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
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# PLATONIS PROTAGORAS

*WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDICES*

BY

J. ADAM, LITT.D.


FELLOW AND SENIOR TUTOR OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE

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## PREFACE.

THE present edition of the Protagoras is on the same lines as the Pitt Press editions of the Apology, Crito, and Euthyphro.

The Editors venture to hope that the study of this delightful dialogue, for which much has already been done in English by Mr Wayte and more recently by Mr Turner, may be still further encouraged by the publication of this edition.

Mr Neil, of Pembroke College, has kindly read through the proofs, and contributed various criticisms and suggestions.

CAMBRIDGE,  
*July 26, 1893.*

## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN this edition a few errors and misprints have been corrected, but we have not thought it necessary or desirable to introduce any further changes.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE,  
*September 28, 1905.*



## INTRODUCTION.

THE Protagoras of Plato is one of the few dialogues whose authenticity has never been called in question by any eminent scholar. None of the dialogues attributed to Plato is so full of fallacious reasoning; perhaps none contains an ethical theory so difficult to reconcile with ordinary Platonic teaching; but the extraordinary vivacity and power of the dramatic representation, as well as the charm of style, have furnished proofs of authenticity which even the most sceptical critics have been unable to resist.

### § I. *Analysis.*

A brief analysis of the Protagoras will form a fitting introduction to the discussion of its scope and purpose.

Socrates narrates the dialogue to a friend (309 A—310 A).

Hippocrates had visited Socrates in great excitement at an early hour, in order to obtain from him a personal introduction to Protagoras, who had just arrived in Athens. In the interval before they set out, Socrates subjected his young friend to an interrogatory, which forced him to admit that he was

about to entrust his soul to a sophist, without knowing what a sophist really is. Such a course of action Socrates declared to be perilous in the extreme (310 A—314 C). Socrates and Protagoras presently proceeded to the house of Callias, where Protagoras was staying, and having with some difficulty obtained admittance, found themselves spectators of an animated scene, in which Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus are the leading figures (314 C—316 A).

At this point the true business of the dialogue begins. After Hippocrates has been introduced to Protagoras, the latter delivers a speech claiming for his profession a high antiquity. Poets, religious teachers, musicians and others who were in reality 'Sophists', have vainly tried to disguise themselves by other names: Protagoras has found it both more prudent and more honest to profess himself openly that which he is, a Sophist and Educator of men. Prodicus and Hippias with their respective adherents assemble to hear Protagoras publicly explain the advantages of his teaching (316 A—317 E).

Aided by a little Socratic questioning, Protagoras explains that his art consists in making men good citizens. Socrates professes to have thought that civic virtue could not be communicated by teaching, and that on two grounds: first, because the Athenians do not think it can, since they allow any man to advise them in matters connected with the state without requiring from him evidence that he has been taught, whereas they will only listen to an expert when they are deliberating on matters connected with the arts: and second, because as a matter of fact, great statesmen have not succeeded in transmitting



their civic virtue to their sons and wards (317 E—320 C).

The reply of Protagoras is in the form of a *ρήσις* and falls into three sections.

In the first he endeavours to justify the Athenians for permitting any one to give counsel on politics, by relating a myth of pre-historic man, according to which no one is destitute of the foundations of civic virtue, Justice and Shame (320 C—323 A). That every man has part by nature in this virtue is, moreover, a universal belief, for he who publicly declares himself to be wicked is universally looked upon as mad (323 A—323 C).

Protagoras next endeavours to prove that the Athenians regard virtue as capable of being taught. In the first place, we hold men responsible for lacking that only which it was in their power to acquire, and we hold them responsible for their wrong-doing (323 C—324 A). Punishment, in the second place, is intended both by the Athenians and by all other men to be a means of teaching virtue (324 A—324 D).

Finally, Protagoras addresses himself to the question—why do not the sons of great statesmen possess the same virtue as their fathers? It is not from lack of teaching: for it would be absurd to suppose that statesmen teach their sons everything except the one thing needful for life as a citizen, and in point of fact, virtue is taught at every stage of human life—by parents, nurses, tutors, professional teachers for soul and body, and finally by the state herself, through the medium of the laws and the punishment which their violation entails. But children are often inferior to their parents in the capacity

for learning, and it is for this reason that they seem to fall short in civic virtue, although, compared with untutored savages, even the worst products of civilization might seem models of morality. Protagoras concludes by declaring himself a teacher of virtue and explaining his method of taking fees (324 D—328 D).

After thanking Hippocrates for bringing him to hear so fine a display, Socrates requests the Sophist to explain a matter which he had left obscure—Are the single virtues each of them parts of virtue, or only different names for one thing? They are parts of virtue, says Protagoras, in answer to the cross-examination of his rival, distinct from each other and the whole, as the parts of the face are different from the whole face and from one another. In number they are five—justice, temperance, holiness, courage, and wisdom, and wisdom is the greatest of them. We may possess one without possessing all the five. Each has its own peculiar efficacy and no one of them is like another (328 D—330 B).

Socrates endeavours in the first instance to make Protagoras admit that justice and holiness are identical, or nearly so. It is admitted that justice is just and holiness holy: but if justice and holiness do not resemble each other, justice will not be holy, but unholy, and holiness will not be just, but unjust—a conclusion which the Sophist rejects. Protagoras graciously concedes that there may be a considerable resemblance between justice and holiness, without however allowing that the two virtues are alike (330 B—332 A).

The next step in the argument seeks to establish the identity of temperance and wisdom. ἀφροσύνη,

Protagoras admits, is the opposite of *σοφία*, and nothing can have more than one thing which is opposed to it. *ἀφροσύνη* is however opposed to *σωφροσύνη*, as well as to *σοφία*; from which it follows that *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη* are nothing but two names for one and the same thing (332 A—333 B).

If Socrates had also proved the identity of temperance and justice, four out of the five virtues would have been equated, but as he embarks upon his argument, Protagoras seizes the opportunity to plunge into a *ῥῆσις* on the relativity of the notion 'good' or 'beneficial' (333 B—334 C).

Here ensues an interlude, in which Socrates protests against his rival's lengthy speeches, and threatens to depart. At last, in deference to the entreaties of Callias, backed up by some remarks from Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, and Hippias, Socrates consents to stay, on condition that Protagoras shall first question him and afterwards submit to be questioned in his turn (334 C—338 E).

Protagoras proposes for criticism a poem of Simonides, remarking that the subject of the discussion will still be *ἀρετή*, though it is transferred from human conduct to the sphere of poetry. A good poem, Socrates admits, will not contradict itself: but Simonides, after asserting that it is hard to become good, proceeds in this poem to censure Prodicus for saying 'It is hard to be good'. That Simonides contradicts himself, Socrates denies, on the ground that 'to be good' is not the same as 'to become good': perhaps Simonides agreed with Hesiod in the view that it is hard to become, but easy to remain, good. Your cure is worse than the disease,

replies Protagoras: it would be the height of folly to call being good an easy thing. Socrates thereupon, with Prodicus' approval, at first suggests that 'hard' may mean not 'difficult', but 'evil', since the word 'hard'—so says Prodicus the Cean—means something evil in Ceos; but soon abandoning these sophistries he volunteers to give a continuous exposition of the poem (338 E—342 A).

Sparta and Crete are in reality the chief seats of philosophy in Greece, though they try to conceal the fact. The wise men of old knew this and in imitation of the Spartans compressed their wisdom into short and pithy sentences, one of which was the saying of Pittacus 'It is hard to be good'. Simonides wrote his poem to overthrow this maxim (342 A--343 C).

Socrates proceeds to support his theory of the poem by an exposition conceived (as will be afterwards shewn<sup>1</sup>) in the most sophistical spirit, but he correctly apprehends the central idea, viz. that in a world where it is not hard, but impossible to be good, we should not expect too much in the way of moral excellence (343 C—347 A).

The exposition of the poem being finished Socrates expresses himself disparagingly on the value of poetical criticism as a means of arriving at the truth, and the original question is resumed with Socrates for interrogator, as before. Conceding all that Socrates has hitherto been trying to prove, viz. that justice, holiness, wisdom and temperance are of the same kind, Protagoras takes his stand upon the sole remaining virtue and denies that courage bears any resemblance to the other four. By way of reply,

<sup>1</sup> p. xxvii.

Socrates draws a distinction between *θάρασσα* with knowledge, and *θάρασσα* without knowledge, and endeavours to identify the former with courage. The proof which he offers is far from conclusive<sup>1</sup>, as Protagoras points out: it is therefore dropped and a subtler train of reasoning now begins (347 A—351 B).

To the proposal of Socrates, that pleasure should be identified with good, and pain with evil, Protagoras is unwilling to assent. He allows however that knowledge and wisdom, whenever they are present in a man, control his impulses and determine his conduct. But how is this to be reconciled with the common belief that a man having knowledge of that which is better, does the worse, because he is overcome by pleasure? In what sense are pleasures thus called evil? It is shewn that pleasures are called evil when they are followed by pain, and pains good when they are followed by pleasure, but pleasure in itself is good and pain in itself is evil. To be overcome by pleasure is therefore to be overcome by good: but as the phrase implies a censure, it is evident that the good which overcomes is unworthy to overcome the evil. Unworthy the good can only be because there is less of it: from which we infer that 'to be overcome by pleasure' is to choose less in place of greater good. Such a choice can only be the result of ignorance, so that it is incorrect to say that we ever knowingly choose the worse, and pleasure may still be identified with good, pain with evil (351 B—357 E).

Socrates now makes use of this identification to prove that knowledge and courage are the same. If pleasure is good, so likewise is every action which

<sup>1</sup> See note on 349 E.

aims at pleasure: and as no one knowingly chooses evil rather than good, no one ever does that which he knows to be evil. Now fear is the expectation of evil, so that no one, neither the hero nor the coward, encounters that which he believes to be fearful. It follows that the coward who refuses to fight when he ought to fight, refuses by reason of his ignorance. In other words cowardice is ignorance, and therefore courage, its opposite, is knowledge (358 A—360 E).

It is pointed out in conclusion that whereas Protagoras had started by maintaining that virtue could be communicated by teaching, and Socrates by doubting whether it could, they have now changed places: since if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, but otherwise not. Socrates expresses a desire to resume the subject after he has discovered what virtue is in itself (360 E—362 A).

It appears from the preceding analysis that the Protagoras falls naturally into these sections:

I. Introduction to the narration of the dialogue (309 A—310 A).

II. Introduction to the dialogue itself (310 A—317 E).

III. Protagoras' description of his profession, followed by the objections of Socrates (317 E—320 C).

IV. A *ῥῆσις* from Protagoras, containing both *μῦθος* and *λόγος* (320 C—328 D).

V. Cross-examination of Protagoras by Socrates, ending abruptly with a short *ῥῆσις* by Protagoras (328 D—334 C).

VI. Interlude (334 C—338 E).

VII. Cross-examination of Socrates by Protagoras, ending with a ῥῆσις by Socrates (338 E—347 A).

VIII. Conclusion of the cross-examination of Socrates by Protagoras, and final defeat of the Sophist (347 A—360 E).

IX. Epilogue (360 E—362 A).

§ 2. *The General Scope and Purpose of the Protagoras.*

In seeking to understand the scope and purpose of the Protagoras, we shall find it convenient, in the first instance, to view the form of the dialogue as far as possible apart from the matter.

Considered as to its form, the dialogue is an indictment primarily of Protagoras as an educator of young men. It is not however as an individual that Protagoras is attacked, but as the most distinguished representative of the Sophists<sup>1</sup>: ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστῆς εἶναι, he says in 317 B, καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους; and before Protagoras appears on the scene, Plato is careful to instruct us as to the nature of that which was called 'Sophist'. Prodicus and Hippias, as well as Protagoras, receive their share of ridicule<sup>2</sup>, and may be supposed to suffer with him in so far as the aim and method of their teaching agreed with his, although they are not directly associated with him in his fall<sup>3</sup>, which, as rivals<sup>4</sup> in the profession, they doubtless viewed with something more than equa-

<sup>1</sup> 312 C ff., 316 D ff.

<sup>2</sup> 315 C ff., 337 A ff., 337 C ff., 347 A.

<sup>3</sup> Socrates himself expressly separates them off in 359 A.

<sup>4</sup> 318 E, 340 B ff., 341 A ff.

nimity<sup>1</sup>. It is part of the irony of the situation when Prodicus and Hippias fail to see that whereas in the actual discussion it is only Protagoras who is worsted, the attack is in reality directed against the professional Sophist in general—the *ἐμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται*<sup>2</sup>.

Pitted against Protagoras, as the representative of the Sophists, we find, as usual, Socrates. Whether in this case we are to regard Socrates as speaking for Plato or for himself, we shall presently inquire: in the meantime, it is well to notice one particular aspect in which the contrast presents itself. Protagoras represents the principle of *μακρολογία*, Socrates that of *βραχυλογία*: the former excels in continuous discourse, the latter in the method of investigation by question and answer. In the only section of the dialogue where Socrates deserts his usual method, in order to deliver a harangue upon the poem of Simonides, he expressly asserts that the method of Protagoras is futile<sup>3</sup>, and it must be admitted that he is himself, whether intentionally or not, altogether unsuccessful in applying it.

In its formal aspect, therefore, the Protagoras may be regarded as an attempt to shew the superiority of

<sup>1</sup> In 341 A ff. Prodicus furnishes Socrates with weapons against his rival: and in 358 A—359 A they lend their assent to the train of reasoning by which Protagoras is finally overthrown. Bonitz (*Platonische Studien* p. 260) is surely wrong in regarding their assent to Socrates' counter-reasoning as a proof that they too are refuted: what is refuted is the statement that courage is different from the other virtues—a statement to which they never assented.

<sup>2</sup> 313 C.

<sup>3</sup> 347 E. Compare Bonitz l.c. pp. 260—262.



Socrates to Protagoras—of dialectic to continuous discourse. But the dialogue is not merely a “philosophical prize-fight”: the subject-matter of the dispute between the rival interlocutors is one of great importance for the theory of education. It is first expressly raised in 319A: Can virtue be communicated by teaching? If not, education, as it was understood by Socrates no less than by Protagoras, is impossible. The doubts expressed by Socrates upon the subject nowhere throughout the dialogue amount to a denial of what every self-respecting teacher must hold to be true: that the Athenians do not think virtue teachable proves nothing, as they may be mistaken: that Athenian statesmen do not teach it to their sons may prove only that it cannot be taught by Athenian statesmen<sup>1</sup>. But the reasons adduced by Socrates against the view that virtue can be taught are judiciously chosen in order to drive Protagoras into a defence of his position. Protagoras was not only professionally a teacher of virtue, and therefore bound to hold that virtue could be taught, but as the representative of the Sophists, he was bound to maintain that the beliefs and practice of the Arch-Sophist of them all, the Athenian Demus<sup>2</sup>, were in harmony with his own. Accordingly he meets Socrates with a flat denial—the Athenians do hold virtue to be teachable and teach it in a multitude of ways. It is possible to hold this view and still believe that the elements of virtue are present by nature in every man, as Protagoras also asserts: and such was no doubt in reality the belief of the Athenians, as it is perhaps of the ordinary practical man in all ages.

<sup>1</sup> 319A—320B.

<sup>2</sup> See Rep. VI 492 A ff.

Plato's own view of education as the development of the faculties innate in soul may itself be regarded as the psychological counterpart of this ethical creed. But there still remains the question, what must we suppose virtue to be, in order that it may be taught? It is here that Socrates differs from the Athenians and Protagoras. Virtue, according to Socrates, can only be communicated by the teacher if it is identical with knowledge, and to prove this identity the whole of the dialogue from 329 C, with the partial exception of the section on the poem and of the interlude in 333 B—338 E, is devoted. The conclusion to be drawn is that Virtue can indeed be taught, but not by the Sophists, any more than by the educational system, public opinion, and laws of the Athenians, because in them there is no knowledge.

In connexion with this conclusion, we naturally ask: If virtue is not taught by the Sophists, how is it to be taught? To this question the dialogue itself furnishes an implicit answer. Inasmuch as virtue is knowledge, it must be taught by dialectic, the only means by which knowledge can be communicated. The method of Socrates, which it is the object of the formal side of the dialogue to represent as triumphant over the Sophistic *μακρολογία*, is to be understood as the method which will succeed where Sophistic has been shewn to fail. It is thus that form and matter are reunited and the dialogue attains its unity as a work of art.

§ 3. *On the myth of Protagoras.*

So much it was needful to say about the central theme of the dialogue, but there remain three episodes which call for special discussion, partly from their connexion with the subject of the whole, and partly on account of their substantive philosophic value.

The first of these is the myth of Protagoras. The place of this episode in the argument is to shew that the Athenians do right in permitting all and sundry to advise them on political questions. It is not unlikely that the introduction of the mythical form as a vehicle of exposition was due to Protagoras<sup>1</sup>. There can at all events be no doubt that it was rapidly coming into favour in the literary circles of the day, and that it was sometimes employed not only by the so-called Sophists<sup>2</sup>, but by the other Socratic schools<sup>3</sup> as well as the Academy. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that the myth with which we are concerned was written by Protagoras himself. The style shows many marked peculiarities of the kind which we should suppose that Protagoras affected<sup>4</sup>, and although this might be set down to Plato's skill as an imitator, it is difficult to see why Plato should have taken such pains to imitate where he manifestly did

<sup>1</sup> Dümmler's *Akademika* p. 236.

<sup>2</sup> See note on ch. XI. ad *init.*

<sup>3</sup> As for example the Cynics: see Dümmler *l.c.* p. 1 foll.

<sup>4</sup> See on 320 E.

not intend to caricature<sup>1</sup>. Zeller<sup>2</sup> has recently lent the weight of his authority to the view which we are advocating, and an Italian scholar<sup>3</sup> has made it seem probable that the work from which this fable is taken had among other motives the polemical one of maintaining against the theories of Hippias and his followers the superiority of νόμος to φύσις. In the catalogue of Protagoras' works preserved by Diogenes Laertius<sup>4</sup>, two books are mentioned, in either of which the fable may have occurred, *περὶ πολιτείας* and *περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως*: most probably it formed part of the latter.

We have commented in detail in the notes upon the subject-matter of the myth: but its general bearings and literary connexions require to be noticed here.

We may say broadly that two views of early society were current in antiquity. On the one hand the *laudator temporis acti* loved to represent the past as a golden age, from whose glories we have fallen away:

<sup>1</sup> Grote (II p. 47) perhaps states the case too strongly when he says that the fable is "fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm—in my judgment it is even superior—to any other fable in Plato": but hardly any one will now deny that the episode is one of the most valuable and interesting parts of the dialogue. It should be borne in mind that the fable differs in style from what Protagoras says in the rest of the dialogue (except at 334 A, where see note) as much as it differs from the myths of Plato. If Plato could insert in one of his works a speech by Lysias (Phaedrus 230 E foll.) I see no reason to suppose that he might not have made Protagoras deliver a speech of his own making.

<sup>2</sup> In the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* v 2 p. 175 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Chiapelli *ibid.* III p. 15 and p. 256 foll.

<sup>4</sup> IX 55.

while others again saw in the far-distant past little but savagery and woe, out of which humanity has by slow degrees climbed upward<sup>1</sup>. Not a few—and this is perhaps the original view, whereof the others are fragments—maintained that the reigns of good and evil succeed each other in ever-recurrent cycles, as we find in the myth of the Politicus<sup>2</sup>. The fable of Protagoras represents mankind as having risen. It is in effect a novel version of the story of Prometheus superinduced upon a cosmological theory. So far as concerns the creation of man out of the four elements, and the assumption of a period of time during which there were no men upon the earth, we can find

<sup>1</sup> See Dümmler's *Akademika* p. 216 ff. (*Die Anfänge des Menschengeschlechts*). There is an excellent and learned collection of passages bearing on the Golden Age by Graf in *Leipziger Studien* VIII pp. 1—80, and another by Eichhoff in *Fleckeisen's Jahrbücher* Vol. 120 (1879) pp. 581—601.

<sup>2</sup> 269 c foll. When Eichhoff (l.c. p. 596) asserts that there is no hint of a golden age awaiting mankind in the future in Greek profane writings, he ignores the evidence of Hesiod. In the *Works and Days* 174—175 we read: *μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὤφειλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετεῖναι ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανείν ἢ ἔπειτα γενέσθαι*, and *ibid.* 180—181 *Ζεὺς δ' ὀλέσει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων, εἴτ' ἂν γεινόμενοι πολιοκρόταφοι τελέθωσιν*. It has been pointed out elsewhere (*The Nuptial Number of Plato*, p. 60) that the sign of the recommencement of the golden age is when children are born with grey hairs (cf. *Polit.* 273 E): an interesting parallel is afforded by the Testament cited by Mr James in his account of the Revelation of Peter p. 57, where it is stated that one of the signs of the end shall be "children whose appearance shall be as of those advanced in years: for they that are born shall be white-haired". There are traces of a similar tradition in Greek mythology: the three Graeae, for example, had grey hairs from their birth.

parallel views in Plato, and to a certain extent in Empedocles<sup>1</sup>; but there seems to be nothing in contemporary or previous literature to account for the peculiarities of the Prometheus legend as it meets us here. According to Hesiod<sup>2</sup>, mankind originally possessed fire, but lost it through the impious cunning of Prometheus. When Prometheus steals it back again for the use of man, both he and humanity are severely punished, he by the eagle preying on his vitals, humanity by the creation of woman. In Aeschylus, Prometheus appears in like manner as the befriender of man against the gods, but we hear nothing of Pandora, nor does it appear that man had ever possessed the use of fire till Prometheus came and stole it. On the other hand, Aeschylus greatly amplifies the services of Prometheus to mankind, assigning to him the invention of astronomy, number, writing, medicine, and divination, as well as the elements of material happiness and comfort<sup>3</sup>. Although it is not expressly stated by Aeschylus that we owe the political or social art to Prometheus, the poet can hardly have intended expressly to exclude it from the list of his benefactions<sup>4</sup>, since the arts which are attributed to Prometheus presuppose that man has already become in some measure a πολιτικὸν ζῶον. It was reserved for Protagoras to represent πολιτικὴ as a later gift, not from Prometheus, but from Zeus himself, in direct and perhaps conscious antagonism to Hesiod, according to whom the age in which we are now living knows

<sup>1</sup> See the notes on 320 D foll.

<sup>2</sup> Theogony 521—616: Works and Days 47 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Prom. 445—506.

<sup>4</sup> Prom. 506 πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προμηθέως.

neither Justice nor Shame<sup>1</sup>. But the great and fruitful innovation introduced into the legend by Protagoras, whether on his own responsibility, or in accordance with his authorities, consists in making Prometheus and Epimetheus assist the gods in the making of mortal things. The work of the gods ended when they had moulded man and the lower animals: it was Prometheus and his brother who were charged to furnish them with such accidentals as size, strength, hoofs, hair and hide, not to speak of food and procreative power. Protagoras' version of the legend, in which Prometheus already takes part in the creation of man, proved the germ of the later representation of the hero as the artificer of mankind out of clay. In this form the story was transmitted by the poets of the New Comedy to Rome<sup>2</sup>, and appears in quaint and interesting reliefs upon Roman Sarcophagi<sup>3</sup>.

§ 4. *On Socrates' criticism of Simonides' poem.*

The second episode which it is needful to discuss is the criticism given by Socrates of the poem of Simonides<sup>4</sup>.

As we have endeavoured to shew, the aim of the Protagoras is to prove that virtue cannot be communicated by teaching, unless knowledge and virtue are

<sup>1</sup> Works and Days 192 *δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς οὐκ ἔσται.*

<sup>2</sup> Menander ap. Stob. Florileg. II 27 *Προμηθεύς, ὃν λέγουσ' ἡμᾶς πλάσαι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ζῶα.* Compare Philemon in Lucian Am. 43 and Hor. Od. I 16. 13—16.

<sup>3</sup> See Baumeister's *Denkmäler des klassischen Alterthums* P. I 413.

<sup>4</sup> On the restoration of the poem see Appendix.

identical. Now Poetry, in the days of Plato, was regarded as perhaps the most powerful means of teaching virtue, and Protagoras had already maintained its educative value in his speech. It was therefore necessary to inquire whether the claims of the Muses were well founded. It became all the more necessary when the Sophists—or some of them—in this as in many other respects went with the stream, and developed the practice of poetical criticism into an art<sup>1</sup>. Socrates' exposition of the poem is intended to shew by a practical demonstration that poetry does not teach virtue because in poetry there is no knowledge. There cannot be knowledge in the written words of poets οὐς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι δ' ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐξελέγξαι (347 E): for knowledge implies the power to ask and answer questions—its method is, in short, dialectic. Browning and other societies would have received short shrift from Socrates, unless the members communicated with the poet to find out what he meant: and even then the poet would himself require to be cross-examined—an ordeal from which he would not be likely to emerge successfully, being in fact but a Sophist himself<sup>2</sup>. Plato's objection to poetry in the Protagoras is not yet based upon ethical and metaphysical grounds as it was when he wrote the Republic, but rather reminds us of his condemnation in the Phaedrus<sup>3</sup> of written books in general as a means of

<sup>1</sup> See note on 338 E.

<sup>2</sup> See 316 D and note in loc.

<sup>3</sup> 275 D.



education. The poet is a *θεῖος ἀνὴρ*, who says what he does not know: even when alive he cannot explain his meaning: how much less shall another when he is dead! Socrates might have been content to prove his point without doing so much violence to Simonides' meaning. His exposition of the poem is admittedly sophistical. To begin with, there is nothing in the poem itself to indicate that Simonides' primary intention was to overthrow the maxim of Pittacus, as Socrates avers<sup>1</sup>: Pittacus is censured for saying not what is untrue, but what is less than the whole truth. The real subject of the poem is the impossibility of continued perfection among mankind: the mention of Pittacus is but an episode, which might have been omitted without injuring the argument as a whole. But it is in the explanation of details that Socrates runs riot most. His comments upon *μέν*<sup>2</sup>, upon *ἀληθῶς*<sup>3</sup>, upon *κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς*<sup>4</sup>, are obviously and intentionally absurd, while in dealing with *εὖ πράξας*<sup>5</sup> and *ἐκῶν*<sup>6</sup> he contrives by the most perverse sophistry to wrest the plain meaning of Simonides into his own favourite theories of the identity between knowledge and virtue and the impossibility of voluntary sin. But the exaggerated perversity of his exposition is doubtless intended as a satire on the epideictic displays in vogue among some of the Sophists: Plato would fain make it plain that he can beat a Sophist on his own ground.

<sup>1</sup> 342 A—343 C: 344 B et al. Schleiermacher's reference to the fragment of Simonides (in Schneidewin's *Delectus* fr. 2 of Simonides=Bergk<sup>4</sup> fr. 57) proves nothing for this particular poem.

<sup>2</sup> 343 D.

<sup>3</sup> 343 D.

<sup>4</sup> 345 A.

<sup>5</sup> 345 A.

<sup>6</sup> 345 D.

At the outset, he borrows some features from the speech of Protagoras in 316 c: and the remark of Hippias, when the episode is ended, εὖ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς—περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναι may be taken as indicating that Hippias at least accepted the picture as a fair representation of his method<sup>1</sup>. We have not sufficient data to say for certain whether the picture is a caricature or not: probably it is just as much and as little of a caricature as the representation of the Sophists in the Euthydemus. At all events, if the sketch is even approximately true to nature, no one will deny that the Sophists had better have “put the poets on their shelves<sup>2</sup>” if they desired to reach the truth of things.

If the view which we have taken is correct, it will be vain to look for reasoned ethical teaching in the episode. The opinion of Dümmler<sup>3</sup>, that Plato is here attacking Antisthenes for regarding virtue as ἀναπόβλητος<sup>4</sup>, receives no support from the dialogue, even if we allowed that the truly virtuous man could ever have seemed to Plato or even to Socrates capable of losing his virtue.

<sup>1</sup> From this point of view, the whole episode should be compared with the speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus 237 B—241 D.

<sup>2</sup> 348 A, where Socrates virtually confesses that his exposition is naught.

<sup>3</sup> Akademika p. 50.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. Laert. VI 105.

§ 5. *On the identification of the Pleasant and the Good.*

The last episode which requires to be discussed in connexion with the argument of the dialogue is the identification by Socrates of the good and the pleasant. This identity is the hypothesis from which the final refutation of Protagoras is deduced: it is not a substantive result of the dialogue, but only a means to an end.

We remark at the outset, that Protagoras is at first unwilling to accept the identification: still more noteworthy is it that Socrates in reality offers no proof, beyond the εἰ ζῆν fallacy<sup>1</sup>, which begs the question by equating εἰ with ἡδέως. The long discussion on the meaning of the common phrase 'to be overcome by pleasure' does indeed remove one obstacle in the way of the identification, but beyond this it does not go. Even here there are fallacies, as when Socrates infers that knowledge always determines the conduct of its possessor because it is her nature to rule<sup>2</sup>, and in the subtle reasoning of 355 D<sup>3</sup>, which, in point of fact, presupposes the theory that might is right. The only convincing proof, from the Socratic point of view, of the identity of the good and the pleasant, would be to demonstrate their essential unity by an analysis of the connotation of the two names: but of this there is no hint in the Protagoras. The meaning of 'Good' and of 'Pleasant' is supposed to be already known.

<sup>1</sup> 351 B.

<sup>2</sup> 352 B. The fallacy lies in a confusion of the ideal and the real: knowledge may be *ισχυρόν*, *ἡγεμονικόν* and *ἀρχικόν*, and yet not *ισχύειν*, *ἡγεμονεύειν*, or *ἀρχεῖν* in each individual case.

<sup>3</sup> See note in loc.

The teaching of the Protagoras on the relation between Pleasure and Good, as is well known, differs *toto caelo* from that of nearly every other dialogue of Plato. Not to mention the Philebus<sup>1</sup>, and the Republic<sup>2</sup>, where the point is rather that Pleasure is not *the* i.e. the *Chief* Good, in the Gorgias<sup>3</sup> and the Phaedo<sup>4</sup> we have the most explicit assertion of the distinction between the two notions. Contrast the following passages:

οὐκ ἔρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιάσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἔτερον γίνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (Gorg. 497 A).

οὐ ταῦτὰ γίνεται, ὦ φίλε, τὰγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαιροῖς (Gorg. 497 D).

ὦ μακάριε Σιμμια, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὐτῆ ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομισματα κτλ. (Phaedo 69 A).

λέγεις δὲ τινάς, ἔφη, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; "Ἐφη. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ζῆ; Οὐκ ἔφη. Τί δ', εἰ ἡδέως βιοῦς τὸν βίον τελευτήσεις, οὐκ εὖ ἂν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; "Ἐμοιγ', ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν ἔρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν (Prot. 351 B).

ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἰστῆς, τὰ μείζω αἰεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρὰ, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ μικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρὰ, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαιρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐὰν τε τὰ ἐγγύς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐὰν τε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ἢ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῆ· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαιρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα (Prot. 356 B).

<sup>1</sup> 53 C foll.

<sup>2</sup> VI 509 A οὐ γὰρ δῆπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ (i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν) λέγεις. Εὐφόμει· ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

<sup>3</sup> 495 A foll.

<sup>4</sup> 64 D, 68 E foll.

Such passages, which might be multiplied at will, shew that, if there is any meaning in words, the anti-thesis is a real one. Nor does the contrast lurk merely in isolated passages, for the whole tone and argument of the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo* are opposed to any communion between pleasure and good.

Various explanations of the difficulty have been offered.

Those who (like Grote) hold that the dialogues of Plato "are distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and purpose<sup>1</sup>," find of course no difficulty to explain: the *Protagoras* is perhaps the strongest bulwark in their argument. The most thorough-going adherents of the opposite school deny that Plato is serious<sup>2</sup>, Plato's object being merely to prove that whatever we take to be the Chief Good, virtue can only be identified with the knowledge thereof. Between these two extreme views comes the theory that the identification of Pleasure and Good is seriously meant, either as the view of Plato himself when he wrote the *Protagoras*, or as a faithful historical picture of the teaching of his master upon this subject. It seems clear to us that Plato is serious, but we do not find sufficient evidence to justify us in holding that the view which he advocates—whether he believed it formerly or not—was at this time held by the philosopher himself. To the opposite theory, it seems a fatal objection that in none of the minor dialogues which are universally admitted to be earlier

<sup>1</sup> Plato and the companions of Socrates II p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato p. 95: Bonitz *Platonische Studien* p. 264: compare Grote II p. 87.

than the Protagoras does there seem to be any hint of hedonism. On the contrary, the analogues to the Measuring or Calculating art which meet us in the Charmides<sup>1</sup> and Laches<sup>2</sup> are concerned not with the weighing of *pleasure*, but with the determination of what is *good*<sup>3</sup>.

The most probable view is that which regards the episode in question as intended to represent the views of the historical Socrates. It is true that even in the Memorabilia Socrates never in so many words declares that Pleasure is Good<sup>4</sup>, but he frequently inculcates the practice of the virtues on account of the pleasures which they bring<sup>5</sup>. Moreover, if Socrates actually did sometimes call pleasure good, it is easier to understand how the Cyrenaics could have fathered their Hedonism upon him. It is of course quite possible that the formulating of the doctrine is due to Plato, and that the historical truth of the picture suffered by the introduction of greater brevity and precision: we may even suppose that Plato, for dramatic or other reasons, was not careful to represent his Master in all respects as he was. But to stigmatise the doctrine as "utterly un-Socratic," as Schleiermacher

<sup>1</sup> 174 A foll.

<sup>2</sup> 199 c.

<sup>3</sup> The nearest approach to a unification of pleasure and good elsewhere in Plato seems to be in Laws II 663 A ff. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἡδὺ τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανός γ', εἰ μὴδὲν ἕτερον, πρὸς τὸ τινα ἐθέλειν ζῆν τὸν ὕσιον καὶ δίκαιον βίον κτλ.: where, however, Plato is merely insisting on the practical importance of the identification for the welfare of a state.

<sup>4</sup> He identifies *ὠφέλιμον* with good in Mem. IV 6. 8 ff.

<sup>5</sup> e.g. II 1. 19: IV 5. 9: see Zeller Philosophie der Griechen<sup>3</sup> II 1 p. 126.

does<sup>1</sup>, seems to involve a misconception of its moral worth. There is nothing degrading in the theory as it is worked out by Socrates, since it is not the balance of pleasure in each individual species of pleasure which we are recommended to choose, but the balance of pleasure generally and in the long run: it would be quite open to Socrates to maintain that the lower pleasures are never to be chosen, because they are always followed by more pain, or even that they are not even pleasant<sup>2</sup>.

If we accept this explanation, the identification of pleasure and good will be in harmony with the general realistic tone of the dialogue, and we shall be justified in holding that in the *Protagoras* we see the ethical no less than the educational theories of Socrates and Protagoras brought face to face<sup>3</sup>.

### § 6. *Date of Composition.*

Of external evidence as to the date when the *Protagoras* was written, there is none.

The internal evidence, so far as it goes, is in favour of an early date. It rests upon indications furnished by (1) the language and style, (2) the doctrine, (3) references and allusions in the dialogue itself.

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. x 2. 1173<sup>b</sup> 20 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγει τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα. The historical Socrates would have stopped short of this assertion, if we may judge from such evidence as Xen. Mem. I 4. 12.

<sup>3</sup> See Dr Jackson's article on the Sophists in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

On linguistic grounds, Ritter<sup>1</sup> holds that the dialogue was composed before 399 B.C. But the evidence upon which he relies is chiefly derived from the relative frequency of certain particles and formulæ throughout the dialogue, and (as usual with evidence of this kind) it is by no means clear that Plato's choice of particles and the like is not a result of the character of the composition rather than an index to its date. It is also unlikely on many grounds that any of Plato's dialogues are anterior to the death of Socrates. The proofs derived from the exuberant vivacity, the boisterous juvenility and dramatic fire of the dialogue are surer, if more intangible, and all point to a comparatively early date<sup>2</sup>.

In two points of doctrine the Protagoras shews its affinity with the earlier and purely Socratic dialogues. Holiness, as in the Laches, is reckoned as a virtue and placed by the side of *δικαιοσύνη*, whereas in the Republic and Phaedo *δσιότης* is excluded, and it is only the four cardinal virtues that are recognised as such<sup>3</sup>. Too much stress ought not to be laid upon this argument, but at least, if we may trust Xenophon<sup>4</sup>, the recognition of *δσιότης* as a distinct virtue had the sanction of Socrates. The second point is of more importance. Although the subject of the dialogue might seem to have expressly invited mention of that

<sup>1</sup> Untersuchungen über Plato, p. 127.

<sup>2</sup> This subject is well handled by Ast, *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 70 foll.

<sup>3</sup> Prot. 329 C et al., Lach. 199 D, Rep. IV. 428 A, Phaedo 69 C. The doctrine of the Meno and Gorgias resembles that of the Protagoras in this point: Meno 78 D, Gorg. 507 B.

<sup>4</sup> Mem. IV 6. 4.



'demotic virtue'<sup>1</sup> of which Plato made so much, no allusion to it is made<sup>2</sup>. It is perhaps a natural conclusion that Plato had not yet elaborated the distinction—unknown to Socrates—between scientific and unscientific virtue: but it should at the same time be remembered that Plato may have deliberately refrained from adverting to this subject in order to make his picture of Socrates more true to nature. However this may be, the distinction in question is only an ethical deduction from the metaphysical distinction between knowledge and true opinion: its absence from the Protagoras is therefore in harmony with the purely Socratic tone of the dialogue, where we look in vain for the metaphysical speculations or pre-suppositions of Plato's mature age.

<sup>1</sup> It is in the Meno that the difference between demotic and philosophic virtue is first clearly laid down. See on the whole subject Archer-Hind's *Phaedo*, Appendix I.

<sup>2</sup> The nearest approach to a recognition of two virtues, one scientific and the other unscientific, is in the speech of Protagoras 320 C foll. The elements of *πολιτικὴ ἀρετή* implanted in mankind at the beginning and transmitted by father to son are in their essence distinct from scientific virtue, and so far resemble the *δημοτικὴ ἀρετή* of Platonic teaching: but this part of Protagoras's speech is not taken up by Socrates, who will not even allow that the (so-called) virtue which the sophists and public opinion try to teach is virtue in *any* sense of the word, since it is not knowledge. Schöne (Über Platon's Protagoras, p. 51) thinks that the Platonic Socrates *does* recognise the distinction between true and demotic virtue when he expresses (319 A) a doubt whether virtue can be taught, since he afterwards proves himself that it can. No doubt Socrates' change of position in the course of the dialogue finds its justification in this distinction between true and spurious virtue (as it is found in the Meno), but so far as we can see, there is nothing in the Protagoras which shews that Plato had as yet made the distinction explicit to himself.

From the allusion in the dialogue to the art of the Peltasts<sup>1</sup>, Teichmüller<sup>2</sup> has endeavoured to fix the date of composition more precisely. It is known that there were Peltasts in Thrace before the time of Iphicrates<sup>3</sup>, but there is no proof that they formed a regular corps of the Athenian army till the military reforms of 391, which are associated with his name. Teichmüller points out that Plato speaks of Peltasts in such a way as to imply that they are no longer unfamiliar or foreign to his readers<sup>4</sup>, and assigns the dialogue to 393 or 392 B.C., when Iphicrates probably began to organise the new arm.

On all these grounds we cannot go far astray in assigning the dialogue to the second half of the first decade of the fourth century B.C.

### § 7. *Date of the Action.*

The majority of critics are agreed in supposing the dialogue to be conceived as taking place before the war, in 433 or 432 B.C.

It is in harmony with this that Pericles and his sons are represented as still alive<sup>5</sup>, that Socrates is still young<sup>6</sup>, and that Alcibiades<sup>7</sup> is but a youth and

<sup>1</sup> 350 A *τινες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μὴ; Οἱ πελταστικοί*: cf. Theaet. 165 D *πελταστικὸς ἀνήρ*.

<sup>2</sup> Literarische Fehden, p. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Thucydides IV 111. 1: cf. (with Teichmüller) id. II 29, 4: Eurip. Alcest. 498 *Θρηκίας πέλτης ἀναξ* et al.

<sup>4</sup> Contrast Xenophon Mem. III 9. 2, where peltasts are similarly cited in illustration, but called *Θρηκίαι ἐν πέλταις*.

<sup>5</sup> 315 A et al. They died in 429.

<sup>6</sup> 314 B et al. In 432 he would be 36.

<sup>7</sup> 309 B. He was born in 451.

Agathon a lad<sup>1</sup>. Other indications of minor importance point in the same direction. But in patent contradiction to this date come the facts—authenticated by Athenaeus<sup>2</sup>—that the ‘Wild Men’ of Pherecrates, which Plato alludes to as represented last year (πέρυσσι)<sup>3</sup>, was produced in 420 B.C., and that Hipponicus, the father of Callias, is apparently supposed to be dead, whereas he was alive till nearly 421 B.C. Athenaeus is not always an unprejudiced witness when Plato is concerned, but we have no reason to reject his evidence here. Plato frequently introduces anachronisms in matters not essential to the action of his dialogues<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> 315 D. He was born about 448.

<sup>2</sup> Athen. v 218 B and XI 505 F.

<sup>3</sup> 327 D.

<sup>4</sup> Compare Zeller, *Über die Anachronismen in den Platonischen Gesprächen in the Abhandlungen d. Berl. Akad.* for 1873, *Hist. Phil. Kl.* p. 81 ff. The difficulties connected with the date of action of the *Protagoras* are well summarized by Sauppe.



# ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ

[Ἡ σοφισταί· ἐνδεικτικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ,  
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ, ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ, ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ,  
ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΣ, ΙΠΠΙΑΣ.

St. I  
309

I. Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται; ἢ δήλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν; καὶ μὴν μοι καὶ πρόην ἰδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι, καὶ πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος.

Socrates is asked by a friend to describe his interview with the newly-arrived Protagoras.

5

ΣΩ. Εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὀμήρου Β ἐπαινέτης εἶ, ὃς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἡβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου, ἣν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνεται; καὶ πῶς πρὸς σέ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βοηθῶν

έμοί. καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἄτοπον  
 15 μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου,  
 οὔτε προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελαυθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ  
 θαμά.

ΕΤ. Καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σὲ κακείνου C  
 τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὶ καλλίονι  
 20 ἐνέτυχες ἄλλῳ ἔν γε τῇδε τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πολὺ γε.

ΕΤ. Τί φῆς; ἀστῶ ἢ ξένῳ;

ΣΩ. Ξένῳ.

ΕΤ. Ποδαπῶ;

25 ΣΩ. Ἄβδηρίτῃ.

ΕΤ. Καὶ οὕτω καλὸς τις ὁ ξένος ἔδοξέν σοι εἶναι,  
 ὥστε τοῦ Κλεινίου υἱὸς καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει, ὦ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτατον  
 κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;

30 ΕΤ. Ἄλλ' ἢ σοφῶ τινι ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 ἐντυχὼν πάρει;

ΣΩ. Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ D  
 σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.

ΕΤ. ὦ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;

35 ΣΩ. Τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.

ΕΤ. Καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονὸς ἦκεις;

ΣΩ. Πάνν γε | πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας. 310

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ  
 μή σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας  
 40 τὸν παῖδα τουτουί;

ΣΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἶσομαι, ἐὰν  
 ἀκούητε.

ΕΤ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, ἐὰν λέγῃς.

ΣΩ. Διπλῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ' οὖν ἀκούετε.

ΠΙ. Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος  
 ὄρθρου, Ἴπποκράτης ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου Socrates relates  
how Hippocrates  
announced to  
him the arrival of  
Protagoras, and  
how Hippocrates  
and he determin-  
ed to visit Prota-  
goras at the  
house of Callias,  
to see if he would  
teach Hippocra-  
tes wisdom.  
 υἱός, Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν θύραν  
 Β τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, καὶ  
 ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέωξέ τις, εὐθύς εἴσω ἦεν  
 ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύ-  
 δεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνούς αὐτοῦ,  
 Ἴπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος. μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις;  
 Οὐδέν γ', ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὰ γε. Εὖ ἂν λέγοις, 10  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἔνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου;  
 Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη, ἦκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοί. Πρώην,  
 ἔφην ἐγώ· σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι; Νῆ τοὺς θεούς,  
 C ἔφη, ἐσπέρας γε. καὶ ἅμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ  
 σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ 15  
 εἶπεν· Ἐσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὄψε ἀφικόμενος ἐξ  
 Οἰνόςης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ  
 δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν, ὅτι διωξιόμην αὐτόν, ὑπό-  
 τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δε-  
 δειπνηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε 20  
 μοι ἀδελφὸς λέγει, ὅτι ἦκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι  
 μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθύς παρὰ σὲ ἵεναι, ἔπειτά μοι λίαν  
 D πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τάχιστα  
 με ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνήκεν, εὐθύς ἀναστὰς οὕτω  
 δεῦρο ἐπορευόμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν 25  
 ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, Τί οὖν σοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 τοῦτο; μὴν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας; καὶ ὅς  
 γελάσας, Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε  
 μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ. Ἄλλὰ ναὶ μὰ  
 Δία, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἂν αὐτῷ διδῶς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθης 30  
 ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν. Εἰ γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ

Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν τούτῳ εἶη· ὡς οὔτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν E  
 ἐπιλίποισι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα  
 καὶ νῦν ἤκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆς αὐτῷ.  
 35 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ  
 ἐώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι  
 γὰρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. ἀλλὰ γάρ,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ φασι  
 σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ'  
 40 αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον | καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ 311  
 ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλιᾶ τῷ Ἴππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἴωμεν.  
 καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Μήπω, ὦγαθέ, ἐκείσε ἴωμεν, πρῶ  
 γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν,  
 καὶ περιούντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν, ἕως ἂν φῶς γένη-  
 45 ται· εἶτα ἴωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας  
 ἔνδον διατρίβει, ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληφόμεθα αὐτόν,  
 ὡς τὸ εἶκόσ, ἔνδον.

III. Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν

Before setting  
 out Socrates eli-  
 cits by question-  
 ing that Hippo-  
 crates wishes to  
 obtain for money  
 5 from Protagoras  
 not a professional  
 but a liberal edu-  
 cation.

περιῆμεν· καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ B  
 Ἴπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκόπου  
 αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτων, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη ἐγώ,  
 ὦ Ἴππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν  
 ἐπιχειρεῖς ἵεναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ  
 μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα  
 ἀφιζόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπε-  
 νόεις παρὰ τὸν σεαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν Ἴπποκράτη  
 10 τὸν Κῶνον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν  
 ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκείνῳ, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο, Εἰπέ  
 μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ Ἴππόκρατες, Ἴπποκράτει  
 μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν, C  
 ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς ἰατρῷ. Ὡς τίς γενησόμενος; Ὡς ἰατρός,  
 15 ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ



Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν  
 ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν ἐκείνοις, εἴ τίς σε ἤρητο· τελεῖν  
 τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῶ ἔχεις Πολυ-  
 κλείτῳ τε καὶ Φειδίᾳ; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν  
 ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς· Ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός; 20  
 Δῆλον ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιός. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· παρὰ  
 D δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ  
 ἀργύριον ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἔτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ  
 σοῦ, ἂν μὲν ἐξικυῖται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ  
 τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων 25  
 προσαναλίσκοντες· εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω  
 σφύδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο· εἶπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες  
 τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, ὡς τίνι ὄντι τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν  
 νῶ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναί-  
 E μεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου 30  
 ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ  
 περὶ Ὀμήρου ποιητὴν, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου  
 ἀκούομεν; Σοφιστὴν δὴ τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε, ὦ Σώ-  
 κρατες, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη. Ὡς σοφιστῆ ἄρα  
 ἐρχόμεθα τελούντες τὰ χρήματα; Μάλιστα. Εἰ 35  
 οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τίς σε προσέροιτο· αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς  
 312 τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχει παρὰ | τὸν Πρωταγόραν; καὶ  
 ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας—ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας,  
 ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι—Εἰ μὲν τι τοῖς  
 ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστῆς γενησόμενος. 40  
 Σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς  
 τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νῆ τὸν  
 Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶπερ γε ἂ διανοοῦμαι χρῆ λέγειν.  
 Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμ-  
 βάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, 45  
 B ἄλλ' οἷαπερ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ

κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνην ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.  
 50 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

IV. Οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λαυθάνει; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τοῦ πέρι; "Οτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαντοῦ παρα- C  
 5 σχεῖν θεραπεύσαι ἀνδρί, ὡς φῆς, σοφισ-  
 5 τῆ· ὃ τι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστῆς ἐστίν, θαν-  
 μάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶσθα. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὄτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι. Οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, εἰδέναι. Λέγε δὴ, τί ἡγεῖ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστῆν; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἢ δ'  
 10 ὅς, ὡσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὐτοῖ εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλ' εἴ τις D  
 15 ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστή-  
 μονες, εὔποισμεν ἂν που αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. εἰ δέ τις ἐκείνο ἔροιτο, ὃ δὲ σοφιστῆς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν, τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εὔποισμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὧ Σώκρατες;  
 20 ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; Ἴσως ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἰκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἢ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῶν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστῆς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν. ὡσπερ ὁ κιθα-  
 ριστῆς δεινὸν δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὐπερ καὶ E  
 25 ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως—ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Εἶεν· ὃ δὲ δὴ σοφιστῆς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;

Socrates shews that Hippocrates, who calls Protagoras a sophist, does not know what is meant by the word "sophist."

Δήλον ὅτι περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι. Εἰκός γε. τί δὴ ἐστὶν τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστῆς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ; Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.

30

313 V. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον | μετὰ τοῦτο· Τί οὖν; οἶσθα εἰς οἶόν τινα κίνδυνον ἔρχει ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχὴν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῷ, διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρηστὸν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ πονηρόν, πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκεψώ, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὐ, καὶ εἰς συμβουλήν τούς τε φίλους ἂν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους, σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας συχνάς· ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεῖ, τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σὰ ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς 10 πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ γενομένου, περὶ B δὲ τούτου οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἐπεκοινώσω οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν ἐταίρων οὐδενί, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ τὴν σὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ἐσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φῆς, ὄρθριος ἦκων περὶ 15 μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλήν ποιεῖ, εἴτε χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μή, ἔτοιμος δ' εἰ ἀναλίσκειν τά τε σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκῶς, ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόρα, ὃν οὔτε γινώσκεις, ὡς φῆς, οὔτε διείλεξαι οὐδεπώ- C ποτε, σοφιστὴν δ' ὀνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν, φαίνει ἀγνοῶν, ᾧ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν; καὶ ὅς ἀκούσας, Ἔοικεν, ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐξ ᾧ σὺ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ᾧ Ἴππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστῆς τυγχάνει ἂν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ᾧ ψυχὴ τρέφεται; φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις. Τρέφεται δέ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίνι; Μαθήμασιν 25

Hippocrates therefore will greatly endanger the welfare of his soul, by feeding it with unknown food bought of an unknown species of mankind. 5

δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ  
 σοφιστῆς ἐπαινῶν ἂ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσει ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ  
 30 οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ D  
 κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὦν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων  
 οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασι· ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ  
 σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὠνού-  
 μνοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχη γυμναστικὸς ἢ  
 35 ἰατρὸς ὦν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες  
 κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῷ  
 αἰεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἂ πωλοῦσιν,  
 τάχα δ' ἂν τινες, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ τούτων ἀγνοοῖεν  
 ὦν πωλοῦσιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν πρὸς τὴν  
 40 ψυχὴν· ὡς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, E  
 ἐὰν μή τις τύχη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν ἰατρικὸς ὦν.  
 εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρη-  
 στὸν καὶ πονηρὸν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα  
 καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὄτουσιν· εἰ  
 45 δὲ μή, ὄρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις  
 |κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ 314  
 μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὠνῇ ἢ ἐν τῇ  
 τῶν σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον  
 παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμποροῦ ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις  
 50 ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ  
 σῶμα πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστιν  
 συμβουλευσάσθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαίοντα, ὅ  
 τι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅ τι μή, καὶ ὁπόσον καὶ  
 ὁπότε· ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὠνῇ οὐ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος· μαθή-  
 55 ματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' B  
 ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ  
 ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον  
 ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν

πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον  
 πράγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, 60  
 ἴωμεν καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντες  
 καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσώμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος  
 Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἴππίας ὁ  
 C Ἡλείος· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον· καὶ  
 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί. 65

VI. Δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν  
 τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περὶ  
 τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν  
 ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἴν' οὖν μὴ ἀτέλης γένοι-  
 το, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν,  
 στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα, ἕως συνωμολο-  
 γήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός  
 D τις, κατήκουεν ἡμῶν. κινδυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος  
 τῶν σοφιστῶν ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν·  
 ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν 10  
 ἡμᾶς, "Ἐα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ· καὶ  
 ἅμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως  
 ὡς οἶός τ' ἦν ἐπήραξε. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν,  
 καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλημένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν,  
 "ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ; 15  
 Ἄλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἤκομεν  
 E οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν· ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γάρ  
 τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν. μόγις  
 οὖν ποτὲ ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέωξε τὴν θύραν· ἐπειδὴ  
 δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ 20  
 προστώφῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἐξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπεριεπά-  
 τουν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἴπποῦκικου  
 315 καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος | ὁ  
 Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ

Socrates and  
 Hippocrates pro-  
 ceed to the house  
 of Callias. The  
 scene in the court  
 is described.

5

25 ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ ἕτερος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος καὶ  
 Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος,  
 ὅσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν  
 καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος.  
 τούτων δὲ οὐ ὀπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν  
 30 λεγομένων, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὓς ἄγει  
 ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν  
 διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὡσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ  
 κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἐπονται κεκληημένοι· ἦσαν δέ B  
 τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τούτον τὸν  
 35 χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγωγε ἰδὼν ἦσθην, ὡς καλῶς ἠύλα-  
 βοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδῶν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι  
 Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ  
 μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περιεσχίζοντο  
 οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ  
 40 περιιόντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὀπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

VII. Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσεινόησα, ἔφη Ὀμηρος, Ἴπ-  
 πῖαν τὸν Ἥλειον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ' C  
 ἀντικρὺ προστώφῳ ἐν θρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτὸν  
 δ' ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχος τε ὁ Ἀκου-  
 5 μενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων ὁ  
 Ἄνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖταί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ  
 ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν  
 μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἅττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἴππῖαν,  
 ὁ δ' ἐν θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ  
 10 διεξέειπε τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε  
 εἰσείδον· ἐπιδημεῖ γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος. D  
 ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκῆματί τινι, ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμειῶ  
 ἐχρήτο Ἴππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν κατα-  
 λούντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατά-  
 15 λυσι πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο,

Further de-  
 scription of the  
 scene.

ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ  
 μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῷ  
 ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίμαις Πausανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κερα-  
 μέων καὶ μετὰ Πausανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς  
 E μὲν ἐγῶμαι καλόν τε κάγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν 20  
 ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκούσαι ὄνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι  
 Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ παιδικὰ Πaus-  
 σανίου τυγχάνει ὄν. τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τὸ  
 Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω, ὃ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολο-  
 φίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέ- 25  
 γοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ  
 λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου· πάσσοφος γάρ  
 316 μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος· | ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύ-  
 τητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γιγνώ-  
 μενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα. 30

VIII. Καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθειμεν, κα-  
 τόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπεισηλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης  
 τε ὁ καλός, ὡς φῆς σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι,  
 καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου. ἡμεῖς οὖν  
 ὡς εἰσήλθομεν, ἔτι σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρί- 5  
 ψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι, προσῆ-  
 B μεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον·

ᾧ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ τοι ἦλθομεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ  
 Ἴπποκράτης οὗτος. Πότερον, ἔφη, μόνῳ βουλόμενοι  
 διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων; Ἐμῖν μὲν, ἦν 10  
 δ' ἐγὼ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκούσας δὲ οὐ ἔνεκα ἦλθο-  
 μεν αὐτὸς σκέψαι. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστίν, ἔφη, οὐ ἔνεκα  
 ἤκετε; Ἴπποκράτης ὅδε ἐστὶν μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων,  
 Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱός, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος,  
 C αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλι- 15  
 κιώταις. ἐπιθυμῶν δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι

Socrates intro-  
 duces Hippocra-  
 tes to Protagoras.  
 The latter justi-  
 fies his profes-  
 sion, and the rival  
 sophists assemble  
 to hear him dis-  
 course.

ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο δὲ οἶεται οἱ μάλιστα ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ  
 σοὶ συγγένοιτο· ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον  
 περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἶει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους,  
 20 ἢ μετ' ἄλλων. Ὅρθως, ἔφη, προμηθεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις  
 μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς  
 βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας,  
 καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεω-  
 25 τέρων, ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ  
 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα D  
 πράττοντα· οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε  
 γίνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαι τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί.  
 ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημί μὲν εἶναι πα-  
 30 λαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν  
 ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθῆς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα  
 ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν,  
 οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς  
 δὲ αὐτὸν τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμοφδίας, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε  
 35 Ὅρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίοις δὲ τινὰς ἦσθημαι καὶ  
 γυμναστικῆν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν  
 ἔτι ὢν, οὐδενὸς ἦττων σοφιστής, Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμ- E  
 βριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ  
 Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποίησατο,  
 40 μέγας ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ  
 ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγῳ, φοβη-  
 θέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσ-  
 μασιν ἐχρήσαντο· | ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἄπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο 317  
 εἶναι οὐ ξυμφέρομαι· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐ τι  
 45 διαπράξασθαι ὃ ἐβουλήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν  
 ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν,  
 ὧν περ ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οἷ γε



πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἄττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγαγγέλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν. τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ κατα- 50  
 B φανῆ εἶναι, πολλῇ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ἡγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανούργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἄπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε 55  
 σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι· καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτην ἔσκεμμαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν δεινὸν  
 C πάσχειν διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστῆς εἶναι. καίτοι 60  
 πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ξύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν· οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην· ὥστε πολὺ μοι ἡδιστόν ἐστιν, εἴ τι βούλεσθε περὶ τούτων, ἀπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ 65  
 ἐγὼ—ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἰππία ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἴμεν—Τί οὖν, ἔφη  
 D ἐγὼ, οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; Πάνυ μὲν 70  
 οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη, συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν, ἵνα καθεζόμενοι διαλέγησθε; Ἐδόκει χρῆναι· ἄσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλιῶν κατεσκευά- 75  
 ζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἰππία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ προϋπήρχε τὰ  
 E βάθρα· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἡκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.

