

**PHILIPPE HENRIOT:  
THE VOICE OF FRANCE/"THE FRENCH GOEBBELS"**

**1924-1944**

by

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PHILIPPE HENRIOT.  
*Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Information et à la Propagande*  
(6 janvier-28 juin 1944).

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Abstract/Résumé analytique  
PHILIPPE HENRIOT: THE VOICE OF FRANCE/"THE FRENCH GOEBBELS"  
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Philippe Henriot (7 January 1889 - 28 June 1944) was Vichy's Minister of Information and Propaganda in the final months before D-Day. His political career from 1924-1939 chronicles the uneasy peace of post-war France. As deputy from 1932-1940 during the Stavisky Affair, the Popular Front victory, the Spanish Civil War, Anschluss, Munich, Poland, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, his career chronicles the pre-war political climate. On the collapse of France in 1940, Henriot was a propagandist for Marshal Pétain's National Revolution. The German invasion of the Soviet Union converted him to the collaboration policies of Pierre Laval and Admiral Darlan against Britain, America, and the Soviet Union. His radio broadcasts from 1942-1944, directed against the BBC and the Voice of America, attempted to discredit Allied propaganda while seeking to persuade the French to volunteer for work in German factories for the defence of Europe. He called himself the "voice of France" while his radio adversaries, charging him with treason, called him "the French Goebbels." Along with Joseph Darnand and Marcel Déat, Henriot was one of Vichy's "ultras" who supported the aims of Nazi Germany. Like many traitors, he accused others of his own sin, and the Resistance condemned him to the same judgement he had passed against so many of his countrymen.

Philippe Henriot (7 janvier 1889 - 28 juin 1944) fut ministre de l'Information et de la propagande du régime de Vichy dans les ultimes mois avant la Libération de la France. Sa carrière politique à partir de 1932 laisse voir la malaise de l'après-guerre avec une paix plein d'incertitude. L'Affaire Stavisky et les événements de février 1934, la lutte d'Henriot contre le pacte Franco-Soviétique et le Front Populaire avec Jacques Doriot avait préparé son politique d'apaisement envers les dictateurs dans les crises diplomatiques de l'Ethiopie, de la Rhénanie, de la guerre civile en Espagne, l'Anschluss, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Pologne et le pacte nazi-soviétique. La débâcle en 1940, la défaite militaire de l'Armée française, avait signalé la chute de la Troisième République et la fondation de l'Etat Français sous la présidence du maréchal Philippe Pétain. Henriot fut un propagandiste militant pour Pierre Laval, l'Amiral Jean Darlan, et pour les synarchistes totalitaires de la Révolution Nationale. L'attaque brutale contre l'Union soviétique avait préparé l'adhésion d'Henriot à la politique de la collaboration et son rôle dans la guerre des ondes contre le BBC et La Voix d'Amérique. Lui-même s'appelait "la voix de la France," mais ses adversaires radiophoniques l'ont appelé un traître, "le Goebbels français." Le début du triumvirat milicien de Philippe Henriot, Joseph Darnand, et Marcel Déat a signalé la guerre civile de l'état totalitaire de Vichy, allié avec les Allemands, contre le maquis et la Résistance. La tache de trahison qu'il avait attribuée à ses ennemis fut aussi le jugement menant à leur condamnation et à l'exécution de Philippe Henriot.

PREFACE  
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## Introduction

The revolutionary tradition of 1789 and the counter-revolutionary battles throughout the nineteenth-century were the dialectic of liberal progress. As the aristocracy served as the "fencing master" to the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie served as the political "instructor" for the working class. Alexis de Tocqueville reflected that "the French Revolution, which abolished all privileges and destroyed exclusive rights, has let one survive, - that of property.... Soon, without any doubt, the struggle of the political parties will be between those who own and those who do not own. The great battlefield will be property." The red spectre haunted Europe. The French Revolution, by its excesses against throne and altar, the execution of the King, the confiscation of Church property, and the Jacobin Terror, united monarchists and Catholics. King, Pope, and Hangman was Joseph de Maistre's trinity of Divine retribution for men who, like Robespierre, would become God or His rival, Lucifer. The Satanic nature of the Revolution was traditional France's "Great Fear" - the other side of the barricades - which showed its colours in the White Terror of the Restoration, the June Days of 1848, and the Paris Commune of 1871. The Right that emerged in the nineteenth century's crises of war and revolution was another vision of France that awaited an opportunity to impose its will on the State. The seeds sown by the Catholic Right would reap a bitter harvest that poisoned the political atmosphere of the last decades of the Third Republic.

Stanley Hoffmann sees Republican France formed by revolutionary violence and

authoritarian resistance. The tricolour's spectrum alternated between the theocratic vision of Charles X, the social Caesarism of Napoleon III, and the utopian socialism of the Paris Commune. The Boulanger and Dreyfus Affairs challenged the Third Republic with monarchist, Bonapartist and Communist ideals. The *union sacrée* of 1914 uniting all political parties against the German invasion was unique in an otherwise bitter chronicle of political enmity. The Republican synthesis faltered with the Russian Revolution and a Pyrrhic peace. Stanley Hoffmann's "stalemate" society was a social and political gridlock that the Republic was unable to overcome. "Locarno's pale dawn" of peace was jeopardised by post-war "morts, milliards, mutilés" for both France and Europe. A nation in mourning for a million and a half of its war dead, confronting ruinous reparations, inflation, colonial wars of national independence, and a global economic collapse combined to create the malaise or decadence common to the vocabulary of French intellectual discourse.

Political propaganda dominated Europe between the wars. Propaganda operates by taking cultural myths and symbols and reworking them for political aims. The Paris Exposition of 1937 saw the Eiffel Tower flanked by the symbols which threatened war and revolution to a beleaguered Third Republic: the eagle atop the German pavilion confronted the heroic statue of Soviet workers holding aloft the hammer and sickle. The Nazi revolution appeared as the revenge of 1789, while the Communist revolution appeared to be its fulfilment. Goebbels predicted that 1789 would be wiped from history. The Comintern, the Communist Internationale, worked to foment world revolution. In

the last, uneasy summer of peace in 1939, France commemorated the tercentennial of the French Revolution flanked by the totalitarian ideologies that it had spawned.

Pascal Ory observed that, as an election was a political debate on power, commemoration was a cultural debate on memory. The commemoration of 1939 saw France divided by the revolutionary legacy. Jean Zay, Minister of Education, planned to celebrate the opening of the Estates-General, the National Assembly, Bastille Day, 14 July 1790, the military victory at Valmy on 20 September 1792, and the birth of the Republic on 21 September.<sup>1</sup> Georges Lefebvre's *Quatre-vingt-neuf* defended liberty, fraternity, and the Rights of Man. Jean Zay's *Ligue française de l'enseignement* emphasized the "moderate" revolution. The Girondin revolution took precedence over the Jacobin Terror of 1793 and Montesquieu's liberty and justice took precedence over Rousseau's general will.

The Communists refused to "retreat" from 1793 and adopted Jean-Paul Marat as the founder of the dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>2</sup> Gabriel Péri portrayed a Robespierre of peace who, like Stalin, attempted to eliminate the enemies of the revolution and unite the people in defence of the nation.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, *Gringoire* published accounts of

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<sup>1</sup>Pascal Ory, "La commémoration révolutionnaire en 1939" in *La France et les Français en 1938-1939*, René Rémond and Janine Bourdin, eds. (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978), 115-17.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 132-3.



massacres while *Je Suis Partout* recalled the Terror's suppression of the Vendée. The *Action française's* headline on 14 July proclaimed the fall of the Bastille as "the bloody event." Léon Daudet described the dynamic of 1789 as a "cancer," a "gangrene," and the revolutionary animal as a carnivorous beast.<sup>4</sup> A particularly corrosive parallel portrayed the Revolution as the precursor of modern totalitarianism.

Philippe Henriot's notion of true France denied its revolutionary heritage and its heroes, such as Robespierre and Marat, a collection of criminals, defrocked priests, and pseudo-philosophers. The follies of the Revolutionary Calendar and the cult of the Supreme Being in Catholic churches converted into Temples of Reason were matched by the atrocities of the September Massacres and the Vendée civil war. These were compared to contemporary revolutions in Russia and Spain. The taking of the Bastille, the first "victory of the street," was repeated with the "forest of fists" on Bastille Day 1936.<sup>5</sup>

Henriot's Robespierre was a combination of Caligula and Stalin: "A failed poet and a lawyer without a cause, he baptized his patriotism with cruelty, saving the nation with bloodshed, pitying not his victims but himself, an instrument of a fearful duty."<sup>6</sup> The cult of the Supreme Being was an atheistic masquerade, the Paschal candle renamed

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<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 124-5.

<sup>5</sup>Philippe Henriot, "De Quelques 14 Juillet," *Gringoire*, 4 May 1939, 7.

<sup>6</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Robespierre," *Gringoire*, 1 June 1939, 5.

the "Flame of Truth." Robespierre was declared "the Redeemer of mankind, the Messiah promised by the Gospels." Henriot defined Jacobinism as "a cult of hatred and horror" and Jacobin Clubs "a nest of vipers" -- the models for the modern Bolsheviks and its secret police.<sup>7</sup>

Danton, Robespierre, Desmoulins, Marat, Saint-Just, and General Dumouriez were Henriot's rogues' gallery of ambitious half-starved lawyers, dismissed lackeys, defrocked priests, pamphleteers, comedians without talent, and doctors without clients. In their wake the mediocre, the incompetent, and the idle rushed to grasp power. Behind the revolutionaries heroes were assassins, thieves, and patriotic *poseurs* who swept from the surface of the earth virtue, honour, courage, education, and talent."<sup>8</sup> The Civil War generals, maintained by the Commissars of the People, were the predecessors of the International Brigades, the *pistoleros* and *dinamiteros* of the Spanish Civil War. He spoke of revolutionary tribunals, staffed by magistrates who perverted justice by admitting the testimony of informers whose "civic" duty led them to denounce their parents and friends.<sup>9</sup> Henriot drew a vivid parallel between the deChristianization of France and the official atheism of the Soviet state.<sup>10</sup> The September Massacres of 1792 were compared

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<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Dans la galerie des grands ancêtres," *Gringoire*, 22 June 1939, 1.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

to Spain's June massacres in 1936.<sup>11</sup> Such was another of Henriot's prophetic ironies for the future where, in his words, "the bloody atrocities silenced indignation and even pity."<sup>12</sup>

Henriot's great fear that foreign war would herald revolution and civil war became more palpable in 1939. The revolutionary ceremonies were cancelled by the most aggressive ceremony of all, the outbreak of the Second World War. The debate on France's past and future continued in the midst of an ideological war of words as violent and deadly as any battle of the Second World War. All the measures Henriot condemned in the French Revolution were implemented under the Vichy State. The excesses he condemned in 1939 he would come to defend in 1944.

Henriot, as the Marshal's propagandist, endorsed collaboration and condemned Vichy's "official enemies" Communists, Jews, and Free-Masons. (See Appendix: Images of Vichy Propaganda). Henriot's nationalism amounted to what Eugen Weber described that to love France was to hate what she had become. Henriot placed his bet first on the Marshal and then on Germany. In his vision, Catholic France was beleaguered by atheistic Bolshevism and Anglo-American capitalism. Germany, the former enemy, became Vichy's ally. The logic of his loyalty was to regard the enemy of his enemies as his ally.

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<sup>11</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Ce lundi, 3 September 1792...", *Gringoire*, 29 June 1939, 5.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

Henriot's terrible and eloquent broadcasts as "the voice of France" demolished his opponents, personalizing the war of words, attracting ripostes from the BBC, the Voice of America, Radio-Moscow, Radio-Sottens, and Radio-Algiers until a commando raid by COMAC, the military wing of the French Resistance, led to his assassination. His state funeral at Notre Dame de Paris, presided over by Cardinal Suhard and attended by Vichy's and Nazi Germany's elite, also marked the end of Pétain's National Revolution and Hitler's New Order.

Born on 7 January 1889 at Reims into a Catholic, military family, the young Philippe Henriot was educated at Saint-Jean de Béthune, at Versailles, at Notre Dame de Cambrai and then at the *Institut Catholique de Paris*. A classical curriculum of Latin and the anti-Republican literature of Hippolyte Taine, Ernst Renan, Maurice Barrès, and Paul Bourget was influential. His parents separated, and he lived with his mother and his two brothers in Saint-Denis and then in Paris where he received his baccalaureate in 1905 at sixteen, and the *licence-ès-lettres classiques* two years later in 1907. He spent a year in England working at the Berlitz language school and developed a passion for English literature, especially George Meredith. He left England, having contracted pneumonia, and returned to Paris graduating from the Sorbonne with the *Diplôme d'Etudes supérieures* in classical languages in 1909.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>François Brigneau, *Le Jour où Ils Tuèrent Philippe Henriot*, (Paris: Publications FB, 1992), 24.

He became a teacher of rhetoric and English at the Collège de Sainte-Foy-la-Grande in Bordeaux and the Jesuit college at Tivoli, dedicated to moulding "minds and souls."<sup>14</sup> His first literary effort at 23 was *La Clairière aux Sources* (1912), poems which appeared in the *Revue du Temps Présent*, a Dominican journal. His youthful melancholy found solace in pantheistic poetry. "Pascal's Wager" in *Prière* (1911) speaks of the soul's torment of doubt consoled only by his faith, a sublime Truth that illuminated his steps.<sup>15</sup> Classical studies at the Sorbonne inspired *Rêverie devant un soir de Paris*. A notion of decadence infused his perception of Paris, the "Queen of the world," had decayed into the voluptuousness of a decadent Byzantium. "Le vice est dans le coeur, la vertu sur le front."<sup>16</sup>

Henriot found solace from the distracting vexations of Paris in "la douceur protectrice" of his pastoral retreats that imitated the romanticism of Chateaubriand.<sup>17</sup> *La douce France* for Philippe Henriot embraced the alpine valleys, mountains and forests threatened by fire, erosion, and deforestation.<sup>18</sup> The Luberon fire of 1929 devastated

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<sup>14</sup>"Testis," "Philippe Henriot," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 29 April 1932, p. 1 and AN F41 347 *Commissariat Nationale de l'Intérieur Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. CFLN Ref: ZAC/7/36703. "Un ancien répétiteur de troisième au Collège Tivoli de Bordeaux, tenu par les Jésuites, où il a lui-même fait ses études, pourvu d'un organe sonore, cuivré et tranchant."

<sup>15</sup>Philippe Henriot, *La Clairière aux Sources* poèmes (Paris: Editions du Temps Présent, 1912), 122-4. Henriot's earlier works were not available at Paris' *Bibliothèque Nationale*.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 7-15.

<sup>18</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le grande pitié des forêts de France," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 1 July 1929, 1.

2,800 hectares and inspired Henriot to prophesy the revenge of the forests for thousands of deforested hectares. Trees cut down for livestock pasturage left only weeds; where a forest once stood was unproductive "lande."<sup>19</sup> Henriot's other passion as a lepidopterist afforded him the pleasures of scientific research combined with moments of happiness and innocence. Politics, however, intruded even on these idyllic moments: "open air leisure of independence and freedom, where far from men and their civilisation, one rediscovers nature without an incompetent ministry intruding between the eye of a lover and the wing of a butterfly."<sup>20</sup> Henriot reminded ministers preoccupied with retaining their seats that conservation played a role in preserving France's cultural heritage.

Paul Bourget, a Catholic convert and one of Henriot's intellectual mentors, represented the Catholic reply to an atheistic and materialist *belle époque*. Bourget's *L'Étape* (1902) condemned scientific evolution in a veiled attack on the Republic's "absurd dogma of equality."<sup>21</sup> Catholic socialism confused the spiritual and the material; efforts to bridge the gap between the Church and the Workers were unnatural 'ralliements'. *L'Étape's* abbé Chanut was criticised for supporting the worker's struggle as a debasement of his spiritual task while failing to ameliorate the social conditions of

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<sup>19</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La vengeance de l'arbre" *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 30 April 1930, 1.

<sup>20</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Un monde ignoré: les papillons" *Gringoire*, 24 June 1938, 12. "Notre vie difficile et troublée a plus que jamais besoin d'images sereines."

<sup>21</sup>Richard Griffiths, *The Reactionary Revolution: The Catholic Revival in French Literature, 1870-1914*, (London: Constable, 1966), 275. "La folie de l'égalité, meurtrière à la vie, sous toute ses formes, principe d'abaissement universel dans les moeurs, de dégradation dans les intelligences, et, tôt ou tard, de sanglant désordre dans les actes."

the workers.<sup>22</sup> Bourget warned of the dangers of the Positivist "morality of reason." In *le Disciple* (1889) Adrien Sixte, a modern philosopher, sees the results of his pedagogy bear fruit in one of his students, Robert Greslov. Greslov's cold-blooded seduction of a young woman was motivated by his desire to observe her psychological reactions dispassionately was reminiscent of Laclos' *Liasions Dangereuses*. Bourget attributed the young woman's suicide not only to Sixte's immorality, but to the positivist educational curriculum which created him, i.e., Jules Ferry's republican anti-clericalism. Positivism's political morality of material progress and scientific rationalism challenged Catholic 'spiritual' education.<sup>23</sup> Henriot's *Analyse* (1908), inspired by Bourget's *le Disciple*, referred to the refined cruelty of one who analyzes his own torment to gain strength. "Devoid of emotion, the disciple ignored the agony of his heart."<sup>24</sup>

Social Catholicism, or Christian democracy, were also Bourget's themes. Albert de Mun's Catholic workers circles and Marc Sangnier's *Sillon* looked to a political reconciliation of Christianity and Socialism. Catholic social democrats expressed a mistrust of democracy and progress. This was due, in part, to Bourget's conviction that revolutionary maxims had created the class struggle and divided the nation. Catholics looked to a pre-revolutionary age of hierarchy and mutual trust between classes that

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<sup>22</sup>Paul Bourget, *L'Etape*, cited in Richard Griffiths, *op. cit.*, 276. "L'entière inutilité de ces rapports factices entre travailleurs de l'esprit et travailleurs manuels, où ceux-là ne font que s'abaisser, sans élever ceux-ci."

<sup>23</sup>Griffiths, *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>24</sup>*La Clairière aux Sources*, *op. cit.*, 45-6.

characterized preindustrial France. Avarice had displaced moral and social duties. Conservative Catholics looked back to a golden age of mutual trust between the classes, founded in order and discipline.<sup>25</sup> The Third Force to bridge Catholicism and Socialism was destroyed by the Dreyfus Affair and by the subsequent divorce between Rome and the Republic.

After Sedan, the Army was regarded by conservatives as the bastion of France. The Dreyfus Affair raised the rival claims of the national collective and individual rights, pitting monarchists and Catholics who saw Captain Albert Dreyfus as the alien Jew against Republicans who defended the rights of man. Dreyfus' acquittal led to a Republican offensive culminating in the disestablishment of the Church. The law of Separation of 3 July 1905, drafted by Aristide Briand and approved by Jean Jaurès in *l'Humanité*, was adopted by 341 deputies against the Catholic Right's 233 deputies.<sup>26</sup> With the separation of Church and State and the dissolution of Catholic teaching orders, the Republican schoolmaster replaced the curé. Between 1910 and 1914, Henriot also joined Action Catholique. Already his Catholicism and military background predisposed him to an antipathy towards the Republic.

While the masonic lodges waged war on Catholicism and Germany rearmed,

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<sup>25</sup>See Benjamin F. Martin, *Count Albert de Mun: Paladin of the Third Republic*, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).

<sup>26</sup>Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeline Reberioux (trans. J.R. Foster), *The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914*, (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 227-230.



Henriot fell in love and married the sister of one of his students, the daughter of a solicitor in Libourne. They were married on 23 July 1914. War broke out a week later. His only military service throughout the Great War was in the reserve, "one of those securing the rear."<sup>27</sup> Henriot's marriage in 1914 appeared to many of his parliamentary adversaries as an attempt to escape conscription. In his defence against accusations of cowardice, he cited his medical and professional exemptions, the former for pleurisy and the latter as a school teacher. Responding to accusations of desertion in 1939, he protested that the charges sullied his family's tradition, one uncle served as an officer of the sixty-seventh infantry regiment and was killed at Eparges on 9 March 1915. A brother, a naval ensign and chevalier of the Legion of Honour, died when his destroyer was sunk by a German submarine in the Mediterranean.<sup>28</sup> Despite his protests, Henriot was never able to silence the whisper campaign that branded him as "le soldat inconnu" - the unknown soldier. The accusation weighed heavily upon him and later he refused to speak of it.

The war was Henriot's obsession. His articles published in *Etudes* on Ludendorff, the German annexation policy of the Baltic States, were followed by three short novels. *Trois Prêtres Soldats Tués par l'Ennemi* and *Lettres d'Henri Volatier, Chasseur au 5e*

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<sup>27</sup>Jacques Parrot, *La Guerre des Ondes: De Goebbels à Kadhafi* (Paris: Plon, 1987), 115. Parrot contradicts this and claims that Henriot was a conscientious objector who not only refused to bear arms but also refused to enlist in the reserve.

<sup>28</sup>*Journal officiel*, First session, Tuesday 14 March 1939, 930.

*Bataillon Alpin, à sa Fiancée*,<sup>29</sup> and *La Prison du Silence* (1920). All drew upon his conservative Catholic and military background. The son of a *Chef de Bataillon* (Major), the nephew of Brigadier-General Alfred N. Duffié who fought in the American Civil War, and with two elder brothers also officers, Henriot described a dutiful son who rebelled against the "noble servitude" of the "cult of the army."<sup>30</sup> In a pastiche of the Dreyfus Affaire, Henriot's hero, François, discovers that his father, a General in the French Army, has sold military secrets to pay off his gambling debts. This is an allusion to Colonel Ferdinand Esterhazy's penchant for gambling, which inspired his treason and precipitated the arrest of Captain Dreyfus. The stolen general staff documents, discovered in the father's strong-box, inspire François to confess to his father's theft. The novel describes France's ill-preparedness as the war drew nearer. Henriot wrote of the Republic's "criminal blindness" which ignored the Kaiser's sabre-rattling: "We were totally unprepared. The blind leading the blind believing that denial was enough to dispel a threat - a policy of ostriches." Democratic Republicanism had weakened France: "We had raised the people in the hatred of authority, in the mistrust of superior leadership. We disrupted our ranks by sacrificing our best elements to base and petty grudges."<sup>31</sup> The denouement of *La Prison du Silence* sees François heading for the front as his beloved weeps, knowing he will never return -- one of almost two million of France's

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<sup>29</sup>Brigneau, *op. cit.*, 25.

<sup>30</sup>Philippe Henriot, *La Prison du Silence* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1920), 5. "seul, n'a pu sacrifier les exigences d'un esprit indépendant à la noble servitude militaire."

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 44.

'lost generation'.

Henriot's sojourn in England may have included a stay in Scotland. In any case, Shakespeare's *Macbeth* served as a theme for his novel, *la Tunique de Nessus* (1927). In the novel, Henriot portrayed a failed author, one Albéric Hermaux, who claimed the work of a dead friend as his own.<sup>32</sup> Henriot compared Hermaux's plagiarism to Macbeth's usurped crown. The fatal flaw of unscrupulous ambition cursed those who pursued it. The mantle of power became a tunic of Nessus, destroying those who wore it. The second novel was his last foray into literature. Henriot's marriage provided him with an estate at Eynesse as a wine-grower, making him a man of means -- a "français moyen." This enabled him to devote his efforts first to journalism, where his political articles led him to the political arena.

By 1938 Henriot's political oratory had earned him the esteem of his allies and the censure of his enemies. Other insights can be gleaned from Henriot's vignettes published as *Les Miettes du Banquet* (1938). His "banquet crumbs" reveal a barbed political wit contemptuous of republican democracy. Politics was the art of governing men while making them believe that they governed themselves. He bemoaned the aristocracy of intelligence overwhelmed by universal suffrage.<sup>33</sup> The scandalous traffic in awarding the Legion of Honour to political allies elicited this observation: "The worst

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<sup>32</sup>Philippe Henriot, *La Tunique de Nessus*, (Paris: Editions Spes, 1927), 60.

<sup>33</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Les Miettes du Banquet*, (Paris: Editions "Alsatia", 1938), 7.

insult to courage is to give the same recognition to administrative docility as to military heroism."<sup>34</sup> Political *arrivistes* had supplanted the aristocracy; "those who renounced the attainment of liberty consoled themselves with taking liberties. The plural was more accessible than the singular."<sup>35</sup> Henriot's frustration with the republican stalemate of the thirties is evident in his maxims that "democracy appointed to the highest offices those who were least prepared;"<sup>36</sup> and "the decay of leadership is the principal justification for the rebellion of the masses."<sup>37</sup> In contrast to his attacks against the Republic, Henriot admired the personal dictatorships of Mussolini and Franco. In his eyes, authority was less the art of commanding than the art of being obeyed, a question of character rather than one of title. Henriot spoke of the fashion of condemning authoritarian governments while scorning governments which lacked authority.<sup>38</sup>

The Catholic-classical education of Philippe Henriot combined with his family's military background bred a deep antipathy to the Third Republic in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair. The Radical offensive against clerical education resumed its campaign against "Catholic obscurantism and mysticism." Recruited to defend Catholicism, Henriot would become an implacable enemy of the Radicals and Socialists. Henriot's political

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<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 56-57.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 18-19.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 21-22.

indoctrination into French Catholic nationalism began with the *Action Catholique de la Jeunesse française* and the *Légion de la Patrie* that combined Edouard Drumont's *Boulangism*, Charles Maurras' royalism, and Maurice Barrès' cult of the dead. His enemies were the "occult forces" of the Masonic international and militant anti-clerical and Dreyfusard Republicans who threatened the Christian cement of the traditional notion of France. Drumont, Barrès, and Maurras developed the political myths that became the maxims of "true France" against "anti-France."<sup>39</sup> De Mun's and Sangnier's social Catholicism was a weak element in an otherwise true French national-socialism.

Charles Maurras' "divine surprise," the defeat of France by Germany in 1940, was for many a "divine" opportunity. Busts of Marianne in *mairies* were replaced with the image of a paternalistic Marshal Pétain; the Republic's *liberté, égalité, fraternité* was supplanted with Vichy's *travail, famille, patrie*. Henriot spoke of a "moral" National Revolution that embodied authoritarian discipline, obedience, and tradition in the figure of Marshal Pétain and the new *État français*. Marshal Pétain's National Revolution emulated the virtues of true France against anti-France and exacted its revenge upon the Republic. While the National Revolution looked to a new social order in France, the Vichy State pursued, with Pierre Laval, a policy of collaboration with Nazism, sharing its vision of the New Order in Europe. Jules Roy saw Pétain as "Philip IV" whose legitimacy was challenged by General Charles de Gaulle, "Charles IV." De Gaulle -- the

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<sup>39</sup>Pierre Birnbaum, *"La France aux Français": Histoire des Haines Nationalistes*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993), 36.

self-styled "man of destiny" -- repudiated Pétain's vision of a defeated France, calling for resistance against the German Occupation and a Free France. In a reprise of the classical and Shakespearean tragedies, Henriot's appointment as Minister of Information and Propaganda would become his fatal tunic of Nessus. Henriot's forests served as the birthplace of the maquis that repudiated Vichy's claims of legitimacy. Birnam Wood would rise and march against Pétain's and Henriot's Dunsinane.

The voice of a Catholic deputy in the Republic, Henriot became the voice of the Vichy State against the Republic. His skills were placed at the service of the Marshal and his ministers, both Darlan and Laval, to first persuade and later coerce his audience by exploiting their collective fears. The old hatreds dating from the Commune, the Dreyfus Affair, and the Popular Front ensured that with the 'fog of war' permitted the Vichy government to settle accounts with its 'official enemies'.

Henriot's Radio-Vichy editorials attracted the attention of friend and foe alike forcing Free France and the Resistance to reply through the BBC, Voice of America and Radio Moscow. Henriot was a victim of the divisions in France which he had helped to create. He debates exploited fears collective fears in his radio propaganda seeking to convince many Catholics and *attentistes* that a German defeat would mean a Russian victory. The irony that Henriot's patriotism was regarded as treason while his anti-communism added to the larger debate of the Cold War between Radio Free Europe and Radio-Moscow. His revenge was taken against those who were deemed 'anti-France'.

Charles Maurras' cry at his trial, "C'est la revanche de Dreyfus" was belied by the fact that before Dreyfus' revenge, the other vision of France had exacted a revenge of its own.

## Chapter 1: Political Apprenticeship, 1924-1928

"Quant à moi, je ne vois pas dans la religion le mystère de l'Incarnation, mais le mystère de l'ordre social." Napoleon I

"Morts, mutilés, milliards" was the legacy of the battle of Verdun's price of glory. One and a half million dead, four million maimed and four hundred billion francs in war loans was the ruinous accounting of victory. The Versailles Peace denied France the "German budget" for reconstruction while poisoning relations between the Allies and Germany. The Blue Horizon Chamber of 1919 faced a Europe transformed by war and revolution. The fear of a resurgent Germany and the Weimar Government's reparations default created a hard-line policy which endorsed Premier Poincaré's Ruhr Occupation in 1923. French Radicals and Socialists condemned "Poincaruhrism" and offered instead the League of Nations. A United Nations of Europe was Aristide Briand's vision of the future of Europe embodied in the Locarno settlement. Philippe Henriot was one of the voices raised criticizing the Cartel's domestic and foreign policy. Edouard Herriot's anticlerical education policy both within France and in the regained provinces of Alsace-Lorraine alienated both Alsatian and French Catholics. Herriot's Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand's "spirit of Locarno" was criticized for ignoring the realities of power politics. Henriot came to personify the hard-liners, who rejected disarmament and reparations' reduction, and warned of a resurgent and vengeful Germany. Their opponents opted for the promise of a new world of open treaties, reduced reparations, and disarmament. The Young Plan, the Dawes Plan, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact



outlawing war represented the illusory hopes of a world that could not entertain the possibility of another catastrophic war.

Almost every family in France was in mourning. "The élite of her youth," as Clemenceau put it, "was at rest in a shroud of glory."<sup>1</sup> 1,390,000 men were dead or missing. Among the survivors were another 740,000 *mutilés de la guerre*. The nation's ability to regenerate a lost generation was severely impaired; in 1915 alone it was estimated that 1,600,000 potential births were lost. Apart from the human tragedy was the gargantuan task of physical reconstruction. A treaty stipulation was that Germany pay full compensation for the damages incurred by the war. Reparations were regarded as a sacred right. However, Britain and America, France's wartime allies, were also the creditors of French war-loans. Reparations would bedevil international politics throughout the decade.<sup>2</sup>

The growing animosity between the Cartel and the Bloc National continued to plague France's domestic recovery and post-war security. The war had rallied all to the *union sacrée*. The "Chambre bleu horizon" had done much to bury the hatchet between the partisans of Church, Army, and Republic that had poisoned French pre-war politics. The canonization of Joan of Arc in 1920 was an olive branch offered by the Papacy to

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<sup>1</sup>J.P.T. Bury, *France: The Insecure Peace; from Versailles to the Great Depression* (London: Macdonald, 1972), 23.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 25.

the French Republic. In 1921 diplomatic relations with the Papacy, severed since 1905, were restored. Many religious orders were allowed to resume teaching. Catholics hoped that the Republic would subsidize Catholic schools according to the *répartition scolaire proportionnelle*, based on enrolment in either public or private schools. While the German question monopolized the attention of the Right, the social question preoccupied the Left. Republican anticlericalism, dormant during the *union sacrée*, was resurrected with the 1924 election of the Cartel des Gauches, a Radical-Socialist coalition led by Edouard Herriot and Léon Blum. Catholic schools and religious teaching orders were banned by the law of 7 July 1904; Emile Combes' "republican vigilance" was complete with the separation of Church and State on 9 December 1905. "Republicanizing" France through administrators and teachers was the Cartel's attempt to fulfil Jean Jaurès' battle against the "last idols" and the triumph of "emancipated reason."<sup>3</sup> The Cartel's reply to the canonization of Joan of Arc in 1920 was the "canonization" of Jean Jaurès, transferring his ashes to the Panthéon in 1924.

Radicals and the Socialists included equality of educational opportunity as part of their electoral platform. Edouard Herriot, President of the Radical Party and Cartel premier, reaffirmed the anti-clerical policy of his government, declaring in June 1924 that French democracy would not be safe "so long as access to secondary education was

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<sup>3</sup>Jean-Marie Mayeur & Madeline Reberiou, *The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914*, (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 230-232.

determined by the wealth of the parents and not... by the merit of the children."<sup>4</sup> The renewed Cartelist offensive attempted to uproot what it regarded as the seed-bed of reaction emanating from France's Catholic schools. Herriot's inaugural address outlined a policy of reestablishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union while severing diplomatic relations with the Vatican; an amnesty for deserters and defeatists (including André Marty, responsible for leading the mutiny in the Black Sea); and the dissolution of unauthorized religious orders and the enforcement of republican laws on Catholic teaching schools throughout France and Alsace-Lorraine. Catholic reaction was immediate. Dom Moreau founded the *Ligue des religieux combattants* (DRAC), whose slogans mobilized opinion with, "Equal as at the Front."<sup>5</sup> Catholic interests were represented by the *Liste de concorde nationale et d'action républicaine clemenciste* sponsored, among others, by Georges Mandel, Clemenceau's wartime Minister of the Interior. Many Catholics found it difficult to accept a Jew as the leader of their party. Shortly before the election, however, Philippe Henriot defended the 'French Disraeli', praising Mandel's courage, will power, and ability to dominate an assembly.<sup>6</sup>

Henriot's political apprenticeship began in Bordeaux with the 1924 victory of the *Cartel des Gauches*. Although the alliance was short-lived, their secular education

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<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>François Brigneau, *Le Jour où Ils Tuèrent Philippe Henriot*, (Paris: Publications FB, 1992), 26.

<sup>6</sup>John M. Sherwood, *Georges Mandel and the Third Republic* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), 89-90.

policies - *laïcité* - aggravated old grievances dormant since the Dreyfus Affair. Henriot reminisced in 1944 that politics was not a profession he had entertained. His devotion to teaching and his twin passions for literature and the natural sciences appeared to him an unlikely combination for a parliamentarian. A teacher at the Jesuit Collège Tivoli in Bordeaux, Henriot was recruited to assist abbé Daniel Bergey's election. His oratorical skills were soon recognized. In a debate at Bressuire, Henriot challenged François Albert, the Cartel Minister of Education, who instructed civil servants to remove their children from Catholic schools. In a debate with Bergey's young lieutenant, Steeg was convinced that Henriot had rigged the audience (*fait la salle*). Henriot recalled: "a fond memory of a period of my life where I saw what devotion, disinterestedness, and passionate faith in a cause can attain."<sup>7</sup> One of the Catholic voices against the persecutors of the Church, Henriot's eloquence earned him recognition, and his political apprenticeship prepared him for future battles.

Abbé Bergey was Henriot's Peter the Hermit in the Catholic crusade.<sup>8</sup> As an independent deputy, Bergey took his place with other independents in the Chamber as one of *les sauvages*, and found his spokesman in Louis Marin and General Noël Marie Joseph Édouard, Vicomte de Currières de Castlenau. Through Bergey, Henriot was

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<sup>7</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Souvenirs d'un Militant," *Combats*, 29 January 1944, 1. Abbé Daniel Bergey, former chaplain in the Eighteenth Infantry Regiment, priest and deputy for Saint-Emilion, was Vice-President of the *Fédération Nationale Catholique*, and director of *Soutanes de France*.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

introduced to the leading figures of the Right -- Premier Raymond Poincaré, Republican Federation President Louis Marin, General de Castlenau, head of *la Ligue de la Patrie* and Pierre Taittinger, leader of *Jeunesses Patriotes*.

Louis Marin (1871-1960), professor of ethnography, was a "Republican moderate who was not moderately republican."<sup>9</sup> Marin lectured at the *Ecole d'Anthropologie*, founded in 1876 to advance the study of ethnography, social geography and national psychology. His *Le Triomphe du Vice: Etude Réaliste et Sociale* (1905) argued that France's peasantry was the source of "rural democracy." Rural cooperatives and associations had developed through tradition, not revolution. Traditional family values and the Catholicism of rural France resisted the encroachments of the Republic.<sup>10</sup> Catholics of the Action Française and secular coreligionists such as Maurice Barrès looked to the countryside as the political arena to defend their idea of France: true France was a nation made up of many regional cultures but only one national one; it was

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<sup>9</sup>Benoit Yvert, *Dictionnaire des Ministres 1789-1989*, Paris: Perrin, 1990, 536.

<sup>10</sup>Herman Lebovics, *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity 1900-1945*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), 20-1. In 1903 Marin joined the *Progressistes*, whose members included Jules Méline and Raymond Poincaré. When the incumbent for Nancy died two years later (1905), Marin stood for election. Méline's *Progressistes* were reformed as the *Groupe de l'Entente Démocratique* in 1914 and later in 1924 became *l'Union Républicaine Démocratique*. Marin, as president of the party in 1925, adopted the title of *la Fédération Républicaine*. Invited by Poincaré to serve as minister of the liberated regions in 1920, Marin's party held the balance of power, defeating successive middle-of-the-road governments until late July 1926 when he agreed to take the portfolio for pensions, holding it until 1928 in Poincaré's *Bloc National* ministry. 143.

a nation in which everyone had two *patries*, each commanding a different kind of loyalty.<sup>11</sup> Marin's nick-name was "Deputy Revanche" and he had no love for the Germans. His political education began with the Franco-Prussian War when his home province was annexed by the Treaty of Frankfurt of 1871. As students in Nancy, both Marin and Maurice Barrès supported General Georges Boulanger.<sup>12</sup> Marin demanded the extensive military reinforcement of the eastern frontier while refusing any Franco-German *rapprochement*. For Marin, French pacifists were traitors. Abbé Bergey applauded Marin's address to the Chamber in which he recounted France's sacrifice to the Allied cause and condemned Allied reparations reductions for Germany. He seconded Marin's motion that France's war debt to America was paid in the sacrifice of one and a half million dead.<sup>13</sup> The issue of war and peace rested on the decision whether to implement the punitive articles of the Treaty of Versailles or the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Ruhr adventure had resulted in disaster. It remained to seek peace through collective security.

"We have won the war, we must win the peace" was Clemenceau's injunction to the Allies. American President Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination ignored the complex realities of the post-war world. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, mistrustful of French military hegemony, sought a speedy

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<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.* 18-19, 37.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>D.-M. Bergey, "Bravo Marin!" *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 1 Feb. 1925, 1.

European, including a German, economic recovery. He hoped to reestablish the balance of power without committing Britain to continental guarantees. Clemenceau's demand for the Saar's rich coal deposits and Marshal Foch's demand for military security called for the permanent military occupation of the Rhineland and annexation of the left bank of the Rhine. Wilson and Lloyd George refused, promising instead an American-British alliance with France, contingent on a ratification by the American Congress that never materialized.<sup>14</sup>

France was supreme on a continent transformed by war and revolution. The Europe of 1914 was gone. Germany, Austria, and Russia had all suffered defeat and revolution. The dismembered Hapsburg and Romanov Empires dissolved into their national elements of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania under the mandate of Wilson's policy of national self-determination. Russia was racked by civil war. Britain and America retreated from their continental commitments after a desultory effort to stem the Bolshevik domination of Russia, remaining content to create a *cordon sanitaire* to contain further Communist incursions into Western Europe. Clemenceau, *Père la Victoire*, was branded *perd la victoire*. Britain's and America's failure to renew their military and political commitments to France led both Marshal Foch and Winston Churchill to declare ominously that the peace was no more than a twenty-year armistice.

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<sup>14</sup>Bury, *op. cit.*, 29-30.

Aristide Briand, President Millerand's successor, remarked of the Versailles Peace Settlement that, "It is a faultless treaty. Like the legendary mare, it possesses every virtue but one: it hasn't the breath of life in it."<sup>15</sup> Germany, racked by inflation, was unable to fulfil her reparations payments while pursuing a policy which Lloyd George characterized as "evasion, procrastination, and delay." French post-war reconstruction was based on the "German budget" which relied on reparation payments. When in 1920 the United States refused to forgive Britain's and France's war debt, they in turn refused to countenance a moratorium on German reparations. Briand's conciliation efforts were replaced by Poincaré's hard-line policy. Excluding dissenting Communists and Socialists, Poincaré received the Chamber's support and ordered the occupation of the Ruhr. On 11 January 1923, French and Belgian troops crossed the Rhine and Germany's economy rapidly collapsed under the twin burdens of occupation and galloping inflation. In September 1923, a new cabinet led by Gustav Stresemann agreed to resume reparation payments. But Poincaré's victory was only partial. American pressure as well as occupation costs convinced him to withdraw. His critics, Foch and Millerand, branded the withdrawal a capitulation; an opportunity to negotiate a direct agreement with Germany from a position of strength, independent of France's critical or hostile allies, was lost. Poincaré's left-wing critics branded him *Poincaré la guerre* and *Poincaruhr* who threatened to lead France into another war.<sup>16</sup> The Radical desertion of the National Bloc for the Socialists undermined Poincaré's majority, ensuring the victory of the

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<sup>15</sup>Bury, *op. cit.*, 55.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 71.



Cartel. One of its first acts was to end the Ruhr occupation and accept the American-sponsored Dawes Plan reducing reparations.

Bergey's and Marin's efforts to defend Catholic prerogatives were united in the *Fédération Nationale Catholique* sponsored by Noël Marie Joseph Édouard, Vicomte de Currières de Castelnau (1851-1944). De Castelnau, "the booted Capuchin" to his detractors, was a soldier of France and the Faith to Henriot. He had lost three sons to the war. One of the great military leaders of Verdun, Chief of the General Staff and Army Group commander in Artois and Champagne, de Castelnau was passed over for a Marshalate because of his reactionary political views. De Castelnau, Maurice Barrès successor as President of the *Ligue des Patriotes*, served as the animator for radical nationalists, including Antoine Rédier's *Légion* and its successor, Pierre Taittinger's *Jeunesses Patriotes*. De Castelnau defended Catholic rights, founding the *Ligue de la Défense Catholique* and the *Fédération Nationale Catholique*.<sup>17</sup> He branded the Cartel ministry "a masonic dictatorship," and opposed the agreement reached by Premier Edouard Herriot and Prime-Minister Ramsay MacDonald for the evacuation of the Rhineland. He regarded the League of Nations as a handful of German Social Democrats and English pacifists. The disarmament programs sponsored a chimera of peace that failed to check a resurgent and impenitent Germany. After six months in power the Cartel had abetted the German peril by reducing reparations while condoning the

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<sup>17</sup>Robert Soucy, *French Fascism: The First Wave 1924-1933* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1986), 27.

Bolshevik peril by recognizing the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup> General de Castelnau was defeated in the 1924 Aveyron elections by the pacifist Emile Borel who branded his adversary as a war-monger who sought to avenge the loss of his sons. Herriot attributed de Castelnau's defeat to public ingratitude and the whims of universal suffrage.<sup>19</sup> The whims of universal suffrage were turning from the national issue that dominated the immediate post-war to the social issue that divided France and undermined further the *union sacrée*.

Edouard Herriot, France's Premier throughout the Twenties, was the son of an officer promoted from the ranks and nephew of a *curé de campagne*. Mayor of Lyon in 1905, senator for the Rhône in 1912 and Minister of Transport and Supply in the Briand cabinet in 1916-1917, he was elected President of the Radical-Socialist party in 1919. One of the engineers of the *Cartel des Gauches*, he became President of the Council with Socialist support. Frequent appearances at masonic functions earned him the label as a masonic agent.<sup>20</sup> The Cartel's victory of 11 May 1924 inspired him to launch an attack

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<sup>18</sup>General de Castelnau, "Six mois de Dictature Maçonnique," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 5 January 1925, 1.

<sup>19</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Un soldat de la France et de la Foi," *Editoriaux* 6, 19 March 1944, 22-23.

<sup>20</sup>Henry Coston, *Partis, Journaux et Hommes Politiques d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, (Rennes: Librairie Française, 1960), 532-3. Although he never joined the Masonic lodges, Herriot did not hide his sympathy for the Free-Masons, accepting the honorary presidency of the *Ligue d'Action et de Défense Laïque* founded by the Lodge *L'Effort* on 30 November 1922. Herriot's membership in the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, the *Ligue de l'Enseignement*, and the *Ligue Internationale contre l'Antisémitisme* was seen by his adversaries as proof of his collusion with free-masonry.

on Catholic education. General de Castelnau appealed to the defence of religious liberties against the materialist secularism (*laïcisme matérialiste*) of a masonic conspiracy. The *Fédération Nationale Catholique* united thousands to resist the Cartel, with mass demonstrations throughout the autumn and winter of 1924-1925.<sup>21</sup> Abbé Bergey spoke for his parish and his electors, lamenting the revival of the old divisions dormant since the Dreyfus Affair. Bergey appealed to the lost *union sacrée* undermined by the Cartel's secularism. Catholicism recognized one France, while revolutionary parties saw France in terms of the class struggle.<sup>22</sup> Henriot argued that French Catholics were republicans too, who opposed the government's official atheism. Secularism was the philosophy of the lodges, not the Republic.<sup>23</sup> Henriot's political vocabulary revealed that he was beginning to discover the power of words.

In March 1925, Abbé Bergey announced the formation of the *Union Populaire Républicaine de la Gironde* affiliated with Louis Marin's Republican Federation. The Catholic answer to the persecution of the Cartel des Gauches was the "Cartel populaire" of Liberty, Order, Justice, and Peace.<sup>24</sup> France's archbishops and cardinals joined the opposition to the Cartel's *laïc* laws, condemning them as atheistic and detrimental to the social, political, and national order. *La Croix* stated that the militant anti-Catholic

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<sup>21</sup>Bury, *op. cit.*, 82.

<sup>22</sup>D.-M. Bergey, "Débroussillons," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 8 January 1925, 1.

<sup>23</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Vocabulaire," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 17 February 1925, 1.

<sup>24</sup>D.-M. Bergey, "La Moisson qui lève," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 10 March 1925, 1.

legislation threatened France's temporal and spiritual interests. Demonstrations, petitions, and the intervention of extra-parliamentary leagues were encouraged by the Catholic hierarchy.<sup>25</sup> The Catholic offensive was not without humour as Henriot ridiculed the self-righteous oratory that accompanied Cartel banquets, where the menu was often more important than the speeches. The restaurateur had assumed an increased importance in the Republican institutional framework: "a monument, an amnesty, a commemoration, a protest are all occasions for a banquet.... where orators define the role of the Republic, stigmatize the Reaction, comparing the scorned Bloc National with the progressive Cartel. These orators, napkin in hand and full glasses, launch their tirades, hearten future humanity and liberate the people from clerical prejudice with allocutions which combine the temporal and spiritual that M. Herriot thought were separated forever.... It is a sad régime whose clientele is based on the stomach!"<sup>26</sup>

The French Army fell under the suspicion of the Cartel's "republican vigilance" and Maurice Monnier of *l'Ere Nouvelle* suggested that the General Staff comprise reliable republican officers. Another "Affaire des Fiches" reopened old wounds from the Dreyfus Affair.<sup>27</sup> Henriot retaliated charging that the Jesuit influence within the General Staff

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<sup>25</sup>"La Déclaration des Archevêques et Cardinaux de France sur les lois de laïcité," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 13 March 1925, 1.

<sup>26</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Propos d'un Français moyen: Vatel chez les Cartellistes," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 19 March 1925, 1.

<sup>27</sup>The *Affaire des Fiches* was the discovery in 1904 of dossiers compiled by Premier Combes and his War Minister, General André, of a list of officers and their political loyalties. This was believed to be the work of the Masonic Grand Orient Lodge, sworn enemies of the alliance between the "army and altar."

which had saved France in 1918 was now to be purged and replaced with its masonic counterpart.<sup>28</sup> The Cartel's ten-month parliamentary record had proved a financial and a social disaster. Instead of relying on German reparations, the Cartel's Socialist allies talked of "making the rich pay." Faced with the demand to print two billion francs more than the statutory forty-one billion, Herriot had lost forty votes of his Radical majority. Herriot predicted that rising taxes and rents, dissident Catholics and Alsatians, and the falling franc, would spell the Cartel's collapse.<sup>29</sup>

The Cartel was defeated the following day, 10 April, by the Senate's refusal (156 votes against 132) to ratify Herriot's budget. The new Cartel ministry of Premier Paul Painlevé was a collection of disparate Radicals and Socialists. Cabinet reshuffles did not inspire trust, Herriot remarked when Paul Painlevé, former war minister, was accused of defeatism in the Army Mutiny in 1917; Aristide Briand was condemned for his capitulation at Cannes in 1922; and Joseph Caillaux, minister of finance, charged with accepting bribes during the war. Herriot concluded that this was cold comfort for "the blood of the dead [which] purchased victory, [while] his [Caillaux's] war benefits amounted to 30 pieces of silver." Herriot lamented that the "cult of incompetence" had replaced morality. France lacked a man of honour and conscience.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Propos d'un Français moyen: Une Epuration qui s'impose," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 23 March 1925, 1.

<sup>29</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Qu'il s'en aille!" *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 9 April 1925, 1.

<sup>30</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Un Homme Très Fort," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 23 April 1925, 1. During the war, charges of treason were brought against former Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux and Interior Minister Jean-Louis Malvy. Caillaux's appeals for a negotiated peace compromised

Recruited by the National Catholic Federation to contest the 1925 by-election in Pujois-sur-Dordogne, Henriot opposed the Cartel candidate Théodore Steeg, vice-president of the Council, *Garde des Sceaux* (literally, Keeper of the Seals) and Radical Senator for the Seine. Steeg was also a mason, and member of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, the *Ligue de l'Enseignement*, and the *Défense Laïque*. Henriot, an unknown, took up the challenge against the Cartel's powerful political machine.<sup>31</sup> He was able to hold his own in a public debate with Steeg at Rauzan the day before the election. Steeg, despite his party organization, won only 1,075 of the canton's 2,380 votes, while Henriot gained 500 votes for the *Fédération Nationale Catholique*.<sup>32</sup> By 1926 over 30,000 Catholics petitioned the government to withdraw the anti-clerical education policies. Abbé Bergey reported that over eight thousand were Bordelais, while another five thousand were from the diocese. Bergey's and Henriot's voices were joined by canon Giraudin's *Ligue d'Action et de Défense Catholique*, Jean Guiraud's *la Croix*, abbé Fauchey's *Ligue d'Action et de Défense religieuse*, and abbé Villeneuve's *l'Action Catholique*. Fifty to seventy thousand Catholics were mobilized against the Left. Henriot concluded, "it was

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his association in the *Bonnet Rouge* scandal. The paper's "defeatist" press, it was charged, was secretly financed by Germany. There was no evidence that Caillaux himself had committed treason and his trial was delayed until after the war, when he was found guilty of the rather vague crime of having written letters revealing to the enemy information damaging to the political and military situation of France. Having spent more than two years in prison already, he was immediately released, but was banished from the major cities of France. See Sherwood, *op. cit.*, 20.

<sup>31</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Souvenirs d'un Militant," *op. cit.*

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

not necessary to hope in order to undertake nor to succeed in order to persevere." Catholic solidarity could only advance Catholic interests in the Chamber.<sup>33</sup>

Henriot's fear for Catholic France was less the fear of a German militarism than international Communism. Henriot described the attraction of the "liberating dawn of communism" as the end of bosses, capital, religion, and family. Communism declared the brotherhood of humanity, while the bourgeoisie, chloroformed or intoxicated by the Communist social program, flirted with the monster, bathing in the corruption of its literature and theatre while awaiting the axe.<sup>34</sup> De Castelnau, Marin, Bergey, Henriot and Taittinger led the Catholic crusade against the Cartel. The JP slogan "Famille, Patrie, Dieu" was the watchword of middle-class conservatives and Catholics. Elected to the Chamber in 1919, Taittinger joined the Republican Federation and his "Young Patriots," founded in 1924, was Castelnau's weapon to fight Communism. "Communism calls forth fascism," Taittinger claimed, "... leagues of public safety are ready to defend and save a threatened society." His patriots were sworn to defend France, if necessary by force.<sup>35</sup> Taittinger's blueshirts, like Mussolini's blackshirts, were organized into

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<sup>33</sup>"Le Congrès Catholique de Bordeaux," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 12 July 1926, 1.

<sup>34</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Propos d'un Français moyen: Jeux de Vacances," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 21 May 1925, 1.

<sup>35</sup>Pierre Taittinger, "Pour l'ordre, pour la France," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 17 June 1925, 1. The son of a Catholic noble house whose wealth came from the champagne industry, Taittinger's father had left Lorraine in 1871 rather than live under German occupation. Taittinger recalled that, apart from his faith, his models were Joan of Arc, Louis XIV, and Napoleon. Enlisting in 1914 as a sergeant, he emerged a captain, with two wounds and four citations for bravery. His *Notebooks of Young France* (1926) summarized: "the Communists advocated the use of violence to overthrow the socioeconomic status quo; the JP advocated the

shock troops, staging the mass mobilization of JPs on 15 April 1925 as a show of force.<sup>36</sup>

Paul Painlevé's ministry enjoyed no greater success with its deflationary policy. On 11 May 1924 the franc was at 67 to pound sterling; by 9 June 1925, it had risen to 103 francs, and then to 174. Added to inflation was the colonial crisis in Morocco. Moroccan national independence, encouraged initially by Germany, was reinforced by President Wilson's principle of national self-determination. French Communists led by Jacques Doriot took up the cause after the war. Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the great colonial pacifier, was "cartelized" and replaced by Henriot's old adversary, Théodore Steeg, as Governor-General of Morocco. As parliamentary watch-dog, Henriot wrote, Steeg would be unable to represent his constituents of Pujols-sur-Dordogne. Moreover, Henriot commented that Steeg as *Conseiller-général* of Morocco had taken a French cruiser not from Cherbourg or Toulon, but from Brest which cost the French tax-payers 400,000 francs. Lyautey, by contrast, had returned from his post by commercial steamship.<sup>37</sup> Henriot singled out another minister, Albert de Monzie, who in six months

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use of violence to preserve it."

<sup>36</sup>Soucy, *op. cit.*, 39-47.

<sup>37</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Propos d'un Français moyen: Le bateau de Théodore," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 4 November 1925, 1. Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854-1934), Marshal of France. A Saint-Cyr graduate, Lyautey served in Algeria, Indochina and Madagascar. In 1912 when the French proclaimed the protectorate, as High-Commissioner to Morocco, Lyautey's pacification policy preserved native institutions while offering public health, education and welfare. Despite orders to withdraw, he held Morocco throughout the War. He was named Marshal of France in 1921 and left Morocco in 1925. See André Maurois' biography (English translation 1931) and Alan Scham, *Lyautey in Morocco*, (1970).



had received four successive portfolios: Finance, Public Works, Commerce, and Public Education.<sup>38</sup> Henriot suggested some "immutable" principles for the Ministry of Finance. To keep the minister in power indefinitely, parliamentarians were to receive tax exemptions while taxes doubled. Clémentel, Painlevé, Bonnet, de Monzie, Caillaux, and Loucheur had all failed in their turn to stabilize the franc but, Henriot suggested, that left 890 parliamentarians to try their luck. If each received a fifteen-day appointment, that would settle the question of finance ministers until 1960. Henriot underscored that patience was wearing thin and confidence was evaporating.<sup>39</sup> Six finance ministers in nine months failed to arrest inflation while the franc continued its plunge. By 24 November 1925, Paul Painlevé's Cabinet fell in a non-confidence vote. Inflation, war debt, and ideology were undermining an economy that required peace and prosperity.

Poincaré's failed Ruhr occupation forced French statesmen to explore other avenues to realize France's security. The League of Nations Covenant outlined that member states were obliged to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of each member. War against one member was considered aggression against all. Economic sanctions were endorsed should a member state pursue war. Edouard Herriot and Ramsay MacDonald, French and British premiers, in a rare act of cooperation, issued the 1924 Geneva Protocol calling for compulsory arbitration in international

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<sup>38</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Propos d'un Français moyen: Fregoli au Ministère," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 22 November 1925, 1.

<sup>39</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Propos d'un Français moyen: Le gaspillage des compétences," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 21 Dec. 1925, 1.

disputes. The Covenant, however, lacked the military means to enforce the principles of collective security. Furthermore, America, the Soviet Union, and Germany were not League members. French Communists regarded the League as "capitalist camouflage" while Action Française considered the League both impotent and dangerous.<sup>40</sup>

The Herriot-MacDonald entente was brief. MacDonald's Labour government was defeated later in November, and Austen Chamberlain, Prime-Minister Baldwin's Foreign Secretary, announced in March 1926 Britain's reluctance to subscribe to the Protocol. Herriot's defeat in April 1926 threatened to undermine the accord. Paul Painlevé's foreign minister, Aristide Briand (1862-1932), personified France's efforts to find security within the League of Nations. From 1925 until his death in 1932, Briand was France's "apostle of peace," the eloquent spokesman for the League of Nations, a European confederation which looked to the New International World Order. Briand's politics were dictated as much by realism as idealism. France's security was to be achieved through diplomacy and the pacific resolution of conflicts. The "spirit of Locarno" encouraged an era of international understanding. Gustav Stresemann, German foreign minister until his death in 1929, saw that any security agreement excluding Germany would be directed against her. He proposed an alternative to the Geneva Protocol with a Western pact. Churchill's "pale dawn of Locarno" was signed by Stresemann, Briand, Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Belgium's foreign minister, Vandervelde on 16 October 1925. The Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee recognized the frontiers between France, Belgium,

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<sup>40</sup>Bury, *op. cit.*, 97-8.

and Germany while also providing for Germany's admission into the League. Welcomed universally as a concrete step toward general disarmament, Locarno failed to reach agreement on Germany's eastern frontiers, an omission fraught with implications. Briand's negotiations with Stresemann resulted in the complete evacuation of the Left Bank of the Rhine on 21 September 1926. Germany entered the League of Nations in September 1926 with Briand's blessing: "Away with rifles, machine guns, and cannon; make room for arbitration and peace."<sup>41</sup> Briand and Stresemann were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926.

Henriot likened Locarno to an operetta whose players strutted oblivious to the dangers of Soviet Russia. While famine raged in Russia, refuting the Soviet government's claims of prosperity, Henriot reported that Russian trade unions had donated 152,000 pounds sterling to aid labour unions in the British General Strike of 1926. Henriot warned naive Westerners that their donations for famine relief in Russia might be used to support revolution in Britain: "133,000 children die of hunger to feed the principle of world revolution." The "Locarno Charleston" danced by Stresemann, Briand, Krassine, and Chamberlain ignored the Russian famine while revolutionaries plotted civil war.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, Locarno failed to address the issue of reparations. Henriot emphasized that France retained the financial burden of victory while American credits went to a

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<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>42</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Propos d'un Français moyen: De la difficulté d'écrire l'histoire," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 24 Oct. 1926, 1.

vanquished Germany: "Senator Borah, disguised as an infallible arbiter, has demonstrated to us that paying our debts and reducing us to misery in the face of German prosperity is the final method that is left us to prove to the incredulous that we were the true victors in the 1914-1918 match."<sup>43</sup>

In the 1928 election campaign, the *Fédération Nationale Catholique* offered its own candidates' list. The National Catholic Federation demanded the abolition of the law of 7 July 1904 and amendments to the law of 1 July 1901 extending freedom of education to priests and 'école libres.' Herriot's "centres de préservation républicaine," financed with Catholic taxes, supported modern education where the notions of good and evil were supplanted by amorality and atheism. "And for this," Herriot declared, "you seek our votes, our money, our support, and our children. The *Fédération Nationale Catholique* says: No!" French Catholics were not merely in search of a parliamentary seat, but sought to defend a civilization.<sup>44</sup> Herriot cited Albert de Mun and Maurice Barrès, servants of Faith and Nation, who spoke for the dead against these "miserable sectarians of Combes." Albert de Mun's speech of 21 January 1901 spoke of "the secret of the religious life unknown to the laws of government, [is] a deep source of faith in a tormented world of misery and suffering where men and women have renounced the world's pleasures and by their example sacrificed their liberty, the final and magnificent

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<sup>43</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Propos d'un Français moyen: De Panurge à Dempsey," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 3 Oct. 1926, 1.

<sup>44</sup>Philippe Herriot, "De la rue Cadet à la rue de Grenelle," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 12 Oct. 1927, 1.

expression of liberty itself." Henriot reminded Catholics that their first allegiance was to their faith and their nation, not the republic.<sup>45</sup>

Henriot remarked that every parliamentary deputy serving a four-year mandate had two years to congratulate himself for being elected and two years to live in fear of defeat. The Cartel electoral flood of 1924 was at ebb tide. The *Union Populaire Républicain* (UPR) expressed the twin fears of war and revolution. It endorsed the efforts of the League of Nations but held back from compromising national security. It called for a national ministry above partisan interests: a material and moral resurrection of France. Freedom of religious education was combined with class collaboration. Speaking at Bordeaux, Henriot branded the prophets of class struggle the "professional profiteers of human misery." Henriot's diluted social Catholicism spoke of labour and capital as interdependent, not adversarial.<sup>46</sup> Sarraut's election slogan -- "Le communisme, voilà l'ennemi!" -- prevailed equally for Catholic France. The task was to bar the route to the forces of anarchy and revolution. UPR election tactics were to rally to the parties sharing common agendas. In the second ballot, the UPR candidate would withdraw in favour of

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<sup>45</sup>Philippe Henriot, "M. Homais à la rescousse," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 15 October 1928, 1. Albert de Mun's speech cited "Le secret de la vie religieuse est à des profondeurs où les lois et les gouvernements ne peuvent atteindre, où s'alimente sa source intarissable, et d'où s'élançant sans trêve, vers le monde tourmenté, vers le monde refroidi par l'égoïsme, labouré par la misère et la souffrance, ces hommes et ces femmes qui ont renoncé à lui demander ses joies pour lui donner leurs exemples... et qui font ainsi, dans le sacrifice de leur liberté, le dernier, le plus magnifique, le plus décisif usage de la liberté elle-même."

<sup>46</sup>"Le Troisième Congrès de l'UPR à Bordeaux," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 30 January 1928, 1-2.

the Union Nationale candidate, and block the Cartel.

President Raymond Poincaré's visit to Bordeaux on 30 March 1928 was the occasion to marshal the anti-Cartel forces. Henri de Kerillis, of the Republican Federation, parodied the Radical-Socialist 'magnetic' attraction between Edouard Herriot and Léon Blum. Their 1924 triumph was contradicted by their divergent policies concerning capital and property, inequality and poverty. The Socialists sought to abolish private property and denounced capital as being responsible for misery and inequality while the Radicals believed that inequality was a law of nature. De Kerillis saw the Cartel as the marriage of fire and water: the fire would be drowned and water, becoming steam, would evaporate.<sup>47</sup> Abbé Bergey persuaded Herriot to stand as Libourne Catholic candidate against the Communist, Socialist, and Radical incumbents. The abbé's "beau geste" reminded Herriot of Cyrano's aphorism "c'est bien plus beau lorsque c'est inutile." Herriot was encouraged by the fact that no one could remember the Libourne deputy. He later reflected in 1944 that this opened his eyes to the unsuspected possibilities of the attentions of certain deputies of the popular vote.<sup>48</sup>

Henriot's opponent was one Colonel Picot, a disfigured war veteran and founding

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<sup>47</sup>Henri de Kerillis, "M. Blum et les Radicaux," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 13 April 1928, 1.

<sup>48</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Souvenirs d'un Militant; II: Une Campagne Législative en 1928," *Combats*, 4 March 1944, 1. "Ce qui m'ouvrit de bonne heure des horizons insoupçonnés quant à l'assiduité d'un certain nombre d'élus du suffrage universel." The absentee rate at the National Assembly is still a national scandal today.

president of *les Gueules cassées*. Henriot admitted that a modest reservist such as himself, motivated by civic courage, was not in the same league as his courageous opponent. Picot, however, was resolved to maintain the anti-clerical policy of the Cartel, which sparked Henriot and the Catholic Federation into action. The Radical wine-grower and Socialist teacher agreed to combine their forces after the first ballot in favour of the republican candidate with the best chance of success. Picot refused Henriot's similar suggestion, confident of victory in the first ballot. The race was close and Picot obtained only a marginal victory over Henriot's 3,200 votes. In the eight days separating the first and second ballots, Picot expected Henriot's resignation that did not materialize. Henriot, determined to sweat his "frère ennemi," forced Picot "to go to Canossa," beseeching Bergey for Henriot's votes. Henriot, satisfied, instructed his voters to elect Picot who received all but six of the 3,200 votes, giving the Colonel his majority. Henriot took heart in the fact that personal defeat was salved by national victory. Poincaré defeated the Cartel with 267 new deputies while the *Union Populaire Republicain* won 36 seats in the Chamber. Henriot later recounted that the lessons learned here were a solid political and psychological apprenticeship.<sup>49</sup>

Immediately following his failed attempt to win the Libourne election, Henriot was commissioned to cover the Alsace treason trial in Colmar as correspondent for *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*. The trial shed further light on the problems of France's post-war

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<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.* "Allez dire, après cela, que les campagnes électorales sous la III<sup>e</sup> République n'étaient pas une bonne école de psychologie...."

reconstruction, and the international issues confronting Franco-German collaboration. The trial indicted prominent Alsatian deputies and Catholic priests who resisted the Cartel's rough-shod reintegration of the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Under the administration of the Imperial Reich, Alsace's Catholics, were allowed to maintain religious instruction in secondary schools, and priests were paid employees of the Reich. But France's wartime promises to respect religious liberties, honoured by the *Bloc National*, were not honoured by the Cartel. Many Catholic Alsatians, recently reunited to France, were now forced to defend themselves from the Cartel's anticlerical education policy. Alsatian independence and autonomist movements, once opposed to Berlin, now resisted the close embrace of Paris.<sup>50</sup> Seeking to shift blame, the Left press denounced the autonomist movement as pro-German and Catholic. Henriot reported that such accusations obscured and aggravated the issue; other autonomist movements were usually Communist-inspired. Countering claims that the "malaise alsacien" was inspired by reactionaries, clericals, and German financial aid, Henriot reported that one of the autonomists, Dahlet, was a Radical-Socialist while other defendants were patriots. Deputy Rossé declared "... L'Alsace-Lorraine veut et doit appartenir à la France à jamais et sans restriction...."<sup>51</sup> Prosecutor Fachot's indictment was a passionate litany of nationalist rhetoric of "France rising to save her lost children..." replete with references to the "spilled blood" shed to restore the Marseillaise to Alsace and Lorraine against the forces

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<sup>50</sup>Bury, *op. cit.*, 81.

<sup>51</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Affaires d'Alsace," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 14 May 1928, 1.



of treason.<sup>52</sup> Such patriotic bluster hid the Cartel's blunders.

Henriot separated passion from political agenda, distinguishing between regionalists, legislative autonomists, and separatists. Alsatian aspirations to autonomy was due neither to German subterfuge nor Francophobia, but the Cartel's education policy.<sup>53</sup> Alsations' first cause was Alsace. Passionately French in 1918-1919, they were "deceived, scorned and finally revolted by the provocations of 1924...."<sup>54</sup> The Cartel had failed to reunite the lost province in a Christian fraternity. A reconciliation between France and Alsace was imperative. Alsace's German sentiments were hardly surprising; since 1871 a whole generation had been raised in a German milieu. Germany's attempt to win over Alsatian Catholics had failed. Fifteen of them charged with treasonous conspiracy represented twenty to thirty thousand Catholic Alsations whose trust was betrayed by France. While Gustav Stresemann and Chancellor Curtius supported movements such as *Zukunft* and *Heimatbund*, Henriot cited *Die Brücke* (The Bridge) as more representative of popular opinion. Alsace was the bridge between France and Germany, and it was jeopardized by the Cartel. Only a general amnesty could repair the damage.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Philippe Henriot, "En écoutant le réquisitoire," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 29 May 1928, 1.

<sup>53</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Aux Assises de Colmar," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 22 May 1928, 1.

<sup>54</sup>Philippe Henriot, "En Alsace," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 23 May 1928, 1.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*

The Alsace treason trial was Henriot's first foray into international politics. His notion of a bridge between France and Germany was the profound wish of European statesmen. The trial underlined the issues unresolved by the Versailles peace -- reparations, nationalities, and the search for a lasting peace. In April 1927, the tenth anniversary of America's entry into the war, Briand called on an isolationist America to play a greater role in the peace settlement and reconstruction. To this end, he suggested to American Secretary of State Kellogg a pact outlawing war between France and America. Other governments were invited. On 27 August 1928, the Kellogg-Briand pact was signed at the Quai d'Orsay by representatives of fifteen states; and it would later include sixty-three. The signatories all renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Aristide Briand, hailed as the "blacksmith of peace," had created what his critics called a "Locarno of noble intentions," devoid of economic or military sanctions to deter aggression.

Clemenceau labelled the pact an "absurd buffoonery."<sup>56</sup> Henriot painted world peace as an illusion, universal fraternity its chloroform.<sup>57</sup> He argued that force be tempered by justice, but justice must be tempered by force. British and French military reserves rendered the Pact null while the United States Senate could reject it for the same reasons it rejected the Treaty of Versailles -- the American Senate and Congress would

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<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>57</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'ivresse du chloroforme," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 16 September 1928, 1.

disavow any League action. A similar fate awaited Locarno.<sup>58</sup>

Henriot also spoke of resisting the "financial dictatorship of international capital," a theme common to socialists, communists, and nationalists. During the campaign, *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest* featured Eugène Delahaye's articles, "Unmasking Free-Masonry," tracing the masonic dictatorship from the Elysée Palace to the village school. Herriot's cabinet, he charged, comprised ten masons of fifteen ministries, a *union sacrée* of the Lodges. One hundred and fifty thousand masons ruled a nation of forty million. A third of France's civil servants and teachers constituted a masonic conspiracy whose doctrines dissolved families and created dissolute students.<sup>59</sup> General de Castelnau spoke to the *Association des Chefs de la Famille*, describing the moral erosion of secular education with Edouard Lockroy's "L'Ile revoltée," Emile Zola's "Madeleine Férat," and Paul Marguerite's "La Confession posthume" describing rape, adultery, eroticism, and priests as sybarites or murderers. Republican literature poisoned youth and contributed to juvenile crime.<sup>60</sup> For Henriot, the masonic dictatorship of the Rue Cadet was but a short walk to Communist party headquarters on the Rue de Grenelle: "We know that it takes a Radical only eight days to become a Communist, the eight days separating the second

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<sup>58</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les fêtes de la signature du pacte Kellogg vont commencer," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 24 August 1928, 1.

<sup>59</sup>Eugène Delahaye, "Démasquons la Franc-Maçonnerie: Les Postes qu'ils Occupent," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 16 February 1928, 1.

<sup>60</sup>General de Castelnau, "Le Tout... A L'Etat," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 22 March 1928, 1.

ballot from the first."<sup>61</sup>

The *Gazette du Franc* scandal exposed the finance minister's inside trading in junk bonds and paybacks. The press exposé dimmed the already tarnished image of France's Radical ministries. Henriot recalled Voltaire's *Zadig* recommending that a king's prospective ministers be tested in the "corridor of temptation" containing the wealth of his master's treasures. Presented before the king, the candidate would be asked to dance. The ringing of coins betokened the avarice of those unable to resist temptation. Henriot lamented that paper currency was more easily hidden. Ambition and corruption were synonymous. Léon Blum's appeals on behalf of "the hungry," and "the defence of the working class," were passwords equivalent to "Open Sesame" to the corridors of temptation.<sup>62</sup>

Beneath this discourse was brewing what Julien Benda characterized as the age of the intellectual organization of political and national hatreds,<sup>63</sup> a betrayal of the intellectuals. "The world is suffering from lack of faith in a transcendental truth," he observed, and replaced it with the mystical religion of the "national soul."<sup>64</sup> Benda's

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<sup>61</sup>Philippe Henriot, "De la rue Cadet à la rue de Grenelle," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 12 Oct. 1927, 1.

<sup>62</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Du corridor de la tentation aux terrasses d'Elseneur," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 18 December 1928, 1.

<sup>63</sup>Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals, la Trahison des clercs* trans. by Richard Aldington 1928, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1969), 27.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, 23.

essay served Henriot's own appraisal of the temper of the times. A growing materialism, a fascination with the physical life (*la vie animale*) was accompanied, he wrote, by a corresponding decline in the humanities, where spirit and intelligence were scorned and replaced by the lust for gain - a "bolshevization of the intelligence."<sup>65</sup> The "maîtres de l'heure," unscrupulous intellectuals, abandoned intelligence for fashion. France's "salon bolshevists" such as André Gide and Henri Barbusse had renounced their patrimony for revolutionary ideologies.<sup>66</sup> Gide and Barbusse, hailed like Voltaire, Beaumarchais, and Rousseau, were "modern charlatans" preparing another revolution. The Republican Panthéon's most noble or notorious saint, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, was a braggart of vice; the *Social Contract* was utopian fiction. The romantic education of a literary *Emile* was written by a father who abandoned five children. *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, the apologia of free love, was deadly boring. The model for France's youth was a fraud.<sup>67</sup> But Henriot, too, was succumbing to the traps that Gide, Barbusse, and Malraux had fallen into: the politicization of conscience.

Henriot's political apprenticeship sharpened his oratorical skills and his campaign tactics. "Never again" was the universal cry of peace, but Henriot had little faith in

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<sup>65</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La balustre d'Annency," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 5 September 1928, 1.

<sup>66</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La démission de l'intelligence," *la Liberte du Sud-Ouest*, 1 October 1928, 1.

<sup>67</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La balustre d'Annency," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 5 September 1928, 1.

Briand's New Order. Force tempered by justice was admirable; but justice without force was folly. Henriot perceived that materialism in either its Soviet or American guise were societies devoid of the spiritual. The Republic of Radical masons, pacifists and Socialists, unstable and corrupt, persecuted Catholics and undermined the social bonds of France.<sup>68</sup> France emerged from the post-war years into an uncertain and anxious political and social *ennui*. Jose Ortega y Gasset noted that Europe lacked a moral code, and cited Auguste Comte: "Without some new spiritual influence, our age, which is a revolutionary age, will produce a catastrophe."<sup>69</sup> The materialism and individualism of the "roaring Twenties" ended in an abrupt crash. The crises of the 'thirties would see the disciples of Charles Maurras, Louis Marin, and General de Castlenau marshalled against the likes of Edouard Herriot, Léon Blum, and Maurice Thorez. France "was undecided whether to sweep out the insolent fools and criminals."<sup>70</sup> Henriot's descent into the street was an example of Benda's treason of the intellectuals. The ideological battleground in the war of words between French nationalists, pacifists and revolutionaries looked for a peace that could not be sustained only with noble intentions.

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<sup>68</sup>Birnbaum, *op.cit.*, 15.

<sup>69</sup>Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, (New York: 1932), 22, 187.

<sup>70</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Du corridor de la tentation aux terrasses d'Elseneur," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 18 December 1928, 1.

## Chapter 2: Peace of Illusions, 1929-1933

"Il y a trois choses, le *Locarno spirit*, *l'esprit de Locarno* et le *Locarnogeist*." René Massigli.<sup>1</sup>

The failure of Poincaré's Ruhr expedition yielded the field to those who hoped that international disputes might be resolved through arbitration and conciliation. Aristide Briand saw Geneva as the capital of a United States of Europe and, in this spirit, welcomed Germany's delegates to the League of Nations on 8 September 1926.<sup>2</sup> Belgian socialist Emile Vandervelde described a world at peace by the law of equality where "there are no more enemies where there are no more conquerors, nor conquered, but only peoples united under the sign of equality."<sup>3</sup> The "spirit of Locarno" attempted to reassure the world that war would collapse before the peace offensive. "Moral disarmament" was embodied in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) outlawing war among the signatories.

One of the most prominent French pacifist organizations, the *Association pour la Paix par le Droit* (APD) was in 1929 awarded the accolade, "reconnue d'utilité

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<sup>1</sup>Anthony Adamthwaite, *France and the Coming of the Second World War*, (London: Cassels, 1971), 282.

<sup>2</sup>Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, (trans. Anthony Forster), *The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938*, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 120.

<sup>3</sup>Norman Ingram, *The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France 1919-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 49-50.

publique," by prominent Radicals Paul Painlevé, Joseph Paul-Boncour, and Pierre Cot. The Socialists argued that capitalism was the root of war while the Association professed the rule of law. Their agenda included the replacement of permanent armies with national defensive militia and a tribunal of international arbitration.<sup>4</sup> But behind the vision of Briand's Geneva and the "pilgrims of peace" were the shadows of Verdun and the legacy of Versailles. Henriot regarded the "Locarno of noble intentions" and the "peace offensive" as so many "scraps of paper," similar to the "scrap of paper" guaranteeing Belgian neutrality which had been cynically dismissed by German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in 1914.<sup>5</sup>

Infusing the breath of life into Locarno was the mandate of France's foreign minister, Aristide Briand, while Premier Edouard Herriot sponsored the Soviet Union into the League of Nations. America and Britain, fearful that the League would become an instrument of French power, defeated Léon Bourgeois' motion to give it an international military peace-keeping force. Henriot joined the debate, claiming that France's allies were unwilling to guarantee the peace they had signed. President Wilson's principle of national self-determination created more conflicts than it resolved. National self-determination for Serbians and Croats with liberal-democratic constitutions ignored territorial and national hostilities. Despite the Socialist antipathy for monarchy

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<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 26-8. Emerging from *Les Jeunes Amis de la paix* founded in 1887 by six *lycéens* in Nîmes, the APD established ties with the *Ligue des droits de l'homme*, the masonic lodges, and the Radical Party.

<sup>5</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Un nationaliste de gauche," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 28 April 1929, 1.



and authoritarian rule, Henriot supported King Alexander of Yugoslavia as a necessary figurehead above Serbian and Croat hatreds.<sup>6</sup>

France's "Petite Entente" alliance of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, attempted to compensate for the loss of the Russian alliance, but French continental supremacy was illusory and waning. On 21 September 1929, French troops were to evacuate the Rhineland heedless to the warnings by deputies of the Right. Were the Locarno signatories sincere, Henriot asked, when German *Reichstag* deputies such as former Baltic annexationist Gustav Stresemann, now a liberal, challenged the Versailles settlement? Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Weimar's Minister of Finance, considered Versailles a declaration of war, while Professor Hans Delbrück held France responsible for provoking the war by encouraging Russian mobilization in 1914.<sup>7</sup>

Treaty revisions demanded by the defeated divided the victors. Henriot suspected the reappearance of secret diplomacy where America and Britain appeared to be developing an Atlantic alliance which worked against the principles of Locarno and Geneva. Disarmament conferences in Washington and London limited France's fleet while England and America divided the world into their maritime empires.<sup>8</sup> American

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<sup>6</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'aventure yougoslave," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 13 January 1929, 1.

<sup>7</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Un nationaliste de gauche," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 28 April 1929, 1.

<sup>8</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le lit trop étroit ou la mauvaise nuit de M. Herriot," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 24 June 1929, 1. At the Washington conference (October 1921) Briand faced a united Anglo-Saxon front which imposed a hierarchy of naval preeminence which ranked France as fourth with Italy. Briand resigned in January 1922 to Poincaré whose policy lead to the Ruhr

diplomacy in European affairs was hypocritical and self-serving. America's banker-diplomats ignored past hostilities, but not the debts they had incurred. Wilson's signature on the Versailles Treaty was vetoed by the Senate. New cruisers were launched while naval disarmament accords were signed. The Kellogg pact outlawed war while the Monroe Doctrine provoked it, Henriot charged. The Young Plan earned his reproach, that a "peace without indemnities" meant "restrain[ing] the victor of 1918 while supporting the vanquished of 1929."<sup>9</sup>

The war won, Henriot claimed, it remained to win the peace. Pacifist rhetoric spoke of the "eternal and unbreakable ties created by comrades in arms," the "indissoluble link created by common sacrifices" of the "poilus" and the "doughboys." Cordial relations, however, were frustrated by reparations claims in what Henriot regarded as a strange alliance of creditors asking to dismiss reparations while demanding the repayment of war loans. Premier Poincaré warned that failure to ratify the Young Plan would further estrange France's allies. On Bastille Day, 1929, Henriot suggested that instead of accepting the Young Plan, France would do better to demand her pound of flesh as the "American Shylock" had demanded its share. France was already isolated, Henriot declared: "Owen Young offers the pens of the Committee of Experts and we

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occupation in 1923.

<sup>9</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Peut-on leur dire?" *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 9 July 1929, 1.

celebrate this *beau geste* of international solidarity".<sup>10</sup> The *beau geste*, an honourable retreat, included reduced reparations payments and evacuation of the Rhineland. Henriot claimed that Poincaré had sentenced France to economic pauperism for two generations. Wall Street financiers had defeated the men that the Brandenburgers of Douaumont and the Imperial Guard could not: "on the battlefield of peace, gentlemen are always conquered by merchants."<sup>11</sup> The Young Plan was ratified by a narrow majority; many deputies voted reluctantly to save France from another Cartel. Henriot announced cynically, "This is not war -- this is victory."<sup>12</sup> Poincaré's retirement accompanied the resignation of his *Union nationale* cabinet. Poincaré, seeking to secure France, had invaded the Ruhr. American and British promises of future support all fell short of the military guarantees and a continental commitment that would ensure peace through strength.

Briand's Geneva was to be the capital of a United States of Europe, a counterweight to the United States of America and the Soviet Union. In a series of

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<sup>10</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La faillite du sentiment," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 14 July 1929, 1. The "American Shylock" was a popular reference to the final war debt settlement for France that was negotiated by Senator Henry Bérenger from January to May 1926 and was finally ratified three years later. It provided for the payment of \$4,025 million in sixty-two annual payments which would start at \$30 million and rise to \$125 million in the sixteenth year. Between agreement and ratification, France was deprived of American loans that were aiding European and German reconstruction. See Bernard and Dubief, *The Decline of the Third Republic*, op.cit., 121.

<sup>11</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La bataille perdue," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 21 July 1929, 1.

