BALTIC WORLDS

Two original images by Riber Hansson

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Fifteen thousand women were active in the Arrow Cross movement. Nobody thought that women could commit such evil acts.

FASCIST WOMEN AND FEMALE INFORMANTS. LI BENNICH-BJÖRKMAN.

Democratic development in the Baltic States has been divergent – partly because of different patterns of resistance.

István Rév shares his views on how Hungary is managing its freedom, 20 years after the bloodless revolution. Morality, honor, populism. Where are we headed?

INTERVIEWS WITH ISTVÁN RÉV AND JOACHIM GAUCK.

EAST-MINORITY REPORTS.

When, at the age of 50, he was able to vote for the first time, Gauck wept with joy at being a free citizen of the new Federal Republic.

Is there room for queer and ethnical rights in the New Europe?

features, reviews & commentaries

TRAFFICKING / FINANCIAL CRISES / NORD STREAM / PEASANTS AND BOLSHEVIKS / THE CAUCASUS / SPORT

Dual nature solidified

TWO THEMES – the forms taken by the European regime changes of twenty years ago, and the situation of minorities in the new Europe – are highlighted in this issue of BW, which completes the second year of the magazine's existence. Its dual nature is thus solidified: an academic journal with articles by researchers, and a feature magazine with articles by renowned journalists. At the beginning of next year, BW will also launch a website.

THE SCIENTIFIC essays are thoroughly peer-reviewed in accordance with the customary referee system, with two autonomous reviewers. The quality of this work is guaranteed by BW's editorial advisory board.

Henceforth we will make space for Letters to the Editor.

The editorial team welcomes new literature for review. ■

CORRECTION
The photographs that accompanied Unn Gustafsson's feature article in the previous issue of BW were shot by Hanna Sjöberg.

Lindgren. Finnish inspiration for the Swedish Emil?

Emil of Lönneberga was a prankster, phenomenal at thinking out all manner of mischief. However, he ended up a respected man in his community out in the country, and got as far being chairman of the municipality council.

There has been some speculation about what earlier literary or historical figure from Swedish children's author Astrid Lindgren's home tract of Småland might have been the inspiration for this paragon of pranks. Now we know better. The inspiration was probably – Finnish.

ASTRID LINDGREN'S BROTHER, Gunnar Eriksson, of Näs Manor, outside the town of Vimmerby, was a member of parliament for the Farmers' League (*Bondeförbundet*) – the Swedish agrarian party – in the 1940s and 1950s. He traveled great distances, and came to espouse the idea of a Nordic community, and for this reason learned Finnish and often went to Finland.

There he should have encountered the anecdote collections of archaeologist Sakari Pälsi from the 1940s, on boyish pranks and life in rural Tavastia. Pälsi's favorite theme was precisely imaginative mischief of striplings who were never at a loss as to what to do next.

The hypothesis that Emil was based on Finnish anecdotes has been presented for the first time by the Helsinki historian Henrik Meinander in his latest book, *Finland 1944*. ■

With the periphery at the center

At the intersection between different political, economic, and religious systems, interesting and fruitful interchanges are not uncommon. People living in the borderland may be the last ones to be affected by changes and newfangled ideas emanating from a distant hegemonic center, but they must, on the other hand, be prepared to communicate under the conditions that hold for both sides of the existing borderline. Accordingly, they are forced to show greater flexibility than the "inland population". When such milieux are allowed to develop on their own terms, characteristics such as multilingualism, accessibility, and exchangeability are stimulated.

IT IS WELL KNOWN that the 19th century expansion of the American Frontier towards the West had decisive importance in the emergence of a national *ethos*. European history has been characterized by many borderland cultures, static as well as dynamic. Those around the Roman *limes*, Hapsburg's *Militärgrenze*, and the Iron Curtain are examples of the former, while the border regions between Denmark and Sweden and between France and Germany are examples of the latter. However, these peripheries have not left equally discernable traces in Europe's general consciousness, probably because they have not been described as diligently in literature and film (perhaps with the exception of the "Iron Curtain").

Political-military "barrier cultures" may seem to be more grateful, simple subjects for research than cultures of the more porous sort. Still, academic efforts are being dedicated to the peripheral and heterogeneous cultures that developed in Europe in early modernity, before the culmination of the development of the nation-state, when the construction of permanent structures checked international cultural exchange.

On November 5, 2009, Stockholm's National Library of Sweden (*Kungliga biblioteket*) offered the public an opportunity to learn how well-suited the Baltic Sea area is for such studies. Janis Kreslins, principal librarian, cooperated with Florian Siegl of Tartu University and Jason Lavery of Oklahoma State University in a series of public lectures which demonstrated the extraordinarily rich research flora that the region offers.

These public lectures were part of a larger international conference, arranged for the purpose of founding a cross-disciplinary network for Baltic Sea research. It was an experience of cultural exchange in itself to hear a Latvian-Swedish librarian demonstrate the early-modern Baltic Sea coast towns' exchangeability and ellipticity (right angles were perceived as an alien – Dutch – characteristic), in impeccable American English; an Estonian linguist specializing in German, English, and Swedish present a text on pidgin languages in the Baltic Sea region and the presence of Sámi in Central Sweden in prehistoric times (the latter unclear for linguistic reasons); or, finally, an American historian offer an account of the Reformation's (extremely slow) advancement in 16th century Finland. ■

pontus reimers
Archaeologist and editor (Stockholm)

To a Swede there is always a Finnish connection. To the world Astrid Lindgren is the Swedish connection.

BALTIC WORLDS

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

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contents

essays

17 Responses to the fall of the Wall
29 New elites in the Baltic States
48 Arrow Cross female criminals

features

10 Trafficking and NGOs
40 Nord Stream and its critics

interviews

14 Reflections on the revolution in Hungary
24 Nordrhein-Westfalen: A paradise to wake up in

reviews

56 Sport in Norway
58 Culture and cybernetics

story

37 A 1952 journey in the Baltic Sea

misc.

44 A look at Baltic Rim Economies

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In the age of gray areas

ILLUSTRATION: ARVID WRETMAN

In *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit*, Karl Schlögel, interviewed in the previous issue of Baltic Worlds, apostrophizes real-socialist city architecture as the expression of a garrison or siege mentality. The class struggle that was decreed put society in a state of war. And the broad, fashionable streets became infinitely wider than Haussman's boulevards in Paris after the Communards adventure in 1871, when the entire bourgeois social order was at stake.

It was a major effort just to get from one sidewalk to the other. So much trouble for nothing! Collective neurasthenia. Monumentalism that was so shocking.

There was an element of boredom, as well, as Gudrun Persson notes in an essay which will be published in the next issue of BW. The unexpected, almost by definition, could not occur. The future was dictated in advance. The laws that were applicable to the development of society were objective. Marxism as a state ideology was called "scientific socialism". There was a positive side to such an inflated worship of reason: among those things that unquestionably worked better in the East than in the West was the educational system. With indoctrination there followed education, with literacy, one received a cultural life worthy of the name.

IN THE CASE OF MORALITY, things were worse. When tyranny and terror were phased out – and, via *glasnost* and *perestroika*, the Soviet societies were trying to become perfectly normal – many people behaved out of character. There were too few points of support, too few handrails to hold on to. Vendettas and honor killings, trafficking in sex and in organs were given free range to an extent that made it impossible for ordinary citizens to be safe in countries where Communist dictatorships had reigned. Freedom as phantom.

Anti-Semitism and ethnic discrimination, it turned out, were not things of the past. It became dangerous for homosexuals to live in certain places. Even liberal counterweights became involved in corruption and self-contradiction. How those who prevailed would deal with their disappointment quickly became a recurring theme – highlighted in particular during times of economic crisis and decline. After liberation, states that had lived under Communist leadership suffered unequally. This raises the question of how deeply the dictatorship was able to leave its mark on their subordinate collectives.

Did it too become a victim of its own lack of imagination, its own lack of creativity?

Freedom does not consist in being able to do anything. Freedom is realizing what must be done. It seems that the realization that the regulation of state power has a civilizing function has begun to take root where the free market experiments lie in ruins. Real socialism was of course a party dictatorship that existed at the cost of the legality of the state. Party dictatorship, as demonstrated almost too explicitly by the People's Republic of China, is also consistent with an unbridled market economy.

Academic freedom is an asset that must exist if there are to be differences of opinion in a democratic society. The dictatorship will have none of that. But how much is democratic state power affected by genuine academic freedom, by the unbiased assessment of truth? By posing such a question, one avoids ending up in the trap of Manichaeanism. Gray areas dominate when we move through time and space. ■

Well, speaking of ages: this is also the age of bloodless revolutions – and violent civil wars.

HOMOSEXUALS THE INVISIBLE CITIZENS OF LITHUANIA

PHOTO: LARS RODVALDR

That someone belonging to a minority can be in the majority. The crucial problem for the modernist!

The passing of a homophobic law in July 2009, which aims to protect minors from the negative effects of public information and prohibits the "advertising of homosexual, bisexual and polygamous relations", has thrown the spotlight on the difficult situation faced by the homosexual community in Lithuania.

Inga is a young social worker in her thirties who lives with her partner, Greta, also a social worker. "We try to keep our distance from our neighbors, in order to avoid having to explain the nature of our relationship. I would prefer to not have to hide, to have people accept homosexuality as natural", she explains. "But, on the other hand, I can't bear the dirty looks anymore, the disapproval. I know exactly how people here react. They call us perverts, deviant. Everyone considers us to be pestilent", Inga points out, sad and resigned at the same time.

According to a survey by sociologists specializing in gender issues, 38 percent of Lithuanians would distance themselves from a friend who revealed his or her homosexuality to them.

Vladimir Simonko created the Lithuanian Gay Association in 1995. Homosexuality had just been decriminalized two years earlier. Approximately 200 people joined the association as volunteers. There are almost no official members of this association. According to Lithuanian law, personal information pertaining to official members would have to be made public. No one in the Lithuanian gay community wants to be put on file in this way.

When he publicly revealed his homosexuality 15 years ago, Vladimir Simonko became a victim. He recalls having been physically assaulted in stores and in streets by people who recognized him, as well as having been verbally abused by neighbors. Since then, he is always on guard when going out, out of an instinct for self-protection.

"I am subject to far fewer acts of aggression directly aimed at me. But that doesn't mean they don't exist. Homophobia is moving in a new direction. It's becoming institutionalized. When deputies adopt homophobic laws, there are no assurances that the groups of hate-mongers won't interpret this as a call to act", he hammers out, alarmed at the decisions being made by deputies.

"These invisible citizens", as they are termed by the sociologists who authored a large-scale survey on homophobia in Lithuania, are subject to several forms of discrimination, most notably in the workplace. They do not benefit from any legal recognition or organized communal life, because they are unable to form any type of partnership. For the time being, the formation of a legal, same-sex partnership is made impossible by a resolution adopted by the Lithuanian parliament that states that a family can only be defined as a married couple, composed of a man and a woman.

"The primary reason is a lack of education. Many still think that homosexuality is a crime, a disease; the other reason is the weight of the Catholic Church. The Church's lawyers are involved in the drafting of laws. It is the Church's position to denounce homosexuality", says Marija-Ausrine Pavilioniene, a social-democratic deputy. She has often publicly supported Lithuanian gays by marching alongside them in the gay pride parades of Riga and Stockholm.

Discrimination in the workplace is the most significant, and is still present, despite the introduction, between 2005 and 2007, of a program largely funded by Europe and Sweden and designed to educate employers and employees.

Vytautas Valentinavicius is the president of the Association for Tolerant Youth. He claims to have recently been a victim of discrimination when he requested a day off to participate in the Ilga Conference of the European Association of Homosexuals, held in Vilnius in 2007, and thereby revealed his sexual orientation. "My superiors are still in shock", he says. He received slanderous messages through his work e-mail. He was also prevented from being promoted. The criteria for a management position excluded him de facto. He did not want to register a complaint with the National Board of Equal Opportunity. "How would I prove a discriminatory act?" asks Vytautas Valentinavicius.

According to Valdas Dambrava, spokesperson for the Board, fewer than a dozen people every year register complaints of discrimination in the workplace due to sexual orientation. The concept itself was first created in 2005, in connection with a new law on equal opportunity. Prior to this date, the law only made guarded against discrimination due to gender. "The greatest sanction against employers occurs when discriminatory acts are made public, and we do receive complaints", states Valdas Dambrava. Nonetheless, he concedes that not much progress has been made on the issue during the last four years.

On several occasions, the municipalities of the larger Lithuanian cities have halted attempts made by the Lithuanian gay association to inform the public about homosexuality. The so-called Truck of Tolerance, an initiative funded by the European Commission, was denied entry into Lithuania in 2007. The following year, for fear of disturbances, the truck was relegated to the parking lot of a supermarket by the municipality of Vilnius. Homosexuals wanted to fly the rainbow flag, a symbol of their community. This request was denied by the authorities. In Kaunas, Lithuania's second largest city, it was forbidden to affix large ads to the trolleybuses with the following slogans: "A lesbian can be a teacher", and "A policeman can be gay". During the Ilga conference in Vilnius, participants were victimized. Demonstrations championing traditional family values, organized by young, right-wing militants, were constantly being held – demonstrations that were sanctioned by the municipality.

Given the situation, as Vladimir Simonko remarks, many young homosexual Lithuanians "seek out places where they are safe to express themselves without discrimination and where they can be themselves, without hiding nor lying, and where they can imagine a future". In other words, they emigrate.

Vytautas Valentinavicius contends that those who stay in Lithuania lead double lives. "I am personally acquainted with many homosexuals who are married, who have families, and who go looking for sexual experiences in hiding. Our country, Lithuania, forces people to choose to lead a double life. The individuals who reveal their homosexuality at work will never progress in their career", he affirms.

Upon assuming office on July 12, the new Lithuanian president, Dalia Grybauskaite, promised to propose amendments to the discriminatory law against homosexuals. Several international organizations which defend human rights, like Amnesty International, had been voicing their outrage. On September 17, the European Parliament adopted a resolution inviting Lithuania to be vigilant in ensuring that their national laws remain consistent with international and European law, and stressed the importance of the fight against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Her team has recently proposed new amendments to this law to the Lithuanian Parliament. The article pertaining to the ban on homosexual advertising, in order, supposedly, to protect minors, will be replaced by a ban on all information which would compromise sexual integrity, particularly that of young children.

No date has been set for the re-consideration of the law, which is scheduled to go into effect in March 2010. The debates in Parliament could once again be tumultuous. If the adoption of the amendments appears to be taking too long, the Council of Europe could suspend Lithuania's voting rights in the Council. The Council's Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, made a point of noting during a recent visit to Vilnius that he would keep a close watch on this issue.

In the meantime, Lithuanian homosexuals do not want to lose hope. They still plan to organize, in May 2010, a Baltic gay pride parade in the streets of Vilnius. ✕

marielle vitureau

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AFTER ENTRY INTO THE EU, HOMOPHOBIA WAS LET LOOSE

"End Euro Sodom!" What did the EU in fact have to do with the sudden outburst of homophobia that occurred in Poland and Latvia after the two countries became members in May of 2004? Conor O'Dwyer has done research on the backlash against the rights of sexual minorities in Catholic Poland and, together with his colleague Katrina Schwartz, has compared it to the more secular Latvia. Conor O'Dwyer and Katrina Schwarz are both professors of political science at the University of Florida.

"I was surprised that the backlash became so public, and at an official political level. Poland was always pointed to as a leader and the one most like the West, but this was an issue where politicians, kind of publicly, went against this idea of returning to Europe."

Conor O'Dwyer's research is primarily based on interviews with advocacy groups, anti-gay groups, and politicians in Poland – and with EU officials, as well.

O'Dwyer conducted the first interviews in 2007, while the former government was in power. He did the second round of interviews last summer, after spending a period of time as a guest researcher at CBEES. As he goes through the material, the effects of the change of government are noticeable.

"Among the advocacies, the tenor of the interviews was more positive this time, which is not surprising when you think of how openly homophobic the former government was. The sense I got – but I am really still going through this material – is that what you have now is a return to a sort of taboo status, to what some rights advocates call 'the regime of silence'. According to the advocacy groups, the new government, while not so openly homophobic, was intentionally not implementing its requirements in terms of antidiscrimination policy."

Latvia forbade Pride in both 2005 and 2006. In 2005, a court of law authorized the march, but in 2006 alternative meetings were arranged in its place. The meetings were not provided with police protection, and participants were assaulted with eggs and excrement by counter-demonstrators. As a response to the international critique, Latvia's minister of the interior, Dzintars Jaundžeikars, insisted that he was not forced, "for the sake of a few, to give orders to oppress the entire Latvian people". In Poland, on the eve of the sexual minorities' Equality Parade 2005, the mayor of Warsaw Lech Kaczyński said: "I will prohibit the parade regardless of what I find in the organizer's application. I see no reason to propagate gay culture." The parade in 2004 was also banned by Kaczyński, just a few months after Poland had joined the EU.

Conor O'Dwyer is a professor of political science at the University of Florida.

During the years leading up to Poland's EU membership, however, he had authorized the gay parades.

In your research, there are many examples of restrictions of the rights of sexual minorities and also of homophobia at the highest political levels. Prior to EU membership, the EU certainly demanded that sexual minorities be protected by the labor code. But do you believe that the EU has lived up to its responsibility for gay rights in Poland and Latvia?

"In the process before accession it would be fair to say that it was – although no doubt somewhat debated – not a pressing concern, even if the issue was raised. But I also think that it didn't really become such a visible public issue in the new member-states until pretty much after or right around the time of the accession to the EU. By then the EU could no longer really do anything directly or use its maximum-impact tools anymore. The European parliament has issued very strong condemnations and there have been court cases in human rights, I also think there are more attempts to put indirect pressure on governments in Eastern Europe to support and fund rights organizations. But I wouldn't say it's a top concern."

Your interviews from Poland in 2007 show that two thirds of the activists thought that the European-level institutions do not have much influence in shaping Polish politics and policy on the issue of the rights of sexual minorities. You also spoke with persons within the EU Commission; what did they think about the EU's role?

"I interviewed them on the condition that they not be quoted, but generally the response of that type of European-level officials was that they were very upset about the situation and certainly did not approve or think that it was a trivial matter."

Does the timing of the outbreak of homophobia indicate some kind of reaction to the EU forcing through a process of Europeanization as a condition of membership?

"This is one of the questions that I am still thinking about, how much of it is a backlash against the EU. To word it very strongly, you might say that what happened with this issue is that society became resentful about the way the accession was conducted. It was seen as a process imposed from abroad and the question of gay rights became a question of expressing dissatisfaction with the whole EU project. And I think there is a certain element of truth to that; there are people who go to a gay parade with signs like 'Put an end to Euro Sodom'. But that is probably not a representative snapshot of the public opinion. There was a fear of what would happen after accession that contributed to the very populist parties, such as the Polish Self Defense Party and League of Polish Families with their anti-gay politics. But the immediate results of accession, especially in terms of the economy, turned out to be much more positive. So I don't think that resistance to gay rights is primarily a way of expressing disapproval of the EU, I think it runs deeper than that."

O'Dwyer believes that the EU's role in the breakout of homophobia in Poland and Latvia was to act like a sort of catalyst. The sexual minorities would have stepped forward sooner or later, and this would have stirred up reactions – the fact that the EU stood as a sort of guarantor of minority rights and as a financial resource while the application process was under way accelerated the development.

But both Poland's and Latvia's conceptions of the nation contain homophobic tendencies, which have made it difficult to engender sympathy for norms concerning equal rights. The legacy from the Communist era – in the Soviet Union, homosexuality was taboo and male homosexuality forbidden – is also important.

Poland's national anti-gay discourse dates back to the interwar era, when Roman Dmowski, Poland's chief nationalist ideologue, declared that Catholicism is the essence of Polishness. Catholicism set "true Poles" apart from the country's various minorities. This notion still survives, in particular on the political right. Latvia's nationalism is, on the other hand, coupled to a fear of being assimilated into the larger hegemonic powers, first Germany, then Soviet Russia, and now the EU. The consequence is that the self-suffi-

Queer theory has come to Eastern Europe from the U.S. Will homophobia now spread westward?

cient, hetero-normative family has become integral to national identity. Up until Pride 2005, ethnic tensions had dominated Latvian politics; homosexuality had received very little attention. But in connection with Pride, tensions found a new focus when Latvia's so-called Preachers' Party, despite its Russia-friendly profile, and despite its being religious in an anti-Russian and secular context, managed to unite with the Latvian ultra-nationalists in an anti-gay campaign.

During the accession process, the EU established a lot of conditions. On the issue of sexual minority rights, in particular, it seems that conditionality as a tool for Europeanization is not very effective. Have you observed this in other research areas as well?

"That's interesting, and actually I am at the very early stages of a new project where I would like to pursue a comparison: minority policies not just for sexual but also for national minorities. So I can only venture to mention a part of what I have read so far. In a nutshell: the first wave of scholarship on the issue of national minorities suggested that the EU was extremely instrumental and pretty successful in liberalizing nationalist politics, but lately scholars question how much progress in implementation there has actually been after accession. The theory is that a lot of it consists, basically, of changes in the official policy, but that the actual implementation has very large gaps, also deliberate ones. Another example is the question of corruption in Romania and Bulgaria which is an ongoing problem, where I think the implementation of EU governance and norms has not been all that was hoped for."

According to O'Dwyer, the EU's conditionality is unique. It is fairly powerful, and has produced changes. In a wider perspective, however, outside the EU, the effectiveness of conditionality as a tool for fostering political reform is far more questionable.

"If you look at studies of conditionality attached to, for example, IMF loans, a lot of the literature expresses rather skeptical attitudes about what the conditionality accomplishes.

"However, one argument that does show the importance of conditionality in the case of sexual minorities, is that homophobia was not visible before the countries' membership. Conditionality is all about the consequences attached to taking a certain action, and if they didn't take the action of being openly homophobic, then that would suggest that they were concerned about the consequences."

The issue came to the surface with such force, and the debate was so openly homophobic, primarily because of instability in the countries' party systems. O'Dwyer's research (done in collaboration with his colleague Schwartz) shows that small parties have had disproportionately great influence.

"Because of under-institutionalized party systems you get a lot of new, often far-right, single-issue parties that can have much more voice in the process of forming government in Eastern Europe than they would in, for example, Germany or France. And the more unstable the governmental coalition, the more difficulties moderate voices have holding back extreme coalition members. Poland has had a pretty unstable party system since the fall of Communism, and Latvia even more so. The Polish League of Family lost its place in the government and parliament in 2007. That does mean a decline in homophobic rhetoric, but because of the instability, the door is still open for other populist demagogues.

"While at CBEES I participated in a lot of conversations about political populism in Eastern Europe, which is one of the institute's ongoing research projects. Given that many of the most vociferously anti-gay groups I was investigating in my own research came from the populist right, discussing these issues with Europeanists from such a wide array of disciplines was very helpful when thinking about my own questions."

Since Poland and Latvia are now members, the ability of the EU to impose pressure from the outside, in order to force through changes, has drastically diminished. Instead, the EU must develop methods that are based on voluntarism. This is something that was neglected as a field of activity during Poland's and Latvia's application processes, O'Dwyer and Schwartz point out.

Still, compared with how it was in 2007, O'Dwyer believes that he sees an improvement in the Polish advocacy groups' relations to the EU institutions.

"I am still going through the material, but my impression is that there is a strengthening of the organizations. They had matured, had become competitive in applying for grants through the EU. They were more professional and more oriented towards grants and projects.

"I have become very interested in what impact NGOs and activist organizations from Western Europe have on changing attitudes of politicians and parts of the public. That was where I concentrated the focus of the interviews this time. I am also looking at the extent to which you see a strong, on-the-ground advocacy network in new member states and how much other EU member states and European institutions have been able to foster these."

Not all activists are happy that Poland's openly homophobic debate has now quieted down.

"Some activists actually thought that the League of Polish Families was the best thing that ever happened since it brought real visibility to the question. As one of the interviewees put it: 'The current situation is just a return to the regime of silence which makes it difficult to change the status quo, and the status quo is not a very favorable one.'"

tove stenqvist
Journalist, *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* (Malmö)

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QUEER IN POLISH

During a seminar at CBEES, Joanna Mizielinska, lecturer in gender and queer studies at Warsaw School of Social Research, gives an account of problems associated with the application of queer theory in Poland.

When a theory that has sprung up in one cultural context is transferred into another such context, it runs the risk of being distorted. Queer becomes synonymous with either gay or lesbian, or is emptied of its subversive, confrontational contents because the concept is deprived of its sexuality – queer then becomes anything outside the norm. The fact that both queer theory and the gay movement originate in the U.S. gives rise to further problems. In Poland, queer theory runs the risk of being regarded as yet another import that has come in the wake of a globalization process machinated by the U.S.

"One aspect that one may include here is whether the gay movement in Poland falls into some kind of victim's role, as they are pitied for lagging 'behind' the West. The East-West relationship complicates the issue of what attitude one should take towards the question of why the gay movement has not begun to be politically active until now", says Mizielinska.

In fact, Mizielinska opposes adopting a linear description of the so-called development. Still, she discusses whether there must be an established gay movement in Poland before one can speak about queer. Or, in other words, whether homophobia must be overcome and homosexual be accepted in Polish society before one can bring up the fact that no sexual identities, not even the homosexual, are fixed, but are, rather, socially produced and must be constructed continuously in order not to collapse.

Another problem is that there

Joanna Mizielinska, lecturer in gender and queer studies at Warsaw School of Social Research

The paradox of belonging: easier to break rules when one has gained entrance than when one is knocking on the door.

is no good translation for "queer" in the Polish language. Attempts of translation are misleading.

"To announce a course in queer theory does have its advantages. Students do not know what it is, and come to learn more about it. If one had announced a course in the study of homosexuality, or of deviant or perverse behavior – which would be the Polish equivalents of the word queer – not many students would come", states Mizielinska.

At the same time, she is concerned that queer in Poland is being used as a common denominator for homosexuality, or is becoming a concept for otherness in general (e.g., otherness in gender or ethnicity). For Mizielinska, the basis, the core issue of queer theory, is expressed in the slogan of queer supporters: "We are here, we are queer, get fucking used to it." She asserts that the entire queer theory questions all research based on the idea that identities are naturally established, and that there exist normative sexual behaviors. It is not a question of coming out, but of saying here I am, right now, I take my place in the public sphere. To question the prevailing hetero-normative power structure.

But in Poland it is not easy to assert one's right to be in the public sphere, or express an identity that is based on sexual habits that differ from those of the majority. The widespread homophobia and the weak gay movement raise other and more immediate problems than those formulated by queer theory. The Gay Pride Parade, for instance, is called the Equality Parade in Poland, where the focus is on asserting the rights of which homosexuals are deprived. Such discrimination does take place, and in order to call attention to this, one must refer to "homosexual" in terms of a fixed identity. It is, of course, on the basis of such fixed identities that human rights are established.

Mizielinska also points out that it is not only the gay movement and the queer theories that, as a result of globalization, spread and encounter new cultural contexts. Homophobia can also find nourishment in global contacts and be affected by the power relations between, e.g., East and West.

During fall 2009, Joanna Mizielinska was a visiting researcher fellow at CBEES, Södertörn University. ■

ninna mörner

A POLISH HEART IN LITHUANIA

The Poles of Lithuania are like the Russians of Latvia and Estonia. They are tolerated but not loved. And as always in Central Europe, a minority problem has its roots in history. The historical conflict is mostly about Wilno, as the Poles term the Lithuanian capital Vilnius.

When Lithuania first became independent, between the two world wars, Poland incorporated Vilnius. Lithuanians have not forgotten this, nor how they were denied freedom in their own historical city. This, more than fear of cultural competition, probably underlies the law forbidding Lithuanian Poles to use the original Polish spelling of their names in passports and other official documents, or to put up Polish-language street signs.

In the latest census, in 2001, only about 235,000 people or 6.7 percent of the population identified themselves as ethnic Poles. With a majority of 83.5 percent, ethnic Lithuanians are culturally and politically secure, which explains why the minorities (Russians make up 6.3 percent) were granted citizenship and the right to vote when Lithuania gained independence in 1991.

And yet there are problems.

In September 2009, Lithuania's Supreme Administrative Court upheld a lower-court ruling forbidding languages other than Lithuanian on street signs. The municipality of Salcininkai was told to remove non-Lithuanian (Polish and Russian) street-names. Fines can be imposed on any municipality that does not respect the court's ruling.

Most Poles live in the south-eastern Soleczniki/Salcininkai region, not far from Wilno/Vilnius. The area borders on Belarus and was once part of a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. When Marshal Jozef Pilsudski declared Poland's independence in 1918 and annexed Wilno in 1922, it was part of his dream to revive the original medieval Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which the Grand Dukes had ruled from the Castle in Vilnius.

The fact that Pilsudski chose Wilno as the final resting place for his heart shows the symbolic importance that his dream gave the city. Pilsudski's heart is buried next to his mother's grave in the Polish Military Cemetery. She had given birth to him in 1867, just outside Vilnius.

The Nobel Laureate Czeslaw Milozs (1911–2004), who grew up in Wilno/Vilnius, is the most famous Polish writer to spring from the cultural-historical landscape created by Lithuania's Polish-speakers. Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) also studied and worked in Wilno/Vilnius, when Lithuania was part of the Russian Empire. Mickiewicz and Milozs were very far from being insular Polish nationalists. In their view, borders should not divide people along ethnic lines. Rather, they saw borderlands as areas of multicultural diversity, the kind of diversity that had existed in the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

This may be one reason why, on August 23, 1987, Lithuanian dissidents chose to stage a groundbreaking, retrospective protest against the Molotov Ribbentrop-Pact at the Mickiewicz statue close to the bank of the river Vilnia. The event is seen as marking the birth of the Lithuanian independence movement.

But many Lithuanians have unhappy historical memories of a Commonwealth in which the Poles constituted the upper class and the Lithuanians made up the peasantry, speaking a dialect which was not welcome in Polish-dominated Catholic churches. These memories came alive during the independence movement, and the most radical Lithuanian nationalists exploited anti-Polish sentiments. Thus, the Polish minority fought for autonomy in a new country where Lithuanian was becoming the sole national language.

As is often the case, the struggle against the suppressor brought the two rival groups together, in a common defense of freedom against the greater evil. But political discord followed, particularly when local Polish mayors declared a particular region autonomous. Their Polish nationalism clashed with an equally strong Lithuanian nationalism, as enforced by Vytatuas Landsbergis's leadership.

By the early 1990s, this had created strained relations between Lithuania and Poland. After Landsbergis left office the tension eased significantly. But one very concrete sign of a persistent, underlying conflict is that Lithuania and Poland have, for many years now, failed to connect the two countries' electricity power grids. This causes problems for Lithuania, as the Ignalina nuclear power station was closed towards the end of 2009.

In day-to-day life, there is little Polish-Lithuanian friction to be seen – or heard, for that matter. Many inhabitants of the multicultural Vilnius master the languages of the three large ethnic groups: Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian.

But the Lithuanian Poles' Union has recently staged protests, requesting EU assistance to obtain the right to use the original spelling of Polish names in official documents, to use Polish in public life and to have street signs in Polish in areas where Poles are in the majority. According to Lithuania's new president, Dalia Grybauskaite, the country does not currently violate ethnic minorities' rights; nevertheless, she has hinted at possible improvements.

The phantom pain of the Polish great power. The restlessness of an elite that has been neglected.

When former Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, now Speaker of the EU Parliament, visited Vilnius in October, Grybauskaite said that Lithuania might consider giving Poles the right to write their names in Polish on official documents. Buzek welcomed the pledge and asked Polish protesters congregated outside the presidential palace to show patience. When one demonstrator claimed that Poles have not experienced freedom in Lithuania for two decades, Buzek told him not to exaggerate and pointed to how much things had changed in the last 25 years.

Subsequently, Lithuania's Minister of Justice said that the Constitutional Court's ruling on spelling of names in fact leaves room for Lithuania to accept as legitimate names spelled according to the person's own language.

One example of things that have changed was the democratic presidential election of 2009, when a Lithuanian citizen of Polish descent stood as a candidate. The candidate's name was Waldemar Tomaszewski – or Valdemar Tomaševski, as the name was spelled on the ballot slip. Tomaszewski, who leads the minority party, received 4.7 percent of the votes cast. In the parliamentary elections of 2008, his party won 4.8 percent of votes and three of out of 141 seats. ■

arne bengtsson
Correspondent for the Swedish news agency TT

COMBINING ACTIVISM AND RESEARCH

The dilemma of double-rejection. To be accepted by strangers without betraying the group.

"You cannot just be an academic when you devote yourself to Romani studies, you have to be active in the struggle", maintains Thomas Acton, professor of Romani Studies at the University of Greenwich, London.

Although it is the first time Thomas Acton has lectured at Södertörn University, his audience does not consist entirely of strangers. On the contrary, many of his Swedish Romani friends are present – people who are, like him, politically active in strengthening Romani rights.

Acton has 40 years of experience combining activism and research. He has worked in the field in all the senses of the term "work". At the end of the 1960s, he participated in the development of education for Romanies and travelers living in trailers. To give lessons in ambulating premises was one way of focusing attention on needs not provided for by society.

Acton's research has included the study of how Romanies have been conceptualized in European history. There exist stereotypes about Romanies that are used to legitimate their isolation, Acton argues. Romantic ideas about how they are deviant, wild and hard to control. These ideas are romantic insofar as they often endow their subjects with qualities and behaviors that many within the majority themselves long for, but do not dare to posess or fully express. But in the long run, these stereotypes nourish racism, and justify the oppression of Romanies.

Such stereotypes are often based on second-hand accounts of meetings with Romanies rather than first-hand experience, Acton believes. Stories and historical accounts of Romanies put special emphasis on the Romani as thievish and maladjusted. Behavior that is explained by their being Romanies, rather than as deriving from social circumstances. In order to survive racist acts of cruelty, some Romanies have been forced to conceal the fact that they are Romani. This was the strategy used by Romanies who survived the Holocaust.

Acton knows many Romanies who lead a kind of double life as part-intellectual, part-Romani. This can quite literally entail being a university student on weekdays and living with cousins in a trailer, selling goods and services at the Saturday market on weekends. To combine these different social roles is a dilemma. Those Romanies who complete higher education can sometimes be seen by others as betraying the group, or as allying with the oppressors. Majority intellectuals may view educated Romanies with suspicion, or, at best, with curiosity. The dilemma is accentuated, Acton believes, if the Romani intellectual devotes him- or herself to Romani studies.

Being Romani oneself does not suffice to give adequate knowledge of Romani culture and history. The academic study of the subject can provide many facts, approaches and concepts. But, stresses Acton, this does not mean – contrary to what many people maintain – that Romanies doing research on their own culture produce results that are, by definition, either dubious or of lesser value.

He has met colleagues who maintained that Romanies who conduct research on Romani culture are working through personal traumas with the help of student financial aid or government research funding. "When the discourse is like that, it is not surprising that I have acquaintances in the academic world who haven't dared to come out and talk about their Romani background."

There exists, in consequence, a sort of paranoia among many intellectual Romanies: that they will be rejected as Romanies by their own people, and at the same time be rejected by the majority's intellectuals. On the other hand, adds Acton, during the Soviet era, there was paranoia among all intellectuals, but less – according to Acton – among the Romanies, because they knew they could trust one another.

"All Romanies who get an education cannot be active for the Romani cause. Some study subjects that are far removed from Romani studies. But a Romani must always choose a position or point-of-view, and all choices involve varying degrees of loss", says Acton, and describes the various choices: not to get any education at all, and thus place oneself outside the rest of society; to get an education in order to assert Romani rights; to get an education and to ignore one's background; to get an education and try to avoid taking any definite position. All of these attitudes imply choosing an identity, or trying to live with double identities.

Acton is glad that Romani is, today, a written language into which more and more works are being translated.

"To read the Bible in Romani gives an extra dimension to its contents. This language, which was for so long only spoken, is without the clichés that for instance burden English", says Acton.

When more and more Romani children learn Romani, they will gain access to a global community, and will be able, through media such as the Internet, to have contacts with Romanies in the whole world. In this way, the Romani people will receive – by means of a written language and through globalization – a totally new platform from which to act. ■

ninna mörner

There are approximately 10 million Romani in Eastern Europe, all living as minorities.

