, 1959.)

"Thirst for profit is pushing some imperialistic circles toward continuing the arms race and maintaining the cold war. These circles are sufficiently influential to harm the cause of easing international tension in certain conditions. Those political leaders who have joined their interests with the policy of the arms race are afraid of the easing of international tension and regard it as unthinkable that this easing could become a fact * * *. It is clear that the imperialists will try again to rally the forces of the advocates of cold war." (Speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.)

"As to the questions to be discussed at the conference of the heads of governments, I should like to express some reservations. The nearer May 16, the day of the meeting of the heads of government, approaches, the more one-sided becomes the approach of some statesmen of the Western powers to the problems the participants of the conference will have to face. They talk about and fan

those aspects of this or that problem which, if attention is focused on them, cannot further the search for mutually accepted solutions. It goes without saying that such an attitude does not help the search for ways of solving important international issues. On the contrary, it leads to a maintenance of tension and consequently hinders the normalization of relations between states.

"There is no need to look far to find an example. Let us take a speech, recently made by the U.S. under secretary of state, Dillon, and offered as a summary of U.S. policy before the summit conference. This speech positively smelled of the spirit of the cold war. Dillon's speech reminds us, if anything, of a collection of prefabricated arguments, against the USSR and socialist countries, rather than of a responsible political statement. He kicked up a hullabaloo about the constant communist threat to peace, proposed that the conception of peaceful coexistence be thrown overboard, and crassly distorted the Soviet proposals on disarmament, the conclusion of a German peace treaty, and on West Berlin's transformation into a free city.

"Dillon tried to introduce a stream of unfriendliness and mistrust on the very eve of the summit conference, when it is so important to be consistent, to create and support an atmosphere of trust between states. Dillon described the summit conference as a check on the sincerity of the intentions of the USSR. He tried to make out that the outcome of the conference depends entirely on the USSR and not on all the participants. But nobody will succeed in undermining the trust in the good will of the USSR, the policy of which is clear, is permeated by love of peace and has gained the firm sympathy of the peoples.

"In the eyes of the peoples, the summit conference is truly a serious testing of the policies of the states represented at that conference, perhaps, most of all, of the policy of the United States itself. The peoples will judge sincerity of intention on what each of the four powers brings with it to the conference, and what contribution each power is ready to make to the cause of the lessening of international tension.

"But if one goes by the statement of Mr. Dillon, who understandably is not an outsider to government circles in the United States, it turns out that the U.S. Government is ready to come to an agreement on the disarmament question and on the improvement of relations between the states of East and West only if its own viewpoint is accepted on the Berlin question.

"Why did Dillon have to make a statement which is obviously out of harmony with the atmosphere established between the Soviet Union and the United States after my talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David? Maybe this is simply a manifestation of pugnacity by a diplomat who has got it stuck in his head that if one attacks the other side before talks begin, the other side will become more yielding? One would like to say to Mr. Dillon, and to those who may share his opinion, that such methods are most unsuitable in dealing with the Soviet Union." (Speech in Baku, April 25, 1960.)

THE SUMMIT

"Some in the West claim that the Soviet Union has changed its policy and, therefore, it has become easier to talk with us. This is wrong, of course. We were born Communists, we live as Communists, and will not die, but will continue to march onward as Communists." (Khrushchev speech at Soviet Journalists' meeting, November 14, 1959 (referring to a de Gaulle statement made at a November 10 press conference).)

"We have recently reached an agreement * * * on convening a conference of heads of government on May 16 in Paris. It is envisaged that this conference will be followed by a number of summit meetings. It would be imprudent to try to guess beforehand the possible results of the forthcoming conference * * * (Khrushchev speech to Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960.)

"As for the imminent summit meeting * * * naturally we must not think that all controversial issues can be regulated in one or two meetings between the leaders of Western and Eastern powers." (Khrushchev speech at Paris press luncheon, March 25, 1960.)

NOTE.—For Khrushchev's last public statement on the summit before May 1, see his comments of April 25 in Baku quoted under "U.S. and Western Policy."

COMMENTS ON WEST DURING ASIAN TOUR

"Everyone sees how the plans of the reactionary circles of certain Western powers which pursued a foreign policy 'from positions of strength' are coming to grief. Common sense and the understanding that the policy of 'brinkmanship' is a fatal policy under present conditions are beginning to gain ground.

"It is known that there are circles in the West who are unwilling to reconcile themselves to the beginning of the relaxation of international tension and seek to reverse the march of time and revert the world to cold war times. Especially dangerous in this respect are the activities of the military blocs of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, the holding of military maneuvers in various parts of the world and the establishment of new bases, including those for nuclear-tipped rockets. In this connection it is impossible to overlook the actions of the Japanese ruling circles, which are a danger to the cause of peace.

"The question of peace is the main question of our time. Closely connected with it is the question of the abolition of the colonial system. The sooner the colonial powers are deprived of their colonies—and the colonialists will then be unable to plunder and oppress other nations—the quicker peace on earth will be established * * *.

"In our time, the colonialists cannot act as they did in the past when the destinies of people throughout the world were decided in European capitals. They are casting about for new ways and means of enslaving countries which recently achieved independence * * *.

"Especially dangerous to the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America are various forms of collective colonialism. It is impossible not to mention such manifestations of colonialism as military-political blocs.

"Provocations against Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos are but a few of the shameful deeds of the SEATO bloc operating in your area." (Speech to Indonesian Parliament, February 26, 1960.)

"The struggle for strengthening peace is not an easy job, for still active in some countries are influential forces interested in the continued arms race, and in wrecking the prospect now in evidence of a decrease in international tension and in rekindling the cold war.

"Some of the Western countries are advanced just because those of Asia, Africa and Latin America are underdeveloped. It would be only fair for the Western nations to repay at least a portion of the looted wealth to the peoples whom they held in bondage." (Khrushchev speech to Indian Parliament, February 11, 1960.)

"Whereas all the peace-loving peoples want a further relaxation of international tension, the cold and hot war advocates continue galvanizing such aggressive blocs as NATO, SEATO and CENTO." (Khrushchev speech at Civic Reception in Delhi, February 12, 1960.)

"The Soviet Union and the West have two different approaches to aid. The Soviet Union strives to achieve economic aid which promotes economic independence. But some people in the West utilize assistance as a weapon of new colonial policy." (Khrushchev speech at Bhilai, February 15, 1960.)

"I do not think all of you understand when we show bitterness toward colonialists. For some ages you have been oppressed by colonialists, but still you do not feel as strongly as we do, though we have never in the strictest sense been a colony." (Khrushchev speech at a dinner in Calcutta, February 15, 1960.)

"Peace is also sought by the greater part of the peoples of the capitalist states in Europe and North America, even in the United States of America whose people for long have been influenced by the propaganda of those on the side of the cold war, where expressions of agreement with peace are considered almost akin to traitorous acts towards the interest of the state. * * *." (Khrushchev speech at Jogjakarta (State University of Gadjah Mada) February 21, 1960.)

"The European colonialists implanted their so-called civilization in Asia by the sword and the gun and for centuries they held up the development of the countries they enslaved." (Statement at Press Conference, Djakarta, March 1, 1960.)

"However, to be frank, one must say that the Western countries, having pumped out incalculable wealth from the colonies as a result of centuries of plunder and are continuing to pump out wealth in one way or another * * * might be fair enough to allocate at least a portion of this wealth for aid to underdeveloped countries." (Khrushchev speech to Indonesian parliament, February 26, 1960.)

"[Afro-Asian countries] are important suppliers of raw materials for the Western powers. The supporters of aggression understand that when the majority of Afro-Asian countries follow a peace-loving policy, they are unable to count on the use of the rich resources of Afro-Asian countries in their aggressive plans." (Khrushchev speech to Jogjakarta University, February 22, 1960.)

"The capitalist states are guided by the law of their society—no cheating, no sales—in other words help the weak today so that tomorrow the weak will again come to you for assistance. * * * This is not assistance, but striving to hook by the ear and drag into slavery, to make one or another country the object of exploitation by a state or group of persons." (Khrushchev press conference, Djakarta, February 29, 1960.)

ADDITIONAL KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENTS

The following Khrushchev statements all made after his return from the US, do not fit easily into the four categories listed above. They serve, however, to illustrate his interpretation of "peaceful coexistence," "*detente*," "capitalism," "exchange of ideas," etc.

"There were very good things [in the US], but we must not forget the bad things. This little worm, or, rather, giant worm is still alive, and can display its vitality in the future as well." (Moscow Speech on return from US, September 28, 1959.)

"We must realize clearly that the struggle for the consolidation of peace will be a long one. Peaceful coexistence must be understood correctly. Coexistence means the continuation of the struggle between two social systems, but of a struggle by peaceful means, without war, without the interference of one state into the domestic affairs of another state. One should not be afraid. We must struggle resolutely and consistently for our ideas, for our way of life, for our socialist system. The partisans of capitalism too will not, of course, abandon their way of life, their ideology, they will fight. We hold that this struggle must be economic, political, and ideological, but not military." (Novosibirsk speech, October 10, 1959.)

"He who does not recognize peaceful coexistence wittingly or unwittingly slips down into the positions of the cold war and the armaments race, of deciding international problems by force of arms and not by way of peaceful negotiations. Hence it is clear that it is essential to tear off the masks from all those who wish to embellish the policy of the imperialist state who continue the arms race. Things must be called by their names. The aggressive circles of these countries are striving to decide disputed international questions by means of war. All the pacts and alliances set up by the imperialist states are camouflaged by false statements to the effect that they are allegedly defensive, against the threat of communism. But such statements are not new and have been repeatedly exposed by life itself." (Novosibirsk speech, October 10, 1959.)

"The supporters of capitalism are trying to put a new coat on the decrepit capitalist system, but nothing will come of it; just like a horse, you know, that is getting old and is unable to keep its tail up like a young spirited horse. So, the moribund capitalist system will not see a new surge of energy." (Vladivostok speech, October 8, 1959.)

"In the course of these talks [during the Khrushchev US visit] certain American representatives repeatedly spoke about the so-called free dissemination of ideas. They tried to convince me of the need for wider dissemination in our country of books and films especially selected by them, and of the need for free broadcasting. They want to foist upon us all kinds of trash that would poison

the minds of Soviet people. Can we agree to this? Of course not. Our people do not want to consume bad food poisoned with the venom of bourgeois ideas." (Khrushchev speech, October 9, 1959.)

In his October 31, 1959 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev assessed the relative relaxation of international tension and gave his interpretation of the causes for it. These remarks were not directly linked to his US trip, but it was clear that this was his intention.

"Only recently, the foreign policy of some Western powers was built on openly aggressive calculations, on the 'positions of strength' policy. The inspirers of this policy wanted to impose their will on the peace-loving peoples"—i.e., the communist bloc countries. "Sometimes this approach to international affairs was styled a 'policy of pushing back' or 'rolling back,' but the essence remained the same * * * The advocates of this policy "meant direct military intervention in the affairs of the socialist and other peaceable states. From this stemmed the policy of a continuous arms race, illusory hopes of building up 'nuclear supremacy,' etc * * * Now times have changed. Even some of the active exponents of the 'position of strength' policy see its futility * * * At the present time a more sober evaluation of the situation, a more reasonable understanding of the balance of forces on the international scene is gaining ascendancy in the West." This "inevitably leads to the conclusion that plans involving the use of armed forces against the socialist world should be relegated to oblivion. Life itself demands that the states with different social systems should know how to * * * coexist peacefully * * * the main reason [for these recent changes] lies in the growing might and international influence of the Soviet Union, of all countries of the world system of socialism."

Khrushchev's remarks made clear that Moscow regarded the *detente* (and prospective high-level East-West talks) as a consequence, and not a repudiation of its position of strength policy. Furthermore, by claiming that the improved international atmosphere was due mainly to the West's accommodation to growing Soviet power, Khrushchev implied that there would be further improvement only if the West made further concessions.

WHEN WAS DECISION MADE TO SUSPEND OVERFLIGHTS?

The CHAIRMAN. Proceeding, Mr. Secretary, under our agreed regulations, can you tell the committee when the decision to suspend any further flights over Russian territory was taken?

Secretary HERTER. My impression is that it was taken on the Thursday before the President went to Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be Thursday, is that it, the 12th?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the considerations which led to the decision taken on Thursday, the 12th of May, that there should be no further flights over the—

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, I think I answered that in my own statement, in which I said that since the U-2 system had been compromised, it was discontinued as any other intelligence mission would be in such a case.

The CHAIRMAN. It had been compromised sometime before the 12th, hadn't it?

Secretary HERTER. No, sir.

(Subsequently the Department of State informed the Committee that the reporter had misunderstood the Secretary's answer to this question, which had been "Yes, sir.")

QUESTION OF A MORATORIUM ON FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Was a moratorium on flights agreed upon prior to May 1 to be effective at any time after May 1?

Secretary HERTER. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. You would know of it if it had been taken, wouldn't you?

Secretary HERTER. I am sorry? I couldn't hear the question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any moratorium on the flights agreed upon prior to May 1, to be effective at any time after May 1?

Secretary HERTER. I have heard reports to that effect, but of my own knowledge I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Was such a moratorium ever discussed or considered by anyone in the State Department?

Secretary HERTER. Not by Mr. Dillon nor myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Or anyone?

Secretary HERTER. I don't know of anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the CIA considered such a moratorium?

Secretary HERTER. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Dulles or anyone else order a suspension of flights after the loss of the plane on May 1?

Secretary HERTER. That, sir, he will be able to testify to. I can't tell you as of what date he did that.

PREVIOUS U-2 FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Were any other planes lost on these same ventures prior to May 1?

Secretary HERTER. [Deleted.] Not over Soviet territory.

The CHAIRMAN. None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory?

Secretary HERTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The flight referred to, that Chairman Khrushchev referred to on April 9, you were aware of that, were you?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a successful overflight?

Secretary HERTER. It was.

DELAY IN ANNOUNCING SUSPENSION OF OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. If the President decided to suspend the flights prior to Monday, May 16, which you stated he did on the 12th, why was this announcement delayed until the meeting with Chairman Khrushchev on the 16th?

Secretary HERTER. Because the President reserved that decision to make the announcement in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the reasoning for doing that?

Secretary HERTER. I cannot give you the answer, sir.

EFFECT OF U-2 INCIDENT ON SOVIET WRECKING OF CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated very convincingly that Chairman Khrushchev came to the conference determined to wreck it. Do you believe that the U-2 incident contributed to this determination on the part of Chairman Khrushchev?

Secretary HERTER. Might I say because I have got a little cold and can't hear too well, can that question be repeated?

The CHAIRMAN. You have said that Chairman Khrushchev came to the conference determined to wreck it. Do you believe the U-2 incident contributed to this determination?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I believe it did. It was one of the factors as I tried to explain in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think——

DELAY IN ANNOUNCING SUSPENSION OF OVERFLIGHTS

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, might I for a moment go back to the previous question you had asked as to the President's delay in announcing the suspension of the flights?

You may recall that he at the summit or at the so-called meeting in Paris coupled that with the offer of bringing into the United Nations a proposal for general overflight program superintended by the United Nations and wanted to couple those two things together.

WHY DIDN'T PRESIDENT DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR U-2 FLIGHT?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, why do you think Chairman Khrushchev left a way out for the President by suggesting in one of his earlier statements that he believed the President did not know about these flights?

Secretary HERTER. I can there, of course, only speculate that he had committed himself very strongly in Russia with regard to his friendship for the President, and wished to in that way continue the possibility of the President disclaiming any responsibility for the flight.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason for not accepting this way out on our part? Why didn't we accept that suggestion?

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, that was a question, as you know, of judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what?

Secretary HERTER. It was a question of judgment. As to when the essential facts had been revealed by the capture of the pilot and the plane with all its instrumentation intact, the U.S. Government should admit the fact that this overflight had taken place, that it was an intelligence overflight, and that decision was made, of course, by the President himself.

QUESTION OF WISDOM OF THE HEAD OF A STATE ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESPIONAGE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you are a longtime devotee of international relations and thoroughly familiar with precedents in this field. Is the public assumption of responsibility for espionage by the head of a state the usual and customary practice among nations?

Secretary HERTER. No; the general practice has been, I think, for a long period of time to deny any responsibility whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any precedent in our history or in the history of any great nation in which the head of state has assumed personal responsibility for espionage activities?

Secretary HERTER. No; I do not know of any firsthand. It may be that there have been some. On the other hand, I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that this particular incident was of a very unusual nature.

The CHAIRMAN. As a general policy, do you believe it is wise for the head of state to assume responsibility for espionage activities?

Secretary HERTER. Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a great deal of difference from the public point of view.

On the other hand I believe in a case of this kind the telling of the truth was the better course than getting deeper into fabricating excuses or disavowing responsibility.

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESPIONAGE

The CHAIRMAN. What precisely were the reasons that persuaded you to depart from precedent in this case? What were the unusual circumstances you referred to?

Secretary HERTER. The unusual circumstances were the facts that the materiel and the statement of the pilot, not every bit of which was accurate, but a great part of which was accurate, had been revealed, and could have been presented to impartial tribunals for examination.

Under those circumstances, which was very different from the ordinary espionage case I think it would have become extremely evident and was extremely evident that this incident had taken place.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in our spy cases, isn't it a fact that the evidence of the particular person being a spy, of some of those we had, was not in question. The difference is in whether or not the head of state takes responsibility for it, not that it was convincingly evident he was a spy. Isn't that the difference?

Secretary HERTER. That is a difference.

The CHAIRMAN. We often catch a spy. We have ourselves, it has been related, and there is no doubt he is a spy with all the paraphernalia which usually accompanies a spy, but the point I thought that would be very interesting to the committee to know is why in this particular case, in spite of the convincing nature of the evidence that he was a spy, that the President and the head of state should assume responsibility for it.

Secretary HERTER. The first was that it was obvious from the facts as to what had occurred. Second was that the situation which had led to this entire activity was the one which is probably disturbing the peace of the world the most, and leads to the greatest tensions in the world; namely the danger of surprise attack, and the secrecy behind the Soviet Union.

SOVIET DELETION IN MAGAZINE OF REFERENCES TO PRESIDENT'S EXPECTED VISIT TO RUSSIA

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not after the President said that he did know and took full responsibility for these flights that Chairman Khrushchev became completely intransigent and wrecked the conference?

Secretary **HERTER**. That is very difficult to determine. If I may, I would like to cite at this point just one piece of evidence that I mentioned yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

On May 6 the Soviet Embassy in Washington, before any statement had been made accepting any degree of responsibility, before the President had made any statement, this was on May 6, canceled from the magazine which is published in the United States similar to the magazine which is published by the United States in Russia, called the U.S.S.R., stopped a press run of that magazine and took out of it all references to the coming visit of the President to Soviet Russia. The magazine had in it a welcome to the President in his visit to Russia, pictures of the places that he was going to, and a good many photographs indicating what a great success his visit was going to be. That was canceled and taken out of the magazine entirely.

The **CHAIRMAN**. My time is up. Senator Green. I recognize you for 10 minutes.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COORDINATION ON U-2 INCIDENT

Senator **GREEN**. May I ask a few more questions about the same matter because I do not understand, and perhaps it is my fault, how far the President acted alone and how far the State Department acted alone before they came together and agreed on the situation?

Secretary **HERTER**. Well, I would say that there was consultation right through this period.

Senator **GREEN**. I didn't understand.

Secretary **HERTER**. I would say there was consultation right through in this period. May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman? From the point of view of firsthand knowledge on these matters, I asked Mr. Dillon to come up with me because until May 6, I was out of the United States. He was acting Secretary of State and some of the questions that may be directed to that period when I was out of the country he can answer from firsthand information, whereas I would have to do it only from secondhand information.

The **CHAIRMAN**. We would be very glad to have Mr. Dillon supplement the statement whenever you would like.

Senator **GREEN**. Mr. Dillon, then will you take up the answer to my question?

Mr. **DILLON**. All I can say is that in the period that I had responsibility we were in contact regularly with the President with full coordination.

Senator **GREEN**. Well, the division of authority seems to have resulted in a great many understandings which have been spread well in the press, and the people are anxious to be informed on how it happened; what was the lack in organization or otherwise that was responsible. If you can explain it, I would be glad to have you do so.

ISSUANCE OF COVER STORY ON OVERFLIGHT

Mr. **DILLON**. If it would be helpful, I will be glad to explain briefly the course of events in the few days after the plane was missing.

We first received news that this plane was missing, was overdue at its home base on Sunday, which was the day that the Soviet Union later said the plane was shot down.

At that time, it was determined that a cover story would be used as was stated by the President the other night, which had been previously prepared for such instance.

There was full coordination on this. I knew that the cover story was to be issued and it was discussed that it would be issued as usual when a plane was lost at the base from which the plane was lost. There would be no statement from Washington, and this information was given to the people who would be in charge of the flight at the base where it flew from in Turkey. [Deleted.] In due course, the statement was put out there that a plane was missing. The general content of that statement by the base commander at Adana at Turkey was that a U-2 aircraft on the weather mission originating at Adana, Turkey, was missing; that the purpose of the plane's flight had been a study of clear air turbulence; that during the flight in southeast Turkey the pilot reported he had oxygen difficulties; that the last word heard from MDB at 7 o'clock Greenwich time; that the aircraft did not land at Adana, as planned; and that it could only be assumed that it was now down.

A search effort, he said, was underway in the Lake Van area and that the pilot's name was being withheld pending notification of the next of kin.

After that statement was made no further action was taken here because we did not know the circumstances of how the plane had been lost, where it had been lost, whether it had been actually lost over Soviet territory or not, although the presumption was that it had been lost over Soviet territory, because that was apparently where it was going to be the greater part of the time in the flight.

EVENTS LEADING TO STATE DEPARTMENT MAY 5 STATEMENT ON MISSING PLANE

The next incident occurred on the morning of Thursday, the 5th of May when we heard of the first speech by Mr. Khrushchev in which it was stated that they had shot down a plane. They didn't say where the plane had been shot down, but they said that an American plane was shot down. This required action and statements on our part. The news of that was received by me during the course of a meeting, a regular meeting of the National Security Council which was being held that day as you will remember, somewhere out of Washington, as a part of a civil defense exercise.

A series of civil defense exercises were underway at that time which had been long scheduled. When we heard that news, it was decided that the State Department would handle all questions regarding it and taking part in the discussion at that time, present at that time were myself, Secretary Gates, and Mr. Allen Dulles. So we were all three aware of this decision.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, members of the State Department were meeting with members of the Central Intelligence Agency to try and work out a proper statement.

As soon as we returned to Washington, that statement was finalized in agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency and the White

House was obviously kept informed of the contents of the statement, and the statement was then put out at 12:45 in the State Department. The text of that statement was this:

The Department has been informed by NASA that as announced May 3 an unmanned plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian has been missing since May 4. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure in the oxygen equipment which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

PREPARATION OF GUIDELINES ON MISSING PLANE

Meanwhile, prior to that, in the days immediately before that, there had also been conversations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding information that might be given to NASA in case there were further questions of them in Washington, for confirmation of statements regarding where the plane was down, something of that nature.

General guidelines on this were prepared. This was prior to the 5th, in the period of the 2d and 4th, and these, I understand, were transmitted to NASA by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The State Department at no time worked directly with NASA on any of this publicity or anything regarding these flights.

Senator GORE. Did you say did, or did not?

Mr. DILON. Did not. This is part of the cover operation.

[Deleted.]

NASA STATEMENT OF MAY 5

So then the next item on this was that shortly after this statement, NASA was asked a lot of questions about the plane and they, following the cover story that had been prepared earlier, put out the statement which appeared in the press that same day. I think that came out about three-quarters of an hour after our statement. They apparently utilized the general guidelines which they had been given, to answer questions and put them together into a statement which was then put out.

Senator HUMPHREY. What was the date of that?

Mr. DILON. This was done on May 5. This was right after Mr. Khrushchev's first speech in which he said a plane was down somewhere and this was--you will recall also at that time the Soviets printed a photograph of a plane that was supposedly a wreck and we very rapidly learned, I would say within 24 hours, that this photograph was a fraudulent photograph and was not a photograph of the U-2 wreckage, but was a photograph of some Soviet type plane.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, may I get a correction?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the Senator from Rhode Island has expired.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just a technical point. I couldn't follow the sequence. I was wondering about the background documents we have before us and the sequence of relays.

The CHAIRMAN. You will have an opportunity.

Senator GREEN. I would like to have the witness proceed and finish his statement.

Mr. DILLON. Yes; could I finish this statement?

EVENTS LEADING UP TO STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF MAY 7

Almost immediately, I would say on Friday the 6th, we were aware that this was a fraudulent picture, and so that gave us some concern that the Soviets might have a greater knowledge regarding the aircraft than we had previously suspected, and that maybe they had in their possession more of the aircraft and possibly had the pilot in their possession. So this was then followed on Saturday morning, the 7th by Khrushchev's speech in which he stated that they did have the pilot, and gave for the first time actual information as to where it was shot down and so forth.

The Secretary returned to Washington on the afternoon of Friday, May 6, from Istanbul and Greece, and I reported to him on the situation as of that time, and at that time he naturally took over. Therefore, on Saturday morning, we met with him to determine what to do next, and at that moment as we met, we were faced with this new Soviet statement saying that they had the pilot, and a new situation had arisen, and his action at that time the Secretary has explained. But that was when the decision was made to reveal the fact that this was an American plane.

Senator GREEN. If I understand you correctly—

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator has run considerably over his time.

Senator GREEN. May I ask one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. We are under a time limitation.

Senator GREEN. I thank you for what you have said. As I understand it, your explanation is that too many cooks spoil the broth.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Wisconsin.

TIMING OF SOVIET DECISION TO WRECK CONFERENCE

Senator WILEY. I want to congratulate you, gentlemen.

It seems to me that the facts as developed this morning, plus the President's address, give us what we have practically all known from the newspapers as descriptive of this situation. I want to ask just a few questions, Mr. Secretary.

In your opinion, do you think that when Khrushchev went to Paris he had already made up his mind to blow up the conference?

Secretary HERRER. I do, sir, and I think that the bulk of the evidence indicates that he was under instructions to do so.

Senator WILEY. In your opinion, is the matter of using what we have used in the past, the U-2's, for a mere period of years, all in the interest of preserving the integrity of the United States and the integrity of the West?

Secretary HERRER. I do indeed.

Senator WILEY. And, in your opinion, if the U-2 incident hadn't happened—this is sort of a duplication of the question but I want to get to the main question—would Khrushchev have had an adequate excuse or would he have drummed up one?

Secretary HERRER. That can only be a matter of speculation. I think that Mr. Khrushchev, as indicated by his Baku speech, felt

that from his point of view the summit would not turn out satisfactorily, and that the U-2 incident was a convenient handle for him to use to torpedo the conference.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. Isn't it a fact that from his remarks that he made in his talk in Berlin he knew that we were using what has been called spy planes, and had been using the same for some time?

Secretary HERRER. It certainly does, and that was repeated yesterday by Mr. Gromyko in the statement that he made at the United Nations in which he said they had known of this for some time, that they had known of it at the time that Mr. Khrushchev was at Camp David. [Deleted.]

PRIOR EXPECTATIONS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AT SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator WILEY. Then because of previous conferences, as you have outlined in your remarks, it is very clear that there was no real reason to think that a conference could have accomplished anything, because isn't it a fact that both parties were adamant?

Secretary HERRER. That is true, sir, insofar as Berlin and the German situation was concerned. It might have been possible to work out some interim agreement for Berlin. I am rather doubtful whether it would have been. There was some hope that in the field of disarmament, the East and the West could have agreed on directives to those who were negotiating in Geneva to get down to specific disarmament measures to make a start, and to break away from the deadlock that had occurred over pure generalities. That is a hope that we had, that something of that kind might come out of the Paris conference. But, as you may recall, in our public statements we had made it very clear that people should not expect, not have too great hopes of what might come out of it. But as the President has himself said, he had hoped perhaps from this and perhaps from succeeding summit conferences there might be some easing of the overall atmosphere, which in time would lead to a solution of some of these problems.

KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENT ON A FUTURE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator WILEY. What do you think is the reason that if Khrushchev was as heated up as he claims he was, that he said in 6 or 8 months there would be another opportunity for a conference?

Secretary HERRER. I think with the admonition that we have been given earlier in the day with regard to not bringing political matters into this discussion, the inference would have to be drawn by each individual for himself on that.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF MAY 25

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take more time except I do believe that into the minutes of this meeting should go the address of the President of May 25, which is already attached to this summation of these background documents. But in view of the

fact that we are asking ourselves certain questions about, let us say, where do we go from here, and that is my last question, I ask that this be incorporated in the minutes of this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The speech referred to appears on p. 249 of appendix 1.)

FUTURE U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator WILEY. Now where do we go from here?

Secretary HERTER. Sir, I tried to indicate that in the last part of my statement. As the President has said, we hope to continue to do business on a businesslike basis with the Soviet Government. We intend to continue with the negotiations that are now underway. We intend to continue with our exchange agreements. One thing I might put in the record at this point. From such information as we have received from our embassies in Moscow, and from our missions in other Soviet bloc countries, the attitude toward our people has remained unchanged. There has been no indication of hostility on a people to people basis that has been evidenced in any way from what happened in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Minnesota.

SOVIET FEAR OF SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO WEST GERMANY

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, on page 4 of your statement, you indicate under the subtitle "Summit Prospects Dimmed," a series of developments that you believe indicated a change in the position or a possibility of a change in the position of the Soviet representatives, particularly Mr. Khrushchev, about the summit.

In the third paragraph you say "But clouds began to gather even then," referring to some developments in the Soviet Union.

If you will recall that period, isn't this about the same time that the United States was considering offering nuclear weapons again to West Germany?

Secretary HERTER. I can't recall that we have ever done that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, there has been considerable talk about the offering of nuclear weapons to our allies.

Secretary HERTER. We have not been offering them to our allies—

Senator HUMPHREY. I know you have not been offering them.

Secretary HERTER. Under the law we cannot do that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand that. There has been considerable discussion here in the United States of changing the law and offering weapons to our NATO allies.

Secretary HERTER. There may have been discussions on that subject, Senator, but we never made any specific proposal on that point.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you denying there has been any discussion of it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary HERTER. Oh, no; I said there was some discussion.

Senator HUMPHREY. In official circles.

Secretary HERTER. We have never made any specific proposals of any kind.

Senator HUMPHREY. There was enough talk about it so that resolutions have been introduced into the Congress, and the House of Representatives, as you know, to make sure that this didn't happen.

My question relates to this: Is there not a great fear in the Soviet Union of the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons to Western Germany?

Secretary HERRER. I think that is true. I am not sure that it is confined to Western Germany. I think that it applies to the spread of nuclear weapons in other nations and it might well include Communist China.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes; indeed.

PROPAGANDA NATURE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENTS PRECEDING
SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Is it not possible that during this period of the dimming of the summit prospects that you referred to that you are saying here was a little counteroffensive on the propaganda level by the Soviet?

Secretary HERRER. Yes; that is possible. On the other hand, may I say this: The summit conference itself was not agreed upon until December after the President, Messrs. Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer had met in Paris and a note was sent to the Soviet Government suggesting that a summit conference be held and the date was not agreed upon until later than that, the date of May 16.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I want it quite clear I happen to believe, as you indicated, that the Soviets made up their minds to scuttle this conference in light of certain developments, such as the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to President de Gaulle; and when he found out that the Americans, the French, and the British were not going to back out on Berlin, and were not going to agree to a separate settlement in Germany, I think that Mr. Khrushchev did come to the conclusion, as you have indicated, that the summit conference could not be a success and therefore, he wanted to get out of it.

But the point that I am raising in light of your statement is, would we not expect Mr. Khrushchev to blast off, so to speak, on such subjects as Berlin and a separate treaty with Germany? Isn't this and hasn't this been a part of his general line for a considerable period of time?

Secretary HERRER. Yes; it is not confined to Mr. Khrushchev. It has been almost a standard technique, before any conference, to take a very adamant position before the conference.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Well, I only bring this up because while I recognize there was evidence of what you say, possibly a shift of opinion in the Kremlin, there was always a reason for this and there may very well have been the reason that the Soviet leaders constantly want to wage the propaganda war on this nuclear-weapons distribution problem.

STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS AND NEWS BRIEFING OF MAY 5

I want just to correct the record here. I am sorry to have interrupted Senator Green, but Secretary Dillon, when you were discussing for us the sequence of events relating to the U-2 incident, you talked about a press release of the Department of State on May 5; where is it?

Mr. DILLON. I noticed I received this document after I made my statement, and I noticed that it was not included in this document.

I have here a full text of the on-the-record press and radio news briefing by the State Department spokesman on May 5 at 12:45 p.m. I will be glad to submit this record which includes not only the statement but also on-the-record questions and answers which he made, and that should be inserted before the National Aeronautics and Space Administration news release which was given out before that.

(The excerpt from the press and radio news briefing appears on p. 178 of appendix I.)

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S NEWS RELEASE OF MAY 5

Senator HUMPHREY. Did the Department of Defense give out a release before you did; that is, the State Department?

Mr. DILLON. The Department of Defense's news release was really only confirmation and repetition of the release that had been given out by the airbase commander at Adana, Turkey, and added nothing to that. It merely repeated that that was accurate and that was the one that is in this document.

WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR U-2 FLIGHTS?

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, what agency or who is the person in, the official in, this Government, who is in charge of these flights, such as the U-2 flights?

Secretary HERRER. The Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have constant information, do you have continuing information, in the State Department, as to the number of these flights, the course of these flights, the purpose of these flights?

Secretary HERRER. The general programs had been gone over with the Department. Obviously it is impossible to tell when these flights are going to take place because they are so dependent on the season of the year and on weather conditions.

The Agency has to plan numbers of alternatives so we never know at any particular time or any particular flight. But the general approval of the program had been received from the State Department, of course, as one of the advisers to the President in this matter.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you know of this specific flight ahead of time?

Secretary HERRER. I did not; no. I didn't know it was in the air even when I was overseas nor do I think any of us did until it came down.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that your understanding, Mr. Dillon?

Mr. DILLON. I was not aware that it was in the air until I was informed that it was—it was overdue as I stated previously.

WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR COVER STORY?

Senator HUMPHREY. When something goes wrong on one of these flights, who is responsible for giving the cover story, the coverup story, so to speak?

Mr. DILLON. Central Intelligence Agency, but we are also responsible for agreeing with them that this is a reasonable story, and it is proper in the circumstances, but they have the responsibility for executing it.

[Deleted].

POSSIBILITY OF UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER THE UNITED STATES

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, what do you think would happen in the United States if on our radar screen we should discover a plane flying at high altitude over our territory in this age of the fear of surprise attack?

Secretary HERTER. I think we would do everything we could do to identify it right away.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just identify it?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, identify it. We have the wherewithal, I think to do that.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, would we dispatch interceptors?

Secretary HERTER. I think so.

Senator HUMPHREY. What would be our view of such a flight?

Secretary HERTER. Certainly there is very little that such a flight could ascertain that would worry us much. Every bit of information that we have got in this country seems to be available through public means to anyone who wishes to collect documents. In fact in the whole Russian espionage system they have collected maps, documents, and photographs of every part of the United States.

Senator HUMPHREY. I realize this, but in light of the danger of surprise attack this is what I am getting at. This is a little different, may I say, from a spy working in the railroad yard or taking photographs or even a submarine off our coast even though this gets to be a little serious, too. But in the light of danger of surprise attack by air power, there is some difference, is there not?

Secretary HERTER. There is some difference. On the other hand I think we could identify it very quickly. This is the type of plane that no one could possibly mistake for a bomber when you get close enough to look at it. This is entirely an unarmed glider type of plane.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we ever shot down any Soviet planes over American territory or over any friendly territory in which we have bases or alliances?

Secretary HERTER. Not that I am aware of.

Senator Humphrey. Have we ever intercepted any Soviet planes, in Korea, for example?

Secretary HERTER. I think we have been able to identify them from time to time. Whether we could say that they were deliberate espionage planes or whether they wandered over the line from the border or not I can't tell you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we ever shot any down?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U-2 AIRPLANE?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, we hear a great many statements about this plane being shot down. What is the best evidence on that? Was it shot down from its maximum height or did they consider that it had a flameout at that height and then came down to a lower altitude or what?

Secretary **HERTER**. Senator, there has been a good deal of speculation on that point. I think that we are very skeptical as to whether it was shot down from a very high altitude. [Deleted.]

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Well, I think there is considerable difference in a situation where this plane might have been shot down at 60,000 or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot at at 5,000 or 7,000 feet.

Secretary **HERTER**. We are very skeptical and there are certain evidences that it was not shot down from that altitude. [Deleted.]

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Now, I think it has been quite well-established from Mr. Khrushchev's statements, that the Russians were aware for some time in the past that flights of this kind had gone over their territory.

I say I think it is quite evident that Mr. Khrushchev was aware or the Russians were aware that flights of this kind had gone on over their territory. At least they claim they were. Did they ever file a protest with the U.S. Government?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes, but not with respect to this type of flight.

WILL THE UNITED STATES BE PERMITTED TO INTERVIEW THE PILOT?

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. I understand that we have requested in Moscow that representatives of this Government be permitted to interview the pilot. Have we had any replies from those requests?

Secretary **HERTER**. As yet they have not given us that permission. They have said that "When we have finished interrogating him we will give consideration to it."

HEALTH AND PLACE OF IMPRISONMENT OF PILOT

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Do we have a reasonable idea as to where he is being held?

Secretary **HERTER**. That I can't tell you. We have been assured that he is in good health, and beyond that I can't tell you whether we know where he is held or not. Perhaps one of my colleagues knows that. I don't think we have any information on that.

DEFENSIVE VALUE TO UNITED STATES OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Would you care to give an opinion on the value to this country, in our defensive posture, of these flights, this series of flights which have gone on over Russian territory for the last several years?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes, sir, I will give you this opinion. It is a layman's opinion rather than an expert's opinion, but I think they were of very great value to us.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Isn't it a fact that these flights have enabled us, through the knowledge that we have acquired, to reorient our defensive posture and our equipment and attitudes from time to time because we have been able to find out exactly, in many instances, what the Russians were apparently doing or proposing to do by way of armaments and weapons and installations?

Secretary HERTER. I think that they have been of very great value to us.

EFFECT OF SOVIET INABILITY TO STOP U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, have you had any opportunity to get a reliable cross section reading on what other nations of the world think about the vulnerability of Russian defenses; in other words, on the theory that perhaps a part of Mr. Khrushchev's and the Kremlin's infuriation about this matter is an exposition to the world that they knew about these flights and that they could not stop them from going over the Russian territory with any consistency?

Secretary HERTER. I think that undoubtedly that played a considerable part in his own state of mind with regard to the whole incident, the feeling of frustration that they had not been able to stop these during a period of 4 years.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that that exposure to the Russian people and to many other nations of the world that had been propagandized perhaps into thinking that the Russians were invulnerable may very well have had some effect on the attitudes within the Kremlin?

Secretary HERTER. It may well have had very real effects.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

DOES RUSSIA HAVE A LAND-AIR MISSILE?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do our experts believe that Russia has a land-air missile?

Secretary HERTER. I think you are having both the Secretary of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency that can testify to that better than I could.

Senator MORSE. Have they ever informed you as to what their opinion is as to whether or not Russia has a land-air missile?

Secretary HERTER. We, I think, assume that they do.

Senator MORSE. We assume that they do. Is it on the basis of that assumption that they have been asking Congress for some time for a speedup in our land-air missile program, because of the assumption that Russia may have one?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir. I am being purposely cautious for security reasons as you understand.

Senator MORSE. I understand.

Secretary HERTER. And possibly in executive session when you have talked to Mr. Dulles you could get further information on that point.

Senator MORSE. And yet, I think from the standpoint of our own security, it is rather important that we have some information as to the possibility, on the line of Senator Hickenlooper's question, the possibility of whether or not this was shot down by a land-air missile.

Senator LAUSCHIE. A little louder, if the Senator please.

[Deleted].

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. [Deleted.]

What evidence do we have, Mr. Secretary, that Russia knew of previous American spy plane flights over Russian territory?

Secretary HERRER. Only the statements of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko.

Senator MORSE. When?

Secretary HERRER. Mr. Khrushchev made it a number of times. He did so in his statements in Paris. He did so, I think, in his statements that he made to the Central Committee of the Presidium in Moscow before he left.

Mr. Gromyko made that statement again yesterday.

RIGHTS OVER CAPTURE OF SPIES

Senator MORSE. What international law rights do we have, Mr. Secretary, over capture of American spies by foreign governments?

Secretary HERRER. Excuse me, sir?

Senator MORSE. I repeat it. What international law rights do we have over American spies that have been captured by a foreign government?

Secretary HERRER. We have no rights over them that are in contravention of domestic law. We have no international right.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, Russia is under no international law requirement to make this American spy accessible to American Government officials in Moscow.

Secretary HERRER. I do not think so.

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ON THE U-2 OVERFLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do you think the public knowledge now of these American spy plane flights over Russia has played into the hands of Communist propaganda with the Russian people themselves by increasing the fear, no matter how unfounded we know it is, the fear of the Russian people that our real objective is to make war against Russia?

Secretary HERRER. I think that the Russian Government will do its very best to work along that line in its propaganda.

As I said earlier, the evidence we have so far is that the attitude of the Russian people toward our officials, whether in Moscow or in our missions in the Soviet bloc countries, has shown no change.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF U-2 INCIDENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, what plans, if any, does the administration have of carrying on a peace offensive against Khrushchev now in a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

Secretary HERRER. What the situation may be at the time of the General Assembly meeting is a matter of speculation. The fact that, as I indicated in my prepared statement, he had gone through this extraordinary press conference in Paris using very extreme language, but that he did not make any threats of any specific action; that he then went to East Berlin and called off a mass meeting there, and only invited people to a meeting on the following day and then made a statement with regard to the Berlin situation indicating that there would be no action taken for some time, may well indicate that his position on specific things has not changed. However, only time will

tell. What his attitude will be and what the whole attitude will be at the time of the meeting of the Assembly, of course, we can only speculate.

It is very possible that he may want at that time to make a more conciliatory gesture. [Deleted.]

RED CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON SOVIET ACTION

Senator MORSE. To what extent, if any, do you think Red China has put pressure on the Russian leaders to follow this adamant course of action?

Secretary HERTER. That again, sir, is a matter of speculation.

Senator MORSE. You have no evidence?

Secretary HERTER. But the articles which have appeared in the Red Star magazine, which is their official publication, have been of such a highly critical nature of the whole policy of so-called peaceful co-existence, the whole detente policy that Mr. Khrushchev seemed to have been following, that they may well have had a considerable influence.

RED CHINA'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Senator MORSE. Do you have any reason to believe that we may be confronted with a diversionary movement now in Asia by Red China stepping up military activities in Asia seeking to embarrass us?

Secretary HERTER. I think we should be very alert to that.

Senator MORSE. Do we have any late information as to any progress Red China is making in the development of nuclear weapons, either on their own or assisted by Russia?

Secretary HERTER. No, we do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, your time is up.

The Senator from Vermont.

EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW PILOT

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, one of the missing links in that chain of information seems to be the circumstances surrounding the capture of the U-2 or parts of it and the pilot.

Has every effort been made on our part to see the pilot of the U-2 to interview him?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Has the United Nations taken steps to interview him in view of the Russian resolution or demand now being made in the Security Council?

Secretary HERTER. No, not that I know of.

Senator AIKEN. Have they any right to?

Secretary HERTER. Not that I would know of.

HEALTH OF THE PILOT

Senator AIKEN. Have you any information at all regarding the condition of the pilot?

Secretary HERTER. Only what we have been told; he is in good health.

Senator AIKEN. That was Mr. Khrushchev's statement?

Secretary HERTER. That was—

SOVIET PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

Senator AIKEN. But Mr. Khrushchev very evidently, very obviously, undertook to substantiate his first statement with a false photograph, and then, as I understand it, he later showed another fake photograph to the Russians, claiming that was taken from films developed from the camera in the U-2 plane.

Secretary HERTER. I am not quite so sure that second one was a fake.

Senator AIKEN. You are not so sure—well, I am not referring to the supposed remains of the U-2, but to the photograph of the planes lined up on the ground and claimed to be photographs of Russian planes.

Secretary HERTER. Even so, that could have been a genuine development of film from the plane.

Senator AIKEN. All right.

PREVIOUS RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO DOWN A U-2 PLANE

Isn't it a fact that the Russians had previously undertaken to secure a U-2, both by interceptors and rockets?

Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you about that.

Senator AIKEN. Don't you know anything about that, or don't you want to talk?

Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you about rockets. I think there probably have been occasions when they might have tried by interceptor planes, but they couldn't reach that altitude.

UNLIKELYHOOD THAT U-2 WAS BROUGHT DOWN BY A ROCKET

Senator AIKEN. Than you have no comment to make about an undertaking to get one by rockets?

Secretary HERTER. No, I think I can point out one bit of evidence that perhaps will be supplemented when Mr. Dulles testifies here, and that is that the picture of what seemed to be the genuine U-2 plane had bullet holes in the wings and they are not likely to have bullet holes from any rocket.

Senator AIKEN. No.

Does it seem unlikely to you that the U-2 was brought down with a one-shot rocket?

Secretary HERTER. It seems to us very unlikely.

Senator AIKEN. Leaving the pilot and much of the equipment intact as has been claimed?

Secretary HERTER. It seems to us very unlikely.

Senator AIKEN. Wasn't the list of equipment which was given out by Mr. Khrushchev such equipment as would have been naturally carried on any plane that was undertaking to secure information of this type?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. Of any country?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION ON BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY

Senator AIKEN. Didn't Mr. Khrushchev get himself into a rather untenable position relative to Berlin and East Germany, in fact a

spot so untenable that he found it virtually necessary to scuttle the summit conference one way or the other?

Secretary HERRER. That, of course, again is a matter of speculation. He had committed himself so strongly on these subjects that certainly under circumstances in most free countries, if the chief executive had committed himself to that extent it would have been very hard for him to retreat from that position. Whether or not he has a free enough hand in Soviet Russia to be able to say one thing and act differently the next day or not, I couldn't tell you.

Senator AIKEN. In view of his previous speeches, wasn't he in a position where he was in trouble regardless of what happened at the summit conference?

Secretary HERRER. He had committed himself very firmly.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

VIEWS OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

Are the United States, France, and Great Britain now in accord with, let's say, the future policy as set forth by the President the night before last?

Secretary HERRER. They have expressed great satisfaction with that.

I beg your pardon. I haven't seen any comment of theirs with regard to his statement the night before last. I am speaking of his statement in Paris.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary HERRER. The position that he took in Paris, they expressed complete accord with that.

Senator AIKEN. Have we received any reprimand or any statement in the nature of a reprimand from Britain or France?

Secretary HERRER. None whatever.

U.S. AND U.S.S.R. SPY SYSTEMS

Senator AIKEN (continuing). Since the incidents of recent weeks.

Yesterday, I got a letter from a lady who I thought was somewhat misinformed, probably not indoctrinated, just misinformed, stating that it was the U.S. spy system that forced Russia to maintain a spy system. Do you go along with that theory? It seems to be shared by a good many people, and seems to be a theory which is quite generally distributed though not believed in certain quarters.

Secretary HERRER. I would think, sir, that going back into history that Russia has had a much longer history than the United States and a spy system has been an integral part of Russia's history. [Deleted.]

Senator AIKEN. It is my impression that Russia had an effective system before we did.

Secretary HERRER. Long before.

Senator AIKEN. And that we were very apologetic about our lack of a system up until now.

Well, that is about all.

EFFECT OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

One other thing that seems to bother some people is this:

Would you agree with anyone who stated that if the United States would disarm unilaterally Russia would promptly follow suit?

Secretary HERRER. If we disarmed unilaterally?

Senator AIKEN. If the United States would disarm unilaterally as an example to the world, Russia would promptly follow suit?

Secretary HERRER. I do not.

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long?

PLANS IN EVENT OF SOVIET DOWNING OF U-2

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, I believe that U-2 flights should have been made. I have said that publicly and I have stayed by that statement.

I wondered if the Department and those responsible had not planned well in advance just what we were going to do when the Soviets ultimately got one of these U-2's. Had there been such plans made?

Secretary HERRER. I believe they had. [Deleted.]

Senator LONG. Yes. But that also involves your responsibility because you would be the one who would give the explanation.

Secretary HERRER. That is correct.

ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Senator LONG. While I don't see how the great powers can avoid conducting espionage and military intelligence, as a practical matter as long as it is conducted on the other person's soil, isn't that a violation of international law?

Secretary HERRER. All espionage is a violation of sovereignty, all forms of espionage.

[Deleted.]

However, the Chicago Convention, which is the principal convention dealing with this, has never been accepted by the Russians nor have they accepted any bilateral agreement with regard to airspace over their country.

[Deleted.]

DEVICES CARRIED BY PILOT

Senator LONG. Are these statements about this poison needle and the self-destruction devices correct?

Secretary HERRER. I think so, but there, again, I think that the testimony of Mr. Dulles would be more accurate than anything I could give.

[Deleted.]

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING

Senator LONG. Might I ask this question, also: What is your impression of the present condition of our intelligence behind the Iron

Curtain? Do you believe that we have adequate information, or do you believe it is far from adequate as to what we feel we need to know about a potential opponent?

Secretary HERRER. Well, I think I can answer that in only one way. I think that we are doing the best we can to secure such information as we consider vital. No intelligence service is ever considered perfect. No intelligence service is ever considered completely adequate.

I think we are doing, as I said in connection with this particular operation I felt we were doing, a prudent and efficient job.

ADMISSION OF ESPIONAGE FLIGHT

Senator LONG. Well, I believe I had some information about these U-2 flights prior to this time, not as a member of this committee, but this is information I have run across from time to time as a Senator of the United States. I did not seek to be informed officially and did not want to know directly any more than the hearsay information I had on the subject.

But the thought that occurs to me is this: Would it not be the original plan that this Nation would not under any circumstances admit that it was sending those planes behind the Iron Curtain in the event that one of those planes was captured?

Secretary HERRER. I think that, as Mr. Dillon has explained, a cover story was prepared for that contingency. I think the actual circumstances turned out to be rather different from anything that had been anticipated in the preparatory work that had been done.

Senator LONG. Well, the previous planning had been that we would not admit it; is that correct?

Secretary HERRER. Yes.

Senator LONG. Now, of course, the Russians are in no position to put us on trial. They won't go before the World Court on anything with us, will they?

Secretary HERRER. They have not.

Senator LONG. As a matter of fact, have we not previously tried to get them before the World Court on the shooting down of our planes?

Secretary HERRER. We have tried to get Bulgaria before the World Court and have offered to take one of the cases, the border cases, to court, and they have refused.

Senator LONG. And they have declined?

Secretary HERRER. They have declined.

Senator LONG. In the absence of any admission on the part of this Government, how could they have possibly placed us in a position to force us to admit that that plane was deliberately sent there?

Secretary HERRER. Well, the other cases were all borderline cases of incursions over the edge of the border. This particular case, the plane was shot down in the very center of Russia, some 2,000 kilometers inside of Russia.

Senator LONG. But the point I have in mind, Mr. Secretary, is that I don't see how they can force you to take the fifth amendment because they wouldn't get you before a tribunal to do it because they wouldn't go before it themselves. And I don't see how they could have forced you to concede that that was an authorized mission unless somebody, the President or you, elected to make that admission.

BRINGING INSTANCES OF ESPIONAGE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

But do you see any way that the Soviets could have compelled you to admit that that espionage mission was a calculated plan and deliberately undertaken?

Secretary HERTER. No, sir, the alternative for us was to continue denying any responsibility whatsoever for it. They would undoubtedly as they said they would do, take it before the United Nations, submit all the evidence to the United Nations, and we would have dug ourselves in deeper and deeper in a denial of something which was perfectly self-evident. That was the choice that we were faced with.

Senator LONG. Well, a denial of espionage; but you also would have considerable indication that they would be denying espionage on their part that you are in position to fairly well prove, could you not? Could you not try your espionage cases before the United Nations as well as they could?

Secretary HERTER. We can. But espionage cases we try before our own courts.

Senator LONG. Yes, but if they wanted to try this case before the United Nations, couldn't you just as well have insisted on trying the cases of their espionage in the United Nations simultaneously?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, we could, but in that particular case the issue was a rather different one.

EFFECT OF PLEADING GUILTY OF ESPIONAGE

Senator LONG. Here is the thought that occurs to me. Under the Russian system if the leader admits he made a mistake he has to resign more or less as Malenkov did or more or less throw himself on the mercy of the party. But when we plead guilty to espionage in this case, how can we plead guilty on the one hand and contend that there is no punishment in order when we plead guilty to violating international law?

Secretary HERTER. We have said we admitted it entirely on the ground that for ourselves and for the free world it was essential for us to get information with regard to dangers of surprise attack or aggression.

Senator LONG. The thought that occurs to me is that; and I am not sure that we are in a position to be completely self-righteous about passing judgment on ourselves in our own case; that is what your own people have said, that we judge our own case and do not let the World Court decide these matters. I, for one, have been holding back because I am not sure we have a fair court. But how do you throw yourselves on the mercy of the Court and deny the Court the right more or less to judge what the penalty should be?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, the cases to which you are referring, of which there have been quite a number, have all been border cases where there was no espionage involved, where it was a question of a border patrol or weather patrol or something of that kind where the issue was as to whether or not there was an intentional overflight or not which is entirely different from this particular case.

Senator LONG. Yes, but the thought that occurs to me is that we didn't have to plead guilty to anything. I know lawyers represent guilty clients. Now, as with the lawyer, when you plead guilty,

aren't you more or less in a position that you do have either to apologize or take corrective action, or even under our system of law more or less offer to take your punishment if you are going to plead guilty?

Secretary HERRER. As you may recall, the President had stated that he had taken corrective action. He has characterized this as a regrettable incident. When a demand was made on him, these other demands on him, I don't think you, sir, or anyone else could have accepted those demands.

Senator LONG. I don't require my part of your examination be made a part of the public record, Mr. Secretary. I don't insist on it all, but I don't very well see how we can take the attitude that we are going to plead guilty in the matter and then take the attitude that no apology is forthcoming.

Secretary HERRER. I think this, sir, the circumstances which required our admission are the most important thing of all.

Senator GORE. Would you restate that, please, sir?

Secretary HERRER. That the circumstances which required our taking this action of espionage, namely the tremendous importance to the whole free world and to ourselves of having some knowledge as to whether a sudden surprise attack is going to hit us or what form of aggression was likely to be perpetrated, justified the action.

Senator LONG. [Deleted.] My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.

INFLUENCE OF KHRUSHCHEV ACTIONS ON FUTURE U.S. INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask questions on two items that I have selected from the mail I have received on the summit conference.

The first is that people that write me are concerned because of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev hurled such epithets at us, our President and the Nation, as they have—a coward, a bandit, and aggressor.

Will that influence our course of action in getting information that is necessary for our security?

Secretary HERRER. I think we will do whatever we feel is essential for our security. I am not saying in that respect that we are going to deliberately utilize the U-2 again. I have never said that.

Senator CARLSON. That is one of the questions that concerns our people at the present time.

I was wondering—can we assure the American people that despite all this tirade, there will be no slackening in our efforts to secure, by any measures or means, the information that is necessary for the security of this Nation?

Secretary HERRER. I think both the President—I think the President in particular, has made that very clear.

QUESTION OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO IN BERLIN

Senator CARLSON. I have selected from the mail this question: Can Mr. Khrushchev be counted on to keep his word on maintaining the status quo in Berlin until another summit meeting?

Secretary HERRER. That is one, sir, that I cannot answer.

Senator CARLSON. That is one of the questions that we are getting.

Now, we are treaty-bound to protect Berlin. Furthermore, we have in recent months assured West Berlin that we will never forsake them. Mr. Khrushchev has said plainly that he would meet force with force in Berlin.

Can the American people be assured that the United States has the full cooperation of our allies in maintaining our position on the Berlin status?

Secretary HERRER. Senator, one of the most impressive things that I have ever seen was the meeting of NATO that took place after the aborted, so-called summit conference. I have never seen such unanimity, such firmness, such determination as exhibited at that meeting.

Senator CARLSON. That statement should be at least encouraging to those of us who are concerned about the situation.

CONTINUED EFFORTS TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND SUSPENSION OF
NUCLEAR TESTS

Another thing that I have picked from my mail is this matter that the people are concerned about.

Will the United States continue to press for controlled disarmament and nuclear test suspension?

Secretary HERRER. Yes, sir. I have indicated in my prepared statement that we will continue to do this.

As you know, however, the conditions that we have always adhered to is that the controls have got to be controls that one can rely upon. In other words, reliable controls on both sides.

I think that with the very real danger that exists in the world today of accidental events that may lead to a nuclear war, that we should pursue the course of doing whatever we can to minimize that danger, within the bounds that we have stated; namely, that of reciprocal and effective control.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are making any progress on these nuclear test suspensions at the Geneva Conference and other places?

Secretary HERRER. During the last few weeks, really the last few days, they have been meeting in Geneva examining a coordinated program of research for improving instrumentation so that small shots can be detected underground.

Those conferences have moved, I think, pretty satisfactorily. They are halted at this moment, awaiting some instructions from Moscow.

In the next few days we should know better whether or not there has been any radical change of position on the part of the Russians or not. There is some chance of reaching agreement. It will be a limited agreement at best, but that again depends on full agreement with regard to the control mechanisms.

As you know, those talks have been going for a long time. Until they are shown to be hopeless, I think we will continue with them.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

THREE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that three crucial questions here are these:

One. Was there a failure in policy?

Two. Who, if anyone, was in charge?

Three. Was there a lack of coordination and a breakdown in administrative procedure?

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

Senator GORE. Would you like me to repeat all of them?

I said that there were three questions, it seemed to me, three crucial questions.

One, was there a failure of policy?

Two, who, if anyone, was in charge?

Three, was there a lack of coordination and breakdown in administrative procedure?

I should like to explore these three questions in inverse order.

RECEIPT OF FIRST INFORMATION THAT U-2 PLANE WAS DOWN IN RUSSIA

When did the Department first receive information that the U-2 flight was down in Russia?

Mr. DILLON. Senator, since I was Acting Secretary at that time, I think it is proper for me to answer that.

That information was received in the Department during the day, on Sunday, the 1st of May, at about the middle of the day, our time.

Senator GORE. What was the nature of that information?

Mr. DILLON. The nature of the information as conveyed to me, which had been received in the Department through the Central Intelligence Agency, was that this plane was overdue at its destination, and that the time beyond which its fuel supply would carry it had run out; and so, therefore, it was presumed down somewhere.

Senator GORE. The question I ask is, When did you first have some notice, some information, some hint that the plane was actually down in Russian territory? I was not referring to your presumption that because of its flight pattern and the amount of fuel that it must be down.

When did you actually receive some intelligence, some hint, that the Soviets had the plane?

Mr. DILLON. That the Soviets had the plane—I think the first information we received on that was at the time Mr. Khrushchev made his statement on Thursday morning before the—I think it was the Supreme Soviet—on the 5th day of May.

Senator GORE. Are you sure you received no hint, no information, no report from either your Embassy in Russia or the Central Intelligence Agency that the plane might actually be down in Russia?

Mr. DILLON. Since most of the flight pattern of the plane, its mission, was to spend most of its time over the Soviet Union, it was our assumption, right from the first word, that when the plane did not return that it was most likely that it was down in the Soviet Union. But we did not receive any specific information that it was down in the Soviet Union, that the Russians had either the plane, the pilot, or any parts of it, until Mr. Khrushchev made the statement on Thursday morning.

RECEIPT OF FIRST INFORMATION THAT PILOT HAD BEEN CAPTURED

Senator GORE. When did you first receive some hint, some information, some indication that the Soviets might have the pilot alive?

Mr. DILLON. The first information we received on that was received in the Department in the afternoon of the 5th day of May, after we had put out our first statements.

This was in the form of a report from our Embassy in Moscow saying that various other foreign diplomats had heard at cocktail parties or receptions from various Soviet officials that this plane was down and at one time, to one of these foreign diplomats, a Soviet official said that they had the pilot and that report reached us.

We didn't know whether it was accurate or not, but it gave us pause. That reached us the afternoon of Thursday, and I think it was on Friday that we identified the fact that a photograph of the wreckage as put out by the Soviets was a fraud and so then at that time we assumed, we acted on the assumption from then on, that they probably had the pilot and that they possibly had a good deal of the plane.

Senator GORE. A member of your Department informed me in the offices of the committee on Friday morning of the 6th that the Department did, in fact, have information indicating that the Soviets might have this pilot alive.

Mr. DILLON. That was probably reporting the information which I said was received the afternoon of the 5th regarding that.

BASIS FOR STATEMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT'S NEWS DIRECTOR
LINCOLN WHITE

Senator GORE. Yes. Now you say that you knew of the flight, you knew of the flight pattern, and you assumed that the plane was down in Russia.

You say now that on the 5th you received this information that the pilot was probably alive and yet, on the afternoon of the 6th, this Mr. Lincoln White, official spokesman for the Department, said this:

There was absolutely no—N-O, no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace. There has never been.

Did you authorize that statement?

Mr. DILLON. No, not specifically. Mr. White was not one of those in the Department of State that had any knowledge of these operations.

The statement which we authorized the day before, which is in the record, was not that categoric. But I don't think that there was any reason why he shouldn't have made such a statement. He drew that conclusion from the NASA statement of the day before and when he was asked questions—he didn't volunteer this statement. He was being questioned apparently in a press conference and he made that statement.

We did not authorize a statement, specifically. He did not ask us for it, but he thought he was carrying out the NASA story.

QUESTION OF COORDINATION REGARDING MR. WHITE'S STATEMENT

Senator GORE. Is Mr. White authorized to speak to the U.S. press on behalf of the Department of State?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, he is.

Senator GORE. Are you now saying that he was making statements about this, but that he was not informed on the subject?

Mr. DILLON. I am stating that he was not informed as to the facts of this intelligence operation any more than the people who made the press statements for NASA were informed of the facts of it.

Senator GORE. Do you call that responsible and coordinated performance?

Mr. DILLON. We are getting at this stage, Senator, into another question, the key question of intelligence. When you have something as important and secret as this, it is important to limit the knowledge to the minimum number of people and this was strictly limited throughout the Government and we did limit it in the State Department.

We did not think it was proper to inform our press people. There was a special procedure for people who were informed of this, and the press people were not so informed.

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I am not questioning you about the initial cover statement issue you had in Turkey. I am asking you about an official falsehood on May 6, after you say the Department knew of the flight pattern, assumed the plane was down, a whole day after you received information that the pilot was probably alive and in the afternoon of the day after even I had been informed. I ask you again if you think this is an example of the coordination which you earlier told us the Department had.

Mr. DILLON. Senator, I will answer that. I think it took a major effort which was reached the following day that we were going to abandon our cover story and tell the truth. That decision could not be reached rapidly and quickly. It was reached after long sessions with the Secretary on Saturday and until that was reached, we saw no reason to inform our press officer of anything but the cover story which is what we were standing by up until that time.

BASIS FOR MR. WHITE'S STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I interrupt? I didn't understand why Mr. White wasn't required to clear his statement at this time with you.

Mr. DILLON. I am glad to answer that. Mr. White sees the press every day, and he does not know in advance necessarily the detailed questions that he may be asked.

If a question comes that he thinks he does not know the answer to, he does clear it with us.

Now, the day before, when we put out our statement, it was given to him and he followed exactly what he had been told. He did not make any statement that was quite as categorical as this statement he made the following day.

The CHAIRMAN. Why didn't he stand on the one that had been cleared?

Mr. DILLON. This was just an answer to a question. Why he did it, he thought he was telling the truth. I think he acted perfectly all right. He did not think that this was a new question. He thought he was following the cover story, which he was. So he made this statement. It wasn't a statement; it was in answer to a question. I want to emphasize that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a very categorical statement that went far beyond the other statement. That is what begins to complicate your situation, doesn't it?

Mr. DILLON. Possibly to some extent, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES

Senator LAUSCHIE. First of all, I want to pursue this question. Shall we abandon or modify our efforts of gathering intelligence, covering the military activities of potential aggressors?

First, I ask Mr. Herter this question. At any time during the appearance of Mr. Dulles, the Central Intelligence Agency Director, before this committee, do you know of him at any time being challenged or asked about how he acquired intelligence?

Secretary HERRER. That I cannot answer at firsthand. My impression is that there was a very small group in the Senate with whom he conferred. He has got this responsibility under the law, which was written by the Congress.

Senator LAUSCHIE. You have answered my question. Have you ever heard of any member of this committee or any member of the Congress asking the Central Intelligence Agency to discontinue acquiring intelligence or to modify its methods?

Secretary HERRER. No, I do not.

May I qualify that to this extent? I think that Senator Mansfield had introduced a measure which would provide for a different method of coordinating with the Congress. That is the only thing I do know of.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Would it be right to assume that at this very moment there is great probability that there are Soviet intelligence agents operating in our country?

Secretary HERRER. I would assume so.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Do you know of any member of our Defense Department in a responsible position, or any person in any government who is responsible for security, taking the position that intelligence of a potential enemy's conduct is not essential for the proper development of a nation's own defense?

Secretary HERRER. I do not.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Do I understand that you subscribe to the statement made by the President that for the protection of the security of our country it is essential that intelligence of potential enemies' conduct be acquired?

Secretary HERRER. I do.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Now then, this question: Do you feel that it would be wise for our Government in the face of the discussions about peace and disarmament and banning of nuclear tests to discontinue our intelligence activities?

Secretary HERTER. I do not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would it be a danger to our country if at this moment while we are discussing disarmament and banning of nuclear tests we scuttle the Central Intelligence Agency?

Secretary HERTER. I certainly would not advocate anything of the kind.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is it historically concerning men in a responsible position for the protection of a country, beginning from the earliest days of recorded battles about the use of scouts and intelligence agents, so as to properly guide a country in what it ought to do?

Secretary HERTER. It is a custom, sir, that has grown up, I imagine, ever since warfare began.

KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, the second question: Is it your considered opinion that when Khrushchev came to Paris he had already decided not to participate in the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. That is our best judgment.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that judgment is formulated not upon what he has said but what he has done; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. It is a combination of both. But it is mostly in what he has said, and the assumption is that he had received his orders before he went to Paris.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it a fact that beginning in December 1959 and going down into April, he has made statements indicating that the probability was that there would never be a conference?

Secretary HERTER. Not the probability that there would never be a conference but that if a conference were held it would not turn out to his satisfaction.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MEETINGS WITH DE GAULLE AND MACMILLAN

Senator LAUSCHE. He was scheduled to arrive in Paris on Sunday, May 15; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. But instead of coming there on Sunday, May 15, he came there on Saturday, May 14.

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And on Sunday morning he, with Malinovsky, at the early hour of 11 o'clock already had made an appointment to see de Gaulle.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And at that meeting this vigorous statement about what they expected of Eisenhower if Khrushchev were to attend the conference was read.

Secretary HERTER. Yes; that was not only read but a copy of it was given to General de Gaulle.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why do you think that he came there before his scheduled visit of Sunday and made it Saturday?

Secretary HERTER. Why he came to Paris at all is the real question. That is a question that General de Gaulle asked him at the time of the one meeting when the four were present and to which the answer was completely unsatisfactory.

Senator LAUSCHIE. So that at 11 o'clock in the morning he met with de Gaulle and laid down these four demands upon Eisenhower.

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Then at the hour of 4:30 in the afternoon he went to Macmillan and to Macmillan repeated those demands, that unless they were met he would not attend the conference.

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Did anything happen between his arrival on Saturday, his action at 11 o'clock in the morning on Sunday, and 4:30 on Sunday, that would have caused him to change his mind from what he was thinking when he left Moscow?

Secretary HERTER. Not a thing.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S DEMANDS

Senator LAUSCHIE. Now then, Mr. Secretary, getting down to these demands that he made; that is, he demanded that Eisenhower denounce the overflights; is that correct; and two, that he apologize to the Soviet Union.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHIE. And three, that he punish those directly responsible.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHIE. And four, that Eisenhower promise not to repeat these flights.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, may I add there, sir, that the demand for the apology was added; it was not in the original document. It was one that was added by him while he was in Paris as a fourth condition.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Can we assume that Khrushchev honestly expected that these demands that he made upon Eisenhower would be complied with?

Secretary HERTER. He could not have possibly.

