

OFFICE OF THE COMMAND SURGEON, AIR COMBAT COMMAND  
FELLOWSHIP PAPER  
THE NEED FOR DUAL STATUS COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ITS  
EFFECTS ON AIR FORCE MEDICAL SERVICE RESPONSE TO DEFENSE  
SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES



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A Research Report Submitted to HQ ACC/SGX

Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia

May 2014

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## **INTRODUCTION**

In the course of human history, the military structure is one of the oldest organizations in existence. This structure revolves around a formal hierarchy allowing for orders to be disseminated up and down the chain of command. Hierarchy also ensures a streamlined process to direct large military units. If this structure did not exist within the military, there would be confusion among the roles and responsibilities of those personnel who operate within the construct. Even within a direct, streamlined process that allows for orders and tasks to be relayed, challenges exist. This is true especially when two similar organizations, such as the Federal military and the State military, operate under different legal restrictions, structures, and chains of command, but share common objectives and goals. This interaction between military forces operating under different legal frameworks has caused confusion as to how they approach national disasters, emergencies, and catastrophic events within the United States. In an attempt to provide clearer and a more efficient response, the Dual Status Command (DSC) structure was created to allow for a single chain-of-command for both military forces. But is it truly needed? Does it work? What changes, if any, will be incorporated to how the Federal military, specifically the Air Force Medical Service (AFMS), is employed in support of a natural disaster or national emergency? This paper demonstrates the DSC is an effective command structure without the need of any modifications to the current AFMS response framework.

## **BACKGROUND**

One of the many missions of the United States military is to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). This support is “a vital element in a national approach to prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery operations in the homeland.”<sup>1</sup> The United States

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington DC, February 2013), 14.

military can provide its unique capabilities to enhance civilian authorities' response to natural or man-made disasters or catastrophic events. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines a natural or manmade disaster as "an event that causes, or threatens to cause, loss of life, human suffering, public and private property damage, and economic and social disruption. Disasters and emergencies require resources that are beyond the scope of local agencies in routine responses to day-to-day emergencies and accidents, and may be of such magnitude or unusual circumstances as to require response by several or all levels of government: federal, state, and local."<sup>2</sup> Additionally, a catastrophic incident, as defined within the National Response Framework (NRF) is "any natural or manmade incident including terrorism that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions."<sup>3</sup> A catastrophic incident is more severe than a disaster because the response to the former requires a larger involvement among agencies at the local, state, and federal level and a larger commitment of resources.<sup>4</sup>

The Department of Defense (DOD), under the DSCA mission set, has two objectives: (1) "maintain defense preparedness for domestic Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, and Nuclear (CBRN) and (2) develop plans and procedures to ensure DSCA during complex catastrophes."<sup>5</sup> The military's primary mission, outside of DSCA, is to provide warfighting capabilities. Therefore, how does a military trained to lead and fight on foreign soil transform to one that is now in a secondary support role to domestic civilian agencies? Additionally, how are the

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<sup>2</sup> B. Wayne Blanchard, *Guide to Emergency Management and related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders & Legislation* (October 22, 2008) <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/terms%20and%20definitions/Terms%20and%20Definitions.pdf> (accessed 27 January 2014) 278.

<sup>3</sup> Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, (Washington DC, May 2013), 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington DC, February 2013) 9.

Federal Armed Forces with the State Armed Forces (National Guard) integrated in order to provide a single streamlined response to a domestic disaster, emergency, or catastrophic event? At first glance, the simplest answer may be that the federal government should always take the lead in a response, due to the size of its personnel, budget, and resources allocated to the Federal Armed Forces. However, analysis of the existing legal framework and the layers of responsibilities bring to light the complexities that must be overcome when operating in a domestic environment. These domestic complexities have led to past failures in responding to disasters or catastrophic events.