ANTI-TRAFFICKING EFFORTS HARD TO GET RESULTS

BY **NINNA MÖRNER** ILLUSTRATION **RAGNI SVENSSON**

WITH THE FALL OF THE WALL and the introduction of a market economy in Eastern Europe, trafficking has become increasingly common. The countries of the region have cooperated with the EU in attempts to stop this activity. But trafficking has not diminished. There are those who claim that anti-trafficking efforts have actually led to increased trafficking. Others are of the opinion that the efforts are misdirected, that the welfare of the victims is being ignored.

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"There are root causes of trafficking in the countries of origin, such as poverty, unequal gender relations and traditional social structures to name a few, there are root causes involving the migration process, such as the lack of safe and legal migration opportunities – especially for certain categories of migrants, such as low-skilled and women – as well as root causes in the countries of destination, such as demand for cheap and exploitative labor and the increasingly repressive policies towards undocumented persons."

This is how Irena Koneçná, director of La Strada in the Czech Republic, summarizes the reasons why it is so difficult to stop trafficking. In her view, there are problems in the countries of origin as well as in the destination countries – but also in immigration policy itself.

La Strada is an NGO that supports the victims of trafficking and provides information on the danger that trafficking poses. La Strada International is a network of nine NGOs based in Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldavia, the Czech Republic, Bosnia Hercegovina, Macedonia and the Netherlands. La Strada focuses on groups that are particularly at risk: youth, the unemployed, minorities, and migrants. It runs telephone support and offers victims safe housing and other types of help. One of the first La Strada organizations was founded in the Czech Republic in 1995.

At its inception, the organization focused primarily on sexual exploitation. But according to Koneçná, the trend in the Czech Republic has been towards an increasing number of people being subjected to labor exploitation. Koneçná does, however, emphasize that there are no clear boundaries between different kinds of exploitation. They coincide and intermix.

"I would like to stress that human trafficking is not something 'static'. Rather, it is a process that can begin with labor exploitation and violation of labor laws but end as forced labor or human trafficking, or even sexual exploitation", says Koneçná.

With time, the Czech Republic, like Poland and other countries, has become an important destination country. In the Czech Republic, there are businesses and individuals who engage in sexual as well as labor exploitation. The pattern recurs in other Central European countries that have put themselves through IMF's reform program in order to make the transition to a market economy. They go from being countries of origin to being transit countries as well; finally, they gradually turn into destination countries.

THE PHENOMENON IS COMPLEX: trafficking develops and is transformed. The streams of people who are being bought and sold go in different directions.

The introduction of a market economy in the former Communist states led to unemployment and greater social inequality. The women and men who end up in – or engage in – trafficking have, in many cases, no alternative. They are simply trying to support themselves and their families. As the borders are closed, they are generally forced to enter the richer countries through illegal channels. There are recruiters who actively search out likely subjects for trafficking. Some groups are more vulnerable to attempts at recruitment than

The new Europe was to be the continent of mobility. And it became the continent of migrants.

SCHENGEN

others. Many believe that they are being helped in their attempts to smuggle themselves into the rich countries. In reality, they are being sold, and thus end up having to work off a debt to the buyer – the purchase price. This means that they can be exploited as workers or as providers of sexual services, or forced to perform illegal acts such as stealing or begging. They are at the mercy of those who have bought them and have no influence on their situation or income. They often do not speak the country's language and are afraid that the authorities will discover them and send them home. This kind of vulnerability and exploitation is the essence of trafficking.

THE UN'S PALERMO PROTOCOL, proclaimed in 2000, gives a definition of trafficking. To traffic is to recruit, transport, lead across borders, receive or house a person that one intends to exploit sexually, use as forced labor, as a slave, or for organ transplants; and to use violence, threaten, kidnap, persuade, pay or get paid by, or lure with false prospects, or to gain control over the person in question by other means.

Trafficking for sexual purposes is seen as a lucrative trade. There are no production costs, no warehousing expenses; the women can be exploited repeatedly; their services are sold several times daily and the women can be resold. Less is known about trafficking for labor exploitation or other purposes; but here also, it is likely that large profits are to be had.

At present, anti-trafficking work is being conducted on several levels. The government of the destination country often tries to prosecute criminals and stop the import of humans through illegal channels. At the EU level, cooperative efforts are being made to seal off borders and harmonize legislation. In the countries of origin, efforts are directed more towards prevention – often with funding from the EU or the UN – including information campaigns that warn of the dangers associated with attempts to cross the border in search of a living. Furthermore, a number of NGOs, such as La Strada, operate in the countries of origin and transit, as well as in the destination countries. These offer support and protection to the victims of trafficking. In the destination countries, the NGOs' primary focus is on helping people who are trying to escape from a trafficking situation; in the countries of origin, they focus on helping those who return.

IT IS NOT EASY TO COORDINATE efforts being conducted at different levels. Often there is a contradiction between the intention to help the victims and the end goal of eliminating the organized crime responsible. Furthermore, cooperation between police and NGOs does not always function smoothly in these countries.

Anna Ekstedt, associated with the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), is senior advisor for the "Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings" (TF-THB). TF-THB is a newly established Baltic cooperative project which fights trafficking on the political level. The project includes twelve member countries and seven observer states. The initial phase of the organization's work has consisted in mapping out the relevant actors in each member country; the NGOs often do supportive and advisory field work. In Anna Ekstedt's opinion, this is problematic, since the NGOs may exaggerate the number of victims in order to stress the magnitude of the problem and to justify demands for funding:

"YOU CAN NEVER STOP PEOPLE FROM DREAMING OF A BETTER LIFE — FORTUNATELY, I WOULD SAY."
KRISTINA ABIALA

"Nor does the contact and cooperation between NGOs and state always function satisfactorily. NGOs often base their efforts on the needs of the victim and do not always encourage the victim to notify the police and engage the judicial apparatus. The police, in turn, do not always refer the victims to the NGOs for support."

The trafficking problem may be handled differently, depending on the country and the region. It can be conceived as a juridical problem, as a question concerned with migration, or as a question of human rights. The concept used determines the goals a country sets for itself and the methods on which it concentrates, methods that might include increased legislative action, more stringent border controls, information that warns at-risk groups, or more effective support for victims.

Most countries within the EU have passed legislation that forbids human trafficking, but often the law refers only to groups that are vulnerable to trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. In Sweden, Norway, and Iceland it is a crime to buy sex. There, attempts are made to unite the struggle against trafficking for sexual purposes with the fight against prostitution, based on the argument that the two are, in principle, one and the same phenomenon.

WITH RESPECT TO THE VICTIM'S legal position, legislation differs from country to country. Victims are seldom treated as complainants in any ensuing legal process. Rather, they are classified as witnesses, which deprives them of economic compensation. There is little chance, finally, of a victim being protected from threats emanating from his or her home country, or that the victim will be granted asylum in the country in which he or she has been subjected to trafficking.

Seen from the perspective of the destination country, the great problems are the organized criminals, the perpetrators who run trafficking, and illegal migration. The destination countries seal off their borders and many introduce stringent controls to prevent women and men from being brought in. In spite of this, an increasing number of women and men are being trafficked, or enter the richer parts of Eastern Europe and Northern and Western Europe as illegal immigrants. The fight against trafficking is fruitless. Although a growing number of perpetrators are prosecuted for trading in humans, trafficking quickly finds new paths.

The anti-trafficking efforts that have been undertaken under Sweden's term of the EU presidency have primarily treated the problem as a legal matter – the perpetrators must be apprehended; as a migration issue – illegal immigration must be stopped; and, finally, as a women's issue – the fight against trafficking is an element in the fight against prostitution.

Prior to the EU Ministerial Conference – which took place on October 18 on the occasion of the Antitrafficking Day, itself established by the EU – a number of NGOs (Amnesty International, La Strada International, Anti Slavery International, the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, the Global Alliance against Traffic in Women, Save the Children, Terre des Hommes International Federation, and ECPAT International) had united in a common statement in which the fear was expressed that anti-trafficking measures at the EU level would, first, lead to more stringent migration control, and, second, divert the fight against trafficking into a fight against organized crime. They entreated the EU to assume a more far-sighted view of the trafficking problem, and improve support and help for persons who are or have been exposed to trafficking. A broader view would include things such as labor exploitation, multiple forms of exploitation, at-risk groups, minority issues, internal trafficking, problems related to returning home, victims' right to asylum, and issues of re-trafficking. These are the types of problems identified by those who encounter victims of trafficking.

LILIYA IVANCHENKO IS AN ATTORNEY and a Human Trafficking Prevention Project manager at Living for Tomorrow, an NGO in Estonia. Living for Tomorrow is an international support organization with its main office in the United States, and with sister organizations in other parts of the world. It runs a support network which offers telephone support, provides information to at-risk groups and generally provides help and protection. Liliya Ivanchenko reports that Russian-speaking women in Estonia constitute a risk group. Compared to the majority of the Estonian population, their future prospects are poor. Available information indicates they are a focus of recruitment efforts. Unemployment, which has hit different ethnic groups differently, has led to young women and men living in Estonia's Russian-speaking areas being taken to Estonian cities, where they are exploited either as labor, or sexually.

"Russian-speakers, because they lack Estonian language skills, often cannot get well-paid jobs. Because of this, there is a tendency towards internal human trafficking within Estonia, from the northeastern part of the country to the capital city", says Liliya Ivanchenko. She continues:

"Russian-speakers' risk of becoming victims of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation is also revealed in a survey done in 2006 by the Estonian

Open Society Institute. The survey shows that Russian women are subjected to twice as much pressure from recruiters as Estonian women."

Thus, minority issues play a part, as do internal trafficking and exploitation, in several ways at once. Trafficking can take place within the borders of a single country. The issues are interrelated and unless this is taken into account, anti-trafficking efforts may easily miss the target. If one wishes to spread information about trafficking risks, for instance, it seems reasonable to address the minority groups in their own language.

For a woman desperately trying to support herself and her family, the closed borders and inaccessible labor markets of the richer neighbor countries are tremendous obstacles. Seen from this perspective, the fight against trafficking requires entirely different methods than border checks or the prohibition of the purchase of sex.

KRISTINA ABIALA AT SÖDERTÖRN UNIVERSITY is also of the opinion that borders and legislation on immigration are part of the problem. Assistant professor Abiala works in gender studies and sociology at the university's Institute for Contemporary History. She has visited Moldavia several times, in order to study Moldavian migration and closely linked issues. The only way to stop trafficking is to improve the conditions of the groups that leave Moldavia, Kristina Abiala contends. She is not impressed with the work that EU does to stop trafficking.

"Sweden's minister of justice Beatrice Ask has, during the Swedish EU presidency, said that trafficking is to be prevented through legislation and increased cooperation between customs officers and police. Sweden associates laws against prostitution with trafficking. But even if every country were to adopt anti-prostitution sex-purchase laws, it would still not end trafficking."

When rich countries close their borders in order to stop the entrance of a stream of migrants, it has the opposite effect, Kristina Abiala maintains. The migrants are forced to use illegal means of entry.

"You can never stop people from dreaming of a better life – fortunately, I would say. Migration cannot be stopped. I think free immigration should be allowed, or at least it should be made easier for those who wish to immigrate in order to join the labor force."

In Kristina Abiala's opinion, another way to stop trafficking is to improve conditions for the groups that now leave Moldavia. That is, ensure that they can support themselves and create a future for themselves in their own country.

"The only way to approach the question is to ask people what kind of support they need and what they are asking for."

She has been in Moldavia and has talked to women and young people about their lives, their future prospects and their decision to migrate. Moldavia offers few employment prospects to young women with higher education, as the country is strongly patriarchal and men usually hold the more lucrative positions in society. Families and households have difficulties managing economically, even when the adults have jobs. Wages are low and the country's economy is on the brink of collapse. The alternative is migration.

One NGO ran a campaign in Moldavia, "Abandoned People". A film was shown in the schools, containing strong warnings about how badly things could be for migrants. The person who migrated, the film said, betrayed both his or her family and country.

"It was pure scaremongering. It is, in my opinion, a little naive to believe that young people would be impressed by it, for at the same time they were getting information from other sources. One's neighbor could confirm how much money one could make."

According to Abiala, it is possible to see, in the villages, which households have family members abroad. They have fine houses with modern amenities. There is visual evidence everywhere proving that migration does pay.

"There is a power in their will to migrate. An enormous drive to create a future for themselves and their children. Just as when many people emigrated from Sweden and Norway to the United States in order to create a new future."

When Abiala talks of migration and trafficking, she shares the victims' perspective. Trafficking, in this view, is where one ends up if one tries to migrate – and has bad luck.

A large proportion of Moldavia's population resides outside the country, particularly Moldavians from the country's southern regions. It can be difficult for family supporters to return home, for then the money stops coming in. Family life gets adjusted to one grown person being abroad: to the fact that that's what the division of labor looks like.

TO RETURN HOME WITHOUT MONEY, or to have failed to send money home, makes the return difficult. Those who have failed are often under severe psychological stress, and have difficulties readjusting to life in the home town. Furthermore, the prevalent patriarchal mentality makes it difficult for women who have been sexually exploited to return home, in Kristina Abiala's view.

Suzanne Hoff, international coordinator at La Strada International, based in Amsterdam, says that it is not always easy to give people who have been victims of trafficking adequate support and help. Often, the support provided is still conditional on whether a trafficked person cooperates with the authorities. If the victim is an illegal immigrant in the eyes of the law, it is difficult for that person to file a complaint with the police, since this would mean that he or she risks being sent home, even though national legislation should offer protection and support and provide the person with a reflection period, to consider pressing charges.

If she – for it is most often a woman who contacts La Strada member organizations – receives protection and support, it is often only for the duration of the legal process (or criminal procedure), as is the temporary residence permit. It remains difficult for trafficked persons to obtain a permanent residence permit in European countries.

A trafficked woman who presses charges is usually afraid of what might happen once the legal process is over. Will she be sent home? Will there be any protection for her there? The fear is especially great if the perpetrators are part of a cross-border network, as they most often are, and the woman risks being confronted with them again, facing revenge for the fact that she reported the crime.

Most commonly, the woman is denied permanent asylum in the country in which she has been a victim of crime. She is usually sent home. La Strada member organizations in nine European countries, try to provide reception for the woman, and provide her with a period of rest. Not all European countries have NGOs or an infrastructure able to provide support. Sometimes, the home country also lacks the laws necessary to protect the victim.

The women were seldom in good socio-economic circumstances before they were trafficked, says Suzanne Hoff. Their exposure to trafficking has usually worsened their situation; those returning might also be stigmatized.

"If a person has been exploited as a worker in a bakery, with miserable working conditions and no wages, everyone might realize that the woman is not to blame. But it is regarded to be the woman's fault if she has been exploited in the sex industry. The stigmatization of the woman has to do with the conceptualization of the sex industry."

IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR THE women to become re-trafficked – that is, they once again ends up in, or go back into, trafficking. This is a clear indication of the lack of success of anti-trafficking efforts. Trafficked persons who are identified by the authorities in the destination country are sent home. Once home, they receive inadequate protection and support. The women have no alternative; they must once again try to leave. ■

ninna mörner

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ANTI-TRAFFICKING EFFORTS HARD TO GET RESULTS

It is well worth it to migrate. And now people no longer venturing across the Atlantic.

Turning a blind eye to the obvious

Budapest, fall 2009. István Rév opens the door to the Open Society Archives for a discussion about bloodshed as a poor gauge of a revolution, about honesty and decency as rare commodities, about populism and utopianism.

BY **ANDERS BJÖRNSSON** PHOTOS **CLAUDIA MARTENS**

The Royal Hungarian Post Office Savings Bank, built in 1901 by architect Ödön Lechner, at Hold utca (Moon Street) in Budapest, is a symphony of color and form, of whim and imagination, of a rustic playfulness. Unlike so many other Jugendstil buildings in this city, where exaggeration and far too shapely replicas are always close at hand, this palatial bank, with its many entrances along an extremely long facade, is neither frightening nor particularly overwhelming. For the goal was also to attract customers, those with small savings; to be – inviting.

In the fall of 2009, the entire section of the street is transformed into a construction site. The visitor, on his way to a meeting, experiences a strange combination of admiration and wonder. In 1873, Budapest had been recast as the capital of an empire that already had one. If Budapest had missed out on the pomp and splendor of the Baroque period, the rounded buildings with surrounding gardens in which the aristocracy loved to make appearances in Vienna, and instead became a city comprised of various integrated districts with a bourgeois if not to say industrial character – this was the thesis of historian Péter Hanák in a late work in which he compared the two twin cities with each other[1] – the Hungarians, in the years around 1900, needed to make everything so much more voluminous, much more ornate and florid, in accordance with the instinct that the parvenus permit themselves: to spew when they can't pick and choose.

Why am I here? And which trip is it now? I set my sights on a side street, right in the heart of the former financial center of the metropolis. The pompous Hungarian National Bank building, recently restored. But the tempo on the sidewalks is cautious. For some years now, Hungary has been driven by crises – a social and an economic crisis, but also a crisis of confidence. Did it never learn from all the defeats? "My country has lost all its wars", Ferenc said to me when I visited him here in the summer of 1982 – Ferenc, who had been a child of war in my grandmother's family after the World War I, in the same southern Swedish town, Hässleholm, where Germany's war dictator Erich Ludendorff sat and wrote his memoirs. "And that's what makes me so optimistic. Because if we lose the next war too, we will be free. "

The Cold War. Communism's war against its class enemies – real or imagined.

We sat in a French restaurant on Rajk László utca, near Margaret Bridge, when he uttered those words. Ferenc ordered everything for us in French; he had held a professorship in that language. He and Rajk, one of the first victims of the Stalinist show trials in postwar Eastern Europe, had been students together. The street is called something else today; rehabilitations made the Kádár period has been examined with new eyes. György Konrád, the writer, former dissident and president of both the Berlin Academy and International PEN, constantly in a foreign land, had Ferenc as a teacher in his youth.

I am following a trail – and immediately go astray. In 1982, I also met János Kornai, the economist. It was a sweltering August afternoon, we sat at an espresso bar on the river. His book on socialism qua economics of shortage had recently been published. Now I read in his autobiography about his own path, to and from Communism. Both Kornai, born Kornhauser, and Ferenc were of Jewish descent. A teenage János was helped by a letter of protection issued by the Swedish Embassy during Raoul Wallenbergs's time here, and he was then hidden in a monastery.[2] Because of his language skills, Ferenc was needed as an interpreter and liaison officer when the Germans and Hungarians and Romanians fought on the Eastern Front, on Ukrainian territory. Despite his Jewishness.

Puzzling. So might one think in retrospect.

The building, erected exactly a hundred years ago, in 1909 is located on Arany János utca, just around the corner, between the palatial bank and the cathedral. The family name was Goldberger, Jews from Switzerland; came to Hungary and founded a textile company; here there were offices, administration and management. Most of the Goldbergers were deported during World War II, the company was nationalized by the Communists, who turned the building into a department store for the *nomenklatura*, the members of which could acquire cheap cigarettes and Scotch whiskey with dollars on the premises. István Rév's office is furnished with a writing-desk, bookshelves, and chairs, all look like originals. Some of the pieces have wooden roll fronts that are true to the period. One of the wall decorations was also hanging in his office when I last visited him, in 2001. It is a copy of a portrait that he bought at the National Portrait Gallery in London. Another copy happens to be in my own study. It is a collective portrait of a number of people who founded and ran *Past & Present* – considered by many to be the foremost historical journal in the world for many years after the war. Several of these people were



Post Office Savings Bank and Goldberger House, on the Pest side of the Danube River.

Three foundational phases – and three revolutions – in less than a century. How does one survive?

István Rév, born 1951, is professor of history and political science at the Central European University and academic director of the Open Society Archives, Budapest. His book *Retroactive Justice: Prehistory of Post-Communism* (2005) was widely acclaimed as a scholarly effort to disfigure the image of an era that still haunts the collective memory in the newborn societies. Here reading Stephen Kotkin's and Jan T. Gross's book, *Uncivil Society*.

Marxists. It is odd to behold such a picture in Budapest, twenty years after the real-political collapse of Marxism.

István Rév, director of the Open Society Archives, a center for the collection of documentation connected to the era of Communism and the Cold War, as well as documentation connected to human rights violations, does not duck.

"You see, I started my carrier as an economic historian, and this journal, founded in the 1950s, had a particular focus on economic and social history. Some of the founding editors did indeed have a Marxist background. They nevertheless managed to become serious historians, perhaps in spite of their ideological bias. In this country, the case was the reverse: even good historians were less successful as scholars because ideological requirements prevented them from producing first-rate results. And this has become a reminder to me, that it is possible be intellectually honest and ideologically mistaken at the same time."

Intellectual honesty as a scarce commodity, regardless of the ideological systems? This is a reflection that I make as I write down notes from our conversation.

One of the people in that picture is Eric Hobsbawm. What was important with Hobsbawm, István Rév argues, was that he was able to approach historical currents even at the price of disappointing his ideological peers. That does not mean that Rév idolized him. But Hobsbawm's early book, *Primitive Rebels*, taught him a lot, he says, in its reassessment of unorganized popular movements, in societies that had not developed political consciousness or formal organizations in a modern sense – as struggles for institutionalized power.

"I remember that we had a heated discussion on the Spanish Civil War and on the role of the Soviet Union in the postwar development of the welfare state in the West at the Einstein Forum in Potsdam a long time after *die Wende*, it must have been 2005 – where beside such authorities on 20th century Europe as Tony Judt, Robert O. Paxton, and Hobsbawm himself, Marcus Wolf, the former Stasi-boss, was also present!"

Rév's own background is to a great extent that of a dissident in a police state. He was one of founding members of the "Danube Circle", an early environmental movement with political goals that was awarded by the Right Livelihood Award, "the Alternative Nobel Prize" in 1985, and he was one of those who co-founded *The Budapest Review of Books*, a quarterly that was also published in English, as long as sufficient funds were available – it became a forum for young intellectuals who needed to orient themselves in society when the old powers had disappeared, as well as an information channel for outsiders who wanted to know how people were thinking in the new political culture. In the old days, the opposition had been forced to be circuitous and had used the classical ruse of speaking in allegories.

I tell István Rév about the meetings with Hungarian historians in the early 1980s when a reassessment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels called the "prison of peoples" (*Völkerkerker*), was underway. The imperial epoch did in fact permit significant economic growth in the various corners of the empire, and there was, at least towards the end, after 1867, a relative tolerance of dissidents.

Rév believes that such analogies could serve different purposes:

"For historians such as Iván Berend and György Ránki, two leading reformers, the Stalinist system with its direct Soviet rule in the satellite countries, reduced Hungary to colonial status. They argued that the monarchy on the other hand provided large protected markets for Hungarian agrarian products and a customs barrier for its industry. This gave the Hungarian economy space to develop after

So many European projects! And Comecon was one of them.

”What do the populists want? Retroactive bloodshed?”

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy came into being in 1867.

“In fact their argument tended to justify further Comecon integration that would supply the respective economies with a similar protected market as had been operating before World War I, when the monarchy ceased to exist. In other words – they argued – it would be profitable for a country like Hungary to commit itself to the Comecon. And they went on to suggest that we thereby would be able to reform the Comecon towards a more balanced relationship between the parties concerned. They hoped to turn the Comecon into a real competitor to the European Common Market.”

This interpretation of history thus contained a hidden agenda. It was also influenced at the time, Rév reasons, by Immanuel Wallerstein’s notion of the long history of global economy, the interdependence of (changing) centers and peripheries.

Now, one may raise the question whether the events of 1989 should be interpreted as national liberations, where each country and people followed their own path, or as a concerted action, a more or less simultaneous change of regimes. In either case the question of primacy tends to arise. Who was the prime mover? The Pope, the Poles, Gorbachev?

Hungarians would protest anyway, István Rév comments. They would point instead to 1956 as a starting point for the dissolution of the whole empire.

“When it comes to 1989, many people of today contend that this was not a real revolution, or that it in one way or another was stolen. In the first place, Communism had not had a democratic legitimacy; but neither had the self-appointed people – before the fist democratic elections – that succeeded the Communists. The agreements to replace the old system were reached before any democratic structures were established. Compromises with *l’ancien régime* were made over the heads of the people. This is what secured the peaceful, negotiated nature of the transition. 1989, in opposition to the French Revolution in 1789, offered the model of non-violent revolution. When learning about history at school, children are taught that revolutions usually follow the French model; this is what makes it so difficult to recognize that 1989 was in fact a revolution, a new model of regime change.

“The transition was peaceful, even in Romania. This has disappointed some, to the extent that when none of the high hopes of 1989 has been fulfilled, it became possible to argue that what had taken place in 1989 was not a proper revolution. Today we have to pay a very high price for the compromise with the old regime. There was no lustration, no terror a la Robespierre, no vetting of the Communist elite. Former Communists were allowed to remain in politics. And old, reformed parties have returned to leading positions: in Hungary, in Romania, even in the ‘GDR’. They use their positions to enrich themselves and gain economic advantage. It is difficult to understand for the disillusioned, unemployed people in the midst of financial and economic crisis that this was the price we had to pay for avoiding bloodshed.

“So people of the former Communist countries are very receptive to populist voices!”

This István Rév says with an eye towards the upcoming general election this spring in Hungary. He and everyone else I talk to are expecting a takeover by rightist populists, where there are strong elements of xenophobia and anti-Semitism.

Yet he also is careful to emphasize that 1989 differs completely not only from 1789 but also from 1968.

“Had the Communist regimes collapsed in ’68, it would have been very difficult to reach compromises at the roundtables. Then, utopian ideas were in the air, people were ready for one more adventure. Twenty years later there was no utopian fervor. The dissidents wanted to bring Central Europe back to Europe and to take over old, existing structures that seemed to work so well in the Western part of the world. The slogan of the movement was: ‘No experimentation.’ The goal was to adopt structures from the Western world.

“And now the populists say: Those structures that we imported simply do not work. So in light of today’s crises, we have to ask ourselves if it was a mistake not to experiment. Sarkozy, the French president, – who is no stranger to populism – has called for a renewal of the capitalist order. Populists in East and Central Europe translate such words as a quest for a new system, to reopen the process of transition and instead of importing ideas and institutions from the West, we should invent something autochtonous that goes beyond the capitalist market and liberal parliamentary democracy.”

There is much talk of missed opportunities nowadays.

“It would have been very dangerous to experiment, and to my mind it certainly was advantageous that we did not have hunger for utopianism. And we thought – probably rightly so – that it was a bad idea to lustrate after the long experience of the horrors of the Communist regimes.

“1956 taught us a very important lesson. Based on the experience with the revolution and its defeat in 1956, we feared a Soviet intervention in 1989, a threat both to the opposition and to the Hungarian Communists who believed they would lose power in the event of a revolt that they could not handle.

“In June of 1989, 200,000 people gathered when Imre Nagy, head of the popular regime of ’56, was reburied. The security police, aware of what happened in ’56, thought that the crowd might storm the building of the Hungarian Radio, as it did back in 1956. But when at the end of the day the secret police realized that their worst fears had not come true, they thought and even reported that nothing exceptional had taken place. But in fact what happened was that in the grave were placed the remains of Communism. It was over! It was obvious to all, except to those who thought they were still in power, as they still controlled the radio and the television, unable to understand that a regime could be changed in a hitherto different way, without violence. They waited for the revolution to come. It came, succeeded but without violence.

“And today the populists say that it did not come, as in 1956. There were no executions. ‘The Communists are still around.’ And: ‘We let them ruin the country.’”

What is it that the populists want to see? Retroactive bloodshed? Is the criterion of a revolution that one has gone to the radio building in Budapest, as in 1956, and let oneself be massacred? Rév asks rhetorically. Now people sat down – almost everywhere – at a round table and reasoned with one another.[3]

Are we then in a Weimar Republic situation? Is there a general belief in a much stronger state power, to supplant the existing democratic bodies?

István Rév:

“Well, I won’t be surprised at all if a majority of the electorate vote for a state power with more authoritarian features. The populists have an anti-corruption agenda. They moralize political life. And they have Church support. They would perhaps introduce a quasi-presidential system, with a lesser role for the parliament, strengthen law and order, and bring the media under the control of the state. They will try to finish the revolution in a way that is unfaithful to the spirit of the extraordinary changes that took place in 1989.”

Note. This interview was conducted on Oct. 15, 2009.

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1 *The Garden and the Workshop: Essays on the Cultural History of Vienna and Budapest*, Princeton 1998.

2 Kornai touches on these events in his autobiography *By Force of Thought: Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey*, Cambridge, Mass. 2006.

3 See further Timothy Garton Ash, “Velvet Revolution: The Prospects”, *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. LVI:19. – Garton Ash here, in accordance with Rév, contends that the “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Europe differ fundamentally from the French Revolution and its followers in their non-violent, non-utopian and non-class character and thus can be seen as “pre-French”.

What if the liberation had come in 1968. No round-table discussion, then.

A PROCESS OF NO RETURN

RESPONSES WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL AND THE PROSPECT OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION

BY **KARL MAGNUS JOHANSSON** ILLUSTRATION **RAGNI SVENSSON**

Even at one minute past midnight on 1 January 1990 we already knew that this would be a formative decade in Europe. A forty-year-old European order had just collapsed with the Berlin Wall. Everything seemed possible. Everyone was hailing a "new Europe". But no one knew what it would look like.

Timothy Garton Ash[1]

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the drive for unity between East and West Germany was powerful enough to bring about reunification. In hindsight, reunification seems inevitable, and all attempts to obstruct the process foredoomed. And yet, as initial responses testify, the process of German reunification inspired individual European political leaders with both misgivings and deep anxieties. This article explores initial responses to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the prospect of German reunification, with particular attention to countries and leaders in the European Community (EC). It draws mainly on memoirs and biographies, while scattered evidence on international reactions is to be found in published material and in archival sources. Documents released by the British government in September 2009 provide additional testimony on how West Germany's European allies responded to the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent moves towards German unity.

The international community's countries and national leaders varied in their responses to this challenge. Great Britain, France, Poland, and Israel, in particular, reacted skeptically or negatively at first; but Italy and the Netherlands had misgivings as well.

While the Soviet Union initially denounced German reunification, the U.S. administration backed it. The four Allies, or Berlin powers – that is, the Soviet Union, the U.S., France, and Britain – played a central role in the discussions on German unity and the terms of unification. In 1990, they joined both German states in the "Two Plus Four" talks that led to an agreement that stipulated that the Allies were to relinquish their rights and that a German state was to gain full sovereignty.[2]

This agreement came into force on October 3, 1990, which is when the united Germany gained full state sovereignty.

From the fall of the Wall and onwards, West Germany was engaged in talks with other nations. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of West Germany, personally held talks with Soviet President Gorbachev and with U.S. President Bush. From Bonn's perspective, it was essential to get the backing of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Timothy Garton Ash explains:

> **The external negotiation was basically between the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union and the United States, in that order. The Bonn government makes no secret of the fact that it was the United States, rather than France or Britain, that was its crucial Western supporter in the whole process. Washington was not just self-evidently more important in talks with Moscow, but also more unreservedly supportive than London or Paris – a fact that has done some damage to the Franco-German "axis". Yet the cen-**

> **tral negotiation was that between Bonn and Moscow. In Moscow in February, Chancellor Kohl secured Gorbachev's assent to unification in one state.**[3]

In their account of the process leading to German unification, Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice remark – with admirable understatement – that compared to U.S. President Bush, Mitterrand and Thatcher "were not as relaxed about developments in Germany".[4] Like British Prime Minister Thatcher, French President Mitterrand was worried that Germany would become too powerful. As Tony Judt notes, the first reaction in Paris was to block any move towards German unification, with Mitterrand trying "to convince Soviet leaders that, as traditional allies, France and Russia had a common interest in blocking German ambitions. Indeed, the French were banking on Gorbachev to veto German unity".[5]

When the Berlin Wall was toppled, France held the EC Presidency. The French President invited all of the EC's twelve government leaders, as well as the President of the European Commission (Jacques Delors), to a special meeting in Paris, where they were to discuss the German situation and ask Kohl to clarify his intentions, including those concerning the future of Europe's borders. The informal summit in the Élysée Palace convened on the evening of Saturday, November 18. Jacques Attali, President Mitterrand's adviser, later wrote that the atmosphere had been electric.[6]

In her memoirs, Thatcher recalls that President Mitterrand called this special November Council in Paris specifically to discuss the consequences of events in the East and the fall of the Berlin Wall.[7] Mitterrand did so partly to ensure that Eastern Europe would not dominate the Strasbourg European Council that was scheduled for December. Thatcher further notes:

> **President Mitterrand opened by posing a number of questions, including whether the issue of borders in Europe should be open for discussion. Then Chancellor Kohl began. He said that people wanted "to hear Europe's voice". He then obliged by speaking for forty minutes. He concluded by saying that there should be no discussion of borders but that the people of Germany must be allowed to decide their future for themselves and that self-determination was paramount. After Sr. González had intervened to no great effect, I spoke.**[8]

Thatcher then elaborated on her concerns:

> **I said that though the changes taking place were historic we must not succumb to euphoria. The changes were only just beginning and it would take several years to get genuine democracy and economic reform in Eastern Europe. There must be no question of changing borders. [...] Whatever reservations Chancellor Kohl may have had were not voiced. Whether he had already decided on his next move to accelerate the process of reunification I do not know.** [9]

For his part, Kohl recalls in his memoirs that he came under attack from the British prime minister.[10] According to Kohl, Thatcher wanted to maintain the status quo, but could not prevent the German people from following their destiny.[11] Kohl further notes that mistrust of the Germans existed not only in Paris but also in the Hague, in Rome, and in London.[12] Faced with the fear of Germany becoming too powerful, Kohl tirelessly repeated that there would be no national *Alleingang*.[13]

In other words, Chancellor Kohl took note of how various nations responded to the prospect of German unification, and adopted a policy of self-restraint. In the words of Zelikow and Rice:

> **Kohl voiced no reservations and in fact did not speak of unification at all. His theme was one of reassurance. In private, of course, Kohl's advisers were carefully noting the differences in the way foreign governments had reacted to the opening of the Berlin Wall. The Americans were obviously most positive, the French seemed friendly but reserved, and the British and Dutch were cold.**[14]

Wilfried Martens, Belgium's Premier from 1979 to 1992, also recalls the Élysée summit in his memoirs:

> **With this first summit meeting since the fall of the Wall, Mitterrand attempted to take the wind out of the sails of Thatcher; he wanted to focus the discussion at the European Council on Central Europe. For Mitterrand it was essential that the Community speak with one voice so as to pre-empt the East-West Summit of Bush and Gorbachev in Malta on 3-4 December. [...] We also clearly stated that these new developments should not be allowed to slow down European integration. Kohl was fully committed. This was of vital importance, since the French were afraid that a new, enlarged Germany would turn its back on Europe. The inviolability of the existing borders was formally confirmed, as were the military alliances, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. To my knowledge, German unification or Wiedervereinigung was still not mentioned in Kohl's intervention at the time. No one really knew where we were going. We were mainly feeling our way during the talks. The fall of the Berlin Wall required a mental readjustment, and for some people this meant distancing themselves from what they had declared a short time previously.**[15]

It is noteworthy that Kohl had not yet spoken of reunification. However, ten days after the informal summit at the Élysée, on November 28, 1989, Kohl announced his "ten-point" plan for "reunification".[16] Kohl did not consult his European allies.[17] But according to Kohl himself, President Bush had been informed. [18] Kohl's plan, notes Martens, "encouraged everyone at home and abroad to get a move on."[19] Wondering how the Americans would react to Kohl's ten-point program for achieving German unity, Thatcher soon learned that President Bush backed Kohl, and endorsed both German and European unity.