Senator LAUSCHIE. That is additional proof confirming the assumption that when he left Moscow he never intended to participate in the conference.

Secretary HERTER. You are quite right, sir.

WHY DID KHRUSHCHEV GO TO PARIS?

Senator LAUSCHIE. Why couldn't he have issued this statement while he was in Moscow, and why did he go to Paris instead of making the statement in Moscow?

Secretary HERTER. There it is a matter of speculation but I think that the desire to dramatize himself, the fact that there would be 3,000 correspondents in Paris, that he would have a larger audience in that place, led him to take this particular route.

SOVIET MISDEEDS

Senator LAUSCHIE. Was anything said anywhere about his train of misdeeds, of the Communist Reds', beginning from the very day that they were established as a country, in breaking treaties, in mass murdering of people, including our American boys——

Secretary HERTER. That was not in the brief meeting of the four. The only statements that were made by the President were the statements which were publicized, plus another statement with regard to the U-2 not being again used for this purpose. That commitment of the President could last, of course, only so long as he was President.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have seen certain questions about which I said I would like to get information. To the extent that it can be done, I would like answers to those questions prepared and put into the record. One, broken treaties. Two, participation—not of Red Russia but Red communism—in the Red Chinese-Soviet provocation of trouble throughout the world, their activities in the Katyn Forest, in Quemoy and Matsu, in South Korea where thousands of our American boys were killed, in Red Hungary, East Germany, and in Poland when the liberty fighters rose to procure liberty for themselves.

Secretary HERTER. Senator, I saw those questions as they are incorporated in the Congressional Record and we will be prepared to answer them.

(The questions and answers referred to above appear in appendix 2.)

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to say I am not prepared to put a halo of honesty and holiness on Khrushchev and one of scorn and disgrace upon my country, not in this hearing or any other place. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the time is a quarter to 1. I think it would be a proper time to adjourn until 2:30.

SELF-PRESERVATION

Senator WILEY. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, the Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for a question.

Senator WILEY. We say that the first law of human nature is the law of self-preservation. You have heard that said, have you not?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. That applies to nations as well as individuals: does it not?

Secretary HERTER. It does.

Senator WILEY. And in wartime we speak of what we have called spying here; it is called spying, but in peacetime it is espionage: is it not?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. But there are different rules that apply, too, are there not? In wartime then it generally means the penalty is death. In peaceful times like we have now, the penalty depends entirely more or less upon the court administering it: is that right?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator WILEY. Is it generally conceded that the Kremlin has been engaging in espionage not only in our own country but in virtually all the countries on earth and is still doing it? That is correct, is it not?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. As demonstrated by Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations the other day, they even tried to pull a stunt on our Embassy in Russia: did you see that?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir. [Deleted].

Senator WILEY. Just this one thing. Now, then, if the first law of human nature is the law of self-preservation, then the best means that we can use to preserve the freedom of America, the CIA has been using when it has been using the overflight, the U-2 means; is that right?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We will return here at 2:30.

Secretary HERTER. 2:30.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I may say to the committee that the Secretary has very kindly agreed to go on today and, if the questioning is not completed, to come back in the morning. We will determine that at the end of today's session.

I hope we can make progress.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, there are one or two statements in your own statement I would like to have developed a bit for clarification.

COURSE FOLLOWED BY PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

On page 12, at the bottom of the page of the mimeographed statement you say as follows:

Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober and rational manner.

In which of these groups do you include Mr. Khrushchev?

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE—Resumed

Secretary HERTER. That I think would be very difficult to answer categorically.

There have been a good many estimates made as to whether or not he really means some of the things that he has said with regard to peaceful coexistence, with regard to disarmament and other matters. There is another group that feels that this is a front for the same power line that Stalin used to take.

I don't think it is possible yet to answer that categorically.

I think that events are likely to show which of those groups he belongs to.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did you have in mind when you wrote that? Maybe you can't categorically for all time designate him, but what has been your view and the view of the Department as to which group he belongs in? I think that is rather important as to how we treat him. Is it in our interest to discourage him? If he were a member

of the aggressive course group, I suppose it would be. If he is a member of the group who are proponents of the peaceful course, then it would be to our advantage to encourage or be cooperative within limits. I wondered why you put that in there if you didn't have some idea of who does belong to these groups or how they are constituted.

Secretary HERTER. What I was trying to describe here was in effect a middle course. Insofar as Mr. Khrushchev is concerned, I think those who have dealt with him directly were convinced that he was genuinely in favor of a disarmament program, that he genuinely wanted, for the sake of developing the economy of Russia, a reduction both in expense from a monetary point of view and from a human point of view, of the great burden of armaments.

Certainly there I would put him in the second category. His more recent behavior, however, has shaken my belief that this is entirely genuine, and, as I say, I think that only the events of the next few months and possibly even of the next few years can give a final answer to what you have asked.

IDENTIFICATION WITH TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. Can you identify any other members or any people you had in mind in citing these groups?

Secretary HERTER. No. I would rather have those who are real Russian experts do that kind of identification, those who are familiar with the individuals, more familiar than I am.

There is no question but what there are still——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to have Mr. Bohlen comment on this question?

Secretary HERTER. I would be very glad to have him, if you wish to.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very good to have him comment. He is recognized, is he not, as one of our best Russian experts?

Would you care to comment on this, Mr. Bohlen?

Mr. BOHLEN. Mr. Chairman, my experience has been that it is not always possible to identify a trend in the Soviet Union with individuals. As the Secretary said earlier we literally know nothing of what goes on in the hierarchy. My impression of the statement the Secretary made is that it is possible to detect trends. You cannot identify people with them. My experience with the Soviet officials is that they follow whatever the agreed line is, whether it is hard or whether it is soft, with great consistency, and they just do not reveal sufficiently to any foreigner what their inner thoughts are to identify one individual with one trend or another. But I think the indications are that both trends exist.

COURSE FOLLOWED BY PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

The CHAIRMAN. Well, don't you think we know more about Mr. Khrushchev than any other Soviet leader? More of us have seen him. He has been around more than any other. Don't you have any view as to which of these groups Mr. Khrushchev would be identified with?

Mr. BOHLEN. Well, my acquaintanceship with Mr. Khrushchev was when I was in there as Ambassador when he was not quite as promi-

ment as he is now. I would merely say that he, along with all of them are excellent actors [deleted] and are able to maintain whatever the common line is in their dealings with foreigners. I think also there is a question of time. I think, as the events of Paris showed, that there have been certain shifts of emphasis inside the Soviet Union which were manifested in part by what they did in Paris.

Therefore, it is conceivable that Mr. Khrushchev could have been entirely serious in the line he was pursuing prior to Paris, and be equally serious in pursuing one diametrically opposite to it.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may interpolate, do you mean that prior to the U-2 incident Mr. Khrushchev may have been identified with the second group; that is, proponents of a peaceful course?

Mr. BOHLEN. I would not segregate out the U-2 incident alone, Mr. Chairman. I think, as outlined in the Secretary's statement, there seemed to us to be three elements involved in this matter, and I think it is difficult to assess the value of each. But, certainly, I would say his doubt as to the success from his point of view of the summit conference, that some of the views voiced by the Chinese Communists had probably supporters within the Soviet hierarchy, and the U-2 incident together brought about this change.

I have no difficulty—

IDENTIFICATION WITH TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't wish to make you review all that was said there. I was merely trying to find the inner meaning of this particular statement. I thought that I could elicit some clarification since many of us don't know about these proponents of these courses or about any of these groups of people.

Mr. BOHLEN. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that I think we don't know. That you cannot tell whether X, Y, or Z in the Soviet hierarchy, what particular line he advocates, because he never reveals any difference, even a shade of difference publicly, with what is the agreed line. It is quite impossible, I believe, for anybody to tell who within the leading group stands for one trend or the other. You can only detect from external evidence that there appear to be certain divergent trends and the individuals may not remain the same.

WAS THERE A DECISION NOT TO SUSPEND FLIGHTS AS SUMMIT MEETING APPROACHED?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. One other statement, Mr. Secretary, on page 5, point 2:

The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision.

Can you tell us who made that decision, and when, and of the circumstances?

Secretary HERTER. That is a decision that I think has been carried over the whole 4-year period. Here, sir, we get into certain technical aspects of when these flights would properly be conducted and could not be conducted, but I think the technical reasons had better be kept in executive session.

The finding of a good time for a flight of this kind in relation to current events is almost impossible if you had known in advance that it is going to fail.

The real issue was how urgent was the information and is there any one time that is more favorable than another? From a technical point of view the time was more favorable at that time than another. From a diplomatic point of view, it seemed to me that with the President scheduled to go to Russia later, there would have been the same difficulty; when Khrushchev was here there was the same difficulty, in effect one would run into one time after another where diplomatically it would have been a bad time.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think I make myself clear. I understood from your previous statement and others that the program was agreed upon, and it was running along without being suspended. But this statement seems to leave the implication that a specific decision was taken not to suspend them in view of the conference approaching.

Was such a decision taken?

Secretary HERTER. That I can't tell you. I was not a party to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this says:

The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision.

Was there any decision taken not to suspend it?

Secretary HERTER. I know that when the matter came before me, which was some time previous from the point of view of the continuation of the program, when conditions were appropriate, I did not interpose any objection to it because of any diplomatic event that was coming up.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say then that no specific decision not to suspend them was taken? It was allowed to go along without any decision being taken to suspend them.

Secretary HERTER. I think that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, the other way around is that no positive decision was taken not to suspend them; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That statement, I think, needs clarification. I think, to me, it means that at some point prior to May 1 a specific decision was taken not to suspend them in view of the summit. Isn't that a legitimate interpretation of that sentence?

Secretary HERTER. I think that is correct. May I read what the President said on that subject? He said:

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date.

The program went forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Then that decision was made by the President.

Secretary HERTER. Oh, he was certainly consulted with regard to the continuation of the program.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know when that decision was made?

Secretary HERTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it prior to May 1?

Secretary HERTER. I couldn't tell you.

QUESTION OF MORATORIUM ON FLIGHTS DURING CAMP DAVID TALKS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you know whether there was a moratorium on these flights during the meeting at Camp David?

Secretary HERTER. No. As far as I know, that question never arose.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there was not, as far as you know?
 Secretary HERTER. As far as I know, there was not.

PRESS SECRETARY HAGERTY'S KNOWLEDGE

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to this matter that Mr. Lincoln White did not know that Powers might be alive, the last question before we recessed. Did Mr. Hagerty know whether or not he was at that point?

Secretary HERTER. That I will have to ask Mr. Dillon to answer. I have no direct information.

Mr. DILLON. I have no way of knowing whether Mr. Hagerty knew or not. In the ordinary course of business, a telegram such as the one which informed us of this rumor—it's only a rumor that we had received through other diplomats in Moscow—such a telegram would have been transmitted for information to the White House staff.

Whether Mr. Hagerty knew about it or not, I don't know.

QUESTION OF SOUNDING OUT PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S FEELINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, was any effort made on the part of our Ambassadors or anyone from the Department, after the incident, to pursue Mr. Khrushchev's feelings?

Was anyone instructed to approach him and express any regret or in any way to reconcile him to forgive or overlook this incident?

Secretary HERTER. No, I don't know of any such thing.

The CHAIRMAN. No approach was made?

Secretary HERTER. No.

IMPLICATION THAT FLIGHTS WOULD CONTINUE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, what were the considerations which led to the decision, not only to assume responsibility for the flight, but to imply that the flights would continue in the future?

Secretary HERTER. I have to take responsibility for the statement that was interpreted and if I may, I would like to read you exactly what was said on that score.

This is a statement that was interpreted that we were going to continue the flights:

The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

That is the statement that was interpreted that we were going to continue the flights, and it seems to me it was a pretty far-fetched interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do you mean in that statement you did not intend to convey the view or the possibility that the flights would be continued; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. No; what I was saying there was just what I have testified to today; that from the point of view of our own interests and that of the whole free world, it is essential for us to do

whatever we properly can in order to acquire information to avoid surprise attack or to be prepared for it.

The CHAIRMAN. But in view of that statement, do you think that Mr. Khrushchev could accept it and continue the conference?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I certainly do, if he had wanted to.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think our President would accept such a statement from any other power?

Secretary HERTER. If he wanted to go to a conference? Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator WILEY?

KHRUSHCHEV'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. Now in relation to that last question, the President has suggested time and time again an open skies arrangement, hasn't he?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator WILEY. That means that planes would be flying over our country and over every other country where it is necessary. Again, I go to the subject that I think is most important, because some quoted and I quoted on the floor of the Senate the other day the Biblical verse that a little child shall lead them. I had a group of children from Oshkosh, Wis., that I was talking to. After I talked to them, I opened myself to questions. One of these girls said, "Senator, if we stop taking these flights, how are we going to get the information that is going on back of the Iron Curtain?"

Well, I think all America is asking that question, and I am satisfied that if we are realists, as I think we are becoming more and more, that we are not going to go up a lot of blind alleys about this and that, and about what was or what wasn't said. We are going to face the situation head on and simply say we want defensively to be adequately prepared and alert and we want the Kremlin to know the facts as they have been now for, I think, about 3½ years, that we have been sending these planes over. Khrushchev knew it at the time that he was up at Camp David, and certainly having the knowledge then could have interfered with his interest in holding the meeting if he had wanted it to. Do you think my conclusions are correct in that respect?

Secretary HERTER. I do.

SOVIET REFUSAL TO PERMIT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S TRIP

Senator WILEY. I didn't get the import of the questions when I came in that apparently referred to some different groups. What is the name of the young man who defected the other day? I guess that is what you call it. He testified on—

Senator LAUSCHE. Meet the Press.

Senator WILEY. Meet the Press. It is a long, Russian name. I put what he said into the record today. But one of the important things he brought out, and I would like to get the former Ambassador's attention on this, was that there is a group of young people growing up in Russia who have different ideas, and he was about to go into detail on it when time ran out. But among other things, he is the one who said—and this is important—he said some months ago that Khrush-

shehev and the powers in being would not permit the President to come to Russia, that they would find some excuse.

Now, that is all in what he said over the radio here a couple of weeks ago. That confirms, I presume, your own idea that when Khrushchev came to Paris, he had already decided that he was going to throw the bombshell, and he would refuse to invite the President, and so forth; is that right?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator WILEY. So this is something that didn't result from the downing of the plane.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U-2 PLANE?

I want to ask you a question. Have you any definite information as to whether or not this young Powers is alive?

Secretary HERTER. No, sir. We have no information other than that which the Russians have furnished to us.

Senator WILEY. If that plane had been shot down, do you think the instruments that he had with him would have remained intact?

Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am not skilled enough in the technique of shooting down planes. But I should think it is very doubtful if he was hit by a rocket whether either he or the plane would have come down intact.

Senator WILEY. Is there any thought that perhaps they have the plane? They claim they have the instruments and they have shown something which wasn't the plane. Do you think they have that intact?

Secretary HERTER. They have shown a later photograph of a plane which those who built the plane feel is the plane itself. They have also shown pieces of the plane in Gorky Park in Moscow when they invited all the diplomats to come and look at it, and I think our people feel that that is a genuine part of the plane.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA

Senator WILEY. I want to ask the former Ambassador if it is true that the youth in Russia, the new class of youth, is growing up like this fellow said. Someone said if he had been privileged to carry on his answer he would have said they are not satisfied with their standard of living, that they are not satisfied with the little opportunity they have to express themselves in the political life of Russia. Do you know whether that would be true or not?

Mr. BOHLEN. I think it is a fair assumption, Senator. Of course, as you know, the possibilities for contacts in there during the period I was there were considerably less than they are now. The country is still totally controlled by the mechanism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They control all modes of expression by press, meetings, or anything else, so it is very difficult to get any overt signs of the feelings of the youth or any other section of the population.

But there are certain indications that the youth are looking forward at some time in the future to considerably different circumstances. They hope for better material conditions and also undoubtedly hope for a period when they will have more freedom of expression and more ability to participate in the political life of their country.

But this is very hard to document because people do not talk openly and freely in the Soviet Union.

Senator WILEY. Well, you know that ferment generally is all over this world. You know that the President of Turkey has been kicked out. You saw that today, and you know what is happening elsewhere. Is there any reason why that yeast or ferment should not be operating in Russia among the youngsters?

Mr. BOULEN. There is no reason why it should not be and it is a logical assumption it is. But I should also say that the controls in a society like the Soviet Union are very tight indeed and I have seen no sign that those controls are breaking down or weakening to the point where the party is not in complete control of the situation. They are able to stifle, if you will, or hold in check this ferment due to the nature of their system.

Senator WILEY. Out of the 200 million Russians, how many of them do you think belong to the Communist Party?

Mr. BOULEN. I think the latest figure is somewhere in the neighborhood of 8½ million.

Senator WILEY. Thank you. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Montana?

QUESTION OF INDICATIONS THAT KHRUSHCHEV WOULD SCUTTLE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that at the House hearings, you said there were indications that even before May 6 the Russians planned to scuttle the conference.

Now, it seems to me if we are going to estimate the importance of the U-2 incident in the collapse of the summit, we need to fix the date when these indications in any significant fashion began to appear. I would appreciate, then, in the interest of saving time, yes or no answers to certain questions which I am about to ask unless there is a need of an elaboration.

The first question: Are you aware whether any member of the Cabinet or the President had any reason to believe before May 15 when Khrushchev made his demands for an apology and so forth, that he would come to Paris and leave as he did?

Secretary HERTER. No.

Senator MANSFIELD. Were there any indications that Khrushchev planned to scuttle the conference before the U-2 plane was shot down on May 1?

Secretary HERTER. No.

UNDER SECRETARY DILLON'S SPEECH

Senator MANSFIELD. Did Khrushchev's Baku speech precede or follow Mr. Dillon's speech to the AFL-CIO convention?

Secretary HERTER. It followed it.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would you classify Mr. Dillon's speech as very much in the spirit of Camp David or would you say it was an excellent, forthright and anti-Communist statement somewhat oblivious to the spirit of Camp David, the kind of speech which any official of the State Department might have made before that historic meeting?

Secretary HERTER. That I can't qualify with a yes or no answer, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. You can go into detail there.

Secretary HERTER. I would say this, that Mr. Dillon's speech was almost a requirement as an answer to the allegations that had been made by Mr. Khrushchev against Adenauer and the Germans and his continued repetition which I have given the chronology of, of the fact that they were going to take this unilateral position sooner or later without its being an absolute ultimatum on the subject of Berlin, Germany.

Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, Mr. Secretary, speeches which you and Mr. Dillon made were a counteraction to the gradual hardening of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in the period preceding that?

Secretary HERTER. Entirely.

QUESTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 FLIGHT

Senator MANSFIELD. Did Secretary Dillon propose that a U-2 flight be undertaken prior to the summit conference?

Mr. DILLON. No.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Dillon, as acting Secretary, were you aware beforehand of the scheduling of the U-2 flight over the Soviet Union on May 1?

Mr. DILLON. No, I was not aware of it.

I was aware that there was a program of flights that might take place at some time when the weather was right but I think I was informed of that maybe a month or two before this actual time, and I had nothing to do with it afterward because I didn't in the ordinary course of my duties.

Senator MANSFIELD. Your knowledge was, in effect, general knowledge?

Mr. DILLON. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Herter happening to be out of the country at the time was, I assume, unaware of any specific flight but perhaps had general knowledge that these flights were being undertaken and had been over a period of years.

Secretary HERTER. I didn't know there was a flight underway. The first knowledge I received was when I was in Ankara. All I heard was this same report that a plane was down.

PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FLIGHT

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, both of you have had general knowledge of this: Would it be a fair assumption to say, despite the fact that the President undertook, in a certain sense, personal responsibility for this particular flight, that he, too, likewise, had only general knowledge but that because of his position as the Chief of State, he would be held responsible under any circumstances because of his position of responsibility?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Might I just qualify one thing? When you say he was familiar with this particular flight and his timing, so far as I know all of us were familiar with alternate possibilities of flights but not this particular flight as such.

Senator MANSFIELD. That would apply to the Department of State and the President.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR FLIGHTS

Senator MANSFIELD. From what legislation or Executive orders, or both, was the authority for these flights of deep penetration derived?

Secretary HERTER. Well, presumably from the fact that I have here before me—I am told that this applied to two specific acts. The one that I am particularly familiar with, that I had a moment ago, is the one creating the Central Intelligence Agency. The other is the National Security Act.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would it be possible to have copies for the record at this point?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I ask that they be included in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The provisions in the National Security Act relating to the Central Intelligence Agency follow:)

EXCERPT FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

(Public Law 253, 80th Cong., July 26, 1947; 61 Stat. 495)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY¹

SEC. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status, or from among individuals in civilian life: *Provided, however,* That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director, or Deputy Director, then—

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and

(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit, or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director, or Deputy Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving

¹ Section 102 (a) and (b) amended by Public Law 15, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 19, 20).

in the office of Director, or Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not lower than that in which serving at the time of his appointment and to receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be, including personal money allowance) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency. He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence Agency from such funds an annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which the compensation established for such position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.²

(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall, during the period in which such commissioned officer occupies the office of Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be in addition to the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and appropriated for the armed service of which he is a member.³

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment of any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: *Provided, however*, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

² Civilian Compensation—Subsections (a) and (b) supplemented by section 4, Public Law 359, 81st Congress, October 15, 1949 (63 Stat. 880), increased annual compensation to \$16,000 and \$14,000, for the Director and Deputy Director, respectively, per annum; subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) from section 102, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947 (61 Stat. 495). Sections 104(a)(2) and 105(26), Public Law 854, 84th Congress, July 31, 1956, increased the annual compensation to \$21,000 and \$20,500, respectively, for the Director and Deputy Director.

³ As amended by Public Law 15, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 20).

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office--

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1330, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and

(2) The personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.

* * * * *

ORAL DIRECTIVE SUSPENDING FLIGHTS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, by what authority have these flights now been suspended?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, I have now got before me the National Security Act of 1947, and if you wish we to read the pertinent paragraph I will be glad to do so.

Senator MANSFIELD. No; I would just like to have the pertinent parts incorporated in the executive record.

Secretary HERTER. Right.

Senator MANSFIELD. Now the question, to repeat, is by what authority have these flights now been suspended?

Secretary HERTER. By direction of the President.

Senator MANSFIELD. By a Presidential directive. Could we have a copy of that for the record?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I assume so. I don't know whether it was given in writing or whether it was done by word of mouth.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, will you look into it and see what you can do to comply with the request?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

(It was later reported by the Department of State that the directive was oral.)

DURATION OF ORDER SUSPENDING FLIGHTS

Senator MANSFIELD. Will this order suspending the flights automatically remain in force after President Eisenhower leaves office and until it is superseded by another order of some future President?

Secretary HERTER. It could be. The President's responsibility as Commander in Chief which gives him the right to give an order of this kind would, of course, expire with him. It would only be through some treaty obligation that there would be a binding commitment on the part of the United States to carry beyond his term.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do I understand you correctly, then, to state that this order would automatically die with the leaving of office by President Eisenhower, and to become effective again would have to be once again initiated by the next President?

Secretary HERTER. I believe another President would be free to do as he sees fit.

EFFECT OF U-2 INCIDENT ON KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION IN RUSSIA

Senator MANSFIELD. Have Russian experts in the executive branch suggested the possibility that Khrushchev's position at home may have become seriously undermined?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you believe that the U-2 may have been a contributing factor to this undermining?

Secretary HERTER. It may have been. May I elaborate on that?

It may have been in the sense that it must have been a great shock to both the military and to the civilian leaders in Russia to find that they had been as open as they were for such a long period of time.

Senator MANSFIELD. And to him as well.

Secretary HERTER. To him as well.

POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Senator MANSFIELD. If Khrushchev should be forced out of power, is it the thinking of the Russian experts in the Department that his successor is likely to be a man more amenable to friendly and peaceful dealings with the West?

Secretary HERTER. That, sir, I cannot answer categorically. I think that that is a pure matter of guesswork.

Senator MANSFIELD. All right.

What, in the view of our Russian experts, is the most probable coalition of influential forces in the Soviet Union and in world communism that could bring about Khrushchev's downfall?

Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am afraid of my own knowledge I could not answer that. If you would like Mr. Bohlen to answer that, he is as good an authority as we have on the subject.

Senator MANSFIELD. If you will, Mr. Bohlen. But before you do, I would like to throw out indications that perhaps the military, the Chinese Communists and forces of that kind, might be considered.

Mr. BOHLEN. Senator, I honestly in all sincerity think it is not possible to answer that question. I think in dealing with the Soviet Union in view of the general secrecy prevailing in the Communist bloc it is only after the event that you can hope to trace them back and see what particular influences have seemed to have brought about given decisions. There is literally no way in which a foreigner can ascertain what the varying degrees of influence of all factors which go into the making of any particular event. If I might I will give you one illustration of secrecy. I was not there but in June 1957 for 10 days the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Central Committee itself met in a violent inner row which resulted in the expulsion from both of those bodies of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and several others.

This went on for 10 days in Moscow and no foreigner in the capital and mighty few Russians knew anything about it.

We had trained observers there. There was an extremely alert U.S. press corps and not one of them got any inkling of this major development. This I merely cite to show the degree of secrecy and if you are trying to get these things you are in truth looking into a crystal ball and a very cloudy one at that.

Senator MANSFIELD. What you have said, Mr. Bohlen, is a reinforcement of thoughts you have previously stated in response to questions propounded to you by the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. BOHLEN. That's right, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And, once again, that secrecy is so great there that it is impossible for a westerner to find out what goes on in many instances until after the fact is accomplished.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET RETURN TO DEPTHS OF THE COLD WAR

Senator MANSFIELD. Is it the view of the experts in the Department, the Russian experts, that Khrushchev, even if he remains in power, will now take a harder line, a reversion to cold war type tactics in dealing with the Western nations?

Mr. BOHLEN. The indications at present are, and I am speaking at present, that this will not necessarily be so.

I think we can expect a propaganda campaign. The indication from his own statements and from such information as we have received from Moscow, is that there seems to be no determined policy to return to the depths of the cold war at this time.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would you say that if that reversion does take place, taking the opposite tack from what you have just said, and is pushed by the Kremlin or Khrushchev or his successor, that it will make more difficult the maintenance of peace?

Mr. BOHLEN. It would if it returns to a line that we would call the lowest phase of the cold war, it most certainly would, Senator. However, there are degrees in this thing of return to the cold war situation which are impossible to assess and which might not materially increase the danger of war. But if it went all out, sealed off the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc from contact with the outside world, attempted to exert pressures wherever they thought they could do so, I think undoubtedly a much more dangerous world situation would be created.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I don't want to take too much time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't have any questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey, did I overlook you?

Senator HUMPHREY. I came in late, Senator. If any other Senator wants to go ahead, it is all right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse, are you ready?

Senator MORSE. I will yield to Senator Humphrey.

SECRETARY HERTER'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator HUMPHREY. If the question I ask, Mr. Secretary, has already been asked, just brush it aside. I don't want to take any of your time on that.

Did anyone ask as to whether or not you had any personal knowledge of the U-2 flight?

Secretary HERTER. Of the program?

Senator HUMPHREY. No, of the particular flight.

Secretary HERTER. It was included, I said it was included—I am sure it was included in a group of flights that I had been asked whether I had any objections to them.

Senator HUMPHREY. If you wanted to, could you have effectively vetoed such a policy?

Secretary HERTER. No; I could only have given my advice to the President.

VICE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator HUMPHREY. Would the Vice President be aware of these decisions?

Secretary HERTER. I think that as a member of the National Security Council, he was aware of the program in the larger sense. I doubt if he was familiar with any of the individual flights as such, but he may have been.

Senator HUMPHREY. The reason I asked that question was that the Vice President intimated on a television program, I believe the day before the President's announcement in Paris, that the flights should continue. The next day the President announced that he had already canceled them.

The Vice President said they would continue, and the next day the President announced that they had been suspended.

What I am asking is, would the Vice President, as a member of the Security Council, have any opportunity of knowing the decision that had been made by the President?

Secretary HERTER. There, the days followed so quickly one on another that I just couldn't answer that, whether that opportunity would have been offered or not.

Senator HUMPHREY. What I am trying to get at is the policy-making machinery.

We have a subcommittee, as you know, that is studying the policy-making machinery of the Government, the Jackson subcommittee.

I am a member of that subcommittee. We had recently before the subcommittee Mr. Kennan. We have had many of the prominent officials of Government and former officials of Government.

The program of the reconnaissance flights was an established program, and apparently was agreed upon by the Security Council; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. The Security Council was aware of it, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. The Vice President is a member of the Security Council?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. If the Vice President states on a television program that he understood that the flights would continue, yet the President announced the next day in Paris that as of the previous Thursday they had already been suspended, do you think there was any lack of communication between the responsible officials of this Government?

Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am trying to think of the dates.

The Thursday on which the President gave that order was the day that I went to Paris. I went to Paris that night.

The President followed 2 nights later and whether or not in that 2-day interval anything had been distributed with regard to that order, I just don't know.

IMPACT ON SUMMIT DIPLOMACY OF RECENT EVENTS

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any changed views, Mr. Secretary, as to the value of the so-called summitry diplomacy as a result of this recent meeting?

Secretary HERTER. I think as a method of carrying out negotiations it has taken a hard knock.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have you any idea as to how we are going to proceed in the months ahead? I heard the President's address. It was a good address. He gave a good accounting. He talked about the necessity of maintaining—I believe the word was businesslike relationships—or at least normal relationships insofar as we can with the Soviet Union.

Is there any projected plan as to how we will proceed with our contacts with the Soviet Union?

For example, we have the Geneva Conference still in session on the nuclear testing. I suppose the Disarmament Conference is still a reality.

Is there to be any adjustment in these conferences, any changes? Are they to proceed according to the past?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, the President, I think, made that very clear in his statement.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are there any plans for any type of a high level Foreign Ministers' conference or conference of sub-Cabinet officers?

Secretary HERTER. As of now, there is not. I may add this with regard to the summit; that the four nations that were involved in the summit were the four nations who, as a result of the decisions and agreements reached after the war, were the four nations that have the responsibility for Berlin and for the final settlement of the whole German question, and that is the reason for those four, essentially, getting together.

It is possible that again they will have to get together. Whether normal diplomatic changes would make progress or Foreign Ministers' meetings in advance would make a program so that it would be worthwhile for them to come together, I just can't tell you. That is always a possibility. But almost any other subject, there are many other nations that are involved beside those four, and it is a great question in my mind whether or not that method of coming together for the resolution of problems would be fruitful in the future.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, what you are indicating is that a summit conference merely ought to be the ratification, essentially the ratification, of decisions that have been tentatively arrived at, at the normal diplomatic levels.

Secretary HERTER. In my opinion, that is the most desirable thing.

CONTRADICTORY SOVIET ACTIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. I agree. How do you explain, or is there any explanation for what appears to be a contradictory bit of evidence of Gromyko's blustering up at the United Nations on the Soviet resolution and, yet, of the apparent conciliatory behavior of the Soviets in recent days with respect to the quick release of our plane and flyers who strayed into East Germany and the recent broadening of Soviet-American exchange projects?

Secretary HERTER. There again, you have got one of those contradictions. As I was saying earlier, the fact that the attitude of the people in Moscow and even the officials with whom our Embassy officials have to deal, have been entirely normal since this incident.

It is very hard to reconcile with the very harsh words that both Khrushchev and Gromyko have uttered.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you lay any credence to the doctrine, or at least an observation that has been made, that while the Soviet tactics may change for awhile, that insofar as their general overall strategy is concerned, it will remain pretty much the same as it has?

Secretary HERCER. Certainly as far as their objectives are concerned. I think it was quite clear from some of this documentation that will be put into the record, that is the speeches that were made by Mr. Khrushchev, that he had laid greater and greater emphasis on the eventual triumph of communism over the world, and that he put particular emphasis on that in recent months before the summit.

PREDICTIONS OF SOVIET ACTIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. I have a letter from a gentleman who is a professor emeritus of a university, up at Bennington College, who has had an uncanny record in my years of acquaintanceship with him in understanding what goes on in the Soviet Union. His name is Dr. Bernard Tauer. He is a former Social Democrat of some 35 years ago from Austria, a professor of political economy, now retired. He monitors Soviet broadcasts, studies Soviet literature, particularly photographs and what-have-you. Just to give you a little background, he predicted to me some 3 weeks, I guess it was, before it happened, the removal of Beria. I have a letter here from him right before me, and it is a letter telling how Mr. Khrushchev was going to scuttle the summit conference, written on April 25, this letter is. And I also have a letter from him here in which he says:

The Soviet leader will now do everything possible to prove that Eisenhower is a warmonger and an imperialist aggressor and not a man of peace, in action not merely in words. We must, therefore, prepare ourselves for all kinds of provocations all around the world.

His thesis is that Khrushchev had been selling the Soviet people upon the idea that President Eisenhower was a man of peace and a man with whom he could deal. I don't mean deal, in the sense of the crudeness of that word, but one with whom he could conduct reasonably good negotiations, and that when the President accepted the responsibility for the flights and didn't accept the opportunity, at least what some people say was an opportunity of removing himself from that responsibility, that Mr. Khrushchev took this as a very personal matter, since he had staked his reputation in the Kremlin and in the councils of the Communist Party upon the fact that he could work with Eisenhower. Then Mr. Khrushchev felt that Eisenhower had not only upset the diplomatic applecart, but, more importantly, from a subjective point of view—Khrushchev's—put Khrushchev in a very difficult position with the Communist Chinese, with the rightwing Stalinists in the Soviet Union, so that Khrushchev is now making a personal crusade out of attacking the President.

What is your view of this? I am going to give you this letter. I have a whole series of these, and this is a very remarkable man, may I say.

For example, I have a letter from him 2 weeks before the recent shakeup in the Soviet Union which was not too fundamental, but indicating some of the changes that were going to be made, by a very careful analysis of broadcasts and meetings and literature. I had this man down to see the late Senator Walter George, some of you may recall, and he was very helpful at one time. What is your view of Mr. Khrushchev's reactions lately to the President, the personal venom that he seems to exhibit?

Secretary HERRER. I am particularly interested in two things, Senator, in the letter that you have just read; one, the fact that it was written before the U-2 incident.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary HERRER. In which this authority cites the fact that Mr. Khrushchev was going to scuttle the conference.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that substantiates essentially what you were saying this morning, your own observations on this.

Secretary HERRER. Yes. The second has to do with the fact that the President didn't accept the way out which Mr. Khrushchev appeared to offer him. My own feeling with regard to that second matter is that it was very much of a trap. That what Mr. Khrushchev thought might happen is that the President would disclaim personal responsibility and that then Mr. Khrushchev would say, "The situation is even more dangerous than I thought, because this means that that same little frantic group in the Pentagon"—and that is the phrase that he used in his press conference—"is running the Government of the United States without the President knowing about it, and that makes our situation even worse" and he would have inveighed in exactly the same terms and asked the President for exactly the same apologies and punishments which he asked for later.

I think that the element of personal pique certainly played a part in the whole show.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

The Senator from Kansas.

Senator CARLSON. Senator Aiken—

OTHER COUNTRIES' REACTIONS TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE COLLAPSE

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, the Senator from Vermont.

Senator AIKEN. I won't take long.

Speaking of the reaction of the rest of the world, have you made any analysis of the reaction of the other countries of the world relative to the collapse of the summit meeting?

Secretary HERRER. Yes, I think we have. It isn't, of course, complete. This will mean a study from a great many nations and bring this altogether in one place.

I think that, perhaps, the best indication has been the attitude among the representatives at the United Nations where you have got a cross section from the rest of the world. From the very outset of the Russian complaint there it was very obvious they weren't going to be able to get any votes from their calling this an aggression, except Soviet bloc votes.

Some of the smaller countries, two of them, abstained in the final vote for reasons that were of a rather different nature.

But, by and large, we have heard no sympathy from the point of view of what you might call the uncommitted nations or the free nations of the world for the attitude that Mr. Khrushchev took.

Senator AIKEN. Are you satisfied we have not lost prestige throughout the world as a result, or lost more than Russia has?

Secretary HERRER. May I say, sir, that in my opinion our alliances are firmer than they have ever been.

SOVIET HIERARCHY

Senator AIKEN. What was the significance of the shakeup in the Russian Government prior to the U-2 incident, I believe last April, was it not, when Mr. Kozlov was promoted; and coupled with that question, why don't we hear anything about Mr. Mikoyan any more? Has he been isolated or just gotten out of the news, or what has happened with him?

Secretary HERRER. Mr. Bohlen, who is our expert, is also the censor of the document, so I am afraid he has gone out of the room at the moment.

With regard to the disappearance of Mr. Mikoyan, we have been told this is just a normal vacation he has taken down to the Black Sea. It is true in years gone by he had taken rather extended vacations there, and whether this is true or not we can't say.

With respect to the shakeup, I think the only significance that it had were that two of the strongest members of the central committee were sent to other responsibilities and this may have been a personal strengthening of Mr. Khrushchev's power within the committee itself. But it was not considered very highly significant.

Senator AIKEN. That is, Mr. Kozlov's promotion is not significant?

Secretary HERRER. I don't think so. I didn't know that he as such had been promoted.

[Deleted.]

A long time ago, I think when Mr. Averill Harriman was visiting in Russia he reported that Mr. Kozlov had been pointed out to him by Mr. Khrushchev as his successor, saying that he and Mikoyan were too old to carry on and that Kozlov was the No. 2 man. But there was no telling whether he was saying that seriously or whether he was being flattering about it because Mr. Kozlov was there at the time.

Senator AIKEN. I thought he made the best impression of any of our Russian visitors last summer. At least when he came before this committee, I thought he did.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

FUNCTION OF NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be helpful for this record if you made a statement in regard to the functions of NASA, and the part that NASA played in connection with the U-2 flight.

I don't think the record is very clear as to what are the functions of NASA, and what jurisdiction, if any, the State Department has over NASA and what the relationship between NASA and the National Security Council is, and the State Department.

Secretary HERTER. NASA, as you know, is an agency devoted entirely to the peaceful development of satellites and outer space vehicles of one kind or another.

Its operations have now been separated out from what were called purely military operations, although it is always inevitable in the development of boosters that there should be an interrelationship between the two, because the military vehicle and the peaceful vehicle have got the same problems of propulsion to get up into the air. The witnesses of NASA, of course, will be before the committee.

[Deleted.] Most of the U-2's are used by NASA in connection with purely scientific work, meteorological work. Actually, the Japanese Government found them tremendously valuable in tracing the course of tornadoes last year, and I think that NASA put out at least three publications on their findings from the U-2 weather observations.

[Deleted.]

NASA'S ROLE IN THE U-2 INCIDENT

With respect to the actual development of events in relation to NASA, I am sorry to say that I can't give you firsthand information.

Perhaps Mr. Dillon can supplement that as it occurred while I was overseas and when Mr. Dillon was in charge.

Mr. DILLON. All I can say is as far as I know the State Department didn't have any direct relationships with NASA on this matter, and the relationships that there were, were handled by the Central Intelligence Agency [deleted], so either Mr. Dulles or the NASA witnesses themselves will be able to inform you on that.

Senator MORSE. Why would NASA make a statement in regard to this plane if it was under the jurisdiction of CIA?

Mr. DILLON. On the cover story it was in the open, the plane was under the jurisdiction of NASA. Actually for this operation it was under the jurisdiction of CIA. [Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Therefore, NASA, in your opinion, was acting within the proprieties when it issued the statement that it issued.

Mr. DILLON. I think so; yes.

Senator MORSE. You think it had cleared that statement with CIA or had authority from CIA to issue it.

Secretary HERTER. I think so.

Mr. DILLON. They should have; as I understood the matter, these guidelines to answer questions were prepared by CIA. They were gone over with State Department people a day or two before. We had thought that NASA was going to handle this in the way of answering questions, which we knew they would get, because this was a NASA plane, and they apparently chose instead to forestall the questions just by putting it all out in the form of a statement. [Deleted.]

QUESTION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH COORDINATION ON U-2 STATEMENTS

Senator MORSE. I raise the question because I want to do what I can in order to clarify the record in regard to the allegation made that there is not the best of coordination between the State Depart-

ment, CIA, Pentagon Building, and now NASA, and that there may be a need for a centralization in the State Department of the authority to authorize any statement by any of these agencies in regard to a situation such as this, because of some possible reason to believe that if this had been centralized more we would not have been having different statements coming from different agencies.

Mr. DILLON. We were not aware, actually, of the fact that NASA was going to make as formal a statement as this, and it was somewhat of a surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. I could not hear that answer.

Mr. DILLON. I say we were not aware of the fact that NASA was going to make such a formal statement as this, and I am not sure that the Central Intelligence Agency was either.

All the relationships—as I said in my original statement, there was coordination, there was a decision that the statements were going to be made by the State Department.

That decision was taken and made known to the other agencies concerned, which were the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency then on the morning of May 5.

The Central Intelligence Agency had the relationships with NASA and undertook to pass that on. We had no relationships with NASA. They didn't know we were in this thing, and somehow this statement was put out by NASA somewhat more complete than we expected but it was along the lines of the material that they had been furnished.

VICE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. Turning to a question that Senator Humphrey asked—and may I assure you that I am quite nonpolitical in raising that—I am only seeking to find out who had knowledge of what in regard to the matter. I refer to the May 27 issue of the Washington Post, in an article by Mr. Chalmers Roberts in the course of which he said:

Nowhere in the 3½-hour television program did Nixon refer to any Presidential direction in the U-2 crisis, other than his approval of the flights some years earlier. Nor was there any reference to his own part in the affair. Nixon, of course, sits in the National Security Council. Nixon did say that he was "privy" to the U-2 reconnaissance policy "and I do endorse it." He also said that "I knew about this flight."

Now, my interpretation, Mr. Secretary, of your testimony is that neither you nor the President knew this specific flight was going to be taken at the time that it was taken, but that you did know that there was a general program for such flights and that this flight could be considered as a part of that program.

Now I ask you, do you have any reason to believe that Nixon knew anything that you and the President did not know and that maybe it is just an unfortunate use of language when he says "I knew about this flight," and that he probably means that he knew about the general program of reconnaissance?

Secretary HERTER. I would assume it was about the general program rather than about the particular flight.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. But as far as you know, the National Security Council did not brief its members in regard to any particular flights without also notifying the President in regard to specific flights.

Secretary HERRER. No, I think the National Security Council was only aware of the general program.

Senator MORSE. Are you a member of the National Security Council?

Secretary HERRER. Yes, I am.

NUCLEAR ARMAMENT RACE

Senator MORSE. One final question at this round, Mr. Secretary: As you know I, along with everyone else, I think, who has the interest of peace at heart, am very much concerned about long continuation of this nuclear armament race.

Do you think that the United States and the Western Powers on the one hand and Russia on the other can continue this nuclear armament race with its constant increase and acceleration for another 10 years and not create the great probability of war?

Secretary HERRER. I don't know about the great probability of war, Senator, but I would say certainly increase the chances of war.

Senator MORSE. I know we are of one mind but I want the record to show this particular one mind: Do you agree with me that our generation simply has the responsibility in history to find some honorable way to end this nuclear armament race?

Secretary HERRER. I agree with you completely on that.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that we ought to do everything that we can to try to get the United Nations to exercise greater jurisdictional authority in connection with this whole matter of armament race than we have been able to get it to do so far?

Secretary HERRER. Senator, some time ago I made a speech in connection with disarmament in which I stated my views as to the great necessity in the following years to finding some answer to this, and at the same time finding an answer within the framework of the United Nations of an authority which could maintain the peace with law, and I still feel that just as strongly as I did at the time I made that speech.

RECORD OF THE WORLD COURT

Senator McCREE. Mr. Chairman, my time is up and I want to make a request for data if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator MORSE. This morning we talked about the cases that we had offered to take to the World Court.

Senator WILEY. A little louder, Senator.

Senator MORSE. This morning you talked about the cases that we were willing to take to the World Court. I wonder if the State Department can compile for the committee the record in regard to the World Court's operation, both on the cases it has handled and the cases that we have offered to have it handle that have been rejected by Russia or any other power.

Secretary HERTER. Yes; we will be very glad to do that.

(The following information was subsequently furnished for the record:)

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE—
CONTENTIOUS CASES PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST SOVIET-BLOC
COUNTRIES

1. The United States has proposed to the Soviet Union the adjudication of four separate cases concerning aerial incidents. In each of these cases, the United States has filed with the Registry of the International Court of Justice an application instituting proceedings. These were the following cases: (a) Treatment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of United States of America (*United States v. U.S.S.R.*); (b) aerial incident of October 7, 1952 (*United States v. U.S.S.R.*); (c) aerial incident of September 4, 1954 (*United States v. U.S.S.R.*); and (d) aerial incident of November 7, 1954 (*United States v. U.S.S.R.*). Each of these four cases has been dismissed by the Court for lack of jurisdiction. The Court lacked jurisdiction because the Soviet Union has never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2) of its statute nor agreed to jurisdiction specially in any case.

2. The United States also instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice in cases against Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These were: (e) Treatment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of United States of America (*United States v. Hungarian People's Republic*); and (f) aerial incident of March 10, 1953 (*United States v. Czechoslovakia*). Each of these cases was also dismissed by the Court for lack of jurisdiction. Again, the reason was that neither Hungary nor Czechoslovakia has ever accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in any way.

3. The United States also instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice in a case against Bulgaria, the aerial incident of July 27, 1955 (*United States v. Bulgaria*). This case differed from those above in that Bulgaria had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the former Permanent Court of International Justice in 1921, and it was the contention of the United States that Bulgaria was subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the present International Court of Justice by virtue of article 36(5) of this Court's statute. Bulgaria challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on several grounds, including a decision of the Court in another case arising out of the same aerial incident that Bulgaria is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and a reciprocal invocation of the United States domestic jurisdiction reservation. The United States has moved to discontinue the case.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.

DEVALUATION OF SOVIET CURRENCY

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, recently one of our Nation's financial writers, writing on the conditions in Russia, wrote that Mr. Khrushchev was proposing a devaluation of the currency as of January 1, and he stated that no nation tampers with its currency unless it is in financial difficulty.

What do we know about the financial and economic condition of Russia that would lead us to believe or know that he is planning on devaluing the currency?

Secretary HERTER. This I hadn't heard at all. I hadn't seen that particular statement and I have seen nowhere in any report any indications that they were planning to devalue their currency.

There is no question but that their foreign exchange rate, their official rate, doesn't correspond with reality. They have two rates, one an official rate and one a tourist rate. They are very far apart. One is 4 rubles to the dollar and one is 10 rubles to the dollar. But from the point of view of their internal financial situation, I have heard no reports they were planning to devalue the ruble.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN SOVIET UNION

Senator CARLSON. We have had evidence that there is social unrest among the people, that they are thinking that they are entitled to better living conditions, better homes and housing.

Do we have any evidence of that?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I think there is. But this is a matter that Mr. Bohlen testified to a few moments ago.

Senator CARLSON. That there is?

Secretary HERTER. There is evidence of that. As Mr. Bohlen said, it is impossible to get documentary evidence, as such, because of the secrecy and the discipline in their society, but I think that every visitor to Russia who has had a chance to talk with the workmen or the students at the university and so on, has come back with that feeling.

After all, Mr. Khrushchev has made a good many statements about the necessity of increasing the standard of living of their people.

In their incentives that they offer from the point of view of their workers, better living conditions in these housing projects is one of the principal incentives that they have been offering in the past, giving people priority if their particular sections of a plant do particularly well from the point of view of production, they will be advanced to better living quarters.

I think that the urge for better living quarters and a better standard of living, more consumer goods, is a very real one.

- SOVIET REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES AND LABOR SHORTAGE

Senator CARLSON. Does the State Department have any evidence of a labor shortage in Russia based on a statement that was recently made that Mr. Khrushchev reduced his military strength because it was necessary to get some of the people back into the labor market?

Secretary HERTER. Yes. Very recently there has been a study that I think will be made available to you, made on the whole question of the labor problem in Russia.

(The study referred to appears on p. 283 in appendix 2.)

It is an extremely interesting one from the point of view of the present situation and the relationship of women at work compared with men and the very large excess number of women over men that exists in Russia today.

There is certainly every reason to believe that Mr. Khrushchev's announced reduction of the armed forces was an effort to increase the male labor force by taking the extra men out of the armed services when he said he was planning to reduce from some 3,600,000 down to 2,400,000; that the principal purpose of that was to get a larger working force.

EFFECT ON SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS

Senator CARLSON. Is it not reasonable to assume, then, that Mr. Khrushchev does have some problems, internal problems, and that that may have some effect on his actions and his decision at Paris?

Secretary HERTER. That undoubtedly is true. He has had some other internal difficulty that you undoubtedly know about, Senator, in

connection with the new land that was planted, an area that has not been too successful and this was something on which he had banked very heavily to increase the food supply of Russia and I think he had been rather heavily criticized because it hadn't worked out as planned.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENT'S ORDER SUSPENDING U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator GORE. Returning, Mr. Secretary, to the examination of whether there was a breakdown in coordination and administrative procedure, I would like to inquire when you personally first learned of the President's order that the U-2 flights would be discontinued?

Secretary HERTER. At the time that he gave it.

Senator GORE. When did he give it?

Secretary HERTER. My recollection is that it was immediately after meeting at the White House on Thursday morning at about noon.

Senator GORE. Did he give the order to you?

Secretary HERTER. No, he did not give the order to me. I think it was through General Goodpaster, but I am not quite certain.

Senator GORE. How did you know that it was given?

Secretary HERTER. I heard him.

Senator GORE. You heard him give the order?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator GORE. And this was on Thursday?

Secretary HERTER. This was on Thursday.

Senator GORE. Then you do not know whether this information was communicated to the Vice President?

Secretary HERTER. I have no idea.

Senator GORE. He was not present?

Secretary HERTER. He was not present.

Senator GORE. Was this at a meeting of the Security Council?

Secretary HERTER. No, I don't think it was the Security Council. I think it was at the meeting immediately after the Security Council at which there were three of us present. Allen Dulles was not present and I have forgotten—I think Gates was present—after a Cabinet meeting it was.

Senator GORE. I don't understand.

Secretary HERTER. After the Cabinet meeting.

Senator GORE. After the Cabinet meeting?

Secretary HERTER. Right.

Senator GORE. That settles that. You heard the order issued, and I will have no further question as to where it was issued and to whom. If you heard it issued to Secretary Gates, that settles one question definitely and finally.

But you do not know whether the Vice President was informed about it?

Secretary HERTER. Excuse me—

Senator GORE. Did you wish to add something?

Secretary HERTER. No, no.

Senator GORE. You do not know then whether the Vice President was informed about it?

Secretary HERTER. No, I do not.

QUESTION OF PRESS SECRETARY HAGERTY'S KNOWLEDGE OF SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

Senator GORE. On this question of coordination or lack thereof, in addition to NASA and the State Department, to which Senator Morse referred, there is the State Department, CIA, NASA, Mr. Hagerty, and officials within the Department and perhaps others.

Did Mr. Hagerty operate in this field strictly as press secretary or did he undertake some Executive function?

Secretary HERTER. I know of no Executive function that he assumed.

ISSUANCE OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND NASA STATEMENTS OF MAY 5

Senator GORE. Mr. Dillon, on May 5 Mr. Hagerty, I understand, told a press conference that the State Department and NASA would issue statements. Were you aware of this?

Mr. DILLON. I have very recently learned that he indicated that NASA would issue a statement as such.

It was decided that the State Department would issue a statement. I hadn't been aware that he had said we were. But it had been decided and he knew it had been decided that we were going to do it.

Senator GORE. You say you very recently learned this. How recently?

Mr. DILLON. I think a day ago or 2 days ago that someone from the press said that he had told the press when they were there that NASA would issue a statement, so that they could get their information from NASA.

Senator GORE. Did Mr. Hagerty suggest to you that the State Department issue a statement?

Mr. DILLON. No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this news, as I said earlier this morning, at this National Security Council meeting or right after it that was held outside of Washington, that the State Department would handle the publicity on this, and that we would make any statement that would be made, and it was known at that time that we would make a statement.

Now Mr. Hagerty was not at the Security Council meeting, but he was at that area out there where this exercise was taking place and so he was aware of the fact that the State Department would be making a statement at noon that day at our regular press conference time.

Actually, the statement was delayed 45 minutes. It was made at 12:45 when our regular daily press conference took place.

Senator GORE. Was it decided there that NASA would make a statement also?

Mr. DILLON. It was not to my knowledge, no. It was not decided there that NASA would make a statement.

Senator GORE. Who made that decision?

Mr. DILLON. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know who made any such decision.

The fact is, as I have said earlier, I thought that NASA would answer questions.

I didn't know they were going to make a statement until I saw it.

Senator GORE. You don't know whether NASA or whether Mr. Hagerty made that decision?

Mr. DILLON. I have no idea, no. I would assume NASA made it because we did know that NASA would have to answer questions because this was a NASA plane that was lost and the reporters were going to find out how high the plane flew, what kind of a plane it was, anything they knew about it, and we had given them—the Intelligence Agency had given them good answers on how to answer such questions.

Senator GORE. You say you assume this. You did not know it?

Mr. DILLON. I knew they had given them that material. I knew that as a fact, but we did not know that they were going to use that and put in into the form of a statement as it actually came out.

Senator GORE. But Mr. Hagerty did know that a statement by NASA would be made?

Mr. DILLON. I don't know that what he said meant that he knew they were going to make a formal statement or whether he was just using that as a phrase, indicating that they would answer questions.

He may have thought they were going to make a statement. I just don't know that. He may have called them up and asked them. I don't know.

Senator GORE. Did, in fact, both the State Department and NASA make statements subject to Mr. Hagerty's notice to the press that they would do so?

Mr. DILLON. The State Department made its statement and NASA made one about three quarters of an hour later, yes.

[Deleted].

Senator GORE. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS

Senator LAUSCHE. When did the Camp David meeting take place with Khrushchev?

Secretary HERTER. I am terribly sorry—

Senator LAUSCHE. When did the Camp David meeting take place with Khrushchev?

Secretary HERTER. That was in September as I recall it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did Khrushchev, before May 1, make any statements indicating that the Soviet had knowledge of American reconnaissance planes over their territory?

Secretary HERTER. None.

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon his statements and upon the knowledge which he claims the Soviet possess, what day was it that he understood the first American plane flew over the Soviet?

Secretary HERTER. I can't identify that. My recollection is that when he was in Paris he made the statement that he knew about these overflights at the time that he was at Camp David and that he thought there was something fishy about President Eisenhower at that time.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, then at Camp David he did state that at that time he knew that our planes were flying over the Soviet.

Secretary HERTER. That is what he said later when he got to Paris.

Senator LAUSCHIE. When he got to Paris?

Secretary HERTER. When he got to Paris. He never mentioned it at Camp David or at any time between Camp David and Paris.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Well, if he knew at Camp David that our reconnaissance planes were flying over the Soviet, and he said nothing about it, can you give any reason for his remaining silent on the subject?

Secretary HERTER. He was asked that question in a press conference in Paris.

I haven't got here the exact words of response but I think we could dig them out for you, and tell you just what he said in answer to that himself, but as I recollect, he said he felt that this was an inappropriate moment to bring it up but that he did think there was something fishy about the President at that time.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Then at Camp David, when he knew that our planes were flying over his land, he was discussing what was to be the summit conference; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. What he hoped would be the summit conference.

Senator LAUSCHIE. And if we take him at his word, at that time he hoped to have a summit conference although he knew then that we were supposedly committing a flagrant transgression against his rights.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct, from his own later testimony.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Can you reconcile those two positions as both being true, one that he honestly intended to attend a summit conference and, two, that he knew our planes were flying over his land?

Secretary HERTER. No, it would be very difficult to reconcile the two. It is very difficult particularly to reconcile the tremendous issue that he made of it later when he knew about it all the time, according to his own statement.

Senator AIKEN. Will the Senator yield? You will find on page 16 of the Background Documents Khrushchev's statement that Twining, the then Chief of Staff, sent a plane over Russia which went over Kiev the day after he left Russia. It is the third paragraph on page 16. (See appendix 1, p. 191.)

Senator LAUSCHIE. Yes. Your recollection is that the meeting took place last September.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Now then, from September to May 14, was that the day he came to Paris, he said nothing about this knowledge that he had, was supposed to have had while he was at Camp David.

Secretary HERTER. That is my recollection. I would want to check on that. It is possible that he may have said something at the Presidium meeting before he left Moscow. My expert here tells me he did not, and that was my recollection that he had never mentioned it until he got to Paris.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Can one rationalize the furor of his resentment in May of 1960 compared to his admitted silence at Camp David about similar flights?

Secretary HERTER. No; one cannot.

INFORMATION GATHERING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE U.S.S.R.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Now then, last January 18, Allen Dulles appeared before our committee, and at that time he merely scratched on the surface what I thought was a very vital question: the comparative ease with which the Soviet gets information in the United States and the impregnable wall that bars us from getting news in the Soviet.

I ask you the question, Mr. Herter, to give your understanding of the facility with which we get information out of the Soviet, and that which they get out of the United States.

Secretary HERTER. Senator, as you know, we have what we call an open society. We are very proud of it in which we have complete freedom of the press, in which, except for matters of highest security, very freely talked about, and a great deal is published.

Our technical magazines publish a great deal from the point of view of vital military information. Our installations in this country, while no direct overflights are permitted, can be photographed with comparative ease from an angle of one side.

Generally speaking we have had no restrictions at all on travel in the United States except for a few very small circumscribed areas, like the Atomic Energy Agency plants, and we have had restrictions on Soviet citizens traveling in this country which have been taken entirely as a retaliatory measure because of the limitations put on the travel of Americans in Russia.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Right.

Secretary HERTER. The Soviet society, as you know, is a closed society, where one moves and goes only where they tell you you can go or when they tell you you can go.

Senator LAUSCHIE. This morning in answer to a question, assuming that a Soviet plane was over the United States and what we would do about it, you said that there is no need of them sending planes for reconnaissance purposes because they can get the information without going through that effort.

Secretary HERTER. That is quite so.

Senator LAUSCHIE. That is, they can go to Cape Canaveral and pretty simply see what is going on there.

Secretary HERTER. Well, sir, there are newspaper men down at Cape Canaveral all the time and a good many visitors.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Now the fact is that:

The Soviets still consider that secrecy and the security of everything relating to their military operations is one of their great assets, and they have no intention whatever of changing that. Moreover they have no intention of letting us into areas of military importance.

Those are the words of Dulles.

That is, there is a difference between the Soviet getting information here and our getting it in the Soviet.

Secretary HERTER. Oh, a very great difference. It is the whole difference between an open and a closed society.

PROPOSED PASSPORT LEGISLATION

Senator LAUSCHIE. You have been asking for this Congress to pass a bill that would give the State Department some limited control over Communists going to the Soviet Union. Is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHIE. And why have you asked that?

Secretary HERTER. Because we felt that we ought to have some control—these are American citizens traveling abroad—that we ought to have some control over those who may be going to various parts of the world in interest inimical to those of the United States.

Senator LAUSCHIE. And you asked that because you have in mind the grave dangers that lie in the ability of a Communist to distribute information in the Soviet Union when he makes the visit, if he so desires.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHIE. That bill has not been acted upon; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

POWERS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senator LAUSCHIE. Is there any type of legislation that you feel that we ought to pass with respect to the curtailment of the duties and the powers of the Central Intelligence Agency or the expansion of them. If you have given that subject no thought, you can state it.

Secretary HERTER. I have given it no thought. I hope there would be no change so far as the activities are concerned. [Deleted.]

Senator LAUSCHIE. That is all I have.

ALLEGED FRENCH NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT OF OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there was one statement that I was told when I was in Paris that an account of overflights of the Russian territory had been carried in a French newspaper some 30 to 60 days prior to that.

Have you ever heard of such account?

Secretary HERTER. I think I heard the same reports in Paris but I never saw any documentary proof of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of your people tried to confirm it?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, but I have not heard it mentioned by anyone except when I was over in Paris, too. I had not heard a word before that.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MAY 5 REFERENCE TO OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

In his speech of May 5, Mr. Khrushchev referred to the U.S. overflights of July 2, 1956, April 9, 1960, and May 1, 1960. He said that the April 9 flight caused concern within the Soviet Government and resulted in admonishments to the Soviet military not to let it happen again.

[Deleted.]

KHRUSHCHEV'S INTERPRETATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE
OF OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. This, again, raises this point that puzzles me very much. The evidence is quite clear that Mr. Khrushchev, if he didn't know positively, certainly suspected that it was our planes that were going across his territory, didn't he?

Secretary HERTER. That is what I assume.

The CHAIRMAN. And it comes back to this point that he hadn't raised such a terrible fuss about it until this one, that is, the May 1 flight, which was shot down. And, you said you couldn't reconcile the difference in his attitude toward the prior flights to the attitude toward the May 1 flight. But doesn't the reconciliation, if it is explainable at all—I am just asking you if there is one—does it not lie in the fact that our Government did take the position regarding the May 1 flight and this program, that this is a deliberate program which we, the President, takes responsibility for, and which we intend to continue?

Secretary HERTER. Not which we intend to continue. That has never been said.

The CHAIRMAN. He interpreted it as such. Mr. Khrushchev in his statement, which I have a copy of here—this is his language. He says—this is a quote from part of our Background Documents (see p. 204, appendix 1) which says:

At his press conference, Herter made an outrageous statement. Far from feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he justifies them and says that this will continue in the future. Only countries which are in a state of war can act in this way. * * * Herter's statement has made us doubt the correctness of our earlier conclusions that the President, the American Government, did not know about the flights. Herter's statement says that this intelligence plan was endorsed by the Government.

At least that is the way he interpreted it, and, as we said before—
Senator LAUSCHIE. Who is "he"? Who interpreted it?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a quote from Mr. Khrushchev's statement. He is interpreting what Mr. Herter said as speaking for the Government. But is this not at least a possible reconciliation of the difference in attitude between the prior flights and the May 1 flight?

Secretary HERTER. It might be if one wanted to interpret the words that I spoke that way. There was no need of his interpreting those words that way. Certainly from what I said, that is a very far-fetched interpretation. I think he was interpreting it for his own purposes that way. I think that the one reconcilable feature between those two things is that in one case he had specific evidence and in the other case he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is your position that neither your statement nor the President's press conference can legitimately be interpreted as an endorsement and justification of the flights and a policy of pursuing them in the future?

Secretary HERTER. Certainly not the policies of pursuing them in the future. The President's statement that was made in Paris said it was perfectly clear from what I had said and from what he had said that there was nothing that allowed that inference.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you in your background news conference in Paris on Sunday, May 15, repeat the same statement that you had made prior thereto in Washington?

Secretary HERRER. I was asked at that background press conference whether or not I had made a statement that we would continue doing this. I repeated the very words that I had used in my statement. I said I stood on those. That did not imply that we would continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to that second statement, Mr. Khrushchev had so interpreted it. Were you aware that he had so interpreted it in his statement to the Presidium?

Secretary HERRER. I think I may have been, but if one took cognizance of every interpretation of his of everything that happens in this country one would be spending all one's time trying to correct his statements.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that it is an unreasonable and far-fetched interpretation of your statement or the President's in his press conference that these would be continued; is that correct?

Secretary HERRER. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it or is it not a fact that the press in this country interpreted it in that same fashion?

Secretary HERRER. I am told that some did and some did not.

The CHAIRMAN. It might have been wise for us to clarify at that time so that we interpreted it properly; don't you think?

Secretary HERRER. That, as I think I have indicated earlier, referred to the cessation of the flights and not resuming the flights. The President had reserved to state in Paris in conjunction with the fact that he was going to offer at the United Nations his plan for aerial supervision of all nations that would be willing to submit to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that any head of state, of any important nation at least, could proceed with negotiations at a conference under the situation, at least as he interpreted it, that is, that we intended to continue such flights?

Secretary HERRER. After all, Mr. Khrushchev arrived in Paris and made an arrival statement there the Saturday before the conference saying that he expected to proceed and have fruitful results.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, in order that it is clear what is involved here, I would like to read one sentence, the one that is referred to by Mr. Khrushchev, which I think you clarified. I quote from the statement that was made by the Department of State on May 7 (see p. 187, appendix 1):

The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world.

I think that is the statement that led to the interpretation, don't you?

Secretary HERRER. I am sorry, sir, I have got before me now the statement of May 7. Which were those words?

The CHAIRMAN. It appears on page 12 of the background documents prepared by the staff, the first paragraph at the top of page 12.

Secretary HERRER. That does not in any way intimate that they would go on.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe that that could reasonably be interpreted as meaning that they will continue?

Secretary HERRER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Wiley?

KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH AT BAKU

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this examination, and as you brought out, Mr. Chairman, I think that what we had better do is get down to what I think is the basic issue, not what was said or particularly done, but let's see what Khrushchev did.

On April 28, in what has been called the speech at Baku, an examination of that speech shows clearly that the Soviet Government had come to the conclusion that it would get nowhere at the summit conference. Now, listen to this:

Overnight all the Government-controlled radio stations--
and got the date, May 25--

all the controlled radio stations and newspapers in the Soviet Union began to prepare the people for a summit failure, and flatly blamed the West. The same bitter tones which Khrushchev used in Paris is to be noted in what he said at Baku.

And Baku was days before.

In a violent attack in Baku on Secretary Herter and Under Secretary Dillon, on that same day, the Soviet Premier intimated that he planned to use military power to enforce the prospective seizure in the West.

I quote Khrushchev:

If, therefore, the Western Powers should not wish to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, that would not preserve for them the rights on whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air.

In another portion of his speech, the Soviet Premier practically admitted that he had no hope of reaching any agreement at the summit conference.

He said:

The nearer May 16, the day of the meeting of the heads of Government, approaches, the more one-sided becomes the approach of certain statesmen of the Western Powers to the problems the participants of the conference will have to face.

Then he goes ahead and gives examples attacking Herter and Dillon.

KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION TO SCUTTLE CONFERENCE

Now I want to quote this. This morning I called your attention to this young Russian that stepped out from the intelligence department of the Russian Government, who was heard on the radio. He said, and I quote:

The Soviet Communist regime is in no way interested in allowing so popular a man as the American President to come to the Soviet Union. They are definitely afraid of the impact such a visit can make on the people.

Now if the issue is what caused Khrushchev to shoot his wad, so to speak, I think it is very clear that when he found out, one, that he couldn't make an impression upon his associates who were to be at the conference; two, that Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were unhappy and Mao Tse-tung laced him up and down about this conference, as the record shows, when he found out that they didn't want it; three, that he was having trouble with his own gang in Russia; and, four, that the youth of Russia were simply getting all fed up--he

decided before he went to Paris that he was going to let the balloon go up.

It wasn't the question of U-2. That may have given him the ostensible opportunity to blow his top, but, as a matter of fact, he was all ready to go days before.

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

Now if that is the fact, and I think it is sustained by the people who weigh the evidence, then there is no need of our inquiring into what some folks feel. They may be a little remiss hither and yon in our own public service. They were laboring under deep pressure. When you put yourself in the President's boots and go over there and see what he took, you have to say, "God bless him. He held his temper and he handled himself so that he made all America and all the world proud," and the result was as suggested, as the record now shows. Look at the U.N., look at Britain, what they say about it. And the answer, I think, is that we should just about stop our investigation and not try to ball up further the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record I will say that the President, yesterday morning, heartily endorsed this inquiry.

Senator WILEY. That what?

The CHAIRMAN. The President himself said in my presence that he heartily endorsed this inquiry, and if the Senator wishes to take issue with the President, why I suggest he talk to him about it.

Senator WILEY. Oh, no. I heard him say that. I am not disputing his saying it. I am just simply saying that where do we go from here now?

Are we going further, are we going to try to ball up the agency that gets the information, that has done such a tremendous job, that for 3½ years has given us information.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator misunderstands the purpose of this meeting. It is not to ball up anything. It is to try to clarify a situation for the benefit of the committee and the Senate and the country. And I know of no one who has the slightest purpose of balling up anything.

Has the Senator completed his questions?

Senator WILEY. Yes, I am sorry that I used that expression. What I meant was "confuse," and if there is going to be further evidence, would you mind telling me who the next witness is?

The CHAIRMAN. There will be no other witnesses this afternoon.

Senator WILEY. Well, do you expect to call some later on?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Dulles is coming on Tuesday.

Senator Mansfield—is the Senator through?