Some of the complexities surrounding the military response to a disaster revolve around legal restrictions attributed to the United States Code (USC), specifically Title 10 and Title 32. The Federal Armed Forces, under the direction of the President of the United States, fall under Title 10. Title 10 prevents the Federal Armed Forces from, “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity...”<sup>6</sup> The National Guard, however, under the direction of the Governor of the State, falls under USC Title 32. Under Title 32 the National Guard is allowed, “when ...not in federal service, to perform law enforcement functions as authorized to be performed by the National Guard by the laws of the State.”<sup>7</sup> In other words, according to the USC, Federal Armed Forces are not allowed to conduct direct law enforcement activities within the United States. This is different for the National Guard because when it operates as a militia of the state it does have the authority to conduct direct law enforcement activities with civilian agencies. It is worth noting Federal Armed Forces are provided greater latitude in enforcing federal laws during an insurrection and the United States Coast Guard, even though it is part of the Armed Forces,

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<sup>6</sup> *Armed Forces, US Code, sec. 375 (1956).*

<sup>7</sup> *National Guard, US Code, sec 112 (1956).*

receives its authority under Title 14. This authority grants the USCG law enforcement powers unlike the other Federal Armed Forces services.

In addition to these legal constraints, a disaster or catastrophic event response is structured around the idea that the federal government is not the initial responder. The Federal Disaster Relief Act passed in 1950 makes “it clear that the federal government would not function as the first-line provider of emergency assistance and disaster response and recovery. It would support State and local governments-not supplant them”.<sup>8</sup> This is further detailed in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act: “All requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State. Such a request shall be based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that federal assistance is necessary.”<sup>9</sup> The above reinforces the various competing priorities and legal constraints that must be mitigated before a logical and productive response to a domestic disaster, emergency or catastrophic event can occur.

One example that portrays the difficulties present when applying a domestic military response is the Los Angeles (L.A.) Riots of 1992 (The Riots). By the time The Riots concluded and order was restored, there were 54 deaths and more than \$800 million in damaged property within L.A. County making it the most disastrous example of civil unrest in United States history.<sup>10</sup> The Riots not only involved several civilian agencies, but also included military action from both the National Guard and the Federal military. Additionally, 10,000 California National

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<sup>8</sup> Department of Homeland Security, *A Citizen's Guide to Disaster Assistance*, (Washington DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 2010), 3-2.

<sup>9</sup> Department of Homeland Security, *The Stafford Act, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended*, (Washington DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, April 2013), 25.

<sup>10</sup> Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots,” *Strategic Studies Institute* (Summer 1997): <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/97summer/schnau.htm>



Guard (CANG) troops along with 4,000 federal troops responded to this emergency.<sup>11</sup> The Governor of California mobilized the CANG during the initial response to provide support to the Los Angeles Police Department (L.A.P.D.) and L.A. County Sheriff Department. Under this mobilization, the CANG operated under the authority of the state which allowed participation in law enforcement activities; however, this caused issues when the CANG was later federalized. The Governor of California eventually requested military assistance from the federal government resulting in the establishment of Joint Task Force-Los Angeles (JTF-LA) by the Federal military. Under this new command structure the federal government federalized the CANG, which resulted in restrictions of some activities they previously had been allowed to conduct with local law enforcement agencies. Additionally, there were concerns with the employment of military forces once JTF-LA was transferred to a federal military commander. The CANG was intimately familiar with the key players in the local and state emergency operation cells because the “California National Guard staff officers had regularly attended state interagency coordination meetings prior to the riots.”<sup>12</sup> This relationship allowed for a deeper integration of forces between the CANG and the local and state agencies. The Federal military, on the other hand, did not have these pre-established relationships and therefore was not familiar with local and state emergency plans. When all military troops came under federal command and control (C2), the response to The Riots took an initial step backwards both because of legal constraints (e.g. policing duties) and familiarization within the domestic operating area.

Hurricane Katrina is another example that illustrates the challenges faced by the Federal and State military in responding together to a domestic event. This hurricane was a catastrophic

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<sup>11</sup> Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots,” *Strategic Studies Institute* (Summer 1997): <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/97summer/schnau.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

event costing \$200 billion in damages and the loss of 1,300 lives.<sup>13</sup> “The separate chains of command employed during Hurricane Katrina[‘s] [response] significantly degraded the integration and synchronization of more than 54,000 National Guard and 20,000 Title 10 military personnel from different commands. National Guard and Federal military responses were coordinated across several chains of command but not integrated, which led to inefficiencies and duplication of effort. Without means for an integrated response, no one had the total picture of what forces were on the ground, what forces were enroute, missions being resourced, and missions still required to be completed.”<sup>14</sup>