IX. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Νῦν δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἶδε πάρεισιν, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιού πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἡ αὐτὴ μοι ἀρχή | ἐστίν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, 318 ἥπερ ἄρτι, περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμεν. Ἴπποκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὧν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας· ὅ τι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται, ἐάν σοι συνῆ, ἠδέως ἄν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὁ γὰρ ἡμέτερος λόγος. ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν· ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐάν ἐμοὶ συνῆς, ἧ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ συγγένη, ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῦτά ταῦτα· καὶ ἐκάστης 15 ἡμέρας αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. καὶ ἐγὼ Β ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κὰν σύ, καίπερ τηλικούτος ὧν καὶ οὕτω σοφός, εἴ τίς σε διδάξειεν ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο· 20 ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἴπποκράτης ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειεν τῆς συνουσίας τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν, 25 ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταῦτά ταῦτα, ἄπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἐκάστης C ἡμέρας ξυνὼν αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει· εἰ αὐτόν ἐπανέροιτο· τί δὴ φῆς βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδώσειν; εἶποι ἂν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζευξίππος, ὅτι πρὸς γραφικὴν· κὰν εἰ Ὀρθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ συγγενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταῦτά ταῦτα, ἄπερ σοῦ, 30 ἐπανέροιτο αὐτόν εἰς ὃ τι βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγιγνόμενος ἐκείνῳ, εἶποι ἄν, ὅτι εἰς αὐλήσιν·

οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἶπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ  
 D τούτου ἐρωτῶντι, Ἴπποκράτης ὅδε Πρωταγόρα συγ-  
 γενόμενος, ἧ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμέρα συγγένηται, βελτίων 35  
 ἄπεισι γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἐκά-  
 στης οὕτως ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ  
 περὶ τοῦ; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας,  
 Σὺ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾶς, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ  
 τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἴππο- 40  
 κράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται, ἄπερ  
 ἂν ἔπαθεν ἄλλῳ τῷ συγγενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν.  
 E οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ  
 τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκουσας πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄγοντες  
 ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμοὺς τε καὶ ἀστρο- 45  
 νομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—  
 καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἴππῖαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ  
 ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ  
 οὗ ἦκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν  
 οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, 50  
 319 καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς | πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνα-  
 τώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἔρα, ἔφη  
 ἐγὼ, ἔπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν  
 πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας  
 ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας. Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, 55  
 ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

X. Ἦ καλόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτη-  
 σαι, εἴπερ κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο  
 πρὸς γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἄπερ νοῶ. ἐγὼ  
 γὰρ τοῦτο, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ᾄμην  
 B διδακτὸν εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγουσι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως 5  
 ἀπιστῶ. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἠγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι  
 μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις, δι-

Socrates gives reasons for his belief that the art of politics cannot be taught.

καιός εἰμι εἶπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ  
 οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημί σοφοὺς εἶναι. ὁρῶ οὖν,  
 10 ὅταν συλλεγῶμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν  
 περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέη πράξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰ-  
 κοδόμους μεταπεμπομένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν  
 οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπη-  
 γοὺς, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτως, ὅσα ἡγούνται μαθητά C  
 15 τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι· ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ  
 αὐτοῖς συμβουλευεῖν, ὃν ἐκείνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουρ-  
 γὸν εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ἦ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν  
 γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ κατα-  
 γελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῆ ὁ  
 20 ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθεὶς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν  
 ἀφελκύσωσιν, ἢ ἐξαίρωνται κελεύοντων τῶν πρυ-  
 τάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω  
 διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὰν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως D  
 διοικήσεως δέη βουλευσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς  
 25 ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως  
 δὲ χαλκεύς, σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος, ναύκληρος, πλού-  
 σιος, πένης, γενναῖος, ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς  
 τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδα-  
 μόθεν μαθῶν οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ  
 30 ἔπειτα συμβουλεύει ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ  
 ἡγούνται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοῖνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν  
 τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι E  
 καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢν  
 ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι· ἐπεὶ Περι-  
 35 κλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἂ μὲν  
 διδασκάλων εἶχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν, ἂ δὲ  
 αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν, οὔτε αὐτὸς | παιδεύει οὔτε τῷ 320  
 ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιμόντες νέμονται

ὥσπερ ἄφεται ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου 40  
τουτουὶ νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὐ-  
τος ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῇ  
δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, κατα-  
θέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἕξ μῆνας  
B γεγονέναι, ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι χρήσαιτο 45  
αὐτῷ· καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἳ  
αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν  
οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ  
Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἠγούμαι  
διδασκτὸν εἶναι ἀρετῆν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα 50  
λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ  
ἠγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ  
δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηγηκέναι. εἰ οὖν  
C ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξαι, ὡς διδασκτὸν ἐστίν  
ἡ ἀρετῇ, μὴ φθονήσης, ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον. Ἄλλ', ὦ 55  
Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς  
πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγῳ  
διεξιέναι; πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθη-  
μένων, ὅποτερος βούλοιο, οὕτως διεξιέναι. Δοκεῖ  
τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν. 60

XI. Ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν,  
D θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ In reply to So-  
crates Protago-  
ras relates a table  
of the creation of  
mankind, τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἰμαρμένος γενέ-  
σεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον, ἐκ  
γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ 5  
κεράννυται. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον,  
προσέταξαν Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοσμήσαι τε  
καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθεὰ  
δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, νείμαντος δέ

10 μου, ἔφη, ἐπίσκεψαι· καὶ οὕτως πείσας νέμει. νέμων  
 δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχυρὸν ἄνευ τάχους προσήπτεν, τὰ δ' E  
 ἀσθενέστερα τάχει ἐκόσμει· τὰ δὲ ὥπλιζε, τοῖς δ'  
 ἄοπλον διδούς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο  
 δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι  
 15 ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγῆν ἢ κατάγειον οἴκησιν ἔνεμεν·  
 ἃ δὲ ἠῦξε μεγέθει, τῷδε | αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσφζεν· καὶ τᾶλλα 321  
 οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλά-  
 βειαν ἔχων μὴ τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς  
 ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ  
 20 Διὸς ὥρας εὐμαρίαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ  
 πυκναῖς τε θριξίν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν  
 ἀμύναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ ἐς  
 εὐνάς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνῇ  
 οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυῆς ἐκάστω· καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ  
 25 μὲν ὄπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. B  
 τοῦντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς  
 μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς,  
 τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφήν ζῶων  
 ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσήλφε,  
 30 τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν,  
 σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. ἅτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάντι  
 σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας C  
 τὰς δυνάμεις· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ  
 ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅ τι χρήσαιτο. ἀπο-  
 35 ροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκευφόμενος  
 τὴν νομήν, καὶ ὄρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶα ἐμμελῶς πάντων  
 ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ  
 ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον· ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα  
 παρήν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξίεναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς  
 40 φῶς. ἀπορία οὖν ἐχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς, ἦντινα

σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὖροι, κλέπτει Ἑφάιστοι  
 D καὶ Ἀθηναῖς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί—ἀμή-  
 χανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητὴν τῷ ἢ  
 χρησίμην γενέσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ.  
 τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἀνθρωπος ταύτη 45  
 ἔσχευ, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ  
 Δίῳ· τῷ δὲ Προμηθεὶ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ  
 Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν· πρὸς δὲ καὶ  
 E αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν· εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηναῖς  
 καὶ Ἑφαιστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐφιλοτεχνεῖτην, 50  
 λαθὼν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τὴν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην  
 τὴν τοῦ Ἑφαιστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηναῖς  
 δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀν-  
 322 θρώπῳ τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθεὰ δὲ | δι' Ἐπιμηθεὰ  
 ὕστερον, ἧ̄περ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετέηλθεν. 55

XII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἀνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας,  
 πρῶτον μὲν† ζῶων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, according to  
 καὶ ἐπεχειρεῖ βωμούς τε ἰδρῦέσθαι καὶ Justice, which are  
 ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνό- the foundation of  
 ματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ, καὶ in the beginning 5  
 οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ to every human  
 στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ἤϋρετο. The creature. The  
 οὕτω δὲ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀν- man who openly  
 B θρωποὶ ᾤκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν· ἀπώλ- calls himself un-  
 λυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῇ αὐτῶν 10 just is accounted  
 ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς mad.  
 πρὸς μὲν τροφήν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν  
 θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής· πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὐπω  
 εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική. ἐζήτουν δὲ ἀθροίζεσθαι  
 καὶ σῶζεσθαι κτιζόντες πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν, 15

† Post πρῶτον μὲν addunt codices διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν.

ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν  
 τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς  
 οὖν δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, C  
 Ἐρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ  
 20 δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας  
 συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἐρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον  
 δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις· πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι  
 νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ  
 ὧδε· εἰς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ  
 25 οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ  
 ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω; ἐπὶ πάντας, D  
 ἔφη ὁ Ζεὺς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἀν γένοιτο  
 πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων  
 τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θεὸς παρ' ἐμοῦ, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον  
 30 αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

οὕτω δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἳ τε ἄλλοι  
 καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ  
 λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται  
 μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐκτὸς ὧν τῶν ὀλίγων  
 35 συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς· εἰκότως, E  
 ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλήν πολιτικῆς  
 ἀρετῆς | ἴωσιν, ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἵεναι 323  
 καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται,  
 ὡς παντὶ προσήκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς,  
 40 ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.

ἵνα δὲ μὴ οἴῃ ἀπατᾶσθαι, ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται  
 πάντες ἀνθρωποὶ πάντα ἀνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύ-  
 νης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς τόδε αἰ-  
 λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ  
 45 σὺ λέγεις, ἐάν τις φῆ ἀγαθὸς ἀλλητῆς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην  
 ἡντινοῦν τέχνην, ἣν μὴ ἐστίν, ἢ καταγελωσίην ἢ B



χαλεπαίνουσι, καὶ οἱ οἰκέοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν  
ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ  
πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, εἴαν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός  
ἐστίν, εἴαν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ τᾶληθῆ λέγει 50  
ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγούντο εἶναι,  
τᾶληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καὶ φασιν πάντας  
δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, εἴαν τε ᾧσιν εἴαν τε μῆ, ἢ  
μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην, ὡς  
C ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἄμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν 55  
αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

XIII. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἀνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέ-  
χονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμ-  
βουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι  
αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ  
φύσει ἡγούνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτο-  
μάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμε-  
λειᾶς παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι  
μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγούνται  
D ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἀνθρωποὶ φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς  
θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει 10  
τούς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ᾧσιν, ἀλλ'  
ἐλεοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς  
τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν;  
ταῦτα μὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ  
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰναντία 15  
τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελειᾶς καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ  
διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, εἴαν τις  
E ταῦτα μὴ ἔχη, ἀλλὰ τὰναντία τούτων κακὰ, ἐπὶ  
τούτοις που οἷ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἰ κολάσεις  
καὶ αἰ νουθετήσεις. ὧν ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ 20  
324 ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ | ἐναντίον τῆς πολι-

Moreover, the art of politics is capable of being taught, otherwise cities would not inflict punishments on those 5 who violate it,

τικῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ  
 νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως  
 κτητῆς οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν,  
 25 ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικούντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτὸ  
 σε διδάξει, ὅτι οἷ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγούνται παρασκευ-  
 αστὸν εἶναι ἀρετῆν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδι-  
 κούντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, B  
 ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὡσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως  
 30 τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν  
 οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται  
 —οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγέννητον θείη—ἀλλὰ τοῦ  
 μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς  
 οὔτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα· καὶ  
 35 τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτῆν εἶναι  
 ἀρετῆν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν  
 τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν, ὅσοιπερ τιμωροῦνται καὶ C  
 ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἱ  
 τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὓς ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ  
 40 ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ σοὶ πολῖται· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον  
 τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι τῶν ἡγουμένων παρα-  
 σκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετῆν. ὡς μὲν οὖν  
 εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ  
 σκυτοτόμου συμβουλευόντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι  
 45 διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἡγούνται ἀρετῆν, ἀποδέ-  
 δεικταὶ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. D

XIV. Ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἣν ἀπορεῖς

and, in point  
of fact, virtue,  
which is the pro-  
duct of the poli-  
tical art, is taught  
to all,

5

περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε  
 οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς  
 αὐτῶν νιεῖς διδάσκουσιν, ἀ διδασκάλων  
 ἔχεται, καὶ σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ  
 ἀρετῆν ἀγαθοί, οὐδενὸς βελτίους ποιοῦσιν. τούτου δὴ

πέρι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μῦθόν σοι ἐρῶ, ἀλλὰ λόγον  
 ὧδε γὰρ ἐννόησον· πότερον ἔστιν τι ἔν, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν,  
 E οὐ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν, εἴπερ  
 μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ αὕτη λύεται ἢ 10  
 ἀπορία, ἣν σὺ ἀπορεῖς, ἢ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ. εἰ μὲν  
 γὰρ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν οὐ τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ  
 325 χαλκεία οὐδὲ κεραμεία, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη | καὶ σωφρο-  
 σύνη καὶ τὸ ὄσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν αὐτῷ  
 προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν· εἰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὐ 15  
 δεῖ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα,  
 εἴαν τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν ἢ πράττειν,  
 οὕτω πράττειν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα  
 καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολάζειν, καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ  
 γυναῖκα, ἕωσπερ ἂν κολαζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, 20  
 ὃς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος,  
 B ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα τοῦτον ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ  
 ἀποκτείνειν· εἰ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυ-  
 κότος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται  
 τοὺς υἱεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ μή, σκέψαι ὡς θαυμάσιοι 25  
 γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ  
 ἠγοῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀπεδείξαμεν· διδακτοῦ  
 δὲ ὄντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς υἱεῖς  
 διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἢ ζημία εἰάν μὴ  
 ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ ἢ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς 30  
 C παισὶ καὶ φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς  
 ἀρετὴν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις  
 καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξυλλήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί,  
 ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται  
 πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; οἴεσθαί γε χρῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 35

XV. Ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι  
 οὐπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν.

ἐπειδὰν θᾶπτον συνιῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς  
 καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ  
 5 by parents and  
nurses, by tutors,  
aye and by the  
State herself. πατήρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως D  
 βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἕκαστον  
 καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι,  
 ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τότε μὲν καλόν,  
 τότε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τότε μὲν ὄσιον, τότε δὲ ἀνόσιον,  
 10 καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν  
 πείθεται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ  
 καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ  
 δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον  
 15 γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι E  
 τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὐτὰ γράμματα  
 μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὥσ-  
 περ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν  
 βάρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα  
 20 καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλὰ μὲν νο-  
 θετήσεις | ἐνεῖσιν, πολλὰ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ 326  
 ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν  
 μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγεται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἷ τ' αὐτὸν  
 25 κιθαρῖσται ἕτερα τοιαῦτα σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦν-  
 ται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργώσωσιν· πρὸς δὲ  
 τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὐτῶν ποι-  
 ητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς B  
 τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ  
 τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς  
 30 τῶν παιδῶν, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ᾧσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι  
 καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ᾧσιν εἰς τὸ  
 λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώ-  
 που εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν

πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ  
 σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ 35  
 C χρηστῇ οὔσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζονται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ  
 τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις  
 καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν· καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν  
 μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι· μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται  
 οἱ πλουσιώτατοι· καὶ οἱ τούτων υἱεῖς, πρωϊαίτατα εἰς 40  
 διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀφθαίτατα  
 ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλα-  
 γῶσιν, ἢ πόλις αὐ τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν  
 D καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν, † ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτῶν εἰκῆ  
 πράττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ 45  
 τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράφαντες  
 γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι οὔτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδῶσιν καὶ  
 ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμ-  
 μῶν, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν  
 καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὐρήματα, κατὰ τούτους 50  
 ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· ὅς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς  
 βαίνη τούτων, κολάζει, καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτῃ  
 E καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνοῦσης  
 τῆς δίκης, εὐθῦναι. τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας  
 οὔσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, θαυμάζεις, ᾧ 55  
 Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετῆ; ἀλλ'  
 οὐ χρῆ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ διδακτόν.

XVI. Διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ  
 υἱεῖς φαῦλοι γίνονται; τοῦτο αὐ μάθε·  
 οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ  
 ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου  
 τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει  
 327 πόλις εἶναι, | οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ  
 γὰρ δὴ ὁ λέγων οὕτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ

If the children  
 of good men are  
 sometimes evil,  
 this only shews  
 that all have not  
 the same natural  
 aptitude for vir-  
 tue. Conclusion  
 of Protagoras'  
 speech. 5

† Post ζῆν add. codd. κατὰ παράδειγμα,

μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως—ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπι-  
 τηδευμάτων ὅτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ  
 10 μὴ οἶόν τ' ἦν πόλιν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ  
 ἦμεν, ὁποῖός τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδία  
 καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε  
 τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνηι τούτου,  
 ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς  
 15 φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνη- B  
 μάτων· λυσιτελεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἢ ἀλλήλων  
 δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προ-  
 θύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ  
 νόμιμα· εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυ-  
 20 μίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἶχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἶει  
 ἂν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν  
 ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς υἱεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων;  
 οἶμαι μὲν οὐ, ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ υἱὸς εὐφύεστατος C  
 γενόμενος εἰς αὐλησιν, οὗτος ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ἠϋξήθη,  
 25 ὅτου δὲ ἀφύης, ἀκλεής· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ  
 αὐλητοῦ φαῦλος ἂν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δ' ἂν φαύλου  
 ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταὶ γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ  
 ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ιδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπαίοντας.  
 οὕτως οἴου καὶ νῦν, ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται  
 30 ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων,  
 δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου τοῦ  
 πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, D  
 οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι  
 μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς  
 35 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες, οἰοί περ οὖς  
 πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητῆς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ.  
 ἢ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος,  
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις  
 ἂν, εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυνώνδῃ, καὶ ἀνολο-

- Ε φύραι' ἂν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων πονηρίαν· 40  
 νῦν δὲ τρυφᾶς, ὧ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί  
 εἰσιν ἀρετῆς, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται ἕκαστος, καὶ οὐδεὶς  
 σοι φαίνεται εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος  
 328 τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν, οὐδ' | ἂν εἰς φανεῖη, οὐδέ γ' ἂν, οἶμαι,  
 εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν 45  
 υἱεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ  
 πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ' ὅσον οἶός τ' ἦν ὁ πατήρ  
 καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι  
 τίς ἂν διδάξειεν,—οὐ ράδιον οἶμαι εἶναι, ὧ Σώκρατες,  
 τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων παντά- 50  
 πασι ράδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων·  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν  
 Β προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν. ὦν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι  
 εἰς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων  
 ὀνήσαί τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ 55  
 ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι, καὶ ἔτι πλείονος,  
 ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ  
 τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πε-  
 ποίημαι· ἐπειδὴν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν  
 βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· 60  
 C ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, ἔλθων εἰς ἱερόν, ὁμόσας ὅσου ἂν φῆ ἄξια  
 εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.  
 τοιοῦτόν σοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ  
 λόγον εἶρηκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως  
 ἠγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν 65  
 πατέρων φαύλους υἱεῖς γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων  
 ἀγαθούς, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου υἱεῖς, Παράλου  
 καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦδε ἠλικιωῦνται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν  
 πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων δημιουργῶν. τῶνδε  
 D δὲ οὐπω ἄξιον τοῦτο κατηγορεῖν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς 70  
 εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες· νέοι γάρ.

XVII. Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολλὸν χρόνον κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἤσθον μὴ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πεπαυμένος εἴη, μόγις πῶς ἐμαυτὸν ὡσπερὶ συναγείρας εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἴπποκράτη· ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου, ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προὔτρεψάς με ὧδε ἀφικέσθαι·

10 πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἢ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρου· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρὸν τί μοι ἐμποδῶν, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας

15 ῥαδίως ἐπεκιδιάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξεν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων | συγγένοιτο ὄψοιεν τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχ' ἂν καὶ 329 τοιοῦτους λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι,

20 ὡσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες

25 δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ B ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἢ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασ-

30 μένα. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεὴς εἶμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. τὴν ἀρετὴν φῆς διδάκτον εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώ-

Socrates cross-examines the sophist. "Are the single virtues parts of virtue, or only different synonyms for it?"



C πων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι· ὃ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ 35 πέμφειεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὐτὸς πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἐν τι εἶη συλλήβδην, ἀρετῆ· ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ δῖελθέ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετῆ, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς 40 ἐστὶν ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, ἢ D ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος· τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ.

XVIII. Ἄλλὰ ῥάδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστὶν ἂ ἐρωτᾷς. Πότερον, ἔφη, ὡς περ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστὶν, στόμα τε καὶ ῥίς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ ὡς περ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια, οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι; Ἐκείνως E μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς περ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. Πότερον οὖν, 10 ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, εἴη περ τις ἐν λάβῃ, ἅπαντ' ἔχειν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν, ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὐτοῖς, σοφοὶ δὲ οὐ. Ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς 15 330 ἀρετῆς, ἔφη ἐγὼ, | σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; Πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη· καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἢ σοφία τῶν μορίων. Ἐκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστίν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο; Naί. Ἡ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει; ὡς περ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου οὐκ ἐστὶν 20

P. "Virtue is one, and the single virtues are parts of virtue, distinct from each other like the parts of the face."

ὀφθαλμὸς οἶον τὰ ὄψα, οὐδ' ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἶον τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα· ἄρ' οὖν οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἐστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον 25 τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα B δὴ ὅτι οὔτως ἔχει, εἴπερ τῷ παραδείγματί γε ἔοικεν; Ἄλλ' οὔτως, ἔφη, ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἶον ἐπι-  
στήμη, οὐδ' οἶον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδ' οἶον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ' 30 οἶον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' οἶον ὀσιότης. Οὐκ ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγὼ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποιόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἢ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμα C τί ἐστὶν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δέ σοι; Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε 35 καὶ σέ· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἶπετον δὴ μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἢ δικαιο-  
σύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδικον; ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην; Τὴν αὐτὴν, ἔφη.  
40 Ἐστὶν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἢ δικαιοσύνη οἶον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν D καὶ σύ; Naί, ἔφη. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς ἐγὼ μᾶ. Naί, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν φατέ καὶ τοῦτο  
45 πρᾶγμα τι εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν· ἢ οὐ; Καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη. Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἶον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἶον ὀσιον; ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἴποιμ' ἂν· εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῆ μεντᾶν τι E  
50 ἄλλο ὀσιον εἶη, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴ γε ἡ ὀσιότης ὀσιον ἐσται. τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὔτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

XIX. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτ' εἵποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς·  
 πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἄρ'  
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατέ μοι  
 φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως  
 ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ  
 ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἶον τὸ ἕτερον· εἵποίμ' ἂν  
 ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας,  
 ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἶει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρή-  
 331 C κουςας· Πρωταγόρας | γὰρ ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο,  
 ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἵποι· ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ 10  
 Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῆς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἶον  
 τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστί;  
 τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 ὁμολογεῖν. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινοῦμεθα  
 αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· 15  
 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὀσιότης οἶον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα,  
 οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἶον ὄσιον, ἀλλ' οἶον μὴ ὄσιον· ἢ δ'  
 ὀσιότης οἶον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ  
 Β ἀνόσιον; τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινοῦμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ  
 αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ γε ἐμαντοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην 20  
 ὄσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα δίκαιον, καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ  
 δέ, εἴ με ἐφῆς, ταῦτ' ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην· ὅτι  
 ἦτοι ταυτόν γ' ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνη ὀσιότητι ἢ ὅ τι ὁμοιό-  
 τατον καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη οἶον  
 ὀσιότης καὶ ἢ ὀσιότης οἶον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλ' ὅρα, 25  
 εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ  
 C οὕτως. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως  
 ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην  
 ὄσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τί μοι  
 δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο δια-  
 30 φέρει; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιο-

S. "In that case each virtue will be unlike every other, and holiness for example will be unjust." Protagoras concedes that justice and holiness are like each other.

σύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὀσιότης δίκαιον. Μή μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ·  
 οὐδέν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ  
 ἐλέγχσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ  
 35 τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ' ἂν  
 ἐλέγχσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ εἴ ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, D  
 ἦ δ' ὅς, προσέεικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὀσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ  
 ὀτιοῦν ὀτρωοῦν ἀμῆ γέ πη προσέεικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν  
 τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπη προσέεικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ  
 40 μαλακῷ, καὶ τὰλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλή-  
 λους· καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ  
 οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου  
 μόρια, ἀμῆ γέ πη προσέεικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον  
 τὸ ἕτερον· ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ κἂν ταῦτα  
 45 ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὅμοια ἀλλή- E  
 λους. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοίων τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον  
 καλεῖν οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν  
 πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχη τὸ ὅμοιον. καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας  
 εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, Ἡ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ  
 50 τὸ ὅσιον πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὁμοίων τι σμικρὸν  
 ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ  
 αὐτὸ | ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἶεσθαι. Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ἐγώ, 332  
 ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο  
 μὲν εἰσώμεν, τὸδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα.

XX. Ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Ἔφη. Τούτῳ τῷ

Socrates next  
 argues that tem-  
 perance and wis-  
 dom are identical,  
 and is about to  
 prove the same of  
 5 temperance and  
 justice,

πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τούναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ  
 σοφία; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Πότερον  
 δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε  
 καὶ ἀφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκ-  
 οῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες†, ἢ τούναντίον;  
 Σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνη σωφρονοῦσιν; B

† ἢ εἰ τούναντίον ἔπραττον; codd.

Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως  
 πράττουσι καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττον- 10  
 τες; Συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Τοῦναντίου ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ  
 ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; Ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν  
 τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνη πράττεται,  
 τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνη; Ὁμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν  
 εἴ τι ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ  
 τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς; Ἐδόκει. Καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ 15  
 τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτήτος, βραδέως;  
 Ἐφη. Καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ  
 αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ  
 ἐναντίου; Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι  
 καλόν; Συνεχώρει. Τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν 20  
 τὸ αἰσχρόν; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν;  
 Ἔστιν. Τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;  
 Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξύ ἐν φωνῇ; Ἐφη.  
 Τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύν;  
 Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν 25  
 ἐναντίων ἐν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;  
 Συνωμολόγει. Ἰθὶ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα  
 τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον  
 ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή; Ὁμολογήκαμεν. Τὸ  
 δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι; 30  
 Ἐφη. Ὁμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ  
 ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ;  
 Ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφρο-  
 σύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;  
 E Συνεχώρει. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ 35  
 ἐναντίου πράττειτ' ἂν; Ναί. Πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν  
 ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Ναί.  
 Ἐναντίως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων οὕτων;

Ναί. Ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνη;  
 40 Φαίνεται. Μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν  
 ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφία ἐναντίον εἶναι;  
 Συνωμολόγει. Ἐν δὲ ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι; Φημί.  
 Πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν | τῶν λόγων; 333  
 τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκείνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο  
 45 ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἐκάτερον  
 ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ  
 αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώ-  
 που μόρια; πότερον οὖν δι' ἃ λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ  
 λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ  
 50 συνάδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ  
 ἂν συνάδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἐνὶ μὲν ἐν μόνον B  
 ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνη ἐνὶ  
 ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὖ φαίνεται; ἢ  
 γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως; Ὁμο-  
 55 λόγησεν καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἂν εἴη ἢ  
 σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη  
 ἡμῖν ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ὀσιότης σχεδόν τι ταῦτόν  
 ὄν. ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμω-  
 μεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. Ἄρά τίς  
 60 σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ;  
 Αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο C  
 ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.  
 Πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι,  
 ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ; Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶ-  
 65 τον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν. Ἄλλ'  
 οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, εἴαν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνη, εἴτ'  
 οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα, εἴτε μή. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε  
 μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν  
 ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.

- D XXI. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν  
 ὁ Πρωταγόρας· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἤτιατο  
 δυσχερῆ εἶναι· ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώ-  
 ρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφη ἐγώ,  
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀποκρίναι. δοκοῦσί τινές  
 σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ σω-  
 φρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν; Ἔφη. Τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν  
 εὖ βουλευέσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Πό-  
 τερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ  
 κακῶς; Εἰ εὖ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἅττα εἶναι; Λέγω. 10  
 Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἃ ἐστὶν  
 ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, καὶ  
 E μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ἦ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθὰ.  
 καὶ μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ  
 ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· 15  
 ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος  
 334 ἡρέμα ἡρόμην. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Πρω-  
 ταγόρα, ἂ μὴδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἂ μὴδὲ  
 τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ  
 καλεῖς; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἂ  
 20 ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστί, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ  
 καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα· τὰ  
 δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ· τὰ δὲ βουσὶν  
 μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίν· τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενί,  
 δένδροις δέ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὰ, 25  
 B ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἶον καὶ ἡ κόπρος, πάντων  
 τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη,  
 εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας  
 ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον  
 τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασιν ἐστὶν πάγκρακον καὶ ταῖς 30  
 θριξίν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων πλὴν ταῖς

τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῷ  
 ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστὶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν  
 καὶ παντοδαπὸν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἕξωθεν  
 35 τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐντὸς C  
 ταῦτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ  
 πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενούσι μὴ χρῆσθαι  
 ἐλαίῳ, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅ τι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει  
 ἔδουσαι, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν  
 40 ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην  
 ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις.

XXII. Εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες  
 ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εἶ λέγοι· καὶ ἐγὼ  
 εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω  
 ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἀνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν  
 5 τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ D  
 οὗ ἂν ἢ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ ἐτύγχα-  
 νον ὑπόκωφος ὢν, ὧν ἂν χρῆναι, εἶπερ  
 ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μείζον φθέγγε-  
 σθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ  
 10 ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις  
 καὶ βραχυτέρας ποιεῖ, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἔπεσθαι. Πῶς  
 οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ βραχυτέρα  
 σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ; Μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.  
 Ἄλλ' ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πότερα οὖν E  
 15 ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαυτὰ σοι ἀπο-  
 κρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί; Ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι  
 σὺ οἶός τ' εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν  
 αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, οὕτως, ὥστε τὸν  
 λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸ βραχέα οὕτως,  
 20 ὥστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις | εἰπεῖν· εἰ οὖν 335  
 μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρὸς

Socrates says  
 he must depart  
 on other business  
 unless Protago-  
 ras will consent  
 5 to converse by  
 means of short  
 questions and  
 answers. Callias  
 entreats him to  
 stay.



με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοὺς  
 ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ  
 τοῦτο ἐποιοῦν ὃ σὺ κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευέν  
 με διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἂν βελτίων 25  
 ἐφαινόμην οὐδ' ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν  
 τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. καὶ ἐγὼ—ἔγνω γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν  
 αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεις ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι  
 B οὐκ ἐθέλησσι ἐκὼν εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι  
 —ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν 30  
 ταῖς συνουσίαις, Ἄλλὰ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,  
 οὐδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν  
 συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν σὺ βούλη  
 διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἔπεσθαι, τότε σοὶ δια-  
 λέξομαι. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φῆς δὲ 35  
 καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ  
 C οἶός τ' εἶ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι· σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ· ἐγὼ  
 δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἶός  
 τ' εἶναι. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφό-  
 τερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ 40  
 οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν  
 οἶός τ' εἶην σοὶ παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς  
 λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ—εἴμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ'  
 ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν  
 ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καὶ μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπι- 45  
 D λαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δ'  
 ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτουῖ, καὶ  
 εἶπεν· Οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ  
 ἐξέλθης, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι  
 οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὸς ἡδίου 50  
 ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγόμενων·  
 ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον—ἤδη δὲ

ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιὼν—<sup>2</sup>Ω παῖ Ἴππονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν  
 ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν  
 55 ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαί Ε  
 σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο· νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ  
 δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἴμεραίῳ δρομεὶ ἀκμάζοντι  
 ἔπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων  
 διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι, εἵποίμι ἂν σοι ὅτι | πολὺ σοῦ 336  
 60 μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαντοῦ δέομαι θέουσιν τούτοις ἀκο-  
 λουθεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι δέει θεά-  
 σασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας,  
 τούτου δέου συγκαθεῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι  
 ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπι-  
 65 θυμῆϊς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου,  
 ὡσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ  
 αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ  
 δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ Β  
 ἔγωγ' ᾄμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγο-  
 70 μένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. Ἄλλ' ὄραξ, ἔφη, ὦ  
 Σώκρατες· δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν  
 αὐτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται καὶ σὺ  
 ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸν σὺ βούλη.

XXIII. Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Οὐ

Alciades,  
Critias and Pro-  
dicus all give  
their vote for  
continuing the  
conversation.

καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Καλλία· Σωκράτης  
 μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναι οἱ  
 5 μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρα,  
 τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἷός τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπί- C  
 στασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ'  
 ἂν εἴ τῷ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ  
 Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους  
 διαλεχθῆναι, ἔξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται,  
 10 διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ'

ἐκάστη ἐρωτήσῃ μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων  
 τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ'  
 D ἀπομηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάβωνται περὶ οὗτου τὸ ἐρώ-  
 τημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκούοντων· ἐπεὶ Σωκράτης  
 γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει 15  
 καὶ φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ  
 ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν· χρῆ γὰρ ἕκαστον  
 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι. μετὰ δὲ τὸν  
 Ἄλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών· Ὡ  
 Πρόδικε καὶ Ἰππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα 20  
 E πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἄλκιβιάδης δὲ αἰεὶ φιλό-  
 νικὸς ἐστὶ πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὀρμήσῃ· ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν  
 δεῖ συμφιλιτικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρᾳ,  
 ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλύσαι  
 337 τὴν ξυνοσίαν. | εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρό- 25  
 δικος, Καλῶς μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία·  
 χρῆ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους  
 κοινούς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγόμενοι ἀκροα-  
 τὰς, ἴσους δὲ μή· ἐστὶν γὰρ οὐ ταῦτόν· κοινῇ μὲν  
 γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι 30  
 ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ  
 ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρω-  
 ταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν  
 B καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν,  
 ἐρίζειν δὲ μή· ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὖνοιαν 35  
 οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ  
 ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις. καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἢ  
 στυνοσία γίγνοιτο· ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ'  
 ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ  
 οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε· εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ παρὰ ταῖς 40  
 ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκούοντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι

δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων· ἡμεῖς  
 τ' αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα, C  
 οὐχ ἠδοίμεθα· εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μανθά-  
 45 νοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ  
 διανοίᾳ, ἠδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθιοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἠδὺ πάσχοντα  
 αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι.

XXIV. Ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ  
 πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο· μετὰ  
 δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἰππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν,  
 Ἡππίας begs Protogoras and Socrates to effect a compromise. ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἠγοῦμαι  
 5 ἐγὼ ἡμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας  
 ἅπαντας εἶναι φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ  
 ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος D  
 ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται.  
 ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχυρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων  
 10 εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ  
 κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος  
 εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς  
 πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε,  
 15 μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφύνασθαι,  
 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων δια- E  
 φέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ  
 συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμ-  
 βῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβασ-  
 ζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, | καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβές τοῦτο 338  
 20 εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ  
 μὴ ἠδὺ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς  
 ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχη-  
 μονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν  
 πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς  
 25 τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ:

μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὡς οὖν ποιήσατε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδούχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν B ἐλέσθαι, ὃς ὑμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μήκος τῶν λόγων ἐκατέρου.

XXV. Ταῦτα ἤρесе τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπήνεσαν, καὶ ἐμέ γε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἐλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἶη βραβευτὴν ἐλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἰρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε ὁμοῖος, οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ ὁμοῖος ἡμῖν ὁμοῖα καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε C ἐκ περιπτοῦ ἡρήσεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἰρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἀδύνατον ἰὸ ὑμῖν, ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἐλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἰρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἰρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ' οὕτωςι ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵν' ὁ προ- 15 θυμείσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωνται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν D ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινούμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δείξαι, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὀπόσ' 20 ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. εἰ οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου 25 E ἔνεκα ἕνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι·

Socrates proposes that Protagoras shall question and he himself answer. This is agreed to.

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καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογήσαι ἐρωτήσεων, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἰκα-  
 30 νῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.

XXVI. Ἦρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὕτωςί πως· Ἠγοῦ-  
 μαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας  
 μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν  
 εἶναι· ἔστιν | δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιη- 339  
 τῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε  
 ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἂ μή, καὶ ἐπί-  
 στασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον  
 λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα  
 περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν, περὶ οὐπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν  
 10 διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δ' εἰς  
 ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ που  
 Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν, τὸν Κρέοντος υἱὸν τοῦ  
 Θετταλοῦ, ὅτι

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι B  
 15 χαλεπόν,  
 χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετρά-  
 γωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἄσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω; καὶ  
 ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ  
 20 μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ἄσματος. Εὖ, ἔφη,  
 λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιήσθαι  
 καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ, ἔφη ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καὶ  
 ὀρθῶς. Δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιήσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία  
 λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ ποιητής; Οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ'  
 25 ἐγώ. Ὅρα δὴ, ἔφη, βέλτιον. Ἄλλ', ὦγαθέ, ἔσκεμαι C  
 ἰκανῶς. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προϊόντος τοῦ ἄσματος  
 λέγει που

οὐδέ μοι ἔμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται  
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον·

χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. 30

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κακείνα τὰ  
ἔμπροσθεν; Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη,  
ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι; Φαίνεται ἔμοιγε. καὶ  
ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τι λέγοι. Ἄτάρ, ἔφη  
D ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁμολο- 35  
γεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὅς γε  
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα  
ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀληθεία, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος  
εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιπτακὸν  
τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν 40  
ἔμμεναι, τοῦτον μέμφεται τε καὶ οὐ φησιν ἀποδέ-  
χεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος. καίτοι ὁπότε  
τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ  
ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἤτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον  
οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει. εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον 45  
E παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ  
μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς,  
ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ εἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα  
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων· ἔπειτα, ὡς γε  
πρὸς σὲ εἰρησθαι τάληθῆ, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται 50  
τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής, τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν  
Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ,  
σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν  
340 τῷ ἀνδρί. | δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ—ὡσπερ  
ἔφη Ὁμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ 55  
τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα  
φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένης ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ  
σχῶμεν,

ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας  
 60 τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ  
 ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἧ τὸ  
 τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταυτὸν B  
 ὄν, καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν  
 σκόπει, εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται  
 65 ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ  
 Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σῆν γνώμην· ταυτὸν  
 σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο;  
 Ἄλλο νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ἐγὼ, ἐν  
 μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώ-  
 70 μην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείᾳ γενέσθαι  
 χαλεπὸν εἶη; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Τὸν C  
 δέ γε Πιπτακόν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, μέμφεται, οὐχ, ὡς οἶεται  
 Πρωταγόρας, τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἄλλ' ἄλλο.  
 οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιπτακὸς ἔλεγεν, τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι  
 75 ἐσθλόν, ὡσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἐστὶν  
 δὲ οὐ ταυτὸν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ὡς φησὶν Πρόδικος  
 ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν  
 τὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης  
 αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ  
 80 ἄλλοι πολλοί, καθ' Ἡσίοδον, γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν D  
 χαλεπὸν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς  
 θεοὺς ἰδρῶτα θεῖναι· ὅταν δὲ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον  
 ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δῆπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπὴν περ  
 εἰούσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

XXVII. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα  
 ἐπήνεσέν με· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, Τὸ ἐπαν-  
 ὀρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μείζον  
 ἀμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὁ ἐπανορθοῖς. καὶ ἐγὼ  
 5 εἶπον, Κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς

and, after some  
 playful sophistry,  
 offers finally to  
 give his own ex-  
 planation of the  
 poem.



Ε ἔοικεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός·  
 ἰώμενος μείζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. Ἄλλ' οὕτως ἔχει,  
 ἔφη. Πῶς δῆ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία  
 εἶη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν  
 ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὃ ἐστὶν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς 10  
 ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Νῆ τὸν Δία,  
 εἰς καιρὸν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις  
 Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,  
 341 ἢ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, | ἦτοι ἀπὸ  
 Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερα. σὺ δὲ 15  
 ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ἂν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι  
 φαίνεται, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητῆς  
 εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουί· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ  
 μανθάνειν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως  
 Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανε, ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, 20  
 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με οὔτοσὶ  
 νουθετεῖ ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον  
 Β τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστὶν  
 ἀνὴρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τὰγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν—  
 τὸ γὰρ δεινόν, φησίν, κακόν ἐστίν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει 25  
 ἐκάστοτε, δεινοῦ πλούτου οὐδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲ  
 δεινῆς ὑγείας, ἀλλὰ δεινῆς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου  
 καὶ δεινῆς πενίας, ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος—ἴσως  
 οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὖ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ  
 κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις. 30  
 ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρόδικον· δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου  
 φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν· τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ  
 C χαλεπὸν Σιμωνίδης; Κακόν, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα  
 καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιττακὸν  
 λέγοντα χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 35  
 ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν

ἔμμεναι. Ἄλλὰ τί οἶει, ἔφη, λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίξειεν τῷ Πιπτακῷ, ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν ἅτε  
 40 Δέσβιος ὦν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένους; Ἀκούεις δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε. ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν; καὶ ὁ Πρωτα- D  
 γόρας, Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Πρόδικε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν  
 45 ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μὴ ῥάδιον ἦ, ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναί, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι, εἰ οἶός τ'  
 50 ἔσει τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστιν E εὐθύς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ῥήμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι

θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας.

οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, εἴτα  
 55 τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνου τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἂν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ' ἅ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἄσματι, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει | λαβεῖν μου πείραν ὅπως 342  
 60 ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας ἐκελευέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

XXVIII. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἅ γέ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν. φιλοσοφία γάρ ἐστιν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ

πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Λακε-  
 B δαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταὶ πλείστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ S. "Simonides 5  
 εἰσὶν· ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματί- wrote this poem  
 ζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι to overthrow the  
 ὦσιν ὅτι σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περιείσιν, Laconic saying  
 ὡσπερ οὖς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, ἀλλὰ of Pittacus 'It is  
 δοκῶσιν τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρεία περιεῖναι, ἡγού- 10  
 μνοι, εἰ γνωσθεῖεν ᾧ περίεσιν, πάντας τοῦτο ἀσκή-  
 σειν, τὴν σοφίαν. νῦν δὲ ἀποκρυφάμενοι ἐκείνο  
 ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας, καὶ  
 οἱ μὲν ὧτά τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς, καὶ  
 C ἰμάντας περιειλίττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ 15  
 βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρα-  
 τοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· οἱ δὲ  
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὴν βούλωνται ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ'  
 αὐτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς, καὶ ἤδη ἄχθωνται  
 λάθρα ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι τῶν τε 20  
 λακωνιζόντων τούτων καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος ξένος ὢν  
 ἐπιδημήσῃ, συγγίγνονται τοῖς σοφισταῖς λαυθάνοντες  
 τοὺς ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἐῶσιν τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς  
 D ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξιέναι, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ Κρήτες, ἵνα μὴ  
 ἀπομανθάνωσιν ἢ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν 25  
 ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει  
 μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. γνοῖτε δ' ἄν,  
 ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς  
 φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἄριστα πεπαιδευνται, ὧδε·  
 εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Λακεδαιμονίων τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ 30  
 E συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὐρήσει  
 αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν  
 τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου  
 βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὡσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής,

35 ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν  
 βελτίω. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἱ  
 κατανενοήκασι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν  
 πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν,  
 εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι  
 40 τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. | τούτων ἦν 343  
 καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιπτακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος  
 καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ  
 Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεὺς, καὶ ἔβ-  
 δομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι  
 45 πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς  
 Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας· καὶ καταμάθοι ἂν τις αὐτῶν  
 τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὔσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιο-  
 μνημόνευτα ἐκάστω εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ ξυνελ-  
 θόντες ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι B  
 50 εἰς τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα, ἃ δὴ  
 πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ μηδὲν ἄγαν.

τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος  
 ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις  
 Λακωνικῆ· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο  
 55 τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ  
 χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἅτε C  
 φιλότιμος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἔγνω ὅτι, εἰ καθέλοι  
 τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὡσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν καὶ  
 περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε  
 60 ἀνθρώποις· εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα  
 τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολοῦσαι αὐτὸ ἅπαν τὸ ἄσμα  
 πεποιήκεν, ὥς μοι φαίνεται.

XXIX. Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἅπαντες,  
 εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθύς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ  
 ἄσματος μανικὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν, D

ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε  
 τὸ μὲν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓνα λόγον <sup>The poet says</sup>  
 φαίνεται ἐμβεβληθῆναι, εἰ μὴ τις ὑπο- <sup>that it is truly</sup>  
 λάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήμα ὡσπερ <sup>hard to</sup>  
 ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην—λέγοντος τοῦ Πιτ- <sup>good,</sup>  
 τακοῦ ὅτι Χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα  
 εἰπεῖν ὅτι Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα 10  
 ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, ὡ Πιττακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς,—οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ  
 E ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα  
 ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ  
 ἀγαθῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς· εὐήθες γὰρ τοῦτό  
 γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου· ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ 15  
 θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὕτωςί πως ὑπει-  
 πόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν  
 λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον,  
 εἰπόντα ὦ ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τὸν  
 344 δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὦ Πιττακέ, | οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· 20  
 οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν ἐστίν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν  
 χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου  
 τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως. οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς  
 λόγον τὸ μὲν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς  
 ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ 25  
 μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ  
 καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄσματι εἰρημένων ἀπο-  
 B δεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποιήται· πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ  
 μεμελημένως ἔχει· ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω  
 διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλωμεν 30  
 καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστίν  
 τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἄσματος.

XXX. Λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθῶν, ὡς  
 ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν

50

χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινά·  
but to be good is not hard, but impossible; therefore Pittacus is wrong. γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕξει  
 5 καὶ εἶναι ἀνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ᾧ C  
 Πιπτακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον,  
 ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,  
 ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,  
 ὃν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.

10 τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου  
 ἀρχῇ; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης  
 αἰεὶ καθήρηται· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν  
 καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι  
 ἂν τις, ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ,  
 15 οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὄντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν D  
 συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ αἰεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὐ·  
 καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμῶν ἐπιπεσῶν ἀμή-  
 χανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπῇ ὥρα ἐπελ-  
 θούσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταῦτά ταῦτα·  
 20 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ  
 καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος  
 αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ'  
 ἐσθλός·

τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ εἶναι E  
 25 ἀνάγκη· ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ  
 ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη, οὐκ ἔστι  
 μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι· σὺ δὲ φῆς, ᾧ Πιπτακέ, χαλεπὸν  
 ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι· τὸ δ' ἐστὶν γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν  
 (δυνατὸν δὲ) ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον·

30 πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,  
 κακός δ' εἰ κακῶς.

τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξις ἐστίν, καὶ | τίς 345  
 ἀνδρα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἢ  
 τούτων μάθησις. τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν

ποιεῖ; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας 35  
 μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς  
 γένοιτο; δῆλον ὅτι ᾧ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῶ  
 εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῶ ἰατρῶ· οὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς  
 γένοιτο· ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς ἰδιώται οὐκ ἂν ποτε  
 γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες 40  
 B οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν  
 γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός.  
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε καὶ  
 κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ  
 ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος· αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακῆ 45  
 πράξις, ἐπιστήμης στέρηθῆναι· ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ  
 ἂν ποτε γένοιτο κακός· ἔστιν γὰρ αἰεὶ· ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει  
 κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.  
 ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι  
 C εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, διατελοῦντα 50  
 ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἷόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε  
 τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοι  
 εἶσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

XXXI. Ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιπτακὸν  
 εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ἄσματος  
 ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ γάρ·

τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ  
 γενέσθαι δυνατὸν

διζήμενος κενεᾶν ἐς ἄπρακτον

ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,

πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι  
 καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·

D ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν εὐρὼν ἀπαγγελέω, 10

φησίν· οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξ-  
 ἔρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ῥήματι.

Simonides is content to praise a moderately good man: he seeks not for perfect virtue." Conclusion of Socrates' speech. 5

πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω  
 ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη  
 15 μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μά-  
 χονται.

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἰρημένον. οὐ  
 γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους  
 φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἐκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς  
 20 ὄντων τινῶν οἱ ἐκόντες κακὰ ποιούσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ  
 σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν  
 ἠγείται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ  
 αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ E  
 ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες  
 25 ἄκουτες ποιούσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν  
 μὴ κακὰ ποιῆ ἐκὼν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι,  
 ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἐκὼν. ἠγείτο  
 γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν κάγαθὸν πολλακίς αὐτὸν ἐπαναγ-  
 κάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ | ἐπαινέτην†, οἷον 346  
 30 ἀνδρὶ πολλακίς συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκο-  
 τον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν  
 οὖν πονηροὺς, ὅταν τοιούτον τι αὐτοῖς συμβῆ, ὥσπερ  
 ἀσμένους ὄρᾶν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατη-  
 γορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα  
 35 αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι  
 μηδ' ὀνειδίξωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥστε ἔτι μάλλον  
 ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἐκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς B  
 ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεται· τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπ-  
 τεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἂν τι  
 40 ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες,  
 αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι  
 προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ

† Post ἐπαινέτην add. codd. φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.



ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἠγγή-  
 σατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοι-  
 οὔτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἑκῶν, ἀλλ' 45  
 C ἀναγκαζόμενος. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιπτακῷ λέγει  
 ὅτι ἐγώ, ὦ Πιπτακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω· ὅτι εἰμὶ  
 φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ

ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ μῆδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος·

εἰδὼς γ' ὄνησιπολιν δίκαιον 50

ὑγιῆς ἀνήρ· οὐ μὴν ἐγὼ

μωμήσομαι

(οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος)·

τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων

ἀπειρῶν γενέθλα·

55

ὥστ' εἴ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπλησθείη ἂν ἐκείνους  
 μεμφόμενος.

πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέ-  
 μικται.

D οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά, 60  
 οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμικται· γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῆ·  
 ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ  
 ψέγειν· καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον,  
 εὐρνεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἐπί  
 θ' ὑμῖν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω· ὥστε τούτου γ' ἔνεκα 65  
 οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλὰ μοι ἐξαρκεῖ, ἂν ἦ μέσος  
 καὶ μῆδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ  
 ἐπαίνημι—καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν  
 E Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιπτακὸν λέγων τὸ πάντας  
 δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκῶν (ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν 70  
 τῷ ἑκῶν διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα) ὅστις ἔρδη μῆδὲν  
 αἰσχρὸν, ἄκων δ' ἔστιν οὗς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ.  
 σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὦ

347 Πιπτακέ, | οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἔψεγον. νῦν δὲ—σφόδρα γὰρ

75 καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταυτὰ σε ἐγὼ ψέγω.

XXXII. Ταυτὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποικέναι τούτο τὸ ἄσμα. καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Εὐ μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπι- B  
 δείξω, ἂν βούλησθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Naί, ἔφη, ὦ Ἰππία, εἰσαυθίς γε· νῦν δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἂ ὡμο-  
 10 λογησάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εἰ δὲ δὴ βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν τὸν ἕτερον. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόρα ὀπότερον αὐτῷ  
 15 ἥδιον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ἄσμάτων τε καὶ C  
 ἐπῶν ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγὼ σε ἠρώτησα, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἠδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμπο-  
 20 σίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας D  
 25 τρία φωνὴν τῆν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν· ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ' αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὄρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίδας, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν  
 30 λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς,

Alcibiades now begs that the original question may be resumed. Protagoras appears reluctant, but at last is shamed into allowing himself to be questioned.

λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως,  
 E καὶ πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωνσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοι-  
 αῖδε συνουσίαι, εἴαν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν, οἷοίπερ  
 ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας  
 φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὐς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν 35  
 περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ  
 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν,  
 οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι δ' ἀδυνα-  
 τοῦσιν ἐξελέγξαι· ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας  
 348 ἐῶσιν χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισιν δι' ἑαυτῶν, 40  
 ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πείραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες  
 καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μάλ-  
 λον μιμῆσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· καταθεμένους τοὺς  
 ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς  
 λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν 45  
 πείραν λαμβάνοντας· καὶ μὲν βούλη ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν,  
 ἔτοιμός εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος· εἴαν δὲ  
 βούλη, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχες, περὶ ὧν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσά-  
 B μεθα διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. λέγοντος  
 οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπεσάφει ὁ 50  
 Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἄλκι-  
 βιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ  
 σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ  
 ἐθέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ  
 οὐ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἤτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ 55  
 ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν,  
 Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαλέγεται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἀν-  
 C βούληται ἄλλῳ. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυρθεὶς, ὥς  
 γέ μοι ἔδοξε, τοῦ τε Ἄλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος  
 καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι 60  
 τῶν παρόντων, μόγις προὔτράπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι  
 καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος.

XXXIII. Εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἶου διαλέγεσθαι μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνν λέγειν τι τὸν Ὅμηρον τὸ

Socrates again formulates the question to be discussed. "Are wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, holiness, five names for one thing, or are they all parts of virtue, differing from one another?"

5 *σύν τε δὺ ἔρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνόησεν·*  
*εὐπορώτεροι γὰρ πῶς ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον*  
 10 *καὶ διανόημα· μούνος δ' εἶπερ τε νοήσῃ, αὐτίκα περιῶν ζητεῖ ὅτφ ἐπιδείξεται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσεται, ἕως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕνεκα τούτου σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, ἡγοῦμένός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων*  
 15 *περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἐπερὶ ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; ὅς γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οἶει καλὸς καγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσίν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν· σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ' εἶ*  
 20 *ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς. καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν | ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας* 349  
*τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας, σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος*  
 25 *τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνησθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σε χρὴν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἡρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ*  
 30 *σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, Ἐ τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε*

ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι ἔστιν, ἢ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὃν οἶον 35 τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι

C τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὁμοιά ἐστίν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ οὐ μόριά ἐστίν, 40 ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ οὐ μόριά ἐστίν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μὲν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὥσπερ τότε, φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πη ἄλλη 45 νῦν φήσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώ-

D μενός μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες.

XXXIV. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μὲν ἐστίν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρουν πάντων τούτων. ὣδε δὲ γνώσει ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὐρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως.

Protagoras replies that four of them are tolerably like each other, but that courage is of quite another kind. Socrates tries to shew that courage is identical with wisdom. Protagoras objects to his method of reasoning, and

10

E Ἐχε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγὼ· ἄξιον γάρ ται ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; Καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβούνται ἰένα. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῆς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον 15 σαυτὸν παρέχεις; Κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ

μαίνομαί γε. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν τι  
 αὐτοῦ αἰσχροῦν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, ἢ ὅλον καλόν; "Ολον  
 που καλὸν ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα. Οἶσθα οὖν τίνες  
 20 εἰς τὰ φρέατα | κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως; "Ἐγώ γε, ὅτι 350  
 οἱ κολυμβηταί. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δι' ἄλλο  
 τι; "Οτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων  
 πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἢ οἱ  
 ἄφιπποι; Οἱ ἵππικοί. Τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες;  
 25 οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μῆ; Οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ  
 ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες  
 τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ  
 ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὴν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. "Ἦδη δέ B  
 τινὰς ἐώρακας, ἔφη, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας  
 30 ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων; "Ἐγώ γε,  
 ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας. Οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρ-  
 ραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν; Αἰσχροῦν μεντὰν,  
 ἔφη, εἴη ἢ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοι εἰσιν.  
 Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς  
 35 θαρραλέους εἶναι; Καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, C  
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρείοι ἀλλὰ  
 μαινόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι  
 οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοί εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ  
 ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ  
 40 σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη; Οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις,  
 ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμεν σοι. ἔγω-  
 γε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν,  
 ὠμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρείοι, οὐκ  
 ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ  
 45 πάντες· τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ D  
 ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς  
 ὠμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἑαυ-

τῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπι-  
 σταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἶε τὴν ἀνδρείαν  
 καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταῦτόν εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ 50  
 μετιῶν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν.  
 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὔτῳ μετιῶν ἔροιο με εἰ οἱ  
 E ἰσχυροὶ δυνατοὶ εἰσιν, φαίην ἄν· ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπι-  
 στάμενοι παλαίειν δυνατώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ἐπιστα-  
 μένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴν μάθωσιν, 55  
 ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἄν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογή-  
 σαντος ἐξείη ἄν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις  
 τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία  
 ἐστὶν ἰσχὺς. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ  
 τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἰσχυροὺς 60  
 35I δυνατούς· οὐ γὰρ | ταῦτόν εἶναι δύναμιν τε καὶ ἰσχύν,  
 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίνεσθαι, τὴν  
 δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας τε καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ, ἰσχὺν  
 δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων. οὔτω  
 δὲ κακεῖ οὐ ταῦτόν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν· 65  
 ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους εἶναι,  
 μὴ μέντοι τοὺς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας·  
 θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις  
 B καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις,  
 ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν 70  
 γίγνεται.