<sup>12</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Descente rapide...Tournant dangereux...", *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 28 July 1929, 1.

articles Henriot discussed at length the fragile post-war settlement. Briand's vision of a new Europe, he wrote, was a pale imitation of the United States of America. America, a young nation, was unhindered by old animosities and traditions; Europe was a "tower of Babel."<sup>13</sup> True enlightened internationalism, Henriot suggested, envisaged a United States of the World, a United Nations, but the world persisted in traditional notions of nationalities and frontiers, creating linguistic and territorial disputes.<sup>14</sup>

*All Quiet on the Western Front*, by the German novelist Erich Maria Remarque, served as a focus for the debate between pacifists and nationalists. Remarque's novel, published in 1928, expressed a fascination with war as a national experience which fostered unity, camaraderie, and self-sacrifice but it was also a symptom of international agreements which outlawed war. Henriot questioned whether the aim of the peace phenomenon was to remember the horrors of war or study the international conflicts which divided men: "Do we fulfil our duty to future generations by remembering the sacrifices of those who preceded us?"<sup>15</sup> Henriot gazed upon Germany, asking if all was quiet on the Eastern Front? Germany was an industrial power of the first rank. Stresemann's peace was contingent on the satisfaction of Germany's demands. With the evacuation of the Rhineland and the Saar, Henriot asked if Alsace-Lorraine was next. Abandoned guarantees created a dangerous impression of weakness and decline. A

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<sup>13</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix: I. Feu les Etats-Unis d'Europe," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 25 August 1929, 1.

<sup>14</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La leçon sous la tente," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 11 August 1929, 1.

<sup>15</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Paradoxe ou Symptôme?.." *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 5 May 1930, 1.

Franco-German entente was at best a temporary reconciliation; at worst, an armistice. All was not quiet on France's Eastern Front.<sup>16</sup> Germany's reconstruction was complete and her frontiers too narrow. German munitions had increased a hundredfold, in blatant violation of the Versailles disarmament clauses. Germany's military budget exceeded France's by almost three billion francs. Henriot argued that pacifism's "moral disarmament" was greeted with more demands and new concessions. France would do better to insist on enhanced constraints, not fewer. Guarantees could only be negotiated from a position of strength, and France's military strength was being eclipsed.<sup>17</sup>

Comparing Briand to Doctor Sgnarelle's fatal cures, Henriot called instead for the common sense prescription of Monsieur de La Palice.<sup>18</sup> Pacifist platitudes ignored the realities of power politics.<sup>19</sup> "War does not pay," the socialists declared; auditors-general rarely declare war, Henriot replied. Force was irrational but effective. Like Ulysses seduced by the siren songs calling him to disaster, the socialist-pacifist sirens

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<sup>16</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix: VII. A l'Est, rien de nouveau?..." *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 15 Sept. 1929, 1.

<sup>17</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix: VIII. L'invitation à la valse," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 22 September 1929. Henriot noted that Germany was allowed 122,000 rifles and manufactured 60,000 annually. Granted 1,926 machine guns, Germany manufactured 20,153. Instead of 14 cannon, annual manufactures totalled 378. Allowed a reserve of 447,000 cannon shells, German arsenals had 2,451,000. Germany's military budget of 8 milliards 832 millions exceeded France's by 2 milliards 747 million.

<sup>18</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix: II. Sgnarelle et Don Quichotte," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 29 August 1929, 1.

<sup>19</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix: III. La galerie des illusions perdues," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 2 September 1929, 1. "Malheureusement, c'est souvent contre la plus bête des faits que la plus généreuse des théories se casse le nez."

lured France to disaster.<sup>20</sup> Briand's United States of Europe had first to expunge the "pernicious" ideal of that nationalism for which twenty million men had died. Revolutions and military dictatorships obstructed a United States of Europe.

Divided allies unwilling to guarantee the Versailles settlement caused much popular resentment. John Maynard Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, translated into French in 1920, minimized France's war damage and advocated reduced German reparations payments. The popular feeling in France was one of betrayal.<sup>21</sup> Henriot's anglophobia expressed the popular sentiment of this betrayal, citing England's rapacity that had seized France's colonial empire in India and Canada; Albion's "splendid isolation" during the Franco-Prussian war, and its acquiescence to the dictated Treaty of Frankfurt. Threatened by the German navy, England welcomed the *Entente Cordiale* only after Waterloo, Egypt, and Fashoda. Henriot suggested that the partners of the *Entente Cordiale* marriage might sue for a divorce. "Let us create ententes but do not imagine that they are 'cordiale.' Ententes must be not marriages of love but a union of interests."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>Bernard & Dubief, *op. cit.*, 107-108. Keynes was thought to be influential in British government circles which underestimated France's war damage in loss of men and resources. The London conference of May 1921 fixed Germany's reparations at 132 billion gold marks.

<sup>22</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A La Recherche de la Paix: IV. Un Ami S.V.P.," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 5 September 1929, 1.

British failure to support the Ruhr occupation pointed to Britain's abandonment of the continental commitment. France could not pretend to be the ally of England, only her client and debtor. International conferences at London, Washington, and Geneva confirmed that the axis of diplomacy had shifted from France to America.<sup>23</sup> France's sacrifice realized England's imperial ambitions: the destruction of Germany's *Kriegsmarine* and the confiscation of German colonies. Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald was now reluctant to support France while the German arch-rival threatened to burst its manacles.<sup>24</sup> Henriot's opponents who labelled him a "défaitiste de la paix," ignored the fact that no treaty, pact, or league could contain a nation bent on expansion. Financial, economic, and military *ententes* were a more secure guarantee than a peace built on speeches.<sup>25</sup> Whatever Briand's services as the "forger of peace," it was not necessarily *his* peace that was definitive. Henriot concluded that while "the world changed, man did not."<sup>26</sup>

The United States was the new power broker, and Henriot lamented the increasing

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<sup>23</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix: V. Bertrand et Raton ou l'Entente cordiale," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 8 September 1929, 1.

<sup>24</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix; VIII: L'invitation à la valse," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 22 Sept. 1929, 1.

<sup>25</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix: X. Circuit Fermé," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 3 October 1929, 1.

<sup>26</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Un débat pénible," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 31 December 1929, 1. "La face du monde change. L'homme ne change guère."

Americanization of France. The French language was deformed by Americanisms.<sup>27</sup> Jules Verne's science fiction had become reality in New York: technology accelerated and compressed time and space with steamships, planes, trains, and automobiles. Life was animated by a force that substituted greed for happiness.<sup>28</sup> Henriot spoke of European civilization seduced by "the pitiful substitute which had made a *tabula rasa* of our accumulated riches of the mind and the soul for these base pleasures..."<sup>29</sup> The American syndrome multiplied needs rather than reducing wants; man became the slave of new, insatiable appetites.

Mussolini's Italy was another variable in the post-war settlement. While expressing admiration for "the master who made Italy tremble, whose profile suggested decision and energy," Henriot compared *Il Duce's* fascist state to Imperial Rome under Nero, with police espionage, deportation and imprisonment.<sup>30</sup> Even so, he saw Fascist Italy as a potential ally. A Mediterranean *entente* could avert colonial rivalries,<sup>31</sup> and a Franco-Italian accord could steal a march on Britain and forestall an Anglo-Italian

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<sup>27</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Condoléances à la langue française," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 9 February 1930, 1.

<sup>28</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Voyage Hallucinant," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 21 April 1930, 1.

<sup>29</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Oraison funèbre de la Civilisation," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 27 June 1930, 1.

<sup>30</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A Rome avec Henri Béraud," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 2 February 1930, 1.

<sup>31</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la Recherche de la Paix: IX. A la proue du navire Europe," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 29 September 1929, 1.



Mediterranean *entente*.<sup>32</sup>

In the ranks of the APD during 1928 and 1929, the pacifist debate was carried on in the *Cahiers des droits de l'homme* between Jacques Hadamard, professor at the Collège de France, and Victor Challaye. The peace debate discussed the events that escalated the Serbian crisis of July 1914 into a generalized European conflict. The second issue was "moral disarmament" and the popular image of the weapons' merchants and war-profiteers. Hadamard condemned Austria's dismissal of arbitration and its attack on Serbia which had widened the dispute from two principals to include all the great powers. Challaye emphasized that non-intervention would have localized the war and averted a general catastrophe.<sup>33</sup> As for moral disarmament -- i.e., non-resistance to aggression - - Hadamard warned that the pacifism of non-violence and appeals to international arbitration would be futile. Pacifists might avoid war in refusing to fight the aggressor but, once conquered, would be forced to fight without the luxury of individual conscience.<sup>34</sup> Henriot commented that socialist pacifism and disarmament policies were nothing new. At the Socialist Amiens Congress of 1906 Naquet had called for France's unilateral disarmament. Pacifists who looked for a spokesman to replace weapons with the moral force of law, he wrote, would do well to read the Pope's proclamation of 1

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<sup>32</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Désarmement naval," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 8 December 1929, 1.

<sup>33</sup>Ingram, *op. cit.*, 70.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 70-1.

August 1917.<sup>35</sup> Public opinion was no substitute for military force.

The German presidential elections were cause for concern. Hindenburg's victory reassured many French socialists and pacifists; Hindenburg was the guardian of peace against Hitler, the Nazi agitator. Henriot remarked that the Presidential term was seven years, and Hindenburg was 84. It was a delay for Hitler, and not a defeat. The German elections were a perilous reminder that the will for peace must be maintained by the material and military means to ensure it, "for vigilance and foresight remain virtues without which the noblest dreams risk the cruellest awakenings."<sup>36</sup>

The Soviet Union was another unknown factor on Henriot's tour of the international horizon. Maurice Laporte's *La bouge de la Mère Andrelli* was one Catholic's account of Bela Kun's Soviet terrorist dictatorship in Hungary.<sup>37</sup> In Russia, the People's Commissariat of Labour controlled the lives of ten million workers. As sole employer, the state dictated where workers were needed. *Gulags*, prison work camps in

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<sup>35</sup>Philippe Henriot, "De Naquet à Léon Blum," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 24 November 1930, 1.

<sup>36</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Plaidoiries et Calculs," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 14 April 1932, 1.

<sup>37</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Dans le fosse aux monstres," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 19 September 1930, 1. Laporte, founder of *Jeunesses Communistes* in 1920, balked at the horrors of Varga, Pogany, and Bela Kun in Eastern Europe. Bela Kun, a Hungarian Jew (1886-1939) was a Russian prisoner of war who joined the Bolsheviks and returned to Hungary in 1918 to found the Hungarian Communist Party. He established a Hungarian Soviet Republic for 133 days (21 March - 1 August 1918). After its collapse, Kun worked as a key member of the Comintern until accused and arrested for Trotskyism in 1937. He died in captivity.

the northern forests, housed thousands in filthy barracks, with starvation rations and hard labour. The right to strike was forbidden, the ban enforced by the Soviet secret police. The League of Nations' resolution of 25 September 1926 abolished slavery and forced labour but its refusal to sanction the Soviet Union in effect condoned a prison state.<sup>38</sup> Soviet factories were re-equipping the *Reichswehr* while Communists undermined western governments. Henriot regarded Herriot's indulgence toward the Soviet Union and French Communists as akin to Kerensky's fatal tolerance of the Bolsheviks. Communism had sealed Russia's fate, poisoning domestic as well as international relations.<sup>39</sup>

By 1932 Abbé Bergey thought his acolyte was ready for the political arena. Bergey's nomination of Henriot as his successor was not universally acclaimed in party ranks. Henri de Kerillis suggested instead Fernand Philippart, Bordeaux's former mayor, or he would run against Henriot himself. Henriot replied tranquilly that if Kerillis ran as a candidate, Henriot would be elected on the first vote instead of the second.<sup>40</sup> There was no hiding a party split. Bergey was forced publicly to declare his refusal to run for a third term while using the opportunity to endorse Henriot over the protests of "friends"

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<sup>38</sup> Philippe Henriot, "Le mystérieux 'dumping'," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 2 July 1931, 1. A former secret police officer, defecting to Finland reported that official figures for Soviet "dumping" 1 May 1930 were 662,000: 570,000 men, 74,000 women and 18,000 young men and women between 13 and 18 years old. Frédéric Eccard wrote "Chaque mètre carré de cette route est arrosé de larmes et de sang."

<sup>39</sup> Philippe Henriot, "Les méditations de M. Herriot ou le Prophète à retardement," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 1 October 1930, 1. "Ce sont elles qui ont perverti les cœurs, faussé les consciences, contaminé les intelligences. Et c'est vous qui leur avez ouvert la porte."

<sup>40</sup> Philippe Henriot, "Souvenirs d'un Militant," *Combats*, 6 May 1944, 1.

within the Republican Federation. De Kerillis later withdrew his objections,<sup>41</sup> and resigned from the Federation executive. Here lay the origin of the antipathy between Kerillis and Henriot -- one of many episodes that would poison French political life.

Communist and socialist agitation increased as the depression deepened. André Tardieu's National Union campaign slogan expanded Sarraut's, declaring the Socialists and their Communist allies the enemy. For Henriot, socialism was an industry, not a program. A fashionable atheism, supported with lectures on science, attacked faith and the nature of miracles.<sup>42</sup> He urged all *bons Français* to strike a blow against Socialism for Tardieu's *Union Nationale*.<sup>43</sup> A feature article in *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest* on the eve of the first electoral round acclaimed the new Catholic candidate: Henriot was a born orator with the eloquence of Cicero, "generous and loyal, neither sceptical nor ambitious, he embodies the increasingly rare faculty of the Beautiful and the Good. A Republican who scorns demagogy, the gnawing cancer of democracies, he never sacrifices religious convictions or the national interest to the expedience of electoral strategy."<sup>44</sup> Henriot reminded Catholic France neither to forget nor to yield.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>D.-M. Bergey, "Un mot à des 'Amis'," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 29 April 1932, 1.

<sup>42</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Théologiens en disponibilité," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 13 October 1930, 1. Henriot cited the examples of Marshal Foch, Louis Pasteur, and Cardinal Newman who still believed in God.

<sup>43</sup>Philippe Henriot, "France d'abord," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 1 May 1932, 1.

<sup>44</sup>"Testis," "Philippe Henriot," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 29 April 1932, 2.

<sup>45</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Coleres Impuissantes," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 20 April 1932, 1.

Henriot's oratorical skills were in demand during the campaign. The fact remained that the *Union Nationale* lacked a common strategy<sup>46</sup> while "socialist agitators" denounced capitalism as responsible for increasing unemployment. Georges Ponset, editor of *la Gauche*, saw in Blum the socialist patriarch: Moses dictating his Talmud to the proletarian masses.<sup>47</sup> Declining numbers forced Marin's *Fédération Républicaine* to attract votes with reforms that included women's suffrage, a compulsory single ballot, and proportional representation. The Federation platform also proposed to reform the Constitution and strengthen the executive by granting enhanced Presidential powers to dissolve parliament to better create a majority instead of a series of coalition ministries.<sup>48</sup> The reform proposing the single ballot was defeated by Socialist senators and deputies fearing, as Henriot charged, that the single vote would disrupt "back-room" deals for the second ballot and break the Radical-Socialist monopoly.<sup>49</sup> Here was another indication of the political impasse described by what Hoffmann called the "stalemate society."

Henriot's discourse reflected the fears of his conservative and Catholic constituents, the "Français moyen," and declining party faithful. The Republican

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<sup>46</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Chez nous et en face," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 17 August 1931, 1.

<sup>47</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La brouille dans le ménage," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 15 February 1931, 1.

<sup>48</sup>William D. Irvine, "French Conservatives and the 'New Right' during the 1930s," *French Historical Studies* VIII, no. 4 (Fall 1974), 536.

<sup>49</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Manoeuvres préliminaires," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 22 November 1931, 1.

Federation represented two million rural and middle-class Catholics. Along with the *Union Républicaine Démocratique*, the Catholic-conservative bloc in the Palais-Bourbon numbered almost 160 deputies, representing the Norman and Breton West, the Vendée, the South Auvergne, and a majority of Paris *arrondissements*.<sup>50</sup> Deputies from Bordeaux and Libourne were elected by rural Catholics whose economic conservatism eschewed the Socialists and Radicals. Wine-growers in the Bordeaux region were threatened by American prohibition and a devalued franc; Henriot addressed their concerns in his campaign.

Henriot could not be assured of the Catholic vote, even with Bergey's recommendation. His principal rival was Jacques Rödel of Marc Sangnier's *La Jeune République*. In the first ballot, Rödel won 2,339 votes to Henriot's 5,257. On 7 May, in the midst of the campaign between the first and second ballot, President Paul Doumer was assassinated by a Russian expatriate protesting the starvation of Russian peasants. Albert Lebrun, an old member of the *Fédération Républicaine*, was elected President of the Republic on 10 May 1932. The assassination may have aided Henriot's election. The ballot of 8 May was a trial between Henriot and the Socialist Vielle who lost with 4,953 votes to Henriot's 6,665. Henriot recalled that his election as deputy gave the lie to the objections of M. de Kerillis.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>Irvine, *op. cit.*, 562.

<sup>51</sup>Henriot, "Souvenirs d'un Militant," *op. cit.*

Henriot assumed Bergey's vacant seat, joining Louis Marin in the Chamber. His personal victory, however, was a defeat for Tardieu's *Bloc National*. The Radical "old gang" was back in power. Herriot replaced an ailing Briand as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chautemps as Interior Minister, Paul-Boncour as Minister of War, Daladier as Public Works' Minister, Sarraut as Minister of Colonies, and Painlevé as the Air Minister. Henriot commented that Edouard Herriot had lost a little of his panache since the Cartel, but remained proud and majestic. Even Léon Blum's legal sophistry was no match for Herriot's oratory.<sup>52</sup> In the course of one speech Herriot chided his rivals declaring, "I know that this side of the Assembly reproaches me, but it is better to have one's hand on the heart than on his portfolio [*portefeuille* - a double entendre for wallet]." Henriot responded, "Yes but one has two hands!" The Assembly dissolved into laughter but Henriot was convinced that his riposte had incurred Herriot's enmity.<sup>53</sup>

Events in Germany raised anew the question of peace and security for France. With the publication of Gustav Stresemann's memoirs and Hitler's claims on Danzig, Henriot recognized that both statesman and agitator shared a common will to overthrow the Versailles settlement. Stresemann had signed Locarno not to assure peace but to maintain the status quo in the West, assuaging Britain and France while maintaining Germany's claims in Central Europe. Henriot predicted that Germany would continue to deny her obligations as outlined in the Young Plan and the Hoover Moratorium. Briand's

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<sup>52</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'encombrante victoire," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, June 1932, 1.

<sup>53</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Souvenirs d'un Militant," *op. cit.*

vision of Europe was balanced precariously between a threatened Poland, a tottering Weimar Republic and a repudiated Locarno.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, Germany's refusal to pay further reparations was the Lausanne conference's *coup de théâtre*. The Germans defaulted on reparations, but French loans to the United States were not forgiven. With the flight of the franc, Henriot complained that America remained master of France's destiny while war debts postponed economic recovery.<sup>55</sup> Herriot's declaration that his ministry would stand or fall on France honouring her debts was a speech worthy of the *Académie Française*, but, Henriot noted, "after the oratory will come the accounting."<sup>56</sup> France was forced to reduce military spending while Germany rearmed: there was one law for the victor and another for the defeated. The Hoover moratorium reduced France's reparations from 34 milliard to 3 milliard francs condemning French taxpayers to pay for Germany's default.<sup>57</sup> France was saddled with debts without guarantees, money, or allies, regarded with scorn by some, envy by others, and anger by the rest.<sup>58</sup> Herriot's election slogan -- "On what will we build the new international order, if it is not on the binding agreement of freely-exchanged contracts?" --- sounded hollow when German statesmen hammered the table with their fists and slammed doors behind them when

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<sup>54</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Locarno-Lausanne via Danzig...", *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 4 June 1932, 1.

<sup>55</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le 'coup de théâtre' de Lausanne," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 22 June 1932, 1.

<sup>56</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'agonie de Lausanne," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 10 July 1932, 1.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les ennemis de la paix," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 9 October 1932, 1.



concessions were not forthcoming.<sup>59</sup>

Those such as Herriot who sought to defend France were branded militarists and defeatists. Socialist propaganda portrayed France as armed to the teeth, impoverishing her citizenry with military budgets. Herriot, the consummate politician, claimed to stand by Versailles while assuring Blum that he would dismantle it.<sup>60</sup> The Radical-Socialist *entente* was maintained by Herriot's appeasement of the pacifist left by calling for a "moral disarmament," and a reciprocal disbandment of the *Reichswehr* and the French Army from professional standing armies into reservist national armies. Herriot's folly was a "splendid innocence" in pursuit of a mirage, in Herriot's view; he added that the Premier's *démarche* must have provoked a derisory outburst from the German General Staff, the nucleus of German militarism and the instrument of German revenge.<sup>61</sup> Herriot's and Briand's armaments reductions weakened France, while Germany's "government of barons" planned the next move.<sup>62</sup>

Herriot's ministry collapsed over his decision to honour France's war debt. A non-confidence motion of 10 November carried and defeated the Premier by 402-187 votes. Paul-Boncour's ministry lasted until the following January. Locarno was dead,

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<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup>Philippe Herriot, "L'accablante tutelle," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 23 September 1932, 1.

<sup>61</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Dans les nuées de 'plan constructif'...", *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 1 Nov. 1932, 1.

<sup>62</sup>Herriot, "Les ennemis de la paix," *op. cit.*

Briand's vision in ruins. The Chamber turned its back on him when he ran for the Presidency, and he died shortly after his retirement in 1932, a broken man. France's "cascade of ministries" continued into 1933, beginning unpropitiously with the resignation of Paul-Boncour's Radical ministry and the formation of Daladier's cabinet on 29 January. The following day Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor by President Hindenburg. So much for Léon Blum's prophecy that Hitler was finished with his defeat in the German Presidential elections.<sup>63</sup> In April Hitler assumed emergency powers and announced Germany's rearmament. Henriot reminded the Socialists that Briandism, "the cosmopolitan idyll encouraged by Geneva's "bureau of reveries," had chloroformed France while Germany rearmed. Geneva's "successive fictions of pactomania," its revisions and conciliations had aggravated rather than pacified Germany. France was now confronted by an aggressive military dictatorship.<sup>64</sup> Herriot was forced to admit defeat: "We cannot seriously defend peace by crying 'Down with war'! "There was no mistaking Hitler's objectives to overturn the Peace settlement, if necessary "by the sword." <sup>65</sup> Henriot suggested that Blum's Talmud be exchanged for a New Testament, i.e., a fundamental reorientation in French foreign policy. Germany withdrew from the League of Nations Disarmament Conference on 15 October 1933. The spirit of Locarno had given up the ghost. Poincaré, who had once the nerve to occupy the Ruhr, retired to his

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<sup>63</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Nouveau Testament," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 14 September 1933, 1.

<sup>64</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Redressement nécessaire de notre politique extérieure," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 13 April 1933, 1.

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*

country house at Sampigny in Lorraine, looking anxiously at the Eastern horizon. He felt that "they would come again."<sup>66</sup>

The price of peace was prosperity. The collapse of prosperity endangered both social and international peace. France emerged from post-war reconstruction only to see another war on the horizon. The old guard was passing away. Gustav Stresemann died on 3 October 1929, Georges Clemenceau on 24 November -- as did Marshal Foch, who had predicted a twenty-year armistice. Marshal Joffre, the victor of the Marne, died on 3 January 1931 and was followed by Aristide Briand, his New International World Order in ruins. President Hindenburg died in 1934. Henriot described public disillusionment as an "àquoibonisme" a paralysed political machine that functioned through habit impervious to the popular hope for strong government. For Henriot and others, the political gridlock of Republican politics lead first to frustration and then to open rebellion. Gone was the *union sacrée* of 1914, the Blue Horizon Chamber of 1919 and, with it, the spirit of victory, the war to end war.

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<sup>66</sup>Alexander Werth, *The Twilight of France 1933-1940* (New York: Harper, 1942), 5.

### Chapter 3: February Sixth & Ethiopia, 1933-1936

Stanley Hoffmann described France as a stalemate society in which political parties occupied power rather than governed.<sup>1</sup> For Philippe Henriot, the political gridlock led first to frustration and then to open rebellion; "the decay of leadership -- the primary justification for the rebellion of the masses."<sup>2</sup> The league-led riots of February Sixth, the most serious public violence since the Commune, shattered the republican synthesis. The government that formerly divided France the least had come to represent the worst of all possible worlds. The Ethiopian crisis and the League of Nations' debate over collective security sanctions dramatized the debate on peace or war.

Radicals were courted by both Léon Blum's Socialists and André Tardieu's Nationalists for the 1932 elections, but Herriot refused to commit the Radicals to either camp and "mortgage the decisions of universal suffrage."<sup>3</sup> His neutrality paid off with an unexpected Radical victory at the polls. Herriot feared that power-sharing with the Socialists would force his ministry to implement massive defence cuts, nationalization of the railways, and the arms industry, prohibition of the weapons trade, and a forty-hour work week.<sup>4</sup> Herriot's task was to placate conservative fiscal interests, by keeping the

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<sup>1</sup>Peter J. Larmour, *The French Radical Party in the 1930's* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 66-7.

<sup>2</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Les Miettes du Banquet*, (Paris: Editions "Alsatia", 1938), 10. "La carence des dirigeants est la principale justification de la rébellion des masses."

<sup>3</sup>Larmour, *op. cit.*, 105-7.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 115.

Socialists out of power without dividing the Radicals. Joseph Caillaux was applauded at the 1933 Radical Congress when he declared that "the French State must behave like a good housewife. You must align your receipts on one side, and your expenses on the other."<sup>5</sup> The financiers, the "mur d'argent," had defeated the *Cartel des Gauches* in 1926, and Herriot tried to reassure them with a conservative fiscal policy while promising the Socialists to "fight the economic crisis."<sup>6</sup> Herriot's conservative realism reassured the monied interests while his Geneva Protocol for international arbitration and gradual disarmament had placated the Left. It was a precarious balance between the economic issue of rising unemployment and the issue of national security. February Sixth and a deteriorating international situation that culminated in the Ethiopian crisis ensured that France's parliamentary centre was unable to bridge the polarization of French politics.

Henriot perceived a growing affinity between the *Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière* (SFIO) and the *Parti communiste français* (PCF). Left solidarity was in sharp contrast to dissent at the Centre.<sup>7</sup> Political power relationships were shifting also within Marin's Republican Federation. The loss of twenty seats to the Left in the 1932 election was put down to the abuses of republican democracy and a naive

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<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 109.

<sup>7</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Avignon, ville des Papes - et des Antipapes...", *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 26 April 1933, 1.

electorate.<sup>8</sup> But this explanation masked problems within the Federation itself. The Federation was losing its place; internal rifts suggested a political crisis within the party that appeared with Henry de Kerillis' challenge contesting Henriot's nomination and challenging Marin and his moderates. Marin's motion of censure against Kerillis passed only with a narrow majority.<sup>9</sup>

Other challenges came from Auguste Champetier de Ribes' liberal Catholic *Parti Démocrate Populaire* (PDP) program of pacifism and social Catholicism. De Ribes' paper, *Le Petit Démocrate*, commented that the Federation's moderate Republicanism was gravitating more towards the *Action Française* with the likes of Philippe Henriot and François de Wendel. Marin's paper, *La Nation*, responded by criticising the PDP's "Briandism" and its social Catholicism, which bordered on a "blasphemous rapprochement between the gospels and Revolution."<sup>10</sup> The *Parti Démocrate Populaire* fielded Jacques Rödel to oppose Henriot, revealing divisions in Catholic support. Of the eighty deputies remaining under the Federation banner, only half agreed to vote with the Federation bloc in the new Chamber. The remainder elected to form the *Indépendants républicains et sociaux* under Georges Pernot, a Republican Federation vice-president.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>William Irvine, "French Conservatives and the 'New Right' during the 1930s," *French Historical Studies* VIII, no. 4 (Fall 1974), 535.

<sup>9</sup> William D. Irvine, *French Conservatism in Crisis: The Republican Federation of France in the 1930s*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 56-57.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 58-59.

In reality, the party was no more than a federation. Its republicanism had lost its meaning.

The Republican Federation then, was a Catholic rural party that included eleven counts, five marquises, four barons, two dukes and a prince. Their social prestige gave them access to funds and influence that often assured election or reelection.<sup>12</sup> Marin's friend and fellow deputy from Meurthe-et-Moselle, François de Wendel, secretary-general of the powerful iron and steel cartel, the *Comité des Forges*, was a persistent source of controversy in the 1920s and 1930s. Federation critics charged that de Wendel was the real party leader.<sup>13</sup> François de Wendel was a major source of funding for Taittinger's *Jeunesses Patriotes*. Pierre Taittinger and Jean Ybarnégaray were honorary vice-presidents of the Federation. Philippe Henriot was an honorary vice-president of the league. At the 1929 Federation congress, Edouard Soulier acknowledged the JP as "vigilant defenders of order and public liberty."<sup>14</sup> The Federation alliance with the *Jeunesses Patriotes* deputies Marin's *entente* with Taittinger proved beneficial to both.

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<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 18-19, 23.

<sup>13</sup>William D. Irvine, "French Conservatives and the 'New Right' during the 1930s," *op. cit.*, 537. Whereas the *Action française*, *Solidarité française* and the *Francistes* were leagues and not parties, Taittinger's league had a strong representation in the 1928 legislature with seventy-seven JP deputies.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, 538. The Federation's alliance with the *Jeunesses Patriotes* also included the *Croix de Feu*. Federation vice-presidents Xavier Vallat, François de Wendel, Louis Duval-Arnould, Jacques Poitou-Duplessy, and Jean Ybarnégaray were *Croix de Feu* members while Philippe Henriot served as honorary vice-president of *Jeunesses Patriotes*. William Irvine explains that such dual memberships were designed to further electoral fortunes.

But there was division between party moderates who were challenged by the party militants such as Henriot and Vallat.

The political crisis was evident in the succession of unstable centre coalitions. One of Henriot's first questions in the Chamber asked, with false naïveté, if the government still governed. Socialist deputy Charles Baron replied that this was demanding the impossible.<sup>15</sup> Daladier's cabinet fell ten days after Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations Disarmament Conference on 15 October 1933. Maurice Sarraut's cabinet fell to Camille Chautemps, whose ministry collapsed in turn with the events of 6 February 1934.<sup>16</sup> The Chamber always overthrew the same coalition government.<sup>17</sup> Agitation against the political cover-up of the Stavisky Affair had caught fire with increasing incidents of street violence. Serge Alexandre Stavisky, a Russian Jew and junk-bond dealer, was discovered dead in a Chamonix chalet on 8 January 1934. Henriot uncovered another lead to the scandal under mysterious circumstances. In the company of Horace de Carbuccia, *Gringoire's* editor, Henriot was approached by an unknown woman who refused to identify herself but gave Henriot the name of the *Société du Crédit Commercial et Industriel* which held some of Stavisky's accounts. During the

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<sup>15</sup>François Brigneau, *Le Jour Ils Tuèrent Philippe Henriot*, (Paris: Publications FB, 1992), 27-28. Henriot questioned, "Je voudrais bien savoir si c'est encore le gouvernement qui gouverne." Baron answered, "Il ne faut pas demander l'impossible." Horace de Carbuccia, Deputy for Corsica and *Gringoire's* director, reported that the Chamber burst out laughing.

<sup>16</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le sursis," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 6 November 1933, 1.

<sup>17</sup>John M. Sherwood, *Georges Mandel and the Third Republic*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970,) 137.



Chamber debate on the emerging Bayonne financial scandal, Henriot volunteered to aid the Chautemps' ministry in its inquiry by identifying the bank holding the accounts that were subsequently discovered. Henriot was acclaimed for breaking the conspiracy of silence and exposing corruption.<sup>18</sup>

Implicated in the affair were prominent Radical deputies, Joseph Garat and Gaston Bonnaure; and Radical lawyers André Hesse and René Renoult, instrumental in gaining nineteen adjournments of Stavisky's prosecution for criminal fraud. Political corruption implicated deputies, ministers, superior court judges, police officers, and newspaper owners, predominantly Radicals and Freemasons. Premier Chautemps was doubly implicated by supporting Dalimier, the *Garde des Sceaux*, and Chautemps' brother-in-law Pressard, the attorney-general.<sup>19</sup> On 11 January, Henriot referred to the strange immunity enjoyed by many who benefited from powerful official protection. He asked what measures, besides lip-service, the Government planned to take to protect the savings of workers and small investors from criminals who exploited public confidence.<sup>20</sup> *L'Humanité* and *le Populaire* regarded Stavisky as "the man who knew too much." Kerillis' *L'Echo de Paris* featured a Sennep cartoon with Stavisky's coffin carrying the caption, "Un meuble signé Pressard-Chautemps est garanti pour longtemps." Violent

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<sup>18</sup>Brigneau, *op. cit.*, 30-31.

<sup>19</sup>Philippe Rudaux, *Les Croix de Feu et Le P.S.F.*, (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1967), 62.

<sup>20</sup>*Journal officiel*, session Thursday 11 January 1934, 20.

street demonstrations throughout January were inspired by *l'Action française*, joined by Taittinger's *Jeunesses Patriotes* and Colonel de la Rocque's *Croix de Feu*. As street violence mounted, deputies spoke of "démocratie en danger" -- a Jacobin ploy to divert public anger, was Henriot's appraisal.<sup>21</sup>

The Stavisky Affair prompted Chautemps' resignation on 27 January 1934 while Daladier assumed office amid increasing public protests. Addressing the Ambassadors Conference in February, Henriot spoke of the "Republic of Pals" as a camaraderie where services were rendered for reciprocal favours.<sup>22</sup> He remarked that the lack of popular confidence was the disillusionment between the people and their representatives. Silence over the Stavisky affair betokened complicity, and deputies who reproached the discredited Cabinet were condemned by those who committed them.<sup>23</sup> Henriot and the national deputies in the Chamber refused to be satisfied with the dismissal of the Stavisky Affair as a banal affair of swindlers. Henriot replied, "Banal so be it! if one means by that that it occurs far too frequently. But not so banal if one means that the frequency of its repetition has become chronic." He recalled Maurice Barrès' observation, "It is imperative to remember that a crook only succeeds when he induces the powerful into his swindles."<sup>24</sup> The Radical hierarchy were demagogues of neo-caesarism, plagiarists

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<sup>21</sup>Larmour, *op. cit.*, 141.

<sup>22</sup>Philippe Henriot, *L'Envers du Décor du Palais-Bourbon* (Paris: Editions des Ambassadeurs, 1934), 16.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 20.

of Robespierre and Saint-Just, unmasked by the public demand for justice.<sup>25</sup>

Daladier approached the Socialists and the Republican Federation in the hope of forming another Concentration government. To placate the Socialists, Daladier sacked Paris prefect of police, Jean Chiappe, who had powerful friends among Parisian deputies and Paris' municipal councillors. Chiappe's dismissal was a provocation for the nationalist militants who regarded Chiappe as the force of authority, order, and repression of left militancy.<sup>26</sup> In the evening of 6 February, protesting right-wing leagues converged on the Place de la Concorde, across the Seine from the Palais-Bourbon, and joined the war veterans calling for the resignation of the government. While frightened deputies debated the formation of the Daladier cabinet, rioters stormed the police barricades. Militants of the *Action Française*, *Jeunesses Patriotes*, *Solidarité Française*, and the *Croix de Feu* were joined by students of the *Phalanges Universitaires*, and *Anciens Combattants*. Henriot portrayed Palais-Bourbon deputies, who formerly addressed their electors as citizens, now trembled before the *enragés*.<sup>27</sup> Premier Daladier and Interior Minister Eugen Frot reinforced the police with infantry and armoured units. The rioting lasted until midnight, the Republican *Gardes mobiles* held the line until Colonel de la Rocque called off the *Croix de Feu*. Casualties numbered

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<sup>25</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Le 6 février* (Paris: Flammarion, 1934), 33.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 169.

fifteen dead and over two thousand wounded.<sup>28</sup> The following day, Jean Ybarnégaray warned Daladier that more bloodshed would follow if the Premier did not resign. Public outrage was at a fever pitch. Even Marshal Lyautey threatened to march on the Chamber at the head of Taittinger's *Patriotes* if Daladier refused to resign.<sup>29</sup> Despite an overwhelming vote of confidence, Daladier's nerve was broken and the "government of assassins" resigned at noon.<sup>30</sup>

Was February 6th another "march on Rome?" Henriot perceived the leagues, led by Colonel François de la Rocque's *Croix de Feu*, united in a new *union sacrée* for the defence of eternal France.<sup>31</sup> To accusations that February 6th was an attempted coup by the radical Right, Henriot suggested that war veterans, wearing the *Croix de Guerre* and *Médaille Militaire*, were unlikely revolutionaries whose motto was "that France live by honesty and integrity."<sup>32</sup> The police fired without warning. The results were the same: "The government of this tragic night took fright and fled! You have won the battle and a victory for the future of France!"<sup>33</sup> For Henriot, the fall of Daladier was a victory paid for in blood. Conspiracy lay not with the leagues but with the masonic lodges and

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<sup>28</sup>Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, *The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938*, translated by Anthony Forster, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 226.

<sup>29</sup>Alexander Werth, *The Twilight of France 1933-1940*, (New York: Harper, 1942), 19.

<sup>30</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Le 6 février, op. cit.*, 212-13.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 164.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 183-90. "Pour que la France vive honnête et propre."

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 213-14.

criminals within the government. Daladier's place in history was assured as "the executioner of February 6th."<sup>34</sup> For Henriot, "The revolt of the obedient is often the consequence of those who dared not command." February 6th pitted a national-revolutionary army against the "poisonous intellectual Bolshevism of social division and moral decomposition."<sup>35</sup>

Taittinger's *Jeunesses Patriotes* called for the resignation of all deputies and the formation of a Committee of Public Safety. A plebiscitarian dictatorship evoked fears of a French Mussolini, which he calmed with reassurances of a "republican fascism."<sup>36</sup> Henriot saw the man on horseback, a modern Robespierre, Saint-Just, or Bonaparte leading an authoritarian government of élites.<sup>37</sup> A French Mussolini, a Jean Chiappe or General Maxime Weygand, would have the authority to ensure domestic and foreign security.<sup>38</sup> For Philippe Henriot, Robert Brasillach, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, and others, February 6th was the incarnation of the National Revolution, a restoration of the principles of "God, labour, family." Henriot perceived February 6th as the blood of France shed on the Calvary of the Place de la Concorde. Here was a new France whose

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<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, VI-XI.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, 235-9.

<sup>36</sup>Irvine, "French Conservatives and the 'New Right', *op. cit.*, 536.

<sup>37</sup>Henriot, *op. cit.*, 49-57.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 161-2.

soldiers and citizens had spoken.<sup>39</sup>

The collapse of law and order left the Radicals shaken. Gaston Doumergue, a retired Radical and mason, was called by President Doumer to head a government of "National Truce" and "Republican Defence" against the threatened Republic. Doumergue, hailed as another Joan of Arc, a Foch, and a Clemenceau, was unequal to his press. The Truce was a nationalist/Radical ministry with André Tardieu and Édouard Herriot as ministers of State, Henri Chéron in the Justice portfolio, Louis Barthou in Foreign Affairs, Marshal Pétain in War, and Albert Sarraut as Interior Minister. Herriot saw the truce as an opportunity to merge the Bloc national, Concentration, and the Cartel in a union against revolution.<sup>40</sup> The appearance of the Common Front to oppose the threat of fascism presented by the leagues gained the attention of Herriot's colleague, Xavier Vallat, who declared that the interests of Israel and Moscow were not the voice of France.<sup>41</sup> Herriot balked at the methods of Italian Fascists and German Nazis, but admitted that they had achieved results.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 243-4.

<sup>40</sup>Philippe Herriot, *Mort de la Trêve* (Paris: Flammarion, 1934), 23-4.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 58-61. Xavier Vallat, a distinguished war veteran, and amputee, blind in one eye, was elected as monarchist deputy for the Ardèche in 1919, defeated in 1924, and reelected in 1928. A devout Catholic, nationalist, and an anti-Semite, he flirted with Georges Valois' *Faisceau*, Charles Maurras' *Action Française*, and Colonel François de la Rocque's *Croix de Feu*. Attracted to Marin's revanchism, Vallat joined the Republican Federation in 1933 more from a sense of opportunism than political conviction. See his *Le Nez de Cléopâtre*; also William D. Irvine, *French Conservatism in Crisis: The Republican Federation of France in the 1930s*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 15-16.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 53-4.

February Sixth for Henriot was the great divide. Here he had crossed the line separating traditional Catholic conservatism and a militant nationalism: Henriot's *chef*, the charismatic leader, a Weygand and a Chiappe, was the search for a modern Napoleon. The exclusive notion of true France, *le pays réel*, was at odds with the Republican veneer of *le pays légal*. Added to the fascist formula was the cult of energy expressed in the myth of February 6th. The great hope of February 6th was the great fear that inspired the Common Front against fascism. Henriot's propaganda of the single enemy demonized communists, masons, and Jews as the enemy within. The "method" that Henriot balked at was the recourse to violence. But his propaganda was violent in his thoughts and words. And for a Catholic, the sin, once conceived, is indeed committed.

Henriot christened the Stavisky and February 6th inquiries the "Commission of Thieves" and the "Commission of Fusiliers" held to exonerate the guilty.<sup>43</sup> Henriot's address to the *Ligue national anti-maçonnique* in March outlined the "masonic conspiracy;"<sup>44</sup> of the anti-clerical *Cartel des Gauches*, the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, and the *Ligue de l'Enseignement* dedicating to "republicanizing" France. Both Henriot and Vallat applauded Mussolini's purge of the masonic lodges in Italy.<sup>45</sup> Speaking as honorary President of the National Anti-Masonic League, Henriot cited the

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<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 93-4.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 115-17.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 111-13.

Stavisky conspirators as masons whose loyalties lay with their brotherhood, not their constituents.<sup>46</sup> Doumergue's ministry of truce and appeasement was no more than a temporary suspension of hostilities in preparation of future battles.<sup>47</sup> A symbol of hope in February had become, by October, an epitaph for failure. Henriot noted that with the crisis overcome, the government dissolved once more into its constituent rivalries.

Hitler chose the French political crisis as the first of his subsequent attempts to overthrow the Versailles Peace Settlement and the League of Nations. In October 1933, after failing to secure the acceptance of Germany's "equal rights," Hitler withdrew from both the disarmament conference and the League of Nations. Three months later, Hitler concluded a non-aggression pact with Poland on 26 January 1934. Germany's non-aggression pact with Poland was the first crack in the French alliance system. The French decision to extend compulsory military service from one to two years, to offset the falling birth-rate, was Hitler's cue to announce Germany's rearmament on 16 March 1935. League protests were ignored. The abortive Austrian Nazi *coup* in July 1934 succeeded in assassinating Chancellor Dolfuss but failed to take Vienna. Hitler's declaration of Germany's Anschluss with Austria was a blatant violation of the provisions of the Versailles Settlement. Mussolini challenged Hitler, mobilizing an Italian division to the Brenner Pass to defend Austria's independence. Henriot's perception of Mussolini,

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<sup>46</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Les Méfaits de la Franc-Maçonnerie*, (Paris: Ligue Nationale Anti-Maçonnique, 1934), 20-3.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, VIII-IX.



too, had changed and

become more favourable: the "Carnival Caesar" was now a Julius Caesar with an Imperial vision.<sup>48</sup> Returning from Italy in September, Henriot spoke of fascism's limited freedoms and order, a disciplined youth, and social programs unknown in "so-called social democracies."<sup>49</sup>

On 9 October 1934 King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Foreign Minister Louis Barthou were assassinated in Marseille by Croatian nationalists financed by Mussolini. Henriot described the work as that of "ghetto fugitives posing as political refugees infecting France with the microbe of foreign propaganda."<sup>50</sup> Foreign Minister Louis Barthou's *démarche* between Paris and Rome had not only saved Austria but perhaps even the peace. Henriot regarded Fascist Italy in a new light after Hitler's Anschluss was foiled by Mussolini. "Before France can criticize the loss of democratic freedoms, she could look to the dictatorship of the fisc and its economic control over liberty." Fearing that the Marseille murders might spark another Sarajevo, Henriot counselled moderation in Belgrade.<sup>51</sup>

Henriot's political affinities were to international politics. An Italian alliance with

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<sup>48</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Regard sur le Fascisme," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 26 July 1933, 1.

<sup>49</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Mort de la Trêve*, op.,. cit., 202.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 190-2.

<sup>51</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les Amitiés Imprudentes," *France d'abord*, no. 17 (1 December 1934), 1-2.

France bespoke a Latin community of interests, the old fraternity of arms, and a basis for European peace. The *entente* appeared more imperative with each of Hitler's initiatives. Throughout October and November Henriot was occupied with public speaking engagements in Paris, Louviers, Bordeaux, Louvain, and Brussels. On 3 December, he addressed France's foreign policy issues before a Salle Wagram audience. The threat of a resurgent Germany was due to the League of Nations, "noble in its intentions and powerless in its results." Bi-lateral pacts and resolutions could accomplish little against German rearmament. France's alliance with Poland was circumvented by Poland's non-aggression pact with Germany. The failed Anschluss rendered a Franco-Italian alliance crucial to confront the German menace. War Minister Marshal Pétain demanded one billion francs for rearmament, warning that Germany's military budget was double that of France. The other threat lay with the Comintern where the Third Internationale and Soviet foreign policy designs dictated the objectives of the French Communist Party.<sup>52</sup>

The international scene also dominated the 1935 Radical Congress, divided over the means to ensure peace. Some urged Herriot to maintain guard over the Republic's frontiers, while Pierre Cot advocated an accelerated disarmament program and the organization of an international force at the disposal of the League of Nations.<sup>53</sup> Peace

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<sup>52</sup>Jean Rougier, "Contre la Guerre," *Jeunesse* 34, no. 7 (December 1934), 2.

<sup>53</sup>Henriot, *Mort de la Trêve*, 224-5.

in Europe was again at risk as reparations gave way to rearmament. Henriot compared France's politicians to the senators of Imperial Rome who debated what sauce would be most palatable for the fish entrée while the barbarians besieged the gates.

February 6th 1935 was commemorated in a Notre Dame ceremony attended by militants of the *Action Française*, *Croix de Feu*, *Anciens Combattants* and the *Jeunesses Patriotes*.<sup>54</sup> The National Front was one attempt to capitalize on the event. The Federation supported the Front at local, provincial, and national levels at its National Congress at Nice in April.<sup>55</sup> At the Congress Henriot was named President of the *Jeunesses de la Fédération Républicaine de France* to coordinate the Federation's senior and junior members.<sup>56</sup> Marin's efforts to reinvigorate the party with a youth wing had been prompted by declining membership, as many responded to the attractions of the more militant leagues. By 1934, the challenges to the Republican Federation by the *Croix de Feu* and the Communists had inspired the formation of a youth and a women's auxiliary to the party. This was not an attempt to broaden the party's base so much as an effort to renew the Federation's élite.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Jean Rougier, "Le Six Février," *Jeunesse* 35, no. 9 (February 1935), 3.

<sup>55</sup>"Le X<sup>e</sup> Congrès de l'U.P.R. présidé par Philippe Henriot," *Jeunesse* 35, no. 11 (April 1935), 2.

<sup>56</sup>"Le Comité Directeur des Jeunesses de la Fédération Républicaine de France a été constitué à Nice au cours du Congrès du Parti," *Jeunesse* 35, no. 12 (May 1935), 1.

<sup>57</sup>William Irvine, *French Conservatism in Crisis: The Republican Federation of France in the 1930s*, *op. cit.*, 31-33, 65. The Women's Section collaborated with the National Federation of Women for women's suffrage. Its monthly bulletin, *Les Devoirs des Femmes*, was mostly reprints from *La Nation* on the home and family and a condemnation of Blum's *Du Mariage*.

Henriot's ill-disguised impatience with parliamentary tradition led his contemporaries to wonder what he was doing in the Republican Federation. Jean-Pierre Maxence described him as "lashing, effective, magnificent when leading a charge," but "uncertain in matters of general politics." Relations with Louis Marin were cool, but Henriot remained loyal to the Federation against its younger challengers.<sup>58</sup> By March 1935 Henriot was devoting his energies to his many duties as Bordeaux deputy, director of the Gironde's *Union Populaire Républicaine*, and editor of the Federation's *Jeunesse*.

With a "business as usual" attitude after the Doumergue truce, the elusive search for a parliamentary majority resumed. Henriot summarized the political situation thus: Germany threatened foreign war, Communism threatened civil war, and masonry created unemployment.<sup>59</sup> Premier Pierre-Etienne Flandin's warning that his ministry was "the régime's last card" failed to gain the majority necessary for decree powers. The thirteenth of May marked the beginning of financial panic which earned Flandin a vote of non-confidence. The Bouisson Ministry's "Government of National Union" fared no better, being defeated on 5 June by a narrow vote of 264 to 262. Pierre Laval's government surprised everyone on 7 June by receiving the elusive decree powers to defend the franc. Henriot attributed Laval's victory to parliamentary lassitude, deputies' fear of their constituents, corridor strategies, and Laval's diplomacy. The monetary crisis

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*Les Devoirs* had only 1,625 subscribers.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>59</sup>Henriot, *Mort de la Trêve*, *op. cit.*, 245-6.

was eclipsed by the formation of the Popular Front and the Italian aggression against Ethiopia.<sup>60</sup>

The origin of the Popular Front was in the "Republican defence" demonstrations of the Common Front held on February ninth and twelfth on the heels of the leagues' show of strength on February 6th. The Comintern's directive of 15 May 1935 revealed how seriously it had underestimated the Nazi threat to German Communists and instructed the French Communist party to support France's national defence "against war and fascism." At a stroke, the major obstacle to the creation of the Popular Front was removed. French Communists were joined by Left-Radicals eager to form a Popular Front government on the spot. Herriot, Delbos, and Daladier refused, instead conceding the field to Laval who ignored increasing league posturing especially by *Croix de Feu* "mobilizations" and Action Française violence.<sup>61</sup> Bastille Day 1935 found Radicals, Socialists, and Communists parading under the hammer and sickle, crying for bread, liberty, and peace. The Popular Front's "defence of liberty" called for the disarming and dissolution of the "fascist" leagues and controls on libel and character assassination in the press. Its social program included trade-union rights, a forty-hour week, paid holidays, and extended compulsory education.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Extreme urgence," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 16 June 1935, 1.

<sup>61</sup>Larmour, *op. cit.*, 170.

<sup>62</sup>Joel Colton, *Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 111-14.

Henriot belittled the Popular Front: "If France is weary of parties, it is drunk with programs." The Radical alliance with Socialists and Communists promised to simplify politics by eliminating the Radical party.<sup>63</sup> The "red spectre" appeared on Bastille Day, Sunday, 14 July, with Popular Front demonstrations throughout France to celebrate the unity of the Left. The Revolutionary holiday was not without incident as tempers flared in the politically-charged atmosphere. While the Popular Front confronted the threat of war and fascism, the National Front defended the "collective" and historic principles of faith, patriotism and morality.<sup>64</sup>

The Ethiopian crisis further aggravated political and social tensions as France looked to Pierre Laval's peace initiatives. Laval was convinced that peace in Europe rested on a Franco-German entente against Communist incursions and British manipulations.<sup>65</sup> His policy was rooted also in his horror of another war. He had no alternative but to accept Hitler's peace declarations to seek a *modus vivendi* with France. Laval observed that "war would mean the end of Christian civilization."<sup>66</sup> While

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<sup>63</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La fin des partis?" *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 7 July 1935, 1.

<sup>64</sup>"Exemple à suivre: Cinquante 'salopards' matés par les J.U.P.R.," *Jeunesse* 35, no. 14 (July-August 1935), 2. One local Popular Front parade in Pessac-sur-Dordogne was led by immense red flags emblazoned with a hammer and sickle. The parade was met by *Jeunesses de l'Union Populaire Républicaine* (JUPR). Insults against Colonel de la Rocque, Henriot and fascism provoked a melee. "The riot ended not with the Internationale but with 'Ça ira... les salopards à la lanterne!'" *Jeunesse* reported that "justice was meted out to foreigners-bolsheviks, with heads bowed and flags folded, who learned that France was not the Soviet Union."

<sup>65</sup>Geoffrey Warner, *Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France*, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoodie, 1968), 23-4.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, 60.

Barthou had looked to Italy as an ally against Germany, Laval sought the Italian connection as the basis for an agreement with Germany.<sup>67</sup> The Anglo-French-Italian summit held at Stresa from 11 to 14 April 1935 resolved to present a united front against any future attempt to annex Austria. Three days after the end of the conference, the League of Nations council, meeting in extraordinary session, passed a resolution sponsored by the same three powers which condemned the German government's unilateral action and called for a strengthening of the Covenant. "Stresa and Geneva," wrote André François-Poncet, the French ambassador in Berlin, "were the high-water mark of European solidarity against the ambitions of the Reich...."<sup>68</sup>

Henriot applauded the "Tripartite Front" and France's *rapprochement* with Italy. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June, 1935, came as a shock. The British accord agreed to the construction of a *Kriegsmarine* with a capital ship ratio of 3:1 and unlimited submarine construction. Henriot considered that the treaty was an outright betrayal of an *entente* that was anything but cordial. His anglophobia found ample justification in history: centuries of rivalry were reminders that France's battles were against Albion -- Crécy, Fontenoy, Trafalgar, Waterloo, Fashoda.<sup>69</sup> England, the suzerain of Egypt, Sudan, West Africa, Bechuanaland, the Transvaal, and the Cape, considered Africa *her* continent. But Mussolini refused to take lessons from London on

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<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>69</sup>Philippe Henriot, "De Fachoda à Mogadiscio," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 30 June 1935, 1.

colonial morality. Henriot suggested that French diplomats could follow Mussolini by saying "no" to England.<sup>70</sup>

In June 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare replaced Sir John Simon at the foreign office, and Anthony Eden entered the British cabinet as minister to the League of Nations. Seeking to placate Mussolini, the British Foreign Secretary proposed that Ethiopia relinquish territory in the southern Ogaden province in exchange for a portion of British Somalia which included the port of Zeila. Eden was deputed to take this proposal to Rome. Again, the British initiative was taken without prior consultation with the French in the hopes of presenting a *fait accompli*.<sup>71</sup> Mussolini, however, rejected the proposal during talks on 24 and 25 June. The British had two alternatives. The first was to make it plain to Italy that Britain would not tolerate aggression and would use all her resources and those of the League of Nations to stop it. The second alternative was to let Italy have her way in Ethiopia. Foreign minister Hoare's "double line" consisted of negotiating with Italy while paying lip-service to the League's collective security.<sup>72</sup>

Briand's vow to the League of Nations, "Tant que je serai là, il n'y aura pas la guerre," did not survive his tenure. Henriot commented that the internationalist disciples of Geneva saw the League as the panacea promising to heal all the ills of humanity, the

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<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 98.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*



most terrible of which was war. Now the shadow of war loomed and the League appeared powerless to prevent it. The threat of League excommunication would result in Italy slamming the door and following Germany's example. Henriot described the League as a worm-ridden idol, the "temple sans foi, l'idole découronné et ses derviches ridiculisés."<sup>73</sup> Power politics and the lessons of history overpowered the illusion of collective security. The crisis precipitated a double volte-face among both the French right and left. Nationalists, fearing the collapse of an already tenuous anti-German front, were averse to antagonizing Italy and protested League sanctions. Socialists and Communists marching in the Popular Front "against war and fascism" advocated firmness. Henriot described how Italy's defenders were branded as reactionaries and fascist sympathizers while the Popular Front Republicans went to the aid of the King of Kings "against war and fascism." With barely veiled anti-semitism, Henriot attacked Léon Blum's "specious pretexts" for peace as "a hatred for a civilization which was not his own."<sup>74</sup> Fearing that escalation would embroil Europe in another war, Henriot's opposition to sanctions was an early example of the shift of pacifism from the left to the right: French Socialists and Communists defended sanctions to deter Italian aggression, while nationalists professed a desire to avoid war. The former *bellicistes* had now become the appeasers.

The shadow of Sarajevo and the escalation in arms production and mobilization

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<sup>73</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La chute de l'idole," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 14 July 1935, 1.

<sup>74</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Faisons Le Point," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 15 September 1935, 1.

inspired Henriot's fear of another deadly game like the one that made the Great War inevitable. Collective security threatened to drag France into war. Article 16 of the Covenant declared that a League member who resorted to war was *ipso facto* considered as having committed *an act of war against all other members of the League*, who were then engaged to break all commercial relations with the aggressor, impose collective sanctions, and threaten League military sanctions. The League was thus at the disposal of one nation determined to act. Henriot observed that England's threat of sanctions, supported by Chile, Denmark, Portugal, and Romania, could be made with impunity as these nations had nothing to fear from Italy, whereas France's support of economic and military sanctions would be considered a hostile act against an ally and a pretext for war.<sup>75</sup>

Catholics who looked for guidance from the Pope received a mixed message that spoke of both "the imperative for expansion" and "the necessity for moderation."<sup>76</sup> Catholic journals such as *Sept*, *L'Aube*, *Esprit* and the Christian Communists of *Terre Nouvelle* joined the Socialist *Populaire* and the Communist *Humanité* chorus condemning the Papal blessing on a "just war" in which patriotism prevailed over Catholic

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<sup>75</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La Guerre ou la Paix? (I) Le Covenant contre la Paix," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 13 October 1935, 1.

<sup>76</sup>René Rémond, *Les Catholiques dans la France des années 30*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1979), 82. "Une chose nous semble hors de doute: c'est-à-dire que si le besoin d'expansion est un fait dont il faut tenir compte, le droit de défense a des limites et des modérations qu'il doit garder, afin qu'il ne soit pas coupable...." was the tenor of Pius XI's address to Catholic nurses on 27 August 1935.

conscience.<sup>77</sup> For Gaston Tessier, Mussolini's blasphemous "crusade" was a dishonourable butchery by those who admired force. Georges Bidault of *L'Aube* wrote on 30 August that the Pope's declaration reinforced his faith *and* his opposition to Mussolini.<sup>78</sup> *Action Française* of 23 September 1935 attempted to intimidate deputies who endorsed sanctions against Italy: "If war breaks out, those responsible will have to answer for it."<sup>79</sup> Henriot was dismayed to see "republican priests" in the ranks of the Popular Front. He cited the Dominican superior-general, Monsignor Gillet, to the effect that Catholicism had no common ground with ideology. Domestically, Catholics sought a restoration of "spiritual unity," the abolition of the Republic's "secular seminaries" of the normal school, and the "restoration of moral conscience" as the foundation for peace.<sup>80</sup> International peace rested on seeing people as they are, not as one would wish them to be. A disarmed France invited invasion; national security demanded frontiers and a strong army.<sup>81</sup> *La Croix*, divided between international law and the realities of power politics, expressed hope for a limited and localized war where political and racial passions were moderated by *sang-froid*.<sup>82</sup> A Catholic Maurrasian, Henri Massis, in his

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<sup>77</sup>*La Terre Nouvelle's* cover page was emblazoned with the symbol of the Cross of Christ in red over the hammer and sickle.

<sup>78</sup>Rémond, *op. cit.*, 83-84.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>80</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Voix catholiques dans la tempête I," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 23 November 1935, 1.

<sup>81</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Voix catholiques dans la tempête II," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 24 November 1935, 1.

<sup>82</sup>Rémond, *op. cit.*, 90.

*Manifesto of French Intellectuals for the Defense of the West and Peace in Europe* on 4 October 1935, declared solidarity with Italy in the name of Western Civilization and European peace. The disastrous alliance with England and Geneva defended equal rights for advanced and backward societies, the civilized and the barbarous, he said.<sup>83</sup> Henriot, too, defended Italy's civilizing mission. Catholics were divided between nationalism, socialism and pacifism, he wrote. Foreign-inspired agitation and propaganda, with the complicity of France's Catholic papers prepared for a future revolution and foreign invasion.<sup>84</sup>

The principle of collective security, which England ignored when it served France against Germany, was invoked when it served England against Italy. In reality, Henriot claimed, the League was the servant of British policy. Blum, Herriot, and Paul-Boncour, the pawns of London and Moscow, were undermining Laval's diplomacy.<sup>85</sup> Henriot claimed that the English anti-fascist and collective security crusade was a war not to save peace but to save the route to the Indies, the source of the Nile, and the oil fields.<sup>86</sup>

"The thoughtlessly generous policy of Aristide Briand has collapsed in the most fearful

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<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*, 95. Massis' manifesto was supported by Cardinal Baudrillart and Gabriel Marcel.

<sup>84</sup>"Salutaire mise au point," *Jeunesse* 35, no. 15 (October 1935), 1.

<sup>85</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La Guerre ou la Paix? (III) Les Coupables," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 15 October 1935, 1.

<sup>86</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La Guerre ou la Paix? (II) Les responsables," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 14 October 1935, 1-2.

of tumults."<sup>87</sup> While Geneviève Tabouis of *l'Oeuvre* wrote that the arms embargo and the blockade of Italian ports in Eritrea and Somalia would prove decisive for peace, Henriot considered such "decisive" gestures as perilous steps to the guillotine. *Jeunesse*, under Henriot's direction, joined the press peace war capturing the mood: "Youth of France! In 1914, the politicians' lack of foresight caused the death of 1,500,000. Now the 'antifascists' seek to send you to be killed anywhere in the world. Against the Assassins! Join us for Peace!"<sup>88</sup>

Speaking before a Bordeaux Republican Federation audience in November, Henriot presented a tableau of European power politics. Germany possessed an air force, an army and, with England's complicity, a fleet. A revived pan-Germanic Imperial agenda envisaged a Germany from Aix-la-Chapelle to Baghdad. The Sudeten Germans' claims of reincorporation with the Reich threatened to divide Czechoslovakia. France's "little *entente*" was weakened by Poland's non-aggression pact with Germany. Furthermore, the League was unable to deter Japan's invasion of China. Now, England's "social conscience" professed to make war in the name of peace. Henriot viewed the Italian expedition as the defence of Italian Somalia and Eritrea from cross-border attacks by Ethiopian tribesmen. He asked, "Who is the aggressor: the country which violates

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<sup>87</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Regards Vers l'Est," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 29 Sept. 1935, 1.

<sup>88</sup>"Communistes et Socialistes nous conduisent à la guerre," *Jeunesse* 35, no. 15 (October 1935), 1.

frontiers or the one which seeks to repress their violation?"<sup>89</sup> Laval, in seeking to conciliate England with an economic embargo, hoped to avoid military sanctions. England hoped to remove Laval and see France declare war on Italy. "Whatever the cost," Henriot declared, "Pierre Laval must remain in power. If the Radicals desert him, Laval will have only 210 votes in the Chamber." Referring to February 6th, Henriot asked his audience, "And how many will he have in the Place de la Concorde?" He received a standing ovation.<sup>90</sup>

Even with domestic political support, Laval's diplomatic dilemma was akin to squaring the circle. Supporting Italy meant rejecting the League; supporting Britain meant supporting the League.<sup>91</sup> In conversation with the new Italian ambassador, Cerruti, on 15 August, Laval offered his support for Mussolini's territorial ambitions but only with League approval and with no recourse to war.<sup>92</sup> But there were dissenters in the cabinet. Henriot favoured negotiation for a peaceful settlement, but added that the League of Nations and Great Britain were the keystone of France's security.<sup>93</sup> Radical sloganeering against fascism was Henriot's tactic to overthrow Laval and resume the direction of the Quai d'Orsay. A vote for the Popular Front, wrote Henriot, was a vote for war:

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<sup>89</sup>Maurice Duverger, "Une magnifique Conférence de Philippe Henriot à Bordeaux sur l'inquiétude européenne," *Jeunesse* 35, no. 16 (November 1935), 2.

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 96.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid.*, 102.

"Tomorrow, England, no longer confronting the courteous resistance of Laval but the spinelessness of Edouard Herriot, will not shirk from burning bridges, and military sanctions, already so menacing, will appear with their terrible and bloody consequences."<sup>94</sup> Blum scorned the argument that sanctions would provoke Mussolini into widening the scope of war. The real danger, he maintained, was that Laval's appeasement of Mussolini would divide the democracies and block an anti-German coalition<sup>95</sup>

On 29 September, Mussolini ordered the invasion of Ethiopia for 3 October without a declaration of war. The League voted on the question of economic sanctions on 7 October and proposed the suspension of credit, a ban on Italian imports, and embargoes on the export of arms, ammunition, and strategic materials to Italy; they fell short of the crucial oil embargo. The Italians interpreted French support for sanctions as solidarity with Britain. Laval communicated his reassurances that he would veto military sanctions, the closing of the Suez canal, and the blockade and boarding of ships.<sup>96</sup> Italy warned that a blockade would be considered an act of war. Eden and Chamberlain supported oil sanctions to take effect on 6 December; Laval demurred until 12 December, by which time his secret negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare had "solved" the Ethiopian crisis. Agreement was reached, subject to

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<sup>94</sup>Philippe Henriot, "On demande des amis sûrs," *Jeunesse* 35, no. 16 (November 1935), 1.

<sup>95</sup>Joel Colton, *Léon Blum: A Humanist in Politics*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 121.

<sup>96</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 109.

League approval, giving Ethiopia access to the sea in exchange for the cession of territory conquered by Italy in the Tigré; Ethiopian sovereignty was restored to areas not ceded to Italy.<sup>97</sup> The "Plan" sought to buy off Mussolini by ceding much of Ethiopia even before he had conquered it. A press leak, attributed to Laval, helped to kill it. Geneviève Tabouis exposed the plan in *l'Oeuvre*, succeeding in inflaming public opinion in France and Britain.<sup>98</sup>

The notorious Hoare-Laval Plan presented before the Chamber on 8 December was condemned by Herriot on 11 December. He regarded the Plan as a betrayal of the League of Nations, an abandonment of the Négus, and an acquiescence to fascism. Prime Minister Baldwin, attempting to mollify public opinion, asked for Hoare's resignation, appointing Anthony Eden in his stead. Henriot reflected that, if Mussolini had accepted the offer as a basis for negotiation, Haile Selassie would have rejected it, exonerating Mussolini from charges of prolonging the war. In any case, the Stresa Front was shattered. "Tomorrow," wrote Henriot, "we will not be astonished to learn of a Rome-Berlin *entente* against Moscow and her allies at the price of sacrifices which I foresaw. And the day when our pacifists decided to throw France into an anti-Italian adventure on the side of London, did they reflect what would be the response of Berlin at the side of Rome? This is the question posed for 1936 thanks to the Popular Front, the masonic

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<sup>97</sup>Warner, *op.cit.*, 119.

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*, 122.



lodges, the Soviets, and Geneva."<sup>99</sup>

Laval's delay in concluding the pact was owing to a new domestic political crisis. The *Croix de Feu's* tactics of mass rallies and "mobilizations" against the Popular Front provoked the left-wing press to perceive these "manoeuvres" as preliminaries for a *coup d'état*. The Radical party congress in Paris, 24 to 27 October, considered Laval too "soft" on the leagues because of his sympathy for them.<sup>100</sup> Henriot summarized the triple cry of the Radical Congress: "A bas les ligues! A bas les décrets-lois! A bas l'Italie!" amounted to "A bas Pierre Laval!"<sup>101</sup> To appease the Radicals in his ministry, Laval issued three decrees on the eve of the Radical congress, increasing the *garde mobile* strength, forbidding unannounced political meetings, and restricting firearms -- measures that would have taken years of parliamentary deliberations.<sup>102</sup> Henriot observed that Laval's tactics were admirable, but they were a mark of flexibility, not leadership.<sup>103</sup> On 6 December, *Croix de Feu* Deputy Jean Ybarnégaray rose to speak on behalf of the *Croix de Feu* and proposed a general disarmament of the leagues and Socialist "self-defence" groups. Calling the bluff, Blum, along with Maurice Thorez, seconded the

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<sup>99</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Avant le débat," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 27 December 1935, 1.

<sup>100</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 112.

<sup>101</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Offensive sur tous les fronts...", *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 4 November 1935, 1.

<sup>102</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 112-13.

<sup>103</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Brouillard sur Paris," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 18 November 1935, 1.

motion for mutual disarmament.<sup>104</sup> Henriot and Vallat proposed to add Freemasonry to the list of associations to dissolve.<sup>105</sup> Ybarnégaray's motion was defeated by the Senate provoking Marc Rucart to ask the Senate to concern itself with dissolving the leagues while the Left would concern itself with dissolving the government.

The Popular Front offensive against the leagues defeated even Laval's attempts to retain power. The program, published on 10 January 1936, condemned the government's delay in implementing "effective" measures against the leagues and condemned Laval's secret diplomacy, reiterating the demand for collective security.<sup>106</sup> Part of that security lay with the proposed mutual-assistance pact with the Soviet-Union. Under pressure to ratify the Franco-Soviet pact, Laval told the German ambassador on 18 December 1935, that neither he nor France would be dragged into any Soviet adventures, and "that French public opinion was increasingly coming to realize that the French army should only be used in defence of French soil, and in no circumstances beyond France's own frontiers." This was a terrible admission, considering that Hitler was planning to remilitarize the Rhineland. It was also a virtual declaration of the abandonment of France's eastern European allies.<sup>107</sup> The balance of power in the West

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<sup>104</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 114-15. Many believed that Laval had stage-managed Ybarnégaray's offer of mutual disarmament. Radical support carried the day for Laval while the Socialists and Communists voted as a bloc against the government.

<sup>105</sup>Philippe Henriot, "179 = 104," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 18 (January 1936), 1.

<sup>106</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 128.

<sup>107</sup>*Ibid.*, 130-1.

had shifted. The divided allies had forfeited the diplomatic initiative to deter aggression. That initiative now passed to those who were resolutely determined to overthrow the Versailles Treaty, Locarno, and the League. Mussolini told the German ambassador in Rome on 7 January 1936 that "basically ... [the Franco-Italian military agreements] were, in view of the present situation, pretty well liquidated... Stresa he regarded as dead and buried once and for all."<sup>108</sup> The peace of Europe hinged on the London-Paris axis. Paris deferred to London and London acquiesced to the combined initiatives of Rome and Berlin, determined to dismantle the Treaty and disturb the peace.

Henriot blamed the sanctionists, former pacifists become "bellicistes," for attempting to provoke war, a theme which would come to pervade his subsequent propaganda. The enemy within was more of a threat than the enemy at the gates. Henriot denounced Herriot, Blum, and Cot as agents of the Comintern, the British Empire, and the weapons merchants. The imminent war would be their war. On mobilization day, before French soldiers boarded their Pullman, Henriot threatened to settle accounts with those responsible for provoking "the gentleman's war."<sup>109</sup> He had come to adopt appeasement while Herriot, the former proponent of disarmament, now stood for collective security and resistance to aggression. Herriot's refusal to compromise earned him the epithet, "Public Enemy Number One," bestowed by Henri de Kerillis in *l'Echo*

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<sup>108</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 130.

<sup>109</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Toute la Gauche contre la Paix!" *Jeunesse* 36, no. 18 (January 1936), 1.

*de Paris*. Henriot capitalized on discrediting "masonry," "materialism," and "socialist internationalism" intent on sending France's youth to another war. The Catholic defenders of "true France," the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, *Solidarité Française*, and *Camelots du Roi*, were exhorted to direct their energies against other Frenchmen.<sup>110</sup> Henriot's notion of true France implicitly excluded from the national community those who represented anti-France -- Masons, Communists, and, finally, Jews.<sup>111</sup>

Laval's foreign policy found favour with many conservatives who applauded the Premier's scuttling of collective security. Neutrality, they argued, was security. Quick to forgive, General de Castelnau in an article in *L'Echo de Paris*, 25 April 1936, spoke of peace, calling for Italy to resume her place in the concert of European powers after a lamentable and dangerous conflict.<sup>112</sup> Radicals showed little concern for Ethiopia. Their support for sanctions was inspired neither by international law nor collective security but by France's reliance on Britain to deter Italy, and ultimately Germany from a reckless course. This implied supporting British initiatives at Geneva. Virtually all Radicals were convinced that Italy had a real need, and a right, to expand because of her

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<sup>110</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Les Méfaits de la Franc-Maçonnerie*, (Paris: Ligue Nationale Anti-Maçonnique, 1934), 30.

<sup>111</sup>Pierre Birnbaum, *"La France aux Français": Histoire des Haines Nationalistes*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993), 50.

<sup>112</sup>Rémond, *op. cit.*, 107.

exploding population.<sup>113</sup> Laval was able to maintain a bare majority paying lip-service to sanctions while buying votes with Legions of Honour, rural subsidies, agricultural credits, or uncontested party nominations.<sup>114</sup> When the Chamber's foreign policy debate failed to defeat Laval, Herriot resigned on 16 January. The Radical Executive Committee ordered the Radical ministers Paganon, Bonnet, and Bertrand to follow the leader. Flandin, Mandel, and Marin were forced to follow suit. Laval resigned on 19 January 1936.<sup>115</sup>

The Ethiopian crisis had revealed that force and the threat of force could defeat international law and collective security. France was unable to decide between conciliation and firmness, and the compromises and concessions, in hindsight, spelt its ruin. The government was unwilling to invoke military measures to guarantee the principles of the League, and ultimately the Versailles Peace. Both the Latin alliance and the Stresa Front lay in ruins and the initiative passed to the Rome-Berlin Axis. Albert Sarraut's caretaker ministry, an interim government placed in power after Laval's resignation, awaited the May elections.

America's isolation deprived the League of its major source of power. The

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<sup>113</sup>Larmour, *op. cit.*, 188. Only Julien Durand's December article in *le Petit Comtois*, remarked that Italy already had Eritrea for her burgeoning population and this colony harboured only five thousand Italian settlers.

<sup>114</sup>*Ibid.*, 190-1.

<sup>115</sup>*Ibid.*, 193-4.

Geneva model, established to protect nations from aggression, relied on the Great powers who were unwilling to implement League resolutions. Clemenceau pointed to the fatal flaw of the League, remarking, "It is not sufficient in peacetime to be a mere talking machine. The League is a parliament of super-parliamentarians without any authority." It was difficult to convince citizens of the Western democracies that rearmament was necessary after a decade of promises of world peace. The Popular Front "against war and fascism" waited in the corridors of power as the Chamber debated the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact and Hitler, taking his cue from the League's failure, prepared to march into the Rhineland. The debates between appeasers and sanctionists over neutrality and collective security revealed the League's inability to deter aggression in either Manchuria or Ethiopia. Increasing revolutionary violence in Spain added the Bolshevik wraith of revolutionary class war to the spectre of a European war.

#### Chapter 4: The Popular Front & the Great Fear, 1936-1937

"Solidarity unites men only in misfortune or fear. The Union Nationale will be realized only in a crisis."<sup>1</sup>

Rumours of war and revolution dominated the middle years of the decade. Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations in October 1933 destroyed Briand's vision of the United States of Europe. France's foreign ministers, Louis Barthou and Joseph Paul-Boncour attempted to shore up France's crumbling alliance system. Henriot regarded France's mutual-assistance pact with the Soviet Union as an endorsement of Moscow's revolutionary ambitions and a direct provocation of Germany; Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland in March confirmed his worst fears. Added to the German menace, the Popular Front victory in May 1936 heralded revolution. The rebellion of Franco's Moroccan Army against the Republican *Frente Populare* in June precipitated the Spanish Civil War. Henriot saw a Soviet wave threatening to engulf France. Spain's civil war was a mirror for France. Only the nationalist leagues formed a "barrier of resolute men against the threatening violence of the revolutionary forces."<sup>2</sup>

While the Laval-Hoare scandal had doomed Laval's ministry, the Radical decision to defeat the government created more problems than it solved. A substitute national

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<sup>1</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Les Miettes du Banquet*, (Paris: Editions "Alsatia," 1938), 34.

<sup>2</sup>William D. Irvine, "French Conservatives and the 'New Right' during the 1930s," *French Historical Studies* VIII, no. 4 (Fall 1974), 542.

ministry was rejected; a Popular Front government was rejected by Socialists and Communists preparing for the May 1936 elections. Support for Laval meant overlooking the threat of the leagues, supporting his Ethiopian policy, the end of the League of Nations, and the destruction of the British alliance. Fears that Laval's overthrow would create another February 6th and financial panic inspired many to support him, while inertia and indecision plagued the Radicals.<sup>3</sup> Rivalries among the right pointed to their inability to counter the challenge of the Popular Front. Colonel de la Rocque refused to join any national coalition asserting, "One does not enlist the *Croix de Feu*, one follows it." Henriot argued that such independence sowed division. In reality, local organizers feared that rivalry among the leagues would draw recruits and funds away from the Federation.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, division within the ranks plagued Federation politics. Radical support for Laval's foreign policy was contingent upon his dissolution of the "fascist" leagues. His failure to dissolve them ensured a vote of non-confidence.

Henriot branded Albert Sarraut's caretaker ministry formed on 25 January, the "Ministry of Treason." It included many former ministers who had presided over the Stavisky Affair and February 6th: Chautemps in Public Works, Daladier in War, Paul-Boncour in Foreign Affairs, and Jean Zay as Under-Secretary of State. Henriot was dismissive: "Treason no longer pays even thirty pieces of silver -- a ministry or an

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<sup>3</sup>Peter J. Larmour, *The French Radical Party in the 1930's*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1964, 185-6.

<sup>4</sup>Irvine, *op. cit.*, 544-5.



under-secretaryship of State sufficed."<sup>5</sup> In this poisoned atmosphere, Léon Blum was assaulted by students in the funeral cortege of historian Jacques Bainville. The same day, 13 February, 1936, Charles Maurras, in *l'Action Française*, urged that "the knife" be used against the 140 Deputies who had voted for sanctions against Mussolini. Premier Sarraut took advantage of the law against the armed leagues to dissolve the *Action Française*. Maurras was subsequently indicted and sentenced to four months in prison for inciting to murder.<sup>6</sup>

The Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact was the subject of fierce debate in the Chamber of Deputies; Henriot led the offensive. In June 1934 Foreign Minister Barthou proposed a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland was tabled. Germany refused to join what it considered an "eastern Locarno." Poland was equally reluctant to sign. Barthou, however, was determined to contain Germany, and informed the Russians that France would reach an accord with the Soviet Union alone. Barthou succeeded in gaining the acceptance of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations on 18 September 1934, but his assassination in October postponed further talks. Laval was reluctant to ratify the Soviet pact, hoping instead for a Franco-German *rapprochement*.<sup>7</sup> The German Foreign

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<sup>5</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les Ministres de la Trahison," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 25 January 1936, 1.

<sup>6</sup>Joel Colton, *Léon Blum: A Humanist in Politics*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 116.

<sup>7</sup>Geoffrey Warner, *Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France*, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoodie, 1968), 77.

Office informed Laval that it considered the pact a hostile gesture, and emphasized that Communism was the common enemy, eclipsing Franco-German rivalry.<sup>8</sup> With the Stresa Front shattered and Laval's Latin *entente* in ruins, French diplomats resumed negotiations with the Soviet Union. Debate on the ratification of the pact polarized political loyalties in both word and deed.

Henriot observed that the initiative had passed to the dictators; the Brenner Pass was no longer a frontier but a corridor between Rome and Berlin. The German peril had finally impressed itself on the Left. Britain's imperiousness, Germany's persistence, and League apathy had together contributed to the German resurgence. German non-aggression pacts gave Germany a new freedom of action to realize its eastern ambitions. Germany's refusal to accept the Versailles Treaty's demarcation of its eastern borders provoked Henriot's query whether France could put any faith in a pact that would guarantee Alsace-Lorraine. The ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact was bound to aggravate Hitler. France must seek a *modus vivendi* with Germany, or live under the constant threat of a new 1914. If rapprochement with Germany was premature, Henriot argued, equal caveats applied to the Soviet pact.<sup>9</sup>

Foreign Minister Paul-Boncour presented the pact for ratification on 18 February 1936. Henriot asked for clarification of the terms, asked why the Chamber was being

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<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>9</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Allemagne 1936," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 5 January 1936, 1.

pressed to ratify a document that might trigger the remilitarization of the Rhineland as well as an Italian-German entente. He cited Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador to the League, who saw the pacts of mutual assistance as akin to the pre-war alliances, in themselves a threat to peace. A localized war could escalate into universal butchery.<sup>10</sup> Who profited from the pact? Henriot asked. In a two-front war between Germany and Russia, the Franco-Belgian front would be crucial. France at war with Germany would require Soviet troops to cross Poland to the German frontier, a scenario which Poland refused to entertain, as did Romania, who feared for its north-eastern frontier.<sup>11</sup>

With whom would France sign, Henriot asked, the Comintern or the Third Internationale? Stalin's double game presented the face of collective security to the League of Nations while working to undermine their governments. The 1935 Moscow Seventh World Congress of the Communist International opened with Marcel Cachin, Maurice Thorez, and André Marty<sup>12</sup> in the presence of Stalin and Dimitrov. While

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<sup>10</sup>*Journal officiel*, second session, Thursday 27 February 1936, 622.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.* The Russian accord of 1877 guaranteeing Romanian sovereignty had resulted in the Russian occupation of Western Bessarabia. Only Czechoslovakia had signed a military pact with the Soviet Union.

<sup>12</sup>André Pierre Marty (1886-1956) son of a Communard, Marty joined the French Navy (1908) and instigated the Black Sea Mutiny of 1919 aboard two warships sent to fight the Bolsheviks during the Russian civil war (1918-20). After serving four years in prison, he was amnestied, joined the Communist party and served as deputy from 1924-1940; 1944-1955. He also served on the Central Committee of the Communist party (from 1925) and was a member of the executive committee of the Comintern (1932-1943). Marty was Inspector of the International Brigades that fought against Franco during the Spanish Civil War. Marty and Thorez deserted and fled to Moscow in 1939 until Marty was called to sit on the Algiers Assembly as Stalin's and Thorez's envoy. He returned to France and resumed his post as deputy. He was expelled from the Communist party in a factional dispute in 1953 and divorced

Stalin affirmed that peace was his sole desire, Dimitrov appraised "German fascism ... as the shock troop of the international counter-revolution, as the principal fomenter of imperialist war, as the instigator of the Crusade against the Soviet Union, the fatherland of the workers of the world."<sup>13</sup> Dimitrov declared that Communists remained implacable enemies of every bourgeois government, but would support these governments while working to seize power for the Soviets. The speech was unlikely to allay either German or French fears of Soviet intentions. Henriot asked whether the Franco-Soviet pact was the diplomacy of peace or a more effective instrument to place in the hands of the Internationale and the Comintern? The Popular Front "against war and fascism" was a Communist Trojan horse enabling revolutionary workers to undermine the defences of their enemies. Henriot would ratify the pact only upon the arrest of the scoundrels who were supported by the money of treason.<sup>14</sup> Xavier Vallat and Jacques Doriot seconded Henriot's objections. Vallat compared the treaty to Francis I's alliance with the Turkish Sultan, Suliman the Magnificent, against Charles V. The Moslems though, unlike the Communists, did not keep a Moslem Party in France, determined to overthrow the Monarchy and replace the Bible with the Koran. Doriot, the recently defrocked

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by his wife.

<sup>13</sup>"L'Interpellation de M. Philippe Henriot," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 21 February 1936, 2.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, 1-2. Also *Journal officiel*, 27 February 1936, 623. Henriot cited the recent arrest of Hugo Eberlein, a Soviet agent with funds to finance *l'Humanité* and the election of Marcel Cachin.