On December 4, immediately after the meeting between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta, a NATO summit was held in Brussels.[20] After Bush had spoken, Kohl suggested that the meeting adjourn, but after "an awkward pause, Italian prime minister Giulio Andreotti asked to continue with his presentation. He warned that self-determination – if taken too far – could get out of hand and cause trouble. Kohl snapped back that Andreotti might not hold the same view if the Tiber divided his country".[21] In connection with "the skirmish between the Germans and the Italians", Thatcher said that she shared Andreotti's concerns.[22] According to Zelikow and Rice, Thatcher "felt defeated, both by the American stance on Germany and by Washington's strong support for further integration of Europe".[23] After the NATO summit in Brussels, Thatcher later wrote: "The fact remained that there was nothing I could expect from the Americans as regards slowing down German reunification – and possibly much I would wish to avoid as regards the drive towards European unity."[24]

Thatcher now pinned her hopes on an Anglo-French axis. "If there was any hope now of stopping or slowing down reunification it would only come from an Anglo-French initiative. Yet even were President Mitterrand to try to give practical effect to what I knew were his secret fears, we would not find many ways open to us."[25]

Thatcher and Mitterrand held private meetings to discuss the German question. Charles (now Lord) Powell, then foreign affairs adviser to Prime Minister Thatcher, wrote memos on the meetings. A breakfast meeting between the two leaders took place in Strasbourg on December 8, in connection with the European Council summit.[26]

According to the memo, Mitterrand spoke critically of Kohl, saying he had no understanding of other nations' sensitivities and was exploiting German "national" feeling.[27]

In her memoirs Thatcher recalls that she and Mitterrand – at his suggestion – had two private meetings

> **to discuss the German problem and our reaction to it. He was still more concerned than I was. He was very critical of Chancellor Kohl's "ten-point" plan. He observed that in history the Germans were a people in constant movement and flux. At this I produced from my handbag a map showing the various configurations of Germany in the past, which were not altogether reassuring about the future. We talked through what precisely we might do. I said that at the meeting he had chaired in Paris we had come up with the right answer on borders and reunification. But President Mitterrand observed that Chancellor Kohl had already**

gone far beyond that. He said that at moments of great danger in the past France had always established special relations with Britain and he felt that such a time had come again. We must draw together and stay in touch. It seemed to me that although we had not discovered the means, at least we both had the will to check the German juggernaut. That was a start.[28]

Thatcher further notes that at the official meetings of the European Council, the discussion

> **was of course very different in tone, although the Dutch Prime Minister Mr. Lubbers said at the heads of government dinner that he thought Chancellor Kohl's "ten-point" plan would encourage reunification, that there were dangers in talking about self-determination and that it was better not to refer to one "German people". This required some courage. But it hardly deflected Chancellor Kohl, who said that Germany had paid for the last war by losing one-third of its territory. He was vague about the question of borders – too vague for my liking – arguing that the Oder-Neisse line, which marked the border with Poland, should not become a legal issue. He did not seem now or later to understand the Polish fears and sensitivities.**[29]

In his memoirs, Kohl writes that the British Prime Minister voiced the strongest reservations in Strasbourg.[30] It infuriated him that Thatcher raised the question of borders. According to Kohl, only Felipe González and Charles Haughey, Ireland's premier, were unreservedly supportive of reunification when, during dinner, the leaders tried to arrive at a common position on the German question.[31] While he met no objections from the representatives of Luxembourg (Jacques Santer) and Belgium (Wilfried Martens), Kohl was disappointed with the reaction of Italian Prime Minister Andreotti, who warned of a new "Pangermanismus".[32] Kohl further notes that Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers was very outspoken about his major reservations on the issue of German unity.[33] The fact that a fellow Christian Democrat voiced such reservations was a great disappointment to Kohl.[34] As for Mitterrand, Kohl believed him to be under the influence of his foreign minister, Roland Dumas.[35]

Martens notes that during the dinner that preceded the final outcome in Strasbourg, Mitterrand – when it came to the German question – "did not take the same line as Kohl. He was very cautious and still did not formally declare himself in favor of reunification. He would not do so until much later".[36]

Martens further comments that

> **German reunification was already a fait accompli in Kohl's mind. He was anxious to convince the opponents and doubters among his fellow government leaders. Thatcher declared herself against the reunification. Mitterrand hesitated, so did Andreotti. Gonzalez, Santer and I were strongly in favor. Lubbers intervened in the form of a question: "On the basis of the past, is it opportune for Germany to become united again?" This tour de table left deep scars. Kohl wanted to force a breakthrough and not everyone appreciated it. He was furious with Lubbers' intervention. As he left the dinner Kohl snarled at Lubbers: "I will teach you something about German history!"** [37]

According to Martens, the most important and most delicate passage in the concluding statement had to do with German reunification.[38] The EC summit effectively reaffirmed Germany's right to unity through self-determination. In the Presidency Conclusions, the special Declaration on Central and Eastern Europe reads as follows:

> **We seek the strengthening of the state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain its unity through free self-determination. This process should take place peacefully and democratically, in full respect of the relevant agreements and treaties and of all the principles defined by the Helsinki Final Act, in a context of dialogue and East-West cooperation. It also has to be placed in the perspective of European integration.**[39]

Martens emphasizes that this statement reflected the principle not of "a German Europe, but a European Germany".[40]

At this time, it was popular among politicians both within and without (West) Germany to quote Thomas Mann's celebrated phrase that what was aspired to was "not a German Europe, but a European Germany". The goal was a closer union and stronger ties between Germany and the supranational European institutions. Europe would save Germany from itself through *Selbsteinbindung*. If he had not done so before, Kohl now saw German unification and European unity as two sides of the same coin. He believed that the best way to restore Germany's reputation was to restrain German power, for the benefit of Europe as a whole.

In the words of Martens: "Crucially, Kohl wanted to embed German reunification within a united Europe. This concurred with his deepest convictions. He wanted to strengthen and broaden the Community with all that this implied at the time: the EMU and the Social Charter and, further in the future, the European Political Union (EPU)." [41]

The idea of tying Germany ever more closely to the EC suited Kohl's efforts to reassure those who were skeptical or negative towards German reunification, to bring it home to them that there was no question of a national *Alleingang* vis-à-vis the East or a hegemonic German role within the EC.

In his biography on Mitterrand, Jacques Attali, who for many years served as adviser to Mitterrand, writes that German reunification was conditioned on European unity.[42]

Garton Ash puts it well: "After trying to prevent or at least to slow down the unification of Germany at the end of 1989, François Mitterrand was reassured by Helmut Kohl's emphatic commitment to push ahead with the further political and economic integration of the existing EC of twelve member states. This Franco-German understanding was the single most important driving force behind the inter-governmental conferences on what was loosely called the European political and monetary union, and hence of the Maastricht treaty." [43]

In a similar vein, Judt, in his account of postwar Europe, states that once it became clear that Gorbachev was not going to veto German unity Mitterrand "adopted a different tack. The Germans could have their unity, but at a price. There must be no question of an enhanced Germany taking an independent path, much less reverting to its old middle-European priorities. Kohl must commit himself to pursuing the European project under a Franco-German condominium, and Germany was to be bound into an 'ever-closer' union – whose terms, notably a common European currency, would be enshrined in a new treaty".[44]

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Mitterrand, after the Strasbourg meeting and before Christmas, paid an official state visit to East Germany. According to Martens, this was "to the great displeasure of Kohl".[45] Mitterrand, who had received no prior information about Kohl's ten-point plan, declined an invitation to attend a ceremony to mark the re-opening of the Brandenburg Gate.[46] However, Mitterrand was reluctant to air opposition to German reunification in public. Mitterrand, according to Thatcher, claimed at his press conference in East Berlin shortly before Christmas that he was not "one of those who were putting on the brakes".[47] Thatcher notes the difference between Mitterrand's public attitude and his private thoughts, adding that she hoped that the meeting between the two, which was to take place in January 1990, "might overcome

this tendency to schizophrenia".[48]

Another meeting between Mitterrand and Thatcher took place at the Élysée palace, on Saturday, January 20, 1990.[49] Here, the British memo-writer noted that Mitterrand spoke of reunification as leading to a re-emergence of the "bad" Germans that had once dominated Europe.[50] Reportedly, Mitterrand said that if Kohl were to get his way, Germany might win more ground than Hitler ever did, and that Europe would have to live with the consequences.[51] Mitterrand went on to warn Thatcher that if Germany were to expand territorially, Europe would be back to where it was before World War I.[52] But he – unlike Thatcher – also acknowledged that no force in Europe could prevent this from happening.[53] In her memoirs, Thatcher recalls that virtually the entire discussion had "concerned Germany". [54] According to Thatcher, Mitterrand

> **was clearly irked by German attitudes and behavior. He accepted that the Germans had the right to self-determination but they did not have the right to upset the political realities of Europe; nor could he accept that German reunification should take priority over everything else. He complained that the Germans treated any talk of caution as criticism of themselves. Unless you were whole-heartedly for reunification, you were described as an enemy of Germany. The trouble was that in reality there was no force in Europe which could stop reunification happening. He agreed with my analysis of the problems but he said he was at a loss as to what we could do. I was not so pessimistic. I argued that we should at least make use of all the means available to slow down reunification. The trouble was that other governments were not ready to speak up openly – nor, I might have added but did not, were the French.**[55]

Thatcher goes on:

> **The fact that little or nothing in practical terms came out of these discussions between me and President Mitterrand about the German problem reflected his basic unwillingness to change the direction of his whole foreign policy. [...] Moreover, his failure to match private words with public deeds also increased my difficulties. But it must be said that his judgment that there was nothing we could do to halt German reunification turned out to be right.**[56]

In her memoirs Thatcher concedes failure: "If there is one instance in which a foreign policy I pursued met with unambiguous failure, it was my policy on German reunification. This policy was to encourage democracy in East Germany while slowing down the country's reunification with West Germany." [57]

Looking back, Thatcher notes:

> **Awareness of the past and uncertainty about the future led President Mitterrand and me, with not very effective assistance from President Gorbachev, to try to slow down the rush to German unification. In the end, we failed – partly because the United States administration took a different view, but mainly because the Germans took matters into their own hands, as in the end, of course, they were entitled to do.**[58]

As Zelikow and Rice emphasize:

> **The fact is that Bonn and Washington were united in a way that made it nearly impossible politically for other NATO allies to go public with their concerns about unification, much less work to derail the process. Without American backing, almost all diplomatic options for Britain and France seemed quixotic. Mitterrand was also not willing to risk his hopes for the future of the European Community on a gambit with the British to confront Bonn.**[59]

In her memoirs Thatcher notes that, as it turned out, Mitterrand was not in a position to abandon the Franco-German axis, on which he had relied in the past.[60]

It appears that while both Thatcher and Mitterrand wanted to slow down the process and feared that reunification would again enable Germany to dominate Europe, Mitterrand soon realized that the reunification process had gained so much momentum that it could not be stopped. The momentum was such that the process had come to a point of no return. This was also apparent at a meeting of European Christian Democrat leaders in Pisa, Italy, on February 17, 1990, a meeting that Kohl omits from his memoirs. This meeting took place shortly after Kohl had returned from Moscow with an assurance from Gorbachev that it was for the Germans themselves to decide under which conditions they would reunite their nation, as well as the nature of the united Germany's government. As we have seen, Kohl had noted the skeptical attitudes shown towards German reunification by some of his fellow Christian Democrats, notably Andreotti and Lubbers. Andreotti, who was born in 1919 and had been prime minister of Italy several times over a period stretching from 1972 to 1992, is said to have echoed the French author François Mauriac: "We love Germany so much that we are happy there are two of them."

The Pisa meeting was held under the auspices of the European People's Party (EPP). Participants at this EPP conference included five EC heads of government: Giulio Andreotti (Italy), Helmut Kohl (West Germany), Ruud Lubbers (the Netherlands), Wilfried Martens (Belgium), and Jacques Santer (Luxembourg). This time, Kohl's speech on German reunification dominated the meeting.[61] Kohl emphasized that the unification of Germany within a united Europe was a dream that was to be realized with political friends in the Federal Republic and, if possible, with others who attended this meeting. In the words of Thomas Jansen, EPP general secretary between 1983 and 1994, who was present at the Pisa summit:

> **In Pisa, Helmut Kohl turned on all his persuasive powers to explain to his colleagues that German reunification did not pose any danger to the process of European integration, but on the contrary offered numerous opportunities. Restoring the unity of the German state could only succeed if it was embedded in the political/institutional framework of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. The Federal Republic was firmly anchored in Western Europe, especially in the economic sense. There would be absolutely no danger of Germany playing "see-saw politics". If reunification succeeded, there would be a gut German predisposition to make European unity work too. Both processes, the European and the German, were bound up with each other, and each affected the other.** [62]

Jansen further reports that an exchange at a press conference, given that evening, testified to Kohl's persuasive powers. The reporter from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Heinz-Joachim Fischer) asked Italy's premier Giulio Andreotti whether he still took the view that the existence of two German states was important to Europe's security.[63] According to Jansen, Andreotti conceded that he now saw things differently: "The political context had changed, he said, and he could see no reason to doubt the assurances he and his colleagues had been given by the federal Chancellor."[64]

Jansen emphasizes the wider implications of this meeting: "The feeling of confidence engendered in Pisa no doubt ensured absolute loyalty of Christian Democrat-led governments, as well as both national and EP (European Parliament) parliamentarians who belonged to EPP member parties, during the process of German unification. In their own countries they helped to persuade public opinion to accept unification and to support it." [65]

Wilfried Martens, in his memoirs, recalls that at this EPP summit “Helmut Kohl succeeded in convincing Giulio Andreotti to support German reunification”.[66] After having had serious misgivings, Andreotti, too, realized the inevitability of the two German states becoming one. He agreed to the creation of a single German state, an outcome that increasingly looked like a historic fact. Eventually, Andreotti – like Lubbers and other European political leaders, including Thatcher – rallied behind the German unity process.

The account of how various countries and leaders within the EC responded to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the prospect of German reunification provides fascinating insights into the thinking and the actions – and, occasionally, the inactivity – of political leaders and decision-makers. It further illustrates the powerful dynamics that were at work. As events unfolded, history took a great leap forward. The collapse of the East German regime and the fall of the Wall in November 1989 led – inevitably, as it seems in hindsight– to the formal reunification of Germany in October 1990. The pace of change is remarkable. The period between the collapse of the Wall and the foundation of a united Germany was less than one year. As Garton Ash has noted: “More happened in ten months than usually does in ten years. The whole map of Europe was – or began to be – redrawn.”[67]

Many believed that German reunification was, at best, a distant prospect. Some of Europe’s political leaders wanted to slow down the process. There were different views, within EC, on how reunification should proceed. The obstructionists, however, were on the wrong side of history, as the unification of the two Germanies proved unstoppable.

It is striking how emotional and outspoken British Prime Minister Thatcher was on the “German problem”. She, in particular, made her worries public. Thatcher’s and Mitterrand’s initial opposition to reunification has long been known. But the sources on which this article is based testify to the depth of both leaders’ anxieties, and illuminates the part that European leaders played in the process. Thatcher and Mitterrand were not alone in being worried about German reunification; so were, notably, Chancellor Kohl’s fellow Christian Democrats Giulio Andreotti and Ruud Lubbers, heads of government in Italy and the Netherlands respectively.

In contrast to Thatcher, however, the socialist Mitterrand and the Christian Democrat leaders favored greater European integration. Germany’s national unity became closely associated with European unity. It is useful to pose the counterfactual question: How might European integration have evolved without German unity? Without the transformative effects of German reunification, it would probably never have achieved its current depth. Europe’s integration was reinforced by the emergence of a reunified Germany in 1990, strengthening the drive for a political as well as an economic and monetary union, including the introduction of a single currency. At the same time, after its reunification, Germany emerged as the most powerful country in Europe. The internal European balance of power shifted in Germany’s favor. Europe had changed significantly.

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An economic explanation of 1989. When debt-ridden elites left the scene

After twenty years, debate has finally arisen on how to interpret the events that took place in Eastern Europe in 1989. Until now, each country has tinkered with its particular picture of the events, based, in turn, primarily on descriptions of resistance, the people's revolt against the Communist regimes. A popular folk-legend has complemented this picture, according to which the revolution was at first pure of heart, but had hardly gotten started before it was appropriated by the old elite. (See interview with István Rév, pp. 14-16.)

In the fall of 2009, a book was published which offers a new interpretation of the causes behind the Eastern European collapse of 1989. This interpretation utilizes structural and economic explanations. The work is based on a course for history students offered at Princeton University. The course was led by Stephen Kotkin and Jan T. Gross, both professors at Princeton, and Adam Michnik, a prominent member of the Polish opposition movement, now editor-in-chief of Poland's leading newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Gross and Kotkin presented their book at a well-attended lunch seminar at Stanford University in October.[1]

The book's primary argument is that the Communist system collapsed because it had lost out in its race against the West. This competition was especially strong in Eastern Europe's so-called people's republics, and nowhere more obvious than in East Germany, which had no other justification for existing than its being different and better than West Germany. After World War II, there was economic growth in Eastern Europe – less consumer-friendly and more directed towards heavy industry, but nevertheless growth that could nourish the hope of one day catching up. It was not until the oil crisis of 1973 that it became clear that the planned economies did not have the capacity to renew themselves and adjust. When the West experienced a wave of growth during the 1980s and 1990s, the gap grew quickly. At the same time, more information was available about living conditions on each side, which further increased discontent in the East. The Eastern European governments started an uncontrolled merry-go-round of loans from Western banks. At the end of the 1980s, it was clear to the leaders of most Eastern European states that they would only be able to back their loans with new loans: their combined debt amounted to about 90 billion dollars. The regimes were broke. They had not been able to increase their exports and thereby obtain foreign currency. It seemed that all alternatives had been exhausted, and then it no longer made sense to turn loose the repressive apparatus that had been built up over the years.[2]

A fundamental precondition was, of course, that the Soviet Union, under Gorbachev, would no longer deploy the military against opposition. (But this book is not about the Soviet Union; that is a somewhat different story.)

The description is not overly controversial. But controversy has arisen around the authors' attack on a conception of the Eastern European revolutions as expressions of nascent civil societies. Kotkin is dubious about the concept civil society per se. It is difficult to uphold the dichotomy between civil society and the state, he thinks, for civil society is dependent both on a state to maintain laws and regulations, and on a juridical apparatus to safeguard its independence. Neither functions in Communist societies. Furthermore, both authors claim that that the intelligentsia's role in the dissolution of Communism has been exaggerated. In fact, only few and poorly organized individuals offered resistance – organized resistance cropped up very late. The exception is, of course, Solidarity in Poland, which had broad membership, a long history and strong social anchors.[3]



The authors focus, instead, on what they term "uncivil society": an extensive, well-organized and wealthy elite with the resources needed for reaching decisions and making outside contacts. This elite was scarcely independent of the state. It made up between 5 and 10 percent of the population, and its own lack of legitimacy and credibility was in itself a problem. When members of this elite could no longer find solutions to everyday economic problems, and when the Soviet Union withdrew its support, the crisis became obvious even to them. It was the weakness of uncivil society, rather than the strength of the protestors, that led to the collapse.[4]

The book devotes separate chapters to the GDR, Romania, and Poland, which illuminate differences within the region. Of all the Eastern European countries, the GDR was most exposed to comparisons to the West, embodied in the many people who fled to the West. Its per capita state debt was astronomical but was kept secret from the population. Investments in high technology had been unsuccessful, and the GDR was out-competed by Asian exporters in the area of cheap export goods. The country's leadership even closed down the GDR's smaller, relatively successful, but private-owned companies. When, in October 1989, Erich Honecker turned over the party and state leadership to Egon Krenz, there was not much to be done. In his polemic against more heroic narratives of battle and victory, Kotkin emphasizes the fact that the resistance that rallied around *Neues Forum* was both relatively new and relatively unorganized.[5]

Romania was an example of a planned economy that had decided to pay back its Western debts. Romania's per capita debt was lower than that of other countries; still, the population was forced to live with darkness, cold, and rationing. Meanwhile, the unrestrained luxury enjoyed by members of uncivil society constituted a glaring contrast; the misery of the average residential quarter was compared to palatial buildings and limousine corteges. The other Communist regimes were aware of this and understood that the Romanian solution could hardly be an option for them. In Romania, Kotkin stresses, the opposition was even weaker than elsewhere. In Timisoara, it was the resistance of a single clergyman that awakened the hidden frustration and led to the congregation of chanting protestors – not organizations – which, in turn, caused Ceausescus's fall from power.[6]

Polish resistance is brought up as a contrast to the weaker resistance in other parts of Eastern Europe. Jan T. Gross, the author of this section of the book, stresses that both Solidarity and the regime were willing to compromise and avoid bloodshed. This portrayal of Solidarity is not novel. On the other hand, Gross's account of Wojciech Jaruzelski's role does place the latter in an unusually agreeable light. In the spring of 1989, Jaruzelski and some of his closest coworkers threatened to resign if there was no round-table conference with the opposition. The actions of both opposition and regime had consequences that neither had expected. Solidarity did not wish to take on the responsibilities of government; it was forced to do so. Uncivil society tried to survive by compromising, but lost its position as a result of the compromises.[7] Its choice of a peaceful solution made Poland an important role model. When freer elections were instituted, Poland's foreign debts were forgiven. This was a one-time occurrence, the effects of which can be seen in Poland's relative imperviousness to the present economic crisis.

When this book was presented at Stanford it met with no serious critique, despite the presence of several major figures in the history of the region. One

"We are the people", but where were the people? Red bosses were weighed down by the burdens they carried – not clear for whom.

question that was raised related to the role played by nationalism, which, according to Gross, was negligible in Eastern Europe. Was then not the regimes' lack of legitimacy a determining factor? No. Their limited legitimacy had existed for years; it was the economic situation that deteriorated rapidly during the 1980s.

It took a little time before the great debate over the book started up. In the late fall, Timothy Garton Ash, who has described the uprising in Eastern Europe in more romantic terms, directed an acrimonious attack against Kotkin in a double-page spread in *The New York Review of Books*.[8]

We can, therefore, expect major clashes in the future that will enrich our understanding of 1989. ■

anu mai kõll

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After the "German question": A "Russian question" in Europe remains

"Nobody wanted the reunification of the European continent in 1989."

Hungarian analyst László Bohri delivered this harsh first assessment during a panel debate at Södertörn University, in connection with the Södertörn conference on the legacies of 1989, "Recasting the Peaceful Revolution".

He sharpened his tone still more: "The liberation of Eastern Europe was in conflict with the original idea of *perestroika*. And *perestroika* was conceived to save the Soviet Union."

Bohri wanted to remind us that continental stability was more important to the West than national liberation. Control of Eastern Europe stabilized the continent, and the West was afraid that Michail Gorbachev was losing control. The West feared that all of Europe would degenerate, as Yugoslavia later did.

Bohri's Czech fellow panellist, Peter Brod, took the argument even further: "In the 1970s, communism had been winning in Africa and Vietnam. The only hope in the West was that containment would still be efficient in Europe."

And then he turned the comment around:

"Still, it happened. Even today we do not understand what was achieved."

Even if the panel topic – "How We Knocked Down the Wall" – may not have been totally proper, it reflected a perspective that predominated during the entire conference: the fall of communism was the result of popular pressure and protest from below, not of great-power politics.

Those of us who were around in the 1960s, and observed what happened then, were suddenly, paradoxically, reminded of that time's Marxist – or even Maoist – rhetoric: the liberation of the working class is the result of the struggle of the working class alone. Substitute class for people. And *wir sind das Volk*.

If one focuses on popular demands and power, Poland obviously comes to mind first – even more so than the fall of the Wall. But the events of November 9 had an overwhelming symbolic and illustrative power, as concrete was literally crushed and masses of people

PHOTO: ISTOCKPHOTO.COM

moved forward joyfully.

"The Wall is a problem for Poles", Tomasz Jastrun, Polish poet-turned-diplomat, remarked during the panel discussion. "We were first but we have no better symbol."

Poland's heroic pictures of the Solidarity strikes and the demonstrations in Gdansk predate the images of the Wall by almost a decade.

As was to be expected, only veteran Swedish diplomat Örjan Berner defended conventional wisdom during the conference days:

"The development in the Soviet Union was absolutely decisive", he said bluntly, speaking at a seminar for Swedish witnesses to the events of 1989, which had preceded the international conference at Södertörn. "Gorbachev's decision not to support the GDR regime in Central Europe sealed the fate of the GDR."

In any case, Michail Gorbachev will go down in history as a hero of retreat. Regardless of his original intentions or miscalculations, he set a process in motion that he realized was irreversible. And he decided against using force in an attempt to stop it.

So Europe became free and was, eventually – at least to a large part – unified within the EU. But Russia considers itself defeated. It is a frightening fact that Russia – and particularly the current Russian leadership – still, two decades later, looks back on these events as a defeat.

And – to allow a heretical, cynical comment that I do not like to utter – maybe contemporary Western leaders were right in fearing that the liberation of the European continent would lead to continental instability.

There was much to celebrate in the autumn of 2009. But the "Russian question" is still there, and it is a peculiar and discouraging twist of history that we felt more at ease with the leaders in Moscow 20 years ago than we do with their successors today. ■

anders mellbourn

Visiting professor, CBEES; former director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Stockholm)

After the work of liberation in 1989 came instability on the Continent. The wars in the Balkans should be added to the balance sheet.

Fifty years of waiting for the right to vote. A conversation about power and powerlessness, culpability and reconciliation

Joachim Gauck was 50 years old when, on March 18, 1990, he first voted in a free, democratic election. The Berlin Wall had fallen a half-year earlier; the German Democratic Republic, the GDR, was now holding its first – and last – real election. Just half a year later, on October 3, 1990, the GDR ceased to exist, and what had been the GDR became part of the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. former West Germany.

When Gauck left the polling station in the port town of Rostock, where he was a pastor, he had tears in his eyes. He was asked why he was crying.

"I have voted", he answered.

But Joachim Gauck was not only voting in a real election for the first time. He was also a candidate. And even though the election was a disappointment for his civil rights movement party, he himself was elected to the last East German *Volkskammer.* Here he became chairman of the committee that supervised the dismantling of the East German security service. In the reunited Germany, he subsequently became the director of the special department that was established to deal with all documents found in the archives of Stasi (GDR counterintelligence). In popular parlance, his department was given his name: *Gauck-Behörde*.

The seditious pastor had, in one year's time, become a high-ranking official in a reunited Germany.

At the end of October 2009 Gauck visited Södertörn University. Here, he was the keynote speaker at the large twenty-years' memorial conference. Gauck chose to describe the great change and transformation that had taken place in East Germany, *die Wende*, as a long process of moving towards a civil and civilized society, during which people changed from being subjects to being citizens.

PHOTO: SEBASTIAN HILLIG – HTTP://FLIC.KR/P/5YHYRC

When Joachim Gauck introduces himself, he emphasizes that he comes from a part of Europe in which two generations have been deprived of their democratic rights. Gauck was born under Nazism and grew up under the Communist Soviet system. Starting in early childhood, he had been brought up neither to choose nor to question those who were to decide for him. The GDR incorporated one into a totalitarian system, at first innocuously – in elementary school – and then in the public youth movement Free German Youth, FDJ.

"It is all about conformity, and is, in the beginning, not especially ideological. In the beginning, one is supposed to see oneself as part of a group, not as an individual. The opposite of Communism is not really anti-Communism but individualism", he emphasizes.

During the Nazi era, people were supposed to show docility and conformity, *Gefolglichkeit*. And even if Communism was – "of course" – better than Nazism, the two systems bore obvious resemblances when it came to social control and the lifestyles they promoted.

"To try to understand an ideology by studying its dogma is a mistake. Instead one must analyze concrete actions, how power is enforced and powerlessness created."

The church was the only alternative to the society's and the Party's institutions.

"The church's work among young people was semi-legal", says Gauck during our brief talk at the opening of the conference.

As a young pastor, he took his first trip abroad, to Sweden, with an ecumenical youth delegation. He took a great number of slides, and when he came home he showed them at a youth congregation in the church. He was subsequently accused of "contempt of the state" and his passport was revoked.

"I have since learned that the leader of the delegation was a Stasi informer."

For many years, the goal of the church and of other East German social critics was to improve the system and socialism, to find a genuinely socialist system. In Poland and Czechoslovakia people were more realistic, in his view. Author Václav Hável, who became independent Czechoslovakia's first head of state, spoke of the necessity of being able to live in truth and of how the authorities' power was founded on the powerlessness of the powerless.

The change came in the spring of 1989. Young people, in particular, wanted individual freedom. They realized that freedom could not be won within the system. One had to flee to the West, which one could do via Hungary.

"In my sermons in 1989, I said that we must see ourselves as powerless, not try to make the system better. We must abandon fear, I urged."

In the fall of 1989, the wave of protests swelled. There were demonstrations in Leipzig and mass meetings were held in the churches.

From the power of the powerless came new potentates. More than a few have felt betrayed – the eternal footnote to revolutions?

"This was a strange transformation. The rationality of obedience, which had existed for generations, was replaced by a longing for freedom, nourished by religion, music, and culture."

The demonstrators' slogan, *Wir sind das Volk*, could not have been uttered in West Germany. There it would have been associated with the nationalist idea of a greater German Reich. In the GDR it referred not to nationalism but to citizenship.

"If we, in the street, are the people, then what is the Party? If we are the people, then we are citizens."

Joachim Gauck became spokesman for *Neues Forum*, one of the opposition groups that after the fall of the Wall assembled at the negotiation table to discuss the GDR's political future with the old party bosses and power holders. The meeting took place in a parish house located in a side street in central Berlin.

"We knew that if the leaders agreed to participate in a dialogue, they had lost. I had previously tried to invite Party representatives to partake in our church days, but they never dared to come."

At an anniversary celebration of the fall of the Wall, Gauck is less inclined to dwell on the years during which he was in charge of Stasi documents. But he does stress the importance of demanding accountability for injustices and outright crimes (as when people were killed while trying to flee over the Wall). When someone questions the legality of holding former leaders of another state responsible for crimes committed by the regime, his irritation is noticeable.

Among the former GDR leaders, Gauck respects Günter Schabowski. Schabowski became a personage in history books after he, at a press conference in the late afternoon of November 9, let it be known – in an aside – that the GDR would introduce exit travel. A few hours later, the Wall was opened.

Joachim Gauck believes that Schabowski, unlike the other bosses, has thought things over and is sincerely repentant. The two met, and Schabowski said that he did not understand how

"WE DREAMED OF PARADISE BUT WOKE UP IN NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN. THAT IS ALSO RATHER NICE."

JOACHIM GAUCK

he could be indicted and convicted. Gauck coldly responded that it was not a question of personal remorse but of a state governed by law that demanded accountability for the exercise of power. Schabowski must be sentenced and accept his punishment, even if Gauck believed his remorse was sincere. But Gauck promised to visit him in prison on Christmas Eve.

Schabowski was sentenced to prison, Christmas Eve came around, and Joachim Gauck went visiting – not to the prison, however, but to Schabowski's home, as the latter was on leave:

"The prisons are not what they were during the GDR era."

Now Schabowksi claimed to understand what Gauck had meant with accountability and punishment.

"Had I still been a pastor, I might have been more forgiving", says Joachim Gauck, turning to a pastor within the group. "But the principle is important. Democracy rests on the assumption that a human being is a responsible subject."

As an old theologian, he is also uncertain about whether it is right to use reconciliation as a political concept, as is done today. When the news magazine *Der Spiegel* brought together Gauck and the South African archbishop Desmond Tutu, head of the South African reconciliation committee, they were not in total agreement. In South Africa, crimes were also investigated that were committed under the apartheid regime and during the fight for freedom. But those who bore witness and confessed were neither prosecuted nor punished.

"The bishop is, of course, an impressive person and it was incredible to meet him and talk to him. After a while, we agreed that the conditions for reconciliation can differ from country to country, according to the contexts."

Like former members of the opposition in Poland and the Czech Republic, Joachim Gauck often expresses bitterness about the politicians and intellectuals in Western Europe who, during the Cold War, did not seriously criticize the Communist regimes. The peace activists he met in the West attacked USA's or NATO's militarism much more than they did that of the Soviets. They did not conceive Communism itself as a fundamental problem. This was also reflected in the attitude to Poland's Solidarity movement:

"The resistance in Poland was clerical, nationalist, and anti-Communist. It was seen as not quite proper."

Like regime critics in the GDR, who – for far too long – sought to improve socialism, many intellectuals in the West believed in "a third way".

"But they had no model for how the economy was to function. No country has been able to offer its citizens prosperity without a market economy", Joachim Gauck points out. "Free socialism" was doomed because its advocates knew nothing of economics.

"It is good that there are ordinary people", he says. People want that which functions in practice.

Even today, Joachim Gauck is not satisfied with the Germans' views on freedom. They believe most fundamentally that security is more essential. Obedience remains more important than responsibility. He can, however, live with the fact that not everything turned out the way that, for a brief moment 20 years ago, one might have hoped:

"We dreamed of paradise but woke up in Nordrhein-Westfalen. That is also rather nice."

anders mellbourn

FACT FILE

Joachim Gauck, 69 years old, born 1940.
Former pastor of the evangelical (Lutheran) church in the GDR. Spokesman for the opposition group *Neues Forum* and from 1990 to 2000 responsible for the Stasi archives in Berlin.
Keynote speaker at Södertörn University October 22, 2009.
Has just published his memoirs, *Winter im Sommer — Frühling im Herbst: Erinnerungen*. (Munich: Siedler Verlag 2009. 349 pages). In that book, Joachim Gauck depicts his younger years and his activity as an evangelical pastor in the GDR, a uniform surveillance society; the nearly unreal transition period of peaceful popular protests that led to the unification of Germany; and his activities as head of the preserved archives of Stasi (the Ministry for State Security).

The difference between East Germany and South Africa: in one case the weaker ones fell, in the other, they got the upper hand.

Report from Helsinki. Hot feelings about Cold War

The Cold War was not only a power struggle between two superpowers flexing their military muscle and maneuvering in the international political arena. It was also a period of abundant contacts across the "Iron Curtain" between individuals and groups. These groups and individuals interacted with and inspired one another. Each side produced propaganda which highlighted the differences between the two systems and peoples, "the others". There were, however, also conceptions of "the other" derived from sporadic but real meetings, meetings which awoke curiosity and a willingness to establish closer relations.

The Aleksanteri Institute's ninth annual conference, "Cold War: Interactions Reconsidered", held in Helsinki, examined these more low-key contacts and varying interpersonal relations and attitudes.

"It was difficult to choose among all the interesting contributions. But we did not wish to hold an overly large conference, since we wanted everyone to have time to meet and get to know one another. The papers that are now included are of high quality", said Sari Autio-Sarasmo, one of those responsible for arranging the conference.

And, during three intense conference days, the majority of the participants expressed agreement with this opinion. The majority of the contributions focused on European and Russian events, meetings and relations, though the U.S. was a constant presence.

Niina Nisonen-Tranka spoke about the meetings between researchers on each side of the Iron Curtain. Jessica Gienow Hecht described cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. Top right: Sari Autio-Sarasmo talking with a conference participant.

The Aleksanteri Institute's Riika Nisonen-Tranka has looked at how Eastern European and Soviet researchers and scientists traveled to the West, and how they impressed Western colleagues with the achievements made in the East. One example of this is the soft contact lens, which Professor Otto Wichterle from Czechoslovakia demonstrated to American scientists at a congress, and which was later developed by Barsch & Lomb.

There were mediators, people who traveled between the two worlds. Truck drivers made up a group that got through the Iron Curtain. They turned into smugglers, diplomats, traders, story-tellers, and news distributors, as Emiliya Karaboeva, of the University of Sofia, explains in her paper "Truck Drivers as Transnational Actors in Cold War Europe".

Women would travel to the Women's World Congress where they met and socialized across the East-West borders. They brought with them accounts of the issues and battles that engaged them at home. The discourse took place on two levels, according to Janou Vorderwuelbecke, of Leibniz University. During a 1975 World Congress held in East Berlin, an official manifesto was agreed upon; at the same time, informal discussions took place among women from the same countries. The shared experience of being women was the basis for cross-border meetings, impelled by an ambition to agree on a joint formulation.

According to Nelli Piattoeva of the University of Tampere, the Soviet Union's educational system functioned, at times, as a model. High-quality education for all was, for many years, a powerful logo of Soviet socialism. The Soviet Union offered Third World countries support and funding for the development of an educational system, and many people came to the Soviet Union as guest students. After the fall of Communism, the Soviet educational system was re-evaluated and rejected as being slanted and steeped in ideology.

The Soviet Union was not alone in ideologically regimenting its citizens' thinking. Richard H. Cummings, an independent researcher, gave details on the background of the Crusade for Freedom, a CIA-financed campaign for the collection of money for Radio Free Europe. American citizens arranged flea markets, bowled, spread flyers, and signed manifestos in support of the free news service. Cummings has gone through the movement's surviving accounts and has found that none of the money collected actually reached the radio channel. The whole campaign was a scheme to mobilize the American people against the Soviet Union and build a popular movement for freedom, democracy, and "American values" – a kind of ideological mobilization directed from above.