XXXV. Λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφη, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς;  
 Ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπος ἂν  
 εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος  
 ζῶη; Οὐκ ἔφη. Τί δ', εἰ ἠδέως βίους  
 τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν, οὐκ εὖ ἂν σοι  
 δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; Ἐμοιγ', ἔφη.  
 Socrates begins afresh. "Is not pleasure the same as good? And when men say that they eschew the good because they are overcome by pleasure, is not this inaccurate?" 5

Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἠδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν.  
 Εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῶν ἠδόμενος. Τί δὲ, C  
 10 ὦ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἠδέ  
 ἅττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθὰ; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω,  
 καθ' ὃ ἠδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, μὴ  
 εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὖθις αὖ  
 τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρὰ,  
 15 κακὰ; Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἀπλῶς οὕτως,  
 ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἠδέα D  
 τε ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακὰ· ἀλλὰ  
 μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ  
 ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς  
 20 πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἅ  
 τῶν ἠδέων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἐστὶ δ' αὖ καὶ ἅ τῶν  
 ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἐστὶ κακὰ, ἐστὶ δ' ἅ ἐστιν, καὶ τρίτον  
 ἅ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθὰ. Ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς,  
 ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδο-  
 25 νῆν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον E  
 ἠδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν  
 εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν. Ὡσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐκάσ-  
 τοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ εἰ μὲν πρὸς  
 λόγον δοκῆ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται  
 30 ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τότε  
 ἥδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν. Πότερον οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, σὺ  
 βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι;  
 Δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγείσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις  
 τοῦ λόγου. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, τῆ δέ πη καταφανὲς |  
 35 ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν 352  
 ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν  
 τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς  
 χεῖρας ἄκρας εὔποι· ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ



στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι  
 σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν 40  
 σκέψιν· θεασάμενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν  
 καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ὡς φῆς, δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν· ἴθι  
 δὴ μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀπο-  
 Β κάλυψον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ  
 τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ 45  
 ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοι-  
 οῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν  
 εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται,  
 ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν  
 ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἀρχεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν 50  
 θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ  
 ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοοῦμενοι  
 C περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπέδου, περιελ-  
 κομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ  
 τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἢ 55  
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον ἀρχεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ  
 γιγνώσκῃ τις τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι  
 ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἄλλ' ἅττα πράττειν ἢ ἂ ἂν ἢ  
 ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν  
 βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ 60  
 λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἰσχυρόν  
 D ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων  
 κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.  
 Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἶσθα  
 οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοὶ 65  
 οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς φασὶ γιγνώσκοντας τὰ  
 βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ  
 ἄλλα πράττειν· καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅ τί ποτε  
 αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν ἠττωμένους

70 ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τινος τούτων E  
 κρατουμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιούντας. Πολλὰ  
 γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς  
 λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Ἴθι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχειρή-  
 σον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὃ ἐστίν  
 75 αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν | ἡδονῶν 353  
 ἠτᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα,  
 ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. Ἴσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων  
 ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ  
 ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ  
 80 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς  
 ἠτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε  
 εἶναι; εἶπατον ἡμῖν. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς  
 σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅ  
 τι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; Οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, B  
 85 εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας,  
 πρὸς τὰλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει.  
 εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ  
 ἠγήσασθαι, ἢ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερόν  
 γενέσθαι, ἔπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐῷ  
 90 χαίρειν. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε  
 ὥσπερ ἦρξω.

XXXVI. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο  
 ἡμᾶς· τί οὖν φατὲ τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς C  
 ἤττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εἵποίμ' ἂν  
 ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὠδί· ἀκούετε δὴ·  
 5 πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρω-  
 ταγόρας φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄν-  
 θρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν  
 τοῖσδε—οἶον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ  
 ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες

Pleasures are often called evil when pains follow them, and pains good when they are followed by pleasure, but at the time pleasure is good, and pain evil.

ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν; Φαίεν ἄν. 10  
 Οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν.  
 D πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῆ φατέ εἶναι; πότερον ὅτι τὴν  
 ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ  
 ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον  
 νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ 15  
 παρασκευάζει; ἢ καὶ εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον  
 μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως  
 δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅ τι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ  
 ὀπηροῦν; ἄρ' οἰόμεθ' ἂν αὐτούς, ὧ Πρωταγόρα,  
 ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς 20  
 τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακὰ ἐστιν,  
 E ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ  
 τᾶλλα. Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς  
 πολλοὺς ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι. Οὐκοῦν νόσους  
 ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας 25  
 354 ποιεῖ; ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, | ὡς ἐγῶμαι. Συνέφη ὁ Πρω-  
 ταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὧ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν, ὡς  
 φαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα  
 κακὰ ὄντα, ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾶ καὶ ἄλλων  
 ἡδονῶν ἀποστρεφεί; ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν; Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν 30  
 ἀμφοῖν. Οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροί-  
 μεθα· ὧ ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιάρᾳ  
 εἶναι, ἄρα οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τά τε γυμνάσια  
 καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας  
 τὰς διὰ καύσεών τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακειῶν καὶ 35  
 λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μὲν ἐστιν,  
 B ἀνιάρᾳ δέ; φαίεν ἄν; Συνεδόκει. Πότερον οὖν κατὰ 4  
 τόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα  
 ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὅτι  
 εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὑγίειά τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν γίγνονται 40

καὶ εὐξίαι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαι  
καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαίεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι.  
Συνεδόκει. Ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ δι' ἄλλο τι, ἢ ὅτι  
45 ἀποτροπᾶς; ἢ ἔχετε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὃ  
ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονᾶς C  
τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἄν φαίεν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ  
δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν  
διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς  
50 κακόν; Συνεδόκει. Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἡγείσθ' εἶναι κακόν,  
τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ  
τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μείζονων  
ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῆ ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους  
παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο  
55 τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι D  
τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἄν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν·  
ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρω-  
ταγόρας. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ  
λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ  
60 λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν  
αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν  
παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέ-  
πετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς E  
ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε.  
65 Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Πάλιν τοίνυν,  
ἔφην ἐγὼ, εἰ με ἀνέροισθε, ὧ ἄνθρωποι, τίος οὖν  
δήποτε ἔνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῆ;  
συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἄν ἔγωγε. πρῶτον μὲν  
γὰρ οὐ ρᾶδιον ἀποδείξαι, τί ἐστὶν ποτε τοῦτο, ὃ ὑμεῖς  
70 καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἥπτω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶν  
πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθῆσθαι

355 ἔξεστιν, εἴ πη ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι | εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν  
 ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ  
 ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιώσθαι τὸν βίον ἀνευ  
 λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο 75  
 φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ,  
 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως  
 ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε,  
 ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἀνθρώπος, ὅτι  
 κακὰ ἐστίν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν, 80  
 B ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ  
 αὐθις αὐτὸ λέγετε, ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἀνθρώπος τὰγαθὰ  
 πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρήμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ  
 τούτων ἡττώμενος.

XXXVII. Ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖα ἐστίν, κατάδηλον  
 ἐστίν, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα The phrase  
 "To be overcome  
 by pleasure" is  
 an absurd way  
 of expressing the  
 fact that men  
 often choose a  
 less good in pre-  
 ference to a  
 greater. It is by  
 reason of their  
 ignorance that  
 they do so.  
 ἅμα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶ καὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ  
 κακῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυ-  
 οῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά,  
 πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ, ἔπειτα  
 αὐθις ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶ. θέμενοι δὲ  
 C οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἀνθρω-  
 πος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. ἐὰν  
 οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, διὰ τί, ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν· ὑπὸ 10  
 τοῦ; ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς  
 οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετεἴληφεν  
 ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἀποκρινώμεθα  
 καὶ λέγωμεν, ὅτι ἡττώμενος—ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει· τοῦ  
 ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νῆ Δία. ἂν οὖν τύχη ὁ ἐρόμενος 15  
 ἡμᾶς ὑβριστῆς ὢν, γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἢ γελοῖον  
 D λέγετε πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακὰ, γιγνώσκων ὅτι  
 κακὰ ἐστίν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ

τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἄρα, φήσει, οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν  
 20 ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων; φήσομεν δῆλον  
 ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν  
 ἐξημάρτανεν ὃν φαμεν ἤττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. κατὰ  
 τί δέ, φήσει ἴσως, ἀνάξιά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ  
 25 κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζω,  
 τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἢ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἢ; οὐχ E  
 ἔξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. δῆλον ἄρα, φήσει, ὅτι τὸ  
 ἠττώσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω  
 κακὰ λαμβάνειν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω. μεταλάβωμεν  
 δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς  
 30 αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος πράττει,  
 τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ ἀνιαρά,  
 γιγνώσκων, ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἠττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν  
 ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι | ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ τίς ἄλλη 35  
 ἀναξία ἡδονῆ πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλ-  
 35 λήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμι-  
 κρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ  
 μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον. εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀλλὰ πολὺ  
 διαφέρει, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν  
 ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ, μὴν ἄλλῃ τῷ,  
 40 φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῆ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ  
 ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεῖς B  
 τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεῖς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ  
 πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἰπέ ποτέρα πλείω ἐστίν.  
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἰστῆς, τὰ μείζω αἰεὶ καὶ  
 45 πλείω ληπτέα· εἰ δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρὰ, τὰ ἐλάτ-  
 τω καὶ σμικρότερα· εἰ δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρὰ, εἰ μὲν  
 μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, εἰ μὲν τε  
 τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω εἰ μὲν τε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν  
 ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πράξιν πρακτέον ἐν ἧ ἂν ταῦτ' C

ἐνῆ· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα· 50  
 μή πη ἄλλη ἔχει, φαίην ἄν, ταῦτα, ὧ ἄνθρωποι; οἶδ'  
 ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν. Συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνω.  
 "Ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε,  
 φήσω. φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύ-  
 θεν μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὐ; Φήσουσι. 55  
 Καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ  
 αἰ ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ μικρότεροι;  
 D Φαίην ἄν. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εἶ πρᾶττειν,  
 ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πρᾶττειν καὶ λαμ-  
 βάνειν, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πρᾶττειν, 60  
 τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἄρα ἡ μετρη-  
 τικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη μὲν  
 ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλακίς  
 μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς  
 πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἰρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ 65  
 μικρῶν, ἢ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο  
 E τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν  
 ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ  
 καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἄρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν οἱ ἄνθρω-  
 ποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σφάζειν ἂν τέχνην, 70  
 ἢ ἄλλην; Τὴν μετρητικὴν, ὡμολόγει. Τί δ', εἰ ἐν τῇ  
 τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἰρέσει ἡμῖν ἦν ἡ σωτηρία  
 τοῦ βίου, ὅποτε τὸ πλεον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἐλέσθαι καὶ  
 ὅποτε τὸ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον  
 πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτ' ἐγγυὺς εἴτε πόρρω εἴη, τί ἂν 75  
 357 ἔσφζεν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; | ἄρ' ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἄρ'  
 ἂν οὐ μετρητικὴ τις, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ  
 ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ  
 ἀρτίου, ἄρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ; ὁμολογοῖεν ἂν  
 ἡμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ οὐ; Ἐδόκουν ἂν καὶ τῷ Πρω- 80

ταγόρα ὁμολογεῖν. Εἶεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ  
 ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἰρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν  
 ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὔσα, τοῦ τε πλείονος καὶ ἐλάτ-  
 τος καὶ μείζονος καὶ μικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω B  
 85 καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἄρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται,  
 ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὔσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς  
 ἀλλήλας σκέψις; Ἄλλ' ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητικὴ,  
 ἀνάγκη δὴπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Συμφήσουσιν.  
 Ἦτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη,  
 90 εἰσαυθίς σκεψόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, τοσοῦτον  
 ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀποδείξιν, ἣν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωτα-  
 γόραν ἀποδείξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθ' ἡμᾶς. ἤρεσθε δέ, εἰ C  
 μέμνησθε, ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὠμολογοῦμεν ἐπι-  
 στήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αἰεὶ κρατεῖν,  
 95 ὅπου ἂν ἐνῆ, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων·  
 ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ  
 τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὠμολογοῦ-  
 μεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ  
 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡτ-  
 100 τᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτὸ φατε D  
 εἶναι; εἶπατε ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἶ-  
 πομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελάτε ἂν ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν  
 ἡμῶν καταγελάτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε.  
 καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὠμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδεία ἐξαμαρ-  
 105 τάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς  
 ἐξαμαρτάνοντας· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακά·  
 καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι  
 ὠμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη  
 πρᾶξις ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμα- E  
 110 θία πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἡττω εἶναι,  
 ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη· ἥς Πρωταγόρας ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς



εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἰππίας· ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ἔστωντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

XXXVIII. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκρι-  
 358 μένοι | ἂν ἦμεν· ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωτα-  
 γόρου ἐρωτῶ, ὦ Ἰππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε—  
 κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος—  
 πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ  
 ψεύδεσθαι. Ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι  
 τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὁμολογεῖτε/ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺν  
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου  
 τούδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι· εἴτε γὰρ  
 B ἡδὺν εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χάρτόν, εἴτε ὀπόθεν καὶ  
 ὅπως χαίρεις (τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὦ βέλτιστε Πρό-  
 δικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναί. Γελάσας  
 οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. Τί δὲ  
 δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιούδε; αἰ ἐπὶ τούτου  
 πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἄρ' οὐ  
 15 καλαί†; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον;  
 Συνεδόκει. Εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδὺν ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν,  
 οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω εἶναι, ἢ ἂ  
 C ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατὰ, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω·  
 οὐδὲ τὸ ἦττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία,  
 20 οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία. Συνεδόκει  
 πᾶσιν. Τί δὲ δὴ; ἀμαθίαν ἄρα τὸ τοιούδε λέγετε, τὸ  
 ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεύσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων  
 τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίω; Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει. Ἄλλο

† Post καλαὶ add. codd. καὶ ὠφέλιμοι.

Now fear is expectation of evil; and as no one willingly enters on what he believes to be evil, 5

25 τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἔρχεται  
οὐδ' ἐπὶ ἃ οἶεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν,  
ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἶεται κακὰ εἶναι D  
ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῆ  
δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μείζον  
30 αἰρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον. Ἄπαντα ταῦτα συνεδό-  
κει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν. Τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ τι δέος  
καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; πρὸς σέ λέγω, ὦ  
Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε  
φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρα μὲν  
35 καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Προδίκῳ δὲ E  
δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ. Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε,  
διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν,  
ἄρα τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἃ δέδοικεν,  
ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἃ μῆ; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων;  
40 ἃ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὠμολόγηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἃ  
δὲ ἡγεῖται κακὰ, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε  
λαμβάνειν ἐκόντα. Ἐδόκει καὶ ταῦτα | πᾶσιν. 359

XXXIX. Οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

ὦ Πρόδικέ τε καὶ Ἰππία, ἀπολογεῖσθω  
ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπε-  
κρίνατο, πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μὴ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον  
παντάπασι· τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὄντων  
5 μοριῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ  
ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὐτοῦ  
ἐκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα  
λέγω, ἀλλ' ἃ τὸ ὕστερον εἶπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη  
10 τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις εἶναι,  
τὸ δὲ ἐν πᾶν πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, B  
γνωσεσθαι δέ μ' ἔφη τεκμηρίῳ τῷδε· εὐρήσεις γάρ,  
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ

the coward  
wrongly believ-  
ing war to be  
painful or evil, is  
afraid to fight,  
by reason of his  
ignorance. Thus  
5 cowardice is ig-  
norance and  
therefore brava-  
ry, its opposite,  
is wisdom.

ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους,  
 ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ· ὧ γινώσκει ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἢ ἀν- 15  
 δρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς. καὶ ἐγὼ εὐθύς  
 τότε πάνυ ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον  
 ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξήλθον. ἠρόμην δ' οὖν  
 τοῦτον, εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· ὁ δέ, καὶ  
 C ἴτας γ', ἔφη. Μέμνησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα 20  
 ἀποκρινόμενος; Ὡμολόγει. Ἰθι δὴ, ἔφη ἐγώ, εἰπέ  
 ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἢ  
 ἐφ' ἄπερ οἱ δειλοί; Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἕτερα;  
 Ναί, ἢ δ' ὅς. Πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα  
 ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρείοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ; Λέγεται δὴ, ὦ 25  
 Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη  
 D ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῆς  
 ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἄρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ, ἡγουμέ-  
 νους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ μῆ; Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ', ἔφη,  
 ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύ- 30  
 νατον. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ὥστ'  
 εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἡγείται  
 εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ  
 ἠυρέθη ἀμαθία οὕσα. Ὡμολόγει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἃ γε  
 θαρροῦσιν πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι, 35  
 καὶ ταύτη γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοὶ τε καὶ  
 E οἱ ἀνδρείοι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πᾶν γε  
 τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἃ οἱ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ  
 ἀνδρείοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν  
 ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. Πότερον, ἔφη ἐγώ, καλὸν 40  
 ὄν ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; Καλόν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ  
 καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὠμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν·  
 τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὠμολογή-  
 σαμεν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

45 Ὅρθως γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ | ποτέρους φῆς εἰς τὸν 36ο  
 πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν ὃν καὶ ἀγαθόν;  
 Τοὺς δειλοὺς, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶπερ.  
 καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ; Ὁμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη.  
 Ἄρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι  
 50 ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον τε καὶ ἄμειον καὶ ἡδιον; Ἄλλὰ καὶ  
 τοῦτο ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμ-  
 προσθεν ὁμολογίας. Τί δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ  
 κάλλιον τε καὶ ἄμειον καὶ ἡδιον ἔρχεται; Ἀνάγκη,  
 ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρείοι οὐκ αἰσ- B  
 55 χροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχροὺς  
 θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχροὺς,  
 ἄρ' οὐ καλά; Ὁμολόγει. Εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθὰ;  
 Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ  
 μαινόμενοι τούναντίον αἰσχροὺς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται  
 60 καὶ αἰσχροὺς θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ὁμολόγει. Θαρροῦ-  
 σιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχροὺς καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοϊαν  
 καὶ ἀμαθίαν; Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; τοῦτο δι' ὃ C  
 δειλοὶ εἰσιν οἱ δειλοὶ, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς;  
 Δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν  
 65 ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Διὰ ταύτην  
 ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοὶ εἰσιν; Ὁμολόγει. Δι' ὃ δὲ  
 δειλοὶ εἰσιν, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ; Συνέφη.  
 Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν  
 εἴη; Ἐπένευσεν. Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντίον  
 70 ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία. Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ D  
 μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ ἐστίν;  
 Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία  
 δειλία; Πάνυ μόνις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ σοφία  
 ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία  
 75 οὕσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ; Οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὐτ' ἐπι-

νεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε· καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Τί δὴ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φῆς ἂ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης; Αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον. Ἐν γ', ἔφην ἐγὼ, μόνον ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὡσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μὲν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ. 80 Φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμέ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριῶμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

XL. Οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἄλλου ἔνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα, ἣ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος, πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου 361 φανεροῦ | γενομένου μάλιστ' ἂν κατά-  
 δηλον γένοιτο ἐκείνο, περὶ οὗ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἐκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτι ἕξοδος τῶν λόγων ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελαῖν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, 10 εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι ἄτοποί γ' ἐστέ, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τὰναντία σπεύ-  
 B δεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδείξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ 15 ἀνδρεία, ᾧ τρόπῳ μάλιστ' ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἡ ἀρετή· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή, ὡσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν. Πρω- 20 ταγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος νῦν τοῦναντίον C ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι, ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἦκιστα εἴη διδακτόν. ἐγὼ

Conclusion.  
Socrates and Protagoras have both veered round to the opposite of that from which they started.

οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω  
 25 ταραπτόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ  
 αὐτὰ γενέσθαι. καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελλθόντας  
 ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅ τι ἔστι, καὶ πάλιν  
 ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ  
 διδακτὸν, μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ  
 30 ἐν τῇ σκέψει σφήλλῃ ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ D  
 διανομῇ ἡμέλησεν ἡμῶν, ὡς φῆς σύ. ἤρρεσεν οὖν μοι  
 καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως·  
 ᾧ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ προμηθεύμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου  
 τοῦ ἐμαντοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ  
 35 εἰ σὺ ἐθέλεις, ὅπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ  
 ἂν ἤδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας,  
 Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυ-  
 μίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τᾶλλα E  
 οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἡκιστ' ἀν-  
 40 θρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἶρηκα,  
 ὅτι ὦν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ, τῶν μὲν  
 τηλικούτων καὶ πάντων· καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυ-  
 μάζοιμι, εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ.  
 καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰσαῦθις, ὅταν βούλῃ, διέξιμεν·  
 45 νῦν δ' ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι | τρέπεσθαι. Ἄλλ', ἦν 362  
 δ' ἐγὼ, οὕτω χρῆ ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ  
 οἶπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλιᾷ τῷ καλῷ  
 χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα.

ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆμεν.

## NOTES.

**Πρωταγόρας ἢ σοφισταί· ἐνδεικτικός.** This is how the title appears in B, except that *ἐνδεικτικός* (which is absent in T) is apparently from a later hand<sup>1</sup>. Plato probably called the dialogue *Πρωταγόρας* (compare the titles *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, etc.—the majority of the dialogues are named after an interlocutor): the words *ἢ σοφισταί* and *ἐνδεικτικός* were added by Thrasyllus, whose date is about the Christian era. The *Protagoras* is the sole example of an ‘endeictic’ dialogue: it is so called because it was thought to be an arraignment (*ἐνδειξις*) of the Sophists. That this is the meaning of *ἐνδεικτικός*, and not ‘probative’, can be inferred from the fact that Albinus used *ἐλεγκτικός* in its place (*εἰσαγωγή εἰς τοὺς Πλάτωνος διαλόγους* Ch. v. Cobet takes the right view: see his edition of *Diog. Laert.* III 51). The arrangement of the Platonic dialogues into tetralogies is also probably due to Thrasyllus. The *Protagoras* is the second dialogue of the sixth tetralogy, the others being (1) *Euthydemus*, (3) *Gorgias*, (4) *Meno*. See Grote’s *Plato*, Vol. I p. 158 foll.

### CHAPTER I.

Socrates meets a friend, who asks him to describe his interview with *Protagoras*.

1. **πότεν—ῶραν.** The opening words of Cicero’s translation of 309 A the *Protagoras* are preserved by Priscian (VI 63): “quid tu? unde tandem appares, o Socrate? an id quidem dubium non est, quin ab

<sup>1</sup> B denotes the Bodleian MS=Bekker’s  $\mathfrak{B}$ : T a manuscript in the library of St Mark’s at Venice (append. class. 4 cod. 1)=Bekker’s t. The former is the best representative of the MSS of the first class: the latter is supposed by Schanz to be the source of all the MSS of the second class.

Alcibiade?" ἤ=Latin an? introduces a second question intended to forestall Socrates' answer to the first: compare Apol. 26 B πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κτλ.;

2. **κυνηγεσίου—ῶραν.** For the metaphor in *κυνηγεσίου* Sauppe quotes Soph. 222 D τῆ τῶν ἐρώτων θήρα τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικας, οὕτω προσέσχεσ and Xen. Mem. I 2. 24 Ἀλκιβιάδης—διὰ μὲν κάλλος—θηρώμενος κτλ. τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ῶραν (=τὸν ὠραῖον Ἀλκιβιάδην, cf. βίη Ἡρακλείη for βίαιος Ἡρακλῆς) is a slight *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* as in the English: 'From hunting, no doubt—after the young and blooming Alcibiades'. It was part of Socrates' habitual irony to pretend to be in love with young men of ability (cf. the words of Alcibiades in Symp. 216 D Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἰετὸν περὶ τούτους ἔστι καὶ ἐκπέπληκται and 216 E: see also *infra*, note on 310 A line 38).

3. **καὶ μὴν μοι καί.** καὶ μὴν is merely 'well' as in Phaedo 84 D καὶ μὴν—τάληθῆ σοι ἐρώ. The second καί goes with *πρώην*: 'well, it was only the other day that I saw him etc.' In the next line καλὸς ἀνὴρ is in the predicate: the readings of Bekker (*ἀνὴρ*) and Athenaeus (*ὁ ἀνὴρ*) are less good. ἀνὴρ μέντοι is 'but yet a man' (*παῖς*). At the age of 18 an Athenian *εἰς ἀνδρας ἐνεγράφετο*.

5. **ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν—ὑποπιμπλάμενος.** αὐτοῖς=μόνοις is emphatic as in the usual αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν and therefore precedes ἡμῖν. ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι apologises for ἀνὴρ μέντοι: for this use of ὡς γε cf. Euthyd. 307 A ὡς γε πρὸς σέ τάληθῆ εἰρήσθαι and *infra* 339 E: καὶ in καὶ πάγων is 'and' not 'even'. ὑπο- in ὑποπιμπλάμενος is diminutive, like sub- in Latin. So in 312 A ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαιεν τι ἡμέρας.

7. **οὐ σὺ μέντοι.** "In interrogationibus haec particula" (*μέντοι*) "ita cum οὐ negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quaerit summam veritatis ingerit speciem" (Hoefer, de particulis Platonis, p. 34). The idiom is very frequent in Plato, e.g. Rep. I 339 B, Crat. 439 A, Theaet. 163 E. Translate 'You don't mean to say that *you* disapprove of Homer'.

309 B 8. **ὁς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἦβην κτλ.** Homer Il. xxiv 348 and Od. x 279 πρώτων ὑπνήθη τοῦπερ χαριεστάτη ἦβη. To insert τὴν (with Hirschig) before ἦβην would make the reference to Homer less precise. The line in Homer refers to Hermes, and Sauppe quotes Clement to shew that sculptors modelled their busts of Hermes after Alcibiades.



12. εὖ ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, sc. διακείσθαι. Socrates replies to his friend's second question (καὶ πῶς πρὸς σέ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;) first, and to his first question (ἤ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνεται;) second, in the words καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι, where οὖν marks the regression to the earlier inquiry. Both B and T read ἄρχομαι by mistake for ἔρχομαι: ἔρχομαι is found in a Vienna codex (suppl. phil. gr. 7) which Kral and Wohlrab place along with B in the first class of MSS.

16. οὐτε προσεῖχον—ἐπελανθανόμην τε. τε following οὐτε throws emphasis on the second clause: e.g. Apol. 26 C παντάπασι με φῆς οὐτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοῦ; τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. The idiom is very common in Plato (e.g. infra 347 E, 360 D, 361 E) and corresponds to neque—que or (more frequently) neque—et in Latin. For the interchange of pronouns ἐκείνου—αὐτοῦ see on 310 D.

21. καὶ πολὺ γε, i.e. καλλίονι ἐνέτυχον.

309 C

25. Ἀβδηρίτη. Abdera, on the coast of Thrace, was the birthplace of Democritus and of Protagoras. The reputation of the city for heaviness and stupidity seems not to be earlier than the age of Demosthenes: see pseudo-Dem. περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον 23 ὥσπερ ἐν Ἀβδηρίταις ἢ Μαρωνείταις ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν Ἀθηναίοις πολιτευόμενοι and Cic. ad Atticum VII 7. 4.

27. υἱέος. Schanz writes υἱέος in conformity with the general usage of inscriptions about Plato's time, but MSS upon the whole favour υἱέος: see the Editor's note on Crito 45 C.

28. τὸ σοφώτατον. So the MSS: Schanz and others read σοφώτερον, apparently the reading of Ficinus, who translates the word by *sapientius*. Socrates however is thinking of Protagoras, who is not σοφός, but σοφώτατος (line 32): the effect of the neuter τὸ σοφώτατον is to generalise the statement into a kind of adage. σοφώτερον would introduce a somewhat frigid comparison between Alcibiades and Protagoras in respect of wisdom; and it should also be noted that the MSS reading σοφώτατον was more likely to be changed to σοφώτερον by mistake than vice versa. There may be an allusion to some proverbial form of speech resembling that in Theognis 255 κάλλιστον τὸ δικαίτατον· λῶστον δ' ὑγαίνειν κτλ.: cf. also the Scholium referred to in Gorg. 451 E. The sentiment is an interesting anticipation of the Stoic paradoxes as to the beauty of the wise man.

30. ἀλλ' ἤ expresses surprise and interest: 'What! have you just left etc.' So in Gorg. 447 A ἀλλ' ἤ τὸ λεγόμενον κατόπιν

ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν; Presently μέν οὖν is as usual corrective: see on Apol. 26 B.

309 D 33. σφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. The interest is sustained by reserving the name of Protagoras to the end.

310 A 37. πάνυ γε πολλά καὶ εἰπών κτλ. Sauppe places a comma after πάνυ γε, but it suits the rapid movement of the dialogue better to take πάνυ with πολλά.

38. τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω. Literally 'why didn't you relate', i.e. 'tell us at once'. So in 317 D τί οὖν—οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν; This construction of τί οὐ and τί οὖν οὐ is common in animated conversational style, especially with the second person: e.g. Gorg. 503 B τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἐφρασας τίς ἐστίν; = φράσον ὅτι τάχιστα—οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις φράξω as Thompson remarks.

τὴν ξυνοουσίαν recalls συγγεγονώς in line 36. The continual use of the words συνείναι, συγγίγνεσθαι, πλησιάξαι, ἰέναι ἐπί, ἐρᾶν and the like to denote the relation between learner and teacher in Plato's dialogues depends upon the conception of the philosophical impulse as ἔρως: see Symp. 210.

39. ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί. The slave was doubtless in attendance on the Friend.

42. ἀκούητε. From this, as well as from ἡμεῖς and ἀκούετε, it appears that the Friend was not the only listener.

44. διπλῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ χάρις. The expression is almost proverbial: cf. (with Schneidewin on Soph. Phil. 1370) Eur. Rhesus 162—163 παντὶ γὰρ προσκείμενον κέρδος πρὸς ἔργω τὴν χάριν τίκτει διπλῆν, and Eur. Suppl. 333—334 τῷδ' ἐτ' εἰρηκας καλῶς καί μοι· διπλοῦν δὲ χάριμα γίγνεται τόδε.

## CHAPTER II.

Socrates begins his story. Hippocrates called on him at an early hour and entreated him to apply to Protagoras on his behalf.

1. ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου. ὄρθρος βαθύς is the period just before daybreak: ὄρθρος is the morning twilight, and βαθύς implies that it was more dark than light: Crito 43 A. A similar use of βαθύς is seen in the expressions βαθεῖα νύξ and βαθεῖα ἑσπέρα.

2. Ἴπποκράτης—Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός. Hippocrates is known only from this dialogue. δέ without preceding μέν is regular in such twofold descriptions of a person: Sauppe refers to Aesch. Pers. 151 μήτηρ βασιλέως, βασιλεία δ' ἐμή and II dt. VII 10 πατρὶ τῷ σῷ,

ἀδελφεῷ δὲ ἐμῷ Δαρείῳ, ἡγόμενον. The use of δέ in *māλλον δέ* = 'vel potius' is the same.

5. ἦει ἐπειγόμενος. So B<sup>1</sup>: neither in the 3rd singular of such forms nor elsewhere do Plato's MSS always avoid hiatus. Schanz (Vol. XII p. xv) would insert the *ν ἐφέλκυστικόν* in such forms before a vowel, unless a pause follows.

9. Ἴπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος. We have followed Heindorf in printing a full stop after *οὗτος*. Heindorf (following Ficinus) correctly takes the words as an aside; Socrates recognises Hippocrates by his voice. The neuter comparative of *νέος* regularly implies that the new is worse than the old: see on Euthyphr. 2 A.

10. εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε. Compare Ar. Knights 186 *μῶν ἐκ καλῶν εἰ κάγαθῶν; μὰ τοὺς θεούς, εἰ μὴ 'κ πονηρῶν γε* and Blaydes in loc. The idiom originally meant 'unless by *νεώτερα* you mean *ἀγαθά*', which would be a contradiction in terms, since *νεώτερον* is *κακόν*. Preceded by *οὐδέν* it has come to mean little more than 'except good'.

12. πρῶην: see 309 D *τρίτην γε ἦδη ἡμέραν*.

14. ἔσπερας γε: *χθές* is unnecessary, as the Athenians counted the interval between two sunsets as one day (Kroschel, referring to Varro ap. Gell. Noct. Att. III 2. 4).

ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος. The *σκίμπος* was a low stool or bed. According to a Scholiast on Ar. Clouds 254 the word means properly a 'lame stool' (*χωλῶν κραββάτιον*) and is connected with *σκιμπάζειν* = *χωλαίνειν*. *ἐπιψηλαφῶ* is followed by the accusative where it does not (as here) contain the idea of search for, e.g. in Rep. II 360 A (*ἐπιψηλαφῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον*).

17. Οἰνός. Oenoe (probably = the Wine-country) was a *δήμος* in the *φυλὴ Ἴπποβοιωτῆς*, near Eleutheræ, on the road to Thebes. The slave had endeavoured to escape across the frontier into Boeotia. There was another *δήμος* of the same name near Marathon, belonging to the *φυλὴ Αἰαντῆς*.

19. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον. For this sense of *ἔρχομαι* ('come back') Heindorf quotes Lysias *ὑπὲρ Μαντιθέου* § 4 *ἀλλ' ἦλθομεν πρὶν τοὺς ἀπὸ Φυλῆς εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταλθεῖν πρότερον πένθ' ἡμέραις*.

21. ἀδελφός. So (not *ἀδελφός*) the MSS. The article is not rarely omitted with names denoting relation, as we usually omit it with 'father' and 'mother'. See Kühner's *Griechische Grammatik* II p. 522. The force of *ἔτι* is 'late though it was'. *δέ* is commonly omitted after *ἔπειτα* and *εἶτα*: so *infra* 350 D *πρῶτον*

μὴν γάρ—ἐπειτα: Symp. 211 A πρῶτον μὲν αἰεὶ οὖν—ἐπειτα οὐ τῆ μὲν καλῶν, τῆ δ' αἰσχροῦν.

310 D 23. **πύρρῳ τῶν νυκτῶν.** The plural is idiomatic: cf. Symp. 217 D διελεγόμεν αἰεὶ πύρρῳ τῶν νυκτῶν: Ar. Clouds 2 ᾧ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ τὸ χρέμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὅσον. So μέσαι νύκτες for 'midnight'. "In quibus loquendi formulis" remarks Heindorf "νύκτες horas nocturnas denotant".

24. **ὁ ὕπνος ἀνήκεν** is modelled on Homer (e.g. Il. 11 71 ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνήκεν), but Plato gives a different turn to ἀνήκεν by adding ἐκ τοῦ κόπου, where ἐκ is 'from', not 'after' (as Stallbaum thinks). Note presently that οὕτω to introduce the apodosis after participles is especially common in Plato: cf. infra 314 C, 326 D.

26. **ἀνδρείαν.** ἀνδρείος occurs in much the same sense in Meno 81 D οὐδὲν κωλύει—τἄλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρείος ᾗ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν. σοί is emphatic and should therefore be accented, like σέ in line 31.

27. **ἀδικεῖ.** ἀδικεῖν is often used of a past injury because the injury is regarded as continuing till atonement is made: see on Crito 50 C.

30. **ἂν αὐτῷ διδώς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθης ἐκείνον.** For the variation of pronouns cf. Euthyphr. 14 D ἀλλά μοι λέξον τίς αὐτῆ ἢ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοῦς καὶ δίδουαι ἐκείνοις; supra 309 B and infra 318 C. The change is most frequent where the second pronoun is different in case from the first: compare Classen on Thuc. I 132. 5. Cobet ejects the words καὶ πείθης ἐκείνον, but they are supported by the parallel expression of 311 D ἂν μὲν ἐξικνηῖται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν.

31. **ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί:** i.e. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί. The exclamation is common: see Blaydes on Ar. Plutus 1.

32. **ἐν τούτῳ εἶη.** Cf. 354 E and 356 D εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῶν ᾗν τὸ εὖ πράττειν.

310 E 33. **οὔτε τῶν φίλων.** The English idiom would lead us to expect οὔτε τῶν τῶν φίλων: but in Greek the double article is avoided by substituting 'my friends' for 'my friends' property'. Analogous is the usage known as *comparatio compendiarum*, e.g. κόμαι Χαρίτεσσιν ὁμοίαι (Il. xvii 51), where 'the Graces' is put for 'the Graces' hair'.

**ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα.** See on Apol. 23 B. ταῦτα=διὰ ταῦτα is frequent in Plato and Aristophanes.

37. **ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν.** Probably about 445 B.C., if

the date of action of the dialogue is 433—432. (See *Introd.* p. xxxvi.) Protagoras went to Thurii in 443 B.C. being charged by Pericles to draw up a code of laws for the new colony.

41. **Καλλία τῷ Ἱππονίκου.** Callias, son of Hipponicus, belonged to one of the richest families in Athens (*infra* 337 D *αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως—τὸν μέγιστον καὶ δλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε*). His devotion to the 'Sophists' in general is remarked upon in *Apol.* 20 A *ἀνδρὶ δὲ τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἱππονίκου* (cf. *Crat.* 391 B): but he seems to have been particularly attached to the doctrines of Protagoras: see *Theaet.* 164 E *οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μάλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου* (i.e. *Πρωταγόρου λόγων*) *ἐπίτροπος*. One of his two sons (*Apol.* 20 A), Protarchus, appears as an interlocutor in the *Philebus*. In 393—392 Callias was associated with Iphicrates in the command of the Athenian forces at Corinth, and as late as 371 we find him acting as ambassador to Sparta (*Xen. Hell.* vi 4). It appears that he spent all his money and died in actual want (*Athenaena* XII 52).

42. **μήπω, ὡγαθέ.** The MSS have *μήπω ἀγαθέ*: probably the archetype had *μήπωγαθέ*, by a natural mistake. Cobet rejects *ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν*, reading *μήπω γε*, on the ground that with *μήπω γε* the Greek idiom does not repeat the verb: but there is no proof that the verb could not be expressed with *μήπω* (without *γε*).

43. **δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν.** Herwerden needlessly suggests that *ἐξαναστάντες* should be read, or *εἰς τὴν αὐλήν* rejected: *εἰς τὴν αὐλήν* goes with *ἐξαναστῶμεν*: cf. *ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποι ἐξαναστῆναι* in *Theages* 129 B. *δεῦρο* we should translate by 'here': 'let us rise and go out into the court here'. Classic Greek does not admit of *τῆδε* in such a case: see Cobet's *Novae Lectiones* p. 91.

### CHAPTER III.

Socrates cross-examines Hippocrates as to his purpose in putting himself under Protagoras, and elicits from him that his object is liberal education.

1. **ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν.** For *ἀναστάντες* after *ἐξαναστῶμεν* cf. *infra* 314 C where *ἐπιστάντες* is followed by *στάντες*, 328 E *ἐπεκιδιδάξει—ἐξεδίδαξεν*: 351 C *διεξελλθόντας—ἐξελλθεῖν*: *Phaedo* 104 D *ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δῆ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι—εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἢ περιμττή*; *Euthyd.* 281 C *οὐκ ἐλάττω πρᾶττων ἐλάττω ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι*,

ἐλάττω δὲ ἀμαρτάνων ἦττον ἂν κακῶς πράττοι and Rep. I 336 E : Phaedo 59 B : Crito 44 D : Crat. 399 A—B.

311 B 2. ἀποπειρώμενος—διεσκόπουν. ῥώμη of strength of will and resolution (cf. ἀνδρεία above 310 D) as in Polit. 259 C πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ ῥώμην. γνώμης, the suggestion of Hoenebeck, would be much less forcible and exact.

8. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κτλ. ἂν goes with ἀπεκρίνω in line 13. The application of the similes follows in D, and each illustration contains two subordinate protases, viz. (in B) (1) εἰ ἐπεινεῖς—ἐκείνω, (2) εἰ τίς σε ἤρετο, and (in C) (1) εἰ δὲ—ἐκείνους, (2) εἰ τίς σε ἤρετο. With this multiplication of protases Heindorf compares Meno 74 B μανθάνεις γὰρ που ὅτι οὐτωσὶ ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστὶ σχῆμα, ᾧ Μένων; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἰ σοι εἶπεν ἄπερ ἐγὼ, πότερον σχῆμα ἢ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι; εἶπες δὴ που ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι. The reasoning from analogy is quite in Socrates' style: see for example Gorg. 448 B foll.

9. Ἴπποκράτη—τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν. It is unnecessary (with Naber) to bracket Ἴπποκράτη. Hippocrates, the founder of medical science, born about 460 B.C. in Cos, was at the height of his renown about the year 400. He is referred to also in Phaedrus 270 C (εἰ μὲν οὖν Ἴπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πείθεσθαι) as holding the view that the human body could not be understood apart from ἡ τοῦ ὄλου φύσις. The expression τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν constituted a sort of medical degree, since it marked a man as one of the 'sons of Asclepius'—a recognised school of medicine in Cos and Cnidus. See Blümner Griechische Privatalterthümer p. 354.

311 C 15. Πολύκλειτον—Φειδίαν. As Hippocrates was the leading doctor, so Polyclitus and Phidias were the foremost sculptors of the fifth century B.C. in Greece. Polyclitus is not elsewhere mentioned in Plato (except infra 328 C): according to Pliny (Nat. Hist. XXXIV 55) he was born at Sicyon, but Argos was the centre of his school. Phidias is referred to in Meno 91 D οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν and in Hipp. Maior 290 A—D.

21. εἶεν—παρὰ δὲ δὴ. εἶεν is explained by Timaeus in his Lexicon Vocum Platonicarum as expressing συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφή δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. According to the testimony of ancient grammarians the particle was pronounced εἶεν with inter-

vocalic aspiration as in ταῶς. See note on Apol. 18 E. The rough breathing may possibly be due to popular etymology from εἶα ἔν, ἔν being used as in ἐν μὲν τόδ' ἤδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων Aesch. Eum. 589. In the best MS of the Republic (Paris A) εἶέν is regularly written, and the same orthography is found in B, e.g. Gorg. 466 C. δὲ δῆ is used to introduce the application as in 312 E. See also note on 357 A infra.

24. ἂν μὲν ἐξικνήται—καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν, sc. ταῦτα 311 D  
τελοῦντες or ἀναλίσκοντες. Heindorf compares Xen. Mem. III 9. 11 ὁπότε γὰρ τις ὁμολογήσειε τοῦ μὲν ἄρχοντος εἶναι τὸ προστάπτειν ὃ τι χρῆ ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἄρχομένου τὸ πείθεσθαι, ἐπεδείκνυεν ἐν τε νηὶ τὸν μὲν ἐπιστάμενον ἄρχοντα, τὸν δὲ ναύκληρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντας πειθομένους τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ—καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, οἷς ὑπάρχει τι ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον, ἂν μὲν αὐτοὶ ἠγῶνται ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (sc. τούτους ἐπιμελομένους), εἰ δὲ μή κτλ.

27. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες. ἄγε, φέρε, ἰδέ, εἰπέ are not rarely used in addressing subjects in the plural. Compare Ar. Peace 383 εἰπέ μοι τί πάσχετ' ὦνδρες; Pl. Euthyd. 283 B εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι. The exhortation or command is in general primarily addressed to one man: contrast however infra 330 B and Lach. 186 E σὺ δ', ὦ Λάχης καὶ Νικία, εἴπετον ἡμῖν ἐκάτερος.

30. ἄλλο γε, i.e. other than the name 'Protagoras'. It is more 311 E  
in accordance with Plato's usage to make the first question end with the first ἀκούομεν, and regard the ὥσπερ clause as introducing the second question τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; This second question is rejected by Cobet as spurious, but the punctuation which we have adopted seems to remove the difficulty. The ὥσπερ clause defines in advance the meaning of τοιοῦτον: for this and for the asyndeton compare Sophist. 258 B—C πότερον οὖν—δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον; ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα ἢν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἢν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν μὴ καλὸν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ ταῦτόν ἢν τε καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἐν; Crat. 394 A—B: Theact. 172 D with Heindorf's note. See also 330 A ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου, where the same punctuation should be adopted. In line 33 the MSS read ἠκούομεν by mistake for ἀκούομεν.

33. σοφιστήν—εἶναι. On σοφιστής see infra, note on 312 C. γε implies that Protagoras may be a sophist only in name. εἶναι is frequently used with verbs of naming: compare Lach. 192 A ὃ ἐν

πᾶσιν ὀνομάξεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι. Cobet's suggestion to read εἶεν, ἔφη, ὡς for εἶναι, ἔφη. ὡς is ingenious but needless.

36. αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ—παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν, sc. τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;  
 312 A 38. ὑπέφαινεν τι ἡμέρας. ὑποφαίνει ἡμέρα is used, as Heindorf says, *de die illucescente*. Here τι ἡμέρας = 'something of day', 'some daylight'.

39. εἰ μὲν τι—ἔοικεν. Heindorf remarks that Stephanus' conjecture τοῦτο ἔοικεν is needless, the vague indefinite subject being frequently omitted. Comp. Crat. 387 D εἶπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν μέλλει ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι. Phaedo 99 E ἕως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάξω τρόπον τιὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν.

41. εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτόν. εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας goes with παρέχων: cf. Symp. 179 B ἰκανὴν μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται—εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Young men of fashion were fond of looking to Greek, as opposed to Athenian, public opinion. The MSS have αὐτόν, but the use of the third personal reflexive pronoun for the first and second in the singular number does not seem to be certain in Plato: and it is simplest to suppose that σ fell out after Ἕλληνας: Schanz Vol. VII p. xii.

44. ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην. οὐ goes closely with τοιαύτην, and μὴ is virtually 'perhaps' (originally 'lest' as in ὄρα μὴ Theaet. 145 B): 'but perhaps after all (ἄρα) this is not the kind of learning which etc.' Compare Euthyd. 290 E ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν and Apol. 25 A ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους. Meno 89 C μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογήσαμεν. In all of these passages it is better to take μὴ in this way than as equivalent to Latin *nisi*. From this use of μὴ grew up the use of μήποτε = 'perhaps', frequent in Aristotle and later, e.g. Eth. Nic. X 2 1173<sup>a</sup> 22 μὴ ποτ' οὐ λέγουσιν τὸ αἴτιον.

- 312 B 46. οἷαπερ ἢ παρὰ is the reading of T: B has οἷα περι. The γραμματισταί of Athens were Schoolmasters, who besides teaching reading and writing (cf. infra 326 D) translated (ἐρμηνεύειν) Homer and interpreted his γλώτται. They were distinct from the γραμματεῖς κοί or κριτικοί who pursued more scientific literary and grammatical studies. The κιθαριστής and γραμματιστής between them taught μουσική, and the παιδοτρίβης γυμναστική; and μουσική and γυμναστική were the two parts of παιδεία or liberal education: Rep. II 376 E.

48. ἐπὶ τέχνῃ—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ: cf. 315 A ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μαθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος. The distinction between professional and liberal (ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει) education is fre-



quently emphasized by Plato (see especially *Laws* I 643 D): his word for the latter is always *παιδεία*, cf. *Gorg.* 485 A, *Rep.* VI 492 C. The 'arts' are throughout the *Republic* looked on as *βάνανσοι*, and unfit for men whose souls are free.

## CHAPTER IV.

Socrates continues his cross-examination, and reduces Hippocrates to *ἀπορία*.

3. *παρασχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρὶ σοφιστῆι*. The word *παρέχω* 312 C is often used of putting oneself in the hands of a doctor: compare *Gorg.* 456 B *φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἱατρῷ*. *ἀνήρ* is regularly used (mostly in a complimentary sense, real or feigned) with words which denote one's profession, standing or the like, e.g. *ἀνὴρ μάντις*, *ἀνὴρ νομοεύς*, *ἄνδρες δικασταί*; compare *Euthyphr.* 15 D. For *παρασχεῖν* Cobet reads *παρέχειν*, but if MSS can be trusted, Plato used the aorist infinitive with *μέλλω* tolerably often: see Schanz Preface to *Symposium* p. vii.

7. *οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι*. So<sup>5</sup> in *Gorgias* 520 B *οὐκ ἐγχευρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι* (their pupils) *δ' αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν*. Here Socrates uses the most general form of expression because ex hypothesi nothing is yet known as to the sophist: cf. infra 330 C *ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγματι τί ἐστὶν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα*; Cases like *Crito* 53 D *οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον εἶν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα*; are somewhat different and contain a slight admixture of contempt: see the Editor's note in loc.

8. *οἶμαί γ' εἰδέναι*. Hippocrates *οἶεται εἰδέναι μὴ εἰδώς*: he is thus, according to Socrates, in the worst of all states: compare *Apol.* ch. VI foll. Socrates now proceeds to convict him of ignorance.

10. *ὥσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει—τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα*. Hippocrates derives *σοφιστής* from *σοφός* and *(ἐπ)ιστ(αμαι)* "quasi sit ὁ τῶν σοφῶν ἴστης" (Heindorf, comparing the derivation of "Ἡφαιστος in *Crat.* 407 C from *Φάεος ἴστωρ*). The correct derivation is perhaps given by *Suidas* s.v.: *σοφιστής καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος ὡς σοφίζων* (cf. *σωφρονίζω*=make *σώφρων*), but *-ίζω* is very elastic in meaning, and *σοφίζω* may very well mean 'play the *σοφός*'.

14. *τῶν τί σοφῶν*. *τῶν πρὸς τί σοφῶν* would be more precise, 312 D but the accusative of reference is preferred for brevity. For the construction Kroschel compares *Theages* 125 C *τῶν τί σοφῶν*

συνουσία φῆς σοφὸς εἶναι τοὺς τυράννους; where however σοφῶν is masculine. The neuter of σοφός is not here used ironically as in Theaet. 157 C παραλίθην ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.

17. ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν. Heusde suggested ἐπιστήμων after ἐστίν, but the sense can be supplied out of the -ιστής of σοφιστής, according to the derivation of the word just given: the full sense is as it were ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν (σοφ)ιστής.

18. τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ. There is no need to change the verb to ἀποκρινάμεθα, as was done by Bekker to suit ξριτο: compare infra 354 A εἰ ἐροίμεθα—φάτεν ἂν and Phaedr. 259 A εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν—δικαίως ἂν καταγελῶεν.

ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης. These words are not of course part of the imaginary questioner's interrogation, but are spoken by Socrates to help out Hippocrates' answer. Socrates suggests that Hippocrates should say that the sophist is ἐπιστάτης of some sort of ἐργασία, but in order that the answer should come from Hippocrates himself, he substitutes for the desired answer: '(The sophist is) ἐπιστάτης—of what kind of ἐργασία?' Hippocrates then replies by explaining the ἐργασία, viz. τὸ ποιῆσαι δευδὸν λέγειν. The full grammatical construction would be ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης (ὅτι ἐστίν ἀποκρινάμεθα ἂν αὐτῷ); If we take this view, it is not necessary to insert ἐστίν after ἐπιστάτης (with Hirschig).

Note that ἐπιστάτης is substituted here for ἐπιστήμων: it is clear from Crito 47 B that Plato connected the two words—probably because both contain the syllable -ιστ- as in ἴστωρ: he frequently plays on the similarity of form between ἐπίσταμαι ἐπιστήμη and ἐπιστατεῖν: see the Editor's note on ἐπιστάτη καὶ ἐπαῖοντι in the Crito l.c.

19. τί ἂν εἴποιμεν—ὦ Σώκρατες; Hippocrates is on the verge of ἀπορία, and merely throws out his suggestion ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δευδὸν λέγειν for what it is worth. The words ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δευδὸν λέγειν are strictly speaking a reply to the question of Socrates ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; for τοῦ ποιῆσαι δευδὸν λέγειν answers ποίας ἐργασίας, and but for the intervening clause (τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι;) the word ἐπιστάτην would have been in the nominative.

Thus explained, the MSS reading need not be changed. The next best view is to read (with Schanz) τί ἂν <ει> εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δευδὸν λέγειν;

23. ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστῆς κτλ. Compare Gorg. 449 E and 451 A foll., where much the same reasoning is employed to discover τί ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, περὶ οὗ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται (Gorg. 451 D). Rhetoric and Sophistic were regarded by Plato as sisters: cf. Gorg. 464 B foll. The clause ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστῆς κτλ. is logically the protasis to εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστῆς κτλ.. see on 311 E above.

25. εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστῆς. For εἶεν and δὲ δὴ see on 311 C 312 E above.

27. δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι. Stahl's emendation (ἐπίστασθαι for ἐπίσταται), which had occurred to us independently, seems to be certain. Most editions read ἡ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπίσταται; inserting ἡ before δῆλον (with Heindorf) and giving the words to Socrates, but it is surely more natural to regard them as giving Hippocrates' reply to Socrates' question, in which case δῆλον ὅτι is right. The MS reading ἐπίσταται gives a *non sequitur*; for the harpist makes one δευρὸς λέγειν περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα i.e. περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, not περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμων-ἐστίν i.q. ἐπίσταται. The next sentence τί δὴ ἐστι τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτὸς τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν ὁ σοφιστῆς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ (sc. ἐπίστασθαι); in no way invalidates the reading ἐπίστασθαι: it is everywhere *assumed* in the Platonic writings that he who makes others know has knowledge himself: see for example Alcib. I 111 B οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι χρῆ τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὅτιοῦν αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναί; ἡ οὐ; πῶς γὰρ οὐ; and *ibid.* 113 C, 118 C.

30. οὐκέτι. See below on οὐκέτι in 321 D.

## CHAPTER V.

Socrates points out that Hippocrates is running a grave risk in submitting himself to one of the 'Sophists' without knowing what 'Sophist' means.

3. ἡ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα κτλ. For ἡ compare Crito 50 E ἡ πρὸς 313 A μὲν ἄρα σοὶ τὸν πατέρα—πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι; and for the general form of the sentence Apol. 28 E εἰ ὅτε μὲν—τότε μὲν—τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος—ἐνταῦθα δὲ, Meno 94 C—D, Gorg. 512 A: see the Editor's note on Apol. 1.c.

5. πολλὰ ἂν περισκέψω: but εἶδει in line 4 and παρεκάλεις in 8. The effect is to represent the process of reflection by oneself as prior to consultation with friends. Heindorf on Gorg. 514 D quotes a

parallel from the Theaetetus (144 E): ἀτὰρ εἰ, νῶν ἐχόντων ἐκατέρου λύραν, ἐφή αὐτὰς ἠρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστευόμεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθα ἂν (i.e. should have inquired *first*) εἰ μουσικὸς ὦν λέγοι;

9. τὴν ψυχὴν. Compare (with Heindorf) Rep. ix 583 E δ μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφοτέρα εἶσται. ἐν ᾧ presently is like ἐν τούτῳ in 310 D where see note: Heindorf cites Eur. Iph. T. 1057 καὶ τᾶμ' ἂν ὑμῶν ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχειν ἢ μὴδὲν εἶναι. For καὶ ἐν ᾧ we should at first sight expect καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ: for the Greek idiom is Relative+Anaphoric pronoun, not Relative+Relative when the two pronouns have the same antecedent and are connected by a conjunction: e.g. Gorg. 452 D τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο δ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι—καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ: see the Editor's note on Apol. 40 A. Here however the fact that the relative precedes its antecedent (δ δὲ περὶ πλείους—περὶ δὲ τούτου) makes the rule inoperative; and there are other exceptions: e.g. Rep. II 374 B καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς δ πεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βλου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος—καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι, and Theaet. 192 B καὶ δ οἶδεν καὶ δ αἰσθάνεται (where however Bonitz rejects the second δ, perhaps rightly).

313 B 14. τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ. Heindorf's suggestion τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ τῷ ξένῳ would convey a somewhat different meaning, viz. 'this arrival, the foreigner'. The presence of ἀφικομένῳ renders the article after τούτῳ unnecessary: cf. infra 337 E τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος. There is some contempt in τούτῳ=isti (see note on Apol. 45 A), and much scorn in τὴν σὴν ψυχὴν, repeated slowly at the end of the clause.

15. ὄρθριος: the MSS have ὄρθριον by mistake. The adjectival construction of this word is found in Laws XII 961 B δεῖν δὲ ὄρθριον εἶναι τὸν σύλλογον.

20. γινώσκεις. The present is regularly used of being acquainted with a person: e.g. Phaedo 60 A Ξανθίππη, γινώσκεις γάρ: Theaet. 144 C ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γινώσκεις αὐτόν. γιγνώσκω. In Plato the perfect is generally used of knowing *things*: e.g. Apol. 23 B ὅστις—ἔγνωκεν ὅτι κτλ., Euthyphr. 2 C τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκέναι.

οὔτε διελέξαί οὐδεπώποτε, sc. αὐτῷ: cf. on 313 A line 9 above.

313 C 22. ᾧ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν is wrongly rejected by Cobet.

The words are to be taken closely with τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν φαίνει ἀγνοῶν: that Hippocrates should entrust himself to that of which he knows nothing is the climax of Socrates' rebuke.

23. **ἔοικεν**: sc. εἶναι, i. e. be true (not ἐμὲ ἀγνοεῖν, which is doubtful Greek for *ἔοικα ἀγνοεῖν*). The subject is simply 'it', as in Rep. I 333 C where *ἔοικεν* is similarly for *ἔοικεν εἶναι*.

25. **τυγχάνει ὦν—ψυχὴ τρέφεται**. *τυγχάνει ὦν* is virtually equivalent to 'really is': cf. Gorg. 468 D *οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὄν κάκιον*, and note on Euthyphr. 4 E. The *ἔμπορος* is a travelling merchant who trades on a larger scale than the retail dealer or *κάπηλος*: see Rep. II 371 D ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους; The same account of the Sophist as *ἔμπορος τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα* (Soph. 231 E) is given in Soph. 223 C—224 E.

26. **φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις**. We follow Schleiermacher in giving these words to Socrates. Turner judiciously points out that *γὰρ* in *ἔμοιγε* is only appropriate if Socrates speaks the words, and that Hippocrates could hardly assent till he knew what *τροφή ψυχῆς* meant.

28. **ὅπως γε μὴ—ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἔξαπατήσει**. *πωλεῖν* is 'to have on sale': 'to sell' is *ἀποδίδοσθαι*. Cobet, *Novae Lectiones* p. 159. For *ἔξαπατήσει* the MSS have *ἔξαπατήση*, but the 1st aor. conj. is very doubtful in Plato after *ὅπως μὴ* (see on the whole question Kühner's *Griechische Grammatik* II p. 899), and final *-η* and *-ει* are frequently confused in the MSS.