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the U.S Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified three areas of disaster planning that needed to be addressed. One of those areas that the GAO focused on was the DOD. A “significant shortfall of DOD’s pre-Katrina planning was that the department did not fully address the division of tasks between National Guard resources under the governor’s control and the federal resources under Presidential control, nor did it establish time frames for the response.”<sup>15</sup> This lack of integrated planning resulted in the local, state, federal agencies and DOD not understanding the capabilities and resources the National Guard and Federal military could contribute.<sup>16</sup> The insufficient level of integration between the Federal military and State military was observed during the search and rescue missions conducted in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This was attributed to the nonexistence of a single point operation cell responsible for complete oversight of all aviation assets throughout the execution of these missions. “The search and rescue operations of the National Guard and Federal military

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<sup>13</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters*, (Washington DC: May 2006), 10.

<sup>14</sup> Ludwig J. Schumacher, “Dual Status Command For No-Notice Events: Integrating the Military Response to Domestic Disasters,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 7, article 4 (February 2011), 2.

<sup>15</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters*, (Washington DC: May 2006), 4.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

responders were not fully coordinated, and military operations were not integrated with the search and rescue operations of the Coast Guard and other rescuers. At least two different locations were assigning search and rescue tasks to military helicopter pilots operating over New Orleans, and no one had the total picture of the missions that had been resourced and the missions that still needed to be performed.”<sup>17</sup> Finally, the military C2 structure established for this disaster exacerbated the issues between the Federal military and the National Guard. The C2 for an integrated response was identified in previous GAO reports, but even as Hurricane Katrina approached landfall the C2 structure had still not been established. “Ultimately, the military took a pragmatic approach to deconflict the operation with separate active-duty component and mobilized Reserve volunteers-were under the command and control of Northern Command’s Joint Task Force-Katrina, while the National Guard forces, including those from other states, were under the command and control of the governors of Mississippi and Louisiana.”<sup>18</sup> These multiple C2 chains not only prevented a seamless approach, but created additional confusion across all military forces.<sup>19</sup>

In an attempt to simplify and improve military efficiencies the DOD appointed Lieutenant General Russel Honore to lead Joint Task Force Katrina. General Honore immediately took charge and began directing the military response across all Federal and State military forces. Even though General Honore’s actions were an attempt to provide a single military response, because of legal constraints, his response caused issues within the National Guard instead. “Although the Guard troops were under command of the governor...they obeyed

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<sup>17</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters*, (Washington DC: May 2006), 7.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

Honore because he was a three-star general. But as soon as he would leave the scene, Guard officers would have to come in to straighten out conflicting orders.”<sup>20</sup>

After Hurricane Katrina and other previous Federal and State military domestic responses, it became apparent a single military command structure was needed. The solution to this need resulted in the creation of a command structure known as a dual-status commander. This structure allows for a military officer to be given the authority to command both Federal and State military forces. Additionally this position provides for a coordinated and streamlined military response for DSCA operations.

### **DUAL STATUS COMMANDER**

A dual-status commander (DSC) is a position specifically established in order to incorporate precise and effective support to civilian agencies during a natural or manmade disaster. “A DSC is a commissioned officer of the Regular Army or Air Force or a federally recognized ARNG or ANG officer authorized, pursuant to Title 32, USC, Section 315 or 325, by SecDef [Secretary of Defense], with the consent of the applicable governor of state, to exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, a state of command.”<sup>21</sup> This position is unique because the DSC is required to manage two separate and distinct chains-of-command simultaneously without overlapping orders from one chain to the other. Joint Publication 3-28 defines this caveat as, “exercising all authority in a completely mutually exclusive manner.”<sup>22</sup> The DSC must understand this complex legal environment to avoid violating any state or federal laws. For example, if the DSC assigns the Federal military with a mission that is being directed by the state’s governor, he would be violating federal law. Additionally, the DSC must also

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<sup>20</sup> William Matthews, “Two Hats Are Better Than One,” *National Guard*, March 2013, [http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/display\\_article.php?id=1341937&\\_width=](http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/display_article.php?id=1341937&_width=) (accessed 22 January 2014).