Communist,<sup>15</sup> argued that the imminent war was a Comintern strategy to achieve world revolution.<sup>16</sup>

The Franco-Soviet pact was ratified on 28 February 1936 by a vote of 353 against 164. During the debate, Henriot was assaulted outside the Chamber by Communist deputy Arthur Ramette, whose parting insult was, "Tiens, salaud, ça t'apprendra!" Henriot replied that he did not foresee a duel. He was not, however, one to forgive insults. Such events indicated the political climate, in which words became fists.

Edouard Herriot scoffed at nationalist fears as either ignorant or fanatical: "The government of the Soviets, formerly dedicated to universal upheaval, [was] now allied to international order." Henriot asked if Herriot was inspired by the fear of war or the forthcoming elections and asked where France was going. His question was answered by Hitler's military occupation of the Rhineland on Saturday, 7 March 1936.<sup>17</sup> The response in Sarraut's ministry was divided. Only Sarraut, Henri Guernut, Pierre-Etienne Flandin, and Yvon Delbos were among the nine Radical ministers who favoured taking

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<sup>15</sup>Alexander Werth, *The Twilight of France 1933-1940*, (New York: Harper, 1942), 63. Jacques Doriot, a Communist renegade, was expelled from the party as a "deviationist" for suggesting the Popular Front before it had received Moscow's approval. His expulsion led to the appointment of Maurice Thorez, but Doriot retained his Saint-Denis seat to bait his former comrades, until he lost Saint-Denis to Communist Fernand Grenier in the elections of August 1937.

<sup>16</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Où allons-nous?" *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 2 March 1936, 1.

<sup>17</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 66. The demilitarized Rhineland included not only the left bank but also a fifty-kilometre strip of the right bank which prohibited any fortifications, troops, or facilities for mobilization.

action. "In order not to alarm the French people," Paul Bastid, Radical President of the Chamber's Foreign Affairs Committee, refused to call the committee into session. General Maurice Gamelin attempted to restrain the Council and estimated that 265,000 German troops had occupied the Rhineland. In reality, only 22,000 troops reinforced by 14,000 local police took over the occupation.<sup>18</sup> Gamelin offered two military options: partial or general mobilization. The former was inadequate, while the latter a prelude to war. Was the government prepared to march into the Rhineland? <sup>19</sup> There was no pressure from the Radicals to do anything, and strong support for doing nothing.<sup>20</sup>

Sarraut and Flandin demanded mobilization, but the military, uncertain of British support, restrained the cabinet from issuing an ultimatum to the German government. Churchill observed that, had the French been equal to the task, the ultimatum would have been issued and mobilization declared; Britain would have been compelled to honour its Versailles and Locarno obligations.<sup>21</sup> Here was the moment of truth. As it was, Britain urged the French government to petition the League of Nations. Lord Lothian's response was representative of British opinion: "After all, they [the Germans] are only going into

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<sup>18</sup>Donald Kagan, *On the Origin of War and the Preservation of Peace*, (New York: Doubleday Inc., 1995), 360.

<sup>19</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 67-8. The French Army comprised seventy-six divisions allied to the Belgian Army with twenty-one divisions against thirty-two under-strength German divisions.

<sup>20</sup>Larmour, *op.cit.*, 198.

<sup>21</sup>Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), 193.

their own back-garden."<sup>22</sup> "France's leaders," wrote Henriot, "forgot the maxim of forbidding only what one was sure of being able to prevent and demanding only what one was sure of being able to obtain." The "sorcerer's apprentices," of peace and disarmament, international conscience, and the Franco-Soviet pact had conjured disaster.<sup>23</sup> Hitler's greatest bluff had paid off.

Henriot attacked the Socialists, asking, "Where were you in 1914-1918? Did you not rally, denounce and stigmatize the *jusqu'au boutisme* when France was invaded, pillaged, and her children murdered'." France was being betrayed by the dupes of the Soviets and by Jews, the panic profiteers, who hoped to precipitate another 1914.<sup>24</sup> Churchill ascribed France's failure to weakness: "Weakness is not treason, though it may be equally disastrous. Nothing, however, can relieve the French Government of their prime responsibility. Clemenceau or Poincaré would have left Mr. Baldwin no option."<sup>25</sup> The Rhineland occupation was a strategic and political disaster for the French. Germany's military frontier advanced by one hundred miles; the occupation demonstrated to France's eastern allies that she would not fight, and that England would hold her back even if she tried.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 197.

<sup>23</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les Apprentis sorciers," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 10 March 1936, 1.

<sup>24</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les industriels de la panique," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 12 March 1936, 1.

<sup>25</sup>Churchill, *op. cit.*, 198.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 199.

The coming May election campaign was spurred by Germany's actions. Léon Blum set the tone for the Socialists in his radio speech of 21 April, 1936: "Peace, Bread, and Liberty" against the "two hundred families" (the 200 largest shareholders who chose the Bank of France's regents) and the "merchants of death." Socialists reaffirmed collective security through the League, and disarmament "with, without, or against Hitler." The paramilitary leagues were "biding their time," and Blum demanded their dissolution.<sup>27</sup> Communist propaganda invoked the revolutionary victories of Valmy, the Marseillaise, and the *quarante-huitard* alliance of the worker and the bourgeois. Anti-fascist propaganda showed a caricature of Hitler with a blood-stained knife between his teeth, inscribed Krupp-Wendel.<sup>28</sup>

Marin's party feared for its rural vote; farmers made excellent milch-cows for rural communism. Henriot warned rural France of Dimitrov's statement that French peasants, attached to the capitalist régime and private property, were to be conquered. He warned Bordeaux farmers to guard their doors and pocket-books.<sup>29</sup> Henriot's high profile during the elections earned him the title "Public Enemy Number 1" by the Communists.<sup>30</sup> He defeated Max Bonnafous of the Néo-Socialists in the first round,

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<sup>27</sup>Colton, *op. cit.*, 123-4.

<sup>28</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 72-3.

<sup>29</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Cheval de Troie," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 20 (March 1936), 1.

<sup>30</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'honneur d'être une cible," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 1 May 1936, 1. Bonnafous, a graduate of the Ecole normale supérieure, prefect of Bordeaux and Minister of Agriculture in Laval's cabinet won 3,279 votes while Henriot received 5,563 votes in the first round elections on 26 April.



while baiting the Communists and their allies. On the second ballot, a much closer race, Henriot was reelected with 6,473 votes to Bonnafous' 6,379. But the Gironde was the exception to what was otherwise a Popular Front landslide. Henriot characterized the Popular Front program as a melange of sound ideas and absurd utopias. How did Premier-elect Blum hope to reconcile the forty-hour week and the defence of the franc; the dissolution of the leagues and fraternization with the *Croix de Feu*, the struggle against Hitler and universal peace in the ranks of the League of Nations? Such were the contradictions which were supposed to render France "free, strong and happy."<sup>31</sup> Léon Blum now became the hated symbol of the right's defeat. A Jew, author of the "immoral" *Du mariage*, Blum was the victim of a smear campaign by the extreme nationalist press whose circulation, although marginal, was far from insignificant: *Gringoire* (640,000 in November 1936), *Candide* (339,500 in March 1936), and *Action Française* (around 100,000) all levelled their guns at the Socialist leader.<sup>32</sup> At the opening session of the new Chamber, Xavier Vallat, defeated by Herriot for the presidency of the Chamber, announced that Blum's ministry was indeed historic: "For the first time this old Gallic-Roman country will be governed by a Jew." Called to order, Vallat continued that it would be better to see France governed by a peasant from the soil than a Talmudist.<sup>33</sup> His vitriol, however, was in proportion to the weakness of his

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<sup>31</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Au seuil de l'expérience," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 10 May 1936, 1.

<sup>32</sup>Julian Jackson, *The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy 1934-38* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 251.

<sup>33</sup>Colton, *op. cit.*, 144.

position. The Popular Front Ministry received the Chamber's confidence with 384 votes to 210.

Blum's cabinet included twenty-one ministers and fourteen undersecretaries. Of the key posts, the Radicals received National Defence (Edouard Daladier), Foreign Affairs (Yvon Delbos), and Education (Jean Zay); the Socialists assumed the Interior (Roger Salengro), Finance (Vincent Auriol), National Economy (Charles Spinasse), Labour (Jean Lebas), Public Works (Albert Bedouce), Agriculture (Georges Monnet), and Colonies (Marius Moutet). Three ministers of state without portfolio coordinated and provided liaison with their respective parties: Camille Chautemps for the Radicals, Paul Faure for the Socialists, and Maurice Viollette for the Republican-Socialists. Three women (at a time when women did not even have the vote) were appointed as undersecretaries: Irène Joliot-Curie for Scientific Research, Suzanne Lacore for Child Welfare, and Cécile-Léon Brunschvicg for Education.<sup>34</sup> The Communists refused cabinet appointments, preferring to support the Popular Front without sharing in the responsibilities of power. The election was greeted with spontaneous general strikes which spread throughout France. The Left's fears of a fascist coup on February 6th were mirrored by the Nationalists' fears of an imminent Communist revolution in the strikes of June 1936.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 141.

<sup>35</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, 250.

The Matignon agreements of 7 June on collective bargaining, wages, paid vacations, and the forty-hour week resolved the striker's demands, but the strike continued. The crisis came on 11 June when Maurice Thorez warned the strike committees that they were running the risk of destroying the Popular Front alliance with the middle classes. The "revolution" was postponed and workers returned to their jobs. The forty-hour work week bill was passed on 12 June by 385 votes to 175.<sup>36</sup> On Sunday, 14 June the Communists celebrated with a rally of 100,000 in the Stade Buffalo at Montrouge. Four immense flags in the middle of the stadium proclaimed a new France: each bore the tricolour in the top corner and a golden R.F. (*République Française*) on a red field, with the Communist hammer and sickle between the two letters.<sup>37</sup> On 25 June 25 Roger Salengro, Minister of the Interior, informed the Chamber that the number of strikers had declined from the peak of 1,165,000 to 165,000.<sup>38</sup>

The threat of revolution had indeed shaken the right. Bertrand de Jouvenal characterized the strikes as "the Great Fear of June 1936." Henriot was disconsolate; France would repeat the experience of Russia and Spain. Henriot saw the Popular Front

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<sup>36</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 104. A Communist deputy confided to Alexander Werth that the Senate would ratify the Matignon agreements. "Of course the Senators are going to vote it; they are haunted by the vision of a *Front Populaire* demonstration of 500,000 people trampling down the flower-beds in the Luxembourg garden [outside the Senate]."

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>38</sup>Colton, *op. cit.*, 154-5.

as France's expiation, and urged party youth to rebuild.<sup>39</sup> The leagues were outlawed on 18 June 1936, against vigorous objections by the Federation, who regarded them as the last defence against revolution. The Federation's alliance with *Jeunesses Patriotes* was severed briefly when Taittinger resurrected the *Parti républicain national et social*,<sup>40</sup> but a greater challenge was presented by the *Parti Social Français* (PSF), successor to the *Croix de Feu*. In numbers, organization, and press, the PSF posed a major threat. Police estimates of *Croix de Feu* membership had grown from 35,000 in February 1934 to 228,000 by August 1935, and 500,000 by February 1936. This exceeded the numbers of the French Socialist Party (200,000) and the French Communist Party (284,000).<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, the Federation retained one advantage over its rival: it had sixty deputies compared to PSF's eight which critics labelled the "*Parti sans franchise*."<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Rénovateurs," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 23 (June 1936), 6.

<sup>40</sup>Henry Coston, *Partis, Journaux et Hommes Politiques d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, (Rennes: Librairie Française, 1960), 546-7. The PRNS, founded in October 1930, failed to recruit enough members and did not pose a threat to the Federation. By 1938 many of the PRNS membership proposed a reunion with the *Fédération Républicaine*.

<sup>41</sup>Robert Soucy, "French Fascism and the Croix de Feu: A Dissenting Opinion," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 26 (1991), 159-160, 180-181. Soucy argues that the *Croix de Feu* was indeed a fascist party, disputing the arguments of René Rémond, Zeev Sternhell, and Philippe Burrin who argue that fascism originated with the Left. The varied leadership of Taittinger's *Jeunesses Patriotes* and Doriot's *Parti Populaire Française* revealed only minor variations, but they shared the same authoritarian programs, auxiliaries, and enemies -- Marxists, masons, and Jews.

<sup>42</sup>William Irvine, *French Conservatism in Crisis: The Republican Federation of France in the 1930s*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 25-26. On the debit side, the Federation lost seven seats in the 1936 elections, all but one in the industrial north or the Parisian basin, emphasizing the party's failure to respond to industrial workers. At the same time, the polarization of French society assisted the party's candidates in the west and the Massif-Central.

The election was a disaster for the Radicals who lost thirty seats to the Socialists, twelve to the Communists, seven to the centre, and twenty-six to the right.<sup>43</sup> Henriot saw Emile Combes' anticlerical party divided between its social sympathies and its financial orthodoxy. Emulating the Leagues, the Communist and Socialist youth groups, the creation in 1933 of *Jeunesses Radicales* had recruited some 20,000 militants by 1936 as a force within Radical ranks. Marcel Sableau declared that Radical youth preferred "Order, Authority, Nation" to "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."<sup>44</sup>

The incident which provoked Henriot's wrath and earned his enmity was his own invalidation. Communist deputy Florimond Bonté charged that Henriot's election committee had visited Catholic parents of the *Petites Soeurs*, persuading them to vote for Henriot. There were charges of bribery and spoiled ballots. Bonté's motion was passed by 236 votes to 169; a by-election for the Gironde was called for 27 September.<sup>45</sup>

Henriot lashed out at his adversaries, "This from the men who are the defenders of

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Massif-Central.

<sup>43</sup>Larmour, *op. cit.*, 202.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 215-223. The Biarritz Congress polarized party factions. Popular Front militants within the party were challenged by the anti-Communists: the left sang the Internationale and the right responded with the Marseillaise. Delegates were shocked to see the raised fist greeted with the fascist salute. The symbolic arm-raising did more harm than good. Some tried to explain it away as the ancient Olympic salute; others said it was a repetition of the Tennis Court Oath. The gesture proved too compromising, so the next day they joined their hands above their head, which was somewhat less equivocal, but which *l'Echo de Paris* claimed as the Freemasons' sign of distress.

<sup>45</sup>"Philippe Henriot invalidé," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 25 July 1936, 1. Henriot's riposte was, "Invalididez-moi! Quand vous aurez voté pour obéir à des ordres, vous serez plus à plaindre que moi."

universal suffrage and the enemies of dictatorship... servants of the lodges and the Soviets."<sup>46</sup> The by-election reconfirmed Henriot's victory, giving him a 1,356 vote majority. Also reelected were François Valentin, Federation deputy for Nancy, Xavier Vallat, deputy of the Ardèche and Paul Creyssel, deputy of the Loire.<sup>47</sup> All would achieve prominence under the Vichy regime: Valentin as leader of the *Légion des combattants*, Vallat as head of the *Commissariat Générale des Questions Juifs*, and Creyssel as Vichy minister for propaganda.

The "flight from the franc" had been a recurring problem since 1934. Political unrest, economic stagnation, international tension, and anxiety over an inevitable devaluation induced French investors to convert their francs into gold, American dollars, and Swiss francs. By June 1936, in his report to Parliament, Minister of Finance Vincent Auriol estimated the volume of capital "missing" from the French economy at approximately sixty billion francs; twenty-six billion francs had fled abroad.<sup>48</sup> Henriot charged that the thirty percent devaluation was the result of the Popular Front's social program, which ruined the savings of workers and farmers, threatened small business, and reduced France's gold reserve.<sup>49</sup> Here was Henriot as the voice of the common people.

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<sup>46</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les dictateurs esclaves," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 25 (August 1936), 1.

<sup>47</sup>"Les Remerciements de Philippe Henriot," *Jeunesse* 36, 1 Nov. 1936, 1.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, 180.

<sup>49</sup>Philippe Henriot, "En attendant la prochaine...", *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 5 October 1937,

The voice of Catholic France was reaffirmed with "Quadragesimo Anno," the 1931 encyclical of Pius XI, condemned both revolutionary socialism and rapacious capitalism. Rome's "second *ralliement*" sought to reconcile the church in France with social and economic realities.<sup>50</sup> Blum's ministry, unlike the *Cartel des Gauches*, was not anticlerical and, sought to build bridges between Socialists and Christian-Democrats. Catholic journals responded with either doubts or enthusiasm. René Rémond's analyzed two different notions of the Church's social role. The "unitary" notion attempted to unite Catholics as a pressure group in defence of Catholic liberties. The "participatory" notion called instead for a reChristianization of society<sup>51</sup> and "the extended hand" was an attempt to unite Catholics and Republican social democrats. Henriot perceived this as a tactic to weaken the Catholic alliance with the Right. Catholic voters were shifting from the Federation's unitary policy toward the participatory notion of Christian democracy. The *Jeunesses Ouvrières Chretiennes* (JOC) adopted a social Catholicism. *L'Aube*, founded in 1932 by Francisque Gay, and *Sept*, founded in March 1934 by the Dominican friars of Juvisy, refused to take sides. Marc Sangnier's resurrected *Sillon*, *Jeune République*, won four seats for the Popular Front. *Terre Nouvelle's* revolutionary liberation theology displayed a hammer and sickle and the Cross, an alliance between Marxism and Christianity.<sup>52</sup> Emmanuel Mounier's *Esprit*, founded in 1932, attacked the

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<sup>50</sup>Francis J. Murphy, *Communists and Catholics in France, 1936-1939: The Politics of the Outstretched Hand*, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989), 5.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>52</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, 259. *Terre Nouvelle* was placed on the Catholic Index in June 1936.

"established disorder" of the Third Republic and called for a necessary revolution. The Catholic "Third Force," neither Left nor Right, opposed Marxism and capitalism, asserting the primacy of the spiritual over the material.<sup>53</sup> *L'Aube* carried the banner of the Third Force. At the elections of 1936 Gay, its editor, and Georges Bidault, its leading editorialist, both stood as Third Party candidates against the right (but in seats where the Left was very weak).<sup>54</sup>

The *Fédération National Catholique* refused to entertain the "extended hand" proffered by the Communists. Instead, the Federation presented Albert de Mun's corporatism, a program of social peace and class collaboration, as Catholic France's response to Marx's class struggle and civil war.<sup>55</sup> However, the resurrection of corporatism was a tacit admission that the social question was paramount. CGT membership rose from 1,300,000 in May to nearly 5,000,000 in September.<sup>56</sup> Léon Jouhaux, head of the CGT, was labour's political power-broker. Henriot raised De Mun's corporatist critique of syndicalism charging that unions disturbed the social peace while corporatism conciliated interests in the professional family. Unions too, were instruments of oppression against workers. Employers, in self-defence, were forced to

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<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.* See John Hellman's *Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left, 1930-1950*, (McGill-Queen's Press, 1980), and Bernard Doering's *Jacques Maritain and the French Catholic Intellectuals*, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 260.

<sup>55</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Leur Maître et Les Nôtres," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 27 (15 November 1936), 1.

<sup>56</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 103.



organize, dismissing their social responsibility to the worker who had become the enemy and France the victim.<sup>57</sup> Henriot emphasized a progressive Republican Federation -- traditionalist, not reactionary -- and spoke of "the spiritual values of eternal France" threatened by the materialist ethic and the rapid pace of modern life. The profit motive was at work undermining France. But unlike the Marxist materialist ethic, Henriot spoke of the principles of faith and nation which "ennobled daily life and gave it meaning." Politics was not an end in itself but a means of serving the national community.<sup>58</sup>

To the Scylla of German militarization on France's eastern frontier was added the Charybdis of a civil war on the western frontier. Henriot had foreseen the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War as early as 1931 and attributed it to the Comintern's handiwork organizing the class struggle against the Spanish bourgeoisie while anarchists and Catalan separatists divided Spain into a federation of Iberian Soviet Republics.<sup>59</sup> French domestic politics was further aggravated by General Franco's mutiny against the Spanish Republic on 18 July 1936. The June Strikes were no more settled when "Arms for Spain" strikes, inspired by the Communists to pressure the Government to send military aid to the Spanish Republic, resumed again in August.<sup>60</sup> There were reports of Soviet

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<sup>57</sup>Henriot, "Leur Maître et les Nôtres," *op. cit.*, 6.

<sup>58</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Notre But et Notre Esprit," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 27 (15 November 1936), 1.

<sup>59</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Tempête sur l'Espagne," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 20 April 1931, 1. Shortly after Henriot's article, the Zamora government proclaimed a state of siege on 12 May 1931.

<sup>60</sup>Larmour, *op. cit.*, 214.

atrocities committed against churches and clergy. *Fédération Républicaine* correspondents met Carlist volunteers from Navarre and Castile armed with rifles, cartridge bandoliers, and images of the Virgin and the Sacred Heart, who marched for their faith, their country, and the monarchy against the *Frente Populare* as the "Reconquista" had won Spain from Islam.<sup>61</sup> Spain's Civil War was a warning for France.<sup>62</sup>

Blum's cabinet was split over the issue of intervention to aid the Spanish Republic. Interventionists included Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos, Minister of National Defense Edouard Daladier, and Air Minister Pierre Cot; Camille Chautemps, Edouard Herriot, and President Albert Lebrun were in favour of neutrality.<sup>63</sup> France looked first to Britain in foreign policy initiatives. Delbos and Herriot were determined not to jeopardise the Anglo-French *entente*, and Eden opposed intervention.<sup>64</sup> Jules Jeanneney, Senate President, reminded Blum that, during the Rhineland crisis, France had yielded. It was ill-advised now to aid France's embattled sister republic. The nationalist press campaign warned that France's intervention would provoke further German and Italian intervention that might escalate into a general war. As Communists, Socialists, and the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT) organized mass demonstrations calling for

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<sup>61</sup>Robert Cassagnau et Guy Lignac, "Ce que nous avons vu au Front," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 25 (August 1936), 3.

<sup>62</sup>Philippe Henriot, "On se tue en Espagne," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 26 November 1936, 1.

<sup>63</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La France et les Etiquettes," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 26 (September 1936), 1.

<sup>64</sup>Colton, *op. cit.*, 236, 242.

"Planes for Spain!" Delbos proposed an international non-intervention agreement including Italy, Germany, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union; it was signed on 15 August after Italian and German delaying tactics ensured that Franco's army had secured a domestic foothold with the Falange, the military and the Catholic Church. As Joel Colton summarized, "Blum's dilemma was that he could not save the Spanish Republic and the peace of Europe at the same time; tragically, the peace that he had helped to preserve was a fragile one."<sup>65</sup>

For Henriot, the threat came less from a rearmed Nazi Germany than from French Communists. Speaking before *l'Union indépendante versaillaise antisoviétique*, he likened Communism to a "hatred knowing neither frontiers nor nation," with France its final battlefield.<sup>66</sup> A xenophobic strain began to appear in nationalist rhetoric, and was aggravated by the problem of refugees seeking asylum in France. "All the scum of Europe has settled here," wrote Pierre Gaxotte of *l'Action Française*<sup>67</sup> while Henriot observed that increasing numbers of political refugees welcomed by the Popular Front

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<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, 269. Hitler hoped that Germany's professed "neutrality" would defuse international reaction to German rearmament and the extension of military service. Mussolini boasted openly of his Black Shirts in Franquist ranks while the German Condor Legion "advised" the Nationalists. The dictators' reinforcements to Franco provoked the Soviet Union's reply with tanks, artillery, planes, and technicians in October. Communist volunteers joined the International Brigades in support of the Republic crying, "Madrid will be the tomb of fascism!" André Marty was named Inspector of the International Brigades.

<sup>66</sup>"Philippe Henriot à Versailles," *Jeunesse* 36, no. 27 (15 November 1936), 3.

<sup>67</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, 251.

had made France the "dépotoire de l'Europe."<sup>68</sup> Blum, Cot, Zay, and Salengro were the targets for a smear campaign mounted by the Right-wing press. Pierre Cot was accused of being in the pay of Moscow; Jean Zay's pre-1914 anti-militarism was exhumed by *l'Action Française*.<sup>69</sup> Interior Minister Roger Salengro, who eventually committed suicide, earned the hatred of the Right for his dissolution of the extra-parliamentary leagues.

For a France mindful of the League's failure to restrain Italy's aggression, Spain was the fear of another Sarajevo: the escalation of a localized war into a general European war. Henriot suggested that foreign minister Yvon Delbos' principles of collective security and non-intervention set France on a dangerous course. Spain was a battlefield not of ideals but of German and Italian ambitions in North Africa and the Mediterranean. The Popular Front's sentimental solidarity with the Spanish *Frente Populare* threatened to engulf France.<sup>70</sup> Indeed, the League's principle of collective security was abandoned along with Ethiopia by lifting sanctions against Italy on 4 July 1936. Berlin recognized the Italian conquest of Ethiopia later that month. The anti-Comintern Pact of 25 November 1936 was described as a "measure for the defence of European Culture and civilization and world peace." It failed to allay suspicions that the

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<sup>68</sup>"Au Coeur de la Cornouailles, A Pleyden: Philippe Henriot, Xavier Vallat, Emmanuel Temple enthousiasent 15,000 paysans et marins," *Jeunesse* 37, no. 34 (15 February 1937), 3.

<sup>69</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, 250.

<sup>70</sup>"Au Coeur de la Cornouailles,..." *op. cit.*

"pact of steel" against Communism was a cover for a military alliance and an accord on spheres of influence.

The face of Communism was brought closer to home with reports of burned churches, massacred priests, and the desecration of graves in Spain. Franco was depicted as the defender of Christian civilization against Marxist barbarism. The Spanish conflict was a Holy War, a new crusade. Catholics received powerful support in March 1937 from Pope Pius XI's encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*, which decried Marxist materialism and atheism, its notions of the family, the human being, and its political and social ideology. The encyclical charged that Communism was alien to both the natural and the divine order, and prospered from the abuses of capitalism and the weakness of democratic-liberalism as witnessed in Russia and Spain. It reaffirmed the spirit of communal social justice for employers and workers, the necessary duties of Christian charity, and education for social cohesion between the classes for the common good. The pontifical verdict was categorical: any collaboration with Communism was unacceptable to those who sought to defend Christianity.<sup>71</sup> In April, atrocities of the Republicans were matched by the Franquist bombing of Guernica, the Basque capital, on 27 April 1937.

Revulsion against the bombing of Guernica, and Basque loyalty to the Republic led some Catholics to question Franco's pronouncement of a "holy war." Others

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<sup>71</sup>"Pie XI a condamné le Communisme," *Gringoire*, 18 June 1937, 2.

attempted to steer a middle course. The terror bombing of Guernica inspired Georges Bidault to write in *l'Aube*, "A crusader is not a murderer of children."<sup>72</sup> *Sept* pitied the suffering of the Spanish people and refused to glorify atrocities. Most Catholics, however, joined with the right in support of the insurgents, seeing in the Spanish mirror a bloody reflection of their own fears.<sup>73</sup>

Spain also inflamed domestic political battles. "Liberal" Catholics' flirtation with Communism, Henriot cautioned, was the kiss of Judas. Before a rally of fifteen thousand farmers and sailors at Pleyden, Henriot appeared with Xavier Vallat and Georges Cousin. Responding to a heckler's charges that the ills of the Popular Front were due to the fascists, Henriot asked, "Who had taken power in May 1936, the Popular Front or its adversaries?"<sup>74</sup> Communist hecklers and counter-demonstrators were dispersed; the presence of eight hundred *gardes mobiles* indicated the opposing moods. Here was an example of the efforts of the traditional parties to mobilize France's Catholic masses.

Henriot made his own pilgrimage to Spain, some time in January or February 1937, and was received by General Franco at Salamanca. Upon his return, Henriot reported that the new Spain called to mind Italy's renaissance of faith and youth.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup>René Rémond in Murphy, *op. cit.*, 42-3.

<sup>73</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, 262.

<sup>74</sup>"Au Coeur de la Cornouailles...", *op. cit.*, 3.

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*

Speaking before an audience of 1,500 on Friday, 12 March at the Ambassadeurs in Paris, Henriot reported that he saw in Franquist Spain the example for French patriots to "bury the hatchet" under a common leadership.<sup>76</sup> Henriot's speeches also drew Communist fire, earning him the epithet, the "eighth traitor" (the "seven traitors" referred to generals who had surrendered Burgos and Salamanca to Franco).

The dissolution of the leagues and the creation of aggressive new parties such as Doriot's PPF and de la Rocque's PSF challenged the Federation and its clientele. After thirty years, the Federation remained a varied collection of deputies supported by a limited number of *notables*. It was not a mass party and it was not a growing party. Contemporaries found it necessary to remind readers of what, exactly, it was.<sup>77</sup> The youth wing was a copy of its elders.<sup>78</sup> Traditionalists and "moderns" within the Republican Federation debated cohabitation or alliance with the new parties. Unable to choose, the Federation continued to support a twin effort of adaptation within and compromise without.<sup>79</sup> The "moderns" like Vallat and Henriot looked beyond the horizon to a more militant posture with other parties against the common enemy. Jacques

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<sup>76</sup>"Pierre Taittinger et Philippe Henriot dans le XVI<sup>e</sup>," *Jeunesse* 37, no. 36 (15 March 1937), 2.

<sup>77</sup>Irvine, "French Conservatism and the 'New Right' during the 1930s," *op. cit.*, 562.

<sup>78</sup>Jean-Noël Jeanneney, "La Fédération Républicaine," in *La France et les Français en 1938-1939*, René Rémond and Janine Bourdin, eds. (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978), 347. Jan Crouan, vice-president of *Jeunesse*, in November 1938 spoke of the "vitality" of the Federation youth wing but as Jean-Noël Jeanneney observed, its bridle was held too tightly.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*

Doriot's *Front de la Liberté* was such an opportunity. The traditionalists regarded Doriot with suspicion as a former wolf now turned shepherd. But Vallat excused Doriot's former Communism, attributing it to a youth spent in the slums of Paris. Here was a marriage of convenience that might gain more votes for the Federation by its alliance with a new, dynamic party while conferring an aura of respectability to Doriot's "fascist" PPF. Doriot's *Front de la Liberté* offered an intentionally vague program of freedoms of assembly, thought, work, commerce, and press and was designed to appeal to both moderates and extremists.<sup>80</sup> Doriot's "Freedom Front" was being funded partly by François de Wendel, the Federation's "grey eminence." It was later discovered that the party's other source of funds was coming from Italy. As William Irvine observed, the Federation's "fear of a Communist coup outweighed the threat of a fascist *putsch*."<sup>81</sup>

Paul Marion, another Communist renegade and propaganda director of Doriot's PPF paper, *L'Emancipation Nationale*, published two violently anti-communist tracts, *Le Front de la Liberté face au communisme*, and *Toutes les preuves, C'est Moscou qui paie*. These tracts provided ammunition for Henriot's portrait of Soviet foreign policy as leading France to war, aided by an underground army camped within France and the CGT union leadership conspiring to seize power.<sup>82</sup> Léon Jouhaux's CGT was

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<sup>80</sup>Jean-Paul Brunet, *Jacques Doriot: du communisme au fascisme*, (Paris: Balland, 1986), 272-273.

<sup>81</sup>Irvine, "French Conservatism and the 'New Right,'" *op. cit.*, 556-557, 561.

<sup>82</sup>Brunet, *op. cit.*, 272.



Taittinger's "tyranny of the masses," the prelude to Communist dictatorship. Only a united and disciplined front, electoral solidarity, and a single candidate could defeat the Popular Front on its own turf with its own tactics.<sup>83</sup> The *Parti Agraire* joined as the voice of rural France. Champetier de Ribe's *Parti Démocrate Populaire* joined to balance the Radical's treasonous alliance with the Communists, and to oppose Léon Jouhaux's threats to nationalize key industries.<sup>84</sup> *Gringoire* estimated that an anti-Marxist national front, a popular vote of six million, could overturn the Popular Front's five million in the October cantonal elections.<sup>85</sup> The Federation's thirty-fourth congress in Paris, 3-6 June 1937, reaffirmed the notions of the "French" family and nation, the freedom of all social classes and the "ideal." In contrast, a Marxist International in Moscow and Barcelona conspired to see France succumb to the fate of Spain.<sup>86</sup>

Doriot's PPF never became a serious electoral rival. Colonel de la Rocque's PSF, on the other hand, was a popular and dynamic mass-party, and a distinct threat to Marin's Federation. The PSF was also the missing piece for the *Front de la Liberté*. With its *Volontaires nationaux*, the PSF claimed almost a million members in 1936. The PSF program, outlined by la Rocque in his *Service Public*, contained most of the

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<sup>83</sup>Georges Suarez, "M. Pierre Taittinger, président du Parti national et social, commente son adhésion au Front de la Liberté," *Gringoire*, 4 June 1937, 3.

<sup>84</sup>Georges Suarez, "M. Champetier de Ribes, Président du Parti Démocrate Populaire approuve le principe du Front de la liberté," *Gringoire*, 7 May 1937, 3.

<sup>85</sup>Georges Suarez, "L'Adhésion de M. Mathé, président du groupe agraire de la Chamber des députés," *Gringoire*, 14 May 1937, 3.

<sup>86</sup>"Le discours d'ouverture de Philippe Henriot," *Jeunesse* 37, no. 43 (15 June 1937), 2.

bromides of the Right summarized by "travail, famille, patrie" and a corporatist "dirigisme."<sup>87</sup> Articles in the party paper, *le Flambeau*, also sponsored Colonel de Gaulle's proposal for a professional army and a mobile armoured spearhead of tanks and aircraft. Any Franco-German *rapprochement* would be based on military parity -- a strong France within a united European community. La Rocque refused to join with Doriot, explaining that his party preferred its role as mediator between the militant extremes; anti-Communism alone was incapable of rallying the nation. The real fear was that Doriot might seduce PSF militants into his ranks.<sup>88</sup> Henriot lamented that the "flame" of the PSF refused to join the "torch" of the *Front de la Liberté*.<sup>89</sup> The PPF smear campaign was more explicit, branding the PSF as "the greatest common divider." La Rocque's "neutrality" benefited the Popular Front while rumours circulated of secret government funding.<sup>90</sup> Henriot seconded Jean Ybarnégary's observation that PSF duplicity with the Radicals had forfeited the leadership of the right.<sup>91</sup> Its slogan,

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<sup>87</sup>Philippe Rudaux, *Les Croix de Feu et Le P.S.F.*, (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1967), 100, "l'homme n'est pas fait pour la société ni la société pour l'Etat, mais l'Etat est fait pour la société et la société pour l'homme."

<sup>88</sup>Brunet, *op. cit.*, 274.

<sup>89</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La torche et le flambeau," *Jeunesse* 37, no. 39 (1 May 1937), 1.

<sup>90</sup>Irvine, *op. cit.*, 558. Pozzo de Borgo, formerly of the *Croix de Feu*, wrote a series of articles in the Right-wing weekly *Choc* claiming that de la Rocque was in the pay of André Tardieu and Edouard Daladier.

<sup>91</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Savoir avant ou regretter après," *Jeunesse* 37, no. 45 (August 1937), 1.

"neither right, nor left" was opportunism.<sup>92</sup>

Neither Doriot nor la Rocque lacked in the essential ingredients for mass politics, charisma and opportunism. Henriot's brief alliance with Doriot and Marion introduced him to mass audiences. The power of the spoken word at mass rallies demonstrated what could be achieved in the harnessing of national energies. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1937 Henriot spoke at PPF rallies where Federation members were well-represented. *Jeunesse* reported 50,000 at the Sainte-Luce rally near Nantes on Sunday, 11 July. At Bordeaux the following Monday, 20,000 heard Taittinger, Doriot, and Henriot. At Annonay in the Ardèche, Vallat's fief, 10,000 welcomed Vallat, Doriot, and Henriot.<sup>93</sup> Challenging the Popular Front's "peace, bread, and liberty," Henriot spoke of France's neighbours provoked by the fiction of non-intervention, a national defence budget supported by crushing taxes and two devaluations, bread never more expensive, a muzzled press law and banned demonstrations.<sup>94</sup>

In the Chamber, Henriot asked why the Government did not simply outlaw the minority, as in Spain. Felix Brun countered that it was Franco who had rebelled, taking

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<sup>92</sup>Irvine, *op. cit.*, 558-559. La Rocque later explained when the issue of the *Front de la Liberté* was reopened in 1938 at a rally in Lille that the PSF refused to be the auxiliary of the old parties.

<sup>93</sup>These figures must be handled with extreme caution. *L'Emancipation nationale* reported 50,000 at the mass rally at the Vel d'Hiver on 7 May in a complex that could house only 13,000. Brunet, *op. cit.*, 271.

<sup>94</sup>"En Quelques Semaines, plus de 100.000 Français ont acclamé les orateurs du Front de la Liberté," *Jeunesse* 37, no. 45 (August 1937), 3.

up arms against the Republic. The Chamber would not allow the Bordeaux deputy to do likewise. Henriot retorted that the Communists were hardly defenders of the Republic; he would rather cast his vote for Franco than for Marty's International Brigades. Gaston Bergery, the Neo-Socialist leader, seconded Henriot's predictions that France, like Spain, must face either civil war or national union. The President recessed the Assembly for fifteen minutes to cool the acrimonious debate.<sup>95</sup> The Blum ministry fell in June 1937, to be replaced by Camille Chautemps without the Socialists. Paul Reynaud considered that Chautemps' efforts to reconcile the financial policies of Poincaré with the social politics of Blum were doomed to fail.

Officially, the Radical Congress endorsed non-intervention in Spain but sympathizers within the ministry -- such as Pierre Cot, César Campinchi, and Yvon Delbos -- turned a blind eye to French violations of the neutrality accord. Fears of fascist encirclement, covert intervention by Italy and Germany, and solidarity with the Spanish Republic supported the case for intervention. Jean Zay later admitted that domestic opposition prevented Blum from risking open aid to the Spanish Republic. Zay confessed that Blum's "relaxed non-intervention" ensured the reproaches of both the Right and the Left while being unable to offer the Spanish effective support.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup>*Journal officiel*, second session, Tuesday 25 May 1937, 1626-1627.

<sup>96</sup>Colton, *op. cit.*, 257-60, 264. Zay wrote in 1942 that if France's intervention in Spain had resulted in war, it "would not have been undertaken then (even without England) under conditions more unfavourable than at the time of Munich or than in 1939." German rearmament had not yet advanced, and "Czechoslovakia and undoubtedly the USSR would have followed us."

The "red scare" was Henriot's campaign theme in the October cantonal elections. He warned that a Communist victory would place the power of the police and army in its hands.<sup>97</sup> The coup, when it did come, was not from the Communists, however, but from the *Cagoule*, a revolutionary splinter of Maurras' *Action Française* who conspired to overthrow the Republic by force. The *Cagoule* was created by Eugène Deloncle in December 1935 as the *Organisation secrète d'action révolutionnaire nationale* or *Organisme spécial d'action regulatrice nationale*. The Popular Front victory inspired Deloncle and his group to resist what they regarded as an imminent Communist coup. Lead by Eugène and Henri Deloncle, Jacques Correze, Edmond Duseigneur, Jean Filliol, Gabriel Jeantet, and Félix Martin, the Toulouse group, *le Groupement militaire patriotique français*, was joined by Joseph Darnand's *les Chevaliers des Glaives* at Nice and Marcel Bucard's *Comité de rassemblement anti-soviétique*.<sup>98</sup> In exchange for Italian weapons and funding, the *Comité* murdered Italian anarchists Carlo and Nello Roselli on 9 June 1937, and were also suspected of sabotaging aircraft destined for Spanish Republicans.

Their most notorious terrorist act was the bombing of the *Confédération générale du Patronat Français* and the *Industries métallurgiques et mécaniques*. The "attentats de l'Etoile" on 11 Sept 1937 were an attempt to signal an imminent Communist coup.

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<sup>97</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'illégalité légale," *Jeunesse* 37, no. 46 (1-15 September 1937), 1.

<sup>98</sup>Frédéric Freigneaux, "La Cagoule: Enquête sur une conspiration d'extrême-droite" in *l'Histoire*, no 159 (Oct. 1992), 6-17. The secret password: "Tiens, je croyais que tu avais quitté la France." "Non, je lui ai juré fidélité."

Deloncle planned his own coup for the night of 15/16 November. His attempt to recruit Generals Georges and Dufieux failed, however, and a week later, Interior Minister Marx Dormoy ordered the arrest of the conspirators. The police discovered weapons caches and a list of ministers to arrest or execute along with floor plans of key ministries and the Elysée Palace.<sup>99</sup> To Henriot the conspiracy smacked of a Georges Simenon police novel. The discovery of thousands of rifles, cartridges, machine-guns and, Henriot commented sarcastically, "undoubtedly cannons," was the first measure of every successful Communist coup from Moscow to Barcelona: disarm the bourgeoisie. "Communist assassins of the Third Internationale preferred to work without risk, attacking only those disarmed and unable to defend themselves."<sup>100</sup> The conspirators still had not stood trial by 1940.

The Federation distanced itself from the PPF with the fall of the Blum ministry. Marin's effort to lead the former leagues-turned-parties into Federation auxiliaries was frustrated by the ambitions of Doriot and La Rocque to the same end. The municipal elections reanimated the old hostilities. The centre parties and Catholic Social Democrats seeking a Third Way found themselves in a political no-man's land between two implacable enemies. Doriot's initial successes claimed 100,000 new members in October 1936 and, according to party statistics, PPF membership peaked at 295,000 at the beginning of 1938. Although the figure may be exaggerated, the trend was probably

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<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Derrière La Cagoule," *Jeunesse* 37, no. 50 (1 December 1937), 1.

accurate. Despite François de Wendel's contributions to PPF party coffers and Doriot's allusion to the Federation's "young, rich talents," the PPF was declining. By the end of 1938 the party was largely a spent force. Its rise and fall paralleled that of the Popular Front, against which it was largely a reaction.<sup>101</sup> The gulf that separated Marin from Doriot was more easily bridged by the Federation's "young, rich talents," one of whom was Philippe Henriot. The future would see them collaborating on another Front.

The Popular Front created a division within France unknown since the Dreyfus Affair. Two great fears were at work. First, the Communist-inspired strikes of June 1936 remained etched in the minds of the nationalists and the bourgeoisie. The second great fear, of course, was the fear of war. France's allies reevaluated their commitments. The German-Polish non-aggression pact in 1934, the Franco-Soviet pact in February 1936, the Rhineland militarization in March, the Popular Front triumph in May, and the Spanish Civil War in June were milestones on the road to a war which was drawing inexorably closer. To the fear of another August 1914 was added that of another October 1917. The international crusade against "fascism" served both the strategic interests of the Soviet Union and the revolutionary aspiration of French Communists.<sup>102</sup> Many were convinced a national war was the springboard for universal revolution.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, 255.

<sup>102</sup>Jackson, *op. cit.*, 257.

<sup>103</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma, *De Munich à la Liberation 1938-1944* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979), 13-14.

The Federation's brief honeymoon with the PPF was another step in Philippe Henriot's evolution: from a grudging admiration for Mussolini's fascist Italy, he grew to venerate Franco's Spain, and then to collaborate with Jacques Doriot. The meeting of extremes is not as unlikely as it would first appear. Both were *enragés*, fiercely anti-Communist, one a party heretic, the other a Catholic militant. Both were supreme propagandists, skilful manipulators of mass audiences. These "new men," De la Rocque, Déat, Doriot, and Deloncle, were the leaders of movements ranging from moderate to militant to terrorist. Their vocabulary of Corporatism, the Third Force, neither right nor left spoke of "a necessary revolution" against the "established disorder." Social-nationalism or fascist socialism, led a few to the temptation of totalitarianism.



### Chapter 5: Neither Peace nor War, 1938-1940

"Dans le monde où nous vivons, le Droit sans l'appui de la Force n'est qu'un cri de vaincu." Georges Clemenceau

The Ethiopian crisis had exposed what Henriot called the "league of collective insecurity." The German march into the Rhineland, Hitler's greatest gamble, had confirmed his hunch that France would not mobilize. The Maginot Line provided a false security that defended France but abandoned her allies. The Spanish Civil War inflamed debate about intervention or neutrality in the conflict, resistance or appeasement to the dictators. The Czech crisis divided France into either *Munichois* or *anti-Munichois*. The German invasion of Prague in March 1939 and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia marked the cynical repudiation of Versailles by both its guarantors and revisionists. Peace in Europe hung by a thread. The last months witnessed desperate efforts by British and French statesmen to avert war by seeking an alliance with the Soviet Union in order to deter German ambitions. The Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact, confirming Henriot's worst expectations, removed Hitler's fear of a two-front war and sealed the fate of Poland. The subsequent German-Soviet attack on Poland triggered a witch-hunt in France against the new "defeatists," the French Communist Party.

Henri de Kerillis and Geneviève Tabouis branded the Federation as willing or unconscious accomplices of Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. Henriot replied with some justice that their clamour for collective security ignored the "relaxed non-intervention"

policy that had sent men and arms to Spain. For Henriot, domestic and international Communism constituted a greater threat to the peace than the threat from either Nazism or Fascism.<sup>1</sup> He appealed for a ministry that would make France independent of Moscow and master of itself: "If France seeks friendships abroad, it must refuse to be dominated by them."<sup>2</sup>

Henriot's appearance at a rally in Lyon, a worker's city and Herriot's personal fief, provoked a riot when Popular Front militants attempted to disrupt the rally. Henriot was shouted down. Refusing to leave, he stood his ground for an hour until chalk dust bombs enveloped the theatre in a white fog. Undaunted, Henriot's faithful retreated to another café where Henriot finished his discussion of the Communist "extended hand" and the raised fist of the Popular Front salute.<sup>3</sup> In Brussels, Liège, and Namur, Henriot spoke of the Spanish Civil War as the crusade of Western civilization.<sup>4</sup> As the military initiative passed to Franco, a flood of Spanish refugees crossed the Pyrenees seeking asylum in France. Henriot's Catholic charity did not extend to "the vanguard of a revolutionary invasion, a murderous plague that could be stemmed only by a closed frontier, a 'cordon sanitaire,' to hold the Spanish revolution at bay."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'Insécurité Collective," *Jeunesse* 38, no. 54 (3 February 1938), 1.

<sup>2</sup>"'Tout accord avec les communistes est impossible' proclame Philippe Henriot aux Ambassadeurs," *Jeunesse* 38, no. 55 (17 February 1938), 2.

<sup>3</sup>"Philippe Henriot à Lyon," *Jeunesse* 38, no. 56 (3 March 1938), 2.

<sup>4</sup>"En Belgique Philippe Henriot est acclamé," *Jeunesse* 38, no. 57 (17 March 1938), 2.

<sup>5</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'Invasion rouge," *Jeunesse* 38, no. 58 (7 April 1938), 1.

The collapse of the Popular Front in June 1937 was due to the same financial issues that had defeated every French ministry before it. The Senate's refusal to grant Blum decree powers defeated attempts to restore confidence. Called to replace Chautemps' ministry, Blum failed to recruit the Radicals in his battle with the Senate as who had doubts concerning the Popular Front's economic agenda. Communists condemned Blum's failure to support the Spanish Republic. Socialists were frustrated by the "pause" in the reform legislation, and their one-day CGT general strike (13 March), followed by the Clichy massacre, created deeper resentments.<sup>6</sup> The search for a *union sacrée* in the face of a deteriorating international situation persuaded Blum to propose a "Thorez to Reynaud" coalition government. Paul Reynaud insisted that any coalition include Louis Marin, who would have nothing to do with Thorez.<sup>7</sup> Henriot explained that any accord with a party obedient to a foreign government, which promoted civil and foreign war, alienated England and isolated France, was impossible.<sup>8</sup>

Blum's second failure to receive Senate approval to govern by decree led to the withdrawal of the Socialists, leaving Vice-Premier Daladier and the Radicals free to form a new ministry (10 April 1938 - 20 March 1940). On 10 April, the government was

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<sup>6</sup>Maurice Larkin, *France since the Popular Front: Government and People, 1936-1938*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 60-61. A Popular Front counter-demonstration against a PSF rally in the suburb of Clichy was broken up by police, who fired on the crowd killing seven and wounding hundreds.

<sup>7</sup>Peter J. Larmour, *The French Radical Party in the 1930's*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 235.

<sup>8</sup>"'Tout accord avec les communistes est impossible' . . . , " *op. cit.*

reformed, with Daladier as Premier and Georges Bonnet Minister of Foreign Affairs. Henriot greeted Daladier's cabinet, without Blum, Auriol, Cot, and Paul-Boncour, with confidence. Forgotten was the old antipathy toward Daladier as the 'executioner of February 6th'. Henriot's Daladier was the new leader who would extend diplomatic recognition to Franco and restore relations with Mussolini to minimize the threat of war.<sup>9</sup> But it was too late for France and Britain to court Italy in the hope of deterring Germany. Mussolini, placated by Eden's resignation, encouraged Chamberlain's overtures resulting in the Anglo-Italian agreement of 16 April 1938 which gave Italy, in effect, a free hand in Ethiopia and Spain in return for what Churchill described as "the imponderable value of Italian good will in Central Europe."<sup>10</sup> Within central Europe, the Sudeten Czechs were next on Hitler's agenda. Chamberlain had written off the Soviet proposals of 18 March for a conference to discuss a united front against the German challenge, maintaining that the support of France or Russia was unlikely to prevent Czechoslovakia from being overrun by Germany.<sup>11</sup>

Henriot's objections to the Russian alliance in 1938 were similar to those of 1935. He added, however, that another factor entered into the diplomatic equation. Stalin's purges of the Red Army in 1937 cast serious doubt on the Soviet Union's military value:

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<sup>9</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Lueurs dans les ténèbres," *Jeunesse* 38, no. 59 (21 April 1938), 1.

<sup>10</sup>Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), 283.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 274. As Chamberlain wrote on 20 March "... I have, therefore, abandoned any idea of giving guarantees to Czechoslovakia, or to the French in connection with her obligations to that country."

"A Franco-Russian alliance would be no more than the forced conscription of a free people to the service of a sanguinary despot."<sup>12</sup> Joseph Barthélemy's article in *le Temps* on 12 April, the first to repudiate the Czechoslovakian alliance, came as a bombshell. His arguments provided ammunition for both the French Right-wing press and Reichminister Joseph Goebbels' propaganda offensive.

Joseph Barthélemy, a Sorbonne law professor, argued that Locarno was all but dead. France's military commitment to Czechoslovakia rested on the collective action of the League, but France was not committed to defend Czechoslovakia alone.<sup>13</sup> Political and military realities militated against a hard-line policy towards Germany. Poland's non-aggression pact with Germany, Germany's and Italy's withdrawal from the League of Nations, and Belgium's declaration of neutrality, left only Great Britain and France to oppose Germany. While Czechoslovakia constituted a military bastion against German expansion in the East, France's military invincibility was purely defensive. A French offensive in support of Czechoslovakia necessitated leaving the Maginot line, breaking through the Siegfried line, and fighting across the length of Germany, by which time

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<sup>12</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'Axe Moscou-Barcelonnette," *Gringoire*, 11 February 1938, 3.

<sup>13</sup>Joseph Barthélemy, "Mais si, André...", *Gringoire*, 13 May 1938, 1. Joseph Barthélemy (9 July 1874 - 1 May 1945) obtained his doctorate in 1899 and became professor of law at the faculties of Paris, Lille, Aix and Montpellier. His political career began after the war in 1919 when he was elected deputy of Gers on the *Bloc National* ticket. Reelected in 1924 with the Republican Left but defeated in 1928, he engaged in an open struggle against the Popular Front. He became Minister of Justice in the Vichy State from January 1941 until 26 March 1943. He died before he could be brought to trial. Benoît Yvert, *Dictionnaire des Ministres, 1789-1989*, (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 664.

Czechoslovakia would have ceased to exist. Soviet military support for Czechoslovakia entailed Soviet troops crossing Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, -- all adamantly opposed to Soviet forces on their soil.<sup>14</sup> Germany's repeated provocations were met by only diplomatic protests. The League's failure to protect Austria did not oblige France to safeguard Czechoslovakia. If England's frontier lay on the Rhine, France was England's reluctant sentry. Czech mobilization and resistance would be the death sentence for another million soldiers which, on the heels of the last sacrifice, would amount to collective suicide.<sup>15</sup> Barthélemy's parallel comparing the spring of 1938 with the spring of 1870 evoked images of war and revolution.

Premier Daladier was of a different mind, and announced on 12 June that France would honour its 1924 treaty with Czechoslovakia.<sup>16</sup> Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet on 10 September approached Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador in Paris, asking if Britain intended to support a French mobilization and, if so, with what? London offered two infantry divisions and 150 aircraft. By 14 September Czech negotiations with Germany had broken off and war appeared imminent. Churchill noted that Britain's unwillingness to support France had left the Czechs to their fate.<sup>17</sup> While London encouraged concessions, Moscow and Paris preached firmness. Henry de Kerillis argued

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<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>Churchill, *op. cit.*, 290.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 297.

that Hitler's crusade on behalf of the Sudeten Germans was based not on his professed aim to include German nationals within the Reich, but rather on his determination to destroy Czechoslovakia as a military power and an ally of France and Russia.<sup>18</sup> Henriot compared the crisis to a poker game with increasing stakes where each antagonist was especially anxious to know if the other would execute his conditional threats.<sup>19</sup>

The anti-Munichois position was led by *l'Humanité*. Henri de Kerillis was the only nationalist to defend Czechoslovakia and the Eastern Alliance as the foundation of France's foreign policy. The Socialist *le Populaire* was split. Alexander Werth considered Blum's neutrality an attempt to parry accusations of Jewish animosity to Hitler. The *Munichois* position was expressed by *le Canard Enchaîné*: "What do we care if 3,000,000 Germans want to be German?"<sup>20</sup> *Gringoire*, *Candide*, and *Je Suis Partout* were also prepared to abandon Czechoslovakia to its fate. Doriot's *la Liberté* and *l'Emancipation Nationale* defended appeasement. On 26 September *la Liberté* printed Flandin's poster inviting civil disobedience to resist mobilization. All endorsed the Four-Power Pact policy of the Western bulwark against Communism for the minimal sacrifice of Czechoslovakia.<sup>21</sup> The French press and Chamber debates convinced the British

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<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 280.

<sup>19</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'énigmatique été," *Jeunesse* 38, no. 64 (4 and 18 August 1938), 1.

<sup>20</sup>Alexander Werth, *The Twilight of France 1933-1940*, (New York: Harper, 1942), 200-202.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 203-204.

cabinet that the French had no fight in them.<sup>22</sup>

In the Chamber of Deputies, appeasers argued that resistance to German demands meant war. The French Air Force was weak; the sacrifice of another generation would leave France a nation of old men. A French Army emerging from the security of the Maginot line would be cut to pieces.<sup>23</sup> Daladier's ministry was divided. Paul Reynaud, the Minister of Justice, and Georges Mandel, Minister of Colonies, supported immediate mobilization to convince Hitler that France meant business, obliging him to either accept a settlement or face war with France, England, Czechoslovakia, and Russia. Resisters were supported by Champetier de Ribes, Minister of Pensions, César Campinchi, Minister of Marine, Jean Zay, Minister of Education, and Queuille the Minister of Agriculture.<sup>24</sup> The appeasers within Daladier's cabinet represented rural constituencies in the Centre and West of France: de Monzie, Minister of Public Works, Pomaret, Minister of Labour, Joseph Caillaux, Foreign Minister Bonnet, Flandin, and Vice-Premier Chautemps claimed to speak for the French peasantry which constituted the bulk of the army.<sup>25</sup> Daladier's dilemma was at once political and personal: France's military obligations and the possibility of a German retreat on one hand were weighed against the millions of lives that might be lost if the bluff did not succeed. His personal experiences

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<sup>22</sup>Churchill, *op. cit.*, 301.

<sup>23</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 217.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 219.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 219-20.



as both a veteran of the Great War and father of two sons of military age figured in his dilemma. Camille Chautemps was of the same mind with two sons eligible for military service. He had often said he would not let them die for Spain; why should he let them die for Czechoslovakia? Daladier hesitated, deciding against mobilization for the moment. The initiative passed to Neville Chamberlain.<sup>26</sup>

Pacifist *Munichois* of the Left found themselves in agreement with anti-Communist *Munichois* of the Right. Hitler held the balance for either peace or war, and Henriot laid the blame at the feet of the Radicals. Declaring war on Germany would ensure the fall of France. The Radicals, especially Edouard Herriot and Pierre Cot, former opponents of the Maginot line who had characterized military credits as a "death budget" now voted for massive loans for national defence. Henriot summarized the *Munichois* position as "Not this and not them."<sup>27</sup> Resistance to Hitler's Sudetenland demands, Henriot claimed, was as foolish as it was criminal; it was endorsed by those who had done nothing to prepare France and now asked for a "union sacrée." The Franco-Soviet pact had forfeited France's alliances with Belgium and Poland. Both Poland and Romania were shaken by the thought of Soviet troop deployments to aid the Czechs, and the United States had declared itself neutral. So much for the "Entente of the Democracies."<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 220-21.

<sup>27</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Pas Ça et Pas Eux!" *Jeunesse* 38, no. 65 1 and 15 Sept. 1938, 1.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

*L'Action française's* headline of 20 September proclaimed that France desired peace and would not fight for the Russians or the Free-masons of Prague.<sup>29</sup> At the height of the crisis, Marin sent two delegations to Daladier, Lebrun, and Bonnet, pleading for conciliation.<sup>30</sup> At Godesberg the German Chancellor refused Chamberlain's proposal for an international committee to redraw the Czech frontiers and demanded that all German-speaking areas, including those containing a large proportion of Czechs, be ceded at once. He insisted that the claims of the Hungarians and Poles be settled as well. German intransigence stiffened French and English resolve, and both supported Czech mobilization on 23 September. On 24 September Daladier ordered a partial mobilization, declaring to his cabinet that the Godesberg plan was unacceptable. On 26 September the British government issued a statement that a German attack against Czechoslovakia would oblige France, supported by Great Britain and Russia, to assist Czechoslovakia.<sup>31</sup> Foreign Minister Bonnet told friends in Parliament that he was being overwhelmed by the *bellicistes* Mandel and Reynaud. Frightened but not idle, Bonnet and his friends treated the British declaration of solidarity with France and Czechoslovakia as a fabrication: "Pas de chantage au patriotisme! All Frenchmen must unite in their determination to defend peace." On 28 September Pierre-Etienne Flandin covered Paris

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<sup>29</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma, *De Munich à la Libération 1938-1944*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979), 21.

<sup>30</sup>Jean-Noël Jeanneney, "La Fédération républicaine," in *La France et les Français en 1938-1939*, René Rémond and Janine Bourdin, eds., (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978), 354.

<sup>31</sup>John M. Sherwood, *Georges Mandel and the Third Republic*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), 210-11.

with posters announcing: "ON VOUS TROMPE -- You are being deceived.... For weeks and months, a plot has been organized by secret forces to make war inevitable."<sup>32</sup> The police tore down the posters, and seized Doriot's *La Liberté*, which carried Flandin's protest on its front page.<sup>33</sup> On 29 September *l'Action Française* paraphrased a verse from the *Internationale*:

S'ils s'obstinent, ces cannibales  
 A faire de nous des héros,  
 Il faut que nos premières balles  
 Soient pour Mandel, Blum et Reynaud.<sup>34</sup>

The acceptance of Mussolini's Great Power summit at Munich averted war at the last moment. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia proceeded without representatives of either the Czechoslovakian or Soviet governments. Churchill observed that the Germans were not the only vultures upon the carcass. Immediately after the Munich Agreement on 30 September, the Polish Government gave a twenty-four-hour ultimatum to the Czechs, demanding the frontier district of Teschen.<sup>35</sup> Georges Duhamel expressed the collective sense of relief and shame at a peace secured without honour. France had lost not only her Maginot Line in Central Europe, but also her "Descartes Line." French

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<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 211.

<sup>33</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 249.

<sup>34</sup>Sherwood, *op. cit.*, 212. "If these cannibals persist in making heroes of us, Our first bullets must be for Mandel, Blum and Reynaud."

<sup>35</sup>Churchill, *op. cit.*, 322.

schools were closing in Czechoslovakia. Munich was not only the diplomatic Sedan predicted by de Kerillis, but a cultural defeat. Alexander Werth observed that France's century-long spiritual leadership in Europe was ending.<sup>36</sup>

Louis Marin declared on 1 October his relief that another Marne had been avoided and France's warmongers frustrated.<sup>37</sup> Others such as Thierry Maulnier, a young Right editorialist for *Combat*, wrote in November that if France had gone to war and defeated Germany, the bulwark against the "bolshevization" of Europe would have been removed.<sup>38</sup> The Munich settlement was applauded in the Chamber, which renewed its confidence in Daladier on 4 October with an overwhelming 537 votes. The former executioner of February 6th was now hailed as a peacemaker. Alexander Werth noted that most French deputies feared that a charge of "warmongering" could prove fatal in the next election. Unlike the Communists, the French Socialists, though profoundly divided, all but one voted for Munich.<sup>39</sup>

The Chamber also granted plenary powers to Daladier. The Premier was thus

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<sup>36</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 276.

<sup>37</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 18.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 21. Jean-Pierre Azéma included the Right Radicals, the nationalists of the PSF, the Republican Federation, Flandin's Democratic Alliance and the Socialist pacifists of Paul Faure among the appeasement deputies. The partisans of appeasement, including many Italophiles, hoped to forge a third force independent of either Moscow or Berlin. The most machiavellian counted on a reciprocal neutralization between Slav and Teuton.

<sup>39</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 264. Of the dissenting 75 votes, 73 were Communist joined by Henri de Kerillis and the Socialist deputy Bouhey.

encouraged to settle accounts with the *bellicistes*, especially the French Communist party whose vote against Munich was proof of their war-mongering.<sup>40</sup> At the Radical Congress at Marseilles on 27 October, Daladier charged the Communists with being agents of a foreign power and Public Enemy Number 1 for their attempts to paralyse French production with defeatist propaganda.<sup>41</sup> What Daladier lost from the Left he gained from the Right. The shift first became apparent when the Republican Federation endorsed Daladier's radio speech of 21 August in which he announced his plan to "put France to work" and authorized national defence industries to abandon the forty-hour law.<sup>42</sup> The resignation of Frossard, Public Works Minister, and Ramadier, both leaders of *l'Union Socialiste*, and their replacement by the capitalists de Monzie and Pomaret, were "promising signs" of a ministry without Popular Front ministers.<sup>43</sup> Daladier's national coalition replaced Blum's "Marin to Thorez" formula in April with his own "Marin to Blum" coalition in October. While Blum was agreeable, Marin stalled, then refused to share power with the Socialists.<sup>44</sup> The final act in the Federation's *ralliement* to Daladier was the failure of the General Strike of 30 November. Daladier brought the CGT to heel with the temporary lay-off of 800,000 employees and the dismissal of union

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<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, 279.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 282.

<sup>42</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 27-8.

<sup>43</sup>Jeanneney, *op. cit.*, 353.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 354 and Werth, 280.

leaders.<sup>45</sup> The Chamber's vote of confidence on 10 December found the Socialists and Communists the new opposition. Frossard observed that the Federation's support was crucial in Daladier's triumph.<sup>46</sup>

In Munich's aftermath, Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet welcomed Joachim von Ribbentrop's proffered non-aggression pact signed in Paris on 6 December. The diplomatic accord followed on the heels of *Kristallnacht* on 30 November.<sup>47</sup> To avoid unpleasant confrontations, Jewish ministers were not invited to the official reception of the Reich minister. In a private aside, Bonnet informed Ribbentrop of France's "disinterest in the East" which the German Foreign Minister interpreted as a signal that France would not obstruct Germany's eastern ambitions.<sup>48</sup>

The accord did not placate Henriot, who summarized France's task for 1939: "Tout pressé, tout pressant, tout à faire à la fois," made more immediate by Italian claims on Corsica and Nice and the uncertainty of France's allies. American press attacks

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<sup>45</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 28.

<sup>46</sup>Jeanneney, *op. cit.*, 355.

<sup>47</sup> Herschel Grynszpan's assassination of the German embassy official Ernst von Rath in Paris sparked the Nazi-inspired *Kristallnacht* - Night of Broken Glass - of 30 November. *Kristallnacht* saw Storm Troopers destroy hundreds of Jewish homes, businesses, and synagogues. Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish Jew, attempted to avenge the treatment of his German parents. "Being a Jew is not a crime. I am not a dog. I have a right to live and the Jewish people have a right to exist on this earth. Wherever I have been, I have been chased like an animal."

<sup>48</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 33.

against the dictators, reproduced by the Left press, were likely to be the only cooperation that France could expect from America. Britain, guarantor of France's territorial integrity, was even more determined to safeguard the Suez Canal. Chamberlain's efforts to wean Mussolini from the Axis with Mediterranean concessions in Tunis were not reassuring, and Henriot suspected that a separate British accord with Italy excluded France.<sup>49</sup> France's other "ally" was the ball and chain of the Franco-Soviet pact, cloaking antipathy behind collective security. While the Republican Federation was divided over the greater threat -- Berlin or Moscow -- there was no confusion for Henriot. French Communists, *agents provocateurs* of the Third Internationale, were determined to launch France into an ideological war abroad and provoke revolution at home.<sup>50</sup>

Henriot's attentions to the enemy within undermined the Popular Front's propaganda of "fascist encirclement" on the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees.<sup>51</sup> He belittled such scare tactics. The Maginot Line and British and French naval supremacy were insurance against such an eventuality.<sup>52</sup> Henriot saw the flood of Spanish refugees entering France as reinforcements for French Communists and the fulfilment of the Comintern's agenda. His catalogue of Communist atrocities in Spain included vivid

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<sup>49</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A la suite de 1939," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 3 January 1939, 1.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Espagne 1936-1939 III. Le chantage aux trois frontières," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 4 February 1939, 1, 3.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*

accounts of pillage, thousands of priests and nuns tortured and murdered. Catholics had fair warning of what awaited their faith under Communism.<sup>53</sup>

Events in Spain moved quickly with the resignation of President Azana on 26 February, followed by joint Anglo-French recognition of Franco as head of the Spanish government. Marshal Pétain was appointed French ambassador to Burgos on 3 March. The fall of Madrid on 28 March ended the conflict. Franco's victory and "la débâcle des rouges" were applauded by the nationalist press. 170,000 women and children and 270,000 soldiers marched into France as refugees. *Gringoire* published a loathsome caricature of a burglar and murderer, with a large bag of stolen art and church treasures on his back, entering France, saying, "I'll find plenty of work here." *Le Jour* wrote, "Will France open her door to the murderers?" *Le Matin* stated that France must not allow herself to be "blackmailed by pity" (*le chantage à la pitié*).<sup>54</sup> Henriot cited classical history where invaders placed women and children at the head of their columns to disarm the enemy.<sup>55</sup> It was feared that Spanish, Italian, and German political refugees might embroil France in international complications with the dictators, while threatening French jobs.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Espagne 1936-1939 I. La déposition des témoins," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 2 February 1939, 1.

<sup>54</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 328.

<sup>55</sup>*Journal officiel*, Second session Friday 10 March 1939, 912-913.

<sup>56</sup>Michael Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), 36.



Henriot's target in the Chamber was André Marty, Inspector-General of the International Brigades. He called upon the Assembly to condemn "the Butcher of Albacete" to the charge of murdering Frenchmen as well as Spanish women and children. He cited Marty's role in a military court-martial and summary execution of one French citizen and the disappearance of nine other volunteers who had been arrested on Marty's orders and then disappeared.<sup>57</sup> Henriot asked whether Deputy Marty, as Inspector-General of the International Brigades, was acting in the service of a foreign power, and in violation of the French criminal code's definition of treason.<sup>58</sup>

The Munich settlement proved little more than a reprieve when German troops invaded Prague on 15 March 1939 and the German government proclaimed Czechoslovakia a Reich "protectorate." The full implications of Bonnet's confidence to Ribbentrop now became apparent. Chamberlain responded with territorial guarantees to Poland and Romania while Churchill observed, "Here was the righteous cause deliberately and with a refinement of inverted artistry committed to moral battle after its

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<sup>57</sup>*Journal officiel, op. cit.*, 914-15. Marty served as a prosecution witness in the court-martial of one Commander Delasalle. Delasalle was accused of "betraying" the Republican position during the failed assault on the Aranjua Opera on 26 December 1936. According to the deposition of a witness, Henriot reported that Delasalle protested his innocence but was shot in the name of revolutionary justice. Another incident involved the disappearance of French volunteers under Marty's jurisdiction. Three thousand international volunteers embarked on the *Pizzaro* on 18 January 1939 at Barcelona where Marty detained sixty odd volunteers, including twelve Frenchmen. The order for their release never came. On 2 February they were convicted, without charges or legal counsel, of an unknown crime. Three escaped across the border, but the fate of the others was unknown.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, 916.

assets and advantages had been so improvidently squandered."<sup>59</sup> Pierre Gaxotte of *Je Suis Partout* attempted to save face, observing that the loss of Czechoslovakia was compensated by Poland, a superior ally.<sup>60</sup> In the wake of the German unilateral annexation, Daladier received plenary powers for national defence.<sup>61</sup> Henriot voted with the Federation for Daladier; a vote against Daladier would signal a divided France to England, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia when events demanded solidarity. Quick with recriminations, Henriot charged that Germany's European hegemony was owing in part to the failure of French statesmanship.<sup>62</sup> *Gringoire* mockingly caricatured the great French statesmen recognized for their services to Germany, "Aux grand hommes français, l'Allemagne reconnaissante." Briand had sabotaged France's victory; Herriot had liberated the Reich by abandoning reparations; Paul-Boncour had recognized equality of arms; Sarraut had permitted the Reich to remilitarize the Rhineland; Blum and Daladier had created the Rome-Berlin Axis; Jouhaux had disorganized France's labour; Cot had destroyed French aviation; and Auriol had cut billions from national defence.<sup>63</sup> Here was born the myth of the strange defeat.

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<sup>59</sup>Churchill, *op. cit.*, 348.

<sup>60</sup>Lucien Rebatet, *Les Décombres*, (Paris: Editions Denoël, 1942), 138.

<sup>61</sup>Werth, *op. cit.*, 333.

<sup>62</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Defense Nationale et Pleins Pouvoirs," *Jeunesse* 39, no. 68 (March 1939), 1.

<sup>63</sup>"Aux grand hommes français, l'Allemagne reconnaissante," *Gringoire*, 23 March 1939, 4.

Relations between Germany and Poland quickly deteriorated. Since 1920 the Polish Government had refused to accommodate Reich claims on Danzig or extra-territorial rail routes across the Polish corridor. Diplomatic initiatives to wean Italy from the Axis also vanished when on 26 March Mussolini claimed Corsica, Tunis, and Nice.<sup>64</sup> At dawn on 7 April 1939, Italian forces landed in Albania. Henriot compared Czechoslovakia to Albania, one was Hitler's springboard against Poland, while the other would be Mussolini's springboard against Greece and Yugoslavia.<sup>65</sup> France mobilized while Britain introduced conscription and despatched the Mediterranean fleet to oppose another Italian *coup de force*.

Franco-British guarantees to Poland and Romania meant little without Soviet support. The Soviet Union was the one power that could restrain Hitler's tantrum diplomacy. But Soviet diplomatic initiatives at the end of April were received coolly by the British Foreign Office. Instructions to Admiral Drax in Moscow warned against any agreement which would restrict British freedom of action; the Soviets were considered auxiliaries not allies, in the peace efforts.<sup>66</sup> A Franco-British eastern pact uniting Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade with Moscow did not assuage Henriot's fears; Russia's military value against Germany was questionable given that the entire officer corps was executed in 1937 on charges of intelligence with Germany. A Soviet military alliance

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<sup>64</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Où en sommes-nous?" *Gringoire*, 30 March 1939, 2.

<sup>65</sup>Churchill, *op. cit.*, 350.

<sup>66</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 37.

would further jeopardize France's alliances with Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia.<sup>67</sup> Marcel Déat's 4 May article, "Faut-il mourir pour Dantzig?" in *l'Oeuvre*, affirmed that "French peasants had no wish to die for the Poles."<sup>68</sup> Negotiations dragged on throughout the summer. As British and French emissaries negotiated with Moscow, Henriot argued that the accord must apprise France of Soviet military capabilities.<sup>69</sup> The threatened peace would be saved only with Daladier's resolve.<sup>70</sup>

The alliance against Hitler rested in the hands of Stalin. At the XVIIIth Congress of the Communist Party in March, Stalin emphasized that the Soviet Union had no intention of "pulling the chestnuts from the fire" for the Western democracies. Indications of the shift in Soviet foreign policy became apparent when Maxim Litvinov was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov. Litvinov's attempts to forge an "anti-fascist" coalition with the West had foundered with Chamberlain's appeasement at Munich. Stalin, anxious to avert war, found his Jewish foreign minister an embarrassment. Franco-British negotiations with the Soviets stalled from 18-21 August when Daladier pressed General Doumenc to gain the best terms for the common interest. Doumenc observed and reported Molotov's vacillations until the arrival of Joachim von Ribbentrop. The German Foreign Minister arrived with full powers to conclude an accord between

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<sup>67</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Choisir ses Amis," *Jeunesse* 39, no. 69 (April 1939), 1.

<sup>68</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 34.

<sup>69</sup>Philippe Henriot, "l'Indispensable Sang-Froid," *Jeunesse* 39, no. 72 (July-August 1939), 1.

<sup>70</sup>"M. Philippe Henriot à Uzès," *Jeunesse* 39, no. 72 (July-August 1939), 4.

Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union; it was ratified on 23 August. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact forbade the signatories to join a hostile alliance, putting an end to the tripartite negotiations. A secret protocol determined spheres of influence for a fourth partition of Poland on the Narev-Vistula-San rivers. Poland was caught between the German hammer and the Soviet anvil. With the stroke of a pen, the Pact eliminated the German fear of a two-front war.

On the evening of 25 August, Hitler received two communiqués. The first declared Mussolini's unreadiness for a European war; the second announced the conclusion of an Anglo-Polish alliance. Hitler thought it still possible to isolate Poland while negotiations continued between Berlin and London. He offered to protect the British Empire in exchange for the Polish cession of Danzig and the organization of plebiscites in the Danzig corridor. At the National Defence Council meeting on 25 August, Daladier dismissed Bonnet's efforts to pressure the Polish government to compromise over Danzig.<sup>71</sup> The French ambassador at Berlin, Robert Coulondre, despatched a message, "Il faut tenir, tenir, Hitler bluffe."<sup>72</sup>

Daladier's refusal to bend to Hitler's demands was endorsed by Henriot and France as the first French public opinion polls indicated a mixture of resolution and

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<sup>71</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 39-40.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, 40.

resignation, "il faut en finir."<sup>73</sup> On the eve of war, Henriot characterized the Nazi-Soviet pact as Hitler's "tunic of Nessus": "A renewed, rearmed France, sure of her allies was determined that the predator who bluffed, strutted, and blackmailed Europe for the past six years would have his war, thus ensuring his ultimate defeat. Peace was lost, and with it Hitler's limited war."<sup>74</sup> It appeared that Henriot was ready to die for Danzig.

Daladier decreed general mobilization for 1 September. Two days were to elapse, however, before the French and British declaration of war requiring the constitutional assent of Chamber and Commons and the voting of military credits. Pierre-Etienne Flandin argued that war would be a crime and, even after the declaration of war, lobbied the government to ask for peace before real hostilities against Germany began.<sup>75</sup> Mussolini's last-minute proposal for a peace conference for 5 September was seized upon by Bonnet hoping for another Munich accord. Hitler was convinced that the British would abandon Poland at the last moment. Warsaw feared that Britain and France would desert Poland as they had deserted Czechoslovakia. On the evening of 2 September, Bonnet proposed a "symbolic withdrawal" of German troops.<sup>76</sup> Britain's and France's ultimatum demanded not a symbolic but a total withdrawal of all German forces from Poland.

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<sup>73</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 35.

<sup>74</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La Paix? Oui! La Guerre à terme? Non," *Gringoire*, 31 August 1939, 1.

<sup>75</sup>Sherwood, *op. cit.*, 225.

<sup>76</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 40-1.

Henriot could not hide his sense of betrayal of the lost peace that a generation had done everything short of war to avoid. Here again was the lesson of Versailles. He directed his anger not against Hitler or the Nazis but rather against Germany, whether in the guise of the Imperial Reich, the Weimar Republic, or the Nazi dictatorship. The Prussian doctrine of the Ems despatch, the "scrap of paper" of Belgian neutrality, necessity above the law, was the doctrine of *Deutschland über alles*. *Mein Kampf's lebensraum* was a plagiarized compilation of Germany's geopolitics, whether under Frederick II, Bismarck, Wilhelm II, Stresemann, or Hitler. A Germany divided into a mosaic of principalities, duchies, and kingdoms produced the likes of Dürer, Beethoven, Weber, and Goethe. A Germany united produced only soldiers and war; to forget the lesson of history again would be criminal. France's duty was to ensure that the Germany which made Hitler must not survive him.<sup>77</sup>

What Marc Bloch referred to as Communism's intellectual zig-zags began on 26 August when *l'Humanité's* headline read: "Union de la nation française contre l'agression hitlérienne." At war's outbreak, Communist deputies had voted seventy billion francs in military credits. On 20 September, however, the PCF adopted the Comintern directive denouncing the "imperialist war" and demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities. The collapse of Poland was hastened by the Soviet invasion of 17 September. On 29 September Warsaw fell. Premier Daladier declared the French Communist Party illegal on 26 September and demanded the arrest of Communist deputies on 8 October. The

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<sup>77</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'Eternelle Allemagne," *Gringoire*, 7 September 1939, 3.

subsequent witch-hunt imprisoned Communist leaders, persecuted local party members and trade-unionists to the satisfaction of the right. Hitler's peace overture of 6 October was rejected. By mid-October, the PCF's campaign of "revolutionary defeatism" presented France as obedient to the orders of London bankers, with no reason to fight Hitler.<sup>78</sup>

*Gringoire* pointed to the psychological radio war mounted by Radio-Stuttgart and joined by Moscow's "La Voix de la Paix." Broadcasts in French attempted to undermine the government with slogans such as, "Prevent the carnage by defeating Daladier and his clique," and "subscriptions to war loans would only prolong the war." These were acts of treason.<sup>79</sup> Henriot perceived that Soviet "neutrality" in the war amounted to an alliance against the democracies. Thorez and Marty, Hitler's implacable adversaries, were now at his service. Communist defeatism crying "Down with war" was treason, its punishment the firing squad.<sup>80</sup> Henriot's treason campaign accused French Communists

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<sup>78</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 45-6.

<sup>79</sup>F. de Servoules, "Radio de Guerre," *Gringoire*, 7 March 1940, 3.

<sup>80</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Moscou-Vincennes via Berlin," *Gringoire*, 16 November 1939, 3. There was a grim acceptance of the war, but there was no enthusiasm. Alexander Werth noted that "*Il faut en finir*" lacked an ideological and an emotional dynamic. The Russo-German pact had a devastating effect on the French working-class, the only class which, until then, was violently anti-Hitler. Werth deemed Daladier's Communist witch-hunt a mistake. He argued that had the Communist leaders been given enough freedom to defend Stalin, they might have discredited themselves in the eyes of the workers. Instead, the arrests aroused worker-party loyalty and their attitude to the war became increasingly morose and sceptical. Thus, the anti-Nazi working class, which might conceivably have remained anti-Nazi in spite of the Stalin-Hitler pact, became pacifist. Werth, *op. cit.*, 346.



of being agents of not only a foreign power but an enemy power; Moscow was Berlin's ally, and Moscow's servants performed Berlin's work. Henriot invoked "il faut en finir" as the verdict of summary justice for Communist espionage and treason.<sup>81</sup> In April 1940, forty-four ex-Communist Deputies were tried before a military tribunal and condemned to prison sentences of two to five years; nine, including Thorez, Marty, and Duclos, in Moscow, were condemned *in absentia*. Shortly thereafter, Albert Sérol, Socialist Minister of Justice, decreed the death penalty for treason.<sup>82</sup>

Henriot might also have taken pride in foreseeing the Soviet Union's next move. Stalin, leader of both the Soviet Union and the Communist Internationale, executed the next stage of his program to reap the harvest of the pact with Hitler. On 30 November 1939 Russia attacked Finland without declaring war. Henriot described Finland's petition to the League of Nations as another tragic appeal to an impotent Geneva. Hitler, the modern Atilla the Hun, was joined by Stalin, the modern Genghis Khan. Finland's declaration of neutrality, the illusory guarantees of collective security and mutual assistance were now so many autumn leaves tossed by the tempest.<sup>83</sup> War was the mid-wife of revolution. Stalin conspired to allow the belligerents to exhaust themselves so that he might confront a weakened victor. Hitler, preoccupied in the West, would leave Stalin free to attack North-Eastern Europe. Finland confronted two slaveries: the Red Star or

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<sup>81</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Il Faut en Finir!" *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 16 January 1940, 1.

<sup>82</sup>Joel Colton, *Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 339.

<sup>83</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Tempête sur les Neutres," *Gringoire*, 6 December 1939, 1.

the Swastika. Collective security, indivisible peace, international conscience were ghosts of a powerless League,<sup>84</sup> the "Club du Temps Perdu."<sup>85</sup> Henriot recalled Clemenceau's maxim: "In the world in which we live, law without the support of force is only the appeal of the vanquished."

There was much confusion. Poland had been conquered, but nothing else had happened. Former *Munichois* became *bellicistes* over the Finnish war with the Soviet Union. The nationalist press demanded aircraft for Finland's Marshal Mannerheim, the support of the "world's two greatest fleets," and the assembly of an anti-Muscovite army. Finland was the strategic hinge that would swing to the defeat of Leningrad; then march to the Rhine and take the Siegfried line from behind. Lucien Rebatet ridiculed this burlesque strategy which failed to consider five hundred Russian and German divisions.<sup>86</sup> The German propaganda offensive during the "phoney war" began to affect morale during the months of waiting for the German offensive in the West. Radio-Stuttgart repeated that England would fight to the last Frenchman, while Dr. Ley explained that Hitler's promised revenge on France in *Mein Kampf* had been written in a moment of anger. German propaganda suggested that Hitler, like Frederick Barbarossa, Philip Augustus, and Richard the Lion Heart, would become the leader of a great anti-

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<sup>84</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Piège," *Gringoire*, 14 Dec. 1939, 3.

<sup>85</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Club du Temps Perdu," *Gringoire*, 20 Dec. 1939, 1.