30. **ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος**. *ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος* together 313 D make a plural, and according to strict logic would require a plural article; but *ὁ* is written by attraction instead of the grammatically impossible *οἱ*. Compare Symp. 186 C *ὁ διαγιγνώσκων—τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔρωτα*: infra 355 E *τὰ ὄνματα—τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρόν*.

42. **τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων**. *τυγχάνεις* has sunk to a mere 313 E copula. It is not necessary to insert *ὦν* after *ἐπιστήμων*, although it is only in a few cases that *τυγχάνω* (in this sense) occurs in Plato's MSS without the participle expressed, viz. Phaedr. 263 C *μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει*: Gorg. 502 B *εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον*: Rep. II 369 B *τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής*: Alc. I 129 A *ῥάδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γυνῶναι ἑαυτὸν*: ibid. 133 A *ἐκείνο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον*. In these cases (as here in the

Protagoras) it is easy to suppose that the participle has fallen out from 'lipography': but in Hipp. Maior (perhaps pseudo-Platonic) 300 A and in Laws XI 918 C and Timaeus 61 C the participle cannot be so easily supplied: and that the construction without the participle was used in every-day speech appears from Ar. Eccl. 1141 *καὶ τῶν θεατῶν ἔτις εὖνους τυγχάνει*. See Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 342.

45. *περὶ τοῖς φιλάτοις*. τὰ φίλτατα is used here of the soul's health as in Gorg. 513 A *σὺν τοῖς φιλάτοις ἡ ἀρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει*.

314 A 46. *κυβέυης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης*. Cobet rejects *τε καὶ κινδυνεύης*, but Plato often puts metaphor and interpretation side by side. Compare infra 314 B *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα* (where Deuschle wrongly rejected *καὶ μαθόντα*): 334 D *σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει*. Euthyd. 297 C *πολὸν γὰρ πού εἰμι φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἶδς τε ἦν τῇ τε ὕδρα διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρία οὖση καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνιέση, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν ἀποτμηθεῖ τοῦ λόγου, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μῆδς, καὶ καρκίνω τιγὶ ἐτέρω σοφιστῆ...δς ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ λέγων καὶ δάκνων κτλ.*: Lach. 194 C *χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν*: Theaet. 174 C *εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων*. See also note on *τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας* in Euthyphr. 3 A.

49. *παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου*: so B. The *κάπηλος* is put in the foreground as the most usual seller of *σιτία* and *ποτά*: the article is expressed only once, because the *κάπηλος* and *ἐμπορος* both belong to the same genus 'merchants': cf. Hdt. IV 71 *τὸν οἰνοχόον καὶ μάγειρον καὶ ἵπποκόμον καὶ διήκονον καὶ ἀγγελιηφόρον κτλ.* There is no sufficient ground for bracketing the words *παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου* as is done by Schanz, nor for reading *παρὰ του* (with T) and omitting *καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου*, as Hermann did.

*ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις*: i.e. other than our own bodies. Cf. 311 E *τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν*; It need not be implied that the body is itself an *ἀγγεῖον* (viz. of soul), though the notion is not unplatonic, and kindred expressions are found in later philosophy, e.g. Marcus Aurel. x 38 *τὸ περιεκείμενον ἀγγειῶδες καὶ τὰ ὄργανα ταῦτα τὰ περιπεπλασμένα* (said of the body).

314 B 56. *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα*. *λαμβάνειν ἐν* (not *εἰς*) as in Rep. VII 517 A *ἐλπίως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναντο λαβεῖν*: Soph. 243 C *ταῦτὸν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*. For *καὶ μαθόντα*,

which is explanatory of ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα, see note on κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης.

59. **νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον.** Heindorf quotes Eur. Andr. 80 γέρων ἐκείνος ὥστε σ' ὠφελεῖν παρών, and points out that whereas νεώτεροι ἢ ὥστε would deny altogether ἡ τοῦ διελέσθαι δύναμις: the words νέοι ὥστε are less strong "nobis nonnisi iuvenilis quaedam facultas suppetit ad tantam rem diiudicandam". The best mss of Plato read ταῦτόν, τοιοῦτον, τοσοῦτον, etc. in the great majority of cases rather than ταῦτό etc. Schanz (Preface to Laws, p. vi) thinks it probable that Plato always used the forms in -ν. In inscriptions of Plato's time τὸ αὐτό and τὸ αὐτόν occur side by side, but apparently only τοιοῦτον, τοσοῦτον. See Meisterhans Grammatik der Griechischen Inschriften<sup>2</sup> p. 122.

63. **Ἱππίας.** Hippias of Elis was one of the most accomplished and—if we may trust the Platonic writings—ostentatious of the Sophists. According to the Hippias Maior (285 B foll.) he claimed to be at home in all the learning of the day—in Astronomy, Geometry, Arithmetic, Philology, Music, Mythology, History and Archaeology. See Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen I<sup>4</sup> p. 956 foll.

64. **οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον.** Contrast Crat. 402 B 314 C οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος. Either construction is admissible. Prodicus of Ceos is repeatedly mentioned in the Platonic writings. A fellow-citizen of the poet Simonides (infra 339 E), he professed like Gorgias and Hippias to educate young men (Apol. 19 E, Theages 127 E, Rep. x 600 C) and received very large sums in return for his instruction together with the gratitude of his pupils. On one occasion, when in charge of a political mission from Ceos, he is said to have won great reputation in the βουλῇ at Athens for his conduct of public business, and to have given at the same time private lectures, which were popular and well paid (Hipp. Maior 282 C). He laid great stress on the importance of using words in their correct sense (ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων): see infra 337 A, 358 A, and Euthyd. 277 E, Charm. 163 D, Lach. 197 D; cf. also Phaedr. 267 B; but this was only taught (we are told) in his 50 drachma lecture; the impecunious Socrates had only paid one drachma and was not quite master of this subject (Crat. 384 B). Socrates is fond of professing himself a pupil of Prodicus, e.g. infra 341 A, Meno 96 D, Charm. 163 D. Prodicus wrote eulogies of Heracles and others (Symp. 177 B): the substance, if not the actual words, of his Apologue of Heracles at

the cross-roads is given by Xenophon Mem. II 1. 21. A scholiast on Rep. x 600 C says the Athenians put him to death by hemlock for corrupting the youth, but there is no other authority for this unlikely story. Compare Zeller 1<sup>4</sup> p. 952 foll.

## CHAPTER VI.

Socrates and Hippocrates proceed together to Callias' house.

1. **δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα.** This idiom seems not to occur elsewhere in Plato. We can hardly supply *ποιεῖν*: rather *δόξαν ταῦτα* is like *δόξαντα ταῦτα*, an accusative absolute, the singular verb being kept as in *ἔδοξε ταῦτα*. See Goodwin's Moods and Tenses (new Edition) p. 339 § 854.

2. **προθύρῳ.** The rooms of a Greek house opened on the cloisters surrounding the *αὐλή* or court: from the *αὐλή* a passage (*θυρωρεῖον*, so called because the porter's lodge was situated in it) led into the *πρόθυρον* or space in front of the main door (*αὐλειος θύρα* or *αὐλεία* without *θύρα*). Blümner, Griechische Privatalterthümer p. 147 ff.

**ἐπιστάντες διελεγόμεθα.** The situation recalls Symp. 175 A foll., where Socrates, on his way to Agathon's house, is discovered standing wrapt in thought in front of a neighbouring house.

5. **οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν.** *οὕτως* with the apodosis after participles is extremely common in Plato: see above on 310 D.

6. **στάντες.** For the dropping of the preposition after *ἐπιστάντες* see on 311 A. The Bodleian has *ἐστάντες*, but T *στάντες*: Schanz reads *ἐπιστάντες*, Cobet *ἐστῶτες*. Tr. 'we came to a stand and conversed'.

7. **δοκεῖ οὖν μοι.** Compare Phaedo 108 D *ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμὸς—τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ*: the construction is fairly common in Plato: see on Crito 43 D. To have a eunuch for porter was rare, and a mark of wealth: they were supposed to be more trustworthy than others and fetched a higher price in the East (Hdt. VIII 105).

314 D 8. **κινδυνεύει—ἄχθεσθαι.** Present, because the dialogue is narrated just after it took place (see 309 B), and as Protagoras is still with Callias, the stream of visitors probably continues. It is not quite clear why the number of the *sophists* should have made the porter annoyed *with the visitors*: unless the visitors themselves were sophists. Probably therefore *τοῖς φοιτῶσιν* means *τοῖς φοιτῶσιν*



σοφισταῖς: in the porter's judgment the house was already too full of sophists. φοιτᾶν implies frequent visitation: cf. Lach. 181 C χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερόν σε φοιτᾶν αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείου ἡγείσθαι.

10. ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν. There was a metal knocker (ρόπτρον, κόραξ, ἐπίσπαστρον) on the αἰλεις θύρα. Blümner Gr. Privalt. p. 149.

11. οὐ σχολή αὐτῷ. For αὐτῷ 'the master' cf. infra 315 B, Rep. I 327 B ἡρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη, and the Pythagorean αὐτὸς ἔφα 'ipse dixit'.

12. ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν. So B: T has ταῖν for τοῖν. Cobet has shewn that the dual feminine of the article is the same as the dual masculine: *Variae Lectiones* p. 70.

13. ἐκρούομεν, but ἐκρούσαμεν in line 10. Socrates pretends to be somewhat staggered by the rebuff.

14. ἐγκεκλημένης. So Bekker for ἐγκεκλειμένης of B: the Attic form is κλήω not κλείω: Cobet, *Var. Lect.* p. 159.

19. ἀνθρωπος. According to Ast, the Greeks sometimes used 314 E ἀνῆρ and ἀνθρωπος without the article of a definite person "sed ita ut vel contempionem vel reprehensionem aliquam simul indicarent". But in the cases quoted in support of this usage where the word is in an oblique case, the meaning is quite general like the English 'a man', e.g. Rep. X 595 C δεινὸν τινὰ λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα: Phaedo 98 B ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν χρώμενον: Soph. Phil. 1228 ἀπάταισιν αἰσχροῖς ἄνδρα καὶ δόλοισ ἐλών: Theaet. 155 D ἐάν σοι ἄνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν—συνεξερευνήσωμαι: it is therefore safer to suppose (with Schanz and most Platonic scholars) that where ἀνῆρ and ἀνθρωπος of the MSS can only be translated by 'the man', the rough breathing should be restored: e.g. infra 315 E and Phaedr. 267 A, 268 C: Rep. I 331 E.

21. προστώψ. The αὐλή was surrounded by cloisters. This προστώψον is doubtless that on which the passage from the πρόθυρον opened.

23. Πάραλος—Ἀντίμοιρος. The mother of Xanthippus and 315 A Paralus had once been the wife of Hipponicus, to whom she bare Callias: Plut. Pericl. xxiv 9. In 320 A as well as in Meno 94 B Plato remarks that Pericles was unable to teach the art of statesmanship to either of his two sons: cf. Alc. I 118 E τῷ—Περικλέους υἱέε ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην. They both died of the plague. One of

the most interesting fragments of Protagoras describes the fortitude of Pericles when his sons died: see Appendix II. p. 203, Frag. 3. Charmides, son of the elder Glaucon, was Plato's maternal uncle: the dialogue Charmides is named after him. He was φιλόσοφος τε καὶ πάνυ ποιητικός (Charm. 155 A), and as remarkable for σωφροσύνη as for personal beauty (ibid. 157 D). He was afterwards one of the Ten, and fell along with Critias at the battle of Munychia in 404 B.C. (Xen. Hell. II 4. 19). Of Philippides and his father Philomelus and Antimoerus of Mende (on the west coast of the peninsula Pallene) nothing further is known.

29. **τούτων—ἐφαίνοντο.** B and T omit οἷ, which was inserted by Stephanus: Heindorf prefers to insert ὧν after λεγομένων. The MSS reading could only be defended if ἐφαίνοντο could be regarded as parenthetical=ὡς ἐφαίνοντο, like δοκεῖ μοι=ὡς δοκεῖ μοι (see on 314 C above), but there seems to be no authority for such a use of φαίνομαι. It is hardly to be supposed that in ἐπακούοντες and ἐπήκοοι (in B below) there is an allusion to an outer circle of Protagorean students, deemed unworthy of the subtlest teaching of the master, in spite of Theaet. 152 C, where Socrates is hardly serious.

31. **ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων.** The plural is used as in Theaet. 157 C παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι and Rep. x 601 A χρώματ' ἅττα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν.

315 B 34. **χορῶ.** The tragic chorus consisted of 15 χορευταί, arranged in 3 rows (στοῖχοι) of 5 each, the leader (κορυφαῖος) being in the middle of the first. So here Protagoras occupies the middle of a row of 7. With the metaphor cf. Theaet. 173 B τοὺς—τοῦ ἡμέτερου χοροῦ and ibid. C λέγωμεν δὴ—περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων: Phaedr. 246 E foll.

35. **ἠύλαβούντο.** The MSS have εὐλαβούντο, but in the classic period εὐ- (and εἰ-) were always augmented in the past tenses, while after 300 B.C. ἠύ- does not appear on inscriptions. See Meisterhans Gr. der Att. Inschr.<sup>2</sup> p. 136.

## CHAPTER VII.

The scene in the house of Callias is further described.

1. **τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη Ὀμηρος.** Homer Od. XI 601 τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἑρακλήϊην. The reference is not to be pressed beyond the words quoted: for there is no special likeness

between Homer's Heracles (*δεῦνόν παπταίων, αἰεὶ βαλέοντι ἑοικώς* 608) and Plato's Hippias, whose situation as here described is more like that of Minos in Homer *ibid.* 569 foll. *χρῦσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσι, ἤμενον· οἱ δὲ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἶροντο ἀνακτα ἤμενοι ἐσταότες τε κατ' εὐρυπυλὲς Ἀΐδος δῶ.* With *ἔφη Ὅμηρος* ('as Homer said') cf. *Meno* 76 D *σύνης ὅ τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος.*

3. *ἐν θρόνῳ—ἐπὶ βάθρων.* Hippias is depicted as a school- 315 C  
master among his pupils.

4. *Ἐρυξίμαχος τε—Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἄνδροτίωνος.* Eryximachus and his father Acumenus were doctors. The former delivers one of the speeches in the Symposium, defining his art as *ἐπιστήμη τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐρωτικῶν πρὸς πλησμονὴν καὶ κένωσιν* (*Symp.* 186 C). Phaedrus, son of Pythocles, of the deme of Μυρρινοῦς in the tribe Πανδιονίς, also appears in the Symposium, and gives his name to the dialogue Phaedrus. Andron, son of Androtion (so T here, and both B and T in *Gorg.* 487 C—the Ἄριστίωνος of B is therefore a mistake) is in the *Gorgias* described as one of those who shared the view of Callicles, that too much *φιλοσοφία* ruined men. His son is believed to have been the orator Androtion.

7. *περὶ φύσεως.* The primary substance which early Greek philosophy sought to discover was called by them *φύσις*: see Aristotle *Met.* IV 4 p. 1014<sup>b</sup> 32 foll. *τούτων γὰρ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων τὰ στοιχεῖα φασιν εἶναι φύσιν, οἱ μὲν πῦρ, οἱ δὲ γῆν, οἱ δ' ἀέρα, οἱ δ' ὕδωρ, οἱ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον λέγοντες, οἱ δ' ἔνια τούτων, οἱ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα.* Thus (among others) Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles called their books *περὶ φύσεως*, i.e. on the substance which gives birth (*φύει*) to all else. By Plato's time the word had acquired a wider meaning equivalent to 'de rerum natura', our 'Nature', and it is in this sense that the word is here used.

8. *ἀστρονομικά ἄττα.* Schanz brackets *ἀστρονομικά*, but the word is meant to be taken rather with *μετεώρων* than with *φύσεως*. On Hippias' skill in astronomy compare *Hipp.* Minor 367 E ἦς (sc. *ἀστρονομικῆς*) *αὐτὸν δὲ τέχνης ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμων οἶε εἶναι ἢ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν.*

10. *Τάνταλόν γε.* *Od.* XI 582 *καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον κρατέρ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα.* Prodicus is compared to Tantalus because of his physical wretchedness: see *Crat.* 395 E *καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις βουλόμενος ταλάντατον ὀνομάσαι, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἴποι ἂντ' ἐκείνου Τάνταλον· τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἔοικεν ἐκπορίσαι ἢ τύχη τῆς φήμης.*

315 D 11. ἐπιδημεῖ γὰρ ἄρα. Heindorf's correction ἐπιδημεῖ for ἐπεδήμει seems to be necessary, as Prodicus is still in Athens. Just so the presential tenses are used in 314 D κινδυνεύει δὲ—ἄχθεσθαι and infra line 15 κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. If the clause is taken as a parenthetical clause of explanation, there is nothing harsh in the construction: ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκῆματί τινι naturally enough follows on εἰσεῖδον. For γὰρ ἄρα (a somewhat rare combination) Heindorf quotes Rep. IV 438 A πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, Symp. 205 B ἀφελόντες γὰρ ἄρα (so T: B has only γάρ) τοῦ ἔρωτός τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, Laws III 698 D συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας σαγηνεύσαιεν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν. γὰρ ἄρα always introduces something supposed to be known to the person addressed: see 314 B οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον.

18. Πausanias is known from the Symposium 180 c foll. The deme Κεραμῆς was in the tribe Acamantis. ὡς μὲν ἐγῶμαι is to be taken closely with καλὸν τε κάγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν.

315 E 20. τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. Compare Symp. 174 A ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισμένη ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν (i.e. Ἀγάθωνα) ἴω. There is no ground for reading καλὸν for καλός with Stephanus: cf. Lach. 180 E τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε—διαλεγόμενοι.

22. Ἀγάθωνα. It is at the poet Agathon's house that the scene of the Symposium is laid. From his speech in that dialogue 194 D foll. we should infer that he had studied under Prodicus to some purpose. Born about 447 B.C., Agathon was first successful on the tragic stage at an early age: cf. Symp. 175 E ἡ δὲ σὴ (sc. Ἀγάθωνος σοφία) λαμπρά τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα, ἢ γε παρὰ σοῦ νέου ὄντος οὕτω σφόδρα ἐξέλαμψε καὶ ἐκφανῆς ἐγένετο πρώην ἐν μάρτυσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυριοῖς. He visited the court of Archelaus about 407 B.C. and died probably about 400. That he was held in esteem by the Athenians appears from Ar. Frogs 83 foll. Ἀγάθων δὲ ποῦ 'σθ'; ὅπου 'στ'; ἀπολιπὼν μ' οἴχεται ἀγαθὸς ποιητῆς καὶ ποθεινὸς τοῖς φίλοις. For παιδικὰ Πausανίου compare Symp. 193 B.

23. τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον. So BT: the idiom is like our 'There was this young man'. The nearest parallels seem to be Phaedo 59 B ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεύς and Rep. x 615 D ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιώται τινες. τοῦτό τε δὴ (Ast), τοῦτό τ' οὖν (Heindorf), τοῦτ' ἔνδον ἦν (Schirlitz), have been suggested, while Kroschel rejects the words, but the text is probably sound.

τὸ Ἀδεμάντω. Adimantus son of Cepis is not elsewhere

named. The son of Leucolophidas was afterwards *στρατηγός* under Alcibiades, whose policy he supported (Xen. Hell. I 4. 21): he was taken prisoner at the battle of Aegospotami, but spared by the Spartans. He was afterwards put on his trial by Conon on the charge, not improbably a true one, of having betrayed the Athenian fleet at this battle: see Kock on Ar. Frogs 1512.

27. *πάσσοφος—άνήρ—καλ θείος*. For *άνήρ* BT read *άνήρ*, but see on 314 E above. *πάσσοφος* is often ironical: e.g. Euthyd. 271 C *ὁ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, θαυμασία, ὦ Κρίτων· πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τῷ γε, οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ ὅ τι εἴεν οἱ παγκρατιασταί*. For the meaning of *θείος* cf. Meno 99 C *οὐκοῦν—ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἷτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσιν καὶ λέγουσι; θείος* (in the form *σείος*) was the favourite Spartan word of praise and was much affected by the Socratic circle in Athens.

## CHAPTER VIII.

After Hippocrates has been introduced to Protagoras, the latter enlarges upon the antiquity of his profession. At the suggestion of Socrates a circle is formed to hear the Sophists discourse.

4. *Κριτίας* the foremost of the Thirty so-called tyrants was related to Plato on the mother's side: Perictione Plato's mother being granddaughter of the elder Critias, who was father of Callaeschus. He is one of the dramatis personae in the Charmides and Timaeus, and the dialogue Critias is named after him. A Scholiast on the Timaeus 20 A (quoted by Stallbaum) describes him as *γενναίος καὶ ἀδρᾶς φύσεως, ἤπτετο δὲ καὶ φιλοσόφων συνοουσίῳν, καὶ ἐκαλεῖτο ιδιώτης μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος δὲ ἐν ιδιώταις*. For the fragments of his poems see Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*<sup>4</sup> II p. 279 foll.

5. *ἐπι σμίκρ' ἄττα—διαθεασάμενοι*. *σμίκρ' ἄττα* is the plural of *σμικρόν τι*, and as *ἐπι σμικρόν τι διατρίψαντες* would mean 'after a little further delay', so *ἐπι σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρίψαντες* means after 'some little further delays'. The reference in *ἐπι* is to 314 C. *ταῦτα* in *καὶ ταῦτα* refers to the causes of the delays, which were, as usual, some topics of discourse: its antecedent is involved in *διατρίψαντες*.

8. *πρὸς σέ τοι ἦλθομεν*. Here, as in 314 E, both B and T have *316 B* *τι* for *τοι*: but *τι* is impossible here, and this use of *τοι* is very frequent in address: Heindorf refers (inter alia) to Ar. Plut. 1100 *σέ τοι σέ τοι λέγω, Καρίων, ἀνάμεινον*.

316 C 17. *οἰεταί οἱ μάλιστα ἄν γενέσθαι*. B and T read *μάλιστα* without *ἄν*: see on Crito 51 E. It is more likely that *ἄν* should have dropped out after *μάλιστα* here than that Plato's usage should have varied with *οἶμαι* and the aorist infinitive referring to the future: cf. infra 353 B ἢ οἶμαι ἄν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερόν γενέσθαι, where *ἄν* is in all the MSS.

19. *μόνος οἰεῖ δεῖν—πρὸς μόνους*. *οἰεῖ δεῖν* is virtually like one verb, *ἀξιούς* or the like: it therefore takes the nom. (not the acc.) with inf.; cf. Demosth. Fals. Leg. 235 *εὐθὺς ἠγοούμεν ἐν τούτοις—αὐτὸς περιεῖναι δεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ μεγαλοψυχότερος φαίνεσθαι*, quoted by Stallbaum on Crito 50 E. Note that Protagoras here uses the more precise *μόνος πρὸς μόνους*, but above only *μόνῳ* (316 B)—unless (with Cobet and Schanz) we there insert *μόνοι* before *μόνῳ*.

21. *ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἰόντα κτλ.* For *καὶ ἰόντα* T reads in the margin *κατιόντα*: Liebhold suggests *καταλόντα*. *ἰόντα* however is parallel to *ξένον* and to *πέιθοντα* 'a man who is a stranger and goes—and tries to persuade etc.' The whole passage recalls Apol. 19 E—20 A *τούτων* (viz. Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias) *γὰρ ἕκαστος—οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἄν βούλωνται—τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι*. Notice throughout the longwinded character of Protagoras' speeches: cf. Philostrate. Vit. Soph. I 494 (quoted by Kroschel on 320 C), *γνοὺς δὲ τὸν Πρωταγόραν ὁ Πλάτων σεμνῶς μὲν ἐρμηνεύοντα, ὑπτιάζοντα δὲ τῇ σεμνότητι καὶ που καὶ μακρολογώτερον τοῦ συμμέτρου τῆν ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ μύθῳ μακρῷ ἐχαρακτήρισεν*.

316 D 31. *τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς*. *ἐπαχθὲς* like *φορτικόν* means what hearers will resent (think a burden or *ἄχθος*) as in bad-taste because presumptuous: cf. Demosth. de Pace 4 *τὸ λέγειν περὶ ὧν αὐτὸς εἶπέ τις καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ—οὕτως ἠγοῦμαι φορτικόν καὶ ἐπαχθὲς ὥστε κτλ.*

32. *τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν*. *σοφός* and its derivatives are often used especially in early writers in connexion with poetry, e.g. Theognis 19—20 *Κύρνε σοφίζομένῳ μὲν ἐμοὶ σφρηγίς ἐπικέσθω τοῖσδ' ἔπεισιν*, Pindar Isthm. 4. 29—30 *μελέταν δὲ σοφισταῖς Διὸς ἕκατι πρόσβαλον σεβιζόμενοι*.

34. *τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαίου* = 'Orpheus and Musaeus and their schools'. The Editors quote Ar. Frogs 1032 foll. *Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι, Μουσαῖος δ'*

ἐξακέσει τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς, Ἡσίοδος δὲ γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὥρας, ἀρότους· ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὀμηρος ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμῆν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν πλὴν τοῦδ' ὅτι χρήστ' ἐδίδαξε, τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὀπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν; for the misplacement of τε compare *Crito* 43 B ἐν τῷσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνία καὶ λύπη εἶναι.

36. Ἴκκος—Ἡρόδικος. *Iccus* is mentioned in *Laws* VIII 839 E foll. as a model of temperance. According to *Pausanias*, he won in the pentathlon at the Olympic games and afterwards set up\* as a trainer (*γυμναστής*). *Herodicus* of *Selymbria* in *Thrace* combined the professions of the *γυμναστής* and *ιατρός* (*μίξας γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικῆν*). He is described in *Rep.* III 406 A as the inventor of the *παιδαγωγικῆ τῶν νοσημάτων ἰατρικῆ*—by means of which he tortured first himself (by prolonging his own dying) and afterwards others: *δυσθανατῶν—ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο* (*ibid.* B).

ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν—σοφιστής. *Heindorf* reads ἦττον in place of ἦττων, but νῦν ἔτι ὢν is 'still living' and οὐδενὸς ἦττων σοφιστής is a descriptive qualification.

39. Ἀγαθοκλῆς—Πυθοκλείδης. *Agathocles* is mentioned in 316 E *Lach.* 180 D as teacher of *Damon*: according to the *Alc.* I 118 C *Pythocles* also taught *Pericles*. A *Scholiast* on the *Alc.* I (1. c.) remarks: *Πυθοκλείδης μουσικὸς ἦν τῆς σεμνῆς μουσικῆς διδάσκαλος, καὶ Πυθαγόρειος, οὗ μαθητῆς Ἀγαθοκλῆς, οὗ Λαμπροκλῆς (Δάμπρος, van Prinsterer), οὗ Δάμων*. With the sentiment compare the imitation in *Plut. Pericl.* 4. 2 ὁ δὲ Δάμων ἔοικεν ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστῆς καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν δεινότητα.

42. ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο. Compare *Plut. Pericl.* 1. c. οὐ μὴν ἔλαθεν ὁ Δάμων τῇ λύρᾳ παρακαλύμματι χρώμενος.

43. κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι. εἶναι is tautological as in *Isaeus περὶ τοῦ* 317 A *Μενεκλείου κλήρου* 32 ἡμεῖς ὠμόσαμεν εὐ ποιεῖν ἀλλήλους—κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ, and in the common ἐκὼν εἶναι: but no other instance of the precise phrase κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι is quoted.

47. οἱ γε πολλοὶ—οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται. Compare *Gorg.* 474 A τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ ἓνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. For ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν (to be taken with οὐδὲν) see on *Apol.* 17 A. The phrase is used to qualify the comprehension of a word or phrase, generally οὐδεὶς or πάντες.

49. τὸ οὖν—ἐπιχειρήματος. B and T read τὸν for τό, by a natural error. *Heindorf* compares *Theaet.* 144 A τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα

—*πρῶτον αὐ εἶναι διαφερόντως—ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν ὠρόμην γενέσθαι κτλ.* and Rep. I 331 B τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσασαι—*μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται.* Here *καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος* is a virtual repetition of *ἀποδιδράσκοντα*: cf. *τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα* above in 316 C. The sentence reminds one of the practice observed in Spartan education—to punish the youths not for stealing but for failing to escape with their booty: Xen. Rep. Lacæd. 2. 8 εἶποι δ' ἂν οὖν τις· τί δῆτα, εἴπερ τὸ κλέπτειν ἀγαθὸν ἐνόμιζε, πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐπέβαλε τῷ ἀλισκομένῳ; ὅτι, φημί ἐγώ, καὶ τἄλλα, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι διδάσκουσι, κολάζουσι τὸν μὴ καλῶς ὑπερετοῦντα: compare Rep. I 361 A τὸν ἀλισκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον.

317 B 54. *τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδόν.* “h. e. τὴν ὁδὸν ἣ ἅπασά ἐστιν ἐναντία τούτων. pro τούτων eadem comparatione quae vocatur compendiaria dici potuit τούτοις. Andocid. or. I 4 ἐγὼ πολὺ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτοις γνώμην ἔχω” (Kroschel). For ἅπασαν with an adjective compare (with Kroschel) Xen. Anab. I 5. I ἦν ἡ γῆ πέδιλον ἅπαν ὁμαλὲς ὥσπερ θάλαττα and the common phrase *πάν τούναντιον*.

56. *σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους.* The *σοφιστῆς σοφίζει*, i.e. *παιδεύει*: see note on 312 C above. Theæt. 167 C (where Socrates is speaking for Protagoras) ὁ σοφιστῆς τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ ἀξίος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν.

59. *σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν.* “Crebra modestiae formula, bene explicat Steph., quod ita dico, ut in eo operi divinum agnoscam”. Heindorf on Theæt. 151 B καὶ σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὄναιτο.

317 C 61. *πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ.* Meno 91 E οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν (i.e. Πρωταγόραν) ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα. The phrases *εἶναι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ*, *ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ* and the like are common.

62. *οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ.* For the asyndeton Heindorf compares Hom. Od. XIV 96 ἧ γάρ οἱ ζῶη γ' ἦν ἄσπετος· οὐ τιμὴ τόσση ἀνδρῶν ἠρώων. The nearest parallel to *πάντων* (which Cobet rejects) after *οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ* seems to be in Dem. Adv. Lept. § 3 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐφ' ὅτου τοῦτο οὐ πεπόνθατε τῶν πάντων (quoted by Heindorf).

64. *ἀπάντων* goes with *τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων*. It seems better to take *περὶ τούτων* with *βούλεσθε* than with *τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι*: otherwise it is hardly possible to separate *τούτων* from *ἀπάντων*.



67. ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι—ὅτι ἔρασταί. *ὅτι* depends rather on ἐνδείξασθαι than on καλλωπίσασθαι: compare infra 327 A ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληγτε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, and *ibid.* Β τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων, *Phaedo* 94 D τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νοουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. See also notes on 327 A and 335 E below.

68. εἶμεν. BT read εἴημεν, but in Plato's time the short form of the optative plural is regular: see on *Apol.* 22 E.

τί οὖν—οὐ—ἐκαλέσαμεν. See above on 310 A; and for ἐπακούσωσιν note on 315 A.

72. καθεζόμενοι. So T: B has καθιζόμενοι, but presently in 317 D 317 E both MSS read συνεκαθεζόμεθα.

74. καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντιλαβόμενοι. This passage is difficult and different views are possible as to the construction and meaning. The MSS read καὶ αὐτοὶ τε. If the MSS reading is retained, τε must be regarded as answering to δέ in ἐν δὲ τούτῳ (cf. *Euthyphr.* 3 E), and καὶ αὐτοὶ = *etiam ipsi*, i.e. even without waiting for servants—a harsh explanation both for καὶ and αὐτοί. If τε is left out (with most of the editors, following Heindorf), καὶ αὐτοὶ means 'ourselves also' as opposed to Callias and Alcibiades in ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης. There is still a slight difficulty in contrasting αὐτοὶ with these two, because they also would seem to be included in αὐτοὶ (πάντες ἡμεῖς—καὶ αὐτοί), but such slight inaccuracies of expression are common in actual dialogue, which Plato's style is intended to imitate.

77. Καλλίας. Hermann read Κριτίας in order to escape the 317 E slight difficulty remarked on in the preceding note: "sed hospitii erat Prodicum ut accederet invitare". Kroschel.

78. ἀναστήσαντες: but ἄγοντε just before. *Euthyd.* 273 B offers an exact parallel (if we follow the reading of the Bodleian MS) ἰδόντες δὲ αὐτὸν ὃ τε Διονυσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντε διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλοις, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες εἰς ἡμᾶς: cf. *ibid.* 273 A εἰσελθόντες—παριεπατείτην and D ἐγελασάτην γοῦν ἄμφω βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους. The dual in Plato as in Greek generally is apt to sink into the plural.

## CHAPTER IX.

Protagoras explains his profession. It is to teach civil virtue and make men good citizens.

318 A 8. γάρ used like Latin *enim* to introduce a speech (introductory γάρ): see on Apol. 20 E.

9. ὅ τι—ἀποβήσεται—πυθέσθαι. For the situation compare Gorg. 455 C—D where Socrates says ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγὼ τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνῶς ἀσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως ἀσχύνοιντ' ἂν σε ἀνερέσθαι· ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτάσθαι· τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, εἴαν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλευεῖν οἴοι τε ἐσόμεθα;

14. ἐν τῇ ὑστεραία ταῦτά ταῦτα: sc. ἔσται σοι. ἐν (bracketed by Schanz after Hirschig) before τῇ ὑστεραία means 'durative': cf. (with Kroschel) Thuc. 1 44. 1 τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἦσσαν—ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραία μετέγνωσαν κτλ. and add infra 321 C ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρήν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει καὶ ἀνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς.

318 B 19. ὅ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος. τυχάνοις (suggested by Bekker) would be the usual periodic structure: but the indicative is looser and more direct: Kroschel compares Gorg. 464 D εἰ δέοι—διαγωνίζεσθαι—πότερος ἐπαλεῖ. Notice the usual Socratic implication that virtue is knowledge.

20. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως. Cf. Meno 74 D ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὕτως and infra 331 C. So μὴ γάρ, μὴ σύ γε, μὴ τοι γε and the like are often used without a verb expressed. ὥσπερ ἂν belongs to εἴποι ἂν in lines 28 and 32: it is answered by οὕτω δὴ in line 33. αὐτίκα here does not mean 'for example' but goes with μάλα (which intensifies it): 'as if Hippocrates were to change his desire on the spot and conceive a desire (ἐπιθυμήσειεν) for etc.' αὐτίκα μάλα is idiomatic, cf. Gorg. 469 D αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, Crat. 384 B αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναί.

22. νῦν νεωστί: *nunc nuper* as in Meno 90 A. The more general word is followed by the more specific exactly as in Theaet. 161 C βατράχου γυρῖνου where γυρῖνος according to a Scholiast is τὸ ἐκ τοῦ βατράχου παιδίον.

23. Ζευξίππου. An obscure sculptor (not painter) of this name is mentioned in Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 1229 (quoted by Overbeck, Die Antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Künste

bei den Griechen p. 300). The Zeuxippus here mentioned is supposed to be the same as the famous painter Zeuxis of Heraclea (the Greek colony in Italy, most probably) who is mentioned by Plato in *Gorg.* 453 C, and several times by Xenophon (*Mem.* I 4. 3, *Oecon.* 10. 1, *Symp.* 4. 63 τὸν Ἡρακλεώτην ξένον): see Overbeck, l. c. p. 311 foll. Zeuxis began to rise into fame probably about 424 B.C.: he would therefore be still a young man about the date when this dialogue is supposed to take place: see *Intro.* p. xxxvi. Brunn would read Ζεύξιδος for Ζευξίππου here, but according to Fick (quoted by Sauppe) Ζεύξις is nothing but a familiar diminutive of Ζευξίππος: for other similar examples see Fick, *Die Griechischen Personennamen* p. xxviii foll. -ίππος in proper names was aristocratic (*Ar. Clouds* 62 foll.) and could upon occasion be omitted or added without prejudice to personal identity: compare *Clouds* 929 οὐχὶ διδάξεις τοῦτον Κρόνος ὦν with *ibid.* 1071 σὺ δ' εἰ κρόνιππος, where -ίππος adds mock dignity to κρόνος.

29. Ὀρθαγόρα τῷ Θεβαίῳ. Orthagoras is said by Athenaeus 318 C (IV 184 E) on the authority of Aristoxenus to have taught Epaminondas how to play the flute.

31. αὐτόν but ἐκείνου in 30 and ἐκείνῳ in 32: see on 310 D. εἰς ὃ τι βελτίων is here used rather than ὃ τι or τί βελτίων (as in line 27) to prepare for εἰς ἀθλησιν where the preposition could hardly be dispensed with.

33. οὕτω δῆ. Heindorf would write οὕτω δέ, which is frequent after ὥσπερ, e.g. 328 B: see his note on *Phaedo* 72 C.

34. Πρωταγόρα συγγενόμενος: "gravius hoc quam σοὶ συγγενόμενος" Kroschel. See also note on 335 A.

43. λωβῶνται is here rather κακῶς ποιεῖν than κακὸν ποιεῖν, 318 E although (like κακουργεῖν, λυμαίνομαι and the like) it unites both meanings: cf. *Rep.* I 335 B foll., and see on *Euthyphr.* 3 A κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν. With the words of Protagoras compare those of Anytus in *Meno* 91 C Ἡράκλεις, εὐφῆμει, ὦ Σώκρατες, μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν, μήτε οἰκείων μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοι γε φανερά ἐστι λῶβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγινομένων.

τὰς γὰρ τέχνας—ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας. τέχνας is used of Arithmetic, Geometry, Solid Geometry and Harmonics in *Rep.* VII 532 C: elsewhere in Plato αἱ τέχναι generally means the mechanical arts, e.g. *Rep.* VI 495 D and VII 522 B. Here τέχνας can only mean the subjects taught in schools (γραμματική, λογιστική, κιθαριστική) as

Sauppe remarks, but there seems to be no precise parallel to such a use of the word.

47. εἰς τὸν Ἴππιαν ἀπέβλεψεν: see on 314 B.

49. εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. The editors quote Meno 91 A οὗτος γὰρ—πάλαι λέγει πρὸς με ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ἧ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαι τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ: Euthyd. 273 D ἀρετὴν—ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴμεθα ὡς τ' εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα.

319 A 54. ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας forms a single expression: 'good citizens' are the ἔργον of πολιτικὴ τέχνη. So Ar. Knights 1304 ἄνδρα μοχθηρὸν πολίτην.

56. ἐπάγγελμα δ' ἐπαγγέλλομαι. ἐπαγγέλλομαι and its derivatives are often used of sophistic 'professions'.

## CHAPTER X.

Socrates professes to disbelieve that ἀρετή can be communicated by teaching. His arguments are twofold: (1) while in matters connected with the arts of building, ship-carpentry, and the like, the Athenians will listen only to the professional man, in politics they give ear to any and every one: (2) Athenian statesmen have not been able to communicate their political virtue to their sons.

2. εἴπερ κέκτησθαι. Cobet's rule (Mnemos. XI p. 168) "ubi praecedit vocalis, semper (Plato) κέκτημαι ponit, ubi consonans, promiscue κεκτῆσθαι et ἐκτῆσθαι" represents the usage of the best MSS, but Schanz now writes ἐκτῆσθαι universally after consonants. See also Mnem. VIII 336. ἐκτῆσθαι is in reality an old Ionic form: it is used by Aeschylus Prom. 795 κούνῳ δμμι' ἐκτῆμέναι.

319 B 5. οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἀπιστῶ. The MSS reading ὅπως ἂν ἀπιστῶ was corrected by Heindorf, ὅπως ἂν with the subjunctive being only used in final clauses. The subjunctive is deliberative: cf. Euthyphr. 11 B οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἶπω δ νοῶ.

6. οὐ διδακτόν—μηδὲ. οὐ negatives διδακτόν only, μηδὲ the whole of its clause: a similar case is Eur. Andr. 586 δρᾶν εὖ, κακῶς δ' οὐ, μηδ' ἀποκτείνειν βία. μή after verbs of thinking and saying is tolerably common in Plato. See on Euthyphr. 6 B ὁμολογούμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἶδέναι.

8. ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, sc. φασί. Compare 337 D where Hippias calls Athens τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας: a somewhat less favourable judgment is given in Laws I 641 E τὴν πόλιν ἅπαντες ἡμῶν Ἕλληνες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ὡς φιλόλογός τε ἐστὶ καὶ πολύλογος, Λακεδαιμόνα δὲ καὶ Κρήτην, τὴν μὲν βραχύλογον, τὴν δὲ πολύνοιαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυλογίαν ἀσκοῦσαν.

12. μεταπεμπόμενος is probably middle: Plato does not seem to use μεταπέμπειν in the sense of 'send for' (like Thucydides e.g. I 112. 3 Ἄμυρταίου μεταπέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεσι βασιλέως: VI 52. 1 et al.). The subject is τοὺς πολίτας to be supplied from τὴν πόλιν. Compare Gorg. 455 B foll. ὅταν περὶ λατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστη αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι and Alc. I 107 A—C. Kroschel well remarks that the words περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων (which Hirschig wrongly rejects) are added to shew that it is only about the actual buildings that the builders are consulted, "non de necessitate, utilitate, magnitudine", as to which the orators advise: compare Gorg. 455 D.

17. κἂν πάννυ καλὸς ἢ κτλ. Imitated in Alc. I 107 B and C: 319 C ἐάν τε γε σμικρὸς ἢ μέγας ἦ, ἐάν τε καλὸς ἢ αἰσχρὸς, ἔτι τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννής, πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—ἀλλ' ἂν τε πένης ἂν τε πλούσιος ἢ ὁ παραινῶν, οὐδὲν διοίσει Ἀθηναῖοις, ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλεύωνται, πῶς ἂν ὑγαίνοιεν, ἀλλὰ ζητοῦσιν λατρὸν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον.

20. οἱ τοξόται. The τοξόται (bowmen) or Σκύθαι (so called from their nationality) or Πενσίνιοι (from one Πενσίς who according to the Schol. on Ar. Ach. 54 had the chief hand in establishing them) were the police. ἔλκω was regularly used of removing an offending orator: e.g. Ar. Knights 665 κἂθ' εἶλκον αὐτὸν οἱ πρυτάνεις χοῖ τοξόται.

21. ἐξαίρωνται. So T (B has ἐξέρωνται): the present is perhaps due to tense-assimilation to κελεύοντων. The active αἶρειν is used in the same connexion by Ar. Eccl. 261 ἡμεῖς δὲ γ' ἦν αἶρωσ' (sc. οἱ τοξόται), ἐὰν κελεύσομεν, but no exact parallel for the use of the middle has yet been found—the nearest seems to be Eur. I. T. 1201 οὐ γὰρ ποτ' ἂν νῦν ἠράμην βάρων ἀπο: cf. Ar. Ach. 1140 τὴν ἀσπίδ' αἶρου καὶ βάδιζ' ὧ παῖ λαβῶν: ibid. 953.

23. περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως. So B and T, but in both 319 D the copyist had doubts as to the text. It is usual to drop either τῶν

or διοικήσεως: Kroschel transposes τῶν and περί. Sauppe retains the MSS reading, making περί govern διοικήσεως—but this is very harsh. τὰ τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως is a periphrasis for ἡ πόλεως διοίκησις (for the omission of the article with πόλεως cf. Polit. 296 E τούτων δεῖ καὶ περί ταῦτα τὸν ὄρον εἶναι τὸν γε ἀληθινώτατον ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως, ὃν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων): ‘the city’s administration’ being contrasted with τῶν ἐν τέχνῃ διοικήσις. The whole phrase περί τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως corresponds to 318 E καὶ περί τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.

25. ἀνιστάμενος. The audience sat in the assembly: cf. Rep. VI 492 B ὅταν, εἶπον, ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἀβροῖοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας—ψέγωσι κτλ.

29. μαθῶν. Heindorf quotes many cases of the transition from plural to singular in Plato (e.g. infra 324 B): the change is justified here because in each case the reproach would be addressed to a single person.

31. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι—ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ. See on Apol. 40 D οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα κτλ.

319 E 34. οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι. Plato comments on the inability of statesmen to teach their sons political sagacity in Meno 93 B foll., citing Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides as cases in point. Compare Alc. I 118 E foll.

35. ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο. The phrase is used by Plato in the other passages where he deals with this topic: cf. infra 324 D, Meno 93 D and 94 A.

320 A 38. νέμονται ὡσπερ ἄφετοι. νέμεσθαι is properly ‘to graze’, and ἄφετος is said *de grege numini alicui consecrato* (Heindorf): cf. Critias I 19 D ἀφέτων ὄντων ταύρων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πουσειδῶνος ἱερῷ. The same expression occurs in Rep. VI 498 C ὅταν δὲ λήγη μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίνουσαι, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν. Here the object of νέμεσθαι is virtually the clause ἐάν που—τῇ ἀρετῇ ‘going to and fro by themselves they graze like creatures set apart upon whatever excellence etc.’: cf. (for the use of ἐάν) Rep. VII 528 A φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ’ ἂν ἄλλω εἴ τις τι δύναίτο ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.

39. ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. αὐτομάτῳ (used as in Theaet. 180 C, Polit. 271 D δ δ’ ἤρου περί τοῦ πάντα αὐτόματα γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) agreeing with ἀρετῇ would make the expression more pointed, and avoid the slight contradiction involved

in the expression *αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν* (since one cannot spontaneously *fall in with* a thing), but *αὐτόματοι* is not to be pressed, and should be understood as equivalent to *ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου* (cf. 323 C).

40. **Κλεινίαν.** The author of the First Alcibiades makes Alcibiades himself speak of his younger brother as *μαυνόμενος ἄνθρωπος* (118 E).

42. **μη διαφθαρή δῆ.** *δῆ* adds a touch of irony to spare the feelings of Alcibiades.

43. **καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος.** According to Plutarch (Alcib. ch. 1) Ariphron shared with Pericles the guardianship of Alcibiades. Ariphron was Pericles' brother.

45. **ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ,** i.e. Pericles to Alcibiades. Pericles is 320 B humourously represented as restoring his ward in despair to the very man who was suspected of corrupting him: and Alcibiades is again appeased.

48. **οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.** See Gorg. 515 C foll., where it is argued that Pericles, Cimon and Miltiades made none of their fellow-citizens better.

51. **κάμπτομαι.** Stallbaum quotes Thuc. III 58. 1 *καίτοι ἀξιοῦμέν γε—καμφοθήναι ὑμᾶς καὶ μεταγνώναι.*

52. **πολλῶν μὲν—τά δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηγηκέναί.** It is implied that Protagoras' originality is not equal to his industry. The MSS have *ἐξευρηκέναί*, but in the perfect as in past tenses generally initial *ευ* became *ην*: see on 315 B above.

55. **ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον.** See below on *ἐπίδειξάμενος* in 328 D. 320 C

56. **ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέρους.** Gorg. 527 A *τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθος σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὡς περ γράβς.*

57. **ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθῶν.** So BT: Cobet requires *ἢ λόγῳ διεξέλθω*, but *λόγῳ διεξελθῶν* contrasts with *μῦθον λέγων*, not with *ἐπίδειξω*, which belongs to both participial clauses. For the aorist participle (where we should expect the present) compare with Sauppe Theaet. 167 D *ἀμφισβήτει λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθῶν.*

## CHAPTER XI.

Protagoras' reply falls into three sections: viz. (1) 320 C—323 C, (2) 323 C—324 D, (3) 324 E—328 D: compare Introduction, p. xi. In the first he is concerned to justify the Athenians for allowing everyone to address them on political questions: this he does in the first instance by relating a myth of pre-historic man.

It is probable that this myth comes from Protagoras' treatise *περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως*, mentioned in Diog. Laert. ix 55. It does not resemble the other myths of Plato in point of style, and if not actually written by Protagoras, it is at least carefully modelled on his way of writing: compare the similar imitations of the style of Agathon in Symp. 194 D foll. and of Prodicus infra 337 A foll. See Introd. p. xxi. That the 'Sophists' taught by means of parables we can see from Prodicus' Apologue of Heracles in Xen. Mem. II 1. 21 foll. The other passages in Plato treating of the primitive constitution of man are Polit. 269 C foll., Tim. 42 E foll. and Symp. 189 C foll. In Rep. III 414 C foll. there are also some points of resemblance to the present story.

1. ἦν γὰρ ποτε χρόνος. γὰρ introduces the story: see on Apol. 20 E *Χαιρεφώντα γὰρ ἴστε ποῦ. ἦν χρόνος* was usual in beginning a tale: the editors quote Theocr. 8. 1 *ἦν χρόνος ἀνίκ' ἐγών κτλ.*

320 D 2. *θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν.* In the Timaeus 42 E foll. the creation of men takes place after that of gods. The lower animals in the Timaeus arise from the degeneration of the souls of men in later births, every soul being first born as man: cf. Tim. 41 E with 90 E foll. Here the lower animals are created simultaneously with man, for *θνητὰ γένη* is of course not limited to the human race.

3. *χρόνος ἦλθεν εἰμαρμένους γενέσεως.* The omission of the article, as well as the whole turn of expression (*ἦλθεν αὐτοῖς χρόνος*), is somewhat poetic.

4. *θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον:* so in Tim. 42 E it is the created gods, not the *δημιουργοί*, who make men. There however it is not said that human creatures were made within the earth: but compare the *γενναίων ψεύδος* of Rep. III. 414 C *ἦσαν δὲ* (i.e. the citizens of Plato's state) *τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐν τὸς πλαττόμενοι.* The wide-spread tradition of autochthonous races among the Greeks no doubt helped to produce such anthropological theories, with which compare Empedocles (ap. Ritter and Preller Hist. Philos.<sup>7</sup> p. 143) *οὐλοφυνεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον:* Symp. 191 C *ἐγένων καὶ ἔτικτον* (sc. primitive men) *οὐκ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀλλ' εἰς γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ τέττιγες:* and Polit. 272 A *ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες.* It is to be noticed that Plato regularly uses *ἐντός* (not *ἐνδον*) as a preposition: *ἐνδον* (so used) is the more poetic word.

*ἐκ γῆς—κεράννυται.* Compare Tim. 42 E (of the creation of man) *μιμούμενοι* (i.e. the created gods) *τὸν σφέτερον δημιουργόν, πῦρὸς καὶ γῆς ὑδατὸς τε καὶ αἴρος ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου δαρεῖζόμενοι μόρια*



ὡς ἀποδοθησόμενα πάλιν εἰς ταυτὸν τὰ λαμβανόμενα ξυνεκδύλων. For 'air and water' is substituted here τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ κεράννυται. Fire is the rarest and earth the densest of the four elements: Protagoras' theory is that air and water are produced by mixing these in different proportions, for κεράννυται cannot mean merely that the elements interchange. Compare the theory attributed by Aristotle to Parmenides: *Met.* I 5. 986<sup>b</sup> 33 δύο τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς πάλιν τίθησι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ὄσον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων. It is noteworthy that Plato himself regards all four elements as differentiated, although imperfectly, before the creation of the κόσμος by the δημιουργός: compare *Tim.* 53 A foll. The chiasmus in γῆς καὶ πυρός followed by πυρὶ καὶ γῆ is part of Protagoras' art.

6. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἐμελλον. Cf. *Rep.* III 414 D ἐπειδὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἐξειργασμένοι ἦσαν καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οἶσα ἀνῆκε.

7. Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ. In *Gorg.* 523 D Prometheus again appears as the servant of Zeus, commissioned to put a stop to man's foreknowledge of his day of death: in *Polit.* 274 C he is mentioned as the giver of fire to mortals. The Hesiodic and Aeschylean form of the legend, in which Prometheus *steals* the fire, does not appear in Plato, except at 321 D, nor is there any hint in his works of the story in Hesiod about the gift of Pandora—the source of human ills—to Epimetheus (*Works and Days* 50 foll.), though it is worth noting that Plato like Hesiod makes the creation of woman posterior to that of man (*Tim.* 42 B).

9. παραιτεῖται—αὐτὸς νείμαι. The object clause, as usual with verbs like *παραιτεῖσθαι* (*deprecari*) depends on the positive part of the verb (here *αἰτεῖσθαι*): see on *Apol.* 31 B. αὐτός is 'by himself', without Prometheus' aid. We follow Cron and Turner in retaining the MSS *νείμαντος δέ μου* as against Bekker's δ' ἐμοῦ: the antithesis, as Cron remarks, is between the actions—*νείμαντος* and *ἐπίσκεψαι*. The point to be noticed is that Afterthought invites Forethought to exchange offices with him: it is Afterthought whose duty it is to inspect (*ἐπισκέψασθαι*): cf. *Gorg.* 526 C ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται).

11. τὰ δ' ἀσθενέστερα—τὰ δέ. B and T have τοὺς δ' ἀσθενε- 320 E στέρους—τοὺς δέ, a natural mistake, which can hardly be due to Plato.

13. ἔμχανάτω δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. Plato's own style rarely falls into verse: compare *Rep.* X 621 B εἰς τὴν γένεσιν ἄττοντας

ᾧσπερ ἀστέρας. The whole passage is full of rare and often poetic rhythms, words, constructions, and turns of expression: e.g. ἄσπλον φύσιν, σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγήν, τῷδε αὐτῷ (for αὐτῷ τούτῳ), αἰστωθείη, ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, εὐμαρίαν (as against εὐμάρειαν), and many more: note also the effort after balance and variety in *ικανοῖς μὲν ἀμύναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα* (321 A), *τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς—ἄλλοις δὲ—τοῖς δὲ—ἔστι δ' οἷς*. "Summum opinor," says Heindorf, "in his imitantis philosophi appareret artificium, si quid de propria Protagorae dictione superesset". See *Introductio*. p. xxi.

14. **σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν.** The usual construction would require *σμικρότητα*: the change is perhaps due to the desire for balance with *ἃ δὲ ἠῶξε μεγέθει*, but the same construction occurs *infra* in line 21 with *ἀμφιεννύς*.

321 A 18. **μή τι γένος αἰστωθείη.** Aesch. *Prom.* 232 *αἰστώσας γένος*: *ibid.* 668 *κεραυνὸν δὲ πᾶν ἐξαἰστώσοι γένος*. Note the emphasis with which Protagoras asserts the permanence of the *genus*: cf. *infra* 321 B *σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων*.

20. **εὐμαρίαν.** So Schanz with BT: the editors generally read *εὐμάρειαν*. The older form is intentionally used here: see above on line 13.

24. **ὑποδῶν** is Cobet's correction for *ὑπὸ ποδῶν* of B and T. See *infra* on 321 C *γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον κτλ.*

321 B 25. **τὰ δὲ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις.** After *τὰ δὲ* the MSS read *θριξίν καὶ*. The words seem to have been wrongly introduced from line 21. This (the suggestion of Ast, adopted by Schanz and others) seems better than to read for *θριξίν καὶ* the words *ὄνυξιν καὶ*.

31. **οὐ πάνυ τι**=non satis: cf. note on Euthyphr. 2 B *οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γινώσκω*. *οὐ πάνυ* is the English 'not quite', sometimes equivalent to 'not at all' by *meiosis*: the addition of *τι* makes the phrase a little less emphatic. *πάνυ οὐ* is quite a different phrase and means 'altogether not'.

321 C 32. **καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις.** After *τὰς δυνάμεις*, the words *εἰς τὰ ἄλογα* are found in T, but not in B.

36. **ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα**: like *ικανῶς τοῦ βάρους ἔχοντα* in Theaet. 194 D and the genitive after *καλῶς ἔχειν* and the like.

37. **γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄσπλον.** Compare the description of Έρωσ in *Symp.* 203 C: *ἀνυπόδητος καὶ ἀοικος, χαμαιπετής ἀεὶ ὦν καὶ ἀστρωτος*. *ἀνυπόδητον* contrasts with

ὑποδῶν in 321 B (line 24), and justifies Cobet's emendation for ὑπὸ ποδῶν. Aristotle (*περὶ ζῴων μορίων* IV 10, p. 687<sup>a</sup> 23) alludes to this passage of the Protagoras: ἀλλ' οἱ λέγοντες ὡς συνέστηκεν οὐ καλῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ χεῖριστα τῶν ζῴων (ἀνυπόδητόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν εἶναι φασι καὶ γυμνὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὄπλον πρὸς τὴν ἀλκὴν), οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν.

39. ἐν ἧ̄. See above on ἐν τῇ ὑστεραία 318 A. All the *θηητά γένη* then according to Protagoras issued forth on the same day. Plato thought otherwise: see on 320 D line 2.

40. ἐχόμενος: so T: "σχόμενος B, sed in marg. vitii nota" Schanz. *σχόμενος* is occasionally found in this passive sense, especially in compounds (Sauppe quotes Soph. 250 D *συνεσχόμεθα* and Isocr. XIX 11 *φθόγη σχόμενον*), but the present participle is at least equally well attested here and suits the meaning better: cf. (with Kroschel) Laws VI 780 B ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἀπορίας ἐχομένοις.

42. τὴν ἐντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί. Aesch. Prom. 252—254 321 D πρὸς τοῖσδε μέντοι πῦρ ἐγὼ σφιν ὤπασα. καὶ νῦν φλογωπὸν πῦρ ἔχουσ' ἐφήμεροι, ἀφ' οὗ γε πολλὰς ἐκμαθήσονται τέχνας—which is the usual form of the story. In Polit. 274 C Plato attributes fire to Prometheus, and the arts to Hephaestus and Athena. *σύν* denotes a much closer connexion than *μετά*: it is seldom used by Plato except in a few adverbial phrases, or in religious uses (like *ξύν τισι* Χάρισι καὶ Μούσαις Laws III 682 A), or in semi-poetic passages like the present: see on οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ̄ in Crito 48 C.

46. ἔσχεν is 'obtained': see on ἔσχετε in Apol. 19 A. ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Δί̄ reminds one of Sophocles' *Δίκη ξυνέδρος Ζηνός* O. C. 1382.

48. οὐκέτι means that Prometheus had to draw the line there; he had been able to steal the fire, but farther he could not go—no doubt because time pressed. The same idiomatic use of οὐκέτι (ἤδη) occurs above in 312 E μὰ Δί̄, ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν: it is extremely common in Plato and in Greek generally: see note on Euthyphr. 3 E and Cope on Arist. Rhet. A 1. 1354<sup>b</sup> 7 referred to there.

49. Διὸς φυλακαί are no doubt Κράτος and Βία, as in the 321 E Prometheus. Compare Hesiod Theog. 385 foll. (quoted by Heindorf) καὶ Κράτος ἠδὲ Βίην ἀριδείκετα γείνατο τέκνα (sc. Στύξ) τῶν οὐκ ἔστ' ἀπάνευθε Διὸς δῶμος οὐδέ τις ἔδρη οὐδ' ὄδος ὄπη μὴ κείνοις θεοῖς ἡγεμονεύει· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρ Ζηνὶ βαρυκτύπῳ ἐδριώνται.

εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς κτλ. Protagoras reverts to the story of

the theft. Similarly in 346 D below Socrates reverts to a part of the poem which he has quoted some time before in 345 C.

51. ἔμπυρον τέχνην is τέχνη which works by πῦρ, as ἔντεχνος σοφία in line 42 is σοφία working by τέχνη.

322 A 54. τοῦ βίου—δι' Ἐπιμηθέα. βίου is 'means of living' as in line 45. The words δι' Ἐπιμηθέα mean 'thanks to Epimetheus': cf. Ar. Clouds 12—14 ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμαι δειλαιος εὔδειν δακνόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς δαπάνης καὶ τῆς φάτνης καὶ τῶν χρεῶν, διὰ τουτοῦ τὸν υἱόν, and in Rep. I 354 A οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίμαι, δι' ἑμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ. The words are rejected by Schanz (after Sauppe), but without reason: the jingle (Προ-μηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπι-μηθέα) is quite in Protagoras' style.

55. ἦπερ λέγεται. Aeschylus relates the punishment but not the trial: cf. Prom. 7—9 τὸ σὸν γὰρ ἄνθος, παντέχνου πυρὸς σέλας, θνητοῖσι κλέψας ὥπασεν· τοιαῦδὲ τοι ἁμαρτίας σφε δεῖ θεοῖς δοῦναι δίκην.

## CHAPTER XII.

The myth is continued (322 A—322 D) and used to justify the Athenians for listening to promiscuous political advisers, since according to it all men are endowed with πολιτικὴ ἀρετή—as indeed all men believe, otherwise they would not (as they do) regard as insane the man who does not at least pretend to possess justice and πολιτικὴ ἀρετή generally.

1. θέλας μετέσχε μοίρας: μοίρα is 'dispensation', and refers to the ἔντεχνος σοφία, which is θεία because derived from Hephaestus and Athena.

2. [διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν]. These words are open to objection on two grounds. The singular τοῦ θεοῦ is inaccurate—no single god has been mentioned as akin to man: nor can τοῦ θεοῦ well be taken as God in the monotheistic sense, or as generic for τῶν θεῶν—both usages are alien to the whole tone of the myth. These difficulties might perhaps be got over by reading τοῦ θελοῦ= τῶν θεῶν, but another difficulty remains. The reference in τὴν συγγένειαν can only be to 320 D τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοί, the creatures being regarded as children of their creators as in Tim. 42 E νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες (the created gods) τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διάταξιν, but there it is not only man but all θνητὰ γένη that are in this sense 'akin to gods'—why then should not the lower animals also have built themselves fanes? As the phrase is at best a bad case of loose thinking

and inaccurate writing in an otherwise careful and elaborate piece of composition, I have followed Kral and Schanz in rejecting the whole phrase. The words were perhaps an (inaccurate) gloss on *θείας* in *θείας μοίρας*. For the sentiment which they express see the Editor's Introduction to the Euthyphro p. xvi.

**μόνον**: man alone *θείας μετέσχε μοίρας*: see note in loc. Cobet's *μόνος* would be more grammatical, but the attraction of *ζῶν* is too strong.

3. **ἐπεχείρει βωμούς τε ιδρύεσθαι κτλ.** Hom. Od. III 48 πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἀνθρωποι.

4. **ἔπειτα.** *πρῶτον μὲν* and *ἔπειτα* refer to logical sequence rather than temporal: Protagoras follows the maxim ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα.

7. **ἡὔρετο.** MSS *εὔρετο*, but see on 315 B above.

9. **ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων.** Compare Polit. 274 B 322 B τῆς γὰρ τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νέμοντος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος ἀπερηνωθέντες ἐπιμελείας, τῶν πολλῶν αὖ θηρίων, ὅσα χαλεπὰ τὰς φύσεις ἦν, ἀπαγριωθέντων, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ ἀφύλακτοὶ γεγονότες διηπάζοντο ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

14. **ἧς μέρος πολεμική.** *πολεμική* is recognised as a part of *πολιτική* in Rep. II 273 D foll.

15. **σφίεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις.** The insufficiency of the individual for his own wants is assigned as the cause of city life in Rep. II 369 B *γίγνεται τοίνυν—πόλις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν' οἶει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν; οὐδεμίαν, ἢ δ' ὅς.*

19. **αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην.** The editors cite Hesiod (Works and Days 192) *δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς οὐκ ἔσται* (of the *γένος σιδήρεον*, where man is corrupt). *αἰδῶς* is a part of *δέος* (Euthyphr. 12 C): it keeps men together by making them fear the censure of their fellows (Laws I 647 A—B); compare Homer Iliad xv 561 foll. *ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε, καὶ αἰδῶ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ, ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμῖνας. αἰδομένων δ' ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σοοὶ ἢ ἐπέφανται· φευγόντων δ' οὐτ' ἄρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτε τις ἀλκή.* *δίκη* is here the abstract principle 'law' like Latin *iuris*: for the original meaning of the word see Verrall on Eur. Med. 411.

20. **πόλεων κόσμοι—συναγωγῶ.** The phraseology no less than the rhythm is highly poetical.

21. **τίνα οὖν τρόπον.** For *οὖν* retained in the indirect the editors cite Symp. 219 D *ὥστε οὐθ' ὅπως οὖν ὀργιζομένη εἶχον οὐθ' ὅπη*

προσαγαγόμενην αὐτὸν ἠπόρουσαν. Cobet's δῶ for δόλη is attractive but unnecessary.

22. πότερον ὡς κτλ. "Eleganter omissum ἔφη, ut obliqua oratio statim in rectam transeat" Heindorf, quoting (inter alia) Xen. Cyrop. I 4. 28 ἐνταῦθα δὴ τὸν Κῦρον γελᾶσαι τε ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν δακρῶν καὶ εἰπεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπίοντα θαρρεῖν ὅτι παρέσται αἰθίς ὀλίγου χρόνου· ὥστε ὀρᾶν σοὶ ἐξέσται κἂν βούλη ἀσκαρδαμυκτεῖ. Sauppe quotes an exact parallel in 338 B infra εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι ἀσχροὺς εἶη βραβευτήν ἐλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἶτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται κτλ.

24. εἰς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν—ιδιώταις. This division of labour takes place as soon as men begin to unite in cities: compare Rep. II 369 E foll.

322 D 30. κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως. κτείνειν is poetical for the ἀποκτείνειν of prose.

32. Ἄθηναῖοι: without the article as in 319 B and 324 C.

322 E 35. οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς: 319 C οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται. The antithesis between οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὡς σὺ φῆς and εἰκότως ὡς ἐγὼ φημι is a poor one, since οὐκ ἀνέχονται has to be repeated with εἰκότως. We should expect some word like ἀλόγως before ὡς σὺ φῆς, or perhaps οὐκ εἰκότως has dropped out after φῆς.

323 A 37. ἦν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης—ἰέναι. The antecedent to ἦν is συμβουλῆν not ἀρετῆς: cf. Laws I 632 C (quoted by Heindorf) κατιῶν δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ἅπασιν τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν (sc. φύλακας) διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας. The phrase διὰ δικαιοσύνης ἰέναι is equivalent to δικαίαν εἶναι as διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι to φίλον εἶναι.

38. ἅπαντος. Schanz reads παντός on account of παντί following: but Plato frequently interchanges ἅπας and πᾶς; see on Euthyphr. 9 E. It is natural that the more emphatic form ἅπαντος should come first.

40. ἡ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. ἡ = *alioquin* is regular with δεῖ, προσήκει, and the like, in the preceding clause: compare infra 323 C ἡ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις and 325 A.

αὐτῆ—τούτου αἰτία: asyndeton as in 318 A τοσοῦτος ὁ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος.

41. ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται. The presence of τῷ ὄντι, as Sauppe remarks, shews that ὡς depends on τεκμήριον in line 44: compare infra 324 C ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται—ἀποδέδεικται σοι.

323 B 54. προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην: elsewhere in Plato προσποιεῖσθαι takes the infinitive. Thuc. I 137. 7 has ἦν ψευδῶς προσποιήσατο.

ὡς ἀναγκαῖον: ὄν need not be added, as Heindorf shews: 323 C cf. Rep. v 449 C ὡς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται.

## CHAPTER XIII.

Protagoras now passes to the second part of his reply (323 C—324 D), in which he seeks to prove by two arguments that men believe that virtue can be taught: (1) as we hold men responsible for ἀδικία, it is clear that we conceive of it as capable of being acquired (323 C—324 A); (2) punishment is in point of fact intended to teach well-doing (324 A—324 D).

4. οὐ φύσει ἡγούνται εἶναι—ἀλλὰ διδακτόν. Sauppe (on 322 C) remarks that the giving of δίκη and αἰδώς to all is inconsistent with the theory that πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ can be acquired by teaching. What Protagoras no doubt means is that while all men have a part in δικαιοσύνη (323 A), because they possess δίκη and αἰδώς, they may be improved by teaching, but it must be allowed that his words are hardly consistent with themselves. See Introduction, p. xix.

15. τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰναντία τούτοις. This, the MSS reading, 323 D retained by Heindorf, and recently by Kral, is, we think, right. ταῦτα in line 14 does not have its antecedent in the previous sentence, but is explained by τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰναντία τούτοις. Protagoras in fact divides 'goods' into two classes, viz. (1) goods φύσει, (2) goods ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς, and calls the former καλὰ, the implied examples being personal beauty, stature and health. Schanz's rejection of τὰ καλὰ is therefore needless.

The editors mostly read τὰ κακά, but (in spite of Ficinus' *haec mala eorumque contraria*) this would seem to be precluded by the μέν and δέ in ταῦτα μὲν γάρ and ὅσα δέ—ἀγαθὰ: the contrast requires that one class of goods shall be set over against another, and is much weakened if we put 'evils' in the foreground by reading τὰ κακά. Further, ταῦτα is too remote to be easily taken with τὰ κακά in the sense of 'these evils', whereas if we take the pronoun merely as anticipating τὰ κακά, then the statement becomes too wide: for not all κακά, not all ἀγαθὰ (τὰναντία τούτοις, on this view) come to men φύσει, as indeed the next clause states.

21. συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντιον—ἀρετῆς. We have here the 323 E first hint of the unity of the different vices and (by implication) virtues: compare infra 329 C.

- 324 A 24. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις—διδάξει. Cf. infra 342 D.
25. αὐτό σε διδάξει: 'fact will shew you': Theaet. 200 E ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν κατηγοούμενος—εἶφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό: the idiom is a frequent one.
27. οὐδείς γὰρ κολάζει κτλ. Plato's own theory of punishment so far agrees with this, but goes deeper: see Gorgias 525 A foll. προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ δύνασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὀρώντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται. Vice (being ignorance) is disease of soul, as νόσος is of body: it is the business of the judge to cure the one as of the physician to cure the other: cf. Rep. IX 591 A—B and Gorg. 478 D σωφρονίζει γὰρ πού καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη: hence (ibid. 480 B foll.) the sinner should go before the judge as readily as the patient to a doctor, and should even accuse his friends. In the ideal city the judges are to put to death incurable sinners just as the doctors will allow incurable patients to die: III 409 E foll. τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφνεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, ἀποθνήσκουν ἐάσουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφνεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν. The same holds good of punishment after death: for Ardiaeus and the others in Rep. X 616 A, whose punishment is everlasting (οὐχ ἦκει—οὐδ' ἂν ἦξει δεῦρο), are incurable—ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν ᾄδου ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νοσητήματα—the majority are punished to purge them of the guilt contracted upon earth and teach them to choose more wisely their lot of life next time. The remedial view of punishment is embedded in the genius of the Greek language, as is shewn by the punitive sense of σωφρονίζειν, δικαιοῦν, εὐθύνειν. The older and sterner view (δράσαντι παθεῖν) appears more rarely in Plato's time.
- 324 B 29. ἠδίκησεν. See above on 319 D.
30. τιμωρεῖται. The editors quote Aristotle Rhet. I 10. 1369<sup>b</sup> 12 διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἐνεκά ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιούντος, ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ. The distinction is not invariably observed in Plato, although he generally uses τιμωρεῖσθαι in passages where the gravity of the sin is more insisted upon.
31. οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος—ἀγένητον θείη. Turner (on 324 B) quotes Laws XI 934 A οὐχ ἐνεκα τοῦ κακουργήσαι διδοὺς τὴν δίκην, οὐ



γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀγένητον ἔσται ποτέ κτλ. The phrase οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη represents a common proverbial saying: cf. Simonides Frag. 69 τὸ γὰρ γεγενημένον οὐκέτ' ἄρεκτον ἔσται (Sauppe) with Bergk's note, and the impressive application of the saying in Aesch. Ag. 1019—1021 τὸ δ' ἐπὶ γὰρ ἅπαξ πεσὸν θανάσιμον προπάρουθ' ἀνδρὸς μέλαν αἷμα τίς ἂν πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαιτ' ἐπαείδων;

38. **κολάζονται**: the middle (in the present) is rare: Heindorf 324 C quotes Ar. Wasps 405 νῦν ἐκεῖνο νῦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦξύθυμον ᾧ κολαζόμεσθα κέντρον ἐντέτατ' ὀξύ.

## CHAPTER XIV.

Here begins the third part of Protagoras' reply: 324 E—328 D. In this chapter he begins to shew that virtue is in point of fact taught to all by shewing that it would be absurd to suppose that it is not.

1. **λοιπή ἀπορία**. For the omission of the article before a 324 D relative clause (Heindorf suggested the insertion of ἡ after *λοιπή*) Sauppe quotes Rep. III 413 E φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ὦν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἧς ἐμάνθανεν. The ἀπορία was raised by Socrates in 319 D foll.

4. **διδάσκουσιν**. Contrast infra 325 B τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς υἱεῖς and *ibid.* τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, said of the parents as *διδάσκουσιν* (in the usual sense of *διδάσκονται*) is said here and in Meno 94 B. Similarly in Prot. 320 A ἐπαίδευε is used where we should expect ἐπαυδέυετο: cf. ἐπαυδέυσατο in Meno 93 D.

ἀ διδασκάλων ἔχεται. See note on 319 E supra.

7. οὐκέτι μῦθον ἀλλὰ λόγον. Gorg. 523 A ὃν σὺ μὲν ἠγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἂ μέλλω λέγειν.

13. **δικαιοσύνη—τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι**. Thus for the first time 325 A Protagoras definitely speaks of the virtues in language implying their unity: cf. 323 E.

15. **ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆν**: ἀνδρὸς is somewhat loftier and more impressive than ἀνθρώπου (cf. Rep. VIII 565 E βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων). For the sentiment cf. Rep. VI 501 B ξυμμιγνύντες τε καὶ κεραυνύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὁμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.

16. **μετὰ τούτου**: not μεθ' οὗ, see on 313 A καὶ ἐν ᾧ. For the use of μετὰ cf. Phaed. 69 A ff. (μὴ) ἧ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν,

ἀνθ' οὗ δὲ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία κτλ.

19. καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα: nearly equivalent to 'not only child but etc.': παῖδα is put first as the natural object of κολάζειν—"et nos ergo manum ferulae subduximus" (Juv. I 15).

21. ὑπακούη is more than obey: the word means 'to hear and answer' (cf. Crito 43 A): tr. 'respond', sc. by becoming better (as explained in line 20).

325 B 22. ὡς ἀνιάτων ὄντα—ἀποκτείνειν: Rep. III 410 A τοὺς—κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφρεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσι. In the next line αὐτοῦ in αὐτοῦ πεφικτός is still this 'one thing', viz. ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ.

25. ὡς θαυμάσιοι γίνονται. The MSS have ὡς θαυμασίως γίνονται which could only mean 'in what a strange way are produced'—a meaning irrelevant here. The point is that it is θαυμαστόν if 'good men'—virtue having been proved to be teachable—teach their sons everything except virtue. θαυμάσιοι (with Kroschel and other editors) seems the simplest of the many emendations proposed: cf. Euthyd. 305 B θαυμάσιοί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. The mistake may have arisen from the influence of the common θαυμασίως ὡς. Next best is Hirschig's θαυμασίως γίνονται ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ (cf. 328 E οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ἢ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται) or θαυμασίως γίνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοί: cf. Meno 89 B οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται and Heindorf's emendation on 326 C below. As to γίνονται "Saepius a Platone id quod argumentatione colligitur, γίγνεσθαι dicitur, ut p. 355 A φημι ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι ὅταν λέγητε κτλ., Euthyd. p. 298 E οὐκοῦν ὁ κύων πατὴρ ὦν σὸς ἐστίν, ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων". Kroschel. The same use of γίγνεσθαι is common in Aristotle.

28. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα. For the form of the sentence and for ἄρα here and in line 34 compare note on Crito 50 E ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα.

29. διδάσκονται (but not of course ἄρα) is interrogative: so οὐ διδάσκονται in line 34.

30. ἐφ' ᾧ. This, and not ἐφ' ὧν (as asserted by Schanz) is after all the reading of B: see Adamson in Cl. Rev. VII p. 445. In itself, ἐφ' ὧν (so T) is not indefensible: ἐφ' ὧν (i.e. ἐπὶ τούτων ᾧ) κτλ. would mean 'in the case of subjects which if they have not learnt' (μὴ μαθοῦσι), the latent ᾧ depending on μαθοῦσι. This use of ἐπὶ with the genitive is common in Plato, e.g. Rep. VII 524 E ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν. But ἐφ' ᾧ (which Heindorf had already

conjectured) is simpler and better. For the misplacement of  $\tau\epsilon$  in ἢ  $\tau\epsilon$  ζημία see note on 316 D above.

33. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν is to be taken with ξυλλήβδην, which goes 325 C with the verbal noun ἀνατροπαί: 'almost wholesale subversion of their house'. ξυλλήβδην means not κατὰ σμικρόν, but so as to embrace everything: cf. Rep. I 344 A—B τυραννὶς ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται—ἀλλὰ ξυλλήβδην, and Theognis 147 ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῇ 'νι. For ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν see on 317 A.

35. οὔσθαί γε χρή: a way of answering one's own question: Crito 53 D, 54 B.

## CHAPTER XV.

In this chapter Protagoras shews that the whole scheme of Athenian education is intended to teach ἀρετή.

1. μέχρι οὐπερ ἂν ζῶσι, i.e. οἱ παιδευόμενοι: in 326 D foll. it is shewn that education does not end when school is left, but goes on through life.

3. ἐπειδὴν θάπτον seems not to occur elsewhere in the Platonic writings: in Alcib. I 105 A is ἐὰν θάπτον. τάχιστα is more usual after such conjunctions. Kroschel quotes an imitation of this passage from De Rep. Laced. 2. 1 ἐπειδὴν τάχιστα οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῖς τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνώσιν, εὐθὺς μὲν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς παιδαγωγοὺς θεράποντας ἐφιστᾶσιν, εὐθὺς δὲ πέμπουσιν εἰς διδασκάλων μαθησομένους καὶ γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν παλαιστρα.

5. ὅπως βέλτιστος: so BT: there is no reason for inserting ὡς 325 D after ὅπως with Kroschel and Turner: βέλτιστος does not mean better than all others, but very good.

6. παρ' ἑαυτον κτλ. "Est eo ipso tempore quo quidque vel fit vel dicitur" Heindorf.

8. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον κτλ. Sauppe well quotes Ter. Ad. 417—418 where a father ρουθετεῖ his son "Hoc facito—Hoc fugito—Hoc laudi est—Hoc vitio datur". Compare Horace Sat. I 4. 105 ff.

10. τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ: τὰ μὲν is not δίκαιον, καλόν, ὁσιον, but quite general: 'this do, that do not'. The τάδε μὲν—τάδε δέ of T is unnecessary; cf. τὸ μὲν—τὸ δέ in line 8. The symmetry of the sentence is worth noting ( $a, b, b, a$ ): first τὸ μὲν—τὸ δέ, next τόδε μὲν—τόδε δέ twice, last τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ, the end recalling the beginning. Compare note on καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν in Crito 49 B.

ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθεται: without apodosis: see Goodwin, Moods

and Tenses (1889) p. 179. This idiom occurs more than once in Homer: it is perhaps a remnant of the days when the conditional particles introduced a main sentence: certainly the Greeks were not conscious of any such ellipse as εὖ ἔξει.

11. ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον. ξύλον is 'a piece of wood', not necessarily a dead log, as appears from Hdt. III 47 εἰρίοισι ἀπὸ ξύλου (of the cotton tree) and other exx. in L. and S. The growing child is compared to a tree growing up and becoming crooked (note the present διαστρεφόμενον—καμπτόμενον). Plato frequently applies the metaphors 'crooked', 'warped' and the like to victims of vice and vicious education: compare Gorg. 525 A πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας. Theaet. 173 A σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὄρθοι τὰς ψυχάς.

12. εὐθύνουσιν—πληγαῖς. Cf. Arist. Ἰθην. πολιτ. Ch. 8 τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας ἠθύνει ἐν κυρία οὖσα τοῦ ζῆμι οὖν καὶ κολάζειν (of the Areopagitic council). For εὐθύνειν (here passing into the meaning of 'chastise') see note on 324 A οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει. To illustrate πληγαῖς Sauppe quotes the well-known line of Menander ὁ μὴ δαρεῖς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεύεται.

13. εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες. It appears from 326 C that there was no regular age for going to school; the parents decided in each case. Plato ordains (Laws VII 809 E) that children shall learn γράμματα (i.e. reading and writing, *ibid.* 810 B) from 10 to 13, and the lyre from 13 to 16.

πολὺ μάλλον—εὐκοσμίαις. Protagoras' description of the aim of Athenian education agrees with the account of the Δίκαιος λόγος in the Clouds 961 foll.

325 E 17. ὥσπερ τότε: supra 325 C ἐπειδὴν βῆττον συνιῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα.

18. ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων: i.e. as they sit on the benches: cf. above 315 C. παρατιθέασιν represents the works of the poets as intellectual food: cf. Theaet. 157 C παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.

19. ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν: Homer especially, and also Hesiod, Theognis, Phocylides. Compare Laws VII 810 E, from which passage it also appears that extracts were frequently made for committing to memory (ἐκμανθάνειν).

20. ἀναγκάζουσιν: μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις: Arist. Pol. VIII 1339<sup>a</sup> 28 (quoted by Sauppe). So Niceratus in Xenophon Symp. III 5 says that his father ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὀμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν,

21. *διέξοδοι* means finished narratives or descriptions (cf. *λόγω* 326 A *διεξεληθῶν* and *διεξιέναι* in 320 C). It is to be noted that so far we have not got beyond *ποίησις ψιλή* (i. e. unaccompanied by music): lyric poetry begins to be studied when the lyre has been learnt (line 26).

24. *ἕτερα τοιαῦτα*: for the phrase see on *Apol.* 26 A. The accusative (internal) depends on *ἐπιμελοῦνται* as in 325 C *ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν* and *Laws VII 812 E ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ παιδευτῆς ἐπιμελείσθω*: the whole phrase is equivalent to *ἐτέραν τοιαύτην σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦνται*. Verbs taking the external object in the genitive or dative are not precluded from taking the internal object in the accusative.

28. *εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες*. *ἐντείνειν εἰς* is to stretch 326 B into, i. e. to 'put into': whence *ἐντείνειν ἐς κύκλον χωρίον τρίγωνον* 'to describe a triangle in a circle' (*Meno* 87 A); *περὶ γὰρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνεις τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους* of adapting to metre (*Phaed.* 60 D); and here of accompanying poems on the lyre: the boys learn the poems and tunes (made by the poet) together, while the Citharist plays the lyre. Plato in the *Laws VII 812 D* foll. requires the *κιθαρίσματα* to be identical with the tune to which the poem is sung: *δεῖ—τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας προσχρῆσθαι—τόν τε κιθαριστήν καὶ τὸν παιδευόμενον, ἀποδιδόντας πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι· τὴν δ' ἑτεροφωνίαν καὶ ποικιλίαν τῆς λύρας, ἄλλα μὲν μέλη τῶν χορδῶν ἰεῖσῶν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ τὴν μελωδίαν ξυνθέντος ποιητοῦ—πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ προσφέρειν κτλ.*

*ῥυθμούς τε καὶ ἁρμονίας*. *ῥυθμοί* times or rhythms (cf. *Rep.* III 399 E foll.), *ἁρμονίαι* scales (ibid. 398 D foll.). *ῥυθμός* and *ἁρμονία* between them make up *μουσική* in the narrower sense: see *Symp.* 187 A foll., where music is defined as *περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη—περὶ ἁρμονίαν* since it reconciles *ὀξύ* and *βαρὺ*, *περὶ ῥυθμὸν* since it reconciles *ταχὺ* and *βραδύ*.

29. *οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παιδῶν*. Sauppe quotes *Rep.* III 401 D *κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς*.

30. *εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμωστότεροι*. See *Rep.* III 400 C foll., where, after it is shewn that *τὸ εὐρυθμον* and *τὸ εὐαρμωστον* imply *εὐλογία*, Plato continues (400 D) *εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμωστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐθήθεια ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἦν ἄνοιαν οὔσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐθήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εἶ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν*.

34. εἰς παιδοτρίβου: Protagoras passes to γυμναστική, the second great division of Greek education: Rep. II 376 E.

35. ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ. Plato asserts that the true object of γυμναστική is not to cultivate the body, but to educate the soul to the proper mean between hardness and softness: Rep. III 410 C foll. On the soul as the mistress of the body see Phaedo ch. 43.

326 C 39. μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι. The first μάλιστα is due to Heindorf: it is necessary to the meaning. Most of the editors insert the word μάλιστα not after ποιούσιν but after δυνάμενοι, explaining its loss by the presence of μάλιστα following: but it comes (we think) more naturally after ποιούσιν.

42. ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν: ἐκ is rejected by Cobet (cf. Gorg. 514 C ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν): but the phrase is just as stereotyped as εἰς διδασκάλων, to which (in line 40) it forms an appropriate contrast—in neither of the two cases were the Greeks (in all probability) conscious in common parlance of an ellipse. Sauppe quotes a fragment of Ar. Banqueters 42 οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπεδίδρασκες ἐκ διδασκάλου, Plutus 84 ἐκ Πατροκλέους ἐρχομαι, and other parallels.



43. ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν: hardly to be taken literally, but only in the sense that ignorance was no excuse for breaking the laws.

44. κατὰ τούτους ζῆν. After ζῆν occur in the MSS the words κατὰ παράδειγμα. "Facile succurrat cuivis κατὰ τούτους ζῆν καθάπερ παράδειγμα—quamquam talia notanda potius quam statim corrigenda" says Heindorf. Most recent editors bracket or reject the words, which are open to objection on several grounds, that the laws are not an example but a *rule* of life, and Plato does not use παράδειγμα precisely in this way, as well as from the harsh omission of ὤς. The suggestion of Sauppe that the words are a gloss on κατὰ τούτους by a scribe referring to the illustration which follows—'as for example'—has much probability.

326 D 45. γραμματιστάι: see on γραμματιστοῦ 312 B.

46. ὑπογράφαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι should be understood of tracing (by dots or otherwise) the outlines of the lines (γραμμαί) which form letters. These outlines would be filled up by the pupil: see Blümner, Griechische Privataltherthümer p. 315. The usual view (since Heindorf) has been to regard the γραμμαί as horizontal lines ruled for guidance; "ut pueri in schola directe s. ad lineam scribere iubentur, ita in vita quae agunt ad legis normam iis dirigenda sunt", Kroschel. Such a view is however inconsistent with

the meaning of *ὑπογράφειν* and of *ὑφήγησις*, and (in view of Plato's statements as to the nature of Law) renders the simile inexact. *ὑπογράφειν* in Plato regularly refers to an outline drawing (as *ὑποτυπούσθαι* to moulding in outline *Tim.* 76 E) and is opposed to *ἀπεργάσασθαι* and (in Aristotle) to *ἀναγράφειν*, e.g. *Rep.* VIII 548 C—D *οὐκοῦν—αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτω γεγρονῦα καὶ τοιαύτη ἂν τις εἴη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὸν τε δικαιοτάτον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον*, and *Theaet.* 172 E, where a litigant's *ἀντωμοσία* is called *ὑπογραφὴ*—a sort of outline drawing *ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον*, but which his speech must simply *ἀπεργάσασθαι*. *ὑφηγεῖσθαι* is similarly used, only with the added idea of guiding: e.g. *Rep.* III 403 D—E *οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἰκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες παραδοίμεν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὄσον τοὺς τύπους ὑφηγησαίμεθα—ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιοῖμεν;* and *Laws* X 890 C *δεῖ ταῦτα οὕτω πράττειν διανοομένους ὅπῃ περ ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης ὑφηγήσῃται γράφων*. The point of the simile is this. As the child draws his pen between the outlines

of the lines forming letters (making e.g. ) into ) , so we must keep our actions between certain outlines, which are the laws. Plato invariably regards *νόμοι* as only *τύποι*, within which our actions should fall: cf. *Rep.* II 383 C *παντάπασιν—ἐγῶγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρώμενη* (whence *νόμους ὑπογράφειν* here and in *Laws* V 734 E): see also *Polit.* 294 A foll. *τὸ δ' ἄριστον οὐ τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν ἰσχύειν, ἀλλ' ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν—ὅτι νόμος οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιτο τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιοτάτον ἀκριβῶς πᾶσιν ἅμα περιλαβῶν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτάττει. αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πράξεων—οὐδὲν ἕωςιν ἀπλοῦν ἐν οὐδενὶ περὶ πάντων καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχην οὐδ' ἠγνινοῦν—*for which reason in the *Republic* (VI 497 D) there must always be a power above the laws. The explanation which we have given does not disagree with the account of Seneca in his *Epistles* XV 2. 51 “*Pueri ad praescriptum discunt. Digni illorum tenentur et aliena manu per literarum simulacra ducuntur*”: it is supported by Quintilian I 1. 27 “*cum vero iam ductus sequi coeperit, non inutile erit eas (sc. literas) tabellae quam optime insculpi, ut per illos velut sulcos ducatur stilus*”. It is probable that both these authors had the present passage in view.

It should be noted that *γράφειν νόμους* was a regular phrase: compare the image in *Rep.* VI 501 A.

49. ὥς δὲ καί. ὥς for οὕτως is rare in Attic prose: Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Rep. VII 530 D *κινδυνεύει ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγήναι*. For δέ see above on 318 C.
- 326 E 54. εὐθύναι regularly denotes the 'putting straight' or examination of a magistrate when his office expired. It is not clear whether Protagoras' philological zeal does not cause him to stretch a point in giving to the word a wider signification: but see on εὐθύνουσιν in 325 D.

## CHAPTER XVI.

Protagoras at last comes to the difficulty raised by Socrates in 319 E. Virtue having been proved to be teachable, it is only from a lack of natural aptitude that good men's sons sometimes turn out badly: compared with men who have never been taught virtue, even they are good. Protagoras concludes with a manifest bid for pupils.

4. ἔμπροσθεν: viz. at 324 E.
- 327 A 6. οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν: equivalent to πάντας δεῖ εἶναι δημιουργούς: no one must be a layman in ἀρετή.
12. ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα. As ἐδίδασκε is the important word, ἐπέπληττε has no effect on the construction, but is in effect enclitic: see on 317 C ἐνδειξασθαι καὶ καλλώπισασθαι.
- 327 B 19. εἰ οὖν οὕτω. οὖν marks the reversion to the original protasis, viz. εἰ μὴ οἶόν τ' ἦν—καὶ τοῦτο κτλ., from λυσιτελεῖ to νόμιμα being parenthetical: it therefore seems better to print a colon rather than a full stop after νόμιμα.
- 327 C 24. ἐλλόγιμος ἠξήθη. Proleptic adjectives with αὐξάνω are common: Heindorf cites (inter alia) Rep. VIII 565 C τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν.
27. ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταὶ γ' ἄν: γ' ἄν for γοῦν was Shilleto's conjecture, which can hardly fail to be right. ἀλλ' οὖν—γε is an emphatic 'but at all events': cf. Gorg. 496 D *μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τὸ γε πειρήν αὐτὸ ἀνιάρῳν*.
29. οὕτως οἴου καὶ νῦν. Sauppe's ᾧου κὰν νῦν seems to be quite needless: the conclusion is naturally put as a command—'so in the present case, you are to think'.
30. τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις. So BT. ἀνθρώποις in this emphatic sense is a little awkward with ἀνθρώπους two lines below



and *ἀνθρώποις* said seven lines below of savages (though the word is qualified in both cases), but the text is probably right: cf. 323 C *ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα θνῆτιν' οὐχὶ ἀμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς* (sc. *τῆς δικαιοσύνης*), ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις. Of the suggested emendations the most reasonable is perhaps Sauppe's ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἐννόμοις ἀνθρώποις—which he has now given up in favour of the MSS reading.

31. αὐτὸν is not emphatic: to be *δίκαιος* is to be a *δημουργός δικαιοσύνης*, cf. 326 E *τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν*.

33. μήτε—μήτε—μήτε—μηδέ. *μηδέ* introduces the climax: see 327 D note on *οὔτε—οὐδέ γε* in *Apol.* 19 D and Cope on *Arist. Rhet.* I 4. 4. Presently *ἀλλ' εἶεν* is used rather than *ἀλλ' εἰσί* (in spite of *ἐστίν* in line 33) because the hypothetical nature of the case is becoming more prominent. For the passage of a relative clause into a main clause (*οἷ* is not to be repeated after *ἀλλά*) see on 313 A.

35. ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες. It appears not only from *Athenaeus* (V 218 D), but from *Suidas* and others that the play in question was called *Ἄγριοι*. The few fragments of it which remain (see *Kock's Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* I pp. 146—150) give us no indication of the plot or treatment. The probability is that the *Ἄγριοι* formed the chorus (compare the names *Νεφέλαι*, *Βάτραχοι* etc.), “ad quos”—as we should infer from the words of Plato—“*Athenienses quidam, pauci sine dubio, vitae civilis in sua urbe pertaesi (μυσάνθρωποι) sicut Pithetaerus et Euelpides, accedebant imprudenter sperantes se inter homines immanes meliorem iustioremq̄ quam in civitate sua vitam inventuros esse*” (*Kock*). Plato was perhaps thinking of the same play again in *Rep.* VI 496 D *ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὦν εἰς πᾶσιν ἄγριοις ἀντέχειν*.

οἷοι περ οὓς πέρυσιν: so BT, and there is no sufficient reason for altering the text to οἷους πέρυσιν (with Sauppe, after *Athenaeus* V 218 D) or οἷους περ πέρυσιν with Schanz. Plato does not always avail himself of the liberty of attraction: a parallel is quoted from *Crat.* 432 E *ἴνα κομιδῆ ἢ τοιοῦτον οἶόν περ οὐ θνομά ἐστιν*.

36. πέρυσιν. *Athenaeus* V 218 D *ἐδιδάχθησαν δὲ οἱ Ἄγριοι ἐπ' Ἀριστίωνος ἀρχοντος*, i.e. Ol. 89 4=421/420 B.C. For the bearing of the date of the *Ἄγριοι* on the question when the dialogue of the *Protagoras* is assumed to have taken place see *Introd.* p. xxxvii.

Φερεκράτης. The fragments of *Pherecrates*—a poet of the old comedy who gained his first victory in 438 B.C.—are given in *Kock's Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* I pp. 145—209.

ἔδιδάξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. The Λήναιον (also called Λίμναι and *τέμενος τοῦ Διονύσου*) was an enclosure sacred to Dionysus on the south-east slope of the Acropolis. Compare Photius s.v. Λήναιον· περιβόλος μέγας Ἀθήνησιν, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἤγον, πρὸ τοῦ τὸ θέατρον οἰκοδομηθῆναι, ὀνομαζόμεντες ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. The phrase ‘at Lenaeum’ seems to have survived even after all plays were given in the Dionysiac theatre, as by this time they were, and to have been understood as equivalent to ‘at the Lenaeian festival’ (cf. Ar. Ach. 504 οὐ πὶ Ληναίῳ τ’ ἀγῶν), for which the expressions ἐν Ληναίοις and (ἔδιδάχθη) εἰς Λήναια are more usual in the *didascaliae* (see Müller’s *Bühnenalterthümer* p. 316 note 3). The Lenaea took place in the month Gamelion.

38. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ, sc. γενόμενοι. γίγνεσθαι ἐν is ‘to come to be in or among’, ‘to fall among’. ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα of 314 C is the same idiom.

μισάνθρωποι. So the MSS. The various suggested emendations (ἡμιάνθρωποι Heinrich, μιξάνθρωποι Jacobs, μεσάνθρωποι Lehrs) proceed on the supposition that the word is an epithet of the ἄγριοι, which is most improbable: “alii sunt ἄγριοι, alii μισάνθρωποι, neque in illa sermonis iunctura” (sc. if we regard the ὥσπερ clause as explaining τοῖς τοιοῦτοις) “scribendum ὥσπερ sed οἳ περ fuit” (Heindorf).

39. Εὐρύβατῳ καὶ Φρυωνῶδα. Two proverbial scoundrels of real life: see Suidas s. vv. Εὐρύβατος πονηρός, ἀπὸ τοῦ πεμφθέντος ὑπὸ Κροίσου ἐπὶ ξενολογίαν μετὰ χρημάτων, ὡς φησιν Ἐφορος, εἶτα μεταβαλομένοι πρὸς Κύρον· ἦν δὲ Ἐφέσιος κτλ. Φρυωνῶδας τῶν ἐπὶ πονηρίᾳ διαβεβοημένων, ὃς ξένος ὦν κατὰ τὰ Πελοποννησιακὰ διέτριβεν Ἀθήνησιν—ἐκ τούτου τοὺς πονηροὺς Φρυωνῶδας καλοῦσι. They are frequently mentioned in Greek literature: see Blaydes on Ar. Thesm. 861. Blaydes remarks that -ῶνδας is a Boeotian termination: cf. Ἐπαμεινῶνδας, Χαρώνδας and the like.

327 E 42. οὐδέις σοι φαίνεται εἶναι. εἶναι is Heindorf’s emendation for εἶθ’ of the Bodleian. For the asyndeton with ὥσπερ see above on 311 E.

43. τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν. The same illustration occurs in Alc. I III A.

328 A 48. τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν repeats τίς ἂν—διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν νειεῖς: and οὐ βῆδιον οἶμαι εἶναι—τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι is a variety on οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς φανείη, which the οὐδέ γ’ ἂν of line 44 might lead us to expect would be repeated—but the sentence is a

slight anacoluthon. This is better than to take *ἄν* of *οὐδὲ γ' ἄν* in line 44 with *εἶναι* of line 49.

51. οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς. On *οὕτω δέ* see above note on 318 C.

52. κἄν εἰ: κἄν = καὶ εἰ is somewhat rare in Plato, e.g. *Meno* 72 C κἄν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσιν, ἐν γέ τι εἶδος ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν: it is extremely common in Aristotle. The *ἄν* shews that the idiom must have arisen from cases where the apodosis contained a verb with which *ἄν* could go, e.g. κἄν εἰ ἀποθνήσκω, εὖ ἔχοι. Such cases as *Symp.* 185 A κἄν εἴ τις—ἐξαπατηθείη, καλὴ ἢ ἀπάτη, where the verb after *εἰ* is in the optative, preserve traces of the origin of the construction.

55. ὀνήσαι τινα πρὸς. ὀνήσαι is Dobree's correction for *νοῆσαι*: 328 B cf. *Rep.* x 601 D εἶπερ οἷός τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὀνήσαι ἀνθρώπων.

58. τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* IX 2. 1164<sup>a</sup> 24 ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. This is more than Plato says: see next note.

60. ἀποδέδωκεν: but κατέθηκεν (gnomic aorist) two lines lower down. It is not necessary to reject ἀποδέδωκεν (with Sauppe and Schanz) or to read ἀπέδωκεν (with Kroschel and Kral). ἀποδέδωκεν is hardly to be explained as a gnomic perfect (Goodwin), certain examples of which are rare, if not unknown, but is to be taken in its natural sense: 'if he prefers, he has already paid...if not etc.': this is also Heindorf's view. Unless the pupil had *paid in advance*, Protagoras left the fee to his own conscience and (according to his own account, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι) generally fared better, even though (if *Diogenes Laertius* IX 52 may be trusted) his fee was 100 minae. If Protagoras made no bad debts, he escapes the censure of Plato in *Gorgias* 519 C, where it is said that, if teachers of *δικαιοσύνη* do not receive their fees, it only shews that they have failed to teach their subject and deserve no fees.

61. ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν. "Tactis sacris aramve tenentes veteres iurare satis est notum" Heindorf, quoting *Aeschin.* in *Timarch.* § 114 λαβῶν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρα τὰ ἱερά καὶ ὄμβσας μὴ λαβεῖν δῶρα—εἰληφὼς ἠλέγχθη.

69. τῶνδε. Protagoras is more encouraging than Socrates in 319 E.

## CHAPTER XVII.

Here begins Socrates' criticism of Protagoras' speech. The question is first raised—Is Virtue one, or many? The connexion between this question and the speech of Protagoras is that if Virtue has a unity in knowledge, it is teachable, otherwise not: see Introd. p. xx.

328 D 2. **ἐπιδειξάμενος.** *ἐπιδείκνυσθαι* and *ἐπιδείξις* are regularly used of a Sophistic display: e.g. Gorg. 447 A *πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῶν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο*, Crat. 384 B *τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπιδείξιν*. *ἐπιδείκνυμι* is also sometimes used in the same way, e.g. Euthyd. 274 D and infra 347 B: in 320 C above *ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξον* is intended to suggest this meaning, which comes out more clearly in *ἐπιδείξω* two lines below.

3. **ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον** goes with *ἔβλεπον* and *ἔτι* with *κεκλημένος*.

8. **ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου:** with mock solemnity: so 335 D *ὦ παῖ Τηποῦκου*, Rep. II 368 A *ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τάνδρός*.

9. **ᾧδε** in the sense of *δεῦρο* is noted as a Platonic idiom by the lexicographers. The usage is found in tragedy, but no other example is quoted from Plato.

328 E 12. **ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν:** cf. Meno 99 E *ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτὴν, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ*.

15. **ἐπεκδιδάξει—ἐξεδίδαξεν:** see on 311 A.

329 A 17. **τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους:** *καὶ* goes with *τοιούτους*—'even such', 'just such': *τούτου* should not be inserted (with Sauppe, Schanz, Kral) before *τοιούτους*.

20. **ὥσπερ βιβλία.** Hermann wished to read *οὐχ ὥσπερ βιβλία*, since the orators do make a speech when spoken to: but the point is that like books they do not answer the questions asked, or put questions themselves, as the true dialectician does: cf. Phaedr. 275 D *δεινὸν γάρ που—τούτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμοιον ζωγραφία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταῦτόν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὡς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ τι ἔρῃ τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἔν τι σημαίνει μόνον αὐτόν ἀεί:* infra 347 E and Hipp. Min. 365 D *τὸν μὲν Ὀμηρον—ἐάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι, τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησε τὰ ἔπη*. A similar objection applies to laws: see Polit. 294 A (quoted above on 326 D).

22. **ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία.** The MSS have *χαλκεία*, but (as Kro-

schel points out) in *Crat.* 430 A εἴ τι χαλκίον κινήσειε κρούσας. χαλκαῖα would mean 'smithies'.

23. **μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει:** ἀποτείνει is used absolutely as in *Gorg.* 458 B καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν. Compare *Euthyd.* 300 B ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, οὐ σιγῶντα λέγεις; οὐκ οὐκ ἄ γε ἐγὼ, ἔφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις (MSS. χαλκίοις), ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ σιδήρια λέγει.

25. **δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου.** δολιχὸν is the reading of B and T, but (1) the adjective δολιχός seems to be exclusively poetic, the word surviving in Plato's time only in the form δόλιχος for δολιχός δρόμος (cf. for the change of accent κάκη by κακή, Φαῖδρος by φαιδρός and the like): (2) δολιχός τοῦ λόγου would be a rare construction, though not without parallels, e.g. πολλὴν τῆς χώρας in *Xen. Cyrop.* III 2. 2 and τῆς μαρίλης συχνήν in *Ar. Ach.* 350: ἀμήχανον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας of *Apol.* 41 C is different: (3) after the expressive simile which we have had, 'a long speech' sounds very weak. On the other hand δόλιχος τοῦ λόγου, the suggestion of Stephanus, is strongly supported by 335 E where Socrates compares Protagoras, because he plays the *ρήτωρ* and not the dialectician, to a δολιχοδρόμος: νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ δεοῦ μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἱμεραίῳ δρομῆϊ ἀκμάζοντι ἔπεσθαι ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι, and the editors quote a number of parallels to the metaphor, such as *Plut. Phoc.* 23. 3 καλῶς ἔφη πρὸς τὸ στάδιον, τὸν δὲ δόλιχον τοῦ πολέμου φοβοῦμαι; *Epicrates* in *Kock's Com. Att. Frag. Vol. II* p. 283 ἐπεὶ δὲ δόλιχον τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἤδη τρέχει, *Ar. Clouds* 430 τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι με λέγειν ἑκατὸν σταδίοισιν ἄριστον and *Frogs* 91 πλεῖν ἢ σταδίῳ λαλίστερα, *Eupolis* (*Kock l. c. I* p. 281) (of Pericles) ὁπότε παρέλθοι δ' ὡσπερ ἀγαθοὶ δρομῆς ἐκ δέκα ποδῶν ἤρει λέγων τοὺς *ρήτορας*. Dropping the sporting metaphor we may say 'spin out a league of verbiage against you'. The δόλιχος was 24 στάδια, the στάδιον being covered 12 times both ways: cf. *Pind. Ol.* III 33.

27. **ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ.** The MSS read αὐτά, which most recent 329 B editors change to αὐτό with Stephanus, regarding the idiom as analogous to that in 324 A αὐτό σε διδάξει, but in this idiomatic use of αὐτό the verb is generally, if not always, in the future. αὐτό που λέγει in *Ar. Eq.* 204 and the cases quoted by Blaydes in loc. are different, since in each case αὐτό has a *definite* antecedent expressed. ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ is simply as 'things themselves' i.e. 'as facts shew': the reference is to the speech which Protagoras has just delivered.

Compare Arist. Pol. IV 12. 1331<sup>a</sup> 21 δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται κτλ. and (with Heindorf) Xen. Cyr. VI 1. 7 οὐκ οἶδα μὲν ἐγώ γε, εἴ τι δεῖ λόγων, ὅπου αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα δείκνυσι τὸ κρῆτιστον.

31. εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. The optative follows *σμικροῦ* τινὸς ἐνδεῆς *εἰμι πάντ' ἔχων* as virtually equivalent to *πάντ' ἂν ἔχοιμι* (Heindorf).

32. εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἂν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. The fulness of expression is no doubt intentional: Socrates politely dwells upon his compliment. The objections to the syntax are two-fold: (1) ἂν with the optative in protasis; (2) εἴπερ (in clauses of this kind) with its verb expressed. Cases of the potential optative in the protasis are given by Goodwin MT. p. 192 (e.g. Xen. Mem. I 5. 3 εἴ γε μῆδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάσασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι); for εἴπερ with verb expressed Heindorf cites Meno 98 B ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι (ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην) ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα. Socrates' νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι (hardly serious) in 328 E is not inconsistent with πειθοίμην ἂν, since he at once qualifies his assent by πλὴν σμικρόν τι μοι ἐμποδῶν: it is sufficiently represented here by καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. We therefore agree with Heindorf, Wayte, and Turner in retaining the MSS reading: other editors mostly read either εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἂν καὶ σοὶ, or drop πειθοίμην ἂν and retain καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι.

329 C 35. ἔλεγες γάρ: 322 C δικαιοσύνη and αἰδώς are looked on as two *distinct* virtues.

36. πολλαχού: 324 E—325 A: cf. 323 A and E.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

Socrates elicits from Protagoras (1) that while Virtue as a whole is one, the single virtues differ from each other and form the whole like the parts of the face: that it is possible to possess one virtue without possessing all: and that in all there are five virtues, justice, temperance, holiness, bravery, wisdom, of which the last is greatest (329 D—330 A): (2) that the virtues differ from each other not only in themselves, but in their *δύναμις* (330 A—330 B): (3) that justice is just, and holiness holy (330 B—330 E). The refutation of Protagoras does not begin till the next chapter.

329 D 4. προσώπου: προσώπου is treated as an abstract conception—'parts of face': cf. ψυχή in 313 C κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται: Rep. IV 435 C εἰς φαῦλόν γε αὐ—σκῶμα ἐμπεπτώκαμεν περὶ

ψυχῆς, εἴτε ἔχει τὰ τρία εἶδη ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῇ εἴτε μή. In Aristotelian language, the face is *ἀνομοιομερές*.

7. ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὄλου: so the MSS and Heindorf (who suggests ἀλλήλων τε καὶ τοῦ ὄλου): recent editors mostly omit either ἀλλήλων or τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων. τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων should be taken quite generally, τῶν ἐτέρων (and thus, by implication, τὰ ἕτερα) having its meaning defined by the clause ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὄλου. τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων could be dropped without injury to the sense, but hardly ἀλλήλων: without ἀλλήλων Plato would have written οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὄλου: cf. 330 A ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον (not τὰ ἕτερα οἶα τὰ ἕτερα): and so 330 E, 331 A, 331 D, 349 B, 359 A.

11. μεταλαμβάνουσιν—μολίων—ἄλλο. μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέ- 329 E  
χειν, μεταδιδόναι and the like take an accusative of the part as well as a genitive of the whole. μεταλαμβάνειν μολίον = 'to receive a part of a whole': μεταλαμβάνειν μολίου = 'to receive a part of a part'.

14. ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν ἄδικοι δέ: cf. Laws I 630 B πιστοὺς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγιῆς ἐν στάσεσιν οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο ἄνευ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς. διαβάντες δ' εὖ καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐθέλοντες ἀποθνήσκειν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ὡς φράζει Τύρραιος τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰσὶ πάμπολλοι, ὧν οἱ πλείστοι γίγνονται θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν πάντων.

15. καὶ ταῦτα: for σοφία and ἀνδρεία have not yet been named—only δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη and ὁσιότης. See Introd. p. xxxiv.

17. καὶ μέγιστόν γε σοφία: Protagoras speaks as a σοφιστής, 330 A glorifying his profession.

18. ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο: equivalent to τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο. τὸ δέ, τὰ δέ etc. without preceding τὸ μὲν, τὰ μὲν etc. is a frequent idiom. Crat. 399 A πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δ' ἔξαιρούμεν. Soph. O. T. 1229 οἶμαι γὰρ οὐτ' ἂν Ἴστρον οὐτε Φᾶσιν ἂν νίψαι καθαρῶς τῆνδε τὴν στέγην ὅσα κεύθει, τὰ δ' αὐτίκ' εἰς τὸ φῶς φανεῖ κακά.

20. ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου: we have placed the mark of interrogation before ὥσπερ: see on ἄλλο γε in 311 E. The sentence ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμοῦ οἶον τὰ ὄτα thus corresponds exactly to ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον. For τὰ τοῦ προσώπου followed by its parts in the same case compare infra 349 A ἐκεῖνα—τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ and Theaet. 151 A οἷς ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσι—ἐνίοις μὲν—ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἔᾶ. For the asyndeton regular in explanatory and ampliative clauses see note on Apol. 22 A.

330 B 27. ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες. So T: B has only ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη. The longer form of answer is more suited to Protagoras' style.

330 C 32. ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τί ἐστιν. Compare infra 332 A ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; 332 C, 358 D. Plato frequently begins a train of reasoning in this way.

34. καὶ ἐμοί: so T: B has καὶ μοι. καὶ ἐμοί seems slightly better than κάμοι, as forming a more effective balance to ἐμοὶ μὲν in the last line.

35. ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες: but ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ as Greek usage requires. Protagoras is addressed first on the principle *seniores priores* and *honoris causa*; contrast 311 D, and compare 353 A (Kroschel).

εἶπετον: contrast 311 D εἶπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, where see note. The dual gives prominence to the notion in κοινῇ σκεψόμεθα (line 31). The connexion of this part of the argument with the rest is this: in 330 A—330 B it is said that no one part of virtue is οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, e.g. that δικαιοσύνη is not οἷον ὀσιότης (major premise): here it is said that δικαιοσύνη is δίκαιον, ὀσιότης ὄσιον (minor premise): from which the conclusion (in the next chapter) is drawn that δικαιοσύνη is not ὄσιον, nor ὀσιότης δίκαιον. This stage of the argument is therefore neither "tautological nor unmeaning" as Grote (quoted by Turner) asserts.

330 D 47. οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὄσιον. Notice the identification of the 'not ὄσιον' with ἀνόσιον: see below on 331 A.

330 E 49. εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε. ὦ ἄνθρωπε is somewhat brusque: so ὦ ἄνθρωποι in 314 D above. ἄνθρωπε without ὦ would border on rudeness: e.g. Gorg. 518 C ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκεις, εἰ σοι ἔλεγον, ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲν ἐπαίεις περὶ γυμναστικῆς. εὐφήμει is frequent to express shocked surprise, real or feigned: e.g. Rep. I 329 C, Meno 91 B ('Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες), Gorg. 469 A, Euthyd. 301 A.

## CHAPTER XIX.

Socrates endeavours to refute Protagoras and to shew that Justice and Holiness are identical. If ὀσιότης is not οἷον δικαιοσύνη, nor δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὀσιότης, it will follow (says Socrates) that ὀσιότης is ἀδίκον and δικαιοσύνη ἀνόσιον. This is absurd, and therefore ὀσιότης is δίκαιον and δικαιοσύνη ὄσιον. Protagoras will only admit that there is a certain likeness between the two virtues.



4. τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια. B and T omit the article, which can hardly be dispensed with—since the assertion was made not of parts of virtue, but of *the* i.e. all the parts: see 330 A ἀρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον—; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει κτλ.;

οὕτως—ὡς. ὥστε for ὡς would be more usual: cf. Rep. II 365 D ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλειονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. Perhaps the ὡς of Phaedo 108 E πέπεισμαι—ὡς πρῶτον μὲν—μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος κτλ. is the same in kind: cf. the old English 'so as'. Here οὕτως—ὡς with the infinitive is natural in view of τοιοῦτον οἶον in the vicinity: 330 C and D.

11—12. σὺ—σός: notice the mock asperity: I expected better 331 A things of γοῦ.

16. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν: the interrogation begins here and ἄρα is illative.

17. ἀλλ' οἶον μὴ ὄσιον. So far we are entitled to go, but in τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον (line 18) the contrary and the contradictory are confused, as is frequently the case in Plato's dialogues: see note on Euthyphr. 7 A θεομισές, where are cited Alcib. II 138 D foll., Rep. IV 437 C: add Phileb. 48 B foll. where φθόνος is said to be joy at a friend's misfortune because envy of a friend's success implies joy at his ill-luck (cf. *ibid.* 50 A), and Euthyd. 276 B οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς; πάνυ γε. Plato was not unaware of the rules of logic in this matter (see Symp. 201 E—202 A), but the tendency of Greek thought and life was not to rest content with negations; whence words like ἀνωφελής, ἀφθονος acquired a positive significance, and Solon could enact ('Αθηναίων πολιτεία Ch. 8 ad fin.) ὅς ἂν στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως μὴ τιθῆται τὰ ὄπλα μηδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. Part of the argument in the next chapter suffers from the same flaw: see on 332 A line 3.

18. ἀλλ' ἀδικον ἄρα: Heindorf's emendation for ἀλλὰ δίκαιον ἄρα, the reading of the best MSS, which τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον proves to be wrong and shews how to correct. Heindorf's correction was afterwards confirmed by a Paris MS. ἄρα is illative. For τὸ μὲν unexpressed (the words are equivalent to ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικον ἄρα) before τὸ δέ see on 330 A ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.

22. ὅτι is 'because', not 'that': see note on line 24 below. 331 B

23. δικαιοῦτης ὁσιότητι. Socrates gives the words the same termination to suggest their closer likeness ('justness' to holiness): δικαιοῦτης is found also in Gorg. 508 A as a balance to κοσμιότητη.

Plato was fond of this suffix and coined by it the word *ποιότης* Theaet. 182 A.

24. *καὶ μάλιστα πάντων—οἶον δικαιοσύνη*. Kroschel objects to the emphasis, and inclines to doubt the genuineness of this clause. If *ὅτι* in line 22 is translated as 'because' and not as 'that', the difficulty disappears. *ταῦτὰ ἂν ταῦτα* in line 22 thus means simply that *δικαιοσύνη* is *ὅσιον* and *ὀσιότης δίκαιον* (lines 20—21), which is the meaning also assigned to *ταῦτὰ ἂν ταῦτα* by Protagoras in his reply (line 27 foll.). Socrates (for Protagoras) will reply that *δικαιοσύνη* is *ὅσιον* and *ὀσιότης δίκαιον* for two main reasons: (1) because *δικαιοσύνη* is the *same* as *ὀσιότης*—this he does not much insist on—or because *δικαιοσύνη* is *ὅτι ὁμοίωτατον ὀσιότητι*—this he insists on more: (2) because *δικαιοσύνη* is *οἶον ὀσιότης* and *ὀσιότης οἶον δικαιοσύνη*—this he insists on most of all (*μάλιστα πάντων*), and with reason, because it expressly refutes Protagoras' assertion in 330 A—B. On the other hand if *ὅτι* is translated as 'that', Kroschel's objections can hardly be got over—viz. that *ἦτοι ταῦτόν—δικαιοσύνη* is *not* the same as Socrates' reply on his own behalf; that the words are ignored both by Protagoras in his reply and by Socrates himself in 333 B; and that the emphasis of *μάλιστα πάντων* is strained and unnatural.

331 C 28. *ἄπλοῦν*: opposed to *ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι* in 29. Plato uses *ἄπλοῦν*, as opposed to *διπλοῦν, διάφορον, σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, ποικίλον* and the like, of that which is uniform, simple, true without any difference or qualifications: Bonitz in *Hermes* II (1867) p. 307 foll.

32. *μή μοι*: see on *μη οὕτως* in 318 B.

33. *τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο—ἐλέγχεσθαι*, cf. infra 333 C *τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι*. Here *τὸ*, as often, introduces a quotation.

34. *τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ τοῦτο λέγω*: *τοῦτο* (cf. line 33) belongs to the *τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ* and not to *λέγω* in the usual sense of *τοῦτο λέγω* 'I mean this'.

331 D 38. *τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι*. Anaxagoras went so far as to say that snow was black (because it is still water, though congealed): Ritter and Preller § 128 note b.