<sup>21</sup> Joint Publication 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2013, C-1.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, C-1.

understand that federal orders cannot be given to the National Guard when it operates in a state capacity.<sup>23</sup> Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the process to request a DSC both as a Title 32 officer or a Title 10<sup>24</sup>. In order to request a Title 10 DSC steps 2 through 4 occur in reverse order. To assist the DSC, the DOD created a pool of Title 10 Deputy Commanders from the Federal military branches of the United States Army (USA) and United States Air Force (USAF). This was done to provide federal insight to the DSC, which in most situations will be a National Guard officer. Even though it is not a requirement for the DSC to be a National Guard officer, they are usually chosen because they are well-versed in the laws of the state they are

operating in and understand the unique issues of the state and the communities within the state.

The DOD 2005 Civil Support Strategy supports this view by stating that the National Guard is a better option than the Federal military when supporting civilian agencies because of its extensive

experience and exercise training with local law enforcement and first responders as well as their intimate knowledge of the communities they serve; especially during times of need.<sup>25</sup>

The DSC was previously used in various National Special Security Events (NSSE) and other non-emergency situations beginning with the 2004 G-8 Conference at Sea island, GA, but



Figure 1: DSC Support Request Process

<sup>23</sup> Joint Publication 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2013, C-1.

<sup>24</sup> USNORTHCOM Publication 3-20, *Title 10 Support to Dual Status Command led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures*, 31 January 2012, 1-6.

<sup>25</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Hurricane Katrina, Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters*, (Washington DC: May 2006), 28.

the DSC position was more of an ad-hoc structure versus a formalized legal function.<sup>26</sup> The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 established the DSC as an official command and control function. In Figure 2, the flow chart outlines an example of the kind of DSC structure that can be established to meet a unified response to a domestic disaster, emergency, or catastrophic event.<sup>27</sup>

Hurricane Sandy provided the DSC structure an opportunity to test the concept.<sup>28</sup> Major General Charles Gailes Jr., who commanded Task Force 51, U.S. Army North during Hurricane




Figure 2: DSC C2 and Staff Structure Model (Example)

Sandy stated, “Hurricane Sandy marked the first time that actual tactical control of Nation Guard and DOD active and reserve forces was given to a dual-status commander for a major, multi-state natural disaster.”<sup>29</sup> Additionally, it was observed, “as the “New FEMA”

<sup>26</sup> William Matthews, “Two Hats Are Better Than One,” *National Guard*, March 2013, [http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/display\\_article.php?id=1341937& width=](http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/display_article.php?id=1341937& width=) (accessed 22 January 2014).

<sup>27</sup> USNORTHCOM Publication 3-20, *Title 10 Support to Dual Status Command led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures*, 31 January 2012, 1-11.

<sup>28</sup> Joseph Andrew Lee, “FEMA Implements Proactive Response Model for Superstorm,” *On Patrol*, Fall 2013, <http://usoonpatrol.org/archives/2013/10/28/fema-implements-proactive-resp> (accessed 24 January 2014).

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

began its response to Sandy, this new level of coordination led to what some might consider an awesome display of American might, ingenuity and community cohesiveness.”<sup>30</sup>

Hurricane Sandy resulted in \$71.4 billion in damages and 131 deaths, categorizing the storm as the second most costly in the history of the United States.<sup>31</sup> The utilization of 4,000 Federal military and 9,000 National Guard personnel during this storm justified the need for a DSC and created a situation in which the DSC C2 concept could be properly tested.<sup>32</sup> Several of the general officers given DSC status for their state’s operating area gave this new structure positive remark. According to the New Jersey DSC, Brigadier General James Grant, Hurricane Sandy “solidified that dual-status commanders [were] the correct way to go,” and “it absolutely put the stamp of approval...”<sup>33</sup> Brigadier General Michael Swezey, who was the New York National Guard Adjutant General and the New York DSC stated, “the dual-status commander concept was validated during the Sandy response.”<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, the governors of the affected states all agreed that the dual status command structure was able to move from idea to validation. The National Governors Association was satisfied that a real world event like, Hurricane Sandy, tested this C2 organization and it passed.<sup>35</sup> General Charles Jacoby, commander of Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), further highlighted the positive effects of DSC when he said, “[a]lthough the dual-status commander concept is relatively new, it has already proven itself to be a powerful tool for improving responsiveness, command and control, continuity of operations and unity of effort. Together, we will maintain an open dialog with the Council of Governors and state adjutants general to ensure the many lessons from Hurricane Sandy are indeed learned,