Senator WILEY. No, that is the point I am making. I want to state in all sincerity, gentlemen, it is your responsibility if you want to call this man who has created this agency under the mandate of the Congress, that we have appropriated money for, and have not tied his hands and he is the one who brought about this; let us be frank.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is misinformed if he thinks that type of testimony is going to go in the public record. There was no intention at any time of putting this in the public record.

Senator WILEY. Did you hear yesterday when the distinguished Senator from Ohio very plainly and bluntly talked about the leaks. I belong to a committee where I have seen them go right from the committee room right out in front of the fellows who have the mechanisms for giving the news. This is the first time I have blown my top, but I am simply telling you in the interests of my country, I think you should not call in this other agency. I think that these gentlemen have told what the public knows now, but to bring in this other agency, I think would be a mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator say that he knows Senators who have gone out of executive sessions before the microphone and repeated what has been said here?

Senator WILEY. I am not putting my finger on any Senators. If you want to know what is going on what have they got the television out there for and you are quoted every day as appearing before it.

Let's be frank. This is not the only committee where they spill the beans. But I am talking about the Central Intelligence Agency, gentlemen. I happen to know something about it, and I know what it means, and people over in the House know what it means, and I sincerely hope that you will not bring Dulles before you. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.

JURISDICTION OVER THE AIRSPACE AND THE HIGH SEAS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, in an attempt to clarify some of the confusion which exists in some of our minds I would like to ask some questions:

What is your present official interpretation of international law as regards the extension of national sovereignty skyward?

Secretary HERTER. I don't think we have any.

Senator MANSFIELD. We have no international law in that field as yet?

Secretary HERTER. That I know of. There is no definition as to what is considered the atmosphere above the air. There is no accepted interpretation or verbiage when they are talking about the atmosphere.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would you think it advisable to have an international conference or conferences to decide the question of sovereignty in the air over a country and also the possibility of regulating the seas in a more orderly fashion?

Secretary HERTER. Well, as you know, we have tried for over a year to get the United Nations to get the outer space committee organized and underway.

Senator MANSFIELD. At our suggestion?

Secretary HERTER. At our urging. We have been urging that this be done. We have been pressing it. We have not been able to make any headway because the Russians refused to go along. There have been further discussions of this proposal but we have been unable to agree on who should carry it out. I think we are making progress but it is still one of those things where there is a constant dispute as to what should be done.

Not only that but we had hoped to get it adjusted in time so that this year there could be a great international scientific congress be-

cause you're dealing with new matters that the scientists are expert in that the layman is not, and the Soviets were unable even to allow the calling of that congress.

Senator MANSFIELD. No. In other words, as yet there is no clarification of this particular matter.

Getting back to my statement concerning regulation of the seas, we, of course, operate under the doctrine of freedom of the seas. But what I have in mind is the fact that it is my understanding that the Soviet Union can launch missiles anywhere it wants to up within, say, three miles of our coastline if it is in our vicinity, and we have the same right under international law to fire missiles up to 3 miles, say of Vladivostok. Is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, and it depends again on what one takes as the territorial waters. Three miles have been the generally accepted territorial limit. The Soviet Government has claimed 12 miles and, as you know, the recent Geneva Conference failed in reaching agreement among the nations as to what should constitute the territorial water of different nations.

Some nations have gone much farther than that, particularly with regard to fishing rights.

Senator MANSFIELD. That's right, but what I have in mind is that times have changed considerably, even in our generation.

Mr. Chairman, may we have order in the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. It is difficult to have order.

Senator MANSFIELD. The fact is that we have these satellites going skyward hundreds of miles and we have these missiles going thousands of miles into the ocean. It was because of these new factors that I offered the suggestion that it might be well to have international conferences to take heed of changed conditions in this modern day.

We have also advocated, as you are aware, peaceful uses of outer space, and we have made no headway.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, the first question I wish to pursue leads to a question of Mr. Bohlen. Since others have asked him questions, I wonder if I might ask that he return.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 FLIGHTS

Mr. Secretary, Secretary Dillon testified this morning that he did not know of this particular flight, and to the best of my memory you said you were away at the time and did not know of this particular flight.

Secretary HERTER. I knew of the program. I made that clear in which the flight was included but not that particular flight.

Senator GORE. I was specifying this particular flight. Did I correctly understand both of you?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, Senator. I had heard about 6 weeks earlier that a series of flights would be undertaken and I had not heard anything since that time but it was not in my regular order of business.

Senator GORE. Would you repeat what you said? I did not understand it.

Mr. DILLON. I said I was informed about 6 weeks before the date of this flight, I say, that there was a program of particular flights of which this one could have been a part, and I did—

Senator GORE. It could have been but you did not know of this particular one.

Mr. DILLON. No; I did not know any more than that of this particular flight.

QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator GORE. The President, in his statement to the American people, the other night, said this:

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

Now, as I understand your reply to the chairman of the committee, you did not participate in the making of a decision to halt or not to halt this particular flight.

Secretary HERTER. I had approved of it.

Senator GORE. On this particular program.

Secretary HERTER. And approved of it as a part of the program. The question of the halting of it was not in issue at that time although I knew that the summit conference was coming.

Senator GORE. Well, my specific question is this: Did you participate in a conference or were you aware of a decision; did you make a decision? What is the full extent of your knowledge of a decision that the flight would not be discontinued?

Secretary HERTER. I know of no conference at which that matter was discussed.

Senator GORE. Then would it have properly been——

Secretary HERTER. The only matter that came before me was the approval of this program.

Senator GORE. How long ago did you approve the program?

Secretary HERTER. I can't tell you exactly, but it was some time prior to the time I went abroad.

Senator GORE. Is it a matter of weeks?

Secretary HERTER. A matter of weeks.

Senator GORE. Would such a decision have been properly within the province of the State Department?

Secretary HERTER. No. The State Department would not have a final decision in the matter. The State Department would have an advisory position in the matter, and the CIA did consult with us about it.

[Deleted.]

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

Senator GORE. I understood the purpose of this hearing was to develop the facts insofar as we were capable of doing so, and to the extent that security would permit, to make available the facts to the American people.

Do I correctly understand the purpose of the hearing?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee understands it as I understand it in spite of the opinion of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask, is it——

Senator WILEY. You might as well just now.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Is it confined to what our Government has done or are we concerned about what the Soviet has done?

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly am concerned about what the Soviet has done.

Senator LAUSCHIE. It hasn't been manifested here today.

(Procedural discussion.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.

Senator WILEY. May I just say one thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator yield to the Senator from Wisconsin?

Senator WILEY. I realize when I hit the ceiling before that I was probably not as coherent as I should be. I want to say to you with the conviction of a man who has lived long, that the business of a committee like ours is to develop facts for legislation, facts that are necessary to bring out curative legislation, or if you please, if you want to investigate an individual, that is another thing. We had the McCarthy hearings. We know what that did, but here is another angle.

It is not the business of this committee to expose to the people of this country a mechanism that is so important to preserve the life and integrity of this country, and I mean the CIA, I know what it means. I happen to know something about what it has done [deleted] and to me, at least, and as I say, as a young man of past 70 summers, please remember that when you go into this thing, as you are going into it, you are going to expose a mechanism that is as vital to the life of this country as anything you can think of.

It is that mechanism that made possible this series of three and a half years of exploratory missions over the Soviet Union [deleted].

If that is what you are going into, just count your words.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

Senator GORE. Dealing with the CIA is not a new experience for me. I happen to have handled in the House of Representatives the appropriation bill for the Atomic Energy Commission for 5 years before I was elected to the U.S. Senate.

I was party to the appropriation for the atomic energy program when the atomic bomb was being built in my State. No one ever heard those secrets from my lips. Every year for the past 14 I have listened to the testimony of the CIA from one to two or three or more times. I don't think that it is necessary that we violate the security of this country in order to hear Mr. Allen Dulles' testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Dulles said to this committee when he was asked if he would appear, that he would be very pleased to appear. He thought it would serve a useful purpose. He had no objection.

Senator GORE. I am aware that I am pursuing very important questions that reflect upon the effectiveness of our country and the prestige of our country. That is all the more reason why they should be pursued.

I thought this was the purpose of the hearing, to develop the facts, and insofar as they could be revealed to the public, to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is quite right.

QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator GORE. To return to the question, insofar as either of you know, or any official of the Department, no actual decision to proceed with the flight or not to proceed with the flight was made.

If such a decision was made, it was beyond your knowledge. Is that a correct statement?

Secretary HERTER. Yes; I think that I ought to say this. When the matter came before me, I had an opportunity of disapproving it and did not do so. Not it, but the program.

Senator GORE. But this particular flight did not come before you?

Secretary HERTER. It came as one of a group.

[Deleted.]

NOTICE TO SECRETARY HERTER OF PLANE'S MISFORTUNE

Senator GORE. When did you first learn of the plane's misfortune?

Secretary HERTER. I received word in Ankara, Turkey, that a plane was down. That is all.

Senator GORE. From whom did you receive it?

Secretary HERTER. It was handed to me from a slip of paper that Mr. Livingston Merchant had. He was sitting behind me at a NA'TO meeting and he handed me a slip of paper, "word has come that [deleted] a plane is missing."

I don't think he said in Russia. I didn't know which one of the flights it was.

Senator GORE. It is your presumption that this was a communication within the Department?

Secretary HERTER. Oh, yes. I assume it was either in the Department or from CIA sources with whom we are constantly in touch overseas.

Senator GORE. I believe my time is up. I will return to this.

[Deleted.]

PARIS PRESS BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR BOHLEN

The CHAIRMAN. You had one question of Mr. Bohlen. He was called back at your request.

Senator GORE. Yes. If I may digress a moment, I have been told several times, Mr. Bohlen, that in your press briefing at Paris, I believe on this 16th, you expressed the view that except for the U-2 plane, there would have been a summit conference.

Will you relate to us what you said at this briefing in this regard?

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall, Senator, honestly that I made that statement—

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall that I made that statement. The press briefing that I held on the 16th was an open press conference on the record, and I do not recall any statement of that kind because my view then as now is that the U-2 was one of the factors that may have led to the particular Soviet behavior at Paris.

I really do not recall any such statement of that kind. It's all on the record. This was an open press conference.

Senator GORE. You did not hold an off-the-record background briefing?

Mr. BOHLEN. I held a background later in which I outlined at that conference the three factors that I believed and still do entered into the formulation of the Soviet position.

Senator GORE. Was a transcript made of that background briefing?

Mr. BOHLEN. I would have to check on that, sir. I think there probably was.

Senator GORE. Would you supply it to the committee if there was?

Mr. BOHLEN. If there is one, I would have no views on it.

Secretary HERTER. I would have no objection.

(The transcript referred to was subsequently furnished for the confidential use of the committee.)

Mr. BOHLEN. If there is a transcript of it, but I recall the circumstances very well in this, in that three factors that I mentioned earlier, the Soviet pessimism as regards the outcome of the summit from their point of view; the possible opposition or questioning of its conduct and the U-2 matters were the three factors that appeared to me to have entered into Soviet decision to torpedo the conference.

I might add, Senator, for clarification on this, we have used the words "scuttle the conference" quite often.

There are various ways of scuttling a conference. You can scuttle a conference before it begins or you can sabotage it from within [deleted].

[Subsequently, Mr. Bohlen made available to the Committee the following statement of views he held in Paris at the time the Summit Conference came to an end:]

I would like to just briefly note—this is a personal opinion—that there were three elements in this situation:

One, I think, was the situation in Moscow, whereby there were some people who were a little bit concerned about the manner in which Khrushchev was conducting the foreign relations of the Soviet Union, for reasons already touched on.

The second was that I believe that he came to think—or the Soviet Government came to think—that the prospects for any agreement at the summit, on Berlin particularly, which is one that he had committed himself so deeply to, were very dim indeed. Before the plane incident, they were visibly preparing the usual tactic of placing the onus in advance upon the Western Powers for any expected failure. But had there been no plane incident, I believe the conference would have run its full course. There would have been discussions. There would have been the normal, if you want to call it that, the normal type conference with the Russians, of which we have had many in the last 15 years, but without results.

The plane incident, the whole development connecting with that, moved things into a totally new dimension. And I think that the evidence is conclusive, that he came here to Paris with the idea of either torpedoing the conference or conceivably—because you cannot read their full minds—the hope that somehow or other that the pressure from our Allies would force the United States to capitulate. I think he makes this very plain. And this is where he made his major miscalculation. Our Allies stood with us solidly—wonderfully well.

Of course, it is easier to say that now than it was before.

Mr. DRYDEN. I was told that these statements had been cleared by

Mr. DRYDEN. The CIA people with whom we were dealing, sir.

Senator GORE. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator from Ohio have any further questions?

DUTIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senator LAUSCHIE. Mr. Herter, I have in my hand the National Security Act of 1947, and I have read from page 5 that part of the material which deals with the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Are the duties enumerated in this section complete?

Secretary HERRER. Yes; I think those are enumerated in that section.

Senator LAUSCHIE. This section didn't place any directions on how intelligence is to be obtained.

Secretary HERRER. No.

[Deleted.]

PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR C-2 FLIGHT

Senator LAUSCHIE. Based upon the questions that have been asked here today, one set implied that the President should not have told the truth. The next set implied that one of the men lied. And the third set implied that there was an inability to coordinate the views.

Now, my question is—off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Take it off the record.

We will make a special dispensation, whatever the Senator wishes. Does he wish it on or off?

Senator LAUSCHIE. Let it be on. Has anyone given any thought about the peculiar position that the President of the United States is placed in in connection with the paradoxical situation that he is supposed to be a man of truth, and moral character, and yet requested to lie about these matters, if they are within his knowledge?

Secretary HERRER. I am not sure whether that is a rhetorical question or whether you are asking me that question.

Senator LAUSCHIE. Well, take it both ways. [Laughter.]

Senator GORE. Rhetorical or oratorical. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHIE. Well, let's assume that you were the President, Mr. Herter, and you were faced with the dilemma of telling a lie about what happened or telling the truth. In either event you are hooked. What course would you follow?

Secretary HERRER. I can answer that one so far as I myself am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. He followed both.

Senator LAUSCHIE. I don't know. I am beginning to wonder if what the Central Intelligence Agency is doing ought not to be a matter left with them and without the knowledge of the President.

I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I just want to make a comment. The Senator from Ohio has put his finger on the very point that perhaps I didn't make clear to him earlier in my inquiry. This is, in my opinion, a central important question about this whole matter, the wisdom of the policy of involving the President in this kind of business, that is, espionage, which traditionally involves lying and cheating and murdering and violating the sovereignty of countries with which a country is not at war and all of this. And what the Senator has said is—perhaps I didn't make it clear—is exactly the point that I was seeking to raise and to elucidate in the first line of questions that I asked. And I agree with him this presents a very difficult

dilemma, and the question is the wisdom of departing from the traditional historical practice of not involving the head of the state in any espionage responsibilities that he is above and apart from. We follow that in the Congress, as you have just stated. [Deleted.] We treat it differently, and I was suggesting and raising the question of whether it is wise to depart from the traditional practice that all important states throughout history, without exception in accordance with the Secretary's testimony, have followed. That is the very point. I don't think the Senator understood what my point was.

Senator LAUSCHE. I knew if I were President——

Senator WILEY. You would tell the truth.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would tell the truth.

Senator WILEY. So did he.

The CHAIRMAN. He did and this is the answer.

Senator LAUSCHE. And could you expect him to do anything else?

Senator WILEY. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the only way you could enable him to perform his duty to his country was not by having him know what was done and if he didn't know the question would be pursued why didn't he know.

Senator WILEY. He taught the world a lesson in 1960, new diplomacy, by telling the truth, and I think that it will echo down through the years.

Senator LAUSCHE. So I don't know which group to follow.

The CHAIRMAN. It is echoing down the years already. This is the principal echo that has arisen from this whole matter.

Senator LAUSCHE. The tragedy is that this is made the principal echo but all of the misdeeds of the Soviet are looked upon as inconsequential.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Senator is entirely incorrect in that statement. He draws conclusions that are not justified by the record or any statement that I have heard before the committee.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, I can——

Senator MANSFIELD. Can I ask a question?

[Deleted.]

USIA'S DIRECTOR'S RADIO PROGRAM APPEARANCE

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand Mr. Allen's statement on the television program was not approved by you or by the Acting Secretary?

Secretary HERTER. No. As I understand it, this was in answer to a question on a TV program.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes. I think we have the program here. But could somebody on the staff find it right away so that I could read it just as it is? (See p. 212, app. 1.)

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, while they are looking for it, is it or is it not the policy of the Department of State that its employees clear public statements with regard to delicate international relations before they make them?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the policy?

Secretary HERTER. It is. Any statement dealing with foreign affairs should be cleared with the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Then when they are made in this fashion without clearance, it is not in accord with your policy; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. Well, as I say, this had not been cleared with us.

The CHAIRMAN. He is an employee—

Secretary HERTER. I think it is very possible that a prepared statement had been cleared, but not an answer to a question. There is no way of clearing that, until one knows what question is asked.

The CHAIRMAN. What I asked this for is because later on it seems to me one of the important things that might come out of this committee hearing is a tightening of the policy which gives the Department of State and the Secretary of State a much closer control over public statements by other agencies. It strikes me that we would get in much less trouble if all these people would clear with you or with whoever is Secretary of State of the Department, we will say. Don't you think that would minimize the chances of inconsistent statements being made by members of the Government?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, that is so. But I think that anything that he may have said in a prepared statement on that TV program at that time had been cleared. Insofar as answers to questions are concerned, there is no way of clearing them without knowing the questions and in that way he was on his own.

The CHAIRMAN. It is his responsibility, then, when he goes beyond anything that had been cleared?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, on page 35 of the Background Documents on the summit conference, about 7 or 8 lines up from the bottom of the page, Mr. Allen, in response to a question from Miss Dodd, states the following:

There are a lot of different definitions of "spying" and I don't want to try to quibble, but I do think I ought to point this out and that more people ought to recall it: When he went down he told exactly what his mission was and exactly what he was expected to do, and he was under instruction to do that.

Now, the answer to the question, I just thought ought to be in the record, because there was some confusion about this statement in view of information which had been given to a group previously in the Capitol. Again, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am through with my questions of Mr. Herter, but I want to express my thanks to Secretary Herter, to Secretary Dillon and to Ambassador Bohlen for their candor and frankness today and to assure them that I, for one, appreciate what they had to say, and I think they have made a real contribution to clearing up a confused situation which confronted the committee as a whole.

Secretary HERTER. We are very grateful for that, Senator.

Senator WILBY. Of course, on this side of the aisle, I have praised your statement in the beginning and I will praise your conduct in the conclusion. You all did very well.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. I do not wish to unduly tire the Secretary, but I am perfectly willing to come back after dinner or to come back tomorrow. I do have many more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is my understanding the Secretary—he looks very well to me—would prefer to go on tonight. He does not wish to run over to next week.

Secretary HERTER. I prefer to go on, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. I don't think it will take very long tonight.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION TO DISCONTINUE FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator may proceed.

Senator GORE. Fine.

I wish to resume my inquiry with respect to this particular flight. I am perturbed that you say it would not be within the province of the Department of State to make the decision to discontinue these flights; that this would be a decision for Mr. Dulles to make.

Secretary HERRER. No, I never said that at all.

Senator GORE. I beg your pardon?

Secretary HERRER. I never said that at all. I said he was the operational man who had to plan things, and then submit them for approval.

Senator GORE. Well, what would be the proper agency to consider whether these flights should or should not be discontinued?

Secretary HERRER. If the question of discontinuance had come up, if that was a decision to be made, we would have been asked advice on it. We were not asked for advice on it. We gave approval to carry on with the routine planning that had been done from the point of view of flight.

Senator GORE. Some weeks prior?

Secretary HERRER. Yes, and had given that approval.

Senator GORE. Did that approval—

Secretary HERRER. That approval, as I say, is advice.

Senator GORE. Was advice?

Secretary HERRER. Is advice. The President himself took the responsibility for any final decision.

Senator GORE. Did your approval involve continuation of the flight through and during the period of the summit conference?

Secretary HERRER. Not specifically as such. The approval constituted going ahead when conditions were appropriate for carrying them out.

Senator GORE. Did you give no consideration to discontinuance at a time prior to the summit meeting or during the summit conference?

Secretary HERRER. Senator, I answered that question before when I said that there is no good time for a failure, that if the summit conference had debarred carrying out these flights the President's visit to Russia may have been the next thing that might have debarred them.

It may have been debarred when Khrushchev was at Camp David; it may have been debarred when Mr. Khrushchev was visiting in France.

There may have been any number of diplomatic reasons why they shouldn't be conducted at a given period of time.

In my opinion, the value of the information and the necessity of carrying out these flights under given conditions warranted their going ahead.

Senator GORE. I am trying to be specific in my questions, and I am trying to elicit from you whether at the time you gave your approval for the general program some weeks prior to this particular flight, you gave specific consideration to the question of continuance or discontinuance during or near the time of the summit conference.

Secretary HERRER. Certainly. The summit conference was very much on my mind as it was on everybody's mind, at that time.

Senator GORE. And you gave your approval then?

Secretary HERRER. I did.

Senator GORE. To their continuation throughout the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. That was never specified as such.

Senator GORE. In other words, you are saying, then, that there was no decision to discontinue?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator GORE. Then if any decision to discontinue or if any decision was made not to continue, to use the words, you are not aware of it?

Secretary HERTER. No. The only decision that I know of at any stage of the game was to go ahead.

[Deleted.]

COMPARISON OF STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator GORE. Another statement which the President made, I would like to read:

Of course we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace, there could be no higher obligation than to pursue it.

Now, on page 4 of your statement here today, I would like to read. This is on page 4, beginning "Summit prospects dimmed."

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the second, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs on page 4 be reprinted at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The paragraphs referred to follow:)

In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente." There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-United States cultural agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the Antarctic treaty.

But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.

Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation on his speeches available to the committee.

Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight—notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.

Senator GORE. You will see from this statement, Mr. Secretary, that you contradict the President's statement, do you not?

The President says:

We had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about.

From what I have just read, you list one, two, three, four occasions where the Soviet policy had, in fact, changed.

Do you wish to comment?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I would be very glad to comment.

I don't think that there is any essential disagreement in the two points of view.

I am talking primarily in my statement in regard to Berlin and Germany.

The President was talking about a series of things in which he spoke of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control, and then he added Germany and Berlin.

As I testified earlier in the day, I think we all had hopes that there might be a possibility of making some progress, even though not in the German-Berlin situation, but in the disarmament field, and as a corollary possibly in the nuclear testing field where it was not a summit problem, but it would have been a three-power problem that could have been discussed in Paris.

For instance, so long as there was any hope of making any progress, the President was willing to go.

Senator GORE. I didn't question the President being willing to go so long as there was any hope of progress.

What I was asking you to comment on was what appears to me to be a contrast between the President's statement that there is no indication that basic Soviet policies had turned about, and where you give almost a full page indicating that they had turned about. But you have finished your comment on that.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, there was some talk here about basic policy and tactics in connection with the summit. I don't think the President felt events such as I cited necessarily mean that Soviet basic policy had changed.

I think as he said after Camp David, he hoped that there was a mutuality of interest, particularly in the disarmament field, which would allow the great powers getting together in order to make progress in disarmament.

That had always been the area in which he hoped, because of the mutuality of interest, that we might make progress.

I don't think that there is anything fundamentally opposed in these two statements.

EXTENT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S POWER

Senator GORE. Now, I want to ask a few questions which relate to the first of the three questions on which I wish to examine your opinion; that is, whether the diplomatic failure in Paris represented a failure in policy.

You recall that I submitted certain questions to you here on March 22. At that time I asked you:

Do you think it would have been more prudent to have had an understanding

about the subjects to be considered at a summit conference before agreeing to have one, or do you think this is the proper way to keep the store?

Secretary HERTER. It is a gamble. I don't know.

Senator GORE. You are gambling with high stakes, and it seems to me in a reckless manner. I am disturbed to have the Secretary of State make the statements that you have made today about the summit conference; that there is no plan, no purpose, no understanding as to what will be discussed and what we hope to attain there.

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Senator, I view this as essentially a matter of exploration. We have the situation where an individual, Mr. Khrushchev, is the man who makes the decisions so far as we know, for the Russians.

Later on, I asked you:

Is there any reason why the Russian dictator could not delegate the same power to his Foreign Minister as President Eisenhower should or does delegate to you?

Senator HERTER. None.

Senator GORE. Then isn't that a fallacious argument?

Secretary HERTER. Not necessarily, because you are dealing with an individual personality who many believe wants to be the negotiator.

Now, I read those things because one of the principal, if not the principal, justifications for going to the summit and for the exchange of visits was that Mr. Khrushchev and he alone spoke for the Russian people, but today you tell us on page 7:

I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow. Any substantive changes in those positions apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could be undertaken.

And then on page 8, you say:

This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Moscow.

Secretary HERTER. There appears to be an inconsistency in those two statements.

When I was testifying here before, the visits of Mr. Khrushchev in which sometimes he had an important person with him and sometimes he did not—

Senator GORE. In which what, sir?

Secretary HERTER. Sometimes in which he had an important person with him and sometimes he did not, indicated that his situation at home was such that he had a great deal more leeway than had previously been the case.

When he went to Paris, and I think this has been brought out, he had with him Gromyko and Malinovsky, General Malinovsky, Marshal Malinovsky, who never left him for one moment at any time. This was a departure from previous occasions. This is why we said they had gone back to their standard policy of taking directions from home.

Prior to that time I had believed he had greater leeway than was clearly indicated here in Paris.

Senator GORE. So the assumption proved to be erroneous.

Secretary HERTER. It is.

USUAL DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURES VERSUS SUMMIT CONFERENCES

Senator GORE. I believe you testified before the House, according to press reports yesterday, that summitry as a diplomatic method had had some hard knocks.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I did.

In answer to a question from Senator Humphrey, I repeated the same thing today.

Senator GORE. And in recommending, which I certainly endorse, continuing businesslike negotiation with the Soviets, you have in mind the more usual processes and procedures of diplomacy.

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator GORE. Negotiations.

Secretary HERTER. The one thing that I did point out, however, is that with regard to the Berlin situation, Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union have responsibility. This is the carryover from the war.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Secretary HERTER. And that there, there must be agreement. This is a thing we have been fighting all the time, that unilateral action by the Russians cannot take away those rights and obligations which they as well as ourselves had acquired as a result of the war.

That it must be done by the consent of the four.

So that whether or not in the future the discussions to reach agreement among the four should take place through diplomatic channels, through ambassadorial level, through foreign minister or not, I would not say which would be the level, but I think that it is much better to see if we cannot, as we did in the foreign ministers' conference, and failed, try to reach a large measure of agreement prior to the meeting of a summit conference so that there might be one or two small unresolved issues that could be resolved there rather than trying to negotiate when you know that you are very far apart at a summit conference.

Senator GORE. Well, I hope that you will persist, and that the President will persist in the businesslike undertakings. I will not ask you to say that summitry apart from diplomacy failed. I am content with your statement in that regard. I am sorry that I think it did fail.

Secretary HERTER. I would differ with you, sir, on the question of personal diplomacy as against summitry. I think that visits are, on the whole, useful things.

I wouldn't say that that was something that should be discarded completely. I think it is particularly true that visits of ministers of foreign affairs, and visits of heads of state from time to time can accomplish a great deal of good. But I believe very strongly that insofar as heads of state are concerned that is not the place to begin negotiations. It is the place perhaps where there should be the culmination of negotiations.

Senator GORE. I will agree with you in that statement. The exchange of visits offers opportunities. But the formalization of a head of state conference, where severe international tensions are involved, without precise planning, without assurance that at least limited

agreements can be reached, is, in my view, a dangerous process, and a policy upon which we should never have embarked.

Of course, it is easier to say that now than it was before.

Hindsight, of course, we learned a long time ago, is better than foresight.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield for a moment? I have one or two questions and then he may come back to it.

Senator GORE. Good.

AUTHORIZATION FOR U-2 FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. These I think have been covered but for clarification, I might ask them again. Was there ever a time when the President authorized each flight in this program; that's never been the practice.

Secretary HERTER. It has never come up to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. Not of the National Security Council.

Secretary HERTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It has always been under a blanket authority understood?

Secretary HERTER. That is my impression.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this blanket authorization under review, either constant or periodic review?

Secretary HERTER. In my experience the CIA has planned a number of alternate flights at a time. [Deleted.]

BACKGROUND OF NASA STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. When the Department brought Mr. Bohlen back from Manila, and he was well-known as an expert on Soviet behavior, and this was, I thought, in anticipation of these summit meetings which had been discussed a long time, did he or any other of our Russian experts advise you or the President to wait and see what Mr. Khrushchev knew about the U-2 flight before making the NASA statement?

Mr. DILLON. The people in the Department who were familiar with Soviet policy took part in discussions with the CIA which led to the coordination and the agreement on the guidelines which were given to NASA, and those included the people who were familiar with all aspects of our policy.

However, as we said before, we did not know that there was going to be a full statement by NASA.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bohlen was not consulted about the NASA statement.

Mr. DILLON. Nobody in the State Department was consulted about the statement as a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody.

What puzzles me about this is why was there such compulsion, if there was, to make such an immediate reaction? I have wondered why there was any necessity for immediately reacting to the first Khrushchev statement.

It would seem to me much more normal to wait a while and see what developed.

Was there anything that was compelling you to answer almost immediately?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, I would say so. It was such an unusual and remarkable statement when Mr. Khrushchev said that American plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union, that we were not in the position to not make any comment whatsoever.

As a result we had to make some comment, and we made the very bland statement which was put out on the 5th.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean that. You misunderstood me. I accept the necessity for the cover story, the statement.

Mr. DILLON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the second one that went into such detail. It would seem to me that it would be commonsense not to follow up too quickly in the matter of timing. What was the reason for that?

Mr. DILLON. The State Department's second statement was innocuous too. It didn't go into any detail, any more detail than the original cover story did. There was great—if any detail, that was the statement that was put out by NASA.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that the NASA statement itself is what put you in a position of having to make a further statement?

Is that true?

Mr. DILLON. The further statement, I think, was the next statement in this series, was the one that was put out on Saturday which was made only at the time when we knew that the Soviets probably had the pilot, which was new information, and then the Soviets had already said they had him, and had said where he was shot down, and the probability was that they had certain parts of the airplane because the picture which they had first put out turned out to be a fraudulent picture.

BACKGROUND OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S STATEMENT OF MAY 7

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps I don't understand the timing of it.

It seems to me, if I do understand it, that you could have stood upon the cover story for some time before the necessity of any further statement, awaiting developments.

Mr. DILLON. You mean, your question is why we made the statement on Saturday, May 7, which was the first time we departed from the cover story.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Secretary HERTER. That, as I think I have testified before, was a decision that was made in the light of the very full revelation of Mr. Khrushchev in giving out, both as to the pilot's testimony, and as to the parts and equipment that had been recovered. That was when we had to make the decision were we going to keep on lying about this or were we going to tell the truth?

The CHAIRMAN. Why there wasn't a third alternative is what I am trying to get at?

Why didn't you just be quiet and say nothing? You don't have just the alternatives of either continuing to lie or to tell the truth?

You could have said nothing. I was just curious. Was it ever considered that you didn't have to react?

Secretary HERTER. A good many statements were already being made in Congress, a good many statements were already being made or required of us almost.

The press was hounding everybody, "What do you say now after what Mr. Khrushchev had said," it was a very difficult time in our society, our form of society to have said nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that was the statement in which you said "it has been established that insofar as the authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights." Is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was not a truthful statement at that point, was it?

Secretary HERTER. No, this was still partly cover.

The CHAIRMAN. Still partly cover?

Secretary HERTER. Still partly cover. It was not until Monday, after the briefing had taken place before the congressional leadership here on the hill that the full statement was made.

The CHAIRMAN. It was after that statement that the full statement was made?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

BACKGROUND OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT OF MAY 9

The CHAIRMAN. That full statement, if I understood it—I think you have testified—was only after complete and thorough consultation with everyone concerned, and had the unanimous support of State and the President; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. It is, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore, go ahead.

Senator GORE. Well, when you made the final statement that the President did approve, he was responsible—I am not undertaking to quote you exactly—you also made it plain that he did not approve specific flights?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

[Deleted.]

BLOW TO UNITED STATES' MORAL POSITION

Senator GORE. I will wait until Mr. Dulles' testimony.

Now, I wish to make my own feelings explicit. I have not intended to suggest, nor do I believe the chairman or anyone else has intended to suggest, that the President or any other official of the U.S. Government tells a falsehood. I don't know of any requirement in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence or any other jurisprudence stemming from Roman law that a citizen is required to incriminate himself. I know of no requirement that a nation is required to incriminate or denigrate or defame itself. I do not claim any sense of morals or sensitivity to moral standards greater than the average American, but I want the record to show that I was humiliated with official falsification, and I think millions of Americans were humiliated. I can agree with you that our alliance stood firm. I am happy that it did, but I think we would be deluding ourselves if we did not realize that this unfortunate incident has dealt a severe blow to the moral position of the United States. I think we should begin to mend it. The way to mend it is to ferret out our errors and our mistakes, correct them, and thereby demonstrate to the world our will and our capacity to survive this kind of blow—and I hope be stronger thereafter.

WAS PRESUMMIT MEETING SUGGESTED?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there was one point that I overlooked. I had heard that Chairman Khrushchev had directly or indirectly made some inquiry about the possibility of meeting Mr. Eisenhower before the summit meeting. Do you know whether or not that is so?

Secretary HERTER. No. I know of no such effort.

The CHAIRMAN. No effort?

Secretary HERTER. Actually, Mr. Khrushchev, when he came to Paris, or just before he came to Paris, sent a note to the British and to the French, I think, largely on a procedural matter; no such note to us. When the President arrived in Paris, there was just as much opportunity for Mr. Khrushchev to seek a meeting with him as with the others; and no such effort was made from any Russian source.

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS OF THE SOVIET UNION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, have you drawn any inferences from this whole event relative to the military preparedness of the Soviet Union?

Secretary HERTER. Of course, my judgment would not be as good as that of experts. And here, again, I wouldn't want to give my judgment as a considered judgment from the point of view of the record. There is no question but what the Russians are very active in certain directions, and that the intelligence that has been gained with regard to that activity has been of very great value to us. And I think that is as far as I should go.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator WILEY. Is the cold war still on or is it over?

Secretary HERTER. It remains to be seen.

Senator WILEY. Then, we had better give primary attention to the main issue, instead of quarreling about who is who and what is what in relation to handling situations. It was your judgment; it isn't my judgment. It isn't the business of every little one in the Senate to tell you what you should do. It is your business, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield, do you have any questions?

Senator MANSFIELD. No.

Senator GORE. Off the record, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

[Deleted.]

LESSON OF THE U-2 INCIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, one last thing. Do you think we have learned—not just we, but all of us, including you and the administration—anything from the U-2 incident?

Secretary HERTER. Not to have accidents.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all we have learned?

Senator GORE. Not what?

Mr. MACOMBER. Not to have accidents.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that is the only lesson we can draw from these events?

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, I think that anyone would be foolish to say that with hindsight one couldn't have done better than

when one is faced with certain events at a given time. I think obviously we should be giving serious consideration to the very best method of the handling of anything of this kind that might happen in the future; and I think from that point of view, as the President said, we welcome this inquiry. We welcome a full disclosure as far as we could from the point of view of responsibilities and coordination. I thank you for your patience here today.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you for your patience and your frankness and candor. I think you and your associates—Secretary Dillon and Mr. Bohlen—have been most cooperative in this whole hearing. I like to think that out of this one—as you know, rather pet project of mine—is that the State Department itself be given greater prestige and authority in controlling and coordinating all matters relating to our foreign relations—as I have tried in the case, for example, with the recent instance of control of the black market in Turkey. I think your Department, the Department of State, ought to have more authority than we have in the past accorded it. I am sure that some of our troubles do not relate to any fault on your part, but to the sort of institutional practices that have grown up—and people assuming authority to make statements without consulting you and the Department. I feel at this stage of the proceedings that this may be one of the good things that will come out of these hearings: that the prestige and authority of the State Department will be enhanced.

Secretary HERTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator GORE. Could I join you in commending the Secretary and his assistants for their candor and their patience and their diligence here today.

Secretary HERTER. Thank you.

Senator WILEY. May I also join you the third time by saying, in my humble opinion the evidence and the statement you made and the statement that Dillon made and the President's speech show conclusively that the breakup of the summit conference was due to Khrushchev and no other cause.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The committee is adjourned until next Tuesday.

(Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 31, 1960.)

[As noted in the foreword, Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, appeared before the committee on Tuesday, May 31, at 10 a.m., and testified in executive session. For security reasons, his testimony was not released to the public. The committee recessed on May 31 at 5:10 p.m., to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 1, 1960.]

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Capehart.

Also present: Hon. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency; and Capt. L. P. Gray III, USN, Military Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Our witness this morning is Dr. Hugh Dryden, the Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

I remind members of our committee that today our transcript will be censored and released to the press. Tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. we will meet again in this room in executive session with Secretary Gates.

Dr. Dryden, do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. I have no prepared statement but if the committee will, I would like to proceed for 10 minutes or so to give you the background of NASA's research with the U-2 aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. HUGH L. DRYDEN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA); ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES P. GLEASON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, NASA

STUDY OF AIR TURBULENCE BY U-2'S

Mr. DRYDEN. There is an extensive program on air turbulence which was begun by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). It is a part of—as far as NASA is concerned, it is a part of the aeronautical activities transferred to NASA in accordance with the National Aeronautics and Space Act.

In this program, which began in 1956, there have been 200 weather flights of U-2 aircraft with NASA and air weather service instrumentation covering flights extended over about 264,000 miles. Ninety percent of this flight time was above an altitude of 40,000 feet, and 40 percent of it, or about 100,000 miles, was above 50,000 feet; and these

flights have been conducted in the Western United States, Western Europe, Turkey, and Japan.

I may recall to your minds that the function of NACA was that of an aeronautical research agency to support the Government's program in the development of civil aircraft and military aircraft.

RESEARCH INFORMATION PRODUCED

We produced only research information used in the design of airplanes.

One important part of this research information which certainly is brought to your mind by some of the recent accidents to aircraft is that of loads on the aircraft due to atmospheric disturbances or gusts. There are two types of problems: one illustrated by the experience of the airplane which recently got caught in thunderstorm activity is that of the maximum load which the airplane may reach which may tear the wings from the body.

The other and more insidious type of loading is the repeated load due to gustiness or rough air that many of you have often encountered in flying. These repeated loads produce a type of brittle failure which we call fatigue failure. This has, as you may recall, been encountered in one or two types of airplanes and remedied at considerable cost.

Now, it has been the function of NACA to carry on a program to furnish the designer information on the magnitude of atmospheric gusts encountered by airplanes, the frequency of occurrence of loads of different magnitudes. We have been engaged in the general type of activity since 1933 and have data on all of the civil transports from that date.

ARRANGEMENTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON AIR TURBULENCE

That, of course, gives you a record of experience with the performance capabilities of present airplanes, but it was our responsibility to try to get this information for airplanes yet to be built. This meant that in practice we were always seeking the highest and fastest airplanes to get information of this kind from, so as to be in advance of the development of the commercial aircraft.

To do this we made arrangements to get information from military airplanes.

For example, at the close of World War II we installed our instruments in the B-36 airplane used then by SAC; and during their training operations these instruments continued to record gusts and the data were sent to us for analysis.

Now the pattern of operation with the commercial airlines and with the military has been the same throughout. We meet with the owners and operators of the airplanes—whether an airline or the military service—come to an agreement with them that our instruments can be installed on their airplanes.

In the early stages we send our instrument technicians to visit and supervise the installation of the instruments. We train employees of the airlines or the GI's in military—

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Dryden, does any of this have any relevance to the inquiry which this committee is concerned with?

Mr. DRYDEN. It does. We will come to this immediately. We train our technicians to change the film and send the information to NASA for analysis. We have no detailed knowledge of the flight plans until after the fact; and as a matter of record, we obtain information needed to analyze the data. Observations extend throughout the world. At the present time we have instruments on Pan American and TWA jets which, of course, go around the world. We have cooperated with foreign governments and airlines by lending instrumentation.

U-2 OPERATION

Now the U-2 operation is in the same general pattern of operation. This project was organized in 1956 when [deleted] the capabilities of this new airplane were brought to our attention. It was able to fly at altitudes very considerably higher than any existing airplane.

The program has been carried on entirely openly. There have been three reports issued, unclassified; there have been press releases on these operations from time to time.

The program was unclassified except that the data which revealed the airplane could go higher than 55,000 feet were classified. They will now be declassified since the potentialities of the airplane have become known.

[Deleted.]

NEED FOR DATA AT HIGHER ALTITUDES

I must take you back to the atmosphere at the time. These were the days when the airlines had had DC-6's and DC-7's, and Constellations. At that time we knew the 707, the DC-8, and the Electra were under design. We were told that the first of these airplanes would be developed early in 1959. All of our previous data with airplanes had been at altitudes generally not too much above 20,000 feet where these airplanes operated. The new airplanes would operate at 35,000 to 40,000 feet, and the military services were interested in supersonic airplanes which traveled at much higher altitudes, so that there was at this time a great pressure on us to find methods of obtaining data, and the presence of the capabilities of the U-2 airplane seemed to us to give the answer. Some of our advisory committees at the time were bringing to our attention the great need for this information. I will simply read one extract, if I can find it quickly for you, and this committee called our attention to the fact that we did not have suitable airplanes available.

There are three basic regions within which data are available. below 25,000 feet, up to 30,000 feet with military vehicles, up to 55,000 where meager data are available from balloons and rockets and inference from meteor trails. Existing research vehicles are reaching to higher altitudes—

and so on.

It is recommended that emphasis be placed on obtaining quantitative information on air turbulence at the highest altitudes reasonably obtainable with existing research vehicles.

[Deleted.]

Now this program was carried on from 1956 through the present time. NASA was established in October, October 1, 1958, and this was one of the programs carried over into NASA.

I might recall to you that NACA was not extensively involved in aeronautical activities, that NASA, at present, is engaged in international space activities. So far we have not had any adverse reactions on the part of people with whom we are cooperating abroad in space programs.

I think this gives the general background and I would be glad to respond to questions or to continue with the NASA chronology of the week of May 1, as you desire, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we ought to proceed with questions. [Deleted.]

LINE OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM NASA TO THE PRESIDENT

Do you report directly to the President? What is your relationship to the rest of the Government?

Mr. DRYDEN. At that time the NACA was managed by a committee of 17 persons appointed by the President who did report directly to him.

I was the chief executive officer reporting to the committee at the time this project was started.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1956?

Mr. DRYDEN. 1956.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time the agency was known as the NACA?

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. When did it change its name to NASA?

Mr. DRYDEN. On October 1, 1958, it not only changed its name but was collected with other parts of the Government into a completely new agency, the NASA.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it report to the President?

Mr. DRYDEN. It reports directly to the President, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a committee of 17 you say?

Mr. DRYDEN. There is not a committee in NASA. There is an Administrator and Deputy Administrator appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anyone on the staff of the White House who is given the duty of receiving your reports?

Mr. DRYDEN. Doctor Glennan reports and talks very frequently with the President himself. He does keep the Science Adviser fully informed of our activities in space.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the Science Adviser?

Mr. DRYDEN. Dr. Kistiakowsky.

The CHAIRMAN. So if anyone has the direct responsibility within the White House, the office of the Presidency, it is Dr.—

Mr. DRYDEN. Kistiakowsky. He is the President's adviser on science and technology. He has no line responsibility. He is an adviser to the President.

REPORT OF U-2'S LOSS

The CHAIRMAN. The first that you knew of this was the loss of the U-2 plane on May 1?

Mr. DRYDEN. May 1 it was reported to the Administrator and myself that a U-2 had been lost, without further detail.

[Deleted.]

ANTICIPATION OF INQUIRIES ABOUT LOSS

The CHAIRMAN. Did CIA consult with you as to the precise language of the release of May 5?

Mr. DRYDEN. What was—

The CHAIRMAN. Who drew up that language?

Mr. DRYDEN. It was discussed in consultation. The questions the press asked were: who is the pilot, where was the airplane going, what information do you have about it?

So that between CIA and ourselves, a list of these questions which we had received was recorded, and the general nature of the answers to these questions decided upon. Now, let me tell you about the so-called release of the statement. On the morning of Thursday, May 5, was Khrushchev's announcement that the plane was shot down. Somewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock, I believe, the President directed an inquiry and public report on the missing plane, and as reported in the Herald Tribune—I do not have any other stenographic record—in quotes, it says:

At the White House, Mr. Hagerty announced at the direction of the President a complete inquiry is being made. The results of these inquiries, the facts as developed will be made public by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of State.

BACKGROUND OF THE MAY 5 NASA RELEASE

The reporters who had listened to Mr. Hagerty, many of them, came immediately to our public information office to obtain further information. We ourselves thought it was better to take the agreed-upon answers to the questions, to write them into a statement, and give it to them all at once, rather than engage in a general free-for-all on this subject. I would like to emphasize that the text of that statement as issued was not cleared with CIA or anyone else, although the information in it, the answers to the questions that are contained within it, were cleared with CIA, and I am told by them with State.

The CHAIRMAN. You discussed all of the substantive facts and statements in that with representatives of the CIA?

Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct. It was not intended to give out a statement. We were confronted with a large group of reporters who wanted the facts. We could either engage in a general free-for-all discussion—we thought it preferable to take these facts, put them in a piece of paper and give it to all of them at once.

CLEARANCE OF MAY 5 STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. After consulting with CIA, you prepared this statement, and they knew what the statement was?

Mr. DRYDEN. I tried to say before that the statement itself or the facts that were collected in a statement was not cleared with anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. With anyone?

Mr. DRYDEN. With anyone but ourselves. The substance of it had been cleared. The fact that it was written down in a statement on a piece of paper was not cleared with anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you issued this to the press, did you have anyone from the Department of State look at it and approve it?

Mr. DRYDEN. We had no contact with the Department of State. Our direct contacts were solely with the CIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Has no one ever advised you that the Department of State should be consulted when statements affecting our foreign policy are made?

Mr. DRYDEN. I was told that these statements had been cleared by CIA with State. I did not independently check that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Who told you that?

Mr. DRYDEN. The CIA people with whom we were dealing, sir.

REASON FOR MENTIONING OTHER U-2 BASES IN MAY 5 RELEASE

The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason for saying in your statement that these planes were being used in Japan and Turkey and California. Why were you so specific about Japan and California?

Mr. DRYDEN. We were asked by the press, "How many U-2 planes does NASA have in its weather program? Where are they operating?" Now, much of this had been published in these documents to which I referred which had been publicly released. To take a specific one, one released just a few months ago in June 1959, this has been released generally, you will find in this that these operations—

The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish you to read that memorandum. I only want to know your thinking. You issued this without checking it with the State Department. Why did you state that they were operating out of Turkey?

Mr. DRYDEN. This published report—

The CHAIRMAN. You had already published it?

Mr. DRYDEN (continuing). Had said, "These flights were made from bases at Watertown Strip, Nevada."

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but those were weather flights.

[Deleted.]

Mr. DRYDEN. We had mentioned Adana, Turkey, and Atsugi, Japan, in this free and open publication.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield?

GROUNDING OF U-2'S

Senator MANSFIELD. Dr. Dryden, have all our U-2's been recalled since the President's order of Thursday, a week ago, that there would be no further overflights of the Soviet Union?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge, sir. I believe at the present time the airplanes are grounded. But I think this is a question again that the operating people will have to answer.

INCIDENT IN JAPAN

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you recall the incident which occurred in Japan some months ago when a U-2, I assume, landed at Atsugi and GI's landed from a helicopter and ordered the Japanese civilians in the area to leave?

Mr. DRYDEN. I remember the newspaper accounts of it. I have no personal knowledge of the incident.

[Deleted.]

We made arrangements to put instruments in U-2 airplanes. There comes back to us flight plans of weather flights, and our instrumentation and the data from those instruments, and I do not have in advance knowledge even of the weather flight operations—

Senator MANSFIELD. I am referring to a story which appeared in Time magazine 2 or 3 weeks ago. I was seeking collaboration of that story. But you have no personal knowledge whether it was true or false?

Mr. DRYDEN. I have no personal knowledge of it, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Your responsibility in these U-2 flights is primarily observation and calculation concerning weather conditions?

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct, and in those flights made with U-2's with our instruments, for our purposes.

CHAIN OF COMMAND TO THE WHITE HOUSE

Senator MANSFIELD. What is Dr. Glennan's position? You are the Administrator of NASA.

Mr. DRYDEN. I am the Deputy Administrator. I appear because I was here in 1956 through this program, from the beginning.

Senator MANSFIELD. Dr. Glennan is the Administrator?

Mr. DRYDEN. He is the Administrator.

Senator MANSFIELD. And Dr. Glennan supposedly reports directly to the President?

Mr. DRYDEN. To the President, yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Does he or does he not report directly to Dr. Kistiakowsky?

Mr. DRYDEN. The President on the average sees him two or three times a month.

Senator MANSFIELD. Where does Dr. Kistiakowsky—

Mr. DRYDEN. He is a member of the White House staff.

Senator MANSFIELD. I know that he is the President's scientific adviser.

Mr. DRYDEN. He is not in the line of command.

Senator MANSFIELD. The chain of command is directly from Dr. Glennan to the President?

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

DATE OF COVER STORY

Senator WILEY. What was the date of that cover statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. The Turkish story was put out by the local commander in Istanbul on Tuesday, May 3. The statement which we issued recording the agreed-upon answers to questions was on Thursday, May 5. If I might just continue this, on Friday, May 6, a NASA U-2 airplane was flown at Edwards Air Force Base, exhibited to the press, they saw the instruments that were used. They took movies of the airplane. On Saturday, May 7, Mr. Khrushchev reported that he had the pilot. At 6 p.m. State issued a statement admitting the reconnaissance flight.

At 6:30 NASA directed all further inquiries to the State Department.

Senator WILEY. Let's get back to my question. What was the date of the cover statement that the chairman has been talking about?

Mr. DRYDEN. The 5th, as I understand it, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. NASA is primarily engaged in seeking weather information.

Mr. DRYDEN. We have no intelligence activities either in the development of devices, methods, instruments or operations.

CLEARANCE OF MAY 5 STATEMENT

Senator WILEY. My understanding is that this cover statement was the result of previous interrogation by the press.

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. When you issued it, you did not consult with Central Intelligence?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not on the statement itself but all of the questions had been taken up with them. We had no source of information. We asked how shall we reply to the name of the pilot, to the flight plan of the airplane, and the answers as given us are incorporated in the statement, although the exact text was not read back to CIA.

PUBLIC RELEASES ON U-2 WEATHER FLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. You referred to some publicity that was issued, I think you said, in 1959.

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, the first press release on our U-2 project was released on May 7, 1956.

Senator WILEY. You held up a blue docket referring to 1959.

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, this is some of the results.

Senator WILEY. Has that been made public?

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Senator WILEY. On what pages is the part you referred to, because I want it in the record. I want to try to get this story simple and clear.

Mr. DRYDEN. On page 3 of this NASA memorandum which carries a number, 4-17-59L, the flights were made from bases at Watertown Trip, Nev., Lakenheath, England, Wiesbaden, Germany, Adana, Turkey and at Atsugi, Japan. Two additional flights were made from a base in Alaska and these data have been combined with those from Japan in the statistical treatment.

Senator WILEY. Yes. You agree that that has been public information now for some time?

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Senator WILEY. Since 1959?

Mr. DRYDEN. And even earlier, I think in 1957-57, one of them deals with the western part of the United States only, and I believe that 1959 is the one which gives the list, yes, sir.

June of 1959.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

[Deleted.]

REASON FOR NASA STATEMENT

Senator GORE. In response to a question by me, Secretary Dillon testified as follows:

No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this news, as I said earlier this morning, at this National Security Council meeting or right after it that was held outside of Washington, that the State Department would handle the publicity on this, and that we would make any statement that would be made, and it was known at that time that we would make a statement.

That leads me to wonder why NASA was making a statement at all.

Mr. DRYDEN. This information, this decision of which you speak was not transmitted to us. I would like to remind you that this is all within a few hours. The information we had was a statement made at the White House which I read to you that the reporters were referred to NASA and the State Department for the facts and this was the extent of my knowledge when the statement was issued.

NASA UNAWARE OF DECISION TO LET STATE DEPARTMENT
HANDLE PUBLICITY

Senator GORE. Then you did not know that a high level decision had been made that the State Department would make whatever statement was made with respect to this.

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct. Within the 3 hours or so of this interval, this was not passed to us, and I would again say that so far as we were concerned the cover story was in effect as the result of the collaboration with CIA for the period from May 1 to May 7, and we did nothing, we said nothing contrary to the agreed on facts relating to the cover story.

Senator GORE. When did you first learn of this high level decision that the State Department would make whatever statement was made and would handle the publicity on this matter?

Mr. DRYDEN. I think that after the statement was issued, there were some calls as to—I do not know how to place the time. The only thing I have been able to find in our records is an instruction to our people as of Saturday to refer all inquiries to the State Department. I believe that before that time, there had been some discussions of why the statement had been issued by us, and I have explained the reasons for that.

Senator GORE. I will get to that in a moment. When did you first know that the decision had been made, to which Mr. Dillon referred, that the State Department would make statements and would handle the publicity on this matter? You say you were not informed that the decision had been made at the time you made your statement.

Mr. DRYDEN. It was subsequent to the day of May 5, May 6, or May 7. I have a record of May 7. After the State Department's statement at 6 p.m., that NASA would refer all inquiries to the State Department, I believe we were informed, probably on Friday the 6th, but I have no specific record.

Senator GORE. Who informed you?

Mr. DRYDEN. I think it was a telephone call. I just do not have a specific recollection whether it came as a telephone call or a contact with Dr. Glennan at lunch at the White House. I just do not recall, sir.

We can perhaps clear that up for the record after consultation, sir.
 Senator GORE. I think it would be well if you can do so.
 (The following information was subsequently furnished:)

STATEMENT BY DR. DRYDEN ON WHEN NASA WAS NOTIFIED OF DECISION TO HAVE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE HANDLE PUBLICITY ON U-2

The telephone logs of Dr. Glennan and myself show no calls to or from the State Department on May 6 or 7, but it is my best recollection that we did learn of the decision on May 6.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS PREPARED TO HANDLE INQUIRIES

You have referred several times to questions and answers, or the answers to questions as the case may be, supplied to you by CIA. Do you have a copy of that question and answer series?

Mr. DRYDEN. We may have some rough notation. What we did was record the types of questions that the press was asking us. We then took these types of questions to the CIA and discussed them with them as to the answers.

[Deleted.]

Senator GORE. Was there not a typewritten copy?

Mr. DRYDEN. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Senator GORE. But you do have some notes.

Mr. DRYDEN. The statement itself enables you to reconstruct the questions. They are generally who was the pilot, what was the flight plan, where was the airplane supposed to go, what was the route, how many airplanes does NASA operate on weather missions, from what bases have these airplanes been operating? I think you can reconstruct the questions from the statement itself. I am not sure whether we can find the notes that someone may have written down to refresh his memory in discussing it.

INSTRUCTIONS TO NASA TO MAKE STATEMENT

Senator GORE. Who instructed your Agency to make a statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. We were instructed to answer questions.

Senator GORE. By whom?

Mr. DRYDEN. By the CIA, who said that this had been coordinated with the State Department.

Senator GORE. And the CIA gave you instructions to respond to questions?

Mr. DRYDEN. We asked for information. The operation was not ours. We had no knowledge of the operation itself. We said, "How shall we reply to these questions? You realize the fact that we did not know very much about where this airplane was, whether the Russians have the airplane, whether they have the pilot. What do you want us to say in this interim period? Can we find out more about it?"

Senator GORE. You felt the burden of saying something, did you?

Mr. DRYDEN. We felt the burden of answering questions because for 4 years the existence of this NASA weather flight program had been known.

WHEN WERE COUNTERMANDING INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED?

Senator GORE. And, meanwhile, no one informed you that the decision had been made at the highest levels of Government that the State Department would handle this?

Mr. DRYDEN. The discussions I referred to, the visits of the press, were made within an hour or two of the making of that decision at a place outside of Washington, and it was not communicated to us within that 2-hour period.

Senator GORE. You have told us it wasn't communicated to you at all.

Mr. DRYDEN. Until the following day.

Senator GORE. Until after you had made a statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. A statement. To get the chronology again, this meeting to which you refer, at which the decision was made, was on the morning of May 5, somewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock. A decision was made and Mr. Hagerty informed the press at the direction of the President that the facts would be obtained through NASA and State. The reporters came immediately over to our public information section wanting to know some of these facts.

Senator GORE. Do you know whether either Mr. Hagerty or President Eisenhower had been informed of this decision reached outside Washington?

Mr. DRYDEN. I think the President was outside Washington at the time.

Senator GORE. It seems to me that I recall the President participated in this conference.

Mr. DRYDEN. I just do not know the details of that. I think it was given in the testimony of the Secretary of State.

Senator GORE. Wasn't that a meeting of the National Security Council?

Mr. DRYDEN. I do not know that, to my knowledge. The statement was made that Mr. Eisenhower was at secret Civil Defense Headquarters.

Senator GORE. Will you repeat that?

Mr. DRYDEN. I say the statement says that President Eisenhower was at his secret Civil Defense Headquarters.

REFERENCE TO MR. DILLON'S TESTIMONY REGARDING NASA'S ROLE

Senator GORE. I will read from Mr. Dillon's statement:

Now, Mr. Hagerty was not at the Security Council meeting, but he was at that area out there where this exercise was taking place and so he was aware of the fact that the State Department would be making a statement at noon that day at our regular press conference time. Actually, the statement was delayed 45 minutes. It was made at 12:45 when our regular daily press conference took place.

Senator GORE. Was it decided there that NASA would make a statement also?

Mr. DILLON. It was not, to my knowledge, no. It was not decided there that NASA would make a statement.

Senator GORE. Who made that decision?

Mr. DILLON. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know who made any such decision.

So you say you decided upon instructions of CIA?

Mr. DRYDEN. No.

Senator GORE. Just how do you state it?

Mr. DRYDEN. I stated that we had received word of the White House announcement that the facts will be made public by NASA and the Department of State. Now, this means I suppose that within this 2- or 3-hour period this information was not transmitted to us. I do not know the reasons.

Senator GORE. Do you know if Mr. Hagerty called you or Mr. Bonney or anyone in the Department suggesting that a statement be made?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator GORE. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator Hickenlooper?

NASA ACTION BASED ON PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDING WITH CIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Dr. Dryden, when the newsmen came to the Information Department of NASA, did the Information Department act on its own?

Mr. DRYDEN. No, they did not. They acted in consultation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With you?

Mr. DRYDEN. With me; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was it in connection with that consultation, based upon the information which you then had about Mr. Hagerty's statement, that you authorized the issuance of the statement by the Information Service of NASA?

Mr. DRYDEN. It was called a memorandum to the press. I did not attribute sufficient importance to the distinction between answering questions of reporters and giving them the same information on a piece of paper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After you had made the statement, or your Information Department issued this statement, was this statement sent to the CIA or the State Department?

Mr. DRYDEN. It was sent—I do not know exactly what time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And was the statement which was issued by your Information Department—perhaps you have answered this question—cleared with CIA in its context or with the State Department prior to the issuance by your Information Service?

Mr. DRYDEN. I have answered that. The statement, as written, was not cleared.

The information in the statement had been previously cleared by CIA, with State.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the statement was based, then, upon the understandings which had previously been had?

Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With CIA?

Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And with the State Department?

Mr. DRYDEN. Nothing—no substantive information was added to it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just to get this cleared up a little bit, after you learned of the statement of Mr. Hagerty—which I believe was the source of your determination to make the May 5 statement—after you had learned of that statement of Mr. Hagerty that NASA and the State Department could give information on this matter, did you

get in touch with the White House, Mr. Hagerty, or any authoritative person there, or with the State Department?

Mr. DRYDEN. I did not. I say I perhaps erroneously did not see the difference between answering questions of a large number of reporters and putting the same thing down on a piece of paper. It is the same information.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wanted to ask you for a copy of that statement.

Mr. DRYDEN. The committee has it already.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand it is in the background documents. That is all right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the background documents.

(See appendix 1, p. 180.)

NO WRITTEN MEMORANDUM OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Senator GORE. Also, I believe you were going to supply to the chairman the question and answer series.

Mr. DRYDEN. I was going to see if there is around, a penciled memorandum of the questions. I am not sure that there is.

Senator GORE. If there is?

Mr. DRYDEN. If there is, I will supply it to the chairman.

(The following information was subsequently furnished:)

No memorandum of questions and answers was made; the discussion was entirely oral.

NASA'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 FLIGHT

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche, the NASA statement is found on page 4 of the background documents.

[Deleted.]

Senator LAUSCHE. At the time you issued your statement you did not have knowledge of what the Soviet knew about it and what actually happened?

Mr. DRYDEN. We did not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you have knowledge of the instructions that were given to the pilot?

Mr. DRYDEN. No, sir. No knowledge about the operations.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is—

Mr. DRYDEN. We heard Khrushchev's press announcement, of course, that morning.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all that I have with this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that your position as an international weather gatherer has been compromised by this U-2 incident?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not so far. [Deleted.]

(From this point on all further testimony on this date was classified by order of the committee.)

(At 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 o'clock a.m., June 2, 1960.)

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1960

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Brig. Gen. George S. Brown, U.S. Air Force, and Capt. Means Johnston, Jr., U.S. Navy, military assistants to the Secretary of Defense; Capt. L. P. Gray III, U.S. Navy, military assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Hon. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency.

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have this morning the Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, I think you know about the regulations. Your testimony will be taken down but nothing will be released except that which has been passed by the censors representing the State Department and the CIA, and I assume perhaps you may want to consult with them.

I think you understand that.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you have a statement.

Secretary GATES. A very brief statement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. GATES, JR., SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you.

I have a short statement, if I may read it. It relates to two subjects. First, I am certain that you wish me to cover the role played by the Department of Defense in the U-2 overflight program.

ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN THE OVERFLIGHT PROGRAM

Elements of the Department of Defense gave technical advice to the U-2 project. No military aircraft were used for these flights nor were the pilots military personnel.

From time to time, the Director of the CIA, after obtaining the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, recommended a series of programs to the President.

More specifically, I reviewed program proposals embracing several priority missions, one or more of which it was proposed to execute in the near future. Responsibility for the operational conduct of the program rested with the CIA.

We obviously were interested in the results of these flights as we are in all of our Nation's intelligence collection results.

FLIGHTS GAVE VITAL INFORMATION

For example, from these flights we got information on airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic production and aircraft deployments, and things like these.

These were all types of vital information. These results were considered in formulating our military programs. We obviously were the prime customer, and ours is the major interest.

TEST OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

Secondly, on a separate subject:

One incident, and one over which I assume full responsibility, is the calling of a test of the readiness of our military communications from Paris. In view of the fact that my action in this matter has been subject to some speculation, I would like to give you the facts.

First of all, our military forces are always on some degree of alert. So it is merely a matter of moving this degree or condition of alert up or down the scale. On Sunday night, May 15, we were already aware of the sense of the statement which Mr. Khrushchev was going to make the following morning. The conditions which he had set for his participation in the conference made it apparent even at the time that he deliberately intended to wreck the conference.

This communications alert was not an act that was either offensive or defensive in character. It was a sound precautionary measure. It did not recall Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine personnel from leave. There was no movement of forces involved. However, I want to emphasize that it did make certain that, if subsequent developments made necessary a higher state of readiness, such action could be taken promptly and convincingly.

Under the circumstances it seemed most prudent to me to increase the awareness of our unified commanders. Moreover, since the command and individuals concerned in the decision process, including the President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas, it was important to check out our military communications. At about midnight, Paris time, Sunday night, I requested that a quiet increase in command readiness, particularly with respect to communications, be instituted without public notice, if possible.

One phase of our testing is to call no-notice exercises of our command communications. While some commands went further in executing the instructions issued by the JCS as a result of my message than I had anticipated, I consider the order proper and absolutely essential. In similar circumstances I would take exactly the same action.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

PRESUMMIT DISCUSSION REGARDING SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

Mr. Secretary, did you or any of your aides participate in any conference prior to May 1 regarding the U-2 flights?

Secretary GATES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was some weeks before May 1 briefed on the preliminary results of the April 9 flight. At that time, I was informed of a program of possible flights, one of which would be selected to be flown, and I gave my approval of that program.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anything said at that time about a moratorium in view of the summit conference?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who participated in that conference?

Secretary GATES. That conference was in my office in the Pentagon, and was between myself and a man from CIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone in the State Department present?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the State Department was advised specifically of the plans for the May 1 flight?

Secretary GATES. I don't know from my own knowledge, but I am perfectly certain that the Secretary of State was advised of the program as I was.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't advise him nor was he represented at that meeting?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And no one raised the question of whether or not there should be a suspension?

Secretary GATES. No, sir. In this conversation, it was a private conversation between the CIA representative and myself, and I was asked for my advice or approval of the program and I gave it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but I merely meant that the question of whether or not there should be a suspension in view of the upcoming summit was not raised; is that correct?

Secretary GATES. Not raised between the two of us, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it raised at any time?

Secretary GATES. I didn't have any other discussions about the flight with anyone, Senator Fulbright.

The CHAIRMAN. Then so far as you know, it was not raised?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

QUESTION OF ANY PRIOR SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, were any flights prior thereto ever suspended because of political meetings, that is, other than weather or military considerations?

Secretary GATES. I have no knowledge of any suspension of any flights for those purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no suspension to your knowledge when the Camp David meeting took place?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor was there any suspension, so far as you know, during the period in which Khrushchev visited the United States?

Secretary GATES. I don't know of any suspension. I don't know precisely whether during that period we flew any flights, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No, but I mean you didn't discuss the question?

Secretary GATES. I didn't discuss the question of suspension of flights, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you never considered it, then you had no position relative to the continuation, did you?

Secretary GATES. I approved this program, so I took a position affirmatively.

SIGNIFICANCE TO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Were the results of these flights important to the Defense Department?

Secretary GATES. The results were very important to the Defense Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Very useful to you?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you regard it as an important loss that the flights have now been suspended?

Secretary GATES. I think that, through becoming compromised, we have lost an important source of intelligence. It has been a very successful program over the past.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is a great loss from your point of view not to have available any further flights; is that correct?

Secretary GATES. I think if we had been able to continue them without having been caught and therefore compromised the source, it would have been most useful.

RUSSIAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gates, did Khrushchev, or the Russians, know of overflights prior to May 1?

Secretary GATES. He says he did.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what do you think?

Secretary GATES. I believe that he did, Mr. Chairman, but I don't believe anyone could specifically prove it. But I believe that he did. I believe he told the truth.

The CHAIRMAN. If he knew about it, why did the incidents of May 1 compromise the flights; why should they be discontinued?

Secretary GATES. Well, I don't believe he knew the exact type and character of the flights. He probably—all he knew was that they were [deleted] aircraft high in his sky.

KNOWLEDGE OF PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE RE ORDER FOR ALERT

The CHAIRMAN. On your order on May 15, your alert, did you consult the Department of State before ordering it?

Secretary GATES. No. I advised the Secretary of State, who was with the President when it was issued.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise him before you issued it?

Secretary GATES. He was advised before it was released yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was his opinion asked or was he merely advised of it?

Secretary GATES. Well, I told him that I was about to issue a communications alert, and the communication readiness exercise.

The CHAIRMAN. He approved of it.

Secretary GATES. He did not register any disapproval.

The CHAIRMAN. Well then he approved it.

Secretary GATES. I think so, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that Mr. Herter?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In Paris.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise the President?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Before it was made?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the NSC consulted about the alert?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

MEETING OF MAY 9

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gates, did you participate in any meeting on May 7 to consider the statement which was later issued by the Secretary of State?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or on May 9?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

On May 9, that is Monday, I believe, I participated in a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State.

On the morning of the 9th.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you approve of the statement made in which the full revelation was made?

Secretary GATES. I approved of the statement that was made on May 9, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was present at that meeting?

Secretary GATES. Well, I know that Mr. Douglas and myself were present from the Department of Defense. Mr. Herter and Mr. Douglas Dillon, and Mr. Kohler were present, I think Mr. Bohlen was present from the State Department, there may have been one or two others.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that meeting go on for some time?

Secretary GATES. I would say about an hour.

The CHAIRMAN. About an hour.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCUSSED

The CHAIRMAN. Was the question of whether or not it was wise for the President to take responsibility discussed at that meeting?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your position?