39. *ὄπη*: an old emendation for *ὀμή*.

44. *ταῦτα*: the parts of the face.

331 E 47. *καὶ πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχη τὸ ὅμοιον*. This (the MSS reading) is successfully defended by Kroschel. The emphasis is on the first

part of the sentence ('it is not right to call what has some likeness like—any more than to call what has some unlikeness unlike—even if the likeness be very small'), to which accordingly *κἀν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον* reverts: compare Socrates' reply, which says nothing of *τὸ ἀνόμοιον*, in the next sentence. The German editors (except Cron and Kroschel) either reject *τὸ ὅμοιον* (Schanz, Sauppe, Bertram), or read *τὸ ἀνόμοιον ἢ τὸ ὅμοιον* (Heindorf) or reject altogether the words *οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια* (Kral).

## CHAPTER XX.

Without establishing more surely the identity of justice and holiness, Socrates now seeks to prove the identity of temperance and wisdom, and begins to discuss the relation between temperance and justice.

The proof that temperance and wisdom are the same is briefly as follows: *ἀφροσύνη* is the opposite of *σοφία*, and also of *σωφροσύνη*: but a thing can have but one opposite: therefore *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη* are identical. It is admitted at once that *ἀφροσύνη* and *σοφία* are opposites: the proof that *ἀφροσύνη* is *ἐναντίον σωφροσύνης* is of some length and (as well as the assertion that a thing can have but one opposite) assumes the identity of the contrary and contradictory. The usual sense of *ἀφροσύνη* (intellectual folly) and the meaning natural from its derivation (as the opposite of *σωφροσύνη*) are also—as is natural to one who holds that vice is ignorance—identified, and the whole argument is unnecessarily spun out.

1. *ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς*. See above on 330 C.

332 A

3. *πότερον δὲ ὕταν*. Here begins the proof that *σωφροσύνη* is *ἐναντίον ἀφροσύνης*. (1) *τὸ ὀρθῶς* and *ὠφελίμως πράττειν* is *σωφρονεῖν*, and *σωφροσύνη* is that by which one *σωφρονεῖ*: (2) *τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττειν* is *ἀφρόνως πράττειν* and *οὐ σωφρονεῖν*: from which it is inferred that *ἀφρόνως πράττειν* is the opposite of *σωφρόνως πράττειν*, or (as is worked out at inordinate length) that *ἀφροσύνη* is the opposite of *σωφροσύνη*. In equating *μὴ ὀρθῶς* with *ἀφρόνως πράττειν* in (2) Socrates again confounds contradictory and contrary: see on 331 A.

6. *ἢ τοῦναντίον*. So Stallbaum, after Heindorf's *ἢ τοῦναντίον πράττειν*: the MSS have *ἢ εἰ τοῦναντίον ἐπραττον*, which is faulty both because it in no way corresponds to the answer *σωφρονεῖν* and because *εἰ* with the imperfect is here unsuitable. In *ἢ τοῦναντίον* it

will be observed that Socrates already allows no middle position between *σωφρονεῖν* and its opposite: see above on line 3.

332 C 19. *φέρε δὴ*. From here to line 27 Socrates tries to prove that a thing can have but one *ἐναντίον*. This is true only if we confine *ἐναντίον* to the meaning of 'contradictorily opposite' throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the *ἐναντίον* of *καλόν* is *μὴ καλόν*: as soon as we say that its *ἐναντίον* is *αἰσχρόν* we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them multiform)—since *μὴ καλόν* is not *αἰσχρόν* but may be anything in the whole world except *καλόν*. This part of the argument is therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between contrary and contradictory terms.

332 D 27. *ἀναλογισώμεθα*: of reckoning up and reflecting as in Rep. I 330 E, X 618 C.

33—34. *ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης—ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης*. This has not been admitted in so many words, but with *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀφροσύνη* for *ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης* and *ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης*: 332 B line 12: cf. C line 18.

332 E 40. *ἔμπροσθεν*: 332 A.

44. *τό* does not belong to *ἐν* but to the clause *ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι*: cf. *τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο* in 331 C. *ἐκείνον* refers to Chapter XVIII.

333 A 49. *οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς—συναρμόττουσιν*. "In his lenem agnosco Sophistae irrisionem, qui supra § 43" (326 B) "*πάντα τὸν βίον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖσθαι dixisset*". Heindorf.

333 B 52. *πλείω δὲ μῆ*. B reads *πλείουσιν*, T *πλείοσι*: *πλείω* is a suggestion of Heindorf's, adopted by most editors. The nominatives *ἐν μόνον* in line 51 and *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη* in 53 are strongly in favour of *πλείω*. If *πλείουσιν* is retained, it must be regarded as a blemish in Plato's style.

59. *τὰ λοιπά*. If *δικαιοσύνη=δσιότης* and *σωφροσύνη=σοφία* it remains to identify either *δικαιοσύνη* or *δσιότης* with either *σωφροσύνη* or *σοφία* in order to prove the identity of these four virtues. Socrates begins to prove that *δικαιοσύνη=σωφροσύνη*.

60. *ὅτι ἀδικεῖ*: *ὅτι* (cf. infra 333 D, and Parm. 155 E) is equivalent to *κατὰ τοῦτο ὅ*: cf. Rep. I 340 D *ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει*; *ὅ τι* the relative and *ὅτι* the conjunction shade into one another here. There is much to be said for Cron's view that the words should be written alike: see on Apology, Appendix II. p. 123.

333 C 62. *πολλοὶ γέ φασιν*. In Rep. I 348 B foll., Thrasymachus

asserts that *ἀδικία* is *εὐβουλία*, *ἀρετή*, *καλόν* and *ἰσχυρόν*: compare also Polus in Gorg. 469 B foll. Notice that Protagoras' *οἰμῖ* opinion—that *ἀδικία* is not compatible with *σωφροσύνη*—makes for the identification of *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη*.

65. τὸν τῶν πολλῶν: on account of the τῶν here, Heindorf wished to insert *οἱ* before *πολλοί* in line 62, but such a view could hardly be said to be held by the majority: cf. Rep. I 348 E *εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες κτλ.* As Sauppe points out, the article τῶν refers only to the above-mentioned πολλοί. With the situation compare Rep. VII 527 E foll. *σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγει, ἢ οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους ἀλλὰ σαντοῦ ἔνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ' ἄν ἄλλω εἴ τις τι δύναιτο ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.*

66. εἴτ' οὖν—εἴτε: see on Apol. 34 E.

## CHAPTER XXI.

Before Socrates has completed his proof that *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη* are identical, Protagoras takes occasion to deliver an irrelevant though carefully constructed harangue on *ἀγαθά*.

1. ἐκαλλωπίζετο. Cf. Phaedr. 236 D *παῦσαι πρὸς με καλλωπι- 333 D ζόμενος· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω δ εἰπὼν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν*: so also *τροφᾶν*, cf. Euthyphr. I 1 E *ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τροφᾶν, αὐτός σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι*, where see note.

6. ἔστω. Protagoras has already disclaimed this view in 333 B.

8. ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν: Hirschig suggested *ὅτι ἀδικούσιν*, but see on 333 B. Schanz rejects the words, but without sufficient reason.

9. εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες. *εὖ* is here primarily of success, and *κακῶς* of failure, but the collocation of *εὖ πράττειν* with *ἀδικεῖν* is intended to suggest that the view which Protagoras is defending is a paradox. Plato frequently makes use of the double sense (as we should call it: but see on Euthyphr. 3 A) of *εὖ πράττειν*, *εὖ ζῆν* and the like, to imply that the virtuous life is the happy one: e.g. Alcib. I 116 B foll.: Rep. I 353 E foll.: Charm. 172 A, 173 D: compare Euthyd. 281 C.

10. λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθά. Socrates proceeds to elucidate the definition of *εὖ* in *εὖ πράττειν*.

12. ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: Xen. Mem. IV 6. 8 *ἄλλο δ' ἄν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον; οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον*

ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ὅτι ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Plato Rep. II 379 B τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν; ναί.

333 E 15. ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι. The martial metaphor in the desiderative ἀγωνιᾶν is carried on by παρατετάχθαι, which is the MSS reading, and means literally 'to be set in array', cf. Thuc. IV 43. 3 οἱτοὶ γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἔσχατοι. For the metaphorical use cf. Rep. III 399 B ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνόμενον τὴν τύχην. The whole clause describes the outward demeanour of Protagoras, which causes Socrates to fear an imminent personal conflict. Kock's παρατετάσθαι, accepted by Schanz, does not suit, since παρατετάσθαι means 'to be tired, worn out', e.g. Euthyd. 303 B καὶ γελῶντε καὶ κροτοῦντε... ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν, cf. Ar. Clouds 213. It is noteworthy that συντεταγμένως and συντεταμένως are frequently found as variants in Platonic MSS.

334 A 20. οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. The argument is here broken off, and not (in its present form) again resumed. If Socrates had continued, Protagoras would doubtless have asserted that what is ὠφέλιμον for man is *for him* ἀγαθόν. The argument has therefore been: σωφρονεῖν, it is said, is ἀδικεῖν. But σωφρονεῖν = εὖ φρονεῖν = εὖ βουλευέσθαι ἴφ (but only if) εὖ πράττειν (i.e. ὠφέλιμα πράττειν) accompanies εὐβουλία. In other words ὠφέλιμα πράττειν = ἀδικεῖν is the stage which we have reached—a thesis which it is the object of the Republic and of a large part of the Gorgias to refute.

πολλὰ οἶδ' ἄ. The speech which follows may be from some work by Protagoras (so recently Zeller in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie v 2, p. 177), perhaps his περὶ ἀρετῶν, mentioned by Diog. Laert. IX 8. 55 (since ἀρετή is a general word for excellence). Zeller points out that just as the notion 'true' was conceived by Protagoras (in his πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος) as relative, so here the notion 'good' is represented as relative and varying with that to which it is relative.

21. ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὠφέλιμα: ἀνθρώποις μὲν has no antithesis expressed: were the antitheses expressed in full, the sentence would be very cumbersome, running somewhat as follows: ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἄ ἀνθρώποις μὲν <τὰ μὲν> ἀνωφελῆ ἐστὶ, καὶ σίτια—μυρία, <τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς ὠφέλιμα>, τὰ δὲ γε <ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀνωφελῆ>. For μὲν without a balancing clause see on τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι in Euthyphr. 3 C, and on 330 A above for τὰ δὲ without a preceding τὰ μὲν. ἀνωφελῆ is 'hurtful', as frequently: see above on οἶον μὴ ὄσιον in 331 A. With Protagoras' classification of ὠφέλιμα—

ἀνωφελεῖ—οὐδέτερα compare Gorg. 467 E ἀρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων, δ' οὐχί ἤτοι ἀγαθὸν γ' ἔστιν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν (where see Thompson's note) and infra 351 D.

24. οὐδενί: Schanz follows Naber in reading οὐδέσι against the MSS both here and in Euthyd. 302 C. The plural would be more appropriate here, but what is denied of all individuals is denied of the species, and the dative plural of οὐδέεις seems to lack authority.

28. εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις—πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν. Heindorf suggests εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις—the indicative being generally used in this phrase, e.g. Alcib. I 122 B εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλοῦτους ἀποβλέψαι κτλ.—αἰσχυνθείης ἀν ἐπὶ σαυτῷ: but Goodwin MT. p. 188 § 500 quotes a precisely similar example from Thuc. II 39. 5 καίτοι εἰ ῥαθυμία μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτη—ἐθέλοισιν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν κτλ. In both examples the present in the apodosis contains a reference to the future.

30. φυτοῖς—πάγκακον. Theophr. Hist. Plant. IV 16. 5 πολέμιον γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ ἔλαιον) πᾶσι· καὶ ἔλαιον ἐπιχέουσι τοῖς ὑπολείμμασι τῶν βιζῶν· ἰσχύει δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ἔλαιον ἐν τοῖς νέοις καὶ ἄρτι φνομένοις· ἀσθενέστερα γάρ κτλ.

ταῖς θριξίν—ἀνθρώπου. Arist. περὶ ζῳῶν γενέσεως V 5. 785<sup>a</sup> 30 foll. says that a mixture of oil and water is a remedy against grey hairs.

34. ἐνταῦθα, i.e. ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

36. ταυτόν. This form, not ταυτό, of the neuter of ὁ αὐτός is almost regular in Plato: see on 314 B.

38. μέλλει, sc. ὁ ἀσθενῶν: see on 319 D.

39. ὅσον μόνον 'just enough to'. Cf. Rep. III 416 E δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς τοσοῦτον, ὅσον μήτε περιεῖναι αὐτοῖς...μήτε ἐνδεῖν. Theaet. 161 B ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως.

τὴν δυσχέρειαν—ᾄψοις. The nausea is of course that felt by a sick person at the smell of food: so far there is therefore no reason for holding ῥίνων to be corrupt and reading χυμῶν (as Kroschel formerly read), still less εὐκρινῶν with Bergk. But it is not clear how oil could thus prevent nausea, nor does there seem to be any parallel among the ancients to such a statement. It is known that the ancients (like many modern peoples) used oil in cooking much as we use butter (see Blümner's *Privatalthertümer* p. 228), but the present passage seems rather to point to the use of some kind of fragrant oil sprinkled on the food after it was cooked. The Greeks were at all events not unfamiliar with the use

of scents in banqueting: see Xen. Symp. II 2 foll. Kroschel thinks Plato is making fun of Protagoras by putting into his mouth the word 'ἡμῶν προ πικρῶν vel χυμῶν', but this view will hardly command assent.

## CHAPTER XXII.

This and the next three chapters form a kind of interlude. In this chapter Socrates, protesting against Protagoras' long replies, remembers an engagement and is about to go, and Callias beseeches him to stay.

334 D 11. **καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει.** Hirschig would reject the words, but they explain the metaphor in *σύντεμνε*: see on 314 A *κυβέης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης*.

334 E 15. **ὄσα ἔμοι δοκεῖ.** Compare Gorg. 461 D *τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βούλωμαι*;

19. **καὶ αὖ βραχέα.** Sauppe cites Gorg. 449 C *καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημί, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπέιν. τοῦτου μὴν δεῖ, ὧ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τοῦτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσαῦθις*: cf. also Gorg. 461 D and Phaedr. 267 B.

335 A 24. **ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων—οὕτω διελεγόμεν.** Asyndeton is frequent in such sentences: cf. Rep. II 359 B (cited by Heindorf) *εἰ τοιῶνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, δόντες ἐξουσίαν—εἴτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν κτλ.* See on 311 E.

26. **ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα.** With *ἐγένετο ὄνομα* (for which Kroschel reads *ἐλέγετο ὄνομα*) cf. Apol. 20 D *τί ποτ' ἔστιν τοῦτο ὃ ἔμοι πεποιήκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν: γίγνεσθαι* is the usual passive to *ποιεῖν*. With the sentence generally cf. Euthyphr. 4 E—5 A where Euthyphro says *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τι ἂν διαφέρει Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ κτλ.*: see note in loc. for more parallels.

27. **οὐκ ἤρρεσεν—καὶ—οὐκ ἔθελήσοι.** The combination of indicative and optative in the same sentence in indirect speech is fairly common: Goodwin MT. p. 261 § 670.

335 B 30. **ἡγησάμενος.** Heindorf conjectures *ἡγησάμενος οἶν*, but *οἶν* may be dispensed with after a short parenthesis.

335 C 38. **τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος.** Meno 94 B *ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους αἶψα καὶ τοὺς φαιλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνατοὺς γεγόναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα*: Rep. VI 478 A *ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἑτερόν τι δυναμένην ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν*.



40. *ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο*. For this construction see note on Crito 44 D *εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον—οἰοί τ' εἶναι—ἵνα οἰοί τ' ἦσαν*. A secondary tense of the indicative is found with *ἵνα* and *ὅπως* (without *ἄν*) in final clauses dependent on a wish which can no longer be fulfilled, or on the apodosis to an impossible protasis: Goodwin MT. p. 120 § 333. The idiom is frequent in Plato and sometimes corrupted by scribes e.g. Meno 89 B *ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες—ἐφυλάττομεν—ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο ταῖς πόλεσιν*—where perhaps we should read *ἀφίκοντο* and *ἐγίγνοντο*. See Cobet's *Variae Lectiones* pp. 102, 359.

47. *τρίβωνος*. The ordinary clothing of an Athenian consisted 335 D of a *χιτών*, or shirt, with a *ιμάτιον* or short mantle worn above it. The *τρίβων* was a short cloak of coarse material worn by the Spartans and sometimes by the Laconisers in other states to take the place of both *χιτών* and *ιμάτιον*. It was the ordinary garment of Socrates (Symp. 219 B), and was afterwards much affected by the more ascetic philosophers, such as the Cynics (Diog. Laert. VI I. 13). Its use was supposed to be a mark of sturdy simplicity and austerity of manners.

50. *οὔδ' ἄν ἐνός*. The two parts of *οὐδεὶς* are sometimes separated by *ἄν* or a preposition, often with the effect (as here) of increasing the emphasis by making *οὐδέ* = *ne—quidem*, cf. infra on 343 D *οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓνα λόγον*.

53. *ὦ παῖ Ἰππονίκου*: see on 328 D above. With *ἀεὶ μὲν—ἀτὰρ* Sauppe compares Rep. II 367 E *καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάννυ γε ἦσθην*.

54. *φιλοσοφίαν*. The original meaning of the word *φιλοσοφία* was 'love of knowledge for its own sake', no particular kind of knowledge being specified. The verb *φιλοσοφεῖν* is first found in Herod. I 30 *ὡς φιλοσοφῶν γῆν πολλὴν θεωρήσας εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας*. In the present passage (as in Thuc. II 40 *φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας*) the word retains its original wider meaning, viz. 'love of knowledge' in general; but side by side with this in Plato it has the more restricted meaning of 'Philosophy', e.g. Rep. VI 496 A *πάνσμικρον δὴ τι...λείπεται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφία*. The wider meaning is also found in Aristotle, where he calls 'Theology the 'Highest Study' (*πρώτη φιλοσοφία*), and elsewhere.

57. *Κρίσωνι*. Criso of Himera, a famous *σταδιοδρόμος*, won 335 E

three times at Olympia, viz. Olymp. 83, 84, and 85 (448, 444, and 440 B.C.). His chastity during his prime as an athlete is mentioned in Laws VIII 840 A. *δρομεὶ ἀκμάζοντι* is rejected by some editors, but *δρομεὶ* should be taken with *Ἱμεραίῳ* and *ἀκμάζοντι* with *ἔπεισθαι*: 'to keep up with Criso, the runner of Himera, when he was in his prime'—presumably at the assumed date of this dialogue he was past his *ἀκμή*.

58. **δολιχοδρόμων**: *δολιχοδρόμοι εἰσὶν οἱ τὸν δόλιχον τρέχοντες*, says the scholiast: see on 329 A.

**ἡμεροδρόμων**. Heindorf quotes Livy XXXI 24. 4 "Hemerodromos vocant Graeci ingens die uno cursu emetientes spatium". Such was Phidippides; see Hdt. VI 105 *ἡμεροδρόμην τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετῶντα*.

59. **διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεισθαι**. *δια-* in compounds frequently denotes competition: for *διαθεῖν* cf. Theaet. 148 C *εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης*. As the emphasis is on *ἔπεισθαι* ('keep up with') *διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεισθαι* is equivalent to *διαθέοντα ἔπεισθαι*: cf. note on 317 C *ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι*, where *καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι* is (so to speak) enclitic as *διαθεῖν τε καὶ* is proclitic [cf. the English "Some—must be talked over by the hour before they could reach the humblest decision, which they only left the office *to return again* (ten minutes later) *and rescind*"]].

336 A 63. **συγκαθεῖναι**: intransitive as in Rep. VIII 563 A *οἱ δὲ γέροντες ξυγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις*: so *παρέχω* for *παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν* infra 348 A *ἔτοιμός εἰμι σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος*: cf. also *ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀπέκρυσαν* (sc. *ἑαυτούς*) Thuc. V 65. 5. The omission of the reflexive pronoun is a well-recognised way of making transitive verbs into intransitive.

336 B 68. **χωρίς**. Soph. O. C. 808 *χωρίς τό τ' εἰπεῖν πολλὰ καὶ τὰ καίρια*. "In talibus locis *δίχα, χωρίς* etc. non ut vulgo, seiunctionem et separationem, sed diversitatem et oppositionem significant". Kroschel. The usage is frequent in Plato. *δημηγορεῖν* is *contionari*—platform oratory.

70. **ὄρᾶς**. Almost like our colloquial 'don't you know' (when used parenthetically and without interrogative force): the *ἄλλα* belongs in strict logic to *δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν*. Heindorf quotes parallels from Aristophanes e.g. Peace 330—331 *οὐκ ἂν ὀρχησάμεθ', εἴπερ ὦφελῆσαιμὲν τί σε. ἀλλ' ὄρᾶτ', οὐπω πέπανσθε*. Where *ὄρᾶς* or *ὄρᾶτε* stand in this way as the first word of a sentence, editors generally regard the usage as interrogative, e.g. Eur. Orest. 581 *ὄρᾶς; Ὀδυσσεὺς ἄλοχον οὐ κατέκτανε*.

72. **καὶ σύ.** So the original hand in T: B has *καὶ σοι*. If we read *καὶ σοί*, the construction is *ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται καὶ σοὶ ἐξεῖναι κτλ.*, but *Protagoras* has nowhere asked that Socrates should be permitted to converse as he likes: quite the contrary. With *σύ* the construction is *καὶ σὺ δίκαια δοκεῖς λέγειν ἀξιῶν διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως ἂν κτλ.* i.e. and *your* demand that Protagoras should converse as *you* wish likewise seems fair. Protagoras asked to be allowed to use his own style in 335 A: Socrates requested that Protagoras should converse as Socrates wished in 334 D, 335 C, 335 E. Alcibiades' defence of Socrates in the next chapter seems also to imply the reading *σύ* here. The only objection to this view lies in the position of *τε* after *αὐτῷ*: we should expect it to follow *Πρωταγόρας*. *τε* is however frequently misplaced (see above on 316 D). *σοί* can only be retained if we either (1) take *καὶ σοί* as altogether independent of *ἀξιῶν*—which is barely possible, or (2) regard Plato as guilty of inaccurate writing.

### CHAPTER XXIII.

Alcibiades defends Socrates, and together with Critias and Prodicus hopes that the conversation will be continued.

1. **οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Καλλία.** The jingle is intentional: Handsome is that handsome says. Plato loves to play upon the names of his interlocutors (*ὦ λῶστέ Πῶλε* in *Gorg.* 467 B): see Riddell's *Digest of Idioms*, § 323, and cf. the Editor's notes on *Euthyphr.* 2 E, 4 E, 5 C.

6. **λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι.** We should expect *τε* to follow *δοῦναι*: see on 316 D.

11. **ἐκκρούων.** "Vox ducta a pugilatu, cuius proprium κρούειν de rep. IV p. 422 B οὐδ' εἰ ἐξείη—ὑποφεύγοντι (τῷ πύκτη) τὸν πρότερον αἰεὶ προσφερόμενον ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν etc." Heindorf. The simple verb is used metaphorically in *Theaet.* 154 E of beating arguments with arguments *ἤδη ἂν—συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν*, and the compound in *Phaedr.* 228 E *ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος*. Here the idea is of beating off, staving off by force, i.e. here by *μακρηγορία*: *ἐκκρούειν δίκην* is used by Demosthenes of staving off a trial by *συκοφαντία* and the like.

15. **οὐχ ὅτι:** 'not but what'. The idiom (as if *οὐ λέγω ὅτι*, 336 D *omitto quod*) is tolerably common in Plato, e.g. *Gorg.* 450 E *οὐχ ὅτι*

τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, Theaet. 157 B τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρέ-  
 τέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς—ἠναγκάσμεθα—χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

17. **Χρή γάρ κτλ.**: said apologetically.

- 336 E 21. **φιλόνηκος**. The MSS read *φιλόνηκος* and presently *συμφιλο-  
 νεικεῖν*. It is however clear that the word comes from *φιλο-* and  
*νίκη*, not from *φιλο-* and *νεῖκος* (in which case the form would be  
*φιλονηκής*: compare *φιλοκερδής*, *φιλοκυδής*, but *φιλότιμος*, *φιλόδοξος*,  
*φιλόθηρος* and the like). Schanz has found only two traces of the  
 original spelling with iota in Plato's MSS (A, B, T): viz. in *Laws XI*  
*935 B* where Paris A has *ἀριστείων πέρι φιλονικήση*, and *Alcib. I 122 C*  
 where *φιλονικίαν* appears as a correction for *φιλονηκίαν* in T. We  
 might in consequence be tempted to suppose that Plato himself  
 wrote *φιλόνηκος* through the influence of a false etymology, were it  
 not that the derivation from *νίκη* alone suits the meaning, and that  
 in more than one passage he shews himself conscious of the con-  
 nexion of the word with *νίκη*, notably in *Rep. IX 586 C* τί δέ; περὶ  
 τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, ὅς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο  
 διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βία διὰ φιλονικίαν (*φιλο-  
 νεικίαν* A) ἢ θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ  
 θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ; Compare also *ib. 581 A-B*.  
 The orthography of this word is an old subject of dispute (see  
 Stallbaum on *Rep. VIII 545 A*): Schanz (Preface to Vol. VI p. x)  
 declares himself, after a full discussion, for *φιλόνηκος*.

- 337 A 25. **ὁ Πρόδικος—ἐφη**. Prodicus contrives to make his remarks  
 an *ἐπίδειξις* on *ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων*, which was his leading subject  
 of instruction: see *Euthyd. 277 E* and cf. above on 314 C. The  
 distinctions drawn by Prodicus are on the whole sound if somewhat  
 wiredrawn and pedantic. The carefully balanced style of the speech  
 finds a parallel in the story of Heracles in *Xenophon Mem. II 1.*  
 21 foll.: compare especially §§ 31—33.

28. **κοινούς—ἀκροατάς—ἴσους**. *κοινός* and *ἴσος* are found as  
 epithets of *ἀκροατής* in the orators: e.g. *Dem. De Cor. 7* τὰ τοῦ λέ-  
 γοντος ὑστέρου δίκαια εὐνοϊκῶς προσδέξεται καὶ παρασχῶν ἑαυτὸν ἴσον καὶ  
 κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀκροατῆν οὕτω τὴν διάγνωσιν ποιήσεται περὶ πάντων,  
 and *Andoc. in Alcib. § 7* δέομαι δ' ὑμῶν, τῶν λόγων ἴσους καὶ κοινούς  
 ἡμῶν ἐπιστάτας γενέσθαι (*Heindorf*).

31. **τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλεόν κτλ.** In other words *ισότης γεωμε-  
 τρική* and not *ισότης ἀριθμητική* should be observed by the audience  
 (*Gorg. 508 A*): the regard paid to the speakers should be in pro-  
 portion to their merit.

34. ἀμφισβητεῖν—ἐρίζειν. Cicero's translation of this sentence 337 B is preserved by Priscian (Nobbe's Cicero, p. 1313): "Nunc a vobis, a Protagora et Socrate (*leg.* o Protagora et Socrates), postulo, ut de isto concedatis alter alteri, et inter vos de huiusmodi rebus controversemini, non concertetis".

39. εὐδοκιμοῦτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαίνοισθε. Heindorf suggests that ἀλλ' οὐκ should be written for καὶ οὐκ, or καὶ omitted: but καὶ is occasionally used in this way.

41. ἄνευ ἀπάτης is opposed to παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένον: εὐδοκιμεῖν implies that he with whom one εὐδοκιμεῖ is sincere. ἐν λόγῳ as opposed to παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς suggests Shakespeare's "Mouth-honour, breath, which the poor heart would fain deny, but dare not".

44. εὐφραίνεσθαι is connected by Prodicus with φρόνησις 337 C (φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα): for a fantastic derivation of the kindred εὐφροσύνη see Crat. 419 D παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ξυμφέρεσθαι τοῦτο ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα, εὐφεροσύνην, τό γε δίκαιον· ὅμως δὲ αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν εὐφροσύνην. Compare Arist. Top. II 6, p. 112<sup>b</sup> 22 Ἡρόδικος διηρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην. The Greek usage of this word hardly conformed to the rule laid down by Prodicus.

45. αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ: αὐτῇ is 'by itself', i.e. without the body, as αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι is without the mind. ἡδύ is introduced to give the derivation of ἡδεσθαι.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

Hippias, anxious for a compromise, proposes the selection of an umpire in a speech marked by his characteristic doctrines and style.

If we may judge from this speech, Hippias must have been devoted to metaphor: e.g. τύραννος, πρυτανεῖον in D, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δαιτητῶν in E, and in 338 A ἐφέιναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας, κάλων ἐκτείναντα οὐρία ἐφέντα, πέλαγος λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, μέσον τι τεμείν, ῥαβδοῦχον and πρύτανιν. Zeller (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* v 2, p. 175) thinks that the opening part of the speech may have come from some book of which Hippias was himself the author.

2. ἀπεδέξαντο means simply 'assented': cf. Theaet. 162 E.

5. ἡμᾶς is Heindorf's correction for ὑμᾶς: "uti mox ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρόν etc., neque video cur se a ceteris h. l. segreget Hippias".

6. φύσει οὐ νόμῳ. The opposition between φύσις and νόμος frequently appears attributed to different sophists or their representatives in the Platonic dialogues: the historical Hippias was a leading champion of φύσις (see *Introd.* p. xxii.). Usually however νόμος is represented as a convention binding men together into friendship and φύσις (whose teaching is that might is right) as responsible for the enmity of man to man in the savage state: e.g. *Rep.* II 358 D foll., *Gorg.* 482 D foll. From the natural principle of 'Like to like' is here deduced something like the Stoic doctrine of the kinship between wise men.

τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ: *Gorg.* 510 B φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἕκαστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ: *Laws* IV 716 C. The proverb appears in the most various forms in Greek literature from Homer (*Od.* XVII 218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον) downwards. For more examples of its use in Plato see Stallbaum on *Gorg.* I. c.

337 D 7. τύραννος—βιάζεται. Hippias has in view the lines of Pindar quoted in *Gorg.* 484 B νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων—ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ κτλ.

12. πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας. The prytaneum (like the temple of Vesta at Rome) was the religious centre of a Greek πόλις. It was sacred to Ἔστια, in whose honour fire was always kept burning, and contained what was called the 'Common Hearth' of the city: see Frazer in *Journal of Philology*, Vol. XIV pp. 145—172. The editors refer to Athenaeus V 187 D τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν, τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μουσεῖον, ἣν ὁ μὲν Πίνδαρος Ἑλλάδος ἔρεισμα ἔφη, Θουκυδίδης δ' ἐν τῷ εἰς Εὐρυπύδην ἐπιγράμματι Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλάδα, ὁ δὲ Πύθιος ἐστίαν καὶ πρυτανεῖον τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

337 E 17. συμβῆναι—ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων. συμβαίνω forms a passive to συμβιβάζω as πάσχειν to ποιεῖν, whence ὑπό: see note on *Apol.* 17 A. συμβιβάζω is regular in the sense of bringing together, effecting an arrangement between: compare (with Sauppe) *Thuc.* II 29. 8 ξυμβίβασε δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδικκᾶν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. Note that ἡμῶν has no preposition with it—this is frequent (but not universal) in similes where ὥσπερ and a preposition precede the object compared, and the effect is almost to make the simile an identification: if on the other hand the object compared comes first, the preposition must be expressed twice. Compare

Theaet. 170 A ὡςπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας (which might have been πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας ὡςπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν) and see notes on Crito 46 C, Euthyphr. 2 C.

20. **λίαν**: with ζητεῖν: κατὰ βραχὺ as in Gorg. 449 B ἄλλ' 338 A ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

21. **ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις**. For the metaphor Kroschel compares Laws III 701 C καθάπερ ἀχάλινον κεκτημένον τὸ στόμα, βία ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου φερόμενον κτλ.

23. **ἡμῖν**: so most editions: BT have ὑμῖν, which can hardly be right, as Hippias is at this moment addressing Socrates alone. "Pro ὑμῖν dici potuit σοί, sed ὑμῖν recte explicari nequit". Kroschel.

24. **πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα**. παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ χρωμένων, says a Scholiast (quoted by Sauppe). This nautical metaphor means to stretch out every reefing rope and so set all sail: κάλως does not refer to the sheet, which is πούς. κινεῖν, σείειν, ἐξιέναι, ἐφιέναι, ἐκλύειν are also found with κάλων in much the same sense.

**οὐρία ἐφέντα**: see on συγκαθεύειν 336 A. For the asyndeton before these words Heindorf compares Euthyphr. 4 C συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δαῦρον ἄνδρα κτλ.

25. **πέλαγος τῶν λόγων**. Sauppe aptly refers to Symp. 210 D ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν πέλαγος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ. Similar metaphors abound in Plato: e.g. Euthyd. 293 A σώσαι ἡμᾶς—ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου, Rep. V 472 A ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι μὲν μοι τῷ δύο κύματε ἐκφυγόντι νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις κτλ.

**ἀποκρύψαντα**: like Virgil's "protinus aërias Phaeacum abscondimus arces" (Aen. III 291): cf. the use of καταδύω in Callimachus Epigr. 2 ἦλιον ἐν λέσχη κατεδύσαμεν and Virgil's imitation "saepe ego longos Cantando puerum memini me condere soles" (Ecl. IX 51).

26. **μέσον τι—τεμεῖν**. τέμνειν ὄδον like *secare viam* is a natural metaphor. Cf. Pindar Isthm. VI 22 μυρίαὶ δ' ἔργων καλῶν τέτμηθη' ἐκατόμπεδοι ἐν σκερῶ κέλευθοι: Pl. Laws VII 803 E τὸ μὲν τῶν τύπων εἶρηται καὶ καθάπερ ὄδοι τέτμηνται καθ' ἃς ἰτέον κτλ. Here μέσον τι τεμεῖν = μέσην τινὰ ὄδον τεμεῖν.

**ὡς οὖν ποιήσατε καὶ πείθεσθε**. ὡς (so B: T has ὡς) is best understood as for οὕτως—a rare usage, except after a preceding ὡς or ὡςπερ as in 326 D, but it is found in Thuc. III 37. 5 (with οὖν and a

form of ποιεῖν as here) ὡς οὖν χρὴ καὶ ἡμῶς ποιοῦντας—παραινεῖν. For ποιήσατε the MSS read ποιήσετε, which is very harsh before πείθεσθε, and is probably a mistake for ποιήσατε, due to the influence of the common construction of ὅπως with 2nd person Fut. Ind. It is however possible that this use of the future as well as the use of ὡς for οὕτως was characteristic of Hippias' style.

27. **ῥαβδούχον—πρύτανιν.** *ῥαβδούχος, ἐπιστάτης* and *βραβευτής* are said of umpires or presidents at games: *ῥαβδούχους εἶπε τοὺς κριτὰς τοῦ ἀγῶνος*, says the schol. on Ar. Peace 733: for *ἐπιστάτης* cf. Laws XII 949 A *γυμνικῶν τε καὶ ἵππικῶν ἄθλων ἐπιστάτας καὶ βραβείας*. *πρύτανις* is an old word with lofty associations for ruler or prince. Cron thinks Hippias made this proposal with a view to be chosen President himself: he was probably still sitting on his *θρόνος*, cf. 315 B, 317 D.

338 B 28. **τὸ μέτριον μήκος:** Phaedr. 267 B αὐτὸς (sc. ὁ Πρόδικος) εὐρηκέναι ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

## CHAPTER XXV.

Socrates protests against appointing an umpire, and in order that the conversation may go on is willing that Protagoras should become the interrogator. The others assent, Protagoras reluctantly.

2. **ἐμέ γε.** The MSS read *τε* not *γε*: *γε* is due to Heindorf. The position of *τε* is usually explained as due to displacement (see on 316 D), e.g. by Kroschel "nam haec dicit Socrates; omnes laudabant meque et Callias retinebat et (omnes) orabant ut praesidem deligerem": but *Καλλίας* can hardly be coupled in this way with an *unexpressed πάντες*. If *τε* is right it must be taken (with Turner) as coupling the whole clause *ἐμέ ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν* with *καὶ ἐλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην*: this is possible, but strikes us as harsh.

338 C 9. **ἀλλὰ δὴ** like *at enim* introduces a possible objection: see on Crito 54 A. The fuller form of the comparative (*βελτίονα* and the like) is less common in Plato than the contracted.

11. **ᾧστε.** Heindorf cites (inter alia) Phaedr. 269 D τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ᾧ Φαῖδρε, ᾧστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι. The insertion of *ᾧστε* with the usual infinitive after *ἀδύνατον* increases the emphasis of *ἀδύνατον* by making it appear more than a mere auxiliary notion. Badham's conjecture *ἀδύνατον ὃν ὑμῖν ἵστε* deserves mention for its ingenuity. For *Πρωταγόρου* see above note on 318 D.



14. **τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.** Gorg. 458 D τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει. τό γ' ἐμὸν is frequent in Plato for *quantum ad me attinet*.

17. **εἰ μὴ βούλεται.** For the asyndeton see above on 330 A.

28. **πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν: οὐκ ἤθελεν** is virtually one word: 338 E 'was very reluctant'. The phrase is quite different from οὐ πάνυ: see on οὐ πάνυ τι in 321 B above.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

Here begins an episode (lasting down to the end of Chapter XXXII), in which Protagoras cross-examines Socrates upon a poem of Simonides. For the bearing of this episode on the general subject of the dialogue see Introduction p. xxv. foll.: and for the different restorations of the poem Appendix I.

3. **περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι.** ἐπῶν is 'verses'. As education in poetry formed part of the usual curriculum at Athens, it was natural for the Sophists to pose as poetical critics, and Sauppe gives a number of references to shew that they did so: it will suffice to quote Isocrates Panath. 18 ἀπαντήσαντες γὰρ τινὲς μοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔλεγον, ὡς ἐν τῷ Δικαίῳ συγκαθεζόμενοι τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρες τῶν ἀγελαίων σοφιστῶν καὶ πάντα φασκόντων εἰδέναι—διαλέγοντο περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως κτλ.: compare infra 347 A, where Hippias says he has a speech ready on the poem, and Hipp. Minor 363 C foll. καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡμῖν ἐπιδέδεικται καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου. Protagoras appears as a critic of poetry in Arist. Poet. 19, p. 145<sup>b</sup> 15 ff. (where he censures Homer ὅτι εὐχεσθαι οἴμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπῶν 'μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά') and in Soph. El. 14, p. 173<sup>b</sup> 19 ff. The popularity of such discussions as the present may be inferred from the well-known scene between Euripides and Aeschylus in the *Frógs* 1119 foll.

9. **νῦν διαλεγόμεθα:** so B and T: the editors mostly read νῦν δὴ 339 A (*νυνδὴ*) *διελεγόμεθα*. νῦν does not mean 'at this *present* moment', but simply 'now', 'on the present occasion', = ἐν τῇ νῦν συνουσία: translate 'about the same subject as you and I are now discussing', i.e. about the subject of our present discussion. A discussion which has never been finished (see on 334 A) and is to be resumed (cf. 338 E ἐπειδὴν ἱκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον, and 338 D) ought not to be spoken of as past. We have in fact in νῦν διαλεγόμεθα an indication that the subject of the dialogue is the same throughout: see

Introd. p. xix. foll. *νῦν* in *καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν* (line 8) is simply 'in the present case' and introduces the application of the general statement contained in *ἡγοῦμαι—λόγον δοῦναι*: cf. Apol. 17 D—18 A *ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν—καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν*.

10. *περὶ ἀρετῆς*. According to Diog. Laert. IX 8. 55, Protagoras wrote a book having the title *περὶ ἀρετῶν*.

12. *Σιμωνίδης*. It is a saying of Simonides of Ceos (circ. 556—468 B.C.) that forms the text on which the discussion in the first book of the Republic is based: see Rep. I 331 D foll. Plato seems also to allude to him in two other places, viz. Rep. II 365 C *ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας κτλ.* and Rep. VI 489 B *οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν—τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς πλουσιῶν θύρας λέναι ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο* (compare Arist. Rhet. II 16. 1391<sup>a</sup> 8 ff. with Cope's note).

*Σκόπαν*. The Scopadae were a ruling family at Crannon and Pharsalus in Thessaly. Simonides seems to have frequently been their guest, and wrote poems in their honour: the most famous is that referred to by Cicero de Or. II § 352—353.

339 B 14. *ἀγαθόν* is here more than morally good: it includes bodily and external as well as internal well-being: whence *χερσίν τε καὶ ποσί* as well as *νόφω*: see also note on 344 B line 4 below. The notion of external well-being belonged to the word from very early times: see Grote Vol. III p. 45 note 3: 'good' and 'bad' are applied in Theognis and Solon "to wealth as contrasted with poverty—nobility with low birth—strength with weakness—conservative and oligarchical politics as opposed to innovation". This sense survived in classical times in the political meaning of *καλὸς ἀγαθός*, e.g. Xen. Hell. II 3. 12, Pl. Rep. VIII 569 A.

16. *τετράγωνον*. Simonides avails himself of a Pythagorean notion: among the Pythagoreans the number 4 was sacred, as being the first square number: see Ritter and Preller<sup>7</sup> § 54. The expression *τετράγωνος ἀνὴρ* became afterwards almost proverbial for a perfect man: Sauppe refers to Arist. Rhet. III 11. 1411<sup>b</sup> 27 *οἶον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον· ἄμθω γὰρ τέλεια*.

19. *καὶ πάνυ μοι—μεμεληκός*. From this and 347 A, where the same is implied of Hippias, it would seem that the poem was thought to be difficult.

22. *ἔφην ἐγὼ καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς*. This, Bergk's emendation, is generally accepted. B has *ἔφην ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὀρθῶς*: T *ἔφην ἐγωγε καὶ ὀρθῶς*.

28. *ἔμμελέως—νέμεται*. *ἔμμελέως* belongs to *εἰρημένον* and 339 C *νέμεται* is poetic for *νομίζεται*: cf. (with Sauppe) Soph. O. R. 1080 *ἐγὼ δ' ἔμαιυτὸν παῖδα τῆς τύχης νέμων*. The story is (Schol. to Plato Hipp. Maior 304 E quoted by Sauppe) that Pittacus, when ruler of Mitylene, on hearing of Periander's rapid conversion into a tyrant, sat down at an altar and begged to be released of his rule, assigning as his reason *ὡς χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι*. The Scholiast adds that Solon when he heard the remark capped it with *χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ*. Pittacus is mentioned side by side with Bias and Simonides as one of the *σοφοὶ καὶ μακάριοι ἄνδρες* in Rep. I 335 E.

33—35. *ὁμολογεῖσθαι—ὁμολογεῖν*. The middle is said of things, and the active of persons, according to the general rule.

38. *ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν*: these words as 339 D well as *προϊόντος τοῦ ἄσματος* in 339 C are in favour of the supposition that some verses are wanting between *ἀνεψόγου τετυγμένον* and *οὐδέ μοι ἔμμελέως*: see App. I p. 198.

44. *τὸ πρότερον*: adverbial.

45. *θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον*. *θόρυβος* denotes only 'noise', 'tumult' (cf. Rep. VI 492 C *θόρυβον—τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου*): *καὶ ἔπαινον* is needed to shew that the noise was favourable. So supra 334 C *ἀνεθορήβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι*. With *παρέχειν* in this sense cf. the phrase *παρέχειν γέλωτα* in Gorg. 473 E and Theaet. 174 C.

47. *ὥσπερ ἐλὺν ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς*. For the metaphor 339 E compare Euthyd. 303 A *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—ὥσπερ πληγείς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐκέλεμην ἄφρωνος*. Socrates describes the effect of Protagoras' questions on himself in words which recall the descriptions of his own dialectic in its effect on others: compare e.g. Meno 80 A foll.

48. *ἔσκοτώθη τε καὶ εἰλιγγίασα*. So BT: the second hand in T corrects to *ἰλιγγίασα*. According to Suidas (quoted by Schanz in Preface to Vol. VII p. v) the Greeks wrote *εἰλιγγιῶ*, but *ἰλιγγος*. In Plato's MSS *εἰλιγγιῶ* is somewhat less frequent than *ἰλιγγιῶ*.

49. *ὡς γε—ἀληθῆ*: see on 309 A.

50. *ἐγγένηται*: B and T have *ἐκγένηται*: *ἐγγένηται* is Heindorf's correction, now found in a Vienna MS (Kral's I): cf. Phaedo 86 E *ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν*.

53. *σὸς μέντοι—πολίτης*. Iulis in Ceos was their native place. *μέντοι* is 'surely'. Notice the emphasis on *σὸς* and compare *σέ* in lines 54 and 59.

54. *παρακαλεῖν* is future: cf. Theaet. 183 D *ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ—* 340 A *οὐ πείσασθαι αὐτῷ*: Phaedr. 228 C *δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν*:

tr. 'therefore I think I will call you to my assistance'. *ἐγὼ* and *σέ* are contrasted in view of the illustration which is about to follow.

**ὥσπερ ἔφη κτλ.** : *ὥσπερ* corresponds to *καὶ ἐγὼ* in line 59 : as, according to Homer, Scamander called on Simois, so look you, I call upon you. For *ὥσπερ* used in this way see above note on 330 A. The other editors take *δοκῶ οὖν ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ* with the *ὥσπερ* clause, and, regarding *παρακαλεῖν* as a present, print a full stop after *σχῶμεν* in the quotation : but (1) there is a certain awkwardness in the repetition 'I think I am summoning you' and 'so look you, I am summoning you'; (2) the quotation does not finish with *σχῶμεν*, but *ἐκπέρση* in l. 60 belongs to it also—a point which is against separating *φίλε κασιγνήτε—σχῶμεν* from the following clause. In the view which we have taken a fresh start begins with *ὥσπερ*, after which the actual summons follows in the present *ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σέ παρακαλῶ*.

55. **ἔφη "Ομηρος.** Iliad XXI 305 foll. οὐδὲ Σκάμανδρος ἔληγε τὸ δν μένος ἀλλ' ἔτι μᾶλλον χῶετο Πηλείωνι—Σιμβεντι δὲ κέκλετ' αὔσας· Φίλε κασιγνήτε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ σχῶμεν, ἐπεὶ τάχα ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος ἐκπέρσει. This *ἐκπέρσει* explains the occurrence of *ἐκπέρση* in line 60, although (as Heindorf shews) the same metaphor is occasionally found in tragedy (but hardly in prose), e.g. Trach. 1104 τυφλῆς ὑπ' ἄτης ἐκπεπέρθημαι τάλας.

59. **ἀτάρ** : cf. supra 335 D.

61. **μουσικῆς** : 'culture', as often ; here not without some sarcasm, in reference to Prodicus' *ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης*, exemplified in 337 A foll.

340 B 62. **βούλεσθαι—ἐπιθυμῆν.** *βούλεσθαι* is of will : *ἐπιθυμῆν* of desire. The distinction is generally well marked in Plato : see note on Apol. 25 C and compare Cope on Arist. Rhet. II 19. 9. Prodicus does not touch on this example in his speech in 337, but it is quite in Plato's way to select a fresh example (compare Theaet. 147 A—B, 166 E by the side of 159 C, 169 A—B), which may in this case be supposed to come from Prodicus' lectures (cf. 341 A). We should expect the article to be repeated with *ἐπιθυμῆν*, as the two words are to be distinguished (cf. infra in line 67 τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι) : but the article is sometimes dropped with the second of two words even when the words are contrasted, e.g. Euthyphr. 9 C τὸ ὄσιον καὶ μῆ. Here the effect of its omission is perhaps to suggest that the two notions are after all more like than different.

67. *γενέσθαι—εἶναι*. The distinction though long ago recognised by the philosophers was not always present in ordinary speech: otherwise (as Kroschel points out) Protagoras' censure of Simonides would be too absurd, and Socrates' pretended bewilderment out of place. But that Simonides in this poem drew a distinction between *γενέσθαι* and *εἶναι* is certain: whether it was the same distinction as Socrates himself draws later is another question: see on *γενόμενον δὲ ἀδύνατον* in 344 B.

73. *τὸ αὐτόν*. B and T here have *τὸ αὐτόν*, which Schanz retains: 340 C the form occurs on inscriptions and once or twice in Plato's MSS: v. Schanz Vol. XII p. vii.

74. *ἔλεγεν, τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι*. So Heindorf. *ἔλεγεν* is 'said', not 'meant', and the sentence is intended to prove what is stated in the last sentence, viz. that Pittacus *οὐ τὸ αὐτόν ἐαντῶ ἔλεγεν* (said), *ἀλλ' ἄλλο*. *τὸ* goes with the whole clause *χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν*; the emphasis is on *γενέσθαι*: for which reason *τὸ ἔμμεναι* in the next line (for *τὸ ἔμμεναι ἐσθλὸν χαλεπὸν*) suffices. It is unnecessary to read (with Schanz and Kroschel) *ἔλεγε(ν) χαλεπὸν, τὸ γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν*, or *ἔλεγε χαλεπὸν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν* with Sauppe.

79. *Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί*. Socrates dissociates himself from the others, because he is about to give a different solution of Simonides' apparently contradictory statements (in 344 B foll.).

80. *Ἡσίοδον*: in Works and Days 289 foll. *τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς 340 D* *ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρουθεν ἐθῆκαν ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος αἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπήν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηιδίη δῆπεια πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ εἴουσα*. This passage was very famous in antiquity: Plato cites it again in Rep. II 364 C, Laws IV 718 E. Hesiod in effect says it is difficult to become good, but easy to be good. Simonides himself refers to Hesiod's verses in Frag. 58 (Bergk) *ἔστι τις λόγος τὰν ἀρετὰν ναλεῖν δυσαμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις, νῦν δέ μιν θεῶν χῶρον ἀγνὸν ἀμφέπειν,.....οὐδ' ἀπαντῶν βλεφάροις θνατῶν ἔσοπτον, ᾧ μὴ δακέθυμος ἰδρῶς ἐνδοθεν μὸλη θ' ἵκηται τ' ἐς ἄκρον ἀνδρείας*.

84. *ἐκτῆσθαι*: to be taken with *ῥηιδίην*. B and T read *κτῆσθαι*, but cf. 349 E. For the form see above on 319 A.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

After some dialectical skirmishing, Socrates volunteers to give a continuous exposition of the poem.

340 E 7. **ἰώμενος μείζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ.** Socrates is thinking of the proverb *κακὸν κακῶ ἴσθαι*.

9. **ποιητοῦ—ἐκτῆσθαι.** The poet is not of course Hesiod but Simonides. Socrates nowhere said that in censuring Pittacus Simonides implies that it is *easy* to 'keep virtue', i.e. to be virtuous: the quotation from Hesiod was put in the mouth of Prodicus and ἄλλοι πολλοί (340 C). At the same time Protagoras might fairly turn Socrates' fallacies (see on 331 A) against himself and say that if Simonides said it was 'not difficult' to be virtuous, he meant that it was 'easy' to be so.

13. **κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοι :** the art of Prodicus (Socrates means) can lay as good claims to antiquity as yours: cf. 316 D.

14. **θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι.** Kroschel's reading *εἶναι καὶ παλαιά* would somewhat change the meaning, which is 'has long been an art divine': *divine* because practised by poets and the like, cf. Rep. I 331 E ἀλλὰ μέντοι—*Σιμωνίδη γε οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ*: supra 315 E and note. In *ἦτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου* there is an allusion to 316 D.

341 A 17. **οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγώ,** sc. *εἰμί*. The idiom is frequent in Plato, e.g. Symp. 179 E *οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλεῖα—ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν*.

**μαθητής.** Socrates calls himself a disciple of Prodicus also in Crat. 384 B, Meno 96 D, Charm. 163 D.

19. **τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο.** τὸ marks *χαλεπὸν* as a quotation: see above on 331 C.

21. **ἀλλ' ὥσπερ κτλ.** The application of the illustration follows in 341 B line 28 foll. *ἔσως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν—ὑπολαμβάνουσιν*, where see note.

341 B 23. **Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστιν.** The ἢ ἄλλον *τινά* is neglected, and Πρωταγόρας takes us back to *σέ*: cf. note on *ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι* in 317 C. The collocation *σοφὸς καὶ δεινός* is tolerably frequent in ironical characterizations, e.g. Theaet. 173 B *δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται*.

24. **ἔρωτᾶ** explains *νουθετεῖ*: whence the *Asyndeton explicativum*: see on 335 A above.

25. τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν—κακὸν ἔστιν. Prodicus' canon—which rests on the derivation of *δεινόν* from *δέος*—is not borne out by Greek usage, except to this extent, that when a man is called *δεινός*, it is generally implied that he is more clever than good.

26. δεινοῦ πλοῦτου κτλ. Genitives of exclamation in the Platonic dialogues are generally (as Turner remarks) preceded by an interjection, e.g. *Euthyd.* 303 A *πυππαῖς ὦ Ἡράκλεις καλοῦ λόγου* and *ibid.* ὦ Πύσειδον δεινῶν λόγων. Here of course the exclamation is left out as irrelevant: the only relevant point is the use of *δεινός*.

28. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν. Sauppe remarks that we should expect *οὕτω καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν* to introduce the apodosis to the *ὥσπερ* clause (341 A line 21): *καὶ* is however enough to shew that we have reached the application: *οὖν* is introduced on account of the parenthesis from τὸ γὰρ δεινόν to *κακοῦ ὄντος*: and *ἴσως* marks the suggestion as only tentative.

32. φωνήν: 'dialect' as often, e.g. *Phaedo* 62 A *καὶ ὁ Κέβης—ἔττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών*.

33. κακὸν, ἔφη. Prodicus enters into the spirit of the joke: 341 C in view of C and D it would be absurd to take this seriously: see note on *ἀλλὰ παίζειν* in D below.

39. τὰ ὀνόματα—ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν: cf. *supra* 340 A and *infra* 358 A *τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι*. Prodicus pretends to regard Simonides (cf. 341 A) as a teacher like himself of *ὀνομάτων διαίρεσις*.

ἄτε Δέσβιος ὤν: had he been *Κεῖος*, he would have learnt *ὀνομάτων διαίρεσις* forsooth in its natural home.

40. ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρφ: a malicious exaggeration inspired by the *aditum philologicum*.

49. ἀλλὰ παλίζειν. The editors suppose that Socrates is here 341 D turning the tables on Prodicus, who it is supposed meant his criticism seriously, but the tone of the passage seems to imply that Prodicus is in league with Socrates to make fun of Protagoras, who is represented throughout the whole dialogue as lacking all sense of humour. It would not be wit, but sheer buffoonery in Plato to represent Prodicus as *seriously* believing that Simonides had censured Pittacus for having said: 'It is bad to be good'.

καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι. *δοκεῖν* is not pleonastic after *οἶμαι* but means 'think fit'—a very idiomatic use, cf. *Aesch. Ag.* 16 *ὅταν δ' αἰεῖδεν ἢ μινύρεσθαι δοκῶ*. See *Classical Review* III

p. 148, where Mr Arthur Sidgwick discusses and illustrates this usage.

341 E 54. οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων. οὐ δήπου goes with λέγων, which is 'meaning' not 'saying', and τοῦτο is explained by κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. For the asyndeton see on 335 A: and for the use of εἶτα compare 311 A and Symp. 200 A πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, ἢ οὐκ ἔχων;

55. τοῦτο γέρας. Heindorf reads τοῦτο τὸ γέρας as in 344 C: but γέρας may be regarded as predicative and going closely with ἀπένειμε, so that τοῦτο—τοῦτο balance each other. Sauppe compares Symp. 179 C εὐαριθμήτοις δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί.

56. ἀκόλαστον—οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. This seems to be the earliest passage making allusion to the sobriety and uprightness of the Ceans, to which, perhaps, Aristophanes sarcastically alludes in Frogs 970 (οὐ Χίος, ἀλλὰ Κεῖος). In Laws I 638 B (quoted by Sauppe) Plato cites the subjugation of the Ceans by the Athenians as a proof that victory does not always favour the more virtuous side. Strabo (X 486) quotes from Menander the lines καλὸν τὸ Κεῖων νόμιμόν ἐστι, Φανία· ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ζῆν καλῶς οὐ ζῆ κακῶς and explains them by saying that a Cean law required those above the age of 60 to take hemlock so as to make their country's produce suffice to feed the others.

342 A 60. ὁ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο refers to περὶ ἐπῶν 338 E. For the idiom cf. the usual τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, e.g. Symp. 221 B.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

Socrates introduces his exposition of the poem with a paradoxical theory that Sparta is the oldest home of philosophers. The wise men of old accordingly expressed their wisdom in pithy Laconic sayings, and such a saying is that of Pittacus. Simonides, as a rival craftsman, wrote this entire poem to overthrow that saying.

This chapter is intended as a kind of counterblast to Protagoras' claim on behalf of σοφιστική in 316 D foll. In general tone as well as in many of the particular statements it is elaborately ironical: but it should be remembered that Plato thought highly in many respects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions and borrowed much from them in constructing his ideal city.

3. φιλοσοφία γάρ κτλ. Compare 316 D ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημι μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν κτλ.



4. τῶν Ἑλλήνων: 'among the Greeks'. The genitive belongs rather to ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνι than to πλείστη: cf. Thuc. II 18. ἰ ὁ δὲ στρατὸς—ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς εἰς Οἰνόην. Similarly in γῆς ἐκεῖ, γῆς belongs to ἐκεῖ rather than to πλείστοι: there would seem to be no exact parallel to justify us in taking πλείστοι γῆς together. For the meaning of σοφισταί see on 312 c.

6. ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται. σχηματίζεσθαι of 'posing' 342 B as in Soph. 268 A ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἂ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται.

9. οὖς—ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς: viz. in 316 D. The attraction is common enough, e.g. Crito 48 C ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης κτλ. and infra 359 D.

12. τὴν σοφίαν. So B and the second hand in T: the first hand omits the words (so Schanz, Kroschel and Kral).

13. τοὺς—λακωνίζοντας. The editors refer to Ar. Birds 1281 ἐλακωνομόνου ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε, ἐκόμων, ἐπεινῶν, ἐρύπων, ἐσωκράτων and Demosth. κατὰ Κόνωνος 34 μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἐσκυθρωπάκασι καὶ λακωνίζειν φασὶ καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχουσι καὶ ἀπλᾶς ὑποδέδενται. The Laconisers in Athens were tolerably numerous: Plato himself (Rep. VIII 544 c) places ἡ Κρητικὴ τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ πολιτεία nearest in merit to his ideal city.