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<sup>30</sup> Joseph Andrew Lee, “FEMA Implements Proactive Response Model for Superstorm,” *On Patrol*, Fall 2013, <http://usoonpatrol.org/archives/2013/10/28/fema-implements-proactive-resp> (accessed 24 January 2014).

<sup>31</sup> William Matthews, “Two Hats Are Better Than One,” *National Guard*, March 2013, [http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/display\\_article.php?id=1341937&\\_width=](http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/display_article.php?id=1341937&_width=) (accessed 22 January 2014).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

incorporated into our planning and battle-tested during complex disaster exercises.”<sup>36</sup> However, even with all the success the DSC position received during Hurricane Sandy’s aftermath, there were still some challenges discovered in the response.

One of the challenges was related to mission assignment and the scope of those missions. Brig Gen Swezey was able to easily assign and modify mission requirements as he saw fit to the New York National Guard based on the response required. However, he ran into C2 issues with the Federal military component assigned to him as the DSC. “The active-component troops put under Swezey’s command came with very specific mission assignments...If their mission is to clear debris, the dual-status commander can’t simply reassign them to deliver food and water.”<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, Brig Gen Swezey pointed out issues that can occur due to the two distinct command chains and how they affect the DSC when conflicting orders are given. “I’m not the umpire. An issue like that needs to be tossed back to civilian channels,” stated General Swezey.<sup>38</sup> Even though there were several examples from Hurricane Sandy that highlighted challenges in standing up and executing a DSC JTF overall this command structure was extremely successful. Once the DSC is refined to better deal with these challenges, to include overseeing a multi-state DSCA operation, this C2 structure will provide the stability that is required when Federal and State military are responding together within the same operating area.

## **EFFECT ON AIR FORCE MEDICAL SERVICE ASSETS UNDER DUAL STATUS COMMAND**

A common theme seen among senior military leaders when reacting to change is to ask how the change will affect the status quo. The DSC is a completely new C2 structure and is a

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<sup>36</sup> Joseph Andrew Lee, “FEMA Implements Proactive Response Model for Superstorm,” *On Patrol*, Fall 2013, <http://usoonpatrol.org/archives/2013/10/28/fema-implements-proactive-resp> (accessed 24 January 2014).

<sup>37</sup> William Matthews, “Two Hats Are Better Than One,” *National Guard*, March 2013, [http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/display\\_article.php?id=1341937&\\_width=](http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/display_article.php?id=1341937&_width=) (accessed 22 January 2014).

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*



deviation from the Federal military’s previous approaches to a Joint Task Forces (JTF). This section will specifically address how the AFMS assets are employed for DSCA operations within a DSC C2 JTF and whether it has resulted in changes to the AFMS response model.

In order to support the JTF DSC the Federal military created the Joint Support Force element (JSF-SE). The following figure (Figure 3) illustrates the operational tasks and actions that are required from a JSF-SE throughout the various phases from coordinating with various state and federal agencies and training in Phase 0 to demobilization and creating after action reports (AARs) in Phase V.<sup>39</sup> These individuals are Title 10 personnel who work for the DSC to




Figure 3: JSF-SE Operational Task and Actions

provide assistance with federal issues and concerns during a DSCA response.<sup>40</sup> “A baseline JSF-SE consists of 16 personnel (plus a T10 Deputy Commander) with the capability to provide T10 intelligence, operations and plann[ing], logistics and personnel, communications, medical planning, public affairs, information management and knowledge management

<sup>39</sup> USNORTHCOM Publication 3-20, *Title 10 Support to Dual Status Command led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures*, 31 January 2012, 4-2.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-1.