Secretary GATES. My position was that he should take responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the meeting unanimous?

Secretary GATES. I believe it was.

The CHAIRMAN. They all agreed?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It went on about an hour.

Secretary GATES. Well, I would say at least an hour, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, did it go on more than an hour?

Secretary GATES. Well, I am talking about my recollection. I would think it was at least 1 hour. Perhaps it was longer.

STATEMENT BY NASA

The CHAIRMAN. Was the statement issued by NASA on May 5 cleared with your office?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know anything about it.

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any relations with NASA?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, not in this connection.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean in connection with the U-2 flight.

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these U-2 flights under your direct control in the field, that is, under the Air Force direct control in the field?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, they were under the control of the CIA. [Deleted.]

INITIAL STATEMENT BY AIR FORCE IN TURKEY

The CHAIRMAN. How did it happen the Air Force made the initial statement of the missing plane?

Secretary GATES. That was a part of the cover story that was decided upon and they issued this statement from the base in Turkey about a plane being missing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, does that indicate that you had arrived ahead of time in concert with the CIA upon proper procedure to be followed in case of a mishap?

Secretary GATES. I was not familiar with the details of how a cover story would be executed. I was aware of the fact that a cover story existed, and I imagine that when the details of it were put into operation, the Central Intelligence Agency went to work.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not your responsibility to supervise the cover story?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Gore?

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, MAY 5

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the National Security Council.

Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator.

Senator GORE. Did you attend the meeting of the Council held on May 5?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Did the President participate in that conference?

Secretary GATES. At the meeting of the NSC?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Was the cover story discussed there?

Secretary GATES. No [deleted], Senator.

There was a meeting of the small group after the NSC meeting—

Senator GORE. Did you participate?

Secretary GATES. Where we discussed the Khrushchev statement. I participated with the President. It was not at the NSC meeting.

Senator GORE. At this conference in which Mr. Khrushchev's speech was discussed, was the cover story discussed?

STATE DEPARTMENT TO HANDLE RELEASES ON SUBJECT

Secretary GATES. Well, I think it was discussed in a general manner but not in detail. It was decided at that meeting that the responsibility for all releases pertaining to this matter would be handled by the Department of State.

Senator GORE. Was there any discussion at this meeting of the advisability of telling the truth?

Secretary GATES. I think I made a statement in that meeting, something to the effect that the prestige of the Presidency should not be involved in an international lie particularly when it would not stand up with respect to the facts. But that was the extent of the discussion. There was no decision.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S COVER STORY

Senator GORE. After this observation on your part, the State Department did issue a statement that was not true; is that the case?

Secretary GATES. I think—

Senator GORE. Well, the record shows—

Secretary GATES. I think they issued a statement, that is right. I think they issued a part of the cover story statement after that meeting; yes, sir.

Senator GORE. So there was no decision—although the question of involvement of the Presidency in what you call an international lie was discussed, and you expressed your view that it would be an unwise thing to involve the President in the cover story or in an international, an official falsehood?

Secretary GATES. If it turned out that Mr. Khrushchev had all the facts, which we subsequently found out that he had; yes.

QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENT ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY

Senator GORE. How did you think his involvement or his association with this incident in its ramifications could be avoided by an assumption of responsibility by the President for the program?

Secretary GATES. I believe the President did assume responsibility, and I believe he should have assumed responsibility.

Senator GORE. Let me see if I understand you correctly. I certainly do not wish to make any implication at all. I do not wish to impute to you any meaning which you did not intend. Did I correctly understand you to say that this question was discussed at a small meeting following the NSC meeting on the 5th at which you participated as did the President?

Secretary GATES. That is correct, sir.

Senator GORE. Who else participated?

Secretary GATES. Mr. Douglas Dillon, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, and General Goodpaster.

Senator GORE. At this meeting, you expressed the view that it would be unwise for the President to be involved in an international lie, I believe you described it.

Secretary GATES. That is right. This depended on what Mr. Khrushchev knew, when he knew it and if he knew everything that he claimed to know. It turned out later he did. I believe that the President should take the responsibility for the truth, for telling the truth. That is my opinion. I did not know specifically at that time the extent of Mr. Khrushchev's knowledge.

Senator GORE. You have amended your—

Secretary GATES. I didn't mean to be evasive, Senator.

Senator GORE. I understand, but you have now amended, and I would like to clarify, if I may. I know you are not trying to be evasive and I assure you that I am only seeking to develop the facts as they existed. The Government has full leeway, so far as I am concerned, to exercise censorship for security.

Now, when you expressed the view that the Presidency should not be involved in an international lie, did you at that time, on the 5th, suggest the President should assume responsibility, or was this on the 7th or the 9th that you expressed that additional view?

Secretary GATES. It was on the—I had no more meetings on the subject until the 9th, Senator. That meeting was with the Secretary of State.

OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS ON MAY 5

Senator GORE. Did you express the view on the 5th that the President should assume responsibility or did you express that view on the 9th?

Secretary GATES. I expressed the view on the 5th that if Mr. Khrushchev had the complete information and the pilot, that the President should assert the true story.

I expressed it again on the 9th when we knew that he had the plane and the pilot. [Deleted.]

Senator GORE. You were informed that Mr. Khrushchev had made the public speech with respect to the plane, that it was shot down or that it came down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk?

Secretary GATES. Yes. I am not sure of my timing, Senator. We knew some information on the 5th, but we knew a great deal more a day later. He didn't report the full story until the 7th.

Senator GORE. I understand. I am only trying to develop the background of information—

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. And the decision that was made. Although you expressed these views, and although this information was in the hands of or was discussed in the conference—

Secretary GATES. Some information was in our hands.

Senator GORE. The information which you have described?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator GORE. I am perfectly willing for you to describe it.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. I have no description of it except as you give it to me. The decision was not reached at this meeting?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator GORE. A decision to tell the truth was not reached at this meeting on the 5th?

STATE DEPARTMENT TO HANDLE ALL GOVERNMENT RELEASES ON
SUBJECT

Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator. The only decision that was reached at that meeting was that all the statements pertaining to the incident would be handled by the Department of State.

Senator GORE. What information was the State Department to give? Was it specifically understood at the meeting that the cover story would be continued?

Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was assumed that the cover story would be continued at that time.

Senator GORE. And the cover story was untrue?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. It turned out to be untrue. I mean, yes, because it was untrue. We didn't have the full facts that we had 2 days later.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time has expired.

The Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this interrogation. Now see if you can't tell us the story without questioning, starting in when you first became acquainted with the facts, who was there, what was said, and then go on.

For instance, we have heard so many statements about something not being true. Now this release on May 5 was the cover story, wasn't it?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. When did you first get acquainted with the situation? Start in the beginning and give it consecutively so that it will be clear.

CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Secretary GATES. I first got involved in the situation when the airplane did not return to base. I knew an airplane was down, presumably because it hadn't come back and it had taken off. That was on May 1.

I had no other relationship with it until the morning of Thursday, which was May 5 when we had a [deleted] meeting of the NSC at a remote location under a civil defense exercise.

On that morning, there was the preliminary statements of Mr. Khrushchey that we had been flying over his territory, and so forth.

After the NSC meeting, there was a small meeting at which I have listed the members present, in which we discussed this matter.

Senator WILEY. Who was there?

Secretary GATES. Mr. Dillon of the State Department, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster, and myself and the President. We discussed this whole matter. We made the decision there that the matter would be handled by the Department of State, and we adjourned.

I had no further participation or discussion concerning the incident until the following Monday morning.

Senator WILEY. What date?

Secretary GATES. Which was the 9th. I at that time participated in a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State, and he issued his complete statement.

Senator WILEY. Have you got one of these pamphlets in front of you?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. See if we can't get into the record that which is on page 4 for the press. That is the cover story up at the top?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. And that is the one that had been said was a lie?

Secretary GATES. This was a cover story; yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. This was issued when you had only part of the facts; isn't that it?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator WILEY. On May 9, if you will turn to page 5, you have the Department of State's release.

Senator WILEY. Was there one issued on May 9?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT PRESENT ONLY AT MAY 5TH MEETING

Senator WILEY. At any of these meetings, was the President there?

Secretary GATES. The only meeting the President attended was the meeting of May 5th, after the NSC meeting.

Senator WILEY. I didn't understand. Was he there on the 5th?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; after the NSC meeting. That is the only meeting at which he was present.

DECISION ON ALERT

Senator WILEY. When it was decided to have the alert, was that the judgment of all that it was in the interest of the national defense?

Secretary GATES. It was my judgment and I was responsible.

Senator WILEY. You had in mind, did you, what the condition of this country was at the time of Pearl Harbor, how we were asleep?

Secretary GATES. I certainly did.

Senator WILEY. During negotiations.

Secretary GATES. I did, indeed.

Senator WILEY. Is it your judgment from the facts that when Khrushchev went to Paris that he had already made up his mind to call off the summit meeting?

Secretary GATES. Yes; it is my judgment, Senator.

MEETING ON MAY 5

Senator WILEY. Something was said by yourself in the cross-examination to the effect that you claimed they should tell the truth. When was that, on the 5th?

Secretary GATES. I said on the 5th, if it proved that Mr. Khrushchev had the pilot, had the equipment, had the full and complete story, it later turned out that he had, that I believed we should tell the truth at that time.

Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.

REFORMS IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, since you have become Secretary of Defense, you have made it a point to sit in on the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and if an agreement could not be reached you make the final decision.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. In that period you have also brought about reforms and increased the efficiency of the centralized purchasing system.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. In that period you have also brought about a centralization of the communications system.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. For all those you are to be most highly commended because I think they were reforms long overdue and it was about time they were put into effect.

REASONS FOR ALERT

Now, at the time you issued your alert of the communications system in Paris did you have any information that Soviet forces were massing or mobilizing?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Did any one person or any group ask you to order the alert?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. You did that entirely on your own responsibility?

Secretary GATES. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. Did the alert order which you issued put the forces of this country at a war readiness level?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. There was no call back of Reserves or cancellation of leave to any extent.

Secretary GATES. No, sir. There were in one or two instances some people who interpreted the JCS order as meaning that they would have a couple of more aircraft on alert, and in that case, they, on their own, recalled, I believe some pilots who were home or off duty to have approximately two more airplanes on an alert status. But this was done on their own, testing their own alert procedures under the broad order that was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was not the intention of this order to move forces in any way.

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, that JCS order was in response to your order?

Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. Is there any connection between this communications alert and the recent centralization of the communications system?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, because that will not be in effect in its entirety for approximately 9 months.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, during the course of your responses to Senator Gore, you mentioned the following words, "The prestige of the Presidency should not be involved."

Isn't it true that in almost any undertaking, in a general way the prestige of the Presidency is always involved under our constitutional system of government?

Secretary GATES. Certainly.

Senator MANSFIELD. What I am getting at, there is this: That whether or not he had any specific knowledge of this particular flight or of this particular order, which you issued, that nevertheless under our system he is generally responsible for actions undertaken by the head of the CIA and for actions and orders issued by the Secretary of Defense; is that correct?

Secretary GATES. He is the head of the executive branch and he is Commander in Chief, Senator, so of course he is responsible in that sense.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes, he is generally responsible.

Secretary GATES. Certainly.

Senator MANSFIELD. He is Commander in Chief and Chief of State.

Secretary GATES. That is right.

NATURE OF A COVER STORY

Senator MANSFIELD. There has been something said about a cover story and the fact that it is not truthful. Well, isn't a cover story by its very nature almost always a lie?

Secretary GATES. Yes, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is the purpose; to seek protection in some kind of a story under a given circumstance so that for the time being at least the situation could be taken care of.

Secretary GATES. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

SOVIET THREATS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I believe that we have had repeated statements from the Kremlin in the last weeks, months, or even years that contained threats of what the Kremlin is ready to do to the West generally or to the United States under a variety of conditions; isn't that correct?

Secretary GATES. Yes, it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe Mr. Khrushchev has been quoted as saying that he would bury us—whether he meant economically or militarily might be argued—and I believe he stated that they have missiles on the launching pads directed at various countries of Europe as well as the United States?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Those statements have been reported, have they not?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

SOVIET AIR MANEUVERS OVER EAST GERMANY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are the Russians still engaging in scramble operations and massive airflight operations over East Germany; do you know?

Secretary GATES. I don't know of any flights over East Germany recently, but, of course, they have some 20 divisions in East Germany.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know whether this comes within your time or not, but I have heard in one way or another in times past that they have repeatedly had large air forces in the air over East Germany.

Secretary GATES. They have large air forces stationed in East Germany.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean in the air.

Secretary GATES. They have had maneuvers, yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have had maneuvers toward the West German border which come very close to the West German border on occasion?

Secretary GATES. They have had them regularly; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sometimes these are rather massive maneuvers in the air?

Secretary GATES. I believe that is correct; yes, sir.

JUSTIFICATION FOR ALERT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, now, recently we have heard a great deal of discussion and argument about keeping all of our strategic Air Force planes or a great many of them in the air all the time. There have been some that have advocated that and criticized us for not keeping our airplanes in the air more than we have.

Secretary GATES. I am very familiar with this argument, with the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I presume you do not see anything unwarranted about this air alert which you ordered, but I will ask you the question anyway. Do you see any reason for criticism because of a demonstration by your Department of a worldwide air alert of our forces?

Secretary GATES. I stated when I got off the airplane and was asked the question by the press on my return, I said it was incredible to me that anybody would question it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I agree with that statement, but there seems to be some criticism nevertheless.

ADVISABILITY OF OVERFLIGHT BEFORE SUMMIT CONFERENCE A POLITICAL QUESTION

Now, on the question of whether or not, that is from your viewpoint, in your Department, the particular U-2 flight should have been cancelled on the 30th of April, or the 1st of May, or whenever it occurred, isn't that a political question and not a military question?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is in view of the so-called summit conference?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That becomes exclusively a political question as to whether or not it was advisable at that time from the standpoint of the summit conference?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I take it that from the standpoint of primary responsibility you have nothing to say about whether it would be cancelled or not as a political gesture in view of a political conference?

Secretary GATES. Well, I, of course, know of the date of this summit meeting, and if I had had a strong conviction about it I would have said it even though I didn't have the responsibility for the decision. I was in an advisory capacity, but I believed that there was really no good time to stop the collection of important information. There is always some international conference or something.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I am trying to get at is whether you have any primary responsibility for making political decisions, or in your responsibility military decisions?

Secretary GATES. No, my responsibility is with the Department of Defense.

VALUE OF U 2 FLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, these U 2 flights have been extremely valuable in the securing of intelligence, have they not?

Secretary GATES. They have indeed, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have also been very valuable in securing weather information, have they not?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. [Deleted.]

ADVISABILITY OF ALERT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you believe that, in view of the general tensions that exist and the rather jingoist statements, let's say, that have been emanating from the Kremlin from time to time, it was a beneficial thing to have this air alert as not only a show of strength but as an assurance to our friends and allies over the world that we had a readiness capability?

Secretary GATES. I do. It was not an air alert, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sir?

Secretary GATES. It was not an air alert. I think you miss—technically, you said air alert. It was a command readiness and communications alert. I agree, however, with what you said that it was a good thing to do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I shall adopt your description for my question, then, on that point.

But anyway, it was a show of ability on our part in connection with our alertness, general alertness, and our ability to put a defensive force into the air in a short time?

Secretary GATES. Yes, and we could go from there to further measures if we needed to, but this was primarily a measure of checking command and checking communications, particularly, as I said in my statement, in view of the fact that the persons involved in important policy decisions were out of the country.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you agree that it either does have, or should have, a certain degree of comforting effect upon not only our own country but upon our allies that we do have these capabilities?

Secretary GATES. I would hope it would, Senator. It seems to me this is our responsibility, to be ready and alert under these circumstances at all times, and we always are.

This was merely a matter of degree. It was a little increase in the degree of alertness. We are in an alert condition at all times.

ANOTHER COMMUNICATIONS ALERT ORDERED

At midnight last night, we are having another communications exercise, starting at 11 o'clock last night, and it is going for several days.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This fact that we may be always alert sometimes is not fully appreciated except on occasional demonstrations of that.

Secretary GATES. That is right, and the Joint Chiefs, as a result of this experience and critique of it have recommended to me that we have these alerts on a no-notice basis more frequently.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

[Deleted.]

QUESTION OF ADVANCE PLANNING FOR ACTION IN EVENT U-2 PLANE DOWNED

Senator LONG. Did you advise or consult us to whether we were to admit that we authorized these flights if and when the Soviets did succeed in bringing one of our planes down?

Secretary GATES. If we should continue them or not?

Senator LONG. No, no. What I meant is this: As a matter of forehandedness—I see a naval officer sitting behind you—they taught me the definition of that word as a midshipman—I am sure that you anticipated that sooner or later they were going to bring one of our planes down.

Secretary GATES. We know it was a dangerous occupation; yes, Senator.

Senator LONG. You could anticipate that sooner or later one of these planes was going to fall into enemy hands?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. There was a distinct possibility at any moment, and had you advised and consulted us to how this matter should be handled if and when such an event materialized?

Secretary GATES. No; I had not, Senator. I was only aware of the fact that a cover story existed, but I had no part in it.

Senator LONG. And you had not been advised as to what the position of this country was going to be in the event that that happened?

Secretary GATES. No, sir; this was not my responsibility.

Senator LONG. Senator Young passed up two questions he would like for me to ask. I will just ask them on my time since I have no further questions.

He says if it were essential—

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator ought to ask in his own name.

Senator LONG. May I yield the remainder of my time to Senator Young then?

The CHAIRMAN. No, you may not. You may ask any question you, yourself, but on your own responsibility.

EFFECT OF DISCONTINUANCE OF U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator LONG. If it were essential or important that the U-2 flights be made for years, right up to and including May 1, is the defense of the United States adversely effected by an absolute discontinuance on May 13?

Secretary GATES. We have lost, through compromise, an important source of information. [Deleted.]

Senator LONG. In other words, we do badly need the same information that we were gathering with the U-2 flights?

Secretary GATES. We need a continuity of this information, I think, Senator.

Senator LONG. Then if that be the case, in your judgment was it essential or advisable that the flight of May 1 should not have been canceled?

Secretary GATES. In my judgment, it was proper to fly the flight of May 1.

Senator LONG. Thank you. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

The Senator from Vermont?

WAS ALERT RELATED TO SOVIET PLANS?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, at the time you ordered the communications alert on May 15, did you have any apprehension at that time the Communists might be considering or planning surprise action in any part of the world?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, I felt that the situation was one that was at best, not very constructive. We knew the sense of Mr. Khrushchev's remarks, but I did not anticipate a surprise attack.

I didn't order that kind of an alert.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, it seemed like a good thing to do at the time?

Secretary GATES. I think it was, yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Was the response to the order fully satisfactory?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Have you had any similar alerts since?

Secretary GATES. I testified a minute ago, I believe, that we started one at 11 o'clock last night which will run for several days.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, if this has been covered, please tell me.

Secretary GATES. Yes, Senator.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET THREAT AGAINST OVERSEAS BASES

Senator MORSE. I am somewhat concerned about the implications, propagandawise and otherwise, of the alleged threat of the marshal of the air forces of the Soviet Union that if they know that another spy plane is leaving a foreign base the instructions are to shoot a

missile to that base. What is your judgment as to the seriousness of that threat?

Do you think it is a bluff or do you think that he means it?

Secretary GATES. Well, Senator, this is awfully hard to know. He must know that if he did such a thing that we have allied commitments. If it was an allied country, for example, he would be starting a very major problem for himself.

Senator MORSE. That is the point I want to raise.

Secretary GATES. And this would only be done with the assumption that he would take the consequences of an act that would probably start a general war. [Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Doesn't it seem to imply, Mr. Secretary, that if he is not bluffing, that they thereby mean to start a general war over espionage activity on the part of the United States or any other foreign power that sends a spy plane over their territory?

Doesn't that seem to be—

Secretary GATES. If I understand your question, Senator, I think he must take the responsibility for starting a general war or very likely starting a general war if he hits one of our Allied bases for any reason.

Senator MORSE. Could it possibly imply that the Russians are of the opinion that our power of both defense and aggression is such that they are willing to take it on? To put my question a different way—

Secretary GATES. I doubt very much that they are willing to take it now. I think they absolutely know they will commit suicide the moment they try it because I think they are fully informed in every way possible about, practically, the exact defense posture of the United States.

Senator MORSE. If that is true, and I think it is true, that they ought to know that if they get involved in a nuclear war there can't be any victory for them, and I doubt if there could for us, but apparently this type of military mind in Russia possessed by their air marshal is ready to start a nuclear war. Wouldn't that be a fair deduction from this threat unless it is a bluff?

Secretary GATES. Senator MORSE, I think it is a part of a stepped-up, cold war aggressive, propoganda campaign. That is what I think it really is, because I don't believe that Mr. Khrushchev wants to start a war which he knows will be the end of his country.

Senator MORSE. I am inclined to think that is probably true of Khrushchev. But the reason I am asking this line of questions is to find out from you if the leaders in our country have reason to believe that Khrushchev is being pushed in Russia by a preventive war group that entertains the point of view that sooner or later they are going to have to fight the United States, and that they think probably now is a better time to do it than later.

Do we have any intelligence information that would justify our believing that a military group in Russia is now taking over and pushing Khrushchev to the side?

Secretary GATES. We do not have. We can at this time only speculate. It might be possible that the military group has come into more power in Russia or that Mr. Khrushchev may have had some of his power diluted. This is, however, just speculation, and

it is, I suppose, rather dangerous to speculate, but we do not have any hard facts on the subject.

INFLUENCE OF, AND DANGER IN, SOVIET MILITARY HIERARCHY

Senator MORSE. I understand they have some 250,000 military officers, army and naval and air. Could it be possible that within the military in Russia they see the possibility of reaching an agreement on total disarmament which means that they would be moved out of the very favored position in Russian society they now occupy, and that we need to be on the alert to the possibility that a great military change is taking place in Russia in the form of a military hierarchy taking over control from the Communist leadership?

Secretary GATES. Well, I couldn't agree with you more, sir, that we should certainly be on the alert to this possibility and continuously so. I agree that we must consider this as one of the possibilities.

Senator MORSE. What concerns me is that as far as their leadership is concerned and as far as I have any reason to believe, based upon the briefings we have had from our own American leaders, we are dealing with a group of very amoral leaders in Russia. And when you get amoral leaders among the military establishments, such as they have, I think we have cause for concern as to whether or not even in desperation they might not be willing to start a war. And if this is more than propaganda, if this is more than bluff, if this is more than what you suggest might be the case of a new step-up in the cold war to try to frighten our allies, then we have to take a long look, it seems to me, as to our responsibility to history in respect to following an espionage course that might cause these amoral men in desperation to start a war because there is always the hope on our part that we may be able to contain them until we can negotiate through the United Nations a workable and enforceable total disarmament program.

NEED FOR INFORMATION BALANCED AGAINST POTENTIAL DANGER

I have raised this question because I don't think that in terms of history we can completely ignore our responsibility in dealing with a group of desperadoes such as I think the Russian military people are, and so it raises the question how far we can justify going morally, in connection with an espionage system such as the U-2 system, when we know we are dealing with a group of amoral military leaders in Russia who might start a nuclear war because of their complete lack of appreciation for the value of human life.

It puts us in a difficult position, it seems to me. We have our own security to protect, we have our duty to gather information, but the nature of the "beast" with whom we are dealing—in quotation marks I put the word, of course—nevertheless puts upon us some responsibility, it seems to me, to not go too far in our own espionage program if by going a certain distance might indirectly put us in a position where history might record that we knew we were dealing with that kind of a gang and knowing it we nevertheless followed an espionage course of action that they considered so violated their sovereign rights that they were willing then to take that last step into a nuclear war.

Secretary GATES. Well, the Senator can speculate more intelligently, I am sure, than I can on military people.

Senator MORSE. Not at all.

Secretary GATES. But basically military people are conservative, worldwide, and basically they are well informed on military matters, and therefore, the military in the Soviet Union should know better than the political leaders that they will be lost, and slaughtered and devastated in a nuclear war.

On the other question, it seems to me again as a lay person that our survival is at stake. If he threatens us, I have repeatedly testified in Congress, that I didn't think he intended to make any significant concessions at any meeting, that we have not prepared our defense program on that basis, that we had to keep it under continuous review, at all times, and with a completely closed country, and our survival threatened, if he builds up a capability for a surprise attack, it seems to me absolutely vital that we obtain all the information we can from every source.

Senator MORSE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Indiana.

Senator CAPELLARI. I have no questions except I will say I think you did the right thing by ordering the alert.

I hope that you will continue to be on alert. I hope you will continue to get intelligence on Russia in every conceivable way we can.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

The Senator from Ohio.

SECRETARY GATES' SERVICE IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Gates, how long have you been the Secretary of Defense?

Secretary GATES. Only since last December, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were you in the Department prior to that time?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; I have been there since 1953, in the Department.

Senator LAUSCHE. In what capacity?

Secretary GATES. I was Under Secretary of the Navy, then Secretary of the Navy, then Deputy Secretary of Defense.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon your knowledge, when did the Soviet hierarchy first know of the fact that there were foreign planes flying over the Soviet?

Secretary GATES. I don't think we can confirm, Senator. We just have to take Mr. Khrushchev's statements at face value.

I think that it is debatable how much he knew. I assume he knew that there were planes flying. He said he knew. He says he had known since he was here in the United States. But I don't think we can definitely confirm this.

Senator LAUSCHE. Testimony has been given by some witness that, I think on July 2, 1956, he made a protest that there was a plane overhead in the Soviet.

Secretary GATES. Yes. I have the record of this. I believe this was the time General Twining visited the Soviet Union. They made a public protest of overflights in July of 1956.

Senator LAUSCHE. And since that time U-2's have been making missions over the Soviet?

Secretary GATES. That is correct, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. And Khrushchev, after May 1, made a statement that he knew at the time that he was at Camp David that planes were flying overhead?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then the proof indicates that at the time he was invited to the United States, at the time he went to Camp David, and at the time that he arranged for the summit conference, he knew of these planes being overhead?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. And he did nothing about it? Can a staff member tell?

Secretary GATES. I can't say that we can confirm this, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand.

Secretary GATES. This is his statement.

SOVIET MOTIVATION FOR ATTENDING SUMMIT

Senator LAUSCHE. That is correct. When was Khrushchev in the United States?

Mr. MAREY. September 1959.

Secretary GATES. September 15 through the 27th.

Senator LAUSCHE. He made no statement to the President at that time about planes being overhead?

Secretary GATES. He did not.

Senator LAUSCHE. And he agreed to meet at the summit?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then on May 1 this U-2 was brought down in the Soviet and he then made these declarations that have been reported. That is correct, isn't it?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, what, in your opinion, motivated him in agreeing to have a summit conference, accepting our invitation to come to the United States, meeting with the President, while he knew that this supposed grave transgression of his rights was taking place?

Secretary GATES. I can only hazard again a personal opinion, Senator. My opinion is that he believed that he could not make any progress at the summit meeting, and he made a pre-positioned, he took a pre-position—made a brief on it and came to Paris to wreck the summit quite apart from the U-2 incident.

U.S. AND SOVIET INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING OPPORTUNITIES

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon your opinion or active knowledge, during this period was there espionage practiced by the Soviets in our country?

Secretary GATES. Yes; there was.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that answer based upon your knowledge?

Secretary GATES. Based upon reports that I have read.

Senator LAUSCHE. From the Central Intelligence Agency?

Secretary GATES. Or from the FBI.

Senator LAUSCHE. In the Soviet, all things are hemmed in against an individual getting into proximity of their bases. Am I correct in that?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Does that situation prevail in our country?

Secretary GATES. It certainly does not, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then there is a tremendous difficulty in the ability of obtaining intelligence by our agents in the Soviet as compared to their ability, through their agents in our country?

Secretary GATES. That is correct; and there is obviously no reason for him to overfly the United States.

IMPORTANCE OF U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon the knowledge that you acquired through the U-2's, what would be your opinion about our intellectual ability to pursue properly the development of our national defense?

Secretary GATES. I think we had a responsibility to take every means we could.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is not my question. My question is, If you did not have the knowledge acquired through the U-2's, could you have intelligently developed your national defense to cope with the actual, potential military power of the Soviet?

Secretary GATES. Not as well, Senator; by no means.

Senator LAUSCHE. By no means whatsoever?

Secretary GATES. We have other means.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes?

Secretary GATES. That gives us other information, but this was a very importance piece of information.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you didn't have that information, do you feel that the security of our country in all probability would have been affected because of our inability to develop properly our military strength?

Secretary GATES. I think this was—I want to be careful in my answer because this is one source of several sources of intelligence. It is a very important one. I think it would have been affecting our ability to properly defend the United States if we didn't have this information.

DEMANDS PRESENTED BY KHRUSHCHEV

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, getting down to the matter of the May 16 meeting, have you formulated any opinion as to whether Khrushchev, when he left Moscow, already had prepared these four unacceptable demands that he made upon the President with respect to the U-2 incident?

Secretary GATES. Everyone is entitled to a personal opinion, Senator. I have an opinion, yes, sir, that he had very definitely, because the moment he arrived in Paris he presented these conditions to Mr. de Gaulle along with a copy already in French.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is—the fact is that he was supposed to go to Paris on May 15; Sunday?

Secretary GATES. Yes; he came on Saturday night, I believe.

Senator LAUSCHE. And for some reason that has not been explained, he decided to come there in advance?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. On Saturday?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And early in the morning at 11 o'clock on Sunday, he asked for a conference?

Secretary GATES. Attended by de Gaulle.

Senator LAUSCHE. Attended by Malinovsky, himself, and de Gaulle?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. At that meeting, he set forth those unacceptable demands?

Secretary GATES. That is right, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then in the afternoon at 4:30 he asked for a conference with Macmillan?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And he again set forth those four demands?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. This is merely asking for your opinion.

Do you believe that in self-respect and maintenance of the President's position he could conform to the demands made in that ultimatum?

Secretary GATES. I certainly do not. I certainly believe he could not, I guess, would be a better answer.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am of the opinion that when Khrushchev left Moscow he knew there was not to be a summit conference. He prepared his paper. He had his mode of operation completely outlined.

Secretary GATES. I share that point of view, Senator.

SHOULD U-2 FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED BEFORE SUMMIT CONFERENCE?

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, you have stated that you did not feel that we could, in the face of these discussions about a summit conference, suspend our activities with respect to the security of the country; is that right?

Secretary GATES. That is right, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. If there was to be a temporary suspension of these U-2 flights, when should they have begun? This is speculation. I am just trying to search it out. The discussions for a summit conference preceded by far the September visit in the United States, and then from September to May 16 practically 9 months elapsed. Should we, last September, have discontinued our U-2 flights?

Secretary GATES. Not in my judgment, Senator. I think it would have been most incorrect to have suspended them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you believe the Soviet, because of the arranged summit conference, discontinued its activities?

Secretary GATES. I am sure they didn't, although I don't know, but I am perfectly sure they didn't.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 10

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter, the staff overlooked a document which should have been included in the background information. It

is the Soviet note of May 10, which was sent to our Government, as reprinted in the New York Times of May 11, and I ask that it be inserted in the record so that this step in the development from a documentary point of view may be complete.

(The note referred to appears on p. 195 of appendix I.)

QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVES TO MAY 9 STATEMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, referring just a moment to a previous question, on the May the 9th meeting in which the issuance of the statement by the Department was considered, were there any alternative statements proposed and considered to the one which was issued?

Secretary GATES. Not in principle, Senator Fulbright.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in principle?

Secretary GATES. But there were, of course, various language versions considered.

The CHAIRMAN. Did anyone at that meeting raise the point that for the President, the Chief of State, to assume personal responsibility would be a departure from the historical practice of this country?

Secretary GATES. I think this was understood, Senator, and I believe that we felt the circumstances were different from anything that had prevailed heretofore.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point was raised and discussed?

Secretary GATES. I can't accurately say that it was raised and discussed but it was certainly in my mind and I believe it was obvious to all of us that it was a departure from precedent.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a departure from precedent in this country. Do you know of any other country that has followed this policy?

Secretary GATES. No; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone concerned that this might have far-reaching implications for the future of our intelligence operations?

Secretary GATES. Well, we knew that it already had marked the end of this particular method of collection of intelligence because of its being compromised [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that to your knowledge there was no time in the last few years, in which you are familiar with our activity, that U-2 flights were suspended for political reasons.

Secretary GATES. Not to my knowledge, Senator; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, were you ever consulted with regard to the wisdom of holding a summit conference?

Secretary GATES. No; I was not, Senator.

POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA ON DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTING

The CHAIRMAN. Do you personally believe there is any reasonable hope for any agreement with the Russians with regard to disarmament?

Secretary GATES. I think it is extremely doubtful, Mr. Chairman. I think that the Soviets are playing off-and-on-again tactics; sometimes cool, sometimes cold, sometimes hot.

I believe that their proposal for disarmament or total disarmament is completely unrealistic. I find it rather difficult to believe they will ever agree to the controls and inspections that we will of necessity insist upon to make progress on disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the same with regard to nuclear test bans?

Secretary GATES. I am not so definite on that, Mr. Chairman, from a personal point of view. We seem to have made more progress in the negotiations on tests than we have in the other field. But I again worry about the possibility of having valid control and inspection systems for either of these efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say, I believe, in answer to a question by Senator Morse that you did not believe any significant concessions could be expected from the Soviets at the summit meeting.

Secretary GATES. That is right. This has been consistent with my testimony before the committees of Congress all of this year.

QUESTION OF RELOCATION OF SOVIET BASES

The CHAIRMAN. Is it now probable that, as a result of the revelation of the efficiency of the U-2 photography, the Russians will now change the location of many of their strategic bases?

Secretary GATES. This is quite an undertaking. You don't do the construction that is involved in strategic bases easily or quickly, and they don't know precisely how much information we have about them, and I would think that they would perhaps take different means of building new bases or of dispersing bases or something of that character. But I don't believe that it is very practical to assume that they would shift major installations because of the character required to handle the strategic weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. What I meant is, do you feel that the information you now have may become rapidly obsolete because of their knowing you know about them they will change them, so that you will have a great deal of difficulty in keeping up with their location?

Secretary GATES. We will have to augment other methods toward obtaining this information.

[Deleted.]

RELEASE OF SECRETARY GATES' PREPARED STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, was your prepared statement released to the press?

Secretary GATES. Was what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Was the statement which you read initially released to the press?

Secretary GATES. I didn't release it, unless the committee did.

The CHAIRMAN. No, the committee didn't, as far as I know.

Captain JOHNSON. It has been released by Mr. St. Claire; I believe that he had released it. We didn't release it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it your purpose to release it?

Secretary GATES. It was up to you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, normally, the initial statement made by witnesses is the same as their own testimony. They either censor it or release it. I was just inquiring.

Secretary GATES. It is all right with me if it is all right with you that it be released, Mr. Chairman. I understand it has been released.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been released?

Secretary GATES. That is what I understand.

Captain JOHNSTON. Yes, sir, I was informed by someone from the committee, I believe Mr. St. Claire, that it had been released.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Captain JOHNSTON. By the committee, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask the staff, did you release it?

Mr. MARCY. No, Mr. Chairman, this will just be released in the normal way. It is put on the tape here. It went through the censors and, unless they took any portion of it out, it went to the public.

The CHAIRMAN. I just was wondering.

Secretary GATES. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I considered it your prerogative. I have no objection one way or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. It usually follows the same procedure. You make the statement and then it goes through the record if the censors wish it. Was this statement cleared with the State Department before you made it?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we find out whether a copy got in the hands of the newspapermen other than through normal sources here.

Mr. MARCY. No, sir, that did not happen, not through the committee. Everything goes through the regular process, through the censors, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I asked the clerk a moment ago if you had released it. He understood you had—I mean that you had given it to the press before.

Secretary GATES. I didn't give it to the press, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You or one of your aides, I don't know.

Secretary GATES. No, we did not release it.

TIMING OF KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION TO WRECK SUMMIT

The CHAIRMAN. You stated very positively that you believed the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, before he came to Paris, had already made up his mind to wreck the summit. Can you tell us how and why you arrived at that opinion?

Secretary GATES. Well, I felt, and again speaking personally, I felt that the fact that he arrived on Saturday night and asked for these appointments with President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan, and he arrived with a position paper translated in French in the case of de Gaulle and given orally by translation in English to Macmillan, a position paper that he used almost verbatim as the first part of his text the following morning, was pretty good indication that he had a preconceived plan at the summit meeting and was planning to, in my judgment again, and used the fact that there were 3,000 newspapermen in Paris and he had a platform to issue all of these statements from. Then I believe there were indications in other speeches that he made prior to the summit that he was going to adopt later on.

The CHAIRMAN. What in your opinion caused him to arrive at this conclusion to wreck the conference?

Secretary GATES. Why, I believe that he found that he had been unsuccessful in creating any disunity among the allies. That he was not going to get any substantive concessions himself, according to his terms, on Berlin and other critical issues that he might consider important, and that he wasn't going to get a blanket disarmament check without controls, and so forth. And I believe he felt that he was not going to make any progress at the summit.

EFFECT OF THE U-2 INCIDENT ON KHRUSHCHEV'S SUMMIT ACTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the U-2 incident contributed to that belief?

Secretary GATES. I, frankly in my judgment it did not, Senator Fulbright. I believe it gave him, it contributed to his public case, but I don't think it contributed to his position.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think that was a significant element in causing him to arrive at his conclusion?

Secretary GATES. I really do not; no, sir. I believe it was a factor in his, an important factor in helping him make his case, but I don't think it had anything to do with his policy decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think he would be better off and what reasoning leads you to this conclusion? Why is he better off having followed the course he did, than having gone to the conference and having it result in no concessions?

Secretary GATES. Only he can answer that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think he left in his initial statement what is called an "out" for the President, by saying he thought the President didn't know about this?

Secretary GATES. I don't know what his intentions were, whether that was an out or whether that was just a statement that he believed. I really don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. If it was an out, it would be inconsistent with his determination to wreck the conference, would it not?

Secretary GATES. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. If it was an out as it has been alleged, it would be inconsistent with his determination to wreck the conference. He wouldn't want to give the President an out, would he?

Secretary GATES. I never personally considered it was an out. I just thought he was using this as part of his speech—I don't consider it was an out.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he did say that he thought the President didn't know about it, didn't he, in his initial statement?

Secretary GATES. Yes; he did.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator MORSE, do you have any further questions?

Senator MORSE. Senator Wiley is next.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

Senator MORSE. I have some more questions.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, we know very well that Khrushchev had canvassed the situation with Macmillan, de Gaulle, with Adenauer and with our President, and they were all agreed and firm on the proposition that Khrushchev wanted, to wit, to divide Germany, and so forth and so on. Now, he was acquainted with that fact from his conversations, was he not?

Secretary GATES. I believe he was, sir.

Senator WILEY. And, in other words, he knew that if he went to the conference and couldn't get his way, which would be very apparent, that wouldn't sit so well with the people of Russia?

Secretary GATES. I think that is a good speculation.

Senator WILEY. So, it seems to be the consensus of those people who claim to know, including yourself, that the U-2 incident would give him something to hang on his previous determination and that he utilized. Do you agree to that?

Secretary GATES. Yes, I think he used the U-2 as a tool rather than as a matter of principle. I think he decided that there was no progress for him at the summit.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. Well, there is just this one other question. I think you have answered it, but see if I can't get it out into the open and get it so there won't be any question: Is it your opinion that he had known of the U-2 incidents for a long time—I mean the U-2 flights?

Secretary GATES. I think I believed him when he said that he knew we were overflying the Soviet Union. I don't believe he knew their capabilities. But I think he knew that unidentified aircraft were over his territory.

Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

RELATIONSHIP OF U-2 FLIGHTS TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue a bit further the line of questioning that I was conducting when my time was up because I think you have got to deal also with the problem of where we go from here, in view of Russian attitudes at the present time.

We have the air marshal's statement now which has not been countermanded as far as we know by Khrushchev, that if an American U-2 plane flies from any base, goes over Russia, they will fire a missile against that base.

Your testimony, I think, justifies my concluding that if they fire at that base, that under our commitments under NATO, our obligations to defend our allies, we will meet that force, and that that may very well start general war.

As I understand also your testimony, you share my doubt as to whether or not the air marshal is bluffing, whether or not this is propaganda in the cold war or whether or not this is an announcement of a definite decision as to what they are going to do.

So we have to discuss this hypothetically from this point on. Let's assume that he means exactly what he said, and because of my fear of the type of military mind they have in Russia as contrasted with our own, namely, the difference between amoral military leaders and moral military leaders, I am very fearful that the group in control of the Russian military at the present time means exactly what it says.

They will fire a missile at any base from which an American U-2 plane flies. Doesn't that put squarely up to us then the question as to whether or not we can justify being a party indirectly to the start-

ing of general war by flying any U-2 planes from any foreign base, in view of that announcement by the Russian air marshal?

Secretary GATES. We have announced that the U-2 flights will not be resumed. The President has announced this. This is, of course, known to them and that was announced prior to this Defense Minister's statement that you refer to.

Senator MORSE. That is what I want to clarify for this record because most respectfully, I don't think it is clear in the record that this committee has made to date.

The President announced at Paris that they were suspending them.

Secretary GATES. He made the statement, Senator, that he couldn't commit the next President, but as far as he was concerned, during his administration, the flights were stopped.

Senator MORSE. Then do you wish to express the viewpoint that at the present time the United States does not intend to continue any U-2 flights over Russia?

Secretary GATES. I think we made a commitment not to.

Senator MORSE. There has been a considerable amount of discussion in these hearings and outside of these hearings that in view of that situation that confronts us, it is intended to continue U-2 flights; that the President's statement was a statement made in connection with the summit conference situation.

In other words, the summit conference situation having blown up, it does not follow that that statement of the President now continues in effect.

It is your testimony that it is your understanding it does continue in effect?

NATURE OF PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT NOT TO CONTINUE FLIGHTS

Secretary GATES. I am not a lawyer, Senator, but I think you could take the legal point of view that the President had no commitment because of the blowup of the summit conference, but from a national point of view, prestige and the standpoint of the honorable point of view, I think the United States has made a commitment regardless of the technicality of the timing of the decision, so in my judgment we have made a commitment not to fly U-2 during the administration of this President.

Senator MORSE. I don't care to get into any argument over semantics, but only judging from what I read about the interpretation of the President's speech to the Nation, there are many news comments interpreting the President's speech to the Nation as a speech that does not commit this Nation to a discontinuance of U-2 flights, now that the summit conference has blown up.

I think it is very important that we make clear our position. I am not passing judgment now on what our position should be.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

INTERPRETATION OF PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ABOUT NOT RESUMING OVERFLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. But we have problems, may I say most respectfully, with people in other parts of the world, even including the segments of the population of our allies, raising the question as to whether or

not the President's speech to the Nation the other night means that we may continue U-2 flights.

In view of the statement of the air marshal of Russia as to what they are going to do if they do continue, my question is this: Should not our Government restate its position in regard to the continuation of U-2 flights and give the world assurance at the present time that we do not intend to continue U-2 flights and thus risk the possibility that the Russians may send a missile to the air base from which any U-2 flight might leave?

Secretary GATES. Senator, I have in my hand the President's statement in Paris in which he said:

In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident, and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.

That is a categorical statement that they are not to be resumed. This is what I understand our position is.

Senator MORSE. The President didn't say that in his speech to the Nation the other night. There isn't anything in the President's speech to the Nation the other night that categorically and unequivocally assures to the world that we are discontinuing, as a matter of espionage policy, the flying of any U-2 planes over any foreign territory.

All I seek to do at this point in the record, and please let me assure you of this, is to raise this point so that our Government can remove any suspicion or fear in other parts of the world in view of the Russian air marshal's statement, that the world doesn't have to be concerned about a nuclear war being started by us by sending a U-2 plane from any foreign base over Russia.

I think the world is entitled to that assurance at this moment in order to produce the relaxation that I think is necessary for the continuation, through the United Nations I hope, of a good faith, this attempt to reach some understanding with Russia.

Secretary GATES. It may well need clarification, Senator. I didn't think it did. I thought it was perfectly clear to me that we had made a commitment so long as the President is in office, not to fly the U-2 airplane, and everyone understood it. If they don't, perhaps it should be reexamined. However, you are now faced with making another statement in face of a threat, and I don't know whether this is a wise move or not.

Senator MORSE. I think it is a wise move if we honestly believe that this is more than a threat, that this is an announcement of military policy that they intend to deliver on.

WORLD OPINION ON U-2 OVERFLIGHTS

I don't intend to argue the point. I think the judgment of the world will be against us if, in view of what you call this threat, we should continue U-2 flights, because I think we have to share joint responsibility with Russia then for starting a nuclear war, because I seriously question whether world opinion will ever be with us on this kind of espionage conduct.

I think that world opinion is against our sending a U-2 flight over any foreign territory, because I think most people in other parts of the world consider it a form of constructive aggression.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you have any further questions? I think you are next.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the discussion which you have just had with Senator Morse---I think perhaps I only have a comment because my comment will go to a matter of personal opinion---as I understand the line of questioning that has been going on here, and as I think it probably will be interpreted, the United States is required to take the burden for all the ills of the world and take the responsibilities for all the mistakes in the world; that we must do everything, including complete submission to the demands and the threats of the Kremlin; and that the opinion of the world is apt to be slanted against us unless we do this at this time.

I have heard from so many sources over the country that we have to do this or that or the other thing as a gesture that we are not war-minded or that we are not warmongers, or that we really have some interest in our fellow man.

RECORD OF THE UNITED STATES AS A PEACEFUL NATION

Now, if the record of the United States over the last good many years of humanitarian activities, of fantastic expenditures of billions of dollars for peace, of fostering all kinds of conferences, of making all kinds of offers to meet all kinds of reasonable propositions for peace, based only upon reasonable agreements for their assurance of being carried out---if that isn't an assurance to the world, I personally think that to humble ourselves further by yielding to this threat of this military man in Russia would certainly not add to our prestige in the least, and it probably would be of little use in the eyes of the world, at least to those that we would expect to stand by us in an emergency.

I can't follow that line of reasoning, especially in view of the past record of the United States.

We started out at the end of World War II with the sole and exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, the ability to blow any nation off the map and anybody else if we wanted to if we were war-minded. Nobody else had it. We offered to give it up to an international agency to get out of the atomic business, to turn over all fissionable materials to an international agency; all we asked was that reasonable inspection, reasonable assurance, would be given that the international agency would have control and that no nation would cheat on this obligation.

Never in the history of the world, as far as I know, has a nation, possessing the exclusive ability and the exclusive power to destroy any other nation in the world, have they ever given that up or offered to give it up voluntarily.

We go from that step by step with vast amounts of money, with all kinds of humanitarian offers, with all kinds of peaceful offers, with all kinds of peaceful efforts in the world and I just want to make my position clear: we have stated we are not going to overfly Russia, at least so far as President Eisenhower's administration is concerned, with U-2's---that has been stopped. If we did continue it sometime in the future in the interests of the security of this country, I think:

the security of this country comes first in our responsibility, and we must take whatever reasonable means we have and whatever calculated risks that may be involved in order to secure essential information and in order to secure and maintain our proper defensive posture.

I feel that very deeply and I am not questioning you about it.

You don't have to agree or disagree. I merely wanted to make that statement in view of the fact that I don't agree that we have continually to humble ourselves in the eyes of the world, because I think it can do nothing but destroy the confidence, in many cases, that other Nations have in us if we continue to bow to the threats that emanate periodically from the Kremlin, and we have had just as bad threats in the past as this one. As I pointed out in my previous questions, where they said they have rockets pointed at our bases, they have rockets on the pads pointed at other countries in Europe; they know how many rockets they are going to put on Paris and that they are going to bury us one way or another, and so on, and I think there comes a time when even the world has to turn and stand fast. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

[Deleted.]

The Senator's time is up.

The Senator from Ohio, any questions?

Senator LAUSCHE. No further questions.

KHRUSHCHEV'S CHANGING VIEWS ON A SUMMIT CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to labor this too long, but I am interested in your reasoning. I didn't get to finish that question. Let me go back. Do you think when Chairman Khrushchev was in the United States last September that at that time he had an intention to have a summit conference?

Secretary GATES. I would only be speculating, Mr. Chairman. I think he did.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what happened between then and May 15, in your opinion, that caused him to take the firm decision which you stated a moment ago you believe he had.

Secretary GATES. I really don't know the value of my opinion, Mr. Chairman, but my opinion is that he has tried for many years to divide our allies from us. He has tried to divide the NATO membership in particular. He has resented the bases that surround his country, and he has had, I think, as a No. 1 objective the division of our security and collective alliances. I think he found during this intervening period that he couldn't make a dent in the solidarity and unity of these relationships, that he couldn't get anybody to change their position on Berlin. He found the British and the French and the United States stalwartly together on that subject, and that he found the NATO alliance in good shape and strong, and that he was going to run into a position where he would make no progress, and as someone else has remarked, I believe, during this testimony, he would probably lose some face at home if he couldn't make any progress.

U-2 INCIDENT'S EFFECT ON SUMMIT CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think he would have refused to participate if there had been no U-2 incident?

Secretary GATES. I think he would have—again, we must only speculate, Senator—I think he would have probably employed tactics that would have ruined the summit from within.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think he would have participated?

Secretary GATES. I think he would have participated and found some other mechanism of destroying it.

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles testified that the Air Force gave CIA weather forecasts that were helpful to the U-2 operation; is that correct?

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

[Deleted.]

SOVIET MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

The CHAIRMAN. What inference from Soviet military preparedness can properly be drawn from the U-2 incident?

Secretary GATES. This, pieced together and repeated and associated with other sources of intelligence builds up, unfolds a story that definitely disclosed a military posture.

It builds up a story that gives you a judgment on a capability for a surprise attack. It gives you a judgment on important installations. It gives you some judgment on production. It gives you some judgment on logistic backup and actual military sites, so that I would say it gave you a very definite look-see at their military posture.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it possible for you to give us a judgment? Was this preparation and strength very impressive? Was it greater than you had expected?

Secretary GATES. Coming into two recent jobs I have had, which is the first time I was ever involved in this, I would say that it impressed me, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the result of your overflights and the information you got has given you a better appreciation of their military strength and that appreciation is that they are very well armed—is that correct—better than you expected?

Secretary GATES. In some case, yes. In some case, perhaps less well than they advertised.

EFFECT OF SUMMIT FAILURE ON U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS

The CHAIRMAN. Does this failure of the summit and all that has resulted from it give you any new ideas as to the level of expenditures of programs relating to defense?

Secretary GATES. Not immediately, no, sir. But I believe I have said when I started to testify in January, I repeatedly stated we didn't expect to have any significant or substantive concessions. We believed there was a tactic on the part of the Soviet Union. We didn't know how long it would last and we are not basing our military programs on this premise and I also said that we should keep them under continuous review and as late as April we went back with a major revision in our military programs to the Appropriations Committees.

I believe now we should continue this careful and continuous process, and I have no desire right now to make any further recommendations to the Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee are about to mark up the defense bill I believe next week or this week.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ALERT

The CHAIRMAN. One inference I wish you would comment on that might have been drawn from the ordering of the test on May 15 is, I believe: Would it be fair to draw the inference that you had any doubt about the readiness of our Armed Forces.

Secretary GATES. No, sir, but it is a very good move and we should do it more frequently to have a no-notice alert communications and command readiness test, and we hope to do this, I say we started one again last night which has been long planned, it is going to be about a 7- or 8-day exercise.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been long planned.

DECISION TO ORDER ALERT

Was the one on the 15th long planned?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first think of doing that?

Secretary GATES. There was another one planned for about that period of time, as a matter of fact, I made the decision to do this myself.

The CHAIRMAN. After you arrived in Paris?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that that might have been construed as a provocative act under the circumstances that then existed in Paris?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, it was made after midnight on Sunday night. It was not intended nor was it worded as a provocative message. The first word in it was "Quiet," and the last words in it were "minimum need to know."

It was not meant as provocative. It was not meant as either an offensive or defensive alert.

In fact it was not issued as such. If we were going to go on that kind of an alert we would have had a higher degree of readiness than the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean you intended it as such. Don't you think reasonable people might have regarded it as a provocative act?

Secretary GATES. I think reasonable people would have regarded it as a prudent act.

The CHAIRMAN. But not as a provocative act?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. We have a member here who has just come in. Would you care to ask any questions, Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Can I follow up on two or three of yours?

The CHAIRMAN. You have 10 minutes to do as you please.

[Deleted.]

OVERFLIGHTS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think it was essential to have overflights in order to gain the kind of information that is supposed to have been gained in recent months?

Secretary GATES. Yes; this was by all means our best information. Secretary HUMPHREY. Well, it might be your best information.

Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was essential; yes; I do.

[Deleted.]

SOVIET AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we ever shot down any Soviet aircraft that have ever been over American territory?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have we shot down any Soviet aircraft that have been over areas where we have some military responsibility?

Secretary GATES. Not to my knowledge.

Senator HUMPHREY. Not over Korea; Japan?

Secretary GATES. You mean in peacetime?

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, in the armistice period.

Secretary GATES. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Senator HUMPHREY. We have not?

Secretary GATES. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I had been informed once that we had, and that is why I had asked the question.

Secretary GATES. Maybe we ought to qualify this. There has been speculation that "volunteers" have flown aircraft that have been shot down. These volunteers may have been Soviet, but, as far as I know, any identified as a Soviet aircraft has not been shot down.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has the Soviet Union protested to the United States because of an attack on our part on Soviet aircraft?

Secretary GATES. I can't answer that question, Senator, because my knowledge is that they have not. I don't think they have. No; I don't think so, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have reason to believe that the so-called volunteers might very well have been a little less than volunteers, possibly engaged actively in Soviet espionage?

Secretary GATES. Well, there has been sort of a technique evolving over a period of time in various places of the world where volunteers have appeared and we have always been a little apprehensive about them.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just a little?

Secretary GATES. No, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. I have a few more, Mr. Secretary, pursuing the same line of questioning I was pursuing before.

The President the other night in his speech to the Nation indicated very clearly that a nuclear war would produce devastation upon all participants.

POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL WAR

Going back to my hypothetical, assuming that we should fly a spy plane out of some foreign base and assuming that the Russian air marshal makes good on his threat and strikes that airbase with Russian missiles and starts a general war, do you think we could win it?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. You think we could destroy Russia and have enough of the United States left so that we could remain a power?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; because in this case he would, by initiating this attack, give considerable warning to our retaliatory forces and with that warning, we would move in.

Senator MORSE. Your view then is that the United States could win a nuclear war?

Secretary GATES. If it is started under those circumstances.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Do you think that the Russian military are aware of the fact that we could win a nuclear war if they started that war by simply sending a missile to one air base from which a spy plane might fly?

Secretary GATES. I think they are well aware of it.

Senator MORSE. Do you think then that if he kept his threat of sending a missile to a foreign air base from which a spy plane might be flown, he probably would go much further than that and send missiles elsewhere and if he knows it is going to lead to a general war, start a complete general war?

Secretary GATES. I think he would have to.

Senator MORSE. In your opinion, could we win that war?

Secretary GATES. Well, we could do what we call in the military, prevail in general war, but there would be great damage to the United States.

Senator MORSE. There would be terrific mutual destruction in a general war?

Secretary GATES. Yes; terrific damage.

Senator MORSE. Therefore—

Secretary GATES. But everything depends, Senator, on a lot of factors. If you vary any part of the equation you vary the answer. In other words, time of warning, reliability of missiles, ability to fire a salvo of missiles worldwide against deployed and U.S. forces at home and abroad. These factors and the accuracies of these weapons—any one piece of this equation varies the answer.

INTERPRETATION OF PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ON SUSPENSION OF U-2
FLIGHTS

Senator MORSE. Therefore, referring most respectfully to Senator Hickenlooper's observation, do you think that we would be showing a sign of weakness, that we would be guilty of appeasement, that we would be surrendering to threats if we removed any doubt in the world at the present moment by notifying the world that we have no intention of using military aircraft espionage tactics henceforth either by CIA, by NASA, by the Defense Establishment or by any other agency of the American Government?

Secretary GATES. Well, I wouldn't know quite how to answer your question, Senator, because maybe some of us that live so close to these things have a different understanding than the public has. It is so clear in my mind that the President has made a commitment not to fly these airplanes during his administration that I believe that the question becomes hypothetical, and I believe if it is clear to other people as it is to me that this is so, then it would be, I believe, stepping up to a threat. But if it is not clear, and I am incorrect in this, then I think we ought to take a look at it.

Senator MORSE. I am so anxious to see to it that we make it crystal clear because I am very much concerned about world reaction to our present position. I think we are living in the moment now where we can stop an adverse world reaction, and I think we are living in a moment where there is great danger that a substantial segment of world opinion is going to go against us, unless we are willing to make crystal clear that we are not going to, through any agency of our Government, resort to aircraft espionage, because we are dealing here when we are dealing with espionage, as you so very well, I think, described it yourself, with a form of activity that is a pretty ugly business.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And we all know that it isn't based on principles of truth. In espionage, you do what is necessary to protect your country, including deception and engaging in immoral acts. [Deleted.]

Now, I don't think we humble ourselves. To the contrary, I think we put them on the defensive in world opinion if we say to the world:

Listen, we want the Russians to understand that they are going to have to assume full responsibility for any starting of a war. We have said and we repeat to the world that we have no intention of using aircraft in espionage work over foreign territory.

You think it is perfectly clear. I have just come from across the country and I can give you assurance that it isn't in my judgment clear in American public opinion today, and you have really got a segment of public opinion in this country that wants that assurance from the President, because they take note of the fact that in his speech the other night he wasn't even as definite as he was at Paris in regard to this matter.

NEED FOR ASSURANCE OF CESSATION OF AIRCRAFT ESPIONAGE

Secretary GATES. Senator, under the American tradition, I would say that the President says he isn't going to overfly Russia during his administration, any circumvention of that statement would not be in character with either the President or our country. To me, it is completely clear, but I respect your judgment.

Senator MORSE. I may be completely wrong. My only point is that we can afford, it seems to me, as a Nation that does seek peace, to reassure the world as many times as that when assurance might help the cause of peace, and in doing so I don't think we humble ourselves. To the contrary, I think we put Russia on the defensive. It will help us in my judgment to win the so-called battle of propaganda for peace and strengthen us in getting these issues into the United Nations.

Of course I would say this. I think the President is to be commended for making clear in Paris that he is suspending U-2 flights--that is what he said; U-2 flights.

I think he is to be commended for that, and I hope that those who seek to replace him will give the world assurance immediately that when any one of them is elected President that will be their policy, too, because if all this is a moratorium for a few months, it is not going to strengthen America's position in world opinion. They want to know whether or not this is going to be the policy of the United States, because, in my judgment, if you continue espionage work by way of aircraft, you are going to lose the world opinion in southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the opinion of which America has got to win in the decades ahead to survive, because if that part of the world goes against us, it is only a matter of a few decades before we will cease, in my judgment, being a Nation.

You have got to win to the cause of freedom those hundreds of millions of people, and you are not going to do it in my judgment if you let Khrushchev get by with a propaganda drive now that we are the ones that are committing a form of aggression by carrying out an espionage program. We don't like to face up to it but in my judgment that is going to be the verdict of those people.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
Senator Gore?

SECRETARY GATES' PARTICIPATION IN ISSUANCE OF STATEMENTS

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say that the decision on the 9th that the President should assume full responsibility was a unanimous decision. Did I correctly understand you?

Secretary GATES. The statement that was issued was a unanimous paper. I think I am answering you yes.

Senator GORE. I wanted to give you an opportunity to affirm that, and you so do now.

You did not participate, I believe you told me, or you told the committee, in any conference between the 5th and the 9th.

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator GORE. So you did not participate in a conference or in a communication between the Department of State, the President at Gettysburg, or otherwise, with anyone regarding the issuance of the statement which was issued on the 7th by Mr. Herter?

Secretary GATES. No, I did not.

Senator GORE. Which partially acknowledged the mission of the plane.

Secretary GATES. That is correct. I had no participation in that in any way.

Senator GORE. I believe that concludes my questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

KHRUSHCHEV'S ATTITUDE FOLLOWING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to explore a bit the course of conduct taken by Khrushchev after his visit to the United States, concerning his attitude especially on West Berlin and West Germany. Isn't it a fact that following his visit to the United States, there was shown

by him a conciliatory attitude for a period of about a month or two? Are you able to answer that?

Secretary GATES. My impression is about the same as yours, Senator, that there was sort of a tone of conciliation in the air.

Senator LAUSCHE. We have had before this committee the Antarctic Treaty that has been recommended.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That was signed by the Soviet and by the United States.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that, I think, was last December 1. And there was progress made for a period on the matter of banning nuclear tests.

Secretary GATES. Yes; there was progress made.

Senator LAUSCHE. In fact, there was more progress made during that period than there had been at any other time on that subject.

Secretary GATES. I think that would be fair to say, that it looked more hopeful.

Senator LAUSCHE. On November 14 in a speech Khrushchev brutally attacked Adenauer and the German Republic.

Secretary GATES. I remember the speech.

Senator LAUSCHE. You remember that speech?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And there was some speculation in the minds of the people in our Government as to what his purpose was in making that attack when ostensibly there was to be a conference to reach some agreement on West Germany and Berlin.

Now then, on December 1, he began repeating his threats that he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Is it not a fact that his attack upon Adenauer and upon the German Republic and his purpose to sign a separate peace treaty, was confirmation of the immovable position he took before he met at Camp David about West Berlin and East Germany?

Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was. I think his position was well advertised, and we felt in the Department of Defense that we were living under a threat of a separate peace treaty at that time.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then he has the Baku speech of April 25 in which he gave a harsher version of what he had been saying for months about East Berlin, West Berlin, and the German Republic. That is in April, pretty close to May 16, and then we have those circumstances in which you point out that he had a translated paper originally written in Russian into French translation so that he gave it to—

Secretary GATES. De Gaulle.

Senator LAUSCHE. De Gaulle. How did he present his paper to Macmillan?

Secretary GATES. My understanding, Senator, was that he didn't leave a paper with Macmillan. He talked from the same paper and it was translated through an interpreter to Macmillan verbally. This is my understanding.

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't it also a fact that during all of this time and especially in the several months preceding the conference, the supposed conference, the four powers stated that there would be no yielding on West Berlin, and our rights in West Berlin?

Secretary GATES. That is right.

KHRUSHCHEV'S SUMMIT CONFERENCE AIMS

Senator LAUSCHE. In your opinion, what was the primary thing that he was aiming for in the conference? I am speaking of Khrushchev.

Secretary GATES. You mean when he agreed to go to a summit conference?

Senator LAUSCHE. And down to the end.

Secretary GATES. I testified that I think he thought he would have his way and make some peace treaty in Berlin with some kind of give on the part of our allies and our allies refused to give.

REASONS FOR REVOKING INVITATION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. Now then, have you given any thought to why he revoked the invitation to the President to come to the Soviet land?

Secretary GATES. Well, again we speculate but in my opinion the last thing he wanted was for the President to travel around his country and be acclaimed and received by the population of Russia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you think that he had flashes in his mind about the acclaim that Nixon got in Poland, and in other places?

Secretary GATES. He probably did.

Senator LAUSCHE. And do you think that he kind of thought that there would be demonstrations for the President of the United States by the Russian people unparalleled anywhere?

Secretary GATES. I believe there would have been.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is my honest conviction, that he did not dare have the President meet the Ukrainian people and the normal Russian people, excluding the Communists, in that trip to the Soviet and that is why the invitation was revoked.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LAUSCHE. I yield.

POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ON KHRUSHCHEV'S THINKING

Senator WILEY. I think there are some other facts there that fit into the picture that you have very dramatically given us.

Do you remember after he came to America he went back and he canvassed individually the various heads of the various states, and then he made a trip out east and he met Mao Tse-tung?

It was after that that he made that Baku speech. He made several other speeches, and if you remember, the papers were pretty well filled with the thoughts that the Chinese Communists were telling him, and that at the time that he did go to Paris, that conditions were such that the evidence indicated the Chinese were in Russia. Now all this bolsters the conclusion that the Secretary has made, that it wasn't the U-2 incident. That was just something that he got hold of as an ostensible reason.

The other was that he couldn't get his way and that, I understand, is your position.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have nothing more to ask you. Thank you very much, Mr. Gates.

EFFECT OF DENIAL OF OPPORTUNITY FOR PRESIDENT TO VISIT SOVIET UNION

Senator GORE. If the Senator would yield, I would like to observe that I was in the Far East at the time President Eisenhower made his visit to India and other countries, and there was a tremendous favorable reception. It served the cause of our country magnificently well.

I think it is a great loss to us that the President has been denied the opportunity to visit in the Soviet Union. It would have, in my view, been a great contribution. He is unquestionably a great exemplary influence for America, and I agree with you, Senator Lausche and Senator Wiley, that the denial of the opportunity of this visit is a great loss to us.

I do not know whether Mr. Khrushchev wanted it or did not want it. Everyone can draw his own conclusions there.

I wish now that the exchange visit had been arranged before the summit conference. Perhaps we would have had a different result.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness would like to make a comment.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S DIGNITY AND CHARACTER AT PARIS MEETING

Secretary GATES. I want to make a comment I sort of feel like making, Mr. Chairman. I think you know about this because you were there. I think everyone should be terribly proud of the dignity and character of the President in this Paris meeting.

I happened to be sitting next to him and it was a most remarkable performance of strength of character and dignity of any man I have ever seen.

Senator GORE. You might be interested to know that I immediately took the floor and expressed such views, and I do not believe you will find any member of this committee has criticized the President's conduct while in Paris.

Secretary GATES. I am sure of that. The purpose of my remarks was not intended to do anything but just make a statement. I know he has had remarkable support of not only the Congress and this country, but of all of our allies too, the NATO meeting that followed the Paris meeting was a remarkable meeting.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, gentlemen?

Senator WILEY. I want to express what you usually do, the appreciation of the committee for the fine work of the Secretary here this morning.

Senator LAUSCHE. I did want to go into this speech of Senator Dodd where he points out how Communists took charge in the organizing of the meeting in New York of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. But I am not going to go into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your very frank and candid responses and for the patience that you have shown in bearing with the committee in asking these questions. I think you have made a very useful record for the benefit of the committee, and I think we understand what has gone on much better than we did before you came up here, and I hope that the record, as censored by the proper authorities, will not in any way embarrass you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GATES. I hope not, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, before concluding the hearing I would wish to express to you my personal appreciation for the dignity, intelligence, and discretion and the courage you have displayed and statesmanship during the course of this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

CHALMERS ROBERTS' CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Senator GORE. Now I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the record a chronology of events which I found exceedingly well done by Mr. Chalmers Roberts.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The chronology referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, May 27, 1960]

CHRONOLOGY OF U-2 INCIDENT TRACED IN TANGLED WEB OF SUMMIT DISPUTE

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

Who was responsible for the incredible assortment of conflicting statements and contradictory assertions when the Eisenhower administration was confronted with the U-2 spy plane crisis?

This is the most immediate question in the tangled web of the U-2 affair and the subsequent collapse of the Summit Conference in Paris. What follows is a detailed examination of the facts about the Administration's handling of the U-2 case.

It should be noted beforehand, however, that there are other important parts to the whole story: The apparent public hardening of American policy toward the Soviet Union prior to the U-2 affair; Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's reaction to that hardening; Khrushchev's reactions to the American accounts of the U-2 case; and the internal Soviet pressures on Khrushchev, before and after the spy plane was downed, because of his year-old policy of trying to do business with President Eisenhower.

Whether or not Khrushchev would have scuttled the Summit, had there been no U-2 incident, is not now clear; there are divided opinions in the Administration on that. A good many diplomats do tend to agree with what President Eisenhower said to the congressional leaders yesterday—that Khrushchev may have scuttled the conference because he was under "pressure by the Stalinists," those in Moscow suspicious of any dealing with the West, "and the Chinese" Communists who have openly disagreed with Khrushchev's policies.

But that question is only indirectly related to the handling of the U-2 affair by the Eisenhower Administration.

The chief figures in the U-2 drama in Washington were President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, Central Intelligence Agency Chief Allen W. Dulles and White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty.

It is evident from the record that much of the confusion sprang from the fact that no one acted in supreme authority in directing the Administration's actions.