14. οἱ μὲν ὧτά τε κατὰγννται: thanks, of course, to boxing: cf. Gorg. 515 E τῶν τὰ ὧτα κατεαγόντων (i.e. τῶν λακωνίζοντων) ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὧ Σώκρατες, and Martial VII 32. 5 "at juvenes alios *fracta colit aure magister*".

15. ἱμάντας περιελίττονται. The ἱμάντες were thongs of 342 C leather bound round the knuckles for greater efficacy in boxing: Hom. Iliad XXIII 685. The *caestus*, being loaded with balls of lead, was a much more brutal instrument (Virg. Aen. V 404—405).

16. βραχείας ἀναβολάς: 'short cloaks' in imitation of the τρίβων (the national Spartan dress: see on 335 D). ἀναβολή (here almost concrete) and ἀναβάλλεσθαι were said of the ἱμάτιον, to wear which rightly and like a gentleman was ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ ἀναβάλλεσθαι (Theaet. 175 E), not ἐπ' ἀριστερά (Ar. Birds 1567—1568, a passage which seems decisive against reading ἐπιδέξια in this phrase). From Suidas (s.v. ἀναβάλλει—ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἱμάτιον, οὐ περιβάλλεσθαι λέγουσιν) we may infer that ἀναβολή refers not to the throwing back of the ἱμάτιον over the shoulder (since in point of fact it was thrown back over the *left* shoulder) but to pulling it round the back (from left to right) before throwing the end over the left shoulder in front.

**ὡς δὴ—κρατοῦντας** is “quasi vero—his superent” (Kroschel). For the construction cf. (with Kroschel) Rep. I 345 E οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχεω ἐκόν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτούσῃ, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφέλειαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχεω ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; Madvig’s Gk Syntax p. 168.

20. **ξενηλασίας**. Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Ar. Birds 1012 ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ξενηλατοῦνται and Plut. Lyc. 27. 6 τοὺς ἀθροισζόμενους ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ χρησίμῳ καὶ παρεισρέοντας εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀπήλανεν (sc. Λυκοῦργος), οὐχ, ὡς Θουκυδίδης (II 39) φησί, δεδιὼς μὴ τῆς πολιτείας μιμηταὶ γένωνται καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι χρήσιμον ἐκμάθωσιν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὅπως μὴ διδάσκαλοι κακοῦ τινος ὑπάρξωσιν. The reasons assigned by Plutarch are no doubt the true ones.

23. **οὐδένα ἑώσιν—ἐξιέναι**. Plut. Lyc. 27. 5 οὐδ’ ἀποδημεῖν ἔδωκε (Λυκοῦργος) τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ πλανᾶσθαι ξενικὰ συνάγοντας ἦθη καὶ μιμήματα βίαν ἀπαιδευτῶν καὶ πολιτευμάτων διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀθροισζόμενους etc. (see last note). In Laws XII 950 C foll. (quoted by Sauppe) Plato lays down similar though less stringent regulations as to ἀποδημία.

342 D 24. **ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Κρήτες**. There seems to be no other authority for this statement, but (as Sauppe remarks) the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan institutions is well known.

27. **ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες**. Women in Sparta held a position of much greater power and influence than in the rest of Greece, partly at least in consequence of their superior education, physical and otherwise: cf. Arist. Pol. II 9. 1269<sup>b</sup> 32 πολλὰ διωκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων) and see Grote Vol. II p. 383 foll. Heindorf remarks that wise and pregnant sayings by Spartan women (such as are given in pseudo-Plutarch’s Λακωνῶν ἀποφθέγματα, e.g. the famous τέκνον, ἧ τὰν ἧ ἐπὶ τὰς) were probably already current in Plato’s time.

342 E 30. **εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει—εὐρήσει**. Compare 324 A.  
33. **ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα—συνεστραμμένον**. The aorist is like ‘behold! he has thrown in’: it expresses rapidity by representing the action as no sooner begun than over. The idiom is very frequent in Plato: Turner refers to Stallbaum on Rep. III 406 D εἰάν τις αὐτῷ μικρὰν διαίταν προστάτῃ—ταχὺ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ κάμνειν. With συνεστραμμένον compare Arist. Rhet. II 24. 1401<sup>a</sup> 5 συνεστραμμένως—εἰπεῖν: the metaphor is apparently from an animal gathering itself for a spring (cf. Arist. Hist. Anim. IX 48. 631<sup>a</sup> 27 συστρέψαντες

ἑαυτοὺς φέρονται ὥσπερ τόξενμα and Plato Rep. I 336 B συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς).

34. ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής. With the metaphor compare Theaet. 165 D καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος—ἐμβάλων ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν—ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνίεις κτλ., *ibid.* 180 A ἀλλ' ἂν τινὰ τι ἔρη, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσιν.

35. παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. The phrase is almost proverbial: see on Crito 49 B παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες.

39. φθέγγεσθαι, here of an impressive (almost mystic) utterance, as often in Greek, e.g. Ar. Clouds 315 ἄτῳ αἰ φθεγξάμεναι τοῦτο τὸ σεμνόν.

41. Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος κτλ. This list of the seven wise men is 343 A remarkable as excluding Periander, who was canonized later (Diog. Laert. I 13). Plato refused to allow that a tyrant could be truly σοφός (Rep. IX 587 D) or even (in the true sense of the term) powerful: see Rep. I 336 A οἶμαι αὐτὸ (sc. the view that justice is doing good to friends and evil to enemies) Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰόμενον δύνασθαι πλουσίον ἀνδρός.

*Myson* (the least known of the seven) figures as early as Hipponax (Frag. 45, quoted by Sauppe) καὶ Μύσων δὲν Ὀπόλλων ἀνείπεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονέστατον πάντων. According to a tradition preserved in Diogenes Laertius I 106 the Pythian priestess being asked by Anacharsis to say if there was any man wiser than himself replied Οἰταῖον τινὰ φημι Μύσων' ἐνὶ Χηνῇ γενέσθαι σοῦ μᾶλλον πραπίδεςσιν ἀρηρότα πευκαλίμησι: but another account placed his birthplace in Chen in Laconia, and a third (reading Ἡτεῖόν τινὰ φημι for Οἰταῖόν τινὰ φημι in the oracle) in Etea, which was variously placed in Laconia and in Crete. Sauppe remarks that the presence of Λακεδαιμόνιος with Χίλων seems to shew that Plato did not regard Laconia as Myson's birthplace, but favoured the view which made him a native of Chenae by Mount Oeta. *Thales* (flor. circ. 585 B.C., the eclipse of which year he is said to have predicted) is mentioned in two other passages in Plato (in neither of which is his philosophical teaching—that the ἀρχή is ὕδωρ—referred to), once as an author of useful inventions (Rep. X 600 A), and once as the hero of an anecdote illustrating the philosopher's want of worldly wisdom (Theaet. 174 A). *Pittacus* (flor. circ. 612 B.C.) and *Bias* of Priene in Ionia (contemporary with or earlier than Hipponax, who refers to

him in Diog. Laert. I 84) are mentioned together again in Rep. I 335 E *Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν—ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαριῶν ἀνδρῶν*. Cleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes and Chilon of Sparta (both about the beginning of the 6th century B.C.) are not again referred to by Plato.

The traditions relating to the wise men and many of the aphorisms with which they are credited are given in Diog. Laert. I 22—122 : for the authorities for their lives, and for their sayings, see Mullach's *Fragmenta Philos. Graec.* II pp. 203—234. This passage of the Protagoras, apparently the earliest in which seven are named together, probably contributed in large measure to the canonization of the wise men.

44. *Λακεδαιμόνιος*: Heindorf would read *ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος*, but Plato may well have said 'a Lacedaemonian, Chilon'.

48. *εἰρημένα· οὔτοι*. The sentence beginning with *οὔτοι* shews how one is to learn *αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὔσαν*: the asyndeton (as Heindorf observes) resembles that after *σημεῖον δέ, τεκμήριον δέ* and the like. Here *οὔτοι καὶ κτλ.* is so far removed from *καὶ καταμάθοι—οὔσαν* that we might have expected *οὔτοι γὰρ καὶ* or (as Kroschel reads) *ὅτι* for *οὔτοι*, but the emphatic *οὔτοι* (parallel to *οὔτοι* in line 44 above) renders the explanatory particle unnecessary. Hermann's correction *εἰρημένα ἄ* for *εἰρημένα*—adopted by Sauppe—gives a wrong meaning: for *ἀπαρχή* 'first-fruits' (line 49) coming after *καὶ κοινῇ ἤ ξυνελθόντες*, in marked antithesis to *ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα*, cannot mean merely the sayings of each individual—as it will have to mean if *ἄ* is read, *ἄ* being then in apposition to *ἀπαρχήν*. Kral's *ρήματα βραχέα ἀξιωμακόμενα <σκοπῶν> ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα, ἄ οὔτοι κτλ.* suffers from the same fault, besides that it is very unlikely that *σκοπῶν* should have fallen out.

*κοινῇ ξυνελθόντες—ἀνέθεσαν*. The editors cite Pausanias x 24. I *ἐν δὲ τῷ προνάῳ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς γεγραμμένα ἐστὶν ὠφελήματα ἀνθρώποις εἰς βίον—οὔτοι οὖν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Δελφοῦς ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τὰ ἀδόμηνα Γνώθι σαντὸν καὶ Μηδὲν ἄγαν*. The same explanation of the presence of these maxims on the temple at Delphi meets us in other authors; but in each case the author is obviously borrowing the story from Plato. Plato states that these two maxims were the cream of the wisdom of the wise men: it would be hardly too much to say that upon them the whole structure of Greek ethical philosophy was based. For the construction, and for the practice of thus dedicating wisdom to a god, Kroschel aptly quotes Diog. Laert.

1X ὁ ἀνέθηκε (sc. Ἡράκλειτος) δ' αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ περὶ φύσεως βιβλίον) εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερόν.

52. τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; Plato frequently enlivens his style by such self-interrogations: Sauppe quotes (inter alia) Gorg. 457 E τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; Apol. 40 B τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω;

53. τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας. τῶν παλαιῶν in this emphatic place suggests the contrast with Protagoras and the νεώτεροι whose τρόπος is μακρολογία.

54. καὶ δὴ καί marks the application to the present case: cf. Apol. 18 A ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν κτλ.—καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν.

57. καθέλοι: cf. 344 C. Sauppe quotes Theocr. 22. 115 (of Polydeuces overcoming Amycus) Διὸς υἱὸς ἀδηφάγον ἄνδρα καθείλεν.

60. τούτου ἕνεκα, i.e. τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ἕνεκα. τούτῳ in τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων is τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι: with the construction cf. Rep. IV 443 B εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν and see Stallbaum on Rep. I 342 B.

61. κολοῦσαι. Hdt. VII 10. 5 φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολοῦεν (Sauppe).

## CHAPTER XXIX.

Socrates develops his theory of the poem and applies it to the first two lines, not without much sophistry.

3. **μανικόν.** Notice the extreme dogmatism of Socrates, suggesting a weak case: cf. οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον (line 5).

5. οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον: see on 335 D. πρὸς λόγον = εὐλόγον or εὐλόγως is frequent in Plato: see on 351 E.

6. **ἐὰν μὴ τις ὑπολάβῃ κτλ.** The natural interpretation of the μέν (since it follows ἀγαθόν, not γενέσθαι) is this. While it is difficult 'γενέσθαι' truly good, it is yet possible to reach a fair standard of ἀρετή. The antithesis is implied if not actually expressed in the sequel: see 345 D and 346 C. Compare Introd. p. xxvii.

8. **λέγοντος τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ:** a fresh start is made, to explain ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν.

10. **εἰπεῖν** but λέγειν in line 8: the past tense is used because Socrates is about to put Simonides' meaning in the form of an actual address in past time to Pittacus.

11. **ὡς ἀληθῶς** to be taken with χαλεπὸν ἔστιν: see infra 344 A (line 23). Here again Socrates' interpretation is opposed to the

natural sense of the passage, according to which ἀλαθέως in the poem goes with ἀγαθόν, and has nothing to do with χαλεπόν.

343 E 12. ἐπὶ τούτῳ—τὴν ἀλήθειαν. τούτῳ is τῷ ἀγαθῷ, and τὴν ἀλήθειαν = τὸ 'ἀλαθέως'.

14. εὔηθες—Σιμωνίδου. As well might Socrates say it is εὔηθες to use the word ἄριστος.

15. ὑπερβατόν is used in its technical grammatical sense. Heindorf quotes Long. de Sublim. 22 ἔστιν δὲ (sc. τὰ ὑπερβατὰ) λέξεων ἢ νοήσεων ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν κεινημένην τάξιν καὶ οἰονεὶ χαρακτήρ ἑναγωνίου πάθους ἀληθέστατος.

16. ὑπειπόντα. There is no need to explain ὑπειπόντα here as 'interpreting' (a sense for which no exact parallel is quoted). ὑπειπεῖν is used here in its regular sense 'to say before', 'to say first' as in Ar. Wasps 54—55 φέρε νυν κατείπω τοῖς θεαταῖς τὸν λόγον, ὁλίγ' ἄτθ' ὑπειπὼν πρῶτον αὐτοῖσιν ταδί. The meaning is: if we would arrive at Simonides' meaning, we must regard the adverb ἀλαθέως as transposed, and speak the words of Pittacus first (ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ): i.e. instead of saying ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν first, and quoting Pittacus' saying afterwards, we should begin with χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι (line 19 εἰπόντα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι), and make ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν etc. follow as Simonides' answer (lines 20—23), putting ἀλαθέως last. οὕτωςί πως shews that ὑπειπόντα is to be explained in the sequel viz. from ὡςπερ ἄν το ἀλαθέως in line 23.

19. εἰπόντα: i.q. τὸν μὲν εἰπόντα: see on 330 A. Note the precision in the use of the tenses (εἰπόντα, but ἀποκρινόμενον).

344 A 21. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν. Compare Crito 43 D οὔτοι δὴ ἀφίκται ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν κτλ. μὲν without following δὲ is frequent in a clause introduced by ἀλλά, the antithesis being contained in the preceding negative clause.

23. οὕτω φαίνεται. After φαίνεται the MSS have τό: "vel expungendum vel in τοι mutandum hoc τό" says Heindorf. For πρὸς λόγον see on 351 E.

25. τὰ ἐπιόντα: see Appendix I. p. 198.

344 B 30. τύπον. Socrates' criticism of the poem so far has been δι' ἀκριβείας: cf. Rep. II 414 A ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας εἰρησθαι. See also note on ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι in 326 D above.

31. παντός μᾶλλον is frequent in Plato for 'assuredly': cf. Crito 49 B.

## CHAPTER XXX.

Socrates expounds the next section of the poem in accordance with his theory of the purport of the whole and finds therein his own doctrine that ill doing comes from want of knowledge.

1. **μετὰ τοῦτο—διελθών.** This sentence is somewhat difficult. *τοῦτο* means from *ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν* to *ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον*. The reference in *δλίγα διελθών* must be to the verses omitted between *τετυγμένον* and *οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως* etc. The *logical* object of *λέγει* is the sentence (in line 4) *γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν* etc., which is Socrates' paraphrase of *οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως* etc., but the *grammatical* object begins with *ὅτι γενέσθαι*—the stress being, as often happens, thrown upon the *δέ* clause: 'While it is truly difficult to become a good man (albeit possible for some length of time), to continue in that state after you have become good and to *be* a good man etc.' *γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν* etc. is not, as Socrates *says*, *μετὰ τοῦτο*, but his desire to expound the *τύπον τῶν ὅλων* of the poem throughout (*διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἔσματος*) leads him to begin at the beginning, even at the cost of an error not unnatural in conversational style. See Appendix I. p. 196.

**ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον :** 'as if he were making a speech', i.e. not a poem. The speech begins at *γενέσθαι μὲν*, for *ὅτι* here introduces oratio recta.

3. **οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινά.** These words do not give the gist of the lost lines: still less are they to be assigned (with Bonghi) to the poem itself, for [as Aars remarks *Das Gedicht des Simonides in Platons Protagoras* (1888) p. 12 note 3] it is implied by Socrates in 343 D foll. that *μὲν* in *γενέσθαι μὲν* has no expressed antithesis: they are educed by Socrates himself from *χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως*. Cf. infra 346 E *πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἐκῶν (ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἔν τῷ ἐκῶν διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα) ὅστις ἔρδη μὴ δὲν αἰσχροῦν, ἄκων δ' ἔστιν οὗς ἐγὼ ἐπαινώ καὶ φιλῶ*. The likeliest supposition is that of Blass—that the lost verses contained a further elaboration of the idea in *ἀγαθὸν ἀλαθέως*.

4. **γενόμενον δὲ...ἀδύνατον.** Socrates correctly apprehends the gist of Simonides' objection to the saying of Pittacus, although Simonides himself no doubt read more into the *ἔμμεναι* of Pittacus than Pittacus intended it to express. Simonides here takes *ἔμμεναι* to denote a permanent state, and *γενέσθαι* as not permanent, although in *ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι* he himself uses *ἔμμεναι* more

loosely: see *infra* on 344 E line 27. It is however most improbable that Simonides meant by *γενέσθαι* 'to become', i.e. 'to be made', as Socrates everywhere implies: by *ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν γενέσθαι ἀλαθέως* he meant only 'that a man should prove himself truly good', i.e. quit him like a perfect man: compare Hdt. VII 224 *Λεωνίδης—πίπτει ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἄριστος*, Xen. Anab. IV 1. 26 *ἑρωτᾶν εἰ τις αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐθέλοι γενέσθαι*. The usage is thoroughly idiomatic.

344 C 7. *ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος—γέρας*. Plato Symp. 204 A *θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γάρ*.

8. *ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι—καθέλη*: see below on 344 E line 30.

12—14. *οὐ τὸν κείμενον—τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ*. For the repetition compare (with Sauppe) Gorg. 521 E *οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων—ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον*.

344 D 15. *ὄντα ποτὲ—καθέλοι*. *ποτέ* goes with *καθέλοι* as with *καταβάλοι* in line 13.

19. *καὶ ἱατρὸν ταῦτὰ ταῦτα*. *ταῦτὰ ταῦτα* is virtually adverbial as in Meno 90 D *οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα*;

20. *ἐγχωρεῖ κακῶ γενέσθαι*. Socrates says *γενέσθαι*, although Simonides said *ἔμμεναι*; see on E (line 27) below.

21. *παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ*. Xenophon Mem. I 2. 20 *μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὃ τε λέγων 'ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξαι· ἦν δὲ κακοῖσι συμμισηγῆς, ἀπολείς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον', καὶ ὁ λέγων 'αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ποτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός'*. The first of these quotations is known (see Meno 95 D) to be from Theognis, so that it seems clear that the second must be from some other poet. It is difficult to resist the impression that the author of this line intended *ἀγαθός*, *κακός*, and *ἐσθλός* to have a political sense, and was alluding to the ups and downs of an aristocrat's life in times of civil dissension: compare Theognis 1109—1110 *Κύρν', οἱ πρόσθ' ἀγαθοὶ νῦν αὖ κακοί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ πρὶν νῦν ἀγαθοί· τίς κεν ταῦτ' ἀνέχοιτ' ἐσορῶν*; Euripides Hecuba 595 foll. (quoted by Cron) pointedly contradicts the sentiment of this line (as interpreted by Socrates) *ἄνθρωποι δ' αἰεὶ ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν κακός, ὁ δ' ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλός, οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὑπο* (alluding to Simonides' poem) *φύσιν διέφθειρ', ἀλλὰ χρηστός ἐστ' αἰεὶ*.

344 E 25. *εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν*. *εὐμήχανος* is identified with *ἀγαθός* by means of the middle step *σοφός*: *σοφία* being *ἀγαθόν* because it is one of the virtues. See on τῶ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαύοντι in Crito 47 B.



26. οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι. If Simonides had consistently carried out the distinction between *γένεσις* and *οὐσία* attributed to him (in part rightly: see on 344 B line 4), he would have used *γενέσθαι*, not *ἔμμεναι* here. Socrates throughout interprets *ἔμμεναι* as equivalent to *γενέσθαι* in this part of the poem, in spite of his previous distinction: but so (apparently) did Simonides: see on 344 B.

28. τὸ δ' ἔστιν κτλ. τὸ δέ 'whereas in point of fact' is very frequent in Plato: see on *Apol.* 23 A. Notice how Socrates reverts to the beginning of the poem: see note on 346 D and Appendix I, p. 196.

29. (δυνατὸν δὲ) ἔσθλόν. There is not sufficient ground for rejecting (with most of the editors) *ἔσθλόν*: its position is a trifle awkward, but not more, since *δυνατὸν δέ* is parenthetical, the *μέν* after *γενέσθαι* being balanced by *δέ* in *ἔμμεναι δέ*. Heindorf reads *δυνατὸν δέ, ἔσθλόν δ' ἔμμεναι* with slight MS authority.

30. πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ κτλ. γὰρ is probably due to Plato, who represents this sentence as adducing a reason for *ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον*: see Appendix I, p. 199. *πράξας εὖ* is 'if he has prospered': the whole sentiment is the converse of *ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι* and is characteristic of the ordinary Greek moral code: cf. Homer *Od.* XVIII 136—137 *τοῖος γὰρ νόσος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων οἷον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγρησι πατῆρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*. The view that affliction involves moral degeneracy appears in the transition of meaning in *πονηρός* and *μοχθηρός* from 'afflicted' to 'depraved': the common view that 'prosperity' brings virtue is involved in the usual equivocation on *εὖ πράττειν* 'fare well' and 'do well': see on *Crito* 47 E and *Euthyphr.* 3 A. After *κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς*, is to be understood *ἔπραξεν*.

32. τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα κτλ. In order to read into Simonides 345 A the doctrine that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance, Socrates assigns to *πράξας εὖ* in the poem the meaning of *acting well*, rather than *faring well*.

36. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς, sc. *πράξας*: a free rendering of *κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς* of the poem, which Kral (following Ast) reads here against the MSS.

40. κακῶς πράξαντες, i.e. *εἰ κακῶς πράξαμεν*, as the words of the poem shew. Socrates' reasoning is: to become a bad doctor by practising badly, you must first have been a good doctor: for if you cannot become a *doctor* by practising badly, obviously you

cannot become a *bad* doctor. The argument is as fallacious as it is ingenious: it assumes that *κακὸς ἰατρός* is a twofold notion, and more than *ἰατρός*, whereas it is a single notion and less. It would be more in conformity with experience to say that the *ιδιώτης* does become by practising badly a *κακὸς ἰατρός*.

345 B 45. *αὕτη γὰρ μόνη—στερηθῆναι*. This sentence (necessary as the converse of the statement in 345 A that good action comes from knowledge) is introduced as an explanation of *ὑπὸ χρόνου κτλ.*, because *χρόνος*, *πόνος*, *νόσος*, etc. produce *ἐπιστήμης στέρησις*.

47. *μέλλει—γενέσθαι*. See on 312 C above.

345 C 50. *διατελοῦντα ἀγαθόν* explains *ἀγαθόν* more precisely: cf. 344 B *γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν*. *διατελεῖν* without a participle seems not to be elsewhere found in Plato, though it occurs in Thucydides and others.

52. *ἐπὶ πλείστον*: “*diutissime*, ut *ἐπὶ πολὺ saepe significat diu*”. *καὶ* is ‘also’ not ‘and’, and balances *οὗς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν*: *οἱ θεοφιλεῖς* are also *ἄριστοι*.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

The rest of the poem is now expounded and the theory that no man sins willingly discovered in it.

3. *δηλοῖ* (sc. *εἰρημένα*) is used as in Soph. Ant. 242 *δηλοῖς δ’ ὥς τι σημανῶν κακόν*.

6. *κενεάν* goes proleptically with *μοῖραν αἰῶνος*.

8. *πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον* in apposition to *τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν*. Kroschel compares Simonid. Amorg. *πάμπαν δ’ ἄμωμος οὔτις οὐδ’ ἀκήριος* (Frag. 4).

*εὐρεδοῦς ὅσοι—χθονός*. Hom. Iliad VI 142 *βροτῶν οἱ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδουσι*, Hor. Od. III 14. 10 “*quicumque terrae munere vescimur*” (Heindorf).

315 D 10. *ἐπὶ θ’ ὑμῖν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω*: after Bergk’s emendation for the *ἔπειθ’ ὑμῖν* of the MSS, which cannot be made to scan: see Appendix I. p. 199. It might be possible (in view especially of *φησὶν* in the next line) to regard *ἔπειτα* here as no part of the poem, were it not for 346 D where it must be part. *ἐπὶ θ’ ὑμῖν* is the most probable of the many emendations proposed and accounts by far the most easily for the reading of the MSS. *ἐπὶ* is to be taken with *εὐρῶν*, and *τε* is like the quasi-gnomic *τε* in Homer, e.g. II. I 218 *ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπέιθηται, μάλα τ’ ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ*. Translate “‘trust me,

I will tell you when I've found your man', says he". *ὕμῶν* (a kind of ethic dative) does not belong so much to *ἀπαγγελέω* as to *ἐφευρών*. What Simonides himself wrote was no doubt *ἐπί τ' ὕμῶν* (availing himself of the Aeolic form as in the next line); this Plato put in Attic as *ἐπί θ' ὑμῶν*, from which to *ἐπειθ' ὑμῶν* the step was easy. Sauppe's *ἐπί δὴ μιν εὐρών* and Kroschel's *ἐπεὶ οὕτιν' εὐρών* are hardly happy.

11. *φῆσίν* applies only to the last line: the former *φῆσι γάρ* covers the first sentence.

13. *πάντας ὅστις*: so infra in line 18 *ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν ὅς ἄν* and in line 25 *ὅς ἄν—τούτων*: see also note on 319 D.

15. *ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται*. Proverbial: cf. Laws VII 818 B *ἔοικεν ὁ τὸν θεὸν πρῶτον παροϊμασάμενος—εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐδὲ θεὸς ἀνάγκη μὴ ποτε φανῆ μάχόμενος*. Aars quotes the words of Agamemnon in II. XIX 86 *ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἰτίος εἰμι, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἡεροφοῖτις Ἑρινύς*.

19. *ὅς ἄν ἐκῶν—ποιῆ*: but *ἐκῶν ὅστις ἔρδη* without *ἄν* above, as often in poetry: Goodwin MT. p. 208, § 540.

21. *οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν—ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν*. The doctrine that no one sins willingly—a corollary of the view that vice is only ignorance—is characteristic of the ethical teaching both of Socrates and Plato (compare note on 324 A and on Euthyphr. 2 C), but not of all Greek sages, and it is only by the most perverse sophistry that Socrates here reads it into Simonides, ignoring entirely the words *ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται*.

25. *καὶ δὴ καί*: see on 343 B above.

345 E

28. *καλὸν ἀγαθόν*: see on Apol. 21 D.

29. *καὶ ἐπαινέτην*. The words *φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν* which follow in the MSS were ejected by Heindorf.

30. *μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον*. Sauppe remarks that from 346 A Homer onwards *μήτηρ* generally comes first in such enumerations—an interesting survival, perhaps, of the greater importance assigned to the mother in primitive Greece. *ἀλλόκοτον* ('eccentric' as in Rep. VI 487 D) from *ἄλλος* (in its sinister sense) and *κότος* (i.e. *τρόπος, ἦθος, ὀργή*) according to Phrynichus (quoted by Kroschel).

31. *ἢ πατρίδα*: see Crito 50 E—51 C.

36. *ἔτι μᾶλλον*: not = *μᾶλλον ἢ κατ' ἀξίαν*, but—as is presently explained—because they 'add voluntary feuds to those which they cannot avoid'.

38. *ἀναγκαίαις*: Heusde's correction for *ἀνάγκαις* of MSS.

346 B

ἐπικρύπτεσθαι—ἀναγκάζεσθαι. Plato is probably thinking of Socrates after his trial as he depicts him in the Crito. ἀναγκάζεσθαι 'are constrained' is of course passive.

41. παραμυθεῖσθαι, like *mulcere*, as often. Sauppe quotes Hor. Epod. XIII 18 "deformis aegrimoniae dulcibus *alloquiis*".

43. ἠγήσατο—ἀναγκαζόμενος: 'believed—that he had praised etc.' Plato deals a sly thrust at Simonides' notorious avarice, as Pindar (quoted by Sauppe) does in Isthm. II 6 ἅ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδῆς πω τότ' ἦν οὐδ' ἐργάτις. The words ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος contain the sting: for the life of the χρηματιστής is βίαιος (Ar. Eth. Nic. I 3. 1096<sup>a</sup> 5).

346 C 48. ξμοῖγ' ἐξαρκεῖ κτλ. See Appendix I. pp. 196 foll. for the arrangement of this part of the poem.

50. γ' ὀνησίπολιν. The MSS read γ' ὀνήσει πόλιιν, which G. Hermann emended to τ' ὀνησίπολιιν, Bergk to ὀνασίπολιιν.

51. οὐ μῆν: so the MSS, and so, most probably, Plato; but Simonides can hardly have written this, which will not scan; see Appendix I. p. 199.

53. οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος probably belongs to an earlier part of the poem (before ξμοῖγ' ἐξαρκεῖ: cf. οὐ διὰ ταυτά σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἰμι φιλόψογος in line 47): see Appendix I. p. 199.

55. γενέθλα is Stephanus' correction for γένεθλα of the MSS, a mistake due to supposing that ἀπείρων (not from ἄπειρος) went with ἠλιθίων: it belongs to γένεθλα.

58. πάντα τοι καλά—μέμικται sums up the whole moral teaching of the poem.

346 D 63. καὶ οὐ ζητῶ κτλ. Socrates recapitulates part of the poem by way of interpreting the final text: see note on τὸ δ' ἐστὶν γενέσθαι κτλ. in 344 E above and Appendix I. p. 196.

65. τούτου γ' ἔνεκα: "si hoc spectetur s. requiratur, τὸ πανάμωμον εἶναι" Heindorf: cf. Phaed. 85 B ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρῆ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε. The sense is: if I must wait for perfection before beginning to praise, I shall never praise anyone.

346 E 69. ὡς πρὸς Πιπτακὸν λέγων: not serious, of course, nor true.

71. διαλαβεῖν: i.e. make a division, 'pause', virtually 'punctuate'. The editors compare the use of διαστίξαι in Ar. Rhet. III 5. 1407<sup>b</sup> 14 τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἀδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόκειται.

72. ἄκων δ' ἐστὶν οὖς: see on 344 B.

74. νῦν δὲ—σφόδρα γάρ. Compare Apol. 38 B νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ 347 A ἔστω and note in loc. Here διὰ ταῦτα sums up the clause σφόδρα γάρ—λέγειν.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

The original question is now resumed, Socrates expressing himself disparagingly on poetical criticism. With some reluctance Protagoras consents to submit himself again to Socrates' interrogatory.

6. ἔστι μέντοι καὶ ἔμοι κτλ. Imitated in Hipp. Maior 286 A where Hippias says ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν πάγκαλος λόγος συγκείμενος καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος τοῖς ὀνόμασι. Like Socrates in his recent exposition, Hippias looks upon poetical criticism as a legitimate field for the exercise of sophistry and wit.

7. ἐπιδείξω: see on ἐπιδειξάμενος in 328 D.

347 B

9. ὠμολογησάτην: in 338 D, where however the terms of the agreement are somewhat more stringent.

15. περὶ μὲν ἁσμάτων—ἔάσωμεν. Heindorf quotes Alc. I 113 D 347 C ἔάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὅπτερα συνοῦσι πράξασιν.

18. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι κτλ. This passage (from τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως down to κἄν πάνυ πολλὸν οἶνον πίωσιν) is quoted by Athenaeus III 51. It is doubtful whether Plato is here animadverting on Xenophon's Symposium, in which (2. 1 and 9. 3 foll.) both a flute-girl and a dancing-girl appear: the words τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων would contain a very pretty hit at Xenophon, if the evidence for the allusion were more complete. There is a similar passage in the Symposium of Plato (176 E) εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἔαν, αὐλοῦσαν ἑαυτῇ ἢ ἂν βούληται ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον: this passage Athenaeus (XI 112) cites in support of his theory of a literary rivalry between Plato and Xenophon.

20. ἀγοραίων: like the Latin *circumforanei*, “ἀγοραῖος, vel ut critici veteres volunt, ἀγόραιοι, est ὁ ἐν ἀγορᾷ τεθραμμένος, s. qui totos dies forum conterit, quem ἀγορᾶς περίτριμμα Comicus appellat, vilis et ex ima plebe homo, Aristoph. Eqq. 181 ὅτι πονηρὸς κἄθ' ἀγορᾶς εἰ καὶ θρασύς: 214 τὰ δ' ἄλλα σοι πρόσεστι δημαγωγικά, φωνὴ μαρὰ, γέγονας κακῶς, ἀγόραιοι εἰ” Heindorf.

23. τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας: “run up the price of 347 D flute-players”: τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον—τίμιον Euthyd. 304 B. Heindorf aptly quotes Xen. De Vect. IV 10 χυρσίον ὅταν πολλὸν παραφανῇ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀτιμότερον γίγνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀργύριον τιμώτερον ποιεῖ.

27. **καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι.** So Athenaeus (III 51) and the second hand in T: B and T read *πεπαιδευμένοι*. Schanz brackets *πεπαιδευμένοι*, but *ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας* in line 23 is in its favour.

**οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις—ψαλτρίας.** Compare Theaet. 173 D *δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς* (i.e. τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφοις).

347 E 32. **κἂν πάνυ πολλὸν οἶνον πῖωσιν:** like Socrates in the Symposium: see 220 A, 223 C. In Laws I 637 B foll. Plato argues that wine properly used is the means of teaching self-control, since the man who will be *σώφρων* when drunk will a fortiori be *σώφρων* when sober: cf. *ibid.* II 673 E foll.

33. **ἐὰν μὲν κτλ.** *μὲν* suggests that in different society the same would not be the case—an antithesis which is already expressed in 347 C—D. Compare Apol. 17 B *εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογήην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ.* For *λάβωνται* cf. (with Sauppe) Symp. 218 A *νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἀφουὸς ὅταν λάβωνται* (sc. οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγοι).

35. **οὔτε ἀνέρεσθαι—ἐπαγόμενοι τε:** for the sentiment see on 329 A above: for *οὔτε—τε* on 309 B: for *αὐτοῖς* after *ὦν* on 313 A. *ἐπάγεσθαι* is the regular word for ‘cite’, e.g. Rep. II 364 C *μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται*.

38. **δ ἀδυνατοῦσιν:** δ, not in B and T, was restored by Heindorf: it has since been found in a Vienna MS.

40. **ἑῶσιν:** the subject is supplied from *ἀνδρῶν οἷοιπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν εἶναι*.

348 A 43. **καταθεμένους:** for the asyndeton see on 330 A. Both here and in Tim. 59 C *κατατίθεσθαι* is not used in the sense of laying aside for good, but rather (as generally) putting away to be resumed again. ‘Putting the poets on their shelves’ would give the effect of the Greek.

47. **παρέχειν:** see on *συγκαθεῖναι* in 336 A above.

348 B 53. **καὶ νῦν:** as before 336 B.

56. **ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν.** Symp. 193 E *εἰ μὴ συνῆδη Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὔσι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά.* In *σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι συν-* goes with *ἐμαυτῷ*—I am conscious with myself that I am good—by the convenient fiction which separates the observing *ego* from the observed. Cases where the dative is not a reflexive pronoun are later in development and presuppose only knowledge about, not knowledge along with, the object.

58. ὡς γέ μοι. B has ὥστε μοι : T ὡς γ' ἐμοί (sic). There is 348 C no occasion for the emphatic form of the pronoun.

60. τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι. σχεδόν τι need not be accompanied by πάντες : compare Phaedo 59 C ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν ; σχεδόν τι οἴμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

61. προὔτραπετο. No other example of the aorist middle of προτρέπω is quoted from any Attic author, but ἐτραπόμην is common, e.g. Apol. 21 B μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.

62. ἐκέλευεν : the imperfect of this verb is used in narrative style for the aorist.

### CHAPTER XXXIII.

After a prefatory compliment to Protagoras, Socrates again asks whether the five virtues are only different names for one thing or differ in reality from one another.

5. τὸν Ὀμηρον τό. τό goes with the whole quotation to which τι is in predicative apposition (cf. τί τοῦτο λέγεις and the like), literally 'I think that what Homer says etc. is something', i.e. 'I think there is sense in what Homer says'. Schanz brackets τὸν Ὀμηρον, so as to make the articular clause the subject to λέγειν as in Ar. Knights 334, but there is no occasion for the change. The quotation had become almost proverbial (cf. Symp. 174 D, Alc. II 140 A) for "Two heads are better than one": it is from Iliad x 224 ff. where Diomedes says : σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένω, καὶ τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν, ὅπως κέρδος ἔη· μόνος δ' εἴ πέρ τε νοήση, ἀλλὰ τέ οἱ βράσσων τε νόος λεπτή δέ τε μῆτις. Leaf (in loc.) explains ἐρχομένω as a pendent accusative and for the order of words in πρὸ ὁ τοῦ cites II. v 219 ἐπὶ νῶ τῶδ' ἀνδρί.

8. εὐπορώτεροι—ἔσμεν, i.e. οὕτως ἔχοντες (viz. σύν δύο ἐρχομένω) ; 348 D it is hardly necessary to read οὕτως πως or to change πως into οὕτως as Heindorf suggests.

10. αὐτίκα περιῶν—ἐντύχη. The ἐπιδειξθαι and βεβαιώσθαι—deliberative subjunctives—of the MSS would imply too much eagerness : the change to ἐπιδείξεται and βεβαιώσεται is adopted by Sauppe and others. This mistake (or the reverse) is tolerably frequent in Plato's MSS, cf. Gorg. 489 A (βεβαιώσωμαι T, βεβαιώσομαι B), 505 E (ποιήσωμεν BT), 510 A (ἀδικήσωμεν BT).

12. ἐνεκα τούτου refers to the following clause introduced by

ἡγούμενος. Heindorf refers to his note on Phaedo 102 D λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὑπερ ἑμοί.

348 E 21. ὥστε καὶ κτλ. The reference is to 316 D foll. καὶ does not go with ἄλλων but with the whole sentence (as Sauppe points out).

349 A 22. ὑποκηρυξάμενος 'having had yourself heralded as a sophist': compare Aeschin. in Ctes. 41 ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ὑποκηρυξάμενοι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκέτας ἀφίεσαν ἀπελευθέρους. The force of ὑπο- is probably the same as in ὑπέειπον: see note on 343 E. Notice the effect of the double σεαυτὸν (both of them after a natural pause): σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος—σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας: the -αυτὸν is brought out so strongly as to suggest that Protagoras is the only true Αὐτός or Master.

25. μισθὸν—ἄρνησθαι: 328 B, where however it is not said that Protagoras was the first to take a fee. The Homeric word ἄρνησθαι is occasionally used by prose writers in the phrase μισθὸν ἄρνησθαι: whence μισθαρεῖν.

28. ἐκεῖνα—τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ: see above on 330 A.

349 B 40. ἦν δὲ—τόδε 329 C foll.

349 C 42. ἕκαστα attracted for ἕκαστον: so Rep. VIII 546 C δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστων, i.e. 'lacking—each of them—one'.

45. οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι. ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι like ὑπόλογον ποιῶμαι (Lach. 189 B) and ὑπολογίζομαι (Apol. 28 B) is to 'set down against', 'per contra', whence 'object' as here.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

Protagoras gives up what he had contended for before, and contents himself with saying that courage alone is quite different from its sister virtues. Socrates endeavours to identify courage and knowledge in a cumbrous proof, against the validity of which Protagoras rightly protests.

349 D 2. μόρια μὲν. The antithesis to μὲν was already expressed in ἐφησθα ὄν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἐν εἶναι 349 B.

4. ἦ δὲ ἀνδρεία κτλ. Protagoras therefore yields to Socrates' arguments so far as they have yet gone, and takes his stand on the only virtue the relation of which to the others has not yet been discussed: see on 333 C and D and *Introd.* p. xiv.

9. ἀκολαστοτάτους—ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ: like Otho (*Tac. Hist.* II 49), apropos of whose death Merivale quotes the lines of Byron, which well illustrate the sentiment of Plato:




“And strange to say, the sons of pleasure,  
They who have revelled beyond measure  
In beauty, wassail, wine and treasure,  
Die calm, and calmer oft than he  
Whose heritage was misery”.

10. **ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως.** The extreme difference (cf. *πάνυ πολλὸν διαφέρον* in line 5) between courage and the other virtues is brought out by representing those most lacking in the other virtues as sometimes ‘supremely brave beyond all others’: below in 359 B the *διαφερόντως* is omitted as unnecessary in a recapitulation. Sauppe quotes Tim. 23 C ἡ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὔσα πῶλιν ἀρίστη πρὸς τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομοτάτη διαφερόντως: compare also Gorg. 487 B αἰσχυντηρότερω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. Various suggestions have been proposed, but the text is sound.

11. **ἔχε δὴ.** “Hac sistendi formula aut monetur, qui rectam 349 E viam ingressus est, ut caveat, ut hic et Gorg. 460 A, aut revocatur, qui a recta aberravit, ut Prot. 349 D”. Wohlrab on Theaet. 186 B.

12. **πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ.** Socrates proceeds by reasoning thus: (1) *ἀνδρείοι* are *θαρραλέοι*: (2) *ἐπιστήμονες* are *θαρραλέοι* (349 A line 19—350 B line 28): (3) none who are *θαρραλέοι* without *ἐπιστήμη* are *ἀνδρείοι* (350 B line 28—line 33). From this he infers that *σοφοί* (i.e. *ἐπιστήμονες*) are *ἀνδρείοι*, i.e. that *σοφία* is *ἀνδρεία*. The reasoning is far from cogent. In the first place, we have to *assume* (it is nowhere stated) that *θαρραλέοι* contains two classes and no more, viz. *θαρραλέοι* with knowledge, and *θαρραλέοι* without knowledge: the assumption would be (to Socrates) a natural one, since (according to the reasoning in Chapter XIX foll.) every one who is not *ἐπιστήμων* is *ἀνεπιστήμων*. Now as *ἀνδρείοι* are *θαρραλέοι* and no *ἀνεπιστήμονες* (in the class *θαρραλέοι*) are *ἀνδρείοι*, it follows that *ἀνδρείοι* are *ἐπιστήμονες*, but even then the conclusion of Socrates is not warranted—that *ἐπιστήμονες* are *ἀνδρείοι*, since *ἀνδρείοι* may be only a part of *ἐπιστήμονες*. Socrates—consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning by another fallacy when



about to draw his conclusion in 350 B lines 34 and 38: where see note.

13. **καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη:** i.e. they not only have *θάρος* (which may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In *ἰέναι* Protagoras contrives to give the derivation of *ἴτης*: Sauppe refers to the Scholiast on *Ar. Clouds* 444 *ἴτης. ἰταμός, ἀναιδής, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν χωρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρείος* is coupled with *ἴτης* in *Symp.* 203 D and with *θρασύς* in *Ar. Clouds* l.c.

14. **φέρε δὴ κτλ.** This section (from *φέρε δὴ* to *ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα* in line 19) is intended to prepare the way for the proof of the third proposition (see on line 12) in 350 B: see note on line 32, and compare *Laches* 192 C, where the proof that *ἄφρων καρτέρησις* is not *ἀνδρεία* is introduced in much the same way: *σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα—ὄτι τῶν πάντων καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.*

16. **εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε:** 'as I'm a sane man.' This and similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g. *Euthyd.* 283 E, *Rep.* x 608 D (*εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε*), *Gorg.* 511 B *οἶδα—εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμι.*

17. **τὸ μὲν τι—τὸ δέ τι.** See on *Euthyphr.* 12 A. Kroschel quotes *Phileb.* 13 C *τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς—κακάς.*

350 A 20. **κολυμβῶσιν.** This and the next example are given also in *Lach.* 193 B foll. Sauppe thinks that the object of such diving (an art in which the Greeks were very expert: see *Thuc.* IV 26. 8) may have been to clean the wells and the like.

24. **τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες.** See Introduction, p. xxxvi.

27. **αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν—ἦ.** The notion 'than' is expressed twice: see note on *Crito* 44 C *καὶ τοὶ τίς ἂν ἀσχιῶν εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν κτλ.*, and cf. infra 350 E and (with Sauppe) *Hdt.* VIII 86 *ἐγένοντο—μακρῶ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν ἢ πρὸς Εὐβοίῃ.*

350 B 32. **ἀισχρὸν μεντάν—ἀνδρεία:** and if *ἀισχρὸν*, not *ἀρετή* (which it is), since all *ἀρετή* is *καλόν* (349 E). Compare *Lach.* 182 c *ἡ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλὸν εἶναι* and with the general sentiment *Meno* 88 B *οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἢ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἶον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῆ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῶ, ὠφελεῖται.*

34. **λέγεις:** the present is idiomatically used in referring to an earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on *ἄπερ λέγω* in *Apol.* 21 A. With *λέγεις* followed by an accusative in this sense compare *Symp.* 199 E *πειρῶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν· ὁ Ἔρωσ ἔρωσ ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;*

οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι. This Protagoras did not say, but only that *οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι* are *θαρραλέοι*: see 349 E. For this reason Sauppe and others reject *τοὺς* before *θαρραλέους*, and in favour of this urge the reply of Protagoras (*καὶ νῦν γε*): but inasmuch as (1) *οὐκοῦν οὗτοι—μαινόμενοι φαίνονται* seems to be intended to be incompatible with *τοὺς ἀνδρείους οὐχὶ—εἶναι*, (2) *θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρείοτατοι* in line 38 clearly implies that *θαρραλέοι* are conceived of as *ἀνδρεῖοι* (no less than *ἀνδρεῖοι* as *θαρραλέοι*), we must, if we regard the argument as a whole, retain the MSS reading. Protagoras' *καὶ νῦν γε* is an unwary admission: he does not at first catch the difference between *οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν οἱ θαρραλέοι* and *οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι θαρραλέοι*, and Socrates avails himself of his opponent's slip to hasten to his conclusion—which but for this misrepresentation could only be expressed as *ἀνδρεῖοι* are *σοφοί* (= *ἐπιστήμονες*), not *σοφοί* are *ἀνδρεῖοι*: see on 349 E and 350 D.

37. *ἐκεῖ*, i.e. in the case of *θάραρος* based on *σοφία*, illustrated in 350 C 350 A. Sauppe (after Schöne) reads *οἱ σοφώτατοι, οὗτοι κτλ.*: but *οἱ σοφώτατοι* need not go closely with *οὗτοι* (which is resumptive) any more than *οἱ οὗτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες* with the preceding *οὗτοι*. There is a kind of chiasmus in the order *οὗτοι—οἱ—θαρραλέοι* (*οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι*).

40. *οὐ καλῶς—μνημονεύεις κτλ.* Protagoras sees now that 'All brave are bold' is not equivalent to 'All bold are brave', and rectifies his *καὶ νῦν γε* by pointing out that he originally said only 'All brave are bold': but he confines his attention to this point, without touching on the fundamental flaws in Socrates' argument from 349 E to 350 B.

43. *ᾠμολόγησα* in 349 E.

44. *τότε ἤρουν*. So B and T. In *τότε* there is perhaps a latent contrast to *καὶ νῦν γε* of line 35. Protagoras is correcting his recent slip—had you asked me then (*viz.* at 349 E), I should have answered rightly. *τοῦτο* has inferior MSS authority.

45. *τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν*. The *οὐ* after *ὡς* is due to a confusion between (1) *τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας* and (2) *οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ὡς θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ κτλ.* The insertion of *οὐ* is the more natural because after verbs of refuting and the like the object clause gives what is maintained and not what is refuted, whence *ἐλέγχων ὡς οὐ, ἀντιλέγειν ὡς οὐ* etc.

49. *καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἶε κτλ.* Protagoras ignores Socrates' *third*

proposition in 350 B (28—33), where it is shewn that *θάρσος* without *ἐπιστήμη* is not *ἀνδρεία*: see next note.

52. *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κτλ.*, i.e. you might as well argue (1) οἱ *ισχυροί* are *δυνατοί*, (2) οἱ *ἐπιστήμονες* are *δυνατοί*, therefore οἱ *ἐπιστήμονες* are *ισχυροί*. This would only be correct if for (1) we substituted οἱ *δυνατοί* are *ισχυροί*. To make Protagoras' picture of Socrates' argument complete, we should have to add (3) none who are *δυνατοί* without *ἐπιστήμη* are *ισχυροί*—but this is not true, whereas Socrates' third proposition is. The completed picture therefore fails to represent correctly Socrates' reasoning in each of its steps, but none the less are Protagoras' objections strictly relevant, and indeed fatal to Socrates' conclusion as expressed in 350 C (37—40), and that is why Socrates makes no reply.

35 I A 62. *ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης—τὴν δύναμιν κτλ.* Protagoras says in effect: *δύναμις* and *ισχύς* are of the body, *θάρσος* and *ἀνδρεία* of the soul. *δύναμις* may come from knowledge (as when one has learnt how to wrestle: supra 350 E), or from madness or rage (as in the feats of madmen, or men inspired with the thirst for vengeance: such men have no real physical strength or *ισχύς* as it is presently defined, but excel themselves by virtue of *δύναμις*). *ισχύς* comes from natural constitution (*φύσις*) and proper nurture of the body (by gymnastics in the widest sense). Similarly *θάρσος* may result from art (*τέχνη* is substituted for *ἐπιστήμη* in view of the illustrations in 350 A), from rage or madness (as when Empedocles leapt into Etna): *ἀνδρεία* comes from the native character and proper nurture of the soul (cf. Rep. III 410 D τὸ θυμοειδές—τῆς φύσεως—δρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρείον ἄν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν γίγνεται, ὡς τὸ εἰκόσ).

## CHAPTER XXXV.

Here Socrates, taking a fresh start, endeavours to make Protagoras assent to the doctrine that pleasure is good. Protagoras desires to have the question examined. He allows that wherever knowledge is present, it must rule, but this is inconsistent with the view that one can know the better and do the worse. It is agreed to examine this popular view, in case the inquiry should throw light on the relation between courage and the rest of virtue. On the ethical doctrine of this and the following chapters see *Introd.* p. xxix.

4. εὖ ζῆν εἰ ἀνιώμενος—ζώη. There is the usual ambiguity in 351 B εὖ ζῆν: see on 344 E above.

6. οὐκ εὖ ἂν σοι δοκεῖ. The MSS have *δοκοῖ*, which all the editors (except Heindorf) retain. The meaning required is: 'would he not, think you, have lived well?' (to which Protagoras replies *ἔμοιγε* sc. *δοκεῖ*), *ποῖ* 'would you not think he has lived well?' and *δοκεῖ* is as necessary here as in *ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν εἰ—ζώη* above. The idiom is attested by abundant examples, e.g. Ar. Plut. 380 *καὶ μὴν φίλως γ' ἂν μοι δοκεῖς, νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, τρεῖς μῶς ἀναλώσας λογισασθαι δώδεκα*: Wasps 1404—1405 *εἰ νῆ Δί' ἀντὶ τῆς κακῆς γλώττης ποθὲν Πυροῦς πρῖαιο σωφρονεῖν ἂν μοι δοκεῖς*: in Plato it is extremely frequent, e.g. Rep. I 335 B *πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἂν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι*, Alc. I 105 C *εἰ αὖ σοι εἴποι—οὐκ ἂν αὖ μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν*, Gorg. 514 E, cf. Euthyd. 294 B, 306 B, Gorg. 522 A, and infra 357 A. The corruption is natural: it occurs also in the MSS of Ar. Wasps l.c.

11. ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω: i.e. 'I mean' not 'I say': cf. infra line 25 351 C in E. Socrates puts his question in a different form inviting an affirmative answer. After *ἡδέα* in the next line Heindorf would insert *τὰ ἡδέα*, but the subject is easily supplied.

12. μὴ εἴ τι—ἄλλο. So B and the first hand in T. The clause *εἴ τι—ἄλλο* defines negatively the meaning of *κατὰ τοῦτο*, as *καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν* defined it positively. *μὴ* deprecates or forbids the possible misunderstanding: its use in the idiomatic *μὴ οὐτι* is the same in kind: see above on 319 D. To read *εἰ μὴ τι* (with the second hand in T) would be to beg the whole question—*thaï* step is not reached till 353 D.

20. ἔστι μὲν ἄ κτλ. See on *ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὠφέλιμα* in 334 A. 351 D

28. εἰάν μὲν πρὸς λόγον κτλ. *πρὸς λόγον* does not (except 351 E *per accidens*) mean 'relevant' but is equivalent to *εὐλογον*: compare the phrases *μετὰ λόγου, κατὰ λόγον*; and, for the use of *πρὸς, πρὸς ὀργήν, πρὸς βίαν* and the like. So in 343 D, 344 A. Here the meaning is further explained by the clause *καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ—ἀγαθόν. τὸ σκέμμα* is quite different from *σκέψις*: it is not the inquiry itself, but the *proposition* to be inquired into, viz. that Pleasure is good: if this proposition is reasonable, says Protagoras, we shall accept it, if not, we shall dispute it. The sentiment does not deserve the scorn which Heindorf pours upon it, if only we catch the force of *πρὸς λόγον, σκέμμα* and *ἀμφισβητήσομεν*.

33. δίκαιος—σύ. Plato very frequently omits the copula

ἐστίν: εἰ and ἐσμέν more rarely: εἶναι often: ἦν rarely: parts of the conjunctive and optative very rarely. Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae* 31—35.

κατάρχεις: a lofty word (here used with a touch of irony) with religious associations: the middle is used of beginning a sacrifice. Cf. Symp. 177 E ἀλλὰ τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ καταρχέτω Φαίδρος καὶ ἐγκωμιάζέτω τὸν Ἔρωτα and *ibid.* 176 A.

35<sup>2</sup> A 36. ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι. It is not of course implied that ὑγίεια is an ἔργον σώματος, i.e. something ὃ σῶμα ἐργάζεται. Examples of σώματος ἔργα would be different kinds of bodily labour. ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν κτλ. is equivalent to πῶς ἔχει ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν κτλ.: cf. *infra* 352 B πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην;

37. τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας: the rest being covered by clothes. χεῖρ is not hand here (otherwise χεῖρας ἄκρας would be the tips of the fingers), but the arm, as in Homer's φίλας περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε (*Od.* XI 211).

39. ἐπισκέψομαι. The word is apt here, as it is often used of a medical inspection: compare *Phaedo* 117 E ἐπισκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη. With the whole passage compare *Theaet.* 162 A ἄρα κἀν εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα ἐλθὼν—πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνοὺς, ἐνίοις φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδύμενος;

41. θεασάμενος: with the usual asyndeton: see on 330 A.

352 B 44. καὶ τοῦτο: καὶ refers to 351 C—D.

47. ἡγεμονικόν: this word was afterwards selected by the Stoics to denote τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὀρμαὶ γίνονται (*Diog. Laert.* VII 159).

48. ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος: see on 337 E.

352 C 53. περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ: see the reference in the last note. Aristotle alludes to this passage in *Eth. Nic.* VII 3 1145<sup>b</sup> 23 δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.

56. ἑάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ—μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι: a frequent theme in Plato, e.g. *Meno* 77 B ff., *Gorg.* 466 D ff., two passages which contain much in common with the discussion in this and the next chapter.

58. ἢ ἄ ἂν ἦ: the reading of Stephanus: B has ἦ ἄ ἦ: T ἦ ἂν ἦ.

61. αἰσχροὺς—μὴ οὐχί. Goodwin *MT.* p. 327 § 817. As a σοφιστής himself Protagoras must exalt σοφία.

64. *καλῶς γε σὺ λέγων*: sc. *φῆς τοῦτο*, to be supplied from 352 D *φάναι*.

66. *γινώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν*: "video meliora proboque: deteriora sequor".

75. *ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἠττάσθαι* is virtually within inverted 353 A commas. With *καὶ οὐ* the sentence which started as a relative clause becomes independent: see note on 313 A.

82. *τί δέ—ὄ τι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν*; Compare Crito 44 C *ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῶν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει*; and 44 D *ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο ὄ τι ἂν τύχωσι* (sc. *ποιούντες*).

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

Although pleasures are sometimes called evil and pains good, it is in such cases their consequences which are intended to be so called: at the time itself all pain is evil, and all pleasure good.

The argument proceeds by these stages: First, the meaning of *ἦττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν* is explained (353 C): next, it is shewn that pleasures are called evil when they bring pain in their train or loss of pleasure, not because they are pleasant themselves (353 C—354 A), and that pains are called good because they bring pleasure in their train or escape from pain, not because they are painful themselves (354 A—354 C); therefore pleasure in itself is good, and pain evil (354 C—E). The rest of the chapter forms an introduction to the chapter which follows.

3. *ἐλέγομεν* is more humble than *λέγομεν*—the idea is 'used to 353 C call' till you said it was wrong.

4. *ἀκούετε δῆ*: Socrates bespeaks 'Attention!' like a herald. *ἀκούετε λεῶ* (e.g. Ar. Peace 551) was the usual way of beginning a proclamation at Athens. Compare Apol. 20 D, 32 A, Theaet. 201 D.

6. *ἄλλο τι*. This, the shorter form of this particle of interrogation, is probably not a deliberate abbreviation for *ἄλλο τι ἤ*. Thus *ἄλλο τι τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστίν* = 'this is true—anything else?' i.e. isn't it?, the words being thrown in parenthetically like *nicht wahr* and *n'est ce pas*.

7. *ἐν τοῖσδε—οἷον*: *τοῖσδε* would lead us to expect an enumeration of the cases: as it is, only examples are given. The effect of the Greek may be brought out by 'in the following cases—that often for example etc.' With this punctuation it is needless to write (as Kroschel does) *τοιούσδε* for *τοῖσδε*.

9. *γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν*: compare Meno 77 C ἢ γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Μένων, *γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶν ὁμῶς ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῶν*; *μάλιστα*.

353 D 16. *κἂν εἴ*: see note on 328 A above.

17. *ὁμῶς δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν*. So the MSS: most recent editors (except Kral) read *εἴη*. The imperfect is used because the answer 'No' is expected and desired: would they be evil just because they give us pleasure? Certainly not. See Goodwin MT. p. 190 § 503. Schleiermacher wrongly rejected *δέ* after *ὁμῶς*: the 'apodotic *δέ*' is frequent after *ὁμῶς*, *ὡσαύτως*, *οὕτω* and the like.