(IM/KM), and legal support to the T10 Deputy Commander and DSC.”<sup>41</sup> The main purpose of the JSF-SE is to perform five key tasks to assist the DSC JTF in the following areas: “(1) conduct joint operational planning, (2) maintain day-to-day situational awareness and understanding of T10 and state active duty/T32 forces, (3) fully leverage collaborative capabilities to enhance C2, (4) build and maintain products that support planning and situational understanding, and (5) conduct and participate in training and exercise.”<sup>42</sup>

A key position in the JSF-SE is the deputy commander position. This position generally is assigned to a qualified T10 individual to assist with the execution of federal military orders to



Figure 4: FEMA Regions

T10 forces, especially when the DSC position has been assigned to a non-federalized National Guard officer.

“The T10 Deputy Commander’s responsibility is to support the DSC.

This includes ensuring execution of the DSCs orders to the Federal military

forces and acting as an advisor to the

DSC on Federal military matters. The T10 Deputy Commander also coordinates with the [National Guard] Deputy Commander, if appointed; to achieve unity of effort and purpose within the DSC led JTFs total force operations.”<sup>43</sup> The expectation is that the T10 deputy commander pool will have the capability of supporting multiple states and territories, which are organized

<sup>41</sup> USNORTHCOM Publication 3-20, *Title 10 Support to Dual Status Command led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures*, 31 January 2012, 4-1.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-1.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-2.

under the same format as the FEMA regions (Figure 4<sup>44</sup>). The breakout found in Figure 5 shows the regional assignments for the T10 deputy commander pool.<sup>45</sup> This figure further highlights the reasoning behind grouping certain states throughout the Continental United States ensuring a multi-area response. For example T10 deputy assignment (1) is responsible for Texas, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Kentucky, and Oregon. This allows the T10 deputy commander the ability to respond to these states with the understanding that there is a minimal chance for more than one state within this group to require a simultaneous response.

The staff assigned to the JSF-SE all bring their expertise to the mission. One of these staff members is the medical planner, who is located within the JTF Surgeon General’s office. The medical planner provides the critical link between a mission request and the military medical capabilities that


**Title 10 Deputy Commander Assignments**

Title 10 Deputy Assignment	State Assignment/Region	State Assignment/Region	State Assignment/Region	State Assignment/Region	State Assignment/Region
1	Texas/VI	Pennsylvania/III	Vermont/I	Kentucky/IV	Oregon/X
2	California/IX	Virginia/III	New Hampshire/I	Illinois/V	Montana/VIII
3	Mississippi/IV	New York/II	Washington/X	Nebraska/VII	Wisconsin/V
4	Alabama/IV	Connecticut/I	South Dakota/VIII	Nevada/IX	Kansas/VII
5*	Tennessee/IV	Rhode Island/I	Colorado/VIII	West Virginia/III	Puerto Rico/II U.S. Virgin Islands/II
6	Georgia/IV	Massachusetts/I	Indiana/V	Arizona/IX	New Jersey/II
7	South Carolina/IV	Missouri/VII	Alaska/X	Utah/VIII	Michigan/V
8	North Carolina/IV	Maine/I	Arkansas/VI	Idaho/X	Minnesota/V
9	Delaware/III	Oklahoma/VI	Florida/IV	Wyoming/VII	Ohio/V
10	Maryland/III	Louisiana/VI	Iowa/VII	North Dakota/VIII	New Mexico/VI

\*Proposed T10D for District of Columbia

**Figure 5: Title 10 Deputy Commander Assignments**

are available for employment to a disaster, emergency, or catastrophic event. One of the several roles and responsibilities the medical planner is required to accomplish is to provide “medical planning capability to the DSC-led JTF and serve as a medical operations officer to assist the JTF Surgeon in gaining [and] maintaining situation awareness, managing all military medical

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.fema.gov/regional-operations>

<sup>45</sup> USNORTHCOM Publication 3-20, *Title 10 Support to Dual Status Commander Led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures*, 31 January 2012, 3-2.

resources, and coordinating with medical planners at the local, state, and federal levels.”<sup>46</sup>

Additionally, the medical planner is “the medical [subject matter expert] to the JSF-SE and is the principle advisor to the DSC and T10 deputy commander on all medical issues regarding T10 forces and missions. Their primary function is to plan and develop the health service support (HSS) infrastructure to protect the health of DSC-led JTF forces and mitigate the effects of illness and injury within the