Ioana Macrea-Toma, of Central European University, pointed out that Radio Free Europe's news broadcasting was done very much in the dark. No one knew who was listening, how the audience lived, or what its members wanted from life. It was necessary to fabricate an image both of the listeners and the reality in which they lived.

Several papers were presented in two well-attended sessions entitled "Dealing with the Traumatic Past". Some of the questions raised were: How should one approach oral narratives? How can we handle the violence, and then move on? How should one expect people to react when they realize that the groups to which they belong are considered perpetrators? Throughout the entire conference, a recurring theme was precisely the necessity of understanding and accepting the Cold War era in order to place contemporary events in their context.

Yale Richmond, an expert from the United States in inter-cultural communication, expressed the view that cultural exchange between the USA and the Soviet Union led to the fall of Communism. According to Richmond, when Soviet students were granted an opportunity to see and experience America, they understood what freedom, capitalism, and democracy meant. They then brought this knowledge home with them. The Soviet leadership was allowed to watch American movies before they were censored. The movies were shown again and again to a delighted socialist political elite. Richmond mentioned "Some Like it Hot" – a great success within the elite. With time, he claimed, many would want to have what they had glimpsed when they visited the West or encountered Western (in this case, American) culture.

"When American theater and dance groups toured the Soviet Union, everyone was astounded at what they saw and thought that 'if the West can produce something this fantastic, then there must be something wrong with the picture of the West provided by the propaganda'", Yale Richmond said.

"When the Russian Ballet or circus troops toured on exchange visits to the USA, everyone was amazed at what they saw, and thought that 'if they can produce something this fantastic, then there must be something wrong with the picture of the Soviet Union provided by the propaganda'", objected a woman in the audience.

Historian Jessica Gienow Hecht of

The Cold War was a propaganda war. Advertisers in the West earned more.

Women about women.
Discourses on both sides of the Iron Curtain

the University of Cologne expressed the opinion that state-sponsored cultural diplomacy, as it existed during the Cold War, was a historical parenthesis. Before the World War I, and at present – particularly after 9/11 – the task of organizing and carrying out cultural exchange has been left to private groups and individuals. Gienow Hecht applies the term NGO to all private actors and interest organizations that spread a nation's culture with the aid of different programs and exchanges. She warned of the risks involved in states again relying wholly on NGOs for their cultural diplomacy. NGOs are difficult to control; they can be manipulative, using their freedom of movement to spread their own preferred image of a given nation and its values – an image which does not necessarily coincide with the official picture the state wishes to convey. An analysis of the rich material on Cold War cultural diplomacy shows that cultural diplomacy does have a role to play. Learn from history and be wary of leaving the task to NGOs, Gienow Hecht urged.

"That the NGO manipulates the state – that is an interesting thought, is it not usually the other way around? This I want to know more about!", "Can you name one cultural exchange carried out by NGOs that has had a negative result?" and "Putin has probably heard what you are saying" were some of the reactions in the audience.

The Cold War calls forth heated feelings even now. Research on this era is still relevant to people's every-day lives. ■

More information is available on the home page of the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki.

From a paper presented at the Aleksanteri Institute's ninth annual conference.

During the 1930s, Swedish liberal and social-democratic women's movements had taken an interest in Soviet policies regarding women's issues. However, during the 1940s and 1950s, this interest waned for a variety of reasons. The political and cultural environment of the Cold War made it virtually impossible for either of the two opposing worlds to admit being influenced by the other. In Western discourses, the Soviet Union was characterized as a "totalitarian dictatorship" practicing "socialist oppression", while, in the Soviet perspective, the West was guilty of "capitalist exploitation" and "imperialist warmongering". In Sweden, the era's hegemonic housewife ideal led to a loss of interest in the Soviet system as a model for gender relations: the post-war decade has been labeled the "genuine age of housewives". Dominant discourses of gender difference rested heavily on the notion of a specific female talent for caring.

In the 1960s, several leading Swedish women's movement's magazines published articles about the USSR and the socialist states of Eastern Europe, stressing the importance of wage labor and the need for expanded public childcare – both necessary if women were to achieve economic independence. This renewed interest in the Soviet model probably tells us as much about what was going on in Sweden as it does about what happened in Soviet Russia at the time. Radical winds were blowing through Swedish society – it became fashionable to make reference to the experiences of the socialist countries, at least when it came to women's emancipation.

Interestingly, at the same time as the Swedish press increasingly advocated women's participation in the labor market, referring, in the process, to the Soviet experience as something positive, even something of a role-model, voices were raised in Soviet-Russian media arguing that women with children should be allowed to stay at home. It started with women's magazines publishing complaints about how difficult it was for women to combine sole responsibility for the home and children with full-time wage labor. Housework that had previously been depicted as something that almost took care of itself became a topic of debate. Consequently, solutions totally new to the dominant Soviet discourse on women and work were beginning to be proposed in order to solve the problem of women's dual burden.

In the influential *Literaturnaya Gazeta's* new "Discussion club", a lively debate began in 1967: "As long as women are forced to work for money they will have a double burden, regardless of any efforts to make men wash the nappies, scrub the floors and cook the dinner", claimed an article by novelist Eduard Shim, entitled "Off to Work, Girls!". The title referred to a well-known poster from the World War II, depicting a young woman energetically taking hold of a wheelbarrow, heavily laden with bricks. The author claimed that after the tremendous war-time losses of working-age men, women had had no option; they had been forced to go out to work. Now, in 1967, however, more than 20 years after the end of the war, the author asked himself whether it was really still necessary for women to push wheelbarrows, carry hods laden with mortar and lay pipes. Shim came up with a rather unusual conclusion by questioning women's need to work at all: "The problem of woman's heavy burden – considering that she has both home and work on her mind – will probably only really be solved when women no longer have to think about how to support themselves." Thus, there were those who suddenly perceived female wage labor as outdated, claiming that a well-developed society could afford to pay for housework, or even make it possible for men to support their wives, partners and families.

The author suggested a rather radical solution in the Soviet Russian context, namely that women should stay at home. He also advanced an alternative, less provocative solution: that women's workdays be shortened. This issue had been discussed for a long time in Sweden. But in contrast to Sweden, the length of the work-day for women had not been debated widely in Soviet Russia. Until the mid-1980s, it would remain a taboo subject at official levels; although, in everyday life, various strategies were employed to shorten the workday for women.

Did Shim's proposal signal new trends in Soviet Russian gender politics, or should we, rather, regard it as wishful thinking? When the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* discussed the dual pressures of professional work and family life on women, the underlying assumption was that every woman was employed outside the home. In the late 1960s, a number of voices in Soviet Russian discussions of this issue began to express rather nostalgic attitudes, including men expressing their longing for a woman's care at home. Letters to the editor from male readers in 1967 contained phrases like, "women are supposed to adorn the hearth of the home, like flowers adorn the meadow" or lamentations that "earlier a woman would surprise her husband with a tasty dish, nowadays she surprises him by not cooking anything at all".

At the exact time that voices in the Swedish public debate increasingly questioned obstacles to women's participation in professional work on an equal footing with men, the opposite tendency could be observed in Soviet Russian debates. Nonetheless, for many years to come the discourse of the working mother continued to overshadow any "wishful thinking" about women taking care of men; the latter discourse only came with *perestroika* in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s and on. ■

helene carlbäck
Associate professor of history,
Södertörn University

Clippings

From the international press.
Intellectual consequences of regime change

Demoralizing the nation

The Slovenian philosopher and former presidential candidate Slavoj Žižek recently discussed the return of anti-Communism in communities where there no longer is any organized Communism to speak of:

"Another aspect of the same process is the redefinition in the Baltic countries and in Slovakia of Nazi collaborators as 'anti-Communist combatants'; their collaboration, even their participation in anti-Semitic pogroms, is justified as a tough but necessary part of the patriotic struggle against Communism, as a lesser evil. In the Ukrainian Velvet Revolution that brought Viktor Yuschenko to power, the same songs were sung that used to be sung by Ukrainian nationalists who collaborated with the Nazi occupation. No wonder that, at the instigation of some post-Communist countries, the European Parliament passed a resolution equating Communism with Nazism. And no wonder that, in Slovenia, the populist right reproaches the left for being a 'force of continuity' – with the old Communist regime. New problems and challenges are seen in terms of old struggles and the call for gay rights darkly interpreted as part of a Communist plot to demoralize the nation."

(London Review of Books, Vol. XXXI:22)

Recognition through liberation

Jacques Rupnik, the Czech expert on Eastern Europe, who lives in France, says in a retrospective that the Polish Solidarity movement was a great inspiration for the Ukrainian liberation from the Soviet Union. This also affected the relationship between the two states, Poland and Ukraine:

"Poland broke with the nationalist tradition, and later was the first country to recognize the independence of Ukraine. Its commitment was in keeping with the deep historical ties with its neighbor to the east: a significant part of Ukraine and a significant part of Lithuania had belonged (from the 16th to the 18th century) to Poland. Wilno/Vilnius, the city of Mickiewicz, the great poet of the 19th Century, and of Czeslaw Milosz, his successor in the 20th Century, had been a Polish city until 1939. The territories of Western Ukraine and the city of Lwów/Lviv belonged to Poland before the war. The largest national minority in Poland in the postwar period is the Ukrainian minority (over 200,000)."

(Lettre International 86)

Name change after regime change

Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860), born on the island of Rügen, is the namesake of the university in Greifswald. It was given that name during the Nazi era. After 1945, the university experienced a renaissance in the GDR.

Since 2001, some professors have been calling for a name change, but the university senate has rejected this. In the fall of 2009, a student, dressed in 1700-century attire, read texts by Arndt that were intended to incite people against the French and Jews, reported *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2009-10-13): "Man sollte die Einfuhr der Juden mit ihrem Schmutz verbieten."

A name campaign, "Uni ohne Arndt", has depicted the North German philosopher as a proto-Nazi. Not all students have concurred with this view; it has even come to blows between supporters and opponents of the name change. The senate has appointed an expert committee and will then reconsider the matter. A referendum that had been demanded will not be taking place. ■

Analysis of the financial crisis? Not permitted

In the fall of 2008, when the Latvian local newspaper *Ventas Balss* wanted to explain the impact of the financial crisis for its readers, they did interview Dimitrijs Smirnovs, university instructor at Ventspils University College. He is working on his doctoral thesis in macroeconomics and monetary policy. In the interview, he warned against saving money in the Latvian currency, lats, and predicted that the economy was going to deteriorate.

For this he was arrested by security police in Latvia, reports *Journalisten* (13:2009). He violated a law passed in 2008 that prohibits false stories in the news and the spreading of rumors about the financial system. The police arrested him outside his home.

"Dimitrijs Smirnovs was taken to Riga, where he was interrogated for two hours."

Smirnovs said: "Then they decided to keep me in custody for 48 hours. They said it is illegal to say anything negative about the banking system or the currency. It doesn't matter whether what is said is true or not. It just can't be negative."

Journalisten claims that he was regarded as an enemy of the nation for his statements on the financial crisis: "He has long been at odds with his academic colleagues", it says.

"I warned of this trend several years ago but everyone just laughed at me," Smirnovs says.

Now, he has been shown to be right on point after point, and he regrets nothing.

"Saying what I said was my duty."

That he was not prosecuted is a result, he believes, of the attention paid by foreign media to the case. In Latvia there is no constitutionally guaranteed protection for sources, nor a sole legally responsible publisher, according to *Journalisten*. It is thus the source who sticks his or her neck out. ■

THE COMMUNIST PAST

PARTY FORMATION AND ELITES IN THE BALTIC STATES

BY **LI BENNICH-BJÖRKMAN**

The three Baltic States are shining stars among the post-Soviet countries.[1]

Even though they are in the midst of severe economic crises, their record has been impressive. Credible observers have judged them democratically consolidated. Before 2008, their rate of economic growth exceeded six percent; they became EU and NATO members in 2004. The three states are thus exceptional among the Soviet Union's successor states. The Baltic States are also exceptional when compared to the more exclusive, well-performing category of post-Communist states, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, all of which have recently suffered severe political crises. (Tallberg et al., 2009, chapter four) But this bright picture conceals a more dismal reality. There is a large gap, even abyss, between the three Baltic States, one that often goes unnoticed because of an exaggerated focus on democratic performance and economic growth. I am referring to the overly close ties between politics and business that exist in Latvia, and their negative effects on the Latvian state. Whereas Estonia, in particular, has managed to build state structures that are among the least corrupt – that is, least "exploited" (Grzymala-Busse, 2007) or "captured" (Kaufmann & Hellmann, 2003) – in the entire post-Communist group, Latvia's state rates as both highly exploited and captured. In terms of exploitation, Lithuania, the third Baltic State, is much closer to Estonia than to Latvia, although the country has recently been plagued by several spectacular, high-level political scandals. Why has the Latvian state, in particular, developed such problematic features?

The purpose of this essay is to provide an answer. In my argument, I will try to show empirically that the advantageous formation of state and society during recent Communist decades (1960s-1980s) affected the identities of the political parties that dominated two of the three Baltic States' early, formative governments. These identities, established in the first half of the 1990s, distinctly influenced these two republics' choice of state-building strategies. Most importantly for the dynamics discussed here, two parties – *Pro Patria Union*, which was *the* leading Estonian party during the early transition years of 1992-1995, and its Lithuanian counterpart, the reformed Communists in the *Democratic Labor Party* (LDLP/LDDP) – were clearly characterized by an identity as *nationalistically oriented political actors*. In this, they differed from Latvia's leading party, *Latvia's Way* (*Latvijas Cels* or LC), and in particular its predecessor *Club 21*, both of which had an identity as actors belonging to an all-embracing, progressive elite with integrative visions. To use terminology developed by Linz and Stepan (1996), Estonia and Lithuania harbored a well-developed vision of a distinct and separate political society. In Latvia, by contrast, the boundaries between political, economic and civil societies remained blurred (a token of a more post-totalitarian mentality). These divergent visions influenced choices concerning whether to separate or integrate political and economic power spheres in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, and had consequences for all three republics' post-Communist state-building and political culture.

After the introduction of democratic institutions in the beginning of the 1990s, a widening gap has appeared in the quality of governance within the post-Communist region. This has had a grave impact on legitimacy, welfare and prosperity. (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003; Kornai, Rothstein & Rose-Ackerman, 2004) Most post-Soviet nations, but also post-Yugoslav ones, are characterized by weak states riddled with systematic and widespread corruption and low levels of rule-of-law. These problems have been explained in terms of particular historical experiences, cultural legacies, constitutional designs and policy choices.

It is not easy, however, to explain Latvia's divergence from the other two Baltic States. The three have a good deal in common. All three share a history of once having enjoyed independent statehood (although Lithuania's independence had lasted a good deal longer). All three

[1] The following persons deserve gratitude for their assistance, translation, and comments: Aili Aarelaid-Tart, Daina Bara, Kristine Bruvere, Astrid Hedin, George Kolankiewicz, Lorija Lietaviete, Irmina Mytonaite, Vello Pettai, Ilona Raugze, Georg Sootla, Jurga Valanciutete, Raivo Vetik, as well as an anonymous reviewer. The research was made possible by a grant from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.

have, after their independence in 1991, proven capable of sufficient democratization and reforms to qualify for admission to the European Union. Furthermore, all three harbor dominant traditions, derived from the Western cultural legacy, of Christianity and pluralism. During their transition phase, popular mobilization played a central role in all three, and they underwent similar development into parliamentary democracies (based, for the most part, on proportional representation; Lithuania being the exception, having opted for a mixed system). They are, consequently, characterized by multi-party systems.[2] Politically, it is worth mentioning that all three strongly favor a liberal economy,[3] an economy imposed during the political elites' determined efforts to qualify for EU membership; membership was granted in May 2004. This cultural, structural and political resemblance between the three States makes the comparison all the more intriguing. Clearly, the particular problems that characterize Latvian state-building have been determined by specific factors not yet fully understood.

STATE EXPLOITATION AND STATE CAPTURE

In 2000, the World Bank published "Anticorruption in Transition". In this work, which focused on the former Communist states in particular, the Bank introduced an index measuring "state capture". The index was based on a survey carried out among thousands of businesses and companies active in the region. The index was used to assess the degree to which companies believed that their country's business sector ought, in general, to influence political institutions, using more or less corrupt practices to conduct their affairs. The Bank defined state capture as the illicit infiltration, by economic actors, of the heart of legislation, regulation, and political decision-making. These were broken down into six dimensions: parliaments, ministries, presidential offices, political parties, courts of law, and constitutional courts. Their infiltration by economic interests leads to biased agendas and inequality in influence. (Hellman & Kaufmann, 2002) The report showed that not only bribes but other methods, such as party financing and the purchase of parliamentary seats, were widely used by businesses in order to gain influence and control over politics. Furthermore, it showed that Estonia and Lithuania demonstrated relatively low levels of state capture. Latvia, by contrast, scored much higher, almost on par with Russia. In recent years, recurrent scandals in or close to the Lithuanian government and president's office have shaken both the political elite and the Lithuanian public. The former president Rolandas Paskas was impeached and forced to leave office due to accusations of illegal connections with Russian business groups, connections channeled through his close adviser, the businessman Yurij Borisov. In 2006, Viktor Uspaskich, the leader of the most popular Lithuanian party, was forced to step down due to accusations of illegalities in connection with EU funds, as well as dubious connections to Russia and questions concerning his own university credits. Even so, none of this led to systemic changes in, for example, party financing or the practices of business lobbyist. Nonetheless, the Bank's report considered Latvia's political institutions, and in particular Latvia's parliament, ministries and political parties, to be still more thoroughly "captured" by economic interests. This report was followed by another one in 2002. (Hellman & Kaufmann)

Gryzmala-Busse (2007) has written an important book on the EU's post-Communist states, in which she addresses another, interrelated aspect of state-building. Her index measures what she terms *state exploitation*, that is, the degree to which weakly developed control mechanisms and regulations allow ruling political parties to use state assets for their party's benefit. This index measures three dimensions: (1) the timing of the establishment of state institutions for monitoring and oversight (audit offices, civil service laws, independent anti-corruption agencies), (2) the size of the state administration, and (3) the extent of party finance regulation. Among the nine post-Communist EU member states investigated (Romania is omitted as non-democratic), the index shows Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia to be the least exploited in terms of state exploitation (1.4–2.1 where 1 is the best), followed closely by Lithuania (2.4). At the other end of the scale we find Latvia (8.7), which has the highest score of any in the group – higher even than Bulgaria's (8.3). (Gryzmala-Busse, 2007, p. 5) While the World Bank's index of state capture measures the degree to which economic actors can use political parties to gain illegitimate influence over the state, the index of state exploitation shows how political parties can, once in power, use the state not for private gain but in order to strengthen their own party. Both indexes, finally, draw a sharp line between positive examples such as Estonia and Lithuania, on the one hand, and the negative development in Latvia, on the other.

Central in both indexes is the role played by political parties and party financing. It thus comes as no surprise that there has, for many years, been sharp concern in Latvian politics concerning overly close ties between major economic interests and political parties, as well as the profound problems that have arisen in relation to political parties' financing. Studies have been done which show that Latvian politicians and government ministers themselves believe that public positions are being abused, and that in consequence external actors exercise a considerable, and problematic, influence over Latvian political institutions. (Nørgaard & Hersted Hansen, 2000, p. 36)

Latvia is, today, the only new post-Communist EU-member state that lacks legislation on state subsidies to political parties; its regulation of party finances is minimal. (Kopecky, 2008, p. 11) This is in contrast to Estonia, which introduced state subsidies in 1994 "with the aim of limiting the undue influence of other sources of financing". (Sikk, 2008, p. 97) In Estonia, political parties have been increasingly regarded as public institutions; such is not the case in Latvia. There, private or corporate donations constitute over 85 percent of party finances (IDEA), and even though regulations regarding donations have been tightened, watchdogs such as Transparency International report that they are constantly bent, broken, or ignored. The Global Corruption Report pointed this out, again, in its 2008 report.

Latvian parties still rely on close connections with large economic interests to survive financially. Ideological positions or the size of the party's parliamentary group do less to attract donations than does the party's hold on governmental power positions or presidential office. (Ikstens, 2003, p. 148) Lobbying is quite unrestricted, and often depends on informal ties

PHOTO: ARNE BENGTSSON

[2] Lithuania initially introduced a mixed system of proportional and majority voting; its Constitution was meant to create a stronger presidency than provided for by the other two states.

[3] It has been correctly pointed out that of the three, Estonia was a forerunner; its economy was the first to be thoroughly liberalized, using shock-therapy tactics. Latvia and Lithuania have, however, not lagged far behind.

and pre-existing connections, or the "readiness to give bribes or illegal donations for political campaigns". (Kalnins, 2004, p. 2) Kalnins' investigation on lobbying in Latvia reveals, further, that both the lobbyists themselves and the parliamentary delegates sometimes talk about parties as if they were businesses. "The parties are compared to business, in which a certain level of profitability has to be maintained." (p. 32)

It is of interest *how* this sponsorship is played out. Major business conglomerates and groups are closely intertwined with Latvian politics. There is, for instance, the oil-transit business centered in the port city of Ventspils, a city ruled, for many years, by the infamous and powerful mayor Aivars Lembergs (now standing trial for embezzlement, bribery, etc.); the Avelat food-processing industries, for many years associated with the politician and entrepreneur Andris Skele (the man who founded the People's Party or TP); and the Skonto business group, which is controlled by a former KGB officer and which runs restaurants, radio stations, and oil transit. The country's three major political contributors consist of financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies, companies in the oil and chemical sector, and concerns within the food-processing industry. (Ikstens, 2003, p. 148) Many of these contribute to many different parties, thus "ensuring" themselves of political influence regardless of election outcomes.[4] "In fact", writes Nissinen, "all the strongest groupings, such as transit, give some money to everybody, even when they are primarily attached to one particular party". (1999, p. 203)

This pattern was established early, and made all major parties dependent on business sponsors. This, in turn, discouraged the establishment of state subsidies for parties, for subsidies would diminish the political influence of business groups. It also weakened incentives for establishing monitoring institutions. "A majority of party leaders in fact confirmed the assumption that sponsors seek certain 'interests' from their investments in political parties. Eight out of eleven respondents admitted that potential sponsors frequently put forward suggestions or even demands of political and/or economic character." (Ikstens, 2003) Party elites have come to regard themselves more as a political class, united in the defense of common interests, than as political rivals whose democratic duty it is to demand transparency and mutual criticism. Observers have, accordingly, characterized Latvian political parties as lobby groups for economic interests; "such claims are exaggerated, although they contain grains of truth and disclose something essential about the nature of the Latvian politics" (Nissinen, 1999, p. 203); or as "enmeshed in corrupt practices (of which the public is well aware)". (Pridham 2008, p. 378) The key to Latvia's poor aggregate ratings is, it seems, clearly – whether one terms the problem state capture or state exploitation – the far too close, informal and unregulated connections existing between parties and business, a form of private party-financing which has produced a strong dependency on sponsors.

Latvia stands out as the "bad guy". The rest of this essay will to try to understand why. This investigation will first take us back to the decades of Communist rule, a period many prefer to forget, and then to the first, formative, years of independence, when the three Baltic states had governments dominated by very different political parties, something which shaped their future trajectories.

COMMUNIST PAST: STATE AND SOCIETY FORMATION

Experiences of the Communist period varied considerably between the three Baltic States. To be sure, Soviet occupation put its mark on each in decisive and sometimes similar ways, transforming them from independent states with private-property regimes into Soviet Union republics with planned economies. But while the surface might have shown policies promoting convergence, the reality was characterized by major dissimilarities. The three local (republican) Communist parties developed in different directions during the important decades following the first ten years after the second occupation by the Red Army in 1944. (cf. Kaplan, 1988)

After Stalin's death in 1953, there began a slow and cautious re-emergence of national cultures. This affected the internal organization of local Communist parties. "In this", Misiunas and Taagepera write, "the Latvian regime proved least successful" (1993, p. 131) – that is, least able to incorporate nationalist elements. The environmental protests that began in 1986/87 are often taken as a point of departure in discussions on the role played by the Baltic States' civil societies in bringing an end to the Soviet empire. (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993) But differences between the three states regarding the extent to which unofficial groups and networks had however mildly or unsuccessfully – challenged the regime before the 1980s, are also significant. In the late 1960s, in particular, national dissent that had been "largely dormant in the 1950s and first half of the 1960s was soon to intensify". (Parming, 1977, p. 24) There were occasional protests, demonstrations and manifestations in all three republics; the most well-known are the Kaunas riots in 1972, the 1979 protests among Estonian and Lithuanian students against what was perceived as the Russification of education, and the protests inspired by Polish events in 1980 and 1981 in Tallinn, Tartu, and Vilnius. It has been calculated that between 1966 and 1977, nineteen percent of protests in the Soviet Union as a whole were located in the Baltic States (most of these in Estonia and Lithuania), although the Baltic republics made up less than two percent of the total population. (Alexiev, 1983, p. 34) It is also well known that Lithuania's Catholic Church was the most widespread, active underground movement in the entire Soviet Union, articulating resistance in religious terms.

However, I would argue that of the three Baltic States, only Estonia evolved a civil (and civic) society – that is, clearly organized networks with overt cultural, historical, and nationalistic aims, formed in, and surviving, the 1960s. (cf. Ruutsoo, 2002, pp. 110-116) In Estonia, as in the Soviet Union's more open, Central European satellite states (e.g., Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), a stubborn social network evolved, constituted by a society of elite clubs and loose groups formed around cultural and nationalistic ambitions. This was to be tremendously important during transition. One indicator of intense cultural – not just religious – resistance to occupation and Russification is the level of Russian-language proficiency in the three republics. Between 1970 and 1979, fluency decreased in Estonia from an already low rate of 27.8 percent to 23.3 percent, while in both Latvia and Lithuania the development was reversed. Fluency increased in Latvia from 46.2 to 59.6 percent and in Lithuania from 35 to 52.4 percent. (Misiunas, 1990, p. 209)

LATVIA

One can trace the beginnings of Latvia's unfortunate divergence to the 1950s. The experiences of the 1950s would affect Latvia for decades to come. Towards the end of the decade, the Latvian Communist Party, under the leadership of homegrown Communist Eduards Berklāvs, attempted to transform itself into a more nationalistically oriented party. This strategy involved including more native Latvians in top party positions and increasing the use of the Latvian language. (Levits, 1990, pp. 60-61) This, however, brought on a severe, far-reaching purge in 1959. (Levits, 1990, p. 61; Silde, 1990, p. 73; but cf. Prigge, 2004) Berklāvs was imprisoned, and the purge, which continued until 1962, marked the definite end of a Latvian Communist party with local roots. Signs of Latvian nationalism were usually severely repressed. (cf. Karklins, 1990, p. 49; Misiunas, 1990; Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993, p. 146; Steen, 1997)[5]. The new wave of anti-nationalism initiated from Moscow in the beginning of the 1960s was "most severe by far in Latvia". In Riga, for instance, 5,000 students were forced to stay on in school for an extra year because they showed unsatisfactory knowledge of Russian. (Misiunas, 1990, p. 208) The period of political and social stagnation lasted from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s – a period Levits characterizes with the term "immobilism". Until 1986 and the opening-up of the party structures in accordance with centrally initiated *perestroika* policies, the Latvian Communist Party remained tightly controlled, closed, and repressive.

Did Latvia have a civil society? "No; I, at least, did not know of any. Now there are a lot of people who say that they were in such groups, which is not true. Helsinki was one such group and the Greens in 1986. And that is it." (Author interview with Edvins Inkens) As in most Communist societies, discussions always occurred around the "kitchen table", but this can hardly be categorized as a public space or *Öffentlichkeit*. Eglitis' work on Latvian social movements refers to a "folklore movement" which developed in Latvia in the late 1970s. This movement, however, seems quickly to have died out, killed by the growing repression of the early

[4] However, there is a tendency, over time, for specific parties to become attached to single sponsors – e.g., the Greens and Farmer's Union to Ventspils and Lembergs, the People's Party to Skele (who also founded and led the party in the late 1990s).

[6] Juris Dreifelds, cited in Parming, 1977, p. 26.

1980s. (Eglitis, 1998, p. 12) Levits mentions a cultural elite, actively seeking to articulate national identity (1991, p. 61), but there are few traces of organized networks or friendship circles. Two organized opposition groups, emerging around 1975, should, however, be mentioned: the Latvian Independence Movement and the Latvian Democratic Youth Committee. Nevertheless, all informed scholars writing on the dissent and social opposition of the 1970s draw the conclusion that there was a distinct difference between Estonia and Latvia. Latvians are perceived as passive, "much more quiescent than people in either Estonia or Lithuania" (Alexiev, 1983, vi), even "resigned and socially demoralized"[6]: "Latvians allegedly perceive further group resistance to pressures from the USSR leadership and their general Russification to be impossible." (Parming, 1977, p. 26) The Latvian Communist Party was repressive of indigenous movements, which helps explain the absence, before the mid-1980s, of even minor attempts to mount "soft" resistance. The risks associated with such activities, however innocent they may have appeared, were – as many confess today – simply too great. "The degree of collaboration was amazing", recalls Razuks, "it was a very dangerous thing to fight and resist Communist ideology." (Interview with Razuks)

The repressive nature of Latvia's Communist Party helps explain the difference between Latvian and Estonian resistance. One can also find historical and structural explanations for Estonia's greater capacity to resist Russification and occupation. Earlier, for instance, Tartu University had served the cultural and educational needs of both Estonia and Latvia. The borders created in 1918, which defined the two as independent states, rendered Tartu University exclusively Estonian. Although Latvia established a new university in Riga, it still lost the important influence of a centuries-old humanistic academic tradition. 20th-century Estonians, by contrast, benefited from a "stronger cultural infrastructure". (Parming, 1977, p. 43) Estonia also had the advantage of a large exile community in neighboring Sweden; it was, further, favorably placed (not least linguistically) in its proximity to Finland. As a result, Latvians' "eponymous nationality is in a relatively weaker position than either the Estonians' or Lithuanians'". (Parming, 1977, p. 47) However, a further and important reason for Latvia's relative lack of cultural infrastructure may well have been the weakness of Latvian ethnic identity. Estonians and Lithuanians are relatively homogenous ethnic groups. In Latvia, there are much stronger regionally based cultures – something that also left its traces on the republic's interwar party politics.

With the coming of *perestroika* in the mid-1980s, a movement introduced by a new and more progressive Communist Party leadership, Latvia's situation changed rapidly. In 1986, social initiatives led to the organization of a club for the protection of the environment – the *Vides Aizsardzibas Klubs* (VAK). (Trapans, 1991, p. 28) The club's founders were primarily biologists, among them Indulis Emsis (who was, much later, to become one of Latvia's many prime ministers). (Thomson, 1992, p. 175)[7] This club is often cited as the first real expression of collectively organized activity outside the Communist party. "1986 was the first moment of openness here in Latvia." (Interview with Gavars) An open-minded journal, *Literatüra un Maksla*, was founded in 1985. This was followed, in 1987, by additional initiatives, some of them co-ordinated with those of the other Baltic republics. These included a language festival in Riga, the first of its kind in the USSR (national languages were a very sensitive issue for the Soviet Union). (Misiunas, 1990, p. 214) The new era was most truly launched with the foundation of *Tautas Fronte*, the Latvian Popular Front, in October 1988. The Front brought together individuals of all convictions, almost intoxicated by their new freedom and the new opportunity for collective action.

What about the Latvian intelligentsia? Humanistic intellectuals did not play a crucial role, due, perhaps, to Latvia's distance from Tartu University and its focus on humanities, philosophy and linguistics. The humanists' place was taken by natural scientists, engineers and to a certain extent journalists. These were the intellectuals who were most visible in what, during the late 1980s, quickly developed into a civil arena. This is an interesting factor, and one which, as we shall see, sets Latvia apart from Estonia and Lithuania: the humanities and social sciences, which are academic disciplines less easy to control than the "harder" sciences, were underdeveloped in heavily repressed Latvia.

LITHUANIA

Moscow never challenged the Lithuanian Communist party (LiCP) during the decades following Stalin's death. Under the leadership of the strategy-conscious and popular native Communist Antanas Snieckus, the party was, in fact, the most successful of the three Baltic Communist parties in creating a structure dominated by Lithuanians and in successfully (at least in relative terms) promoting what were perceived as native Lithuanian interests: "The stability of the top party and government personnel appears remarkable by Soviet standards." (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993, p. 146) The leadership of the LiCP remained, for the most part, in the hands of ethnic Lithuanians, who played their cards well. In 1971, 78 percent of Central Committee members were natives – that is, Lithuanians – compared to the Estonian Central Committee's 80 percent natives and the Latvian's low of 42 percent.

The same ratios apply to Communist party members. In Lithuania, ethnic Lithuanians made up 67.1 percent of party members, compared to 52.3 percent ethnic Estonians for the Estonian party and around 40 percent ethnic Latvians for the Latvian. (Parming, 1977, pp. 51–52) During what must have been complicated and at times stressful negotiations, the Moscow Central Committee acknowledged that Lithuanian leaders were behaving cleverly. As a result, local Lithuanian interests occupied a high place on the agenda. In Lithuania, moreover, the native language enjoyed a stronger position than it did in the neighboring republics, and economic conditions were in certain respects better.

During the period of transition that started in 1987, the LiCP played a crucial role in two important ways. First, parts of the Communist leadership established early and close ties with the Lithuanian Popular Front *Sajudis* and its "initiative group'" (for example Ceslovas Jursenas and Bruno Genzelis). In practice, *Sajudis* and the LiCP – that is, the national and the Communist Party – were to overlap and collaborate in a way that was unique among the three republics. There was a *Sajudis*-friendly group within the Communist Party which supported demands for Lithuanian independence at a quite early stage. In a crucial manifestation of loyalty to the national cause, the First Secretary of the LiCP, Algirdas Brauzauskas (later democratic Lithuania's popular president and prime minister) openly declared his support for *Sajudis'* demands for Lithuanian independence during the tense Moscow Supreme Council meeting of 1989.

Following a period of increased internal party tension, caused by the rapidly accelerating popular success of *Sajudis*, the LiCP reached a crucial point in December 1989 when it split in two. The faction associated with *Sajudis* walked out. It separated itself from Moscow, in order to strive more openly for Lithuanian independence. The Moscow-loyal, so-called "platform" Communists remained in the LiCP, making increasingly desperate attempt to save the Soviet Union and their party's dominance. "With regard to domestic Soviet life, the separation from the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow, this event can be regarded as significant as the fall of the Berlin Wall", as one of the participants in these seminal events formulates it. Under the leadership of the popular First Secretary Algirdas Brauzauskas, Second Secretary Vladimir Berezov, and the well-known and respected so-called national Communists Justas Paleckis, Romualdos Ozolas, Bruno Genzelis, and Czeslovas Jursenas, the splinter "nationalist" Communist Party took a clear position in favor of sovereignty (although holding that it was to be achieved in a "pragmatic" manner). This was a bold and risky decision to make, at a time when nobody could clearly predict what would happen with the Soviet Union and how power relations would develop in the Lithuanian state.[8] The stakes were high and "it was of course very risky". This audacious step, in combination with the LiCP's long-lasting history of moderation and national communism, provided the newly-reformed Communist party with much-needed credibility. In late 1990, the splinter Party changed its name to the *Democratic Labor Party* (LDDP), so as to manifest its democratic ambitions and its preparedness for democratic government. Meanwhile, the *Sajudis* party – which, at that point, dominated both the parliament (the Lithuanian Supreme Council) and the government – had begun to split into factions. This left the national Communists, the *Democratic Labor Party*, as the country's major coherent political force.

In Lithuania, societal resistance was primarily religion-based. The Catholic Church was strongly identified with Lithuanian identity. (Alexiev, 1983,

[7] Interview with Indulis Emsis, Riga, 2003-10-20.