<sup>86</sup>Rebatet, *op. cit.*, 234.

bolshevik crusade.<sup>87</sup>

The *drôle de guerre* lacked conviction. France was neither invaded nor clearly threatened. A large faction of the Right which supported Daladier was repelled by the idea of a democratic crusade. Antifascist propaganda was paralysed by the fear that Mussolini might join Germany. The "joke-war" bred public apathy and indifference. The fate of Poland decided, some felt that there no longer seemed to be any reason to pursue the conflict. In an article designed to shore up public opinion and counter growing doubts about the war, Henriot declared that Hitler was a prisoner of his own conquests, as Germany in 1918. His victories were hollow like those of a hunted fugitive who perceived from the four points of the horizon the horsemen of the Apocalypse.<sup>88</sup> Henriot promised that the future peace would not be the peace of the past: "'this' cannot recommence every twenty years."<sup>89</sup>

Rebatet described the ideological morass that blocked the *union sacrée*. Nationalists refused to admit that no war against Germany could be won without Russia. An Allied triumph over Germany would be a Soviet victory. The choice lay between Stalin to defeat Hitler or Hitler to defeat Stalin.<sup>90</sup> Henriot's articles attacking defeatism

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<sup>87</sup>Hélène Eck, *La guerre des ondes: Histoire des radios de langue française pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1985), 33.

<sup>88</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'homme traqué," *Gringoire*, 1 February 1940, 1.

<sup>89</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La Victoire des Vaincus," *Gringoire*, 7 March 1940, 1.

<sup>90</sup>Rebatet, *op. cit.*, 140.

were an admission that France was losing the propaganda war. He argued that those who claimed that war was "unnecessary" and sought to conclude peace before "anything irreparable" happened betrayed those who had fallen already. While Germany's U-boats torpedoed the *Athenia*, English submarines spared the *Bremen*. Civilization was threatened by German and Soviet barbarism; Finland's heroic defence gave the lie to submission. Henriot asked if one were not already defeated by consenting to slavery. In a grudging recognition of Britain, France's ally, Henriot recalled Hamlet on the ramparts of Elsinore, where the apparition commanded him to his duty. "A duty cruel and fierce which he tried to shirk. Futile struggle...."<sup>91</sup> For Henriot, the Communist proposal advocating a pact with Stalin against Hitler, was an impossible choice. Hitler's attack on Poland and Stalin's attack on Finland matched duplicity with betrayal.<sup>92</sup> Goebbels' radio addresses affirmed the solidarity of the German people with their *Führer*. Henriot argued that solidarity in crime demanded solidarity in punishment.<sup>93</sup>

The war of nerves took its political toll as well. With the Russo-Finnish armistice and the collapse of Denmark and Norway, discontent within Daladier's ministry at the irresolute prosecution of the war led to his resignation on 21 March. The new premier, Paul Reynaud, owed his marginal vote of confidence (268 votes to 156, with 111

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<sup>91</sup>Philippe Henriot, "To Be or Not To Be...", *Gringoire*, 28 Dec. 1939, 1.

<sup>92</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Choix Impossible," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 2 January 1940, 1.

<sup>93</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Un observateur Américain," *Gringoire*, 25 April 1940, 3.

abstentions) to the support of Blum, Mandel, and Herriot.<sup>94</sup> Herriot later expressed his doubts to General Charles de Gaulle, wondering whether the Palais Bourbon's vote of confidence in Reynaud was illusory.<sup>95</sup> Reynaud's cabinet did little to restore Herriot's confidence with the appointment of Blum and Monnet.<sup>96</sup> Waiting behind the Maginot Line, French soldiers looked east while civilians hoped for a quick peace or a bloodless victory. There was a tone of futility in Herriot's epitaph for the heroic resistance of Poland, Finland, and Norway. The rights of law and liberty had fallen to the right of might.<sup>97</sup> The ruin was not only material but spiritual. In a world which had lost faith in law, force became a duty. Only the triumph of force at the service of an ideal could restore meaning to a world that had ceased to believe in law.<sup>98</sup> Spoken on the eve of defeat, Herriot's words were prophetic indeed for the future of France. The war of nerves was shattered on 10 May 1940 with the German attack at Sedan.

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<sup>94</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 51.

<sup>95</sup>Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs*, vol. 1: *The Call to Honour 1940-1942*, Jonathan Griffin, trans. (London: Collins, 1955), 37.

<sup>96</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Chacun sa liberté," *Gringoire*, 28 March 1940, 2.

<sup>97</sup>Philippe Herriot, "Mort de la morale internationale," *la Liberté du Sud-Ouest*, 24 April 1940, 1.

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*

## Chapter 6: National Revolution Militant, 1940-1941

"They were ready to find consolation in the thought that beneath the ruins of France a shameful regime might be crushed to death, and that if they yielded it was to a punishment meted out by Destiny to a guilty nation." Marc Bloch<sup>1</sup>

Marin's Republican Federation appeared to have closed ranks in the face of the common enemy. Its professed solidarity, however, masked a fundamental division which first surfaced at the beginning of 1938, with the *Anschluss*. Henriot and Vallat supported the Latin *entente* with Italy, sacrificing everything to their fierce anticommunism. Another party member, Debû-Bridel expressed his concerns in March 1938 after hearing several party speakers at Lyon. According to Vallat, Parmentier, and others "one could believe that France was threatened by Russia and that a descent of Cossacks on Paris was imminent." Marin and the "Lorrains" were isolated by the new "sorcerer's apprentices." Henriot and Vallat rallied to Vichy, while Marin retreated into a solitary isolation and worked with the resistance.<sup>2</sup> Marshal Pétain's armistice was the keystone of the National Revolution and General Charles de Gaulle's call for resistance. On the outcome of the conflict hinged the survival of Pétain's eternal France or De Gaulle's Free France. The debate on the defeat -- *la débâcle* -- served as the forum for Vichy's and London's

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<sup>1</sup>Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940*, (translated by Gerard Hopkins), New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968, 170.

<sup>2</sup>Jean-Noël Jeanneney, "La Fédération républicaine." In *La France et les Français en 1938-1939*, René Rémond and Janine Bourdin, eds. (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978), 356-7. Marin's personal resistance redeemed himself but failed to resurrect his party following the Liberation.

propaganda in the psychological battle for France. Philippe Henriot's and Marc Bloch's examination of conscience examined the "dry rot" which resulted in defeat. Henriot saddled the Popular Front with the defeat while Bloch charged the military as responsible for the collapse. Henriot's career determined his loyalty to the Marshal, the National Revolution and, ultimately, collaboration. Marc Bloch's resistance was a loyalty to the Republic against Goebbels' professed aim to strike 1789 from history. Churchill's directive to "set Europe ablaze" employed these same ideas to frustrate Goebbels' objective.

Twice daily, General Staff summaries reported all quiet on the Eastern Front. Belief in the inviolability of the Maginot fortifications was universal: the decisive campaign would be elsewhere. Lucien Rebatet recorded in his diary, "What would they say if it occurred to them to reread Joffre: 'La défensive passive conduit infailliblement à la défaite'?"<sup>3</sup> With the British continental commitment secured, the French Army of 1940 prepared for its third war with Germany.

At the Nuremberg Trials German generals agreed that a major Franco-British offensive in the opening days of the war, with the bulk of the *Wehrmacht* committed to Poland would have steeled the French army and the nation to the struggle, eliminated military incompetents and political defeatists, and dispelled the *drôle de guerre* mentality

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<sup>3</sup>Lucien Rebatet, *Les Décombres*, (Paris: Les Editions Denoël, 1942), 231.

of victory without bloodshed.<sup>4</sup> The French General Staff had foreseen everything except a war of movement.<sup>5</sup> The moment of truth arrived when the German offensive finally came on 10 May. The invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium convinced Gamelin that here lay the main German assault. On 13 May, massed German armoured divisions crossed the Meuse and broke through General Corap's Sixth Army near Sedan. On 15 May the Dutch Army surrendered. The German break-out threatened simultaneously the British Expeditionary Force and the bulk of the French Army advancing in Belgium to the Dyle-Breda line, the French Armies in the South, and Paris.

In the whirlwind of events, Henriot's articles reveal the abrupt change from the *drôle de guerre* mentality. On 16 May he attacked the defeatists. The war had just begun, and already there were demands for a magnanimous peace. He declared that France was at war against Nazism and the German people, and any future peace would be one of "inflexible justice and implacable severity."<sup>6</sup> With a military situation becoming more desperate by the hour, Henriot spoke of Reynaud's mass at Notre Dame as the *union*

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<sup>4</sup>John M. Sherwood, *Georges Mandel and the Third Republic*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970), 226.

<sup>5</sup> See Don W. Alexander, "Repercussions of the Breda Variant." *French Historical Studies* VIII, no. 3 (Spring 1974), 459-88; Jeffrey Gunsberg, *Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West*, (Westport Conn. 1979); Judith Hughes, *To the Maginot Line*, (Cambridge Mass. 1971); Robert Young, *In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933-40*, (Cambridge Mass. 1978) and Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1995), that examines at French intelligence failures to detect the scale of the 1914 German offensive and, in 1940, to predict where and when Hitler would attack.

<sup>6</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Magnanimité," *Gringoire*, 16 May 1940, 3.



*sacrée* -- the faith of those who prayed and believed in those who commanded and fought against "the insolent legions of barbarism."<sup>7</sup> Gamelin's dismissal on 19 May, the appointments of Philippe Pétain as Vice-President of the Council and General Maxime Weygand as the new Generalissimo were an attempt to reassure France that "our leaders and soldiers are united." The victor of Verdun would show France's soldiers the path to victory.<sup>8</sup> Lucien Rebatet saw Weygand's appointment as akin to calling for a surgeon when the diagnosis was peritonitis.<sup>9</sup>

Weygand's counter-attack against the flanks of the German spearhead, coordinated with the remnants of Lord Gort's BEF, was too little, too late. Reynaud's personal appeal to Roosevelt was a desperate call ignored by an isolationist Congress. During the night of 5/6 June, Paul Reynaud appointed Brigadier-General Charles de Gaulle as Under-Secretary of State for National Defence. De Gaulle advised Reynaud that the battle for France was lost, but that the struggle could continue from the Empire. The "Marne recovery" would be on the Mediterranean.<sup>10</sup> Weygand, however, appealed for an armistice, fearing that the military collapse would bring anarchy and revolution.<sup>11</sup> On

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<sup>7</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Tous unis devant le péril," *Gringoire*, 23 May 1940, 1.

<sup>8</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Ces jeunes généraux qui se sont couverts de gloire," *Gringoire*, 30 May 1940, 2.

<sup>9</sup>Rebatet, *op. cit.*, 362.

<sup>10</sup>Charles De Gaulle, *War Memoirs*. Vol. 1: *The Call to Honour 1940-1942*, translated by Jonathan Griffin, (London: Collins, 1955), 66.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 70.

10 June Mussolini declared war on France. Roosevelt remarked that "the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbour."<sup>12</sup>

Michael Balfour observes that propaganda is most effective in uncertain times where fears became reality, creating an overwhelming paralysis.<sup>13</sup> The flight of millions before the advancing German Army was not due solely to the collapse of the military front. The exodus was inspired by fear which had been generated for months by foreign and domestic propaganda. Radio also proved to be a powerful psychological weapon in the fall of France. Paul Ferdonnet's Radio Stuttgart broadcasts coined the phrase, "les Anglais donnent leurs machines, les Français donnent leurs poitrines," but the Luftwaffe air raids on Warsaw and Rotterdam on 14 May sowed the seeds of *l'exode*, the panic flight from Paris. On 17 May, Goebbels ordered his radio stations to broadcast reports of the terror bombing of Rotterdam.<sup>14</sup> Rumours of a fifth column suggested that all Germans in France, including Jewish émigrés, were enemy agents; that the Government had fled Paris while the British retreated toward the coast. Reynaud and "the Jew Mandel" were portrayed as warmongers who dismissed Gamelin because the Commander-in-Chief saw no alternative but to negotiate an armistice. Radio-Humanité

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<sup>12</sup>Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Their Finest Hour* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), 129-32.

<sup>13</sup>Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 188.

<sup>14</sup>Balfour, *op. cit.*, 181. Rotterdam's victims numbered almost one thousand casualties while the Dutch Foreign Minister, van Kleffens, after leaving the country, gave the figure as 30,000 in thirty minutes. This was the version used by the Allies for the rest of the war.

from Moscow competed with Radio-Stuttgart -- "Travailleurs de France, debout pour la victoire du prolétariat!" -- condemning "Reynaud-la-guerre," clerical-royalist cliques, and Allied warmongers.<sup>15</sup>

Resistance was overwhelmed by those who were resigned to defeat. In the midst of military and political collapse, Pétain's appointment was acclaimed. For the right, Pétain was the old soldier, Catholic peasant, partisan of order; for the left, the symbol of the Republican Army, the conqueror of Verdun, "the most noble, the most human of our military leaders," as Léon Blum wrote when Pétain was appointed Ambassador to Madrid. When he was appointed vice-president of the Council on 18 May 1940, a Radical-Socialist Senate welcomed him with the cry of "Enfin!" Pétain's radio address on 17 June spoke to a nation traumatized, its army in retreat. "C'est avec le coeur serré que je vous dis aujourd'hui qu'il faut cesser le combat." The Prefecture of Brest declared the speech an enemy ruse until another broadcast confirmed, "Il faut tenter de cesser le combat."<sup>16</sup> Refusing to fight from North Africa, Pétain would seek an armistice; "Je fais à la France le don de ma personne pour atténuer son malheur" was his consent to bear the mantle of defeat as an act of expiation and redemption.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Jacques Parrot, *La Guerre des Ondes: De Goebbels à Kadhafi*, (Paris: Plon, 1987), 85-86.

<sup>16</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma, *De Munich à la Libération 1938-1944*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979), 64.

<sup>17</sup>Gérard Miller, *Les pousse-au-jour du Maréchal Pétain*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975), 49.

The decision to sue for an armistice was made to save French lives and avert what Weygand feared was an imminent Communist coup. German armistice terms presented on 21 June 1940 included a demarcation line dividing Atlantic from Mediterranean France. Three eastern départements formed a *zone interdite* forbidding refugees to return to their homes; a *zone rattachée* of the departments of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais was to be administered by the Brussels Kommandantur. The armistice provided that the German Army would occupy northern France while providing for an unoccupied or "Free zone" in the south. Pétain's new government was to be relocated at the resort town of Vichy. France was to accept the maintenance of German occupation troops, adjusted according to circumstances, and the internment of almost two million prisoners of war "until the peace." These political hostages were to be ransomed later. The French delegation, under General Huntziger, accepted the terms on 22 June; two days later they accepted the Italian terms as well.<sup>18</sup> Peace was never concluded. The armistice legitimized Franco-German relations and created the basis for economic exploitation and political collaboration. But for France, fighting its second war in less than a quarter-century, haunted by the spectres of 1871, 1917 and 1936, resistance was an impossible choice.<sup>19</sup>

Henriot expressed great hopes born of great fears. Accepting the defeat and the

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<sup>18</sup>Richard Griffiths, *Marshal Pétain*, (London: Constable, 1970), 242.

<sup>19</sup>Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), 15.

armistice offered an opportunity to rebuild a shattered France with a National Revolution -- a restoration of the spiritual values of religion, nation, and family under the leadership of France's most esteemed public figure.<sup>20</sup> Henriot's grief at the fall of France was not only political. His son, Jacques, was killed in a flying accident on 23 June just before the end to the fighting. Henriot's *Gringoire* article "Beyond the Ruins" was both fearful and hopeful, recalling Paul Claudel's elegy on the Spanish Civil War: one was caught between heaven and hell with only twenty seconds to choose. Henriot chose Pétain, and in so doing accepted the armistice. Angelo Tasca commented that France's "phoney war" had ended with a phoney armistice.<sup>21</sup>

The armistice was unacceptable to General de Gaulle. His broadcast from London on 18 June explained the defeat as a military collapse, a fatal combination of German mechanized forces, military complacency, and political pacifism and called for France's colonies to join his Free French resistance. De Gaulle's appeal was anticlimactic; the German triumph of arms had established a continental hegemony which Britain was powerless to contest. While the resistance could offer little in the way of practical aims, those who favoured the armistice argued that France could be saved. This proved decisive for the future orientation of both collaboration and resistance.<sup>22</sup> Pétain's notion

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<sup>20</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Par delà les ruines," *Gringoire*, 20 June 1940, 3.

<sup>21</sup>Denis Peschanski (ed.), *Vichy 1940-1944: Archives de Guerre d'Angelo Tasca*, (Paris & Milano: Editions du CNRS Paris and Feltrinelli Editore, 1986), 429. "On est entré dans l'armistice comme on est entré dans la guerre. Drôle de guerre, drôle d'armistice."

<sup>22</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 67.

of the state saw power rooted in the soil; it could not be represented outside its frontiers. If it lost its roots, it would die. A government-in-exile could not create national unity. To remain in place was absolutely imperative. The France of the Pétainists only existed if it commanded, if it continued to give orders.<sup>23</sup> Pétain's broadcast of 20 June explained the defeat as symptomatic of a deeper malaise. The spirit of victory in 1918 was contrasted with the defeatism of 1940. Victory was the spirit of disciplined self-sacrifice; defeat was the result of materialism and individualism.<sup>24</sup> Pétain's "too few children and too few arms" ignored the fact that the armies of France and of Germany were numerically equal. Pétain's signal was to see his government place the responsibility for the debacle at the feet of a corrupt masonic-Jewish Republic, the Popular Front.

Admiral Jean-Louis-François Darlan's assurances that France's Mediterranean Fleet would remain in French hands failed to calm the British sea lords' fears of the strategic threat posed to Britain if the French Navy fell into German hands. Accordingly, on 4 July at Mers-el-Kébir (Oran) Admiral Cunningham offered Admiral Gensoul the British ultimatum: the fleet could join forces with the Royal Navy, scuttle itself, or sail to distant French colonial ports. Gensoul refused. The British squadron opened fire

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<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 31. *Candide*, 13 November 1940 cited the Marshal, "... Car le néant, c'est avant tout l'absence d'autorité. L'autorité, quand je suis venue ici, n'était nulle part."

<sup>24</sup>Miller, *op. cit.*, 33-4. Pétain spoke of "trop peu d'enfants, trop peu d'armes, trop peu d'alliés, voilà les causes de notre défaite... Depuis la victoire, l'esprit de jouissance l'a emporté sur l'esprit de sacrifice. On a revindiqué plus qu'on n'a servi. On a voulu épargner l'effort; on rencontre le malheur."

killing 1,267 French sailors. Churchill's order for the preemptive strike poisoned Anglo-French relations and created the backdrop for the dissolution of the Third Republic and the creation of the French State. On 9 July the Assembly voted 624 to 4 for constitutional revision. Anatole de Monzie reflected that the Popular Front parliament had left the scene as "penitents" who abandoned power and sacrificed liberty for the assurance of order.<sup>25</sup> Pierre Laval put it more bluntly to the assembled Deputies, "since parliamentary democracy wished to enter into a struggle with Nazism and fascism and ...lost ..., it must disappear. A new regime -- one that is bold, authoritarian, social and national -- must take its place."<sup>26</sup> On 10 July the Third Republic was dissolved by a vote of 568 to 80. Only the deputies from *La Jeune République* and the *Parti Démocrate populaire* refused full powers to Pétain.<sup>27</sup> Henriot welcomed the architects of the National Revolution which would prevail over the petty grudges and bickering of the Republic. Ominously, he also spoke of naming those responsible for the defeat.<sup>28</sup>

*Maréchalisme*, the national veneration of Pétain, was the lever to persuade France

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<sup>25</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 32.

<sup>26</sup>Geoffrey Warner, *Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France*, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoodie, 1968), 190. Laval gloated over a personal revenge for his defeat after the Hoare-Laval pact in 1936: "That Chamber spewed me up, now I'm going to spew it up."

<sup>27</sup>Only 80 of 568 deputies voted against granting full powers to Marshal Pétain. Pierre Miquel's *Les Quatre-Vingts* (Paris: Fayard, 1995) points out that the majority of the deputies who voted "no" were former maires from coastal or mountainous regions of France, the areas that later gave birth to the future Resistance. See Bertrand le Gendre, "Le suicide de la République," in *Le Monde*, 6 May 1995.

<sup>28</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Nommez partout des Responsables," *Gringoire*, 8 August 1940, 1.

to accept the armistice. In the summer of 1940 Vichy offered Pétain as the national and social cement of a New France of order, obedience, and duty. Catholic moralists had a field day interpreting the catastrophe as divine retribution for past sins. National contrition and repentance were Vichy's political metaphysic. To remain French was to "think Pétain". One poster asked, "Etes-vous plus français que lui?" Catholic obedience to the state was emphasized by the Church. Gaullist dissidence was a crime against the established order.<sup>29</sup> Monsignor Saliège, Archbishop of Toulouse, condemned the Republic for having banned God from the schools and the nation. Paul Claudel, a militant Catholic, wrote on 6 July 1940 that France, after sixty years, was delivered from the yoke of universal suffrage and Radical anti-Catholicism with its Jews, masons, and Republican teachers.<sup>30</sup>

Pétain, named Head of the French State on 10 July, offered an intellectual and moral *redressement*; the "false notion of the natural equality of men" would cede to natural hierarchies of families, professions, and communes. New élites would emerge from this false egalitarianism to be disciplined by work. Schools would be cleansed of the pseudo-culture of intellectuals. Pétain's National Revolution offered a national community purged of the pleasure ethic, class conflict and, as the *Charte du Travail* later outlined, the alliance of capitalism and socialism. The economy, formerly driven by the

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<sup>29</sup>Louis Allen, "Jews and Catholics," in *Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology*, (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985), 75.

<sup>30</sup>The Declaration of Nîmes concluded, "Autour de vous, Monsieur le Maréchal, nous souhaitons vivement pouvoir servir la France... vous nous donnez des raisons d'espérer."



profit motive, would be reorganized and controlled by corporations ruled by an authoritarian state where a small group advised, a few ordered, and one leader governed.<sup>31</sup> Pétain's ministers, appointed on 13 July, were recruited from the military and the radical right. Weygand was appointed as Minister of National Defence, General Colson received the War Ministry, General Pujo the Air Ministry, and Admiral Darlan the Navy. Laval was appointed Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs in hopes of conciliating Hitler and Mussolini. Other ministers were chosen for their right-wing loyalties: Marcel Peyrouton was appointed Minister of the Interior, Raphaël Alibert, as Minister of Justice, was to be responsible for the decree-laws on citizenship and naturalization. The new portfolio of Youth and the Family was entrusted to Jean Ybarnégaray.<sup>32</sup>

Henriot rejoined the staff of *Gringoire*, relocated at Marseille. Its editor-in-chief, Horace de Carbuccia, placed the newspaper at the service of the National Revolution. Its first service to the Marshal was to demand justice to those responsible for the collapse of a worm-eaten Republic that had toppled at the first shock of the German blitzkrieg. All that remained was to sweep away the debris with the broom of the National

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<sup>31</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 79-80, 101. The régime was authoritarian, a gerontocracy of conservative notables, not one fascist single party. Jean-Pierre Azéma argues that R. Bourderon's article "Le régime de Vichy était-il fasciste?" *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale* 8, (1973) is unconvincing. Paris "ultras" such as Rebatet, Déat, and Doriot considered Vichy reactionary and endorsed a closer collaboration if not co-belligerency with Germany.

<sup>32</sup>Griffiths, *op. cit.*, 252-3.

Revolution.<sup>33</sup> Promising a healthy and disciplined France united in solidarity, the agenda became what Stanley Hoffmann characterized as the "great revenge of the minorities." Lucien Rebatet wrote that France was to be purged of Jewish democracy, "punished and purified."<sup>34</sup> Georges Bernanos dismissed Vichy's National Revolution as the "revolution of the losers".<sup>35</sup>

Henriot's articles called on Minister of Education Emile Mireaux and Jean Ybarnégaray, Minister of Youth and the Family, to implement the educational and moral *redressement* of the National Revolution. Education was to restore the fraternal virtues of *travail, famille, patrie*. Christian brothers and sisters were to repair the damage of the

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<sup>33</sup>Both Pétain and Laval took a special interest in Vichy's propaganda for the new *État français*. However, the *Haut Commissariat à la Propagande Française* suffered from successive appointments and dismissals. Jean Prouvost served as Propaganda Minister until replaced by Laval's appointee, Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour on 6 September. On 28 October Pierre Cathala was appointed as *secrétariat-général à l'Information* for press and radio. The press directive read, "Les journaux, dans les circonstances que nous traversons, ont une mission importante et grave à remplir. Le sort de notre pays se joue et dépend dans une certaine mesure de l'attitude de la presse. Comment pourrait-il échapper aux directeurs de journaux, à moins qu'ils ne soient délibérément ou sourdement hostiles à la politique pratiquée par le Maréchal Pétain, que le thème essentiel est à l'heure présente celui de la collaboration, et que c'est sur ce thème que la propagande doit exercer au maximum son effort? Nul n'ignore qu'une partie de l'opinion montre encore de l'incompréhension. Les journaux ne doivent pas avoir le souci de ménager telle ou telle fonction de l'opinion, mais celui d'éclairer et de guider." Cited in Denis Pechanski, "La Propagande de l'Etat Français: Encadrer ou Contrôler?" in Laurent Gerbeau and Denis Peschanski (ed.) *La Propagande sous Vichy 1940-1944*, (Paris: Collections des Publications de la Bibliothèque de la Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, 1990), 13.

<sup>34</sup>Rebatet, *op. cit.*, 476.

<sup>35</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 86-7. "La révolution des ratés"

former Republican élites.<sup>36</sup> Primary school graduates were semi-literate, physically unfit and patriotic illiterates. The solution lay in teaching the history, language and moral values of Latin classical civilization. The *Syndicat National des Instituteurs* (SNI) was instructed to replace secular Republicanism with the achievements of the pre-Revolutionary monarchy.<sup>37</sup>

To Jean Ybarnégaray Henriot addressed a call for the abolition of divorce. Pétain's *trop peu d'enfants* was Vichy's mandate to restore family values. "The sinister gift [of divorce] given to Christian France by the Jew Naquet" created social discord, moral confusion, and the solitude of hearts in what Léon Daudet called the division of the child (*le partage de l'enfant*). The family could not be restored without the repeal of divorce.<sup>38</sup> The law of 2 April 1941 forbade divorce during the first three years of

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<sup>36</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Débourage des Crânes: lettre ouverte à M. le Ministre de l'Education Nationale," *Gringoire*, 25 July 1940, 2. The National Teachers Union was dissolved. Its prominence in leading the twenty-four hour general strike on 12 February 1934, forming the *Comité de Vigilance des Intellectuels contre le Fascisme*, and welding the Common Front into the Popular Front made it a Vichy target. The law of 17 July 1940 permitted the state to dismiss any civil servant who constituted an "element of disorder." Freemasons were dismissed from public service in August, purging 1,328 teachers. Those teachers who remained were required to take an oath of loyalty to the régime. The pedagogical struggle between the classical and élitist *lycée* system, and the technical, modern curricula was politically charged. Vichy, like its republican predecessor, sought to mould citizens in its image. Vichy education policy distinguished between curricula for boys and girls, urban and rural France.

<sup>37</sup>W.D. Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 7-8.

<sup>38</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Abrogez le divorce," *Gringoire*, 19 September 1940, 1. The 1884 divorce law had been introduced by Radical Republican Alfred Naquet. The fact that he was a Jew lent support to Vichy's anti-semitism, but his Boulangism was overlooked. Paxton, *op. cit.*, 167.

marriage, and magistrates were instructed by Justice Minister Barthélemy to apply the new law retroactively to proceedings already in progress.<sup>39</sup> Civil divorce, however, remained on the statutes as Madame la Maréchal was a divorcée.

Vichy's legislation was designed to carry out a domestic revolution in institutions and values.<sup>40</sup> Revolutionary in appearance, reactionary in reality, the National Revolution's broom was portrayed as sweeping the trash from the national house with the motto, "The walls are sound" (*les murs sont bons*).<sup>41</sup> "Anti-France" described the régime's official enemies who were subjected to a collective punishment. The "purification" of the French state began on 22 July 1940 with Justice Minister Raphaël Alibert's Commission for the Revision of Naturalization reviewing all grants of French citizenship since 10 August 1927. Of some 500,000 dossiers examined, 15,154 naturalized French were stripped of their citizenship. Of these, 6,307 were Jews.<sup>42</sup> The decree also revoked the citizenship of those who had left France between 10 May and 30 June, targeting the *Massilia* deputies and de Gaulle's *Français Libres*.<sup>43</sup> Masonic lodges were proscribed on 13 August 1940. Public officials were required to swear an oath of loyalty to the Marshal that they were not (or were no longer) masons. Decrees

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<sup>39</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 167.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>41</sup>Miller, *op. cit.*, 104.

<sup>42</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 170-1.

<sup>43</sup>Miller, *op. cit.*, 182.

of 16 August 1940 and 10 September 1940 limited admission to medicine and law schools. Jews and masons were now the official enemies of the new régime.<sup>44</sup> The notorious *Statut des Juifs* of 3 October 1940 excluded Jews from all political and professional life. A law of 4 October authorized prefects to intern foreign Jews in special camps.<sup>45</sup> Joseph Barthélemy, Keeper of the Seals, declared that "The Jewish people, alien, unable to assimilate more than all others, dominators of nations which receive them, will no longer reign over France."<sup>46</sup>

Henriot asked who were *les responsables*? How could the world's most powerful army collapse in six weeks? He pointed to the strikes that had weakened France's limited industrial capacity and deprived her army of modern weapons. Henriot wrote of an authoritarian social contract to impose a new discipline on workers.<sup>47</sup> The arrest of Jean Zay, Georges Mandel, and Pierre Mendès-France, along with other *Massilia* "deserters" inspired a demand for quick and summary justice.<sup>48</sup> On the same day that the *Statut des Juifs* was decreed, Henriot applauded the legislation on secret societies, the purge of Republican teachers and civil servants, the organization of labour, the initiation of public works, and the arrest of *les responsables*. What had been impossible during thirty years

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<sup>44</sup>Michael Marrus & Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), 19.

<sup>45</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 174.

<sup>46</sup>Raymond Tournoux, *Le Royaume d'Otto*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1982), 51.

<sup>47</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La main tendue," *Gringoire*, 24 October 1940, 1.

<sup>48</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Vite et Tout," *Gringoire*, 5 Sept. 1940, 2.

of Republican politics was accomplished in a few weeks by the National Revolution.<sup>49</sup>

De Gaulle's Dakar expedition was a turning point in Vichy-German collaboration. "Catapult," the Anglo-Gaullist task force, sailed on 31 August for Dakar in an effort to secure the strategic West African colony. Dakar's Governor-General, Pierre Boisson, answered the British force with shell-fire. Naval reinforcements from the Toulon squadron determined the outcome in Vichy's favour. On 24 and 25 September, in retaliation for the attack on Dakar, French aircraft bombed Gibraltar. While Vichy severed diplomatic relations, Dakar did not provoke a declaration of war by either France or England. Churchill feared the French fleet would tip the balance in the Mediterranean in favour of the Axis. British directives entreated de Gaulle to desist from speaking of Pétain as "Père-la-défaite de Vichy" in his radio broadcasts. Further attacks might drive Vichy into alliance with Germany.<sup>50</sup> Dakar undoubtedly inspired Pétain's broadcast on 11 October outlining a policy whereby the new regime would "liberate itself from traditional friendships." Franco-German relations would dominate France's future. To Germany, Pétain offered "a new peace of collaboration" or a "traditional peace of oppression"; if Germany would "rise above her victory, we will know how to rise above

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<sup>49</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Toute la Revolution," *Gringoire*, 3 October 1940, 1.

<sup>50</sup>Jean Oberlé, *"Jean Oberlé Vous Parle": Souvenirs de cinq années à Londres*, (Paris: La Jeune Parque, 1945), 159. The BBC's French Desk was instructed to refrain from condemning Pétain until November 1942, the invasion of French North Africa.

our defeat."<sup>51</sup>

The 11 October broadcast prepared the French public for the Montoire summit of 22-24 October. Laval attempted to reach a settlement with Germany in exchange for the active defence of the French Empire against the British.<sup>52</sup> Hitler's interviews with Laval and Pétain were not promising. He reminded Laval that terms would be dictated at the peace. France was conquered and was liable to suffer the consequences. France could soften the defeat only to the extent that its forces were mobilized against England. Pétain, by contrast, asked for a peace that "favoured those who had tried to make a new start" and said that he anticipated, as a result of cooperation, "a more advantageous outcome of the war for France." Pétain's radio broadcast of 30 October announced his decision to pursue a policy of collaboration.<sup>53</sup> Henriot's description of the Montoire meeting was as inconclusive as the actual summit.<sup>54</sup> His propaganda publicized Laval's new policy toward France's conquerors. Laval's radio broadcast on 31 October was more

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<sup>51</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma argues that Pétain's collaboration was inspired by a realistic pragmatism, and not through any sympathy with the Nazis. Marc Ferro disagrees and perceives that Pétain had crypto-Nazi leanings. Pétain personally signed decrees that were harsher than what the Nazis required of the French.

<sup>52</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 109-10.

<sup>53</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 77. Paxton argued that Pétain hoped that collaboration would ease the suffering of the prisoners of war, reduce occupation costs, and create a flexible demarcation line hastening the transport of foodstuffs.

<sup>54</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Vive Pétain," *Gringoire*, 31 Oct. 1940, 1. Pétain announced that he had voluntarily adopted the policy of collaboration. "C'est librement que je me suis rendu à l'invitation du Führer. Je n'ai subi de sa part aucune pression. La politique de collaboration est la mienne. Les ministres ne sont responsable que devant moi. C'est moi seul que l'histoire jugera."

explicit. Economic collaboration with Germany would serve the "interests" of both France and Europe. Laval gambled that the future Europe would be German and he attempted to find a place for France within the New Order instead of waiting for the outcome of the war. It was only a matter of time before England collapsed. As Otto Abetz, German ambassador to Vichy, put it at the 29 November meeting, Montoire was a step toward "the unification of the continent against England."<sup>55</sup>

The summer crisis of 1940 passed, leaving Britain bloodied but unbowed from the aerial blitzkrieg. What Churchill considered Britain's finest hour was the first glimmer of hope for occupied France. On the evening of 21 October, French listeners tuning to the BBC heard Churchill's defiant promise to cleanse Europe of the Nazi plague.<sup>56</sup> Churchill's speech was matched by De Gaulle's "Brazzaville Manifesto" of 27 October announcing the creation of the Empire Defence Council. De Gaulle disputed Vichy's legitimacy, branding it a servile tool of the invader: "It is necessary therefore, for a new authority to assume the burden of directing the French war effort. Events are imposing this sacred duty upon me. I shall not fail in it...."<sup>57</sup> It was against the Anglo-Gaullist challenge in Africa that Laval's "new policy" coincided with German strategy. Vichy propaganda tried to paint De Gaulle as a British mercenary. Henriot mocked De

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<sup>55</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 86-7. The Germans viewed Pétain's collaboration with mistrust. On 10 December 1940 Hitler approved the draft plan "Attila" for the military occupation of the non-occupied zone in case General Weygand or other colonial leaders followed Free France.

<sup>56</sup>François Kersaudy, *Churchill and de Gaulle* (Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1990), 111-12.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, 117.



Gaulle and de Larminat, "champions of an intransigent patriotism," charging that London's *France libre* was the refuge of the dismantled Popular Front and the lodges. Condemning the attack on Dakar, Henriot defended Pétain: "The conqueror of Verdun cannot be the accomplice of the assassins of Libreville."<sup>58</sup>

The ideological Battle for France was laid out in De Gaulle's Brazzaville Manifesto and Churchill's order to "set Europe ablaze." Vichy's counter-propaganda orchestrated the cult of the Marshal. A *note d'orientation* of 22 November 1940 outlined the role of the print media to "guide and enlighten" public opinion in the Marshal's National Revolution. Those who withheld allegiance were excluded from the national community. The humiliation of defeat, the panic flight of refugees, the annexations, prisoners of war, Oran and Dakar reinforced the myth of *Maréchalisme* -- Pétain as the conqueror of Verdun and saviour of France.<sup>59</sup> It was this unanimous *maréchalisme* that greeted Pétain in his tour of the *zone libre*. Henriot used the tour to silence doubts. To

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<sup>58</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les assassins de Libreville," *Gringoire*, 14 November 1940, 2. Colonel Edgard de Larminat joined Free France but failed to persuade his Syrian regiment to join the Gaullists. He was joined by General Catroux from Indochina and General Paul Le Gentilhomme from Djibouti while Algeria, Morocco and French West Africa remained under Vichy control, partially owing to General Maxime Weygand's autumn tour of the African Empire. See Paxton, *op. cit.*, 69.

<sup>59</sup>Pierre Laborie distinguished between the charismatic cult of *maréchalisme* and *pétainisme*, the policy of collaboration with Germany. Pierre Laborie, "L'évolution de l'opinion publique," in Laurent Gerbeau and Denis Peschanski (ed.) *La Propagande sous Vichy 1940-1944*, (Paris: Collections des Publications de la Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, 1990).

be loyal to the Marshal was not to applaud but to serve.<sup>60</sup> The newly created *Chantiers de la Jeunesse*, the *Légion*, *Compagnons de France* and the *Ecole nationale supérieure des Cadres de l'Uriage* were to be the *Ecole normale supérieure* of the National Revolution.

Henriot spared little sympathy for the plight of Jewish refugees interned in concentration camps. "We are hungry in order to save France, but not to feed the *métèques* or famine-makers. In our era of draconian measures, it is important that the guilty be served first. Summary justice must be served. It is by making these wretches tremble that we comfort our own."<sup>61</sup> Food shortages gave a new social and economic status to agriculture which in turn, served to reinforce Vichy's traditional social philosophy. Pétain's address of 12 October 1940 extolled the family farm as "France's principal economic and social base." Henriot extolled the peasant as one who wasted nothing. The land had resumed its true value by dire necessity, restoring the peasant to his position in the national community. The peasant was a poet of land and people whose life and labour served as the foundation for renewed hopes.<sup>62</sup>

*Travail, Famille, Patrie* reinforced the collective illusion that attempted to legitimate Vichy. A populist *maréchalisme*, Pierre Laborie suggests, concealed

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<sup>60</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Servir," *Gringoire*, 12 December 1940, 1.

<sup>61</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Indésirables et affameurs," *Gringoire*, 9 January 1941, 2.

<sup>62</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A terre française génie français," *Gringoire*, 27 March 1941, 2.

weaknesses and contradictions in *l'État français*. Popular veneration for the conqueror of Verdun did not imply support for the régime of which he was leader and symbol. Vichy was a provisional solution, a government of circumstance unable to overcome widespread apathy. Resignation to defeat was secondary to the concern for survival. Laborie argues that this could explain the absence of reaction to the first statutes against the Jews on 3 October 1940.<sup>63</sup> At year's end, rumours of a divided cabinet suggested that cracks were forming in *l'État française*.<sup>64</sup> Henriot opposed Public Works Minister Ludovic-Oscar Frossard's appeal for an amnesty for Gaullists: "While such an amnesty was a comfort for the guilty, it was a betrayal of the innocent. How can one simultaneously serve the Marshal and excuse the traitor de Gaulle? If one seeks to safeguard French unity, it is necessary to protect it from those who undermine it from within as from those who threaten it from without."<sup>65</sup> Such was the exclusive logic of *pétainisme*. The National Revolution would restore a France ruined by the Popular Front: "This régime ruined [France] economically, disarmed her materially, corrupted her morally, divided her socially, and isolated her diplomatically. Then it delivered her powerless to the ideologies responsible for the defeat. Under this abject régime where international socialism held the levers of power, France died." The list of Vichy's fears - the strikes of 1936, the 1937 Exposition, the raised fist -- were to be swept away. The

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<sup>63</sup>Laborie, *op. cit.*, 230-231.

<sup>64</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Une nouvelle guerre des nerfs," *Gringoire*, 16 January 1941, 2.

<sup>65</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Défense des Partisans," *Gringoire*, 30 January 1941, 1.

National Revolution promised to create a new political vocabulary.<sup>66</sup> Such exhortations were cold comfort in the winter of 1940 for refugees more concerned with survival. Food became a national obsession which bred indifference toward the virtues of the National Revolution.<sup>67</sup> Robert Paxton cites the bitter slogan of cold and hungry Parisians during the winter of 1940: "Pas de pain, vive Pétain. Pas de feu, vive Pucheu."

Pétain's National Revolution showed its true face in seeking revenge on those who were held responsible for the "unnecessary" war and the defeat. Vichy's façade of justice masked revenge in what was its own peculiar reenactment of the Dreyfus Affair. The Supreme Court of Justice created on 30 July 1940 was responsible for judging "former ministers or their immediate subordinates ... who betrayed the duties of their office." For the Vichy state justice would be forced to submit to politics in a régime where magistrates were required to swear an oath of loyalty to the head of state.<sup>68</sup> Pétain received petitions during the armistice from civil servants demanding the arrest of Paul Reynaud and Léon Blum. Chief of Staff General Weygand confided to Justice Minister Joseph Barthélemy that prisoners of war were demanding accountability.<sup>69</sup> Pétain's 11 October 1940 broadcast spoke of the last government declaring a war already lost.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Changez de vocabulaire," *Gringoire*, 13 March 1941, 3.

<sup>67</sup>Laborie, *op. cit.*, 227-228.

<sup>68</sup>Henri Michel, *Le Procès de Riom*, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), 20.

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.

*Gringoire* demanded retribution against international Jewry and masonry "responsible" for the war and defeat. Daladier had declared war; Reynaud had prolonged the war against Pétain's and Weygand's counsel. Léon Blum, Georges Mandel, Jean Zay, Yvon Delbos, Pierre Cot, and Pierre Mendès-France, the *Massilia* deputies determined to continue the war from North Africa, were arrested in Algiers and charged with desertion.<sup>71</sup> Henriot characterized the *Massilia*'s passengers as the raft of the shipwrecked -- a rogue's gallery of masons, strike leaders, saboteurs of national defence, anti-clericals, anti-patriots, vermin of the ghettos, and fanatics of the Popular Front whose raised fists led the demonstration at the Place de la Bastille. These were the deserters who abandoned the helm of France, the *mauvais Français* who excused Mers-el-Kébir and the tirades of a deceived general. England was the last hope of these saboteurs of France.<sup>72</sup>

The task of propaganda was to prime public opinion against those responsible for the defeat. Henriot's *Comment mourut la paix*, first serialized in *Gringoire* and published

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<sup>71</sup>"Au premier rang des coupable: la juiverie internationale et la franc-maçonnerie," *Gringoire*, 1 August 1940.

<sup>72</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Radeau des Naufragés," *Gringoire*, 29 August 1940, 1. The accused Paul Reynaud, General Gamelin, and Edouard Daladier arrived at Chazeron prison on 5 September 1940, two days after the publication of the law; on 9 September, Georges Mandel joined them followed by Léon Blum on 15 September. Guy La Chambre, Pierre Cot's successor at the Air Ministry, arrived on 19 September from the United States to place himself at the disposal of "French justice." On 25 April 1941, the hostages were joined by the Socialists Vincent Auriol, Marx Dormoy, Salomon Grumbach, and Jules Moch. Pierre Cot, who refused to leave the United States, was deprived of French citizenship on 7 September. The trial of Paul Reynaud and Georges Mandel, while not under the mandate of the Court, was held in reserve. See Michel, *op. cit.*, 36-7.

in book form in 1941, and *Le "journal secret" de Jean Zay* serialized under Henriot's editorial scrutiny in *Gringoire* and published as *Carnets secrets de Jean Zay: De Munich à la Guerre* in 1942, reflected Vichy's campaign to condemn those responsible for the "unnecessary war."<sup>73</sup> The debate between Gaullists and Pétainists remained in the domain of press and radio in the early stages of the war, but the protracted conflict eventually produced a literature of defeat and collaboration to combat clandestine resistance literature. Literary collaboration resulted in the *Miroir des livres*, ninety authors and 103 titles selected by French editors, the German Propaganda Office, and the German Institute. Henriot's *Carnets secrets de Jean Zay* was billed as "the exposé of the former Jewish minister of Education in the Blum cabinet who, with his co-religionist Mandel, was one of the war-mongers who fled the German advance aboard the *Massilia*." The diary was advertised as a cynical testimonial offering a glimpse of the back-room politics of the Popular Front.<sup>74</sup> Henriot's editing in light of the defeat presented Daladier's resistance to Hitler, applauded by Henriot in 1938 and 1939, was condemned as treason in 1940.

Henri de Kerillis, Georges Mandel, and Maurice Thorez were Henriot's "triumvirate of treason, ... victims of blind public opinion which they had created or the

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<sup>73</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Comment Mourut la Paix* (Paris: Les Editions de France, 1941), 1-2.

<sup>74</sup>Gérard Loiseaux, *La Littérature de la Défaite et de la Collaboration, D'après 'Phonix öder Asche' de Bernard Payr*, (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1984), 93-94.

docile servants of British capitalism."<sup>75</sup> Daladier, Reynaud, Mandel, and Saurrat had systematically undermined Foreign Minister Bonnet's efforts to save France and the peace.<sup>76</sup> During the Czechoslovak crisis, Bonnet's pleas with Premier Hodza to cede the Sudetenland and resolve the crisis peacefully, were frustrated by "mysterious Paris 'correspondents' [who] advised the Czechs to "Hold on, cede nothing.'" Henriot charged that Mandel and Reynaud, fearing "their war was slipping through their fingers," frustrated Bonnet's efforts, and fortified Czech resistance.<sup>77</sup>

Henriot interpreted Zay's diary as the secret confessions of an ambitious minister whose actions had condemned France to defeat.<sup>78</sup> Mandel, Reynaud, Daladier, "were puppets whose sinister operators [Chamberlain and Churchill] pulled the strings."<sup>79</sup> Henriot's theme of British perfidy was convenient, in light of the Dunkirk evacuation, Mers-el-Kébir, Dakar, were regarded as the betrayal of an ally. France, disarmed by Geneva's illusory collective security, was ill-prepared: "When the flood beat upon us, nothing was ready, neither morally, nor materially." The fate of fifteen million French in the occupied zone and two million POWs was ascribed to the Popular Front.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Henriot, *op. cit.*, 2-3.

<sup>76</sup>Philippe Henriot, ed., *Carnets Secrets de Jean Zay: De Munich à La Guerre* (Paris: Les Editions de France, 1942), IV-V.

<sup>77</sup>Henriot, *Comment Mourut la Paix, op. cit.*, 6-7.

<sup>78</sup>Henriot, *Carnets Secrets de Jean Zay, op. cit.*, 91.

<sup>79</sup>Henriot, *Comment Mourut la Paix, op. cit.*, 52-3.

<sup>80</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Oui, il y a des responsables," *Gringoire*, 2 January 1941, 1.

*Comment mourut la paix* shared many charges raised by Marc Bloch's *Strange Defeat*. Both books were written in the heat of the moment when passions clouded judgement. Both condemned Communist mental acrobatics, from Geneva's pacifism to the Popular Front's resistance to war and fascism. Both condemned labour strikes for higher wages when national security was at stake. But they differed on the responsibility for the war and defeat. Their respective arguments served as the justification for either collaboration or resistance. Bloch attributed the defeat to political corruption, careerism, and the failure of leadership; Henriot saw it as a political conspiracy. Bloch saw the collapse as a military event "We cleared out because the Germans turned up where we didn't expect them and where we had never been told to expect them."<sup>81</sup> France's "strange" defeat was owing to the failure of the French and British High Commands to communicate, let alone coordinate their counter-attacks. When the counter-offensive did come, the French and British attacks were not launched simultaneously and failed to cut off the German armoured spearhead. With the mutual disenchantment of both Weygand's and Gort's staff, further pretence at collaboration was abandoned. Churchill's "Miracle of Dunkirk," the reembarkation of the British Expeditionary Force, was the only right military decision, Bloch affirmed. "What would have been the future of the war if the British Army had been pounded to pieces on the Continent of Europe in May and June

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<sup>81</sup>Bloch, *op. cit.*, 48. Marc Bloch (1886-1944), son of a professor of ancient history, became an authority on the Medieval economy. His service in the Great War earned him the *Légion d'honneur* and the *Croix de Guerre*. As Professor at Strasbourg, he co-founded, with Lucien Febvre, the journal *Annales* in 1929 devoted to a multi-disciplinary approach to history using sociology and cultural geography. A professor at the Sorbonne (1936-1939), Bloch was recalled to army service in 1939 where he witnessed the military events first hand.



1940? Still, it was harsh, and it was asking a good deal of the French soldier at the time to see things from so lofty a standpoint."<sup>82</sup>

Three events in the autumn of 1940, Mers-el-Kebir, Dakar, and Montoire, were key events for the regime and the French. Mers-el-Kébir in June 1940 and Dakar in September reinforced the "perfidious Albion" propaganda, yet the majority of the population remained favourable to Britain. Postal control reported that the French followed closely the developments of the Battle of Britain, applauding the German defeat. Reactions to the Montoire interview of 24 October 1940 appear to confirm a generalized opposition to collaboration in spite of a massive press campaign promoting Franco-German reconciliation. Vichy repeatedly emphasized the defeat, the armistice, and the pragmatic opportunities of collaboration. The propaganda appeared to be counter-productive; instead of instilling a resigned acceptance, it inspired the hope of erasing the shame of defeat. The Montoire handshake divided France. Prudent *maréchalistes* were not *pétainists* but anxious *attentistes*.

Jacques Ellul distinguishes between vertical and horizontal propaganda. Vertical propaganda, possessing the technology of centralized mass communication and directed by a technocratic elite, seeks to mechanically influence a passive audience with the instruments of persuasion. It is the easiest to produce, but its effects are of short duration, requiring constant renewal. Horizontal propaganda is populist emanating from

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<sup>82</sup>Bloch, *op. cit.*, 73.

a community of equals whose participation is voluntary and active. Vertical propaganda requires the comprehensive apparatus of the state mass communication media; horizontal propaganda needs a large organization of people.<sup>83</sup> An early Vichy propaganda memorandum noted that the majority of French people, despite their loyalty to Pétain, displayed a growing reluctance to support either the National Revolution or collaboration with Germany. The memorandum warned of "the camouflaged enemies," capitalists and civil servants loyal to the Third Republic.<sup>84</sup> Workers were indifferent, hesitant, exasperated, or scornful of a National Revolution that failed to suppress the black market, control inflation, or address social grievances. This disaffection was exploited by the propaganda of the Marshal's enemies. Another source of rebellion came from patriotic anti-German anglophiles or gaullists whose resistance to the Marshal's collaboration was deemed "more emotional than rational." "They refused to admit that this policy [of collaboration] was the only one that could save France from total annihilation in the future peace." The memorandum emphasized that a concerted effort by Government Information Services and the Legion was indispensable to combat opposition propaganda. In the social and economic domain, the memorandum recommended the organization of production, unemployment relief, salary increases and suppression of the black market. For "moral order," it recommended a purge of all declared or camouflaged adversaries of the National Revolution. There was no mistaking

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<sup>83</sup>Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 80-82.

<sup>84</sup>F 41 266 *Service de la Propagande: Le Maréchal, Légion Française des Combattants, Prisonniers de Guerre*) 1941-1942, "L'Etat Autoritaire et l'Opinion Publique," [no date], 1-4.

its intention when reference was made to the Nazi purge of 30 June 1934 -- "the night of the long knives" -- adapted, of course, to French conditions.<sup>85</sup>

Examples of horizontal propaganda appeared on the anniversary of the armistice on 11 November 1940 when students carrying two rods (*deux gaules*) demonstrated at the Arc de Triomphe. On Joan of Arc Day, 11 May 1941, de Gaulle broadcast orders to the French to demonstrate against the Nazi conquerors in a battle of silence. Between the hours of 3:00 and 4:00 in the afternoon, the French were instructed to come out on to the street, parks, and promenades of cities and villages: "They will walk individually, or in families, or in groups of friends. *Absolute silence will reign*. But by looking into one another's eyes they will speak their common desire and fraternal pledge: 'The enemy will not get the better of us. Some day he will be driven out.'"<sup>86</sup> Intellectual resistance was another form of horizontal propaganda, designed to circumvent "Anastasia," the name ascribed to French censorship. François de Menthon's first issue of *Liberté* on 25 November 1940 carried Marshal Foch's maxim: "A people is only defeated when it accepts it," and Marshal Pétain's phrase: "I abhor the lie: we will no longer lie to this country." Articles drew reader's attention to the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and Italy's annexation of the Alpes-Maritimes department and Corsica. The seventh issue printed the text of a message from General de la Laurencie to Darlan expressing the

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<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*, 5-8.

<sup>86</sup>Charles, J. Rolo, *Radio Goes to War: The "Fourth Front"*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), 198.

universal hope for a British victory. The tenth issue, 1 October 1941, printed Pierre Bidedevant's sensational letter of resignation as judicial advisor of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, reminding Pétain of Hitler's attitude toward the defeated: "An attitude of humble submission by the conquered, instead of appeasing the victors, encourages them to new abuses."<sup>87</sup> The clandestine press was the first expression of internal resistance in the psychological war. In October 1940, *Pantagruel* appeared as "La feuille française d'information ni vendue ni à vendre," a play on words which inferred that the paper was not for sale nor had "sold out" to the enemy. Circulation had reached 10,000 by the time its staff was arrested in August 1941. *Résistance*, first published by "*Musée de l'homme*" in December 1940, lasted a year until its members were arrested.<sup>88</sup>

Indicative of Henriot's stature within Vichy's propaganda network was his access to the régime's preeminent ministers, including Paul Marion and Abel Bonnard, the

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<sup>87</sup>Marie Granet & Henri Michel, *Combat: Histoire d'un Mouvement de Résistance de juillet 1940 à juillet 1943*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), 1957, 59. The first issue of the communist *La Vérité* appeared on 31 August 1941 and went through seventy-one issues until the Liberation. In the southern zone, the first issue of *Libération* appeared in July 1941 as the bi-monthly "organ of the directory of the forces of the French Liberation," then in 1942, as "the organ of the Forces of the French Resistance." In 1943 *Libération's* circulation reached 100,000. In August 1941 appeared the *Cahiers du Témoignage chrétien*, printed every two months with 18,000 copies.

<sup>88</sup>Henri Michel, *Histoire de la Résistance en France 1940-1944*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), 83-84. Individual resistance slowly organized into groups, intelligence and escape networks, *réseaux*, and then movements. Disarmed and prevented from immediate action, bulletins and newspapers offered information on the battlefronts, refuting Vichy's distortions. See also Jean-Pierre Azéma, "Résister," in *Résistants et collaborateurs: Les Français dans les années noires*, ed. by François Bedarida in *L'histoire*, Éditions du Seuil, 1985, 12.

respective ministers of Information and Education.<sup>89</sup> Marion orchestrated anti-communist, anti-masonic and anti-semitic propaganda for cinema, radio, press, and public campaigns. Along with Jacques Benoist-Mechin, François Lehideux, and Pierre Pucheu, Marion was alleged to be a member of the Synarchy, a group of technocrats who supported collaboration with Germany. The Synarchy drew suspicion as a conspiracy to wrest power from the state and create a totalitarian régime. In his interview with Henriot, Marion explained that propaganda sought a political transformation of the individual, not through the "dictatorship of majorities," but by outlining the national goals of the state and creating a collective consensus. The defeat, Marion charged, was proof that democracy had ruined authority and hierarchy, which the National Revolution attempted to restore. Marion denied that Vichy's press and radio were German mouthpieces as claimed by what he called London's "Jewish-masonic" broadcasts, arguing that Vichy's propaganda was constrained as the French State was neutral in the

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<sup>89</sup>Paul Marion (1889-1954) was theoretician and propagandist in turn for the Communists, the neo-Socialists, and Doriot's *Parti populaire français* before serving in Vichy's propaganda ministry. He entered the Sorbonne in 1921 after demobilization, where his talent as a student agitator found him in the ranks of the Communist party. He rose rapidly, teaching in the central workers school from 1924-1926, as a journalist with *L'Humanité*, and as editor of *Cahiers du bolchevisme*. In April 1926 the Central Committee sent Marion to Moscow. Resigning from the Communist Party in 1929 after being expelled from Russia, he joined the Socialist party in 1931, providing the ideological program for the neo-socialism of Marcel Déat and Gaston Bérgerly that lead to their split from the party in 1933. In 1936 Marion joined Jacques Doriot's political bureau as editor-in-chief of the party weekly, *l'Emancipation nationale*, and the daily *La Liberté*, in 1937. His study of the revolutionary dictators *Lénine, Mussolini, Hitler, Franco: leur combat* (1939) was also an attack on Doriot's vacillations. See Patrick H. Hutton (ed.), *Historical Dictionary of the Third French Republic 1870-1940*, 2 vols. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 601.

Anglo-German war.<sup>90</sup> Henriot summarized Marion's efforts; "In summary, you could not swear to tell 'the whole truth' but you are faithful in telling 'nothing but the truth'."<sup>91</sup>

Education was another pillar of the National Revolution. Vichy's educational policy was embodied in the "Principles of the Community" sponsored by Education Minister Jérôme Carcopino and displayed in all French schools. The principles emphasized leadership, obedience, and duty, while condemning any group that divided national unity.<sup>92</sup> Pétain's educational blueprint was concerned especially to purge the pernicious influence of Communist primary school teachers. Education and the army were the schools of the nation, the institutions of tradition, honour, and moral education. Pétain's article on education in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* on 15 August 1940 outlined an agenda whereby the individual was to be reeducated to function within the family, society, and nation. He distinguished between "good and evil, order and disorder, France and anti-France," arguing that neutrality was impossible in the new French state. Youth's

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<sup>90</sup>Philippe Henriot, "M. Paul Marion m'a dit...", *Gringoire*, 19 September 1941, 2. Vichy had severed diplomatic relations with Britain after Mers-el-Kébir, but was not at war with England. The British blockade of French ports was the source of much resentment. Members of Pétain's cabinet worked to gain co-belligerency recognition by Germany. The Marshal was unable to declare war without the consent of the dismissed Assembly. His April 1941 address stating that France did not attack former allies presented a false notion of Pétain's sympathy for the British and his resistance to the German occupation.

<sup>91</sup>"En somme vous ne pouviez pas jurer de dire 'toute la vérité' mais vous êtes fidèles à ne dire 'que la vérité.'"

<sup>92</sup>John F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 33.

watchword must be "discipline, obedience, service."<sup>93</sup>

Carcopino's successor, Abel Bonnard, was accepted only reluctantly by Pétain who preferred General La Porte du Theil to the "Gestapette" Bonnard whose homosexuality was hardly a model for the new "moral order."<sup>94</sup> Communists characterized him as "the Nuremburg pilgrim."<sup>95</sup> His *Pensées dans l'action* spoke of the defeat as destiny's blessing in disguise.<sup>96</sup> Bonnard's vision of the National Revolution included a Franco-German *lycée* to promote the "European spirit" in youth while teachers were exhorted to combat Anglo-Gaullist radio. In August 1942 a circular ordered teachers to report any Communist or Gaullist sympathies among their students.<sup>97</sup> Henriot's interview with Bonnard contrasted Montaigne's practical education

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<sup>93</sup>Halls, *op. cit.*, 9.

<sup>94</sup>Minister for National Education and Youth (Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Education nationale et à la jeunesse) 18 April 1942 - 20 August 1944, Abel Bonnard (1883-1968), left Maurras' *Action française* for Georges Valois' paper *le Nouveau siècle* in 1925. In 1936 he published *les Modérés* professing admiration for Nazism and its French counterparts -- the "chemises vertes" of Henri Dorgères and Doriot's PPF. A member of *Groupe Collaboration*, he published numerous anglophobic and pro-Nazi articles in Chateaubriant's *la Gerbe*, Brasillach's *Je Suis Partout*, and Drieu la Rochelle's *la Nouvelle Revue Française*. As education minister, he created two chairs of anti-semitism at the Sorbonne: one in contemporary Judaism and the other a chair in racial studies after his predecessor, Carcopino, had refused. Benoît Yvert, *Dictionnaire des Ministres*, (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 671.

<sup>95</sup>Halls, *op. cit.*, 35-36.

<sup>96</sup>Loiseaux, *op. cit.*, 155. Abel Bonnard's *Pensées dans l'action* attributed the defeat as the lesson of Providence. "Il nous faut goûter dans notre malheur, le bonheur de sentir enfin la réalité sous nos mains, au lieu de la recevoir sur nos têtes. Mieux vaut éprouver le sentiment de notre force dans une vie dure, que celui de notre faiblesse dans une vie molle. Du reste le Destin ne nous laisse plus le choix."

<sup>97</sup>Sweets, *op. cit.*, 40-41.

"tête bien faite" with the diploma's academic "tête bien pleine," adding that the ruinous effects of extreme individualism would be replaced by the sense of the collective. Youth would be the vanguard of the French renaissance, speaking a pure national language, inspired by simple devotion and discipline. Elites would not be those carrying diplomas but those whose leadership inspired by example. Henriot added that the choice between pettiness and grandeur was the will: "What is unrealistic today is not the desire to become great but the obstinate attempt to remain small and unworthy."<sup>98</sup> Bonnard's "pettiness" was growing resistance.

Failure to persuade through propaganda or education led to persuasion by coercion. Pierre Pucheu,<sup>99</sup> the new Minister of the Interior appointed by Darlan on 11 August 1941, was determined to purge France of the "foreign rabble" and the "Jewish leprosy." He demanded from his police intendants that he be informed of the "moral character" as well as the professional competency of each civil servant.<sup>100</sup> Pucheu's purge of the police and departmental prefectures transformed the state police

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<sup>98</sup>Philippe Henriot, "M. Abel Bonnard, ministre secrétaire d'Etat à l'Education Nationale, m'a dit...", *Gringoire*, 18 September 1942, 1-3. "Ce qui est chimère aujourd'hui, ce n'est pas de vouloir entrer dans la grandeur, c'est de prétendre rester dans la petitesse."

<sup>99</sup>A brilliant student at the lycée Louis-le-Grand and the Ecole Normale Supérieure, from 1926-1938, Pierre Pucheu directed the Steel Cartel and became President of the Etablissements Japy until August 1939. Nationalist, violently anti-Communist, and expressing contempt for parliamentary democracy, he joined de la Rocque's *Croix de Feu* and then Doriot's PPF. Appointed Secretary of State for Industrial Production on 23 February 1941, he was part of the synarchy group which attempted to create Franco-German economic collaboration. Benoît Yvert, *Dictionnaire des Ministres, 1789-1989*, (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 723.

<sup>100</sup>Sweets, *op. cit.*, 50-1.



administration. A mobile police force, the *Gardes mobiles réserves* (GMR), was created to seek out and purge Communists in municipal government.<sup>101</sup> The assassination on 26 July 1941 of Marx Dormoy, the Popular Front Interior Minister who exposed the Cagoule, was the first of many notorious acts of state terror.

Vichy's Communist witch-hunt and the German invasion of the Soviet Union provoked active resistance. With Minister of Justice Joseph Barthélemy, Pucheu's *Sections spéciales*, created on 14 August 1941, pronounced retroactive death sentences for political offenses. Three new police units -- the Police for Jewish Affairs, the Anti-Communist Police, and the Police for Secret Societies -- targeted the regime's and the conqueror's "official enemies."<sup>102</sup> On 21 August 1941, at the Barbès-Rochechouart Paris metro station, naval cadet Alfonse Moser was shot by three young Communist commandos led by Pierre Georges (Colonel Fabien). The day after Moser's assassination, the hostage order of 22 August warned that any Frenchman in the Occupied Zone could be detained. On 24 August, four Germans were attacked in the Nord; two months later, on 20 and 21 October, two teams of the same Youth Battalions attacked *Feldkommandant* Lieutenant-Colonel Hotz at Nantes and Dr. Reimers, an advisor to the German military administration at Bordeaux.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup>Philippe Henriot, "M. Pierre Pucheu, ministre de l'Intérieur, m'a dit...", *Gringoire*, 31 October 1941, 1.

<sup>102</sup>Marrus & Paxton, *op. cit.*, 224.

<sup>103</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 240.

Henriot voted for the dissolution of the Republic and full powers to the Marshal. He joined the entourage of National Revolution ideologues and technocrats. Pétain's Montoire handshake sealed a Faustian pact that offered Vichy's élites the trappings of power while relieving the Germans of the administrative task of military occupation of half of France. Vichy compliance with the armistice ensured its increasing unpopularity, for the armistice appeared to be an enforced humiliation, despite the efforts of Henriot, Marion, Bonnard, and Pucheu. Montoire, accepted by Pétain and denounced by De Gaulle, cast the die for either collaboration or resistance. Where Charles de Gaulle and Marc Bloch looked to a Republican virtue,<sup>104</sup> Pétain and his ministers offered a collective punishment, discipline and obedience that evolved into compulsion and repression. For Bloch, the Judeo-Christian tradition served as a *raison d'être* for living, believing, and fighting.<sup>105</sup> De Gaulle promised that "The spirit of France rests with those who are continuing the struggle, with those who will not give up, with those who will be there when victory is won!"

*Maréchalisme* was at its peak in the months after the defeat. Pétain was hailed as the uncrowned king, the protector of France, the great Pétain oak.<sup>106</sup> Pétainisme was

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<sup>104</sup>Bloch, *op. cit.*, 176.

<sup>105</sup>*Ibid.*, 178. As a Jew, Bloch was barred from teaching by Nazi anti-semitic decrees. Active in the Resistance, where he took the *nom de guerre*, "Narbonne," Marc Bloch was arrested and executed by the Germans. He requested that he be buried with his decorations earned as a soldier fighting for France. His epitaph read DELIXIT VERITATEM.

<sup>106</sup>Halls, *op. cit.*, 13. In the forest of Tronçais near Vichy, a 270-year-old oak tree, planted in Colbert's time to provide bottoms for the French fleet, was named *le chêne Pétain*. Later the

another matter.<sup>107</sup> *Gringoire's* masthead carried Pétain's slogan: "For Frenchmen there is no other cause to defend and serve than that of France." Henriot wrote that France's duty lay not in promoting the victory of either England or Germany but in discipline and obedience to the Marshal's orders.<sup>108</sup> While a majority supported the Marshal, however, only a minority supported his Government. Official radio and press propaganda was unable to dispel the notion that it was a French mouthpiece for German ideas.<sup>109</sup> Marc Bloch counselled, "the voice on the radio may speak our language, but it comes from the other side of the Rhine."<sup>110</sup>

While France placed its faith in the Marshal, the same confidence was not given to his government. The coup ousting Laval on 13 December 1940 was welcomed in the mistaken belief that Laval's dismissal was the Marshal's repudiation of a *rapprochement* with Germany.<sup>111</sup> Hailed in France, the "Thirteenth of December" provoked Hitler's anger. Vichy initiatives to normalize relations with Germany were snubbed. Pierre-

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oak was solemnly shot by the Resistance.

<sup>107</sup>Laborie, *op. cit.*, 232.

<sup>108</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Unité Française d'Abord," *Gringoire*, 30 May 1941, 3. "Pour un Français il n'y a pas d'autre cause à défendre ni à servir que celle de la France."

<sup>109</sup>F 41 267 *Service de la Propagande: Listes des Délégués 1941-1944*, 26 September 1941, 2-7.

<sup>110</sup>Bloch, *op. cit.*, 148.

<sup>111</sup>Laborie, *op. cit.*, 232. Each week, hundreds of thousands of letters and later millions were opened by the services of Postal Control. These and prefecture's reports serve as the major sources for the study of public opinion.

Etienne Flandin, Laval's replacement, resigned on 9 February 1941, forced to admit his failure to reopen negotiations with the Germans. Foreign Affairs devolved to Admiral François Darlan as the Marshal's Dauphin, who assumed the Vice-Presidency of the Council, the ministry of Information on 10 February, the Interior on 17 February, and Defence on 11 August. Like Laval, Darlan, whose family's naval tradition stretched back to the Battle of Trafalgar, was determined to carve a niche for France in the New Europe. Darlan saw a German invasion of Britain as unlikely: equally, Britain was "finished on the continent." In the unlikely event of a British victory, Darlan told a radio audience on 2 May 1941, France, stripped of her navy and empire, would become a "second-class Dominion, a continental Ireland."<sup>112</sup>

Darlan's Continental System, like its Napoleonic predecessor, hoped to wreak history's revenge on England by joining in Germany's war aims. However, the ambitions of the conqueror of 1940 and the illusions of the conqueror of 1916 were at opposite poles. The Marshal's path of collaboration would not placate Hitler any more than the policy of appeasement. The trouble was that giving the Germans anything was to give them everything. Radio-London was France's other beacon intruding upon Vichy's delusions. BBC Radio-London responded to Darlan with Oberlé's jingle "Un amiral nommé Darlan est garanti allemand," or "Le triomphe des Allemands n'est pas garanti pour longtemps." Its greatest propaganda coup was against Radio-Paris with a phrase that was on the lips of all French; "Radio-Paris ment, Radio-Paris ment, Radio-Paris est

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<sup>112</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 111-13.

Allemande," sung to the tune of "La Cucuracha" - the cockroach.<sup>113</sup> In August 1940, Chad, Cameroon, and Congo-Brazzaville rallied to De Gaulle's standard. Apart from the German occupation, French Equatorial Africa constituted the greatest challenge to Vichy. The colonial rebellion forced Vichy to keep the French Empire outside of the Axis orbit under penalty of forfeiting it to the Gaullist "dissidents." The Empire provided a territorial base which afforded de Gaulle a freedom of action denied other governments in exile, who were dependent on British good-will.<sup>114</sup>

Henriot defended what Pétain called *France éternelle* from anti-France. In the final analysis, propaganda was of little value. Everything depended on events, and events challenged loyalties to Vichy from the beginning. De Gaulle was encouraged by the student march on 11 November to the Arc de Triomphe bearing two rods -- 'deux gaules'. It was dispersed by German rifle and machine-gun fire. At the end of 1940, Carlton Gardens and the BBC broadcast General de Gaulle's order for a national demonstration emptying the streets from 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. on 1 January 1941. The call had been heard and the silent vote betokened defiance and resistance. The New Year's Day demonstration confirmed that nothing could stop what Goebbels called "the intellectual

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<sup>113</sup>Oberlé, *op. cit.*, 50. Oberlé's jingle was based on a pre-war commercial, "Le meuble Lévitan est garanti pour longtemps" and was adapted to discredit Darlan's collaboration. Pierre Dac credits "Radio-Paris ment, Radio-Paris ment, Radio-Paris est Allemande" to Maurice Van Moppès to the air of "La Cucuracha." It translates as "Radio-Paris lies, Radio-Paris lies, Radio-Paris is German." Pierre Dac, *Un Français libre à Londres en Guerre*, (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1972), 46.

<sup>114</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 139. By October Gabon, French Equatorial Africa, the New Hebrides, Tahiti, Oceania, and New Caledonia had joined Free France.

invasion of the continent by English radio."<sup>115</sup> Radio was to play an increasingly important role in the battle for France.

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<sup>115</sup> Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac (ed.) *Les Voix de la Liberté: Ici Londres, T.I: Dans La Nuit 18 juin 1940- 7 décembre 1941*, (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1975), XVIII-XIX.

## Chapter 7: The Revenge of History, 1941-1942

Henriot spoke of France's courage "to face reality." This reality was the acceptance of the German conquest of Europe. Instead of waiting passively for the coming of peace, Henriot argued, France might contribute to its construction. A dictated peace would ensure hostility whereas a peace of collaboration, a continental concord, was the vision of a new Europe.<sup>1</sup> "Facing reality" was Henriot's euphemism for collaboration. A continental system would unite Europe against France's former allies, England and the United States. Henriot's allusion to a 'continental concord' was the product of a policy brief submitted to Otto Abetz, German ambassador to Vichy, in February 1941. Admiral Darlan's technocrats, Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Pierre Pucheu, Paul Marion, and François Lehideux, outlined a project that envisaged France as the "Atlantic bridgehead" of the New Europe. France, with its fleet and empire, would serve as the foundation for a European economic community in a German-dominated continent. All Darlan required was a generous peace settlement with Germany.<sup>2</sup> To this end, Darlan and his advisors attempted to show their good faith by aiding the Germans in North Africa. The German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 convinced Henriot that

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<sup>1</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Que sera la paix?" *Gringoire*, 17 April 1941, 2.

<sup>2</sup>Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 114-15. François Lehideux succeed Pierre Pucheu as Minister of Industrial Production in February 1941. The Ministry directed Organization Committees responsible for the appointment of the *patronat*, organization, allocation of scarce resources, and price and wage controls. Controlling 321 branches of French business, the ministry had created the French war economy, what Anatole de Monzie, former deputy of the Lot, regarded as a "mercantile feudalism." Paxton, *op. cit.*, 219-218.

the French State and the German Reich shared the same enemies and active collaboration would secure France's place in the New European Order. The Montoire handshake was the deadly pact where Pétain and Darlan gambled on the New Order and committed the fate of France to a man who was prepared to gamble everything.

German Middle Eastern military strategy, not Darlan's continental system, attracted Hitler's attention in late April 1941. The conquest of the Balkans and Greece afforded Hitler the chance to exploit Mediterranean possibilities. When the Iraqi nationalist Rashid Ali-al-Gailani revolted against the British in April 1941, threatening the British in Egypt became a key element in Germany's exploitation of the colonial crisis. The Paris Protocols signed on 28 May granted German access to Syrian airfields, French military aid to Rashid Ali's rebellion in Iraq, the Tunisian port of Bizerta as a supply base for Rommel's Afrika Korps and, eventually, the use of Dakar as a German submarine base.<sup>3</sup> Darlan insisted that the Protocols have maximum publicity.<sup>4</sup> The defeat of Rashid-Ali's revolt meant blockading German supplies to Iraq through Syria. Generals de Gaulle and Catroux hoped that General Dentz's Syrian army would oppose the arrival of German air units and welcome the Free French forces. But on 21 May a French defector, Colonel Collet, informed them that Dentz was preparing to resist the

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<sup>3</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 116-17. German concessions included a small reduction in occupation costs, easier passage across the demarcation line, and the release of some 70-80,000 World War I veterans in German POW camps.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 117-18.



British and Free French military forces preparing to invade Syria.<sup>5</sup>

As battle was joined, heavy casualties were reported by both sides. Henriot claimed that England, France's "hereditary enemy," looked to Syria as an opportunity to seize another French colony in the name of its [Gaullist] mercenaries and puppets.<sup>6</sup> Darlan's radio broadcast to Free French Forces in Syria beseeched them not to fight against their fellow soldiers, and invited them to accept the Marshal's amnesty and rejoin the ranks of Vichy's army.<sup>7</sup> Henriot compared dissident officers like Catroux to the French traitors who bowed to England's will during the Hundred Years' War.<sup>8</sup> At the height of the battle Darlan declined Luftwaffe support, while reinforcements from North Africa could not prevent the surrender of Acre on 14 July. It was a bitter Bastille day for both Darlan and De Gaulle. Henriot attempted to assuage the Syrian defeat, explaining that French Somalia (Djibouti) had fallen only after blockade and siege. Dakar and North Africa remained intact despite Anglo-Gaullist efforts to appropriate France's

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<sup>5</sup>François Kersaudy, *Churchill and De Gaulle*, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1990), 136.

<sup>6</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'ennemi héréditaire jette le masque," *Gringoire*, 12 June 1941, 1. Free French forces, under the command of General Legentilhomme, numbered only 6,000 infantrymen, with eight guns, ten tanks, supported by twenty-four aircraft: the British, under General Maitland Wilson, mustered one Australian division, a cavalry and two infantry brigades, supported by sixty aircraft. Vichy forces under General Dentz comprised eighteen regular battalions with 120 guns, ninety tanks and as many aircraft; in all, more than 30,000 men. Kersaudy, *op. cit.*, 138.

<sup>7</sup>Hélène Eck, *La guerre des ondes: Histoire des radios de langue française pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1985), 58.

<sup>8</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'ennemi héréditaire jette le masque," *op. cit.*

empire.<sup>9</sup> Henriot probably took heart from Vichy's repatriated Syrian Army. Of Vichy's Syrian forces only 127 officers and 6,000 troops were won over to Free France. The majority -- 25,000 men, officers, diplomats and civil servants -- were repatriated.<sup>10</sup>

The Syrian adventure failed to dissuade Vichy's élites. The "concrete" goals of *collaboration d'état* were presented by Paul Marion on the 13 June 1941 conference of propaganda delegates. He repeated the stock-in-trade arguments that the German occupation was a result of the defeat and the direct result of a nation ill-prepared for war. The armistice was the only way to retain what remained of France's territorial integrity. Resistance would result only in further German annexations while an Anglo-American victory would reduce France to a mere pawn of Allied strategy.<sup>11</sup> Collaboration fulfilled the three simple objectives of the Marshal: to support France, preserve the empire, and win the peace.<sup>12</sup> Darlan's broadcast on 14 June 1941 described collaboration as creating "a favourable climate for honourable treatment;" the "new Europe" would be realized "only if France has her honourable place."<sup>13</sup> Henriot adapted Marion's propaganda agenda comparing his own prophecies of the fall of France to Demosthenes' Philippics against the threat from Macedon. "The most cultivated, literary, and refined civilization,

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<sup>9</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'Empire devant la dissidence," *Gringoire*, 25 July 1941, 1.

<sup>10</sup>Kersaudy, *op. cit.*, 146.

<sup>11</sup>Denis Peschanski (ed.), *Vichy 1940-1944: Archives de Guerre d'Angelo Tasca*, (Editions du CNRS Paris and Feltrinelli Editore Milano, 1986), 276-280.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 284.

<sup>13</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 119.

fell to the military prowess of Macedon and Rome. The Roman legions later became the heroic defender of Hellenic soil and the Greek city-states."<sup>14</sup>

Armistice and Empire were more than merely symbols in Vichy. The empire was a lever of collaboration and a diplomatic and political trump card.<sup>15</sup> Vichy's France themes of *Fidélité, Unité, Patrie* were instrumental in keeping most of French Africa from rallying to de Gaulle. De Gaulle, for his part, commissioned his Information Minister, Jacques Soustelle, to organize Radio Brazzaville and broadcast regularly to France overseas from 5 December 1940.<sup>16</sup> The Germans took it seriously enough to jam the transmissions. By August 1941 *Radiodiffusion Nationale* had resumed short wave

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<sup>14</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Rayonnement de la France," *Gringoire*, 20 June 1941, 2.

<sup>15</sup>Dominique Rossignol, *Histoire de la propagande en France de 1940 à 1944: L'utopie Pétain*, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1991), 122, 125. Roland Hugon's work *150 ans de conquête des coeurs* cited Jules Ferry's speech in 1885 taken out of context; "Oui, les races supérieures ont un droit sur les races inférieures. Un droit parce qu'elles ont un devoir. Le devoir de les civiliser, de les éclairer, de les pacifier." The "civilizing mission" coincided with Nazi racial theories and a propaganda devoted to the reconquest of the Empire. See also Charles Robert Ageron, "Vichy et l'Empire" in *Le Régime de Vichy et les Français*, 1990.

<sup>16</sup>Jacques Parrot, *La Guerre des Ondes: De Goebbels à Kadhafi*, (Paris: Plon, 1987), 141. On 16 December, De Gaulle received the following telegram: "Plan propagande radio maintenant appliqué. Sept émissions quotidiennes dont deux en morse, trois entendues en Afrique du Nord et en Syrie et deux locales." Doctor Friedrich of Radio-Paris convinced his superiors of the *Propaganda Abteilung* that a "black radio" transmission might be more effective than jamming. The *ersatz* Radio-Brazzaville, feigning support for the Allied cause, reported both good and bad news for both sides, and attempted to divide metropolitan listeners between Giraud and de Gaulle. Bruce Lockhart, Director of PWE sponsored British radio counter-propaganda including the German *Soldatensender* to German troops in France. *Radio Inconnue, Radio Patrie, and Radio-Catholique* complemented the BBC's "white" or official propaganda. See Charles Cruikshank, *The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare 1938-1945*, (Oxford University Press, 1981).

broadcasts to the colonies with "La voix de la France." Vichy was forced to reinforce links with the empire which remained loyal to the Marshal or lose them to the Gaullists.<sup>17</sup> The empire also served to distract the French from the privations of the Occupation while maintaining the illusion of France's equal power status under a German New European Order.<sup>18</sup>

Henriot's appointment to *Radiodiffusion National* (Radio-Vichy) in early February 1942 as a propagandist in the radio war mirrored the crisis of collaboration. The war of the two Frances was waged on the periphery of its empire, in Indochina, the French Indies, and especially Africa. Henriot was despatched to West Africa in 1942 to combat

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<sup>17</sup>Hélène Eck, *La guerre des ondes: Histoire des radios de la langue française pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1985), 46. and F 41 268 *Propagande: Circulaire aux Délégués* 1941-1944, no.7, 30 June 1941 and 2 September, 1941. Vichy's "Semaine de la France d'Outre-Mer" in 1941 instructed propaganda delegates to recruit officers, clergy, légionnaires and youth presidents to speak on France's empire. Propaganda films such as *Dakar*, *La Tragedie de Mers-el-Kébir*, *Images et Paroles du Maréchal Pétain*, *Un An de la Révolution Nationale*, and *Discours anniversaire du 17 juin* were also recommended. Robert Zaretsky's study of Nîmes during the occupation reveals that popular acclaim for Pétain was not to be confused with the acceptance of collaboration. The propaganda film, *A Year of the National Revolution*, revealed that scenes of Pétain were "the object of lasting ovations," with one exception: the scene of Pétain's handshake with Hitler at Montoire was greeted with shrill whistles of disapproval. See Robert Zaretsky, *Nîmes at War: Religion, Politics, and Public Opinion in the Gard, 1938-1944*, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 148-149.

<sup>18</sup>The decree-law of 1 October 1941 established *Radiodiffusion nationale* under the direct control of Laval, *Vice-Président du Conseil* and René Bonnefoy, until the Laval's dismissal on 13 December 1940. Darlan placed Commandant Duvivier in the post on 25 February 1941 who directed Darlan's propagandist agenda. With Laval's return to power in April 1942 dismissed Duvivier with André Demaison. Separate branches were in Marseille and Montpellier. See Claude Lévy, "L'organisation de la propagande allemande en France," in *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, no. 64 (October 1966), 24.