Here is the chronological record as far as it is known today:

May 1.—The U-2 flight of pilot Francis G. Powers took place on this date because of a clear weather forecast. That forecast also indicated that such good weather probably would not be repeated for some weeks; that is, until after the Summit Conference, then 2 weeks off. CIA officials say the equipment carried by Powers, including the tiny poison needle, is standard equipment carried by all Strategic Air Command crews. It is designed to help a crewman escape if downed in enemy territory. Powers never was ordered to use the needle to avoid capture; it was for use to avoid torture, if captured, according to CIA officials. The pistol was not for murdering Russians but for shooting small game, it is contended.

Second flight

The day of Powers' flight, there was a second U-2 flight from Turkey. This was a meteorological flight outside the Soviet Union, the kind of flight the National Aeronautics and Space Administration unwittingly thought all U-2's were making. NASA was, of course, the "cover" for the clandestine flights over the Soviet Union.

These penetrations of Soviet air space had been going on for four years with results highly gratifying to American intelligence officials. There had been a great many of these flights and the Powers mission was not the first designed to cross the Soviet Union. Others had succeeded when he failed.

So detailed were the photographs brought back by the U-2s that at one time the State Department's Policy Planning Staff considered a proposal to show them to Khrushchev. The idea was to use them in an effort to break down his resistance to inspection and control for various disarmament schemes.

The proposal was rejected, however, partially on the grounds that Khrushchev already knew of the flights and that such a move might lead him to make such a public row that they would have to be discontinued.

Cutoff planned

CIA officials contend that there was to be a cutoff of U-2 flights before the Summit, that the question was how much time constituted a margin of safety. Nevertheless, the Powers mission was permitted to take place two weeks before the Summit. In his speech on Wednesday the President implied he fully approved of that.

Mr. Eisenhower said that, as to complaints over the timing of the flights so close to the Summit, "there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed." By implication, he meant there was no reason to cancel the flight because of the impending conference with the Russians.

However, this has not always been the President's policy. In September, 1956, in the midst of the Suez crisis negotiations with the Russians as well as the Egyptians—the President did order a halt to the U-2 flights. Then he apparently wanted to avoid an incident which would make negotiation more difficult.

There is no evidence, however, that the President was aware beforehand of this particular flight or that either the State Department or the CIA thought his specific approval necessary. He had delegated authority for the flights, once having approved the entire U-2 scheme following Soviet rejection of his "open skies" plan at the 1955 Geneva Summit conference.

May 1-4.—During this period the CIA and the State Department knew that Powers was missing; they hoped he had crashed and that pilot and plane had left no tell-tale evidence. The initial confusion over the missing plane, as to whether it was Powers or the legitimate meteorological flight in Turkey the same day, was soon cleared up. There is no evidence that the Administration laid out any plan of how to handle the possible disclosures later made by Khrushchev.

May have been misled

The Administration may have been misled into thinking Khrushchev would remain silent because of Soviet action over the expected visit to the United States of the boss of the Soviet Air Force, Air Marshal K. A. Vershinin.

On May 2 the Soviets asked for a 48-hour postponement of the announcement of the visit. But on May 4 they agreed to a joint United States-Soviet announcement and it was made that day. The visit was canceled on May 13 after Khrushchev's U-2 disclosure.

On May 3 it was announced from Istanbul, Turkey, that a single-engine Air Force plane was missing near Lake Van, not far from the Soviet border. It was described as a high altitude research plane belonging to NASA.

The report said the plane was one of two which had taken off from the United States base at Incirlik near Adana, Turkey, on a weather reconnaissance mission. The other plane returned safely but the pilot of the missing craft was said to have reported his oxygen equipment was out of order.

Standard story

This was the standard sort of "cover" story for the missing U-2, issued in the hopes that it would suffice. It was not known here whether Powers' U-2 went down or why. To this date, in fact, there is only Khrushchev's word that it was downed near Sverdlovsk, deep inside the Soviet Union.

May 5.—Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow the bare details of the U-2 flight, deliberately (he said later) withholding information

which would have let Washington know that Powers was alive and that much of his equipment had been captured intact. He set a trap into which the Eisenhower Administration fell.

In his Wednesday speech, Mr. Eisenhower contended that the "covering statement," as he called it, was imperative "to protect the pilot, his mission, and our intelligence processes at a time when the true facts were still undetermined."

On May 5 Secretary Herter was in Athens, en route home from a NATO foreign ministers conference in Turkey. In charge of the State Department was Under Secretary Dillon.

Dillon's responsibility

Under the President's delegation of authority, it was Dillon's responsibility for what next occurred until Herter's return late on May 6. It was on May 5 and 6 that the administration allowed itself to be entangled in a series of lies about the U-2.

When newsmen went to Press Secretary Hagerty for comment on Khrushchev's speech, Hagerty was careful to say only that the President did not know of the news story about the speech.

News of the speech arrived here just after the President had left by helicopter for a National Security Council meeting at a secret hideout, part of a civil defense exercise. There is no evidence on whether the President at that meeting discussed what to do about the Khrushchev disclosure. The subsequent record indicates that he left it to Dillon and the State Department.

State Department spokesman Lincoln White, who received his instructions personally from Dillon, said that "it may be" that the plane Khrushchev referred to was the missing so-called NASA aircraft. It was also announced that the President had ordered an immediate inquiry into Khrushchev's accusation.

Trouble compounded

This semi-lie was aggravated by NASA's press chief, Walter T. Bonney. Unaware that NASA was being used as a "cover" for the spy flights, Bonney said at a press conference that the plane was on a wholly peaceful mission. He gave details of the plane's Adana take-off, its route within Turkey and the pilot's alleged report of his oxygen trouble. The Administration's story thus was that a peaceful flight outside Soviet borders might have by accident transgressed the Soviet-Turkish border.

There is no evidence that the President or Dillon, or anyone else in authority in the Administration, took charge of the whole affair and told NASA to say nothing. There have been subsequent hints from the White House, however, that some such order went out to NASA but was overlooked or disregarded. The record here is not clear.

May 6.—In Moscow it was claimed the U-2 was shot down by a rocket on Khrushchev's personal order, but other details still were withheld. However, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko termed the American explanation "nonsense."

"Full facts" asked

The State Department said it was asking the "full facts" in Moscow. White, still acting under Dillon's orders, declared that "there was absolutely no—no—deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet airspace." The lie thus was compounded.

Around dinner time Herter arrived home from Greece to take charge of the State Department.

The strongest evidence that the handling of the U-2 affair was left by the President to the State Department—first to Dillon, then to Herter—comes from Vice President Richard M. Nixon. On a May 15 television show Nixon gave this explanation, putting part of the blame for the fumbling on the insistent demand of newsmen for the facts:

"Now, let's look at the problem with which our people in the State Department were confronted when this information developed. They did not know at the outset what the Soviet Union knew. They did not know that the pilot had been recovered and that they had obtained information from him or otherwise which made it imperative we acknowledge that these flights had taken place.

Alternative question

"Now, some would say then, 'well, why then didn't we keep our mouths shut and say nothing and wait until we found out what they knew?'"

"And here again we have the problem of the open society. We have newsmen in Washington. The newsmen descended upon the State Department and other

officials in great numbers. They had a right to. And they asked for the information. What about this? And, so under the circumstances, it was felt that the best thing to do was to engage in effect in what usually is engaged in where so-called espionage activities are undertaken, evasive actions, evasive actions, so as to protect the pilot in the event that he had been captured and also evasive actions so as to give the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, for example, an opportunity to accept the consequences of this flight without admitting as he has had to admit that it had been conducted for espionage purposes."

Later in the same program Nixon added that "they had to make a snap decision at the moment and it proved that it turned out that that decision was wrong and in these kinds of activities, we, of course, want to try to avoid mistakes if we can."

References missing

Nowhere in the three-and-a-half-hour television program did Nixon refer to any presidential direction in the U 2 crisis, other than his approval of the flights some years earlier. Nor was there any reference to his own part in the affair. Nixon, of course, sits in the National Security Council.

Nixon did say that he was "privy" to the U 2 reconnaissance policy "and I do endorse it." He also said that "I knew about this flight * * *."

On Friday afternoon, May 6, the President went to his Gettysburg, Pa., farm for a weekend of rest and golf. He did not return to Washington until Sunday, May 8 but he was in telephone communication with Herter during the weekend. Hagerty, who accompanied the President to Gettysburg, also talked by phone to Herter.

May 7. Khrushchev, in a second Moscow speech on the U 2, disclosed the pilot was alive and talking and that much of his equipment had been captured intact. Khrushchev showed the Supreme Soviet photos taken from the U 2 of Soviet military installations and he detailed the plane's equipment.

Genuine information

American officials, who received the speech in the morning, Washington time, knew Khrushchev was using information that was genuine and that some of it could have come only from Powers himself.

Khrushchev quoted Hagerty as saying that "the President, in his opinion, knew nothing about the incident involving the American plane. I fully admit (said Khrushchev) that the President did not know that a plane was sent beyond the Soviet frontier and did not return."

The Khrushchev speech resulted in a series of all-day conferences in which the chief figures were Herter, Dillon, Allen Dulles and a number of lesser State Department officials, including Herter's adviser on Soviet affairs, Charles E. Bohlen.

Out of this came a unanimous decision to tell the truth—but not all the truth. The dinner-hour State Department statement said that the flight referred to by Khrushchev "was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U 2 plane * * *."

Flight justified

The flight was justified on the grounds of the need "to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain" to lessen the dangers of a surprise attack on the free world in general and the United States in particular.

On the critical issue of who was responsible for the flight, however, the statement lied. It said that "as a result of the inquiry ordered by the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Mr. Khrushchev."

In making this statement, chiefly the decision of Secretary Herter, those involved were guided by a number of considerations. They felt that Khrushchev had the evidence and therefore an admission was essential despite the earlier lies. But they were trapped in a dilemma on the issue of responsibility. They decided it was best to avoid admitting any responsibility by President Eisenhower even at the cost of accepting the resultant impression that Washington's control was so lax that American pilots around the world could go off on their own on a mission that might provoke a war.

Dulles willing

During the State Department deliberations Allen Dulles made it clear that he, as head of CIA, was prepared to take full responsibility for the flight, that if the

Administration wanted to pin the blame on him to avoid blaming the President, he would agree. But this idea was not accepted as being practical in view of Khrushchev's disclosures.

Herter read the draft statement on the phone to the President in Gettysburg. He approved it without changing a word.

In part, at least, Herter's decision to tell the Ho that no one in Washington authorized the flight also was based in the slim hope that somehow Khrushchev would accept it. The Secretary and his aides had noted Khrushchev's acceptance of what he had taken as Hagerty's disclaimer of any Eisenhower responsibility.

May 8. While the world assessed the seemingly incredible American admission that the U-2 had indeed been on an espionage flight, President Eisenhower returned to Washington and met with Herter at the White House.

Notes to Britain, France

The same day Khrushchev sent notes to Britain and France about the forthcoming summit conference. In them he complained about the U-2 but gave no indication it would be used to wreck the conference as was to be the case.

By now Hagerty was alarmed at the implications of the admission statement, implications that the President did not know what was going on. He was insistent to Herter that this should somehow be eliminated. It is not clear whether the President said the same thing to Herter directly but if he did there would seem to have been no reason for Hagerty to do so.

May 9.—After another State Department conference, Herter put out a statement in his name saying that "penetration" by the U-2s of the Soviet Union had been going on for four years, that this had been done by presidential orders "since the beginning of his Administration" in order to gather intelligence. But Herter added that "specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to presidential authorization." This, at last, appeared to be the truth.

Unaware of Implication

This was the statement which left the implication that such U-2 flights would be continued over the Soviet Union. But there is reason to believe that none of those involved at State Department was conscious of any such implication when they drafted the statement. They took the view, shared by the CIA, that the U-2 setup now was "a blown agent" to be discarded, that other intelligence gathering methods would continue, however.

Nonetheless the implication was there and neither State nor the White House did anything to correct it until the President himself told Khrushchev in Paris a full week later that "these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed."

The President said Wednesday he wanted no public announcement until he met Khrushchev in Paris. American officials also claimed the flight suspension was ordered the previous Thursday, May 12, which is at cross-purposes with the claim that no implication of further flights was contained in Herter's May 9 statement.

Nixon unaware

Indeed, Nixon in his May 15 television appearance seemed unaware that the flights had been cancelled. He then said:

"The first responsibility of the President of the United States * * * is to protect the security of this country and of free peoples everywhere from the devastation that would result from a surprise attack. Now, that is why these flights were made in the first place. That is why an indication has been made that such activities may have to continue in the future * * *"

Herter and Dulles appeared on May 9 before a specially arranged closed-door Congressional leadership meeting. To at least some of those present Herter left the clear implication that the flights would continue.

May 10.—The Soviet news agency, Tass, described Herter's statement as "a frank attempt to legalize and justify violation of the state frontiers of other nations for espionage purposes." A Soviet note to the United States avoided blaming President Eisenhower personally but, in referring to the May 7 statement by State, said it did "not correspond to reality." It charged that the U-2 flights "are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States of America."

Welcome doubted

May 11.—At an exhibition in Moscow of the U-2 wreckage and equipment, Khrushchev said Herter's May 9 statement made him doubt "Our earlier conclusion" that the President himself did not know of the flights. He said he doubted the President would be welcome in Russia during his scheduled June visit there.

When asked whether the U-2 incident would come up at the Summit Conference, Khrushchev replied: "It is already the subject of worldwide discussion. Therefore I believe there is no need to put it on the discussion schedule at the Summit Conference."

The same day at his press conference here President Eisenhower took full responsibility for the U-2 flights, said nothing to counter the implication that they would continue, remarked that "no one wants another Pearl Harbor."

May 12-14.—During this period Khrushchev went to Paris a day early, arriving on Saturday, May 14. Herter arrived on May 13 but there was no United States-Soviet contact. On the 13th the Soviet Union sent protest notes to Norway, Pakistan and Turkey warning against further use of their territory for such missions as those of the U-2 which Khrushchev had claimed took off from Pakistan with the expectation of landing in Norway.

On the 12th the United States sent a note to Moscow which said the United States had "fully stated its position" about the U-2 incident in the May 9 Herter statement.

By now President Eisenhower's responsibility for the U-2 flights, if not for the specific Powers mission, had been firmly established on the public record.

May 15.—The President arrived in Paris just before Khrushchev's call on French President de Gaulle. The President considered two possible moves in this final day before the Summit Conference was to open: To ask for a bilateral meeting with Khrushchev and to announce publicly that no more flights would be made.

But the President decided against either step. He did so chiefly on the basis of de Gaulle's report of the hard stand taken by Khrushchev in their talk that morning. His aides told him they deduced from Khrushchev's words with de Gaulle that the Soviet leader had come to Paris bound by a prior Moscow decision by the ruling Presidium, that he therefore could not be swayed by either suggested Eisenhower move.

Allen statement

On this same day in Washington George V. Allen, chief of the U. S. Information Agency, said on a television show that Herter "has not said that we are going to continue to fly" U-2 missions, that "he hasn't said one way or another." This statement surprised State Department officials who now say Allen was talking entirely on his own, that he had consulted nobody in advance.

May 16.—At the only Paris confrontation between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev, the Soviet leader said the United States had "torpedoed" the conference. He demanded that the President apologize for the flights, call off further flights and punish those responsible for Powers' mission. These were the same demands of which he had informed de Gaulle the day before. He charged the President with making "treachery" the basis of his policy toward the Soviet Union.

To this the President responded by terming Khrushchev's demands an "ultimatum" which "would never be acceptable to the United States." He also told Khrushchev that U-2 flights had been suspended and would not be resumed. The two men parted in anger. The Summit had collapsed before it had begun.

SPEECH OF SENATOR DODD

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to put into the record a copy of Senator Dodd's speech describing how this meeting in New York, on the phase sponsored by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy but organized by Communists, was conducted.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The speech referred to follows:)

[From the Congressional Record, May 25, 1960, pp. 10234-10237]

THE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN MOVEMENT

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in his statement of January 22, J. Edgar Hoover warned that Nikita Khrushchev's visit to this country had resulted in the reinvigoration of the American Communist movement and that the FBI was receiving increasing evidence of stepped-up Communist activities at many points.

Among other things, Mr. Hoover warned that non-Communist organizations dedicated to causes that command popular support could expect Communist efforts to infiltrate their ranks.

Evidence that has come into the hands of the Subcommittee on Internal Security indicates that the Communist Party has made the nuclear test ban movement the chief target of its infiltration operations. I think it important that this evidence be placed before Congress and before the public so that we may have a better understanding of the methods by which the Communists operate and of the goals they seek to achieve. I should like to detail to you some of the evidence of this infiltration, and to suggest the outline of a self-defense program for all organizations whose purposes make them particularly vulnerable to Communist infiltration.

I do not accept the thesis that if one happens to hold a position that enjoys the support of the Communist Party on any issue, one is, ipso facto, either a pro-Communist or a fellow traveler. The Communists are opposed to the poll tax: does that make all people who oppose the poll tax Communists? The Communists support the Forand bill. Does that make the many millions of Americans who have endorsed the bill Communist sympathizers? Obviously not. But on a foreign policy issue of overriding importance like the test ban, if a legitimate organization adheres to a policy which coincides with Communist policy, then it must be prepared to expect a concerted effort at infiltration by the Communist termites. The more urgent the issue, the more respectable the organization, the more illustrious the names on its letterhead, the greater the temptation from the Communist standpoint.

The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy is headed by a group of nationally prominent citizens about whose integrity and good faith there is no question. Among them are people like Norman Cousins, of the Saturday Review, Mr. Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee, Mr. Norman Thomas, and so forth. They advocate a point of view which some of us consider unrealistic or utopian, but it is, nevertheless, a significant point of view on an issue of life and death importance. For the personal motivations of most of those associated with the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy I have the most sincere respect. The point of view they represent deserves a hearing—indeed, it must be heard.

Last Thursday evening, May 19, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy held a rally at Madison Square Garden in New York City. Many eminent persons attended this rally. The speakers included Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Mr. Alfred Landon, Mr. Walter Reuther, Gov. G. Mennen Williams, of Michigan, and Dr. Harold Taylor, former President of Sarah Lawrence College. At this meeting, the speakers urged that another summit meeting be convened for the purpose of attempting to arrive at an agreement banning nuclear tests.

Because I esteem the sincerity of the original founders of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and the sincerity of the speakers I have named, it was for me an unpleasant duty to have to notify them that the unpublicized chief organizer of the Madison Square Garden rally, Henry Alrons, was a veteran member of the Communist Party; that there was also evidence of serious Communist infiltration at chapter level throughout the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy; that the Communist Party and its front organizations had done their utmost to promote the meeting; that the Communists provided much of the organizing machinery for the meeting because they planned to use it as a pressure instrument in support of Soviet nuclear diplomacy.

This information was confirmed by the Subcommittee on Internal Security only several days before the Madison Square Garden meeting was scheduled to take place. Because I wished to be fair to all the decent and prominent people who were associated with the meeting as sponsors or as speakers, I had some doubt about the advisability of rushing into print with my information only

48 hours in advance of the rally. Instead, I decided to communicate the information, or at least certain essential portions of it, to Mr. Norman Cousins, the chairman of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Mr. Cousins came to Washington to see me and we had a long and frank discussion about the problem.

The directors of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, it turned out, had some inkling of the existence of a Communist infiltration and were extremely unhappy about it. When the Communist affiliations of the chief organizer of the Madison Square Garden meeting were brought to Mr. Cousins' attention, he immediately suspended the organizer in question. This was 2 days before the meeting. It is my understanding that the national committee of the organization intends to take some further measures against Communist infiltrators.

If I have any criticism to make, it is that the directors of the organization have moved so slowly to confront the problem and that the measures they have taken have been inadequate. I was, for example, surprised to discover that one of the officers of the committee, Mr. Norman Thomas, had, as early as last January, expressed serious suspicion about the individual who later became organizer of the Madison Square Garden meeting—but that no action had been taken on Mr. Thomas' warning.

To me it is appalling that the Communists should be able to infiltrate and manipulate a movement founded on sincere humanitarian and pacifist motivations, and headed by so many reputable citizens. Perhaps this is a situation in which remedial legislation is indicated, a situation in which private citizens must have the assistance of Government to cope effectively with a movement that operates by stealth and by secrecy.

In accordance with the subcommittee's mandate from the Senate, it was clear that our duty required that we do everything in our power to get at the facts. In presenting the information we have gleaned to the Senate, it is my hope that I will be able to do so in a manner that will avoid injury to the innocent and will point the way to a constructive course of action by Government and private organizations.

The test ban has for several years now been the chief objective of the Communist propaganda apparatus. Of this there is ample documentary evidence.

In his speech before the congress of the Soviet Communist Party on January 27, Nikita Khrushchev, in his most militant rhetoric, called for a permanent ban on nuclear tests.

The main political resolution adopted by the 17th congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., in February 1960 said:

"The demand that the administration end nuclear testing and ban the H-bomb has found a widening response in community meetings, peace talks, petitions, and sermons from the pulpit."

On February 16, 1960, seven Communist foreign language newspapers took a full-page advertisement in the New York Times and called on the President—

"1. To proclaim the achievement of total, universal, and controlled disarmament as the goal of National U.S. policy.

"2. To restore the moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons and to do everything in your power to insure early agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests.

"3. To oppose the sharing of nuclear warheads with NATO allies."

The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has not solicited the praise of the Communist movement, and most of its leaders, I am certain, would be much happier if they received no plaudits from Communist sources. The fact, nevertheless, remains that the committee in recent years has been the recipient of consistent and generous praise from the Communist press. The Communist organ, *New World Review*, for April of this year, for example, carried these paragraphs under the caption "Peace Groups in the United States":

"No amount of conspiratorial silence can wipe out the forces for disarmament and peace; but it can leave them isolated from each other and ignorant of the efforts their fellows are making.

"It is our purpose to bring to our readers' attention the main groups in our country working toward these ends, beginning in this issue * * * with a description of the main nonsectarian national organization.

"NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY"

"SANE offers a wide choice of channels for expression of the American people's desire for a world without war. Under the co-chairmanship of Norman

Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, and Clarence Pickett, executive secretary emeritus of the American Friends Service Committee, and with the sponsorship and support of many noted Americans, SANE provides an elastic organization and comprehensive program through which ordinary people can be effective.

"Local committees of SANE exist in many cities, towns, counties, and small communities throughout the United States. Their membership policy is flexible and they generally welcome additions to their forces, whether for one particular campaign or on a long-term basis."

Mr. President, to anyone who is familiar with the language of communism, the paragraphs I have just quoted constitute a clear directive to members of the Communist Party to enter into the ranks of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. These paragraphs, I might point out, were not the haphazard product of a novice or intellectual dilettante. They were written by the editor of the magazine, Jessica Smith, a hardened oldtime Communist.

As for the Madison Square Garden meeting, the Communist organ, the Worker, in a series of its own advertisements, called upon all the Communists faithful to turn out in strength. The masthead of the Worker for May 15 carried a banner headline "For Sanity in Foreign Policy-- All Out to Madison Square Garden, Thursday, 7:45 p.m."

Given this background, it was only natural to anticipate that the Communists would attempt to find their way into the organizing mechanism of the meeting.

The name of the Communist Party member who served as chief organizer of the Madison Square Garden meeting is Henry H. Abrams. As I have pointed out, Mr. Norman Cousins suspended Mr. Abrams several days before the meeting, when I brought the matter to his attention. Until the date of his suspension, however, Mr. Abrams devoted virtually full time to the organization of the meeting for many weeks. He did so, moreover, without remuneration.

On March 16, 1960, Mr. Abrams attended a meeting of the executive committee of the Greater New York committee of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Let me read just two sentences from the minutes of that meeting, which clearly illustrates the central role this Communist agent has played:

"Dr. Lear reported that Gov. G. Mennen Williams has accepted our invitation to speak at Madison Square Garden. Henry Abrams then gave the rest of the Madison Square Garden report."

Henry Abrams' residence at 11 Riverside Drive, New York City, and his telephone number of Trafalgar 4-7760, is the address and telephone number used by the headquarters of the Upper Manhattan Sane Nuclear Policy Committee. Abrams has served as an accountant for both the Upper Manhattan Committee and the Greater New York Committee of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. From these facts it emerges that his association with the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy was a long and fairly prominent one.

Now let us look at Henry Abrams' Communist record.

In 1939, he resided at 972 East 14th Street, Brooklyn, N.Y. In that year he signed a Communist Party nominating petition from that address which appeared on page 4091 of the election records.

He was a member of the 11th Assembly District Club of the Communist Party which met at 27-44 Broadway, New York City. On Tuesday, February 15, 1944, it was announced at a meeting of this Communist club that Henry Abrams would give a class for Communists on the preparation of income tax forms.

Henry Abrams was a member of the Young Communist League and later of the upper West Side section of the Communist Party of New York City. He has been a consistent financial contributor to the Communist Party, U.S.A.

As recently as September 28, 1958, the official Communist Party newspaper, the Worker, printed a letter from Henry Abrams endorsing the candidacy of Benjamin Davis for State senator in the 21st senatorial district of New York City. Benjamin Davis is national secretary of the Communist Party, and is, in fact, one of the most notorious of native Communists, a fact which is well known to most Americans. He was one of the leading members of the party convicted in the famous Foley Square Smith Act trials of a dozen years ago. He spent several years in jail for advocating the overthrow of the U.S. Government by force and violence.

Mr. Abrams has served as an accountant for the American Communist Party, for the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, and for the late Congressman Vito Marcantonio.

Abrams has carried out Communist policies in many ostensibly non-Communist organizations which have, in fact, served as fronts for the Communist

Party. Among the organizations promoted by the Communists in which he has played an active role are the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, the Hiroshima Commemorative Committee, the National Committee of the American Forum for Socialist Education, the American Labor Party, the United Independent Socialist Conference Committee.

I state all these things as facts, Mr. President. On Friday, May 13, Henry Abrams was given the opportunity to deny them in a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. He invoked the fifth amendment in reply to all questions regarding his years' long record of service to the Communist conspiracy.

The obvious and declared purpose of the Madison Square Garden meeting was to influence American policy on the nuclear test ban. It is one thing when American citizens come together, in accordance with their rights, for the purpose of urging a specific policy on their Government. It is an altogether different thing when such a meeting is infiltrated by the Communists and when the chief organizing role falls into the hands of a member of the Communist Party, which, as we all know, is a quisling instrument of Soviet policy. Such a situation has an important bearing on American security, because it is axiomatic that all actions of the Communist Party are planned to subserve the ends of Soviet diplomacy.

Let me say here, parenthetically, that this is by no means the only occasion of Communist machinations in the field of nuclear policy. At a previous hearing, we established that Abraham G. Mezerik, a man with a long Communist record, actually managed a so-called American Nobel Anniversary Forum and Dinner, held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City on January 11, 1958, which concentrated on the theme of an American ban on nuclear testing. It was brought out in this hearing that this gathering while managed by a Communist, was financed by a prominent American capitalist, who was unaware of Mezerik's Communist record.

With all this interest in the subject, the Internal Security Subcommittee summoned Mr. Abrams to appear and testify. Through his attorney, Leonard Boudin, of New York, Mr. Abrams pleaded illness, and asked to be excused from coming to Washington to testify. We then arranged to hear him in New York City. He showed up with a doctor's certificate that he was suffering from heart disease, and moved a further continuance on the ground that his condition was so serious that being questioned might cause him serious harm. Since the committee was aware that Mr. Abrams had continued right up to that day to carry a heavy load as the man in active charge of arrangements for the May 10 meeting at Madison Square Garden, we were not impressed by these claims.

We had a New York City Public Health Service doctor present, and asked Mr. Abrams if he would consent to be examined then and there. He refused, so we denied the request for a continuance and went ahead with the hearing, which was in executive session.

As I have indicated the hearing had been called in the hope that we could learn from Mr. Abrams the full story of Communist infiltration of and participation in this movement for a nuclear test ban, as a basis for determining what, if any, legislation may be indicated in this area.

The subcommittee has received evidence, much of it still of a classified nature, that Henry Abrams is not a lone infiltrator, that there exists in fact a serious Communist infiltration in the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.

What, specifically, are the Communists attempting to achieve by their infiltration of the test ban movement, including their recent all-out support of the Madison Square Garden meeting? The answer to this is, I believe, obvious.

The Communist purpose in supporting the test ban agitation and in going all out to make the Madison Square Garden meeting a success is to exert pressure on the administration to make still further concessions to the Soviet viewpoint in order to arrive at a test ban agreement; to create a climate of public opinion which will make it impossible for the administration to resume small underground tests, even though there may be every reason to believe that the Kremlin is conducting such tests; to enervate the free world so that it becomes incapable of responding with appropriate measures to challenges at Berlin and at other points.

In the test ban negotiations that are now going on there are major differences between the Soviet position and our own. These differences hinge around the question of inspection. In my own opinion, we have already conceded too

much, especially by agreeing in principle to a further voluntary moratorium on undetectable underground tests. But for those tests that are subject to detection, we still take the stand that here should be an inspection system based on an adequate number of fixed stations, with at least 20 or 30 onsite inspections per annum. The Kremlin wants a minimum of inspection. It wants as few stations as possible, and its spokesmen have indicated that they would not be willing to accept more than a few onsite inspections per annum.

The Kremlin apparently attached major importance to the Madison Square Garden meeting as a pressure operation in support of its nuclear objectives. This, I believe, is conclusively demonstrated by the generous and sympathetic coverage of the meeting in the Soviet press. I think this is interesting. According to an AP dispatch of May 21st, Pravda headlined its account of the meeting with the words "We Want To Live in Friendship With the Soviet Union," while the Izvestia headline read "Rebuff to Advocates of War."

I believe that the heads of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy have a serious contribution to make to the great debate on national policy. But they can only make this contribution effectively if they purge their ranks ruthlessly of Communist infiltration and if they clearly demarcate their own position from that of the Communists, first, by stressing the need for adequate inspection, second, by reiterating at every opportunity their opposition to the tyranny of communism.

On the basis of the evidence that has come to me, I do not believe that the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has taken the necessary measures to create a climate that is inhospitable to Communist infiltration. At the Madison Square Garden rally, for example, there was much direct and inferential criticism of American policy, but, according to the press accounts and reports from private sources—persons who were present at the meeting—there was almost no criticism of Khrushchev or of his arrogant, insulting, gutter-level behavior in Paris. On the contrary, the speakers called for an immediate effort to renew the summit conference.

Let me digress briefly for a comment on this last proposal, which has, unfortunately, not been confined to the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Perhaps I am old-fashioned, but to me it seems that after the President of the United States has had to endure a barrage of the crudest insults ever leveled at a head of state, a petition to Khrushchev for another summit meeting would constitute a total abandonment of national dignity. The only conceivable political consequences of so craven an action would be to encourage Khrushchev to further arrogance and further demands.

As I have said, I have found no serious evidence that the Madison Square Garden meeting was organized and conducted in a manner which would have discouraged Communist participation. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Communists and their sympathizers turned out in force. Although no Gallup poll or breakdown was possible, I am convinced from reports that the Communists were responsible for a very substantial percentage of the overflow turnout. A number of well-known Communists, including Alexander Trachtenberg, a top party member, were observed in the audience. Outside the meeting, the Communists brazenly distributed literature in their own name.

If decent organizations like the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy wish to protect themselves against the danger of Communist infiltration, I cannot emphasize too strongly the need for an organizational climate that is openly inhospitable to Communists. This is a situation where a tepid declaration of devotion to democracy simply will not suffice, while a neutral silence is an open invitation to disaster.

I can think of other things that can and should be done by the directors of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and of other non-Communist organizations which must contend with the problem of Communist infiltration. At top level, control is relatively easy. One can more or less assume that the people who are elected to a board of directors or to a national committee have enjoyed public visibility over a period of years so that their records are known. At the local level, not even the FBI with all of its resources could offer a 100 percent guarantee against infiltration. However, I think it is possible for organizations to exercise a good deal of control by carefully examining the personal records and bona fides, first, of all those who volunteer to help establish local organizations; second, of those who are elected to office in local organizations; third, of all those assigned to organizing activities.

If any effort had been made to do these things, the Madison Square Garden situation might have been avoided. But for 25 years, Henry Abrams has been a Communist. Without looking up his record, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy allowed him to become the chief organizer of the rally in New York City. That was not taking the necessary precautionary measures.

I think it is not too much to ask that all such committees, which are headed by good people and made up of thousands of good people, ought to give consideration to the question whether Communists like Abrams are taking a part in the running of their meetings. Many of these committees have been doing good work. But it is little wonder that they become infiltrated by Communists if they do not take the pains and the time to ascertain who some of their people are, before they allow them to become officers or chief organizers of mass rallies.

I believe it is not too much to ask our fellow citizens who are organizing committees for the purpose of exerting influence on Congress—as they have every right to do—to make a preliminary, cursory check of the persons who are working in their organizations, especially before they hold such meetings.

This would not be an easy task. But there is much that can be done. It will not always be possible to obtain accurate personal information, because many Communists operate underground as secret party members. But in the case of a man like Abrams, who has a public record of membership, the facts should be available without too much effort.

Perhaps this is a situation in which private organizations can in some way be assisted by Government. This is a problem that the Subcommittee on Internal Security is at present exploring.

Mr. President, in closing my remarks, I wish to pay my personal tribute to Mr. Norman Cousins, the chairman of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, for the manner in which he has reacted to the revelations of the subcommittee. Mr. Cousins has been a neighbor and a friend of mine for many years. I have the highest regard for him. That is why I called him up and told him what I knew about Abrams. He was good enough to come to Washington to see me.

I said, "I don't want to release this material 24 hours before your meeting. You have your plans all made. But many innocent people will be present, and a number of them will be prominent people. Why haven't you checked on people like Abrams? Norman Thomas said in January that he was doubtful about the man's background. Here it is the middle of May, on the eve of your meeting, and you have not yet done anything."

Mr. Cousins was upset about the matter. He immediately suspended Abrams. Not only did he do this, but he told me he was glad we had informed him about Abrams. He offered to open the books of his organization to the subcommittee and to cooperate in every way to rid his organization of Communists.

I assure Mr. Cousins and other persons connected with his committee that the Subcommittee on Internal Security is ready to cooperate with them to help to prevent a repetition of the Madison Square Garden situation.

I think it is not too much to say that the subcommittee is desirous and willing to help any other organization to avoid infiltration by subterranean elements who are not there for any good purpose, and who are certainly not interested, as are the good people who make up the bulk of their membership, in the welfare of the United States.

I yield the floor.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS ON EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

1. PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS ON U.S. PLANE

[From the New York Times, May 6, 1960]

LONDON, May 5 (Reuters)—Following, in translation, are excerpts from the section of Premier Khrushchev's address today referring to the shooting down of a United States plane Sunday, as broadcast from Moscow:

On instructions of the Soviet Government, I am duty bound to report to you on aggressive acts directed in the last few weeks by the United States of America against the Soviet Union.

What form did these aggressive acts take? The United States sent its planes, which violated our state frontier and intruded into the airspace of the Soviet Union:

Its last but one aggressive act was perpetrated by the United States of America on April 9, 1960.

A United States plane intruded into the airspace of our country from the Afghanistan side. Of course, no man in his right senses can think and assume that this violation was done by Afghanistan, a country which is friendly with us.

We are convinced that this plane belonged to the United States of America and obviously was based somewhere on the territory of Turkey, Iran or Pakistan, which are linked with the U.S.A. by obligations under the aggressive NATO bloc.

[Mr. Khrushchev said the Soviet Government decided against making a protest but ordered military commanders to act if another plane intruded.]

American military men apparently liked this impunity as it happened on April 9, and they decided to repeat the aggressive act.

INCIDENT ON MAY DAY



Selected for this was the most festive day for our people and the workers of the world—the day of May the First—the international holiday of fraternal solidarity of the working class.

That day, early in the morning, at 0536 hours, Moscow time, an American plane flew over our frontier and continued its flight into the interior of the Soviet land. A report on this aggressive act was immediately given to the Government by the Minister of Defense.

The Government had stated this: Since he realizes what he comes up against when intruding into a foreign territory, if he gets away with it he will attempt fresh provocations. Therefore, the plane must be shot down.

This task was fulfilled and the plane was shot down.

According to first information, it has transpired that the plane belongs to the United States of America although it bears no identification signs.

Now an expert commission is studying data that fell in our hands. It has been established that this plane that crossed the state frontier of the Soviet Union was coming either from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan.

After the study of all materials that are now at our disposal, the Soviet Government will lodge with the United States of America a strong protest and will warn it that if similar aggressive acts against our country continue, we reserve the right to respond to them with measures we shall find necessary in order to insure the safety of our country.

We shall also give the most serious warning to those countries that put their territories at the disposal of the United States of America for aggressive acts directed against our country.

The following conclusion comes to mind: Aggressive imperialist forces in the United States in recent times have been taking the most active measures to undermine the summit or at least to hinder any agreement that might be reached.

“WHO SENT THIS AIRCRAFT?”

The question then arises: Who sent this aircraft across the Soviet frontier? Was it the man who is Commander in Chief of the American armed forces who, as everyone knows, is the President? Or was this aggressive act carried out by Pentagon militarists? If such actions are taken by American military men on their own account, it must be of especial concern to world opinion.

Perhaps it was a result of the friendship that is now forming between the United States and Franco that the American militarists decided to act independently, as did the Spanish military junta, which rose up against the legal Spanish Government.

Thus, in the so-called free world, military dictators not seldom set up their regimes using the methods of Franco. But the peoples are beginning to understand where true freedom is and where there is tyranny.

Take, for instance, the events in South Korea. The head of the puppet Syngman Rhee regime, the best friend of the United States and the father of his country as someone or other called him in America, has now been overthrown by the people and is now a political corpse. And it was not the Communists who were behind these events; even American political leaders have had to admit.

The sufferings of the Korean people led them to rise up against the bestial yoke, and the peoples understand that it was not only a question of Syngman Rhee himself who was to blame but all those who supported him and hung him round the necks of the South Koreans.

It is no coincidence that the free world sees so many popular demonstrations demanding freedom.

Comrade Deputies, the impression is being formed that the aggressive actions newly undertaken by the United States against the Soviet Union are a foretaste of the summit meeting.

Are they taken in order to exert pressure on us and to attempt to frighten us with their military superiority in order to undermine our determination to work for easing tension, to eliminate the cold war and to put an end to the arms race?

All these missions are sent in order to prevent any agreement on vexing questions, for we cannot say that this aircraft was a harbinger of peace, that it was on a goodwill mission. No, it was a real bandit flight with aggressive intentions.

We can say to those gentlemen who sent the aircraft that if they think they can bend our knees and our backs by means of such pressure, this will have no effect on us. The Soviet Union has every means to give a rebuff to those who want to exert pressure in order to achieve a solution convenient to aggressors.

In the name of the Soviet Government let me express thanks to the men of the military units who carried out with honor the task laid on them in defending the frontiers of our motherland.

Comrades, the Soviet people and Government have always expressed their peaceful intentions and friendly feelings toward the United States, but in answer to this we have black ingratitude.

"FEELINGS OF INDIGNATION"

It is understood that this has aroused feelings of indignation against the activities of the American military men. But we must control this feeling and must be ruled not by our emotions, but by reason.

Government leaders interested in preserving peace must soberly consider the consequences of such actions and think what they might lead to.

Hitler's aircraft before the war used to intrude into our airspace. The Soviet Government would protest, but Hitler refused to pay attention and then attacked us. And where did that all end?

How do we assess the incursion of American aircraft—as a precursor of war or a foreshadow of attack, of the repetition of what Hitler did? The Soviet Government thinks that all the same there is no reason to draw such conclusions.

There is another relationship of power in the world, and in this the people's will to peace plays a great part and this is why we do not conclude that this is a prewar trial of strength or a reconnaissance made to try our nerves, preserve the atmosphere of the cold war so that the imperialists can continue to bind their people with taxation, to carry on the arms race, and to keep their people in a state of fear of war and to continue to impose their will.

The Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions, we do not want the cold war, we want disarmament and our proposals made to the United Nations on this subject remain in force still. Once again, we repeat that disarmament is the right way to preserve peace and in such conditions no country would be able unilaterally to arm and attack another. The Soviet Government once again calls on the Government of the United States to end the cold war. All states must act peaceably so that calm, peace and happiness can prevail.

2. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS RELEASE, MAY 5, 1960

[No. 509-60]

For the Press:

The U.S. Air Force confirmed on May 3, 1960, that a NASA U-2 aircraft is missing in Turkey. It was on a weather mission originating at Adana, Turkey. Purpose was a study of clear air turbulence. During the flight in SE Turkey the pilot reported oxygen difficulty. Last word heard at 9 a.m. 1st of May, Turkish time (3 a.m. 1 May e.d.t.) over emergency frequency. U-2 aircraft did not land at Adana as planned and could only be assumed down. A search effort is underway in Lake Van area.

The missing U-2 is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration aircraft. The pilot is an employee of Lockheed Aircraft Corp., under contract to NASA.

The U-2 program was initiated in 1955 to perform high altitude weather research.

The flight was a joint NASA/AF Air Weather Service Mission.

3. EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS BRIEFING, MAY 5, 1960

* * * * *

Mr. WHITE. Now, the Department has been informed by NASA that as announced May 3 an unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure in the oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

That is the end of the statement.

Q. What was the plane doing, weather reconnaissance?

A. NASA is briefing reporters on the full details of that.

Q. When you say you are taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, do you mean you are asking for information on the pilot, or making a protest about the plane?

A. This matter is being taken up with the Soviet Government, John (Hightower), through our Ambassador in Moscow.

Q. Yes, but it is a protest or an inquiry?

A. I can't say just what form it will take at this stage, I would think, initially, an inquiry.

Q. Is this the report which the White House announced would be made?

A. That is correct.

Q. You say it may be that this was the missing plane?

A. Yes.

Q. There are other planes missing or——

A. Not that I am aware of.

Q. Unaccounted for?

A. No, not that I am aware of.

Q. You say this plane was from Adana, Turkey. Is that the U.S. Air Force Base down there?

A. As I say, you better get this information from NASA. (See NASA Press Release No. 60-193.)

Q. Khrushchev also said an American plane violated the Soviet frontier by flying over the Afghan border on April 9. Do you have anything on that?

A. We have absolutely no—N—O—information on that at all.

Q. Wasn't this plane accompanied by another plane of the same type when it started out on the reconnaissance flight?

A. I am not aware of that, if that is a fact, but I assume NASA can give you that information, Paul (Ward). I have nothing on it.

Q. Link, the area where this plane disappeared is the same as the other plane——

A. This is the Lake Van area.

Q. Is that the same area where the earlier plane disappeared in 1958?

A. In the neighborhood of it.

Q. Link, how do you know the plane was having difficulty?

A. He reported it.

Q. He reported it by radio?

A. That is right.

Q. At the time did he give his position?

A. In the Lake Van area.

Q. Was his course such at that time that if continued it might have taken him over the Soviet Union?

A. John (Hightower), I don't have those details.

Q. Was that the last communication from him, Link?

A. So far as I know.

Q. What was the question?

A. The question was, was that the last communication from the pilot, and to my knowledge it was.

Q. Is the name of this pilot being released by somebody?

A. Here I would like to go off the record. * * *

Q. Link, has any protest been received from the Soviet Government?

A. No, sir, it has not.

Q. Link, do you have any comment on the rest of Khrushchev's speech, his statement that the Summit looks gloomy now because of his aggressive American action?

A. No.

Q. Is this the first indication we had in Khrushchev's speech that the plane had been shot down? There was no previous communication from the Soviets?

A. Nothing prior to this.

Q. Thank you, very much.

A. Yes, sir.

4. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION NEWS RELEASE, MAY 5, 1960

[NASA Release No. 60-193]

Memo to the Press:

One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a continuing program to study gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude, has been missing since about 9 o'clock Sunday morning (local time), when its pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area.

The airplane had taken off from Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The flight plan called for the first check point to be at 37 degrees, 25 minutes, North: 41 degrees, 23 minutes, East, and for a left turn to be made to the Lake Van beacon, thence to the Trabazon beacon, thence to Antalya, and return to Adana. The flight scheduled was estimated at 3 hours, 45 minutes, for a total of 1,400 nautical miles. Takeoff was at 8 a.m. local time.

(The above-given times are the equivalent of 3 a.m. Sunday, and 2 a.m., eastern daylight time.)

About 1 hour after takeoff, the pilot reported difficulties with his oxygen equipment. Using emergency radio frequency, he reported he was heading for the Lake Van beacon to get his bearings, and that he would return to Adana.

As indicated above, his flight plan called for him to make a left turn at the Lake Van beacon. His last report indicated he was attempting to receive that beacon. It is believed he probably was on a north-easterly course, but there was no further word.

An aerial search was begun soon after receipt of the last communication. The Lake Van area is mountainous and very rugged. No evidence has been sighted of the aircraft having crashed.

If the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the airplane from the last reported position would be impossible to determine. If the airplane was on automatic pilot, it is likely it would have continued along its northeasterly course.

The pilot, as are all pilots used on NASA's program of upper atmosphere research with the U-2 airplane, is a civilian employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., builders of the airplane.

When the research program was begun in 1956 by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (predecessor to NASA), the Federal agency did not have a sufficient number of pilots to operate the program, and so a contract was made with Lockheed to provide the pilots.

Overseas logistic support for NASA's continuing use of the U-2 is provided by Air Weather Service units of the USAF.

NASA has procured a total of 10 U-2 airplanes. The airplane was originally built as a private venture by Lockheed to serve as a "flying test bed." It is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney J-57 turbojet engine, and can maintain flight for as long as 4 hours at altitudes of up to 55,000 feet.

Since inception of the research program in 1956, the U-2 flying weather laboratories have operated from bases in California, New York, Alaska, England, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

The U-2 airplanes are presently being used in California (Edwards AFB, one), Japan (Atsugi, three) and Turkey (Adana, four).

The instrumentation carried by the U-2 permits obtaining more precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, the jet stream, and such widespread weather patterns as typhoons. The airplane also has been used by NASA to obtain information about cosmic rays, and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere, including ozone and water vapor.

Instrumentation carried includes: Angular velocity recorder, to measure the airplane's rate of pitch; modified VGH recorder, to measure and record head-on gust components in flight; flight recorder Model BB, continuous recorder of indicated airspeed, pressure altitude and normal acceleration; airspeed and altitude transducer to measure pressure altitude and indicated airspeed; temperature and humidity measuring set AN/AMQ 7, to measure indicated free air temperature and indicated relative humidity; and vortex thermometer system, to measure true free-air temperature within one-half degree centigrade at high speeds.

5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE, MAY 6, 1960

[No. 249]

The following is the text of a note delivered today by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

The Embassy of the United States of America by instruction of its Government has the honor to state the following:

The United States Government has noted the statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, N. S. Khrushchev, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5 that a foreign aircraft crossed the border of the Soviet Union on May 1 and that on orders of the Soviet Government, this aircraft was shot down. In this same statement it was said that investigation showed that it was a United States plane.

As already announced on May 3, a United States National Aeronautical Space Agency unarmed weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May 1. The name of the American civilian pilot is Francis Gary Powers, born on August 17, 1929, at Jenkins, Kentucky.

In the light of the above the United States Government requests the Soviet Government to provide it with full facts of the Soviet investigation of this incident and to inform it of the fate of the pilot.

6. EXCERPTS FROM PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS ON U.S. PLANE INCIDENT, MAY 7, 1960

[From the New York Times, May 8, 1960]

Following are excerpts from the concluding speech to the meeting of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow yesterday by Premier Khrushchev, as provided in English in New York by Tass, the official Soviet press agency:

The aggressive act committed by the American Air Force against the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed the Deputies and all the

Soviet people. Numerous inquiries and appeals are being received by the session and the Soviet Government. In view of this permit me to dwell on this question once again and to furnish certain new data.

After my report to the Supreme Soviet, in which I dwelt on this fact, the United States Department of State claimed in an official press statement that the point in question was a violation of the Soviet State Frontier by an American aircraft of the "Lockheed U-2" type, which allegedly was studying weather conditions in the upper layers of the atmosphere in the area of the Turkish-Soviet frontier.

This plane had allegedly strayed off its course because the pilot had oxygen trouble. The State Department asserts that the pilot lost consciousness; and, steered by its automatic pilot, the plane flew into Soviet territory. According to the Department of State, the pilot only had time to report back about the failure of his oxygen equipment to the Turkish airdrome in Adana, whence it flew, an airdrome which allegedly does not belong to the military but to the National Aeronautics and Space Research Administration.

Soon after that, the National Aeronautics and Space Research Administration issued a statement with a view to confirming the State Department's version.

"MANY SILLY THINGS"

Comrades, I must tell you a secret. When I was making my report I deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and in good health and that we have got parts of the plane. We did so deliberately because had we told everything at once, the Americans would have invented another version.

And now, just look how many silly things they have said—Van Lake, scientific research and so on and so forth. Now that they know that the pilot is alive they will have to invent something else and they will do it.

[Mr. Khrushchev read from the United States statement issued after his first announcement; it was printed in the New York Times last Friday.]

These are the official versions put into circulation by American officials to mislead the public opinion of their country and the world.

I must declare, comrade Deputies, that these versions are completely untrue and calculated for gullible people.

The authors of these versions supposed that if the plane was shot down, the pilot most probably perished too. So there will be nobody to ask how everything actually happened, there will be no way to check what sort of plane it was and what instruments it carried.

"ALIVE AND IN GOOD HEALTH"

First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the shot-down American plane is alive and in good health. He is now in Moscow. Brought here also are the remains of this plane and its special instrumentation, discovered during the investigation.

The name of this pilot is Francis Gary Powers. He is 30 years old. He says he is a first lieutenant of the United States Air Force, where he served till 1956, that is, to the day when he went over to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Francis Powers reported, incidentally, that while serving with the American Air Force he used to get \$700 a month, but when he went over to the intelligence service and started carrying out spying assignments to glean secret information, he began getting \$2,500 a month. That is how capital buys lives, buys people. The flier testified that he had no dizziness, nor had his oxygen apparatus failed. He was flying along the assigned course, accurately executing his chief's orders, switching on and off the equipment over the pre-selected targets for gleaning intelligence on the Soviet Union's military and industrial establishments, and flew on until the very moment his piratical flight into this country's interior was cut short.

I want to tell something about the results of the examination of the plane that has been shot down and its equipment, as well as of the questioning of the pilot. The inquiry still continues, but the picture is fairly clear already.

PLANE TYPE CONFIRMED

To start with, this was, indeed, a high-altitude, low-speed "Lockheed U-2." They banked on its high altitude and believed that this plane cannot be brought down by any fighter or antiaircraft artillery. That is why they thought it could fly over Soviet territory with immunity. In fact, the plane flew at a great altitude and it was hit by the rocket at an altitude of 20,000 meters [65,000 feet]. And if they fly higher, we will also hit them! The plane was in no way equipped for "upper atmosphere research" or for taking "air samples," as official American spokesmen assert.

Not at all. This was a real military reconnaissance aircraft fitted with various instruments for collecting intelligence and, among other things, for aerial photography.

The competent commission of experts, which examined the wrecked plane, has established from the documentary evidence that this American plane is a specially prepared reconnaissance aircraft. The task of the plane was to cross the entire territory of the Soviet Union from the Pamirs to the Kola Peninsula to get information on our country's military and industrial establishments by means of aerial photography. Besides aerial cameras the plane carried other reconnaissance equipment for spotting radar networks, identifying the location and frequencies of operating radio stations and other special radio engineering equipment.

Not only do we have the equipment of that plane, but we also have the developed film showing a number of areas of our territory. Here are some of these photos. Here are photos of these airfields. Here are two white lines. They are lines of our fighters. Here is another airfield and also planes on it. All these films we developed ourselves.

CAMERA IS PRAISED

Here are photos of petrol stores. It must be said that the camera is not a bad one and the photo is very accurate.

But I must say that our cameras take better pictures, are more accurate, so that we gained little in this respect.

These photos here show industrial enterprises.

There is also a tape recording of the signals of a number of our ground radar stations. These are incontestible evidence of the spying done by the American plane shot down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk. That is what "air samples" American reconnaissance took, and it took them not over Van Lake in Turkey but quite elsewhere.

The only thing that is true is that this plane was stationed at the American-Turkish air base at Incirlik east of Adana. As Powers, the flier, testified, he was serving with the 10-10 unit, which, for the sake of disguise, is under control of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, but in reality, conducts high-altitude military reconnaissance.

In his depositions, Powers mentioned the names of several officers he had served with at the American military base in Turkey. According to Powers' testimony, the commander of the American 10-10 unit is Col. William Shelton and his deputy is Lieut. Col. Carol Funk.

Before his flight, Powers had long trained himself for flying into the depth of this country and, as he said himself, he had flown along the Soviet frontier many times in order to study the radar system of the Soviet Union.

"POWERS, THE SCOUT"

On April 27, Powers, the scout, flew over from the Turkish city of Adana to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan on orders from his superiors. And it was, therefore, from Pakistan's territory, that is, from the Peshawar airfield—and not from the Turkish airfield outside Adana, as stated in the United States State Department's version—that Powers took off on May 1 with instruction to fly along the course indicated on his map over the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk and other points and reach Archangel and Murmansk, before landing at the Bude airfield in Norway.

Now we can say where he was flying to. I must admit that we knew it already when I was reporting this fact. We did not say anything at that time in order to see what the Americans would invent. Now that they have made their invention, we report how everything actually happened.

This is what Powers said when questioned about the task of his flight over Soviet territory.

"I was to take off from the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, cross the national frontier of the U.S.S.R. and fly across Soviet territory to Norway. I was to fly over certain points of the U.S.S.R., of which I remember Murmansk and Archangel. During my flight over Soviet territory I was to switch on and off the equipment over certain points indicated on the map. I believe my flight over Soviet territory was meant for collecting information on Soviet guided missiles and radar stations."

I want to ask the gentlemen from the State Department: Is it such "air samples over Lake Van" that the spy flier Powers was to take?

IRAQI REVOLT RECALLED

I say nothing of the fact that by flying along this course, the American scout plane grossly violated the national sovereignty of Afghan-

istan by having flown across that country's territory without permission. But there is, perhaps, nothing extraordinary in this for the morals of American militarists. Such actions of theirs have long been known.

Suffice it to recall the flight of American military aircraft over the territory of Austria, when the aggression was being prepared against Iraq, where a revolution had just taken place. The Austrian Government protested against the treacherous violation of Austria's sovereignty by American military aircraft and against that blatant act of disrespect for her neutrality sealed by the signatures of the United States, among others.

If one believes the version that the pilot lost consciousness owing to oxygen trouble and that the aircraft was subsequently controlled by the automatic pilot, one must also believe that the aircraft controlled by an automatic pilot flew from Turkey to Pakistan, touched down at Peshawar Airport, stayed there three days, took off early in the morning of May 1, flew over the territory of Afghanistan, crossed the Soviet frontier, flew more than 2,000 kilometers over our territory for a total of some four hours.

All the time of the flight over our territory the aircraft was under observation and was brought down as soon as the order was received.

When our anti-aircraft rocket battery intercepted and brought down the plane, the pilot, it must be believed, soon regained his consciousness because he bailed out by parachute; you just note he was not ejected by the automatic device but left through the upper canopy designed for emplaning. The question arises why did he do this if there are devices for rapid ejection?

He did this possibly because there was an explosive charge in the aircraft which was to have blown up the plane as soon as the pilot was ejected. The pilot knew this and possibly was afraid that he would be killed in the explosion. Clever enough!

"NOT THE ONLY PRECAUTION"

But the installation of the infernal machine was not the only precaution taken. To cover up the tracks of the crime the pilot was told that he must not fall alive in the hands of the Soviet authorities. For this reason he was supplied with a special pin. He was to have pricked himself with this poisoned pin, resulting in instantaneous death.

What a barbarism! Here is this instrument—the latest achievement of American technology for the killing of their own people (a photograph is produced).

But everything alive wants to live and when the plane was brought down the pilot bailed out by parachute. And when he landed he did not follow the advice of those who sent him on his anti-Soviet predatory assignment but remained alive.

It is alleged that the flight was made for scientific purposes to investigate the upper layers of the atmosphere. The question arises why the pilot then had to be armed with a noiseless pistol. He was given it for some emergency, not to take air samples but to blow people's brains out. All this we shall present to the public as material evidence. This is what, so to say, such Christians are like.

He was given this pistol after making low bows as they do in churches. And yet they call us godless atheists. Yet we have never committed such crimes against humanity and never will. If the pilot was given a pistol to defend himself against wild beasts in case of a forced landing, the question arises, why a pistol with a silencer? This also shows what so-called scientific purposes were pursued by the plane.

The pilot who was supposed to explore the atmosphere was given 7,500 rubles in Soviet currency. The question arises, when and where was he to have spent them and for what purposes, for he did not fly to exchange old rubles for new?

GOLD FRANCS, GOLD RINGS

The pilot was also given French gold francs. I have seen these gold francs with my own eyes. And you can see them here in the photograph. They are covered with cellophane on both sides of the coins. Done in a cultured, American way. But what did the pilot need these francs for? He also had West German, Italian, and other currency. Besides his own watch he was also given for his trip another two gold watches and seven gold rings for ladies. Why was all this necessary in the upper layers of the atmosphere? Or, maybe, the pilot was to have flown still higher to Mars and was going to lead astray Martian ladies?

You see how thoroughly American pilots are equipped before setting off on a flight to take samples of air in the upper layers of the atmosphere. Thus, no concocted version can save the reputation of those who bear the responsibility for this perfidious act.

Thus, no concocted version can save the reputation of those who bear the responsibility for this perfidious action. They were caught red-handed as organizers of the incursion in the airspace of the Soviet Union not long before the meeting of the heads of government in Paris, not long before the visit to the Soviet Union of the President of the United States. I believe that this is a bad preparation for serious talks on easing international tension.

I am now reading in the Western press comments on these events and there are some people who accuse us, Khrushchev, of wanting to undermine the summit meeting because otherwise he would not have presented this fact at the session of the Supreme Soviet but raised it through some other channels but what did you expect, gentlemen? You are accustomed to make mischief and some people regard this as all but a good thing and keep silent. No, we are not such kind of people: if you made mischief bear the responsibility for this openly.

WHY SUCH A "RECKLESS STEP"

They live according to the law; if one is rich, one will not be imprisoned. This is true for the capitalist because he always can buy himself off. But there is another country, the country of socialism, where law protects the state, protects society, protects everyone living in this state.

What could be the reason for such a reckless step? This was evidently done because someone in the United States was obsessed by the idea of intelligence. The United States proposal on the "open sky" is well known. We rejected this proposal and the American military then decided to "open" the Soviet sky by themselves.

But there are rules of international laws, there are national frontiers and no one has the right to disregard these laws and to cross the frontiers of other countries.

From the lofty rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, we warn once again those countries that make their territory available for the take-off of planes with anti-Soviet intentions—do not play with fire, gentlemen!

The governments of the three countries—Turkey, Pakistan and Norway—must be clearly aware that they were accomplices of this flight because they permitted the use of their airfields against the Soviet Union.

7. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 7, 1960

[From The New York Times, May 8, 1960]

WASHINGTON, May 7.—*Following is the statement on the U-2 plane incident issued by the State Department today after clearance by President Eisenhower:*

The Department has received the text of Mr. Khrushchev's further remarks about the unarmed plane which is reported to have been shot down in the Soviet Union. As previously announced, it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President, it has been established that insofar as the authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights as described by Mr. Khrushchev.

Nevertheless, it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

It is certainly no secret that, given the state of the world today, intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries and postwar history certainly reveals that the Soviet Union has not been lagging behind in the field. The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world.

One of the things creating tension in the world today is apprehension over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction. To reduce mutual suspicion and to get a measure of protection against surprise attack, the United States in 1955 offered its "open skies" proposal—a proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of the unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past four years.

8. TEXT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH WARNING NATIONS WITH BASES USED BY U.S. PLANES

[From the New York Times, May 10, 1960]

Following is the text of remarks by Premier Khrushchev at a reception in the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow yesterday, as provided in English in New York by Tass, the official press agency:

Dear Comrade Dvorak, Ambassador of friendly, fraternal Czechoslovakia!

Dear friends, comrades, gentlemen!

We are very pleased to attend the reception held on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic, the celebration of Victory Day, which indeed is a holiday for all the peoples. The Soviet people, at one with all other peoples, sincerely want that there should be no more war, that this war should be the last, that it should be remembered by the peoples and should go down in history as the last war.

We are doing our utmost to achieve this indeed. That is precisely why the Soviet Union submitted at the United Nations its proposals for general and complete disarmament. We not only insist on the necessity of reducing armed forces but already now, without waiting for such decisions by the Western countries, we unilaterally cut the armed forces of the Soviet Union by one-third.

When we have reduced our armed forces to 2,400,000, some time will pass, and we shall think it over and evidently we shall further reduce our Army. Comrade Zhadov [Gen. Aleksandr A. Zhadov, deputy commander of Soviet ground forces] over there scratched the back of his head—another reduction.

No, this will not be done now, Comrade General, but later.

We shall do this if the situation favors such measures. Of course, we shall not cut our armed forces to such a level which would prejudice the security of the Soviet Union. You should bear in mind that we do not reduce our armed forces for financial reasons. No, the financial situation of our state is splendid and, if need be, could not only forbear from reducing the army and navy, but increase them. I repeat, if this were necessary we could do this without tense efforts. But as good masters we say: Why have bigger armed forces than we need?

CONTROLS NOT FEARED

If our partners agree we are willing to accept total disarmament and we shall effect it honestly. We are not afraid of control. If you please, gentlemen, then you could fly over our territory, check, take pictures, do what you please.

Such an issue as now could not arise then. The Department of State explains the incident with the downed reconnaissance plane more or less as follows: One cannot, they say, admit, nor can one deny. It turns out, as in the well-known joke, that here is a maiden who is also not a maiden for she has a child! The marriage was not registered, therefore one can regard her as a maiden in a way. But she gave birth, to a child. Can one regard her as a maiden or not?

This does not happen in real life. We tell the Americans: Your plane flew over our country on an intelligence mission. We tracked its

flight and it flew to the Sverdlovsk area, where it was brought down. That is how you got into a mess and you are in a mess. Pluck up your courage and say: Yes, there was such a disgraceful fact. And this is a big disgrace for America since everyone sees now how disgraced in the eyes of the world are those who committed such a shocking act of aggression. The whole world wants peace, a relaxation of international tension while certain quarters in the United States stage such a provocation.

What were the purposes of this flight? A provocation! This is bad, very bad indeed!

TIMING FOR SUMMIT SEEN

I have already said, comrades, and now I repeat, that this was done deliberately and deliberately timed for the summit meeting in Paris. It is said that it was the work of the military. Only the military? What kind of state is this if the military do what the Government opposes? How can the Government tolerate this? If anyone of our military allowed himself to do such a thing, we would pull him up immediately. The Government and the country are strong when the entire machinery functions smoothly, when everything is subordinated to the Government. Therein lies real strength. Understand me rightly: When everyone pulls in a different direction what kind of state is this and what confidence can one have in the policy of such a state?

There can be no confidence in the policy of such a state! The statement that the aggressive flight was made without the will and instructions of the Government, that nothing was known of it in the State Department, does not give credit to the Department of State of the United States. And what about Allen Dulles?

For he knew about all this and he also is a member of the United States Government! For this is Allen Dulles' aviation! It turns out that the State Department's reply is, as the saying has it, too thin.

It is possible, I do not know this for certain, but I do not preclude the possibility that the Government of the United States of America knew of this flight. But I, so to speak, confide it to you!

STATEMENT HELD ALARMING

In diplomatic language it would be better to say: It knew, but it stopped its ears and closed its eyes and now depicts the matter as if the devil led astray some official. However, let it be, with this Government and with its way of issuing statements on all this.

One thing is alarming in this statement. It is vague. More, this statement blames us for not allowing to fly over or travel across our country those who want to study our defenses, to discover secrets. And that is why they, that means the American Government, had been impelled to send planes on intelligence missions. This is a very dangerous explanation. It is dangerous because it does not denounce but tries to justify such a flight and seems to say that such flights are possible in the future, too, because the Soviet Union does not think to reveal its secrets to countries that pursue unfriendly policy toward us.

Using this as the only justification, some gentlemen intend to gain the right in the eyes of public opinion to fly over our territory in the future, too, gleaning important military secrets.

I repeat once again this is very dangerous, let alone that it is wrong in principle and not in keeping with the spirit of international peaceful relations. If someone intends to fly over our territory, reconnoitering objectives and gleaning state secrets, we shall bring down such planes, just bring them down!

More, if such flights are repeated, we shall take appropriate counter-measures.

OTHER COUNTRIES WARNED

I should say this: Those countries that have bases on their territories should note most carefully the following: If they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory we shall hit at those bases. Because we assess such actions as provocations against our country!

We tell the Governments of those countries, if you leased your territory to others and are not the masters of your land, of your country, hence, we shall have to understand it in our way. Those who lease your territory, operate against us from your territory. Their lands are far from us while your land is near. That is why as a warning to remote targets, we shall find the range to the near ones. Let them draw the appropriate conclusions.

I should not like to heat up passions because even in wartime people long for peace, await an end to the war and dream of peace. There is no war now. Our strength is being tested. Therefore, let us not draw conclusions aggravating relations between countries, such conclusions as would hamper us in the future, I should like to say, even in building good relations with the United States of America. Today I declare once again that we want to live not only in peace but also in friendship with the American people. The American people want no war. I am sure of this.

On the eve of the Paris meeting the aggressive circles wanted to bring strong pressure to bear upon us. We say: Let us conclude a peace treaty with Germany. Some of our former wartime allies are against this.

WEST BERLIN STAND DECRIED

But why? Plainly speaking, why need the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom West Berlin? They need it as a dog needs a fifth leg. West Berlin does not give them anything. By the way, no one encroaches on West Berlin. It is said, freedom is at stake, but who encroaches on freedom?

Let the West Berliners continue to live as they do now and let them have the regime they like. The Soviet Government has long since declared that to select a regime is a matter for each people and that everyone should live as he prefers to. If the Western powers do not want to sign a German peace treaty we shall have to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

The point is that even after we conclude such a treaty with the German Democratic Republic they would like to exercise those rights which flow from Germany's surrender, to exercise them in defiance of the peace treaty we would have signed. But if we sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, the terms of war will be ended and, hence, the terms of surrender will also be ended. They will cease to operate. If after the signing of a peace treaty some one would

like to force his way into West Berlin which we would like to see a free city, our force will resist this force.

Aware of this, some leaders in the United States of America decided to teach Khrushchev a lesson. Since it is said that force will resist force, we shall teach a lesson to the Soviet Union, we shall fly over your territory and we already flew over it and returned home.

EARLIER FLYOVER NOTED

This happened, for instance, on April 9. I have already spoken of this. Even now this flight is denied in the United States. In this case the ethics is: If the thief is not caught, he is no thief. But this time we caught the thief and now the whole world knows of it.

The reconnaissance plane should have been brought down on April 9, too. But our military, to put it mildly, let a chance slip by. And we, as one says, took them to task for it. On May 1 the reconnaissance plane was shot down. The military splendidly coped with the task when the opponent grew bold. For the American military thought like this: If the April 9 flight passed off with impunity, that means they cannot hit it at such an altitude, and the aggressive military wanted to demonstrate their strength once again fifteen days before the summit meeting.

Well, Khrushchev, what are you boasting of? We fly over your country and you can do nothing about it. They expected to fly over over Soviet territory this time, too, to fly over Sverdlovsk and to show that we can do nothing about it. Indeed, an unpleasant situation! And now when he hit the air pirate with a rocket, as the saying has it, it is time to dismount from the horse!

S. M. Budenny: One must slash down to the saddle, and everything will go to pieces.

Nikita Khrushchev: I believe that this cavalry rule is quite appropriate!

Attempts are still made to frighten us because in the West bombers are flying on round-the-clock vigil * * *.

ROCKETS ON VIGIL

I should like to tell those people: Listen, gentlemen, we also have bombers, but they are not on vigil, in our country rockets are on vigil!

It is common knowledge that V bombers, as a rule, fly at an altitude ranging from 12,000 to 17,000 meters, they cannot rise higher because designers still cannot overcome technical difficulties. The plane which committed the diversion on May 1 flew at an altitude of 20,000 meters. They say it was an unarmed V plane. It was because it was unarmed that it could fly at such an altitude. They expected that such a plane will be invulnerable for a long time to go. They even expected that this will be almost for all time.