[8] Interviews with Justas Paleckis, 2004-06-15, Vilnius; Czeslovas Jursenas, 2004-06-17, Vilnius;Vladimir Berozov, 2004-09-16, Vilnius; Antanas Beinara-Vicius, Vilnius 2004-09-15 – all belonging to the faction within the LiCP that broke with Moscow.

p. 23) Two social forces, one underground and one official, articulated resistance towards the regime. In 1972, the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* began to appear, distributed as an underground, *samizdat* publication. Three Catholic dissidents of the pre-war generation, among them Viktoras Petkus, had initiated this publication. In Lithuania, to a much greater extent than in Latvia or Estonia, religion was intertwined with and even seen as constituting national identity: "In Lithuania, religious issues evoke strong nationality responses, and religion is often used as a channel for expressing what essentially amounts to nationalist dissent." (Parming, 1977, p. 26) Despite their great importance as a source of inspiration for the entire region during the Soviet era, however, there are few signs that Catholic resistance movements formed themselves into parties during the transition phase.

The other openly political oppositional force in Lithuania consisted of several small, unconnected networks of university students, united around social-democratic ideas formulated during the 1960s and 1970s.[9] When the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party was officially re-established in 1989, these clandestine "streams" came together. However, the Lithuanian social democratic "movement" in no way equaled the extended, personally overlapping system of clubs that evolved (as we shall see) in Estonia.

For these reasons, the 1988 establishment of the Lithuanian Popular Front Sajudis marked something that was significantly new in the Lithuanian context, with few (if any) links back to earlier opposition or resistance initiatives. A vehicle for large-scale popular mobilization, *Sajudis* provided a shared ground for resistance and for the growing oppositional movement. Within the movement, a prominent university milieu came to play a distinctive role. Several of the 35 people who had taken the initiative of founding *Sajudis* – for example Alvyrdas Juozaitis, Bronislavas Kuzmickas, and Petrus Genzelis – had a background in philosophy.[10] In both Lithuania and Estonia, indeed, the humanities – history, journalism, philosophy – constituted a major platform for resistance. Major public figures who took oppositional stances during the late 1980s, and went into politics in the early 1990s, brought with them humanism and an interest in values, moral issues, and historical patterns of development. That had an influence on Lithuanian and Estonian politics, which became more spiritual, idealistic and also, perhaps, less cynical than did Latvian politics. Early on, persons with strong nationalist sentiments, such as music professor Vytautas Landsbergis,[11] joined *Sajudis*. His quick rise to a position of leadership was highly troubling to some circles, where he was regarded as a "climber" and a fundamentalist.[12]

ESTONIA

Top positions in the Estonian Communist Party (ECP) were frequently held by Russian-born Estonians (so-called *Istlased*) loyal to Moscow. Their nick-name *Istlased* was based on the fact that the *nomenklatura* often spoke Estonian with a Russian accent, thus making them "Yestonians". (Misiunas, 1990, p. 207) However, as mentioned above, ethnic Estonians dominated the top party structures (a factor which set the Estonian party apart from its Latvian counterpart). It is probable that Moscow, aware of Estonia's historically rooted anti-Communism, had seen to it as early as 1949–1952 that the ECP was dominated by cadres loyal to the center. (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993, p. 149; cf. Aarelaid-Tart, 2003, p. 72) Nevertheless, the party became, in time, increasingly "Estonian-inclined". (Aarelaid-Tart, 2003; see also Ruutsoo, 2002) The de-Stalinization of the late 1950s and the "thaw" during the 1960s, for instance, allowed native Estonians to rise to leadership positions within the ECP. The crushing of the Prague Spring of 1968, however, "destroyed Estonians' liberal illusions about the possibility of Communism in their home country having a human face" (Aarelaid-Tart, 2003, p. 73) for more than a decade to come. Nonetheless, again in contrast to Latvia, the Estonian Communist Party did not denounce nationalism; it was permitted "as long as its manifestations do not lead to active dissent in other areas of societal life". This placed the Estonian and Latvian Communist parties at opposite poles when it came to tolerating expressions of nationalism. (Parming, 1977, p. 52) Although the ECP was not very popular in Estonian society, it clearly demonstrated far stronger liberal tendencies than did its Latvian counterpart.

Estonia differed greatly from the other two Baltic States in that a semi-autonomous social elite, composed of intellectuals, had begun to constitute itself during the Communist era. Neither Latvia nor Lithuania had any equivalent to Estonia's many informal networks and clubs, either in scope or continuity. Estonia had a more extensive grass-roots society than Lithuania, one that had gathered the local intellectual elite in a veritable sub-society of clubs, groups and small associations. (Bennich-Björkman 2006, 2007) Not only did this club society give birth to numerous interconnected groups which revived constructions of Estonian history and national identity. It also engaged particular individuals who, when democratization started, had thus already acquired significant "organizational" experience, had already helped establish social networks and had already deliberated on national identity. (Bennich-Björkman & Likic-Broboric)

Some of these groups, such as the 1966 Estonian Democratic Movement and the Estonian National Front, articulated outright opposition to Communism and focused on Estonian independence. (Alexeiv, 1983, p. 35) Estonia's club society, as it took form during the backlash following the 1970s Prague Spring, was much less overtly political. Elsewhere, I have described its members as engaging in "soft resistance". (Bennich-Björkman, 2007) The most important thing affecting the democratic state-building that followed, however, was the fact that one of the major political parties in independent Estonia's post-1991 politics – *Pro Patria*, later *Isamaaliit* (today *Res Publica/Isamaaliit Union*) – emerged directly from this club-based civil society. Its roots reach back to 1974 (at least); the party thus links civil society to politics. Since *Pro Patria* governed, in coalition, during 1992–1994, the formative years of Estonian state-building, Estonia's club-based civil society is directly linked to Estonian party formation and state-building strategies.

Club Tõru (established in 1974) was officially initiated as part of a centrally launched, Communist party-sanctioned reading campaign.[13] For over twelve years, it provided a meeting-place for intellectuals who wanted to discuss crucial topics of the day, educate themselves, and preserve Estonian culture and history. One of the leading figures was the young Trivimi Velliste,

PHOTO: LUMIEREFL – HTTP://FLIC.KR/P/O86RO

9 Interview with Dobelis Kirvelis, Vilnius, 2005-02-03.

10 Interviews with Arvyrdas Juozaitis, Vilnius, 2004-03-09; Petrus Genzelis, Vilnius, 2004-03-09; Bronizlavas Kuzmickas, Vilnius, 2004-03-10.

11 Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, Vilnius, 2004-06-20.

12 Interview with Vytautas Petkevicius, Vilnius, 2005-02-02, who holds the provocative view that Landsbergis betrayed the original ideas of *Sajudis*, and was an infiltrator working for Russian interests.

who would lead the Estonian Heritage Society movement in the late 1980s and, still later, serve as minister in Mart Laar's first government.[14] Meanwhile, in 1975, a home-town movement (Estonian: *Kodulinn*) was founded in Tallinn; its goal was to preserve and clean, as well as educate young students about, their home-town. Its initiator was a television journalist, Tiina Mägi. *Kodulinn* became an official organization coupled to the Komsomol, as was usual in those days.[15] Mart Laar, who was to become both the leader of *Pro Patria* and, in 1992, the first prime minister of independent Estonia, was one of the Tallinn high-school boys engaged in preserving Tallinn's buildings and monuments while increasing his knowledge of Estonia's history. In 1978, he enrolled in the history department at Tartu University as one in the "class of 1978".[16] Shortly thereafter, a small informal network under the leadership of the three prominent history-class students began to form; both Mart Laar and Lauri Vahtre, who would later become prime-minister Laar's adviser, were leading figures. Sharing strong anti-Communist sentiments,[17] they formed *Noor Tartu* (English: Young Tartu), a movement modeled on Kodulinn. (Laar, 2002, p. 22) [18] Members of *Noor Tartu* often cleaned up old cemeteries and gravestones, which was officially defined as community service; their simultaneous contribution to the re-conquest of Estonian history was more politically controversial.[19] In contrast to both *Tõru* and *Kodulinn*, which had also engaged in community service, the leaders of *Noor Tartu* were clearly motivated by anti-Communist aspirations – despite the fact that Soviet power then seemed firm and steadfast, with *perestroika* lying years in the future.

Here, then, we see the first building blocks of a nationalist network that engaged in what should rightly be termed a mild form of regime resistance, played out in continuous, if tacit, negotiations between activists and authorities. (cf. Eglitis, 1998, p. 16) In 1986, after the beginning of *perestroika*, which officially permitted, even encouraged initiatives from outside the Communist party, and following in the footsteps of *Kodulinn* and *Noor Tartu*, the Estonian Heritage Society (*Eesti Muinaskaitse Selts*) was founded. Trivimi Velliste from *Tõru* played a leading role in this movement, which consisted of local sub-societies in small towns and cities, involved many thousands of participants, and fulfilled the purpose once launched by the hometown movements of restoring and re-conquering Estonian history and culture. The Heritage Society has been held to incorporate aspects resembling a political party. It definitely played an important role in the nationalist movement. (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993, p. 314)[20]

Thus, parties such as the Estonian *Rahvarinne* (Popular Front), founded in June 1988 by the moderate Communist Edgar Savisaar, were not as qualitatively different from previous organizations as were their counterparts in Lithuania and Latvia. A form of civil society existed already in Estonia. As a result, Estonia's Popular Front does not occupy the symbolic position in national history writing held by the other two states' equivalent parties. *Rahvarinne* included liberal-minded Communists as well as non-partisans, but was quickly complemented by an alternative, nationalist and more outspokenly anti-Communist movement. The Citizen Committees attracted members from the nationalist networks of the 1970s and 1980s described above, and became intimately associated with Tunne Kelam, who had founded the 1988 Estonian National Independence Party. Out of this movement grew the Citizens' Congress, which acted, in 1990-1992, as a parliamentary forum that functioned as an alternative to, and sometimes rival of, the Estonian Supreme Council. (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1997, pp. 89-90).

THE FIRST POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENTS

The political parties that governed the three Baltic States in the first formative years after democratic elections differed profoundly. During this period, democratic states took form, and the identity and experience of the leading political forces became particularly important in molding the trajectories taken.

The first post-independence elections were in 1992 (Estonia and Lithuania) and 1993 (Latvia). While the parliamentary elections of the 1990s were dominated by the still-vibrant Popular Fronts, subsequent elections were characterized by the participation of a large number of (mostly) newly-formed or recently re-established[21] political parties. These elections, although most often resulting in coalition governments, were dominated, in each country, by a single party – *Pro Patria* in Estonia, Latvia's Way (*Latvijas Cels*) in Latvia and the Democratic Labor Party in Lithuania. Estonia's *Pro Patria* received 28.7 percent of the country's parliamentary seats, Latvia's Way 36 percent, and Lithuania's Democratic Labor Party 54 percent. (Kreutzer & Pettai, 1999) The nationalist movement was thus the winner in Estonia (although things might have turned out differently had Russian-speaking Estonians been allowed to vote; the victory might then have gone to the so-called Coalition Party, which drew together the so-called "red directors"). The Estonian *Pro Patria* party was founded in 1991, before the start of the election campaign. During the following two years, *Pro Patria* played – with the support of the nationalist Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP) and the *Mõdukaads* (a more or less social-democratic party) – a crucial role in leading Estonia's transition to democracy and capitalism. Close friends and acquaintances from *Noor Tartu* and EÜS (the Estonian Student Association), such as Lauri Vahrtre, Jüri Luik, and Tiit Pruhli, formed Laar's closest circle.[22] *Pro Patria's* leadership had clear ideas about "cleaning the place up" (a slogan from their pre-election campaign). This was to be done by breaking old nomenklatura ties and establishing clear divisions between business, politics and bureaucracy. Because its members consisted to such a great degree of intellectuals, students and academics, the party neither had nor established close contacts with business circles. If anything, the party honored principles of morality and non-corruption.

In Lithuania, the Democratic Labor Party (LDLP/LDDP) won a landslide victory in the 1992 elections. Under the leadership of the highly popular Algirdas Brauzauskas, and with the support of the former *Sajudis* wing of pragmatists, now gathered in the Forum for the Future,[23] it was actually possible for this reformed Communist Party to return to power and completely wipe the popular front party Sajudis from the political scene.

Brauzauskas was a pragmatist, but he was also a liberal reformer and a politician who had supported Lithuanian independence. When it came to financial assets and organizational experience, the Democratic Labor Party obviously had substantial means at its disposal, greater than any other actor's. But the party had, besides, a history of moderation and support for Lithuanian aspirations. It had reinforced its identity as a risk-taker in its fight for Lithuanian independence. All this made it well equipped for the task of governing the new state during its first four years of turbulence, privatizations, and unsettled power conditions. There is nothing to suggest that the Democratic Labor Party, despite its roots in the Lithuanian Communist Party, entertained close ties with business circles or with the nomenklatura. This may seem surprising; but it can be explained by the fact that the core group broke with the mother party in 1989, and shortly thereafter established itself as a separate party.

Contrast the two cases, described above, with that of Latvia. Latvia's Way, the party that was formed in 1992, did not derive from pre-existing resistance groups or networks, or even from the reformist wing of a moderate Communist Party. Early in the process of party formation, close ties between politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals were established, so as to "integrate" Latvian society – as well as secure party financing. One finds tendencies, very early in the party's history,

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13 The "book-lovers'" campaign, launched by Moscow in 1974, provided the constituting group with an official but welcome roof under which to meet. Interviews with founders Trivimi Velliste, 2004-02-20; Toivo Palm, 2004-09-03.

14 Personal information, anonymous referee. During the 1960s, informal society was, it has been claimed, fairly vibrant; the authorities were more open during this period.

15 Interview with founder Tiina Mägi, Tallinn 2004-09-03.

16 The studies were organized as programs, in which the students followed a five-year curriculum. While there was minimal freedom of choice, and individual deviance was minimal, the program structure did mean that students became closely knit.

18 The name "Noor Tartu" deliberately alluded to the Estonian nationalistic movement in the late nineteenth century, Noor Eesti.

19 Interviews have been conducted with all three leading figures, as well as several participants, in order to deepen and nuance the picture of Noor Tartu. Madis Kanabik, Tartu, 2004-02-19; Kärt Jenes-Kapp, Tallinn, 2004-02-22; Mart Kalm, 2004-09-27; Rünno Vissak, Tartu, 2004-02-19; Eero Medijainen, Tartu, 2004-02-19.

20 Interview with Marju Lauristin, 2001-03-01. – Laar writes in his memoirs that the movement "rief zu einem neuen nationalen Erwachen auf" (2002, p. 28).

21 When I use the term "re-established", I mean that these parties had existed, before, in the independent, inter-war Baltic states (cf. Lewis, 2000, chapter 2).

22 Interview with Hain Rebas, 2004-08-30, Gothenburg, minister of Estonian defence 1992-1993.

23 Interview with Alvyrdas Juozaitis, Vilnius, 2004-03-10; Kazimiera Prunskiene, Vilnius, 2004-03-10.

of businessmen using personal contacts and friendships in the Latvia's Way party to lobby for particular interests. Thus, the first steps were taken on a road that would develop into a systemic pattern of what is, often, corruption – or at least highly disputed ties and types of lobbying. To understand the difficulties Latvia's Way's faced as ruling party during these politically formative years, we should take a closer look at the party's background and formative circumstances.

LATVIA'S WAY AS ELITE PARTY

Latvia's Way has its roots in 1990-1993, the years of the reign of the Supreme Council, much like several other Latvian parties. It constituted itself as a political party only after the elections. This did not stop it from gaining, and keeping, government power. It ruled for nine years (always in coalition with other parties). The call to form a party that would, as its founders put it, be "modern and European" but simultaneously capable of integrating with Latvian society, was first formulated by a number of deputies linked to the Supreme Council's Economic Commission and the Commission for Foreign Affairs. The first step was to set up a political club – the so-called Club 21.[24] The Club's declared goal was to integrate society, that is, to avoid the exclusion of groups or individuals. Given Latvia's particular demographic situation, and the resultant rapid politicization of citizenship issues, the Club's goal was tied, first and foremost, to issues of ethnic integration. A modern party, its founders believed, should espouse ethnic diversity, pluralism and tolerance. Basically, the Club served three purposes. First, it offered an arena in which a new and integrative network, the basis for a modern, Western, open party, could grow. In Estonia, this type of integrative network had already begun to form in the 1970s; it later provided the basis for Pro Patria. In Latvia, such a network had to be deliberately created by a political club, one that invited "progressive" political actors to meet each other behind closed doors. "The people invited to the Club were like-minded people: tolerance, democracy, market economy", as Valdis Birkavs puts it.

Second, and equally significantly, Club 21 had the crucial task of providing basic input regarding Western ideas and experiences on democratic, economic, and administrative issues. In short, it was through Club 21 that those who were to form Latvia's modern and progressive party gained insights into modern statecraft, as provided by the foreign experts invited to Club 21. The Club provided informal settings, where liberal reformers, committed individuals who were genuinely working for social change, could freely discuss their ideas. Third, Club 21 served as a national think-tank, gathering together like-minded, liberal and Western-oriented people to discuss alternatives for Latvian political and economic development.

Club 21 rested on three social pillars: politicians, intelligentsia, and last but not least, businessmen – that is, Latvia's (new) economic entrepreneurs; in short, *the elite*. All, it was thought, supported the development of a liberal European state and society. Politicians formed the core of Club 21. People from the cultural field, the "intelligentsia", were invited because they enjoyed a high reputation in Latvia. The decision to include economic entrepreneurs in the Club's basic membership had major consequences for Latvia's future political development. It opened up direct avenues for entrepreneurial influence on Latvia's Way – a pattern that, as privatization accelerated, soon spread to other parties and, consequently, to Latvia's political institutions. Entrepreneurs not only exerted economic influence; they could also exploit personal ties of loyalty and friendship in demanding favorable treatment from ministers and others. (cf. Nørgaard & Hersted Hansen, 2000)

As the first euphoric feelings of independence started to fade, idealistic motivations and the sense of working for a common cause gave way to more egoistic ambitions. Meanwhile, Latvian economic entrepreneurs increased their strength and power. They were already, so to speak, "inside" political power centers:

> **Businessmen started to create a lobby, always, in Club 21. Prime ministers, Godmanis, then Gorbunovs, etc., came to the Club – businessmen who wanted to use this opportunity to lobby for themselves, not for the interests of the Club. In the beginning, I had control over the businessmen, but they wanted to lobby for themselves.**
> (Interview with founder Krumins)

Why were the economic entrepreneurs, Latvia's new businessmen, invited to a club whose declared purpose was to create a winning political party capable of building the Latvian state? According to Janis Krumins and Indulis Berzins, they were brought in to garner support for projects and for the future party.[26] But equally crucially, they were considered part of the new Latvia's future elite – a Latvia that would not require boundaries between power spheres. "Then of course, the people who got started in business, the new capitalists, were in many ways our compatriots in many things." (Interview with Pantalejevs) It was, after all, a liberal party, and it seemed natural "to involve not only politically active but economically active people. To LC (Latvia's Way) came many businessmen and so on and politically active young people – the best to my mind". (Interview with Vaivads) Edvins Inkens clearly articulates the vision of a Latvia functioning with a single, united elite: "I do not see it as possible to create two elites, because we are such a small society. This fact has had many adverse consequences. This is a very good society – for those who use contacts for their own personal benefit." (Interview with Inkens)

When the party Latvia's Way was established, finally, in September 1993, Club 21 was its most important base. The core of the party consisted of members of the club: Indulis Berzins, Valdis Birkavs, Māris Gailis, Anatolijs Gorbunovs and Ojars Kehris were among those prominent club participants who later held powerful positions in the party and in government.[27] Thus, the network established by Club 21 constructed, very early, the close ties between politics and economics that characterize the Latvian party sphere. Some prominent participants were uneasy about this development. (Interview with Meierovich) Once a pattern had been established, during Latvia's politically constitutive phase, that "allowed" ties between the leading political party and Latvian business interests, such ties became endemic to Latvian political life, and contributed to the aggravation of the problems that are measured, today, in terms of state capture and state exploitation.

One can cite an additional, telling example that illustrates the rather astonishing absence, in Latvia, of a concept of political society as a delimited power sphere: the choice of the non-partisan entrepreneur Andris Skele as prime minister, brought in to solve Latvia's 1995 government crises. After prolonged negotiations between different coalition partners and two failed attempts by Maris Grinblats (TB) and Cevers (*Saimneks*) to form a government, a so-called rainbow coalition was put together, consisting of six parties: Latvia's Way, TB, LNNK, the Farmers' Union, the Unity Party and *Saimneks*. Unable to reach an agreement on a partisan candidate for prime minister, the parties compromised by choosing Andris Skele. (Nissinen, 1999, p. 194) Skele was, at the time, no party politician; but he was already one of Latvia's leading business entrepreneurs, a position he would reinforce in the years to come. Appointing Skele head of government at a time of large-scale privatization sowed uncertainty in Latvia's growing business community. It was, many politicians believe, a mistake: "We made a mistake when we agreed on a non-partisan prime minister" (interview with Birkavs), "we invited in Skele as prime minister and that was a mistake" (interview with Gailis).

> **His appointment helped change the rules of the political game in Latvia, because "he was the first politician to make money using state resources."** (Interview with Inkens) **The problem with him was "his business connections, that he was an entrepreneur".**
> (Interview with Repse)

> **Other economic actors felt compelled to augment their own political contacts and opportunities to exert influence. Many – for instance, Parex Bank – sought to insure themselves politically by sponsoring many parties at a time. Skele's skeptical attitude towards political parties (although he did create the People's Party in 1998) had a further, seriously negative effect on Latvian political culture.** (Interview with Birkavs)

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Choosing to base Latvia's leading political party on the *progressive elite* (including not only civil society and entrepreneurs, but exile groups as well) and the 1995

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24 Interviews with Janis Krumins, Riga, 2001-10-17, 2003-10-24; Indulis Berzins, Copenhagen, 2004-01-28; Andrejevs Pantalejevs, Riga, 2003-10-21; Janis Vaivads, Riga, 2004-08-19; Mailis Gailis, Riga, 2000-10-23; Ojars Kehtris, Riga, 2004-08-18; Valdis Birkavs, Riga, 2001-10-18. (For information on Club 21 and the formation of LC.)

25 Interview with Valdis Birkavs, prime minister 1993-1994, chairman of LC, Riga 2001-10-18.

26 Interview with Krumins, Riga 2001-10-17.

27 Personal information via fax from Andris Berzins (LC), former prime minister, on LC persons also active in Club 21.

appointment of a non-partisan entrepreneur to the office of prime minister were, I have argued, policies that derived, to a great extent, from the lack of any clear idea about the necessary autonomy of political society in democratic politics. Instead, the initiators of Latvia's Way – most of them liberal, tolerant, well-intended reformers – carried over an unproblematized, Communist notion that the state should be governed by an integrated elite. In that sense, even though Latvia's Way (founded on Club 21) was a liberal party, its leaders were still overly influenced by Soviet concepts of the state. The apparent dangers with this approach in a system where money has started to "rule" did not become apparent until the pattern of economic-political ties had already been cemented – a pattern which has proven very tenacious.

The fact that Latvia's liberal reformers, working during the 1990s, intuitively espoused the Communist-derived concept of an integrated elite, rather than that of separate spheres of power, can thus be explained by elements in Latvia's history. The most important of these is made up of absences: the absence of civil society in pre-transition Latvia and the absence of reformist factions within Latvia's Communist Party. The liberal reformers had, to put it simply, too few democratic ideas and visions upon which to draw; too few resistance movements, too few attempts to create an alternative or oppositional path. This meant, in turn, a paucity of both the visions and democratic identity needed to provide models for what democratic political actors should be and do. A comparison, in particular, between Latvia and Estonia, shows how civil initiatives taken during authoritarian rule can make a real difference when it comes to subsequent, positive change – in this case, in promoting democratic state-building. Ideas, networks and identities need time to take shape and mature, and that is why, even though a committed liberal party did form in Latvia, it lacked a profound, much-needed identity as a political actor.

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CONCERNING THE BALTIC

BY **LORENTZ VON NUMERS**
ILLUSTRATIONS **RIBER HANSSON**

One memory from my youth is a conversation I had with a Herr Belevucetic about the body of water that he had contemplated from the quay in Travemünde. The encounter between Herr Belevucetic and the Baltic had taken place a couple of decades previous to our meeting in a Dalmatian harbor, but he had still not gotten over it.

– And such color, he trumpeted, and such color! Like oil drums. Hellish!

No, in our geological era the Baltic has hardly had an Adriatic sparkle. It is a drab and stony body of water whose northern coves freeze to the bottom during cold winters and with a southern coast that is mostly flat as a pancake, with silted-up lagoons and solitary lime cliffs.

What images do I retain in my memory? A thunderstorm over Haminanlaks, frightened sheep that cluster next to the lead-gray swell.

On a journey home from the south, after having spent a day in the old Königsberg, I embark on the little steamship in the harbor of Pillaus and walk along the gunwale to my cabin. As I open the porthole I see in the north an enormous rain cloud towering like a burial mound over the sea. While dusk falls, a change comes over me. A feeling of terrible distress takes possession of me – and at the same time a thoughtless, coolly smiling resignation. In the dock, small waves, shiny and hard like porcelain plaits placed edgewise, clatter against the anchor chains. The wind torments the dunes. The sun shines on the flat crowns of the fir trees. I rest under the cloud, the steamship's smoke paints our low roof.

When in June we slipped in between the arms of Reval's pier to where the brindled "Suurtöll" lay idle. And the knocking of the rust-hammers.

Nothing could be more desolate than a walk in a light rain in the forest of fir trees that had been planted in arrow-straight lines on the dunes around Brigitten.

I was born a stone's throw from the Aura river, where it runs into the Ersta. My family has for some generations wandered along the coasts and has buried its dead in all the provinces around the Baltic Sea, never being settled anywhere for more than three generations, never more than three Swedish miles inland. On my mother's side they were sailors for several generations. Therefore I love this temperamental and bleak body of water, which tastes brackish on the tongue.

But the object of love

that cannot be anything outside the human being. I must localize it or clothe it in words. It would, on the other hand, be absurd to search for a motive for the obvious. If I say that for the last couple of years something that I would call "the Baltic" has demanded my attention, as phenomenon and as polarized feelings of loss and tenderness, will I then make myself understood?

The Baltic.

It is probably merely a mood, and any attempt to define the areas where that mood is experienced is problematic. And any attempt to account for its components is fraught with difficulties. But it is something that only small mixed-together peoples could produce, peoples who carried on a lively shipping trade, who shared a common linguistic medium and who were under imminent threat from the outside. Wherever a national culture becomes all too pronounced – Central Swedish,

Great Russian, High German – there the mood vanishes.

And yet, the Baltic as a state of mind and life milieu is far from limited to the former Baltic provinces where it has been most strongly perceptible. (The leveling and sandblasting that is happening today is a different matter – I speak of what has been or might come to be). No, the Baltic is felt equally clearly in Danzig, in the linguistically confused Vyborg, or in the Swedish-Pomeranian harbor towns. But one needs landscape, as well, and preferably nothing thoroughly decided which called up fierce feelings of captivation. The southern border of the Gulf of Finland and the Riga Bay seems best suited for this purpose – a landscape that seems both prematurely aged and threadbare, predominantly beige and grayish purple, a landscape that could almost be met with anywhere in many countries all the way down to the Ardennes, if it were not markedly poorer than these. One must, of course, not be overcome with despair, as for example in the Seinäjokki region. What is desired is a moderate melancholy.

To maintain this well-tempered state of mind is difficult, if one has good reasons for feeling anger or sorrow. Even issues that, according to yesterday's ways of thinking, adhered to the "Baltic" – agrarian policies and language conflicts – to mention just two substantial dossiers, were likely to disturb that which was absolutely unique, the mood.

Yes, the absolutely unique. And this has, to me at least, a value that transcends all moral qualities. What does one know about the calculations for pricing a mood? Is it not exactly the consciousness of the precarious nature of the conditions of living that has given the Baltic milieu its melancholy, irresponsible enchantment? One of my Estonian friends characterized it as "the cool sensation of tender, boundless happiness between attacks of gall-stone....".

Yes, what does it matter to the one who balances on the needle-point of perceptions that whole tribes of peoples have in the past become insolvent or that it was a herring-strangling language like Low German, and not Venice's sonorous tongue, that mutilated the local sounds? Now when the song-festivals have ended and that which is done, is done.

Small peoples, mixed together ...

It is really the same everywhere, the rare alloy of blood along this band of coast, building-styles and languages, the smell of the chambers and the heavy-hearted ceremoniousness of careworn Hanseatic towns. And wherever one goes, the Peasant Peoples as compact and immovable background, speaking unwieldy, diphthong-rich tongues, in the mind's eye's memory forever bargaining on shoreless market-places with bumpy cobble-stone pavements and the government buildings' rows of pillars like white stockings on fat legs on the horizon ....

It is the art of building, the frame for the moods I am trying to capture here, which even scantily summarized most clearly mediates the impression of violent muddling. Here, every architectural style means domination by new rulers – I am speaking, here, primarily of the former Baltic Sea provinces – first the Lower Saxon Hanseatic, the German of the Knightly Orders in brick and stair-case gables, the Swedish baroque, the Baltic Empire that Nils Erik Wickberg has described with such affection, and finally, the proud, high signifiers of Tsarism, lumbering cathedral-churches, raised in the most prominent places – at the greatest square of Riga, at the Domberg of Reval and the dark-red Uspenski, a handsome exception on a stony Nyland promontory.

The historian of art may try, here, to find that which is shared and that which divides, formulate or repudiate hypotheses of a Baltic cultural milieu. For me, an amateur, the conviction of there being something essentially common is based on "recognition", on feelings of pleasant comfort and sympathy – yes, on something as indefinable as the constantly renewed memory: dusk in snowy weather, high black spires –

I mentioned above that the Baltic mood evaporates whenever a national culture becomes all-too purely cultivated. And this is connected with the simultaneously provincial and cosmopolitan nature of this ocean-dominated place. It existed among the people as well as the buildings, it was in a way a translation into nautical terms of certain conditions in the old Danube monarchy! And if one does not understand that, one has little prospect of following what is to come.

But in these areas, incomprehension is well-established. Much of that which an ignorant traveler – "the Swede on Eastern travels" – calls Russian can thus with impunity be designated Baltic. At the Baltic Sea the Slavic was late in asserting itself. The amber-gathering Obotrits of the early Middle Ages and the Russian folk wedge that shot up along the Narva River's east shore won no homeland-right up here – not before Tsar Peter took Nyen town. And how ill-at-ease was not the true Russian in the metropolis that a ruler's command had conjured up out of the "Finnish marshes", in Petersburg, in the most Baltic of towns, the quintessence, despite every type of Caesarean extravagance in buildings and perspectives!

On the other hand, nor should we over-dimension the German element. The moulds for social life and scholarship have without doubt been German on the Baltic Sea's south coast (and in the Central Swedes' Stockholm, even after the battle of Brunkeberg). But the casting was on the whole of another consistency.

In this context, I find no amusement in working out how strongly the "non-Germans" have influenced the Baltic Sea provinces' former ruling class. It is enough to refer to the differences in character between Baltic

Germans and national Germans. The difference in lifeview between, let us say, a male person from Leipzig and a gentleman from Dorpat were not negligible. The special blend of what in Reval is called "Härzänsbildunk", of naive egoism, of gallows-humor[1] and the prim conceit of high birth can only with difficulty be discovered south of the Marien Church in Lübeck. But it was that which united us despite everything – the Petersburgian on the Nevski, the flaneur in Edlund's corner and the – today, extinct – kolingen, the harborworker, in Skeppsbron.

There is, beside all this, something in the fairly sparse "Baltic literature", in the narrowly shoved-together, anxiously aged towns' atmosphere, which puts one in mind of the turn-of the-last-century's singular German-Jewish authors in Prague. One seems suddenly to find oneself facing something at once ridiculous and unendurable, a terribly complicated problem in miniature, one is gripped by a helpless embarrassment, similar to that which overcomes one in the presence of a very ancient dwarf who is trying to tell one of his love and who is constantly at a loss for words. The absurd that one is astonished by in some polemical, deadlypoisonous footnote in Jahrbuch für Heraldik, Genealogie und Sphragistik, in the frog-like assonances heard in certain Estonian names, in the collision between grotesque trendiness and ramshackle Middle-Ages as in, for example, the Vyborg of the 1930s ....

In my early teen-age years, I travelled by canoe up the River Sauka under chain bridges, under slowly swinging wings of windmills, under precipices where the plougher strode turned to the heavens, supernaturally large, and the white cumulous clouds and the strand-swallows and the blue dragonfly a few miles upstream where the river became so stony and shallow that the canoe scraped on the bottom.

I was so happy.

In the little museum in Pernau, the world's most poignant museum, where in the low rooms a crocodile hide over the serfs' rough dippers and between von Kügelgen's dull, narrow small paintings the mummycase like a newly-varnished Mora clock.

The grave slabs stood stacked against the outer wall, next to the stairs and two mermaids – double-tailed, with fins split-edged as grape leaves – smiled a bit in the chapped limestone. Why the grave-covers had ended up there probably no one now living knows. It was one o'clock in the afternoon. The town slept in the July sun's yellow hood. The bicycles had left winding tracks in the thick dust. The boy who that summer contemplated the grave stones in the side of the deserted square is myself.

Oh I know, I know. That within one which wants to be ill, to cry like a girl turned towards the wall.

But one must be a good thin-legged man not to make crude jokes in these courts of twilight. For us on the north side, who have received a more infantry-tactical determined fate, it's mostly, nowadays, a matter of form. But, on the other hand, we set great store on that. And moods or not, one thing we probably have in common: the conviction that despite all personal gingerbread-work and draughts of Parisian air and temporary leaps out of fate, the meager pine forest with its collapsed stacks of wood and long echoes is right across the road, when that time the splinter flies from the fir stems, when the irremediable joins up with us, walking at our side, when the machine-gun hacks and hacks.

That kind of cold fall day.

So there is, in fact, no risk that the fundamental mood will be lost. ■

Translated from *Månen är en säl. Prosastycken i skilda ämnen* [The Moon is a Seal. Prose Pieces on Various Subjects] 1952

1 The Eastern "humor noir", which in its harshness usually upsets the Stockholmers either morally or socially, has in this collection [of stories] given rise to the anecdote concerning the Siberian garrison. The story was told to me at a sauna by Carl-Gustav Wahren of Tavastland's Cavalry, and he had heard it himself from a Baron von Ungern-Sternberg, who had experienced it. This was the same Baron who later became a prince in Mongolia and was torn to pieces between four horses.

REMARKS

Uspenski is the Orthodox cathedral in central Helsiniki.

In the battle of Brunkeberg 1471, Swedish national troops defeated the forces of the Danish king Christian I, then head of the Union of Scandinavian Monarchies.

Mora clock is a traditional grandfather's clock from the Swedish province of Dalecarlia.

Skeppsbron is the old harbor of Stockholm.

LORENTZ VON NUMERS (TURKU 1913-ANGERS 1994)

In one of his essays, Lorentz von Numers used the expression "homeless as a Finland-Swedish intellectual"; he could have had himself in mind. With a heavy generalization one could say that there were two kinds of Finnish authors writing in Swedish in the interwar period and later: the so-called "bygdesvenska" – that is, rustic-Swedish authors, who mostly came from peasant stock, often deeply rooted in the soil of their home villages – and the "kultursvenska", the "cultural-Swedish", authors of urban, middle- or upper-class backgrounds and cosmopolitan worldviews. Lorentz von Numers demonstrated a combination of homelessness and belonging. It compelled him to travel the borderlands of reality, time, and genres. He also demonstrated the feeling of being at home everywhere in Europe, a characteristic of those who, like him, have seafaring forefathers and roots around the entire Baltic Sea – but never too far inland.

In the case of von Numers, this homelessness was accentuated by his cultural-aristocratic fascination with the Mediterranean world and with medieval culture, the French, and by a conservatism that leaned towards a feudal past rather than towards the totalitarian. This orientation allowed him to find soul-mates in Helsinki's Active Student Union (*Aktiva studentförbundet*) and among fellow authors such as Örnulf Tigerstedt and Göran Stenius. Otherwise, he was an outsider in Finland, a small and insular peasant-democratic state torn by a dispute over what was to be its national language.

NOR WAS VON NUMERS, a poet who took Nobel Prize Laureate Erik-Axel Karlfeldt as his model, and an essayist who modeled himself on Frans G. Bengtsson, the sort of author that the young Finnish republic would take to. The country's inability to appreciate von Numers's art is one example of its cultural shortcomings, condemning a unique and multi-faceted authorship to undeserved oblivion.