Radio-Brazzaville.<sup>19</sup> Speaking from Radio-Niamey in Nigeria, Henriot addressed the dissident French colonies, now "the puppets of a British colonel." French West Africa's governors, administrators, and officers answered only to French leaders. Henriot reminded his listeners of the loss of the *Dunkerque* and the *Strasbourg* at Mers-el-Kébir and the *Richelieu* at Dakar -- all to British shells. He claimed more French sailors and civilians had suffered from the British blockade and bombing than from the Germans.<sup>20</sup> He held Dakar's defence as an example of French honour defended. From Dakar, Henriot visited Conakry, Koalach, Barmalo, Porto-Novo, and Abidjan. Addressing the garrisons of Fort Lamy at Brazzaville and Pointe-Noir at Fort Archambault, Henriot promised that Gaullist Africa, "trapped behind the bars of dissidence" by Frenchmen posing as British mercenaries, would be liberated by the true Free France of the Marshal.<sup>21</sup>

The colonial front was defended by Gaullist Radio-Brazzaville while Radio-Vichy competed with Radio-Paris and the BBC for French metropolitan audiences.<sup>22</sup> Radio-

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<sup>19</sup>F 41 268 *Propagande: Circulaire aux Délégués* No. 69, 30 May 1942 1-3. Delegates were instructed to organize protests against the aggression against Madagascar on the themes of "La Defense de l'Empire" and "Veillons au Salut de l'Empire." Attention was drawn to the political exposés on Radiodiffusion National by François Chasseigne, Paul Creyssel, and Philippe Henriot.

<sup>20</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Sur les routes impériales: aux Français de la Dissidence," *Ici, Radio-France*, 11 April 1942, 34-5.

<sup>21</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'A.O.F. carte maîtresse du jeu français," *Gringoire*, 1 May 1942, 1.

<sup>22</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 67. Despite jamming, radios in the unoccupied zone continued to receive London, Swiss Radio-Sottens and even Moscow. See Lévy, *op. cit.*, 24-25.

Paris, under the direction of Bofinger, former director of Radio Stuttgart, offered popular French singers. Classical concerts featured the best orchestras and virtuosi. Listeners also were subjected to anglophobic tirades pillorying Jews and masons.<sup>23</sup> While sparing the Marshal, Radio-Paris' staff condemned Weygand, Darlan, and the "reactionary" and "clerical" gerontocracy of Vichy.<sup>24</sup> Increasing incidents of resistance and sabotage, attributed to British conspiracies, sparked Radio-Paris' warning that the Communist National Front would lead only to the horrors of civil war. Friedrich's program, "A German journalist speaks," expounded on the collaborative role of an agricultural France integrated in a German dominated New European Order.<sup>25</sup> Lucien Rebatet saw Germany's struggle as France's battle. Co-belligerency would shorten the war and offer France an equal partnership in the German New Order.<sup>26</sup> To Rebatet, the war was an ideological struggle between fascism and democracy. Fascism's trinity of nation, soil, and people was at war with a democracy ruled by an oligarchy of masons and Jews. Ominously, Rebatet spoke of another French National Revolution more akin to

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<sup>23</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 67. Until the German occupation of the Southern zone on November 11 1942, Radio-Vichy focused on parades at the Hotel du Parc, the peasantry and agricultural projects. Reporters were reminded to avoid "taboo" subjects like the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and the expulsion of their French inhabitants. Eight daily information bulletins were broadcast and the "Radio-Journal" attempted to compete with foreign broadcasts. Information bulletins read the despatches of *l'Office française d'Information* (OFI) followed by the commentaries of the "Journal parlé" with journalists like Philippe Henriot. Radio-Vichy was unable to dissuade its audience from the impression that its broadcasts were censored or distorted by the German and French propaganda services.

<sup>24</sup>Raymond Tournoux, *Le Royaume d'Otto*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1982), 53. See glossary citation, Radio-Paris and Jean-Hérolde Paquis.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>Lucien Rebatet, *Les Décombres*, (Paris: Editions DeNoël, 1942), 640.

Germany's, blessed not with holy water but with blood.<sup>27</sup> Henriot later called *Les Décombres* the breviary of the National Revolution.<sup>28</sup>

Radio-Vichy's broadcasts attempted to perpetuate the illusory *Rassemblement national* with an uninspired diet of parades at the Hôtel du Parc, the raising and lowering of the colours, and the Marshal's Sunday walkabouts among the French. The Legion, youth, peasants, and workers, formerly divided by the class struggle, were to be reunited under the rubric of class conciliation. The *Charte du Travail* was given wide publicity from September until December 1941, but its critics complained that the Labour Charter, imposed from above, threatened civil rights and undermined the autonomy of professional unions.<sup>29</sup> The régime's hate campaign against masonry and Communism was even harder to sustain. By early 1942, anti-masonic broadcasts had been replaced by anti-British propaganda as the naval blockade tightened. The French radio public, indifferent to the masonic conspiracy, was more concerned with food, fuel, and prisoners.<sup>30</sup> Germany, with the assistance of the Vichy government tightened the screws of the armistice that compromised further its "neutrality." The Vichy gamble was that collaboration would pay great dividends in the future peace. For the Germans,

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<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 652-654.

<sup>28</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les Décombres par Lucien Rebatet," *Gringoire*, 2 October 1942, 4.

<sup>29</sup>Etienne Fouilloux, "Les Chrétiens, la Résistance et la Collaboration," in *Résistants et collaborateurs: Les Français dans les années noires*, ed. by François Bedarida in *L'Histoire*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985), 104.

<sup>30</sup>Antoine Lefebure, *Le Rôle et l'Influence de la Radio en France pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale*, Mémoire de maîtrise Université de Paris, 1972, 41.

*Kollaboration* secured the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres as Vichy and Italy vied to aid their ally's war of conquest that would make Hitler supreme on the continent.

The invasion of Russia was the first item on the agenda at Vichy's propaganda conference of 25 July 1941 convened by Paul Marion. Marion charged that the Soviet Union had unleashed the war of 1939, throwing Germany against France and profiting from the war in the west to reap territorial annexations in the east. The French proletariat, inspired by the Commune, deprived of the succour of religion, and deceived by parliamentary socialism, stubbornly maintained its loyalty to the Soviet Union, thus constituting a barrier to the future. Delegates were directed to emphasize the National Revolution as a social revolution -- a *union sacrée* against Bolshevism.<sup>31</sup> Henriot described the invasion as the final battle in "a twenty year European crusade of Christianity against Bolshevism." The Jewish-masonic International was now in league with its Communist counterpart.<sup>32</sup> The Russian soldier's fierce defence was the result of twenty years of revolutionary catechism grafted onto Slav patriotism. Henriot described a "primitive bestiality" that had inspired the fanaticism of Bela Kun in Hungary and André Marty in Spain was now apparent in the battles of the Eastern Front.<sup>33</sup> Monsignor Baudrillart spoke of a new crusade "to deliver the tomb of Christ." Eugène

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<sup>31</sup>Peschanski, *op. cit.*, 302-303, 306.

<sup>32</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Comment l'U.R.S.S. est à l'origine de tous nos malheurs," *Gringoire*, 27 June 1941, 1.

<sup>33</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La peste rouge," *Gringoire*, 8 August 1941, 1.



Deloncle spoke of a "White International."<sup>34</sup>

The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the anniversary of the armistice, was the great divide for resistance and collaboration in France. Marshal Pétain broadcast on 12 August 1941 and spoke of a rising "ill wind;" "the authority of my government is contested; its orders are poorly executed.... A genuine malaise is gripping the French people."<sup>35</sup> As the Communists attacked German troops and Germans arrested and executed French hostages, Vichy's propaganda had already taken sides. The same articles of faith that had been current in the 'thirties and were now transposed into a global battle of titans as Vichy propaganda adopted the myths and techniques of the German conqueror.

The *Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme* (LVF), created in August 1941, was part of the Marshal's efforts to "win the peace." It did so not as an independent French unit but as the 638th Infantry Regiment of the *Wehrmacht*. The first contingent of the LVF, in German uniform and swearing an oath of loyalty to Hitler, was formed at Versailles on 25 August 1941. Laval and Déat addressed LVF volunteers drawing the unfortunate comparison between the LVF and Napoleon's *Grande Armée* of

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<sup>34</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma, *De Munich à la Libération 1938-1944*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979), 225.

<sup>35</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 226

1812.<sup>36</sup> The ceremony was interrupted by Paul Colette's assassination attempt against Laval and Déat. A twenty-one-year-old ex-sailor from Caen and former *Croix de Feu* member, Colette enlisted in the LVF hoping to kill one or more of the leading French collaborators. Laval and Déat petitioned Marshal Pétain for mercy on Colette who was sentenced to death by a French court on 1 October 1941 and a reprieve was granted two days later.<sup>37</sup> Henriot applauded the Marshal's clemency, but reminded France of Pétain's warning that the gesture would not be repeated.<sup>38</sup>

The war intruded upon Vichy's National Revolution. When German victories stalled outside Moscow, the first doubts appeared. Churchill promised to rid Europe of Nazism. De Gaulle offered the flame of the resistance and a distant hope of liberation. The Atlantic Charter (9 August 1941), signed by Churchill and Roosevelt, renounced territorial aggrandizement, advocating national self-determination, freedom of the seas, free trade and an international collective security system "after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny." In propaganda terms, the Atlantic Charter was a monumental flop -- a "gush of high-sounding irrelevance," was one British observation. Its laudable ideals

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<sup>36</sup>AJ 41 361: *Etude sur la Légion des Volontaires Française Contre le Bolchevisme*. See also J. Delarue, *Trafics et Crimes sous l'Occupation* (Paris: Fayard, 1968), 176-7. Recruits comprised a majority of PPF militant volunteer youth motivated either by admiration for National Socialism or a fanatical anti-Bolshevism. A second group were fathers of families and unemployed youth whose political sympathies were reinforced by the proffered salary. The third group were mercenaries or misfits -- "têtes brulées" of the PPF, and criminals released from prison.

<sup>37</sup>Geoffrey Warner, *Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France*, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoodie, 1968), 281-2.

<sup>38</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Justice du Chef, Clémence du Père," *Gringoire*, 10 October 1941, 2.

remained a distant hope. No one knew how they were to be implemented.<sup>39</sup> In Vichy, Henriot belittled the "Washington-London-Moscow Axis" and the new *entente* with "Soviet democracy." Western aid, he claimed, would be used to pillage Europe.<sup>40</sup> Pétain's letter to Hitler on the anniversary of Montoire emphasized a common interest in defending a "higher culture" against Bolshevism. The Marshal's meeting with Goering at Saint-Florentin on 1 December was again praised as another milestone that ranked with Montoire in the resurrection of Charlemagne's and Napoleon's continental union.<sup>41</sup> Such were Darlan's signals to the Germans to renew negotiations and to the French for hopes of a "lenient peace." Cabinet ministers prepared enormous dossiers of economic, social, and political measures to that end, but negotiations stalled with Darlan's insistence on political autonomy. Talks broke down on 19 December.<sup>42</sup> By then another challenge in

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<sup>39</sup>Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Public in Britain and Germany*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 231-233. The Atlantic Charter signed at Argentia in Newfoundland on 9 August 1941 outlined a more permanent system of general security to disarm nations threatening aggression beyond their borders. The supplement to the Charter were the Four Freedoms enumerated by Roosevelt early in 1941: freedom of speech and worship, freedom from want and fear. The restatement of Wilson's "Fourteen Points" was Roosevelt's attempt to prepare the American public for war. As it transpired, America's entry into the European war was to be decided by Hitler, not by Roosevelt. More importantly, the Charter was the occasion introducing the American and British chiefs of staff to one another to better coordinate Allied strategy for the second front and the return to the continent.

<sup>40</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le revanche de Staline," *Gringoire*, 4 November 1941, 3.

<sup>41</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Sur la Route de l'Europe nouvelle," *Gringoire*, 5 December 1941, 1.

<sup>42</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 126-128. General Alexander's Eighth Army offensive in North Africa and Italian entreaties for aid inspired Darlan's suggestion to supply Rommel's Afrika Korps through Bizerte. Weygand was dismissed to appease the Germans further. Reciprocity was not forthcoming, however. The Armistice Commission was unwilling to abolish the Demarcation Line or grant a French administration of both zones. In addition, the British offensive stalled before Tunisia was reached and Vichy's aid to Rommel was rendered moot.

Asia threatened to overwhelm Indochina.

Vichy's imperial control remained secure in North Africa, but not in Asia. The armistice terms recognized Japanese claims for bases in return for diplomatic recognition of the Vichy state. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, and the fall of Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines forced further concessions.<sup>43</sup> The collapse of British power in Asia was driven home with the sinking of H.M.S *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*. Where was France in the tempest? Henriot asked. The Marshal's armistice agreement with the Japanese had preserved the French Empire while the American, British and Dutch had collapsed in one fell swoop.<sup>44</sup> The battle fronts in North Africa and Asia brought the conflict ever closer to the home front.

Marion instructed propaganda delegates to portray the German invasion of the Soviet Union as the revenge for Soviet duplicity in 1939. Armed as it was, the Soviet Union could have prevented the war by allying itself with France and England, forcing

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<sup>43</sup>Paxton, *op. cit.*, 82-3.

<sup>44</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La France dans la Tempête," *Gringoire*, 1 January 1942, 1. Initially, Hitler's declaration of war on the USA was not considered the major strategic error that it was. It appeared to confirm that Germany still retained the initiative. Japan's victories acted as antidotes to fears of America's industrial capacity which had lost essential resources of rubber, tin and bauxite from South-East Asia. Balfour, *op. cit.*, 244. The Japanese military occupation of Indochina was now called a "protectorate," a term all too familiar to listeners. Vichy's superficial sovereignty in Indochina was dismissed with the outright Japanese takeover on 9 March 1945 and naming the Emperor Bao Dai as the head of an independent Viet Nam.

Germany to retreat. Henriot was forced to concede Soviet military strength after the failed German assault on Moscow on 20 December; the invasion revealed the extent of the Bolshevik peril to Europe.<sup>45</sup> Henriot admitted, however, that French opinion hailed Russia's resistance and applauded America's entry into the war. Soviet communiqués spoke of the triumph of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, "the same judeo-masonic cliques responsible for France's defeat." When German defeats and English victory earned popular approval, France had forgotten Mers-el-Kebir, Dakar, Syria, and the bombing of France's cities. A British victory in Tripoli and Tunisia would mean the loss of French North Africa.<sup>46</sup> Already we see Henriot's reference to the increasing disparity between public opinion and Vichy's élites. He applauded the German victories in North Africa as history's revenge on Britain. Napoleon's revenge on Britain was Rommel, a Battle of the Pyramids for Egypt that would secure French North Africa.

Pétain's New Year's address for 1942 blamed the divisions within France on the twin pressures of foreign and domestic radio which challenged his authority. He also announced his political and moral captivity, and appealed for unity as French loyalty to him eroded.<sup>47</sup> A *union sacrée* was being formed, but it was not the one envisaged or

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<sup>45</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le bourreau de l'Europe," *Gringoire*, 16 January 1942, 2.

<sup>46</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La France dans la Tempête," *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup>Tournoux, *op. cit.*, 129. "Dans l'exil partiel auquel je suis astreinte, dans la demi-liberté qui m'est laissé, j'essaye de faire tout mon devoir. Chaque jour, je tente d'arracher le pays à l'asphyxie qui le menace, aux troubles qui le guettent. Aidez-moi. Faites la chaîne en me tendant la main. Gagnez chaque jour sur vous-même de petites victoires. Rapprochez-vous davantage les uns des autres. Retrouvez vos coeurs à l'espérance. Tous ensemble, nous sauverons notre pays...."

created by the National Revolution. The Gaullists constituted the greatest threat. To confront this challenge, Vichy propaganda was forced to abandon its "neutrality" and turn to jamming, repression, and counter-propaganda. Jamming hostile radio transmissions required thousands of jammers; *Radiodiffusion Nationale's* twenty were totally inadequate, compelling the state to rely on German technical advisors to defend its radio sovereignty. Radio receivers were either registered or confiscated in the Occupied Zone. To deter clandestine reception in the south, Darlan agreed to fines and imprisonment, but balked at German demands for the death penalty as a "grave psychological error."<sup>48</sup> Counter-propaganda was the domain of press, cinema, and radio. Georges Suarez compared de Gaulle to General Dumouriez, an ambitious mercenary and pawn of British imperialism. Charles Maurras argued that de Gaulle on the bridge of an English destroyer or leading English troops shelling a French colony was a strange way of fighting Germany to the bitter end. De Gaulle's alliance with Stalin revealed his true

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<sup>48</sup>The Loi de l'Etat Français of 28 October 1940 forbade, under penalty of fines of 10-100 francs and imprisonment of six days to six months, the public reception of British broadcasts and any "anti-national" propaganda. This was circumvented by private reception. Publication of a harsher second law, 28 October 1941, prohibited public and private listening to anti-German broadcasts, with fines of 200-10,000 francs and imprisonment from six days to two years. These new measures were unsatisfactory to the German authorities. Stülpnagel's note to the Vichy government insisted on hard labour and the death penalty, and Vichy's authorities were requested to submit to the *Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich* a modification of the law of 28 October 1941 by 3 January 1942. Darlan's reply of 31 December warned that severe penalties would undermine German objectives and exasperate public opinion. He suggested instead the reinforcement of jamming efforts. To placate the Germans, Vichy authorities publicized in the press the condemnation of those who infringed the law of 28 October. The German occupation of the southern zone and the ordinance of 18 December 1942 imposed the penalties that Vichy had been unwilling to implement. See Levy, *op. cit.*, 25-26.

colours, betraying both France and Europe.<sup>49</sup>

In early 1942 Henriot was dissuaded from accepting a German offer to serve as a war correspondent on the Russian Front by Du Moulin de Labarthète, a Federation colleague. Instead, he accepted a position with Radio-Vichy. Du Moulin de Labarthète later congratulated himself for "having saved a man that *Gringoire* had slowly intoxicated, one who was unable to suppress his elan, tame his passions, but whose nationalism was irreproachable...."<sup>50</sup> Henriot's private thoughts are not known but nothing had really changed. His political orations against anti-France in the 'thirties were transposed to the ideological battles of the Second World War. The domestic issues that had divided France during the Popular Front were now part of the global struggle. Henriot's decision was consistent with his pre-war political loyalties and partisan hatreds. The New Europe was the bulwark against what he perceived as an invasion that was both revolutionary and racial. The enemy of his enemies was his ally. Germany at war with Britain, Russia, and America was, for Henriot, history's revenge. The triumph of Vichy's National Revolution was tied to a German victory on the battlefield and the imposition of Nazi ideals on the domestic front. France herself somehow became lost in the equation.

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<sup>49</sup>Gerard Loiseaux, *La Littérature de la Défaite et de la Collaboration d'après 'Phoenix öder Asche' de Bernard Payr*, (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1984), 196-9.

<sup>50</sup>Philippe Amaury, *Les Deux Premières Expériences d'un "Ministère de l'Information" en France*, (Paris: Librairie R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias, 1969), 278.

Fulfilling Churchill's order to "set Europe ablaze" was the task of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), the Ministry of Information (MoI), and Special Operations Executive (SOE) to organize the European resistance against Germany. From the start, Allied propaganda to France assumed a singular importance. France was the Atlantic bridgehead back into Europe. Radio-London's and Voice of America's largest and most important language desk was France. The French language still held a unique place throughout Europe as the *lingua franca* of the continent's political and social élite. Anglo-American "Europe First" strategy planned a cross-Channel invasion on the French coast where resistance could prove crucial for the invasion.<sup>51</sup> Both British and American propaganda saw radio as a new weapon in its arsenal. It was an instrument for gathering and transmitting intelligence, news, information, and hope.

While Nazi and Vichy propaganda appealed and exhorted, the British Ministry of Information considered the best way of sustaining morale was to provide plenty of information. The Home Planning Committee outlined the main function of the Ministry to inform rather than to propagandize. Honesty was the best policy, neither exaggerating military victories nor minimizing defeats. Besides, there were few victories to celebrate

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<sup>51</sup>Holly Cowan Shulman, *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy 1941-1945*, (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 28, 30. To head the French desk, Robert Sherwood and John Houseman, Roosevelt's advisers, hired Pierre Lazareff. Born in Paris in 1907 to Russian Jewish parents, Pierre Lazareff at nineteen had joined the staff of *Paris-Midi* and then *Paris-Soir*, a politically neutral, successful commercial venture. After the fall of France he escaped to New York, where he tried unsuccessfully to publish an independent journal. Unable to find any other job, he went to work for the American Foreign Information Service in 1941, and in February 1942 he took charge of creating a French desk for the Voice of America.



in 1940-1941 as Goebbels trumpeted German and Axis victories. War morale depended on both material and mental factors: the public had to be sure that the war was necessary and just, that victory was possible, that the burden of sacrifice and hardship was being fairly shared, and that the sacrifice was not being wasted by muddled or weak leadership. During the Battle of Britain, the British government held the confidence of its people. During the Battle of France, the French government in 1940 did not.<sup>52</sup>

The BBC French desk assumed high priority for both the British and Gaullists as an instrument of psychological warfare and the voice of Free France. BBC Radio-London team was led by Jacques Duchesne dedicated to keeping the flame of the French resistance burning by commemorating historic dates, including the Treaty of Westphalia, the conquest of Algeria, the battle of Jena, the anniversaries of Pasteur and Voltaire. Bastille Day commemorated *la Marseillaise*, *la Carmagnole*, and the heroic appeals of Danton and Saint-Just. The anniversary of the Republic on 4 September, was commemorated recalling France's colonial empire, her victorious army of 1918, artists, writers, musicians, philosophers, and statesmen. The Battle of the Marne and the armistice of 11 November recalled the German defeat in 1918. Jeanne d'Arc was celebrated by Vichy as a French martyr executed by England; the BBC portrayed her as a victim of treason, delivered by Vichy to the German enemy. Radio-London offered hope and ideals. One early propaganda success directed against rival Radio-Paris was to substitute the phrase "Radio-Paris ment, Radio-Paris ment, Radio-Paris est Allemande,"

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<sup>52</sup>Balfour, *op, cit.*, 75.

to the tune of "La Cucuracha." Still, the best propaganda was military victory, conspicuous by its absence in 1940-1941. The Germans were in a better position to assess the broadcast audience. At the beginning of November, the General commanding occupation troops deplored that, after 18h 30 when Radio-Paris ceased its broadcasts, the BBC was "master of the ether." His report for March 1941 added that Parisians were indifferent to German propaganda, but "one could hear the refrains of London variety shows whistled in the streets."<sup>53</sup>

Vichy's propaganda was directed specifically at BBC London. Mazeyrie Publishers printed broadsides against the BBC as *Bobards, Boniments, Corporation*, in the vain hope of discrediting London. The growing success of resistance radio was evident in all departments of the Southern Zone as documented by the files of the Secret Societies Police.<sup>54</sup> Camille Fégy, writing in the collaborationist *la Gerbe* of 24 April, observed that a village curé reported that his parishioners had lost faith in the leadership,

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<sup>53</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 69. Correspondence from Occupied France indicated popular support for the BBC. A Breton requested the *Marseillaise* and *Sambre et Meuse* both forbidden in Occupied France; a lycée student from Clermont-Ferrand requested instructions for his friends to "expel the Germans"; a letter from Tarbes recounted that students at a girls' school responded in unison "Radio Paris ment" when their school mistress spoke of Radio-Paris. One correspondent from Chambéry indicated that there was no one in the streets during BBC broadcasts, and all the bistros might as well close at eight o'clock. See Oberlé, *op. cit.*, 59-60, 110; and glossary citation on the BBC. See glossary.

<sup>54</sup>Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 323. Illustrated magazines outlined the duties to the Chief of State: "it is forbidden to criticize institutions or government personalities, or listen to antinational radio." Thousands of secret police documents were classified as "Surveiller," "À Eliminer," "À Interner," "Communiste," "Terroriste," "Fait du Marché Noir," "Antigouvernemental," "Gaulliste," and "Ecoute la Radio Anglaise."

"the nation was no longer governed. "We have no news. No leaders, only bureaucrats. The people scorn official radio and are contemptuous of Radio-Paris; I am alone in the village in listening to Radio-Paris and I do so hiding the fact from my parishioners. They are avid listeners to Anglo-Saxon stations and clandestine broadcasts like children listening to forbidden speeches believing only what is forbidden."<sup>55</sup>

For General de Gaulle, Free France existed only by virtue of radio. Between 1940-1942 its mandate, as conceived by de Gaulle, was a moral mission to prevent France from "resigning itself to the infamy of slavery." Radio was the instrument of the spiritual reconquest of France.<sup>56</sup> The battle of the V, "the chalk campaign," was the first sign of collective resistance. In January 1941 the head of the BBC Belgian Service,

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<sup>55</sup>Fernand Grenier, *C'était Ainsi... (1940-1945)*, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975), 119-20. Fernand Grenier, journalist for the clandestine *l'Humanité* and future Commissar for Air in the *Comité français de la Libération Nationale*, was born into a working class family. He worked as a bank clerk, and as a baker. He joined the Communist party in 1922 and participated in Communist-led protests within the army against the Ruhr occupation. After his demobilization, he was selected as a pupil of the *Ecole centrale du Parti Communist* at Bobigny in 1924 and 1925. Grenier organized and led a large textile strike between Sept 1928 and April 1929 and was twice imprisoned. In 1932, he was called to Paris to direct *l'Association française des amis de l'URSS*. He took over Doriot's fief in the legislative elections at Saint-Denis, on 1 August 1937. Mobilized in 1939, described in his *Journal de la drôle de guerre* (1969), he was arrested on 5 October 1940. He escaped from the Chateaubriant prison in June 1941 before the Communist prisoners were executed and worked for the clandestine *l'Humanité*. In 1942 he was sent by Jacques Duclos to London as the Communist party's commissar to de Gaulle's *France combattante*. He broadcast from London in July 1943 and joined André Marty as one of Henriot's targets. In June 1945, he was elected member of the Central Committee of the Communist party and pursued his political career as Seine deputy under the Third and Fourth Republics. His autobiography, *C'était ainsi* (1959) recounts his war years. Benoît Yvert, *Dictionnaire des Ministres, 1789-1989*, (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 692.

<sup>56</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 70-71.

Victor de Laveleye, Brussels deputy, former Minister of Justice (1937), and former President of the Belgian Liberal Party, suggested that his countrymen display the letter 'V' for victory and freedom.<sup>57</sup> The symbol spread throughout France and Holland and the Morse code of '... - ' for "V" was adapted to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony as "destiny knocking at the door." Goebbels' response was to adapt it to German propaganda: the Eiffel Tower carried a giant "V" for *Viktoria* with the caption, *Deutschland siegt auf allen Fronten*. The popularity of the V-Campaign gave BBC European News Editor Noel Newsome and his assistant Douglas Ritchie, speaking as "Colonel Britton," the idea to use the campaign to foment resistance. Churchill adopted the "V" sign as his personal signature but quashed any idea that propaganda should dictate policy.<sup>58</sup> The "V," characterised by Charles Maurras as "puerile chalk inscriptions," was the only weapon of the early resistance. Radio-Paris announced on 2 April that owners and tenants were responsible for any anti-German graffiti on their properties and graffitists would be prosecuted. School teachers in the Occupied zone were ordered to ensure that children did not leave school with any chalk in their pockets. At Augoulême, on April 5, a listener described the proliferation of "Vs" and "Vive de Gaulle." Another said that each morning the front of the Hotel du Roi René at Aix-en-Provence, where the German Armistice Commission was housed, was covered with Vs "so that a man has had to be stationed there and does nothing else but wipe them off."

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<sup>57</sup>Tournoux, *op. cit.*, 89. Source Maurice Schumann. The Flemish word for freedom was *vrijheit*.

<sup>58</sup>Balfour, *op. cit.*, 214.

Threats of collective punishment proved futile. Doriot's *L'Emancipation Nationale* (quoted by the Swiss paper, *Tagwacht* of May 8) admitted the "the so-called Gaullists had won the battle of the chalk."<sup>59</sup>

Douglas Ritchie was Henriot's first target. He characterized Colonel Britton's V-Campaign as England's final, desperate attempt to incite sabotage and assassination. British fortunes were at their lowest ebb after the fall of Hong Kong. Henriot described an England, with its back to the wall, wreaking revenge not against Germany or Japan, but against France overseas in Senegal, Syria, Djibouti, and Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. "England seeks the consolation of seeing us delivered to the disorders and horrors of civil war before succumbing herself...."<sup>60</sup> What Henriot saw as an emerging civil war was in fact a growing resistance, supplied by British arms, courtesy of the SOE. Henriot was setting the stage for Vichy's treason trial, the judgement at Riom.

Vichy's propaganda set-piece, the Riom trial, sought to buttress its legitimacy by condemning its Republican predecessor. Laval, Marion and Du Moulin de Labarthète wanted to prosecute on the declaration of the "unnecessary war." A conviction would

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<sup>59</sup>Jean Oberlé, *"Jean Oberlé Vous Parle": Souvenirs de Cinq Années à Londres*, (Paris: La Jeune Parque, 1945), 112-113." Alors, nous battîmes avec des "V". Il ne faut désespérer, On les aura, Il ne faut pas vous arrêter, De résister, V, V, V, V..., Sur les murs et sur les pavés, Faites des V." See also Charles, J. Rolo, *Radio Goes to War: The "Fourth Front"*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), 175-176.

<sup>60</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'Angleterre cherche des assassins: ça presse," *"Ici, Radio-France,"* 7 February 1942, 2-4.

saddle the Republic with the responsibility for starting the war while absolving Germany of any wrong-doing. Paul Baudouin, however, cautioned that an acquittal of Germany after the defeat of France would be a double humiliation. Georges Bonnet, Foreign Affairs Minister during the Polish crisis, came to Vichy to explain that the government - and his own efforts in particular -- had done everything possible to prevent war. It was Germany that invaded Poland, the ally of France.<sup>61</sup> For those who considered the war inevitable, the military cause of the debacle was obvious. The problem lay in the large military presence within the Vichy government. Transferring responsibility from the military to the political preserved the prestige of the two military leaders of the régime, Marshal Pétain and General Weygand. General Huntziger, defeated at Sedan and later promoted to Minister of War, took an intermediate position. France had not been prepared for war. France's officers, obedient to orders issued by incompetents, were defeated beforehand by the politicians. The Army lacked the tools of victory. It was thus decided that responsibility for the defeat would not go beyond March 1936, when Pétain and Weygand no longer exercised a major influence.<sup>62</sup>

The Riom propaganda dossier underlined, "Democracy promised bread, peace, and liberty. It lead to misery, war, and defeat."<sup>63</sup> The curtain was raised on the Riom trial of "les responsables" and "bellicistes" on 19 February 1942. The prisoner's dock

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<sup>61</sup>Henri Michel, *Le Procès de Riom*, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), 31.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>63</sup>F 41 266 *Service de la Propagande: Maréchal, Légion, Prisonniers de Guerre, 1941-1942* [February 1942]. The date was deduced from a reference to 18 months of armistice.

held the defendants: Léon Blum, Edouard Daladier, Guy La Chambre, and Maurice Gamelin. Georges Mandel and Paul Reynaud were detained for a later trial. The Republican régime that had displaced the heroic virtues with comfort, sloth, pleasure, and the passion for money was indeed on trial. Henriot was witness for the prosecution who held those in the dock responsible for the dead, prisoners, refugees, widows, and orphans. In an effort to rekindle the public outcry of 1940, Henriot asked why nothing had been done to defend France's soldiers who had been sent to the slaughter? Where was the French Air Force when the blitzkrieg was unleashed? How could five hundred French aircraft repulse five thousand?<sup>64</sup> Public curiosity having been whetted, everyone in France awaited convincing explanations and revelations.

It was impossible to filter the enormous mass of facts and figures to allow only those favourable to the régime.<sup>65</sup> The trial was held less to enlighten the French than to maintain the prejudices and prerogatives of the Vichy State. One hundred thousand brochures, *Les responsables*, were distributed by the *Centres de propagande de la Révolution Nationale* (CPRN), listing the causes of the defeat. A malformed Central Europe of Poles, Czechs, and Southern Slavs created the issues that ensured Germany's revenge on the peace. France's allies, England and America, had defeated efforts to guarantee the peace.<sup>66</sup> Léon Blum was accorded the status of France's evil genius.

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<sup>64</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'absent," *Gringoire*, 27 February 1942, 1.

<sup>65</sup>Michel, *op. cit.*, 82.

<sup>66</sup>F 41 302 *Anticommunisme*.

Popular Front support for Republican Spain had threatened to embroil France in a three-front war with Spain, Italy, and Germany. Daladier returned to his former status as the "executioner of February 6th." Pierre Cot and Guy La Chambre were arraigned for France's "broken wings": the *Armée de l'Air* confronting a numerically superior *Luftwaffe*.<sup>67</sup> Henriot targeted French Communist-led strikes in the factories and street agitation that aggravated civil war, ruined the social peace, and disarmed France. Mandel and Reynaud, opponents of an inevitable *Anschluss*, were warmongers who had defended the Czechs and Poles.<sup>68</sup> Henriot concluded by drawing attention to the empty chair at Riom reserved for England. France's diplomats were the lackeys of England. The French Army, England's shield, was now its victim.<sup>69</sup>

But French public opinion had evolved as the war changed; England was no longer alone, and the entry of the Soviet Union and America, with their enormous military power, fostered second thoughts about Axis victory claims.<sup>70</sup> Riom was exposed by Maurice Schumann's 19 March 1942 broadcast, in which he reported André Le Troquer's directives to journalists covering the trial. Reporters were ordered to confine their discussions to the lack of preparations from 1936 to May 1940; to

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<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Procès de Riom: Le ministère devant les chambres," *Ici Radio-France*, 14 March 1942, (Paris: Les Editions de France, 1943), 17-18.

<sup>69</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La première responsable: Accusée, levez-vous!" *Ici Radio-France*, 28 March 1942, 26-28.

<sup>70</sup>Henri Michel, *Le Procès de Riom*, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), 315-16.



emphasize the accused as negligent in their duties; to illustrate that the army lacked the tools indispensable for modern war and was not on trial. Reference to General de Gaulle's ideas of tank warfare was forbidden. Arguments and rebuttals would be provided. On no account was the Marshal to be implicated or the armistice challenged. The key theme was that "France was condemned to construct a new régime or perish."<sup>71</sup> Schumann, broadcasting on Radio-London, noted that Marshal Pétain, as Minister of War in 1934, had ignored the fortification of the Northern sector, especially the Ardennes. He pointed to the General Staff's opposition to the armoured divisions.<sup>72</sup> Pétain's preface to General Chavineau's book affirmed that an invasion was impossible, that the defensive was the strategy of the victor. Finally, Schumann charged that Pétain was the author of the strategy and the tactics responsible for the defeat.<sup>73</sup>

The Army was present at Riom in the figure of a silent and humiliated Gamelin. Blum and Daladier demolished the prosecution. Blum charged that the court was illegal, that France's government was repudiating the principle of sovereign universal suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution of 1875.<sup>74</sup> Daladier railed against the travesty of justice whereby the defence was limited to reading the table of contents of the indictment. He asked why the War Minister of 1934 [Pétain] had not protested against reduced military

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<sup>71</sup>Michel, *op. cit.*, 80-1.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, 81-2.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 345-6.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, 111.

credits; why the General Staff had no response to the German offensive; why the army was immune from blame for the defeat while politicians were saddled with the new crime of "treason to duties." He concluded, "Today Gambetta would be imprisoned and Bazaine would be the government."<sup>75</sup> How was it that the Republic was held responsible for a war made inevitable by the annexation of Austria, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland? To the charge of weakening the French army, he replied that the Popular Front had voted all the credits demanded by the General Staff, spending more on tanks and planes than on pouring concrete.<sup>76</sup>

The trial was also a political effort to appease the conqueror, but from its debut failed to resolve the dilemma of whether to pronounce a guilty verdict for those who had declared war or to condemn those who had failed to win it. The Riom trial divided further Berlin and Vichy. When the Supreme Court was created, the Vichy government had yet to define the politics of collaboration. Berlin's aim was to saddle the French government with responsibility for having declared war on Germany. As the trial progressed, it was apparent to the Germans that the judges were prosecuting responsibility for the defeat, not the declaration of war. The trial was a double failure:

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<sup>75</sup>During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 General Bazaine's Army at Metz represented the last hope of the Republic to reinforce Gambetta's Tours Army and break the German siege of Paris. Metz tied down Frederick-Charles' Second Army until Bazaine surrendered a starving city on 29 October 1870. After the war Bazaine was tried for treason, sentenced to death, reprieved and condemned to life imprisonment. Pétain would receive the same sentence at his post-war trial. Alistair Horne, *The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune, 1870-1871*, (London: Macmillan, 1965), 106-107.

<sup>76</sup>Michel, *op. cit.*, 118-19.

Berlin failed to make France responsible for the declaration of war while Vichy failed to shift responsibility for the defeat to the Popular Front. Riom rebounded on its creators, succeeding only in partially rehabilitating Vichy's official enemies while implicating the army and state's highest officials.

Riom appeared less a trial seeking the truth than a "white terror" that prosecuted the régime's enemies while defending its allies. On 6 March, Admiral Darlan informed Roland Krug von Nidda, German Consul General at Vichy, that the Riom trial was to be suspended.<sup>77</sup> Darlan and Barthélemy informed the Marshal on 11 April 1942 that the proceedings were being adjourned to pursue and broaden the inquiry to *all* those responsible.<sup>78</sup> Clearly, the Germans were frustrated; and change was in the air. Abetz dissuaded Vichy cabinet members such as Jacques Benoist-Méchin and François Lehideux from resigning, advising them to await a purge of the remaining *attentistes* of the Marshal's cabinet.<sup>79</sup> Darlan's fall from German favour was imminent and Laval waited in the wings.

The Royal Air Force bombing of the Paris Renault factories on the night of 3/4 March 1942 intruded on the Riom proceedings, and served as another reminder of the "unnecessary war." One of the thornier moral issues of Allied strategy was first

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<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, 374.

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, 376-7.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, 383.

introduced in 1942 with the appointment of Arthur Harris as the new chief of Bomber Command. He was instructed to implement the policy of area bombing.<sup>80</sup> The Renault factory produced an estimated 18,000 trucks annually. The Billancourt report confirmed that 300 bombs fell on the factory, destroying forty percent of the buildings, halting production for four weeks. French civilian casualties were heavy with 367 killed and 341 badly injured. Henriot reported that a convent, a children's day care centre, a hospital, and worker's houses were destroyed. British leaflets claiming that they bombed as precisely as possible were cold comfort to the 620 dead and 1,500 wounded.<sup>81</sup> Marshal Pétain condemned the criminal aggression of a former ally against innocent civilians and declared Sunday, 8 March, a day of national mourning.<sup>82</sup> A cenotaph was erected at Place de la Concorde to the victims, and a manifesto condemned the British bombing, contrasting it with the German occupation. Intellectuals, ecclesiastics, and journalists published a manifesto praising France's former enemy and rebuking France's former ally. Henriot's signature appeared on a list which read like a collaborationist *Who's Who*:

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<sup>80</sup>Martin Middlebrook & Chris Everitt, *The Bomber Command War Diaries, 1939-1945*, (Penguin, 1985), 240. The "area bombing" directive sent to Bomber Command on 14 February 1942 by Churchill and the War Cabinet instructed that "It has been decided that the primary objective of your operations should now be focused on the morale of the enemy civilian population and in particular, of the industrial workers."

<sup>81</sup>The RAF leaflets dropped during the Billancourt raid read: "Nous savons ce que vous faites pour diminuer les effets de votre collaboration forcée. Mais seuls, vous ne pouvez pas tout faire. C'est pourquoi nous venons aider... Nous viserons aussi exactement que possible et... nous connaissons notre affaire."

<sup>82</sup>Saint-Paulien, (Maurice-Yvan Sicard), *Histoire de la Collaboration*, (Paris: Editions de l'Esprit Nouveau, 1964), 276. An apologist for collaboration, Sicard was a member of the political bureau of Doriot's PPF. Editor-in-chief of the PPF paper *l'Emancipation Nationale* which appeared in Marseille from 1940-1944, he served as Doriot's lieutenant while the latter served on the Eastern Front with the LVF.

Abel Bonnard, Robert Brasillach, Alphonse de Chateaubriant, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Jean Luchaire, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Paul Chack, Monsignor Vincent, rector of the Catholic University of Angers, and Canon Tricot, professor of the Catholic Institute of Paris. Henriot declared that "as long as there is a factory standing in Germany, England has no excuse for bombing factories in France." Constrained by the conqueror's armistice, betrayed and bombed by a former ally, Henriot argued that France had paid twice for the defeat. He questioned the professed aims of British strategy. The seizure of French ships, internment, soldiers and sailors killed at Oran and Syria, colonies starved and the country blockaded, France devastated -- all "for the defeat of Germany?"<sup>83</sup>

Schumann's broadcast lamented the civilian casualties, but argued that French factories were building tanks, aircraft engines, and nearly a thousand trucks a month for the *Wehrmacht*. The workers' deaths forged France's national unity against the invader.<sup>84</sup> Police sources claimed that Clermont-Ferrand workers argued that the victims, attracted by higher wages, should not have been working for Germany in the

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<sup>83</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Premier bombardement de la région parisienne: les Anglais à notre aide," *Ici Radio-France*, 7 March 1942, 9-12. "Français, Comprenez qu'entre une usine, une ville, un pays occupés, mais qui renaissent, et une usine, une ville, un pays qui meurent il y a une différence entre occupation et extermination."

<sup>84</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 74. The allusion to the hostages referred to the 4 March announcement by the German governor of Greater Paris of forty hostages shot in reprisal for the murder of a German soldier.

first place.<sup>85</sup> The RAF repeated the raid on 2 April. The fire-bombing of the German Baltic port of Lübeck on 28/29 March was denounced by the Paris press as an attack upon an "open city." Fernand Grenier noted that the *Luftwaffe's* bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam and London, hailed as exploits, became crimes when the RAF retaliated.<sup>86</sup> Approximately 190 acres of the old town was destroyed including the *Marienkirche*, the "mother Church of Northern Germany."<sup>87</sup> The bombing debate would recur throughout the war to disturb the Allied conscience.

The fall of Darlan and the reappointment of Laval dispelled any illusions about Vichy's independence. Henriot welcomed the alliance of the peasant of Artois and the peasant of Auvergne: "London's and Moscow's worst nightmare, hated by the Popular Front, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Anglo-Jewish tyranny, were united on the same path."<sup>88</sup> Fernand Grenier saw Laval as Hitler's *gauleiter*; public reaction was probably of the same mind as regional and departmental delegates were asked to report on the

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<sup>85</sup>John F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 162. The organizer of the Place de la Concorde commemoration, Secretary of State Jacques Benoist-Méchin, noted that "la grande majorité des Français approuvait les bombardements de la RAF." See also Eck, *op. cit.*, 74.

<sup>86</sup>Grenier, *op. cit.*, 115.

<sup>87</sup>Middlebrook & Everitt, *op. cit.*, 252. Lübeck was not raided by the full strength of the RAF again during the war. A Swiss diplomat and President of the International Red Cross negotiated an agreement with the British that the port would not be bombed again because it was being used for the shipment of Red Cross supplies.

<sup>88</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Une grande voix française," *Gringoire*, 24 April 1942, 1.

public reaction to Laval's appointment.<sup>89</sup> Laval received the portfolios of the Interior, Information, and Foreign Affairs as well as of Vice-President of the Council. Darlan remained Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and Pétain's Dauphin. Although Pétain remained nominally President of the Council as well as Chief of State, Laval was effectively head of the government. He was not his own master though; he was responsible for guaranteeing labour, food, and material to Germany, and public order in France. His appointment was contingent on fulfilling labour quotas determined by his March agreement with Fritz Sauckel, Reich plenipotentiary of labour.<sup>90</sup>

Guaranteeing order, food, and workers was almost impossible. Public disaffection mounted with the lack of food; French workers were reluctant to work in German factories while French POWs languished in German stalags. Laval himself feared dismissal, and replacement with either Doriot, the *Sicherheitdienst* candidate, or Darlan,

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<sup>89</sup>F 41 268 *Propagande: Circulaire aux Délégués* No. 67, 1.

<sup>90</sup>Michael Marrus & Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), 219. Fritz Sauckel, former Gauleiter of Thuringia noted for his severity, was appointed Commissioner of Man-power replacing Hans Richard Hemmen. Sauckel ruthlessly pursued his mandate to 'place the economies of the Occupied territories at the service of the German war economy' insisting on the rights of the conqueror. Hubert Lagardelle, Minister of Labour noted that during the *Relève* negotiations, Laval suggested the exchange of one worker for one prisoner of war. Sauckel refused and Laval then suggested one prisoner for every three workers. The deal finally agreed on was the release of one prisoner for seven workers. Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 187. See also Hubert Lagardelle, "Travail," in Philip Whitcomb, trans. *France During the German Occupation 1940-1944: A Collection of 292 Statements on the Government of Maréchal Pétain and Pierre Laval*. 3 vols. (Stanford Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1959), vol. I, 135-137.

in the event of Pétain's death.<sup>91</sup> He was convinced that Hitler needed France as a partner in his war against the Soviet Union, and his radio address of 20 April was tailored more for a French than a German audience. Absolving Germany of the crime of provoking war, and blaming the Popular Front and England, Laval appealed to the peasants and workers to support Franco-German collaboration to defend civilization against Bolshevism.

Laval's "new men" replaced Vichy's traditional *cadres* with younger militants. Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton note Vichy's general slide toward younger and more marginal leaders after 1942.<sup>92</sup> Paul Creyssel assumed the propaganda portfolio.<sup>93</sup> André Demaison replaced Darlan's appointee, Commandant Duvivier, in radio. René Bonnefoy, former editor of Laval's *Moniteur du Puy-de-Dôme*, was appointed press secretary. The appointments of Darquier de Pellepoix and René Bousquet were indications that Laval's new ministers were more amenable to German ambitions. Darquier "de" Pellepoix, founder and president of the *Association of the Wounded of 6th*

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<sup>91</sup>Marrus & Paxton, *op. cit.*, 230.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*, 287.

<sup>93</sup>Born in Marseilles, Paul Creyssel was a member of Left republicans and Independent Radicals while a deputy for the Loire in 1932, and was reelected as *Croix de Feu* Deputy in May 1936. He was Chief of Information and Censorship prior to 1942; Director-General of Propaganda at the Ministry of Information under Marion and Laval until March 1943 and Secretary-General of Propaganda and member of the National Broadcasting Council. He was replaced by Henriot and resigned 8 March 1944. *Office of Strategic Services, A Selected Who's Who in Vichy France June 1940 to August 1944 : Research and Analysis Branch OSS*, 24 October 1944, 176-177. A copy of the OSS document is held at the IHTP in Paris.



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February, was an old friend of the Germans. His anti-semitic weekly, *la France enchaînée* was funded by secret German sources. Xavier Vallat's appointment to the *Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives* (CGQJ) in 1940 had frustrated German embassy and secret police plans to install Darquier. Darquier's "Association for the Defence of the Race" collaborated with the German-sponsored Institute for the Study of Jewish Questions. Laval's return brought Darquier in his train and he was named by Pétain as Commissioner-General for Jewish affairs on 6 May 1942.<sup>94</sup> On 12 May Darquier mimicked his employer's *Blut und Böden* ideology, demanding total expulsion of the Jews; he referred to deportations as "public hygiene" and promised "to settle the Jewish question once and for all."<sup>95</sup> René Bousquet, former prefect of the Marne in 1940, the Champagne in 1941, and Pucheu's lieutenant, was appointed Interior Minister. French and German police collaboration resulted in the arrest and deportation of thousands of Jews in the Occupied zone during the night of 16/17 July 1942. Bousquet's accords with SS General Oberg in August promised closer collaboration of French police against "anarchy, terrorism, and communism."<sup>96</sup>

One of the darkest aspects of the Occupation was the informing campaigns. Informing destroyed the social ties of trust between human beings, and created suspicion, resentment, envy and, ultimately, denunciation. The informing was due partly to the fact

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<sup>94</sup>Marrus & Paxton, *op. cit.*, 284-86.

<sup>95</sup>*Ibid.*, . 290.

<sup>96</sup>Benoît Yvert, *Dictionnaire des Ministres, 1789-1989*, (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 672.

that there was never enough food. Scarcity created rationing, black-market inflation encouraged informing. Radio-Paris' program "Répétez-le" was devoted to poisoned-pen letters denouncing neighbours, business rivals, and especially black-marketeers. Jews were suspected of hoarding food, of eating well while others went hungry.<sup>97</sup> Foreign Jews at Drancy arrived with tags outlining their social status, the arrest date, and the charge. On the reverse was a number identifying the informer and the amount of the reward. At Saint-Etienne in July 1941, the price varied between 600 and 900 francs.<sup>98</sup> Henriot, writing in *Gringoire* on 13 June 1941, expressed concern for the increasing incidence of bounties (*tickets de la délation*). Informing revealed a dangerous trend, he thought. Envy whetted by privation transformed a civic duty into a vice. "Does anyone imagine that the spirit of envy, fostered by deprivation, is not strong enough as things are now? Does anyone believe that informing, and even informing for pay -- since the author is suggesting 'food rewards' for informers -- is in harmony with the French character? Is turning bargaining into a civic virtue the right way to encourage the revival of the public spirit?"<sup>99</sup> On 27 October 1941, the *Bulletin de France* (no. 55) published by Vichy's social propaganda committee, condemned the practice: "A propagator [of the new faith] thou art. An informer thou are not. Complaining is the reaction of the weak.

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<sup>97</sup> André Halimi, *La Délation sous l'Occupation*, (Paris: Editions Alain Moreau, 1983), 84.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 134. "Croit-on que l'esprit d'envie entretenu par les privations ne soit pas suffisamment développé? Trouve-t-on que la dénonciation et même la dénonciation rémunérée, pris que l'auteur propose des 'primes alimentaires,' aux délateurs s'accorde avec le caractère français? Faire du marchandage une vertu civique, est-ce vraiment contribuer au relèvement de l'esprit public?"

Compelling recognition is the reaction of the strong." Even Pétain entreated France to renounce the poisoned pen campaign that was threatening national unity.<sup>100</sup>

Racial theories first began to appear in Henriot's wartime articles in May 1941. Henriot cited Dr. Alexis Carrel's book *L'Homme* on racial degeneration to support his notion of decadence. To the social plague of alcoholism, the bistro, and café was added the racial theme of the *métèque* invasion. The Popular Front had opened France's borders to Europe's refugees; the result was a social catastrophe. Referring to Germany in all but name, Henriot spoke of measures adopted by certain countries to defend themselves against toxic contamination, and suggested that "France's future lay in preserving itself from the degeneration which threatened the race of men of Rocroi, Valmy, Austerlitz, and Verdun."<sup>101</sup> American Jews were portrayed as monopolists of politics, wheat, press, cinema, and radio, and the allies of Blum, Mandel, Zay, and Mendès-France. Destroying food depots, derailing trains, and black market profiteering were not "French crimes." A Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy in Moscow and New York was directing the resistance to take up arms against the Axis powers. Israel ruled the tripartite pact of capitalism, democracy, and Bolshevism. In a chilling reference, he argued that the "solution" to the European Jewish question required "maximum equity"; it also required maximum severity.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, 207. "Propagande tu es. Délateur tu n'es pas. Se plaindre est la réaction des faibles. S'imposer est la réaction des forts."

<sup>101</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Sauver la race!" *Gringoire*, 1 May 1941, 2.

<sup>102</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Libérez-Nous Des Juifs," *Gringoire*, 5 June 1942, 1.

Henriot's articles were similar to Dr. Friedrich's broadcast of 22 April 1942 on Radio-Paris: "The solution to the Jewish question must not inspire humanitarian sentiments." Darquier's thrice-weekly broadcasts argued that the defeat dated from the moment France's old Breton, Auvergnat, and Lorrain blood was mixed with that of the Jews from Warsaw and the merchants of Trebizond. He warned of the dangers of "gangrene," "contamination," "leprosy," and defended the "hygienic" remedies taken by the government.<sup>103</sup> Rumours of foreign Jews dying of hunger in concentration camps were dispelled. The *métèques* of Central Europe's ghettos, the "parasites of capitalism" would be employed in hard physical labour for their moral and physical health.<sup>104</sup> *Gringoire* applauded the arrests: "We are starting to rid ourselves of the foreign, stateless Jews who, since the Popular Front, have invaded France. Bravo Monsieur Laval! This is the *sine qua non* of the moral and material renewal of our country."<sup>105</sup> The Jesuit Gaston Fessard warned in *Témoignage chrétien* that France was in danger of losing its soul. The laws of God transcended the laws of the state. Christian resistance was the antidote to the crusade against Bolshevism.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>103</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 88-89.

<sup>104</sup>Lefebure, *op. cit.*, 69.

<sup>105</sup>*Gringoire*, 28 August 1942, 3.

<sup>106</sup>Fouilloux, "Les Chrétiens, la Résistance et la Collaboration," *op. cit.*, 104. Fessard published *Pax Nostra* (1936) and a study of the Munich crisis in *Épreuve de force* (1939). For Sulpician Louis Richard in Lyon, Nazism was an anti-Christian neo-paganism, the sin of the Twentieth Century. Antisemitism denied the Judaic sources of Christianity and thus of Western culture.

As of 7 June 1942, all Jews in the Occupied Zone over the age of six were required to wear the Star of David emblazoned with the word *Juif* or *Juive*. French police estimated that over 100,000 Jews were subject to the decree and after a few weeks 83,000 wore the Star. The wearing of the Star provoked the first acts of collective resistance. Public reaction ridiculed the Nazi obsession: in Paris, Bordeaux, and Nancy, Jewish sympathizers wore yellow flowers, yellow handkerchiefs, or bits of paper inscribed with "Auvergnat" and "Goy." London reported that Paris university students wore badges with the inscription *Juif* purporting to stand for "*Jeunesse Universitaire Intellectuelle Française*."<sup>107</sup> Jean Bruller confirmed the public protest; people sported stars with the label "Christian," "Breton," "Brahmin," and "Zazou." Some people put stars on their dogs. This might have been effective if the whole population had started wearing stars, as the Danes, led by King Frederik, were to prove.<sup>108</sup> The mood changed abruptly during the night of 16/17 July.

In the early morning of 16 July, 9,000 French police and *gardes mobiles*, assisted by Doriot's PPF blueshirts, joined the Gestapo in Operation *Vent printanier*, the arrest of all foreign and stateless Jews in the Occupied Zone. Many Jews, warned by French

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<sup>107</sup>Marrus and Paxton, *op. cit.*, 236-9. Fernand Grenier noted that Gestapo decrees of 13 July forbade Jews to frequent restaurants, cafés, bars, theatres, cinemas, concerts, music-halls, public telephone booths, markets, pools and beaches, museums, libraries, historic monuments, sports events (as participants or spectators), race tracks, campsites, and parks. Grenier commented that "they [the Jews] were allowed to breathe... until further notice!" See Grenier, *op. cit.*, 132.

<sup>108</sup>Vercors (Jean Bruller), *The Battle of Silence*, (London: Collins, 1968), 183-184.

police, went into hiding. In order to meet the German quotas, set at 32,000 Jews to be deported by the end of the summer, Bousquet's Ministry of the Interior sent secret instructions to regional prefects in the Unoccupied Zone on 5 August, directing them to send to the Occupied Zone all foreign Jews who had entered France since 1 January 1936.<sup>109</sup>

Vichy's press was mobilized to serve German goals. Henriot's "Romance of the Star [of David]" and "Reverse of the Star" cited the historical precedents whereby kings and popes had confined the Jewish poison (*nocivité*) by restricting them to ghettos. Special legislation supervised and punished them. The demons of international Jewry, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembour, Bela Kun, Stavisky, and Blum were among Henriot's more notorious examples.<sup>110</sup> Those who tried to escape from the Occupied Zone without a visa or identity card were arrested by Vichy police at the demarcation line. Henriot condoned the mass arrests, and his cryptic "Le voilà bien le retour à la terre"<sup>111</sup> suggests that he knew that the deportations were not geographical but vertical. Another *grande rafle*, or dragnet during the nights of 26-28 August, arrested Jews hiding in the "Free Zone." Bousquet reported that 11,184 Jews were arrested, though the total was later revised to a more modest 7,100. Karl Oberg suggested that the shortfall might be filled by expanding the category of "deportables" and Bousquet agreed to include

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<sup>109</sup>Marrus and Paxton, *op. cit.*, 257.

<sup>110</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La Romance de L'Etoile," *Gringoire*, 7 August 1942, 1.

<sup>111</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Revers de l'Etoile," *Gringoire*, 7 August 1942, 3.

Belgian and Dutch Jewish refugees. At year's end 42,500 Jews had been sent from France to Auschwitz.<sup>112</sup> Radio-London claimed that the persecution of the Jews had transformed France from the nation of asylum (*terre d'asile*) to the nation of shame (*terre de honte*).

Catholics and Protestants alike protested the arrest and deportation of Jews. Archbishop of Toulouse, Monsignor Jules-Gérard Saliège's pastoral letter condemning the Jewish persecution was read in all parishes of his diocese on Sunday, 30 August.<sup>113</sup> The letter spread throughout the southwest and was published in *Témoignage chrétien*, *Franc-Tireur*, *Combat*, and other Resistance journals as well as broadcast over the BBC.<sup>114</sup> Pastor Boegner broached the Jewish deportations to Laval, who claimed that those deported were Jewish black market profiteers and Gaullists. Approaching Admiral Platon, Boegner confided that Laval and his government were dishonouring the Marshal. Platon noted that Boegner's "Huguenot conscience" pitied the Jews at the expense of the prisoners. Invoking the armistice, Platon planned to "honour the signature of France" by

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<sup>112</sup>Marrus and Paxton, *op. cit.*, 260-1. Serge Klarsfeld's father was arrested in Nice during the rafles in the "Free Zone." He succeeded in hiding his wife, daughter and son in a closet with a false partition before he was taken away. Serge Klarsfeld was responsible for bringing René Bousquet to trial for crimes against humanity. The trial was cut short by Bousquet's assassination in June 1993.

<sup>113</sup>*Ibid.*, 271. "The Jews are real men and women. They cannot be abused without limit... They are part of the human species. They are our brothers like so many others."

<sup>114</sup>*Ibid.*, 272-274. Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyon, followed with a public protest on Sunday, 6 September, but couched it in terms of loyalty to the régime, recognizing "that there is a problem for the French authorities to resolve." Cardinal Gerlier, with the episcopal title of *Primat des Gaules*, was branded *le Primat des Gaullistes*.



delivering Jews to the Germans. René Bousquet dismissed the protests, claiming that the government's actions would be praised in the future. International Jewry would be broken through deportation, and the remaining French Jews would be saddled with strict obligations and limited rights.<sup>115</sup>

Monsignor Delay, Bishop of Marseille, addressed a stinging letter to *Gringoire* (Marseille edition). Such actions, the bishop noted, were "contrary... to the true spirit of the National Revolution." While admitting that the Jewish question posed difficult national and international problems, Delay condemned the arrests of men, women and children who, he suspected, were sent to their deaths. While reasons of state required measures to defend and punish abuses, the domain of the state had its limits.<sup>116</sup> The theologian's protest asserted the dictates of conscience over the duty of obedience. Henriot replied to the clerical protests, warning France's spiritual leaders to know their place. The Church was responsible for religion but the State was the sole judge of its own methods. The Church must not turn consciences against obedience due the State. The demarcation between the divine and the temporal was defined by the Concordat. The state recognized what was God's while the Church must render unto Caesar what was Caesar's.<sup>117</sup> Philippe Henriot, former defender of the Church, had become a "rebel

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<sup>115</sup>Philippe Boegner, (ed.), *Carnets du Pasteur Boegner, 1940-1945*, (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 199-205.

<sup>116</sup>Marrus and Paxton, *op. cit.*, 273.

<sup>117</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Plaidoyer pour un concordat," *Gringoire*, 9 October 1942, 1.

angel" and defender of "reasons of state."<sup>118</sup>

Henriot wrote that France must accept the reality of hard truths rather than the anaesthetic of false hopes.<sup>119</sup> One of the harder truths was Sauckel's May conference with Laval demanding 250,000 French workers for Germany's war plant. On the anniversary of the German invasion of Russia, Laval broadcast to France "Je souhaite la victoire de l'Allemagne..." and spoke of sending workers to Germany to forge the weapons that would defeat Bolshevism. The outcry was immediate. Laval, the man who dared to hope for a German victory, a Judas, blackmailer, and slave trader who "forced French workers to a life worse than coolies in the bombed-out factories of the Reich," had condemned himself to death. He had closed 1,300 French factories to create domestic unemployment while forcing French workers to seek work abroad.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>118</sup>The Church hierarchy drew back from a rupture with the régime. Monsignor Saliège objected to "the indecent use that certain people [the Resistance] have made of his letter," and went on to renew "his complete loyalty to the Marshal and to the powers that be." Cardinal Suhard made a similar declaration, and Gerlier followed suit. Suhard and Gerlier, the two princes of the church in the two zones, accompanied Laval and Pétain at a military review in Vichy on 29 October signalling the Church's *rapprochement* with the régime. Marrus and Paxton, *op. cit.*, 277.

<sup>119</sup>Henriot, "Micros de Londres et de Boston: les menteurs salariés," *Ici, Radio-France*, 13 June 1942, 69-70.

<sup>120</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 90. Paul Morand, proofreading Laval's speech, was visibly disturbed at the phrase "Je souhaite la victoire de l'Allemagne," and suggested instead "Je souhaite que l'Allemagne ne soit pas vaincue..." expressing Laval's desire for the end of the war and the reconciliation with France. Laval asked Morand to read the entire sentence "Je souhaite la victoire de l'Allemagne, car si elle était vaincue, le bolchevisme se répandrait partout en Europe." Morand replied that those who heard the phrase in bad faith would not place a comma but a period after "la victoire de l'Allemagne." Laval retorted that it gave him no pleasure to see the Germans win the war but he was paying them with words, not actions. He claimed that the phrase was worth the return of 100,000 prisoners and 100,000 workers that the brute Sauckel

Henriot repeated Laval's complete sentence thus: "Je souhaite la victoire de l'Allemagne, car autrement le bolchevisme s'installerait partout." France must choose, he urged, not between Germany and Russia, but between civilization and barbarism.<sup>121</sup> Laval's speech also outlined the *Relève* to recruit volunteer labour to work in German factories in exchange for the release of prisoners of war. Propaganda delegates were instructed to mobilize public opinion for the *Relève*, emphasizing solidarity between workers and prisoners. A Soviet victory over a defeated Germany would mean another, more brutal occupation. Laval was honouring the armistice while liberating prisoners in exchange. Workers were defending Europe and contributing to the future peace. Young workers were offered an opportunity to visit Central Europe and witness the German revolution at first hand to judge better for themselves what a future "French socialism" would look like. Only the abandonment of traditional notions of nationalism could foster "the reconciliation of European nations."<sup>122</sup> Grenier pointed out that Laval's anniversary wish was also a reminder that Hitler was no closer to victory than the year before. Grenier asked "How low will these crooks descend? The stalags continue to serve as blackmail. Montoire was for the return of the prisoners! Backpacks for the Eastern front! Laval in power! Our workers in Germany! All for the return of the prisoners! Laval has become the recruiter for the factory-graves."<sup>123</sup>

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demanded. See Tournoux, *op. cit.*, 150.

<sup>121</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Pour ou contre le bolchevisme: les deux camps," *"Ici, Radio-France,"* 27 June 1942, 75.

<sup>122</sup>F 41 268 *Propagande: Circulaire aux Délégués 1941-1944*, no. 74, 1-5.

<sup>123</sup>Grenier, *op. cit.*, 127.

Laval's *Relève* campaign began on 11 August at Compiègne, site of the surrender and armistice. He welcomed the first train of liberated prisoners as workers departed for the Reich. Henriot spoke of the prisoners' gratitude to Laval while the Jews of London and New York insulted him.<sup>124</sup> On 13 August, London noted that three skilled workers were required to liberate one prisoner. Despite an intensive propaganda campaign, *Relève* recruitment fell far short of expectations. Only 50,000 workers from the Occupied Zone and 17,000 from the Unoccupied Zone volunteered.<sup>125</sup> Laval's decree-law of 13 September rectified the shortfall by requiring all French men from sixteen to fifty and all unmarried French women between twenty-one and thirty-five to be deemed available for compulsory labour effective February 1943. London responded the following day, ordering collective civil disobedience.<sup>126</sup> The BBC campaign was joined by the Voice of America. Orientation guides directed broadcasters to warn France of German "guarantees": French workers were housed in poor conditions; German factories were subject to intensive Allied bombing; Laval's agreement would transform France into an agricultural province of the Reich while Europe's workers built weapons for their own enslavement.<sup>127</sup> Worker's protests at Lyon, Saint-Etienne, and Grenoble forced Laval to advance the deadline from 15 October to 30 November. On October 20 he broadcast, "The government is resolved not to tolerate individual or group resistance of employers

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<sup>124</sup>Henriot, "Le premier train de la Relève: Quand la vérité nous vient d'Amérique," 29 August 1942, *Ici, Radio-France*, 114-115.

<sup>125</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 307.

<sup>126</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 93. London ordered the *fuite nationale devant la conscription*.

<sup>127</sup>Shulman, *op. cit.*, 63.

or workers who, scorning the national interest, remain deaf to my appeals."<sup>128</sup> Henriot considered the test-case decisive for the future of France: "You have the chance to recover with your tools what France has lost by arms. For yourselves, for the prisoners, and for France." Laval warned the French not to place their hopes in salvation from abroad. A lenient peace was being jeopardized by workers who, influenced by foreign propaganda, refused to honour France's commitments.<sup>129</sup>

Pierre Bourdan's London broadcast observed that the real significance of the *Relève* was that it pointed to a crisis in German manpower and industry.<sup>130</sup> The war had indeed reached a crisis. Even with the failure of German arms to force Russia's collapse, by the end of August 1942 German forces had reached the Volga, the foothills of the Caucasus, and the gates of Egypt. Japan's empire stretched from Burma to the Aleutian Islands. Britain faced starvation while Anglo-American merchant ships were being sunk by *Kriegsmarine* "wolfpacks" in the Atlantic. Churchill's journeys to Washington, Cairo, and Moscow were announced as missions of despair.<sup>131</sup> Henriot

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<sup>128</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 94.

<sup>129</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'appel du Président Laval: la Relève," *"Ici, Radio France,"* 145-7. The *Relève* campaign carried alternate veiled threats and pleas. Lucien Felignes' broadcast threatened, "Nous avons la révélation brutale qu'une grande partie de cette jeunesse n'avait pu ou pas vouloir saisir les nécessités de l'heure... Ces jeunes, ces affreux petits crétins ont besoin d'être formés d'être dressés, à la relève!" cited in Antoine Lefebure, *Le Role et l'Influence de la Radio en France pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale*, (Université de Paris: 1972), 79.

<sup>130</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 94.

<sup>131</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La rengaine du jour: le second front," *"Ici, Radio-France,"* 25 July 1942, 97-99.

billed Allied strategy conferences for the "Second Front" as akin to La Fontaine's fable of the "Meeting of the Rats" -- who would bell the cat?<sup>132</sup>

The disastrous Anglo-Canadian raid on Dieppe in August reinforced Henriot's notion of "Fortress Europe." The loss of fourteen ships, 127 aircraft, 2,000 prisoners, and 3,000 dead provoked Henriot to ask what such an expenditure in men and materiel had gained. British sources reported that all military objectives had been realized. Henriot countered that, if the objective was to evaluate the defence, the demonstration was striking. General Mountbatten's troops were trained for ten months in the art of winning battles while appearing to lose them.<sup>133</sup> Pétain and Laval conveyed their congratulations to the German High Command in France and to German troops who had swept the invaders from French soil.<sup>134</sup>

Laval's 22 June broadcast fell just short of a declaration of war against the Allies. Hitler's 30 September broadcast boasted that the Reich was secure; the Battle of the Atlantic all but won; Stalingrad was on the point of surrender; any Allied invasion would meet the same fate as Dieppe; the Axis was strong and, according to the Führer, "we

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<sup>132</sup>*Ibid.*, 99-100.

<sup>133</sup>Henriot, "Répétition manquée de second front: le rembarquement de Dieppe," *Ici, Radio-France*, 22 August 1942, 109-10.

<sup>134</sup>Grenier, *op. cit.*, 149. BBC broadcasts to Dieppe warned that the raid was not an invasion. Citizens were to remain indoors. Following the raid, Hitler released all Dieppois held in German POW camps as a reward for their neutrality. Dieppe citizens, unable to express their solidarity with the three thousand captured or killed Canadian and British soldiers, boycotted the military funeral held in honour of their "defenders."

have already behind us the most fateful trial of our people. Nothing worse can or will ever happen."<sup>135</sup> All his prophecies were to be refuted within twelve months.

One police report summarized the National Revolution as "terreur blanche, marché noir, bibliothèque rose".<sup>136</sup> Henri Moysset's<sup>137</sup> address to Vichy's propaganda delegates elaborated on the weakness of the National Revolution. He perceived that the psychological foundation of all contemporary revolutions and popular mass parties was "the void" (*L'appel du vide*). Great events inspired great hopes and great fears. All contemporary revolutions constituted a break with the past (*coupée du passé*) through social erosion or a catastrophic event. The agony of the present (*l'angoisse du présent*) was to anticipate a new future. The separation between the Marshal and France could be bridged only by evoking the *positive* passions of a national renaissance over a collective disease. Implicitly, Moysset was condemning the *negative* passions which animated the National Revolution. The Marshal's popularity did not extend to his government. In contrast to Pétain's vision of an archaic past, de Gaulle offered a national liberation in a future free of Nazism. The national renaissance had failed to bridge the void. Moysset claimed that neither Napoléon nor Pétain had any concrete notion of the future. The

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<sup>135</sup>Balfour, *op. cit.*, 280-282.

<sup>136</sup>Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 116.

<sup>137</sup>Henri Moysset, one of Vichy's state-secretaries of Labour, was professor at the *Centre d'Etudes Navales*, and co-editor, with Marcel Déat, of the collected works of Proudhon. Former Secretary of State then Minister under Darlan, Moysset was responsible for the Labour Charter. See Denis Peschanski (ed.), *Vichy 1940-1944: Archives de Geurre d'Angelo Tasca, op. cit.*, 263-264.

*Comités de Propagande Sociale du Maréchal* was of the same mind and renamed its propaganda offices *Centres d'Information et Renseignements* (CIR) on 21 October 1942, the anniversary of Montoire. The directive admitted that the name "did not correspond to any future reality."<sup>138</sup>

By 1942 dissidence, -- portrayed in Vichy's propaganda as no more than a few Gaullist renegades grouped about a microphone, and financed by exiled Jews and masons -- had become a force to reckon with. The National Revolution's broom failed to sweep its opponents from national life. It was forced to rely on German bayonets instead.

For de Gaulle Free France was a combatant France. Radio-Vichy could no longer make any claim to be the voice of an independent France, *la France seule*.<sup>139</sup> *Revanchard* patriotism, de Gaulle's *furor Gallica*, were declarations of national pride. On Bastille Day 1942, *France libre* was renamed *France combattante*. News of General Koenig's heroic defence of Bir Hakeim against Field-Marshal Rommel's *Afrika Korps* inspired admiration for the defenders of the "Desert Verdun." The Second World War was approaching its crisis.

Jacques Ellul observes that action makes propaganda's effects irreversible. It

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<sup>138</sup>F 41 270 *Registre de Délibérations de la Centrale de Propagande pour la Révolution Nationale*, 21 October 1942, 5.

<sup>139</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 13-14.



defines one's allies and one's enemies. Any action considered reprehensible by traditional moral standards requires continuous affirmation.<sup>140</sup> General Charles de Gaulle considered collaborators traitors. To his Chief of Staff, Pierre Bilotte, he explained: "Only two policies are possible: that of *France libre* and Déat's. Vichy has no meaning."<sup>141</sup> Philippe Henriot's collaboration rationalized that France could be best served by not only accepting the German conquest but supporting Hitler's German Order in France.

French morale ultimately depended on material factors sustained by the promise of victory. One propaganda directive presented the twisted logic of collaboration as "Ainsi, l'actuelle demi-liberté est la condition de notre liberté".<sup>142</sup> But the phrases of "the necessities of the hour," "facing harsh truths," or creating "a favourable climate for honourable treatment," could not mask the double-think of collaboration that called black white. Henriot's triumphal prophecies of history's revenge in the great battles of 1941-1942 against Britain, America, and the Soviet Union ended at Stalingrad and Casablanca and would give new meaning to Goebbels' "victory in defeat."

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<sup>140</sup>Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 29-30.

<sup>141</sup>Tournoux, *op. cit.*, 140.

<sup>142</sup>F 41 266 *Service de la Propagande: Maréchal, Légion, Prisonniers de Guerre 1941-1942*, 4.

The global nature of the war transposed Vichy's war against the Jews, Communists and masons to Britain, the Soviet Union, and America. Germany's defence of the continent from Western materialism and Asiatic barbarism was Henriot's "revenge of history." The enemy of his enemies was his ally. Collaboration was the carrot of a future peace and the stick of compulsion. The Marshal's path of collaboration, pursued by Darlan and Laval, determined Henriot's loyalties and reaffirmed his political hatreds.

## Chapter 8: The Milice & The Maquis, 1943

"The masses must be informed, guided, directed. The time has come for 'inflexible authority' which, alone, will assist the true, discourage the false and convince the hesitant."<sup>1</sup>

In the flush of early German triumphs, Goebbels celebrated sixty-five *Siegesfanfaren* -- fanfares of victory -- in 1941.<sup>2</sup> In 1942, *Siegesfanfaren* were reduced to nineteen. Laval shared Goebbels' confidence in the triumph of German arms. His labour decrees, the *Relève* and the *Service du travail obligatoire* (STO), were aimed at securing a favourable peace for France in the German New European Order. By 1943 the victory fanfares were eloquent by their absence. The crisis of the Second World War intruded upon Vichy's propaganda that had fostered the myths of independence with a fictional sovereignty within collaboration. The Allied invasion of North Africa, the German invasion of the southern zone, the dissolution of the Armistice Army and the scuttled Toulon Fleet shattered these illusions. The fall of Stalingrad inspired Roosevelt's proclamation of unconditional surrender at Casablanca and Goebbels' declaration of total war at Berlin. These were the ideological themes that dominated the propaganda of the belligerents. The hope of liberation created the first collective resistance to Laval's labour conscription. What Henriot called the *Front Revolutionnaire Nationale* vied with the

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<sup>1</sup>Paul Modave, "M. Philippe Henriot nous parle de la France de la Collaboration Européene" *La Gerbe*, 4 March 1943, 1.

<sup>2</sup>Ernest K. Bramsted, *Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda*, (Michigan State University Press Cresset Press, 1965), 296.

communist *Front National* and the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance* in what Jean-Pierre Azéma called the Franco-French civil war. Milicien Henry Charbonneau described the Milice revenge as their revolution"<sup>3</sup>

Prior to Vichy's "month of disasters," Henriot trumpeted the contrast between France's and Britain's empires in 1942. While Pétain received the homage of France's colonies, Britain's Dominions reproved Churchill for delivering a defenceless Empire to aggressors.<sup>4</sup> The "impulsive Marlborough," architect of the disastrous Dardanelles and Narvik expeditions, Hong-Kong and Singapore, was presiding at the dissolution of the empire he had vowed to retain. The aircraft Churchill had refused Weygand were now offered to Stalin. Henriot presented the Anglo-Soviet alliance as England's abdication as a great power: Churchill could offer to Stalin only "defeated armies in the East and useless armies in the West."<sup>5</sup> The collapse of American, British, and Dutch colonies in Asia sparked British Admiralty fears of Japanese naval incursions into the Indian Ocean. Laval intimated to the Germans that its Axis ally, Japan, might avail itself of French

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<sup>3</sup>Henry Charbonneau "Notre Revanche, C'est Notre Révolution," *Combats*, 11 December 1943, 1. *Combats* was the Milice newspaper and is not to be confused with the resistance paper *Combat*.

<sup>4</sup>Philippe Henriot, "De Churchill à Pétain: Deux Empires, Deux Chefs," *Ici, Radio-France*, 21 February 1942, 7-8.

<sup>5</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Stafford Cripps au pouvoir: l'invasion de l'Angleterre," *Ici, Radio-France*, 14 March 1942, 15-16. Sir Stafford Cripps, an Oxford graduate in law, entered Parliament as a Labour candidate in 1931. His pre-war pacifist and pro-Soviet sentiments made him Churchill's choice as British Ambassador to Moscow (1940-1942) and he returned to serve in Churchill's war cabinet as Minister of Aircraft Production. Henriot portrayed Cripps as a Soviet agent.

Madagascar as a submarine base in the Indian Ocean.<sup>6</sup>

But reality intruded upon Vichy's imperial illusions. The French empire was not secure. Churchill launched a British expeditionary force against the French African colony in May. Propaganda and Information Services had recorded the Marshal's speech on the "aggressions of our allies," and had occasion to play it again on 4 May 1942 with the British attack on Diego-Suarez in northern Madagascar. French troops were forced to evacuate on 7 May, retreating to the south. De Gaulle protested to Alexander Cadogan, Permanent-Secretary to the Foreign Office, declaring that "the British action risked shocking many French people." Henriot construed Diego-Suarez as compensation for the British reverses in Burma and India. England's "pitiful Alleluias of Mers-el-Kébir, Damascus, and Diego-Suarez will not hide the bells from Hong-Kong to Singapore, from Rangoon to Mandalay tolling for the ruin of the proudest empire in the world."<sup>7</sup>

England's Faustian pact with Stalin had gained a master instead of a servant, Henriot claimed: "There is a power actively and unceasingly committed to the task of overthrowing existing civilisation, secretly, by propaganda and, when it can, by bloody

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<sup>6</sup> Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1972), 313. Laval suggested to the Germans in April 1942 that France could be useful to the Tripartite Pact in Asia. He proposed to discuss with Ambassador Mitami the offer of Madagascar as a Japanese naval base.

<sup>7</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'agression de Diégo-Suarez: les voleurs de grand chemin," *Ici, Radio-France*, 16 May 1942, 53.

force. There is a state of which three million citizens languish in distant exile, whose élites were methodically destroyed and of which near a half-million, reduced to servitude for their political opinions, shiver and freeze in the Arctic night, punished for life in the mines and forests for the sole crime of wishing to allow the freedom of thought."<sup>8</sup> Surprised listeners learned that the passage was not Henriot's but was taken from Churchill's *Great Contemporaries*. England must be near to collapse, Henriot concluded, when Churchill sacrificed the principles of democratic freedoms to ally with the régime responsible for the most implacable oppression and servitude in history.<sup>9</sup> England, the champion of human liberty, had consigned to Soviet Russia the responsibility for organizing "European reconstruction." The Allied coalition had formally repudiated any annexations, prompting Henriot to ask whether such declarations had ever prevented the Soviets from annexing Finland or the Baltic states.<sup>10</sup>

Five months later, the English simultaneously attacked Majunga, the great port on the west coast of Madagascar, and Ambaja and Morondova in the south. The British attack on 16 September found Henriot among prominent "continentalists of the Euro-African Revolution" at the Salle Wagram in Paris presided over by Governor-General Cayla of Madagascar and General Jauneaud, former commander of the aerial forces of

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<sup>8</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Palinodies churchilliennes: la peste rouge," *Ici, Radio-France*, " 4 April 1942, 29.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 76-7. also see Archives Nationales F 41 268 *Propagande: Circulaire aux Délégués* no. 74, 26 June 1942. Henriot's addresses on the *Relève* followed propaganda themes circulated to delegates.

Syria and Madagascar. Jacques Doriot, and Jacques Benoist-Mechin criticized Laval's neutrality; Benoist-Mechin claimed that "an Empire undefended [was], an Empire lost." Henriot cited Pétain's formula that "la vie n'est pas neutre: elle consiste à prendre hardiment." Also present at the rally were Bucard's *Francistes*, the *Service d'Ordre Légionnaire*, Marcel Déat, Alexis Carrel, Admiral Platon, Abel Bonnard, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Robert Brasillach, Fernand de Brinon, and Raymond Fernandez.<sup>11</sup> Their names headed a petition endorsing co-belligerency with Germany. Tamatave was abandoned on 18 September. Tanarive fell on 23 September, and on 5 November British forces secured the island. In Henriot's assessment, England's attacks against the French Empire forced France to play the German card.

In the Mediterranean theatre, the fall of Tobruk to Rommel on 21 June placed the *Afrika Korps* at the gates of Egypt. Henriot's broadcast, "The Revenge of History," recounted the anniversary of the English seizure of Alexandria and the Suez Canal on 11 July 1882. Ferdinand de Lesseps' vision of uniting Asia and Europe was seized by London as a profitable toll bridge. Captain Marchand's epic, two-year trek ended at Fashoda with Britain's threat of war. Italy in Ethiopia threatened the source of the Nile, and once again England warned of sanctions and war. July 1882 and July 1942 were the fulfilment of Napoleon's curse against his most implacable enemy.<sup>12</sup> A month before

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<sup>11</sup>Saint-Paulien, *Histoire de la Collaboration*, (Paris: Editions de l'Esprit Nouveau, 1964), 323, 336-7.

<sup>12</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'Angleterre et l'Egypte: les revanches de l'histoire," *Ici, Radio-France*, 11 July 1942, 90-1.

"Operation Torch," Henriot credited Washington rumours which named French West Africa as the next objective.<sup>13</sup> His fears were realized with the BBC signal "Allo Robert, Franklin arrive!" on 8 November announcing to Robert Murphy, Roosevelt's emissary, of the American invasion of Algeria and Morocco. Fearing an imminent invasion of southern France, on 10 November Hitler ordered "Operation Anton," the occupation of the French Mediterranean coast which was carried out the following day. The violation of Vichy's neutrality afforded Pétain the opportunity of relieving the armed forces of its oath to the Head of State. Instead, France and the empire heard, every fifteen minutes the Marshal's message: "People of France. I believed that I had experienced the darkest days of my life: the situation today reminds me of the memories of 1940. I salute with sorrow the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and all those who are dying for the honour of the empire and the security of the nation. French at home and overseas confide in your Marshal and think of France." Within the hour, German troops had occupied the radio station, and the broadcast ceased.<sup>14</sup>

On 9 November, Admiral Jean-François Darlan and General Henri Giraud ordered the 120,000-strong Vichy colonial army to lay down its arms. On 10 November

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<sup>13</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'Afrique visée: Hypocrisie américaine," *"Ici, Radio-France,"* 3 October 1942, 131.

<sup>14</sup>Raymond Tournoux, *Le Royaume d'Otto*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1982), 203. Pétain announced, "Français, je croyais avoir vécu les jours les plus sombres de mon existence: la situation aujourd'hui me rappelle les mauvais souvenirs de 1940. Je salue avec douleur les militaires, les marins, les aviateurs et tous ceux qui tombent pour l'honneur de l'Empire et la sauvegarde de la Patrie. Français de la métropole et de l'Empire, faites confiance à votre Maréchal qui pense à la France."