I shall say further, when Twining, the then Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, arrived here we welcomed him as guest and entertained him. He left our country by air and next day sent a plane flying at great altitude to our country. This plane flew as far as Kiev. The question arose: Should we protest? I proposed that no protest should be lodged. Only an animal might act like Twining which, eating at one place, might do its unpleasant business there.

From such behavior we draw the conclusion: 'To improve rockets, to improve fighters. Our fighters can fly as high as 28,000 meters. But the difficulties of a fighter are that though it can rise high, it is not so easy and simple to find the target in the air; a plane in the air is like a needle in the ocean.

But the rocket finds its targets itself. This is the advantage of the rocket and we use of it. We have both fighters and rockets. That is why I say: If there are still politicians who would like to rely on bombers, they are doomed to failure. With the up-to-date military techniques bombers will be shot down even before they approach the target. We also have good aviation. I flew to America in a TU-114. This plane is a modification of a bomber with a flying range of 17,000 kilometers. I mentioned this to the President of the United States. However, the ceiling of the bomber is within the sphere of operation of fighters. It is now not so difficult to bring down a bomber.

The Americans can do this, but we can do it even better.

That is why one should abandon this exchange of threats. It would be better to speak of peace and friendship, how mutually advantageous it is to trade, how good relations can be established between peoples, how cultural contacts and tourist travel can be developed. This would be a far more useful and lofty job and all the peoples of the world would welcome this. This is precisely what our stand is, comrades! The peoples demand tranquillity, they are against wars and military conflicts. Let us try and meet these just demands of the people.

SOVIET GOALS CITED

When we were preparing the recent session of the Supreme Soviet we did not envisage the discussion of any military questions. We drafted a law on the abolition of taxes paid by factory and office workers and a law on the completion of the transition to a seven and six-hour working day. We prepared for discussion at the session the question of increasing by 25,000,000,000 to 30,000,000,000 rubles expenditures for the expansion of industry manufacturing consumer goods so as to emerge to first place in Europe during this seven-year-plan period and to catch up with the United States five years later. What lofty aims from the attainment of which not a single people, not a single individual in the world, would suffer!

And here, as one says, to "cheer us up," they timed such an aggressive act for the great proletarian May Day holiday! But the aggressors themselves did not expect that they would indeed cheer us up. When Marshal Malinovsky mounted the mausoleum on May Day to make his speech, I could already congratulate him on the shooting down of the plane. He replied that he had learned this just before motoring to Red Square. This was good news before the minister's speech at the May Day parade.

Comrades, today we are celebrating the day of victory in the war in which we lost more people and wealth than any other country. We mourn over the dead but at the same time we celebrate and rejoice in our victory.

HAILS WAR VICTORY

We rejoice because our people not only rehabilitated the devastated economy but far surpassed the pre-war level of development. This

victory is also being celebrated in countries that were our allies in the last war. The Ambassadors of those countries are also here. We have just clinked glasses with the American Ambassador, Mr. Thompson. But after our "clinking" in the air, are ringing of our glasses in the Czechoslovak Embassy—is already not the proper ringing.

I respect the Ambassador of the United States and I am convinced that he had nothing to do with this incursion, that he could not have anything to do even if he wished to.

I am convinced of the ethical qualities of this man. Since I know him I think that he is not capable of such a thing. Evidently he feels this incident as a big annoyance for his country and for himself as the representative of the United States in the Soviet Union. This must be taken into consideration.

Comrades! I propose a toast to the victory, to the nations and peoples who fought against Nazi Germany and with us won a great victory!

I propose a toast to friendly Czechoslovakia, to the remarkable people of Czechoslovakia, to the hosts of this house, the Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Republic, Comrade Dvorak, and his wife, to all who represent the fraternal Czechoslovak Republic in the Soviet Union!

I raise my glass to the end of wars, to the end of provocations, to peace and friendship between the peoples.

9. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY 9, 1960

[Department of State press release No. 254]

On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position of the United States Government.

Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union from wartime cooperation to postwar conflict in 1946 and particularly since the Berlin blockade, the forceful takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Communist aggressions in Korea and Vietnam the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled. With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership.

For many years the United States in company with its allies has sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many proposals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union. The Presi-

dent's "open skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military installations in the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and other nations that might wish to participate. For several years we have been seeking the mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on a reciprocal basis. More recently at the Geneva disarmament conference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of controlled disarmament. It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West. But this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the Free World against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense. Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization. The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

This government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in the coming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris Chairman Khrushchev would be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction from the minds of peoples everywhere. Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.

At my request and with the authority of the President, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, is today briefing Members of the Congress fully along the foregoing lines.

10. TEXT OF SOVIET UNION NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, MAY 10, 1960

[From the New York Times, May 11, 1960]

Moscow, May 10 (AP)—Following is the text of a Soviet note today to the United States on the downing of an American plane, as translated by the United States Embassy.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to state the following to the Government of the United States of America:

On May 1 of this year at 5 hours 36 minutes (5:36 A.M.), Moscow time, a military aircraft violated the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and intruded across the borders of the Soviet Union for a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles). The Government of the U.S.S.R. naturally could not leave unpunished such a flagrant violation of the Soviet state boundaries. When the intentions of the violating aircraft became apparent, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the area of Sverdlovsk.

Upon examination by experts of all data at the disposal of the Soviet side, it was incontrovertibly established that the intruder aircraft belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and was sent through Pakistan into the Soviet Union with hostile purposes.

SOVIET CITES EVIDENCE

As the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, N. S. Khrushchev, made public on May 7 at the final session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, data from the investigation leave no doubt with respect to the purposes of the flight of the American aircraft which violated the U.S.S.R.'s border on May 1. This aircraft was especially equipped for a reconnaissance and diversionary flight over the territory of the Soviet Union. It had on board apparatus for aerial photography, for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radio-technical equipment which formed part of the U.S.S.R. anti-aircraft defenses. At the disposal of the Soviet expert commission, which carried out the investigation, there is undisputable proof of the espionage reconnaissance mission of the American aircraft; films of Soviet defense and industrial establishments, a tape recording of the signals of Soviet radar stations and other data.

The pilot [Francis G.] Powers, about whose fate the Embassy of the U.S.A. inquired in its note of May 6, is alive and, as indicated in the afore-mentioned speech of the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, N. S. Khrushchev, will be brought to account under the laws of the Soviet state. The pilot has indicated that he did everything in full accordance with the assignment given him. On the flight map taken from him there was clearly and accurately marked the entire route he was assigned after take-off from Adana [Turkey]; Peshawar [Pakistan]-Aral-Sverdlovsk-Archangel-Murmansk, followed by a landing at the Norwegian airfield at Bodo.

PILOT'S UNIT IDENTIFIED

The pilot has also stated that he served in sub-unit No. 10-10, which under cover of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is engaged in high-altitude military reconnaissance.

This and other information revealed in the speeches of the head of the Soviet Government completely refuted the United States State Department's concocted and hurriedly fabricated version, released May 5 in an official announcement for the press, to the effect that the aircraft was allegedly carrying out meteorological observations in the upper strata of the atmosphere along the Turkish-Soviet border.

After the complete absurdity of the afore mentioned version had been shown and it had been incontrovertibly proved that the American aircraft intruded across the borders of the Soviet Union for aggressive reconnaissance purposes, a new announcement was made by the United States State Department on May 8 [Moscow time] which contained the forced admission that the aircraft was sent into the Soviet Union for military reconnaissance purposes and, by that very fact, it was admitted that the flight was pursuing aggressive purposes.

In this way after three days the State Department already had denied the version which obviously had been intended to mislead world public opinion as well as the public opinion of America itself.

"OPEN SKIES" ISSUE NOTED

The State Department considered it appropriate to refer in this announcement to the "open skies" proposal made by the Government of the U. S. A. in 1955 and to the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept this proposal. Yet, the Soviet Government, like the governments of many other states, refused to accept this proposal which was intended to throw open the doors of other nations to American reconnaissance. The activities of American aviation only confirm the correctness of the evaluation given to this proposal at the time by the Soviet Government.

Does all this mean that, with the refusal of a number of states to accept this proposal for "open skies" the U. S. A. is attempting arbitrarily to take upon itself the right to "open" a foreign sky?

It is enough to put the question this way, for the complete groundlessness of the afore-mentioned reference to the U. S. A. "open sky" proposal to become clear.

It follows from the aforementioned May 8 announcement from the United States State Department that hostile acts by American aviation, which have taken place numerous times in relation to the Soviet Union, are not simply a result of the activity of the military commands of the U. S. A. in various areas but are an expression of a calculated U. S. A. policy. What the Soviet Government has repeatedly declared in its representations to the Government of the U. S. A. in connection with the violations of the U. S. S. R. national boundaries by American airplanes has been confirmed, namely, that these violations are premeditated.

U. S. POLICY DISCUSSED

All this testifies that the Government of the U. S. A., instead of taking measures to stop such action by American aviation, the danger of which has more than once been pointed out by the Soviet Government, officially announces such actions as its national policy.

Thus, the Government of the U.S.A., in the first place, testifies to the fact that its answers to representations of the Soviet Government were only for the sake of form, behind which was a concealed effort to avoid the substance of the issue, and that all violations by American aircraft of national boundaries of the U.S.S.R. represented actions conforming to U.S.A. policy.

In the second place, and this is the main point, by sanctioning such actions of American aviation, the Government of the U.S.A. aggravates the situation even more.

One must ask, how is it possible to reconcile this with declarations on the part of leading figures of the U.S.A. that the Government of the U.S.A., like the Soviet Government, is also striving for improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., for a relaxation of international tension, and the strengthening of trust between states.

Military intelligence activities by one nation by means of intrusion of its aircraft into the area of another country can hardly be called a method for improving relations and strengthening trust.

It is self-evident that the Soviet Government is compelled under such circumstances to give strict instructions to its armed forces to take all necessary measures against the violation of Soviet boundaries by foreign aviation.

VIEWS SAID TO DIFFER

The Government of the U.S.S.R. regretfully states that, while it undertakes everything possible for the normalization and improvement of the international situation, the Government of the U.S.A. follows a different path.

It is impossible to exclude the thought that, apparently, the two governments view differently the necessity of improving relations between our countries and for the creation of favorable ground for the forthcoming summit meeting.

The Soviet Government, as well as all the Soviet peoples, considers that personal meeting and discussions of the President of the U.S.A. and other official figures with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. during his visit in the U.S.A. made a good beginning in the cause of normalizing Soviet-American relations and therefore an improvement of the entire international situation as well.

However, the latest actions of the American authorities apparently seek to return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst time of the "cold war" and to poison the international situation before the summit meeting.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot avoid pointing out that the State Department's statement which is unprecedented in its cynicism, not only justifies provocative flights of the armed forces of the U.S.A. but also acknowledges that such actions are a "normal phenomenon" and this in fact states that in future the United States

intends to continue provocative invasions into the confines of the air space of the Soviet Union for the purpose of intelligence.

U.S. CONTRADICTION SEEN

Thus the Government of the U.S.S.R. concludes that the announcement that the flight was carried out without the knowledge and permission of the Government of the U.S.A. does not correspond to reality because in the very same announcement the necessity for carrying on intelligence activities against the Soviet Union is justified. This means that espionage activities of American aircraft are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the U.S.A.

The Government of the Soviet Union makes an emphatic protest to the Government of the U.S.A. in connection with the aggressive acts of American aviation and warns that, if similar provocations are repeated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures, the responsibility for the consequences of which will rest on the Government of the state committing aggression against other countries.

The Soviet Government would sincerely like to hope that the Government of the U.S.A. recognized in the final analysis that the interests of preserving and strengthening peace among people, including the interest of the American people itself, whose starving for peace was well demonstrated during the visit of the head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, to the U.S.A., will be served by the cessation of the aforementioned dangerous provocative activities against the U.S.S.R., by cessation of the "cold war," and by research through joint efforts with the Soviet Union and other interested states for a solution of unsettled international problems on a mutually acceptable basis, which is awaited by all people.

11. TRANSCRIPT OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S NEWS CONFERENCE, MAY 11, 1960 [EXCERPTS]

[From the New York Times, May 12, 1960]

Washington, May 11 (UPI)—Following is the transcript of President Eisenhower's news conference today:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER. Good morning. Please sit down.

I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident.

A full statement about this matter has been made by the State Department and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of both parties.

For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to say, with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further to say—for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful at this time.

The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

My second point: The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.

"BELOW THE SURFACE"

These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak, "below the surface" activities. They are secret because they must circumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations.

They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.

These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force—with operations supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities.

We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives, but must be kept under strict control in every detail.

These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure—just as in the Soviet allegations there are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to believe that the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.

Third point: How should we view all of this activity?

DISTASTEFUL BUT VITAL

It is a distasteful but vital necessity.

We prefer and work for a different kind of world—and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.

This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which I was ready instantly to put into effect—to permit aerial observation over the United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal again at Paris—since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.

My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by what is an incident or a symptom of the world situation today.

This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed nonmilitary plane can only reflect a fetish of secrecy.

The real issues are the ones we will be working on at the summit—disarmament, search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin and the whole range of East-West relations, including the reduction of secrecy and suspicion.

Frankly, I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great issues. This is what we mean when we speak of "working for peace."

And as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this matter.

1. ROBERT J. DONOVAN of The New York Herald Tribune. Mr. President, since our last visit, or conference, Prime Minister Khrushchev has made some pretty vigorous statements about your plans for bringing Mr. Nixon to the summit in case you had to come home. Do his comments in any way change your intention?

A. No, indeed. And, I should clarify something, there seems to be some misunderstanding; because a friend from Congress, a friend indeed of the other party, told me the other day that he had never heard of the latter part of my press conference on this point where I said if my—my absence from the conference had to be more than two or three days, I would be right back there, and I believe I remarked, I am not sure, that the jet plane made this kind of a trip possible.

Now, as far as Mr. Khrushchev's statement, this, I can just say this: He has never asked me my opinion of some of his people. [Laughter.]

2. CHARLES H. MOHR of Time magazine. Mr. President, in case, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union should reject your proposal for surprise attack conference, or open skies arrangements, do you think that the development of satellites like Samos and Midas will possibly in the next few years erase our worries on the score of surveillance and also are you doing anything now to speed up those scientific projects?

A. Well, I know of nothing—no, I keep in touch with my Scientific Advisory Committee and operators, and I know of nothing we could do to speed these up. They are research items and as such no one can predict exactly what would be their degree of efficiency. So I couldn't make a real prediction of what is going—how useful they are going to be.

Q. Sir, do you think that their development will ease our worries on the question of secrecy?

A. Well, I say, I just can't predict what the final results will be. Now, we do know this, right now. I believe, it's either Tiros that is sending back constantly pictures on the cloud cover all around the earth, and that is admittedly a rather rough example of what might be done in photography. But this is being done constantly, and I don't know how many thousands of photographs have been taken, and they send them back on command.

3. LAURENCE H. BURD of The Chicago Tribune. Mr. President, last week you used the word "if" in connection with your trip to Russia. Have you changed any plans about that, or think you might?

A. No, not at all. I have no idea, but you can never tell from one day to the other what is happening in this world, it seems, so I just

said—"if"—and I put it in the positive sense, I think. I expect to go; put it that way.

* * * * *

6. EDWARD T. FOLLIARD of the Washington Post and Times Herald. Mr. President, do you think the outlook for the summit conference has changed, or has been changed in the last week or so?

A. Not decisively at all, no.

* * * * *

11. MERRIMAN SMITH of United Press International. Mr. President, quite aside from your comment about the U-2 plane episode, sir, I wonder if you could give us your reaction to a rather denunciatory speech made this morning, right ahead of the summit meeting, by the Russian Foreign Minister. Mr. Gromyko attributes to this country deeds and efforts which he said amount to dangerous ways of balancing on the brink of war. He says that the United States has deliberately engaged in provocative acts in conjunction with some of our Allies.

Now, with statements like this, do you still maintain a hopeful attitude toward the summit?

A. Well, I'd say yes. I have some hope, because these things have been said for many years, ever since World War II, and there is no real change in this matter.

Now, if we—I wonder how many of you people have read the full text of the Abel trial, the record of the trial of Mr. Abel [Rudolph Abel, convicted Soviet spy.] Well, I think he was sentenced to thirty years. Now, this business of saying that you're doing things that are provocative, why, they had better look at their own record. And I'll tell you this: the United States and none of its Allies that I know of has engaged in nothing that would be considered honestly as provocative. We are looking to our own security and our defense and we have no idea of promoting any kind of conflict or war. This is just, it's absolutely ridiculous and they know it is.

12. HENRY N. TAYLOR of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers. Mr. President, sir, would it be trespassing on your request about the U-2 to ask if you could tell us something about any possible Soviet reconnaissance flights over the Western part of the world, and our response to them, if any?

A. Well, I could just say this: as far as I know, there has never been any over the United States.

* * * * *

15. CHARLES W. ROBERTS of Newsweek. Sir, in connection with the Abel trial which you mentioned—the Soviet Government in that case made no effort to defend Colonel Abel. I wonder if an American citizen were arrested by a foreign government and brought to trial as a spy, what the policy of this Government would be so far as his defense was concerned?

A. Well, we would certainly offer the good offices of our embassy, and see whether there was anything we could do. Of course, we would have to do it, it would be an internal matter there and we would have to do it with the permission of the other country. So far as I—I think that if there is anything wrong diplomatically with

my answer, you had better ask the State Department, but I think that would be the result.

* * * * *

17. MARVIN L. ARROWSMITH of the Associated Press. Mr. President, you have said many times that you wouldn't go to the summit under any threats or ultimatums. Yesterday, as you know, the Soviets in their note threatened retaliation against us if we continued to fly these planes over their territory. Do you regard that kind of threat as within the category you were speaking of? A. No. I think that you have to set that aside in a special category. I don't believe it's the kind of thing that you call an ultimatum at all.

18. EDWARD P. MORGAN of American Broadcasting Co. Mr. President, a point of clarification, Mr. President: Do we infer correctly that your prepared statement this morning is the final, complete and ultimate answer to your critics, friendly and hostile, on the subject?

A. I said that at this time I could see nothing useful more that I could say, so that's where I stand at this moment.

* * * * *

20. JOHN SCALI of the Associated Press. Mr. President, you said in your initial statement that the Soviet account of the downing of this plane contained many discrepancies, and that there was reason to doubt that the plane was downed at a high altitude, as Mr. Khrushchev claims.

Can you tell us, sir, whether the Administration at some future time intends to expose these discrepancies, and can you at this time without violating what you have said, give us any more details about how we believe this plane actually came down in the Soviet Union?

A. Well, I don't think I am—you raise a question that is really an auxiliary to the main issue, and so I don't mind saying this: That, take the pictures themselves, we know that they were not, or we believe we know that they are not pictures of the plane that was downed, and there are other things in their statements.

Now, I don't know what's going to happen in the future, but these things you can be sure will be carefully looked into. And, as again I say, I do not foreclose any kind of statement that in the future may be necessary. I am saying that now I can see nothing more useful to say.

* * * * *

23. RAYMOND P. BRANDT of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. In view of your emphasis on the—you might go back to the summit if you had to come back here, have you any idea how long the Paris meeting will go on, how long do you think it will take you to get to some agreement?

A. Well, I don't know. But I just want to point this out: I hear that some, and I don't know whether this is all of the others or not, but they do not like the simultaneous translations. Now, let us assume you have called an hour's conference, and one of you, for example, wants to make a, let's say, a ten-minute exposition. When you take seriatum translations, here is already a half hour of an hour's conference gone, and you have had only ten minutes.

Now, these are very slow and laborious things, and consequently the possibility of prophesying how long this thing is going to be is really remote. Now, for my part, I am perfectly ready to work as

many hours as an individual human can to get this thing along the line, but I am prepared to go to this thing as long as there is any usefulness whatsoever promised, and even if I am called back, and I know I have one date for one twenty-four hours, I am still ready and prepared to go back. And that is what I have been trying to insist, that I am not making my own convenience and my own duties here the decisive thing as to how long this conference will last.

24. LILLIAN LEVY of the National Jewish Post and Opinion.—Mr. President, are any changes in the present borders of West Germany part of the German question to be discussed at the summit? I ask this, sir, because this issue has been raised by a responsible West German leader and member of Adenauer's Cabinet who recently suggested that Germans be allowed to return to Sudetenland.

A. I didn't get the very first clause of your question.

Q. Well, what I asked—were boundaries going to be part of the German question to be raised?

A. Well, at this time we wouldn't raise it. As a matter of fact, they've been living with these boundaries for a long time, and I would see at this moment no possibility of changing them except in methods that would be unacceptable, so, it might be raised by someone but I have no plan to do it.

Mr. ARROWSMITH. Thank you, Mr. President.

12. ACCOUNT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S INFORMAL NEWS CONFERENCE, MAY 11, 1960

[From the New York Times, May 13, 1960]

London, May 12 (Reuters).—Following is an account, issued today by Tass, Soviet press agency, of the informal news conference held yesterday in Moscow by Premier Khrushchev, incorporating a transcript of the questions and his replies:

Following the press conference given by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Soviet and foreign correspondents were invited to examine the exhibition of the fragments of the downed American plane.

During their visit to the exhibition, the correspondents met Nikita Khrushchev, who, having examined the wreckage of the plane and talked to experts, was preparing to leave. The correspondents surrounded Nikita Khrushchev and a conversation ensued.

The correspondents expressed satisfaction with having been given an opportunity of examining the fragments of the plane and the equipment and special apparatuses it carried.

I see that you are satisfied with the press conference, Nikita Khrushchev said. You must have got the answers to all your questions. I have already said that we intend to take to the Security Council the question of the aggressive intrusion of an American plane within the confines of our country.

If the Security Council—on which, apparently, pressure will be exerted by the United States—does not take the right decision, we shall raise the matter in the United Nations General Assembly.

Such aggressive actions by the United States of America are highly dangerous things.

This danger is enhanced by the fact that in his statement of May 9, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, not only sought to justify this act of aggression, but said also that the U.S. Government intended to continue such flights.

“OPEN THREAT TO PEACE”

This is an open threat to peace. We will shoot down such planes, and we will strike at the bases from which these planes will be sent to our country. You understand that if such aggressive actions continue, this might lead to war.

Question. May I ask you a question? one of the correspondents asked Nikita Khrushchev.

Mr. KHRUSHCHEV. Even two if you like.

Q. You have probably noticed a placard among the fragments of the plane urging assistance to the pilot. What do you think its authors meant?

A. We assisted the pilot when he flew into our territory and gave him due welcome. If there are other such invited guests, we shall receive them just as hospitably as this one. We shall try him, try him severely as a spy.

Q. How could all this affect the summit meeting?

A. Let those who sent this spy plane think over this question. Though they should have thought about the consequences beforehand. After all, an aggression has been committed against our country. And we shall continue annihilating all the aggressors who dare raise a hand against us. You see how accurately our rocketeers shot down the plane without setting it on fire! The pilot is alive, the instrumentation intact, in other words the material evidence is here for everyone to see. These are very skillful actions of our rocketeers. We are very grateful to them for this.

EFFECT ON SOVIET PUBLIC

Q. Will this plane incident influence Soviet public opinion when Mr. Eisenhower comes to Moscow?

A. I would not like to be in Mr. Eisenhower's place. I would not like to be asked the questions which might be put to him when he comes to the Soviet Union. I can only say: The Soviet people and our public are very polite, so there will be no excesses, but questions will be asked of course.

I would put it this way: one person, namely, Mr. Herter, has helped the President particularly in this respect.

At his press conference Herter made an outrageous statement! Far from feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he justifies them and says that this will continue in the future. Only countries which are in a state of war can act in this way.

We are not in a state of war with America. These aggressive actions and Herter's statement are impudence, sheer impudence!

Herter's statement has made us doubt the correctness of our earlier conclusions that the President, the American Government, did not know about the flights. Herter's statement says that this intelligence plan was endorsed by the Government.

The Americans, obviously, were compelled to say this because otherwise they would have had to bring Allen Dulles to account. Dulles, in turn, would have exposed the Government by saying that he carried out a plan approved by it and, consequently, endorsed by the head of the Government. I proceed from the statement that was made by Herter.

There was a time—I remember it from my young days—when many criminals and other suspicious elements roamed the world. These people resorted to a following trick:

A bandit with a small boy would hide under a bridge and wait for someone to cross it. Then the bandit would send the boy to the passer-by and the boy would say: Hello, Mister, give me back my watch. The natural answer would be: "What's that? Now run along!" Then the boy would insist: But look, Mister, this watch is mine. Why don't you give me back my watch? Then the armed bandit would appear, as though attracted by the noise of the argument, and tell the passer-by: Why do you bully the boy? Give him back his watch and pass over your coat, too!

The United States wants to live according to this law. But we are not defenseless passers-by. Our country is a strong and mighty state which can try its strength with it. If the United States has not experienced yet a real war on its territory, has not experienced air raids, and if it wishes to unleash a war, we shall be compelled to fire rockets which will explode on the aggressor's territory in the very first minutes of war.

I say this because I have read Herter's statement saying: "We are compelled to fly; it is the fault of the Soviet Union itself, because it does not give us access to its secrets, which we simply must know. This is why, if you please, we undertake such flights. After all, the President has said that the skies should be open—this is why we fly and shall go on flying, shall go on opening the skies."

How can an official representative of a state speak in this way about another nation!

We do not live according to the laws of the United States. We have our own laws and this is why we shall make everyone on our territory respect these laws—and the violators will be thrashed!

I liked the article in the British newspaper *Daily Worker*, whose meaning was as follows: If we accept the philosophy which some people in the United States want to instill in the public, it will be something like this—it is not the burglar that is guilty, but the owner of the house he broke into, because he locked it, thereby compelling the burglar to break in.

But this is a philosophy of thieves and bandits!

I think that if world public opinion correctly realizes all the gravity of the situation and approaches this aggressive act of the United States policy with due responsibility, if everyone unanimously condemns this act, and if the United States Government no longer uses such methods with regard to other states, this will be a good refreshing, so to say ozonizing, tendency in international relations.

Reading American press reports these days, I see that excepting a few gangsters of the pen who are whitewashing this action, the absolute majority of people writing in the American press, including those

who are notorious for their past unobjectiveness, are indignant about this incident, regard it as perfidy with regard to the Soviet Union.

It is a good sign. If you, newsmen, inform the public correctly, this incident, as very other incident, will finally be digested. After all, gentlemen, we must live in peace, and not only in peace but also in friendship.

“INCORRIGIBLE OPTIMIST”

Q. Can one remain optimistic about the United States policy?

A. I hold myself to be an incorrigible optimist. I regard the provocative flight of the American intelligence plane over our country not as a preparation for war, but as probing. They have now probed us and we boxed the nose of the “probers.”

Some United States officials are making a big noise now. Let them! The Soviet Union is not Guatemala. They cannot send troops here.

We have means to cool down bandits, should they wish to use their brazen methods against us. If they behave in this way, they will get this calmative.

Q. Mr. Khrushchev, has your estimate of President Eisenhower, which you gave upon your return from the United States, changed?

A. Well, the statement issued by the United States Department of State in connection with the intelligence plane naturally alters my belief that the United States President had nothing to do with this affair. I did not know that such an intelligence plan existed in the United States and that it included a program of reconnoitering flights over the Soviet territory.

It follows from the statement of the Department of State, which was approved by the President, that flights of American intelligence planes over our country are not a whim of some irresponsible officer, but realization of a plan, prepared by Allen Dulles, leader of the Central Intelligence Agency, a department within the jurisdiction of the United States President.

Mr. Herter admitted that the United States President had issued directives to collect various intelligence information by all possible means. On the basis of these directives, programs have been worked out and implemented, which, as Herter said, included large-scale observations from the air with the aid of aircraft and by means of penetrations.

I want you to pay attention to this—by means of penetrations, that is by means of reconnoitering, spying flights over the territory of a state with whom normal relations exist.

And this plan was approved by the President. An unheard of action. And after all this I am expected to say: “What nice people you are.” That would mean lacking in self-respect.

I would say that Mr. Herter has removed all wrappers. He has removed all the paint with which, as it were, they camouflaged, made up and applied cosmetic treatment to the policy of the imperialists of the United States.

Now, through his statement, he has revealed the bestial, fear-inspiring face of imperialism.

So what? It turns out that this face inspires no fear any longer. Such actions of the U.S.A. militarists are not inspired by the heroism of these masterminds, but by cowardice.

Danger comes not from one who has command of one's nerves and counts on one's powers and possibilities, but from a coward who fears everything.

I often read something like this: "Khrushchev claims that capitalism will die. Isn't this the reason why reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union are made?" But it was not I who said it. It is Marx who explained this a hundred years ago. If Messrs. Capitalists consider that Marx is wrong, then this should console them, then there is nothing to lose one's head over or show the white feather?

Q. Did the Turkish, Pakistani and Norwegian authorities know about the provocative flight of the American plane?

A. It is difficult for me to speak in the name of these countries, but I do grant that they did not know—the Americans are not accountable to them. I do not think that even the Prime Ministers of the countries on whose territory American military bases are situated are let inside those bases.

The fault of such nations as Turkey or Pakistan is that they have joined aggressive blocs. The peoples saying on this score is "one sells one's soul to the devil; before one has done so, one can be one's own master, but after it is the devil that is the master." That is how matters are at present with Turkey, Pakistan and Norway.

I warn you, Messrs. Foreign Journalists, don't sell your souls to the devil, keep them to yourselves. You would do better by applying your energies to promoting the progress of society. The Communist ideas shape the most progressive and the most correct trend in the development of society.

The best of Americans, such as John Reed, the author of "Ten Days That Shook the World," grasped the great meaning of these ideas. John Reed was a very clever man. Yet he was not born Communist, but came to accept it during the October Revolution, and he died Communist.

Some of you scribble stories against communism out of lack of wisdom and understanding. May God forgive you for this.

When I read the bourgeois journalists' stories slandering Soviet realities and communism I get angry sometimes, but, on second thought, I say to myself: Not all the journalists are John Reeds. Indeed, they are ordinary men, hired by such publishers as Hearst, who, like spiders, seize a man and enmesh him in their web.

And if such a journalist fails to supply slanders against communism, what then, will Hearst, or any other publishing concern, need for him? Hearst will not keep such a correspondent for a single day.

HEARST ARTICLE CRITICIZED

I talked with Hearst twice. During our second conversation I told him: "How is it that you told me one thing and wrote another?" And he replied: "Did I sum up the interview wrongly?"

I must do him justice: He summed up the essence of the talk more or less accurately, but his commentary to it misrepresented the whole meaning of it.

I told him this, but he replied: But I am a capitalist, it is my own commentary that I give. Indeed, he is a capitalist, but most of you are not capitalists, nor will you ever be. So why have you got to serve capitalism?

My conviction is that all the roads lead to communism. Where else can they lead to?

This is just what the American imperialists fear. This is why they get nervous, and fling themselves into reckless adventures. This shows they are not sure of their own system.

The State Department of the United States says that all countries engage in spying. But the Soviet Union never sent its planes into the United States or any other countries for reconnaissance purposes, nor does it do so. If there have been any individual instances of our planes inadvertently violating the airspace of other countries - this has happened on our frontier with Turkey and Iran - we have apologized to those countries and punished those responsible for such violations.

We want to warn those who may try to send their spies into this country to think carefully of the consequences.

Q. Do you still want President Eisenhower to come to the Soviet Union?

A. What shall I say? Take my place and say it for me.

You see for yourselves what difficulties are cropping up. I am frank with you. You know my attitude to the President of the United States. I have often spoken about it. But my hopes have been somewhat disappointed. I am a man and have human feelings. I am responsible for the direction of the Soviet Government.

You must understand that we Russians, we Soviet people, always go the whole hog: When we play, we play, and when we fight, we fight. So how can I now call on our people to turn out and welcome the dear guest that is coming to us. The people will say: Are you nuts? What kind of a dear guest is he who allows a plane to fly to us to spy? The American militarists who sent the aircraft on a spying mission over this country have put me, as one responsible for the arrangements for the United States President's arrival in the U.S.S.R., in a very difficult position.

Frankly speaking, I think the United States President understands this himself.

Supposing, before my visit to the United States, we had sent such a plane over there and they had shot it down. One can imagine the kind of welcome I would have got from Americans. They would have met me according to my desserts. I think everybody understands that.

One can guarantee, however, that during the President's visit there will be no excesses. Our people are courteous; they let off steam in words, and will leave it to the Government to act. They will not indulge in any insulting actions.

I think that American journalists and tourists feel now the constraint and discipline of Soviet people.

I have not heard of a single case of one of our people insulting an American. This is commendable. This speaks of the strong spirit of our people.

Q. Will the flight of this plane come up at the summit?

A. It already is the subject of discussion all over the world. That is why I do not regard it at present as necessary to put this matter on the agenda of the summit conference.

We are allowing for the fact that I alone will represent the Socialist countries at the conference while the Western powers will have three

representatives there. But I do not think that two of these three approve of this aggressive, dangerous act of American brass hats.

Apparently you would like to know when I intend to fly to Paris. I intend to arrive in Paris, on May 14, a day or even two before the conference starts in order to get acclimatized a little. I like Paris, it's a nice city. Well, and if others do not come I mention this because some are threatening that the conference may not take place -- then it will be clear that it is not our fault that the conference did not take place. So we shall go to Paris! And if the conference does not take place? Well, we have lived without it for many years and will live for another hundred.

It is not our country alone that is interested in the conference. All the world is interested in it. The peoples of all the world want international tensions to relax, want a normalization of international relations. I believe our partners in the negotiations are as interested in the conference as the Soviet Union. Therefore the conference will depend upon our partners.

We are ready. I intend to emplane for Paris on Saturday, May 14.

Some diplomats take offense and say that Khrushchev, if you please, is indulging in too harsh expressions. I should like to have heard their reactions had a similar aggressive invasion been committed against their country.

What do you expect of me, after all, that I should take off my hat and welcome this invasion? No, we shall meet gangsters the way they deserve. And this was a gangster, bandit raid.

Have you seen here the "air sampling instruments?" How can the authors of the fib look into our eyes after it was exposed? True, we know the kind of eyes imperialists have. As the saying goes: "Spit in their eyes and they would keep saying: God's dew."

Now you see that I did not tell the whole story deliberately at the Supreme Soviet session because we knew whom we were dealing with. We did not say at first that the pilot was alive, that the instruments were intact, that the plane did not explode.

They believed that the pilot committed suicide, and now that he is alive the American press seriously reprimands the pilot for a breach of his instructions, for failure to commit suicide and surrendering instead.

Some in the United States say that the pilot must be brought to trial for breaking the instructions and failing to destroy himself. Well, this is bestial talk. This is the ideology of imperialism. You, gentlemen, American journalists, you read newspapers, don't you? This is a horrible thing.

NOTE RECEIVED FROM U.S.

Q. Did not the American Chargé d'Affaires ask for an interview with Powers?

A. The Americans have sent us a note on this question and asked to be allowed to have an interview with him. But they themselves understand that this is too much. The pilot is now under investigation, he is a spy, isn't he? So how can one speak about an interview with him? He must answer before our Soviet court.

Q. Does this mean that neither the Ambassador nor the Chargé d'Affaires will be allowed to see Powers?

A. I did not say that. Maybe they will, maybe they will not. We shall see later. I cannot reply to this question now because the investigation is in progress.

Q. Will you regard as aggressive actions flights of aircraft of Western powers to Berlin after the signing of a peace treaty with Eastern Germany?

A. We have already made a statement in this connection. I repeat: After the signing of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, the status determined by the terms flowing from the military surrender for this territory will change.

Since that moment the occupation of West Berlin will be over, all access to Berlin which was based upon the surrender of Germany will cease from that moment. Then the German Democratic Republic will exercise full control of its territory and will also control access to West Berlin, which is situated on its territory.

If the German Democratic Republic comes to terms with the countries concerned and will allow them to use the airspace, the waterways, the rail and highways, this will no longer be our business. That will be the business of the German Democratic Republic. That's her sovereign right.

Some say that the Western powers will force their way into West Berlin.

I want to make it clear. If anyone tries to force his way, our military units stationed in the G. D. R. to safeguard peace will counter the force of violators of peace with their own force, and let some hotheads in the West ponder what would come of that for them.

DELAY IN VISIT SUGGESTED

Q. Considering this aircraft incident and your attitude toward President Eisenhower, wouldn't you prefer Eisenhower's visit to be put off?

A. We shall exchange views with the President on this question when we meet in Paris. We still want to find ways to improve relations with America, we want to have normal relations with the United States. And we believe that with time Soviet-American relations must grow into friendly relations between the peoples of our countries.

That would be normal and that is what all normal people are striving and will continue to strive for.

Any more questions? In conclusion I have this to say, we deal harshly with those who invade the borders of our homeland, who violate our sovereignty. But we want to live in peace and friendship with all nations. I hope you will understand our attitude when we angrily condemn such aggressive actions. But we take a sober view of things and realize that even the sharpest polemics are better than war.

This is why we shall do everything to have this strain relieved, shall do everything to normalize the international situation and to restore good relations with the United States if, of course, the United States also contributes to this.

I should ask you to take this into account and not to write anything that could increase tension still further. What do you need it for? After all, you will be in for trouble if a war breaks out. A war does not bring happiness to anyone.

During the past few days I have read many statements by American Senators, Congressmen, businessmen, and I believe it is a good sign that many of them deplore this action of their Government.

I believe it is a good sign that people do not lose their heads, that not everyone explains the matter as Herter has done.

VISIT TO FRANCE HAILED

Q. What would you like to wish the French people in connection with your trip to Paris?

A. The French people have given me a good welcome, just as the American people, but, of course, I do not want to set one people off against the other. However, my visit to France was undertaken later and the impressions are therefore fresher.

I am very much pleased not only with the welcome given to me by the French people but also with the talks I had with President de Gaulle. As to the people, well, all the peoples want peace. Wars are started by the governments, while the people's lot is to spill their blood. This is why they all want peace.

The French people also want peace. We fought against militarist Germany together with France. If war breaks out, and it can be unleashed by West Germany, Frenchmen will remember that they had a good ally in the past—the Soviet Union. This ally may come in handy again. But it is best we prevent war and be allies in the struggle for peace.

I think it is time to end this impromptu press conference.

Let me thank you, dear comrades and gentlemen, let me wish you success.

Unfold the truth, the noble cause of peace, and you will earn the respect of your people.

13. TEXT OF UNITED STATES NOTE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, MAY 12, 1960

[Department of State press release No. 262]

There follows the text of the note delivered on May 12, 1960, to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in reply to the Soviet note of May 10, 1960:

The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Soviet Government's note of May 10 concerning the shooting down of an American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1, and under instruction from its Government, has the honor to state the following.

The United States Government, in the statement issued by the Department of State on May 9, has fully stated its position with respect to this incident.

In its note the Soviet Government has stated that the collection of intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a "calculated policy" of the United States. The United States Government does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purposes. What it emphatically does deny is that this policy has any aggressive intent, or that the unarmed U-2 flight of May 1 was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming

meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris or to "return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war." Indeed, it is the Soviet Government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intentions in respect to these matters.

For its part, the United States Government will participate in the Paris meeting on May 16 prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent in seeking agreements designed to reduce tensions, including effective safeguards against surprise attack which would make unnecessary issues of this kind.

14. TRANSCRIPT OF "ABC'S COLLEGE NEWS CONFERENCE," WITH GEORGE V. ALLEN, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, MAY 15, 1960

The ANNOUNCER. Here comes the future. From Washington, D.C., we present the Peabody Award-winning College News Conference, where the leaders of tomorrow meet the leaders of today.

Here today to meet our panel of university reporters is the Honorable George V. Allen, Director of the United States Information Agency. Now here is our founder and moderator, Ruth Hagy.

Miss HAGY. Good afternoon and welcome to another weekly edition of College News Conference.

Mr. Allen, it is a great pleasure as always to have you back in our campus newsroom.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you.

Miss HAGY. I would like you to meet the students who are going to interview you at this time. From George Washington Law School, Chuck Manatt, who is the president of the National Federation of Young Democrats. From Trinity College, Martha Dodd, who is the daughter of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, Senator Dodd. From Howard University, Timothy Jenkins, the president of the Student Council. From the University of Maryland, Sybil Rapoport, the secretary of the student body. From Tufts University, David Jackson, who is a Sears, Roebuck Scholar who comes to us under the National Merit Scholarship program. He enjoys one of the fine scholarships given by many corporations in this country to enable many of our talented young people to continue with their education.

Now, students, as you know Mr. Allen is a very distinguished diplomat and it is a good thing for us that he is because he is in a very hot seat today. This is the day before the beginning of the summit conference and Russia goes into this international poker game with a full house of cards. The advantage that they have gained from the downing of the U-2 plane and our subsequent admission that the plane was on a spying mission, and then the launching of a four-and-a-half-ton space satellite, today, five times larger than anything we have put into the air and more than three times larger than any of their previous launchings, carrying a dummy—not a man—and incidentally, this feat was predicted on this very program two weeks ago by Senator Henry Jackson who anticipated that on the eve of the summit there would be another great space achievement by the Russians.

And so you see, Mr. Allen, as our Number One public relations officer and his agency who have the job of interpreting us to the rest of the world, find that on the eve of the summit they have indeed—they find us in a very precarious and a very delicate position with the Russians having scored these two coups. However, he has had a great deal of experience in handling all sorts of matters. He has been our Ambassador to Iran, to India and Nepal, to Yugoslavia and to Greece. He has been Assistant Secretary of State for both Public Affairs and for Near Eastern Affairs. I am sure that he will be able to handle this one.

Who has the first question for him?

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Allen, given that your agency has the unique responsibility of interpreting our foreign policy in its most favorable light abroad, I wonder how you intend to vindicate the U.S. position on this spy incident?

Mr. ALLEN. Let me say right off, that the responsibility of my agency is to try to represent the United States as honestly and as fairly as we can. Your implication that we try to put as favorable an aspect on the United States carries more of the connotation that we are merely trying to present the good side and hide the bad side. That is not the philosophy of the U.S. Information Agency. I must emphasize and say in all genuineness that we try to present the United States as honestly and as fairly as we can.

Insofar as the recent events are concerned, we have played them right straight down the middle just as straight as we know how to play them.

Miss RAPPOPORT. Well, Mr. Allen, what have the reactions been abroad? How has our explanation been accepted by the foreign peoples?

Mr. ALLEN. You refer to the U-2 incident, of course?

Miss RAPPOPORT. Yes.

Mr. ALLEN. Reactions abroad—again I am going to be just as honest and frank as I possibly can—have mainly centered around three things: One of them is somewhat favorable; two of them are somewhat unfavorable. The rather favorable side has been a very considerable amount of comment abroad, of understanding of the necessity of the United States and the free world in general, to try its best to find out what is going on behind the Iron Curtain.

There is a very general concern about getting more information and an understanding of efforts on the part of the United States to try to do it. Furthermore in that same line there has been a rather considerable amount of appreciation for the fact that the United States was capable of carrying out activities of this kind.

The two unfavorable aspects: First, the confusion, shall I say, of the announcements that came out of Washington on the subject and not only the original announcement saying that the plane was on a weather mission, but subsequent announcements which need some clarification here today, I think, concerning our right to carry out activities of this kind which have caused dismay in various foreign circles.

But the other unfavorable aspect is the wide concern on the part of people in many countries abroad lest this affect adversely the chances of the success of the summit. Most of them around the world are

hoping very much that the summit will find some measure of success, and this has caused dismay.

Mr. MANATT. Mr. Allen, who is the person in authority who authorized the original statement that this was a weather plane?

Mr. ALLEN. That was a spontaneous reply, as a matter of fact. It was already prepared, according to circumstances which were foreseen and it was just almost a, I think, a pushbutton reply. As far as the actual reply made, it was made by the spokesman for the State Department, Mr. Lincoln White. I spoke to Lincoln White yesterday and he said he gave out exactly the honest information he had in his hand from his reports from the field.

Mr. MANATT. Don't you believe, sir, this will prove very unfortunate to involve NASA in something like this when our complete intentions were to divorce it from the military area and to bring the civilian areas into space much more?

Mr. ALLEN. That is an unfortunate aspect of it, yes.

Miss HAGY. May I clarify one point that I think has people confused. The officials of NASA who gave out this information were acting in good faith, were they not? They were under the impression that this was a weather plane, that this was a weather mission, this reconnaissance mission? Or were they in on the deception?

Mr. ALLEN. That is getting into more details with regard to inside operations than I think I ought to try to comment on in all frankness. At the same time I will say this, that I know that the spokesman of the State Department who gave out the information was acting in entirely good faith when he said that it was a weather plane.

Now your immediate question is, Doesn't this embarrass us by getting NASA involved in military operations? It does, I think. On the other hand let me remind you that the United States has been in the forefront from the beginning on the whole question of space, of trying our level best in every international conference that we have had, in the United Nations and in our talks with the Russians, and so forth, to make outer space an international operation, with cooperation—we have gone very far in offering to have internal space supervised—outer space supervised by multilateral operation. We are perfectly ready to go in with the Russians and anybody else in an international operation on space, just as we have been ready to go in with the Russians on an open-skies proposal for over-flights by airplanes. We have been pressing for this kind of agreement since—well, since the United Nations started.

Miss DODD. Mr. Allen, as a propaganda specialist, what do you think Mr. Khrushchev will do with the pilot of the plane?

Mr. ALLEN. That is hard to predict. I have seen some suggestion that he may present him at the summit meeting as a sort of a gesture. I don't know. I would doubt that. Judging by the background, I would guess that he would probably hold him as a card close to his chest for a while.

Miss DODD. Well, if he does put him up for trial, how far do you think the United States should back the pilot?

Mr. ALLEN. We should do everything possible to see that he gets a fair and honest trial. That means, of course, through diplomatic procedures. I want to emphasize this: A lot has been said about the fact that this man was a spy and caught spying and so forth. There are a

lot of different definitions of "spying" and I don't want to try to quibble, but I do think I ought to point this out and that more people ought to recall it: When he went down he told exactly what his mission was and exactly what he was expected to do, and he was under instruction to do that. He wasn't wearing a false mustache and a cloak and dagger and that sort of business that you usually think of as a spy pretending that he is somebody that he isn't. He gave an honest report of what his mission is and I think that ought to be recalled by everybody concerned.

Mr. JACKSON. Premier Khrushchev last week sent formal protests to the countries that based the U-2's in Europe and in Asia. President Eisenhower also stated that in event of Russian intervention we would go to the aid of our allies. Already Norway has lodged a formal protest with the United States for using Norwegian bases for these flights. How can our allies give much credence to such a pronouncement from the President when they see our continual backing off in the Israeli-Egypt dispute over the use of the Suez Canal when we stated that we would go to Israel's aid to get free use of the Suez Canal and we have continually backed off on that?

Mr. ALLEN. We never said we would use Marines or the Navy or the Army to help Israel get through the Suez Canal. We have every time the question has come up in the United Nations or anywhere else, we have expressed our views very forcibly and very strongly that the Suez Canal ought to be open to the peaceful shipping of all nations.

Mr. JACKSON. But don't we have a moral commitment to Israel to make sure that it is?

Mr. ALLEN. When you say "make sure" does that mean go to war? That is the usual point of what you are talking about. When you are saying: "You can't believe in us because we say that we have a moral commitment to see that Israel gets through the Suez Canal," we have never said that we would go to war to assure that Israel would get through the Suez Canal.

Miss RAPPOPORT. I would like to get back to the unfavorable reaction of which you spoke before about the U.S. right.

The United States has maintained that this spying was sort of a necessary evil. Yet Mr. Allen, as a member perhaps of the younger generation I would like to know your opinion of the example of morality that is being set by the United States Government in justifying this breaking of international law.

Mr. ALLEN. The international law being the encouragement of an airplane over the Soviet territory or the spying?

Miss RAPPOPORT. Espionage.

Mr. ALLEN. The espionage part of it.

Are you suggesting for reasons of morality that the United States ought to get completely out of any espionage business?

Miss RAPPOPORT. I would like to know your opinion on the morality of it.

Mr. ALLEN. That is a very fair question. I wish very much, Sybil, that we could. Nothing would please me better. If we had a world which would permit that. I think, as a matter of fact, that we have gone a far way towards an open society in proposals which we have made, such as those which President Eisenhower made in 1955 in

which he not only offered to the Soviet Union but urged the Soviet Union to get rid of this closed society, this suspicion and these Iron Curtains that are going to prevent people from finding out. Let the planes fly opening. The United States has been in the forefront in urging that kind of a result.

Miss RAPPOPORT. If you say therefore because of this tightness of the iron curtain there is a need for these reconnaissance flights in order to penetrate it, then why did the Government admit it, thus jeopardizing future security of the United States?

Mr. ALLEN. That is a very important question and I have been very much interested and I may say quizzical about a great many comments that I have seen on that very subject. Darning the United States for having admitted that the plane was flying over Soviet territory for the purpose of obtaining information about the Soviet Union. I must say right here that I think that that was one of the most important things that has been done in this whole field of trying to build an open society. The frank admission on the part of the United States that we did it.

Now a lot of people will say: "You didn't do it until your hand was forced," and all that kind of matter, but I must emphasize that I think this admission—yes, we were trying to get information to guard this nation against surprise attack. We have gone through Pearl Harbor, we have submitted to surprise attack and where there is a great area of the world where there is no other means of finding out what is going on, the United States has said: "Yes, we are going to try—we have a right to try to get information as best we can."

Let me say just one more thing—I know you want to ask questions; I don't want to take too much time on my own, but there has been a great misunderstanding that I would like to correct, today: Mr. Herter, the Secretary of State, has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He has said that there is an obligation and a responsibility on the part of the government of the United States and of the free world to try to obtain information to guard against surprise attack. But he has not said that we are going to continue to fly. He hasn't said one way or another.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Allen, you seem to express confidence in the virtue of our admission, on moral grounds, but now the consideration of this admission in terms of jeopardizing the position of our allies. Given that the Russian statement is that there is a possibility of missile retaliation, do you recognize that this is a thing which might compromise the virtue of our open admission?

Mr. ALLEN. Timothy, I didn't justify our admission on moral grounds, no. I said that in my opinion, this is one step towards the general concept of an open society—open skies. I am not saying whether it is moral or immoral. I am just saying that in my opinion is a step in that general direction.

Mr. JENKINS. But considering the practicality of our allies being very much involved in our making such an admission, namely that the planes took off probably from their territories, doesn't this seriously jeopardize their position, in juxtaposition to the Soviet Union?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, that is one of the very difficult problems of this whole situation of the U-2, is this situation of our allies. There again I am quite frank to say here that it is perfectly obvious—I am not

telling any secrets when I say that our allies are naturally going to be much more concerned from now on. It is quite natural that they would be, about the actions taken from airbases in their territory.

On the other hand, in keeping with the same idea of trying to develop open skies, I believe that we will have the support of the general free world in the direction, in the trend in which the United States is trying to go.

Miss HAGY. Mr. Allen, you have used the term "open societies" now, twice. I wonder if you would perhaps elaborate on this. We have heard about President Eisenhower's open skies plan which he presented before the United Nations and which presumably he is taking to the summit conference in a revised form. Could you tell us something about how the open society differs from open skies?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, the open society is a new and enlarged phrase but it grows out of the idea that we are going to get away from the seclusion and secrecy of every military action and allow—when we offer opportunity for Soviet planes to fly over the United States, take photographs, see anything they want to, that is open skies. All we ask is that we be able to do the same.

If you can take that step, then perhaps you might get towards the idea of societies being open. That is laboratories, combined tests for atomic explosions, things of that sort. We are trying to build. We want to encourage the Russians to come in with us, to investigate the explosion of atomic energy underground, in tests to see how the seismographic implements can detect it. All those sorts of things.

Mr. MANATT. Mr. Allen, in preparation for the summit meeting we have had in a few short weeks the announcement that Vice President Nixon may go to the summit, we have had the announcement of the reconvening of underground nuclear testing and also the U-2 plane incident.

I am wondering, do any members of our government in reference to the people in preparing for the summit consult with you in relation to, for example, the nuclear testing statement, and what effect this will have on the rest of the world and what effect it will have on the summit meeting?

Mr. ALLEN. I must say that I was not consulted with regard to the nuclear testing statement, but I want to emphasize here again that oftentimes these statements are—the impression in the public mind is what they see in a headline. We haven't said we are going to start resuming nuclear weapons testing at all. We have offered to the Russians an opportunity to participate with us in examining how nuclear testing, nuclear explosions underground, can be detected through improved seismographic instrumentation.

Now that is quite a different thing from the general idea that we have suddenly said we are going to start resuming—

Miss HAGY. That is perfectly true, Mr. Allen. It took a whole week for the true picture of this resumption of tests to become clear.

Now isn't it a part of the obligation to make sure that the original statements are presented with such accuracy that there is not a chance of this harm being done to us in a propaganda and public opinion way? Shouldn't they consult with you in the method of presentation so that it doesn't take a whole week for a refutation to penetrate?

Mr. ALLEN. I think perhaps I will have to agree with you although I must say no amount of consulting with me will determine how American newspapers are going to write their headlines.

Mr. JACKSON. I would like to get back to the "open society" for a moment. Don't you agree that before any meaningful open society may be attained there must be a government by law and not of force implemented by men?

Mr. ALLEN. In each nation, do you mean, or in the world?

Mr. JACKSON. In the world.

Mr. ALLEN. In the world.

Yes. That opens up a very much larger question. We have to achieve a government of laws in the world, a rule of law in the world; yes, very definitely.

Mr. JACKSON. Then don't you think that we are slightly hypocritical in our outlook towards international law? We will take the decisions of the World Court when they are favorable to us or we will accept their decisions. If we don't accept their decisions, we won't abide by them. We will break international law when it can be justified for our mutual security.

Mr. ALLEN. You have it almost right. What our position is under the Connally Amendment, we will not accept the jurisdiction of the World Court if we consider that it is a part of our internal matters and therefore we keep the decision as to whether we will allow a case to go to the World Court or not. I couldn't agree with you more. I think that we ought to build up the international court in every way we possibly can. That is the smallest little step we can take. We ought, in my opinion—I don't have any hesitation in stating it right here as strongly as I can—that the first and smallest step is to accept the jurisdiction of the international court.

Mr. JENKINS. Don't we in effect, then, by positing such a rule of expediency undercut the real significance of any such meeting at the summit, where four men are going to sit down in the center of Europe and decide the world's problems with absolute criteria by which they shall operate in making their decisions? We have no common acceptance on a legal theory, which should be operative between nations. And at the last summit conference it was the policy of the USIA to present this as a very favorable meeting which had accomplished many significant gains.

Now when we view this in the light of the summit conference coming on, haven't we actually by the mere admission that this is not the real means for arriving at settlements, undercut the significance of such a meeting?

Mr. ALLEN. I am not quite certain, Timothy—let me try to say what I think you mean.

Mr. JENKINS. Or will there be any attempt of USIA to bring out of this meeting things which are significant? Would those things which are significant really be pertinent to the solutions of peace for our society?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I think the summit meeting has possibilities of finding things that would add towards the peace of the world; yes.

Miss HAGY. Are you optimistic about it?

Mr. ALLEN. Unfortunately—I wish I were. I think it is possible that the summit meeting—I am just guessing, now, but it seems to

me it has the most likely chance of accomplishment in the field of new instructions to the disarmament negotiators. I wish I could be optimistic.

Your point, I think, Timothy, is why do we have summit meetings if we agree that a rule of law in the world is what is needed. The rule of law in the world is what we are heading towards, but we have to take an awful lot of steps in between time in every direction possible in order to achieve that rules of law.

Mr. MANAIT. Mr. Allen, you have said, I believe, in the past that executive initiative and positive programs make the best propaganda in themselves, new ideas, new things we are doing.

What new programs or new ideas is President Eisenhower taking to the summit with him other than the warmed-over version of the open skies announcement of five years ago?

Mr. ALLEN. President Eisenhower will announce that tomorrow at the meeting. It certainly wouldn't be proper for me to tell you today what he is going to say tomorrow.

Miss RAPPOPORT. I would like to ask something about this morning's news story about the satellite being launched yesterday by the Soviets. You recently said that we had caught up with the propaganda gains of the Russians in space. Doesn't this now put them out once more ahead of us in propaganda, and how does your agency counteract this?

Mr. ALLEN. Putting earth satellites up is always going to be a kind of a seesaw thing. The Russians have a big jump today in putting up a four-ton satellite. It is by far the largest that has ever been put up and it is an important step towards eventually putting a man in space.

I am the first to recognize that. Although I will remind you, and our listeners, that until this morning the only earth satellites going around the earth were American. There were five of them. The only ones today that are sending back information from outer space are American. Five of them are still radiating back. The amount of information we have given to the world on space, on the dimensions of space and what goes on out there has been, I'd say, almost ten to one American against Russian.

Miss HAGY. Nevertheless, if they succeed in putting a man into space before we do—and it looks now as though they might with this trial test that they have just launched this morning—will that not give them a great propaganda advantage?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, it will. It will certainly give them a great propaganda advantage, but I wouldn't—as a propagandist I wouldn't propose that we put up a man there until we are pretty sure that we can get him back—absolutely sure.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Allen, it is a conceded fact that we are now fourth with respect to overseas broadcasting.

Mr. ALLEN. In factor of time on the air, yes.

(R)

Mr. JENKINS. Yes. It is also a surprising fact that many of the major auto manufacturers invest more in public relations than we do as a whole country. I wonder then what you have to say about the probabilities of an increase in the budget out of this year's Congress?

Mr. ALLEN. We are asking for a small increase this year. I hope and believe we will get it.

Miss HAGY. Thank you very much. We are going to have to conclude on that note, sir, because our time has just run out. It is all too short when we have so many interesting things to talk about with you.

Thank you, students, for your interesting questions. We would like to invite all of you at home to join us again next week when our guest will be Governor G. Mennen Williams, of Michigan, and until then, goodbye and a good week from Ruth Hagy and the college news correspondents of College News Conference.

THE ANNOUNCER. College News Conference is created and produced by Ruth Hagy. Assistant producer, Johanne Curran. This program was directed by Richard Armstrong and originated in Washington, D.C.

This has been a presentation of ABC Public Affairs.

15. TEXT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENT AT PARIS SUMMIT CONFERENCE, MAY 16, 1960

[From the New York Times, May 17, 1960]

Paris, May 16 (Reuters)—Following are the text, in unofficial translation, of a statement made by Premier Khrushchev of today's session of the summit conference and made public by the Soviet Union.

President de Gaulle.

Prime Minister Macmillan.

President Eisenhower.

Permit me to address you with the following statement:

A provocative act is known to have been committed recently with regard to the Soviet Union by the American Air Force. It consisted in the fact that on May 1 a United States military reconnaissance aircraft invaded the Soviet Union while executing a specific espionage mission to obtain information on military and industrial installations on the territory of the U.S.S.R. After the aggressive purpose of its flight became known, the aircraft was shot down by units of the Soviet rocket troops. Unfortunately, this was not the only case of aggressive and espionage actions by the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the Soviet Government was compelled to give appropriate qualification to these acts and show up their treacherous nature, which is incompatible with the elementary requirements of the maintenance of normal relations between states in time of peace, not to speak of its being in gross contradiction to the task of lessening international tension and creating the necessary conditions for the fruitful work of the summit conference. This was done both in my speeches at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and in a special note of protest sent to the United States Government.

At first, the United States State Department launched the ridiculous version that the American plane had violated the borders of the U.S.S.R. by accident and had no espionage or sabotage assignments. When irrefutable facts clearly proved the falsity of this version, the United States State Department on May 7, and then the Secretary of State on May 9, stated on behalf of the United States Government that American aircraft made incursions into the Soviet Union with mili-

tary espionage aims in accordance with a program endorsed by the United States Government and by the President personally.

Two days later, President Eisenhower himself confirmed that execution of flights of American aircraft over the territory of the Soviet Union had been and remained the calculated policy of the United States. The same was declared by the United States Government in a note to the Soviet Government on May 12. Thereby the United States Government is crudely flouting the universally accepted standards of international law and the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter, under which stands the signature of the United States of America also.

INDIGNATION WAS VOICED

The Soviet Government and the entire people of the Soviet Union met these declarations of leading statesmen of the U.S.A. with indignation, as did every honest man and woman in the world who displays concern for the destinies of peace.

Now, at a time when the leaders of the Governments of the four powers are arriving in Paris to take part in the conference, the question arises of how is it possible productively to negotiate and examine the questions confronting the conference when the United States Government and the President himself have not only failed to condemn this provocative act—the intrusion of the American military aircraft into the Soviet Union—but, on the contrary, have declared that such actions will continue to be state policy of the U.S.A. with regard to the Soviet Union.

How can agreement be sought on the various issues that require a settlement with the purpose of easing tension and removing suspicion and mistrust among states when the Government of one of the great powers declares bluntly that its policy is intrusion into the territory of another great power with espionage and sabotage purposes and, consequently, the heightening of tension in relations among states?

It is clear that the declaration of such a policy, which can be pursued only when states are in a state of war, dooms the summit conference to complete failure in advance.

We, naturally, take note of the declaration by the United States Government of such a policy and state that in the event of a repeated intrusion by American aircraft into the Soviet Union we shall shoot these planes down.

The Soviet Government reserves the right in all such cases to take the appropriate retaliatory measures against those who violate the state sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. and engage in such espionage and sabotage regarding the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. Government reiterates that, with regard to those states that, by making their territory available for American military bases, become accomplices in aggressive actions against the U.S.S.R., the appropriate measures will also be taken, not excluding a blow against these bases.

In this connection it is impossible to ignore the statement by President Eisenhower to the effect that under the threat of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic he could not take part in the summit conference, though what he called a threat was merely a declaration by the Soviet Government of its firm resolve to do away with

the vestiges of war in Europe and conclude a peace, and thus to bring the situation—particularly in West Berlin—in line with the requirements of life and the interests of insuring the peace and security of the European nations.

How then can the Soviet Government take part in negotiations under conditions of an actual threat emanating from the United States Government, which declared that it would continue to violate the U.S.S.R. borders and that American aircraft had flown and would continue to fly over the Soviet Union's territory? The United States Government has thereby declared its intention to continue unheard of and unprecedented actions directed against the sovereignty of the Soviet state, which constitutes a sacred and immutable principle in international relations.

“OVERT AND HONEST POLICY”

From all this it follows that for the success of the conference it is necessary that the Governments of all the powers represented at it pursue an overt and honest policy and solemnly declare that they will not undertake any actions against one another which amount to violation of the state sovereignty of the powers.

This means that if the United States Government is really ready to cooperate with the Governments of the other powers in the interests of maintaining peace and strengthening confidence between states it must, firstly, condemn the inadmissible provocative actions of the United States Air Force with regard to the Soviet Union and, secondly, refrain from continuing such actions and such a policy against the U.S.S.R. in the future.

It goes without saying that in this case the United States Government cannot fail to call to strict account those who are directly guilty of the deliberate violation by American aircraft of the state borders of the U.S.S.R.

Until this is done by the United States Government, the Soviet Government sees no possibility for productive negotiations with the United States Government at the summit conference. It cannot be among the participants in negotiations where one of them has made treachery the basis of his policy with regard to the Soviet Union.

If, under the obtaining conditions, the Soviet Government were to participate in negotiations clearly doomed to failure, it would thereby become a part to the deception of the nations, which it has no intention of becoming.

It stands to reason that if the United States Government were to declare that in the future the United States will not violate the state borders of the U.S.S.R. with its aircraft, that it deplors the provocative actions undertaken in the past and will punish those directly guilty of such actions, which would assure the Soviet Union equal conditions with other powers, I, as head of the Soviet Government, would be ready to participate in the conference and exert all efforts to contribute to its success.

As a result of the provocative flights of American military aircraft and, above all, as a result of such provocative flights being declared national policy of the United States of America for the future regard to the Socialist countries, new conditions have appeared in international relationships.

Naturally, under such conditions, we cannot work at the conference; we cannot because we see the positions from which it is intended to talk with us: under the threat of aggressive reconnaissance flights. Espionage flights are known to be undertaken with reconnaissance purposes with the object of starting a war. We, therefore, reject the conditions the United States of America is creating for us. We cannot participate in any negotiations and in the solution of even those questions which have already matured; we cannot because we see that the United States has no desire to reach a settlement.

"DECEPTION" IS RULED OUT

It is considered to be a leader in the Western countries. Therefore, the conference would at present be a useless waste of time and a deception of the public opinion of all countries. I repeat, we cannot under the obtaining situation take part in the negotiations.

We want to participate in the talks only on an equal footing, with equal opportunities for both one and the other side.

We consider it necessary for the peoples of all the countries of the world to understand us correctly. The Soviet Union is not renouncing efforts to achieve agreement. And we are sure that reasonable agreements are possible, but, evidently, not at this but at another time.

For this, however, it is necessary first of all that the United States admits that the provocative policy it has declared by a policy of "unrestricted" flights over our country is to be condemned and that it rejects it and admits that it has committed aggression and admits that it regrets it.

The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that if not this Government of the United States then another, if not another then the next one would understand that there is no other way out but peaceful coexistence of two systems, capitalist and Socialist. Either peaceful coexistence or war, which will result in a disaster for those who are pursuing aggressive policy.

PEACEFUL LINKS STRESSED

Therefore, we think that some time should be allowed to elapse so that the questions that have arisen should settle and so that those responsible for the determining of the policies of a country would analyze what kind of responsibility they placed upon themselves, having declared an aggressive course in their relations with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. Therefore, we would think that there is no better way out than to postpone the conference of the heads of government for approximately six to eight months.

The Soviet Union on its part, will not lessen its effort to reach an agreement. I think that public opinion will correctly understand our position, will understand that we were deprived of the possibility to participate in these negotiations.

However, we firmly believe in the necessity of peaceful coexistence because to lose faith in peaceful coexistence would mean to doom mankind to war, would mean to agree with the inevitability of wars, and under the circumstances it is known what disasters would be brought by a war to all nations on our planet.

I wish to address the people of the United States of America. I was in the U.S.A. and met there with various sections of the American people and I am deeply convinced that all the strata of the American people do not want war. An exception constitutes but a small frantic group in the Pentagon and, supporting it, militarist quarters that benefit from the armaments race, gaining huge profits, which disregard the interests of the American people and in general the interests of the peoples of all countries, and which pursue an adventurous policy.

We express gratitude to President de Gaulle for the hospitality and rendering us the possibility to meet in Paris, the capital of France. We also appreciate the efforts of the Government of Great Britain and Prime Minister Macmillan personally.

We regret that this meeting has been torpedoed by the reactionary circles of the United States of America by provocative flights of American military planes over the Soviet Union.

We regret that this meeting has not brought about the results expected by all nations of the world.

Let the disgrace and responsibility for this rest with those who have proclaimed a bandit policy toward the Soviet Union.

ISSUE OF EISENHOWER VISIT

As is known, President Eisenhower and I have agreed to exchange visits. Last September, I made such visit to the U.S.A. We were greatly gratified by that visit, the meetings and talks we had in the United States, and for all this we expressed our appreciation.

The President of the U.S.A. was to make a return visit to our country. Our agreement was that he would come to us on June 10. And we were being prepared to accord a good welcome to the high guest.

Unfortunately, as a result of provocative and aggressive actions against the U.S.S.R., there have been created now such conditions when we have been deprived of a possibility to receive the President with the proper cordiality with which the Soviet people receive welcome guests. At present, we cannot express such cordiality to the President of the U.S.A. since, as the result of provocative flights of American military planes with reconnaissance purposes, there are created conditions clearly unfavorable for this visit.

The Soviet people cannot and do not want to be sly. That is why we believe that at present the visit of the President of the U.S.A. to the Soviet Union should be postponed and agreement should be reached as to the time of the visit when the conditions for the visit would mature. Then the Soviet people will be able to express proper cordiality and hospitality toward the high guest representing the great power with which we sincerely want to live in peace and friendship.

I believe that both President Eisenhower and the American people will understand me correctly.

The Soviet Government states that on its part it will continue to do its utmost to facilitate the relaxation of international tension, to facilitate the solution of problems that still divide us today. In that we shall be guided by the interests of strengthening the great cause of peace on the basis of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

16. TEXT OF EISENHOWER STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE MEETING ON MAY 16, 1960

[Department of State press release No. 271, May 17, 1960]

Following is the text of the statement by President Eisenhower, following the May 16 meeting of the Four Heads of Government:

Having been informed yesterday by General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan of the position which Mr. Khrushchev has taken in regard to this Conference during his calls yesterday morning on them, I gave most careful thought as to how this matter should best be handled. Having in mind the great importance of this Conference and the hopes that the peoples of all the world have reposed in this meeting, I concluded that in the circumstances it was best to see if at today's private meeting any possibility existed through the exercise of reason and restraint to dispose of this matter of the overflights, which would have permitted the Conference to go forward.