AFTER COMPLETING HIS high-school education in 1933, von Numers worked as a journalist. During the Spanish Civil War, he also served as an observational officer in the Pyrenees. During the Finnish war against the Soviet Union, he worked at a news agency and as a war correspondent. After the war, he again worked as a journalist, for, among others, *Svenska Dagbladet*, a right-wing newspaper published in Stockholm. In 1947 von Numers settled in Sweden, in 1959 in France. Between 1972 and 1978, he served as cultural attaché to the Finnish embassy in Paris.

von Numers moved between different genres with an ease that indicates that he chose genres according to his purpose. After his poetic debut with the collection *Svart harnesk* (Black Armor), 1934), he wrote a few more collections, whereupon he abandoned the genre. After that, he moved with ease between free, intermediate forms of cultural causeries, travel descriptions, historical essays and historical novels. von Numers's appreciation of cultural paradoxes, of the exotic and the burlesque, led his penetrating mind and equilibristic pen to translations of Froissart, Joinville, Montaigne and Voltaire, and to environments such as the kingdom of Mallorca, the Palestine of the Crusaders and the world of the Knights of Malta; it also led him to contemplate the life story of the French renegade Pascha Bonneval, who served in the Ottoman Empire, and to write a historical novel about Francois Villon.

For an author with von Numers's outlook it was natural to see the Baltic Sea as the Mediterranean of the North or as a marine version of the Habsburg Empire, even if ill-tasting and of a beerbottle color. ■

max engman

Professor of general history, Åbo Akademi University

NATURAL GAS MAKES RUSSIA STRONGER

BY **ANDERS HELLNER** ILLUSTRATION **RAGNI SVENSSON**

For nearly 45 years, the Baltic was a divided sea. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were incorporated into the Soviet Union. Poland and East Germany were nominally independent states, but were essentially governed from Moscow. Finland had throughout its history enjoyed limited freedom of action, especially when it came to foreign and security policies. This bit of modern history, which ended less than twenty years ago, still influences cooperation and integration within the Baltic Sea area.

The former Baltic Soviet republics were soon integrated into the European Union and the Western defense alliance NATO. The U.S. and Western Europe accomplished this in an almost coup-like manner. It was a question of acting while Russia was in a weakened state. East Germany was reunited with West Germany and was thus pulled into both the EU and NATO. Following the Baltic States' example, Poland quickly let itself be incorporated into the West's economic and military structures. A resurrected but weakened Russia viewed this development with disapproval and bitterness. The Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin has called the dissolution of the Soviet Union a geopolitical catastrophe.

The integration has run into a series of difficulties. Russia has not been particularly helpful. For the EU, which has so many member states with "difficult" backgrounds in the area, the development of a strategy and program for the Baltic Sea has long held high priority. This is particularly the case when it comes to issues of energy and the environment.

In June 2009, the EU Commission presented a proposal for a strategy and action plan for the entire region – in accordance with a decision to produce such a strategy, which the EU Parliament had reached in 2006. Immediately thereafter, the European Council gave the Commission the task of formulating what was, for the EU, a unique proposal. The EU had never before developed strategies applying to specific geographical areas within the Union. The Baltic Sea strategy is a pilot project and may come to be followed by similar projects for other areas. During the latter half of 2009, under Sweden's EU presidency, the project, parts of which had been initiated earlier, was launched. The project is extensive, if somewhat vague, and affects almost 100 million people living in eight EU countries around the Baltic Sea. The strategy has its roots in concern over the lack of coordination that has characterized the region for so long, and which is

First, many loved a weak Germany. Then, many loved a weak Russia.



In the Nord Stream project, the two have found each other. As in the 1920s?

primarily caused by the region's sharp division during the Cold War. The principle problems are: the seriously worsened state of the environment throughout almost the entire Baltic Sea, inadequate transportation infrastructure, trade barriers, and uncertainty surrounding energy sources.

The Baltic Sea strategy entails a new way of working and cooperating within the Union. New laws or institutions are not really essential to future progress. What is essential is that the governments show willingness to find new ways of cooperating effectively. The countries' economies must be coordinated. Today, trade with countries that are immediate neighbors predominates. The development in the Baltic Sea region has been hindered by the great distances within the area, but also the distances to the rest of the EU countries. It takes 36 hours to get from Warsaw to Tallinn by train. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania are isolated when it comes to energy supplies.

Lately, the Russian-German energy project Nord Stream has added to tensions in the Baltic region. As in the case of a similar project, South Stream, which runs under the Black Sea, Russia has managed to get a firm grip on Europe's future energy supply. In a number of countries, fear is spreading, a fear rooted in previous experience. This is not just a matter of Russia securing the export of its large gas reserves, or of meeting Western Europe's great energy requirements. No, say many: in the background, a broad and ambitious political agenda is unfolding, designed by an ever-more authoritarian Russia that wishes to regain a position of power in international society – the position that was lost with the fall of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Today, Russian natural gas flows through land-based pipelines that traverse Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It has caused concern in the recipient countries in West Europe, and in particular Germany, that Russia has occasionally broken off deliveries for political reasons – in order to punish countries, as has occasionally happened with Ukraine – as well as technical reasons. The new pipeline under the Baltic Sea will deprive the transit countries of large revenues. Furthermore, the new pipeline is constructed in such a manner that Russia can break off supplies to those countries that for whatever reason fall into disfavor.

Nord Stream, as it is envisioned, will constitute a corridor 1,200 kilometers long and 2 kilometers wide. It will run along the bottom of the Baltic Sea from the town of Vyborg near St. Petersburg to Lubmin, a town in the vicinity of Greifswald. Two parallel gas pipelines will be constructed, each with a width of 1.2 meters. The excavation of the sea bed, which is yet to begin, would affect a corridor about 150 meters broad. The installation would have an impact on a zone ten times that large. On its way from Vyborg to Greifswald, the gas line would pass through the economic zones of five countries: Finland, Sweden, and Denmark and, of course, the two owner countries Russia and Germany. About 40 percent of the gas line will be laid through the Swedish zone east of Gotland; it will then proceed east of Danish Bornholm and finally end up in Germany.



At present, it seems that a service platform, which was to be established northeast of Gotland at a depth of 50 to 90 meters, will not in fact be built.

If everything goes according to plan, one of the two lines, with a capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters, will be ready to start operating in 2010. The second line, with the same capacity, would be ready in 2012.

Nord Stream would transport gas originating in western Siberia and the large fields in the Barents Sea. Construction has already begun on the Russian, land-based part of the project, which is controlled by state-owned Russian Gazprom. Construction on the part based on German land has not yet begun, but it will, when finished, reach areas near Bremen and areas near Olbernhau, close to the Czech border.

EU's annual gas consumption is today somewhere around 90 billion cubic meters, which is equivalent to more than 25 percent of Germany's total energy consumption. More than 80 percent of the gas is imported, to a large extent from Russia. EU's projected gas consumption for 2015 is estimated at 680 billion cubic meters and the need for imported gas at just over 500 billion cubic meters – in other words, a large increase. The world's greatest gas reserves are located in Russia, which owns close to 30 percent of the total – as compared to Norway's 1.3 percent. For Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Great Britain, Nord Stream is of vital importance. This is not the case for Sweden, however. In Sweden, gas has, so far, constituted less than 2 percent of the total energy supply. These prognoses do not, however, take into account what will happen if the world's nations reach an agreement to reduce the emission of carbon dioxide radically. This would drastically reduce the need for gas – according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Increased use of wind power and nuclear power together with more effective energy utilization would reduce the use of gas by 5 percent up until 2015 and by 17 percent up until 2030. If this forecast proves realistic, the future need for Russian gas will be significantly smaller than today's estimates.

A variety of different objections were raised against Nord Stream. The construction of the pipeline may, for instance, lead to environmental problems. These specific misgivings have delayed the start of the project. During and after World War II, large amounts of ammunition, chemical weapons and mines were dumped in the areas through which Nord Stream is to pass. Two German mines, containing about 200 kilograms of explosives, were recently found. One was northeast of Gotland, seven meters from where the pipeline will be located. The risk of heavy metals, phosphates, and organic toxins being released is thought to be great. In addition, the German-Russian gas line would go against the Swedish policy of reducing future dependence on fossil fuel.

The underlying argument, however, concerns security policies. The Swedish Energy Agency has expressed itself unusually clearly on this issue. It has, indeed, been remarkably outspoken, given its location in a militarily neutral country which has been particularly cautious when it comes to statements that might provoke Russia. According to the Swedish Energy Agency, there is much evidence suggesting that Russia has, in the past, used its energy resources as a means of achieving political goals – for instance when Moscow used the gas tap as a weapon during a 2006 conflict with Ukraine – and that it will continue to do so in the future. There is definite unease within the EU about becoming too dependent on Russia for its future energy needs.

The main stockholder in Nord Stream, Gazprom – of which former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder is chairman – is, not surprisingly, of the opinion that Nord Stream can scarcely be held to be contrary to broad European objectives. As early as

2000, both the EU Commission and the EU Parliament expressed their support for the project, and reaffirmed their support in 2006. Here, then, a number of European countries are torn between their need for energy, and their fear that Russia will use its energy resources to regain influence over the areas that once made up the Soviet Union, including those countries which once were members of the Communist empire's Warsaw Pact. In an open letter to President Obama this spring, 23 former heads of state and a number of Central European intellectuals pointed out that Russia, after the invasion of Georgia, had proclaimed a "sphere of privileged interests" which might very likely include their countries as well. "Pipeline politics is a Russian tactic", said the authors of the letter, two of which were Václav Hável and Lech Walesa.

Radoslaw Sikorski, at present Poland's foreign minister, went the furthest. During his term as defense minister, he compared the Russian-German agreement on the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline with the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which had de facto divided Central Europe into spheres of Russian and German influence.

Gerhard Schröder played an interesting role in the foundation of Nord Stream. It was while he was Federal Chancellor that Germany approved the project and, furthermore, provided an economical guarantee of 1.4 billion dollars. The deal between Russia and Germany was cemented a few weeks before Schröder left office after the election defeat of 2005. A few weeks later, he accepted the position of chairman of Nord Stream, which carries a yearly salary of 250,000 euros.

Schröder was not the only leading politician who found employment within Nord Stream. The former Finnish prime minister, Paavo Lipponen, has been active as an imbursed middleman. The former Italian prime minister and former chairman of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, however, declined an offer to become chairman of South Stream. Matthias Warnig is CEO for Nord Stream. During the 1980s, he served as a major in the secret East German police Stasi, at the same time that Vladimir Putin, who was a colonel in the Russian intelligence service KGB, was stationed in Leipzig. Warnig, however, claims that the two never met and that his background in Stasi is irrelevant to the present pipeline debate.

The security concerns that have been voiced in connection with the construction of Nord Stream are primarily grounded in the fact that Russia has disappointed expectations when it comes to developing democracy, a market economy, and a state ruled by law. On the other side of the Baltic Sea, especially in the Baltic States and Poland, where memories of Russian hegemony are fresh, there is great suspicion of Russian intentions and Russia's exercise of power.

Few claim that the Nord Stream project would entail a direct military threat. On the other hand, the project may give the Russian military occasion for expanding its presence in the middle of the Baltic Sea. A hypothetical terror threat would serve as an excellent excuse for Russia (and for Germany) to arrange for military supervision of the construction of Nord Stream, which would continue, perhaps, even after the pipeline has begun to function. In the future, Nord Stream will provide a significant proportion of the EU countries' energy supply; it may fetter EU in its future dealings with Russia.

Nord Stream's structures are expected to operate for about fifty years. If and when the Russian military presence in the area increases, it is not unreasonable to assume that other countries will also boost their military presence. The result will be increased tension, perhaps incidents that will require diplomatic intervention. Any terrorist threats leveled against the installation will be dealt with by Russian armed forces. A law passed fairly recently gives the Russian president the mandate to deploy Russian forces abroad without a parliamentary hearing. Another problem with the entire Nord Stream project is the lack of openness. Nord Stream itself is probably doing its best to explain and justify its plans. But Russian energy policy is secretive. Hidden contractual provisos are commonplace, as is corruption.

A seasoned expert on Russia who has previously held high positions within the Swedish intelligence service, Jan Leijonhielm, said in the daily *Dagens Nyheter* on October 20, 2009:

"It is unfortunate for the surrounding world that Russia is not developing towards democracy and that military ability is gradually being recovered, and that Russia is prepared to use it, as well as energy extortion, against neighboring countries. Russia is still, without comparison, the largest security policy actor in our immediate surroundings, and it is not the nation that I would choose to become economically dependent on."

Collaborative projects of this sort usually lead to greater trust among the countries that participate in the projects. Greater trust may indeed develop here, as far as relations between Russia and Germany are concerned. But for a number of Baltic Sea nations, it seems that the opposite will be the case. Nord Stream will make Russia independent of the transit states.

There are other problems in connection with the gas line project which may have security policy consequences. A large proportion of Nord Stream's gas will be difficult and expensive to produce. Russia is about to establish a gas OPEC together with Algeria, Iran, Qatar, and Venezuela. A rather pretty collection of countries, that is, as members of a producers' cartel. The majority of the members are not at all unwilling to use their large energy resources for political purposes. Here, the EU can get into serious political trouble in the future. The only countries among the Baltic Sea region's EU members that have a positive view of the project are, in fact, Germany and Denmark.

In late October 2009, Denmark gave its consent to the project, and Sweden and Finland gave theirs in November. The Swedish government's decision met with critique from, among others, the Swedish Social Democrats. The minister of the environment, Andreas Carlgren, however, was of the opinion that the government had made an extensive environmental investigation of the gas pipeline and that Nord Stream, during the 23 months the investigation lasted, had been assigned some serious homework. Carlgren further stated that "all states have the right to place a line in international waters". The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is unequivocal. This is because no coastal state should be able to monopolize international waters. So Nord Stream is not a joint project for the Baltic Sea. This also means that the large project will make it more difficult to decide on a joint EU energy policy.

The Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy concluded that the gas line will not be a serious threat to environment, marine life, or cultural heritage. During the period of environmental impact assessment by the Danish authorities, the corporation agreed to comply with a series of Danish demands. Among other things, the route is to be changed so that it goes south rather than north of Bornholm. The Bornholm fishermen will, further, be provided with new trawls that can handle being drawn across gas lines. The corporation is generally liberal when it comes to meeting the demands that concerned parties might have. The reconstruction of the harbor in Slite, Gotland, is another example.

The concession process differs from country to country. In Sweden, the government decides on the issue. In Germany a court of law, in Denmark an administrative department, while, in Finland and Russia, the process includes several steps. Sweden gives priority to the environment of the Baltic Sea. The decision is taken using the Convention on the Continental Shelf as a guideline.

A relatively longer stretch of gas line travels through Swedish waters than through Danish. The line passes through bird preservation areas and has greater impact on navigation. None of the governments concerned have brought up security policy issues.

After all, when it comes to Nord Stream, it is difficult to conjure up images of a military threat. The Baltic Sea is, rather, characterized by non-military threats. At issue, here, is a series of problems, the solutions of which demand great economic and human resources, but most of all cooperation and consensus among all countries around the Baltic Sea. Sad to say, in this matter, much is left to be desired.

The greatest problem is, perhaps, the environment. The Baltic Sea is one of the world's sickest seas. Because of discharge from agriculture on both sides, the Baltic Sea may have reached a condition of almost chronic eutrophication, a situation that calls for the

NATURAL GAS MAKES RUSSIA STRONGER

deployment of new, drastic measures.

Another serious environmental problem is the discharge of heavy metals, anti-flame substances, dioxin, mercury etc., as well as litter, such as slowly decomposing plastic materials. Belarus, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic have no Baltic Sea coastline, but all three nations have rivers that drain into the Baltic Sea, and they are responsible for about 15 percent of the heavy metals that are released into its waters.

Oil spills, in the relatively cold and species-deprived Baltic Sea, continue to be a serious problem, even though great efforts are being made to prevent such spills. There is extensive transportation of oil cargoes through the Baltic Sea. Oil is, of course, a natural product, but it decomposes extremely slowly at low temperatures. Fish depletion is a much-discussed problem. The supplies of many species of fish, such as cod, Baltic herring, and eel, have declined rapidly.

As far as radioactive substances are concerned, the Baltic Sea has high concentrations of Strontium 90 and Cesium 137, higher than seas in other parts of the world. The radioactive substances in the Baltic Sea derive from nuclear tests, the Chernobyl disaster, and European nuclear power plants.

Russia holds the key to a large proportion of the energy supply of the eastern Baltic nations in particular. It is essential that relations between Russia and especially the Baltic States and Poland improve. But it is also essential that the EU show a hitherto undemonstrated ability to develop a policy towards Russia which is both constructive and sustainable, and that Russia become integrated into European cooperation. ■

anders hellner
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NATURAL GAS MAKES RUSSIA STRONGER

A BALTIC SEA FORUM FOR DISCUSSION

Extremely unassuming, almost colorless. One article follows the other, no illustrations, no layout, hardly any systematic organization.

This sounds like an off-putting assessment of a journal. But in this case, a lovely surface and seductive enticement of the reader are not at issue. The content is what counts.

Baltic Rim Economies is an information-dense journal, one might almost say bulletin, published six times a year by the Pan-European Institute at the Turku School of Economics. The journal covers the Baltic region in general, but concentrates on the Baltic States and Russia.

The driving force behind the journal is Kari Liuhto, director of the Institute and professor of international economics. And it does indeed take drive to run the journal, for the publication of *Baltic Rim Economies* receives no outside funding – nothing from the Finnish state, nothing from the Nordic Council or from the Baltic Assembly, nothing from foundations .... There simply is no money to spend on an attractive layout.

The format of each issue is simple. Of about forty pages, seven are dedicated to the economic development of the Baltic States, Poland, and north-west Russia (including Kaliningrad). These are followed by a number of articles about subject matters of current interest, such as – at present – developments in Belarus and the Arctic. Over the year, some 200 such articles are published, pedagogically numbered according to dates of publication.

But two subjects are always covered, says Kari Liuhto: the economy and the environment.

IT IS PERHAPS NOT NECESSARY to mention this, but *Baltic Rim Economies* (BRE) is an Internet journal. It has about 20,000 subscribers (subscription is free) in 80 countries, which means that many more thousands read it. The Pan-European Institute has striven hard to reach this impressive distribution. The journal is sent to public bodies, organizations, research institutes, persons involved in politics and the economic sector, and many interested individuals.

The contributions to BRE have one characteristic in common: they are short, about one A4 page or 6,000 characters. It is easy to find the piece that interests one, flipping through or skipping the rest. The format does not encourage long, nuanced discussions. This can be perceived as a disadvantage. But it becomes an advantage.

When the contributors are limited to one A4 page, they must condense the message – if they have one. The format shows, implacably, whether a text has a clear theme or thesis – or whether it is merely another example of the all-too-familiar empty rhetoric about networks, sustainability, boundary-crossing, and so on.

When I read some of this year's issues, I encounter some contributions that fall into the latter category. These include a piece from Jan Fischer, prime minister of the Czech Republic (about partnership with Russia, in 4:2009), and pieces from the EU's commissioner of agriculture, Mariann Fischer Boel, and Finland's minister of education, Hanna Virkkunen, (about sustainable educational policies, both to be found in 4:2009).

It is perhaps especially easy for politicians to write this way. But researchers, who do not have the courage to focus on the essential, or who merely report, also end up in this category.

BUT THERE ARE, LUCKILY, many examples of the opposite tendency. One is by Mats Hellström, former minister of trade and county governor (and, by the way, one of the few Swedish contributors). He finds the cracks that abound in the pretty rhetoric concerning innovation. Innovation is certainly necessary, and is a major part of the EU Commission's Baltic Sea Strategy, but, in Hellström's view, there has been far too little attention paid to the demand (per se) for new solutions. This demand must be stimulated by public institutions, and this requires that the governments of the Baltic Sea region learn to cooperate.

Other contributions of this sort are written by various Baltic ministers, such as Latvia's minister of defense, Rasa Juknevicıene (about greater Western support for the Baltic States against Russia, 4:2009) and Estonia's minister of culture, Laine Jänes (about creative industries, 5:2009).

Somewhat to my surprise, I found that Finland's prime minister Matti Vanhanen had managed very well in his A4-article on future Baltic cooperation (5:2009). With what a Swede would characterize as laconic Finnish determination, Vanhanen tackles all the promises and strategies concerning the Baltic Sea (such as "The Baltic Sea Action Plan", 2007), and demonstrates that action must be taken now.

Finland will host the next Baltic Sea Action Summit in February 2010 – and Vanhanen pledges that concrete commitments to save the Baltic Sea's environment will then be on the agenda. No one will be allowed to shirk the responsibility they assumed at an earlier date – the lesson being directed at Russia, in

particular, could not be clearer.

But the piece also directs demands towards Sweden, as holder of the EU presidency. By December Sweden should have been be able to produce forceful decisions based on the Baltic Sea Strategy submitted this summer by the EU Commission. The four targets for improvement – the environment, economic development, accessibility, and security – must be given concrete form, even if the EU, oddly, does not intend to grant additional funding.

Matti Vanhanen has stuck his neck out in BRE – the proof of the pudding will come in February 2010!

Interesting differences of opinion sometimes surface. Two Belarusian writers, Vladimir N. Shimov and Kiryl Apanasevich, have critical views concerning the Belarusian economy, but Apanasevich places more faith in future reforms (4:2009).

The project Nord Stream has been the focus of a number of articles, both for and against, most recently in 5:2009. Nord Stream is a far-sighted way of transporting gas, a way to avoid hundreds of LNG tankers, not to mention oil tankers in the sensitive Baltic Sea – in the opinion of Ambassador René Nyberg, who has connections to the Finnish business sector. Others disagree: An unnecessary project that only benefits German interests, argues the researcher Edward Hunter Christie in Vienna, which is, furthermore, economically questionable. He is backed by Polish researcher Lukasz Antas, who thinks that a prolonged economic crisis in combination with a more stringent environmental consciousness will decrease the demand for gas.

I have here mentioned only a few of the many interesting contributions to appear in this brief A4 format. It is noteworthy that several Russian researchers and others ivolved in the debate have contributed with very frank, critical analyses of the hollow Russian economy. The informative and important journal *Baltic Rim Economies* has been published by the Pan-European Institute since 2004, when the previous publisher Bofit, an institute connected to the Bank of Finland, had decided that the time had come for renewal: after all, the Baltic States and Poland had now become EU members.

THE PURPOSE OF PUBLISHING the journal is, says Kari Liuhto, to draw attention to the Baltic Sea area as a region, and to facilitate the dissemination of information among the eight EU members as well as Russia and Belarus.

If taken individually, small states become marginalized in the EU. They must cooperate more closely, and as a region – how, asks Liuhto, can they otherwise hope to catch the attention of larger investors in the U.S. and China? The large states (Russia, Germany, and Poland) may want to act unilaterally; the trick is to persuade them to engage in common regional efforts.

Similar ideas are brought up by contributors to BRE, e.g. Henrik Lax (3:2009), who at the time was a Finnish representative in the European Parliament. He goes so far as to characterize the Baltic Sea region as a bridge between the EU and Russia.

But the journal BRE is not an instrument for spreading a certain opinion or agenda. The writers are solely responsible for their contributions. The journal is meant to be a place where one finds expert information and open discussion among interested individuals.

It is Karel Liuhto personally who requisitions the articles, a task that must be extremely time-consuming, considering the wide variety of contributors.

Liuhto particularly prioritizes the journal's purpose as a forum for discussion. This will, perhaps, eventually mean the disappearance of BRE's national economic surveys. After all, a number of banks also provide such surveys. Nor would Liuhto be opposed to the idea of surrendering the articles on the Arctic to a similar net journal, covering the Barents region. Here there is opportunity for a Norwegian initiative!

ALL IN ALL, IT IS SINGULARLY worthwhile browsing in the visually modest journal *Baltic Rim Economies*. It is best, perhaps, not to read everything; rather, one should pick and choose.

The one thing an old journalist might wish for would be an improved structure. The articles are often arranged at random, sometimes grouped around a specific theme, such as the environment or Russia – then comes an interval, occupied by other subject matters, whereupon additional articles on the environment or Russia may appear again. This is neither pedagogic nor reader-friendly.

A more detailed presentation of the contributors would also be desirable. For the reader, it may be important to know a politician's party affiliation, or the sort of institute with which a researcher is associated.

But these are marginal notes concerning a journal that covers the countries around the margins of the Baltic Sea. ■

olof kleberg
Slavist and political scientist, former editor-in-chief of *Västerbottens-Kuriren* (Umeå)

Baltic Rim Economies can be found at the homepage of Turku School of Economics

PHOTO: LUMIEREFL – HTTP://FLIC.KR/P/QDQDA

Matti Vanhanen surprises. As usual.

Life expectancy.
The culture that kills

PHOTO: LARS RODVALDR

After the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of successor states, various social phenomena have developed in extremely different ways across different ethnic groups. This is particularly true of mortality and life expectancy.

For example, during the years leading up to 1990, life expectancy was at the same level in Estonia as in nearby parts of Russia (the city of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast). Men in Russia could expect to live, on average, just under 65 years, while women could expect to reach a considerably more advanced age – slightly more than 74 years. The figures for those living in Estonia were roughly the same: 65.5 years for ethnic Russian men and nearly 66 years for ethnic Estonian men, 74.5 years for ethnic Russian women, and just over 75 years for ethnic Estonian women. After 1990, dramatic changes occurred in a very short span of time.

AMONG RUSSIAN MEN in Russia, life expectancy decreased by 4.5 years, and among Russian men in Estonia, it decreased by almost 5 years, to somewhat over 60 years in both cases – and this in a period of only ten years! Among Russian women life expectancy also fell, but not nearly as dramatically: Russian women in surrounding Russia had a life expectancy of 72.5 years, while Russian women in Estonia were living on average one year longer. The only ones who gained a clear advantage because of the changes during this period were ethnically Estonian women in Estonia: they increased their life expectancy by nearly a year.

These data were presented at a workshop at Södertörn University in the fall of 2009 by the Södertörn sociologist Mall Leinsalu. The overall conclusion she drew from her material was that cultural context weighs quite heavily when large social transformations take place, whereas state boundaries and state affiliation have less significance. She has also been able to show that cardiovascular diseases explain, more than any other particular factor – such as accidents (including suicide), infections, tumors – the increase in mortality that translates into a decline in life expectancy, except in the case of the group of ethnic Russians in Estonia, where tumors are the predominant factor causing an increase in mortality.

IN RUSSIA, THE LARGE losses of human life have occurred in the cohorts of 20-29 and 35-54 years of age for men, and 50-54 for women, although men have two to three times the mortality rate of women in that interval, and an even higher mortality rate relative to women in certain other age ranges. Among Russian men in Estonia, the most significant increase in mortality is from 30 to 59 years, with the oldest five-year interval (55-59) showing the greatest increase. This is also the cohort that shows the highest increase in mortality among Russian women in both Russia and Estonia. ■

Apostles of the future.
To colonize was to westernize

PHOTO: TRAIN CHARTERING & PRIVATE RAIL CARS

The rulers of Tsarist Russia had early on pondered the possibility of expanding the Empire beyond its original borders by colonizing the thinly populated, and, by contemporary standards, uncivilized lands in the East.

Professor Alberto Masoero at the University of Venice has studied documents and maps in Russian archives connected to this colonization and to the closely linked population movements. Russia abolished serfdom in 1862. The Empire's eastwards expansion was, in part, meant to provide the liberated peasants with land. According to Masoero, Russian colonization closely resembled that of 19th-century USA. As Masoero points out, neither could claim legitimacy by citing the need to convert an autochthonous, heathen population, as had been the case during the colonization of, for instance, Africa and South America.

IN THE U.S., COLONIZATION was directed to the West, while Russian colonization was directed eastwards; but in both cases, people were moved so that one's own peasants and farmers could gain access to arable land. In both cases, the original population was driven away. The Russian colonization process was organized by a special ministry, which sent out engineers and administrators to build the new, expanded empire. With time, Russia's territories became so extensive that it was impossible to administrate the apparatus without the aid of local elites.

Just as U.S. railway networks were extended further and further west, early 20th-century Russia started construction on the trans-Siberian railroad in order to connect the towns and the people spread out over the enormous new territories. The railroad engineers were heroes. As representatives of a new culture and a new kind of know-ledge, they were apostles of modern society. To colonize was to westernize.

WITH TIME, THE NEW Asian Russians became part of the Soviet Union. It was typical of the special culture that was created around the expanding Russia that the peoples who were swallowed up by this extended community should be granted a place in it. The Russian colonies were not – as were other powers' colonies – located in a periphery entirely removed from the center. Rather, they were part of a totality. Masoero wishes to stress the ways in which Russia's colonial project can be seen as an expression of a special culture, based on the idea of a new, communal country, built (with the aid of a benevolent elite government) by all and for all. For Lenin, Siberia became emblematic of his utopian concept of a new Russia. In Siberia there were territories without a history that could be recreated at will; all they needed was the presence of able-bodied people. ■

Alberto Masero presented his research at a lecture at Södertörn University in the fall of 2009.

Economic significance of camps. Terror under the microscope

Two prominent experts on Russia shed light on the Soviet Union during the Stalin Period in a slim volume that has been published by the Stockholm School of Economics.

In his text "The Archives and the Stalinist Economy", R. W. Davies illuminates the nature of decision making in the central political authority, the Politburo, and in the government, the Council of the People's Commissars (*Sovnarkom*). The absence of a struggle over a political platform is striking, at least after 1932, when Stalin firmly establishes his monopoly on power. But the dictator was by no means involved in all matters; this was particularly the case when it came to questions involving the economy. This might have been because of a lack of knowledge, or it might simply have had to do with developments in the economic system that were difficult to do anything about, such as high inflation. Social unrest within the population could also have the effect of holding him back at times.

DAVIES BELIEVES THAT the importance of the camp system as a contributor to the economic mobilization of the Soviet state has often been exaggerated, especially when the impending major war is taken into account. First – because of Robert Conquest's research – the extent of the Gulag in quantitative terms has been exaggerated, and, secondly, the efficiency was low and the transaction costs high in an enclave production based on slave labor. In 1940, "prisoners of all kinds were responsible for some 18 percent of building work and 1-2 percent of industrial production", he writes.

On the other hand, says Davies, Conquest arrived at realistic ideas from the very start of the number of victims of the Great Terror of 1937-1938 (one million executed), and he was right in that the terror struck not only experts and party cadres but people of all classes and strata, particularly those who could be suspected of a willingness to cooperate with a presumed future enemy.

Nevertheless – despite the waste of human resources – the Soviet Union's contribution to the fight against Nazi Germany was extraordinary. No less than 56 percent of GDP in 1942 went to the defense effort in the Soviet Union, compared to 52 percent in the U.K. and 40 percent in the U.S. And one should keep in mind that national income per capita was much lower in the Soviet Union than in these other states. "Civilian industry was certainly better prepared for war in the Soviet Union than in the other allied countries", Davies concludes.

IN HIS TEXT, Teodor Shanin, recognized authority on agrarian societies and peasant organizing, highlights Alexander Chayanov's historic role, and his return in the debate on peasant society. Chayanov was among the many academics purged and murdered during the 1930s; economist Nikolai Kondratiev was another. Chayanov's theory of self-sufficient peasant agriculture – a form of production that was not profit-maximizing – obviously stood in the way of Stalin's and the Communist Party's objective of eradicating the freeholders – the kulaks – as a class.

Chayanov had previously been a leading scientist in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. But as Shanin shows, his intellectuality had an enormous dynamism, and he also wrote – in addition to his scholarly works – novels, poetry, theater pieces, and devoted himself to art history as well to as his work as a builder. All of this versatility seems to have appeared defiant and illegitimate to a regime that was busy trying to gain preferable right of interpretation in all areas of society. ✕

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Future Kosovo traumas? In the age of breakaway republics

The Western international community's recognition of the breakaway state of Kosovo will have negative repercussions, particularly in the Caucasus, writes the Swedish-speaking Russia correspondent Anna-Lena Laurén of the Finnish broadcasting company Yle, in her new book. The peoples of the Caucasus have fought wars against aggressors for century upon century. But when the Russian Empire, in the form of the Soviet Union, ceased to exist, civil wars and border wars came to claim new victims in the name of the nation-state, a focus that, in the rest of Europe, saw its best days in the 1800s.

THEN, THE BATTLE for the nation was mainly a "large-state nationalism", uniting ethnicities of the same sort. Today, it involves ethnic groups of between 200,000 and two million people fighting for their own national sovereignty in the mountains and lowlands in the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and occasionally distancing themselves from – if not repudiating – their own ethnic minorities. Georgia has international recognition as a state, but is challenged by Abkhazians and South Ossetians, who have formed their own enclaves despite Western opposition, though with the recognition of Russia. Why should they be denied the right the Western powers gave the armed Kosovo Albanian separatists? wonders Laurén. She recommends neither the one nor the other.

She enjoys her dealings with ordinary people, especially with outspoken women. They speak with each other mostly in Russian, but these people lack the ingrained subservience to a temporarily installed authority that characterizes Russian political culture. Equality and hospitality are as widespread as corruption and vendettas in these societies – societies that have learned to live in balance with nature and with a diversity of languages and traditions. Laurén partakes without hesitation of the good food offered, poses impertinent questions to those in power, and is slightly fearful of the Islamic fundamentalism that is spreading among young people, who are ignorant of how Islam, for their fathers and forefathers, served as a cultural rather than an ideological foundation. ✕

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

A gender analysis of the Hungarian People's Tribunals in the aftermath of World War II

ARROW CROSS WOMEN AND FEMALE INFORMANTS

BY **ANDREA PETÖ**

Woman as perpetrator can escape even a trained eye. What escaped her eye?

> **"The Arrow Cross did not bother with women. Women were not partners for them. During the interrogations, I did not meet a single Arrow Cross woman. And you are saying this only now [that 10 percent of Arrow Cross party members were women]. Why didn't you tell me this thirty-five years ago, when I could have swooped down on them?"**

This was the answer I received from a former officer of the State Protection Authority, Hungary's secret police (*Államvédelmi Hatóság* or ÁVH), when I asked him, during a 2007 interview, about Arrow Cross women. From 1949 to 1973, this man had investigated domestic reactionary forces (that is, war criminals and Arrow Cross members). The quote illustrates the dilemma that researchers face when they inquire into phenomena the very existence of which many deny. At the Central European University, quantitative researchers have begun work on documents stemming from the Budapest People's Tribunal – documents that have been preserved in the Budapest City Archives. This research represents the first systematic inquiry into the operation of the People's Tribunals. In light of the initial findings, we may reassess the views that experts and the broader public have held on transitional justice and draw attention to previously neglected gender aspects of right-wing radicalism.

THE DEBATE ON THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNALS

In recent years, the analysis of World War II history has once again taken political center stage in the former Eastern Bloc countries. In Hungary, the debate about criminalizing Holocaust denial was resumed, partly in response to the advance of far-right political organizations whose internal group cohesion is confirmed through Holocaust denial. In Hungary, the debate over who was responsible for the losses in World War II and for the murder of 600,000 Hungarian Jews – or rather the absence of such a debate – has caused a split in the nation's collective memory. After World War II, at the very outset of the democratic transition, the Hungarian People's Tribunals were to draw a distinction among prewar, wartime, and postwar values. The courts that investigated war crimes in Europe, and later in Japan, served the function of defining, in legal terms, such crimes and of punishing offenders. In Hungary, the courts were only half-successful in this endeavor. An inquiry into why this was so may help us re-evaluate various elements of the nation's collective memory.

In Hungary, the post-Holocaust jurisdiction – the 1945 Act on People's Tribunals – was established haphazardly. For this reason, the 1945 Act became controversial. It was criticized on legal as well as political grounds. The 1945 Act on People's Tribunals was a rough sketch; the newly appointed judges, who lacked experience, had to interpret it. Court cases were undertaken quickly, sometimes without thorough preliminary investigation, for it was virtually impossible to carry through such investigations in the immediate aftermath of the war. The primary objective was to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands. Later, as the postwar situation stabilized and the political climate hardened due to the Cold War, new legislation was introduced in order to regulate the function of people's tribunals more strictly. Act VII of 1946 was followed by Act XXXIV of 1947, which regulated the proceedings.[1]

Critics of the work of the People's Tribunals in Hungary have used both legal and political arguments to define the tribunals' shortcomings.[2] The legal critique focuses on these courts' failure to function in a "legal" manner. They were, in fact, political tribunals, for they introduced retrospective justice. The first questions raised about the legal basis of the Tribunals pointed to the fact that international pressure had led to the introduction of retrospective justice. This was not in conformity with the Hungarian legal tradition. Meanwhile, political critiques bring up the fact that the country was under Soviet occupation. They both condemn the courts (as promoters of the Communist takeover) for their excessive rigor, and fault the Communists for being too lenient in their treatment of minor Arrow Cross figures and war criminals who had played a minor "historical role".