Darlan was confronted by General Dwight Eisenhower's Chief-of-Staff, General Mark Clark, who instructed Darlan to order a cease-fire independent of Pétain's directives. Darlan duly announced that he had assumed full authority in North Africa in Pétain's name, and ordered all area commanders to cease fire.<sup>15</sup> On 11 November the cease-fire was extended to French forces in Algeria and Morocco. On 13 November, American military authorities ratified the "Darlan deal." Pétain, paralysed by events, refused to leave France for Algiers, electing to share the fate of his fellow countrymen while secretly wondering if he had betrayed France. On 14 November, Pétain received Laval, who read Ribbentrop's demand for a declaration of war against England and the United States within twenty-four hours. Laval was to be granted full powers, or a *gauleiter* was to be appointed and France would suffer the fate of Poland. Pétain refused to declare war on the United States and Britain, but ordered Vichy's North African forces to resist the invasion. On 17 November, Constitutional Act No. 12 bestowed full powers on Laval.<sup>16</sup>

The "Darlan deal" had satisfied Roosevelt's State Department, sparing American lives in preparation for the campaign against Rommel in Tunisia. The deal was unacceptable to De Gaulle, the BBC, Voice of America, and Radio-Vichy. "Un amiral

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<sup>15</sup>Geoffrey Warner, *Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France*, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoodie, 1968), 330.

<sup>16</sup>Tournoux, *op. cit.*, 223-230. To Robert Gibrat, who had resigned as communications minister, Pétain asked agonizingly, "Croyez-vous que je suis un bon Français?" To the Canadian diplomat Dupuy he said, "Je serai fusillé."

nommé Darlan est garanti pro-allemand," was Oberlé's response.<sup>17</sup> Darlan, "a Judas who delivered his own countrymen to the torturers, a symbol throughout Europe of the evil fascism of collaboration, was the man now recognized by the Americans as the supreme French authority in North Africa."<sup>18</sup> Pétain's broadcast of 19 November disowned the "generals in the service of a foreign power" who had refused to obey orders. "Unity is more indispensable than ever," he concluded. "I remain your guide. You have only one duty: to obey. You have only one government: that which I direct. You have only one country, which I embody: France."<sup>19</sup> On 23 November, Governor-General Boisson ignored Pétain's order and rallied West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française) to the Americans. For Henriot, the jewel of France's African Empire was in the hands of the "butchers of Arkansas and the planters of Missouri." The German

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<sup>17</sup>Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac (ed.), *Les Voix de la Liberté: Ici Londres, III: La Fin du Commencement 8 novembre 1942-9 juillet 1943*, (Paris: La Documentation Française), XXIV.

<sup>18</sup>Holly Cowan Shulman, *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy 1941-1945*, (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 76. Eisenhower and Roosevelt had sound military reasons for accepting Darlan as High Commissioner of French North Africa. The American general commanded only about 110,000 men, whereas the French troops in North Africa numbered 120,000, plus 250 tanks, more than 150 combat planes, and were backed by the French fleet. French army officers in Morocco and Algeria were right-wing anticommunists loyal to Marshal Pétain. The Allies aimed to conquer North Africa, from Casablanca through Tunis, which meant subduing and administering lands along a coast that stretched more than twelve hundred miles. Eisenhower reasoned that the Allies could not govern such vast territories without the support of the already existing colonial -- now Vichy -- administrative structures. But no matter how logical his plan was, Eisenhower's decision marked a political as well as a military divide.

<sup>19</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 351. André Lavagne noted that the Marshal's abdication, was, as the Marshal himself noted, an act of semi-cowardice. See Tournoux, *op. cit.*, 225-226.

occupation of the south, in contrast, was an act of self-defence.<sup>20</sup>

There was no hiding the overwhelming popular response which greeted the American invasion of North Africa. Henriot reported that the Jews, with heads held high, were planning their next revenge while French arm-chair strategists were delirious with the reports of foreign broadcasts.<sup>21</sup> Henriot put as much faith in President Roosevelt's guarantee to restore North Africa as he did the earlier promises of President Wilson -- another American betrayal. On 20 November, Laval broadcast a sustained attack on the United States and a defence of Franco-German collaboration. Roosevelt's attack on North Africa had "created the irreparable breach which we had done everything to avoid." If the Allies won the war, France would be forced to submit "to the domination of communists and Jews," he claimed. "We do not want universal Bolshevism to come in the wake of its Anglo-Saxon accomplices and extinguish the light of French civilization forever."<sup>22</sup> Radio-London and Brazzaville declared that Pétain and his government were

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<sup>20</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les Américains en Afrique du Nord: Washington, te voilà!" "*Ici, Radio-France*," 14 November 1942, 154. Dominique Rossignol notes that "silence and obedience" were the instructions of *L'Espoir française* to its propaganda delegates. "La France doit avoir la confiance en lui." German appraisal of public opinion following the Allied landings led to the assessment that the Allied ability to surpass German war production was one of the elements of victory. Propaganda became more violent in tone. Roosevelt was demonized as a mason and a Jew, along with Churchill, the capitalist gangster. Parisian press and collaborationist parties described the foursome waltz with Churchill serving as Roosevelt's cavalier and De Gaulle as Stalin's companion. Dominique Rossignol, *Histoire de la propagande en France de 1940 à 1944: L'utopie Pétain*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), 317.

<sup>21</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Félonies et dissidence en Afrique du Nord: les quarante secondes," "*Ici, Radio-France*," 22 November 1942, 159-160.

<sup>22</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 351.

German captives. Henriot responded that those who spoke of captivity were themselves employees of foreign governments and usurpers of France's sovereignty. "Honneur et Patrie" was no more than "Honneur et Argent."<sup>23</sup>

*L'Espoir français*, the Propaganda Ministry handbook, published Hitler's letter of 26 November 1942 assuring Hitler's support in defending France's colonies and expressing his hope that France would assume her responsibility in the common destiny of Europe.<sup>24</sup> At dawn the next day, German troops disarmed the Armistice Army and attempted to seize the French Fleet at Toulon. Admiral de Laborde ordered the fleet scuttled.<sup>25</sup> France occupied, stripped of its army, navy, and empire, according to Henriot, would figure in the annals of history under "the great betrayal of the French Army."<sup>26</sup> Henriot branded Roosevelt the American Shylock demanding his pound of

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<sup>23</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les émigrés de l'intérieur: l'Honneur et l'Argent," *"Ici, Radio-France,"* 20 December 1942, 191-192.

<sup>24</sup>Dominique Rossignol, *Histoire de la propagande en France de 1940 à 1944: L'utopie Pétain*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), 178. Hitler's letter to Pétain, 26 November 1942. "Je suis irrévocablement décidé à aider la France, à reconquérir les colonies qui lui ont été volées par les Anglo-Saxons... en exprimant l'espoir qu'ainsi pourra être engagée une collaboration dont nous n'attendons, de la part de France, rien d'autre que la compréhension du destin commun de l'Europe."

<sup>25</sup>Warner, *op. cit.*, 357. At 5.30 a.m. 27 November 1942, the order was carried out. Within a few hours the Toulon Fleet that faced both ways -- three battleships, seven cruisers, and one aircraft carrier -- lay on the bottom.

<sup>26</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La trahison des chefs militaires: Nuit sur la France," *"Ici, Radio-France,"* 29 November 1942, 167-169.

flesh by ransoming France's empire.<sup>27</sup> The irony was that German occupation costs were raised on 27 November to 500 million francs daily. France was the victim of two extortions, one real, the other imagined.

The "Darlan deal" forced Vichy state propaganda to respond as best it could to control the damage. Henriot branded the admiral. "Pétain's Dauphin" was now "Roosevelt's ephemeral viceroy." In his broadcast Henriot compared Darlan to Judas<sup>28</sup> seduced by his ambition and Roosevelt's promise of absolute power.<sup>29</sup> Darlan's claim that he had acted under German constraint was contradicted by his declarations opposing the Anglo-French Union of 1940 that would have made of France a crown colony. Darlan's assassination by Bonnier de la Chapelle on 24 December left the field clear for Generals Giraud and de Gaulle, puppets of Roosevelt and Churchill who were dividing the spoils of France's empire. Collaboration with Germany was the only means of regaining France's stolen empire.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le pillage de l'Afrique du Nord par les Anglo-Saxons: le drapeau sur l'épave," *Ici, Radio-France*, 6 December 1942, 174.

<sup>28</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Darlan cherche des excuses: le faux témoin de Nerac," *Ici, Radio-France*, 23 December 1942, 196-198.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 199-202.

<sup>30</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'assassinat de Darlan: l'Empire écartelé," *Ici, Radio-France*, 27 December 1942, 204-208. The elimination of Darlan left Roosevelt free to choose between Generals Honoré Giraud or Charles de Gaulle. Roosevelt, suspicious of De Gaulle's moral and political claim to lead "free" France, preferred General Giraud. The sixty-three-year-old general, who had been captured by the Germans in 1940 and escaped in April 1942, appeared tailored to American foreign policy -- a military man with no political objectives. Unlike de Gaulle, Giraud never claimed to speak for France in the councils of the United Nations. His one clear ambition was to defeat the Germans and liberate France. Giraud, however, lacked the

The events of November 1942 were a political catastrophe for Vichy, inspiring mass resignations. Memoranda to regional propaganda delegates inquired how many remained to continue the work of the régime.<sup>31</sup> Propaganda was to be "streamlined," which meant adopting German directives. French authorities were obliged to apply German criminal law for crimes against the German Army of Occupation. The death penalty was decreed for any violence against German soldiers, possession of firearms and explosives, asylum offered to prisoners of war, or assistance to citizens of states at war with the Reich. Lesser crimes, such as listening to radio broadcasts other than German or *Radiodiffusion Nationale française*, or publishing any information which discredited the Reich or fomented agitation among the population of the occupied territories, were to be punished with forced labour, fines, or imprisonment.<sup>32</sup>

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personality, the political vision, and the moral authority of de Gaulle. See also Shulman, *op. cit.*, 77-78.

<sup>31</sup>F 41 270 *Propagande CIR (Centres d'Information et Renseignements) Circulaire aux Délégués* No. 90, 23 December 1942, 2.

<sup>32</sup>AJ 41 720 *Documents relatif à l'intervention allemande en Radio*, Ordonnance 18 December 1942, "Concernant La Sauvegarde de L'Occupant," 1-4. The wide range of "offences" ranged from trivial misdemeanours to capital offences: spitting at Germans, shouting "down with Germany," chalking the V-sign or Cross of Lorraine, distributing photographs of de Gaulle or Communist tracts, "assisting the English," smuggling letters across the demarcation line, wearing the British and American colours, using secret codes in internal correspondence, espionage, possessing offensive literature like Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, carrying a false identity card, putting maps in prisoner-of-war parcels, possession or trafficking in arms and ammunition, acts of terrorism, ringing the doorbell of the *Feldgendarmarie* (German military police) without reason, being Jewish, carrying two fishing rods ("de[ux] gaulles" = de Gaulle), listening to foreign radio broadcasts, insulting a girl accompanied by a member of the German army, singing "La Marche Lorraine." In addition, there was always the catch-all crime of "showing antipathy towards the German authorities." See W.D. Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 53-54.

With the empire in the hands of the Allies, the Southern Zone occupied, the Marshal's 1942 Christmas message spoke to the French reminding them that France was honour-bound to respect the armistice as an example of loyalty, pride, and honour.<sup>33</sup> The Marshal's "silence and obedience" appeal sounded hollow. Pétain was the Emperor without his clothes; his kingdom was a fiction. Vichy propaganda was forced to concede that the National Revolution was having to give way to the struggle outside Vichy's borders. Henriot compared the Allied invasion to the Greeks besieging Troy, the Anglo-Saxon enemy was at the gates. The Atlantic Charter was merely the second edition of Wilson's Fourteen Points. It tolerated only democratic states, with the convenient exception of the USSR. France's liberation was to be the reestablishment of the masonic-Jewish Republic with its anarchy of class conflict, mass naturalization, low birth-rate, and international finance. The liberation ransom would be the restoration of Marianne in the mairies of France's communes.<sup>34</sup>

From the beginning, Roosevelt had subordinated the defeat of fascism and the

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<sup>33</sup>Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 105. "N'abandonnez jamais une parole donnée. Soyez toujours des exemples de loyauté, de fierté et d'honneur. Vous deviendrez ainsi un symbole."

<sup>34</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Livre Blanc américain: panneau électoral," 10 January 1943, *Et s'ils débarquaient?* (Paris: Editions du Centre de l'Agence Inter-France), 1944, 10-11. In 1943 Voice of America outlined Allied war aims as not simply military victory but the defeat and destruction of National Socialism as a political system. General Eisenhower's and President Roosevelt's "Darlan Deal" was a cynical dismissal of ideals for the hard realities of power-politics. Voice of America supported de Gaulle as the symbol of the French Resistance who alone in 1940 had stood up against the Germans. Roosevelt's antipathy towards De Gaulle for seizing Saint-Pierre and Miquelon placed American confidence first in Giraud, then Darlan and then Giraud, frustrating both French desks in New York and London.

victory of democracy to military victory. His main concern was that internal discord might divide the Allies. The Casablanca Conference formalized Anglo-American western strategy. On the conference's last day Roosevelt announced the principle of unconditional surrender of Germany and Italy promising that the Allies would not conclude a separate peace. Until the launching of a Second Front, American and British Air Staffs were instructed that "the primary aim will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."<sup>35</sup>

This declaration of unconditional surrender appeared to discredit the claim that the Allies were making war not against the German people but against Nazism. Henriot branded the Anglo-Americans the "false allies of liberty" who confiscated the French

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<sup>35</sup>Max Hastings, *Bomber Command*, (London: Pan Macmillan, 1993), 184-185. The Casablanca Directive -- CCS 166/I/D from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Air Marshal Harris and General Eaker -- were ordered to embark on the combined demolition of German military and industrial targets as a preliminary to D-Day. Submarine factories and bases were the first priority while the Battle of the Atlantic raged with the highest Allied losses in March 1943. Bombing of reinforced concrete submarine pens on the French Atlantic coast proved fruitless. Until the Barnes-Wallis' "earthquake bomb" in 1944, the submarine bases were all but invulnerable to bombing. The *Luftwaffe* factories and depots succeeded next in priority, designed to secure command of the air by destroying the air defence of Germany's war industry. Strategic, or what Sir Arthur Harris called "panacea targets," were included as vital to German military machine; ball bearings, oil, synthetic rubber, and military transport. The directive for a "Combined Bomber Offensive" was an intended marriage of American precision bombing policy and British industrial area-bombing policy. Bomber Command was Britain's last independent contribution to the Allied war effort and Harris was determined not to be submerged in an American-led bombing strategy. Harris interpreted the Casablanca directive as a general mandate for the future of the bomber offensive, rather than as a specific order to be obeyed. He was not corrected by either Churchill or Portal until 1944.



empire and bombed its people while recruiting mercenaries, arsonists, and murderers dedicated to a régime of international tyranny. Churchill, forced to choose between Sikorski and Stalin, had abandoned Poland and with it the principles of the Charter. Stalin paid lip-service to the Atlantic Charter's principles, disavowing annexation by right of conquest, but Britain's military indebtedness to the Soviet Union forced Churchill to grant Soviet spheres of influence. As Churchill abandoned Sikorski, so too would he abandon de Gaulle and Giraud. Poland and France were to become provinces of Soviet Europe whose elected delegates could take their grievances to the Kremlin.<sup>36</sup>

Goebbels, describing the Battle of Stalingrad, announced that "capitulation" was not in the German vocabulary. But at the end of January 1943, capitulate was precisely what Frederick von Paulus' Sixth Army had done. Goebbels' "Total War" speech, radio silences and funereal music attempted to convey the image of a defeated Sixth Army as a symbol of patriotic self-sacrifice. Goebbels hoped by this means not only to create the mood for total mobilization, but to instill what British propagandists at the time dubbed "strength through fear."<sup>37</sup> Henriot compared the fall of Stalingrad with the fall of Toledo's Alcazar. Both were episodes of the millennial struggle of civilization against

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<sup>36</sup>Philippe Henriot, "M. Churchill enterre la Charte de l'Atlantique: ces messieurs de la famille," *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 28 March 1943, 76-79. Wladyslaw Eugeniusz Sikorski (1883-1943), was Poland's Chief of Staff in 1921 and its Premier in 1922. Banned from politics after Joseph Pilsudski's 1926 coup, he became Premier of the Polish government-in-exile in London after the German occupation.

<sup>37</sup>E. H. Gombrich, *Myth and Reality in German War-Time Broadcasts*, (The Athlone Press, University of London, 1970), 25.

barbarism. As victory had emerged from the ashes of defeat in Spain, so too would it emerge in Russia.<sup>38</sup>

Goebbels' greatest propaganda coup was the discovery in Katyn Forest, near Smolensk, of the mass grave of 14,500 Polish officers who had been methodically executed in the spring of 1940 by the NKVD. The Polish Government-in-exile severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The *London Times* of 28 April blamed the Poles for contributing to Goebbels' triumph, while the *New York Times* regretted "that both the Russians and the Poles have fallen into the Nazi trap." While the Poles and the Russians fell out, the British and the Soviet governments did not, disappointing Goebbels' hope for a permanent rift between the Allies. The Allied coalition remained intact determined to see the war through to the defeat of Nazism.<sup>39</sup>

Katyn served Henriot as it did Goebbels. Katyn was the Soviet commentary on Allied promises of liberation. Henriot reminded his audience that Poland would do well to remember the American Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, who declared that Poland must negotiate its peace with Moscow alone. If that was the case, Henriot argued, then Poland's peace would be another Katyn which, unlike so many other unstable and

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<sup>38</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Chute de Stalingrad: les aveux de Lord Beaverbrook," *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 7 February 1943, 33-35.

<sup>39</sup>Bramsted, *op. cit.*, 332-333. Hostile relations with Stalin were made more acrimonious with the discovery of the Katyn massacre. See Louis Fitzgibbon, *Katyn Massacre*, (Corgi Books, 1977).

precarious peace settlements, had the advantage of being definitive.<sup>40</sup>

Vichy anti-communist propaganda was quick to capitalize on the massacre, publishing 12,000 illustrated brochures, *Le "Communisme" c'est la "Fosse Commune."* The brochure outlined the history of Bolshevik repression, famine and purges in 1921, 1933, and 1937. The United States and England condoned the sadism of the Jewish directors of the Soviet secret police and the barbarians of the Kremlin.<sup>41</sup> Allied propaganda, in turn, cited the German reprisal against Lidice. Reinhard Heydrich, one of the principal leaders of Himmler's SS, was assassinated by a Czech commando unit in May 1942. Hitler ordered the town of Lidice razed, its citizens shot or sent to labour camps, and its name erased from the map of the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.<sup>42</sup>

The German surrender at Stalingrad coincided with the creation of the Milice on 30 January 1943. Emerging from the ranks of the *Légion des Combattants* and its more militant *Service d'ordre légionnaire* (SOL), Vichy's Praetorian Guard had been conceived as a political and paramilitary élite to lend force to Vichy's decrees. Laval inherited the shock troops, but had no need of them until the dissolution of the Armistice Army in

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<sup>40</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Katyn: la paix des cimetières," *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 25 April 1943, 98-99, 100-101.

<sup>41</sup>F 41 302 Anticommunism, "*Le Communisme*" c'est la 'Fosse Commune'." April 1943.

<sup>42</sup>André Halimi, *La Délation sous l'Occupation*, (Paris: Editions Alain Moreau, 1983), 221-222.

November 1942.<sup>43</sup> Joseph Darnand, president of the *Alpes-Maritimes Légion* and Francis Bout de l'An, the "militaires," worked to purge the Légion of lukewarm members, "politiques" such as François Valentin. The creation of the *Service d'Ordre Légionnaire* (SOL) in January 1942 was the turning point. Initially a colour party for Légion demonstrations, the SOL leadership was determined to take action against the Resistance.<sup>44</sup>

Laval, with Pétain's approval, designated Joseph Darnand as the Milice secretary-general.<sup>45</sup> Darnand set the tone for the new élite. Aimé-Joseph Darnand, born 19 March

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<sup>43</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma, *De Munich à la Libération 1938-1944*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979), 237. Pétain gave his approval for the Milice on 5 February 1943. The Milice comprised the militants of Déat, Doriot, Bucard, and Deloncle. See Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 131.

<sup>44</sup>Jean-Paul Cointet, "Les Chevaliers du Maréchal," in *L'Histoire, Résistants et collaborateurs: Les Français dans les années noires*, ed. by François Bedarida, (Éditions du Seuil, 1985), 112-114. In 1914-1918 almost eight million men were mobilized; in 1940 5.5 million veterans were still alive and three million belonged to veterans associations. During the 1930s, the directors of the *Union fédérale* and *Union nationale des combattants*, especially after 1934, suggested that veteran's moral leadership might serve as a counterweight to the national crisis and the decline of French democracy. On 29 August 1940 the *Légion des Anciens Combattants* was created as the Marshal's militants. Banned by the Germans in the Occupied Zone on 22 September 1940, the *Légion* was confined to the forty-five "free" or partially occupied departments. Headed by Pétain, the *Légion* was administered by François Valentin, the young Lorrain lawyer, former president of *l'Association catholique de la jeunesse française*. When the Milice was formed, Jean Frassiniet, director of *Marseille-Matin*, submitted his resignation refusing to endorse an "enlightened patriotism" that favoured a German victory and enlisted the Legion to this end. Only a minority of legionnaires entered the SOL and the Milice. SOL recruited 10%-15% of original legionnaires while the Milice garnered about 5% of the SOL membership. A split in the Legion between the "militaires" and the "politiques" surfaced. The former saw the Milice as strictly a Pétainist palace guard while the latter saw it as the nucleus of a future French fascist party.

<sup>45</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 238-239.

1897 at Coligny, Ain, the heroic sergeant of the Great War, twice wounded and mentioned in despatches for courage under fire, he received the Military Medal, the Belgian *Croix de Guerre*, and the Order of the Army. Demobilized in 1922, frustrated in his attempt to become an officer, he joined the Lyon branch of *Action Française*, becoming a *chef* of the *Camelots du roi* in Provence. His favourite expression was "Je suis pour l'ordre et la hiérarchie." The Greek gamma was adopted as the Milice insignia, a symbol of strength and renewal. The psychological profile of Milice recruits included Catholic right-extremists, fanatical anticommunists, antisemites, old leaguers, and *Camelots du Roi*. Youthful idealism and *maréchalisme* inspired some, while opportunism motivated others who saw the Milice as a way of escaping the STO.<sup>46</sup> Abel Bonnard acclaimed France's new élite devoted to rebuilding France within the New Europe: "the lost materialism of full stomachs and empty souls will never return."<sup>47</sup> Henriot joined Darnand's Milice in March at the same time as he joined Alphonse de Chateaubriant's

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<sup>46</sup>J. Delperrie de Bayac, *Histoire de la Milice 1918-1945*, (Paris: Fayard, 1969), 175-176, 181, 190-191. The Milice appealed to marginal groups; frustrated malcontents and mercenaries attracted by the perquisites of tobacco, wages, and legally sanctioned violence. The leadership came to adopt the principles and methods of the Gestapo and the SS. The Milice recruited 4,000 young men and women, giving it a fascist plebeian character. Most joined to escape the STO. Others were attracted by the taste for action or money. A *franc-gard* was clothed, lodged, and received 2,500 francs per month, compared with a worker who earned 4,500 francs per year. Men without conscience or work joined including criminal elements such as Georges Mandel's murderer Jean Mansuy, alias Solnlen, received a bounty of 10,000 francs for each STO *réfractaire* that he arrested. See also Jean-Pierre Azéma, "La Milice" in *Vingtième Siècle*, vol. 28 1990, 98.

<sup>47</sup>Abel Bonnard, "Dégager le petit nombre," 8 May 1943, *Combats*, 1.

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*Groupe Collaboration*, seeing himself as a "revolutionary for the revolution."<sup>48</sup> He presented cultural collaboration as the "necessary and inevitable *rapprochement*" for the creation of a New Europe.<sup>49</sup> "The masses must be informed, guided, directed. The time has come for 'inflexible authority' which, alone, will assist the true, discourage the false and convince the hesitant."<sup>50</sup>

Vichy élites quickly adopted the political principles and reeducation techniques of the German revolution. *Combats*, the weekly journal of the Milice from 1943 until the Liberation in August 1944, under the direction of Henry Charbonneau, former *Camelot du Roi* and Cagoulard, recruited Henriot and Bonnard among others to defend the Marshal's armistice and collaboration.<sup>51</sup> Francis Bout de L'An, head of Milice propaganda, characterized Darnand's Milice as a *corps d'élite* whose mission was to refute adverse propaganda, and to seek out the leaders of forces hostile to the régime and

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<sup>48</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Révolutionnaires Oui... Mais pour la Révolution," *Combats*, 29 May 1943, 1.

<sup>49</sup>Paul Modave, "M. Philippe Henriot nous parle de la France de la Collaboration Européenne" *La Gerbe*, 4 March 1943, 1. *Collaboration* claimed an inflated membership of 260,000; the vast majority of "members" were those who had signed petitions for the return of the prisoners. Henriot's address at Nancy on 27 May 1943, at a meeting to form the local *Collaboration* group, drew over one thousand according to *La Gerbe*. The audience was comprised of Vichy officials, Germans, and members of the LVF, PPF, and RNP. See also Catherine Brice, *Le Groupe "Collaboration" 1940-1944*, 130.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 3. "Voilà pourquoi, si la France refuse de réagir à la raison et à la sagesse, il faudra le coup de fouet de l'épreuve pour la sauver. Tout espoir n'est pas perdu. Mais la masse veut être éclairée, guidée, commandée. L'heure est venue de l'autorité inflexible qui, seule, utilisera les bons, découragera les mauvais et déterminera les hésitants."

<sup>51</sup>Henry Coston, *Partis, Journaux et Hommes Politiques d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, (Rennes: Librairie Française, 1960), 542.

repress them.<sup>52</sup> Milice targets included any who challenged the authority of the government: Communist subversives, black marketeers, and civil servants who "paralysed" the administration.

Seeking to allay fears of a Nazified France, Henriot cited Mussolini's and Hitler's declarations that Fascism and National-Socialism were not articles for export.<sup>53</sup> Henriot observed that some French had refused to accept that France had lost the war. Henriot argued that the acceptance of the armistice and Franco-German collaboration increased the power of both partners, which England sought to prevent; that the resistance was a conspiracy of Anglo-Saxon capitalists, Jews, masons, and war-mongers who united their forces to silence the true voice of the French; He spoke as a true believer in the German vision of Europe. Total commitment, "adhésion sans réserve," was a necessity imposed by events.<sup>54</sup>

There was little to distinguish Darnand's Milice and Henriot's New Order from the excesses of the Nazi dictatorship. In radio's war of words, André Demaison, director of *Radiodiffusion nationale*, lamented in early 1943 that as the military balance shifted in favour of the Allies, actions and events indeed spoke louder than words. Propaganda

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<sup>52</sup>Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 132. *Notre Combat*, February 1943.

<sup>53</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Bolchevisme et national-socialisme: faut-il choisir?" 23 May 1943, *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 23 May 1943, 133-135.

<sup>54</sup>Paul Modave, "M. Philippe Henriot nous parle de la France de la Collaboration Européenne" *La Gerbe*, 4 March 1943, 1.



suffered from clumsy, repetitive presentation: "The broadcasts of the Légion or the Milice are rarely listened to. Repetitive, with little variation, their political themes were too general."<sup>55</sup> While Demaison recognized the popularity of Creyssel and Henriot, other chroniclers gave the impression that they did not believe what they were reading. The real problem, of course, was that Radio-Vichy's "technicians of influence" were being forced to adopt the notions and techniques of the conqueror.<sup>56</sup>

Chateaubriant's *Groupe Collaboration* of intellectuals was matched by other "cultural" organizations such as *Jeunesse Europe Nouvelle*. Jean Weiland's *Jeunesse Europe Nouvelle* (JEN), was a youth group promoting Franco-German cultural exchanges, encouraging its members to learn German while propaganda teams encouraged French workers and youth to work in Germany. The shift in mid-1942 from the National Revolution to the *Front Revolutionnaire Nationale* indicated an increasing militancy. By 14 June 1943, the JEN advocated participation in aerial defence, the LVF, the NSKK, and the Todt organization. The JEN's paramilitary *Groupes de Protection* led

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<sup>55</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 99-100. Demaison claimed that Radio-Vichy placed more emphasis on the tricks to get by in hard times: what to do with wool remainders; what were the new textiles to replace wool and cotton. Soon there would be a new program, "The Protection of the Family from Aerial Bombing."

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 98-100. Another factor which hampered print propaganda was the lack of paper. Correspondence between the Ministry of Information and printers in the two zones revealed increasing difficulties in printing. On 21 Oct 1943, Propaganda's Technical Services solicited tenders for 50,000 copies of Paul Creyssel's *Où sommes-nous?* Thirteen printers in Paris were approached. Eight declared that they had no paper; two declared a lack of workers. Others claimed delays or costs they could not afford. Also see Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 326.

either to the Milice or to the Waffen SS.<sup>57</sup> The régime's new "toughness" spoke otherwise as to the methods such as the Milice now created to honour the armistice and the STO.

Laval instructed Paul Creyssel's propaganda staff to "not so much render his government popular, as to permit it to remain effective."<sup>58</sup> The ministers' conference held on 16 March 1943 saw Laval recommend "mutual support" between propaganda and the Milice. Radio programs such as *la Milice française vous parle* and *La minute de la Milice* were the result. Speculation and rumours cast the new Milice in the role of Laval's personal henchmen, or a German SS unit dedicated to imposing the Nazi régime on France.<sup>59</sup> Laval's failure to recruit volunteer workers for the Relève forced him to satisfy Sauckel's manpower demands with the *Service du Travail Obligatoire* (STO). Announced on 15 February 1943 over *Radio nationale*: all young men born between 1920 and 1922 who had missed military service owing to the defeat were required to register at local *mairies* to be screened for exemption or designated for work, either in

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<sup>57</sup>Catherine Brice, *Le Groupe "Collaboration" 1940-1944*, Mémoire de maîtrise préparé sous la direction de M. le professeur J. Droz, Université de Paris I, 1978, 180-190.

<sup>58</sup>Hélène Eck, *La guerre des ondes: Histoire des radios de langue française pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1985), 79-80.

<sup>59</sup>F 41 270 *Propagande: CIR (Centres d'Information et Renseignements) Circulaire aux Délégués*, no. 92, 8 February 1943, 1-2. Paul Creyssel's memorandum to propaganda delegates endorsed closer relations with the Milice directors. Propagandists were instructed to support the Milice emphasizing the theme of resistance to Communist subversion of the New Order. Rumours to the effect that the Milice was seeking to impose the Nazi régime in France, or that it was under the orders of Laval and the Germans against Marshal Pétain, were to be dispelled.

Germany or for German industries in France. Sauckel had already demanded half a million men by mid-March 1943. Although this was later reduced to 250,000, on 9 April Laval accepted another demand for another 220,000, to be filled by the end of June.<sup>60</sup>

Vichy's Ministry of Information encouraged its delegates to promote STO workers as "ambassadors of French quality." Propaganda's technical services also distributed posters reminding workers to offer their labour as German soldiers gave their blood in the struggle against Bolshevism. Labour volunteers would liberate prisoners from the camps, support a German victory, and upgrade France's miserable status as a satellite state.<sup>61</sup> Laval's instructions of February 1943 to prefects emphasized that the STO was a matter of the government preserving the initiative in an operation that otherwise the German authorities would have been forced to carry out themselves.<sup>62</sup>

London called for collective passive resistance, a "disciplined abstention,"

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<sup>60</sup> H.R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942-1944*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 19-20, 22. Authorities succeeded in producing the required number of departures for Germany while reporting that the STO provoked public incidents of hostility unprecedented since the establishment of the regime. An incident at Mazamet in the Tarn in March, an important textile center, hit hard by the first STO conscription, saw another 116 young men scheduled to leave on 11 March. An estimated crowd of 2,000, a sixth of the population, sang the *Marseillaise* and the *Internationale* at the departure shouting "A bas Laval" and "Police à la Relève."

<sup>61</sup> Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 190-192.

<sup>62</sup> John Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 179. Professor Sweets noted in his study of Clermont-Ferrand during the occupation that, despite the pervasive hostility of the population and the steady growth of the resistance movements, the Germans were able to conscript workers for the German war economy.

refusing to register with the slave traders. Civil servants were asked to contribute to "administrative sabotage."<sup>63</sup> Jean Oberlé's slogan, "Ne vas pas en Allemagne!" was broadcast throughout 1943. Henri Frénay, head of *Combat*, signalled London that the flight from the census exceeded all expectations. Prefects reported the "ill-concealed exasperation of the population." Pierre Limagne noted in March that "the wave of deportations was hourly transforming public opinion." The STO made resistance a mass phenomenon.<sup>64</sup>

The Communist *Front National* reported on 10 March 1943 that the French were no longer preoccupied with food, but with deportation. Michel Brault, newly appointed by the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance* (MUR) as director of maquis operations, issued circulars on 25 May to direct local initiatives for the creation of maquis units.<sup>65</sup> By the middle of the year Sauckel was being widely referred to as an unwitting recruiter for the maquis.<sup>66</sup> Henriot emphasized France's role in a German victory as the sole chance of

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<sup>63</sup>W. D. Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 365. Within the ministry of labour itself a group of civil servants under Jean Ismélari set up a special clandestine section to *prevent* departures to Germany. This section set up a *commission d'appel* (which the Germans mistakenly interpreted as a "call-up service," but in reality was an "appeal service" *against* call-up), which issued hundreds of official exemptions. Indeed, the whole country seemed intent on aiding and abetting defaulters.

<sup>64</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 95-96.

<sup>65</sup>Kedward, *op.cit.*, 30, 34-35.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, 38-40. A tract attributed to *Combat*, "Debout contre l'esclavage," Feb-March 1943, gave credence to the collective revolt against the STO. Wives and mothers were invited to encourage the *défaillance* of husbands and sons; doctors were encouraged to forge medical certificates saying "*inapte Allemagne*"; police were asked to refuse to arrest *réfractaires*; the general population was encouraged to hide them.

survival for France and Christianity. *Attentiste France*, impatient to be liberated, applauded the Allied bombings as hastening the hour of salvation. "The only regret is that we have only the opinion of the living. We would be interested to know what the dead think." For air raid victims, Henriot warned, Allied liberation was to be found in death; the fruits of Allied promises was a harvest of coffins. Invoking the example of Spain, Henriot claimed that France was divided by partisan politics with old scores to settle and vengeance to assuage. Here were the seeds of France's civil war.<sup>67</sup>

On 27 April 1943, Fernand Grenier's broadcast spoke of *Le sort des martyrs*. The grave-diggers of France were responsible for the tyranny which imprisoned soldiers in German concentration camps, starved French women and children, and conscripted youth for forced labour in German factories. First among the "spokesmen of treason" was Pierre Laval, "white tie and black conscience," and Laval's lieutenants, Doriot, Déat, Creyssel, Chasseigne and Henriot, too young for service in 1914 and too old in 1939, who demanded the execution of Frenchmen.<sup>68</sup> Henriot defended Laval, arguing that the labour service in Germany was harsh but not ruinous. France could fear worse exactions from the conqueror than those already imposed; the expulsion of the Alsatians was a vivid reminder and present danger. Laval, said Henriot, was pleading the cause of France

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<sup>67</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Bombardements anglo-américains sur la France: les moissonneurs de cercueils," *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 7 March 1943, 58-59.

<sup>68</sup>Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac (ed.) *Les Voix de la Liberté: Ici Londres, III: La Fin du Commencement 8 novembre 1942 - 9 juillet 1943*, (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1975), 145.

and its future linked to Germany defending Europe from Bolshevism.<sup>69</sup>

The surrender of Rommel's *Afrika Korps* in Tunisia on 13 May was Henriot's opportunity to remind applauding Frenchmen that Tunisia was not German, but French. Yet another colonial food source had been lost, diverted from Marseille to London. The Mediterranean was now a British lake. The seizure of Gibraltar in the eighteenth century and Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and the Suez Canal in the nineteenth century was matched by the Anglo-American conquest of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria in the twentieth. Generals who congratulated themselves for having expelled the Germans in reality had only exchanged conquerors.<sup>70</sup> Henriot's chronicle of British imperial expropriations was of small value. The historical animosities between Britain and France were cold comfort when it was Germany that occupied France.<sup>71</sup>

Against French hopes of Allied liberation, Vichy propaganda played on fears of its cost. The Allied invasion of Sicily and Italy in July was Henriot's occasion to reaffirm the notion of "Fortress Europe." He painted the invasion/liberation not as a simple matter of the arrival of the Americans and the departure of the Germans. France was the glaxis

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<sup>69</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Entretiens Laval-Hitler: l'ombre s'étend sur la France," *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 2 May 1943, 104-107.

<sup>70</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La Tunisie occupée par les Alliés: la France partout perdante," *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 16 May 1943, 119-122.

<sup>71</sup>Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 44.

of Germany's fortress. Henriot conjured up scenes of Dante's *Inferno*, with France's cities subjected to a terrible rain of fire and steel. Whereas the English bombed France under the pretext of attacking Germans, the Germans would bomb what remained of France to retaliate against the English and the Americans.<sup>72</sup> German armies in France were prepared for an assault. In Tunisia, Anglo-American armies, battled against a numerically inferior Afrika Korps with its back to the sea. In France the positions would be reversed, with the assailant's back to the sea. Bizerta and Tunis were taken by land, France would have to be taken from the sea.<sup>73</sup> Memories of Dieppe were rekindled to bolster the myth of the Atlantic Wall of Fortress Europe.

Henriot's membership in the *Milice* and *Groupe Collaboration* increased his stature in collaborationist circles. He accompanied the French delegation to the International Congress of European Journalists in Vienna, led by Information Secretary-General René Bonnefoy and Marcel Déat.<sup>74</sup> The 1943 Congress of Vienna claimed to liberate Europe from the Jewish venom, the world from the nightmare of Bolshevism,

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<sup>72</sup>Philippe Henriot, "En attendant le débarquement: et s'ils débarquaient?" *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 18 May 1943, 123-125.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 126

<sup>74</sup>René Bonnefoy was *chargé de mission* to Secretary of State for Information under Paul Marion from 15 May 1942 until 2 December 1942 when he was appointed Secretary-General to the Ministry of Information under Laval and then Director-General of the French Office of Information on 12 August 1943 until January 1944 when he was replaced by Henriot. Office of Strategic Services, *A Selected Who's Who in Vichy France June 1940 to August 1944*, Research and Analysis Branch OSS, 24 October 1944, 138.

the worker from capitalist exploitation, and Europe from Anglo-Saxon imperialism.<sup>75</sup> Henriot observed that Croat, Slovak, Romanian, Hungarian, and Spanish journalists were the heralds of European collaboration, but it was the workers of the *Front du Travail* who translated into reality the Congress theme, "Sieg oder bolschevismus"<sup>76</sup> Dispelling Allied propaganda about Germany's war-weariness and discontent, Henriot portrayed a great nation at war, whose citizens stoically endured privations while industrial production figures mounted indicating the resolve of the German population.<sup>77</sup> He hoped to provoke *réfractaires* to reflection by adapting Pascal's wager to collaboration. Frenchmen made an equal wager, betting that Germany would lose the war. If they were mistaken, how many generations would suffer the consequences? Resistance and *attentisme* were founded on Germany's defeat. If Germany was victorious, a mistaken wager would spell the ruin of France.

Henriot's efforts to discredit the resistance were futile as long as the French state dedicated its efforts to deporting its own citizens. While Allied radio capitalized on popular indignation, collaborationist radio sought to defuse it in what became "the battle

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<sup>75</sup>Maurice Martin du Gard, *La Chronique de Vichy 1940-1944*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 252. Déat and Henriot were disappointed that they were not asked to speak at the Congress but Henriot was consoled with a butterfly larvae acquired from a Viennese collector which he observed constantly throughout the return voyage.

<sup>76</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Retour de Vienne" *Combats*, 31 July 1943, 1-2.

<sup>77</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Congrès international de journalistes à Vienne: impressions d'Allemagne," *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 27 June 1943, 165-166.



of the Maquis."<sup>78</sup> The mass flight from German labour conscription was so great that Jean Bichelonne, Laval's Minister of Industrial Production, proposed that STO conscripts work for the Reich in France itself. The suggestion came too late to stem the flight of STO fugitives. Henriot attributed civil disobedience to dissident radio that romanticized the resistance, portraying arrested suspects as martyrs and their crimes of terrorism as heroic acts. How could attacks on gendarmes assist Germany's defeat and Britain's victory? Armed with parachuted weapons and acting in the name of a prostituted patriotism, resisters were no more than assassins and brigands -- and here, Henriot argued, were the ominous signs of civil war.<sup>79</sup>

Touring Milice units in Marseille, Briançon, Grenoble, Vichy and Saint-Girons,<sup>80</sup> Henriot charged that the "viper's nest of resistance" was led by teachers and clergy who, instead of teaching the hard lessons of sacrifice, encouraged discontent. Henriot attacked the unholy alliance of Communists and Catholics in which theologians defended moral resistance instead of reminding Catholics of penance and obedience. As Roderick Kedward documents, the traditional rivalries between Republican schoolteachers and Catholic clergy were overcome by the STO. Many schoolteachers were reserve

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<sup>78</sup>Eck, *op. cit.*, 97-98. Measures against defaulters were stiffened: a stringent law of June 11, 1943 prescribed administrative internment for those who failed to register, as well as a heavy fine; employers who failed to ensure the registration of their employees were also liable to penalties. See W.D. Halls, *op. cit.*, 360-361.

<sup>79</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le drame d'Arlanc: réfractaires et communistes," *Et s'ils débarquaient?* 20 June 1943, 160-161.

<sup>80</sup>"Le camarade milicien Philippe Henriot parlera," 18 Sept 1943, *Combats*, 6.

officers. Others were mayor's assistants with access to official stamps and documentation. Above all, teachers and priests had taught most of the local men, and were often sympathetic to the plight of reluctant conscripts.<sup>81</sup> Even so, trains departed for Germany with young men singing the "Marseillaise" or the "Internationale" and giving a clenched-fist salute.<sup>82</sup> Protests against the call-up continued throughout France while many *réfractaires* took to the hills joining the *maquis*, outlaws sustained by the local population. In the Gard, a tract in July headed "Deportation means death" warned that STO workers in German factories were liable to be killed by Allied bombings, and concluded that to "join the maquis" was a way to fight back.<sup>83</sup>

The invasion of Sicily, Mussolini's abdication and the Italian surrender on 8 September, Giraud's invasion of Corsica on 13 September revealed an ever-tightening noose around Fortress Europe. Rumours of imminent Allied landings in the south gave many *réfractaires* good reason to hide out in the maquis. It was in this context that Henriot was able to sow doubt and fear in "the war of nerves." The "battle of the

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<sup>81</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 163-164.

<sup>82</sup>Halls, *op. cit.*, 366. Professor Halls cites Father Bergey's recruitment of seminarians from Evreux who boarded the STO train for Ratisbon. At the first stop all but two took to the hills.

<sup>83</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 60. August 1943 was a crucial month for re-evaluation and redefinition of Vichy policy. Kedward noted the sense of crisis underlying government documents. Added to the problem of the *réfractaires* was added that of the *retardataires*. Prisoners of war who had volunteered to work within Germany as *travailleurs libres* were allowed leave to visit their families in France. Over 50% failed to report back and the Germans threatened suspension of all leave. The inclusion of women in the STO was the final collapse of Vichy's social policy, Laval being content with the concession of allowing women workers to remain in France.

maquis" was compounded by the "battle of the farmers." Anticipation of an imminent landing and the end of the war made farmers even more unwilling to surrender goods to Vichy's rationing and fixed prices board, the *Ravitaillement Général*. Rural and urban France was agreed that the German "doryphores" (potato beetles) were devouring France's agricultural produce.<sup>84</sup> The farmers' revolt compounded "the battle for grain," Vichy's efforts to control the black market. Economics and patriotism converged. The Prefect of the Dordogne complained that the local *Corporation Paysanne* was hostile. *L'Agriculteur du Périgord* wrote, "They speak to us of our duties... let them pay more attention to our rights."<sup>85</sup> Farmers voiced the common complaint that "the Germans take everything," legitimizing the black market. The farmers and the conscripted workers were uniting in their opposition to the régime.

The Haute-Vienne prefect spoke also of a shadow "Préfet du Bois." In the eyes of the Vichy State the maquis "Robin Hood" had become a dangerous Bolshevik.<sup>86</sup> The rural maquis frustrated Vichy directives and created what Kedward called an "outlaw

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<sup>84</sup>Marie Granet & Henri Michel, *Combat: Histoire d'un Mouvement de Résistance de juillet 1940 à juillet 1943*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), 39.

<sup>85</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 96. The Prefect of the Haute-Vienne in August 1943 complained to Vichy that the prices of pork, corn, and poultry were too low, with the result that peasants were open to selling their produce to higher bidders. In the Dordogne the statutory price for a kilo of potatoes stood at 2 fr. 20 in October, whereas black market prices reached 15 francs. The Prefect was unable to stop this, short of putting an inspector behind every peasant's door and a gendarme at every fork in the road.

<sup>86</sup>Max Hastings. *Das Reich: Resistance and the March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division through France, June 1944*, (London: Michael Joseph, 1981), 63.

culture" that defied Vichy's official administration.<sup>87</sup> Vichy's propaganda accentuated thefts, attacks, and sabotage while reassuring the public that the perpetrators were being brought to justice.<sup>88</sup> Henriot's propaganda attempted to undermine maquis support in the countryside claiming that the maquis was "a battle against the farmers." In reality the 'battle of the farmers' was against the government,

Milice operations attracted London's attentions on 15 July: the Milice was warned to desist from hunting down fugitives and resisters or suffer reprisals.<sup>89</sup> Henriot welcomed Vichy's death penalty for "patriotic crime" perpetrated by criminals posing as patriots. The resistance red terror was to be answered by Vichy's white terror.<sup>90</sup> The abyss of credibility between Vichy propaganda and its audience is best illustrated with

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<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, 97-98. The FTP (Franc-tireurs et partisans) determined prices to be regulated and posted them in public places. If a farmer demanded higher prices his goods were "pinched" by a maquis van. These tactics sought not to suppress the black market but to make it accessible to all. "Uncooperative sellers and buyers will be unmasked and severely punished," warned an FTP tract. "In the case of serious offenders, and all second offenders, we will not hesitate to destroy their entire livelihood." The tract was signed *La France Combattante*.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*, 77-79.

<sup>89</sup>"Avertissement à des assassins polis" 10 July 1943, *Combats* 1. *Libération* of 1 August 1943 published "A warning to traitors" first broadcast by Algiers on 30 June. To deter Gestapo-Milice man-hunts, *Libération* published in October several "black lists" of informers and Miliciens identified by their initials and their locales. Informers who had denounced resistance sympathizers, or divulged the names of workers who had disobeyed the orders for the *Relève* were to receive the attentions of the resistance as a warning.

<sup>90</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Crime et Châtiment," *Combats*, 4 September 1943, 1. Jacques Delperrie de Bayac's *Histoire de la milice* cites the text from *Combats*, 16 October 1943, which stated that informing was a duty for miliciens. Miliciens were asked to designate hostages to their chiefs if they were resistance victims. See André Halimi, *la Délation sous l'Occupation*, (Editions Alain Moreau, 1983), 202.

an anecdote from the Lot. On 12 September 1943, the Prefect, M. Loic Petit, reported an incident at Luzech, the site of an annual pilgrimage to Notre-Dame-de-l'Ile. Attending were M. Raoul Berenguier, departmental propaganda delegate, and M. Bessac, President of *Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne* (JAC). Monsieur Bessac spoke of the war dead of 1914-18 whose sacrifice was shamefully wasted in scandalous pleasures. Those who died in 1939-40 confronted an unjust aggressor, and proved that Frenchmen still knew how to fight and die. Berenguier interrupted Bessac, declaring that France, not Germany, had declared war. Ignoring the comment, Bessac continued, "They died for the same cause, for the fidelity to alliances and treaties, to defend the weak and oppressed, law and liberty." M. Bessac cited the last words of his brother, abbé Bessac, killed during the 1940 campaign, who died "for Christ and for France." Berenguier retorted, "They died for the Jews." This provoked threats from the assembled Catholics, whose affection for the popular abbé took the insult as both personal and sacrilegious. Berenguier attempted to calm the audience, crying, "Vive le Maréchal," and was greeted instead with "Vive la France!"<sup>91</sup>

Laval's October amnesty promised *réfractaires* that they would not be sent to Germany if they registered with the authorities. Instead, they were offered the comparative security of a job in France, denied those who had already come forward. Furthermore, Laval had negotiated a "pause" in departures to Germany from mid-

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<sup>91</sup>F 41 271 *Renseignements aux Délégués Regionales*, Cahors 25 septembre 1943 Préfet du Lot, Loic Petit à M. Paul Creyssel, Sec-Gén à la Propagande, Ministre de l'Information. The Prefect recommended another posting for M. Berenguier.

October until year's end. During the "pause," regional prefects received circulars from the Labour Ministry defending its policy by emphasizing that Laval's skilful negotiations for the STO had reduced Sauckel's original demand for 1,200,000 workers to 670,000. In return, the circular stated, 110,000 prisoners had been freed and 250,000 had been transformed into "travailleurs libres" within Germany. It was argued that 6.6% of Belgians were "recruited" while only 1.6% of the French had been drafted.<sup>92</sup> These statistics served as cold comfort to those conscripted and deported.

At year's end, as Resistance attacks increased and appeals to *réfractaires* went unheeded, Henriot's tone grew increasingly menacing. Appeals for unity and magnanimity were futile to those who, encouraged by the BBC and Voice of America, were determined to resist. Resistance black-lists were obviously having an effect. Henriot mentioned that Radio-Vichy never stooped to such tactics as broadcasting proscribed names, or sending threatening letters and scale-model coffins to magistrates, gendarmes, and civil servants.<sup>93</sup> Vichy police documented 1,149 incidents, 209 against collaborators. From 2 November to 2 December there were 310 attacks in the Haute-Savoie alone. The prefect was relieved of his duties and replaced. Henriot bemoaned a police weak in numbers and weapons, and indulgent tribunals which allowed the guilty to escape. Fighting fire with fire was the response to disobedience: "There are still some

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<sup>92</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 55-56.

<sup>93</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Aux Portes de l'Abattoir," *Combats*, 13 November 1943, 1. Collaborators and Miliciens were sent model coffins with a hangman's noose.

Frenchmen left who will sacrifice themselves for their country while others defend themselves by allowing their friends to avenge them. We are faced with the choice between death and self-defence. Many moralists say that this is civil war, but we prefer civil war to the slaughter-house. I am certain that we will escape from this terrible dilemma only with one method; the immediate organization of repression." Henriot cited the fierce motto of Vaillant-Couturier to his troops before the war: "for an eye, two eyes, for a tooth, the whole mouth."<sup>94</sup> Darnand's Franc-Garde was equipped with weapons in October 1943 and in November Darnand appealed in *Combats* for Miliciens to join the Waffen SS.<sup>95</sup>

Henry Charbonneau summarized the Milice mandate: "*Notre Revanche, C'est Notre Révolution*."<sup>96</sup> Revenge was now armed and the Resistance was fighting back. Moments before the appearance of Darnand and Henriot to address a Milice rally at Nice, a grenade exploded and mortally wounded three miliciens. Two raised their arms in salute upon Darnand's arrival while another grievously wounded saluted Darnand with his left hand as his right arm had been severed in the explosion.<sup>97</sup> The Nice incident revealed the hatreds and loyalties of both the Milice and the Resistance. In a bungled

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<sup>94</sup>Henriot, "Aux Portes de l'Abattoir," *Ibid.*, 2. "Pour un oeil, les deux yeux, pour un dent, toute la gueule."

<sup>95</sup>Delperrie de Bayac, *op. cit.*, 214, 228.

<sup>96</sup>Henry Charbonneau "Notre Revanche, C'est Notre Revolution," 11 December 1943, *Combats*, 1.

<sup>97</sup>"A Nice, Foyer de Notre Révolution, Joseph Darnand et Philippe Henriot ont marqués les étapes de la victoire" 4 December 1943, *Combats*, 1.

effort to discredit the Communist Resistance, the Milice murdered the former Radical Senator Maurice Sarraut, Victor Basch, eighty year-old President of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* and his wife of seventy-nine,<sup>98</sup> Senator Aimé Berthod, and Professor Gosse, dean of Grenoble University. Schumann also cited the derailment of two passenger trains in Saône-et-Loire. The arrested suspects were two Miliciens acting under orders and in possession of tracts warning the French of Saône-et-Loire, that patriots were responsible for train derailments. The tract ended, "So much the worse for the dead bourgeois! Vive de Gaulle! Vive Stalin!"<sup>99</sup>

Pierre Dac compared Henriot and the Milice as France's answer to Hitler and Himmler, "le roi des salauds." On 9 December 1943, at 21h 30, Radio-London presented Pierre Dac's "Police-Milice" (to the tune of Macky's refrain from Bertholt Brecht's *Threepenny Opera*.) For the Milice's crimes against Frenchmen and France, vengeance and justice would be paid in full.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup>Henriot's radio broadcast indicated Sarraut among the personalities of the old regime to liquidate. Denis Peschanski (ed.), *Vichy 1940-1944: Archives de Geurre d'Angelo Tasca*, (Paris & Milano: Editions du CNRS and Feltrinelli Editore, 1986), 538. Sarraut symbolized the middle path which sought to restore power to the parliamentarians. Six miliciens were arrested and charged with the murder of Sarraut but were later freed on 20 January 1944 by Darnand when he was appointed Secretary-General for the Maintenance of Order on 30 December 1943. Delperrie de Bayac noted that the Milice provided a get-away car and a machine-gun to the assassin.

<sup>99</sup>Crémieux-Brilhac, *op. cit.*, 141.

<sup>100</sup>Pierre Dac, *Un Français libre à Londres en Guerre*, (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1972), 50, 46-47.



I	II	III	IV
Gens d'milice	Mercenaires,	Fous sadiques,	Sale engeance,
Et complices	Tortionnaires,	Hystériques	Sans conscience
Des polices	Sanguinaires,	Domestiques	Ni décence,
De Vichy	Bons à tout,	De Berlin	Vous devrez,
Traquent nos frères	Les souffrances	Pour la Boche	Tristes êtres,
Réfractaires	De la France	Qui s'accroche	Disparaître.
Qui se terrent	Crient vengeance	L'heure approche	Pour les traîtres,
Dans le maquis.	Contre vous.	De la fin.	Pas de pitié!

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1943 the French waited for the invasion that never came. The Prefect in Limoges declared in early December that the optimism of the summer had given way to despondency. Vichy's propaganda was refuted by the maquis and the Resistance. The maquis "occupation" of the Ain town of Oyonnax was a master stroke of propaganda that aimed to show that the maquis were not the rabble of foreign bandits portrayed by Henriot. On 30 December three hundred maquisards, dressed as a uniformed company, took over the town at midday with a military procession to the *monument aux morts*. A wreath with the dedication, "Les Vainqueurs de Demain à Ceux de 1914-18" was laid. The maquis then dispersed, affirming their presence and mobility. The occupation of Oyonnax was broadcast by the BBC, applauded

throughout France, and praised by De Gaulle.<sup>101</sup>

The Allied military campaigns of 1943 heralded an ultimate German defeat, but failed to provide a decisive Allied victory. The Mediterranean campaign had eliminated Italy but had not appreciably weakened the German army. The most significant victories were by the Russians at Stalingrad and Kursk. Stalin increasingly came to regard the Americans and British as ineffectual at best, double-dealing at worst. He saw the Anglo-American failure to open a second front in France as a postponement made at the price of the lives of Russian soldiers. The Allies remained bogged down in Italy and the British continued to press for further Mediterranean operations. At the Teheran conference in November-December 1943, Roosevelt announced that a second-front attack would be mounted in late spring 1944.<sup>102</sup> France awaited its deliverance from the Germans with hope, fear, and a grain of impatient humour and dread: "Comme ils tardent! Vite le débarquement... mais pas dans mon coin."<sup>103</sup>

Jean-Pierre Azéma's profile of "organic intellectuals" traced an obsession with the decadence of the West, a fascination with fascist virility, and the vision of a new Rome and its crusade to drive back the Anglo-Saxons and Soviet barbarians. All were attracted to power, betting first on Pétain, then Laval, before playing the German card. All

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<sup>101</sup>Henri Amouroux, *La Grande Histoire des Français sous l'Occupation: l'Impitoyable Guerre Civile*, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1983), 268-273.

<sup>102</sup>Shulman, *op. cit.*, 86.

<sup>103</sup>Rossignol, *op. cit.*, 325.

accepted civil war. Déat wrote, "France will be covered with concentration camps and permanent execution squads. The birth of a new régime will be made with forceps and sorrow."<sup>104</sup> The "ultras," Darnand,<sup>105</sup> Henriot, and Déat looked at the "internal enemy" and the opportunity to settle old scores against their Popular Front enemies. Henriot too had burned his bridges as he waited in the corridors of power.

Henriot's loyalties to the Marshal and collaboration were in stark contrast to popular support for de Gaulle, resistance, and Allied liberation. The STO ensured that the Marshal's government had little claim on the loyalty of its subjects. Henriot's broadcasts reflected Vichy's attempts to buttress an increasingly untenable position as French citizens voted with their feet, fleeing the STO and awaiting the Allied liberation. In the face of passive and active resistance, Henriot threatened repression when France "refused to react to reason and common sense." The principles of Vichy propaganda to enlighten and guide gave way to a propaganda that ordered. Henriot announced that the hour had struck when "inflexible authority would assist the true, discourage the false and

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<sup>104</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 228-229.

<sup>105</sup>Ted Morgan, *An Uncertain Hour: The French, the Germans, the Jews, the Barbie Trial, and the City of Lyon, 1940-1945*, (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1990), 116-117. Darnand flirted with the idea of going over to the Gaullists in mid-1942. Through intermediaries, Darnand sent word to the Gaullists that he was ready to leave for London and could turn over some important arms depots to the resistance. Gaston Palewski, de Gaulle's chief of cabinet, brought the general the news and a furious de Gaulle replied, "And tomorrow, if Darquier [de Pellepoix, Vichy's commissioner for Jewish affairs] wants to get circumcised, should I take him too?"

convince the hesitant."<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>106</sup>Philippe Henriot, *La Gerbe*, 4 March 1943, 3. "Voilà pourquoi, si la France refuse de réagir à la raison et à la sagesse, il faudra le coup de fouet de l'épreuve pour la sauver. Tout espoir n'est pas perdu. Mais la masse veut être éclairée, guidée, commandée. L'heure est venue de l'autorité inflexible qui, seule, utilisera les bons, découragera les mauvais et déterminera les hésitants."

### Chapter 9: Minister of Information & Propaganda, 1944

"I was the voice of France who sought victory, as I must force myself to be the voice of France's survival."<sup>1</sup>

In September 1943, Joseph Darnand signed with Marcel Déat a *Plan de redressement* affirming that a French reconstruction was possible only with a German victory. The proposal addressed to the Reich suggested a plan to combine the various collaborationist movements into a single national Milice.<sup>2</sup> Joseph Darnand, Philippe Henriot, and Marcel Déat, attuned to German demands for order and security, launched what Henri Amouroux called the "pitiless civil war."<sup>3</sup> Henriot's appointment as Minister of Information and Propaganda in January 1944 was part of the Reich's efforts to keep France subservient and maintain labour deportations to Germany's war industries. It was Henriot's and Vichy's last gasp.

By late fall of 1943, Vichy's following had vanished; even the Germans recognized that Laval was universally detested. Pétain resented being relegated to the status as figurehead, and hoped to use Vichy's "neutrality" to mediate a separate peace between America and Germany and continue the battle against communism. Laval,

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<sup>1</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Eux et nous," *Editoriaux Prononcés à la Radio par Philippe Henriot, Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Information et à la Propagande*, no. 4, 6 March 1944, 62-63.

<sup>2</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma, "La Milice" in *Vingtième Siècle*, vol. 28 1990, 92.

<sup>3</sup>Henri Amouroux, *La Grande Histoire des Français sous l'Occupation, 1939-1945; vol. 6, l'Impitoyable Guerre Civile, vol. 7, l'Hiver du Grand Espoir*, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1983).

however, talked not of mediation but of alliance with Germany.<sup>4</sup> Under the advice of Lucien Romier and Henri Moysset (State Secretaries for Labour), Pétain, on 12 November, informed Laval that he was dismissed; the Marshal would assume the presidency. In case of his death, constitutional power would pass to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The decree was to be announced on national radio on 13 November. Pétain's "strike" exasperated Hitler who refused to accept "another 13 December." Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, communicated an ultimatum on 4 December instructing the German Ambassador, Otto Abetz, that both Pétain and Laval remain in their present offices. Pétain was forbidden to implement the constitutional decree and was assigned a German "watch-dog" in the person of the diplomat von Renthe-Fink. The ultimatum further demanded a cabinet shuffle to ensure continued collaboration.<sup>5</sup> On 9 December, Abetz instructed Pétain to accept the new ministers. Joseph Darnand would replace René Bousquet as Minister of Interior, Philippe Henriot would replace Paul Creyssel in Information,<sup>6</sup> while Marcel Déat would replace Lucien Romier in Labour.

Laval negotiated the future cabinet in Paris. His interview with Abetz and General Oberg on 20 December confirmed the appointment of Henriot as Creyssel's replacement

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<sup>4</sup>Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1972), 323.

<sup>5</sup>Philippe Amaury, *Les Deux Premières Expériences d'Un "Ministère de l'Information" en France*, (Paris: Librairie R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias, 1969), 273-274.

<sup>6</sup>Paul Creyssel, former Radical then Parti Social Français deputy for the Loire replaced Marion as Secretary-General of Information.

for propaganda.<sup>7</sup> Laval appealed for support against the Marshal's personal attack and offered the Milice as a force to be used against the maquis as the gauge of collaboration, something more concrete than verbal promises, in return for Vichy's continued existence.<sup>8</sup> Abetz, harried by an impatient Ribbentrop, demanded confirmation of the cabinet change by 24 December. As the deadline approached for a response to Germany, Martin du Gard asked, "But which Germany? There are already two ambassadors; one accredited to the Marshal directly [Renthe-Fink], the other Abetz, close to Laval." The Marshal declared: "Je resterai dans la tranchée."<sup>9</sup>

By 29 December 1943 Berlin's patience was exhausted. Parisian press attacks against Vichy were further reminders to Laval that the "ultras" were waiting in the wings. Martin du Gard reported that "They [the Germans] want guarantees, something other than declarations against Bolshevism on the radio. They want their men." Pétain protested the nomination of Henriot, who had "insulted the Army," recalling his broadcasts against the North African generals who had gone over to the Allies in November 1942. He was scandalized to learn that Henriot had a son in the SS which he

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<sup>7</sup>Amaury, *op. cit.*, 274. Carl Albrecht Oberg was Himmler's *Höherer SS-und Polizeiführer* who, with Helmuth Knochen's SS *Einsatzkommandos* established in regional prefectures, replaced the *Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich*.

<sup>8</sup>H. R. Kedward, "The Maquis and the Culture of the Outlaw (With Particular Reference to the Cévennes)," in *Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology*, Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985, 242.

<sup>9</sup>Maurice Martin du Gard, *La Chronique de Vichy 1940-1944*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 299.

regarded as a "perversion of patriotism!"<sup>10</sup> In a five-hour conference between Pétain, Abetz, and Laval, Abetz argued that increasing disorder and an impotent police justified the appointment of the ultras. Pétain argued that "the shadow of civil war was already apparent and it was feared that it would be inflamed by the choice of certain individuals. The proposed nominations [Darnand, Henriot and Déat] are ill-timed: Henriot's speeches, in spite of his talent, have the opposite effect to the one intended." Finally, he declared: "Do what you want, but I will sign nothing. The appointments will bear the sole signature of M. Laval."<sup>11</sup>

The Milice ministers, Darnand and Henriot, were Laval's pawns to placate the Germans, undercut the Parisian militants, and impose the authority of the state against the Resistance. In sum, the French state sought to put in place what the Reich had refused in the *Légion Tricolore*: a specialized reserve unit to employ as he saw fit and under the exclusive control of the state to reconquer the authority lost in November 1942.<sup>12</sup> Laval, forced to accede to German instructions, was forced to dismiss Paul Creyssel for Henriot whom he considered "a clerical fanatic lost in Nazism." He attributed Henriot's radio popularity to his scathing wit: "The French love political innuendo [*bavardage politique*]. They are ardent admirers of Chamber sessions. Today,

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<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 299-300, 312. "C'est un inverti du patriotisme!" André Henriot was serving in Italy with the NSKK, the motorized corps of the *Waffen SS*.

<sup>11</sup>Marc Ferro, *Pétain*, (Paris: Fayard, 1987), 516.

<sup>12</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma. "La Milice" *op. cit.*, 89.



they have all that through the radio. Philippe Henriot's twice-daily debate with Algiers is more talented than theirs, and he wins at every blow [il gagne à tout coup]."<sup>13</sup> Laval's 6 January 1944 decree merged the *Secrétaire d'État à l'Information* with the *Secrétaire d'Etat à la Propagande*. Philippe Henriot was appointed to the ministry thanks to the political power of the Milice, which retained the confidence of the SS.<sup>14</sup>

On 30 December, the appointments of Darnand and Henriot were confirmed. Darnand's position placed at his command 45,000 gendarmes, 6,000 mobile police, and 25,000 members of the GMR (*Groupes mobiles de réserve*) created by Pucheu to ensure public security. Henriot's appointment as minister of both Information and Propaganda was part of the new Milice state which controlled the police, courts, prisons and propaganda.<sup>15</sup> Henriot was given his national forum. His New Year's message reaffirmed Darnand's deal with the Germans declaring war on the "merciless enemies posing as allies."<sup>16</sup> On 7 January Henriot's interview in *Aujourd'hui* declared that he

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<sup>13</sup>Amaury, *op. cit.*, 281.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, 276-277. On 3 January 1944 Angelo Tasca reported Paul Marion's confidential statement that Abetz insisted on the appointment of a Parisian collaborator in the new cabinet. Laval refused Jacques Doriot's appointment offering the Justice Ministry to Déat who refused. The Germans held Doriot in reserve in case of failed negotiations. Marion considered that Himmler's plan was to introduce into France the same regime as in Belgium: military administration, government of secretaries-general, a privileged position for the PPF analogous to the Rexists in Belgium, with the PPF placed in all high positions of command. See Denis Peschanski (ed.), *Vichy 1940-1944: Archives de Geurre d'Angelo Tasca*, (Paris & Milano: Editions du CNRS Paris and Feltrinelli Editore, 1986), 541-542.

<sup>15</sup>Azéma, "La Milice," *op. cit.*, 97.

<sup>16</sup>*Allocutions Prononcées à La Radio par Monsieur Philippe Henriot du 1 janvier au 31 janvier 1944*, 1 January 1944, 1.

sought neither title nor place but supported the government completely: "Today we need people who would dare to compromise themselves for France. I know that I am seen as a partisan minister, ... but the Marshal reminds us that life is not neutral."<sup>17</sup>

At a conference on 5 January 1944 with President Laval, Darnand, and SS Colonels Karl Oberg and Helmuth Knochen outlined the principal powers of the *Secrétaire général au Maintien de l'Ordre*. Darnand's interview with Pierre-Antoine Cousteau in *Je Suis Partout* and *Paris-Soir* on 7 January 1944 reported his declaration of war on the Resistance, the maquis, and their accomplices. On 10 January Laval signed the decree, appointing Darnand head of all French police forces. By mid-January German authorities had authorized Milice operations in the northern zone.<sup>18</sup>

Martin du Gard observed that there were moments when Henriot spoke the truth. Indeed, the collaborator's head, dominated by large ears, suggested a textbook of mental pathology, perhaps even genius. He had an amazing voice, serious, full, cultivated, and possessed a real literary talent, with a command of the language derived from his

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<sup>17</sup>François Brigneau, *Le Jour où Ils Tuèrent Philippe Henriot*, (Paris: Publications FB, 1992), 33. "Je ne me fais aucune illusion sur les difficultés qui m'attendent. Ce n'est ni le titre, ni la place que j'ai recherchés: c'est un manière supplémentaire de me compromettre, car aujourd'hui nous avons besoin de gens qui osent se compromettre pour la France. Je sais qu'on s'attend à voir en moi un ministre partisan. Il est vrai que ju suis un homme de parti, selon le mot du Maréchal qui nous a rappelé que la vie n'est pas neutre."

<sup>18</sup>J. Delperrie de Bayac, *Histoire de la Milice 1918-1945*, (Paris: Fayard, 1969), 234-235.

classical studies.<sup>19</sup> Surrounded by his Milice fanatics, Henriot appeared troubled. Martin du Gard detected in Henriot's defiant expression an uncertainty and self-doubt; a face lined with deep furrows, a cynical and mocking grimace, sad and scornful. "An extremist blinded by his passions and intoxicated by his words," according to Alfred Fabre-Luce's *Journal de la France*: "Pale, burning with passion, he overcomes his nervous depressions, and transforms them into pathos. Listening to him on the radio is as emotional an experience as a public assembly. This voice, urgent and stormy or else slow, sad and tinged with irony, first captures the listener physically, then goes on to capture his mind."<sup>20</sup>

Since everyone listened to the BBC, despite jamming, Henriot's strategy challenged Radio-London openly, the better to challenge them.<sup>21</sup> The effectiveness of Henriot's propaganda was recognized by adversaries and partisans alike. For Pierre Limagne, the talented "French Goebbels" created havoc. *Franc-Tireur* described him as the "Master of a Sacred Fear."<sup>22</sup> Anatole de Monzie noted that "Henriot is not an

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<sup>19</sup>Martin du Gard, *op.cit.*, 311-312. Martin du Gard observed that Henriot's appearance in a propaganda film at Lille evoked fear in the audience.

<sup>20</sup>Alfred Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France*, p. 549 cited in Amaury, *op. cit.*, 284. "Livide, brûlé par la flamme qu'il répand, il surmonte ses dépressions nerveuses, les transmue en pathétique; avec lui l'audition de la radio est aussi chaleureuse qu'une réunion publique. Cette voix précipitée et fougueuse (ou bien lente, avec une tristesse nuancée d'ironie) obtient une adhésion physique qui précède et détermine l'adhésion de l'esprit."

<sup>21</sup>Amaury, *op.cit.*, 282.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 280-281.

eloquent man, he is a machine-gun."<sup>23</sup> Martin du Gard observed that "families changed their meals in order to hear him. There is no one in the street when he broadcasts. This indicates how the French love oratorical jousts, venomous attacks and talent. If Henriot was at the microphone in August 1940, de Gaulle, in his London studio, would not have played his role so easily. Doubtless, many things would have transpired differently."<sup>24</sup>

Henriot's propaganda was directed to what Jacques Ellul sees as the collective "foci of interest."<sup>25</sup> The anxieties of the undecided, those *réfractaires* and *attentistes* who wavered between the government and the resistance. German support for the new ministers was designed to keep the French subdued. It was too much to hope that Radio-Vichy could achieve much more. Darnand declared on 16 February, "The Milice is created in order to animate the political life of the country by its propaganda and its activity."<sup>26</sup> Jacques Ellul notes that propaganda must be rooted in action; and Henriot's coercive propaganda on behalf of the Milice was the voice of physical coercion.<sup>27</sup> Darnand's address in *Combats* 1-8 January 1944 stated that the Milice need not fear its

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<sup>23</sup>Brigneau, *op. cit.*, 34.

<sup>24</sup>Martin du Gard, *op. cit.*, 312-313.

<sup>25</sup>Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 49.

<sup>26</sup>Azéma. "La Milice" *op. cit.*, 89.

<sup>27</sup>Ellul, *op. cit.*, 21.

small numbers. Historically, a handful of men ruled destiny.<sup>28</sup>

Henriot's editorial of 10 January 1944 reopened the second front debate: the Anglo-Americans announced its imminence, the Germans their determination to repulse it. Allied propaganda repeatedly announced the second front to assuage Stalin's frustrations with his Allies. With the "war of nerves," the Allies hoped to demoralize their adversary and inspire confidence in the future liberated people. Evoking popular sentiment, Henriot argued that France hoped that the invasion would come but might take place somewhere other than in its own backyard. "France speaks of it [the invasion]," Henriot observed, "but with less pleasure than when it was distant and theoretical."<sup>29</sup> He responded to personal attacks from London as he had once responded in Chamber debates. Jean Oberlé's 13 January broadcast branded Henriot a German mercenary. Henriot replied that he spoke for the France of the French, not the France of naturalized Jews, masons, Communists, and Anglo-Saxon financiers who paid the salaries of his BBC adversaries. This was "the abominable coalition which corrupted it [France] morally, disarmed it militarily, precipitated it into a war already lost ... by a clique, which pays you in foreign currency." London's personal insults masked issues that concerned France: what guarantees did England offer for the restoration of the French Empire? Would Marty deliver France to Stalin? Would France share the fate of Poland

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<sup>28</sup>Azéma, "La Milice," *op. cit.*, 93. "Ne craignez pas d'être seulement le petit nombre. Dans l'histoire de tous les temps, ce sont toujours les poignées d'hommes qui ont forcé le destin."

<sup>29</sup>*Allocutions de Philippe Henriot*, 10 January 1944, 3.

if the invasion failed?<sup>30</sup>

The majority of Henriot's broadcasts were addressed toward *attentistes*, "salon Gaullists" awaiting the invasion, and *réfractaires* fleeing the STO. Vichy propaganda attempted to undermine the sympathies that these groups shared for the resistance's Communist leadership. Characteristically, Henriot's propaganda defended Vichy policy decisions taken with the general welfare in mind. Those who took to the maquis were dupes of Algiers, London, and Brazzaville who had sold their soul to the Bolshevik devil for the promise of liberation. Passive and active resistance, Henriot warned, threatened to "destroy everything that the Marshal and his government so desperately sought to save for you, against you, and in spite of you."<sup>31</sup> On 18 January Henriot portrayed a desperate maquis appealing to Algiers for arms and aid. The resistance was threatened with imminent collapse with weapons available for only 10% of their personnel. The maquis faced either dissolution or massacre.<sup>32</sup> London's *Bureau central des renseignements et d'action* (BCRA) confirmed that in Nîmes, "soldiers without uniforms" were in dire need of supplies and arms. Many resorted to armed robbery. Vichy's propaganda exploited these attacks, seeking to sway the rural population against the crime wave. The BCRA document indicated a growing lawlessness that allowed real criminals

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<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 15 January 1944, 5-6.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 19 January 1944, 7-8.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 21 January 1944, 10-11.

to exploit the confusion covering their own activities, which were far from patriotic.<sup>33</sup>

London anticipated increasing attacks against the Resistance with the Milice in power. CFLN (*Comité Français de Libération Nationale*) propaganda to Occupied France sought to direct popular hostility toward the Germans and French collaborators into an organized and collective resistance, both passive and active. London's task was to remind its audience of General de Gaulle's call for solidarity with the resistance, and President Roosevelt's promise that the New Year would see the end of the war.<sup>34</sup> "Vichy's pseudo-government" was the zealous servant of the Nazis. Darnand's escalation of police terror reflected the increasing disquiet of the collaborators. The Commissariat of Information instructed its staff to remind traitors that, after the liberation, punishment would be proportional to crimes against the Resistance.<sup>35</sup> Vichy propaganda would attempt to create confusion by calling patriots "bandits and assassins."<sup>36</sup> London's fears were confirmed on 20 January when Darnand received Laval's approval for Milice courts-martial. Attackers of German or Vichy officials would henceforth be subject to trial by secret court-martial. Those found guilty were denied defence or appeal and

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<sup>33</sup>F 41 344 *Direction des services spéciaux: Renseignements 1943-1944*, Bulletin de Renseignement no. D.76 du 11 février 1944, B.C.R.A. Alger, Référence: 10916 "France: Résistance active Région de Nîmes." 1.

<sup>34</sup>F 41 338 *Directives pour la radio vers la France*. Dec 43-May 44, Alger, 25 décembre 1943 CFLN: Commissariat à l'Information, "Directives pour la semaine 25 décembre 1943-1 janvier 1944," 1-2.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, Directives pour la semaine 1-8 janvier 1944, "Le Pseudo-Gouvernement de Vichy," 2-3.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 8 January 1944, "France Occupé," 1.

executed immediately.<sup>37</sup>

Henriot compared Darnand's "special sections" to the military committees sent to suppress the Vendée rebellion of 1793.<sup>38</sup> The courts-martial and the death-penalty were not reprisals or repression, he asserted, but simply measures of legitimate self-defence against railway sabotage, the burning of harvests, and attacks against state officials. Radio-Algiers or Radio-London, under Communist control, condemned the French government's measures to protect its citizens from criminals. Algiers and London claimed a monopoly on the right to kill while denying state tribunals the right to judge the murderers of magistrates or gendarmes employed in the service of justice.<sup>39</sup> Henriot's 1939 article on the 1793 Vendée rebellion condemned the massacre by the revolutionary Committee of Public Safety only to endorse the Vichy state's repression in 1944. Henriot had discovered the justification of reasons of state and the use of power.

By February, Henriot's broadcasts had attracted the attention of the CFLN's Ministry of the Interior and Information. A report to the *Commissariat Nationale de l'Intérieur* attested that Henriot's audience comprised all of France. His editorials

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<sup>37</sup>Henri Michel, *Le Procès de Riom*, (Paris: Albin Michel), 1979, 29.

<sup>38</sup>J. Delperrie de Bayac, *Histoire de la Milice, 1918-1945*, (Paris: Fayard, 1969), 299.

<sup>39</sup>*Allocutions de Philippe Henriot*, 21, 22 January 1944 19h 40; repeated 22 January, 12 h 40, 11-12.



appealed to nationalists and the "orderly" classes (*les nationaux et les gens ordonnés et paisibles*) who, fearing the growing incidence of terrorism, began to doubt London and Algiers. The report warned that Henriot's propaganda was making significant inroads in dividing the unity of the resistance. Counter-propaganda must reply to his accusations.<sup>40</sup> Algiers' Ministry of Information noted that Vichy radio propaganda was attempting to duplicate Goebbels's techniques. Counter-propaganda was therefore to emphasize that resistance attacks were directed solely against the morale of occupation troops: the German soldier must consider France a battle zone and the population hostile.<sup>41</sup>

Henriot exploited collective fears, especially the increasing tempo of Allied bombing of French targets. The true terror merchants, he said, were the RAF who had bombed Rennes, Creusot, and Nantes. Air raids which had levelled German cities would soon be directed against French coastal cities. Evacuations of these cities were for the security of their inhabitants. Unlike the nightmare exodus of 1940, "Alas! There were no more vehicles in which to flee and no army to defend them."<sup>42</sup> Dispelling the notion of a quick and painless liberation, Henriot suggested instead a pitched battle on French soil, replete with the atrocities of Red Spain. The promised peace would be the dawn of

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<sup>40</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements*, (CFLN) 1943-1944. "La Propagande de Philippe Henriot," 10.2.44 CFLN/CNI Dates: Inf: 10/11.2.44; Réc: 17.4.44; Dif: 4.5.44.

<sup>41</sup>F 41 338 *Directives pour la radio vers la France*. Dec 43-May 44, CFLN: Comm. à l'Info. Alger, 29 January 1944 No. XXII, "France Occupée," "Le CFLN et l'Assemblée Consultative," 1.

<sup>42</sup>*Allocutions de Philippe Henriot*, 25 January 1944, 21.

civil war with Soviet regiments marching down the Champs Elysées.<sup>43</sup> Allied psychological warfare was camouflage for its strategic impotence. Allied boasts of obscuring the sky with planes, of an irresistible army of ten million, were unnecessary unless the Allies were uncertain of victory. Allies' psychological warfare was a war of lies, their journalism of blackmail, coming to the rescue of military force.<sup>44</sup>

The Salerno landing of 9 September was four months old and Allied predictions of reaching Rome by Christmas had proved false. Henriot asked, "Why these perpetual delays?" London's and Algiers' reports affirmed that Germany was exhausted, but Anzio and Monte Cassino demonstrated otherwise.<sup>45</sup> The hope of liberation was contradicted by Canadian Prime-Minister Mackenzie King's concern that if the cross-Channel invasion failed, the war could be protracted not by days or months, but by years. Henriot asked, "If his hypotheses are realized, will the assassins and saboteurs deliver you?"<sup>46</sup> The bombing of the Papal residence at Castel-Gandolfo and Monte Cassino's Benedictine monastery were acts of impotent revenge for the failure of the Italian campaign. Protests by the bishop of Chichester and the Archbishop of Canterbury condemning area bombing were the belated protests of a Pontius Pilate, offering contrition for the atrocities to salve

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<sup>43</sup>*Editoriaux Prononcés à la Radio par Philippe Henriot, Secrétaire d'Etat à L'Information et à la Propagande*, No. 1 du 7 février au 13 février 1944, "Disques d'Alger," 7 February 1944, 7-9.

<sup>44</sup>*Allocutions de Philippe Henriot*, 21 January 1944, 10-11.

<sup>45</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Marchand d'épouvante," *Editoriaux* 2, 16 February 1944, 21-23.

<sup>46</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le réveil du bon sens," *Editoriaux* 1, 13 February 1944, 43-44.

their conscience. American materialism threatened Christianity's spiritual civilization. The "liberators" threatened to destroy Rome's heritage of twenty centuries.<sup>47</sup>

Henriot's portrait of revolutionary bands terrorizing the peasantry was an attempt to undermine the maquis' base in the countryside, driving a wedge between locals and the armed Resistance. It failed. The population refused to aid police investigating attacks, offering succour to STO fugitives. Some of the gendarmerie and most of the populace came to see the attacks as a logical consequence of the maquis' struggle for survival.<sup>48</sup>

Henriot spoke of the radio resisters who offered their saliva in contrast to the German and LVF soldiers who offered their blood. The "professors of patriotism" who spoke of "Honneur et Patrie," -- Maurice Schumann, Jacques Maritain, Philippe Barrès, Jean Oberlé, and Jean Marin, -- incited Frenchmen to attack the Germans, yet the Germans endured and remained.<sup>49</sup> The patriotism of Vincent Auriol, Jules Moch, Fernand Grenier, André Marty, Pierre Bloch, and Pierre Mendès-France, Communists and Jews who deserted France, incited a violence that served only to aggravate the occupation.<sup>50</sup> Maurice Barrès' "la terre et les morts" inspired Henriot's riposte to

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<sup>47</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le monastère assassiné." *Editoriaux* 2, 18 February 1944, 42-43. Monte Cassino was rebuilt after the war.

<sup>48</sup>H.R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942-1944*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 79-80.

<sup>49</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Surmonter sa défaite...", *Editoriaux* 1, 10 February 1944, 22-23.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 24-25.