JOA, and serve as the hub for achieving HSS situational awareness, by establishing a Joint Medical Operations Center (JMOC) for information management and the facilitation of HSS synchronization.”<sup>47</sup>

In analyzing the DSC structure and the process to request forces for employment it is apparent a significant change to current business practices will not occur under

this new structure. There is a

new command and control function, but the processes of providing forces by the component

commands have not been modified. Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH), the Air Force’s




Figure 6: Process for Title 10 Forces Mission Availability

<sup>46</sup> USNORTHCOM Publication 3-20, *Title 10 Support to Dual Status Commander Led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures*, 31 January 2012, 4-13.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-23.

component command to USNORTHCOM, issued clarifying guidance establishing the new ground rules when operating under a DSC led JTF. The figure above depicts the process to make T10 forces available for mission assignment to assist in a disaster emergency or augment an operation already underway.<sup>48</sup>

Per Air Force Instruction 10-801 “the Air Force provides support to the lead federal agency (LFA) as a result of a domestic disaster or Presidential declaration of emergency in accordance with NRF guidance.”<sup>49</sup> This is accomplished by AFNORTH which is responsible for developing processes, planning how Air Force conducts DSCA, and ensuring a combined approach with the National Guard in support of civil operations within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility.<sup>50</sup> There are several methods the Air Force uses to respond to domestic emergencies which are classified in the following terms: (1) major accidents, (2) natural disasters, (3) hazardous material spills, and (4) chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents.<sup>51</sup> The various responses instituted when dealing with the above domestic emergencies are: (1) immediate response, (2) mutual aid agreements, (3) 10-day rules, and (4) Presidential declaration.<sup>52</sup> The size and scope of the response are all limited by various legal constraints as dictated by the federal government. When responding to a DSCA response the Air Force will provide its assets as described in the following paragraph.

Presentation of Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) for a DSCA event is accomplished through the Air Force Service Components to the CCDRs (Combatant Commander). AEFs are presented to the JFC in a single, capabilities-based entity-the Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF). The AETF is the Air Force warfighting organization attached to a JFC. The AETF is organized, equipped and sized with the appropriate type and number of forces for the mission to be accomplished. The AETF commander (i.e., COMAFFOR [Commander Air Force Forces]) organizes

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<sup>48</sup> USNORTHCOM Publication 3-20, *Title 10 Support to Dual Status Commander Led Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures*, 31 January 2012, F-9.

<sup>49</sup> Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-801, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, 19 September 2012, 5.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

forces as necessary into Air Expeditionary Wings, Air Expeditionary Groups, Air Expeditionary Squadrons, and/or expeditionary flights, detachments, or elements to provide reasonable internal spans of control, command elements at appropriate levels, and to retain unit identity.<sup>53</sup>

The AEF presentation of forces explanation provided in the previous paragraph will follow a C2 structure through the federal chain of command for all T10 Air Force forces. These forces will assist the supported CCDR, which for domestic response can either be USNORTHCOM or United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). If the response is considered too large or complex for one Service and more than two Services are required to support the disaster then a JTF is established. An established JTF encompasses all Federal military forces and provides C2 to allow an efficient flow of task and objectives to the T10 personnel. The JTF will usually




Figure 7: Title 10 Presentation of Forces - USAF

maintain operational command (OPCON) and tactical command (TACON) authority over all

<sup>53</sup> Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-801, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, 19 September 2012, proposed Chapter 4.