18. *ὅ τι μαθόντα ποιεῖ κτλ*. So the MSS. A variety of emendations have been proposed for *μαθόντα*, such as *ἀμαρτόντα* (Schleiermacher, followed by Heindorf), *ἀμαθάνοντα* (Orelli), *παρόντα* (Hermann), *παθόντα* (Sauppe and others), while Kroschel doubts the entire passage *ἦν—ὀπρῶν*, saying "Totus autem locus ita comparatus est ut de eius emendatione desperandum esse videatur". It would be natural to regard this particular passage as corrupt if this were an isolated example of the idiom in question: but—not to mention other authors—it occurs also in the following passages of Plato: Apol. 36 B *τί ἀξιόσ εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσύχλιαν ἦγον*: Euthyd. 283 E *εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον—ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἂν, σοὶ εἰς κεφαλῆν, ὅ τι μαθῶν ἐμοῦ—καταψεύδει κτλ*: *ibid.* 299 A *πολὺ μέντοι—δικαιότερον ἂν τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτουμι, ὅ τι μαθῶν σοφοῦς νιείσ οὕτως ἐφυσεν*. In each of these cases the MSS reading *μαθῶν* (not *παθῶν*) should be retained. In the direct speech *τί μαθῶν* is used in an impatient question: *τί μαθῶν τοῦτο ἐποίησας* is 'whatever made you think of doing this?' (e.g. Ar. Clouds 1506, Wasps 251, Ach. 826): cf. the idiom *τί ληρεῖς ἔχων*; in which *τί* depends on *ἔχων* (see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 624). *τί μαθῶν* becomes in the indirect *ὅ τι μαθῶν*, but in every case in which this phrase occurs in Plato *ὅ τι μαθῶν* means not 'why' but 'because'. The transition in meaning is sometimes explained as parallel to the use of *ὄλος*, *ὄσος*, *ὤς* etc. for *ὅτι τοιοῦτος*, *ὅτι τοσοῦτος*, *ὅτι οὕτως*, so that *ὅ τι μαθῶν* = *ὅτι τοῦτο μαθῶν*: but a simpler explanation is perhaps possible (see my edition of the Apol. Appendix II. p. 123). *ὅ τι μαθῶν* is an impatient *ὅ τι* just as *τί μαθῶν* is an impatient *τί*: but as *ὅτι* and *ὅ τι* are in reality the same word (see on 333 B), and *ὅτι* means 'because', *ὅ τι μαθῶν* comes also to mean 'because' (impatiently), the original interrogative force being lost. Similarly, in sentences like *ληρεῖς ἔχων*, the interrogation is dropped, and



the participle alone survives, conveying the same sense of blame or impatience as in *τί ληρείς ἔχων*; which is probably the form of sentence in which this idiom originated. Here *μαθόντα* is of course the nom. plur.: if (as we suppose) the original force of the participle is no longer felt in this idiom, there is nothing harsh in finding it in agreement with a neuter subject.

31. *οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἄν—ἐροίμεθα*. There is no sufficient reason 354 A for changing *ἄν* to *αὐ* or for omitting *ἄν*: *ἄν* points forward to the apodosis in line 37 *φαίεν ἄν* and is just as idiomatic as *ἄν* in *ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ*, e.g. in 311 B above.

33. *οἶον τά τε γυμνάσια κτλ.* Rep. II 357 C *τρίτον δὲ ὄρας τι—εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρνεύσθαι καὶ ἰατρνεύσις τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαίμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα οὐκ ἄν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν.*

34. *τὰς στρατείας*. Arist. Eth. Nic. X 7. 1177<sup>b</sup> 9 *οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρέεται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἄν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνουντο.*

35. *καυσῶν τε—λιμοκτονιῶν*. Gorg. 521 E *πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἰργασται ἀνὴρ (sc. ὁ ἰατρός)—τέμνων τε καὶ κῶων, καὶ ἰσχυαίνων καὶ πνίγων—πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων.* *λιμοκτονία* ("Hungerkur", says Stallbaum) is part of the *μικρὰ δίαιτα* of Rep. III 406 D.

42. *ἄλλων ἀρχαί*: 'dominions over others'—not *ἄλλων πόλεις*: 354 B cf. Gorg. 452 D *αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστω*. Heindorf's conjecture *ἄλλαι* (i.e. 'besides') is not necessary, in view of Gorg. 514 A (quoted by Sauppe) *ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινῶν ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡγτινοῦν*.

45. *τέλος*. The philosophical sense of this word—as an end of action—is beginning to appear in Plato: compare Gorg. 499 E *ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν κτλ.*

46. *ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς* is Stephanus' emendation for *ἀλλ' ἡδονάς*. 354 C

49. *ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν*: the copula is attracted to the predicate, as regularly: cf. infra 359 D *τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ ἠρέθη ἀμαθία οὔσα*.

66. *εἰ μὲ ἀνέροισθε*: without the *φαίην ἄν* which we should 354 E expect. Socrates apostrophises the *ἀνθρωποι* as if they stood before

him; the *φαίην ἂν ἐγώγε* of line 68 is part of what Socrates says to the *ἄνθρωποι*.

70. ἐν τούτῳ: see on 310 D above. *πάσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις* means all the proofs that pleasure is good and pain evil.

71. ἀναθέσθαι suggests (as often) draughts-playing: a comparison which is worked up into a simile by Plato in Rep. VI 487 B—C.

355 A 73. ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι. B and T have ἢ before *ἄλλο τι* by a natural mistake: it is corrected in T by a later hand.

79. ἄνθρωπος: so the MSS, but *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* in line 82. Kroschel refers to the variation in 321 D *ἄνθρωπον—τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ—ἀνθρώπῳ—ἄνθρωπος*. Compare infra 355 E.

355 B 81. καὶ αὖθις αὖ λέγετε. We should of course expect *λέγητε*, but the second part of a logically subordinate clause in Greek tends to become an independent clause: see on 313 A.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

The meaning of the phrase ‘to be overcome by pleasure’ is now explained in conformity with the results of the last chapter.

If we substitute ‘good’ for ‘pleasure’, the common saying that we do evil, knowing it to be evil, because overcome by ‘pleasure’, becomes ‘we do evil knowing it to be evil, because overcome by good’ (355 B—C). ‘To be overcome by good’ is shewn to be the choosing of greater evil in place of lesser good (D—E). Similarly, substituting pleasure for good, and pain for evil, we have the sentiment ‘we do the painful, knowing it to be painful, because overcome by pleasure’, and here also ‘to be overcome by pleasure’ is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains (355 D—356 A). No doubt in this case the pleasures are present and the pains remote, but we make allowance for this in our process of weighing pleasures and pains against themselves and one another (356 A—C). ‘Near’ and ‘Far’ have the same bewildering effect on the eyes when we look at size and number: but there the arts of measurement and of arithmetic resolve our perplexity (356 C—357 A). In like manner there must be some art or knowledge whose function it is to settle the value of ‘more’ and ‘less’, ‘near’ and ‘far’ etc. in their application to pleasure and pain. In other words τὸ ἡδονῆς ἠτῆσθαι is due to ignorance (357 A—357 E).

2. *χρώμεθα ἅμα*. ἅμα is due to a correction in one inferior MS,

approved by Cobet and Kroschel: BT have *χρώμεθα ἄρα*. If we read *χρώμεθα ἄρα*, there are difficulties serious enough to suggest an error in the reading: (1) the position of *ἄρα* is to say the least most unusual: no example is quoted of *ἄρα* coming at the end of a conditional clause in this way: (2) is *ἄρα* to be taken with *ἐάν* in the usual sense (*si forte*) or as inferential? The inferential meaning strikes us as somewhat farfetched, and the other is both inappropriate here and impossible from the position of the particle. On the other hand *ἄμα* is almost necessary to the sense: without *ἄμα*, the words *ἐάν μή—χρώμεθα* would not correctly describe Socrates' procedure in the following discussion, in which he *does* use all four names. But as he does not use them *together*, his procedure is accurately described by the addition of *ἄμα* to *χρώμεθα*.

7. *θέμενοι—οὕτω*: *οὕτω* is explained by *ὅτι γιγνώσκων—αὐτὰ ποιεῖ*: 'let us lay it down and say etc.' The thesis of the many is stated in order to be demolished. With the style of reasoning which follows compare Gorg. 499 A—B where (as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that pleasure is good and pain evil) it is argued that in that case the bad man would be just as bad and just as good as the good man since he feels just as much pain and pleasure as the other: see also Alc. I 116 A *ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἡ ἀγαθὸν καλόν, ἡ δὲ κακὸν αἰσχρόν; ναί. τὴν ἄρα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δέ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μὲν, κακὴν δέ.*

11. *ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς*. The antithesis is not expressed by a *μὲν* 355 C clause but in *ἐκείνῳ δὴ—τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* below.

12. *μετέληφεν*: the subject is *ἡδονή* and *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is in apposition to *ἄλλο ὄνομα*. *ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς* means in place of pleasure, i.e. the name pleasure.

19. *ἐν ὑμῖν*: not 'before your tribunal', but 'in you', i.e. 355 D inside you, in your souls. The idea is of a conflict between the good and evil in the soul before you do the evil. *ἐν ὑμῖν* might have been *ἐν αὐτῷ*, but the *ὑβριστής* now selects his interlocutors as his examples. The subtle reasoning which follows may be put thus: We do evil, knowing it to be evil, because *we* are overcome by good. But—since that which we do is evil—the good which overcomes is less worthy than *the evil in us* which it overcomes. 'Less worthy' (to overcome) means that 'there is less of it': to be overcome by good is therefore to choose less good than evil. The

argument is extraordinarily ingenious but hardly sound—the flaw lies in substituting ‘the evil in us’ for ‘us’: it was not ‘the evil in us’, but ‘we’ who were overcome by good. See also *Introd.* p. xxix. The usual way of taking *ἐν ὑμῶν* as ‘before your tribunal’ or the like (cf. *Gorg.* 464 D) makes the false step much more serious—since it substitutes not ‘the evil in us’ but simply ‘the evil’ for ‘us’.

23. *ἀνάξια ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν* should be translated literally—‘the good is unworthy of the bad’. The expression—in Greek as in English—is somewhat strained in order to correspond to *οὐκ ἀξιῶν* above (line 19): but after all ‘I am unworthy of you’ is much the same as ‘I am less worthy than you’. The Greeks can even use *ἀνάξιος* in the sense of ‘more worthy than’, ‘too good for’: e.g. *Soph. Philoct.* 1009.

24. *τὰ μὲν μείζω—ἦ*: i.e. when *τὰ κακά* are *μείζω* and *τὰ ἀγαθὰ* *σμικρότερα*, then *ἀνάξια τῶν κακῶν*: *τὰ κακά* are *ἀνάξια τῶν ἀγαθῶν*, when *τὰ ἀγαθὰ* are *μείζω*, and *τὰ κακά* *σμικρότερα*. Similarly with *πλείω* and *ἐλάττω*. It must be borne in mind that *ἄξιος* does not here denote moral, but rather physical strength or value: good is *ἀνάξιον κακοῦ*, because it is smaller or less numerous.

355 E 25. *πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἦ*. See on 330 A.

28. *μεταλάβωμεν*, i.e. ‘let us change and take the names pleasant and painful and apply them to etc.’ Compare *infra* 356 D. *ἐπί* follows *ὀνόματα* as in *τίθεσθαι ὄνομα ἐπί τινι* and the like.

356 A 33. *καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία*. This—the MSS reading—is undoubtedly right. Plato coins the word *ἀναξία* for ‘unworthiness’ to complete the parallel with D above: cf. lines 19—23 *οὐκ ἀξιῶν ὄντων νικᾶν—κατὰ τί δὲ—ἀνάξιά ἔστι ἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν κτλ.* Similarly in *Phaedo* 105 E Plato coins *ἀνάρτιος*, in 106 A *ἄθερμος* (rightly accepted, in spite of MS authority, by editors) and *ἄψυκτος* (see MSS, but Wyttenbach’s *ἄψυχρος* is—we think rightly—accepted by some editors) as pointed and convenient negatives to *ἄρτιος*, *θερμός*, *ψυχρός*. Cicero’s translation “*quae igitur potest esse indignitas voluptatis ad molestiam, nisi in magnitudine aut in longitudine alterius utrius posita?*” (Nobbe’s Cicero, p. 1313) shews that *ἀναξία* was read in his time: so in Ficinus’ “*quae vero alia inest ad dolorem indignitas voluptati quam excessus inter se atque defectus?*” The word *ἀναξία* hardly took root in Greek, though occasionally found in the writings of the Stoics, whose regular word for this notion is *ἀπαξία*. *ἡδονῆ* (now found to be the reading of some MSS) for *ἡδονή* is due to Heindorf.

35. **ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ**: as Sauppe remarks, we should expect *ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μείζω—γιγνεσθαι*, but the words are said as if for *καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία κτλ.* had been written *καὶ πῶς ἄλλως ἀνάξια τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς τὰ λυπηρά, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλλείποντα*;

37. **μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον**: this case is not given above (D—E) because the notion of *intensity* is more applicable to pleasure (and pain) than to good (and evil): cf. *Phileb.* 24 A foll. with 27 E *ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρασ ἔχουσι, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤττον δεχομένων ἐστών; ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκратες.*

**εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι.** So far we have reached this point. To be overcome by pleasure is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains and the like. But here the element of time comes in: a man might fairly say—yes, but the pleasures are *now*, the pains remote. Socrates tries to shew that this makes no real difference.

38. **τὸ παραχρήμα ἡδύ.** When we are overcome by pleasure, we do the pleasant, not the painful: therefore the contrast is between the present *pleasure* and the remote consequences, whether pleasure or pain. For this reason it would be wrong to supply *καὶ λυπηρόν* after *ἡδύ*.

41. **ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι κτλ.** Compare *Rep.* x 602 D 356 B *ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἰστάναι βοήθειαι χαριστάται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν;* ὥστε μὴ ἄρχουσι ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον κτλ.

42. **καὶ τὸ ἐγγύς κτλ.**: in order that a near pleasure might count for more than a remote.

44. **ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα κτλ.** Compare *Laws* v 733 B *ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, λύπην δὲ οὐθ' αἰρούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα, τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον ἀντὶ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα. λύπην δὲ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος λύπης οὐ βουλόμεθα κτλ.*

47. **ἐὰν τε τὰ ἐγγύς κτλ.** When once you have equated 'near' and 'far' (see last note), then (but not till then) your final choice is not affected by the question of proximity in time. Theoretically, no doubt, this is right: but no man is so *ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι* as to weigh *ἐγγύς* and *πύρρω* correctly; whence the saying "Let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die". 'Near' and 'far' can only be weighed aright on the supposition that man is immortal and will live hereafter under the same moral laws as rule us here: but of immortality there is no hint in this dialogue.

49. **ταῦτα**: i.e. *τὰ ἡδέα.*

53. *ὄτε*: the notion of time readily passes into that of cause as in *quoniam* and *cum*.

54. *φαίνεται ὑμῖν κτλ.* Two examples are given: (1) size—of which *παχέα* and *φωναί μεγάλοι* (according to the Greek and Roman way of viewing sound) are special varieties, (2) number, i.e. *τὰ πολλά*. The specific varieties *παχέα* and *φωναί μεγάλοι* are not dealt with in the sequel. With what follows compare (besides Rep. x 602 D cited above) Euthyphr. 7 B foll. and Alc. I 126 C foll., and with the present passage Phileb. 42 A and Rep. VII 523 C—524 C. The resolution by the intellect of such contradictory sense-perceptions is made the basis of Plato's scheme of higher education in the Republic.

57. *αἱ ἴσαι* is Heindorf's correction for *ἴσαι*.

356 D 59. *μήκη—πράττειν*: as we *ἠδέα πράττομεν*. *πράττειν* (with *μήκη*) is explained by *λαμβάνειν*: see above on 314 A.

61. *ἡ μετρική τέχνη*. See Introd. p. xxxii.

62. *ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις*. *ἢ* is omitted in B and T. 'The power of that which appears' is its power to affect us.

63. *ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίη κτλ.* *ἄν* is not to be supplied. Plato is reverting to the illustration in C. The imperfect is idiomatic for 'causes us, as we saw, to wander' etc. (viz. because *τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη* seem to us both *μείζω* and *ἐλάττω*): it is what Goodwin calls the 'philosophic imperfect': compare Crito 47 D *διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικάω βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο* (becomes as we saw), *τῷ δὲ ἀδίκω ἀπώλλυτο*. By adding *καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν—σικκρῶν* Plato treats his hypothesis that *εὖ πράττειν* is to select *μεγάλα μήκη* as a fact: he does so also in *ἄν ἐποίησε κτλ.* i.e. 'would have made', viz. if we had made use of it, but we did not. If the hypothesis were still treated as a hypothesis, we should have had *ἄν ἐποίηι* (and not *ἄν ἐποίησε*) to correspond to what would then have been *ἄν* (expressed or understood) *ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίηι*.

*ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω*. *ἄνω κάτω* (Theaet. 195 C) and *ἄνω καὶ κάτω* (Gorg. 495 A) are other forms of this proverbial phrase.

357 A 79. *ἀριθμητική*. In Gorg. 451 B foll. *ἀριθμητική* is said to be a science concerned with *τὸ ἀριτὸν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσα ἐκάτερα τυγχάνει ὄντα*: whereas the function which is here assigned to *ἀριθμητική* is there given to *λογιστική*: *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητική ἢ λογιστική ἔχει· περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστὶν τὸ τε ἀριτὸν καὶ τὸ περιττόν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους* (cf. lines 73 ff. *τὸ πλέον—τὸ ἔλαττον ἢ*

αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον) ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριον ἢ λογιστική.

81. εἶεν—ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ. The MSS read ἐπειδὴ δέ, but after εἶεν Plato regularly uses δὲ δὴ in coming to the *application* of a train of reasoning or illustrations: compare 312 E εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστῆς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; and 311 D εἶεν—παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν κτλ.

90. εἰσαυθὶς σκεψόμεθα. Siebeck, who asserts (Zur Chrono- 357 B  
logie der Platonischen Dialogen p. 121 foll.) that this and similar formulas were intended by Plato to be a distinct promise of future dialogues (if not a reference to a later part of the same dialogue) finds here a reference to Politicus 283 D foll., where the 'measuring art' is discussed and described as the βασιλικὴ τέχνη.

93. ἦνίκα ἡμεῖς—ὠμολογοῦμεν: 352 B foll.

357 C

96. ἔφατε: in 352 D. The original ἤρσεθε has to be repeated in consequence of the introduction of this independent clause.

98. ἤρσεθε: in 353 A.

101. εἶπατε: but εἶπατον in 353 A: otherwise there is no 357 D  
change in the quotation. B and T have εἶπετε, but Stobaeus (who cites from τοσοῦτον in 357 B to μεγίστη 357 E in his Florilegium) reads εἶπατε. According to Rutherford (New Phrynichus p. 219) εἶπετε is not Attic, but this is doubtful, if any faith can be placed in MS authority.

107. ἦς τὸ πρόσθεν. This—the reading of the best MSS—has been unjustly rejected in favour of εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν; but εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν can hardly be justified here. Sauppe refers to 339 D ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθών, where however εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν goes with προελθών, and in all the cases which he quotes there is a verb containing the idea of progress to go with the phrase, and so in Ar. Knights 751 ἀλλ' ἐς τὸ πρόσθε χρῆ παρῆν' ἐς τὴν πύκνα (where probably we should read παρῆν' for παρῆν' as in Ach. 43 παρῆν' ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν). Where there is no such verb (which is very rarely the case) the phrase means 'with a view to what lies in front', e.g. Alcib. 1 132 B οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται. It need hardly be said that the phrase cannot mean simply ἔμ-προσθεν. On the other hand ἦς seems to be just what is needed: the construction in full would be καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης (ἐνδεία), ἀλλὰ καὶ (ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐνδεία) ἦν τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ὠμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικὴ (sc. ἐστι: for the omission of ἐστὶ after ὅτι cf. infra 359 D ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύνατον): 'and from lack, not merely of

knowledge, but of the knowledge which you have further admitted above to be measuring knowledge'. The attraction of the relative extends to *μετρητική* also in spite of *ὅτι*: compare Apol. 37 B ὦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων for τούτων ἃ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακὰ ὄντα (ὅτι being used with the participle as in Gorg. 481 E: see note on Apol. l.c.).

357 E 111. ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη: compare Laws III 689 A τίς οὖν ἢ μεγίστη δικαίως ἂν λέγοιτο ἀμαθία;—ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημί εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δέ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.

113. οὔτε αὐτοί: the verb hangs fire: we should expect Plato to continue *οὔτε οἱ ὑμέτεροι παῖδες ἔρχονται κτλ.* Stephanus thought *προσέρχσθε* had fallen out after *αὐτοί*, Madvig *ἔτε*, while Kroschel suggests *οὔτ' ἐφοιτᾶτε αὐτοί*. It seems probable that the text is corrupt: at all events no parallel has yet been adduced. The two cases quoted by Sauppe (Dem. πρὸς Ἀφροβον § 54 and pseudo-Dem. πρὸς Τιμόθεον § 52) are more than doubtful in respect of their text, which (as Sauppe quotes it) is not according to the MSS. Madvig's *ἔτε* is simplest, but the future seems out of place: perhaps *ἦτε* should be read.

115. ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος: i.e. τοῦ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἠττᾶσθαι.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Socrates begins to apply the results of the previous discussion to the subject of his dispute with Protagoras.

Pleasure is good and pain evil, and no one willingly encounters what he believes to be evil. But fear is the expectation of evil: therefore no one will willingly encounter what he fears.

358 A 3. ὦ Ἰππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε. Here and in 358 E and 359 A ὦ has dropped out in the MSS after preceding -ω. The effect of its omission would be to render the address unduly abrupt.

4. ὑμῖν. So the MSS. Sauppe's *ἡμῖν* is not necessary. *ὑμῖν* means all three sophists: and *ὁ λόγος* is not the discussion as a whole, but the speaking, viz. in answer (cf. *δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον*). Throughout this chapter all the Sophists reply: in the next Socrates makes use of their united admissions to destroy Protagoras alone.

9. διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων: see note on 314 C.

358 B 10. εἶτε ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπως—ὀνομάζων. This mode of address insinuates that Prodicus was a *θεῖος ἀνὴρ*, since a God was addressed in a similar way. See Crat. 400 E ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστίν



ἡμῶν εἴχεσθαι, οἵτινές τε καὶ ὀπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι and compare Euthyd. 288 A θαυμάσιά γε λέγεται, ὧ ἄνδρες Θούριοι, εἴτε Χίοι εἴθ' ὀπόθεν καὶ ὄπη χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι and Symp. 212 C ὅτι καὶ ὄπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε. A similar effect is produced in Symp. 176 C by the words Σωκράτη δ' ἐξαιρῶ λόγου, since there was a proverb τὸ θεῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου: cf. Rep. VI 492 E θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου. The multitude of epithets given to gods is best illustrated by such a hymn as the Homeric Hymn to Ares line 1 foll. \**Ἄρες ὑπερμένετα, βρισάρματε, χρυσοεπήληξ, ὀβριμόθυμε, φέραςπι, πολισσοῦε, χαλκοκορυστὰ κτλ.* In the multitude of names the suppliant hopes to include the acceptable one.

12. πρὸς δ' βούλομαι: emphatic 'with a view to my meaning' (πρὸς δ' ὀνομάζω).

14. ἐπὶ τούτου. This usage can only be on the analogy of ἡ ἐπὶ Σάρδεων ὁδός and the like: actions are looked on as ways leading to a goal or destination or τέλος: cf. supra 354 C and D. To take the words (with Sauppe) as 'in the case of this' 'in this domain' would give a wrong meaning: the moral character of an art being determined by its end, it is καλόν only if it aims at the end. The expression is however very curious, and perhaps unique. I once thought that ἅπασαι might conceal some present participle such as ἀγούσαι—agreeing with πράξεις: but the occurrence of ἀπάσας below in 359 E shews ἅπασαι to be probably genuine here. The reasoning is this. Pleasure, the end, is good, pain evil: consequently all actions aiming at the end are καλαί, and therefore good (as usual ὠφέλιμος is but a synonym for 'good'): therefore—as no one willingly selects evil rather than good—no one willingly does the worse (i.e. selects evil actions) when he might act better. As it is with πράξεις that bravery and cowardice are concerned it is necessary for Plato to establish that 'no one willingly seeks the worse' is true of individual acts as well as of ultimate ends.

15. ἄρ' οὐ καλαί. The words καὶ ὠφέλιμοι which follow οὐ καλαί in the MSS are rightly rejected because they anticipate the identification in the next line.

18. ἢ ἂ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατὰ is Heindorf's emendation of the corrupt ἢ ἂ ἐποίει καὶ δύναται of the MSS.

20. ἦττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ κτλ. The phrases ἦττων αὐτοῦ and 358 C κρείττων ἑαυτοῦ are here substituted for ἦττων τῆς ἡδονῆς and κρείττων τῆς ἡδονῆς. Compare the discussions in Rep. IV 430 E foll. and Laws I 626 E foll., where κρείττω and ἦττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ are inter-

preted as the victory of the better part in us over the worse and conversely. As the worse part is the part which seeks ἡδονή, i.e. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the identification is just.

358 D 31. καλεῖτέ τι δέος. Heindorf's emendation for καλεῖτε δέος of the MSS. See note on 330 C above.

33. προσδοκίαν τινά—κακοῦ: a common definition: cf. Lach. 198 B δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. φόβος in Laws I 644 C is defined as 'expectation before pain' (πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς).

358 E 36. δέος, φόβος δ' οὐ. Prodicus' distinction is just, though often dropped in practice: in φόβος 'the physical agitation due to present danger (ἡ παραντικά πτόησις, says Ammonius) is the leading idea', in δέος the apprehension of evil to come (κακοῦ ὑπόνοια). See note on Euthyphr. 12 B, where Plato implicitly recognises the difference.

37. ἀλλὰ τόδε: sc. διαφέρει. οὐδὲν διαφέρει does not of course mean 'there is no difference', but 'it doesn't matter'.

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

It is here proved that courage is wisdom.

Socrates first reverts to the point at which the discussion on ἡδονῆς ἠττάσθαι began (359 A—C): next, Protagoras asserts that ἀνδρείοι and δειλοὶ are willing to encounter opposite things, but Socrates shews that both encounter what they take to be θαρραλέα, i.e., so far, the same things (359 C—E). Protagoras thereupon objects that ἀνδρείοι will encounter e.g. war, while δειλοὶ will not. Socrates replies by shewing that if cowards do not willingly enter upon war, the reason is their ignorance (359 E—360 A). In general, while brave men fear and feel courage honourably, i.e. well, the reverse is true of cowards, owing to their ignorance (360 A—360 B). And since it is through δειλία that men are δειλοὶ, and we have shewn that men are δειλοὶ through ἀμαθία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν, cowardice is ignorance, and consequently bravery is wisdom, viz. δεινῶν τε καὶ μὴ δεινῶν (360 B—360 E).

359 A 5. τότε: 330 A foll.

9. τὸ ὕστερον: 349 D foll.

359 B 18. ἠρόμην: 349 E.

19. καὶ ἴσας γ', ἔφη. The recapitulation stops here. ἔφη ἐγώ in the next line is the usual 'said I' of narrated dialogue.

359 C 22. ἐπὶ τί: so MSS: the second hand in B reads ἐπὶ τίνα, but cf. infra line 27 where the question is repeated with ἐπὶ τί. For the

common passage from singular to plural the editors compare Phaedo 58 C *τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα*;

25. **δεινά**: the MSS read *δειλά* by mistake, and so in 360 C below *δειλῶν* three times for *δεινῶν*.

30. **ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις**: see on 342 B.

359 D

33. **ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἦττω—ἀμαθία οὐσα**. The only proof given that we 'encounter evils believing them to be evils' was the phrase *ἦττω εἶναι ἡδονῆς* (for which *ἦττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ* is here substituted: see on 358 C). We have demolished this proof by shewing that the phrase means *ἀμαθία*, and we therefore infer that *ἐπὶ ᾧ δεινὰ ἡγέται εἶναι οὐδεις ἔρχεται* (*δεινά* being a subdivision of *κακά*).

34. **ἠύρέθη**. The MSS have *εὐρέθη*: but see on 315 B.

39. **αὐτίκα**: "veluti, ne longe hinc abeam" (Kroschel) and so 359 E 'for example': a very frequent use in Plato.

40. **πότερον—καλὸν ὄν κτλ.** Compare 349 E.

42. **ἔμπροσθεν**: 358 B.

53. **κάλλιον τε**. The MSS read *καλὸν τε*. Stephanus made the 360 A necessary change.

58. **καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι**. In 350 B 360 B *all* those who are *θαρραλέοι* without *ἐπιστήμη* are called *μαινόμενοι* by an expressive metaphor. Here the *μαινόμενοι*—which is *suggested*, but no more—by the *μαινόμενοι* in 350 B—are treated as a distinct class: the word is to be understood of literal madmen like Ajax in the play of Sophocles. The word *θρασεῖς* has an evil connotation as in *Laws I 630 B θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν ἀπάντων*: Plato could not have said *θαρραλέοι* here since *θαρραλέοι* throughout the dialogue is applied also to *ἀνδρείοι*. It would be better to reject (with Kral) both *καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς* and *καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι* than only *καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς* with Sauppe and Schanz: we should then—as throughout this chapter—have only one negative to *ἀνδρείοι*, *viz.* *δειλοὶ*, but we may allow some latitude of expression to Socrates, and *καὶ* after *οὐκοῦν* is slightly in favour of supposing that other classes follow *οἱ δειλοὶ*, though it *may* go with the whole sentence.

69. **ἐπένευσεν**: Protagoras dies hard: see on Euthyphr. 8 A. 360 C

75. **οὔτε—τε**: see on 309 B.

360 D

77. **αὐτός—πέρανον**. Gorg. 506 C *λέγε, ὦγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέρανον*.

81. **φιλονικεῖν—τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι**. For the orthography of *φιλονικεῖν* 360 E see note on 336 E above. Apparently *φιλονικεῖν* is not elsewhere

used in Plato with the accusative, but the construction is a natural one and occurs in Thucydides: in Rep. I 338 A we have *προσποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον*.

## CHAPTER XL.

Socrates points out that while Protagoras' theory would point to the conclusion that virtue is not teachable, he himself in trying to prove that virtue is knowledge goes near to maintaining that it is. Thus the interlocutors have as it were changed places. The dialogue ends with mutual compliments.

4. *αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή*: 'virtue itself', literally 'virtue, the thing itself'. Compare Crat. 411 D *εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἐστὶν ἔσις*: Theaet. 146 E *γυνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν*: "*αὐτὸ (per se) substantivis et adiectivis adiunctum rei alicuius naturam ac vim per se et universe spectatam significat*", says Ast. This use of *αὐτός* furnished Plato (as in *αὐτοάνθρωπος* and the like) with a convenient way of denoting his Ideas, but here of course *αὐτό* does not denote the Idea but is *ipsum* as opposed to *τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς*.

361 B 14. *πάντα χρήματα*: exaggeration—as if Socrates held *ἐπιστήμη* to be the *ἀρχή* of the universe and said *ἐπιστήμη πάντα* as Heraclitus might say *πῦρ πάντα*.

19. *ὄλον*: i.e. *ἡ ἀρετή*—the gender is like *αὐτό* in line 4. Sauppe cites Meno 79 B *ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὄλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν*.

361 C 22. *ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι*: a frequent usage in Plato: see on Apol. 27 A *ἔοικεν γὰρ—διαπειρωμένῳ*.

24. *ἄνω κάτω*: see on 356 D above.

27. *ἐξελεῖν—ἐπι*. There is a slight hint of military metaphor: 'fare forth against virtue also to see what she is', 'also attack the question what is virtue': cf. Rep. II 374 A δ (*στρατόπεδον*) *ἐξελεθὼν—διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιούσιν*: cf. the similar use of *λέναι ἐπι* in Rep. V 473 C *ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴμι δ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι*. Here *ἐξ-* is appropriate, because the first campaign is as it were ended (*ταῦτα διεξελεθόντας*): it is moreover natural to retain it, on account of the tendency noted on 311 A. A later hand in T has *ἐλεῖν*, but the MSS reading is unobjectionable, nor is there any need to read *διελεῖν* or *διεξελεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν* as Kroschel suggests. For the sentiment cf. Meno 100 B *τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμμεθα*

τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή.

28. ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ: Siebeck (in the treatise cited on p. 187) here and in 361 E εἰσαῦθις—διέξιμεν finds a promise of the Meno and the Gorgias.

29. μὴ πολλάκις: *ne forte*, as often in Plato. What often happens may happen in a future case: so Lucretius uses 'saepe' for 'ut saepe fit'.

32. Προμηθεὺς—προμηθοῦμενος. Puns on proper names are 361 D frequent in Plato: see Riddell's Digest of Idioms § 323.

35. κατ' ἀρχάς, viz. 348 C ff., 320 B.

38. οὔτε—τε: see on 309 B.

361 E

41. ὧν ἐντυγχάνω: a somewhat rare attraction, since in the unattracted form the relative would be in the dative and not in the accusative case: compare Theaet. 144 A ὧν δὴ πρόποτε ἐνέτυχον—καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω ἤσθθμην κτλ., where Wohlrab cites also Gorg. 509 A.

42. τηλικούτων: Socrates was about 36 at the date of action of the Protagoras.

47. ἔφην: 335 C.

362 A

Καλλία τῷ καλῷ: see on 336 B above. For καλῷ cf. Symp. 174 A ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν (viz. Agathon) ἴω. Sauppe reminds us of the use of καλός on vases, and also cites Ar. Ach. 143 ἐν τοῖσι τοίχοις ἔγραφ' Ἀθηναῖοι καλοί (of Sitalces) and the famous Κριτία τοῦτ' ἔστω τῷ καλῷ of the dying Theramenes (Xen. Hell. II 3. 56).

## APPENDIX I.

### ON THE POEM OF SIMONIDES.

THE difficulties of this poem are well known, and have called forth many pages of comment<sup>1</sup>. The restoration proposed by Schneidewin has met with most favour, and is printed in most texts of the Protagoras, not because it is thought to be certain, but as the nearest approach to certainty of which the case admits. It may be at once allowed that no restoration can claim to represent with certainty just what Simonides wrote in the order in which it was written. Plato is seldom careful to make his quotations accurate, and the perverse exposition of the meaning of this particular poem is hardly calculated to increase our confidence in his verbal accuracy here. Nevertheless, Plato is our sole authority for the poem in question, and consequently that restoration will be the most probable which, while it satisfies every metrical requirement, involves the fewest changes in the text and sequence of the poem as it stands in Plato.

The words apparently quoted from the poem, as they occur in the Bodleian manuscript, are according to Schanz as follows (we note obvious corrections at the foot of the page).

339 B. ἀνδρα<sup>2</sup> ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν χερσί<sup>3</sup> τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον

<sup>1</sup> On p. 20 of his fourth edition of the Protagoras, Sauppe enumerates the discussions on the subject down to 1884. The most important contribution since that year is Das Gedicht des Simonides in Platons Protagoras, von J. Aars, Christiania, 1888. Aars's restoration has received the approval of Peppmüller (in the Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift for 1890, p. 174 foll.) and others: and there now seems to be some prospect of finality in the criticism of the poem. In his program (Das Simonideische Gedicht in Platons Protagoras und die Versuche dasselbe zu reconstruiren, Graz 1889) Schwenk follows Aars in every essential point.

<sup>2</sup> ἀνδρ'.

<sup>3</sup> χερσίν.

339 C. οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον<sup>1</sup> νέμεται καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωντὸς εἰρημένον χαλεπὸν φάτο<sup>2</sup> ἔσθλ' ἔμμεναι

341 E. θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο<sup>3</sup> ἔχει γέρας

344 C. ἄνδρα δὲ<sup>4</sup> οὐκ ἔστιν<sup>5</sup> μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι ὃν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη

344 E. πράξας μὲν γὰρ εἷς πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς

345 C. ἐπὶ πλείστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὗς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλήσιν

345 C. τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν διζήμενος κεν ἔαν<sup>6</sup> ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον εὐρνεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονὸς ἔπειθ' ὑμῖν εὐρὼν ἀπαγγελέω

345 D. πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι<sup>7</sup> καὶ φιλέω ἕκων ὅστις ἔρδῃ μῆδ' ἐν αἰσχροῖς ἀνάγκῃ δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται

346 C. ἔμοιγε ἔξαρκεῖ ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ μῆδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος εἰδῶς γε δὴήσει πόλιν<sup>8</sup> δίκαν ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ οὐ μὴν ἐγὼ μωμῆσομαι οὐ γὰρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος τῶν γὰρ ἡλιθίων ἀπείρων γένεθλα<sup>9</sup> πάντα τοι καλὰ τοῖσι τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμκται.

In 346 D—E part of the poem is paraphrased and repeated in the words οὐ ζητῶ πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον εὐρνεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονὸς, ἔπειθ' ὑμῖν εὐρὼν ἀπαγγελέω· ὥστε τούτου γ' ἔνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαίνεσομαι, ἀλλὰ μοι ἔξαρκεῖ ἂν ἦ μέσος καὶ μῆδ' ἐν κακῶν ποιῆ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι ἕκων ὅστις ἔρδῃ μῆδ' ἐν αἰσχροῖς.

The only words whose place in the poem is somewhat doubtful are ἔμοιγε ἔξαρκεῖ and οὐ γὰρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος. They are excluded both by Bergk and Blass, but it is not likely that they come from Plato, since μοι ἔξαρκεῖ occurs also in the final recapitulation, and οὐ διὰ ταυτὰ σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἰμι φιλόψογος is said (346 C) as well as οὐ γὰρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος. Bonghi (quoted by Aars<sup>10</sup>) assigns the words οἶόν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινα in 344 B to a place in the poem after ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον: it is however tolerably clear that they come from Socrates, who is merely developing the latent antithesis in χαλεπὸν.

Schneidewin's<sup>11</sup> restoration is as follows:

Στροφή.

"Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν  
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

(Desunt quinque versus.)

<sup>1</sup> Πιττάκειον I (i.e. Vind. suppl. Phil. gr. 7) rightly.

<sup>2</sup> φάτ'.

<sup>3</sup> τοῦτ' <sup>4</sup> δ' <sup>5</sup> ἐστι. <sup>6</sup> κενεαν I, rightly.

<sup>7</sup> ἐπαίνημι.

<sup>8</sup> γ' ὀνησίπολις after Bergk: Hermann ὀνησίπολις.

<sup>9</sup> γενέθλα.

<sup>10</sup> p. 8, note 1.

<sup>11</sup> In his *Delectus poesis Graecorum*, p. 379.

## Ἐντιστροφή.

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,  
 καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσλὸν ἔμμεναι.  
 Θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,  
 ὃν ἂν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.  
 Πράξαις γὰρ εἴ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,  
 κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς, καὶ  
 τοῦπίπλειστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

## Ἐπιφθόσ.

Ἐμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ  
 ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ  
 μῆδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος εἰδῶς τ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν, ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ.  
 οὐ μιν ἐγὼ μωμάσομαι·  
 οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος.  
 τῶν γὰρ ἀλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα.  
 πάντα τοι καλὰ, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.

## Στροφή β'.

τοῦνεκεν οὐποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν  
 διζήμενος, κενεῶν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,  
 πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐνεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός.  
 ἔπειτ' ἕμμι εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω.  
 πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,  
 ἐκῶν ὅστις ἔρδη  
 μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν, ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

There is little probability in this arrangement. Schneidewin altogether neglects the evident metrical resemblance between the words from *ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ* to *τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται*<sup>1</sup> and the other sections of the poem. But the obvious and indeed fatal objection to Schneidewin's restoration is that he makes a wide departure from the order of the words as they come in Plato, placing the *ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ κτλ.* of 346 C before the *τοῦνεκεν οὐποτ' ἐγὼ* of 345 C. That Socrates *reverts* in 346 D to *τοῦνεκεν οὐποτ' ἐγὼ κτλ.* is no reason for placing these words in the last part of the poem, any more than we should place the words "Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως κτλ. after *ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι κτλ.* because Socrates reverts to them in 344 E. A man who professes to be giving a continuous exposition of a poem may revert to the middle of it when he has come to the end, in order

<sup>1</sup> See the restoration below on p. 198.



to illustrate the sentiment with which the poem concludes, but it would be the superfluity of naughtiness to put the end of the poem into the middle, which is what Schneidewin makes Socrates do. If *οὐ ζήτῶ κτλ.* in 346 D were in reality the conclusion of the poem, we ought to frame our *Στροφή β'* out of these very words, and not from *τοῦνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ κτλ.* We should then have to omit the words *ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται*, because they are not found in 346 D—E, but it is beyond question that these words are part of Simonides' poem. It is tolerably certain that in 346 D we have but a recapitulation of part of the argument, presented as a commentary on the concluding text *πάντα τοι καλὰ κτλ.*, which sums up the whole ethical teaching of the poem. This is practically admitted by Schneidewin himself when he writes his final strophe not as it appears in 346 D, but as it stands in 345 C—D.

Bergk<sup>1</sup> arranges the poem in three complete strophes. His restoration has the merit of recognising the similarity in rhythm between Schneidewin's Epode and the other parts of the poem: several of his emendations are also in all probability right<sup>2</sup>. It may however be doubted whether he does well in altogether excluding from the poem the words *ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ* and *οὐ γὰρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος*, and he deserts the Platonic order even more ruthlessly than Schneidewin when he places *ὅς ἂν ᾗ<sup>3</sup> κακὸς—μὴ μέμικται* directly after *ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον*, besides that Plato clearly indicates by the words *προϊόντος τοῦ ἄσματος* (339 C), *ὀλίγον—εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθῶν* (339 D), and *ὀλίγα διελθῶν* (344 B), that there is a lacuna after *τετυγμένον*.

Blass<sup>4</sup> agrees with Bergk in regarding the poem as a sequence of strophes, but discovers four of these in place of three. In the first strophe Blass's arrangement agrees with that of Schneidewin: in the second, he supposes the two first verses to be lost, and the rest to contain *ὅς ἂν ᾗ κακὸς κτλ.* down to *τοῖσι τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται*: the third consists of *οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως—τούς κε θεοὶ φιλόωσι*: the fourth and last extends from *τοῦνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ* to *ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται*. This arrangement (which further agrees with that of Bergk in rejecting *ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ* and *οὐ γὰρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος*) upsets even more completely than either of the others the sequence of the poem as it is given by Plato, and for that reason is most unlikely to be right.

<sup>1</sup> Poetae Lyr. Graeci<sup>4</sup>, III p. 384 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See the footnotes on p. 195.

<sup>3</sup> Bergk's emendation for *μῆ*.

<sup>4</sup> In the Rheinisches Museum for 1872, p. 326 ff.

The only arrangement which faithfully adheres to the Platonic order of citation is that of Aars, in the treatise referred to already<sup>1</sup>.

## STROPHE 1.

1. "Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν,
2. χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

Verses 3—7 are wanting.

## STROPHE 2.

1. Οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται,
2. καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.
3. Θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχει γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
4. ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.
5. Πράξας μὲν εἴ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
6. κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς <τις>,
7. καὶ τὸ πλείστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς κε θεοὶ φιλιῶσιν.

## STROPHE 3.

1. Τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν
2. διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
3. πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρνεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
4. ἐπὶ δ' ὕμμιν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω.
5. Πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
6. ἐκῶν ὅστις ἔρδῃ
7. μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

## STROPHE 4.

1. Wanting.
2. — — — — — [οὐκ εἰμ' ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος·] ἔξαρκεῖ γ' ἐμοί,
3. ὅς ἂν ἦ κακὸς μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδώς γ' ὄνησίπολιν δίκαν,
4. ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ, οὐδὲ μὴ μιν ἐγὼ
5. μωμήσομαι· τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων
6. ἀπείρων γενέθλα·
7. πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.

This restoration seems to us on the whole the most probable. In line 4 of Strophe 2 Plato no doubt wrote *ὃν ἂν* (the MSS reading) for *ὄν*, using the more common construction in defiance of metre,

<sup>1</sup> p. 194, note 1.

just as in line 5 γάρ after μέν is due to the desire to shew the sequence of thought. In lines 6 and 7 of the same Strophe Plato omits some monosyllable after κακῶς, perhaps τις or τι or αὖ: Hermann's view that καί of the next line should be written in line 6, and line 7 be made into τοῦπίπλειστον ἄριστοι κτλ., is perhaps less probable. For line 7 we should prefer as nearer to the words of Plato ἀπὶ πλεῖστον ἄριστοι κτλ. In the third Strophe we prefer ἐπὶ τ' ὕμῳ for the reasons given in the note upon the passage on p. 166. In the last Strophe δὲ ἂν ἦ κακός is Bergk's emendation for δὲ ἂν μὴ κακός ἦ: here again Plato substitutes the commoner idiom for the rarer and more poetic, with which we may compare Aristophanes Birds 694 γῆ δ' οὐδ' ἀήρ οὐδ' οὐρανός ἦν. It is however more likely that Simonides wrote δὲ ἂν ἦ κακός μήτ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, i.e. μήτε κακός μήτε κτλ., for this idiom is seldom found with μηδέ or οὐδέ: see Jebb on Sophocles Philoctetes 771. To take μηδέ for ἀλλὰ μὴ would give a wrong meaning, as can be seen from the paraphrase in 346 D ἀλλά μοι ἔξαρκεῖ ἂν ἦ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ. It seems better too, in this line, to take εἰδώς γ' ὀνησίπολιω δικαν ὕγιῆς ἀνὴρ (sc. ἐστίν) together, and print colons before εἰδώς and after ἀνὴρ. In line 4 οὐδὲ μὴ μιν is Bergk's restoration for μὴν of the MSS. The position assigned by Aars to οὐκ εἰμ' ἐγὼ φιλοβωμος (in line 2) is only tentative, but it is slightly supported by οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψογος coming before ἐμοίγ' ἔξαρκεῖ in 346 C. There is nothing in Plato to indicate that the first line (with part of the second) is wanting in Strophe 4, but neither is there anything to prove the reverse, and (since the poem is not in any case preserved entire, five verses being omitted in the first Strophe) it is much more reasonable to assume an omission here than violently to distort the sequence of the poem as quoted by Plato.

Whether the poem is to be ranked as an ᾠδὴ ἐπίνικος, an ἐγκώμιον, or a σκόλιον is a question which should not be raised until the poem has first been restored from the quotations in the Protagoras. If the restoration given above is even approximately correct, the poem cannot be classed as an epinikion: an encomium it is not likely to be, since no one is praised. There is no reason whatever for identifying it with the famous encomium referred to by Quintilian (XI 2. 11). Blass holds that the poem was a scolion, and this is by far the most probable view, but no certainty is attainable on the point. With the exception of the lacunae which we

have noted, the poem is most probably complete, for Socrates is trying to prove that Simonides attacks Pittacus throughout the *whole* poem: see 345 D οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὄλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι and 343 C, 344 B.

We add a translation of the poem, incorporating the few changes which we have made in Aars's restoration.

## STROPHE 1.

It is hard to quit you like a truly good man, in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without blame.

(The five lost *vv.* may have further elaborated the meaning of 'truly good').

## STROPHE 2.

Nor do I deem the word of Pittacus well said, wise though he was that spake it: 'it is hard,' he said 'to be noble.' To a god alone belongs that meed: a man cannot but prove evil, if hopeless calamity overthrow him. Every man if he has fared well is good, evil, if ill: and for the most part best are they whom the gods love.

## STROPHE 3.

Therefore never will I cast away my portion of life vainly upon a bootless hope, seeking what cannot come to be, an all-blameless man, of us who take the fruit of the broad earth: when I find him, look you, you shall hear. I praise and love all them that willingly do nothing base: against necessity even gods do not contend.

## STROPHE 4.

---[I love not fault-finding]: enough for me if one be not evil nor exceeding violent: yea sound is the man who knoweth justice, benefactress of cities: nor will I find fault with him: for the tribe of fools is infinite. Surely all is fair wherein is no alloy of foul.

---

The easy-going morality of the poem is in harmony with what we know both of the life and poetry of Simonides: he was ever 'a genial and courtly man,' anxious to make the most of life, "dwelling with flowers like the bee, seeking yellow honey" (Sim. *Frags.* 47).

## APPENDIX II.

### PROTAGORAS' LIFE AND WORKS.

WE give the life of Protagoras as recorded by Diogenes Laertius (IX 50—56) and add the fragments of his works, according (in the main) to Frei's arrangement<sup>1</sup>.

#### ΒΙΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΟΥ.

Πρωταγόρας Ἀρτέμωνος ἢ, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Δείνων ἐν Περσικοῖς, Μαιανδρίου, Ἀβδηρίτης, καθά φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός ἐν τοῖς περὶ νόμων, ὃς καὶ Θουρίοις νόμους γράψαι φησὶν αὐτόν· ὡς δ' Εὐπόλις ἐν Κόλαξι, Τήϊος· φησὶ γάρ,

Ἐνδον μὲν ἐστὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁ Τήϊος.

οὗτος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος λόγους ἀναγινώσκοντες ἠρανήζοντο· καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ φησὶ βαρύφωνον εἶναι τὸν Πρόδικον. διήκουσε δ' ὁ Πρωταγόρας Δημοκρίτου. ἐκαλεῖτό τε Σοφία, ὡς φησὶ Φαβωρίνος ἐν παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ. καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις· οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤρξατό που τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· Ἐπιάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπος· τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστὶ· τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἔλεγέ τε μηδὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις (καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ) καὶ πάντ' εἶναι ἀληθῆ. καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τοῦτον ἤρξατο τὸν τρόπον· Ἐπεὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἢ τ' ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὦν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐξεβλήθη πρὸς Ἀθηναίων· καὶ τὰ βιβλί' αὐτοῦ κατέκαυσαν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, ὑπὸ κήρυκι ἀναλεξάμενοι παρ' ἐκάστου τῶν κεκτημένων. οὗτος πρῶτος μισθὸν εἰσεπράξατο μῶς ἑκατόν· καὶ πρῶτος μέρη χρόνου διώρισε καὶ καιροῦ δύναμιν ἐξέθετο

<sup>1</sup> Quaestiones Protagoreae, p. 176 foll., where the references are fully given.

καὶ λόγων ἀγῶνας ἔθετο, καὶ σοφίσματα τοῖς πραγματολογοῦσι προσήγαγε· καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφελὺς πρὸς τοῦνομα διελέχθη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιπολάζον γένος τῶν ἐριστικῶν ἐγέννησεν· ἵνα καὶ Τίμων φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ,

Πρωταγόρης τ' ἐπίμικτος ἐριζέμεναι εὖ εἰδῶς.

οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε. καὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένης λόγον τὸν πειρώμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, οὗτος πρῶτος διείλεκται, καθὰ φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθύδημῳ. καὶ πρῶτος κατέδειξε τὰς πρὸς τὰς θέσεις ἐπιχειρήσεις, ὡς φησιν Ἀρτεμίδωρος ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἐν τῷ πρὸς Χρύσιππον. καὶ πρῶτος τὴν καλουμένην τύλην, ἐφ' ἧς τὰ φορτία βαστάζουσιν, εὔρεν, ὡς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ παιδείας· φορμοφόρος γὰρ ἦν, ὡς καὶ Ἐπίκουρός που φησὶ. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἤρθη<sup>1</sup> πρὸς Δημόκριτον, ξύλα δεδεκῶς ὀφθείς. διεἶλέ τε τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα· εὐχωλήν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν· οἱ δέ, εἰς ἑπτὰ· διήγησιν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν, ἀπαγγελίαν, εὐχωλήν, κλήσιν, οὐς καὶ πυθμένας εἶπε λόγων. Ἀλκιδάμας δὲ τέτταρας λόγους φησὶ· φάσιν, ἀπόφασιν, ἐρώτησιν, προσαγόρευσιν. πρῶτον δὲ τῶν λόγων ἑαυτοῦ ἀνέγνω τὸν περὶ θεῶν, οὗ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄνω παρεθέμεθα· ἀνέγνω δ' Ἀθήνησιν ἐν τῇ Εὐρυπίδου οἰκίᾳ ἧ, ὡς τινες, ἐν τῇ Μεγακλείδου· ἄλλοι δ' ἐν Λυκείῳ, μαθητοῦ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτῷ χρησαντος Ἀρχαγόρου τοῦ Θεοδότου. κατηγορήσε δ' αὐτοῦ Πυθόδωρος Πολυζήλου<sup>2</sup>, εἰς τῶν τετρακοσίων. Ἀριστοτέλης δ' Εὐαθλὸν φησιν.

ἔστι δὲ τὰ σωζόμενα αὐτοῦ βιβλία τάδε. Τέχνη ἐριστικῶν. Περὶ πάλης. Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων. Περὶ πολιτείας. Περὶ φιλοτιμίας. Περὶ ἀρετῶν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως. Περὶ τῶν ἐν ἄδου. Περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρασσομένων. Προστακτικὸς. Δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ. Ἀντιλογιῶν δύο. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν αὐτῷ τὰ βιβλία. γέγραφε δὲ καὶ Πλάτων εἰς αὐτὸν διάλογον.

φησὶ δὲ Φιλόχορος, πλέοντος αὐτοῦ ἐς Σικελίαν, τὴν ναῦν καταποντωθῆναι· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεσθαι Εὐρυπίδην ἐν τῷ Ἰξίονι. ἐνιοι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν τελευτήσῃαι αὐτὸν, βιώσαντα ἕτη πρὸς τὰ ἐνενηκόντα· Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ φησιν ἐβδομήκοντα, σοφιστεῦσαι δὲ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἀκμάζειν κατὰ τὴν τετάρτην καὶ ὀγδοηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα. ἔστι καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἡμῶν οὕτως ἔχον,

Καὶ σεῦ, Πρωταγόρη, φάτιν ἔκλυον, ὡς ἄρ' Ἀθημένω

Ἔκ ποτ' ἰὼν καθ' ὁδὸν πρέσβυς ἐὼν ἔθανες.

Ἐἴλετο γάρ σε φυγεῖν Κέκροπος πόλις· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν που

Ἰαλλάδος ἄστου φύγες, Πλουτέα δ' οὐκ ἔφυγες.

<sup>1</sup> (?) ἤχηθ.

<sup>2</sup> Fortasse scribendum Ἐπιζήλου: v. Arist. Pol. Ath. 29. 1.

λέγεται δὲ ποτ' αὐτὸν ἀπαιτοῦντα τὸν μισθὸν Εὐθαβλον τὸν μαθητὴν, ἐκείνου εἰπόντος, 'ἀλλ' οὐδέπω νίκην νενίκηκα,' εἰπεῖν, 'ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν νικήσω ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐνίκησα λαβεῖν με ἔδει· ἐὰν δὲ σύ, ὅτι σύ.'

γέγονε δὲ καὶ ἄλλος Πρωταγόρας, ἀστρολόγος, εἰς δὲ καὶ Εὐφορίων ἐπικήδειον ἔγραψε· καὶ τρίτος στωϊκὸς φιλόσοφος.

## FRAGMENTS.

## A. Physical.

1. πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος· τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι (from 'Ἀλήθεια ἢ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος s. Καταβάλλοντες: see Pl. Theaet. 152 A).

2. περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν· πολλὰ γάρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι· ἢ τε ἀθλητῆς καὶ βραχῦς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (from περὶ θεῶν ap. D. L. IX 51).

From Protagoras' περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰῶδος no fragments seem to survive.

## B. Ethical.

Of the περὶ ἀρετῶν there seem to be no fragments.

3. τῶν γὰρ υἱῶν νενηνίων ὄντων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν ὁκτῶ δὲ ταῖς πάσῃσι ἡμέρησι ἀποθανόντων νηπενθέως ἀνέτηλ. εὐδῆς γὰρ εἴχετο, ἐξ ἧς πολλὸν ὦνητο κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέρην εἰς εὐπομίην καὶ ἀνωδυνίην καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖσι δόξαν. πᾶς γὰρ τίς μιν ὄρων τὰ ἑωυτοῦ πένθηα ἐρρωμένως φέροντα μεγαλόφρονά τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἑωυτοῦ κρείσσω, κάρτα εἰδῶς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ ἐν τοιοῖσδε πράγμασι ἀμηχανίην<sup>1</sup> (from (?) περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρᾶσσομένων ap. Plut. Consol. ad Apoll. 33. 118 E—F. The subject is the fortitude of Pericles on hearing of the death of his two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus).

The περὶ φιλοτιμίας is known only from Diogenes' catalogue (IX 55).

## C. Political.

Of the περὶ πολιτείας nothing (so far as is known) survives.

4. ἦν γὰρ ποτε χρόνος—κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως (from (?) περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως ap. Pl. Prot. 320 C—322 D).

## D. Grammatical.

Of the περὶ ὀρθοεπειας (mentioned in Pl. Phaedr. 267 C) nothing remains.

<sup>1</sup> The Ionic is as it appears in Plutarch. Following the example of Frei, we have not written the other fragments in Ionic.

## E. Rhetorical.

5. (?) *δύο λόγοι εἰσι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικείμενοι ἀλλήλους* (from the *ἀντιλογιῶν δύο* ap. D. L. IX 51).

6. *τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν* (from the *τέχνη ἐριστικῶν* ap. Arist. Rhet. II 24, p. 1402 a 23).

The *δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ* (D. L. IX 55) and the “*rerum illustrium disputationes, quae nunc communes appellantur loci*” (Cic. Brut. 46) have apparently left no trace.

## F. Various.

7. *φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται, καὶ ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένουσ δέι μανθάνειν* (from the *μέγας λόγος*—probably identical with the *Προστακτικὸς*—: see Cramer Anecd. Paris. I p. 171).

8. [*Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε*] *μηδὲν εἶναι μῆτε τέχνην ἄνευ μελέτης μῆτε μελέτην ἄνευ τέχνης*<sup>1</sup> (perhaps from the same, ap. Stob. Flor. 29. 80).

Another fragment, probably from the same work, is quoted by J. Gildermeister and F. Bücheler from a Syriac translation of Plutarch's *περὶ ἀσκήσεως* [Rhein. Mus. vol. XXVII (1872) p. 526]. The original perhaps ran:

9. *οὐ βλαστάνει παιδεία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐὰν μὴ τις εἰς βυθὸν ἔλθῃ.*

Of the *περὶ μαθημάτων*, and the *περὶ τεχνῶν* (of which perhaps the *περὶ πάλης* was a part) nothing (so far as is certainly known) survives. Gomperz's ingenious and learned attempt<sup>2</sup> to prove that the ‘Defence of Medicine’ which under the title of *περὶ τέχνης* appears in the collection of Hippocratean works<sup>3</sup> was written by Protagoras and belongs to the treatise *περὶ τεχνῶν* has not, as yet, commended itself to critics<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Gomperz (cited in the next note), p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted from the *Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaft in Wien: Philosophisch-Historische Classe, Band cxx.*

<sup>3</sup> Littré, vi 1—27.

<sup>4</sup> See Wellmann in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, v p. 97 foll.



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