Bénazet's Radio-Algiers broadcast, describing a patriot who carried a sample of the soil of France to de Gaulle. The significance was not lost on the general, Henriot claimed, whose personal ambition had sold the Empire of Lyautey, Marchand, and Gallieni to Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. De Gaulle's coffer held dead soil while France's true soil was the living earth of the Marshal whose faithful had neither denied nor abandoned France. It had been made more sacred by the blood of its martyrs, victims to those who acted in de Gaulle's name.<sup>51</sup>

On 15 January 1944 Fritz Sauckel demanded a further one million workers to be despatched to Germany at the rate of 90,000 a month throughout 1944, with another million for work on coastal defences. Laval protested that such quotas would precipitate a mass flight to the maquis, to the detriment of both the Vichy administration and the German occupation, since more troops would be required to maintain order. Abetz persuaded Sauckel to reduce his first demand to an initial 270,000, to be sent in equal batches in March, April, and May. "Combing-out commissions" were to trim non-essential labour for the STO. Vichy justified the measures by asking for "understanding of the present necessities of the European struggle," thus identifying itself with the German cause.<sup>52</sup> On 25 February, Pétain confided to Renthe-Fink that he too supported a Franco-German "reconciliation" preferring this term to "collaboration." Pétain admitted that Laval's "Je souhaite la victoire de l'Allemagne" had come to share his opinion.

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<sup>51</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le coffret de M. de Gaulle," *Editoriaux* 2, 14 February 1944, 3-5.

<sup>52</sup>W. D. Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 363.

Furthermore, Pétain admitted that Henriot's propaganda was proving fruitful for both Vichy and Germany, and he requested German assistance to suppress the increasing incidence of arson and murders perpetrated by the maquis.<sup>53</sup>

Sauckel's demands were the subject of renewed appeals to STO fugitives. Laval persuaded him to postpone his monthly labour quotas while offering amnesties to delinquent *réfractaires*. Contracts were reduced from one year to three months, with the first departures postponed until March 1944.<sup>54</sup> Laval's amnesty for *réfractaires* of the *STO*, *Chantiers de la Jeunesse*, and *Jeunesse et Montagne* expired on 1 April. Henriot noted that exemptions would be extended to workers in essential services such as farm and mine workers, and students who would be allowed to remain in France. Others were to be exempted if their employer designated a replacement.<sup>55</sup> Henriot attempted to persuade his audience that Vichy was not only shielding the French from the Germans, but also protecting *réfractaires* from the maquis. The concessions and exemptions were deeply resented by those who had been conscripted earlier. To stop the steady drift into hiding or the maquis, Vichy imposed fines, imprisonment, and force. It was in the

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<sup>53</sup>Ferro, *op. cit.*, 529.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 529.

<sup>55</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Retour à la France," *Editoriaux* 6, 22 March 1944, 39-40. Despite the amnesty for *réfractaires* and suspension of departures to Germany, registration continued and those marked fit for service in Germany (*apte Allemagne*) knew they would be the first to go if the Germans renewed their pressure. The only students qualifying for exemption were those in medicine. Those still serving their eight months in the *Chantiers de la Jeunesse* were next to be targeted. See Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis*, *op. cit.*, 75.

context of this accelerated repression and the disillusioned hopes of an Allied landing that the seduction of the amnesty, and the effective casuistry of Henriot need to be set.<sup>56</sup>

Henriot appealed to a *réfractaire* audience not as Minister of Propaganda but as the father of two sons, one killed on the eve of the armistice and another serving as a volunteer on the "European front." Appealing to their loyalty to the Marshal, Henriot argued that their work in Germany would regain France's independence: "It is not a question of working for the enemy. The Franco-German war is over. Those who refuse to do so out of personal self-interest, the better to aid bolshevism attain its goals. Opposing Germany means accepting the victory of capitalism and Bolshevism."<sup>57</sup> The revolt against the STO was a betrayal of the prisoners whose return was contingent on France's worker-volunteers. They could not refuse what their fathers had so generously given. "My two sons, boys like yourself, are my double sacrifice, which has helped me to understand and guide you better."<sup>58</sup>

Radio-Moscow's 9 March broadcast denounced "the foul Henriot [who] speaks

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<sup>56</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 77.

<sup>57</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Réponse à une jeunesse anxieuse," *Editoriaux* 3, 25-26 February 1944, 38-39.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, 40-41. On 13 January, Rispoli, head of *Renseignements Généraux* in the Lozère, reported the figures of those reporting for STO medical examinations: at Mende on 6 January eighty-six of 250, at Marvejols on 9 January only thirty out of 203, and at the most industrialized of the three towns, Saint-Chély-d'Apcher on 11 January, only eleven out of 245. The department had been ordered to furnish 250 agricultural workers and twenty-six road-menders by 14 January: it had ended up with no more than nineteen and five respectively. Kedward, *op. cit.*, 117-118.

to our youth like the cat who hides his claws in order to lull his prey." London's counter-propaganda disclosed Henriot's true loyalties citing his 1942 *Gringoire* declaration, "Entre l'esclavage allemand et l'esclavage anglais, je choisis l'esclavage allemand." Henriot defended the context of the phrase, recounting his June 1942 tour of Morocco and his conversation with the director of the governor's cabinet. Henriot countered that when a nation was enslaved, it was rarely given a choice. His task, he explained, was not to preach the resignation to slavery but the revival of France. Suffering would teach France what wisdom could not. Surgery which cured the disease was preferable to the anaesthetic which treated only the symptoms.<sup>59</sup>

London reminded the minister of his former Republican loyalties. Henriot's *Gringoire* article, "La Guerre des Touristes" (2 May 1939) on the German annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, outlined the pan-Germanic vision of world conquest. Henriot's "L'Homme Traqué" (7 September 1939) had presented Hitler as prisoner of his own conquests, pursued by the four horsemen of the Apocalypse.<sup>60</sup> Henriot's rejoinder recalled that throughout the 'thirties he had spoken against the absurd creations of Central Europe hatched by Wilson and Lloyd George: "There was no dogma of the permanence of the treaties. If these treaties were revealed as unjust it was preferable to

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<sup>59</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les deux esclavages," *Editoriaux 4*, 1 March 1944, 20-21.

<sup>60</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. CFLN/CNI Ref: ATE/13/36701, "Deux Articles de Philippe Henriot dans *Gringoire* 2 May 1939 et 7 September 1939."

change the frontiers by negotiation rather than with the voice of cannons."<sup>61</sup> As for his attacks against Hitler, Henriot argued that, despite his efforts to avoid a criminal war engineered by the intrigues of Poland and Downing Street, he was mobilized, along with millions of his compatriots, in the passionate hope for an impossible victory. "My pen and voice were committed to the service of my country in this duel between Germany and France.... I did everything to galvanize Frenchmen in the justice of their cause and the certainty of victory... offering not only ardour but also my son to the war...."<sup>62</sup> Henriot claimed that "for those nine months, I was the voice of France who sought victory, as I must force myself to be the voice of France's survival."<sup>63</sup>

Henriot's propaganda was coordinated with the Milice offensive against the maquis and the resistance throughout France. Darnand approached the German Occupation forces seeking to arm the Milice. The *Wehrmacht* rejected his overtures, the Embassy at rue de Lille was more sympathetic, and the SS was the most receptive. In exchange for Milice recruits into the Waffen SS, Darnand received the weapons denied to him by Vichy. Karl Oberg and Helmuth Knochen certified that Darnand was "politically absolutely irreproachable."<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Eux et nous," *Editoriaux* 4, 6 March 1944, 60.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, 61-62.

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, 62-63.

<sup>64</sup>Azéma, "The Milice," *op. cit.*, 94.



Milice terror squads and resistance sabotage and attacks had created a civil war climate in France, provoking the resignations of numerous civil servants. Radio-London and Algiers reminded Vichy bureaucrats and administrators that their duty was to remain in place and cooperate with the Resistance, particularly by delaying the processing of STO conscripts. Miliciens and those serving the new tribunals were considered war criminals.<sup>65</sup> Henriot replied predictably, that Darnand was defending France from Communist terrorism.<sup>66</sup> In February, Vichy officials received authorization to apply for gun permits for self-defence from either German occupation authorities or the French State.<sup>67</sup> This indicated the collapse of both Vichy's police and justice systems. As Vichy became more subservient to the Germans, it was forced to escalate repression against its own citizens while admitting its inability to protect its officials.

Giraud and de Gaulle were divided on the question of the treatment of collaborators. Giraud argued that "the key was not to purge but to unite." The internal resistance looked to Free France to support its own threats and warnings. On 8 August 1943 at Casablanca, de Gaulle, speaking in the name of the CFLN declared, "For these men, there is only one word to say to them: 'Treason' and only one thing to give 'Justice'. Clemenceau said: 'The nation will know who defended it'. We would say: the

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<sup>65</sup>F 41 338 *Directives pour la radio vers la France*. Dec 43-May 44, CFLN: Comm. à l'Info. Alger, 5 February 1944 No. XXIII, *Directives pour la semaine 5-12 February*, "France Occupée."

<sup>66</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Communisme ou la mort...", *Editoriaux 1*, 11 February 1944, 29-30.

<sup>67</sup>F 41 270 *Circulaire aux Délégués* No. 111, 7 February 1944, 1.

nation will know one day that it is avenged."<sup>68</sup> Many government officials were black-listed. In February 1944, London and Algiers radios broadcast that repression be restricted to Miliciens, Doriotistes, and informers. Resistance justice by the *Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* (FFI) deemed any aid, even indirect, to German troops was punishable by death, which explains the increased number of summary executions in the departments where the struggle raged.<sup>69</sup> The *Conseil National de la Résistance* (CNR) condemned the resistance "black lists" and summary executions.

Henriot asked if French "patriotism" was responsible for the murder of one Abbé Sorel, who came to say mass and was attacked because he defended the policy of the government? Was the bombing of a Toulouse cinema another act of "patriotism"? Did the victims die for their collaborationist opinions or for their relations with the Gestapo?<sup>70</sup> Henriot was not intimidated by his name being on Duchesne's black list: "I am not going to go away, Jacques Duchesne. I am staying here. You are on the sidelines. Your work is without risks. And I do not wish for your death. I wish only to be able to

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<sup>68</sup>Pierre Assouline, *L'Épuration des Intellectuels*, (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1990), 15-16. De Gaulle stated, "De ces hommes il n'y a qu'un seul mot à dire: "Trahison", qu'une seule chose à faire "Justice". Clemenceau disait: le pays connaîtra qu'il est défendu. Nous dirons: le pays un jour connaîtra qu'il est vengé."

<sup>69</sup>André Halimi, *La Délation sous l'Occupation*, (Paris: Editions Alain Moreau), 1983, 238. Halimi cites the CNRS estimates of approximately 2,500 individuals, in the pay of the German police, those guilty of the denunciation of patriots, active militants of pro-German organizations or those accused of black-market operations who were sentenced without trial from the autumn of 1943 to 6 June 1944.

<sup>70</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les avocats du maquis," *Editoriaux* 4, 2 March 1944, 27-29.

sleep in knowing that innocent victims, who died without knowing why, are dead because of you. You hate me only because you know that my voice has found a profound response in France among the youth you seek to recruit for your crime and whom I seek to rally to their duty."<sup>71</sup>

Henriot's 15 March broadcast, "the viper's nest," came as a psychological bombshell, announcing that the Lyon resistance had been slashed by the claws of Darnand's Milice. Milice/Gestapo raids on the headquarters of the resistance, Henriot claimed, had led to arrests, and the capture of documents and weapons. If this was true, the entire resistance network was compromised. Henriot alleged that captured documents revealed that the Communist resistance was dictating to Algiers and the CFLN. Lyon's network had been discovered and civil war averted by the forces of the *Maintien de l'Ordre*.<sup>72</sup> After the initial "scoop," nothing more was heard. Montpellier propaganda delegate Joseph Joffre noted that the lack of fuller disclosures cast doubt on the Minister's assertions. Public opinion, initially credulous, had become sceptical with the lack of information.<sup>73</sup> Henriot's editorial of 25 March responded to Joffre's concerns citing one Commander Carlos of Aragon's letter to André Marty, and spoke of coordinating efforts between Spanish Republicans and the MUR (*Mouvements Unis de*

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<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 30-31.

<sup>72</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Noeud de Vipères," *Editoriaux* 5, 15 March 1944, 58-59, 62-63.

<sup>73</sup>F 41 271 *Renseignements aux Délégués Régionales*, Joseph Joffre, Montpellier propaganda delegate to Henriot, State Secretary of Information and Propaganda, 17 March 1944, "L'Affaire de Lyon."

*la Résistance*).<sup>74</sup> Henriot's "viper's nest" also attracted the attention of the CFLN. Although tardy, Radio-London's riposte, Maurice Schumann's "Honneur et Patrie," dismissed the ravings of this "Perrette."<sup>75</sup> The Pucheu trial diverted attention from Lyon to Algiers and another treason trial.

The trial of Pierre Pucheu was the Gaullist reply to the Riom trial. Pucheu was the first to be judged by the CFLN decree of 3 September 1943 accusing members of the Vichy government of treason. The trial also marked a power struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. Giraud protested de Gaulle's refusal of clemency while de Gaulle insisted that French collaborators would be pursued and punished. The resistance demanded Pucheu's conviction for the Chateaubriant affair where the former minister had targeted Communists for execution.<sup>76</sup> Henriot claimed that Pucheu's prosecution was a political

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<sup>74</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Quand l'étranger commande," *Editoriaux* 6, 25 March 1944, 55-60.

<sup>75</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. CFLN Ref: ZAC/7/36703 Commissariat à l'Intérieur Dates- Inf: 31.3.44; Rec: 6.5.44; Diff: 23.5.44, "Nécessité d'une Riposte à Henriot," 2. The informant considered that the masses demanded *coups de grâce*....The sound of his voice lingers still, when one has turned the dial. What he has suggested remains in the mind. What has changed? The Resistance continues its task faithfully and the lie, in the face of the multitude of events, is forgotten.

<sup>76</sup>Benoît Yvert, *Dictionnaire des Ministres 1789-1989*, (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 724. As Darlan's Minister of the Interior, Pucheu attempted to purge France from "la racaille étrangère" and the "lèpre juive." Pucheu as Interior Minister was responsible for the Chateaubriant affair which targeted Communist hostages for execution in reprisal for resistance assassinations. Laval assumed the Ministry of the Interior in April 1942, offering Pucheu the Ministry of Industrial Production which he declined, accepting instead the appointment as Vichy ambassador to Berne, Switzerland. His growing belief in an Allied victory led him to submit a memorandum to Pétain with a view to securing France's entry into the war on the Allied side. Contacting General Henri Giraud in September 1942 after the Allied invasion of North Africa, Pucheu rallied to Giraud, arriving at Casablanca on 6 May 1943. Giraud's letter authorizing Pucheu to serve as captain of artillery on the Tunisian front failed to prevent his arrest. His trial began on 18 August 1943.

show trial engineered by the Communists, and its verdict a foregone conclusion. The discovery of eight corpses in Haute-Savoie, what he deemed a "French Katyn," were examples of Communist justice which dispensed with lawyers, pleas, and evidence, substituting kidnapping, threats and murder.<sup>77</sup> Radio-Moscow's broadcaster Weiss said that Pucheu's trial was only one episode of Vichy's treasonous conspiracy led by Marshal Pétain. Henriot charged that Weiss was rewriting the history of the armistice, forgetting the circumstances of 1940: the confusion and flight of an army without weapons led by politicians who affirmed that continuing the war was impossible. All were overwhelmed by a tidal wave sweeping everything before it in four weeks. Those responsible for the defeat were the judges and prosecutors who placed Pétain, the man who saved France when its so-called leaders abandoned her, in the dock alongside Pucheu.<sup>78</sup> Henriot reminded Weiss that the Marshal's armistice had retained the Army, Fleet, and Empire for France. De Gaulle's new allies, Fernand Grenier and comrades, who had painted de Gaulle as a mercenary of Anglo-American capitalism, were now in Gaullist ranks while obeying Stalin's orders. "We cannot mock them more completely than they mock themselves."<sup>79</sup>

Pucheu's trial saw London and Vichy radio as the voices of prosecution and

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Pucheu was sentenced on 11 March 1944 and executed on 20 March.

<sup>77</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Un Katyn français," *Editoriaux* 4, 6 March 1944, 56-57.

<sup>78</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Juif Weiss aux ordres de Moscou," *Editoriaux* 5, 10 March 1944, 22-23.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.

defence. Algiers' Ministry of Information directed its staff's attention to emphasizing the "Pucheu era" of repression, in collaboration with the Gestapo, against the vanguard of the armies of liberation.<sup>80</sup> Jean Oberlé portrayed Fernand Grenier, a Chateaubriant survivor who confronted Pierre Pucheu, as "the worker confronting his employer, the elementary student versus the normalien." Grenier charged that the prisons, the concentration camps, the hostages, and the execution squads were all the work of the former minister.<sup>81</sup> One young worker came to the bar and said simply, "In the tribunals established by Monsieur Pucheu, the proceedings were much more brief than today when twenty-seven were sentenced in less than a half-hour. I was able to escape, but the others...."<sup>82</sup> Henriot lashed out at Pucheu's accusers, the French Communists, those who disarmed France before sending her to the slaughter-house; those who formerly cried "Down with the army," and proclaimed that the proletariat has no country now called men to arms like vulgar fascists. The magistrates were *arrivistes* whose careers were advanced with the patronage of politicians and Jews. The deputies who voted against military credits and the three year service now censured the defeatism of a Marshal of France who attempted to save what they had lost. The embittered, ambitious, malcontents, Jews, wives and mistresses of intellectuals who spoke of altruism, devotion,

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<sup>80</sup>F 41 338 *Directives pour la radio vers la France*. Dec 43-May 44, CFLN: Comm. à l'Info. Alger, 4 mars 1944 No. XXVII, Directives pour la semaine 4-11 mars 1944, "France Occupée," "Le procès Pucheu," 1.

<sup>81</sup>Jean Oberlé, *Jean Oberlé Vous Parle*: Souvenirs de cinq années à Londres, (Paris: La Jeune Parque, 1945), 246-247.

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.*, 249.

and Christian charity were "mercenaries of conscience."<sup>83</sup>

On 11 March Pucheu was found guilty of "intelligence with the enemy." For Henriot, the verdict confirmed that Communism ruled in Algiers. Pucheu's was the first head to fall in an act of vengeance clothed with the judicial mantle.<sup>84</sup> For Jean Oberlé, though, the former Vichy minister had deliberately chosen the policy of collaboration with Germany. "Thiers, Jules Favre and Gambetta were honoured because they never ceded an inch more to Germany than that recognized by the armistice of 1871. If the Vichy Government had acted likewise, it would not be universally despised today. But by his commitment in 1940 to the policy of collaboration, in going to Montoire to shake hands with Hitler, Pétain had opened the door to the firing squad. Nothing obliged Pucheu to become Minister of the Interior, except his ambition.... exceptional measures against Frenchmen would never have occurred if the Pucheu ministry had not aided the Germans."<sup>85</sup> Pierre Dac's "Commentary on the Double Game" exposed Pucheu's efforts to excuse his actions. The logic of the double game argued that, while ostensibly aiding the Germans, state officials remained at their posts to "éviter le pire" - to prevent a greater evil. Dac mocked the double game. Pétain could argue that he had only used one hand to seal the Montoire accord. Laval's game was not a double game, but a triple or

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<sup>83</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Consciences à vendre," *Editoriaux* 5, 10 March 1944, 30-31. The "mistresses" in question may have been an oblique reference to Raissa Maritain, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil.

<sup>84</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La première tête," *Editoriaux* 5, 11 March 1944, 32.

<sup>85</sup>Oberlé, *op. cit.*, 252.

a quadruple game. The arrests were a double game. The logic was simple: when one is imprisoned, one cannot be arrested. It was the Gestapo and the Milice who were deceived.<sup>86</sup> "All that one gains from it [the double game] is dishonour; all that one can lose is one's head. What say you, chevaliers of the francisque and the swastika, sitting together in the dock with your false tokens? A shiver in the back and sweat on the brow, no?.... Well gentlemen, master players of the double game, the bets are placed!"<sup>87</sup>

London's *Honneur et Patrie* devoted increasing attention to Henriot, "the brown-shirted auxiliary mobilized by the *Wehrmacht* of the Hôtel du Parc." Henriot responded that insults masked the poverty of argument.<sup>88</sup> Churchill's cryptic "Ides of March" had come and gone, and Allied promises of liberation were received with increasing scepticism.<sup>89</sup> Instead of invasion, France received propaganda leaflets.<sup>90</sup> More importantly, Henriot emphasized that London was losing the propaganda war. Poland, Peter II of Yugoslavia, and King George of Greece were the sacrificial pawns of power

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<sup>86</sup>Pierre Dac, *Un Français libre à Londres en Guerre*, (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1972), 262-263. Those who made fortunes in dealing with the enemy played the double game arguing that they had taken back the money stolen from the French. Resisters to the Resistance accredited with thousands of incarcerations, deportations, and murders pleaded that they had prevented someone's arrest, or freed others.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, 265. The francisque was the Marshal's decoration awarded recognizing those who had rendered service to the French State. Former President François Mitterrand was a francisque recipient. See Pierre Péan, *Une Jeunesse Française, 1937-1947*, 1994.

<sup>88</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Quand les métèques crient 'Au drapeau!'" *Editoriaux 6*, 16 March 1944, 1-2.

<sup>89</sup>Philippe Henriot, "A qui la faute?" *Editoriaux 6*, 17 March 1944, 11.

<sup>90</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Ides de mars...", *Editoriaux 6*, 17 March 1944, 15-16.



politics. Henriot advised Finland to capitulate to the Soviets: the Allies could not intervene to guarantee a peace more favourable to Helsinki than that proposed by Stalin.<sup>91</sup> The issues that were to dominate the Cold-war were beginning to emerge.

The Marseille metal workers' strike inspired Henriot's 17 March broadcast on Vichy's corporatist labour policy. In a favourite pre-war theme, he reproved the profits made at workers' expense. Pétain had censured the class struggle that divided France, creating ruin and misery for both employers and workers. Capitalism's social duty was to conciliate workers' grievances.<sup>92</sup> Marseille regional propaganda delegate Paul Klotz reported to Sirot, one of Henriot's cabinet, that the Marseille Employers' Commission resented the minister's intrusion. The eight thousand metal-workers' grievance was that black market prices made subsistence impossible and demanded a three franc raise. The Employers' Commission argued that wages were fixed by the state. A tentative agreement on 20 March offering Marseille's workers parity with Parisian workers was later refuted. Workers' delegates accused employers of bargaining in bad faith. A Special Services document underlined that black market inflation increased antagonisms: workers starved while employers reaped profits from lucrative Reich contracts. Klotz reported that increasing sympathies for Communism among strikers constituted a *real danger* of social

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<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.*, 16-17.

<sup>92</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le devoir social," *Editoriaux* 6, 18 March 1944, 19-21.

revolution.[*original emphasis*]<sup>93</sup> Henriot's intrusion, timed to assist German efforts to end the strike, aggravated the *patrons*.<sup>94</sup> The strike resumed on 21 March and German authorities threatened to arrest union leaders while promising to consider workers' demands. The German notion of compulsory and binding arbitration was more compelling.

The Haute-Savoie was to be the test of wills between the resistance and the Milice. Occupied since November 1942, the mountainous Haute-Savoie became in 1943 the retreat for hundreds of *réfractaires*. In October and November 1943 authorities recorded 175 incidents in the department; the prefect's report to Laval spoke of a pre-civil-war climate.<sup>95</sup>

Henriot's claim that opinion was beginning to shift toward the government and the forces of order appeared spurious when Pétain's ministers had declared war on France's sons, tarring the Maquis as terrorists, bandits, and outlaws. On 10 February 1944 anti-communism ceased to be the rule whereby the Milice judged those who challenged the maintenance of order. Darnand no longer distinguished between "good"

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<sup>93</sup>F 41 344 *Direction des services spéciaux: Renseignements 1943-1944*, Bulletin de Renseignement no. D.76 du 11 février 1944, B.C.R.A. Alger, Référence: 10701, 14 February 1944, "La Situation dans la Région des Hautes Alpes," 1-2.

<sup>94</sup>F 41 271 *Renseignements aux Délégués Régionaux*, Klotz to Sirot, "Grève de la Metallurgie à Marseille," Marseille, 23 March 1944, 1-2.

<sup>95</sup>Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac "La bataille de Glières et la 'guerre psychologique'", in *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale* No. 99, July 1975, 46.

and "bad" terrorists when they resisted the decrees of the government.<sup>96</sup> While Henriot's broadcasts coaxed *réfractaires* to surrender without spilling blood, Darnand planned to divide, isolate, and conquer -- with German assistance, of course. The "viper's nest" of local maquis, *l'Armée Secrète*, and the Communist *Franco-tireurs et partisans* was at Glières.<sup>97</sup> The war against the maquis was about to begin.

General de Gaulle was also apprised of the military possibilities of the Savoie as a maquis refuge and a potential base of action. In September 1943 Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents British Lieutenant Colonel Helsop (Xavier) and French Captain Jean Rosenthal (Cantinier/Apothème) reported 2,350 men ready to fight with *l'Armée secrète*. Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, head of the National Commission of the Interior, and Georges Boris, civil delegate of the *Comité d'Action* (COMAC) were able to impress upon Churchill the potential of a French partisan army comparable to Tito's partisans.<sup>98</sup> Arming the Glières' maquis was a political decision to determine its effectiveness as a military force, and whether the resistance could be used to assist the

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<sup>96</sup>Azéma, *op. cit.*, 101.

<sup>97</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat Nationale de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. CFLN. Commissariat à l'Intérieur Dates - Inf: jan-fév-mars 1944; Rec: 17.4.44; Dif: 29.4.44. "La Semaine Politique à Vichy" 9.2.44, 2. "On suit attentivement ici les opérations miliciennes de Hte Savoie. L'impression des milieux officiels en général est que l'affaire est manquée. Au Parc, cependant, on declare que les opérations de force ne sont pas encore commencées, et que, pour le moment, on se contente d'isoler les différents groupes de réfractaires pour les amener à se rendre sans effusions de sang, (ce qui correspond à la thèse exposée par Philippe Henriot dans sa récent déclaration radiodiffusée)."

<sup>98</sup>Crémieux-Brilhac, *op. cit.*, 48.

coming invasion. The maquis of Thônes and Glières, led by former Armistice Army officers of the 27th *Bataillon de Chasseurs Alpins*, formed the nucleus led by Lieutenants Louis Jourdan (Joubert), Pierre Bastian, Théodose Morel (Tom), and Captain Maurice Anjot. A fully operational training camp impressed the SOE agents who recommended air drops to arm the maquisards. Glières plateau was selected as the drop zone.<sup>99</sup> In the last days of January 1944, Glières was notified by London to prepare to receive parachuted arms in February. While the Secret Army of Haute-Savoie was notified of RAF air drops, special reinforcements were rolling toward Annency while Colonel Lelong was printing posters declaring a state of seige in the department.<sup>100</sup>

BCRA reports for Haute-Savoie reported the lassitude of war-weariness. German reprisals and lack of food had taken their toll. The Savoyards hoped for an end to the war but were reluctant to assume an active role in the liberation. All looked to Great Britain and the United States as France's hope of deliverance from the occupation. Hope was tempered, however, by the fear of invasion. Henriot's "psychosis of terrorism" appeared to have some effect. Russia retained the admiration of all, including the bourgeoisie who no longer considered it the scourge of 1917. So much for Henriot's "red-scare" tactics. Hostility to Germany was extreme. German counter-terrorism put entire villages to the torch, claiming fifty victims in Haute-Savoie in a fortnight,

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<sup>99</sup>Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis, op. cit.*, 134-35.

<sup>100</sup>Crémieux-Brilhac, *op. cit.*

provoking fury in some and instilling panic in others.<sup>101</sup> Henriot's attacks against the Algiers Committee appeared to make some inroads. Many Savoyards viewed Algiers with mistrust, noting that it contained too many old-guard Communists, Jews, and masons, while the purges appeared to be settling old scores. Some villagers applauded the prosecution of the black marketeers, collaborators, and informers, but the majority desired only to be left in peace.<sup>102</sup>

London's signal of an imminent arms drop coincided with the opening of Darnand's offensive, prompting the ascent to the Glières plateau led by Captain Théodose Morel (Tom), the young (28), charismatic Saint-Cyr instructor. Tom's AS maquis invited adjacent *Francs-Tireurs et Partisans* (FTP) camps, "*Maurice Coulomb*" and "*Liberté Chérie*" to join him. Within days others joined, swelling the ranks from 200 to 465 including a company of fifty-six Spaniards threatened with deportation, fleeing Vichy's

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<sup>101</sup>F 41 344 *Direction des services spéciaux: Renseignements 1943-1944*, Bulletin de Renseignement no. D.76 du 11 février 1944, B.C.R.A. Alger, Référence: 10701, 14 février 1944, "La Situation dans la Région des Hautes Alpes," 1-2. Opposition to Laval's collaboration policy was quasi-unanimous. The Marshal, it was believed, was being forced to submit to Laval's dictates and was unable to exercise his functions.

<sup>102</sup>*Ibid.*, 2-4. The BCRA report distinguished four Maquis categories: Communist *Francs-Tireurs et Partisans* was the most active, but rarely confronted the enemy. Its *modus vivendi* was sabotage and intimidation. Popular support for the FTP was gained by distributing stolen ration books to factory workers. The *Armée Secrète*, comprising former officers, complained of the lack of materiel and would be obliged either to join the FTP or dissolve. Other groups' military effectiveness depended on their leadership: some were no more than bandits posing as resistance. The maquis, escapees from the STO, were in hiding and constituted a negligible military force. The population supported maquis activities against the Germans as long as they were spared German reprisals. The lack of a strong German garrison fostered the growth of the resistance, but the German command did not consider the maquis a threat.

*Travail Étranger* by hiding in the mountains.<sup>103</sup> On the night of 13/14 February fifty-four arms containers were parachuted to the waiting maquis. Morel's motto, "live free or die," set the tone for Glières' resistance as the first corner of liberated France. Captain Jean Rosenthal (Cantinier), the inter-allied military mission delegate, invited Maurice Schumann and Radio-London to promote the notion of the Glières maquis as Frenchmen fighting for their own liberation.<sup>104</sup> Behind Morel's maquis and Darnand's Milice were the French of Radio London and Vichy, England and Germany. As Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac observed, on another level, less real than perceived, was the image of liberated and occupied France. The battle of Glières assumed a symbolic dimension, "less the military action on French soil and more a symbol of a struggle for the French soul."<sup>105</sup> Glières afforded high drama for French radio audiences.

Vichy's forces under Colonel Lelong comprised the GMR (*Garde mobiles des réserves*) "Aquitaine" from the west of France supporting the Milice. Operations began with Vichy forces encircling Glières, isolating the maquis from the support of surrounding villages. Encirclement was not conquest, however, and casualties were high in clashes between mid-February and mid-March. On 9 March, during a surprise night

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<sup>103</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 136.

<sup>104</sup>Crémieux-Brilhac, *op. cit.*, 51-52. "Cantinier" requested, "Il faut donner du coeur et de la patience aux combattants qui souffrent, qui sont sans armes, sans nourriture et parfois perdent confiance." Radio links with London, Radio-Alger, Radio-Brazzaville and Radio-France in Moscow complied with "Cantinier's" request.

<sup>105</sup>*Ibid.*, 54.

attack on the GMR post at Entremont, GMR commandant Lefèvre was seized. Taken before Morel, Lefèvre was allowed to retain his pistol in respect for his rank. The prisoner then drew his weapon and shot Morel before being shot himself. The anger and shock of the maquisards at "Tom's" death coincided with a massive parachute drop of 580 containers. Tom's successor, Captain Maurice Anjot (Bayard), entrenched his force on the plateau making Glières a fortress.<sup>106</sup> Maurice Schumann commemorated the loss of Lieutenant Morel (Tom) on 21 March, and Radio-London warned Vichy's police units, especially the Savoie GMR, that Pucheu's execution on 20 March was fair warning. Security forces were to disobey the orders of the enemy, be they German or Vichy.<sup>107</sup> By mid-March, London's propaganda offensive appeared to have influenced the GMR commandant, who relieved *gendarmes* and guards who were having second thoughts. A captured maquisard claimed that their war was against the Germans, not the *gendarmes* and *Milice*. Sixty GMR surrendered and joined the maquis; even some *Miliciens* expressed misgivings.<sup>108</sup>

Darnand arrived at Annency on 18 March to redress the situation, and in consultation with Karl Oberg, agreed to call for German reinforcements on 20 March.

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<sup>106</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 137.

<sup>107</sup>Crémieux-Brilhac, *op. cit.*, 63. "G.M.R. de Savoie, G.M.R. de partout, dites-vous bien que le crime du 13 mars, venant après tant d'autres, hélas! risque de faire peser sur vous une suspicion dont vous ne pouvez vous laver qu'en accomplissant, à votre tour, le grand devoir de désobéissance envers l'ennemi et ses Waffen S.S. de Vichy. G.M.R., pensez-y à Pucheu! La France est magnanime. Mais elle n'entendra point l'excuse de ses fils renégats qui, sur son propre sol, auront contre Elle porté les armes, et chez Elle, assuré la relève de l'ennemi."

<sup>108</sup>*Ibid.*

On Sunday, 26 March, Glières was shelled and bombed. General Pflaum's 157th Alpine division of three infantry battalions, two battalions of *Schutzpolizei*, artillery, 4,000 GMR, with Milice and Gestapo reinforcements, assaulted and breached the Glières defence. Captain Anjou gave the order to retreat and disperse.<sup>109</sup> For many the order to disperse became a rout.

The victory clamour of Radio-Paris informed London of the end. Henriot established a remote broadcast post at Thorens to report the collapse of the Glières resistance and "the end of a legend." The maquis was nothing more than a motley collection of aliens and French betrayed by their leaders who, after the first assault on their positions, threw down their weapons in order to flee more quickly.<sup>110</sup> Henriot depicted the disciplined, volunteer soldiers of the Milice as the force which had replaced the maquis legend with their own. He also reported that some villagers had assisted in the round-up of the terrorists.<sup>111</sup> Expecting proud, defiant soldiers, he reported a dispirited collection of haggard derelicts. The flight of the maquis leaders reminded Henriot of 1940, adding, "one would have thought that they would have seized the

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<sup>109</sup>*Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>110</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La fin d'une légende," *Editoriaux* 7, 29 March 1944, 23-24. Of the two commanders, Henriot portrayed the rebel commander, Valette d'Auzart, as a coward who deserted his men. In contrast, Henriot portrayed Milice Commandant Bernonville, veteran of two German wars, with thirty wounds in the service of France, as a heroic figure battling not against Frenchmen but against cowards and terrorists.

<sup>111</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Printemps de Savoie," *Editoriaux* 7, 29 March 1944, 27-28.



occasion to redeem its stigma."<sup>112</sup> Captain Jean Rosenthal, hiding in Annency, asked Radio-London to refute Henriot's lies. The Miliciens were merely auxiliaries of the *Wehrmacht* and SS. The plateau fell only after a ten-day artillery barrage, air and infantry assault. The Milice pillaged and burned farms in the area and assisted in the man-hunt.<sup>113</sup>

"The men of the maquis fought like lions and the Miliciens like rascals," Schumann reported in *Honneur et Patrie*. From 31 January to 26 March 1944, 465 maquisards defied Darnand's forces and battalions of the German Army. Schumann's broadcasts of 7, 8, and 11 April extolled the heroism of the combatants, officers of the Armistice Army, which had exposed Vichy's impotence. The first military engagement on French soil since 1940, the German intervention, and the final assault on Glières all gave a legendary quality to the battle. Haute-Savoie prefect Marion, despite his antipathy for the maquis, acknowledged that the population resented Henriot's lies. The vast majority were sympathetic not only to *réfractaires* and the Secret Army, but to all groups in conflict with established authority. Marion further signalled the escalating collapse of

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<sup>112</sup>*Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>113</sup>Crémieux-Brilhac, *op. cit.*, 68. Maquis losses in the battle and retreat included Anjot and 150 maquisards. Another 200 maquisards and villagers were arrested, tortured, and later deported. The man-hunt was carried out by the Milice, the GMR, and the Germans. On two occasions, German troops released captured maquisards only to shoot them like rabbits as they were forced to stumble away from their captors across open fields. Prisoners not killed immediately were either deported or shot after Vichy courts martial. Kedward, *op. cit.*, 137.

Vichy's local authority with numerous resignations from the municipalities.<sup>114</sup>

In Glières' aftermath, *Honneur et Patrie* nominated Lieutenant Morel to the Resistance Panthéon. Henriot nominated GMR Commandant Lefèvre for the Marshal's *francisque*. Henriot deemed that Morel had betrayed his oath as an officer, disobeyed his superiors, deserted, and joined the *Francs-tireurs* and Spanish Reds in an ambush against fellow soldiers. Henriot cited Commandant Lefèvre's service as a reserve officer in 1914-1918 with the Legion of Honour, a veteran of 1939-1940, and recipient of the Order of the Nation.<sup>115</sup>

Henriot cited Glières as a fearful example of the consequences of resistance. Resistance forfeited any right to protest German maltreatment; collaboration meant obedience to the orders of France's leaders. While the memories of the Marne, Verdun, and Sedan precluded a Franco-German *rapprochement* for many, Henriot argued that France and Germany would continue to share a common border. Each conflict created only bloody injuries, territorial amputations fostering revenge, and with it the seeds of the next war. "What treason and dishonour is there in envisaging the defence of a common patrimony endorsed by Talleyrand, Victor Hugo, Napoleon, and Marshal

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<sup>114</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 138.

<sup>115</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Honneur et Patrie," *Editoriaux* 8, 7 April 1944, 25-26. London indicated that Lefèvre's weapon was surrendered and Morel returned it, according his adversary the "honours of war."

Lyautey," asked Henriot.<sup>116</sup> Commemorating the end of the Spanish Civil War on 1 April 1939, Henriot reminded France of the atrocities committed by Stalin's executioners. France had inherited Spain's civil war of divided families, army, and nation.<sup>117</sup> The Milice *élan* of sacrifice, maligned by the radio of Jews, aliens, and mercenaries, was Henriot's vision of a new France, akin to Italy's Fascists, Spain's Falange, Germany's Hitler Jugend, Ireland's IRA, and Romania's Iron Guard.<sup>118</sup> This indicated how completely Henriot had adopted the ideas of National Socialism.

Was there a Franco-French war in the spring of 1944, as Henriot and Professor Amouroux suggest? A report to the CFLN Interior Commissariat indicated that a civil war psychosis, created by assassinations and assaults, was further exacerbated by Henriot's editorials. The middle-classes, Henriot's largest audience, feared the collapse of law and order. In Toulouse, bourgeois and Catholic circles were attentive to his editorials on the Algiers Committee, the maquis, and the struggle against terrorism. Workers, threatened victims of Laval's STO, were more receptive to Communist propaganda. Henriot's audience ranged from Milice militants to the *attentistes* whose "wait-and-see" attitude was divided between London and Vichy.<sup>119</sup> Popular support for

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<sup>116</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Notre choix," *Editoriaux* 7, 31 March 1944, 39-40.

<sup>117</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Arriba Espagna," *Editoriaux* 7, 1 April 1944, 48.

<sup>118</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Président chez les Miliciens," *Editoriaux* 8, 5 April 1944, 15.

<sup>119</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. CFLN. Comm. à l'Intérieur Ref. RIA/2/36700 Source; Aveine Dates- Inf. avril; Rec: 6.5.44; Dif: 18.5.44, "Les Réactions de l'Opinion Publique à l'égard des Editoriaux Prononcés par Philippe Henriot." 2-3.

both the maquis and the resistance was apparent. The struggle, as Professor Kedward documents, was against the forces of occupation, not the resistance. Jean Pujudas, one of many Spanish political refugees in the southern zone, claimed that France was not divided like Spain. Maquisards also rejected the notion of a civil war. It was more a question of France as a whole becoming increasingly resentful of an unrepresentative and tyrannical government acting in collusion with the enemy. The escalating brutality of German and Vichy repression provoked emotions and actions comparable to the virulence of a civil war.<sup>120</sup>

Information received at the *Commissariat Nationale de l'Intérieur* warned of the dangers of Henriot's propaganda sowing doubt and confusion in a discouraged people. A concerted counter-propaganda offensive would destroy his arguments. "Henriot, too intelligent to ignore the inexorable development of events, rejects the outcome, obeys his master who has appointed him to the post of minister so long anticipated. Proud and committed, he proclaims his love of France in all his editorials. He has gambled on the German victory with so much fanfare that it is too late to retreat. One of Germany's valets, he will say anything in order to attack the enemies of this power, who are his enemies. Exploiting the slow suffering of the French, their deceived hopes, their privations, he unscrupulously injects his venom into each broadcast."<sup>121</sup> The snail's

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<sup>120</sup>Kedward, *op .cit.*, 155.

<sup>121</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. CFLN Ref: ZAC/7/36703 Commissariat à l'Intérieur Dates- Inf: 31.3.44; Rec: 6.5.44; Diff: 23.5.44, "Nécessité d'une Riposte à Henriot," 1.

pace of the Allied advance in Italy, the Communist red spectre, the bombing campaign, and assassinations worked in his favour. Henriot's propaganda seduced listeners with deceit. The informant recommended immediate action by either Radio-France, the BBC, or even a clandestine station created for this purpose. It was imperative that at 12h 30 and 19h 30, an orator of great talent and with *an equal voice* [original emphasis] anticipate, refute, and destroy his subtle arguments. "We know the attacker, the several arguments by which he prepares his assaults -- his rage, his perfidy, his pride and also his fear. We know his artillery. A counter-battery, judiciously and rigorously applied, can only be successful."<sup>122</sup>

German military authorities, frustrated by Vichy civil servants who paid lip-service to German directives while villagers supported the maquis, now dispensed with the façade of formal correctness.<sup>123</sup> The Franco-French war was a war between the Occupation authorities and its alliance with Vichy government against Frenchmen.

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<sup>122</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>123</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 123-124. Professor Kedward emphasizes that the maquis could not be separated from the communities which supported them. This fact was recognized by the Germans, who terrorized communities sympathetic to the maquis. The Germans considered the maquis as terrorists beyond the protection of the rules of war. Instead of arresting suspect villagers and investigating their case, they chose terror, torture, and summary executions. See also Robert Zaretsky, *Nîmes at War: Religion, Politics, and Public Opinion in the Gard, 1938-1944*, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

## Chapter 10: The Tunic of Nessus

Seeking to divide and conquer as in 1940, high-ranking Nazi leaders, Goering, Goebbels, sounded out the Allies on peace terms other than unconditional surrender. Propaganda's role in support of this diplomacy was to create the persuade the Allies that the "Atlantic Wall," "Fortress Europe," and new secret weapons would shatter the cross-Channel invasion. Eisenhower had a speech prepared in case of another Dieppe -- the failure of Operation Overlord. To ensure that did not occur, Allied air power was directed towards the destruction of factories, submarine bases, railways and bridges. The second battle for France was about to begin. Milice propaganda and terrorism sought to create passivity, suppress resistance, and satisfy Germany's voracious demands for labour. By April 1944, half of the new directors of the penitentiary service were miliciens promoted to regional intendants for the maintenance of order, assisting at tribunals and fomenting terror in Haute-Savoie, Limousin, and Brittany. However, Henriot's ideological crusade against "stateless terrorists and criminal assassins" was problematic when resisters sentenced to death were crying "Vive la France."<sup>1</sup> Henriot's tenure as minister purged the *attentiste* cadres and replaced them with Milice militants. Like Hitler's SS, the Milice "ultras" had become a state within the State.

An insight into Henriot's personality can be gained from his novel, *La Tunique*

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<sup>1</sup>Dominique Rossignol, *Histoire de la propagande en France de 1940 à 1944: L'Utopie Pétain*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), 268.

*de Nessus* (1927). The novel described a failed author, Albéric Hermaux, whose ambition to become another Hugo or Chateaubriand exceeded his talent. Claiming the drama of a dead friend as his own, Hermaux's subsequent acclaim was akin to Macbeth's usurped crown.<sup>2</sup> The Macbeth tragedy was combined with the classical Greek myth of Heracles. In classical mythology, the centaur Nessus, attempting to rape Deïaneira, Heracles' Calydonian bride, was wounded fatally by one of the hero's poisoned arrows smeared with the venom of the Hydra. The dying centaur persuaded Deïaneira to make a love charm of his blood and semen tainted with the Hydra's venom. When Heracles took the young Iole as his concubine, Deïaneira remembered the love philtre and smeared it on Heracles' tunic. The Hydra's corrosive venom ate away at his flesh. In agony, the dying Heracles built a funeral pyre to destroy himself.<sup>3</sup> Macbeth's ambition and the tunic of Nessus were prophetic themes of Henriot's career as minister and his ultimate fate.

Resignations and dismissals disrupted all ministry functions. Paul Creyssel, former minister of Information, had hoped to restrain Henriot's purges, but fled Vichy upon learning of the German warrant for his arrest.<sup>4</sup> By 13 January 1944, radio, press, and censorship were purged by and replaced with Henriot's "ultras" -- Bernard Taddei di Torelli, Henriot's deputy-minister, Charles Filippi as Secretary, Victor Bozon (ex-

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<sup>2</sup>Philippe Henriot, *La Tunique de Nessus*, (Paris: Editions Spes, 1927), 60.

<sup>3</sup>Edward Tripp (ed.) *The Handbook of Classical Mythology*, (London: Arthur Barker Ltd. 1970), 293-295.

<sup>4</sup>Philippe Amaury, *Les Deux Premières Expériences d'un "Ministère de l'Information" en France*, (Paris: Librairie R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias, 1969), 290-294.

*Jeunesses Patriotes*), and his adjutant Jean-Victor Sirot implemented Henriot's directives. Bernard Taddei di Torella, was responsible for political information and propaganda, the technical departments, programs, and both central and regional stations and studios.<sup>5</sup> The law of 5 February 1944 decreed that the State Secretary of Information and Propaganda was also appointed President of the Radiodiffusion Council, ousting André Demaison. Law no. 107 of 26 February 1944 further reinforced the power of the minister. Departmental delegates were sacked while regional delegates, accorded the same rank and prerogatives as regional police intendants, were accountable only to the minister.<sup>6</sup>

Henriot's purges disrupted his ministry. In workers' propaganda, François Chasseigne was replaced by his assistant, Gaillard, who reported in March 1944 the total disaffection of the working class toward all government organizations. Henriot was forced to recall Chasseigne to assist with Déat's Labour Ministry. Workers' propaganda delegates were to be recruited from former Communists, neo-Socialists, and Socialists who had rallied to collaboration and the European Order.<sup>7</sup> Déat's appointment as Labour

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<sup>5</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat Nationale de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. Ref: MTB/2/35905 Dates- Inf: 18.2.44; Réc: 17.4.44; Dif: 3.5.44. "Vichy Nomination de Taddei di Torella au Contrôle de la Propagande des Ecoutes Radiophoniques, Ministère de l'Information."

<sup>6</sup>F 41 270 *Propagande CIR* (Centres d'Information et Renseignements) *Circulaire aux Délégués* No. 112 16 March 1944, 1.

<sup>7</sup>Amaury, *op. cit.*, 298 and Maurice Martin du Gard, *La Chronique de Vichy 1940-1944*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 342. Thursday 4 May 1944, Martin du Gard reported Laval's delight that Déat had finally realized his ambition and was now part of the "brawl." Convinced that the Germans would recognize the support of *l'Oeuvre*, Déat was disappointed to discover that his role as minister would not be made easier. Déat considered the government as a triangle: on one side Darnand and Henriot, on the other Laval, with himself as the third. He was unwilling to



Minister by Laval on 16 March was viewed by London's BCRA as Déat's bid for power, and another example of Laval's shrewd manipulations.<sup>8</sup> Déat's Ministry of Labour was constrained to fulfil Sauckel's labour quotas earning him the epithet, "minister of national deportation." Radio Brazzaville instructed *réfractaires* to return their census forms with illegible names and addresses. The Prefect of the Ain complained of the state's "meagre compensation" for loss of work. Neither workers nor employers would claim it, for fear that those unemployed would be conscripted for labour service in Germany.<sup>9</sup>

Peasant propaganda suffered from similar problems. Henriot's speech at the Palais de Chaillot on 27 May complained of functionaries who created administrative difficulties: "One never knows whether they emanate from congenital stupidity or from refined sabotage...."<sup>10</sup> Vichy's *Corporation Paysanne* carried the banner "La Terre ne ment pas," but by 1944 Vichy had forfeited the allegiance of rural France. The Resistance now claimed the defence of "ancient liberties" and "the nation of our

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work with Darnand-Henriot, who would work with Laval. Laval remained indifferent, awaiting better days.

<sup>8</sup>F 41 344 *Direction des services spéciaux: Renseignements 1943-1944*, Bulletin de Renseignement B.C.R.A. Alger, Ref. No. 17534/A, 24 March 1944, "Déat Ministre," 1-2. On nous dit d'origine de foi, que dans un repas offert il y a des jours par Bunau-Varilla, propriétaire du journal "Le Matin", à Darnand et Henriot, on parle de Déat, et les deux invités de Bunau extériorisèrent, en termes très vifs, leur opposition à l'esprit et à la méthode de leur nouveau collègue. Ces hommes ont la même aspiration politique: être le premier. Leur opposition réciproque, qui ne tardera pas à se manifester, est une garantie de durabilité pour Laval. On peut être assuré qu'il saura exploiter la situation au bénéfice de son propre intérêt.

<sup>9</sup>H. R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France, 1942-1944*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 157.

<sup>10</sup>Amaury, *op. cit.*, 298.

ancestors." Popular defiance against the STO created a Resistance sub-culture. Auxois maquis raised money by levying taxes on the population on a sliding scale of known collaborators at the top to *attentistes* at the bottom, leaving resisters untaxed. A maquis police operated in the Cevennes, punishing acts of pillage and warning the population of "blouson noirs," the false maquisards who were an inevitable social product of a disintegrating authoritarian régime.<sup>11</sup> Chancel's propaganda poster showed a field of wheat with rifles aimed at a German convoy protruding from the stalks, entitled "Produits du sol."<sup>12</sup> Rural France resisted Vichy in 1944 as fiercely as it had resisted Paris in 1794. "Throne and altar" of 1794 had become de Gaulle & liberation by 1944.

Henriot's empire extended to René Bonnefoy's press and censorship department and Louis-Emile Galey's cinema department. Bonnefoy was dissuaded from resigning only with Laval's promise that he would report to the President alone. But the law of 26 February 1944 relative to regional delegates of Information gave Henriot powers which permitted his intervention in press and censorship.<sup>13</sup> Charles Filippi, former Toulouse lawyer, PPF member, and milicien, communicated a German order suspending *La Dépêche de Toulouse* and seizing its paper stocks. Bonnefoy refused to authorize the

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<sup>11</sup>Kedward, *op. cit.*, 246. Seized food reserves and livestock earmarked for the German Army were liberated and returned to their former owners or producers where the Maquis could be seen as protecting the rural economy more effectively than Vichy.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 249. In the Cevennes, the outlaw culture dominated for a year and a half resting on a power base of solidarity and rapprochement between the towns and the countryside.

<sup>13</sup>Amaury, *op. cit.*, 299.

order, protesting that neither the Germans nor Filippi had the right. He admitted that his authority was paralysed: "I refuse to work!" he declared, adding, "I can do no more! Henriot is a scoundrel [*salaud*] who thinks only of reprisals. I remain only to protect some friends."<sup>14</sup>

Laval's sorcerer's apprentices zealously worked to fulfill German wishes for a passive and obedient population. Henriot as minister scorned the French middle class and Catholics he once professed to represent, observing that *attentisme* prevailed despite his efforts to frighten them with the red spectre: "The bourgeoisie showed itself by its well-known watchword, 'I am not political' [*Je ne fais pas de politique*]... I have often remarked that if there were no Catholics to vote for the anticlericals, they would never have their majority in the Chamber. [Did] ...the socialist-communist majorities owe more to the convictions of sincere workers who voted for them, or to the cowardice of a certain bourgeoisie who believed, by supporting them, they were insured against revolution?"<sup>15</sup> Henriot's venomous broadcasts were not merely a response to the growing power of the maquis: he had fallen under the spell of the Nazi revolution,

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<sup>14</sup>Martin du Gard, *op. cit.*, 344. Bonnefoy and Laval were able to resist Henriot's stratagem. Laval defeated Henriot's effort to replace Bonnefoy with J.-L. Vaudoyer on 8 May. *Archives de Guerre d'Angelo Tasca*, 593. The paper shortage did not prevent Henriot's ministry from publishing and distributing tens of thousands of copies of his *Editorials* throughout both zones. Two thousand copies of Henriot's 1943 radio broadcasts "Et S'Il's Débarquaient?" and 50,000 copies of his early 1944 radio broadcasts were distributed. The press runs of later broadcasts were even greater; 75,000 of *Editoriaux* 6 and 7 and 85,000 of *Editoriaux* 12, 13, and 14 were published. The German Occupation authorities endorsed the necessary paper requisitions. See F 41 290 *Philippe Henriot: Diffusion - Editoriaux*.

<sup>15</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Souvenirs d'un Militant," *Combats* 44, 29 January 1944, 2.

adopting its racial policies, discourse, and techniques.<sup>16</sup> Vichy's radio and press propaganda bore Goebbels' unmistakable signature, emphasizing Germany's will to resist and belief in the New European Order.

German propaganda directives of April 1944 contained most of Henriot's themes and reveal how completely the Nazi ideology had permeated Vichy's official propaganda. The collective was emphasized over individual "egoism" as "the guarantee of life and the security of the personality." The bombing campaign, noted the directives, failed to weaken Germany's military-industrial capacity: "Each bomb that explodes on German soil releases new energies." Area bombing and its attendant civilian casualties were symptomatic of bankrupt Allied strategy. Fortress Europe's Atlantic Wall was impregnable: any breach would be sealed by mobile reserves. Germany's new weapons would ensure a German victory.<sup>17</sup> German propaganda went on to discredit the Atlantic Charter by exposing Allied acquiescence to Soviet claims on the Baltic States and Poland, and the sell-out of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Only a European Army under German leadership could conquer Bolshevism.<sup>18</sup> Roosevelt's guarantees to respect France's autonomy in North Africa were annulled by the American refusal to recognize

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<sup>16</sup>H.R. Kedward, "The Vichy of the Other Philippe" in Hirschfeld, Gerhard and Patrick Marsh, *Collaboration in France: Politics in France during the Nazi Occupation, 1940-1944*, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1989), 40.

<sup>17</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française*: Ref. ZAC/8/36701, Dates Inf. 20 avril 1944; Réc. 7 juin 1944; Dif. 29.6.44, "Directives de la Propagande Allemande en France pour la Presse et la Radio", 20.4.44." 3-4.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 6-8.

either Vichy or the Algiers Committee as the provisional government of France. American war aims amounted to a Yankee *Mare nostrum* in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The de Gaulle-Giraud dispute, the trial and execution of Pierre Pucheu, the purge of Vichy officials betokened the repression awaiting those who had remained faithful to the Marshal. British promises to restore France's liberty belied its historical animosity to France as witnessed by its strategy which justified the destruction of France's fleet and the bombing of France's cities.<sup>19</sup>

Henriot cited Poland as the precedent for another division of eastern Europe. On 28 January he reminded Churchill of the British proclamation of 3 September 1940, that territorial changes after August 1939 would not be recognized without the free consent of the interested parties.<sup>20</sup> London had recognized the legitimacy of the Sikorski government and Poland's pre-war borders while Moscow offered another definition of legitimacy, more in keeping with its territorial gains under the Nazi-Soviet pact. Henriot cited the statements of the *Observer* protesting that "the Bolshevisation of Eastern Poland and the imposition of a Communist government would make the Teheran and Moscow declarations worthless scraps of paper."<sup>21</sup> Henriot reminded his audience that Stalin had recognized not Peter II, nor General Mihailovitch, but Marshal Tito and his Communist partisans. Emigré governments, sheltered by London, stood little chance against the Red

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<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 10-12.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 28 January 1944 19 h. 40, 25-26.

<sup>21</sup>*Allocutions de Philippe Henriot*, 25 January 1944, 19-20.

Tsar. The independence of France was bound up with that of Poland and Yugoslavia. Soviet recognition of the Algiers Committee was worthless in light of Soviet betrayals.<sup>22</sup> Henriot declared in his editorial "Les 'abonnés de Brest-Litovsk'" that "if Russia and Germany find themselves confronting each other with the collapse of Poland, Germany will face a terrible, and to some, a prodigious choice. Either she will be plunged into the Bolshevik chaos or bar the route to revolutionary barbarism by the strength of courage and virtue, establishing a dike to stop the barbaric flood from the East, saving her own interests as well as those of her antagonists in the West. If the Germans were capable of rendering such a service, they would have taken a giant step in the path of their redemption and that would allow them to resume their great place in the councils of Christianity." Henriot concluded by announcing that the words were Churchill's not his.<sup>23</sup>

Henriot exposed American propaganda which condemned fascism and defended Europe's Jews while segregation condemned twelve million blacks to ghettos of crime, disease, prostitution, and despair: "The country representing the *avant-garde* of social progress that confines its modern slaves to conditions worthy of the Soviets should not teach us virtues that are only found in the great democracies."<sup>24</sup> He called attention to dissension in Anglo-American ranks over the protracted Italian campaign. While France

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<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 31 January 1944, 33.

<sup>23</sup>Amaury, *op. cit.*, 282-283. The broadcast was aired on 25 April.

<sup>24</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Racisme à l'américaine," *Editoriaux* 9, 13 April 1944, 4.

awaited the invasion, uncertainty fostered speculation. American vice-president Wallace warned that the Soviet doctrine of world revolution threatened a third world war.<sup>25</sup> Henriot perceived that the second front was the first battle in a third world war.

The cumulative purpose of these themes was to wear down the French will to resist. Germany, Henriot argued, was the lesser evil. Henriot challenged the common complaint that "the Germans take everything," arguing that German requisitions were in accord with the armistice. The French could blame food shortages on resistance sabotage that reduced already meagre rations.<sup>26</sup> The Anglo-American invasion, he argued, would result in another military occupation equally burdensome. Henriot's "psychosis of terrorism" bespoke a policy designed to destroy hope, creating doubt, despair and passivity in its wake.

It failed. Hope came from listening to the BBC and Radio-Sottens.<sup>27</sup> Clandestine best-sellers, especially Vercors' (Jean Bruller's) *Le Silence de la mer* and Forez (François

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<sup>25</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Second front et threesome guerre," *Editoriaux* 9, 14 April 1944, 13.

<sup>26</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La paille et la poutre," *Editoriaux* 9, 17 April 1944, 37-38.

<sup>27</sup>Jacques Parrot, *La Guerre des Ondes: De Goebbels à Kadhafi*, (Paris: Plon, 1987), 133. One of Henriot's radio adversaries was René Payot at Swiss Radio-Sottens. The neutrality of Swiss radio found a welcome French audience in both zones, as Swiss broadcasts were less likely to be jammed. Payot defended bombing, arguing that establishing air supremacy and the isolation of the region was the prelude to invasion. Payot's broadcasts provided information to the French that their own radio masked, and he refused to play Henriot's game of engaging in personal polemics. Payot spoke of German demands and resistance attacks which Henriot had attempted to minimize. Henriot could only portray Payot as the "oracle consacré des attentistes sclérosés et des anglophiles honteux."

Mauriac's) *Le Cahier Noir*, were documents of hope for liberation. *Les Éditions de Minuit* were dedicated to intellectual resistance, "le combat de l'esprit." To resist was to react, to fight against apathy and despair.<sup>28</sup> Jacques Maritain's broadcast on Voice of America appealed to French Catholics and Republican France "to rediscover the evangelic sources of democracy." Henriot ridiculed Maritain who baptized with holy water a modified Third Republic.<sup>29</sup> André Maurois, Pertinax, Jacques Maritain, Philippe Barrès, Jules Romains -- these were Henriot's constellation of stateless traitors. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, author of *Night Flight*, was one example of those who claimed to represent the soul of France, shared its sorrows, and railed against the chains which bound France. Henriot characterized Saint-Exupéry's fear for France as a childhood fear of being lost in the void.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Ethel Tolansky, "Les Cahiers du Silence," in *Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology*, (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985), 227-228. The RAF dropped hundreds of thousands of miniature copies of *Le Silence de la mer*. *Les Cahiers du Silence* 1943-45, in order of publication, comprised Vercors', *Le Silence de la Mer* (1943) translated by Cyril Connolly as *Put Out the Light* (Macmillan, 1944); Forez' (Francois Mauriac's) *Le Cahier Noir* (1944); Argonne's (Jacques Debu-Bridel's), *Angleterre (D'Alcuin à Huxley)*; Minervois' (Claude Aveline's), *Les Temps Mort* (1945); and Vercors', *La Marche à l'Etoile* (1945).

<sup>29</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les frères prêcheurs de la dissidence," *Editoriaux* 11, 2 May 1944, 15. Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), Protestant born Catholic convert, together with his wife Raïssa, hosted a cultural salon of the "Catholic revival" including "personalist" philosopher Emmanuel Mounier and artist Georges Roualt. A disciple of Bergson, Maritain became a modern interpreter of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Appointed as France's ambassador to the Vatican (1945-48), he lectured at Princeton University for twelve years.

<sup>30</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Vol de nuit," *Editoriaux* 9, 18 April 1944, 53. Antoine de Saint Exupéry (1900-1944) lived a life of danger and adventure as a military pilot (1921-23) and as a commercial pilot in Africa and South America. *Southern Mail* (1933), *Night Flight* (1932) described in lyrical prose the flight of a human soul between earth and heaven. *The Little Prince* (1943) was written a year before he disappeared mysteriously over the Mediterranean in his twin-engine "Lightning," a pilot for Free France.



Vichy and German propaganda capitalized on the bombing of civilians by the Allied Air Forces emphasizing shared national suffering as a bond of civilian resistance. "Terror-bombing" and "death lotteries" described the devastating effect of the bombing offensive on Lille, Nantes, Le Creusot, Clermont, Toulouse, and Bourges which shared the fate of cities in Italy and Germany.<sup>31</sup> Henriot reported that Churchill's euphemistic "collateral damage" translated into 15,000 casualties in Paris and Rouen, their historic architecture mutilated, France's cities transformed into "scorched earth." Churchill's bombers were the real terror merchants.<sup>32</sup> "How many Germans perished in the workers' suburbs of Saint-Denis, Saint-Ouen, la Courneuve, Noisy-le-Sec, and Bobigny?" Henriot asked. Appealing to the pity of de Gaulle and François de Menthon, Justice Minister in the Algiers' Consultative Assembly, to stop the massacre of innocents,<sup>33</sup> Henriot attempted to seize the moral high-ground. "Where wisdom had failed to unite France, grief had succeeded." Anglo-American materialism and Asiatic barbarism were dedicated to a systematic destruction of fifteen centuries of civilization. Sacré-Coeur de Montmartre and Rouen Cathedral were grim witness to Anglo-Saxon atrocities. The dead

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<sup>31</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Sur les rives du fleuve de feu," *Editoriaux* 9, 15 April 1944, 27. Hitler and Goering, Roosevelt and Spaatz, Churchill and Portal included the demoralization of the civilian population as part of their war aims. By 1944 there were few scruples in either the German or Allied determination to wage total war. Max Hastings notes that between 6 March and D-Day, the Allied air forces had dropped 62,000 tons of bombs on ninety-three key rail centres chosen for attack by Eisenhower's air and transport specialists in preparation for Operation Overlord.

<sup>32</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La France terre brûlée," *Editoriaux* 9, 19 April 1944, 55-58.

<sup>33</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Des tombes de Paris au berceau de Voiron," *Editoriaux* 10, 21 April 1944, 9.

served as lessons for the living.<sup>34</sup>

Indeed, the bombing campaign was a contentious issue. Henriot commented, "At the time when French hearts unite around those coffins, an ex-French general accepts the destruction of his country decided at Teheran by Roosevelt, Churchill, and his ally Stalin."<sup>35</sup> CFLN warned its broadcasters that the bombing campaign in France required the greatest discretion, and further admonished them to offer no criticism of what was an indispensable military task. Military necessity demanded the bombing of military targets and communication arteries. Moralizing was also forbidden. Occupied France would not accept lessons from those spared the bombings.<sup>36</sup> De Gaulle on Radio-Algiers spoke of the shared sorrow of *France combattante* and the stoical acceptance of military necessity. CFLN broadcast directives continued to support the maquis as the alternative

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<sup>34</sup>Discours prononcé par M. Philippe Henriot le 22 avril aux obsèques des victimes du bombardement de la Région Parisienne dans la nuit du 17 au 18 avril 1944, *Editoriaux 10*, 22 April 1944, 15-16.

<sup>35</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Ce qui nous attend," *Editoriaux 10*, 23 April 1944, 24.

<sup>36</sup>F 41 338 *Directives pour la radio vers la France*. Dec 43-May 44, CFLN: Comm. à l'Info. Alger le 22 Avril 1944, Directives pour la semaine du 22-29 avril 1944, "France Occupée," "Le CFLN et la Libération de la France," 1-2. General Delestraint, Commander-in-Chief of the MUR, suggested that the resistance attacks might complement the Allied landing. One plan was for rail sabotage to hamper German troop movements. Inside the government-run French railway system, there was a large and active resistance organization led by thirty-one-year-old René Hardy whose *cheminots* sabotaged the transport of German military units. Delestraint met Hardy in Lyon in May 1943 commissioning him to draft a railway sabotage scheme - the "Green Plan". Hardy drew up a 150 page strategy outlining the location of German reserve divisions and the rail lines that would have to be cut to inhibit their movement. In general, the idea was that more sabotage and less Allied bombing would save civilian lives. See Ted Morgan, *An Uncertain Hour: The French, the Germans, the Jews, the Barbie Trial, and the City of Lyon, 1940-1945*, (New York: Willam Morrow and Company, Inc. 1990), 223-224.

to the STO. France was not alone: the home front was linked to the second front. Pierre Mendès-France, future Premier of France, was a bomber pilot in the Free French "Lorraine" Squadron whose targets in Belgium, Holland and France posed a cruel dilemma for French pilots. They chose to fly at low altitude, incurring greater risks but affording greater precision.<sup>37</sup>

By 1944, the Marshal was Vichy's sole symbol of legitimacy and unity. Henriot's propaganda identified the Marshal-Christ who accused his apostles: "One amongst you, who shares my bread and calls me friend, will betray me." The Marshal's apostles Giraud and Boisson were false liberators who posed as his interpreters.<sup>38</sup> Pétain's eighty-eighth birthday on 24 April was the occasion for Henriot's "media event" -- the Marshal's tour of Northern France.<sup>39</sup> At Melun, Pétain spoke to schoolchildren asking them if they listened to Philippe Henriot and encouraged them to "listen to him every day

as he will give you good advice."<sup>40</sup> Pétain's state visit to Paris on 26 April was

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<sup>37</sup>Marcel Ophuls, *The Sorrow and the Pity*, (New York: Berkley Windhover, 1972), 130-131. This tactic was adopted by Wing Commander Cheshire's RAF "Pathfinder" squadrons, aided by electronic navigation techniques such as H<sub>2</sub>S and Gee, to improve bombing accuracy.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>39</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Bon anniversaire, Monsieur le Maréchal," *Editoriaux 10*, 24 April 1944, 25-26.

<sup>40</sup>François Brigneau, *Le Jour où Ils Tuèrent Philippe Henriot*, (Paris: Publications FB, 1992), 35. Charles Filippi observed that Madame La Maréchale was enamoured by Henriot's eloquence and invited him to dinner often, sometimes with Madame Henriot and their daughter Marguerite, born in 1929. The Marshal loved Marguerite's natural gaiety and playful character that she had inherited from her father.

designed to buttress a tottering régime; and Henriot spoke of Pétain in Paris as the arrival of Henri IV, "the pilot at the helm." Henriot's sense of the historic represented the ceremony at Notre-Dame de Paris united past and present, State and Church, Government and People.<sup>41</sup> Henriot presented Pétain's acclaim in Paris as a national plebiscite, proof to Roosevelt and Churchill that Algiers' claims of legitimacy were unfounded.<sup>42</sup>

London dismissed Henriot's "Parisian plebiscite" as mere publicity; Pétain's "acclaim" was merely a polite welcome. The Marshal's visit to Paris, reputedly to visit bombing victims and meet with the Germans to settle the conditions for his return to the capital, was not what it appeared. In reality, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt had given orders for Pétain's government to leave Vichy in anticipation of an imminent invasion and the fear of a *coup de main* by paratroopers. By April the Germans expected an invasion from all sides and chose a central location for Vichy's élite.<sup>43</sup> Pétain's speech from the balcony of the Hôtel de Ville in Paris was less than the mass demonstration evoked in Henriot's radio and film propaganda. Police agents were sent to all schools of the fourth arrondissement ordering headmasters to send their pupils to the Hôtel de Ville to "thicken the crowd." A journalist reported a conversation between two onlookers. One

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<sup>41</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le pilote à la barre," *Editoriaux 10*, 26 April 1944, 43.

<sup>42</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le plébiscite est fait," *Editoriaux 10*, 26 April 1944, 47.

<sup>43</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. Commissariat A l'Intérieur Ref. ABC/9/35910 Dates- Inf: avril-mai 44; Réc 14.6.44; Dif: 27.6.44 "La Situation Politique: Général Rumeurs de Paris et de Vichy 27 avril," 1-2.

speculated that the "old one" would probably arrive in an ambulance while another claimed that if they waited any longer, he might arrive in a hearse.<sup>44</sup>

Henriot's themes were present in Pétain's speech to the nation on 28 April 1944. The Marshal condemned the crimes committed against peaceful rural communities, the threat of civil war arising from acts perpetrated by the Communist resistance, and the mirage of Liberation. Echoing Laval's hope for a German victory, Pétain expressed his gratitude for Germany's "defence of the Continent," protecting French civilization from Bolshevism.<sup>45</sup>

London pointed out that Pétain might have refused to return to Paris while it was under German occupation. Instead, he went in company with all the traitors: Laval, Darnand, Henriot, and de Brinon, with German authorization.<sup>46</sup> May Day followed on the heels of Henriot's "Parisian plebiscite for Pétain." The CFLN called for workers' solidarity against the Occupation. Radio broadcasts directed by the unions and the *Conseil National de la Résistance* presented the united front of the Allied Internationale: French workers were urged to "go slow," reducing production and intensifying sabotage while

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<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>H.R. Kedward, "The Vichy of the Other Philippe" *op. cit.*, 44-45.

<sup>46</sup>F 41 338 *Directives pour la radio vers la France*, Dec 43-May 44, CFLN: Comm. à l'Info. No. 35 Alger le 29 Avril 1944, *Directives pour la semaine de 29 avril-6 mai 1944*, "Le Voyage de Pétain à Paris," 1.

workers of the free nations worked harder to defeat Hitler's Germany.<sup>47</sup> Henriot retaliated by appealing to workers' solidarity for the New Order: "You are creating an International based not on hatred or the class struggle but on that of understanding and mutual support."<sup>48</sup> Catholic patriotic sympathies for atheistic Bolshevism weakened its Catholic and Gaullist allies before it strangled them, he warned.<sup>49</sup>

Inaugurating "Le Bolchevisme contre l'Europe" with Professor Grimm at Toulouse on 1 May, Henriot presented the Communist rogue's gallery of Lenin, Bela Kun, Noske, Alvarez del Vayo, Négrin, Marty, and Thorez. The *Front National* tactic of the "extended hand" was a ruse to seize power and launch a bloody class war, symbolized by the raised fist.<sup>50</sup> Monsignor Saliège, archbishop of Toulouse, declined the minister's invitation to preside at the opening.<sup>51</sup> The Church's confidence in Vichy had evaporated when the government became the servant of repression. Priests instructed parishioners that while the Church demanded obedience to the state, the Marshal's government was captive to the Germans, Laval their servant, and Henriot and Darnand his accomplices. Obedience was forfeit if it contravened one's conscience. Henriot, the

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<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, "France Occupée, Journée du 1er Mai," 1.

<sup>48</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Premier mai des absents," *Editoriaux 11*, 1 May 1944, 12-13.

<sup>49</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le deuxième front rouge...", *Editoriaux 11*, 6 May 1944, 42-43.

<sup>50</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Exposition antibolchevique à Toulouse," *Editoriaux 11*, 6 May 1944, 48.

<sup>51</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. "Propagande de Vichy," 4.5.44.

Church's rebel angel, retorted that "modern Pharisees" absolved Catholics of the duty of obedience and their oath of fidelity. A rebellious Catholicism pardoned homicide, approved pride, and encouraged rebellion. Henriot argued that "Christ's teaching was one of submission, for rebellion makes one a slave."<sup>52</sup> Henriot's appeals from the propaganda pulpit challenged the Church's role in matters of conscience. Henriot's last weeks in office were devoted to combatting the "extended hand" between Catholics and the Resistance.

Vichy's propaganda employed the symbol of the Marshal as France's last hope. The "Red Spectre" represented the great fear. It retained its propaganda value for what appeared as Henriot's vendetta against the resistance's Communist leadership. The tract, "*André Marty député de Paris vous parle*" recounted Marty's goals outlined in *l'Humanité* in August 1923: to undermine the bourgeois state, its civil service, the police, and the army. "*Marty l'Africain*" outlined Marty's itinerary since his arrival at Algiers on 13 October as Stalin's personal emissary promising the creation of independent Soviet Socialist Republics of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco "under the control of Moscow."<sup>53</sup> Another tract, "Men of yesterday! Men of tomorrow" carried sketches of André Marty, Fernand Grenier, André Mercier, Florimond Bonte, and François Billoux in the Algiers

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<sup>52</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Théologie et mobilisation," *Editoriaux 12*, 9 May 1944, 2-3.

<sup>53</sup>F 41 302 *Anticommunisme*, 3 January & 14 January 1944. Distribution by the Technical Service of Propaganda as of 3 January 1944 listed 50,000 copies of "André Marty, député de Paris, vous parle" were to be placed in workers' and military veterans' milieux while "Marty l'Africain" were to be placed with local "notabilities," veterans, Legion, and bourgeois circles.

Assembly. These were to be the ministers of France's future government. The tracts urged, "French, reconsider! There is still time. Tomorrow will be too late."<sup>54</sup>

A battle of symbols between London and Vichy was over the "Maid of Orléans," Joan of Arc. Pétain's visit to Rouen served as an occasion to lash out against British bombing. The English attacks on France in 1944 were a repetition of 1429. Parallels were drawn between Henry V and George VI who attempted to usurp France's legitimate sovereigns, Charles VII and Marshal Pétain; where French dukes served as British regents, Gaullists served their British and American masters. Joan of Arc was the symbol of unity against those who sought to betray her.<sup>55</sup> The Marshal was the shield of France against French émigrés and mercenaries who served the usurpers of 1431 and 1944.<sup>56</sup> Resistance propaganda portrayed Joan of Arc as the freedom fighter liberating France from foreign occupation.<sup>57</sup> Vichy lost the battle of symbols for Joan as it had with its

farmer's and worker's propaganda. The Maid of Orléans served as the symbol for

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<sup>54</sup>F 41 302 *Anticommunisme*, 13 May 1944; 100,000 copies of "Hommes d'hier! Hommes de demain?" were printed. Vichy's anti-communist propaganda had abandoned by May 1944 any hope of gaining support from French workers whose partisan loyalties lay with the Communists. Distribution was directed to professional associations, maires, police and gendarmes, and Catholic groups.

<sup>55</sup>Philippe Henriot, "L'éternelle leçon de Jeanne d'Arc," *Editoriaux 12*, 14 May 1944, 35, 38.

<sup>56</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le Maréchal chez Jeanne d'Arc," *Editoriaux 12*, 14 May 1944, 42.

<sup>57</sup>Gabriel Jacobs, "The Role of Joan of Arc on the Stage of Occupied Paris," *Ibid.*, 107, 111.



resistance despite efforts to appropriate her for collaboration.

Pierre Dac's Radio-London broadcast of 6 May 1944 awarded Vichy's leaders the German Order of the New Order as *Gringoire* had vilified its Republican enemies for their service to Germany in 1939. Pétain was cited for his surrender of two million of France's soldiers as prisoners of war with the armistice. Henriot was recognized for his tireless defence of national-socialist institutions, who renounced all honour, patriotism, and human dignity to facilitate the action of the enemy.<sup>58</sup> Marcel Déat, who refused to die for Danzig, did not hesitate to sacrifice Frenchmen for Berlin. Jacques Doriot, "*Superüberobersturmbannführer*," fervent defender of order established by brutality, was given the freedom to eliminate freely those who sought to resist totalitarianism from those who wish to preserve it totally. Doriot's "Cross of Merit" citation would serve as the target for the twelve bullets of a firing squad.<sup>59</sup> Pierre Laval, whose white tie hid his black soul, had personally participated in all the machiavellian political operations directed against the nation. This élite *gauleiter* serving the Germans under the cover of French interests, was awarded the Cross of Merit and the death sentence.<sup>60</sup>

Another CFLN memorandum indicated that Henriot's audience was increasing.

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<sup>58</sup>Pierre Dac, *Un Français libre à Londres en Guerre*, (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1972), 163.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 164-165.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, 166-167.

The memorandum emphasized that the immediate task was still to refute Henriot's arguments. Failing that, the informant suggested that, "for lack of another more peaceful solution, it appears to me that the *active organizations could undertake to suppress the source of this propaganda directly.*"(emphasis added)<sup>61</sup> Jacques Duchesne approached Pierre Dac in mid-May, charging him with the task of responding to Henriot, admitting that no one had been able to respond effectively to Vichy's propaganda minister. Dac dutifully accepted the task.<sup>62</sup> His tactic was not to slander his opponent but to ridicule him and his masters. His broadcast mocked the Nazi demons as an "oto-rhino-laryngo-plutocratic-judeo-arthritic-communo-anglo-saxon-gaullist-masonic conspiracy." Dac reduced the Nazi logic of "victory in defeat" to its logical absurdity: "The policy of the Greater European Reich is clear and precise: to allow the Allies to exhaust themselves in a succession of consecutive victories so as to be able to seize, at the hour deliberately chosen by the Führer, an absolute and total defeat that no human nor mechanized force will be able to resist, to the amazement of an astonished world, and inversely, the formidable power of definitive, total, absolute

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<sup>61</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. CFLN. Commissariat à l'Intérieur. Dates Inf: Rec: 11.4.44 Diff: 29.4.44 Reference - deleted (cut out). "Le Danger de la Propagande de Philippe Henriot." 1-2.

<sup>62</sup>Dac, *op. cit.*, 194-195. Duchesne confided to Dac, "Malgré tout ce qu'on peut dire et en dépit de tout ce qu'on peut faire, on ne parvient pas à venir à bout de Philippe Henriot. Et pourtant on y met le paquet en y faisant bon poids. Rien n'y fait, rien ne l'arrête. Il n'y a guère plus que vous à présent, pour essayer de le contrer et pour tenter de le contenir. En conséquence, à vous de jouer maintenant, mon petit père." Dac accepted Duchesne's challenge stoically; "Avant le devoir ce n'est pas le devoir, après le devoir ce n'est plus de devoir, le devoir c'est le devoir."

and unconditional disappearance of National-Socialism and the New Order."<sup>63</sup>

Dac's "Réflexions sur un Discours" responded to Henriot's speech at the Toulouse anti-Bolshevik exposition. Henriot spoke of the Red Army, aided by pro-Bolshevik French, invading and occupying France. Stalin would annex Alsace-Lorraine. The Reds would requisition, pillage, starve, and transport hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen to work in Russia, deport suspects and Jews, conduct mass arrests, torture with modern and sadistic refinement, take hostages, and execute thousands of Frenchmen who attempted to resist. Dac asked if Henriot had confused the Russians with the Germans. He asked Henriot to "speak of these good, these great, these brave Germans, so tender, so gentle, so affectionate, so humane, who fight with so much courage and grandeur of soul in order that all the terrors listed will never occur on the soil of France."<sup>64</sup>

Dac succeeded in provoking his adversary. Henriot responded that de Gaulle's universal popularity was belied by the Paris plebiscite acclaiming the Marshal; "Or was it the Gestapo dressed as French workers or bourgeois?" he retorted. "The acclamations of Paris for Pétain were louder than the vociferations of Algiers."<sup>65</sup> Henriot charged

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<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, 237-238. Dac's mockeries were directed also against his Radio-Paris adversary Jean Hérold-Paquis. Paquis' attempt to mask German reverses with the euphemisms of "elastic defence," "victory in defeat," and "strategic withdrawal" served as the butt for Dac's wry humour.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, 192-193.

<sup>65</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les contradictions de l'impuissance," *Editoriaux 11*, 7 May 1944, 53-55.

that Dac was a Jewish parasite like Mandel who used "la France" to defend his stateless race from the Germans. Bénazet and Oberlé were "salaried liars" paid in shillings, dollars, and roubles.<sup>66</sup> "Bagatelles Sur Un Tombeau" was Dac's impassioned reply to Henriot's challenge. Dac admitted that he was a Jew and therefore not French by Henriot's definition. He admitted that he had corrupted the spirit of France with his pre-war comedies, *L'Os à moelle* and the *Course au Trésor*; that he had sold out to the English, Americans, and Soviets. Dac apologized for not being awarded the Marshal's *francisque* or the Iron Cross, but he did wear the veteran's rosette. His Alsatian roots were from a family which had served in the campaigns of Napoleon, 1870-71, the Crimea, Algeria, and the Great War. They had "paid dearly in suffering, tears and blood." Pierre Dac's brother's gravestone bore witness, "Mort pour le France à l'âge de 28 ans", 8 Oct. 1915 (Champagne). On Henriot's tomb, Dac foresaw, would be the inscription "Philippe Henriot, Mort pour Hitler, fusillé par les Français."<sup>67</sup>

Henriot replied, "Are we now to exchange family deaths as an argument?" citing the death of his own brother in the First World War. While Dac's brother was one of 1,750 Jews killed during the war, Henriot's brother was one of almost two million French soldiers. The question, Henriot asserted, was not that of the dead but of the living. Dac had left France to save himself, enlisting in the ranks of France's enemies; Henriot remained behind to share the sorrows of the French. "Who was the patriot?"

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<sup>66</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Issac dit Dac," *Editoriaux* 12, 10 May 1944, 10-11.

<sup>67</sup>Dac, *op. cit.*, 199-200.