It is possible to escape from this discourse by conducting a gender-based analysis that shifts the focus of the investigation. Here, we move from the examination of major representative or emblematic aspects to a focus on less momentous issues, while integrating the gender approach. Until now, historians have generally focused on emblematic "big cases" while ignoring the gender factor – as we see in the statement made by the member of the secret police at the beginning of this article.[3]

THE COURTS

What are the attractions of this new form of analysis? In line with the traditions of women's history, it provides, first and foremost, the opportunity simply to search out women and make them visible within the institutions that produced the documentation which is now available. In other words, historians can do research on the documentation that institutions produced in the course of their work.

Such institutions include the People's Tribunals, in which lawyers, judges, and public prosecutors were active. But this traditional, historical, descriptive approach is apparently far from simple, even as far as the courts are concerned, for the obvious reason that the legal profession was a male profession. Moreover, when it comes to their experience of the country's liberation, Hungary's lawyers were divided right down the middle. Prior to 1914, law was not only a respectable livelihood for the middle classes; it also offered men upward mobility in society. There was only one semester, after the 1918 revolution and while Mihály Károlyi was prime minister, during which female law students could apply for admission to law school. The women who were accepted were allowed to complete their studies, though various special permits were required.[4] It is interesting to follow the careers of the women lawyers who, complying with the gender-based division of the legal profession, dealt with social matters or worked as people's public prosecutors (since they were, as women, considered innocent). The feminization of the law profession after 1945 coincided with the expansion of "Communist law" and a devaluation of the role of law. Women were encouraged to study law because they were seen as reliable. They began to graduate from the university and receive important positions in the newly transformed state apparatus.

ARROW CROSS WOMEN ACTIVISTS

According to membership records, estimated 15,000 women were members of the Arrow Cross Party in Hungary. After the war, these women were interned or imprisoned because they had supported the occupying German forces, or been collaborators. German and Austrian historians are alone in having studied women who were active in right-wing political parties.[5] A pertinent question is: why did these women join a radical and marginal party with an obviously anti-woman program, a party that wished to keep women in the home?"[6]

My research, which is carried out in cooperation with Ildikó Barna (ELTE, Budapest), has shown that, in Budapest, women accounted for 10 percent of those indicted for war crimes.[7] This percentage corresponds roughly to today's female-to-male ratio in Hungarian public life, that is, Hungary's political parties and parliament. In the pre-1945 period, however, women participated only sporadically in public life, so a ratio of 10 percent is relatively high. In the 20th century, women made up a steadily increasing proportion of the total number of war crime offenders – from 3 percent at the turn of the century to 10 percent in 1990. Today, their share is 16 percent. In Hungary, during World War II, a large number of armed and uniformed women made their appearance on the public stage.

As far as its potential field of mobilization was concerned, the Arrow Cross Party resembled the Communist party. It is important to note that the party was formed under the regime of Miklós Horthy, in a political environment that was hostile to women. After World War I, public discourse portrayed women in general, and especially "the new kind of women", as unreliable and dangerous actors who threatened male hegemony in the economic, political and cultural spheres. This was the argument underlying the restriction of women's right to higher education.[8] The improved political position and greater significance of women jeopardized the authority of the pre-1918 political elite. After women had been granted limited voting rights in 1920, the National Association of Hungarian Women (MANSZ), which had been established in 1918 by Cecil Tormay (1875–1937), became an umbrella organization that mobilized middle-class and upper-middle-class women. In doing so, it served to prevent the progress of both left-wing and right-wing radicalism. During the debate on the electoral law in 1938, it became clear that far-right groups – who, like the left-wing groups, fought for expanded voting rights – were gaining strength. It became increasingly difficult to argue that voting rights should be extended to select individuals on the basis of merit and service, especially if one takes into consideration that Hungary was the only European country in which the number of people entitled to vote actually fell during the interwar period. Among the various politicians, Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös (1886–1936), who was enamored with Italy's fascist regime, was the first to engage in women's political mobilization; he

People's courts were created, and arrived at their decisions, in haste. But is it then reasonable to drag out the retroactive anguish?

established a separate political party for women. The Arrow Cross followed his example.

The Arrow Cross Party was composed of many smaller, divided and marginalized groups and parties. Thanks to the personal abilities and ambitions of Ferenc Szálasi, these splinter groups were united in one party in September 1940. The Arrow Cross Party's organization was extremely hierarchical and rigid. The women's section was to be found two organizational levels below the middle, on the same level as the youth section. The women's function was evidently to secure the support of the mass membership; the Arrow Cross leadership seems to have recognized the political usefulness of its women members. Several different kinds of membership were open to women: full membership, supporting membership and even secret membership. The goal was to further women's political engagement. Male Arrow Cross Party leaders joined the leaders of other political parties in seeking to limit the female members' activities to the social field. Press reports indicate, however, that women members were not satisfied with this: they too wished to be active in politics.[9] However, if women members of the Arrow Cross "took themselves seriously", that is, if they behaved as the equals of men, they were immediately expelled from the party headquarters. There was no room for women in the inner circles of the party leadership or in the decision-making process. Even so, official Arrow Cross rhetoric defined "women" as strong and active.

The Arrow Cross movement faced significant opposition; its members were imprisoned and scorned not only by the country's conservative elite, but by the Germans as well, at least up until the final phase of the war. The movement was meant to socialize its members so that they would be prepared for the time when they would have to take action. The hour struck on October 15, 1944, when Hungary's leader, Horthy, failed in his attempts to get the country out of the war and thus paved the way for an Arrow Cross takeover similar to the one accomplished by Quisling in Norway. It is interesting to note, however, that during the brief period that the party held government positions, the women – who had worked untiringly (and sometimes even secretly) for the Arrow Cross Party – were immediately pushed aside.

When analyzing the history of the war, scholars of gender studies have tended to regard women as victims and underdogs. It is evident, however, that Arrow Cross women could be violent, punching people or shooting Jews and throwing them into the Danube. For such women, it was essential to obtain and exercise power. In this way, they avoided the role of the victim, a role that served as a starting point for many in religious, leftwing, and feminist movements.

During the course of the People's Tribunals, which were pursued with great diligence by the Hungarian Communist Party, now part of the governing coalition, it was thought essential to stress the old political regime's culpability. During the trials, female war criminals were almost automatically branded "Arrow Cross members" – even those who had never been party members.[10] Some of these women had merely seized the opportunity to rob and murder while there was a state of war, in the hope of avoiding punishment. The Arrow Cross women were not women in uniform. They did not serve in armed units. Nevertheless, in the discourse of the People's Tribunals, the archetypal "Arrow Cross woman" was portrayed as a bloodthirsty and depraved individual.

It is difficult to estimate how many women were members of the Arrow Cross, not only because there are no available membership files but also because, in Hungary, the "Arrow Cross" label was used freely in public discourse and during trials. Arrow Cross membership cards were rarely found during house searches; the People's Tribunals usually found it sufficient if a witness stated that he or she had seen the accused wearing an Arrow Cross armband. The People's Tribunal would then declare the accused a "member of the Arrow Cross Party", a factor that added to the gravity of his or her crime. Furthermore, during the chaotic, final months of the war, almost anyone had been able to obtain an Arrow Cross armband. Indeed, as the Red Army approached, there had been no need for – or even any possibility of – official party membership or admission procedures. Arrow Cross "membership" was a political label rather than a real category.

MEMORY POLITICS: FORGETTING AND THE FAILURE TO DISCLOSE

One reason why female war criminals have been left out of historical memory is related to the gender-typical characteristics of the post-World War II period and the demise of the "matriarchy born of need". Now, women who violated the patriarchal norm by wearing a uniform or by being active in public space were dealt with in a public and exemplarily strict manner. They were to be pushed back to their "normal" place.[11] After 1945, however, robbers, looters, and murderers as well as the female relatives of party members made their appearance, because they fitted into a public discourse that sought to restore the male-dominated social order that had been upset by the war.

Another reason was that women with criminal records, who came from the lower social classes and who used the Arrow Cross movement either to take vengeance on their adversaries,[13] or to enrich themselves by looting property abandoned by Jews, could not be regarded as "success stories" and so received less publicity.[14] The majority of the women convicted of war crimes were, in fact, merely common criminals. Historians have ignored these women, as they had no "political" significance. As Norman Naimark has argued,[15] ethnic cleansing is always linked to war. In the chaos that ensues, paramilitary units – in this case, the Arrow Cross – become the instruments of political leaders. Ethnic cleansing is also associated with crimes against property, as it provides opportunities for looting.[16]

In accordance with the historical canon, the "more famous" of the female war criminals and Arrow Cross women, such as Gizella Lutz, wife of Arrow Cross party leader Ferenc Szálasi, as well as the famous actress Sári Fedák, feature in the historical accounts alongside the female perpetrators of the mass murder on Maros Street. This supports the fallacious belief that all the female members of Arrow Cross were middle-class and lower-middle-class women who, lacking professional aspirations of their own, passively joined the party under the influence of male relatives, husbands, siblings and fathers. Or that, in addition to these misguided victims of male manipulation, the Arrow Cross movement's female membership was made up of a number of sadistic, insane women, who would later become pathological murderers.

WHAT THE DATA SHOW: THE SILENT MAJORITY

As part of our research, we went through documents relating to women tried by the People's Tribunal in Budapest. Of these women, twenty-one percent were born before 1896, more than half between 1896 and 1914 and the remaining, close to one-fifth, after 1914. The data show that the proportion of middle-class women in this group was significantly higher (20 percent) than in the general population. Most of those accused by the People's Tribunal were middle-aged women who had been educated and socialized under the Horthy regime.

Four-fifths of the women were born in Hungary, while one-fifth were born in areas that Hungary had ceded to other countries in compliance with the Treaty of Trianon (1920). The proportion of women born outside of Hungary was thus significantly higher than in the population as a whole, where the figure was 7 percent. Coming from outside the country's Trianon borders may have had significant bearing on the women's political radicalism. The left-wing's alternative paths to a radical transformation of society, offered by the trade union, social-democratic and Communist movements, were closed to these women, since for them the national question was of central significance. Accordingly, they chose to direct their political activities towards political organizations that offered them social integration and which were responsive to their grievances.

We did not, however, detect a link between the time of the trial and the geographic origin of the accused women: there is no correlation between the year when the women were indicted and their having originated

from inside or outside of Hungary.

An analysis of the data according to the type of settlement from which the accused women originated reveals that women from small towns are over-represented. Ten percent of the women belonged to this category – which is more than one would expect based on the ratio for the general population. Women from cities (*nagyvárosok*) were under-represented by 7 percent and those from small towns (*nagyközségek*) were under-represented by 5 percent.

Because different categories were used, it is not easy to compare the data from the People's Tribunals to that provided by the census. However, a large proportion of the women found in the database belonged to intellectual professions. In 1941, only 6 of percent Hungary's female wage earners worked as public servants or in intellectual professions; the corresponding ratio among the women indicted was at least one in five.[17] This is an important piece of data, because women with good contacts – most of whom were intellectuals – often avoided prosecution. Moreover, the list of women convicted by the People's Tribunals does not include Arrow Cross women who published articles in the Arrow Cross newspapers from the 1930s and onwards. These women fled to the West. Because they were not "important", no attempt was made to have them extradited, and so they were left out of history. (They returned to Hungary only after 1989, and then as anti-Communist fighters.) The same goes for the women's branch of the National Association of Hungarian Physicians (MONE), which played a key role in the intellectual embedding of the far-right movement. It would require a separate study to account for the rightist radicalization of women, particularly the shift by the first generation of women physicians' from espousing equality before the law to endorsing state-run eugenics. From our point of view, however, it is significant that three female physicians – Dr. Erzsébet Madarász, as well as two other members of the National Association of Physicians – came under the scrutiny of the People's Tribunals. By 1971, Erzsébet Madarász, who had headed the women's branch of the National Association of Physicians, was practicing again in Budapest, as a senior physician. Apart from Madarász, no other Arrow Cross female district leaders feature on this list.

When we analyzed data for women indicted for war crimes according to their occupational status, we were surprised to discover that a great proportion of these women were classified as housewives, widows, or aunts (46 percent). This is surprising because there had been no previous institutional mobilization of that social stratum.

As far as occupation is concerned, we found two other relatively striking features. In 1945, 8 percent of the indicted women were concierges or assistant concierges – whereas in the general sample the number was only 5 percent. These women were common criminals who came from a lower middle class or working class background. Their activities had been motivated by a wish to get their hands on Jewish property. The post-war authorities could easily and quickly get their hands on the concierges. Those of the concierges who did not flee were the first to be denounced by the ordinary residents. This meant that they were drawn into the machinery of justice at an early date. In 1950, finally, agricultural laborers were strongly over-represented: 14 percent of those indicted came from this group, while the share of agricultural laborers in the general population was 6 percent. Thus, contrary to popular belief, not only were members of the organization of ethnic Germans living in Hungary, the *Volksbund*, put on trial (most of whom had been expelled from the country) but large numbers of Hungarian peasant farmers as well.

THE "BIG FISH"

The database on "important" female perpetrators held by the State Security Historical Archive, which is the secret service's archival database, is not compatible with the database in the Budapest City Archives. Both databases have logical gaps and logical deficiencies as far as their comparability is concerned. This renders them inaccurate. Even so, the database of the State Security Historical Archive, which is based on documents from the People's Tribunals, does reveal which people the national security organs focused on. It also tells us something about the functions that the women "selected" for surveillance fulfilled in the Arrow Cross movement, as well as why they were convicted and which sentences they received.

The typical war crime committed by women was denunciation (*besúgás* and *feljelentés*). If we include the denunciation of Hungarian soldiers, then the category of "denunciation" accounts for more than 50 percent of the crimes committed by the women.

The data show that more than half of the convicted women received a limited punishment of police supervision or internment. The data also reveal the state security organs' inaccurate record-keeping. According to the records, only one woman was sentenced to death, and yet we know that at least seven women received a death sentence. The exact number of Hungarian women sentenced to death is unknown, but it was far higher than in the Netherlands and Belgium, where the number was one and two, respectively.[18]

OPPORTUNITIES FOR A GENDER-BASED ANALYSIS

The testimonies of women on trial by the People's Tribunals allow us to map out various reasons why Hungarian women joined the extreme right-wing party. We have no other testimonies, so we must be keenly aware of the limitations of these testimonies. When women join political parties, they have a variety of aspirations, ideas, and plans. The party leaders defined women as an element that would advance their own plans for social changes. These women defined their own spheres of action differently, and they also had alternative assessments of their potential spheres of action.

A methodical analysis of the confessions and testimonies made at the People's Tribunals is difficult because the accused adjusted their statements to conform to expectations and to gain strategic advantages. No normal person incriminates him- or herself willingly. Conversely, many are prepared to confess to their crimes when tried in a court of law. When defendants testify in court, they must select the cultural repertoire that will assist them in presenting whatever they have to say to their best advantage. In what follows, we shall analyze the various factors that influence the selection of this cultural repertoire. This will help clarify the process by which the accused formulate statements about themselves and seek to justify their own decisions and actions by referring to special circumstances – thus constructing an image of themselves in a process that is not without risks.

In the postwar period, which gave rise to extreme power relations, the stories of those who had survived the Shoah were heard by nobody.[19] A dismissive audience silenced the narration. There was no rhetorical space for a narrative of Jewish identity, as the dominant Communist ideology was hostile to the Jewish community as a religious group, for ideological reasons, and to Zionism, for political reasons, as it threatened the assimilation project.[20]

This phenomenon makes itself felt in language – because language provides the tools with which a narrator tells his or her story.[21] The authoritarian states were based on control; they totally dominated the linguistic space that was available for the expression of thoughts. Meanwhile, the various groups created special meanings in order to establish an identity by invoking epistemological space. If we speak of a mediated past rather than an immediate past, we come close to resolving the dilemma of how to view these sources. The sphere of such mediation was the family. The family made up a space that was closed to state intervention and direct regulatory power. Identity was established within the family, with a dividing line drawn between "us" and "them" – between those Hungarians who supported the Soviets and those who opposed them. The Hungarians who defined themselves as "non-Communists" – and non-Communism was the cornerstone of the self-definition of anyone involved in crime or criminal activities committed during the years of Soviet occupation – were those Hungarians who saw themselves as victims of Communism. They developed a language of the victim, a counter-discourse, which would allow them to tell their stories in a political discourse dominated by Communism. After 1945, the language of "Communist crimes" became the language of the minority discourse – which was developed against the majority's suppression, and which became a departure point for establishing a self-identity.[22] Thus, those female defendants whose "cultural repertoire", to use Michele Lamont's expression, accorded with the anticipated mode of remembering, received relatively light sentences. They were handled more leniently than were men who committed the same offense. Here, gender strategies worked to the advantage of women: women received light sentences as compared to males who had committed the very same crime. The "master frame" of becoming a victim created an opportunity for improvisation. The definition of autobiographical remembering as "an improvisational activity that forms emergent selves which give us a sense of needed comfort and a culturally valued sense of personal coherence over time" is called into question by the traumatic events of the 20th century and particularly by the Shoah, which, as Craig Barclay has shown, removed any possibility of "metaphoric mapping". [23]

Remembering occurs in a mythical way, establishing a more or less similar self-representation which is similar to the others. If, as Roland Barthes claims, a

text is a security system for the ego, then creating a life story provides the narrator with illusory or imaginary control not only over the narrative but also over life itself.[24] This is the control that the women who stood accused at the People's Tribunals believed that they possessed. The defendants thus tried to construct a coherent self-representation, mindful of the fact that a single error would lead to their imprisonment for years. In the courtroom, the ability to give a perfect theater performance became a matter of life or death.

THE HISTORY OF NON-ACKNOWLEDGED ACTORS IN SOCIETY

A gender-sensitive analysis of political and social discourse is made particularly difficult by the fact that the identity-shaping power of the discourses establishes homogenous and exclusive units. In times of war, women are portrayed as loyal mothers and citizens who send their sons to war – or as the reverse, collaborators who are a threat to the soldiers' morals. The question is: where do we find subjectivity in these personal narratives? As far as sources related to criminal cases are concerned, we face particular difficulties, for if we regard them as "legends" – to use Paul Thompson's expression – then they are of a fixed structure and conform to the socially accepted system. The court creates a lineal, single-threaded, exclusive narrative regime, and the accused has to find his or her place within this regime. In this situation, female defendants were faced with dual discrimination.

Feminist researchers are sensitive to the development of various power hierarchies and appreciate the consequences of such hierarchies.[25] Concerning the court trial records, power relations among the various actors differ significantly – not merely as a result of the hierarchy and politics of the legal system itself, but also because of differences between defendants and plaintiffs in terms of social status and gender and the degree of their embeddedness in various social networks. The more embedded a defendant was (with corresponding access to information and assistance), the easier she found it to manipulate the court, and thus, often, secure an acquittal.

The story is shaped by the defendant's confession or testimony and is based on her responses to questions. At the People's Tribunals, the questions were posed by men, for women were not employed as lawyers, judges or public prosecutors. All the court officials were men; not until 1945 were women allowed to pursue a legal career. The court's gender policy is obvious, judging from the data. Women defendants who portrayed themselves as weak and powerless victims who had submissively complied with the suggestions and initiatives of men received lighter sentences. The stories of the female accused are "silent", because these women managed, while in the courtroom, to exploit "legends", thus avoiding a search for individual expressions, meanings, and thoughts. The end result was that they were not required to express themselves as individuals. The diversity of the legends, and the many different ways in which they could be used, provided many of the women with a means to obtain lighter sentencing. On the other hand, stories of an individual nature did not accord with the court's cognitive sample. Accordingly, politically active women received harsher sentences. A gender-based analysis may, thus, contribute to a better understanding of the complex legacy of the People's Tribunals and the effect of this legacy on contemporary Hungarian society. It may help us understand why a former officer and interrogator of the State Protection Authority cannot recall a single Arrow Cross woman.

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Post-transition financial crisis: What have we learned?

In the Baltic Sea region, the financial markets have been held up as stellar examples of successful regional "integration". The economies of the region have been more closely interlinked, in particular through direct investments of large Swedish banks in the Baltic States. As was to be expected, however, the global crisis, which began in the United States, soon exerted regional impact around the Baltic Sea.

When, in 1989, the "Iron Curtain" that had divided Europe for almost half a century disappeared, a period of rapid and revolutionary changes began in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They changed from centrally planned economies adhering to the Soviet five-year-model to market economies, adhering to the Western model. They applied for membership in the EU. In May 2004, after years of intensive adaptation processes, the Baltic States, together with seven other countries, became members. Over a period of ten years, they had been "transformed".

This radical transformation was not the result of a natural development, nor did it take place on the countries' own initiative. On the contrary, international organizations and the old Western countries played an active role in the transformation of these new countries. Administrative structures and regulations were introduced, motivated by a dream of EU membership and massive economic support from the outside. International "monitoring" was routine. A large number of organizations scrutinized the countries' performances in the areas that were considered important to their success as EU members.

The financial markets were prioritized: without functioning finances, no sound nation-building. At an early stage, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank engaged themselves in Eastern Europe, offering expertise and resources, loans and stabilization packages.

The primary task of financial markets is to effectively supply the economy with capital. Since financial markets are essential to a country's economy, they are also safeguarded by regulative measures. To be exact, politicians and experts devote more time to securing the functioning of the financial market through regulation (re- and deregulations are also regulations) than they do to securing the functioning of any other market. In spite of this, financial markets have a tendency to do the opposite: to crash.

The financial crisis of 2008–2009 has been described as the most serious to date. Many predict or hope that this crisis will lead to a paradigm shift. Depending on whom one speaks to, the scapegoats vary: faulty incentive structures in the shape of excessive bonuses, the rating companies' naive risk evaluations, the U.S. budget deficit (overextended credit), inadequate regulation, and the complexity of the financial system are some of the reasons cited for the financial crisis. No matter who or what is singled out as the reason, most people seem to agree on one point: *greater transparency* in the financial system may be a solution. In response to the crisis, financial inspection will be established at the EU level. But what do researchers have to say about this?

Financial economics may be described as a field in which knowledge is accumulated *for* the financial markets rather than *about* the financial markets. As a research field, financial economics has played a performative role: research on finance has affected – and has been intended to affect – its object of study. Literature in the field is prescriptive; it is meant to teach people how to behave in the financial market, that is, as long as it functions as it is supposed to. There has, however, been a reaction against this.

Within, for example, business administration studies and economic anthropology, alternative views and understandings of and approaches to the financial market have been advanced which stand in opposition to the economists' rational models. Their studies emphasize the "human" behind the "finance" by, for example, studying stockbrokers in action on the trade floor. The financial market is seen as a part of society which the economic paradigm has mystified and technified. But even financial markets consist of people who think, feel and create meaning, even if they do so within a special environment and under special circumstances. Many critical studies focus on the individual rather than on the organization, and on specific parts of the market or market actors. Even within this research tradition, however, the finance market is approached *sui generis* – that is, viewed as its own particular kind of entity.

Thus, research on the financial markets often focuses on models constructed by economists or on the people on "the floor". Less attention is paid to the fact that the financial market, like any other market, is *organized*. It consists of organizations and organizing activities. One of these activities consists in scrutinizing other actors in the market, and some organizations are dedicated to doing this; others are subjected to scrutiny, and still others both engage in and are subjected to scrutiny: banks scrutinize businesses, while their own activities are being monitored by, e.g., the Financial Supervisory Authority. By taking an organizational perspective, we can ask questions about what greater transparency and enhanced scrutiny means in practice.

An on-going research project which focuses on scrutinizing and organization processes in the Baltic Sea region – with particular focus on the financial markets – will study some of the financial market's organizations and their environment. The purpose of the research project is, among other things, to obtain an understanding of regionalization's economic (or financial) practice.[1] Here, we will focus on the organizational level. How does the scrutinizing process affect the organization of the market? How do growing demands for "transparency" really affect financial praxis? Can risk models and portfolio theories developed within the economic financial paradigm become transparent and open to research? The project is conducted, in part, by Södertörn University, but also forms part of a larger research program located at SCORE (Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research), a center for the study of how markets are organized.[2] The project has its starting point in, among other things, the transformational processes in the Baltic nations.

For it may be time to review the years of shock therapy and rapid change. Was it realistic to demand that the "new" Eastern European countries create the same kind of economies that it took Sweden and other Western countries 200 years to build – in just over a decade? For this was exactly what was done: a market economy with a "functioning financial market" was established in record time.

This was demanded of those who wanted to become members of EU. The manner in which a "functioning market economy" was to be created was put in print by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): the fundamental principles were privatization, liberalization, and stabilization. Counseling and benchmarking flourished. A graded scale was introduced on which the lowest digit (1) was equivalent to a planned economy and the highest (4+) to a market economy. EBRD's "Transition Reports" made it possible to follow the development of, for example, Latvia, by means of indicators that could be related to the fundamental principles of a market economy, as defined by EBRD. As the years went by, more and more countries that had started out with 2's or 3's were awarded 4's. In 2003–2004, when I was researching the international organizations' scrutiny of the Baltic States' transformation, EBRD began to prepare for the states' "graduation" – that is, for the time when the countries were to be considered full-fledged market economies and investments were to be phased out. The Baltic States' graduation was scheduled for 2010.

What choices were there after the fall of the Wall? Could anything have been done differently? The old Europe and its organizations did what they thought best, perhaps against their better judgment, to help the new Europe on its feet. The belief that "if you do what we do, then everything will be alright – then you become just as modern, European and successful as we" was strong during the decade during which the transformation and the adaptation



The afterbirth of shock therapy: to regress several developmental stages!



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to EU took place. But what did the countries adapt to and what have been the consequences? By setting measurable objectives and constructing indicators that provided readings of the progress made, a myth of progress was created in these countries. But what happened to the awareness of local and historic contexts? Was it realistic to seek to reproduce Sweden's and other countries' long development narrative, in a rapid-action version?

Perhaps we are now prepared to learn something from history, at least when we face future transformations. Rather than letting ourselves be dazzled by the objective and clear light shed by numbers, we should probably – today, more than ever – reflect on the local and historic contexts in which such transformations take place. We can, also, only hope that the old Europe will begin to reach some insights about itself by studying how its own models function in the new Europe, which in some cases may even have more "success". It is in the encounter with others that one sees oneself – a saying that ought to be still more relevant in a context where one has developed models designed according to one's own development. What happens when our model of progress is applied in a new context? Was it really possible to copy Sweden's, and other countries', long story of development in a speeded-up version?

So far, the answer has been yes. The economic crises in the Baltic States may perhaps lead to a revision of this answer. Perhaps these and other countries have started to take new, uncharted paths – paths perhaps not even chartable, or measurable? One step in the right direction would be to expose the financial world's knowledge-monopoly to outside competition, and to prepare for a broader, social science oriented research agenda. By basing our research on organizational theory (as well as on other scientific paradigms), we can take new types of cross-sectional views of the financial markets' complex reality. For it has, now, become clearer than ever that "finance" is part of our society. It is, therefore, high time that we enter more deeply into the study of the financial markets, making use of the same kind of tools that we employ when we study the organization of the rest of society. ■

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Communities of memory. The dethronement of historians

The European Union is an elite project encumbered by a democracy deficit. Contributing to the Union's uphill climb is a history deficit. Attempts to write an inclusive and legitimizing European history have not yielded particularly significant results. The Greeks do not want to share a history they regard as theirs alone, and, as a set of fundamental grounding values, the Christian heritage is perceived as problematic in a union that seeks to be inclusive. What a European "we" has looked like in different periods both *can* be discussed and *should* be discussed. For centuries, Europeans have united primarily in order to kill one another on the open fields of the continent. The EU is a peace project, and this dimension of European integration is something for which we should be grateful, and which we should defend.

In the EU interpretation of history, World War II and, in particular, the Holocaust, play a prominent role. In the absence of something better, the desired state of affairs was created as a negation of the non-desired state of affairs. In Sweden, the Holocaust has received particular emphasis in school instruction. The Living History Forum (Swedish name: *Forum för levande historia*) functions as a special Swedish authority with "the mandate to – in light of the Holocaust – work on issues concerning tolerance, democracy, and human rights". On this point, the Swedes seem to be more obedient Europeans than the Finns, who continue to place a high priority on the story of the creation of their own nation, its independence, and its heroic struggle for existence.

Some time ago I happened to come across a somewhat unusual Swedish doctoral dissertation in history, called *Den försvunna historien* [The History That Has Vanished], written by Tomas Sniegon, a historian at Lund. It stands out because, unlike most dissertations in history in Sweden, it does not deal with Swedish history. That dissertations in history written at Swedish seats of learning tend to focus on Swedish history, especially the history that has taken place within the currently existing borders, is not news. But it is a trend that has strengthened. These days, sure bets are the rule in postgraduate education. Safe and predictable topics close to home ensure quick and easy matriculation, good statistics on graduates, and money in the bank. In Sweden, as in other European countries, the Bologna Process, which is informed by the goals of efficiency, is implemented at the expense of intellectual curiosity and scientific creativity.

Sniegon has chosen to grapple with the Holocaust in the Czech and Slovakian culture of history. Even though as many as 270,000 Czechoslovakian Jews and a large number of the country's Roma were victims of the Nazi genocide, the Holocaust has had a very marginal role in the culture of history of the two countries that were formed, in 1992, when Czechoslovakia was split. By joining the EU, the need arose for an overhaul of the national image of the recent past. Sniegon is able to show how the culture of history in these countries has been resistant to the attempts at change pushed by politicians.

A parallel can be drawn here to Finland during the Cold War. As a component of the work towards mutual understanding and friendship with the Soviet Union, the political elite, headed by Urho Kekkonen, introduced a new version of the story of the Winter War and the Continuation War (1939-1940 and 1941-1944), which was characterized by an understanding of the views of the former enemy – also the victorious force. But the account that was politically correct during the Cold War never became the account that was believed by the people. And after the fall of the Soviet Union, the veterans' generation was able to come forward and tell The Truth without opposition.

The dissertation on Czech and Slovakian culture of history is a good example of the great interest that historians and other humanists are now devoting to the issues of the culture of history and the use of history. This new interest in how people relate to the past, and therewith, to the present and the future, is a welcome development. At the same time, it can be seen as an expression of a certain disorientation in the historians' guild. When many historians are no longer convinced that statements about the conditions and processes in the past are meaningful, people's perceptions of history appear as a more fruitful field of research.

Researchers speak and write about people's historical awareness, which is manifest in a culture of history. More concretely, such a culture of history comes into being via the use of history. The use of history is yet another fundamental concept in this context. The interest in the culture of history has taught historians a bit about themselves. They are no longer what they perhaps once were, the priesthood of a nation-state with the preferential right of interpretation. Historical consciousness is not shaped primarily by historians or in school instruction, but in discussions with one's family, or through popular culture such as film. Studies indicate that this is indeed precisely how it is, and they remind the historian with uncomfortable clarity of the replaceability of their craft. Most of the societies of which historians are aware have in fact survived perfectly well without professional historians.

In Danish research, I have seen the notion of memory communities (*erindringsfaelleskaber*), which I think is useful. Such a community can be very tight and stable. At times, this kind of community acquires the less attractive features of sectarianism. The billowing discussion on coastal place names and the origin of the Swedish people that has been conducted in Swedish in Finland has made me realize that this may indeed be the case – for there has been a discussion surrounding these issues for quite some time between academics, and others interested in history, that flares up at times, but never dies out completely.

Interpretations that highlight the Finnish element contrast or infringe upon others that emphasize the Swedish or German elements in place names. Swedish colonization is set against the continuity of settlement. In the community of amateur researchers, one camp has come to an agreement on the nature of place names and origins. Anything that indicates something different is thrust aside. The veracity of their own interpretation is enhanced by tirelessly repeating the same arguments. The community becomes enclosed in a mental coating of Teflon, and academics who have devoted their life's work to a particular problem, and have acquired the special knowledge of the methodology that the problem requires, are told that they should go home and read up on the matter a bit more before trying again.

To be sure, self-satisfied, mutually reinforcing communities can be found in groups of researchers as well. But, thankfully, such tendencies are offset by other mechanisms within the academic world. Among such mechanisms can be found what I would like to call the desirable academic patricide. In seminar rooms, we cannot do without a young generation who – metaphorically speaking – is sharpening its knives. Preferably, the researchers will, on the basis of their experience, show the whippersnappers how the grindstone shall be drawn so that the edge will be sharp and the thrust will penetrate deeply. All researchers who have had long careers should take themselves sufficiently seriously, and achieve so much in their research, that they are deemed worthy of a decisive dethronement. ×

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The degree of mental resistance. In China, capitalism has destroyed more monuments than the Cultural Revolution. (The Guardian, 2009-12-15.)

Sport. The return of enchantment to Western society

Rune Slagstad (Sporten): En idé-historisk studie

[(Sport): A Study in the History of Ideas] Oslo: Pax Förlag 2008. 849 pages.

IN EVERYDAY ENGLISH, television is just that. This Greek/Latin word is used in many languages for the same concept. In Norwegian, the concept is conveyed by the word *fjernsyn*. For Norwegians – and for speakers of the other Scandinavian languages – the literal meaning is preserved and easily understood. The same is true for German speakers. In German, television is called *Fernsehen*. The word means "to look far away". The Norwegian social scientist Rune Slagstad notes that the word *fjernsyn* can be used for denoting a concept other than "television". This observation lies at the very heart of Slagstad's analysis of sport as history, social phenomenon and aesthetics.

Slagstad's book covers a period of two hundred years. To him, in the beginning there was man and nature, the experience and conquest of nature. The first of the book's nine chapters can be characterized as archaeology of sport. It is an excavation of the remnants of activities that were subsequently classified as the beginnings of sport as we know it today. This introductory chapter is devoted to the discovery of the world of mountains in a state that was becoming a nation in its own right: post-1814 Norway. The chapter is called "The cartographers and their landscape". The author quotes the geologist Theodor Kjerulf who, in 1865, argued that geology would become the most popular science: "Because it reveals the picture of the past it cannot avoid directing the thought towards the future. Geology refers continuously to the two televisions [*Fjernsyn*], the beginning and the end of time." (p. 37) According to Slagstad, the quest for exact knowledge of nature and for the experience of nature's sublime beauty lay at the heart of sport as we know it. Not for nothing did this specific activity, which was neither work nor idleness, start at the crossroads of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, when the rationalist spirit coalesced with emotional expressiveness and inspired a specific kind of leisure which can be labeled purposeful behavior.

IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY, sport was a matter of covering distances in nature, in the forests, along the rivers and over the mountains, hunting, fishing and reaching for the mountain tops. It was not necessarily a competition between individuals (or teams). However, contemporary sport is about competition between individuals and teams, even between "nations". Thanks to television, it has become an all-encompassing feature of contemporary society. Slagstad concludes that "geology was the science of television [*fjernsyn*]. However, when television a hundred years later – than 1865 – became a medium that organized social life, it was without this wide historical horizon – 'the beginning and end of time'; television became, on the contrary, the medium of the present – offering a view of what is distant in space rather than in time". (p. 37)

The title of Slagstad's work is put in parantheses. The author does not tell us why. A Norwegian critic of the book, Gerd von der Lippe, has suggested that it is because the book lacks a gender perspective.[1] It does, but the research project has nothing to do with gender issues. It is not even primarily a book on sport. A more likely explanation for the bracketing is that Slagstad's macro-essay is a history of the modern project, in which sport functions merely as a structuring line, an agency that generates the plot.