I was under no illusion as to the probability of success of any such approach but I felt that in view of the great responsibility resting on me as President of the United States, this effort should be made.

In this I received the strongest support of my colleagues, President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. Accordingly, at this morning's private session, despite the violence and inaccuracy of Mr. Khrushchev's statements, I replied to him on the following terms:

I had previously been informed of the sense of the statement just read by Premier Khrushchev.

In my statement of May 11 and in the statement of Secretary Herter of May 9 the position of the United States was made clear with respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a world where nations distrust each other's intentions. We pointed out that these activities had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. As is well known, not only the United States but most other countries are constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union.

There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, through official statements, threatened continued overflights. The importance of this alleged threat was emphasized and repeated by Mr. Khrushchev. The United States has made no such threat. Neither I nor my Government has intended any. The actual statements go no further than to say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility to safeguard against surprise attack.

In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.

I have come to Paris to seek agreements with the Soviet Union which would eliminate the necessity for all forms of espionage, including overflights. I see no reason to use this incident to disrupt the conference.

Should it prove impossible, because of the Soviet attitude, to come to grips here in Paris with this problem and the other vital issues threatening world peace, I am planning in the near future to submit to the United Nations a proposal for the creation of a United Nations aerial surveillance to detect preparations for attack. This plan I had intended to place before this conference. This surveillance system would operate in the territories of all nations prepared to accept such inspection. For its part, the United States is prepared not only to accept United Nations aerial surveillance, but to do everything in its power to contribute to the rapid organization and successful operation of such international surveillance.

We of the United States are here to consider in good faith the important problems before this Conference. We are prepared either to carry this point no further, or to undertake bilateral conversations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. while the main Conference proceeds.

My words were seconded and supported by my Western colleagues, who also urged Mr. Khrushchev to pursue the path of reason and commonsense, and to forget propaganda. Such an attitude would have permitted the Conference to proceed. Mr. Khrushchev was left in no doubt by me that his ultimatum would never be acceptable to the United States.

Mr. Khrushchev brushed aside all arguments of reason, and not only insisted upon this ultimatum, but also insisted that he was going to publish his statement in full at the time of his own choosing. It was thus made apparent that he was determined to wreck the Paris Conference.

In fact, the only conclusion that can be drawn from his behavior this morning was that he came all the way from Moscow to Paris with the sole intention of sabotaging this meeting on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested.

In spite of this serious and adverse development, I have no intention whatsoever to diminish my continuing efforts to promote progress toward a peace with justice. This applies to the remainder of my stay in Paris as well as thereafter.

17. TRANSCRIPT OF NEWS BRIEFING WITH JAMES C. HAGERTY, ANDREW H. BERDING, AND CHARLES E. BOHLEN, PARIS, MAY 16, 1960

[The White House press release]

Mr. HAGERTY. I will try to speak as loud as I can. Can the people in the back of the room hear me? I have a statement from President Eisenhower, which I shall read. The statement is presently being stenciled and will be distributed as soon as it is mechanically possible, by my office.

Mr. Berding and I are here. Also with us is Ambassador Bohlen, who was present at the meeting this morning and who will be available for questions and a report on the meeting, after I finish reading the statement.

I will read it through, not at dictation speed, but I will read it through so that you can get the sense of it, and by the time I am finished reading, the stencil should be available outside.

This is a statement by President Eisenhower. (Mr. Hagerty then read the statement down to the words, "on the following terms.")

What I will now read is what the President read at the meeting [see document No. 14] (and Mr. Hagerty continued reading down to "the main conference proceeds"). This is the end of the statement the President read this morning, but his full statement continues. (Mr. Hagerty read through the final paragraphs.)

That is the conclusion of the President's statement. (Most of the questions that follow, due to very poor hearing in the room, were repeated by Mr. Hagerty for the benefit of those present, but are as accurately as possible the actual words of the questioner.)

Q. How long will the President stay in Paris, Mr. Hagerty?

Mr. HAGERTY. I think that that would depend on what would happen tomorrow.

Q. Mr. Hagerty, did Mr. Khrushchev reply to Mr. Eisenhower's statement?

Mr. BOHLEN. Mr. Khrushchev made a partial reply to the President's statement, by reiterating the three points of his ultimatum. He indicated that the statement of the President that flights would not be resumed; he inquired whether this meant for the duration of the Conference, and the President said, "No." It was indefinite. He then repeated, however, that unless the United States would publicly renounce its past act and punish those which he said were immediately responsible for it, the Soviet Union still could not attend this Conference.

Q. Well, Jim, is the Conference over?

Mr. HAGERTY. I think that I could say—wait a minute—I think it was left wide open when the meeting broke up. If I may have a suggestion which I think would save our time and yours, it would be that if you have any questions on the statement as such, if we could get this out of the way now and then ask Ambassador Bohlen to give you a rundown on the meeting, and during the rundown I am sure quite a few of these questions that you are asking me would be answered. Would that be agreeable?

Q. Did the President have anything to say about the attack that Mr. Khrushchev had been making on Pakistan and other countries where United States bases are located?

Mr. BOHLEN. At the meeting this morning, he did not touch on that part of Khrushchev's statement. He did not go into the details of Khrushchev's statement other than those contained in his own statement.

However, in answer to the question, I think prior to this Conference, that the United States had made it plain that it would fulfill its obligations to any of its allies in the event of any attack or threatened attack.

Q. Did the British and French delegations take a stand on the American position?

Mr. HAGERTY. Did the—you mean the statement that I just read?

Q. And your statement of position—

Mr. HAGERTY. I think Yes, but I would prefer to have that come from the British and French spokesmen, who are now giving their special briefings.

Q. Did Khrushchev make clear that he won't attend any bilateral meetings such as the President mentioned, that he won't be back tomorrow morning at Elysee Palace?

Mr. BOHLEN. I think the first answer to that question is an important one. At today's meeting, Mr. Khrushchev said he did not consider this a meeting of the Paris conference, this was a preliminary meeting to determine, in their eyes, whether the Conference could take place or not. He said the same thing in regard to any possible meeting tomorrow or in the next days.

Mr. HAGERTY. Again, if I can make a suggestion, I think it would be helpful if you would let Ambassador Bohlen, who was at the meeting as a Member of our Delegation, just run down through it. All right.

Q. The Russians are saying that they will have a press conference after the President replies. Now, what you just said here and what you said at the closed meeting earlier, may we consider this the President's final reply to Russia?

Mr. HAGERTY. How can you consider anything as final? The answer would be "No" to your direct question. Now do you mean if I am going to have another press conference today? Who can tell?

Q. Don't you think that Mr. Khrushchev wants to prevent a meeting of President Eisenhower and the Soviet people because he is afraid that the Russian people would welcome the President?

Mr. HAGERTY. Yes, I would agree with that, but that was not the point. Mr. Bohlen might want to answer that question directly on what happened on the invitation.

Mr. BOHLEN. In further elaboration of his statement canceling the invitation, Khrushchev said that the circumstances had changed as a result of this matter of the plane, that it would be hypocrisy for the President to come to the Soviet Union, the Soviet people were not hypocrites and that they would not be able to understand how you could invite the representative of a state whose planes had flown over the Soviet territory and one of which had been shot down by Soviet rockets.

He even said that he didn't know what he would say to his little grandson, if his grandson asked him that question.

In regard to your answer, this is your question, of course Khrushchev did not go into that angle of the thing, but I think it's a reasonable supposition.

Q. Thank you very much.

Mr. HAGERTY. And as far as the invitation or withdrawal of the invitation was concerned, in Mr. Khrushchev's statement this morning, the President did not answer it, but the fact that Mr. Khrushchev withdrew it, I think—the fact that Mr. Khrushchev withdrew it, prevented the President from refusing to accept. [Laughter].

Q. Will you repeat that, please?

Mr. HAGERTY. I said the fact that Mr. Khrushchev withdrew the invitation prevented—

Mr. BOHLEN. (to Mr. Hagerty): No objection of the President.

Mr. HAGERTY. There was no objection on the President's part and it just meant that he did not have to refuse to accept the invitation.

Mr. BOHLEN. The President did not refer at all to that part of Mr. Khrushchev's statement, dealing with the cancellation of the invitation.

Mr. HAGERTY. I would still like to have Mr. Bohlen, who is present [laughter]—

Mr. BOHLEN. I will try and hit, gentlemen, the highlights of this meeting, since it went on for quite a while, as you know. And I think the first point I have already made, that Mr. Khrushchev made it perfectly plain that he did not regard this as his attendance at the Conference, this was a preliminary meeting to see whether or not, as he put it, conditions could be established which would permit them to stay. He read his statement which lasted at least a half hour, and more with the translations—close on to an hour with the translation—was followed by the President's statement.

Mr. Macmillan, and while I think Mr. Hagerty is right, that he would wish to brief it, but I think this was important because both General de Gaulle and Macmillan urged Khrushchev to adopt an attitude which would make this Conference possible. Mr. Macmillan pointed out that their reference to any threat had been completely removed by the present statement that these flights had been suspended and would not be resumed. Mr. Macmillan also made the point that all espionage is in effect violation of sovereignty, and that unfortunately espionage was an unpleasant fact of life, but that he did not see how you could make too much distinction between one form of espionage and another since the great majority of any form of espionage constitutes a violation of national sovereignty.

General de Gaulle, as I say, was trying to counsel moderation on Mr. Khrushchev. He proposed there should be at least a day's recess while there might be an opportunity to see what could be done. He urged upon Mr. Khrushchev not to make any final decision.

In reply to Mr. Khrushchev's question, as I had already said, the President made it clear that this suspension of flights was not just for the duration of the Conference. Mr. Khrushchev ignored this and put out his statement, as you all know, publicly, which contains no reference to the fact that the President had made this important statement.

General de Gaulle pointed out that incidents like this of the plane were in effect the result of the tensions that this Conference had been called upon to deal with. He thought that its very happening, which was in the past, had highlighted the importance of addressing themselves to the subject on which they had come to Paris for. He pointed out that as a matter of commonsense, the time was not far distant when the satellites in orbit would open the skies over all countries, and even mentioned that there was a Soviet satellite launched yesterday, which was crossing France eighteen times a day.

None of this seemed to shake Mr. Khrushchev in his fundamental position, and he announced that he intended to publish this statement at a time of his own choice, and that he could not do otherwise.

He made one interesting reference—interesting to me—when he said that this was a matter that involved deeply the internal politics of

the Soviet Union, a matter which he said was of great importance to them. He stressed the fact that, as he termed it, the United States policy had been made public on this, ignoring the President's statement about the suspension of the plane flights, and that consequently a public statement would have to be issued by the United States, and this statement included not only the question of suspension of the flights but also a denunciation of what had already happened and an expression of regret that this had occurred. The President's statement makes plain this was not acceptable to the United States.

And also the third point was the punishment of those directly responsible, as stated in his own statement this morning.

The matter was left in some obscurity. Up to the time of Khrushchev's announcement of his determination to publish this thing and publish it in full, there had been some consideration along the lines of General de Gaulle's statement of providing—suggestion as Presiding Officer that they should take a recess, should see what might be done through bilateral or other forms of discussion, that he would stay in contact with the delegations and then later on would determine whether to call a session of the Conference.

It was again at this point that Khrushchev pointed out that he did not consider this the Conference, that these were preliminary meetings and not the Conference itself. After he insisted upon publishing this, both Mr. Macmillan and General de Gaulle I think questioned what was going to happen, whether or not a meeting would take place tomorrow, or when, and I would say the matter was left in complete abeyance.

Both General de Gaulle and Macmillan pointed out that if this statement was made public, it would be the taking of a decision of the type which General de Gaulle had urged should not be taken, except after mature and due consideration during the recess.

Q. What is your view? Are you ready for questions?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us why—

Q. What is your view of the significance of Mr. Khrushchev's comments about the internal politics of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOHLEN. It struck me only that I never, at any previous conferences, heard any reference of this kind made. I think anybody can draw their own conclusions from it. I don't propose to speculate on what might be in Mr. Khrushchev's mind, but only say this is the first time I have heard a reference in exactly those terms made in any conference with the Soviets.

Mr. Khrushchev provided a few highlights which I might mention to you, one of which during discussion he raised both his hands—on the subject of innocence in regard to espionage and the friendly feelings towards all countries—he raised his arms above his head and said: "As God is my witness, my hands are clean and my soul is pure." [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Ambassador, is there going to be a Summit Conference?

Mr. BOHLEN. Well, it depends on whom you are talking to. As far as Mr. Khrushchev is concerned, there hasn't been any. I think—and I don't want to speak for our Western colleagues, but we would consider this was a meeting of the Summit this morning. As to what happens in the future, I just don't know.

Q. Mr. Bohlen, is it your feeling that Mr. Khrushchev intends to call off the nuclear discussion, the test ban, and the disarmament discussions, as well as the Summit Meeting?

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't think we can answer that yet. There have been two conferences going on at Geneva, the ten-nation disarmament conference and the nuclear testing thing which has been going on for over a year and a half. We have not yet heard whether the Soviets are going to pull out of those yet.

Q. Can you tell us anything about any further meetings the President will have this afternoon or this evening?

Mr. HAGERTY. Well, first, of course, when he returned to the American residence, after the conclusion of the Summit Meeting, he had a meeting with all of the members of the American Delegation. And he and they, with Ambassador Bohlen and Mr. Berding and myself, were working—and he was working—on this statement that I have just read to you. There is a meeting, and I think it started at four or shortly thereafter, of the Western Foreign Ministers at the Quai D'Orsay, which is probably presently in progress, and that is all the meetings I know of at the present time.

The President is at the residence, and intends to stay there, but I do not know of any meetings scheduled for him other than those with his own people at this time.

Q. Jim, did Mr. Khrushchev make any other references to political conditions in the United States beyond the remark in his prepared statement, which we have?

Mr. HAGERTY. Well, I will ask Mr. Bohlen to answer that. He was at the meeting.

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't think he did. I just haven't seen—I heard him make it, but I can't quite recall whether the reference to his visit to the United States is included in his published statement or not—

Mr. HAGERTY. Yes it is—Yes.

Mr. BOHLEN. He did—it was, yes—about how much he enjoyed it. Then he didn't add anything about the United States except what is in his statement.

Q. Mr. Bohlen, did we offer to make the statement public that the flights would not be resumed during this period of discussion, when it still wasn't clear whether he was going to publish his own statement?

Mr. BOHLEN. This statement actually did not come up, but I would say it is a fair inference that the statement at the Conference could have been made public. But I would like to emphasize in this, in commenting on it, Mr. Khrushchev said that they had heard this with some satisfaction. However, they noted that there was no denunciation of the past act, no expression of regret, and no indication of willingness to punish, as he put it, those immediately responsible for these overflights.

Q. Mr. Bohlen, did Mr. Khrushchev in any way indicate what is going to happen to Captain Powers?

Mr. BOHLEN. No, he did not. Captain Powers' name was not mentioned this morning at all.

Q. Was there any reference, Mr. Ambassador, to the German problem and the possibility of a German peace treaty now?

Mr. BOHLEN. No, the only one is the one contained in his statement.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, what was the attitude of Mr. Khrushchev?

Was he fiery angry or was he noncommittal, or what was the atmosphere of the meeting?

Mr. BOHLEN. I think he certainly wasn't noncommittal, if you read his statement. [Laughter.] He seemed to me to be rather ill at ease, not particularly in his manner of expression, or excited. But I would say he was under some feeling of tension. He seemed to pay a great deal of attention to Mr. Gromyko on one side and to Marshal Malinovsky on the other. The atmosphere of the meeting was very—certainly wasn't cordial. It was not excited, but it was cold and businesslike.

Q. How did President Eisenhower take to Khrushchev's statement, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. BOHLEN. I think the President's statement in response gives you the answer to that.

Q. I mean, physically?

Mr. BOHLEN. Oh, there were no signs. The President has been around a great deal and he didn't show any signs one way or other on his face when he heard this.

Q. Will the President go to the Palais de Chaillot tomorrow at 11 o'clock?

Mr. HAGERTY. The Palais de Chaillot?

Q. To the President's Palace?

Mr. HAGERTY. I think the only thing I can say on that is what we have said two or three times, we will have to wait and see.

Q. Jim, will the President still go to Portugal as scheduled?

Mr. HAGERTY. Gee—you know, we haven't talked about that at all today. [Laughter.] I just don't know, Smitty.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, has the recent expulsion of the two Soviet spies from Switzerland been mentioned?

Mr. BOHLEN. No, the only reference to espionage was the one in the President's statement, and the one I mentioned in Mr. Macmillan's statement, who said it was an unpleasant fact of life that almost forms of espionage involved violation of national sovereignty.

Q. Does the statement by the President this morning represent any change of attitude on the part of the United States toward flights over the Soviet Union?

Mr. HAGERTY. I think his statement pointed out that there had been misunderstanding on this and that both on May 11 and on May 9 I believe the date is, referred to in the statement, these statements we thought were made clear, but there had been misapprehension on one key point.

Q. Then the right to such flights is maintained?

Q. Can I ask a question? Was it not previously denied in Washington that the President had ordered a cessation of overflights, as reported by Mr. Reston in the New York Times?

Mr. HAGERTY. The story that you are referring to, I made the remarks, the story as written was not correct.

Q. But the right to make the flights is maintained?

Mr. HAGERTY. The right to make flights is maintained? I don't know what you mean by the right to make flights?

Q. The right of espionage? [Laughter.]

Mr. HAGERTY (indicating). That's my answer.

Q. Mr. Bohlen, could you possibly say in what order the statements were made?

Mr. BOHLEN. Yes. Khrushchev spoke first. De Gaulle opened up as host and said that yesterday he had received the information concerning the Soviet position from one of the participants, Mr. Khrushchev, and he had made this known to his other two colleagues, and he wondered if anyone had anything to say.

Mr. Khrushchev jumped in and said, "I have something to say," and said it.

Q. Was there any informal exchange between the two men—between Eisenhower and Khrushchev?

Mr. BOHLEN. No, there was not.

Q. Did they shake hands when they came in?

Mr. BOHLEN. No, they did not. When the President came in, Khrushchev was already seated at the table, and the President just took his place at the table.

Q. How did the scene end up, Mr. Ambassador? Did they say goodby to each other informally, or did they just walk out without speaking?

Mr. BOHLEN. They just walked out.

Q. Has the machinery been set up, or is it being set up now to arrange a bilateral meeting, between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower, and if so, who is operating that machinery?

Mr. HAGERTY. No, I don't know of any at the present time. The statement that has been made by the President at the meeting—let me see where it is—on the last page: "We are prepared either to carry this point no further, or to undertake bilateral conversations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. while the main conference proceeds." The President made the offer. We have heard nothing from the Soviets.

Q. May I ask—

Q. Did Mr. Khrushchev propose to adjourn the Conference for 6 to 8 months with some kind of pledge at this time not to change the situation in Berlin?

Mr. BOHLEN. There was no such pledge.

Mr. HAGERTY. The question was did Mr. Khrushchev make any pledge, was it?

Q. No, is the Ambassador considering a proposal of some kind of pledge—

Mr. HAGERTY. Is the Ambassador considering—what proposal, sir?

Q. To adjourn the conference.

Mr. HAGERTY. The proposal to adjourn the Conference, does this change the situation on Berlin? Is that—

Q. Not to change?

Mr. HAGERTY. Not to change the situation—I am sorry—it is difficult to hear here.

Q. Yes. I beg your pardon for my bad English.

Mr. HAGERTY. No, no, I understand.

Q. The question was whether President de Gaulle (?) is considering recent proposals to adjourn the Conference for 6 or 8 months with some kind of pledge that he during this time will not change the actual situation in Berlin?

Mr. HAGERTY. In proposing to end this Conference here and have another one at some time in the future, 6 to 8 months, as Mr. Khrushchev says, does this mean that Mr. Khrushchev will change his position—

Q. Will not?

Mr. HAGERTY. Will not change his position—I am sorry—on Berlin?

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't think it's possible to draw any inference from that statement. He made no reference to Berlin at all, except the one in his published statement. Therefore, I don't think that you can read into this one way or other, it's merely what he said, let's have another—the conference, maybe in 6 to 8 months. He did say—you asked if there was any reference to the internal thing—I think this is in his statement when there would be a new American government.

Q. Ambassador Bohlen, did either Khrushchev or de Gaulle or Macmillan comment in any way on the President's suggestion on United Nations surveillance?

Mr. BOHLEN. The only one who did was Khrushchev, who said that the Soviet Union is sovereign over its own airspace and no one—and he repeated no one—will be permitted to infringe on it. If you ever got, he said, complete disarmament when there were no arms whatsoever, then you could have open skies, open earth, and open water. But until that happens, no one—and he repeated no one—would be permitted to fly over the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Hagerty—

Q. Jim—

Q. Jim, can you tell us why it was, or give us the background, the fact that these flights were suspended and were not to be resumed—why that was not announced, in view of the misunderstanding you mentioned?

Mr. HAGERTY. Well, I thought that it was, by some of our people in our Government, in some conversations that they have been having, but that's the only answer I can give.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, is it correct that prior to Mr. Khrushchev's clean hands and pure soul statement, there had been no detailing of any kind as to Soviet espionage in the West or the United States?

Mr. BOHLEN. There was no detailing of it, but the President's statement, which has just been read by Mr. Hagerty, said: "As is well known, not only the United States but most other countries are constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union."

Q. Mr. Hagerty, do you know whether—if the United States delegation is prepared to counterattack against the Soviet Union on a propaganda basis on the matter, or rather try to calm down the situation?

Mr. HAGERTY. Well, in the first place, I think that propaganda speaks for itself, and I refer you to the President's statement as far as propaganda is concerned here—at this meeting. I think what we tried to do is—on the second part of your question, I think that this is also handled in the statement, where the President says that "In spite of this serious and adverse development, I have no intention whatsoever to diminish my continuing efforts to promote progress toward a peace with justice. This applies to the remainder of my stay in Paris as well as thereafter."

I think those words speak clearly in answer to your statement.

Q. Mr. Hagerty—

Mr. HAGERTY. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you tell us when the three Western chiefs of government will get together and decide their next move?

Mr. HAGERTY. I can't tell you now. I would think that this is one of the reasons the Foreign Ministers are meeting this afternoon.

Q. With the Russian Foreign Minister present, or only the three Western—

Mr. HAGERTY. No, I said the three Western Foreign Ministers are meeting this afternoon.

Q. Did Mr. Khrushchev acknowledge in any way Mr. Eisenhower's statement that overflights will be discontinued?

Mr. HAGERTY. I thought Mr. Bohlen had answered that.

Mr. BOHLEN. Yes, he did, and he said they had some satisfaction on this, but pointed out that the other points of their demands still remained unanswered or unaccepted.

Q. Thank you.

Mr. HAGERTY. Okay?

Q. Thank you.

Mr. HAGERTY. That statement is mimeographed and on the tables outside the hall.

18. COMMUNIQUE, MAY 17, 1960

[White House press release]

The President of the United States, the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom take note of the fact that because of the attitude adopted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union it has not been possible to begin, at the Summit Conference, the examination of the problems which it had been agreed would be discussed between the four Chiefs of State or Government.

They regret that these discussions, so important for world peace, could not take place. For their part, they remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiation. They themselves remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.

19. TRANSCRIPT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S NEWS CONFERENCE, PARIS, MAY 18, 1960

[From the New York Times, May 19, 1960]

Paris, May 18 (Reuters).—Following is the official English translation of the text of Premier Khrushchev's prepared statement at his news conference here today:

Ladies and Gentlemen.

You obviously know the statement which I made on May 16 to President de Gaulle of France, Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain and President Eisenhower of the United States.

The circumstances under which the Soviet Government deemed it necessary to make this statement are generally known. I have in view

the aggressive flights of American warplanes over the Soviet Union, undertaken on the eve of the summit conference, and the public declaration of the United States Government that such flights are its official policy.

Now attempts are being made to lay the blame on us for the alleged refusal of the Soviet Union to take part in the meeting and for making some sort of ultimatums to the United States.

But we have declared and we declare that we are ready to take part in the conference if the United States Government makes up publicly for the insult inflicted upon our country by its aggressive actions. However, we are still not sure that the espionage flights, which are undertaken by the United States, will not be repeated.

Just recall the behavior of the United States leader, after they were caught redhanded. I shall refer to documents, and documents alone.

U.S. VERSION IS RECALLED

On May 5, when all the world learned that an American warplane was brought down over Soviet territory, the Department of State declared that it was an aircraft which flew over Turkey to collect meteorological information. It was claimed also that the pilot radioed back that he had trouble with his oxygen equipment. As a result of this, the pilot allegedly lost consciousness and the plane, steered for quite a time by its automatic pilot, could have accidentally intruded into the Soviet airspace.

It was reported that a search was carried on for this plane in Turkish territory around Lake Van, where the terrain is very mountainous.

When we announced that the American plane had been shot down in the area of Sverdlovsk and that the captured pilot had owned up to being a spy, the United States Secretary of State Herter said on May 9 that it was indeed a spy plane.

More, he said that such flights were being made on the President's instruction and in accordance with a program which provided for extensive aerial surveillance, including "by penetration" of the Soviet airspace. It was a brazen statement on the part of Mr. Herter.

On May 11, President Eisenhower himself confirmed Herter's statement.

On May 12, the United States Embassy in Moscow, in its note to the Soviet Government, again said that aggressive espionage flights were a calculated policy of the United States.

And now, in Paris, the President of the United States issues a statement to the effect that the United States has "suspended" its flights and will not resume them.

Some people ask, referring to this statement: What else does the Soviet Union need? It would seem that the threat of flights by American military planes over the Soviet Union is thus removed.

"SERVITORS OF IMPERIALISM"

Such a statement may have satisfied the servitors of imperialism: The imperialists have grown accustomed to behaving like Russian merchants did of old: they painted the lackeys' lips with mustard, and the latter said, "thank you" and bowed low.

We will not tolerate insults, we have our pride and our dignity. We represent a mighty Socialist state.

But then Eisenhower said at the preliminary meeting on May 16 that what he had meant by his statement about the suspension of overflights by American military planes was that they would not be resumed for the remainder of his tenure as President.

He said he did not know, naturally, what decision the next President would take. Thus, what the President of the United States promises is not renunciation of aggressive policy, but merely a temporary "suspension" of flights till January, 1961.

It is not for a long period that Mr. President promises us to discontinue the provocative policy of espionage flights. But international relations cannot be built on the term of office of this or that official, for what would then be the worth of any international agreement.

If we followed the American President's logic, it would be impossible to negotiate on, say, disarmament. An agreement may, conceivably, be signed today, but lose force tomorrow and be thrown into the wastepaper basket because the person who signed it would leave his post.

To hear President Eisenhower, it would seem that the question of whether American military planes will or will not overfly the U.S.S.R. depends on him and him alone.

Just think, what presumption! He now says they will not overfly. What magnanimity!

Of course, it is for President Eisenhower to decide whether to send or not to send his planes. But it is another question whether they will be able to overfly our territory. This is decided by us, and very definitely for that matter—we shall shoot these planes down, we shall administer shattering blows at the bases whence they come and at those who have set up these bases and actually dispose of them.

The point in question, therefore, is not some sort of "favor" to the Soviet Union on the part of President Eisenhower. We do not ask "favors" of the United States Government, but honest condemnation of the bandit flights of American intelligence planes.

However, President Eisenhower did not utter a single word of condemnation with regard to the provocative policy against the Soviet Union, on the strength of which the spy flights were undertaken.

Can such a statement by the President satisfy anyone but the aggressor himself?

Eisenhower's statement that he has suspended these provocative flights for the term he remains in the White House is not a confession, not even a semi-confession, but an attempt to dodge confession and consequently responsibility for his aggressive actions. But subterfuges and even semi-confessions of political leaders have never helped them to avoid historical responsibility. Even the children are told: If you do something bad—own up and say you "won't do it again." In government affairs, it is even more important to make complete confessions and draw all the necessary conclusions.

PREMIER VOICES SURPRISE

The Soviet people, public opinion in our and all other peaceful countries, would not understand us if we contented ourselves with the

American President's dodges and the "favor" he "graciously" did us by stopping flights over the Soviet Union till January, 1961.

Nor could we fail to be surprised by Eisenhower's statement, which looked like a threat that he planned to submit to the United Nations a new "open skies" plan.

After the Pentagon had realized that the Soviet skies were closed to American spy planes, the people there apparently decided to send planes with the same aims but under the United Nations flag. It is to be hoped that the United Nations is not an American state, not a branch of the Pentagon, and will decline this humiliating role.

Some of you say in your dispatches that flights by American air pirates over the Soviet Union are only a "small incident." You represent here the press of various states, and I would like to ask you what would you think of your government if it treated with indifference, with unconcern, the overflights of your cities by military planes of countries of which you yourselves sometimes write as potential opponents?

Would you respect such a government? Would your families and you yourselves feel safe listening to the drone of an alien military plane over your heads?

But the Soviet people have as much right to think in this way, the more so since the peoples of our country have vivid memories of two murderous wars imposed on us from without, two wars which took a toll of tens of millions of lives.

NEW COURSE DISCERNED

It is indicative that the governments of the countries that have rashly lent their territories for the preparation and carrying out of aggressive spy flights over Soviet territory, are now compelled to right themselves in this or other measure before public opinion and disavow the actions of the American military. They, apparently, have begun to realize—and we are sure that this will soon be realized by everybody who opened their land for the establishment of American war bases—that such things are not to be trifled with.

The Soviet Government regrets that it was impossible to hold the conference now, but, as I have already said, it could not act otherwise. We have done everything to prepare well the heads-of-government meeting, but some hotheads in the United States of America have torpedoed it even before it could be opened.

I repeat, gentlemen, the Soviet Union is firmly for peaceful coexistence, for talks, for the reaching of reasonable, mutually acceptable agreements.

We shall work in this direction, confident that our peace-loving policy meets with the sympathy and understanding of all nations, and we should like to believe that the Western leaders will also strive toward this end, that within six or eight months we shall again meet with our partners in a new, more favorable atmosphere, if they show interest and agreement to have this meeting, if they create the necessary political atmosphere for it, for the discussion and settlement of urgent international problems—that is, if they do not undertake provocations against the Socialist states.

WE CANNOT BE BENT

This can happen even sooner, but only if everybody realizes that no one will be able to intimidate the Soviet Union, the Socialist states, by any provocative actions whatsoever! We cannot be bent!

Negotiations and agreements with us are possible only on the basis of equality, without threats or blackmail.

I should like to thank the President of France, General de Gaulle for enabling the heads of government to meet in Paris, for the efforts he made so that the summit should take place, so that our meetings should be held as agreed upon and conform to the aims for which we have come here.

Today I paid a farewell call on the President of France. We exchanged our views, and I am happy to say that a common striving was revealed to continue to exert efforts for the development and strengthening of our relations in every way. I welcome this and I express my satisfaction that the President and I agree on this most important question.

I should also like to express my gratitude to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan, for his understanding and the efforts he made so that the summit meeting takes place.

And yet, I cannot fail to express some regret as well. If the President of France and the Prime Minister of Great Britain assumed the position of the objective appraisal of facts instead of yielding to their Allied ties, if they displayed more will, the leaders of the United States might perhaps have been obliged to condemn their aggressive actions, and conditions would thereby have been created enabling the summit conference to take place and yield the beneficent results hopefully awaited by all the peoples of the world.

I thank you for your attention, gentlemen, and I am now ready to reply to your questions.

PARIS, May 18 (Reuters)—*Following is the transcript of Premier Khrushchev's news conference here today, held after he made his prepared statement, with the Premier's remarks and those of non-English-speaking correspondents in unofficial translation:*

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to ask your pardon but I want to address myself to that little group in the hall that is booing.

I have already been informed that Chancellor Adenauer has sent some of his riffraff that escaped the beating at Stalingrad and it is they that are indulging in this booing, they that we did not at that time send three meters underground.

Look to it, if you were not beaten at Stalingrad and in the Ukraine, we will give you such a boo that you will lose any desire to come into the hall and boo again.

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to draw your attention to the fact that they are reacting to my words without even listening to the translation.

They understand. These are the plunderers who came to the Soviet Union to plunder and pillage and they carried away their hands—they carried themselves away from the Soviet Union. They escaped a beating.

REPRESENTS SOVIET PEOPLE

The most important thing here is that you are all wise people, and you must certainly understand who is standing before you. I represent the great Soviet people, a people that has won victory in the Great October Revolution under the leadership of the great Lenin, a people that is now successfully building a Communist society, that is confidently marching forward to communism.

And you, this little group, represent those people of whom the Germans themselves will in time be ashamed. I am speaking of this German riffraff and not of the great German people.

Their booing heartens me, heartens and gratifies me because in the words of a great representative of the German people, August Bebel, "If your enemies are attacking you, then know it. Bebel, you are on the right track."

And if you boo me then this adds confidence to me and I understand that I, too, am on the right track.

I shall not conceal *my* pleasure. I like coming to grips with the enemies of the working class and it is gratifying for me to hear frenzy of these lackeys of imperialism. Nothing they attempt to do will gain them any good. The Soviet Union, firm as a rock, is marching forward to build communism and will continue to march forward till the complete triumph of communism in the Soviet Union.

Now thank you for your attention, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall do my best to answer to the full any questions that you may have to ask me.

VIEW ON GENEVA TALKS

DAILY SKETCH, London. Can Chairman Khrushchev say if the Soviet Union will continue the talks on disarmament and on the suspension of nuclear tests?

A. We shall continue our negotiations in Geneva. The American imperialists have received some clarification of late. They received an eye-opener in Sverdlovsk. And if they understand that, then there is a possibility to reach agreement on the discontinuance of tests. But if Eisenhower threatens that he will continue testing, then we, too, will follow suit until the whole world learns who are the true guilty parties and who is resisting agreement. We at any time are ready to sign such an agreement.

The disarmament negotiations are another matter altogether. We are almost convinced that our partners in these disarmament negotiations do not want disarmament but want simply control over armaments, which is in other words the collection of espionage information. We will not agree to this. We are for true disarmament, for true control measures, so that no one should threaten any one else.

What is going on now at Geneva is merely procrastination. But if this procrastination goes on, we will be compelled to approach the United Nations and to say that our partners do not want to reach agreement and that we are asking the United Nations General Assembly to consider the matter.

INSISTS ON ASSURANCES

BRIDGEPORT HERALD (Connecticut). If your allegations regarding the U-2 incident are true or even worse, don't you think that as the

great leader of a great state and knowing that truth is on your side it would be better to have the summit conference now than in six or eight months' time, considering the state of tension?

A. Yes, we are in favor of holding a summit conference. That is why we came to Paris. But the United States must admit its aggressive intrusion, must condemn its act, give assurances that such acts would not be repeated and must punish the guilty party. Then, if it had done so, we would be satisfied and we would have taken part in the summit conference, to seek correct solutions for the questions confronting it. But the United States refused to do this.

How then are we to negotiate with an aggressor, with a state that has committed aggression, and on the contrary is saying that these flights are United States policy?

Ladies and Gentlemen, we all have mothers. You all do, too, otherwise you couldn't have come into this world.

I remember during my youth I was born in a very poor family and it was only very rarely that my mother could buy us some cream. But sometimes when she did our cat would creep up and eat some of the cream, would steal some of the cream. Then my mother usually took the cat by the scruff of the neck and gave it a good shaking and in the end would poke its nose into the cream to make it understand that such stealing was not allowed.

Wouldn't it be better, Ladies and Gentlemen, to take the American aggressors by the scruff of the neck also and give them a little shaking and make them understand they must not commit such acts of aggression against the Soviet Union?

PEACEFUL MEANS AFFIRMED

Die Welt, Hamburg.—Do you still consider that international issues should be resolved by peaceful means?

A. Yes, I reaffirm that our policy has always been to solve disputed issues not by means of war but by peaceful negotiations. That is the policy we have always adhered to and continue to adhere to now.

Q. Do you still adhere to your former proposal regarding the transformation of West Berlin into a free city?

A. Yes, I still adhere to this policy and we see no other reasonable way out. West Berlin is situated in the center of the German Democratic Republic, which is a Socialist republic, whereas the system in West Berlin is a capitalist one.

These two systems are antagonistic and this is always fraught with a conflict. Why should we have such a situation? Wouldn't it be better to take a better decision, that is to insure West Berlin a free city status, withdraw all foreign troops and make it possible for the inhabitants of West Berlin to choose the social system under which they want to live, the one which satisfies them the most, and, of course, on the condition that they are assured freedom of external ties with the world.

This recent conflict with the United States aircraft convinces us all the more that these questions must be solved as we are approaching the matter with ever greater resolve and urgency. By the way, tomorrow I am flying to Berlin. We will talk with our comrades, Ulbricht and Grotewohl, and in general with our friends in the German Democratic Republic.

QUESTIONED ON PEACE PACT

DER TAG, Berlin.—Do you intend to conclude a separate peace treaty in Berlin? (There were additional shouts of “and when?”)

A. Yes, we do intend to sign not a separate peace, but a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and thus to put an end finally to World War II. In that case, the Western powers will be deprived of their occupation rights, the right to maintain their troops in West Berlin. When? That is our business. When we consider the time to be right, we will take our fountain pens from our pockets—the necessary drafts have already been prepared and the drafts will be—we will sit down and sign the peace treaty and announce it to the world.

I would like to add we are simply intending to do what the United States did with regard to Japan.

We fought in the war together with the United States against Japan. But the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan. But we didn't. We are exerting all efforts to prove the necessity to sign a peace treaty together, but we have now almost reached the limits of our patience and of our effort to have a peace treaty signed together and when we do reach the limit we will sign such a treaty by ourselves just as, I repeat, the United States did with regard to Japan.

RECALLS CAMP DAVID MOOD

NATIONAL BROADCASTING Co.—Why, since you knew about these flights, did you not tell President Eisenhower about them and ask him to stop them when you visited the United States?

A. I will answer that question with pleasure. When we were talking in Camp David with President Eisenhower I almost opened my mouth to make that statement.

I was on the point of making it because the atmosphere there was so convivial with President Eisenhower telling me to call him “My friend” in English and using the same words with regard to myself in Russian. And then, thought I, why not raise the matter with this friend of mine.

But when I became apprehensive and I thought there was something fishy about this friend of mine and I didn't broach the subject and it turned out that I was right, because when we caught them red-handed they say they are not thieves, it's just their thief-like policy. That is all.

This recalls to my mind what we used to do in the Donbas when I was the young boy. Whenever we caught a cat in the pigeon's loft, we would catch the cat by its tail and bang its head against the wall and that was the only way it could be taught some sense.

HIS CHOICE FOR PRESIDENT

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM.—Since, because by desire or not, you have become a factor in the American political campaign, would you care to say which President you would prefer to deal with?

A. I thank you for that question. It is a good question, although rather a difficult one to reply to. Nevertheless, I will try to reply.

When I was in the United States, I talked with very many Americans, ordinary people, with people who are wealthy, with representatives of the capitalist world, the statesmen, the farmers. And I re-

tained very good and, I may even say, pleasant memories of my conversations with most of these peoples.

People everywhere are just like people and they all want peace. Perhaps they understand it in their own way, but that should certainly not be the ground for any conflict. Perhaps they don't agree with my understanding and I don't agree with their belief that the capitalism system is better. But that certainly should not be the object of any conflict and, all the more so, of a war.

I am sure that the majority of Americans regret the act perpetrated by the American Air Force.

It is true there are some Americans who have been kidded into indignation against the acts of the Soviet Union but to this I can but reply, how would they themselves feel if we were to fly our aircraft over their country.

But they would certainly come to the conclusion that such flights are absolutely inadmissible, that this can only end in aggression, can only bring about a war.

Regarding the question of who, in my opinion, will become the United States President, there certainly was a person to my liking, a person with whom I am sure we could have reached agreement.

He was a great American, his name was Roosevelt and he was a worthy representative of the capitalist society, but we cooperated with him very well indeed during World War II. When he died his policy died with him.

But we are convinced that persons will come to power in the United States who will pronounce themselves in favor of reaching mutually acceptable agreements.

We have nothing to quarrel about with the American people. They are in favor of capitalism, that is their business and even then it is not all the American people who are in favor of capitalism because many of them are simply under the oppression of the capitalistic system.

But let them come, why doesn't everyone come to the Soviet Union and see for themselves what kind of a life we are now leading.

Let even those who have been booing here come. We'll give them visas, too, and perhaps even they will see the light if they come.

Our country is now second in the world in its industrial production, in science and in culture. If I don't perhaps modestly say that we are first in the world, we certainly do occupy a worthy place in human society.

But I do not want to interfere in the American political scene. We should maintain an attitude of patience and not try to forecast who will come to the fore in the United States elections. The American people will themselves elect their worthy representative as President elect someone who would not understand the necessity of reaching agreement we can wait we have waited and we wait and, if the next President doesn't understand that, we can wait some more. We don't need to hurry, we have long ago chosen the correct path. We have long ago determined the correct line of our development and we are convinced that our choice was made correctly and we are marching confidently ahead to the building of a Communist society.

You, perhaps, in time will also understand that this is the only true road and perhaps you, too, will join this road but even then you will

not even be parallel with us, you will be lagging behind and trailing in our wake. But we don't hold that against you, we'll help you to catch up and share our experience with you.

Combar, Paris. Mr. Chairman, you agreed to come to Franco, despite the facts of the U-2 incident and knowing of the categorical position taken by America. Were you convinced that France might possibly take up a position of appeasement? Why in this case have relations not relaxed despite the intentions and the actions of General de Gaulle? Do you think, nonetheless, that these actions have served the cause of peace?

A. Naturally we knew of the plane incident, in fact, I reported on it in my speech at the Supreme Soviet. Why then did we come here? Because we thought that perhaps the United States might be stricken by some honesty and apologize for its actions.

All the more so that in the recent past the United States apologized to Cuba when an American plane was shot down over that country.

Then why shouldn't they apologize to the Soviet Union? Well, that is what we thought, evidently we were mistaken. It was evidently one thing to apologize to Cuba and another thing to apologize to a Socialist country.

Well, that is their business. It's simply a matter of upbringing, a matter of manners and honor. Regarding the position taken by General de Gaulle. Yes, he did do all he could but nothing came of his efforts.

Why? Well, I can only refer the correspondent who asked that question to General de Gaulle because it was the general who talked the matter over with President Eisenhower and so he knows his reaction. I don't.

As to the results, well, my opinion is that even after a war when the enemy has been routed the people once again live in peace and friendship.

We had no war. What happened was only that someone tried to poke his nose into our affairs and we punched that nose so that now he certainly knows where the border is. If he comes again, he will receive another blow as will the bases from which he takes off and where he intends to land.

Actually, all this should be digested and the world should once again revert to peace and even more than that to friendship. I am convinced that that is the opinion entertained by President de Gaulle. But he, President de Gaulle, found himself in a very awkward situation. That is my opinion, I don't know, he may not agree with me. On the one hand, there was nothing he could do but condemn the action because he is a man of lofty moral principles and there can be no two opinions on this matter. This was a thief-like sally.

But on the other hand, the obstacle to this was that the thief turned out to be France's ally and not simply an ally but a leader in Western quarters.

But, I don't want to go into the details of this matter. It concerns the relationships between the allies. But speaking honestly, if it were an ally of ours that had acted in this way, we would say that that was a bad way to act and that the necessary apologies should be tendered.

Well, there you are, those are the moral principles of communism. I cannot answer for the moral principles of a capitalist society. I am a representative of a Socialist society.

I would like to add to that, if I understand the question to have meant how relations between the Soviet Union and France would develop after this, then my opinion is that all this will have no impact on the good relations that exist between France and the Soviet Union and from the talk I had today with General de Gaulle I gained this same impression also, because I feel President de Gaulle also wants to continue a policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union.

We are certainly in favor of such a policy also, because we hold France in very high esteem as we do President de Gaulle, we esteem the French nation, the French culture, so we certainly hope that our relations with France, far from deteriorating, will improve.

BERLIN Radio. It follows from American press reports that the American delegate Gates, has from here declared an emergency alarm to the American forces. How do you evaluate that act?

A.—I have heard nothing of that report yet, but I certainly have no reason to disbelieve what the correspondent said.

If this is really so it can be qualified as nothing short of a provocation designed to trick the Americans and impose more taxes on them. Perhaps also it can be explained by ordinary cowardice. Sometimes a coward is even more dangerous than a provocation-monger.

A provocation-monger is trying to provoke war while a coward can unleash war out of pure cowardice. I don't know this Gates. It's not for me to judge him. Let the Americans themselves see what sort of a person he is.

The person I can vouch for is Marshal Malinovsky, here, a hero of World Wars I and II, a man who fought valiantly against the German militarists and against Japan during the war, a person who has been often decorated for his outstanding services. There is a true son of a Socialist motherland. And, as he says, he has not been calling any alert nor does he intend to.

SOVIET POWER CITED

But if this action was designed to somehow prevail upon us, then some other country should be chosen as the target for such acts, because we certainly have every possibility of acting with regard to such provocations in the same way as we used to act with regard to that thieving cat which used to creep into the pigeons' loft. We can certainly teach it a lesson.

[A few minutes were lost here due to a power failure.]

I presume that the United States will attempt to raise the taxes in the country over this incident to try to increase their orders for military equipment—first to take more money from the pockets of the taxpayers and thus to gain greater profits out of armaments production.

Our policy is a completely different one. We have adopted, we have taken, the decision to abolish all taxation of the population by 1965. By that time no one in the Soviet Union will pay any taxes at all.

This year, we are completing the conversion of all the workers of the Soviet Union to a seven-hour working day. By 1964, we will have a six-hour working day for all the workers and employees of the Soviet Union and by that time the coal miner will have but a five-hour working day.

That is our policy, and no provocation will make us turn aside or make us swerve from that correct time that we have chosen. That is

the true, the convinced, policy of the Soviet Union, a Socialist policy, the policy of our Communist party.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, East Berlin.—Mr. Chairman, what in your opinion is the reason for the change in the position of President Eisenhower since your talks in Camp David? Can you explain the reasons for the difference in the position of the United States in Camp David and now in Paris?

A. I believe the best reply to that question was contained in the preceding one, the one referring to the alarm, to the emergency alarm—in the alarm of American troops.

This shows that in the United States the most reactionary forces in the Pentagon are coming to the fore, and it is they who sent their planes on a sortie into the Soviet Union, naturally with the knowledge of the United States President. And this explains this piratical policy pursued by the United States.

JORNAL DO BRASIL. Three questions. Mr. Chairman: Do you intend to go to pay a visit to the Latin American countries in the near future?

Second, how do you, what is your appraisal of the Latin-American countries in the the present world situation? and third, can the Latin-American countries participate in the solution of outstanding world problems?

A. The reply to the first question is easy regarding any possible intention that I might have of visiting Brazil. Nobody has invited me to come.

LATIN VISITS POSSIBLE

But I am not losing hope of being invited to visit the countries of Latin America. If I am I shall gladly avail myself of that invitation.

As for Latin America, we are happy to hear the pulse of Latin America's struggle for independence against American imperialism. The welcome accorded to Nixon in Latin American countries was certainly an omen, a signal. And I can but welcome the events in Cuba, where the people proudly and courageously rose up under the banner for the struggle for their independence. I am convinced that the other Latin American countries will also rise up in the struggle for their independence. We will sympathize with their struggle and applaud their successes in this fight.

I am convinced that the peoples of Latin America are accumulating their forces and that they will play an ever growing role in international relations. Unfortunately there still exist in Latin America today countries whose governments are taking money from their people but are serving the interests of the American imperialists. But the Latin American people are awakening, and we welcome this process and sympathize with it.

It is only when the Latin American peoples have their own governments, governments that will express the will of these peoples, that these nations will be able to truly raise their independent voices in the international arena, including the United Nations, and this will certainly be to the benefit of all the countries of the world, to the benefit of the cause of peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, I could certainly be ready and willing to go on with this press conference longer, but the interpreters have intimated that their working day is over and that I should respect the

labor code. Otherwise they say, "Chairman—Chairman." They say, "You better end your conference, or else we will end it without you."

I want to thank the Government of France, President de Gaulle, the entire French people and the citizens of Paris. And not only Paris. For yesterday, for example, we paid a visit to a village outside Paris that Marshall Malinovsky visited during World War I, when he was in the army.

I want to end by saying that the Soviet Union will continue to adhere to the policy of peaceful coexistence between two systems, the systems, that we will continue to pursue a policy of peace aimed at solving all questions at issue by negotiations. But at the same time, we will firmly stand, we will firmly defend, our sovereignty. This policy will, I am sure, be understood by all the nations, for this is the only correct policy, a policy of defending one's sovereignty without threats to any one. Good-by. I want to wish you all the best.

But at the same time, I want to voice the hope that you will work for peace, that your pen will serve the cause of peace and friendship among the nations. Thank you.

20. COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS, MAY 19, 1960

[Department of State press release No. 274]

The Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris on May 19, 1960, and heard statements from the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the events which prevented the holding of the summit conference.

In the communique published at the end of its meeting in Istanbul, the North Atlantic Council welcomed the prospects of negotiations with the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that the negotiations would lead to an improvement in international relations.

It regrets that Mr. Khrushchev's position has made negotiations in Paris impossible.

Reaffirming complete solidarity of the countries of the Alliance, it fully approves the statement of the three Heads of State or Government that "all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiations" and "remains ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future".

21. REMARKS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ON HIS ARRIVAL AT ANDREWS FIELD, MAY 20, 1960

[White House Press Release]

My good friends and fellow citizens:

After a trip of this kind you can well understand what it means to me to have this kind of a welcome. I am deeply appreciative of the trouble that each of you took to come out to this spot. It truly means a lot to me.

As we planned for the Summit, the hopes of the world were not too high. The experience of the past years had denied us any right

to believe that great advances toward the purpose we seek—peace with justice—could be achieved in any great measure. Yet, it seems that the identity of interest between ourselves and the Soviets in certain features was so obvious that logically we should have made some progress.

Certainly the subjects on which we wanted to talk were those that seemed so important to them—for example, disarmament; the widening of contacts so that we would have open societies, or slightly more open societies dealing with each other; then the matter of Berlin and a divided Germany; and finally, as between Russia, the U.K. and ourselves some agreement on a plan for control of nuclear testing.

Therefore, it was a mystery, and remains a mystery, as to why at this particular moment the Soviets chose so to distort and overplay the U-2 incident that they obviously wanted no talks of any kind, and, in fact, made it impossible to begin them. I am not going to speculate today as to the future, but it is quite clear that since they wanted no talks whatsoever at this time that we can be watchful for more irritations, possibly other incidents that can be more than annoying, sometimes creating real problems.

For example, just today a half hour before I landed, it was reported to me that there is a C-47 missing in Western Germany. This is an unarmed, slow plane—no possibility of being used for military purposes—and, in fact, I believe it had nine passengers aboard. There was some bad weather and its route took it near the Eastern German border. We do not know at this moment that any deliberate act delayed it, but at least it is overdue. And so, in the atmosphere in which we now have to think and live we cannot be sure that the worst has not happened.

Now, I may want to talk soon to the nation about these matters, and for that part of it, I now stop. But I do want to tell all of you people about three or four encouraging features that I encountered. First of all, was the assurance of the support of the home folks—from friends, and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the political leaders of both parties, from newspaper comments and editorial comment of every kind—I was assured of the essential solidarity of the United States, and the sincerity of our peaceful purposes.

Secondly, was the conduct of my two principal colleagues of the West. Mr. Macmillan and General de Gaulle were superb. They spoke with one voice with our Delegation in support of those things which we thought right and decent and logical.

Thirdly, was an action on the part of the NATO Council yesterday when Secretary Herter reported to them while I was in Portugal. The NATO Resolution unanimously supported the three Western powers in what we were trying to do.

And finally, the Portuguese reception. In a way I think they wanted to provide the United States and the West—and even me personally—with something of an antidote for some of the disappointments we have felt. Government and citizens alike tried to outdo themselves in the warmth and cordiality of their reception, and on top of that, in their assurances from every side—newspapers, the officials, common people coming in who were serving us in the Palace—everywhere they said—the West in effect is right, and we want you to know it. And they used every possible way to do it. And for that day in Portugal yesterday I am grateful.

Finally, since most of you will understand that by our time here it was one o'clock when I arose this morning I am sure you expected nothing of eloquence. But I did want sincerely to give you some of my reactions, convictions as of this moment, and to say again to each of you: Thank you very much indeed.

22. ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAY 25, 1960

[White House press release]

(As actually delivered)

My Fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk with you about the remarkable events last week in Paris, and their meaning to our future.

First, I am deeply grateful to the many thousands of you, and to representatives in Congress, who sent me messages of encouragement and support while I was in Paris, and later upon my return to Washington. Your messages clearly revealed your abiding loyalty to America's great purpose—that of pursuing, from a position of spiritual, moral, and material strength—a lasting peace with justice.

You recall, of course, why I went to Paris ten days ago.

Last summer and fall I had many conversations with world leaders; some of these were with Chairman Khrushchev, here in America. Over those months a small improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the West seemed discernible. A possibility developed that the Soviet leaders might at last be ready for serious talks about our most persistent problems—those of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control, and Germany, including Berlin.

To explore that possibility, our own and the British and French leaders met together, and later we agreed, with the Soviet leaders, to gather in Paris on May 16.

Of course we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace, there can be no higher obligation than to pursue it.

Nor had our own policies changed. We did hope to make some progress in a Summit meeting, unpromising though previous experiences had been. But as we made preparations for this meeting, we did not drop our guard nor relax our vigilance.

Our safety, and that of the free world, demand, of course, effective systems for gathering information about the military capabilities of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security.

This has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is part of my grave responsibility, within the overall problem of protecting the American people, to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise attack.

During the period leading up to World War II we learned from bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence information, the maintenance of military communications and contact, and alertness of command.

An additional word seems appropriate about this matter of communications and command. While the Secretary of Defense and I were in Paris, we were, of course, away from our normal command posts. He recommended that under the circumstances we test the continuing readiness of our military communications. I personally approved. Such tests are valuable and will be frequently repeated in the future.

Moreover, as President, charged by the Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign relations, and as Commander in Chief, charged with the direction of the operations and activities of our Armed Forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by our government to secure and evaluate military intelligence.

It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred.

Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it. Chairman Khrushchev has stated that he became aware of these flights several years ago. Only last week, in his Paris press conference, Chairman Khrushchev confirmed that he knew of these flights when he visited the United States last September.

Incidentally, this raises the natural question: Why all the furor concerning one particular flight? He did not, when in American last September charge that these flights were any threat to Soviet safety. He did not then see any reason to refuse to confer with American representatives.

This he did only about the flight that unfortunately failed, on May 1, far inside Russia.

Now, two questions have been raised about this particular flight; first, as to its timing, considering the imminence of the Summit meeting; second, our initial statements when we learned the flight had failed.

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack.

Next, as to our government's initial statement about the flight, this was issued to protect the pilot, his mission, and our intelligence processes, at a time when the true facts were still undetermined.

Our first information about the failure of this mission did not disclose whether the pilot was still alive, was trying to escape, was avoiding interrogation, or whether both plane and pilot had been destroyed. Protection of our intelligence system and the pilot, and concealment of the plane's mission, seemed imperative. It must be remembered that over a long period, these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the Nation's security. In fact, their success has been nothing short of remarkable.

For these reasons, what is known in intelligence circles as a "covering statement" was issued. It was issued on assumptions that were later proved incorrect. Consequently, when later the status of the pilot was definitely established, and there was no further possibility of avoiding exposure of the project, the factual details were set forth.

I then made two facts clear to the public: first, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second, this government is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or another, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their government has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and throughout the world. Our necessity to proceed with such activities was also asserted by our Secretary of State who, however, had been careful—as was I—not to say that these particular flights would be continued.

In fact, before leaving Washington, I had directed that these U-2 flights be stopped. Clearly their usefulness was impaired. Moreover, continuing this particular activity in these new circumstances could not but complicate the relations of certain of our allies with the Soviets. And, of course, new techniques, other than aircraft, are constantly being developed.

Now I wanted no public announcement of this decision until I could personally disclose it at the Summit meeting in conjunction with certain proposals I had prepared for the conference.

At my first Paris meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and before his tirade was made public, I informed him of this discontinuance and the character of the constructive proposals I planned to make. These contemplated the establishment of a system of aerial surveillance operated by the United Nations.

The day before the first scheduled meeting, Mr. Khrushchev had advised President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan that he would make certain demands upon the United States as a precondition for beginning a Summit conference.

Although the United States was the only power against which he expressed his displeasure, he did not communicate this information to me. I was, of course, informed by our allies.

At the four power meeting on Monday morning, he demanded of the United States four things: First, condemnation of U-2 flights as a method of espionage; second, assurance that they would not be continued; third, a public apology on behalf of the United States; and, fourth, punishment of all those who had any responsibility respecting this particular mission.

I replied by advising the Soviet leader that I had, during the previous week, stopped these flights and that they would not be resumed. I offered also to discuss the matter with him in personal meetings, while the regular business of the Summit might proceed. Obviously, I would not respond to his extreme demands. He knew, of course, by holding to those demands the Soviet Union was scuttling the Summit Conference.

In torpedoing the conference, Mr. Khrushchev claimed that he acted as the result of his own high moral indignation over alleged American acts of aggression. As I said earlier, he had known of these flights for a long time. It is apparent that the Soviets had decided even before the Soviet delegation left Moscow that my trip to the Soviet

Union should be canceled and that nothing constructive from their viewpoint would come out of the Summit Conference.

In evaluating the results, however, I think we must not write the record all in red ink. There are several things to be written in the black. Perhaps the Soviet action has turned the clock back in some measure, but it should be noted that Mr. Khrushchev did not go beyond invective—a time-worn Soviet device to achieve an immediate objective. In this case, the wrecking of the Conference.

On our side, at Paris, we demonstrated once again America's willingness, and that of her allies, always to go to the extra mile in behalf of peace. Once again, Soviet intransigence reminded us all of the unpredictability of despotic rule, and the need for those who work for freedom to stand together in determination and in strength.

The conduct of our allies was magnificent. My colleagues and friends—President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan—stood sturdily with the American delegation in spite of persistent Soviet attempts to split the Western group. The NATO meeting after the Paris Conference showed unprecedented unity and support for the alliance and for the position taken at the Summit meeting. I salute our allies for us all.

* * * * *

And now, most importantly, what about the future?

All of us know that, whether started deliberately or accidentally, global war would leave civilization in a shambles. This is as true of the Soviet system as of all others. In a nuclear war there can be no victors—only losers. Even despots understand this. Mr. Khrushchev stated last week that he well realizes that general nuclear war would bring catastrophe for both sides. Recognition of this mutual destructive capability is the basic reality of our present relations. Most assuredly, however, this does not mean that we shall ever give up trying to build a more sane and hopeful reality—a better foundation for our common relations.

To do this, here are the policies we must follow, and to these I am confident the great majority of our people, regardless of party, give their support:

First. We must keep up our strength, and hold it steady for the long pull—a strength not neglected in complacency nor overbuilt in hysteria. So doing, we can make it clear to everyone that there can be no gain in the use of pressure tactics or aggression against us and our Allies.

Second. We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our own and Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and commonsense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

Third. To improve world conditions in which human freedom can flourish, we must continue to move ahead with positive programs at home and abroad, in collaboration with free nations everywhere. In doing so, we shall continue to give our strong support to the United Nations and the great principles for which it stands.

Now as to the first of these purposes—our defenses are sound. They are tailored to the situation confronting us.

Their adequacy has been my primary concern for these past 7 years—indeed throughout my adult life.

In no respect have the composition and size of our forces been based on or affected by any Soviet blandishment. Nor will they be. We will continue to carry forward the great improvements already planned in these forces. They will be kept ready—and under constant review.

Any changes made necessary by technological advances or world events will be recommended at once.

This strength—by far the most potent on earth—is, I emphasize, for deterrent, defensive and retaliatory purposes only, without threat or aggressive intent toward anyone.

* * * * *

Concerning the second part of our policy—relations with the Soviets—we and all the world realize, despite our recent disappointment, that progress toward the goal of mutual understanding, easing the causes of tensions, and reduction of armaments is as necessary as ever.

We shall continue these peaceful efforts, including participation in the existing negotiations with the Soviet Union. In these negotiations we have made some progress. We are prepared to preserve and build on it. The Allied Paris communique and my own statement on returning to the United States should have made this abundantly clear to the Soviet Government.

We conduct these negotiations not on the basis of surface harmony nor are we deterred by any bad deportment we meet. Rather we approach them as a careful search for common interests between the Western allies and the Soviet Union on specific problems.

I have in mind, particularly, the nuclear test and disarmament negotiations. We shall not back away, on account of recent events, from the efforts or commitments that we have undertaken.

Nor shall we relax our search for new means of reducing the risk of war by miscalculation, and of achieving verifiable arms control.

* * * * *

A major American goal is a world of open societies.

Here in our country anyone can buy maps and aerial photographs showing our cities, our dams, our plants, our highways—indeed, our whole industrial and economic complex. We know that Soviet attaches regularly collect this information. Last fall Chairman Khrushchev's train passed no more than a few hundred feet from an operational ICBM, in plain view from his window. Our thousands of books and scientific journals, our magazines, newspapers and official publications, our radio and television, all openly describe to all the world every aspect of our society.

This is as it should be. We are proud of our freedom.

Soviet distrust, however, does still remain. To allay these misgivings I offered five years ago to open our skies to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft on a reciprocal basis. The Soviets refused. That offer is still open. At an appropriate time America will submit such a program to the United Nations, together with the recommendation that the United Nations itself conduct this reconnaissance. Should the United Nations accept this proposal, I am prepared to propose that America supply part of the aircraft and equipment required.

This is a photograph of the North Island Naval Station in San Diego, Calif. It was taken from an altitude of more than 70,000 feet.

You may not perhaps be able to see them on your television screens, but the white lines in the parking strips around the field are clearly discernible from 13 miles up. Those lines are just 6 inches wide.

Obviously most of the details necessary for a military evaluation of the airfield and its aircraft are clearly distinguishable.

I show you this photograph as an example of what could be accomplished through United Nations aerial surveillance.

Indeed, if the United Nations should undertake this policy, this program, and the great nations of the world should accept it, I am convinced that not only can all humanity be assured that they are safe from any surprise attack from any quarter, but indeed the greatest tensions of all, the fear of war, would be removed from the world. I sincerely hope that the United Nations may adopt such a program.

As far as we in America are concerned, our programs for increased contacts between all peoples will continue. Despite the suddenly expressed hostility of the men in the Kremlin, I remain convinced that the basic longings of the Soviet people are much like our own. I believe that Soviet citizens have a sincere friendship for the people of America. I deeply believe that above all else they want a lasting peace and a chance for a more abundant life in place of more and more instruments of war.

* * * * *

Finally, turning to the third part of America's policy—the strengthening of freedom—we must do far more than concern ourselves with military defense against, and our relations with, the Communist bloc. Beyond this, we must advance constructive programs throughout the world for the betterment of peoples in the newly developing nations. The zigs and zags of the Kremlin cannot be allowed to disturb our worldwide programs and purposes. In the period ahead, these programs could well be the decisive factor in our persistent search for peace in freedom.

To the peoples in the newly developing nations urgently needed help will surely come. If it does not come from us and our friends, these peoples will be driven to seek it from the enemies of freedom. Moreover, those joined with us in defense partnerships look to us for proof of our steadfastness. We must not relax our common security efforts.

As to this, there is something specific all of us can do, and right now. It is imperative that crippling cuts not be made in the appropriations recommended for Mutual Security, whether economic or military. We must support this program with all of our wisdom and all of our strength. We are proud to call this a nation of the people. With the people knowing the importance of this program, and making their voices heard in its behalf throughout the land, there can be no doubt of its continued success.

* * * * *

Fellow Americans, long ago I pledged to you that I would journey anywhere in the world to promote the cause of peace. I remain pledged to pursue a peace of dignity, of friendship, of honor, of justice.

Operating from the firm base of our spiritual and physical strength, and seeking wisdom from the Almighty, we and our allies together

will continue to work for the survival of mankind in freedom—and for the goal of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and openness among all nations.

Thank you, and good night.

APPENDIX 2

1. QUESTIONS RAISED BY SENATOR LAUSCHIE AND ANSWERS PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Question One: To what extent has the Soviet Union been spying in the United States, West Germany, and other nations?

In recent years there has been continued evidence of the extensive nature of Soviet espionage in the United States, West Germany and other nations. The manner in which the Soviet espionage system functions abroad has been clearly set forth in the findings of the Royal Commissions in Canada and Australia which were set up as a result of the Guzenko and Petrov defections. These commissions established that there was not one but at least three parallel Soviet intelligence networks operating in Soviet missions abroad: military, state security and party. To these may also be added naval and commercial intelligence networks. The activities of eleven Soviet officials expelled from the United States since 1953 are described in the attached document, which was presented to the United Nations by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on May 24, 1960.

So far as the espionage activities of non-official Soviet personnel in the United States are concerned, the case of Colonel Rudolph Ivanovich Abel provides a good example of this type of activity. Colonel Abel was convicted by a federal jury in New York on October 25, 1957 for conspiring to steal United States defense secrets for the Soviet Union. Abel, a veteran of the Soviet intelligence service, had entered the United States in 1948 under false documents as a United States citizen, Andrew Kayotis. While here he also used the name Emil Goldfus for which he had false documents and also documents for a mythical Martin Collins. During his years in the United States and before his exposure Abel used a photographer's studio on Fulton Street in Brooklyn as a front from which he operated.

Methods used by Abel and an accomplice, Reino Hayhanen, were ingenious. In order to contact his superiors, Hayhanen would place chalk marks at various predesignated points. To minimize personal contacts and subsequent danger of compromise by surveillances, a system of widely separated "dead drops" and "banks" was established throughout the metropolitan area of New York. Abel was also a specialist in artifacts. In his "photographic studio" at the time of his arrest were found both the tools and the devices he fashioned for passing messages: hollowed-out coins, bolts, jewelry, magnetic containers, and other objects in which could be inserted film containing code or plain text messages and other material for transmittal.

American citizens recruited by Soviet espionage agents include Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, David Greenglass, Abraham

Brothman, Miriam Moskowitz, Morton Sobell, Harry Gold, Kurt Ponder, Otto Verber, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, Jacob Albam, and others.

So far as Soviet espionage in West Germany is concerned, a spokesman of the Federal German Republic issued a statement on May 13, 1960, briefly describing the scale on which the Soviet Union and other Communist countries practice espionage within the territory of the Federal Republic and West Berlin. The bulletin of the German Federal Government of May 17, 1960, describes this announcement as follows:

"The spokesman announced that between August 30, 1951, and December 31, 1959, more than 18,000 agents of the Soviet Bloc were apprehended in the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Of these, 1,700 were given prison sentences; about 16,500 were acquitted because of duress, genuine repentance, or voluntary and timely confession. All these agents confessed to having had orders to carry out espionage in the Federal Republic or in West Berlin.

"Exact information was given about the authority from which these agents received their orders. Of the agents apprehended in 1959, fully 2,325 admitted having worked for the espionage service of the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, 264 named the Soviet Union as the country from which they had received their orders and 462 admitted having received orders from other East-Bloc countries. * * * The corresponding figures for 1958 are: Soviet zone, 366; Soviet Union, 204; other Communist countries, 236.

"In the first quarter of 1960 alone, 588 self-confessed agents of the Communist Bloc have been apprehended.

"The extent of Communist espionage activities in the Federal Republic and West Berlin alone, and the increase in these activities of late, is evident from these figures. To this must be added that these agents, according to their own confessions, had in each case fulfilled more than one espionage mission. The 264 agents of the Soviet Union apprehended in 1959 had carried out a total of 790 single missions; the 2,325 Soviet zone agents of the same year had completed a total of 8,234 missions.

"According to painstaking analysis by the German authorities, the Communist countries maintain about 16,000 agents on the soil of the Federal Republic and West Berlin, in spite of an annual loss of 2,400 to 2,800 such agents. These figures include agents who have carried out only preparatory missions and agents who have been hired but not put into service."