Henriot asked. While deploring the intervention of the Gestapo, Henriot justified the arrests based on the denunciations of fellow Frenchmen who delivered foreign and Jewish terrorists to protect themselves. Resistance attacks on German occupation troops were responsible for the inevitable reprisals against the innocent.<sup>68</sup> "All the consequences of our confusion, our devastation, and defeat are due to those responsible for them four years ago. Those who claim that our prisoners and workers will not return are those responsible for their relief; those who complain that our Empire was lost are those who betrayed it; those indignant at German reprisals are those who provoked them. Those who lament the fate of France are those who abandoned her."<sup>69</sup>

As the bombing campaign intensified in preparation for D-Day, French cardinals appealed to their British and American counterparts for an end to civilian bombing.<sup>70</sup> Propaganda ministry directives instructed newspapers to reproduce the clerical protest against the bombing, but to delete the first part of the cardinals' declaration censuring the deportation of women to work in German factories. *La Croix* declared that it would reproduce the entire text or nothing. The abridged version subsequently appeared in all the official press, except for religious publications.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Du tac ou Dac," *Editoriaux* 13, 19 May 1944, 7-8.

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*, 8-10.

<sup>70</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le témoignage des Cardinaux," *Editoriaux* 12, 16 May 1944, 52-53.

<sup>71</sup>F 41 347 *Commissariat National de l'Intérieur: Renseignements* (CFLN) 1943-1944. Commissariat A l'Intérieur Ref NJP/3 bis/35.900, Dates- Inf: 23.3.44; Rec: 7.4.44; Dif: 19.4.44, 1.

Dac fought fear with humour. His "Weather Report for the New Order" forecast heavy cloud cover for Germany with Mosquito, Lancaster, and Halifax bombers, heavy showers of steel in the regions of Berlin, Stettin, Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, and other industrial centres. Violent storms from high pressure areas originating in America, Britain, Africa, and especially Russia were forecast. Atmospheric pressure was fiery [*surchauffé*] and resistant in France, poisonous in Germany, with deep depressions in the population. Easterly winds sowed panic over the Reich, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary, while strong westerly winds carried the breath of hope to France and occupied regions.<sup>72</sup> His "Health Bulletin of the New Order" diagnosed that a blood analysis indicated a notable increase of Russic acid. The previous medications of LVF injections, Waffen SS serum, and Gestapo suppositories had not improved the condition. Dac's diagnosis was a serious state of traumatic shock: his prognosis foresaw that the patient would fight vigorously and vehemently before slipping into a coma prior to final collapse.<sup>73</sup>

A nation of forty million Maréchalistes in 1940 had become a nation of forty million Gaullists by 1944. Four years of German occupation had turned French loyalties from the Marshal to the General. Professor Kedward notes that German "correctness" gave way to arbitrary arrests of able-bodied men in the streets. Those who escaped the

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<sup>72</sup>Dac, *op. cit.*, 143-144.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 142.

German and Milice labour dragnets had no choice but to take to the hills.<sup>74</sup> As French youth voted with their feet, Vichy's administration was threatened with collapse. To forestall the inevitable, high government officials were purged. Laval's legislation of 19 April 1944 placed prefects and penitentiary administration under Darnand's Milice, providing broader scope for arbitrary and summary "justice."<sup>75</sup> Extraordinary criminal courts, "tribunals for the maintenance of order" created by the decrees of 14 May and 15 June, extended repression against the maquis to include gendarmes and police whose sympathies for or fear of the maquis made them reluctant to obey orders. Punishment for the crime of "abandoning one's post or crimes against military discipline" received the standard verdict: "No appeal. Immediate execution."<sup>76</sup>

The German authorities recognized that radio was a resistance weapon and confiscations of radios in Normandy, Picardy, and the Brittany coast in mid-May yielded 39,000 receivers in the Calvados and 99,000 in the Seine-Inférieure. There remained enough clandestine radios to receive London's broadcasts. London reiterated that the invasion would *not* be the signal for a national insurrection; that the Resistance must be coordinated with the invasion. All armed men, and only these, were instructed to join the

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<sup>74</sup>Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis*, *op. cit.*, 189.

<sup>75</sup>Henri Michel, *Le Procès de Riom*, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), 366-367. From 1 January 1944 until the German departure twenty-five departmental or regional prefects, and one police intendant were arrested: twenty-two were deported to Germany, nine prefects and eight intendants were dismissed, twelve regional directors of the penitentiary administration were arrested or dismissed and replaced with the clients of Laval and Darnand.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, 29.

maquis; police were instructed to join the Resistance.<sup>77</sup> The official creation of the *Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* (FFI) on 1 February 1944 absorbed all military formations with the *Comité d'Action Militaire* (COMAC) as its general staff. Officially apolitical, COMAC was controlled by Communists Charles Gonard (Morlot), Maurice Benjamin Kriegel-Valrimont, Roger Ginzburg, journalist for *L'Humanité*, and Count Robert-Jean de Vogüé (Commandant Vaillant), head of the Secret Army in the northern zone. France was organized into twelve military regions with FFI regional and departmental leaders. General Koenig in London was appointed to coordinate COMAC activities with the Allies. In the "battle zone," Allied military units requested only intelligence from the Resistance. "Rear zones," which extended with the Allied advance, were to organize sabotage. "Non-operational zones" outside the battlefield were given to the maquis. Several plans were outlined to fulfil these general directives. The "Green plan" sought to paralyse rail transport for the two weeks required for the creation of a bridgehead and the concentration of the invasion forces. The "Blue plan" was the sabotage of electrical stations. The "Tortoise plan" was devoted to delaying enemy concentrations by attacking fuel and munition depots.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup>Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac (ed.) *Les Voix de la Liberté: Ici Londres*. Vol. I: *Dans La Nuit, 18 juin 1940-7 décembre 1941*, (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1975), XXXI.

<sup>78</sup>Henri Michel, *Histoire de la Résistance en France 1940-1944*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), 106-108. The French Resistance leadership regarded that selective attacks on military targets rather than area-bombing would prove more effective in isolating and disabling German reinforcements from reaching the invasion beachhead. SHAEF refused, unsure of the reliability of irregular military forces to fulfill the objectives of D-Day.



Henriot's "war of nerves" prior to the invasion was a psychological battle directed toward *attentistes*. Henriot attempted to divert their gaze from the west toward the east. Instead of minimizing Russian victories, he argued that the "European Army" -- his euphemism for the *Wehrmacht* -- was the bulwark against the Bolshevik avalanche. He implored his audience to remain neutral in a war where a defeated France had nothing to gain; collaboration offered Frenchmen work and wages that the Bolsheviks would seize if victorious. Henriot's propaganda was thus directed toward deterring popular participation in the national insurrection, describing the call for a general strike as "a microbe escaping from the demonic laboratory of a monstrous Mephistopheles," and promising a "bloody bacchanal" with Marty's and Thorez' "dictatorship of the machine-gun."<sup>79</sup> To this, CFLN directives instructed its broadcasters to emphasize that the administration of the territory and the organization of public powers would promote the return of democracy to France. The Committee of National Liberation and the Consultative Assembly were agreed that French laws would be restored as soon as possible followed by general elections.<sup>80</sup>

Verlaine's *Les sanglots longs des violons d'automne* was broadcast on 1 June, alerting French resistance networks to prepare for action. On the evening of 5 June the second part of the message, *Bercent mon coeur d'une langueur monotone*, was the signal

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<sup>79</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les 'patriotes du maquis'," *Editoriaux 13*, 30 May 1944, 63-64.

<sup>80</sup>F 41 338 *Directives pour la radio vers la France*. Dec 43-May 44, CFLN: Comm. à l'Info. Alger le 22 Avril 1944, Directives pour la semaine du 22-29 avril 1944, "France Occupée," "Le CFLN et la Libération de la France," 2.

for operations. German *Abwehr* monitors at the Hotel Lutetia interpreted the message as the code for the general call for immediate action by the Resistance. In the absence of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the High Command alerted the Fifteenth Army stationed in the Pas-de-Calais. The Seventh Army, holding the Normandy sector, was not placed on alert. Resistance forces paralysed German transport and telecommunications throughout France, isolating the Normandy beachhead by delaying reinforcements of two armoured divisions from the south-west. Of 1,050 planned rail breaks, 950 were realized. The Toulouse-Moutauban rail link, reserved to transport the *Das Reich* division to Normandy, was cut. Every train leaving Marseille for Lyon after 6 June suffered at least one derailment.<sup>81</sup>

The Marshal's radio broadcast to the French at 14:15 appealed to the duty of all civil servants to remain at their posts and of citizens to remain neutral for their own and France's safety. In the evening Laval, spoke of the liberation as France's destruction. He reminded his listeners of the armistice and Montoire; the task was to "safeguard our honour" and "permit the reconstruction of our country." He appealed to France to ignore the orders of an American and a French general and remain calm, disciplined, and obedient to the orders of the French government.<sup>82</sup> Charles de Gaulle announced "JOUR-J" at 6:00 that evening over the BBC: "The supreme battle has begun.... For the

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<sup>81</sup>Crémieux-Brilhac (ed.) *op. cit.*, XXX-XXXI, Verlaine's text: *Les sanglots longs des violons de l'automne, Blessent mon coeur d'une langueur monotone.*

<sup>82</sup> AJ 41 424 *Radio addresses of Pétain and Laval 6 June 1944.*

sons of France wherever they may be, whatever they may be, the simple and sacred duty is to fight the enemy by every means at their command."<sup>83</sup> Voice of America announced the rekindling of the flame on the torch of the Statue of Liberty. News of the Allied invasion mobilized Resistance units in all regions. The contagion was so strong, even among disorganized groups, that Allied Headquarters was confronted with the national insurrection it had sought to avoid.<sup>84</sup>

D-Day caught Henriot by surprise. Touring Germany at the time, he announced that the invasion was an American aggression against a neutral France.<sup>85</sup> Addressing French factory workers in Thuringia, Leipzig, and Berlin, Henriot's remote transmissions to France were broadcast at 12h 40, 13h 40, and every evening at 19h 40, and 21h 40,<sup>86</sup> Henriot spoke of Europe's workers forging weapons to defend the European front. German industrial production and public resolve was only strengthened by bombing. Allied accounts of Berlin's destruction were fabrications; they had destroyed only the cultural monuments of Germany's great cities. Henriot spoke of scenes from Dante's

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<sup>83</sup>Max Hastings, *Das Reich: Resistance and the March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division through France, June 1944*, (London: Michael Joseph, 1981), 76.

<sup>84</sup>F 41 270 *Propagande: CIR (Centres d'Information et Renseignements)* Vichy 6 juin 1944, From: Directeur des Centres d'Information et de Renseignements, To: M. le Ministre Secrétaire d'État à l'Information et à la Propagande. The CIR Director, Liausson de Montella, reported on 6 June that attacks against the Propaganda centres required around-the-clock protection. Henriot was asked to approach Darnand to ensure their security.

<sup>85</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La 'Marseillaise' à Berlin," *Editoriaux 14*, 6 June 1944, 27-28.

<sup>86</sup>Amaury, op. cit., 280. Henriot's broadcasts were carried by Bordeaux, Grenoble, Limoges, Montpellier, Nice, Vichy, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, and Paris radio.

*Inferno*, where Churchill's "military targets" were the ruin of civilization demanded by the Jews and the Communists.<sup>87</sup> Undoubtedly, Henriot's speeches were for the consumption of his German allies. Indeed, he was received by his counterpart Joseph Goebbels as an "equal," relating that they discussed sculpture amid Berlin's ruins. Julien Lesage's Voice of America broadcast portrayed Henriot as "the rat caught in a trap." Lesage asked, if Henriot's interview with Goebbels was a meeting of "equals," then who gave instructions to whom?<sup>88</sup> What transpired in the course of the interview is unknown, but the ministers probably discussed Henriot's enhanced powers as propaganda minister for both zones. Henriot returned from Berlin to Paris where he met with Franz von Papen, presumably to discuss Henriot's appointment to head Radio-Paris.<sup>89</sup>

On 8 June Darnand mobilized his miliciens and the Franc-Garde amid "great disorganization." By 23 June, of some 1,000 miliciens affected by mobilization, only seventy reported for duty while 250 claimed that they were unable to report to

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<sup>87</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Naissance de l'Europe," *Editoriaux 14*, 12 June 1944, 42-43, 45. The factory in Thuringia where Henriot spoke to European workers was devoted to the manufacture of rocket fuel for the V-2.

<sup>88</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Deux Amateurs de Faits" *Editoriaux 15*, 24 June 1944, 50-51. Henriot asked if Monsieur "Lesage" was a pseudonym, offering Jean Racine's advice to one of his pseudonymous critics: "Do not change your name, for you will become even more obscure than you already are." 52.

<sup>89</sup>Denis Peschanski (ed.), *Vichy 1940-1944: Archives de Guerre d'Angelo Tasca*, (Paris and Milano: Editions du CNRS Paris and Feltrinelli Editore Milano, 1986), 584. Von Papen was ostensibly visiting his son wounded in an Allied air raid. Angelo Tasca reported that Laval's interview with von Papen was to discuss Laval's attempt to mediate a compromise peace with the Americans and the British.

barracks.<sup>90</sup> Eisenhower's appeal for combatant status for resisters was refused by von Rundstedt. Henriot broadcast the German Field-Marshal's order that all Frenchmen under arms, in violation of the armistice convention, would be treated not as belligerents but as partisans, subject to court-martial and execution. Henriot charged that the responsibility for the execution of French citizens, therefore, lay with General de Gaulle.<sup>91</sup>

Henriot's prediction of a "Katyn Française" was to be realized not by Communist terrorists, but by the Germans. Unable to reach Normandy due to maquis and resistance rail cuts, the Second SS Division *Das Reich* was harassed continually along its route by the maquis. The city of Tulle was liberated on 8 June by the Resistance until it was reinforced on 10 June by the arrival of *Das Reich*. Casualties among the German garrison were 139 men killed, including a Gestapo agent, and 40 wounded by the *maquisards*. The German proclamation warned that for every German soldier wounded, three *maquis* were to be hanged. For every German soldier killed, ten *maquisards* or an equal number of their accomplices would suffer the same fate. Ninety-nine men were seized and hanged from the town's lampposts.<sup>92</sup> On the same day Sturmbannführer Dickmann of *Der*

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<sup>90</sup>Jean-Pierre Azéma, "La Milice" in *Vingtème Siècle*, vol. 28 1990, 99.

<sup>91</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les surprises des libérateurs," *Editoriaux 14*, 14 June 1944, 55-56.

<sup>92</sup>Hastings, *op. cit.*, 105-106, 121, 185-186. Another 311 Tulle factory workers were seized as hostages and taken to Limoges, where their fate was decided by the SS and the Milice. The senior Milice officer announced, "The German authorities have allowed us to collaborate with them to separate the corrupt elements from the town of Tulle. We have done this work as good Frenchmen. "Vive le maréchal! Vive Darnand! Vive la Milice! Vive la France!" A hundred and

*Führer* regiment exacted his own revenge. At Oradour-sur-Glane Dickmann ordered that all men were to be arrested and those identified as maquisards were to be shot. Women and children imprisoned within the church were burned alive. In all, 648 people perished.

A SHAEF G-3 Intelligence despatch on 16 June spoke of the maquis contribution to OVERLORD: "The results achieved by the FFI have far surpassed those generally expected. Wherever armament is sufficient, they have displayed unity in action and a high fighting spirit."<sup>93</sup> Henriot refused to credit reports that Allied soldiers were welcomed with champagne, tears of joy and cries of "Enfin, vous êtes venus." Jacques Duchesne's broadcast, the "war of the roses," reported that Allied troops were greeted with bouquets of flowers and roses were placed on the graves of Allied soldiers killed on the beaches. De Gaulle was welcomed with roses at Bayeux on 15 June. Henriot asked, "How can you welcome among your ruins he who came to provoke them and who

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sixty-two of the detainees were now released, while the others were selected for deportation. These were loaded aboard trucks once more, and driven north to Poitiers on the evening of 12 June to await entrainment for Germany. They joined some 250 other Frenchmen, already herded into the Gestapo Headquarters. On the evening of 13 June they were transferred to Compiègne, and taken from there by rail to concentration camps in Germany, arriving at Dachau on 5 July; 980 of the 2,521 prisoners on the train died during the three day journey. In all, of 149 Tulleois deported, forty-nine returned in 1945.

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid.*, 215-218. The courage and often reckless sacrifice of the Resistance compensated for its lack of military skill. Max Hastings notes the total wartime casualties of résistants in Region R5, where most of the actions with the Das Reich were fought reported 248 killed in the Corrèze, 481 deported; Creuse: 123 killed, 190 deported; Dordogne: 771 killed, 308 deported; Haute-Vienne: 957 killed, 373 deported. Oradour and Tulle were not isolated occurrences. Hostages and prisoners executed by the Germans in and around Paris: 11,000; Lille: 1,113; Angers: 863; Orléans: 501; Reims: 353; Lyon: 3,673; Nice: 324; Limoges: 2,863 - and so on across France. In all, 100,000 French men and women died in Resistance activities and German reprisals.

struts among the ashes and the dead?"<sup>94</sup> Henriot also refuted "fanciful" accounts of a young girl who escorted a lost British soldier back to his lines and asked for orders as a representative of the partisans. Questioned on the numbers of the guerilla troop, she replied 520 in a village of 538. Of the other eighteen, the girl replied that the resistance accepted only those between the ages of ten and seventy.<sup>95</sup>

BBC broadcasts also announced the Resistance Manifesto, endorsed by Louis Marin and Waldeck-Rochet, calling for a general strike, railway sabotage, and instructed farmers to refuse to deliver their foodstuffs.<sup>96</sup> While Allied armies broke out of the Normandy beachhead, Robert Vaucher's report in the *Gazette de Lausanne* claimed there was a power struggle in the French government between moderates and extremists over Laval's effort to ally France with Germany. Henriot replied that these were rumours hatched by agents-provocateurs who attempted to legalise the Anglo-Saxon bombings by forcing Vichy to declare war.<sup>97</sup>

Henriot presented King George VI's visit to the Normandy beachhead as the

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<sup>94</sup>Philippe Henriot, "La guerre des Roses," *Editoriaux 14*, 15 June 1944, 59.

<sup>95</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le paradis et l'enfer," *Editoriaux 15*, 19 June 1944, 19-20.

<sup>96</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le sang des autres," *Editoriaux 15*, 16 June 1944, 2. The Manifesto declared: "Plus une locomotive, plus un wagon ne doivent être en état de rouler, a-t-il dit notamment; plus une voie de chemin de fer ne doit subsister; les camions doivent être sabotés; pas un grain de blé, pas une gramme de viande ne doit parvenir à Paris. Préparez la grève dans les campagnes pour affamer les villes et faciliter, par la famine, la grève générale." Henriot was dismayed to find Marin in the ranks of the Gaullists and Communists.

<sup>97</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Deux Amateurs de Faits" *Editoriaux 15*, 24 June 1944, 52-53.

arrival of the British monarch to oversee his recently conquered Norman vassals. Normandy, along with North Africa, was another jewel in the British imperial crown.<sup>98</sup> The royal visit coincided with the debut of the war of the future, the V-1 attacks against London. England's premature euphoria at the success of the invasion was dashed by the German *dynamiten meteor* announcing a new "wonder weapon."<sup>99</sup> Henriot's increasingly fanciful reports spoke of London's devastation, the paralysis of rail traffic, and increasing anxiety among the population.<sup>100</sup> Pierre Dac attempted to dispel the fear of the "pilotless plane" by asking a doctor for a V-1 vaccination. His serum included extract of *Spitfire*, *Typhoon*, *Marauder*, and bomb shelters. In exchange, Berliners would receive two thousand tons of bombs dropped by piloted bombers on their despairing *Kleindeutsch* heads.<sup>101</sup>

The blood of martyrs was the theme of Henriot's address of 27 May at the Palais de Chaillot before the assembled cadres of the Ministry of Information. He paid homage to the Milice's "maintenance of 'French' order" to strengthen decaying police authority. The uniform made them Resistance targets. Those martyrs who had fallen had shed their

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<sup>98</sup>Philippe Henriot, "George VI chez ses vassaux et l'avion sans pilote chez George VI" *Editoriaux 15*, 17 June 1944, 5.

<sup>99</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Le météore inconnu," *Editoriaux 15*, 17 June 1944, 9-11.

<sup>100</sup>Philippe Henriot, "George VI chez ses vassaux et l'avion sans pilote chez George VI" *Editoriaux 15*, 17 June 1944, 7-8.

<sup>101</sup>Dac, "Commentaire sur l'Avion sans Pilote ou V-1," *op. cit.*, 260.



blood for France.<sup>102</sup> The Milice replied to resistance terror with police terror in an escalating violence. Henriot and Darnand were targeted in March 1944. Three attempts on Darnand, one in Nice and two in Paris, had failed. In May the COMAC order to execute Henriot was confirmed.<sup>103</sup> Jean Zay, Popular Front Minister of Education, was murdered on 20 June. Francis Bout de l'An confided that Zay's murder eliminated one more masonic *belliciste* Jew whom Philippe Henriot had tarred in editing his *Carnets secrets*.<sup>104</sup> Tasca reported on 9 June that Henriot's family at chateau Picon at Sainte-Foy-la-Grande had received death threats. These were made more immediate by the maquis kidnapping of Milice director-general Francis Bout de l'An's family.<sup>105</sup> Meeting with the directors of *Radio-Journal de France* at the hotel Cécil at Vichy, Henriot spoke of resistance threats and demanded a resolve equal to his own. Interviewed later by journalists, Henriot noted that the group would make an excellent target for terrorists and that "one could never be too careful."<sup>106</sup> Indeed, Henriot's fate was in the hands of others.

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<sup>102</sup>"Philippe Henriot au Palais de Chaillot, *Combats* 44, 3 June 1944, 2.

<sup>103</sup>François Brigneau, *Le Jour où Ils se Tuèrent Philippe Henriot*. (Paris: Publications FB, 1992), 18.

<sup>104</sup>Azéma. "La Milice," *op. cit.*, 102.

<sup>105</sup>Peschanski (ed.), *op. cit.*, 589.

<sup>106</sup>"Pressentiments," *Combats* 44, 15 July 1944, 2. An interview with "Henri" in *La Voix de la Résistance* argued that Henriot was approached by an I.S. emissary despatched to persuade him to defect. Henriot considered it too late to repair the damage done by his broadcasts and entrusted his fate to the Milice. See "Comment fut abbatu Philippe Henriot," in *La Voix de la Résistance*, No. 94-95, octobre-novembre, 1964, 12.

In one of his last editorials, Henriot defended himself against the charge of "Goebbels' obedient lackey," and railed against 'Gaullists of the eleventh hour', the "jusqu'au-boutistes" who now claimed that the Marshal's armistice was treason and that France had never been defeated. Henriot recalled Communist collaboration with the Germans before Operation Barbarossa and how French Communists had branded de Gaulle as the lackey of Anglo-American capitalism. Gaullism became a political force only when it offered North Africa to the Anglo-Americans. Such were the facts behind the myth of the resistance and liberation.<sup>107</sup>

Henriot arrived in Paris on 27 June to attend Laval's cabinet meeting held in Paris to please Déat. "Do not be concerned" he told Charles Filippi, "the President asked me to come to help defend his policy." The cabinet meeting with Déat was never held but Henriot learned of the murder of his friend Lapierre and his sister at Eauze (Gers). Henriot's editorial, "S'il y a du sang entre nous..." was written in anger and grief.<sup>108</sup> Julien Lesage spoke of the minister as a German agent living in fear, protected by the Vichy police and the German Army. Henriot's rebuttal outlined his political itinerary, which traced a path from patriotism to collaboration. "Failure to defend the Jews, asking to be liberated from the masons, to spare France from bolshevik domination implied that one was a German agent. To defend and serve the French interest, to refuse homage to George VI, to oppose the maquis, pillagers of farms, murderers of children, ... is to be

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<sup>107</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les salariés sans vergogne," *Editoriaux* 15, 21 June 1944, 28.

<sup>108</sup>Brigneau, *op. cit.*, 13.

a German agent.... The traitors are the political adversaries of yesterday. Your executions are against the political parties condemned by Communists and freemasons. Your pretended army of resistance, loyal to the Republic and democracy, has replaced the ballot with the machine gun. If there is blood between us it is you who have spilled it."<sup>109</sup> Significantly, Henriot's "spilled blood" broadcast was his last.

In May, COMAC issued the order to Morlot's *Groupes-Francis* against Henriot. Charles Gonard (Morlot), Marseille's resistance director since the summer of 1943, informed his team of orders to kidnap Henriot and spirit him by "Lysander" to London to broadcast via the BBC and rally *attentistes*. His final destination would be his Algiers' trial. It was never decided whether to hide Henriot with a resistance network in Brittany or within Paris. Morlot, who knew that Henriot was to be executed, kept silent.<sup>110</sup> The floor plan of the Ministry of Propaganda at 10 rue Solferino and Milice patrol schedules were obtained from the concierge, a veteran of 1914-1918 and a Socialist.<sup>111</sup> Henriot and his wife returned from an evening dinner and cinema at 21:00 on 27 June. At 5:25 the next morning, three cars arrived to reconnoitre. Two guards in front of the ministry were taken at gunpoint. Four others were stationed to replace the captured guards and

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<sup>109</sup>Philippe Henriot, "S'il y a du sang entre nous, c'est vous qui l'avez versé," *Editoriaux* 15, 27 June 1944, 74.

<sup>110</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup>Peschanski, *op. cit.*, 601. Security was the responsibility of the concierge's superior, the son of Charles Laurent. Charles Maurras in *l'Action Française* accused Laurent, former Socialist secretary-general of the *Syndicat des fonctionnaires*, of being a Popular Front pro-Stalinist.

serve as sentries. The German guards saw nothing. As the group crossed Saint-Germain, another two Milice agents threatened to intervene. Morlot called them over, trapped them between two cars and forced them at gunpoint to surrender.<sup>112</sup> At 5:40 the team approached the Ministry, identifying himself as Henriot's bodyguard to the concierge. Once inside, telephone cables were cut and the main entrance was covered.

Morlot's team entered the ministry with the concierge as guide. Thick carpet on the stairs muffled their footsteps past the Ministry office, the secretaries' office, and finally to Henriot's apartment. Knocking on the door, Morlot identified himself: "Milice!... special brigade. Terrorists are seeking to kidnap the minister. He must leave so that we can protect him." Behind the door, Madame Henriot warned, "Don't open it, they are your assassins." Morlot slipped a forged Milice card with his photograph and a false name, -- GONIN, Charles -- under the door. After some moments, the door was unlocked and Morlot's group burst into the room. While Morlot assured Madame Henriot that they meant her no harm, Henriot attempted to seize the muzzle of a Sten gun. Morlot fired a burst of six rounds, gravely wounding Henriot and foiling any hope of kidnapping. The coup de grâce was administered by Emile and Morlot. The entire operation was completed by 5:53. Henriot's bodyguards, warned of their inevitable court-martial and execution, joined the ranks of their assailants after a brief hesitation. The

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<sup>112</sup>Maurice Kriegal-Valrimont, *La Libération, Les Archives du COMAC 1 mai-august 1944*, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1964), 239-240.

teams split up and went into hiding.<sup>113</sup>

Henriot's post was filled by Paul Marion and Xavier Vallat while the Propaganda Ministry printed 70,000 posters of Henriot with captions: "Il disait la vérité, ils l'ont tué". Another 40,000 bore the caption "Sa voix s'est tue". All were distributed throughout France to regional delegates, post offices, German recruiting offices, chambers of commerce, factories, Légion offices, professional, farm, and youth organizations.<sup>114</sup> Charles Maurras described him as the voice of "the great will of conversion to national unity" that inspired so many youth.<sup>115</sup> Marcel Déat recalled Henriot's passionate and partisan oratory in the Chamber, and his fierce opposition to the *bellicistes* as a nationalist and patriot: "the value of a man is measured by the friendships he evokes and the hatred he inspires."<sup>116</sup> Jean Fontenoy in Doriot's *La Révolution Nationale* spoke of Henriot as a simple patriot, an ideological comrade who shared in the sorrowful days.<sup>117</sup> Georges Suarez, a *Gringoire* colleague, recalled that Henriot used his voice as a rapier, as the blade of a guillotine or the voice of the confessional. His

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<sup>113</sup>*Ibid.*, 241-242. Morlot, in the heat of the moment, forgot to retrieve the false Milice identification card bearing his photograph. Emile had the presence of mind to pick it up as the team left Henriot's apartment and returned it to him a few days later.

<sup>114</sup>F 41 290 *Philippe Henriot: Diffusion - Editoriaux*, 22 July 1944.

<sup>115</sup>Charles Maurras, *Action Française*, 30 June 1944, cited in Brigneau, *op. cit.*, 52.

<sup>116</sup>Marcel Déat, "Philippe Henriot" in *L'Oeuvre* 30 June 1944, 1-2. All the eulogies are to be found in the IHTP dossier on Philippe Henriot.

<sup>117</sup>Jean Fontenoy, *La Révolution Nationale*, 1 July 1944, 1.

death was the "revenge of Stavisky."<sup>118</sup> Georges Albertini compared Henriot to Jean Jaurès, both cut down while trying to save France from war and seek a rapprochement with "yesterday's enemy and tomorrow's ally." Both fell to the blows of sincere but misguided patriots. Both died when France needed them most.<sup>119</sup> Goebbels paid his last respects in *Volkischer Beobachter* to "the voice of this pioneer of the new Europe."

Henriot's vigil on 30 June was attended by thousands, including Madame Philippe Henriot, daughter Marguerite, and son André, Joseph Darnand, Fernand de Brinon, and detachments of the Milice and the LVF. The coffin, draped with the tricolour, was carried to Notre Dame. Musicians of the *gardiens de la paix* were followed by two columns of Milice youth carrying torches while Henriot's family and detachments of the *franc-garde* followed. On 1 July the state funeral service was attended by President Laval and Joseph Darnand. General Brécard, grand chancellor of the Legion of Honour, conveyed the Marshal's personal condolences; Otto Abetz represented the German embassy. His Eminence Cardinal Suhard presided over the mass for the dead. One worker among the crowd asked what would become of them now.<sup>120</sup> Others, gathered among the crowd of PPF and Milice militants, cried, "Laval to the firing squad."<sup>121</sup> Pétain refused to speak on the radio on the death of his own Minister of Information and

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<sup>118</sup>Georges Suarez, "La Revanche de Stavisky" *Libération*, 2 July 1944, 1.

<sup>119</sup>Georges Albertini, "Adieu à Philippe Henriot," *La National Populaire*, 8 July 1944, 1.

<sup>120</sup>"Les Obsèques de Philippe Henriot" *Combats*, 8 July 1944, 2. "On sent déjà le vide que cela fait... Qu'est-ce qu'on va devenir, maintenant qu'il n'est plus là?"

<sup>121</sup>Marc Ferro, *Pétain*, (Paris: Fayard, 1987), 575.

Propaganda, confiding to Xavier Vallat that Henriot, like Déat, figured among his "illegal ministers" appointed by Laval under German pressure. Notre Dame's bell tolling for Henriot must have created disquiet for those attending Henriot's last propaganda spectacle. Marion expressed the collaborators' torment at the thought that "[Pétain] was ready to allow all the members of his government to be shot one by one."<sup>122</sup>

Pierre Dac reflected that he had unwittingly written Henriot's epitaph, "died for Germany, shot by the French." "The National-Socialist Funeral of Philippe Henriot," was the tragic and inevitable fate of an intelligence and talent placed in the service of evil. Henriot's funeral was different from the national funerals of Henriot's victims, those imprisoned and executed without defence, appeal, or a funeral.<sup>123</sup>

Henriot's assassination provoked events both ludicrous and malevolent. Vichy's municipal government objected to Milice efforts to rename rue Président Wilson to rue Philippe Henriot until Laval intervened warning that "the Germans have made it known that if the city fathers resist, they will attract German attentions."<sup>124</sup> The Milice mounted the street plaques by day and the Resistance removed them at night. Angelo Tasca noted that Vichy's final tribute to Henriot was to print his collected works in four volumes. Henriot's ambition for literary acclaim was frustrated by the lack of paper. The

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<sup>122</sup>*Ibid.*, 574-575.

<sup>123</sup>Dac, *op. cit.*, 232-233.

<sup>124</sup>Peschanski, *op. cit.*, 600.

Economic Ministry approached the German authorities in Belgium, who were willing to exchange thirty tonnes of paper in exchange for 30,000 bottles of Benedictine brandy.<sup>125</sup>

Darnand confided to Barthélemy: "You see now it is total war, it is not a question of propaganda or policy. We are fighting, it is war."<sup>126</sup> For the Milice, Henriot's ghost cried for revenge. Georges Mandel and Léon Blum, both imprisoned at Buchenwald, suspected that they themselves might be killed in retaliation. The Milice's choice of Mandel, Henriot's former Gironde colleague, was symbolic, like Jean Zay. Darnand testified at his trial that Helmut Knochen first tried to persuade him to accept responsibility for Mandel. He refused, but according to his lieutenants, expressed no surprise at news of Mandel's assassination. Max Knipping, head of the Milice in northern France, seems to be one of those clearly responsible. He was the key in arranging Mandel's transfer from German to French hands, and it was his assistants who organized Mandel's escort. The decision to

assassinate Mandel was taken at the last minute by Knipping, possibly at the instigation of Oberg and Knochen. They may have hoped either to compromise the Vichy

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<sup>125</sup>*Ibid.*, 29. VII. 1944, 606.

<sup>126</sup>Ferro, *op. cit.*, 575.



government, avenge Henriot, or simply to eliminate a man they detested.<sup>127</sup>

Henriot's Easter editorial spoke of death and resurrection. The bells of Easter also spoke of eternal youth and resurrection which defied Pontius Pilate, the arrivisme of Caiaphas, the treason of Judas, the cowardice of Peter, and the doubt of Thomas.<sup>128</sup> He had written, "I cannot envisage my country's death like that of Petronius who opened his veins in a perfumed bath."<sup>129</sup> Like Macbeth seeing Birnam Wood advance on Dunsinane castle, Henriot's kingdom collapsed. Pierre Dac argued that Henriot's ambition, eloquence, and intelligence was placed at the service of evil. The mantle of power became Henriot's tunic of Nessus. This may explain why he reached for Morlot's gun choosing the fate that awaited him after a trial and the inevitable firing squad. Henriot was broken on the wheel of his loyalties, repudiating the Republic he once represented as a deputy and which he attempted to destroy as Vichy minister. The "voice of France" had become the "French Goebbels" employed to pillage France's natural and human resources. Henriot's collaboration was a dead-end, as fatal to Henriot as it was to France. France's resurrection came with the arrival, not of Zhukov's but Leclerc's

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<sup>127</sup>John M. Sherwood, *Georges Mandel and the Third Republic*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), 287-293. Otto Abetz's lawyer held Himmler and the Milice responsible for Mandel's murder; Karl Oberg's lawyer held Abetz and Darnand were responsible. Joseph Darnand believed that it was Knipping; and Knipping says that it was Jean Mansuy and Schmidt, the gunmen, who disappeared. According to Otto Abetz, Himmler ordered Karl Oberg to turn Mandel over to the Milice. Thus, Mandel's death was the result not of Abetz's scheme to hold Mandel, Reynaud, and Blum as hostages, but a plan formulated entirely apart from him by the Milice and the Gestapo.

<sup>128</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Pâques 1944," 9 April 1944, *Editoriaux* 8, 44.

<sup>129</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Les deux esclavages," *Editoriaux* 4, 1 March 1944, 20-21.

tanks welcomed by the bells of Paris. Henriot's bells of Easter announced a resurrection and a liberation tolling the end of fifty months of "armistice." The bells pealed the victory against the prison of silence that Vichy construed as law and order. who were searching for a *modus vivendi* with the Resistance.

### Conclusion: The Trial of Philippe Henriot

"The revenge of experience on those who refuse to listen is to realize that today's rebels are already tomorrow's disciples."<sup>1</sup>

The bells of Paris tolled liberation and *l'épuration* -- judgement. De Gaulle declared from Casablanca on 8 August 1943 that treason would be called to justice. Pierre Pucheu's trial and fate was shared by many others. Simone de Beauvoir wrote that Charles Maurras, Georges Suarez, Robert Brasillach, Paul Fardonnet, and Jean-Hérolde Paquis were the voices of Hitler, and the words of Hitler's propagandists were as deadly as the gas chambers.<sup>2</sup>

The indictment against Philippe Henriot is found in Article 75 of the French Republic's criminal code. Treason is defined as the act whereby anyone who bore arms against France, delivered French troops, territories, or soldiers or sailors to the service of a foreign power, or who had intelligence with a foreign power, committed a capital offence. Henriot's defence would have cited Article 3 of the Armistice Convention, advising all French administrative services of the occupied territory to conform to the demands of the German authorities and collaborate with the latter in a correct manner.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Philippe Henriot, *Les Miettes du Banquet*, Paris: Editions "Alsatia", 1938, 14. "La vengeance de l'expérience sur ceux qui refusent de l'écouter, c'est de savoir que les rebelles d'aujourd'hui sont déjà les disciples de demain."

<sup>2</sup>Pierre Assouline, *L'Épuration des Intellectuels*, Paris: Editions Complexe, 1990, 122-123.

<sup>3</sup>Henry Rousso, "Collaborer," in *L'Histoire: Résistants et Collaborateurs: Les Français dans les années noires*, François Bédarida, ed. (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985), 49.

These two Articles reveal the legal, moral, and political conflict that divided loyalties between the French Republic and the Vichy State. One could not serve both.

Marshal Pétain, the initiator of collaboration, was tried and sentenced to death. The verdict was commuted to life imprisonment by General de Gaulle. Laval and Darnand were the first to be executed for treason.<sup>4</sup> Clemency was not accorded to those intellectuals whose loyalties tied their fate to collaboration. Henriot escaped the post-Liberation trials that prosecuted intellectual collaborators such as Paul Ferdonnet of Radio-Stuttgart and Jean-Hérolf Paquis of Radio-Paris. Their trials represented another round in a recurring "Dreyfus affair" that Henry Rousso calls the "Vichy Syndrome."

The German occupation of France during the Second World War revived the great debates of the century: the society or the nation, equality or hierarchy, the state or the individual, morality or efficiency, integral nationalism or multiculturalism.<sup>5</sup> The Occupation of France intensified the mortal hatreds aggravated by the domestic and international crises of the 'thirties. At Paquis' trial the prosecution accused him of using his gifts of poisonous argument, invective and verbal violence in his daily struggle against Germany's foreign and internal enemies. In his defense, Paquis' lawyer argued

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<sup>4</sup>Laval was tried in October 1945, found guilty and sentenced to death. He swallowed a cyanide capsule, but its potency was diminished by age and Laval was revived. He was half dragged, half carried to the execution stake in a courtyard of Fresnes prison on Monday, 15 October and executed. To the last he tried to cheat the firing squad.

<sup>5</sup>Henry Rousso, *Le Syndrome de Vichy: de 1944 à nos jours*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990), 339.

that the defendant was preaching only to the converted, an "amuseur" for London's mockery. "One feared a Philippe Henriot, not a Jean-Héroid Paquis."<sup>6</sup> Henriot's "psychosis of terrorism" created fear and passivity, an agenda that served France's conquerors. As Vichy's Minister of Information and Propaganda, Henriot was considered a threat and was duly executed by COMAC's commando unit. Paquis and Ferdonnet were found guilty of treason, tried and executed.

Post-war French justice appeared "blind in the right eye" during the later *épuration* trials. The trial of Klaus Barbie, the Gestapo's "butcher of Lyon," reopened French complicity with the Germans. François Mitterrand, awarded the Marshal's *francisque*, retiring President of the Republic, advised his countrymen to avoid dwelling on these issues.<sup>7</sup> The retrial of René Bousquet, former Minister of Interior responsible for the "special sections" was cut short by his assassination in June 1993. Philippe Henriot's ghost reappeared with the trial of Paul Touvier. Pardoned by President Georges Pompidou, the former Lyon Milice inspector was charged by Serge Klarsfeld with crimes against humanity, the murder of seven Jews shot at Rillieux-la-Pape on 29 June 1944 in reprisal for Henriot's assassination.

"I was my own master," Touvier admitted. He did not answer to the Gestapo but

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<sup>6</sup>J. Goueffon. "La Guerre des Ondes: Le Cas de Jean-Héroid Paquis," in *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale* No. 108, October 1977, 41.

<sup>7</sup>Alain Rollot, "Archives," *Le Monde*, 21 April 1994, 25.

undertook, on his own initiative, the round-up of Jews. Clavier, the departmental Milice chief despatched miliciens to the homes and workplace of seven Maçonnais Jews suspected of "resistance sympathies" who were executed summarily while their families looked on. Touvier argued that while seven Jews were executed, thirty were spared. Prosecutor Hubert de Touzalin swept aside Touvier's defence, including his character references from the Catholic Church, and claimed that the victims had the right to a belated justice.<sup>8</sup> Touzalin charged that "the plan was nazi, but the complicity was French!"<sup>9</sup> The judges agreed and Paul Touvier at 79, was the first Frenchman to be convicted of crimes against humanity, receiving the same sentence as Klaus Barbie -- life imprisonment.<sup>10</sup>

Philippe Henriot, "the terror merchant," was described as "the model of a Christian, a sort of lay saint, good, loyal and generous."<sup>11</sup> He was a product of the conflict of loyalties that ended in the murderous debate borne of the French Revolution. As the Paris Commune saw a France divided between the Parisian Communards and

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<sup>8</sup>Laurent Greilsamer, "'Le plan est nazi, la complicité française': L'avocat général a requis la réclusion à vie pour Paul Touvier," *Le Monde*, 20 April 1994, 13. Touvier's victims were Maurice Schisselman, Emile Zeizig, Léo Glaeser, Claude Benzirma, Seigfried Prock, Louis Krzuzkowski and an unidentified victim who sang the death aria from *Tosca* were all executed.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>"Paul Touvier a été condamné à la réclusion à perpétuité," *Le Monde*, Thursday 21 April, 1994, 13.

<sup>11</sup>Maurice-Yvan Sicard, (Saint-Paulien), *Histoire de la Collaboration*, (Paris: Editions de l'Esprit Nouveau, 1964), 260. Even as Minister, Henriot wore only a threadbare blue suit with the Milice Gamma Cross in his lapel.

Versailles' "brutal rurals," France's modern war of religion pitted a Catholic Joan of Arc against a Republican Marianne. "Better Bismarck than Blanqui" in 1871 became "Better Hitler than Blum" in 1936 and "Better to rule in Hell..." in 1944. The memories of the defeat, the exodus, and the armistice were etched in the memory of all. Henriot described 1940 as being suspended "between heaven and earth with only forty seconds to choose." He had made his choice long before 1940. He chose to believe in the Marshal who, Alan Massie sees, was "a poor deluded substitute for a hero, or a god."<sup>12</sup>

As Pétain offered the gift of his person, Henriot offered the gift of his voice. Both claimed that they had acted in the service of France and shared her sorrow. Instead of relieving France of her misfortune, both Pétain and Henriot aggravated it. Vichy's ministers acceded to the demands of the Occupier against the heretics of the National Revolution. Collaboration was a self-created delusion for an armistice that never was and a European New Order whose principles promised to refashion a conquered France and Europe into a slave camp. The anti-Semitic laws that swept away *les apatrides*, Maurras' *métèques*, the stateless refugees of Russia, Italy, Spain and Germany were then used against Jews, Communists and finally against French citizens who resisted the forces dedicated to maintaining the New Order. Pétain and Henriot sacrificed France's sons, her war prisoners, her workers, to France's conqueror. Those who challenged Pétain's legitimacy were deemed the régime's official enemies, the exploiters of France's

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<sup>12</sup>Alan Massie, *A Question of Loyalties*, (London: Hutchison, 1989), 357. Ironically, Pétain's middle name was Benoni. In Hebrew it means "son of sorrow," a name given to children born into Royalist families, to remind them of what had been lost.

miseries. Their destruction was in the name not of liberation but collaboration.

Henriot sought "to defend France and Europe from those who, having refused to fight for their country, can only sound the tocsin of mobilization on the day that they received the order from Stalin and his allies." His adversaries in the Chamber became his enemies in the Resistance; Communists such as Fernand Grenier and André Marty; Jews such as Maurice Schumann, Pierre Dac, and Pierre Mendès-France; and finally de Gaulle, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. To Napoleon's anti-British Continental System was added the defence of the Continent against Bolshevism. Here was Henriot's Catholic Crusade. He joined the ranks of those who considered themselves the voice of the New Europe, the European Front and a German victory.<sup>13</sup> Here was the former realist who branded Aristide Briand's European vision and the League of Nations an illusion. Their "realistic" choice, the acceptance of a defeated France in the German New Order, was unacceptable to the majority of French people. The realists got it wrong. Dissident sons and daughters joined the maquis and the resistance. The European idea exposed the ideological weakness of the collaborators. France was nowhere in the equation. Henriot looked first to Pétain, then to Laval and finally to Germany. Pétain's archaic National Revolution looked to the past; European collaboration looked to the future. Vichy's laws sacrificed the individual to the collective, and sacrificed the French people it had sworn to protect -- all for the promise of a "favourable peace."

Collaboration amounted to exploitation and deportation. As Dominique Rossignol

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<sup>13</sup>Philippe Henriot, "Au Service de la France," *Editoriaux* 13, 17 May 1944, 2.



observed, "If collaboration appeared indispensable to the economic survival of France, it became intolerable in the eyes of history."<sup>14</sup> Unable to create consensus by consent, Vichy resorted to coercion. A civil war logic, brewing since the Paris Commune, the Dreyfus Affair, and more immediately the Popular Front, culminated in Henriot's support for the Communist witch-hunt of 1940, the Jewish *rafles* of 1942, and the Milice manhunts for STO fugitives and Communist "terrorists" in 1943-1944. The enemy of my enemies is my ally was Henriot's logic that ignored the fact his enemies were his own countrymen. The "French Goebbels," like his Nazi counterparts, demonized French Jews and Communists, and the Republican principles which had perverted, in his eyes, the notion of true France. *Collaborationism* adopted the totalitarian vision of France's conquerors. Hitler found his willing servant in Henriot, a rebel angel to do the devil's work. "The plan was Nazi, the complicity French."

Stanley Hoffmann's revenge of the minorities was represented in the Milice slogan "Our revenge is our revolution." The climate of suspicion, fear, the purges, and partisan hatreds, was created by those who cloaked their hatred with the mantle of nationalism. The National Revolution's "Travail, Famille, Patrie" had become "Tracas, Famine, Patrouilles."<sup>15</sup> Henriot's "revenge of history" attempted to harness history to ideology. By 1942 the wheel of history's revenge had turned: Vichy France's stillborn National

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<sup>14</sup>Dominique Rossignol, *Histoire de la propagande en France de 1940 à 1944: L'utopie Pétain*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), 341.

<sup>15</sup>Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), 228.

Revolution collapsed as Axis triumphs faltered and stalled first in North Africa and then at Stalingrad. Neither Goebbels nor Henriot could hide the fact that the ring was closing. Their "psychosis of terrorism" was dispelled by news of the Allied advance and liberation. The Vichy state collapsed because it tried to failed to rule through fear only and failed.

What, then, was Henriot's significance? Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac noted that from 1940-1944 France was the theatre of a propaganda war fought by London, Vichy, and Berlin with radio its weapon. Crémieux-Brilhac's 1974 survey of wartime radio audiences revealed an overwhelming audience for the BBC and Radio-Sottens. While most applauded the actions of de Gaulle, others were no less partisan in their judgement of Marshal Pétain, whom many regarded as unjustly condemned. Between nine and ten percent of those surveyed, doctors, former polytechnicians, and priests considered Henriot's radio broadcasts as *vérités bonnes à dire*. *Attentistes*, the audience Henriot attempted to persuade, were predisposed to London and de Gaulle, while indulgent toward the Marshal who "did what he could" or, at worst, was mistaken. At the resistance end of the spectrum, a minority (thirty percent) supported the Gaullists' London propaganda; fifteen percent were vigorously *antipétainist* especially miners, Renault workers, teachers, and university graduates [*instituteur* and *agrégé*].<sup>16</sup> A

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<sup>16</sup>Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, "Les propagandes radiophoniques et l'opinion publique en France de 1940 à 1944," in *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, No. 101, January 1976, 15-16. The RHDGM questionnaire sent by post in the winter of 1973-1974 to 1,620 male correspondents born between 1898 and 1922. It was addressed to nine professional or socio-economic categories and diverse geographic areas: railway workers, Renault workers,

majority of the French rejected the notion that the old soldier was guilty of treason. They rejected the idea of Pétain as a traitor precisely for the same reason that forced them to approve and applaud the Resistance: self-justification coincides with the desire to embellish a doubtful past.<sup>17</sup> But they believed in the Marshal before they believed in the General.

Professor Crémieux-Brilhac's survey asked the respondents when they thought Germany had lost the war. A majority believed in June 1940 that the war was over. To the question, when did they think that Germany had lost the war, the majority (sixty percent) believed that the Germans had lost the war at the end of 1941 with the entry of the United States. However, research in Vichy's *Contrôle postale* archives suggests that belief in a German defeat came later, between the spring of 1942 and spring 1943.<sup>18</sup> Henriot's radio editorials helped to convince his listeners that the cross-Channel invasion was unlikely to succeed. Only a minority (sixteen percent) believed in the German defeat after the Normandy invasion. How many listened to Radio-Vichy and Radio-Paris? 87.5% questioned possessed or had access to a radio from 1940-1944: 69.5% recall listening to Radio-Paris; 67.5% had listened to Radio-Vichy. Overall, the first point of convergence was the discredit attached to both. A clear majority (66.5%) remember hearing the broadcasts of Philippe Henriot. Half heard him several times a month, 12%

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teachers, professors, doctors, graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, and Catholics were selected from the Pas-de-Calais, Rhône, Gard, and Paris.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 17-18.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 5. See Antoine Lefebure

twice or thrice weekly, and 4.5% daily. Many recalled his daily editorials in the winter of 1943 and the spring of 1944. In retrospect, railway-workers, miners and some teachers were solidly negative, (29.50%), and considered Henriot's broadcasts as traitorous lies. Doctors, polytechnicians, and ecclesiastics expressed admiration (15-20%).<sup>19</sup>

Contrary to Goebbels' and Henriot's ambitions, propaganda was unable to strike 1789 from the annals of history. Forbidden to listen to London, Sottens, New York, and Moscow by their conqueror and its collaborationist government, the French refused to obey their dictates, convinced of an Allied victory. Crémieux-Brilhac stated that the "voice of liberty" was less a conversion than a confirmation. The battles of Britain, Moscow, North Africa, Stalingrad, and Normandy offered hope and a deliverance from evil to a people steeled to the consequences of a failed invasion.<sup>20</sup> The revolutionary legacy of the Republic spoke louder than the voices of the New Order. The Resistance

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<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 12-13. Listening preferences were for foreign broadcasts especially BBC in French (49.5%), Radio Sottens (French-speaking Switzerland) (36.5%), Voice of America, Radio-Vichy (1%), Radio-Paris (1%), Radio-Moscow, Radio-Algiers. A majority, 43.5%, listened often to BBC while 25% listened to Radio-Sottens. Slogans and songs included: "Radio-Paris ment" to the tune of "Lacucuracha" (46%); *Le Chant des Partisans* (12%); *Aujourd'hui le jour de lutte* (13%); and *Lili Marlene* (3%). Maurice Schumann was mentioned in 43% of responses, Jean Marin in 14% and Pierre Bourdan and Jean Oberlé in 8%. De Gaulle's audience responses were higher than the BBC with 79% claiming to have heard de Gaulle before the liberation, 31% often and 33.5% sometimes. The majority knew (58.5%) from the summer of 1940 that a French general had appealed to the French from London through conversations (37.5%), newspapers (9.5%), and radio (45.5%).

<sup>20</sup>Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac (ed.), *Les Voix de la Liberté: Ici Londres*. Vol. I: *Dans La Nuit, 18 juin 1940-7 décembre 1941*, (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1975), XXXII.

drew from the Revolution some of its most effective weapons. "The disaster of France in 1940," wrote the poet Pierre-Jean Jouve, "posed anew the question of the French Revolution. One could obtain the capitulation of the nation only by acting against the ideological heritage of the Great Revolution and *La Marseillaise*."<sup>21</sup>

Jacques Ellul's model of vertical and horizontal propaganda reveals the strengths and limitations of both centralized state media and organized collective resistance. Vichy's technocratic "ultras" employed the instruments of modern technology afforded by a totalitarian state first to persuade and then to coërcer. The BBC, on the other hand, used radio as an instrument to aid horizontal or collective resistance. All of France was collectively and clandestinely gathered around their radios during the Occupation. Resistance grew from passive to active to collective resistance. On D-Day Laval broadcast that the invasion was not France's war. Participation would only aggravate a foreign war into a civil war. But a civil war indeed raged when Vichy, either as hostage or willing servant to the Germans, could no longer guarantee the safety of its citizens. Collaboration was untenable when terror replaced justice and all France experienced at first-hand the exactions of occupation. What sustained them was the will to survive and this is fundamentally due to hope. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen prevailed over the duties of obedience, duty and service to Work, Family and Nation. The Atlantic Charter was a restatement of the Republican principles of Liberty, Equality

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<sup>21</sup>Pascal Ory, "La commémoration révolutionnaire en 1939," in *La France et les Français en 1938-1939*, René Rémond and Janine Bourdin (eds.), (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978), 136.

and Fraternity. "Lafayette, nous voilà," the principles of 1776 and 1789. The *union sacrée* of the "outstretched hand" had saved the Republic in 1944.

Historians have tried to account for the popular acclamations of Pétain in April and De Gaulle in September 1944. Marc Ferro perceived that Pétain's acclamations at Paris and Nancy were cheers for the Marshal and France, not for Laval's policies. In the northern zone Germany represented the sole enemy and oppressor. Parisians did not identify Vichy with the horrors of Nazism. A few weeks later at Saint-Étienne in the southern zone, the reception was different. The delirious enthusiasm which characterised the Marshal's travels in the north had evaporated. German actions spoke louder than words. German reprisals against the maquis in the spring and summer of 1944 attest to their ferocity. In the southern zone where Nazi methods were adopted by Laval's collaboration, Henriot's propaganda and Darmand's Milice ensured that Vichy was identified with the Nazis.<sup>22</sup>

France did not see the Soviet dictatorship of the machine gun, as Henriot feared. But his themes pervaded the subsequent Cold War of words between Voice of America's Radio-Free Europe and Radio-Moscow. Gerhard Weinberg asks, "What if the Soviets had freed Paris?" Perhaps the image of Stalin's muzhiks marching down the Champs Elysées was not as far-fetched as it first appears. The liberation of France rested literally on Churchill's hinge of fate. If Winston Churchill's Second Front strategy to invade

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<sup>22</sup>Marc Ferro, *Pétain*, (Paris: Fayard, 1987), 545-546.

southern Europe had prevailed, the Iron Curtain would have been drawn on an east-west axis from Prague to Brittany rather than a north-south axis from the Baltic to the Adriatic. The strategy of President Roosevelt, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, prevailed over Prime Minister Churchill and Field Marshall Alan Brooke. The Americans were certain that the U.S. could play an important role in the postwar reordering of Europe only if American troops played a major role in crushing the Third Reich. This could be achieved only by a landing in northwest Europe and carrying the war into Germany. The British suggested instead a landing in Greece or Yugoslavia to support the Italian campaign. The collapse of Germany would have removed the last bulwark to a Soviet push into northwestern Europe. "The U.S. might have entered the Cold War with an alliance made up of Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania instead of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.... Charles de Gaulle returned to Paris in the wake of British and American forces. If Soviet tanks had been waiting for him, one of the popular French Communist leaders would presumably have been installed instead. As it was de Gaulle took several Communists into his cabinet, including the Stalinist party leader, Maurice Thorez."<sup>23</sup>

Martin du Gard observed that "If Henriot had been at the microphone in August 1940, de Gaulle, in his London studio, would not have played his role so easily.

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<sup>23</sup>Gerhard Weinberg, "How D-Day Drew the Iron Curtain," *The New York Times Op-Ed*, 7 May 1995, 15.

Doubtless, many things would have transpired differently."<sup>24</sup> Jacques Ellul noted that propaganda does not seek to elevate man but to make him serve.<sup>25</sup> This may provide a clue as to why Henriot's propaganda failed. Where Henriot sowed doubt and fear, Pierre Dac offered hope: "We spoke to the French each evening with sincerity. We did not flatter their hopes. We told them that the war would be long, hard, and would cost dearly in men and destruction. The German strangle-hold on France was slavery. Our conviction struck a chord with those who heard and believed us. We were, in a way, the delegates of the French will. The spineless [*les veules*], the apathetic, the timorous, the shrewd, the Pétainists (more numerous than we believed), the collaborators, had no importance in the final analysis. Everything depends on how France will be led. Our task was finished. If we did our duty as Frenchmen, so much the better. That is sufficient."<sup>26</sup>

Fifty years after the Liberation, the French still remain indulgent to the Marshal's memory while condemning the Jewish manhunts and deportations.<sup>27</sup> The myth of the

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<sup>24</sup>Maurice Martin du Gard, *La Chronique de Vichy 1940-1944*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 312-313.

<sup>25</sup>Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 38.

<sup>26</sup>Pierre Dac, *Un Français libre à Londres en Guerre*, (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1972), 312-313.

<sup>27</sup>"Les Français défendent Pétain," *Le Devoir*, 16 December 1994, 46. A Sondes Survey for the weekly Figaro-Magazine showed 22% who considered that Marshal Pétain betrayed France against 24% who thought that he was wrong but acted in good faith; 30% judged that he sought to safeguard the interests of the country and protect her people; 59% approved the Marshal's government call for an armistice while only 15% thought that he was wrong to not continue the



Marshal fostered by Henriot remained while his ministers became his scapegoat. Henriot's propaganda for the Marshal venerated one symbol of France at the expense of the other, unable to accept that France was both Pétain and de Gaulle. Pétain, the symbol of bygone military might and imperial grandeur, offered his fellow countrymen a chance to recover their self-esteem when they were smarting at the dishonour of defeat. De Gaulle, the "Constable of France," led them back into the victorious fold. Pétain and De Gaulle, the shield and the sword, symbolized two aspects of French honour, one civic, the other military honour. This is perhaps best illustrated by an anecdote related by De Gaulle himself. Shortly after Allied troops landed in Normandy in June 1944, he was driving through one of the liberated towns in an open car. The streets were thronged with cheering, weeping people, one of whom, a peasant woman, tossed a bouquet into his lap with the heartfelt cry: "Vive le Maréchal!" De Gaulle commented, "A good Frenchwomen, to be sure!"<sup>28</sup>

François Mauriac observed that, "If we deserved Pétain, thank God we also deserved de Gaulle."<sup>29</sup> Did Vichy's gamble, its double game, succeed? Vichy had Laval for a German victory, de Gaulle for an Allied victory and Pétain for a compromise

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war from North Africa. Almost half (47%) of those questioned placed responsibility for the defeat on the politicians. The greatest reproach against Vichy was the Jewish *rafles* organized by the French police (57%) and its policy of collaboration with the Nazis (56%).

<sup>28</sup>Werner Rings, *Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939-1945*, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1982), 158.

<sup>29</sup>Jules Roy, *The Trial of Marshal Pétain (La Grande Naufrage)* translated by Robert Baldick, (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 252-253.

peace. It played the odds and lost. The price paid is that France still confronts the black stain created by the German Occupation. While the late Socialist President François Mitterrand maintained that the Vichy regime did not represent the French Republic and its actions were not those of the nation, President-elect Jacques Chirac stated otherwise. In a ceremony commemorating the fifty-third anniversary of the 1942 *Vel d'Hiv* roundup of Jews, Chirac declared that, "These dark hours soil forever our history and are an injury to our past and our traditions.... The criminal folly of the [German] occupier was seconded by the French, by the French state."<sup>30</sup>

Benjamin Constant's observation best described Henriot's and Vichy's collaboration: "In a dreadful moment in history it was argued that one carried out unjust laws only in order to weaken their severity, that the power one agreed to exercise would have done even more damage if it had been placed in hands which were less pure. What a deceitful rationalization, which opened the door to unlimited criminality! Everyone eased his conscience, and each level of injustice found a willing executioner. In such circumstances, it seems to me, innocence was murdered, under the pretext that it be strangled more gently."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>"Chirac acknowledges French role in wartime expulsion of Jews," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 July 1995, A5.

<sup>31</sup>Benjamin Constant, *Principes de politique, applicables à tous les gouvernements représentatifs et particulièrement à la constitution actuelle de la France (1815)* cited in Michael Marrus & Robert Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, frontispiece.

Henriot and his audience represented a significant minority in the French political spectrum. The view from his side of the barricades does something to explain how a nation of forty million *maréchalistes* in 1940 had become a nation of forty million Gaullists by 1944. Henriot's eloquence could not dissuade his audience from regarding four years of German occupation as anything but exploitation and deportation. The hope of deliverance and liberation turned French loyalties from the Marshal to the General.

Henriot's road to hell was paved with sincere if not good intentions. His political loyalties clouded his judgement of France's true interests and true leaders. He considered himself the voice of France but his collaboration earned him the epithet, the "French Goebbels." While Pétain's memory has been rehabilitated with time the memory of Philippe Henriot and his ilk continue to represent the blackest stain of *les années noires*.

Du Moulin de Labarthète described Henriot as "a man that *Gringoire* had slowly intoxicated, one who was unable to suppress his elan, tame his passions, but whose nationalism was irreproachable..."<sup>32</sup> A French Catholic poet and novelist turned journalist and political orator, Henriot sought and gained his national audience and notoriety as the "voice of France" and infamy as the "French Goebbels." Philippe Henriot's political career was like a ship without a rudder drifting between instinctual tides and succumbing to the imposed control of external forces, much like France herself during the last years of the Third Republic and the German Occupation. Jakob

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<sup>32</sup>Philippe Amaury, *Les Deux Premières Expériences d'un "Ministère de l'Information" en France*, (Paris: Librairie R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias, 1969), 278.

Burckhardt called men such as Philippe Henriot one of the "terrible simplificateurs." Henriot's defence of his faith and nation was indeed the voice of a part of France, a Catholic France of the great fear. Henriot was also one of Hitler's and Goebbels' sorcerer's apprentices who spoke of a fearful revenge in order to better divide and rule. Henriot was betrayed by his eloquence. He had said and written things that could not be forgotten or forgiven. Henriot's "tunic of Nessus," a Faustian pact with Nazism, sealed his fate. It remained only for him to take Pierre Brossolette's advice and choose his exit.

The Henriot of Pierre Dac's prophetic epitaph was the same Henriot who received the last rites of the Catholic Church and a state funeral. Henriot and the state he represented was indeed a revenge of the minorities that ignored Cardinal Richelieu's advice that when one plans a revenge, one must dig two graves. Henriot's tunic of Nessus was the cultural despair of Doctor Faustus, the ambition of Macbeth, that betrayed his faith and France. Henriot's Twentieth century 'Philippics' -- the voice of France -- are part of Rousso's Vichy Syndrome. Henriot's voice, along with his soul, was consigned finally to his own prison of silence, the title of his first novel and a tragic radio drama of the war of words.

### Glossary

**ACJF:** *Action Catholique de la Jeunesse Française* was founded in 1886 by Albert de Mun who attempted to foster a social Catholicism and Christian democracy. It was the parent of the *Jeunesse Agricole Catholique* and *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne*.

**APD:** *Association pour la Paix par le Droit* was the pacifist organization supporting the League of Nations which worked to resolve international disputes and deter unilateral acts of aggression by collective security and sanctions.

**BBC:** The British Broadcasting Corporation served as the base for the propaganda of *France libre* during the Second World War until the Liberation. See Radio-London, Radio-Paris, and Radio-Vichy.

**BCRA:** *Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action*, the Central Bureau for Intelligence and Action was set up in November 1940 by Captain André Dewavrin, alias Colonel Passy, at Free French Headquarters in London. The BCRA assumed responsibility for all intelligence and sabotage operations in French territory.

**Chantiers de la Jeunesse:** A Vichy Government-sponsored organization ran compulsory forest work camps for twenty-year olds, at which they were subject to hard work and intense political indoctrination.

CGT: *Confédération Générale du Travail* under Léon Jouhaux was the labour affiliate of the Popular Front.

CGQJ: *Comité Générale pour les Questions Juifs* under Xavier Vallat implemented Vichy's anti-semitic program to disbar Jews from French institutions. Vallat was replaced by the rabid anti-semite Darquier 'de' Pellepoix.

COMAC: The *Comité d'Action militaire* was the military action organization under the direction of Pierre Villon. It was one of several organizations comprising the *Conseil National de la Résistance* (CNR) under Jean Moulin and, after his arrest and execution, Georges Bidault. The CNR was in turn responsible to the *Comité Français de la Libération Nationale* (CFLN) under General de Gaulle.

FFI: *Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* was the title given by Free French headquarters in London to all armed Resistance forces under Gaullist command. The FFI allegedly included the Communist FTP, but the FTP preserved its own command and title independent of the FFI. In March 1944, General Marie-Pierre Koenig was designated FFI commander, a role he exercised from London. After the liberation of France, 140,000 men of the FFI were inducted into the French First Army.

FTP: *Francs-Tireurs et Partisans*, the Communist *résistants*, took their title from the roving bands of French guerrillas who harassed the invaders' lines of communication in

the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. Most FTP groups accepted orders only from the French Communist Party, although they sometimes created local tactical alliances with the *Armée Secrète* or agents from London in order to gain access to parachuted arms and money.

FNC: The *Fédération Nationale Catholique* founded in 1924 attempted to unite Catholics against the *Cartel des Gauches* anti-clerical agenda. General De Castelnau, Maurice Barrès' successor as President of the *Ligue des Patriotes*, served as the animator for radical nationalists, including Antoine Rédier's *la Légion* and its successor, Pierre Taittinger's *Jeunesses Patriotes* (JP). De Castelnau also attempted to defend Catholic rights, founding the *Ligue de la Défense Catholique* as well as the *Fédération Nationale Catholique*.

GMR: The *Garde Mobile de Réserve* was Vichy's para-military force. See Milice.

JP: *Jeunesses Patriotes* was an extra-parliamentary right wing party formed as a pressure group by the *Ligue des Patriotes* in 1924 under the leadership of Pierre Taittinger.

JUPR: *Jeunesses de l'Union Populaire Republicaine* was the youth wing of the *Fédération Republicaine* and its paper *Jeunesse* was edited by Philippe Henriot.

LVF: *Légion des Volontaires Françaises contre le bolchevisme* formed in August 1941 under the inspiration of Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Marcel Déat, and Pierre Laval, was a

military unit in the Wehrmacht serving on the Russian Front.

**Milice française:** The *Milice* was the élite wing created from the *Service d'Ordre Légionnaire* (SOL) under Joseph Darnand as an auxiliary police working in collaboration with the *Gestapo* or *Sicherheitdeinst* against the Maquis and the Resistance. When Darnand became Vichy's Secretary-General for the Maintenance of Order, or police minister, in December 1943, he expanded the *Milice* into a national para-military force to combat the Resistance, and recruited some 45,000 volunteers. The *Milice* were especially feared by the Resistance because of their local knowledge. The great majority of miliciens joined to escape the *Service du Travail Obligatoire* (STO) or forced labour in Germany while others were attracted by high salaries or ideology.

**MUR:** *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance*, a loose alliance of three non-Communist Resistance groups that had developed in the Unoccupied zone of France - *Libération*, *Combat* and *Franc-Tireur* (not to be confused with the FTP).

**PCF:** The *Parti Communiste Français* under the leadership of Maurice Thorez and André Marty organized the defeatist campaign against the "imperialist war" in 1939 and 1940. It later directed the Communist resistance against the German occupation in France after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.

**PDP:** Auguste Champetier de Ribes' liberal Catholic *Parti Démocrate Populaire* (PDP)



adopted a program of pacifism and social Catholicism challenging Louis Marin's *Fédération Républicaine*. De Ribes' paper, *Le Petite Démocrate*, opposed the increasing reactionary trends of Federation members such as Henriot and Vallat arguing that the Federation's moderate Republicanism was gravitating more towards *Action Française*.

PPF: *Parti Populaire Français* led by renegade Communist Jacques Doriot who supported collaborationism with Germany. Doriot served with the LVF on the Russian front and was later appointed as head of the Vichy Government-in-exile.

PSF: *Parti Social Français* was the parliamentary party recruited from the *Croix de Feu* under Colonel François de la Rocque.

Radio-London: The French Section of the BBC, *Radio-Londres* led by Jacques Duchesne, was attached to the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and Ministry of Information (MoI). Its task was to undermine the propaganda of Radio-Paris and later Radio-Vichy. Its programs "Les Français parlent aux Français" and Maurice Schumann's "Honneur et Patrie" attempted to stimulate the spirit of resistance. BBC's forbidden broadcasts became a national pastime during the German occupation. Its most successful propaganda was the "V Campaign." London directed three major radio campaigns organizing passive and active resistance opposing the STO in 1942; supporting the armed struggle of the maquis in 1943; and coordinating the national insurrection with the Allied invasion in 1944. Broadcasts on the eve of the Normandy invasion signalled the severing of rail and road

communications near the Normandy front. Radio-Brazzaville and later Radio-Algiers were the Gaullist radio transmissions directed to France to counter German Radio-Paris and Radio-Vichy.

**Radio-Paris:** The radio war for France was a three way battle between Paris, Vichy, and London. Paris spoke for the conqueror, London, the resistance, and Vichy for *la France seule*. Radio-Paris, created by Goebbels' Propaganda Department in the autumn of 1940, was directed by Doctor Bofinger and featured musical varieties and classical concerts. Addresses by Jacques Doriot, Colonel Labonne, commandant of the anti-bolshevik Légion, and Jean-Héroid Paquis reproached Vichy's "neutrality" and endorsed "a pure France in a united Europe."

**Radio-Vichy:** *Radiodiffusion Nationale* resumed broadcasts in August 1941 and featured a monotonous routine of youth and peasant projects, the changing of the guard, and Marshal Pétain's Sunday walkabouts. Gaullist broadcasts obliged Vichy to abandon its "neutrality" responding with repression, jamming, and counter-propaganda. Fines and imprisonment fell short of German demands for the death penalty. Radio-Vichy was forced to rely on German technical assistance to defend its radio sovereignty. Counter-propagandists featured Paul Marion, Paul Creyssel and Philippe Henriot. Radio-Vichy in 1943 became a fief of the Occupant. Attacking the Comintern, the Atlantic Charter, terror bombing and the promised invasion, Paris and Vichy attempted to swing the psychological balance with uncertainty and fear. Despite jamming, listeners preferred

Radio-London and the Swiss Radio-Sottens.


*La Relève*, conceived by Pierre Laval, the *Relève* was the voluntary recruitment of French workers for German wartime industry created in summer of 1942. Its purpose was to exchange French prisoners-of-war for skilled French technicians and workers. Its failure to enlist workers voluntarily led to the *Service du Travail Obligatoire* (STO) or labour conscription.

SD: The *Sicherheitsdienst*, was the SS Security Service operating under the orders of Heinrich Himmler. The SD possessed some 6,000 agents throughout Europe, and was closely linked with the Gestapo. Most Frenchmen referred to all German police agents as Gestapo.

STO: *Service du Travail Obligatoire* was the detested forced-labour program introduced in Occupied France in February 1943. The *Relève* failed to procure the manpower necessary and compulsion was introduced. By November 1943, 1.34 million Frenchmen were working in German factories (along with millions more Belgians, Dutchmen, Russians, Poles and other defeated nationals). Throughout 1943-1944 the Vichy government launched labour conscription to fulfil German demands for another million French workers inspiring the mass flight of *réfractaires* who took to the *maquis*.

**Appendix**

**"Images of Collaboration: The 'Official Enemies' of Vichy Propaganda"**



GIRAUD




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
THOREZ



MARTY



EXECUTION OF PIERRE PUCHEU





LE MARÉCHAL




LAVAL



DARNAND



ZAZOU



THE ENEMY




CHANTIERS DE JEUNESSE






CHURCHILL




BLOCKADE


MARCHÉ NOIR




AREA BOMBING




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






RESISTANCE RADIO & PRESS



RESISTANCE



ALLIED LIBERATION





### Bibliographic Essay

Philippe Burrin noted that "All fascists were collaborators, but not all collaborators were fascist." In Henriot's case at least, not initially. The career of Philippe Henriot presents one example of a traditionalist turned totalitarian. Bertram Gordon's *Collaborationism in France during World War Two* (1980)<sup>1</sup> regarded the appointments of Henriot and Darnand as Minister as the triumph of Vichy's "Ultra-collaborationists." Unlike the 'moderates', these individuals were dedicated to remaking France in the image of the conqueror.

Philippe Burrin's *La Dérive fasciste: Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933-1945* (1986)<sup>2</sup> relates the evolution toward fascism as a response to an atmosphere of recurrent stress and crisis during the 1930s. In each case fascism was an instrument chosen after all other political options failed. Philippe Henriot's (1889-1944) military background, his membership in the *Action Catholique de la Jeunesse Française* and General de Castelnau's *Fédération nationale catholique* reflect his traditionalist roots. As Gironde deputy for Bordeaux from 1932 until 1940, Henriot's career chronicled the increasing polarization between right and left aggravated by domestic crises and the approach of war. Henriot's antipathy to the Third Republic led him to Pétain's, and, finally to Hitler's Revolution.

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<sup>1</sup>Bertram Gordon, *Collaborationism in France during the Second World War*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980),

<sup>2</sup>Philippe Burrin, *La Dérive Fasciste: Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933-1945*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986).

Henriot's political career from 1924-1944 suggests a traditionalist becoming more militant. Pascal Ory's *Les Collaborateurs, 1940-1945*, (1976) first examined the specific itineraries of French collaborators including Henriot. Ory perceived the Munich crisis as the watershed for future collaborators. Little attention is devoted to Henriot's *maréchalist* propaganda of the National Revolution. The German invasion of the Soviet Union was his conversion to the Nazi revolution.<sup>3</sup>

William Irvine's *French Conservatism in Crisis: The Republican Federation of France in the 1930s* (1979)<sup>4</sup> examines the divisions between the party's moderates and militants. Philippe Henriot's political apprenticeship in the ranks of Louis Marin's Republican Federation was his political springboard. Professor Irvine documents that although Marin worked for the resistance many party militants such as Henriot and Vallat elected to collaborate. Henriot's Catholic militancy and his alliance with extra-parliamentary pressure groups, such as Pierre Taittinger's paramilitary *Jeunesses Patriotes* and Jacques Doriot's fascist *Parti populaire français* reveal a more radical itinerary and the origin of Henriot's 'fascist temptation'.

Robert Soucy in *French Fascism: The First Wave* (1986)<sup>5</sup> sees the post-war

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<sup>3</sup>Pascal Ory, *Les Collaborateurs 1940-1945*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976), 81-82.

<sup>4</sup>William D. Irvine, *French Conservatism in Crisis: The Republican Federation of France in the 1930s*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979).

<sup>5</sup>Robert Soucy, *French Fascism: The First Wave 1924-1933*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1986).

leagues as the right's mobilization to combat the Russian Revolution. Robert Soucy sees the first wave of French fascism in the post-war leagues of the 1920s as the middle-class reaction to the challenge of communism. Mussolini's blackshirts, Bucard's blueshirts, Taittinger's phalanxes and centuries, and De la Rocque's National Volunteers were mass parties which implicitly advocated political intimidation and violence. Taittinger's *Jeunesses Patriotes* qualify as one of many examples of the first wave of French fascism. Henriot's membership in the *Jeunesses Patriotes* first gave him the taste for mass politics. His rhetoric at mass political rallies alongside Jacques Doriot schooled him in the techniques of fascist agitation and propaganda under Doriot's propaganda director, Paul Marion.

The seeds of Henriot's totalitarian temptation was manifest throughout the decades between Locarno and Munich. He divided France into a classic 'we/they' dichotomy between those whom he regarded as "true French" and "anti-French." The defeat of France was the great divide of collaboration or resistance. The German invasion of the Soviet Union for Henriot swung the balance for collaboration. This was his 'crusade'. Recruited into Darnand's Milice, Henriot shared the podium with the likes of Doriot, Paquis, and Déat - the ultras.

Roderick Kedward's article, "The Vichy of the Other Philippe" in *Collaboration in France: Politics in France during the Nazi Occupation, 1940-1944* (1989) sets Henriot's Vichy's broadcasts within the political struggle against Communism. The raised

fists of the Popular Front were magnified to the global struggle of world war. Kedward observed that "Henriot's radio editorials were not just in direct response to Maquis and other Resistance attacks, ... but equally in pursuit of Germany's barbarous racial objectives, and in search of forced labour."<sup>6</sup> How Henriot came to endorse those objectives is the chronicle of the crises that led from Versailles to Danzig; from Mussolini to Franco; Pétain rather than de Gaulle, and ultimately Hitler rather than Stalin.

The Gaullist myth of a people united in resistance obscured the harsh facts of widespread collaboration. The trials of Klaus Barbie, René Bousquet, and Paul Touvier and François Mitterrand's memoirs of his Vichy past have shed further light on the 'dark years' of France during the Second World War.

Was there a Franco-French war on the eve of liberation? The radio war certainly suggested the notion. John Sweet's describes the swing of the historical pendulum from the myth of a nation of resisters to the revisions first presented by Eberhard Jäckel.<sup>7</sup> Robert Paxton's *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order* (1972)<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>H.R. Kedward, "The Vichy of the Other Philippe," in *Collaboration in France: Politics in France during the Nazi Occupation, 1940-1944*, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1989), 40.

<sup>7</sup>Eberhard Jäckel, *La France dans l'Europe de Hitler*, (Paris: Fayard, 1968).

<sup>8</sup>Robert O Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1972).

presented German archival sources that indicated that Vichy ministers were only too willing to do the German's 'dirty work'. Some historians have suggested that Vichy's aid in raw materials and manpower may have prolonged the war in Europe by a year. Thus, the myth that France was an obedient nation of "functional" collaborators, is equally misleading. If anything, John Sweets argues in *Choices in Vichy France: The French Under Nazi Occupation* (1986),<sup>9</sup> France was a nation of "functional resisters."

Henriot's propaganda helped to transform the conflict from a war of nations to one of systems. German war aims and ideology had become Henriot's war aims. The revenge of Vichy's minorities - the rafles, the STO, and the war against the Maquis - precipitated what appeared to be a civil war. Pétain, Laval, Henriot, and Darnand adopted measures ensuring the deportation of French citizens and the pillage of France's resources. The civil war was not between the Milice and the Maquis but the Vichy state against its own people. John Sweets observed in "Hold that Pendulum" that there was no Franco-French war at the Liberation, in the sense of a contest of opponents of roughly equal size, because there was almost no one left to fight for Vichy.<sup>10</sup> Kedward's study of the Maquis' support in the countryside refutes "functional collaboration"

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<sup>9</sup>John F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: The French Under Nazi Occupation*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

<sup>10</sup>John F. Sweets, "Hold that Pendulum! Redefining Fascism, Collaborationism and Resistance in France," in *French Historical Studies*, Vol. XV, No. 4, Fall 1988, 757.

conclusively.<sup>11</sup>

The radio war of words was founded on Lenin's maxim that radio was the instrument *par excellence* for psychological warfare. The major studies of radio propaganda by Asa Briggs<sup>12</sup>, Michael Balfour<sup>13</sup>, and Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac masterly four volume study *Les Voix de la Liberté* (1975) and the work of Radio-Londres.<sup>14</sup> Hélène Eck's study of French wartime radio propaganda *La Guerre des Ondes* (1985)<sup>15</sup> examined Vichy radio counter-propaganda to the challenges of the BBC. Henriot assumes an increasing profile in the radio war of words by late 1944. His radio exchanges with Pierre Dac saw two men who addressed each other across an ideological abyss in the battle for France: a France penitent and Pétainist seeking a renewal in her National Revolution was challenged by a France resistant, refusing to accept the Armistice and defeat. The war of words mounted by Vichy and London constituted another battle for France. A battle for hearts and minds. Before the Normandy landings, the radio war was the psychological battlefield that prepared for the invasion and

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<sup>11</sup>H.R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942-1944*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

<sup>12</sup>Asa Briggs, *The BBC: The First Fifty Years*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

<sup>13</sup>Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organizations, Policies and Public in Britain and Germany*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).

<sup>14</sup>Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, (ed.) *Les Voix de la Liberté: Ici Londres*. 4 vols., (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1975).

<sup>15</sup>Hélène Eck, *La Guerre des Ondes: Histoire des Radios de Langue Française pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1985).

liberation. The origins of this debate lay in the ideas of Joseph de Maistre, the Commune, the Dreyfus Affair, and the Popular Front.

This study of Philippe Henriot's wartime career with Vichy propaganda fills a missing link in an itinerary that culminated in the radio debate that held a nation captive to his words. Recent scholarship on the Vichy regime devoted attention to Henriot's wartime ministry and to his active career as propaganda minister in the first half of 1944.<sup>16</sup> What was missing was an itinerary of a Catholic militant whose name still conjures a notoriety in France.

Why has nothing been written on Henriot until now? The trail of Paul Touvier resurrected again his ghost. One of the objections to this study might be the lack of personal correspondence and papers in the possession of the Henriot family. The family was not approached, partly because the thesis was intentionally confined to the study of Henriot's public life and political writings. Communication with other scholars such as Jean-Pierre Azéma yielded no other research avenues apart from the bibliographic sources cited in the thesis. A colleague, Laurent Dittmann, studying Henriot's uncle, Brigadier-General Alfred N. Duffié, communicated that the Duffié family's efforts to contact the Henriot family were frustrated by the family's reticence.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>François Brigneau, *Le Jour où Ils Tuèrent Philippe Henriot*, (Publications FB, 1992).

<sup>17</sup>Personal correspondence dated 29 August 1995 with Dr. Laurent Dittmann, Professor of French at Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia wrote the author: "To answer your question about the Henriot family, I regret to tell you that I do not exactly know where they are. I have

The thesis has sought to bring to light the career of a Catholic militant caught between two worlds -- one in its death throes and another waiting to be born. Its weakness is that it has not explored other avenues. One area for further research, for example, is a study of the Catholic political culture of the Gironde and Henriot's Bordeaux milieu. Henriot's political career was more fruitful, hence my concentration on archival and press sources rather than his personal correspondence. Perhaps, Henriot's tragedy is that he fell captive to his own propaganda. A neurotic builds castles in the air, but only a psychotic lives there.

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been in touch with the Duffié family, the descendants of Civil War Brig. Gen. Alfred N. Duffié, Henriot's uncle. I know for a fact that they tried to contact the Henriots a couple of years ago to find out whether they had any kind of document pertaining to Duffié. Unfortunately, the Henriots sent them packing and have declined any form of contact ever since. I do not think that they are too keen on historical research.... Sorry I cannot be more helpful."



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