(Sporten) is not a hyphenated history, but a total history. Slagstad's work is a narration about, on the one hand, the creation of Norway and, on the other, Norway as a focal point for trends in global history. The author makes good use of a second ambiguity (in addition to *fjernsyn*) in the Norwegian language. In Norwegian, the English word "sport" is used to denote physical activity as competition. The book analyzes the emergence of contemporary sport with the construction of the modern Olympic Games as a crucial factor. However, sport in the English

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meaning of the word does not exhaust the theme of Slagstad's book. His story has a second core concept, which is conveyed by the Norwegian "idrett". This concept denotes being out in the wilderness trekking, fishing, and hunting. It connotes "health", both physical and mental, fitness and wellbeing, even harmony. Drawing on a basic dichotomy in Slagstad's tale, one can say that "sport" is an outcome of the Enlightenment and "idrett" of Romanticism. The latter dimension also concerns sport as aesthetics and as expressiveness.

IN COMPETITIVE SPORT, the individual appears in a context that includes other individuals and is measured against them; but in the basically non-competitive "idrett", the point is that the individual becomes part of nature or the universe. It is a fine point that the audience of the spectacles of 20th century and contemporary sporting events, of the competitions, belong to the emotional, romanticist side: the precise point is, in Slagstad's view, that *fjernsyn*, which was once experienced as relating to time and eternity, has undergone a transmutation and now refers to place and the present moment. The audience gets its emotional kick through "being there now", even when the competition takes place far away, on the other side of the globe.

Slagstad tells the well-known story of *idrett* as an aristocratic pass-time – although the pioneering amateurs of open-air, non-competitive sports such as mountaineering and tracking were often, and certainly in the Norwegian case, "aristocrats" in spirit alone, scholars, and scientists. These did not belong to the noble estate. Slagstad also treads on a beaten track when he characterizes sport as competition, as the art of the self-assertive, rising bourgeoisie. Slagstad draws on this dichotomy between leisure and competitive activities when he turns to the third social class which emerged as a crucial political force in the course of the early 20th century, the workers, and their relation to sport.

It so happened that Norway, less than half a century after it had become a fully sovereign state (this happened in 1905, although nation-building took off after separation from Denmark in 1814), hosted the sixth Winter Olympic Games. In the inter-war period, Norway experienced, as did other European states – with Finland as a clear example – a conflict between bourgeois and working-class sport. In 1952, however, when the Games were held in Oslo, the split had to be overcome in the sign of the decidedly non-political Olympic spirit.

IN NORWAY, ROLF HOFMO was the chief ideologist "in the social democratic modernizing movement and its utilitarian physiological culture" (p. 198). The focus was on upbringing and hygiene. In this context, sport symbolized a new synthesis of social welfare and culture: the welfare culture. According to Slagstad, the sculptures by Gustav Vigeland in Frogner Park in Oslo, "the ultimate park of corporal culture", is the visual expression of this ideology. However, ironically, Hofmo did not realize that Vigeland had succeeded in creating a showcase for "the vitalist corporal culture which had become the hegemonic trade mark of the nation". Slagstad demonstrates, and this is very important, that the connection between aesthetics and ideology is arbitrary and lies in the eye of the beholder. The naked men, women and children of Vigeland's "vitalist" sculptures were not meant to celebrate Fascist or Nazi ideals – Hofmo indicated that such an association was near at hand – but, on the contrary, to highlight human freedom and joyfulness. And in spite of Hofmo's resistance, the Norwegian authorities used the Vigeland's sculptures as an advertisement for Oslo in the campaign for the Olympic Games.

Thanks to his position as a prominent social-democratic politician and a leading sports ideologist, Hofmo played a central role both in Oslo's lobbying to

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Continued. Sport

get the Olympic Games and in their organization. His idea was that the Games would highlight Norwegian society as a sports society where the masses took active part by viewing the skiing competitions as they took place out in nature. Hofmo was a national strategist. Slagstad views him as an "organic intellectual", as Antonio Gramsci defines the term. He saw in sport (*idrett*) a means of strengthening the working class and making it the vital core of Norwegian society. However, when the Games took place, Hofmo, who had struggled against what he regarded as "the sport idiocy", was pushed to the side-lines and the competition atmosphere prevailed. This happened in 1952, at the zenith of the welfare policy project, and Slagstad argues that the staging of the Oslo Games heralded a new era: "This certainly signified that 'the sport idiocy', contrary to Hofmo's beliefs, would not gradually disappear during social democratic modernity and its utilitarian sport. Sport without any sense has become the dominating culture in the post-modern society, where social democracy has lost its leading position." (p. 292)

Slagstad's book is very Norwegian. It is, however, also a global history of Western civilization as mirrored and embodied in different kinds of sport. The author of *(Sporten)* argues that the rise of sport has been intimately connected with modernist aesthetics. In the early 20th century, painting and philosophy transgressed the boundaries between art and life, and at the end of the century, post-modernism transgressed the boundary between high culture and mass entertainment. The beginning of the process is expressed in Edvard Munch's portrait of Friedrich Nietzsche (1906, after the death of the philosopher). The painting, which is strikingly reminiscent of Munch's famous "The Scream", is expressive and embarrassing. The viewer knows that the subject of the painting is considered to have been insane: for Slagstad it bears witness to the fact that, at the end to the 20th century, Nietzsche's philosophy had become the order of the day: "sport without sense is post-nihilistic illusionism."

FOR SLAGSTAD, SPORT IS A CENTRAL societal phenomenon in secularized Western society – as it is in the westernized rest of the world, one may add. If we read the bracketing of the word "sport" as indicating that it is a provisional title that may be deleted, we get the key to understanding what the book is all about. It is about the gradual return of enchantment to Western society. Like many before him, Slagstad notes the pseudo-religious arguments behind the Olympic idea of Baron de Coubertin and the outright religious *mis-en-scéne* of the Olympic Games in Berlin 1936, with Leni Riefenstahl as the director.

However, the author goes far beyond merely recording the obvious. Analyzing the spread of professionalism, from its beginnings in British soccer football in the late 19th century to its encompassing of every sport imaginable one century later, he is able to demonstrate that, as was the case in Antiquity, from the courses in Delphi and Athens to the Coliseum in Rome, the Olympic Games once again mark the time. Today the Games unite all mankind in the same manner as they united the Greeks and the Romans two millennia earlier.

SLAGSTAD'S HISTORY of the modern world as seen through a Norwegian lens does tell us a lot about sport in the proper sense of the word. An understanding of sport as a model for society gives one an understanding of the modern project as a fusion of rationality and emotion, of analysis and expressiveness. Postmodernism is characterized by sport without sense in a culture saturated with kitsch.

As a book, *(Sporten)* is a collection of essays, each of which offers a new angle on the theme. After the introductory chapter on the birth of modernity as a fusion between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, the following chapters treat the northern playground/English sport; Nordmarka (north of Oslo) as a Norwegian realm of memory centered around sport; utilitarian notions of sport (*idrett*); the corporal aesthetics in the art of Edvard Munch; the stadium as a device for making sport a sacrum (a lengthy analysis of Riefenstahl and the Olympia Stadium in Berlin is included): sport as a spectacle (television broadcasts the Tour de France and the Olympic torch relays night and day), sport without sense (kitsch and emotions); and the maturing of contemporary event society with sport taking center stage.

Precisely because Slagstad's book is not a history of sport, it is a very good read on the significance of sport in the making of Norway and in the shaping of the contemporary world.

kristian gerner

1 Gerd von der Lippe, "Om menn og baller. Sport for litteraturidioter" [About Men and Balls: Sport for Literature Idiots], *idrottsforum.org/feature*, 2009-09-02.

Dissertation review. Making culture governable

Egle Rindzeviciute
Constructing Soviet Cultural Policy: Cybernetics and Governance in Lithuania after World War II

Linköping 2008 (Linköping Studies in Arts and Science 437. Theme Q, Culture Studies, Linköping University, Department for Studies of Social Change and Culture) 277 pages.

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LIFE BEHIND THE IRON Curtain is known mostly through stories of individual suffering and macro pictures of politics and economy. Management practices in the centralized systems are rarely the focus of research. Egle Rindzeviciute's dissertation helps fill this gap, while confirming an observation made by Hungarian-Swedish economic historian György Péteri: the curtain was made not of iron but of nylon – impenetrable but transparent. Similar processes occurred on both sides of the curtain, a result not of "convergence", but of local translations of translocal trends.

RINDZEVICIUTE CHOSE a fascinating subject: central management of the cultural sector in Lithuania after World War II. A pilot study, inspired by her personal experience as an art historian and curator in post-1989 Lithuania, moved her onto the path of historical investigation, and on the traces of a "cultural policy" that was allegedly a cornerstone of management practices in the field of culture. Her investigation went back in time until it reached the event that was to become the beginning of the story: the 1948 publication of *Cybernetics* by Norbert Wiener, a U.S. scientist of Russian-Jewish origin.

WHAT POSSIBLE IMPORTANCE could a book published in the U.S. have had for Lithuanian cultural policies? The chain of associations is complicated. The first connection is that between Lithuania and the Soviet Union. As this connection tightened (a euphemism for annexation), Lithuanian cultural policy came to adhere more and more closely to the Soviet model. The second, more surprising, connection is between the Soviet model and cybernetics. As a capitalist product, cybernetics was banned in the Soviet Union immediately after its creation. After Stalin's death in 1953 and Nikita Khrushchev's official repudiation of Stalinism at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, however, cybernetics was rehabilitated. Indeed, it was promoted to the status of being the science of control, much as the creators of cybernetics themselves, and especially the Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950), had claimed it to be. In 1961, Wiener's article "Science and Society" was published in the most influential Soviet journal, *Voprosy Filosofii*. It was accompanied by an ap-

propriate Marxist commentary, but it was there.

To give a rough summary of the idea behind cybernetics: If one is to gain control of anything – from machines to spheres of collective life – one needs to design a control system that imitates those already designed by nature in plants and animals. "Cultural policy" is then one part of such a control system, the part that covers the domain of culture – the system's "brain", so to speak.

Applying Foucauldian "archeology", Rindzeviciute attempted a reconstruction of the cultural policies in the years 1960–1990 from traces discernible in various inscribed discourses from the period and in interviews with living witnesses. She begins with a three-part sketch of the wider historical background. First comes an account of independent Lithuania's brief history (1918–1940) and cultural policies, insofar as it had any such policies. This is followed by a description of the war years, which ends with Lithuania's annexation by the Soviet Union. The second part is a history of cultural policies in the Soviet Union; the third is a historical account of how cybernetics was translated first into a Soviet and second into a Lithuanian context. These parts of the dissertation in themselves constitute a significant contribution to knowledge, as they bring to light little-known developments.

How can a general theory of control be applied to the domain of culture? By translating culture into a part of the economy, and more specifically, by defining it as part of the service sector. The projection of a materialist ideology onto cybernetics made it possible first to interpret "culture" as a response to certain "needs of the people"; second, to calculate both the needs and the costs of satisfying them; and third, to program these values into a planning and control system (rather than leaving them open to such dangerous phenomena as "supply" and "demand").

What follows is an analysis of cultural policies in Lithuania as reflected in the public (not merely official) discourse over three decades. First, 1960–1970, when the "scientific-technical revolution" was gathering impetus in the entire Soviet Union; then 1970–1980, when this "revolution" ruled and, paradoxically, revealed its weaknesses; and, finally, 1980–1990, when doubts about "calculable culture" grew in strength.

In conclusion, Rindzeviciute stated that

> **cybernetics and systems theory "made culture governable" in the Lithuanian SSR by providing the conceptual tools to envision the cultural sector as complex and relational (connected to the economic as well as to the natural environment). Rooted in Einstein's relativity theory, the system-cybernetic approach made it possible to formalize the development of culture, which was otherwise perceived as intrinsically uncertain. In the age of cybernetic control, one could govern culture by means of predictive calculations: predictions of the cultural sector's future development could be made, based on statistical information about its past behavior.** (p. 248)

RINDZEVICIUTE DISSERTATION offers far more food for thought than would a mere history of a selected time-period of a small European country. It tells the story of cybernetics' rise and fall as a tool for controlling culture. This story has not yet come to an end, however. It continues, although some of the protagonists have changed. While the "calculability of culture" was repudiated and almost ridiculed in Lithuania, the idea seems to have survived very well elsewhere. Also, the sacred divisions between "nature" and "culture" and between "culture", "economy", and "politics", which the Soviet ideologues tried to abolish (justly, in my opinion), live on and thrive. Furthermore, the assumption that everything is calculable (Power, 1997) has returned in full force under the label "transparency through accountability" – currently a scourge of the universities. Perhaps the dream of a universal control system is global and eternal, and the only thing that varies is the means by which it is to be achieved?

barbara czarniawska

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Peasants in a socialist society. A tribute to Viktor Danilov

Lennart Samuelson (ed.)
Bönder och bolsjeviker: Den ryska landsbygdens historia 1902—1939

[Peasants and Bolsheviks: The History of the Russian Countryside 1902—1939]
The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI) 2007. 271 pages.

JOHAN ELLEND
Holds a Ph.D. in history. Researcher at the Swedish Institute for Contemporary History (Södertörn University). His doctoral thesis was about agrarianism and alternative modernities in Estonia around the year 1900. One focal point in his present research is political populism in the Baltic Sea area.

MOST OF US PROBABLY associate the social and economic aftermath of the great October Revolution primarily with the drive to industrialize and modernize Soviet society. But the majority of the Soviet population, both before and for some time after World War II, lived in the countryside and made its living in agriculture. For the socialist party machine and state administration, this part of the population proved very problematic. How might the peasants, who had, to be sure, suffered greatly under the old regime, be persuaded to accept the city-oriented social vision that the revolution represented; how could they be induced to feel solidarity with, or even become part of, the working class? At the same time, it was vital that the rural sector become a central concern if the pieces of the modernization puzzle were to fall into place. Without an agricultural sector to feed the working class, industry could not be developed, while intolerable conditions within the sector might lead to spontaneous urbanization and migration and thus threaten the whole project.

THIS DILEMMA PROVIDES the backbone of the anthology edited by Lennart Samuelson. The anthology's thirteen academic essays, for the most part written by contemporary Russian researchers, discuss such themes as the Russian peasant revolts that predated the October Revolution, the preconditions for the long-term economic planning of the 1920s, the collectivization of agriculture and the elimination of the kulaks, the 1932-1933 famines in the Russian and Ukrainian countryside, and everyday life in southern Ural. Thus, there is space for approaches ranging from the organizational macro-perspective, a theme that often recurs in contemporary Russian research on the Stalin era, to descriptions of everyday life conditions. The anthology uses the series of archival sources on early Soviet history that have been released and published after the *glasnost* era. These include rich material on agrarian society at the time of collectivization. Russian research in this field is rarely noticed outside the country's borders, however – except when it becomes the subject of political controversies. This book is a welcome resource for those who speak one of the Scandinavian languages but who have

Continued. Peasants in a socialist society

no Russian. Furthermore, it honors the work done by recently deceased Russian historian Viktor Danilov, who threw light on the darkest sides of Soviet and Russian contemporary history and played a major role in securing the publication of sources on the 1930s collectivization drive. The anthology's contents provide a good picture of the current state of Russian research.

IGOR NARSKIJ'S "Victors and Losers in Ural's Countryside 1917-1922" is among the anthology's outstanding contributions. The article discusses conditions in the countryside during the critical post-revolution years, describing how the peasantry was transformed from enthusiastic support troops rallying behind the revolution to a starving mass entirely focused on survival. Prior to the revolution, the Ural peasantry had been a relatively prosperous and egalitarian group of independent farmers, well able to exploit Russia's pre-revolutionary economic upturn and accustomed to handling its own affairs. During the Civil War, neither of the contending parties could manage without the peasantry's support. Nor, however, could they manage without arbitrary confiscations. At the same time, the war disrupted agricultural work, as seed corn was commandeered and fields flattened by cavalry. Neither of the warring parties took the peasants' problems seriously, nor saw the need for a long-term perspective on the agricultural question. The peasants' own survival strategy was spontaneously to redistribute land, according to their own norms; collectively to resist directives issued by the state or by either combatant; and to increase their own consumption. By 1922, the famine had reached such proportions that neither the peasants nor the state could cope with the situation without outside help. Starvation finally forced the peasants to abandon resistance and surrender unconditionally to the state. It is hardly surprising that the planning of agricultural policy and the program for peasant welfare both failed.

In her contribution to the anthology, Jelena Tiurina shows that not only was there a lack of tested instruments for long-term planning, but that the planners themselves were, often, treated with as much callousness as were the peasants. Narskij's and Tiurina's articles are important contributions. Both write on conditions within agricultural society during the revolution and the first years of the Soviet era, a subject that has often taken second place to studies of the collectivizations of the 1930s. But as a clear picture of the early years emerges, so does a clear pattern of the state's often ruthless treatment of the peasantry. In an article based on economic documents and reports on conditions in the countryside, Tatiana Sorokina highlights the aimlessness and incompetence that characterized the collectivization drive. The peasants' ignorance and lack of genuine engagement resulted in the misuse and abuse of tools and communal property, as well as diminishing yields. The effects on livestock were most severe, as the peasants long fought to keep their animals separate from communal possessions. This led to an extensive slaughter of livestock and work-animals. Jevgenia Malysjeva's prize-winning article on everyday life in southern Ural during the 1920s and 1930s is a colorful contribution to the anthology. Her work is based on minutes from the Communist Party's purges and on eye-witness accounts – sources that, as it turns out, give an abundance of information on everyday life, crime, morals, and culture in the countryside.

ONE OF THE ANTHOLOGY'S MORE interesting essays is concerned with the Red Army's attitude to and participation in the collectivization drive of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Clearly the army had to be involved in processes taking place in the society around it. To a large extent, the army consisted of peasant youths whose attitudes were all-important to the army's morale and to the manner in which the army, as a social organization, was drawn into the transformation of the countryside. Accordingly, the army's military and ideological schooling became a means of spreading collectivization ideology, as well as for training soldiers for their future duties on the *kolkhozes*. The role played by this conscripted army in the education of Soviet citizens is not only interesting to Soviet historians, it is also a neglected aspect of the history of conscription. The Soviet social machinery monitored the personnel's attitudes from the lowest to the highest army levels, using reports based on soldiers' correspondence as well as the intelligence service's comprehensive interpretations of moods and events.

Finally, Viktor Kondrasjin's essay "The Famine in Russia and Ukraine 1932-1933" must be mentioned. This is an example of the often markedly political history writing that is characteristic of post-Soviet societies. Kondrasjin embraces the Russian interpretation *in toto*: the famine in Ukraine was not a matter of deliberate genocide, and it afflicted Russian and Ukrainian populations equally. No objection can be raised against his use of facts, however. He gives a step-by-step account of the Stalin regime's policy – and the ignorance that riddled it – and reaches the conclusion that these factors suffice to explain the famine.

johan eellend

Piotr Wawrzeniuk (ed.)
Societal Change and Ideological Formation among the Rural Population of the Baltic Area 1880—1939

Studia Baltica II:2, Södertörn University, Stockholm 2008, 206 pages.

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Turning peasants into citizens.

SOME DECADES AGO, HISTORICAL sociologist Barrington Moore Jr. astonished his readers with the claim that peasants were integral in the making of the modern world.[1] This shattering of the old stereotypes of rural populations – that they by their very nature are always traditional, religious, and conservative – created new questions for research, and peasant studies started to flourish. If peasants or farmers – or people in the countryside in general – were not by their nature unvarying (and uninteresting), then their behavior and ideas could change in different historical situations in important ways.

In "Agrarian Change and Ideological Formation – Farmer's Cooperation and Citizenship in the Baltic Area 1880–1939", a project at Södertörn University led by professor Anu-Mai Kõll, these questions about peasants in Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Poland (Galicia) are investigated by paying special attention to the role of cooperative movements in the countryside. These countries in Northern and Eastern Europe are different in interesting ways from the core regions of Europe – and also from one another – with respect to political culture, ethnic composition, and agricultural organization. Furthermore, in the Baltic Area, we need new work on original materials existing in the archives and libraries; the history of this region clearly cannot be investigated using secondary literature, an approach taken by Barrington Moore.

THE VOLUME EDITED BY Piotr Wawrzeniuk is produced with the cooperation of researchers interested in similar questions and is based on a symposium held in 2007 in Haapsalu, Estonia. Some of the key concepts of the essays included in the volume are citizenship, peasant ideology, ethnicity, and gender. Special attention is given to the cooperative movement and its role in introducing modern ideas into rural life. The cooperative movement spread knowledge based on scientific research into new forms of crop production and animal husbandry, helped raise the level of hygiene in milk handling, introduced new forms of enterprise, and provided possibilities of participation regardless of social standing. The cooperative movement and its publications were also a good platform for agrarian ideology and politics (agrarian populism).

The cult of small holdings

The agrarian concept of citizenship was usually based on participation in the use of natural resources and, later on, landownership. In local communities, the right to participate was usually thought to depend on a contribution to the common good – for instance paying taxes to the community. This was not necessarily very democratic and could exclude important segments of the rural population from political participation. In the cooperative movement, participation was usually quite broad socially, and the right to participate in decision making could vary depending on the amount of shares bought in the cooperative or on the extent of contribution to the production of a particular cooperative enterprise. There clearly existed an economic incentive to widen the sphere of participation in the cooperative organization of production (for instance dairies). In some fields, cooperatives were also highly competitive, both in the economic and ideological field, with other forms of private enterprise.

IDEAS ABOUT THE SPECIAL nature of peasant agriculture based on family farming and the cult of the small holding as a more productive and socially useful way to organize agricultural production are already well-known aspects of the agrarian ideology of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. By presenting material about notions of citizenship existing among the peasantry, however, this project at Södertörn University is starting to produce interesting results and comparisons concerning the deep cultural and ideological meaning of this period in European history. Many agrarian political parties in Northern and Eastern Europe supported authoritarian regimes in the 1930s, but, nevertheless, usually survived World War II and were important political movements even in the period after the war.

matti peltonen

1 Barrington Moore Jr.'s work *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* was published in 1966. – The "cases" he investigated were England, France, the United States, Japan, and India.

A double emptiness. The loss of something that could have been

Among the things encountered by the authors on a trip along the southern Baltic coast are these two porn bunnies, who greet visitors to a spa and show the way to the smorgasbord.

Katarina Wikars
Jan Jörnmark
Atomtorg, porrharar och Hitlerslussar: 160 genom Baltikum.

[Atomic Square, Porn Bunnies, and Hitler Floodgates] Lund: Historiska Media 2009. 192 pages.

THE EYE-CATCHING BOOK title is more descriptive than one might think: the "Atomic Square" is to be found in Visaginas where Ignalina, "Chernobyl's little sister", is located, and the porn bunnies stand dressed in net stockings in the lobby of a spa in the health resort Druskininkai. The Hitler floodgates stand abandoned: rust- and lichen-covered giants in the fleshy greenery of what was once East Prussia. Today, two Poles run a dog kennel in a dilapidated *kolchos* by the Masurian Canal.

Jan Jörnmark and Katarina Wikars have traveled through the Baltic States, Poland, and former East Prussia. Wikars starts the book in Narva–Joesuu and then follows the coast southwards: Pärnu, Jurmala, Karosta, Klaipeda, Nida. More or less destroyed, raised from the dead. Pärnu, for example, has survived its fouling during the Communist era, and has managed to obtain the EU's blue bathing-water flag – at the height of the season, 20,000 tourists congregate here. But the palatial, pink-plastered mud bath has closed down. In the era of globalization, mud can be obtained everywhere; the domestic mud has become superfluous. Klaipeda, two state



UNN GUSTAFSSON
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borders from Pämu: in the seventies one could receive Swedish television broadcasts here. Far earlier: Memel, a town in East Prussia. Then a state of emergency, a German-speaking part of Lithuania – until Hitler came. And after Hitler, the Red Army.

IN KLAIPEDA, WIKARS speaks with the war veteran Zigmas Stankus, a former paratrooper. He participated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The soldier, then nineteen years old, was given a single instruction: everyone you meet is an enemy. Stankus has attracted a good deal of attention with his books, in which he portrays the war in a frank, unembellished manner. He tells Wikars that he began to write because no one believed him when he came home and recounted his experiences, not even his friends. "We piss against the mosque wall because we have no clue what kind of a building it is. In our search for money we tear up the cloth in which the Qur'an is wrapped, throw the book on the ground when we cannot read it. We engender an anger that is beyond all control, and we pay for our stupidity with blood." The meeting with Stankus is one of the many openings in the text. They stand as secret doors between the lines, with white-hot handles that insist upon being opened. Everything interconnects; it is merely a matter of us remembering.

The economic historian Jörnmark writes differently, more resolutely than the cultural journalist Wikars. His approach to specific themes is also broader. In the chapter "Herberts Cukurs and the Latvian Paradox", he portrays both the ace pilot and the anti-Semite Cukurs, and the country's 20th century history. Together with the section "Towards the Holocaust", this chapter becomes a journalistic reflection on one of the most gaping blank spaces in the region as whole: the space that the Jewish population left behind.

IN JÖRNMARK'S VIEW, circumstances in Tsarist Russia led up to the Holocaust. His retrospective gaze reaches far back in time, to the medieval kingdom of Poland–Lithuania, to Europe's new border to the East and Russia's legislation of 1795, which created the Pale of Settlement. While I am reading this, the news magazine *Der Spiegel* comes out with an interview with the controversial U.S. researcher Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. Goldhagen raised a major stir with his earlier publication *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, and is still a controversial figure in Germany. According to Goldhagen, it was not the war that made the Holocaust possible; rather, the fact that anti-Semitism was accepted, even encouraged, in Germany.

Jörnmark's analysis indicates that the guilt is so interlaced with the histories of individual nation states that there is no unequivocal answer to the question. In Latvia, for example, the interwar president Karlis Ulmanis put into practice pluralistic views on the rights of different ethnic groups. But these had unforeseen consequences in a nation whose social topography was characterized by great inequalities. Antagonisms grew, and the Jews, who were associated with industrialization, cosmopolitanism and radicalism, paid the price. All of the Baltic States were drained of a relevant part of their own history when the Eastern Jews were murdered or fled. Further, according to Jörnmark, the region lost, thereby, an essential part of its future. The disappearance of the Jewish entrepreneurs was equivalent to a serious brain drain. In order to illuminate the extent of this phenomenon, Jörnmark describes how exiled Eastern Jews contributed to the growing success of Western entertainment and information industries. Individual Jewish inventors, businessmen, and researchers became a major driving force behind the American miracle. The emptiness is therefore double: an emptiness left by the loss of real people, but also an emptiness caused by the loss of something that could have been – or could be.

WIKARS, TOO, DWELLS ON the traces of involuntary migration; not only the Jewish, but the German and Polish as well. She takes her departure from Stefan Chwin's *Hanemann*, a novel about the objects "that are left behind when people flee, disappear, are exchanged". The objects not only survive their owners, they make concrete the almost unimaginable violence that hides behind words like Gulag, death camp, mass flight. In The Museum of Unconditional Surrender (*Muzej bezuvjetne predaje*), another author, the Croatian Dubravka Ugresic, describes how Turks, Poles, Roma, Russians, and ex-Yugoslavians hawk epochs and ideologies in Berlin's flea markets. Here, swastikas lie side by side with red stars and moth-eaten rabbit furs, all available for a couple of D-Marks. For the objects, this is the end station. Wikars feels that even Stefan Chwin's object, that is, history itself, fits in here. This end station is itself in a state of change, I think to myself. New currency, new immigrants, new frontiers. Today, the twenty-year-olds' home-designed T-shirts jostle imported Swedish clogs in Berlin's *Flohmärkte*. The chapter on "The Conditions of Things" revolves, in reality, around the fate of the city of Danzig. With the aid of various authors' works, Wikars weaves a fabric, a thought pattern around survival and death, object and consumption. She ends up with the impact of the financial crisis on the Baltic economies; and the surrounding world's moralizing verdict – "*they wanted too much*".

Wikars's sensitive, thoughtful journalistic style harmonizes with Jörnmark's analyses in an interesting way. He, too, describes the Swedish banks' complicity in the Baltic crisis. The photographs bear witness to the very material emptiness that Swedbank in particular has left behind: the skeletons of buildings that have been started but which will most likely fall into decay before they can be completed. Emptiness is the theme that winds through the book, but emptiness must not be mistaken for meaninglessness. Nor does the book concern itself exclusively with bygone times, with what has vanished. Calle Biörsmark is a documentary filmmaker – a Swede living in Karosta, the former Russian naval base in today's Latvia. After independence in 1994, the Russian population diminished drastically. Many could not manage the requirement that they learn Latvian, and were forced into the gray zone inhabited by the stateless and those with Russian passports. Karosta fell into decay, became violent, crime-ridden. Now it is turning around, slowly. Biörsmark, who is building houses at the moment, talks about "stabilizing an infrastructure", further, about the misery, behind which one finds both solidarity and pride. The older children take care of the younger in a touching and responsible manner; "it is not like that in the West anymore", he, who has chosen to stay, says.

EVEN THOUGH Wikar's and Jörnmark's book is not made up of interviews, it is the voices of the different people that stay with one after finishing the book. Swedish emigrants, Polish intellectuals and feminists, Soviet war veterans. And then there are the photographs, which wholly hold their own, tell their own story of decay and beauty. Their book is a road trip, not a field study. It could have been superficial. But here the reflections and analyses spring from interest and knowledge. In short: this is good journalism, journalism that makes one think – and that makes an appeal to the European memory.

unn gustafsson

Karl Magnus Johansson

KARL MAGNUS JOHANSSON is an associate professor of political science at Södertörn University. His research interests include European integration, foreign policy, political parties, and transnationalism. In particular, he has published widely on various aspects of transnational party cooperation within and throughout the European Union. Recent publications include "Party Politics in the European Council", with Jonas Tallberg (*Journal of European Public Policy,* Vol. 15:8); and "The Emergence of Political Parties at European Level: Integration Unaccomplished", in *How Unified Is the European Union? European Integration Between Visions and Popular Legitimacy*, edited by Sverker Gustavsson, Lars Oxelheim & Lars Pehrson (Springer, 2009). In 1999, he was a visiting senior fellow at the Center for European Integration Studies in Bonn. From 2002 to 2005 he was a member of the steering committee of the Center for German Studies at Södertörn University.

Andrea Petö

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LI BENNICH-BJÖRKMAN is Johan Skytte Professor in political science at Uppsala University. She has published on the organization of creativity, on educational policies, integration, and political culture. A dominant theme in her present research on Eastern Europe and post-Soviet States has been how historical and cultural legacies relate to the divergent post-Communist trajectories. A particular focus has been on the three Baltic States. Within this framework, Ukraine has been included, as the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia). Recent research activities have concerned the impact of the European Union on elite values and political culture in Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania. Her latest publication in this area is a monograph published with Palgrave/Macmillan, *Political Culture under Institutional Pressure: How Institutions Transform Early Socialization*, (2007), dealing mainly with the Estonian Diaspora.

letters to the editor

"Your statement on Slovakia is a pure falsification"

Dear Sirs,
When I turned to Page 6 in the October issue of your magazine, I was quite shocked by the following statement: "Russian is forbidden on Riga's street signs. In Slovakia it is forbidden to speak Hungarian in official contexts." Your statement on Slovakia is a pure falsification.

I would like to inform you that besides the constitutional guarantees there are more than 30 regulations (related to education, culture, public communication, etc.) governing the rights of persons belonging to national minorities in Slovakia.

I refer specifically to the Act on the Use of Languages of National Minorities that came into force in Slovakia on the 1st of September, 1999. This act lays out the conditions for the use of a language of a national minority in official communication in municipalities where persons who are members of a national minority make up 20 percent of the population according to the most recent census. As a consequence, languages of national minorities may be used in more than 650 municipalities (out of 2,891, i.e., in more than 20 percent of the municipalities of Slovakia, where the Hungarian minority constitutes a sufficient percent of the overall population).

Your remark on Slovakia might have referred to the recent amendments to the State Language Law. In no case do these amendments diminish or contradict rights of minorities to use their mother tongue in public communication according to existing Slovak legislation.

There has been a campaign by Hungary against this legislation that, after the review by the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, turned out to be based on false premises. We closely cooperate with the HCNM to eliminate any ambiguities in this legislation. Once solved, the future will show us that high minority standards in Slovakia will have remained untouched.

The journalistic pen is very influential and it should be used cautiously in order not to do more harm than good. I have to admit that your statement is not objective and does harm to Slovakia.

Yours truly,
Peter Kmec
Ambassador of Slovakia to Sweden

REPLY

Dear Sir,
The international press has given an account of these matters that differs from yours substantially. (See, for example, *The Economist* Aug. 1-7 and Aug. 29-Sept. 4, 2009.)

Sincerely yours,
The editors

BALTIC WORLDS

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Budapest illusions.
The defeat of a tyrant

Bluebeard's Castle is a short opera, written for two voices. Béla Bartók had no need of more than one act, nor a chorus – if indeed it wasn't a matter of simply letting the wordless orchestra take over the collective lamentation of the ancient drama – few parameters, this creates considerable leeway. In a production in the fall of 2009, the Budapest Opera chose to perform this one-act play in a quick-paced revival, with a half-hour intermission in the middle. Same lines, same music, same artists, the same scenery (in a fixed décor). But the endings could not have been more different.

Judith, the extraordinary beauty, daughter of a magnate, has broken with her family, abandoned her fiancé, in order to surrender herself to the love of Bluebeard. "Your country is vast and splendid", she says. But his empire is also surrounded by rumors, secrets. It is this Judith wants to reach – with her boundless love. And Bluebeard offers her a view in. Keys with which he opens gates. And it is this Judith wants: to tear down walls, let in the sun and the light. Bluebeard's castle is worth it. But what she discovers is torture and weapons, horror, muteness. "Do not question", says Bluebeard. All fortunes are stained with blood.

When Judith sees that the lake of silence has no tributaries, but is watered with tears, she understands that the rumors were true. Behind the seventh and final door, which Bluebeard to the very last tries to keep her from opening, sits the earlier wives of the honorable man, imprisoned. It is they who have enriched his kingdom. And the very instant she opens her eyes and looks in behind the veil, the door is closed on Judith as well, the most beautiful of the four wives.

It is hardly necessary to prescribe an allegorical reading – or listening – in a country that was locked up and closed so long, with its tormentors and torture chambers. After the intermission the doors then open again – the story repeats itself, but the events receive a new interpretation. Bluebeard has now lost a good deal of his charm and his powers of persuasion. He turns away, not to parry, but to yield. Still captivated by Judith's love, he withdraws, and when the last door is thrown open, it is time for him to enter. Judith remains. She chooses freedom before love, before loyalty to a something great.

And the castle: did it then become the House of Europe?

For a few days in autumn a persistent low pressure wave sits over Budapest. Walking over Liberty Bridge is like strolling in a winter storm in Siberia. Over Josefstadt, a darkness settles in, the kind that makes the figures in Gyula Krúdy's novels from the early 20th century come alive and expose their failings. In *Ladies Day* a ridiculous funeral director meets the dream image of himself, a taskmaster, on the way from a wedding reception to a brothel. John Lukacs, who wrote a wonderful book about fin-de-siècle Budapest, once told an anecdote about the woman who sleeps with her window open in her boudoir in the magical Danube city and with a start rises from her bed, covered only by a bed sheet, in order to see what is moving behind the curtains: "You, terrible man, what are you doing here?" "But this is your dream, Madame, not mine."

The lady could have sprung from Krúdy's head.

His heroes – as in *Sunflower* and *The Red Coach* – are often drawn from a degraded landed gentry, like he himself, a sordid and infamous class that became the national class in Hungary during "l'ancien régime" and the early independence. Lukacs's heroes, however, are matadors of education and culture, the "Men of 1875", who would garner so many successes in the world of art and literature, music and film, medicine and science. One spoke of the Hungarian Miracle – as Europeans would later speak of a Japanese or an Asian intellectual miracle. School discipline and the cult of learning were keys to success, and perhaps there still is an advantage here to Eastern and Central European education in a world where "competitiveness" appears to be all-important.

Imagine now that this is an illusion. Success need not be the same as progress. When Lilla Teatern in Helsinki produced Chekhov's *The Cherry Orchard* in the 1990s, no stroke of an ax was heard in the final act. So many efforts had been in vain. So many grand boulevards had become icy, cold labyrinths. The air of Budapest is now free of the stench of low-octane gasoline. But at the Astoria and the Gellért it is no longer possible to order a cup of Turkish coffee. ■

The old opera house in Budapest on the fashionable Andrássy utca.

PHOTO BY SIEMAR – HTTP://FLIC.KR/P/4RSGYP