Soviet espionage operatives have also been very active in other nations. The recent testimony of Aleksander Y. Kaznacheev before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on December 14, 1959, provides extensive evidence concerning Soviet espionage activities in Asia. Similarly, the testimony of Peter S. Deryabin before the House Committee on Un-American Activities released March 17, 1959, provides evidence of Soviet espionage activities in Austria. The testimony of Yuri A. Rastvorov also before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on February 8, 1956, April 12, 1956, October 24, 1956 and October 30, 1956, provide

evidence of Soviet espionage activities in Japan. Other cases could be given; but it is abundantly clear from the instances already cited that Soviet directed espionage activities are worldwide and extremely extensive in scope.

Question Two: How many times it has breached its commitments to other nations in the world—especially the captive nations?

With regard to the number of times the Soviet Government has breached its commitments to other countries, the Department of State is not aware of the existence of any statistical compilation. A mere count of Soviet violations, whereby, for example, a violation leading directly to the subjugation and absorption of an entire country by the U.S.S.R. would be given the same numerical weight as Soviet infringement of a trade agreement appears, in the Department's view, to lack real meaning. Of course, the Department has closely followed over the years the question of Soviet treaty violations, which has additionally been the subject of close congressional scrutiny as in the Senate Judiciary Committee's 1956 Staff Study "Soviet Political Agreements and Results" and in the 1950 report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee "Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations."

"Soviet Treaty Violations," Number 233 (August 10, 1959) in the series "Soviet Affairs Notes," describes the principal Soviet violations. Violations occurring before and after the beginning of World War II are listed separately and appear under country-by-country breakdowns within each of these two main categories. A copy of "Soviet Treaty Violations" is enclosed.

Question Three: Is there a difference between spying by foot on land on the one hand, and by plane in the air on the other?

Considered in the light of the end purpose of espionage activities, which may be summarized as the acquisition of information which the state, against which the activities are directed, wishes to conceal from the knowledge of one or more foreign powers, there would appear to be no fundamental distinction between the various means which might be employed in securing such information.

Question Four: Is it in the interest of our country that we abandon the general and traditional methods of acquiring intelligence?

As indicated by the President in his report to the American people on May 25, 1960, the security of the United States and of the free world "demand, of course, effective systems for gathering information about the military capabilities of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security. This has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is part of my grave responsibility, to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise attack."

In the same speech the President reiterated his "open skies" offer as a means of guarding against surprise attack. The President indicated that the United States would at an appropriate time submit a program to the United Nations with a recommen-

dation that the United Nations itself conduct aerial reconnaissance. The program outlined by the President offers the best hope for guarding the peoples of the world against surprise attack. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government rejected the President's earlier "open skies" proposal. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will reject his more recent suggestion.

Question Five: If we do so, what are the probabilities of the Soviet Union following a similar course?

In the Department's opinion, even if the United States were to abandon the general and traditional methods of acquiring intelligence, there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union would follow a similar course.

Question Six: Why did the Communists break their treaty with the Poles in World War II and stab the Poles in the back while the latter were fighting the Nazis?

The Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements of August 23, 1939, providing a ten year non-aggression guarantee, furnished a basis for coordinated German and Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. Poland was an early victim, falling under Nazi attack only eight days after the agreements were signed. On September 16, 1939 the U.S.S.R. sent a note to the Polish Government stating that the Polish State was insolvent and that the Polish Government had "virtually ceased to operate." The note claimed that this situation might "create a menace to the U.S.S.R." Using this pretext, the U.S.S.R. occupied major parts of Poland on September 17, 1939. Less than two months later, Molotov boasted: "* * * one swift blow to Poland, first by the German and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty * * *."

Question Seven: What are the details concerning the brutal massacre of Polish soldiers by the Communists in the Katyn forests?

A Select Committee of the House of Representatives made an exhaustive study of the Katyn Forest massacre in 1952. The reports of this Committee, The Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, contain more detail on this subject than is available elsewhere in the Department's files. The facts developed by the Committee were brought to the attention of the United Nations by the U.S. Delegation, and were given wide circulation abroad through the facilities of the United States Information Service.

Question Eight: Why, in World War II, did the Reds, while advancing westward and nearing Poland, induce the Polish people of Warsaw to heroically rebel against the Nazi occupiers and then abandon them to slaughter by the Nazis?

In various wartime agreements, the allied nations pledged themselves to conduct the war against the enemy unrelentingly, and to cooperate after the war in plans for recovery. The U.S.S.R., however, had its own plans for postwar Communist expansion in Eastern Europe, as evidenced by subsequent developments there. This political motive was an important factor influencing Soviet military inaction during the Warsaw uprising.

Question Nine: Why did the Soviet break its pledged word that the people of the satellite nations, under free and open elections, would be permitted to choose the type of government they wanted?

Soviet refusal to grant self-determination to the peoples of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe stems from the Soviet campaign during and after World War II to gain and maintain Communist control over these nations. The United States does not regard Soviet domination over the nations of Eastern Europe as an acceptable permanent condition of affairs. Regimes in these countries have been forcibly imposed and maintained, as in the case of Hungary, by repeated Soviet political and military intervention. The peoples of these countries are denied basic freedoms and real national independence.

Satisfactory solution of the Eastern European problem must be based, in keeping with the solemn pledges by the United States, Soviet, and other Allied Governments during and after World War II, upon the right of the Eastern European peoples freely (a) to choose the governments and institutions under which they will live and (b) to enjoy full national independence free from all foreign interference in their internal affairs.

Question Ten: Why did the Soviet aid and induce the Red Chinese to use their military power against South Korea, resulting in death and injury to thousands of American boys?

The Soviet Union supported Communist China in the Korean War in order to secure the Soviet satellite government of North Korea for the Communist Bloc and, if possible, to expand Communist power to South Korea and in Asia without instigating a world war which would have resulted from the Soviet Union's co-belligerency with North Korea.

Question Eleven: Why did the Soviet encourage the Red Chinese in the bombardment and killing of innocent people at the Quemoy and Matsu Islands?

The Soviet Union has consistently supported the claims of Communist China to Quemoy and Matsu. During the offshore islands crisis, in mid-1954, however, the Soviet leaders spoke of "popular" but not Soviet "government" support of the Chinese Communists "liberation aspirations" toward the offshore islands. At that time they did not threaten to evoke the 1950 Sino-Soviet "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance". In the 1958 offshore island crisis Khrushchev did issue the warning that "an attack on the People's Republic of China, which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union" and that if Communist China fell victim to an atomic attack the aggressor would get a rebuff by the same means. The Chinese Communists, who have consistently followed aggressive policies, probably needed no encouragement to initiate the bombardment of Quemoy, but it is likely that, prior to the 1958 attack, the Red Chinese received some expression of support from the Soviet Union.

Question Twelve: What is the explanation for the mass and merciless murder of the freedom fighters of Hungary, Poland, and East Germany, who were fighting for liberation in those respective countries?

The Communist regime in Hungary was forcibly imposed by the Soviet Union upon the Hungarian people at the end of World War II. Since that time, the Hungarian regime has been and remains, in all essential matters, Soviet-dominated. Because of its origin and nature, it is dependent in the final analysis upon Soviet power for its continued ability to exist and to rule. The Hungarian uprising was so general and sweeping that it unseated this Soviet-dominated regime, attracted large numbers of the Hungarian armed forces to either active or passive support of the revolutionary movement, and placed temporary control of the country in the hands of the Freedom Fighters and of a new coalition government headed by Imre Nagy, which supported the aims of the revolution. Confronted by these internal developments which clearly pointed to the realization by the Hungarian people of their aspiration to live in freedom and independence, and fearing the disintegrative effect which a successful Hungarian revolt would have on the Soviet Bloc structure, the Soviet Union intervened ruthlessly with massive armed force to crush the revolt and reimpose a Soviet-dominated regime upon the Hungarian people. Following the Soviet intervention, the new Hungarian regime, supported by the continued presence of Soviet troops within Hungary, undertook a campaign of systematic and harsh reprisals against the leaders and participants in the revolt aimed at the suppression of all remaining overt dissent and opposition, the re-establishment and consolidation of its power and authority, and the discouragement of any future attempts at rebellion.

In East Germany in 1953 and in Poland in 1956 unrest occurred as a result of popular dissatisfaction with the situation in those countries. In contrast to the 1956 events in Hungary, however, these disturbances were short-lived and resulted in relatively little bloodshed.

LETTER DATED 24 MAY 1960 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL¹

Enclosed herewith is a memorandum giving detailed information on the illustrative list of Soviet espionage agents apprehended in the United States since the death of Marshal Stalin to which I referred in my statement in the Security Council on 23 May.

I request that this memorandum be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) H.C. Lodge

¹United Nations Security Council Documents 4325, May 24, 1960.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INDIVIDUALS
NAMED BY AMBASSADOR LODGE IN HIS STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ON 23 MAY 1960 FOLLOWS:

1. Commander Igor Aleksandrovich Amosov

Amosov entered the United States 17 February 1952 as Assistant Soviet Naval Attache. Amosov was the Soviet principal in an intelligence operation directed by the Soviets from their Naval attache's office. He served in this capacity from 7 June 1952 until his departure in February 1954. Targets assigned by Amosov to the recruited agent included radar developments, details of the latest cargo ships, manuals reflecting details of the latest electronic developments and bombsight data. He paid this agent a total of \$2,000 for his services. Amosov was declared persona non grata for these activities on 3 February 1954 and left the United States on 7 February 1954.

2. Colonel Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov

Bubchikov entered the United States 1 December 1954 as an Assistant Soviet Military Attache. From July 1955 through May 1956, Bubchikov maintained contact with a naturalized American citizen of Russian origin who was employed as a sales engineer. In July 1955 he appeared at the sales engineer's residence late in the evening and sought his co-operation in securing data concerning jet fuel, atomic submarines, and aeronautical developments. Bubchikov offered the engineer large sums of money. In view of these activities the Department of State on 14 June 1956 declared Bubchikov persona non grata for engaging "in espionage activities incompatible with his continued presence in this country". He departed the United States 24 June 1956.

3. Major Yuri Pavlovich Krylov

Krylov entered the United States 4 May 1955 as Assistant Soviet Military Attache, Washington, D.C. In August of 1955, Krylov contacted an employee of the Atomic Energy Commission and attempted to obtain from him information concerning the technical aspects of nuclear power. In 1957, Krylov was declared persona non grata for having improperly purchased quantities of electronic equipment through American intermediaries and having attempted to purchase classified military information. He departed the United States 26 January 1957.

4. Nikolay Ivanovich Kurochkin

Kurochkin entered the United States 4 April 1956 as a Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. In the fall of 1956 a professional writer contacted the Soviet Embassy seeking statistics as to hosiery production in the Soviet Union. He met Kurochkin, who supplied the desired statistical data and, after a series of meetings, informed the writer that if he would obtain military information - including training and field manuals of the United States Army - to be incorporated in articles Kurochkin was writing for Russian military journals, he would share with him his proceeds from the articles. The writer obtained unclassified training and field manuals of the United States Army which he turned over to Kurochkin, but did not deliver the classified manuals which Kurochkin had requested. He was paid approximately \$450. On 6 June 1958, Kurochkin was declared persona non grata for engaging in activities incompatible with his diplomatic status. He departed from the United States on 11 June 1958.

5. Vasily Mikhailovich Molev

From August 1944 through January 1957, Molev served several tours of duty in the United States, occupying positions of chauffeur and property custodian to the Soviet Consulate General in New York and property custodian at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. Boris Morros, an admitted Soviet agent co-operating with the FBI, was instructed by his Soviet superiors to appear in the vicinity of 58 West 58th Street, New York City, at 3 p.m. on the first Tuesday of each month for contact by his Soviet principal. If the contact was not made, Morros was instructed by the Soviets to return the following Wednesday and Thursday. On Wednesday, 7 January 1953, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed Molev in the vicinity of 58 West 58th Street, New York City. Morros was later instructed by his Soviet principal to meet his Soviet contact on Tuesday, 3 March 1953, on the corner of Central Park South and Avenue of the Americas, New York City. On 3 March 1953, Molev was observed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation meeting with Morros at Central Park South and Avenue of the Americas. On this occasion Morros passed to Molev a report previously obtained from Jack Soble, Morros' immediate superior, who was subsequently convicted of espionage. On 25 January 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and Jacob Albam were

arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy. Simultaneously, Molev was declared persona non grata because of his implication in the conspiracy. He departed the United States 28 January 1957.

6. Aleksandr Petrovich Kovalev

Kovalev arrived in the United States 8 October 1950 as a Second Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations. In the course of his stay in the United States Kovalev arranged to receive undeveloped microfilms of materials of intelligence significance at a drop area in New York City. The recruited agent was told to park his car in a designated area in New York City at a designated time and to place a package wrapped in red paper therein so that it could be seen through the rear window in the event material was to be passed. An additional signal by way of marking a telephone directory in a New York restaurant was perfected to indicate to the agent that the material delivered to the dead drop was picked up. Material of intelligence significance was left by the recruited agent in the New York dead drop area and it was retrieved by Kovalev. The agent was given \$500 to purchase an electronic device for delivery to the Soviets an additional \$500 in payment for delivery of a microfilm reproduction of portions of a manual dealing with an automatic steering device for ships. Kovalev was declared persona non grata by the Department of State for his actions in this case on 3 February 1954 and he departed the United States 10 February 1954.

7. Colonel Maksim Grigorievich Martynov

Martynov entered the United States on 3 November 1954 as a member of the Soviet representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee. In August 1954, a Soviet national met a United States Army officer in Germany. The Soviet national, aware of the officer's plan to retire from the Army, asked him to be of assistance in obtaining Military Manuals from the Army Command and General Staff School at Leavenworth, Kansas when the Soviet national came to the United States. Meetings in New York City were arranged and a code phrase was established for recognition purposes.

On 15 November 1954, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, made up to resemble the Army officer, was contacted at the agreed time and place

in New York City by Martynov. Prearranged signals were exchanged and they talked for approximately thirty minutes. Martynov indicated he was a friend of the Soviet National who contacted the officer in Germany and he asked for the proposed assistance, paying him \$250. A subsequent meeting was scheduled for 15 January 1955. On that date, Martynov kept the appointment and the FBI agents accosted him. Martynov identified himself and claimed diplomatic immunity. On 21 February 1955, the Department of State expelled Martynov for the above activity and he departed the United States 26 February 1955.

8. Viktor Ivanovich Petrov

Petrov arrived in the United States 17 February 1953 as a translator employed at the United Nations Secretariat, New York City. Petrov responded to an advertisement placed in a New York newspaper by an aviation draftsman for part-time work. The draftsman was an employee of one of our largest aircraft factories. At the outset, Petrov gave the draftsman insignificant drafting work, later asking him to send for various brochures on aviation. Petrov requested the draftsman to obtain information concerning United States Military Aircraft. The information sought was classified, it concerned the status of United States aircraft development. On 20 August 1956, information concerning Petrov's activities was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as a result of which Petrov's employment at the United Nations was terminated. Petrov departed the United States on 23 August 1956.

9. Captain Boris Fedorovich Gladkov

Gladkov entered the United States 15 December 1953 as Naval Advisor to the Soviet Representation in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. Gladkov met a sales engineer for a New York City Marine Engineering firm at a cocktail party. He cultivated the sales engineer and held a number of clandestine meetings with him. Through the engineer, Gladkov attempted to obtain information relating to United States developments and progress in the field of marine engine design and operation and informed the American citizen that he, Gladkov, had access to fund of money for the purchase of sensitive and classified information on new developments in the field of design and operation of power plants on

various types of naval crafts. Gladkov also sought to obtain, and offered to pay a large sum of money for, publications dealing with fleet training. During his meetings with the sales engineer which continued on a regular basis Gladkov furnished the engineer \$1,550. On 22 June 1956, the Department of State expelled Gladkov for engaging in activities which were incompatible with his status as a member of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations. He departed 12 July 1956.

10. Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Yegorovich Pivnev

Pivnev entered the United States on 17 March 1950 as Assistant Soviet Air Attache. Pivnev endeavored to utilize a Washington businessman's address as a mail drop. He explained to the businessman that he would have mail delivered to him at the businessman's address, which mail was to be addressed to a fictitious person and which, upon receipt, was to be delivered by the businessman to him.

On 24 March 1954, he inquired at a Virginia aerial photographic concern as to the possibility of purchasing aerial maps of Chicago, Illinois. He instructed the firm to seek such maps and agreed to pay approximately \$8,000 for them. On that date he purchased thirty-three aerial photographs of Washington, D.C. and vicinity. Pivnev, in contacting this firm, identified himself as one "George". On 3 May 1954, he contacted a Washington, D.C. photographer, introducing himself as a Mr. George Tinney, a representative of a private firm desirous of purchasing aerial photographs of the New York City area at a scale of 1:20,000 to 1:40,000 feet. Photographs of this type were not commercially available. On 13 May 1954, he agreed to pay the photographer \$700 to obtain the photographs. He advanced on that date the sum of \$400 as partial payment. On 20 May 1954, when meeting with the photographer for the purpose of obtaining the photographs, he was accosted by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on which occasion he identified himself. On 29 May 1954, the Department of State declared Pivnev persona non grata and he departed 6 June 1954.

11. Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk

Kirilyuk arrived in the United States 11 September 1958 as a political affairs officer employed by the Department of Trusteeship and Information for Non-Self-Governing Territories, United Nations Secretariat. In April 1959, an American citizen contacted a Soviet official in Mexico City concerning the possibility of obtaining a Soviet university scholarship. The Soviet official obtained complete background information from the American, including the facts concerning his previous assignment in cryptographic machines and systems while serving in the United States Army. Following his return to the United States, the American was contacted by Kirilyuk, who identified himself as one "George". During the period from June through September 1959, Kirilyuk met with the American in a clandestine manner on five occasions. On these occasions he requested data concerning cryptographic machines and instructed the American to seek employment with a vital United States Government agency. Information concerning Kirilyuk's activities was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations whereupon Kirilyuk's employment at the United Nations was terminated. Kirilyuk and his family left the United States on 10 January 1960.

SOVIET TREATY VIOLATIONS*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union...from the very first days of its existence has accurately and loyally observed the international obligations which it has assumed. The scrupulous observance by the Soviet Union of the treaties and agreements which its representatives have signed is recognized even by those who are unfavorably disposed toward it.

--S. Krylov, Professor of International Law, Moscow State University, (Izvestiya, May 26, 1957.)

Few nations can match the USSR in vociferous protestations of loyalty to international obligations. However, such declarations -- which are typical of Soviet propagandists and scholars alike - diverge widely from actual Soviet practice. In the years since the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet Government, while consistently accusing others of bad faith in international dealings, has not hesitated to violate its own treaty obligations when such action appeared to be in its interest.

Like most totalitarian states, the Soviet Union recognizes the respect in which legal principles are held by the vast majority of countries of the world. Soviet textbooks in international law profess the standard principle of pacta sunt servanda (treaties must be observed), though stressing at the same time that capitalist states violate treaties as a normal rule. The latter claim in turn paves the way for any necessary justification of treaty violations by the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Government habitually accuses the other party of violation as an excuse for its own nonobservance of a given convention. A 1951 text in international law, for example, describes the "nullification" by the Soviet Government of its 1932 nonaggression pact with Finland as "unquestionably correct and fully justified," since this act was "the result of systematic and provocatory breaches of the obligations of the stated pact by the Finnish side."¹ The facts of the case were quite the reverse.

While Soviet writers tend to be circumspect in discussing treaty obligations, their approach to international law in general may be somewhat more revealing of the Soviet attitude. International law, as seen by Soviet theorists, is essentially an instrument of policy, and its institutions and practices are employed to the extent that they are useful. The matter is put succinctly in one Soviet textbook by Professor Kozhevnikov:

Those institutions of international law which can facilitate the accomplishment of the stated tasks are recognized and applied in the USSR; those which contradict these aims in any way are rejected by it /the USSR/.²

* **Soviet Affairs Notes, No. 233, August 10, 1959.**

1. F. I. Kozhevnikov, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of Law, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo /International Law/, Moscow, 1951, p. 421.
2. F. I. Kozhevnikov, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo /The Soviet State and International Law/, Moscow, 1948, p. 25.

Although the Soviet Union does not specifically extend this principle to the observance of treaties, in practice the mental transition is not a difficult one. The peace treaty of Brest Litovsk, the first treaty concluded by the Soviet regime, was signed in order to gain whatever protection it might afford, but without any intention on the Soviet side of abiding by the treaty's provisions. "Yes, of course we are violating the treaty," declared Lenin in March 1918, "we have already violated it 30 or 40 times." ¹

Later Soviet leaders have hesitated to speak so bluntly, but the history of the last 40 years provides numerous examples of deliberate treaty violations by the Soviet regime. A cursory examination of the public conventions entered into by the Soviet Union during this period reveals well over 50 violations. The USSR has disregarded treaty provisions inconvenient to itself, has unilaterally denounced conventions to which it was a party, has threatened abrogation as a means of intimidation, and has on several occasions attacked fellow signatories to treaties of friendship and non-aggression. The cases in this study are some of the more outstanding instances of these practices.

II. PREWAR AGREEMENTS

Treaties of the Soviet Union are based on principles of equality, sovereignty and mutual benefits of states, while treaties of bourgeois countries are based on the principle of the strong over the weak.

--V.I. Lisovskii, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo /International Law/, Kiev University Press, 1956, p. 228.

Violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1929

The Soviet Union adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Pact in September 1928 upon invitation of the original signatory powers, thereby renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Adherence to the pact, however, failed to deter the USSR from employing force against its eastern neighbor, China, in the following year.

Notwithstanding its self-proclaimed policy of "anti-imperialism," the Soviet Union had retained ownership and control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, inherited from the Tsarist regime. Chinese resentment at this survival of Russian domination in Manchuria, coupled with irritation at subversive activities directed from Soviet diplomatic establishments in China, resulted, in 1929, in confiscation of the railroad by the Chinese and the arrest of a number of Soviet employees. The Soviet Government rebuffed attempts to settle the dispute by diplomatic means, preferring to employ its clearly superior military power to force a return to the status quo ante. In October and November 1929 Soviet troops, supported by aircraft and gunboats, invaded Manchuria and secured the capitulation of the Chinese after the latter had lost some 6,000 men in a brief and futile resistance. Efforts by the United States and other Western powers to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact and to encourage a settlement by peaceful means were brusquely rejected by the Soviet Government.

The Litvinov Agreements

In 1933 the United States recognized the Government of the USSR following negotiations and an exchange of letters between Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov and President Roosevelt in regard to various outstanding differences between the two countries. In his letter of November 16, 1933, Litvinov stated:

1. "War and Peace (1918), Selected Works, New York, 1943, vol. VII, p. 301.

...it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics...not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group -- and to prevent the activity on its territory of any group or organization -- which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.

The Foreign Minister's avowal produced no effect whatever upon the activities of the Third International, or Comintern, which continued to carry out its role as the organizer and directing center of the world communist movement from its Moscow headquarters. The purpose of the Comintern, clearly defined in its statutes and theses, was "the struggle by all available means, including armed forces, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and the creation of an international Soviet Republic."

Although the Comintern was formally dissolved in 1943, Soviet-inspired communist activity in the United States continued unabated. Evidence of systematic violation of the Litvinov agreements after 1945 was brought to light by convictions under the US Alien Registration Act of 1940, which made it a criminal offense "to organize or help to organize any society, group or assembly of persons who teach, advocate or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any Government in the United States by force or violence." The trial and conviction in 1949 in a US Federal Court in New York of 11 communist leaders revealed that the American Communist Party, acting upon orders of the Soviet Union issued by Dmitri Manuilsky, Comintern leader and in 1949 Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian SSR, had returned to a policy of violent revolution.

The Litvinov agreements also contained the following provision, as stated by Litvinov in another letter to President Roosevelt on November 16, 1933:

...the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, while reserving to itself the right of refusing visas to Americans desiring to enter the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on personal grounds, does not intend to base such refusals on the fact of such persons having ecclesiastical status.

In March 1955 the Soviet Government expelled the Reverend Georges Bissonette, the most recent in a succession of clergymen of the Assumptionist Order who had resided in Moscow and ministered to the spiritual needs of American nationals of the Roman Catholic faith in Moscow. The Soviet Government refused entry to the Reverend Louis Dion as successor to Father Bissonette on the grounds that the Litvinov-Roosevelt agreement provided for reciprocity in the admission of clergymen to the respective countries. Although the 1933 agreement contained no provision to this effect -- of which the Soviet Union's failure to make any such claims in the intervening years was itself tacit admission -- the Soviet Government continued to bar Father Dion for nearly four years. He was finally admitted in January 1959, after repeated representations by the United States to the Soviet Government.

Invasion of Poland, 1939

On July 25, 1932, the Soviet Union and Poland signed a treaty of non-aggression. The treaty was extended by the protocol of May 5, 1934, and was reaffirmed by the statements of November 26, 1938. Article 1 of the 1932 non-aggression pact stated:

The two Contracting Parties, recording the fact that they have renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, reciprocally undertake to refrain from any aggressive action against or invading the territory of the other Party, separately or together with other powers.

In September 1939, less than 12 months after having reaffirmed this treaty, the Soviet Union invaded Poland. The territory of the Polish state was divided with Nazi Germany. The Soviet Government coolly explained its act of aggression in these words: "The Polish State and its government have virtually ceased to exist. Treaties concluded between the USSR and Poland have thereby lost their validity."

Foreign Minister Molotov, speaking to an extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, gloated over the easy conquest of Poland. "The ruling circles of Poland," he said, "were very proud of the 'durability' of their government and the 'might' of their army. Nevertheless, it turned out that a quick blow against Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, sufficed to leave nothing remaining of the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty."

The Attack on Finland

By the Treaty of Peace between the Soviet Union and Finland, concluded in October 1920, the Soviet Government recognized the independence and sovereignty of Finland, and both parties agreed "to maintain for the future an attitude of peace and goodwill towards one another." On January 21, 1932, the Soviet Union and Finland signed a treaty of nonaggression, which, on April 7, 1934, was renewed for 10 years. Finland, seemingly, could also take comfort from the fact that the Soviet Union, by adherence to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, had renounced war as an instrument of national policy and had joined the League of Nations in September 1934. Article 12 of the League Covenant required that disputes be submitted to the League for arbitration and enquiry, and that neither party should resort to war until three months after the award of the arbiters or the report of the Council.

In October 1939 the Soviet Government, summoning a Finnish representative to Moscow, presented to Finland a series of demands, including cession of territory and disarming of zones along the Finnish-Soviet border. The Finns were disinclined to accede to the Soviet "proposals," and negotiations reached a deadlock. On November 28, 1939, the Soviet Union announced the abrogation of its nonaggression pact with Finland after a "frontier incident" and rejected a Finnish proposal for a commission of enquiry. On November 29, the Soviet Union attacked Finland without a declaration of war. Thirty Red Army divisions crossed the frontier, towing in their wake a "Finnish People's Government," headed by former Comintern secretary Otto Kuusinen. The puppet regime, which established itself at Terijoki near the Soviet border, was recognized by the USSR on December 1 as the legitimate government of Finland. On December 4 Molotov, responding to a communication from the League of Nations, stated:

The Soviet Union is not at war with Finland and does not threaten the Finnish people. The Soviet Union maintains peaceful relations with the Democratic Republic of Finland.

Under the terms exacted from Finland by the Treaty of Peace of March 12, 1940, the Soviet Union annexed the Karelian Isthmus and other Finnish territory. By the later peace treaty of February 10, 1947, the Soviet Union secured additional Finnish territory as a prize for its re-invasion of Finland in 1941.

The Fate of the Baltic States

Like Finland, the three Baltic republics had been officially assured of Soviet friendship and peaceful intentions. As stated in the nearly identical language of the 1920 peace treaties:

...Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence and autonomy of the State of Estonia /Latvia, Lithuania/, and renounces voluntarily and forever all rights of sovereignty formerly held by Russia...

These professions of good faith were reinforced by treaties of nonaggression and peaceful settlement signed by the Soviet Union with each of the three countries. The text of the treaty with Estonia stated:

Article 1. Both High Contracting Parties mutually guarantee the inviolability of the frontiers existing between them...and undertake to refrain from any act of aggression or any violent measures directed against the integrity and inviolability of the territory or against the political independence of the Other Contracting Party, whether such act of aggression or such violent measures are undertaken separately or together with other powers, with or without a declaration of war...¹

This treaty, virtually identical to those signed with Latvia and Lithuania, was by 1939 a doubtful indicator of true Soviet intentions toward these countries. A secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, signed August 23, 1939, placed Estonia and Latvia within the Soviet sphere of interest. A second treaty, with secret protocols, on September 28 transferred Lithuania to the Soviet sphere in exchange for additional Polish territory for Germany.

On September 29, 1939, the Soviet Union compelled Estonia to sign a pact of mutual assistance. Latvia and Lithuania signed similar treaties on October 5 and 10, respectively. The USSR received leases on military bases and port installations and the right to maintain armed forces on the territories of the states concerned.

Its immediate object achieved, the Soviet Union once again gave guarantees to its small neighbors. Clause V of the Estonian and Latvian treaties stated:

The entry into force of this pact shall in no way infringe upon the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, particularly their economic system and social structure.

Clause VII of the Lithuanian treaty stated in more specific terms:

Entry into force of this pact shall not affect to any extent the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, in particular their state organization, economic and social systems, military measures and, in general, the principle of noninterference in internal affairs.

Further assurances were provided by Foreign Minister Molotov in a speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939:

We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies.²

On June 15 and 16, 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied by Soviet troops. On July 21 the three states, following the forced resignation of their governments, were incorporated into the USSR.

1. Treaty with Estonia, May 4, 1932, extended by the protocol of April 4, 1934; with Latvia, February 5, 1932, extended by the protocol of April 4, 1934; with Lithuania on September 28, 1926, extended by the protocol of April 4, 1934.

2. Pravda, November 1, 1939.

III. WARTIME AND POSTWAR AGREEMENTS

Unilateral, arbitrary abrogation of treaties contradicts international law. However, despite this, arbitrary annulment of treaties is a common occurrence in the practice of capitalist states.

--F.I. Kozhevnikov in Academy of Sciences of USSR, Institute of Law, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo (International Law), Moscow, 1951, p. 421.

Soviet Treaty Violations in Iran

Soviet obligations toward Iran were governed by wartime agreements as well as by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship, still in force, concluded on February 28, 1921. Included in the Treaty of Friendship was a mutual undertaking by each party "to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other." The stationing of British and Soviet forces in Iran during the Second World War was regulated by the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance concluded by the two powers with Iran on January 29, 1942. Article V of this treaty stated:

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices or on the conclusion of a peace treaty between them, whichever date is the earlier...

In Article IV of the same treaty, Britain and the Soviet Union agreed "to disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, and the application of Iranian laws and regulations."

On December 1, 1943, during the Teheran Conference, the Big Three issued a communique stating: "The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran." Later, in a letter of September 20, 1945, Foreign Minister Molotov reaffirmed Soviet obligations under the Tripartite Treaty:

As regards the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, the Soviet Government, as you are aware, takes the view that this withdrawal of troops should be effected within the period laid down in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty.

Notwithstanding these various commitments, the Soviet Union began to promote rebellion in the northern area of Iran occupied by Soviet troops. Disturbances broke out in the fall of 1945 in the Soviet-controlled Iranian province of Azerbaijan. Rebels, equipped with Soviet arms and led by the Iranian Communist Pishavari, were aided by Soviet agents who crossed into Iran. On December 12, 1945, the rebels proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. Red Army troops provided full protection and prevented Iranian troops from reaching the scene. Shortly afterwards rebels in the neighboring Kurdish province, carrying Soviet arms and wearing Soviet uniforms, proclaimed an independent Kurdish republic. In Azerbaijan, Pishavari broadcast his thanks to the Red Army for its assistance. Although the Iranian Government appealed to the United Nations, the rebels remained in control and Soviet troops failed to leave by the agreed date of March 2, 1946.

In April 1945 Iranian Premier Qavam, who had gone to Moscow to attempt a settlement, agreed under duress to the withdrawal of the Iranian complaint before the United Nations, to the admission of three Communists to his cabinet, and to the establishment of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company (Russia holding 51 percent of the stock) for exploitation of oil in northern Iran. On May 9, 1946, Red Army forces were withdrawn from Iran, more than two months after the deadline. Subsequently the Iranian Premier, under strong pressure at home, dismissed the Communists from the cabinet. In November 1946 the Iranian Government sent troops into the northern provinces, and the rebel regimes in Azerbaijan collapsed on December 15, 1946. On October 22, 1947, the Iranian Majlis refused to ratify the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement.¹

Abrogation of Treaties with Great Britain and France

On May 20, 1942, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom signed a Treaty of Alliance and Postwar Collaboration at London, in which the signatories pledged joint efforts during the wartime period and concluded an alliance against Germany extending into the postwar period. Part II of the Treaty, a military alliance directed explicitly against Germany, bound each party to give the other immediate support in the event of a German attack. The alliance was to endure for 20 years and to continue thereafter in the event that neither party gave 12 months' notice of a desire to terminate the contract. The Soviet Union concluded an essentially similar treaty of alliance and mutual aid with France on December 10, 1944.

The Soviet Union unilaterally abrogated both these treaties in early 1955. The action was one aspect of a Soviet campaign to prevent the ratification of the Paris agreements, which terminated the occupation of Western Germany and brought the newly formed Federal Republic into NATO. Soviet notes to France and Britain in December 1954 contained warnings that their respective alliances would be annulled if the Paris agreements were ratified. On May 7, 1955, having failed to prevent ratification, the Soviet Union officially annulled its wartime alliances.

The Countries of Eastern Europe

In February 1945 the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, meeting at Yalta, issued a Declaration on Liberated Europe in which they agreed to assist the liberated peoples to set up "democratic institutions of their own choice," in furtherance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Specifically, the three governments agreed to assist the liberated people

...to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people...

These provisions were rendered meaningless by Soviet policies in those territories liberated by the Red Army. Ignoring the Yalta commitments, the Soviet Union, in a now familiar pattern, installed communist-dominated regimes in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. In Rumania, acting through its own authorities and through the Rumanian communist Party, the USSR deliberately prevented the exercise of democratic rights by the people. In February 1945 Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky arrived in Bucharest to dictate the dismissal of the Radescu Government and the imposition of the communist-dominated Groza regime. Direct interference by Soviet authorities -- including the use of troops -- in the elections of November 1946 was only one of the many further instances of Soviet violation of the declaration.

1. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca, New York, 1952, pp. 173-175.

Similar Soviet actions occurred in Hungary and Bulgaria. In Hungary, for example, General Sviridov, Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, unilaterally dissolved Catholic youth organizations in June 1946 and in the following year forced the resignation of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy. Contrary to commitments made at Potsdam on August 2, 1945 that directives of the Allied Control Commissions would be issued by the Soviet Chairmen "after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives,"¹ Soviet representatives on the Commissions in Rumania; Hungary, and Bulgaria consistently issued unilateral instructions in the name of the Commission and thwarted the activities of the British and American representatives even to the point of restricting their freedom of movement.

In regard to Poland, the Big Three at Yalta agreed as follows:

The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. . . .

This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

That the Soviet Union had little intention of observing this agreement became evident almost immediately, when, on April 21, 1946, it concluded a formal treaty of alliance with the so-called "Lublin Government,"² which had been organized in the Soviet Union and moved into Poland behind Soviet troops.

Nevertheless, at Potsdam the Soviet Union once again voiced its adherence to the principles of democracy. The Potsdam Protocol stated:

The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

The Polish Provisional Government was nominally a coalition, but in fact its key positions were occupied by Communists, who had established themselves in the period of "liberation" by the Red Army. Elections were postponed until January 1947 in order to terrorize and eliminate the opposition.³ Representations by the United States and United Kingdom to the Polish Provisional Government calling attention to the obligations of Yalta and Potsdam were rejected. The Soviet Union refused to join the two Western powers in their approach on this matter to the Polish Government.

-
1. Potsdam Protocol, XI. Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and Annex I regarding the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.
 2. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 157.
 3. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-179; Oscar Halecki in Stephen D. Kertasz (ed.), The Fate of East Central Europe, pp. 134-139.

Germany

In Germany the USSR has distorted and violated numerous provisions of wartime and postwar agreements with the Western powers. The subject is too complex for detailed discussion here, but two major sets of agreements may be noted: the agreements reached at Potsdam and embodied in the Potsdam Protocol, and the agreements on the occupation and control of Germany

1. The Potsdam Protocol of August 1, 1945

Democracy. The Protocol contained a statement of common Allied objectives looking toward the development of democracy in postwar Germany. Among the political principles agreed upon were the following:

...The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens...

...local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles...

...all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany...

...Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

The Soviet Union, in its administration of East Germany, has violated these principles both in spirit and in letter. In 1948 the Soviet authorities forced the merger of the Socialist Party of Germany with the Communist Party of Germany, forming the SED or Socialist Unity Party, with the aim of "capturing" the Socialist voters of Berlin and the East Zone. Although they did not succeed in taking control of the SPD of Berlin, they were able to veto the election of the SPD leader Ernst Reuter as Governing Mayor of Berlin in June 1947. In the Eastern Zone of Germany the so-called German Democratic Republic was set up in October 1949 by Soviet order, without prior discussion or free elections. The regime's first elections, held in the following year, were of the single-list variety carried on under the "bloc-party" system and the National Front, a communist cover organization.

Individual liberties, though ostentatiously displayed in the East German Constitution, have never been protected. Soviet military forces cooperated with the East German regime in putting down the uprisings and strikes which occurred in June 1953. The free flow of information and free expression essential to democratic life has not been permitted in the East Zone, and Western radio transmissions have been extensively jammed.

Economic Policies. The Potsdam Protocol provided both for reparations from Germany and for measures of essential economic reconstruction. It was understood and agreed at Potsdam that successful implementation of these measures required cooperation and "common policies" in regard to basic economic functions. The Protocol stated specifically:

...During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit.

Almost from the beginning the Soviet authorities obstructed efforts to implement this principle. In their own zone they pursued a unilateral economic policy and raised

barriers to the flow of trade across zonal borders. Western suggestions, such as that to place manufactures from East Germany in a common pool in order to cover the cost of essential imports, were defeated by Soviet delaying tactics. Depending traditionally upon food from Eastern Germany, the area under United States control was able to survive by means of extensive American subsidy.

An essential aspect of the over-all economic problem was the question of reparations. The Potsdam Protocol stated:

... In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR from its own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 percent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment... as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 percent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Also,

... Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports. (This was not to apply to equipment and products, noted above, received as additional reparations by the USSR from the Western zones.)

No effort was made by the Soviet Union to abide by these provisions. In their own zone Soviet authorities not only refused to account for reparations exacted but also removed large quantities from current production, thus preventing the use of these commodities for payment for necessary imports. Moreover, the Soviet Union failed to make deliveries of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber and other raw materials from its own zone in exchange for shipments of industrial equipment from the Western zones. By contrast, the United States, between March 31 and August 1, 1946, had made shipments from its zone to the USSR of 11,100 tons of reparation equipment. After continued Soviet failure to meet these obligations, the United States suspended reparations deliveries until such time as the USSR would be willing to implement fully the provisions of the Protocol.

Demilitarization. The Potsdam Protocol provided for the "complete disarmament and demilitarization" of Germany. Provisions to this end included the following:

All German land, naval and air forces... and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military traditions in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism.

In 1946 Soviet authorities began building up a sizeable "police force" in the Soviet Zone. In May 1960 the United States protested this process of remilitarization, pointing out that some 40,000 to 60,000 members of the so-called "Police Alert Units," equipped

with Soviet weapons, were receiving infantry, armored and artillery training. At the end of 1953 the Soviet Zone's "police force" numbered 100,000 men (for a population of 17 million), with an additional 140,200 military personnel, including 3 mechanized divisions and air units. By June 1959 East German military and paramilitary forces totalled more than 700,000 men.¹

Eastern Frontiers. The conference at Potsdam also considered the question of the future German-Polish boundary, and included the following statement in the Protocol.

...The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

On July 6, 1950, an agreement was signed between the Soviet-controlled regimes of Poland and East Germany fixing the Oder-Neisse as the definitive frontier between Poland and Germany.

2. Occupation and Control of Germany

On September 12, 1944, representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany, which was amended subsequently to include France. The Protocol in its final form established the four zones of occupation and the special joint occupation for the Berlin area. Paragraph 5 of the Protocol provides:

An Inter-Allied Governing authority (Komendatura) consisting of four Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area.

The Soviet Union was also signatory to the Agreement of May 1, 1945, which stated:

Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised on instructions from their respective governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, /and/ the Provisional Government of the French Republic each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.

With regard to Berlin, the Agreement stated:

An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of four Commandants, one from each Power, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" area. Each of the Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the Inter-Allied Authority.

Almost from the beginning the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Council and the Komendatura carried out obstructionist tactics, as described above, and in Berlin the communist controlled police of the Soviet sector refused to be bound by the legal

1. On the same date the Federal Republic, nearly three times larger in population, had 235,000 men under arms, together with 14,000 police and 12,000 frontier guards. --Statement by Secretary of State Herter at the Foreign Ministers' Conference, Geneva, May 25, 1959; Washington Post and Times Herald, May 26, 1959.

controls authorized by the Allied Komendatura. On March 20, 1948, the Soviet representatives walked out of the Allied Control Council and on April 1 imposed rail and road restrictions on Allied traffic to Berlin. On June 16, 1948, the Soviet representatives left the Komendatura and 10 days later imposed a total blockade of Berlin. On July 1, 1948, the chief Soviet representative in the Komendatura announced that the four power administration of Berlin was terminated. On November 30, 1948, the German Communists set up their own city government in the Soviet sector of Berlin, thus completing the division of Berlin into East and West zones.

On May 4, 1949, after the Western powers had demonstrated their determination to retain their legal rights in Berlin by supplying the city by air, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France reached an agreement at New York, which was confirmed subsequently at the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris. Among other provisions, the New York agreement stated:

All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the Eastern zone and the Western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949.

In addition, the agreement reached at Paris specified:

... In order to improve and supplement this and other arrangements and agreements as regards the movement of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern zone and the Western zones and between the zones and Berlin and also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities, each in his own zone, will have an obligation to take the measures necessary to insure the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water, and road transport for such movement of persons and goods and such communications by post, telephone, and telegraph.

On July 23, 1955, the heads of government of the United States, the USSR, France, and the United Kingdom issued the following statement at Geneva:

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and in the interests of European security.

That the Soviet Union had no intention of carrying out this promise was made clear less than four months later at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Geneva. On November 8, 1955, Molotov stated:

... such a mechanical merger of the two parts of Germany be means of so-called "free elections"... could lead to the violation of the vital interests of the working masses of the German Democratic Republic, to which one cannot agree.

Since that time, the Soviet Union has consistently rejected all attempts to solve the German problem except on its own terms, and in recent months has sought to impose its "solution" on the Western powers by unilateral action in total disregard of its treaty commitments. On November 27, 1958, the Soviet Government notified the Government of the United States that it regarded the agreements on Germany of September 12, 1944 and May 1, 1945 as "null and void," and announced its intention of turning over its functions within Berlin and in regard to access to the city to the so-called German Democratic Republic. The Western powers have refused to accept any such unilateral action on the part of the USSR.

Agreements on Prisoners of War

The terms for the surrender of Japan were defined in the Proclamation of July 26, 1945, issued by the United States, Britain, and China. The Soviet Union, in declaring war upon Japan on August 8, 1945, announced that it had joined in the Allied Proclamation of July 26. Point 9 of the Proclamation stated:

The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

In May 1949, following a Japanese statement that 376,929 Japanese prisoners were still being held, the official Soviet news agency admitted that 95,000 Japanese prisoners were still in the Soviet Union. In 1957 the Japanese stated that 8,069 Japanese citizens continued to be detained in the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia, 2,629 in North Korea, and 1,392 in Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.

The release of German prisoners of war was discussed in 1947 at the Council of Foreign Ministers, which reached agreement that:

German prisoners of war located in the territory of the Allied Powers and in all other territories will be returned to Germany on December 31, 1949.

The Soviet Union reaffirmed this obligation in submitting its plan for repatriation on June 30, 1947.

On January 3, 1949, the United States protested to the Soviet Union for its failure to furnish information on its repatriation of war prisoners. The United States note stated:

...on the basis of the Soviet Government's statement at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow that 890,532 war prisoners were still held by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at that time, only some 447,367 are officially known to have been repatriated to Germany.

In its note of January 24, 1949 to the United States, the Soviet Government promised that "...repatriation of war prisoners will be completed during 1949."

In 1957 the United Nations Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War received a memorandum from the Federal Republic of Germany which stated:

In the course of German-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in September 1955, the Soviet Government declared itself willing to release 9,626 prisoners of war. However, the assurance was also given that any additional persons would be released who might be traced in the Soviet Union on the basis of relevant German lists, provided such persons had German nationality..

According to the memorandum, only 1,772 prisoners had been returned since September 1956. The Soviet Government had refused to repatriate more than 100,000 German war and civilian prisoners who had been forced to settle in the USSR following the elimination of certain forced labor camps on the grounds that they had acquired Soviet nationality. The Soviet Union had supplied no information on the whereabouts of 87,353 prisoners of war and 16,480 German civilians known to have been in Soviet captivity at one time or another; 75 German scientists, whose work contracts had expired long previously, were being detained at Sukhmi.

The Ad Hoc Commission on repatriation of war prisoners reported in September 1957 that the Soviet Government had not even replied to a request to discuss the matter at Geneva.

China

The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, concluded on August 14, 1945, between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China contained, among others, the following provisions.

Article V. The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests and security and economic development of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other Contracting Party.

Article VI. The High Contracting Parties agree to afford one another all possible economic assistance in the postwar period in order to facilitate and expedite the rehabilitation of both countries and to make their contribution to the prosperity of the world.

Article VIII. The Treaty... shall remain in force for a term of thirty years.

In the exchange of notes accompanying the treaty, Foreign Minister Molotov stated:

... The Government of the USSR agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China.

The Soviet Union began to disregard these provisions almost immediately.

(1) In its occupation of Manchuria, commencing in 1945, the Soviet authorities removed from Manchuria assets valued at \$858,000,000 in the form of mining equipment, rolling stock, steel mills, electric power generators, and other equipment.

(2) The Soviet Government made available to the Chinese Communists extensive stocks of Japanese arms and other equipment to be employed against the National Government.

The Unification of Korea

At the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December 1945, the Soviet Union, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, agreed to the establishment of a free and independent Korea. The Report of the Conference, dated December 27, 1945, stated that, "with a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state," there should be established a "provisional democratic Korean government." Further:

In order to assist the formation of a provisional government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organization...

It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organization, to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The Soviet Union from the start thwarted the implementation of this agreement. Its representative on the Joint Commission refused to recognize as "democratic" any parties and organizations not under Soviet control. It prevented UN-sponsored elections in northern Korea, and established there its own regime, the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea which claimed jurisdiction over the entire country. On June 25, 1950, this regime, armed and encouraged by the Soviet Union, attacked the Republic of Korea.

Soviet Pledges in Hungary

On October 30, 1956, the Government of the USSR made a public declaration, printed the following day in Pravda, which stated:

Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation, the Soviet Government has given its military command instructions to withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian Government.

At the same time the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.

The Soviet Union not only broke the pledge, but deliberately used it as a cover in order to crush the revolt in Hungary.

- (1) On October 31, 1956, the Soviet Army began strengthening its forces in Hungary.
- (2) On November 3, 1956, under pretext of negotiating the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Soviet authorities arrested the Hungarian representatives, led by Colonel Pal Maleter, who had been sent to carry on the negotiations.
- (3) On November 4, 1956, Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy broadcast the following statement:

In the early hours of this morning the Soviet troops launched an attack against our capital city with the obvious intention of overthrowing the lawful, democratic, Hungarian Government. Our troops are fighting. The government is in its place. I inform the people of the country and world opinion of this.

- (4) On June 16, 1958, the Hungarian Communist regime of Janos Kadar, who had personally pledged the safety of Imre Nagy after the suppression of the revolt, announced the execution of Nagy and of his associates, Pal Maleter, Jozsef Szilagy, and Miklos Gimes.

Credit Agreement with Yugoslavia

On January 12, 1956, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia concluded an agreement under which Yugoslavia was to receive Soviet credits for economic construction and expansion. By the agreement of August 3, 1956, Yugoslavia received a further credit of \$176 million, to be provided jointly by the USSR and its East German satellite, for construction of an aluminum combine.

In the spring of 1958 the Soviet Union, which had become increasingly disgruntled with Yugoslavia's ideological independence, endeavored to employ its credit agreement as a political weapon. Pravda, on May 9, 1958, noting that "ideological differences" lead to differences on political issues, "threatened in a thinly veiled fashion that economic assistance might be terminated if the Yugoslav ideological line were not changed. On May 27, 1958, Foreign Minister Gromyko handed to the Yugoslav Ambassador a note announcing the unilateral suspension for "five years" of Soviet and East German deliveries under the 1956 credit agreements.

SOVIET MANPOWER¹

1960 - 70

FOREWORD

This report shows the changes in the population and labor force of the USSR that are expected to take place between 1960 and 1970. For purposes of comparison, data also are presented for earlier years.


The USSR has already taken steps to cope with the two most important manpower problems that will be encountered during the 1960's -- the small increments to the population of working age during 1960-65 and the effective use of the huge labor force living on farms. By reducing the armed forces and by controlling the rate of school enrollment among youths during 1956-60, the USSR has succeeded in providing enough additional labor to overfulfill its manpower and production plans in spite of a continuous decline in the increments to the population of working age resulting from the low birth rates of World War II. The number of persons on farms is expected to be almost as large in 1970 as in 1960. By promoting industrial and construction activities in rural areas, the USSR has attempted to employ surplus agricultural workers on the farms, thus keeping rural-to-urban migration at a minimum and avoiding the necessity for providing more housing and public utilities in the already overcrowded cities.

The estimates for the 1950's are based on statistics that have appeared in official Soviet publications. The outlook for the 1960's is based on the following assumptions:

1. That birth rates (by age of mother) will remain at present levels but that death rates will decline slowly,
2. That the goals announced for the Seven Year Plan (1959-65) relating to manpower and education will be achieved and that the trends established in the first half of the decade will continue until 1970,
3. That the planned reduction in the armed forces by 1.2 million during 1960-61 will take place,
4. That no major war or other cataclysmic event will occur.

¹Central Intelligence Agency, May 1960.

THE POPULATION WILL INCREASE FROM 214 MILLION TO 247 MILLION DURING THE 1960's



World War II had a catastrophic effect on the population of the USSR. The population (within the present boundaries of the country) fell from 195 million in 1940 to about 175 million in 1947.* The 1940 level was not regained until 1954.


In addition to the enormous military and civilian losses attributable to the war, birth rates fell to less than half their prewar level and did not recover that level until about 1950. The small number of children born during the war years has already posed periodic problems for

* All population estimates in this report are midyear figures.

Soviet leaders as the groups reached elementary school, high school, and working age. These small groups will be marrying and having children during the 1960's. As they replace the larger, prewar groups, the rate of growth of the population will temporarily decline.


For the decade of the 1960's as a whole, the population will increase at an average annual rate of 1.5 percent -- a little more slowly than during the 1950's.

**THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE WILL GROW BY ABOUT
17 MILLION, OR 16 PERCENT, DURING THE 1960's**



The civilian labor force of the USSR will increase by about 17 million during the 1960's, only 1 million more than the increase during the 1950's. Growth will be slower in the first half of the decade than in the second because the age groups starting to work during 1960-65 will be the unusually small groups born during the war and the early postwar period. The increase will be enough, however, to permit the achievement of the manpower goals set by the Seven Year Plan (1959-65).


THE NUMBER OF PERSONS REACHING WORKING AGE WILL BEGIN TO RISE IN 1962, FOLLOWING A SHARP DECLINE DURING THE 1950's




The total number of persons reaching the normal working age of 15 in the USSR will more than double between 1960 and 1970 -- from 2.3 million to 4.7 million. This increase follows a rapid decline during the 1950's, particularly in the latter half of the decade. These fluctuations result from the sharp decline in the birth rate during 1940-45 and its subsequent rise.

The decline in the number of 15-year-olds would have resulted in a much slower growth in the labor force than actually occurred if the USSR had not taken steps to increase the labor supply. By controlling school enrollment and by reducing the armed forces, however, the USSR has been able to keep its civilian labor force growing at a fairly even pace.

**DECLINING SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND REDUCTIONS
IN THE ARMED FORCES ARE ALLOWING THE CIVILIAN
LABOR FORCE TO INCREASE STEADILY DURING THE
PERIOD OF "POPULATION SHORTAGE"**




Between 1955 and 1960 the civilian labor force of the USSR increased by 10 million, but the population of working age (15 to 69) increased by only 7.4 million. At the same time, the number of persons of working age in dayschools and colleges declined, and the armed forces were reduced.



The decrease in dayschool enrollment resulted both from a decline in the number of persons of high school age and from a decline in the proportion enrolled. More young people thus became available for work. This downward trend in school enrollment is expected to be reversed in the early 1960's, when the number of 15-year-olds begins to rise and when the current reorganization of education is completed.

Between 1955 and 1960 the armed forces decreased by more than 2 million persons, and the Soviet government has announced plans to cut the armed forces by an additional 1.2 million during 1960-61 -- years when the additions to the population of working age will be the lowest (fewer than 1 million each year).


**WOMEN FAR OUTNUMBER MEN IN THE POPULATION
AND IN THE KEY WORKING AGES**



Women constitute 55 percent of the total population of the USSR -- one of the highest percentages in the world. In the age group 25 to 59, there are 139 women for each 100 men. The heavy preponderance of women in these ages is a consequence of the disproportionate losses of men during World War II and also during the collectivization drive of the 1930's. By 1970, women will constitute 53 percent of the population.

The age structure of the population will not change greatly during the 1960's. About the same proportion will be in the working ages 15 to 69 in 1970 as now, but women will be a smaller part of the total.


MORE THAN HALF OF ALL SOVIET WORKERS ARE WOMEN



Women now make up more than half of the civilian labor force of the USSR, but their predominance is gradually diminishing. By 1970 the labor force will be about equally divided between men and women.

Nearly two-thirds of the number of Soviet women 14 years of age and over currently participate in the labor force. Women probably will continue to participate at this high rate during the 1960's. The percentage could rise even higher, for Soviet leaders have established as an ultimate goal the almost universal participation of women in employment outside the home. Soviet plans call for more kindergartens, nurseries, boarding schools, and public dining facilities to make it possible for more women to work.

WOMEN ARE EMPLOYED EXTENSIVELY IN ALL BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY




PROPORTION OF WOMEN EMPLOYED IN SELECTED ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1959

28900

Some sectors of the Soviet economy, such as trade, education, and health, are staffed largely by women. In 1959, about three-fourths of all doctors and about 70 percent of all teachers were women. Although women accounted for about 57 percent of total agricultural employment in 1959, the proportion has been declining steadily and will continue to decline during the 1960's. Even in those sectors where women do not predominate, such as construction and transportation, they nevertheless constitute more than one-fourth of the total.

NEARLY HALF OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE IS EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE



More than 50 million people in the USSR -- nearly half of the total labor force -- are engaged in agriculture. This figure represents the number of persons 14 years old and over who live on collective and state farms and who participate in normal farm activities at some time during the year. It also includes unpaid family workers who live on those farms and who work exclusively on private plots -- still an important source of agricultural production in the USSR.


A little more than one-fourth of the labor force is employed in industry and construction, and somewhat less than one-fourth is employed in the service sector. Slightly more than half of all workers in the services are employed in education, health, and trade, and about one-fourth are employed in transportation and communications.

Agricultural employment is expected to resume its historic downward trend during the 1960's after a temporary interruption during the mid-1950's, when Khrushchev's "new lands" program added several million

people to Soviet farms. In 1970, agricultural employment will still be high, constituting 40 percent of the civilian labor force.

Employment in the services, which increased by 32 percent in the 1950's, will increase by 40 percent during the 1960's. By 1970, 28 percent of the labor force will be working in service activities compared with 21 percent in 1950. Nevertheless, more people will still be employed in the nonagricultural productive industries (manufacturing, mining, and construction) than in the services.

THE RURAL POPULATION WILL CONTINUE TO DECLINE AS A PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL




The rural population of the USSR is expected to drop from 51 percent of the total in 1960 to 43 percent in 1970. Early in the decade the urban population for the first time will exceed the rural population.

Post-Stalin agricultural policies reduced the rate of rural-to-urban migration, resulting in the same rural population in 1950 and 1960. The rural population is expected to drop slowly to about 105 million by 1970.


Although Soviet agriculture probably will achieve sizable gains in productivity during the 1960's, the integration of surplus unskilled farm labor into the urban labor force will present difficult problems. Khrushchev has talked about urbanizing the countryside by developing "farm-cities" at existing farm sites, thus avoiding the necessity for providing additional housing and public utilities in already crowded urban areas. These farm-cities would provide training for jobs in industry and services for farm workers who become surplus through mechanization. Some such scheme may be necessary to cope with the anomaly of a huge farm labor force and a huge rural population in a country undergoing rapid industrialization.

THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE IS STILL LOW



Some idea of the educational level of the Soviet labor force may be obtained from the data on educational attainment of the entire adult population given in the 1959 census. In 1959, only 2.6 percent of the population 15 years old and over had graduated from college, and 60.5 percent had not even completed elementary school (7 years). Considerable educational progress was achieved by the USSR during the decade of the 1950's, after the 7-year elementary school was made compulsory in 1949. Even greater progress probably will be made during the 1960's, when an 8-year elementary education is scheduled to become compulsory.


THE PACE OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS WILL BE STEPPED UP SHARPLY DURING THE 1960's — EVENING SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN HIGH SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE



High school and college enrollment in the USSR will rise rapidly during the 1960's. The USSR is currently reorganizing its school system to place more emphasis on vocational education in high schools and on evening enrollment in both high schools and colleges. The 7-year elementary schools are to become 8-year schools, and attendance will be compulsory. The projected rise in day school enrollment during the early 1960's will result from the increased attendance in the eighth grade of the reorganized elementary schools as well as from the larger proportion of persons of high school age in the population. During the 1960's, 3.5 million to 4 million persons will be graduating from college compared with 2.5 million during the 1950's.

High school education is to be made "universally available" but not compulsory. The USSR also is tightening the controls over school enrollment to provide a more effective means of manipulating school enrollment in accordance with the need for labor. State authorities will decide whether graduates from the eighth grade are to go to work, to high school, or to a trade school. Those who go directly to work will be encouraged to attend evening classes. Enrollment in evening schools will expand almost as rapidly as that in day schools.

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND PRODUCTIVITY WILL CONTINUE TO RISE RAPIDLY



GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1950-70

The continued rise in the level of education and skill of the Soviet labor force, along with progress in technology, should permit productivity to rise rapidly. Gross national product (GNP) is expected to increase about 6 percent annually during the 1960's, a little more slowly than during the 1950's. GNP per capita and GNP per worker (which is a rough measure of productivity) will each increase about 4.5 percent annually.

The high rate of increase in GNP should permit consumption per capita to increase substantially. By 1970 the standard of living of the average Soviet worker probably will be about 40 percent higher than the present level.

SUMMARY INDEX

(List of witnesses appears alphabetically in contents)

	Page
Actions of Soviet Union:	
Contradictory.....	70, 198
Objectives.....	71, 192
Prediction on.....	71
Advance planning in event U-2 plane downed, question of.....	137
Alken, Senator George D.:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.....	138
Herter, Hon. Christian A.....	40-43, 72, 73
Authorization for U-2 flights.....	102, 194
Bringing instances of espionage before U.N.....	45
Capehart, Senator Homer E.: Examination of witnesses: Gates, Hon.	
Thomas S., Jr.....	141
Carlson, Senator Frank: Examination of witnesses: Herter, Hon. Chris-	
tian A.....	40, 47, 77-79
Central Intelligence Agency:	
Duties of.....	94
Powers of.....	84
Cessation of aircraft espionage, need for assurance of.....	158
Chronology of U-2 incident, from Washington Post, May 27, 1960.....	163-168
Communist China's influence on Soviet action.....	40, 161
Communist infiltration in the nuclear test ban movement (from Congres-	
sional Record).....	169-174
Communist propaganda on U-2 overflights.....	34, 39
Consideration of U-2 incident, possible General Assembly.....	39
Cover story.....	28, 115, 128, 129, 134, 178
Decision to suspend overflights.....	
Authority for suspension.....	60
Duration of order to suspend.....	66
Defensive value to U.S. of U-2 overflights.....	37, 136
Department of Defense in overflight program, role of.....	124
Department of Defense news release, May 5.....	178
Department of State statements:	
Background of.....	104
May 7 statement.....	187
Press and radio briefing, May 5.....	178
Press release, May 6.....	181
Secretary of State, May 9.....	193
Devices carried by pilot.....	43
Disarmament and suspension of nuclear tests, continued efforts toward.....	47, 145
Discontinuance of U-2 flights, effect of.....	138
Effect of U-2 incident on K's summit action.....	148
Effect of pleading guilty of espionage.....	45
Effect of summit failure on U.S. military program.....	154
Efforts to interview U-2 pilot.....	37, 40
Espionage and international law.....	43
Events in Paris:	
Final proceedings:	
Khrushchev's press conference.....	11
Tripartite communique.....	11, 235
Tripartite meetings.....	11
Fixed Soviet governmental position.....	9, 10, 12, 52
Khrushchev's arrival.....	8
Khrushchev's calls on De Gaulle and Macmillan.....	8, 52
President's position at first conference.....	9
Suspension of U-2 flights, announcement of.....	9, 24, 25

	Page
Executive branch coordination on U-2 incident.....	28-31, 34, 74
Cover story on overflight, issuance of.....	28
Events leading to State Department May 5 statement.....	29, 34
Events leading to State Department May 7 statement.....	31
Guidelines on missing plane, preparation of.....	30
NASA statement of May 5.....	30
Foreign Ministers deadlock.....	5
Fulbright, Senator J. W.:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Bohlen, Hon. Charles E.....	50, 57
Dillon, Hon. Douglas.....	50, 51, 103, 104
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L.....	112-114, 121
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.....	125-128, 145-148, 153-155
Herter, Hon. Christian A.....	24-28, 55, 56, 57-60, 84-86, 96, 97, 102, 104-106, 107
Opening statement.....	1
Future U.S. intelligence gathering activities, influence of Khrushchev actions on.....	46
Gore, Senator Albert:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Bohlen, Hon. Charles E.....	93, 94
Dillon, Hon. Douglas.....	30, 48-50, 80, 81, 90, 91
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L.....	117-120, 121
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.....	128-131, 153, 159, 162
Herter, Hon. Christian A.....	79, 80, 90, 91, 93, 97-102
Green, Senator Theodore Francis:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Dillon, Hon. Douglas.....	28-30, 31
Herter, Hon. Christian A.....	28
Health of U-2 pilot.....	37, 40, 182
Hickenlooper, Senator Bourke B:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L.....	120, 121
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.....	134-137, 152, 153
Herter, Hon. Christian A.....	36-38
High-level trips.....	5
Humphrey, Senator Hubert H.:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Dillon, Hon. Douglas.....	30, 34, 35
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.....	155, 156
Herter, Hon. Christian A.....	33, 35, 36, 68-72
Information gathering opportunities in United States and U.S.S.R.....	83
Internal conditions in Russia.....	61, 78
Jurisdiction over airspace and high seas.....	89
Khrushchev:	
Attitude on Berlin and Germany.....	159, 190
Changing views on summit.....	153
Decision to wreck summit, timing of.....	147
Extent of power of.....	100
Khrushchev's statements incident to summit, text of:	
Informal news conference, May 11.....	203
Remarks on U.S. plane, May 5.....	175
Remarks on U.S. plane, May 7.....	181
Speech warning nations with U.S. bases, May 9.....	188
Statement at Paris summit, May 16.....	220
Text of May 10 note.....	195
Transcript of Paris news conference, May 18.....	235
Khrushchev statements since visit to United States:	
Berlin, Germany.....	17-19, 41, 87
United States and Western policy.....	19-21
Summit.....	21, 22
Comments on West during Asian tour.....	22, 23

Lausche, Senator Frank J.:	
Examination of witnesses:	Page
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L.-----	121
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.-----	141-144, 159-161
Herter, Hon. Christian A.-----	51-54, 81-84, 94-96
Questions raised and answers by State Department-----	255-260
Long, Senator Russell B.:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.-----	137, 138
Herter, Hon. Christian A.-----	43-46
Mansfield, Senator Mike:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Bohlen, Hon. Charles E.-----	67, 68
Dillon, Hon. Douglas-----	63
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L.-----	114, 115
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.-----	132-134
Herter, Hon. Christian A.-----	62, 63-67, 89, 90
Morse, Senator Wayne:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Dillon, Hon. Douglas-----	74, 75
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.-----	138, 141, 149-152, 156-159
Herter, Hon. Christian A.-----	38-40, 73-77
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:	
Function of-----	73
Grounding of U-2's-----	114
Incident in Japan-----	114
Line of command to President-----	112, 115
May 5 statement, background and clearance-----	103, 107, 113, 116, 117, 180
Research with U-2:	
Information produced-----	110
Study of air turbulence-----	109
U-2 operation-----	111
Role in U-2 incident-----	74
National Security Council, meeting of, May 5-----	128, 130
Negotiation, engaging the Soviet Union in-----	4
Nuclear armament race-----	76
Passport legislation-----	84
Personal diplomacy versus summit conferences-----	101
President's assumption of responsibility for espionage-----	26, 27, 63, 94, 129
President's commitment not to continue flights-----	79, 150, 157
President's dignity and character at Paris-----	162
President's statements incident to summit:	
Address, May 25-----	249
Informal news conference, May 11-----	198
Remarks on arrival at Andrews Air Force Base-----	247
Statement following summit, May 16-----	225
Public releases on U-2 weather flights-----	116
Questions raised by Senator Lausche and answers prepared by Department of State-----	250-260
Responsibility for U-2 flights, who has-----	35, 127
Soviet misdeeds-----	53
Soviet motivation for attending summit-----	142
Soviet policy, signs of radical alteration-----	14
Soviet threat against oversea bases, implications of-----	134,
	138, 176, 187, 188, 190, 202
Soviet Union:	
Action, analysis of-----	11
Decision to cancel Eisenhower invitation-----	12, 27, 60, 224
Decision to wreck conference-----	12, 31, 87
Factors resulting in conference disruption-----	13
Significance of Gromyko and Malinvosky accompanying Khrushchev-----	12
Air maneuvers over East Germany-----	134
Aircraft activities-----	156
Bases, question of relocation-----	146

	Page
Soviet Union—Continued	
Currency, devaluation of	77
Espionage	255, 261-267
Agents apprehended in U.S.	261-267
Goals of	192
Hierarchy	13, 73, 140
Knowledge of U-2 overflights	32, 37, 38, 60, 81, 126, 141, 149
Leadership, possibility of changes in	67
Manpower, 1960-70	283-297
Military preparedness	105, 154
Treaty violations	268-282
Prewar	269
Wartime and postwar	273
Spy systems, U.S. and U.S.S.R.	42
State Department's knowledge of U-2 flights	68, 90
Statements made by president and Secretary of State, comparison of	98
Status quo in Berlin, question of maintaining	46
Statutory authority for flights, except from National security act of 1947	64-66
Summit collapse, other countries' reactions to	72
Summit diplomacy, impact on	69
Summit meeting:	
Preparation for	6
Prospects dimmed	6, 33
Suspension of flights, no presummit discussion regarding	125
Test of military communications	124, 126, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 155
Threat to Berlin	4
United States as peaceful nation, record of	152
U.S. and Soviet intelligence gathering opportunities	142
U.S. intelligence gathering:	
Effectiveness of	43
Importance of	51
U.S. policy, implications for future	14, 33
U-2 flights, importance of	143
U-2 incident:	
Chronology of	163-168
Effect on summit	154
Lesson of	106
President's account of	7
Vice President's knowledge of flights	69, 75
Views of France and Great Britain on U.S. position	42
White, Lincoln, statement of	49, 50, 178
Basis for	49, 50
Question of coordination regarding	50
Wiley, Senator Alexander:	
Examination of witnesses:	
Bohlen, Hon. Charles E.	61, 62
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L.	115, 116
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr.	131, 132, 148, 149, 161
Herter, Hon. Christian A.	31-33, 54, 55, 60, 61, 87-89, 106
World court, record of	76
World opinion on U-2 overflights	151