Federal military forces, either assigned or attached, in order to provide DOD support within the domestic operating area.<sup>54</sup> The USAF presentation of forces represented in Figure 7 outlines the DSC structure that will be used, “when a State JTF is established and the President via the Secretary of Defense and the Governor of the State determine it is customary and proper for the establishment of a DSC” in response to DSCA operations.<sup>55</sup> This figure also highlights the alignment of medical forces within the Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) and the DSC. Furthermore, AFNORTH has provided additional instructions on how it will provide support to the DSC when requested. As stated in an AFNORTH presentation given on 11 December 2012:

“USAF [United States Air Force] will set up appropriate level of C2 structure (wing, group, [or] squadron) to support our airman. This will normally involve sending... [a] 0-6 whose sole job is to support the [administrative command] duties that [AFNORTH] has as the Commander of Air Force Forces. This person does not and will not have operational direction over the units that are supporting your mission. He/She is there to eliminate the burden of administrative responsibilities from the DSC. He/She will not be giving operational direction that is clearly [a] prerogative to USAF units or people.”<sup>56</sup>

The AFMS supports AFNORTH in DSCA operations by providing HSS through the use of various medical capabilities such as: (1) Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS), (2) Air Force Radiation Assessment Team, and (3) Medical NBC Defense Team. The AFMS’ definition of HSS “is to enhance force protection by providing a modular, clinically enhanced, tailored and more life-saving capability while reducing the medical footprint.”<sup>57</sup>

One of the more visible AFMS capabilities is EMEDS. This capability offers the CCDR the ability, “to rapidly deploy and provide forward stabilization, primary care, dental services, force health protection, and to prepare air and space expeditionary forces and/or civilian

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<sup>54</sup> Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-801, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, 19 September 2012, proposed Chapter 4.

<sup>55</sup> Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-801, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, 19 September 2012, proposed Chapter 4.

<sup>56</sup> Briefing, CONR-1AF (AFNORTH), subject: Dual Status Commanders.

<sup>57</sup> Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-42.71, *Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS)*, 27 July 2006, 24.

casualties for aeromedical evacuation.”<sup>58</sup> Additionally, EMEDS “provides essential care, deferring definitive care as dictated by the theater medical [concept of operations] (CONOPS).”<sup>59</sup> These capabilities (both personnel and equipment) falls under the C2 of the COMAFFOR who serves as the commander for all Air Force forces assigned and attached to the JTF.<sup>60</sup> “For the medic, appropriate C2 achieves the unit of effort and integration required to meet support requirements across the entire spectrum of HSS operations. HSS resources, including money, manpower and materiel, are scarce and must be planned, deployed, and employed for the maximum operational effect.”<sup>61</sup> All Air Force medical personnel when employed to support HSS operations “report to and are accountable to the [Line of the Air Force (LAF)] at their level of command and execution.”<sup>62</sup> Some employments of medical personnel may occur in the absence of other Air Force personnel. In this situation the senior deployed USAF medical personnel may be assigned as the COMAFFOR for the JTF.<sup>63</sup>




Figure 8

Figure 8 shows how the Air Force is normally aligned in a JTF<sup>64</sup>. The DSC JTF format does not alter how the Air Force and AFMS normally execute their mission and employ their forces in support to a JTF. The AFMS’ capabilities are tailored to interface with and operate within a JTF.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>59</sup> Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-42.71, *Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS)*, 27 July 2006, 9.

<sup>60</sup> Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-42.1, *Health Service Support Command and Control in Expeditionary Operations*, 14 May 2004, 9.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 5.



This predesignated formation is the reason why the USAF and AFMS will not encounter any difficulty operating within the DSC framework. This is emphasized in a side-by-side comparison between Figure 7 “Title 10 Presentation of Forces” and Figure 8 “Notional JTF” which shows the similarities between both frameworks.

## **CONCLUSION**

The dual status command structure integrated the military’s domestic role for both federal and state. This new streamlined military approach to DSCA operations drastically evolved from the disjointed response that was executed for the Los Angeles Riots of 1992. There are several lessons learned that have been incorporated into guidance, standard operating procedures and law, further enhancing the capabilities and authority of the DSC. Ultimately, this has allowed for a C2 that has benefitted all involved, especially those in need of military assistance. Even though some TACON issues were identified for further refinement during the military’s role in Hurricane Sandy, the DSC continues to prove it is an invaluable asset. This C2 provides an efficient and cohesive framework when both Federal military and State military are required to respond together. As the Federal military and National Guard further develop their unified response, the military’s single approach to no-notice disasters, emergencies, and catastrophic events will continue to evolve resulting in a more precise execution to DSCA. Additionally, the DSC C2 allows for the military component commands, like AFNORTH, to better understand the requirements from the DSC JTF commander. This establishes a (1) clear common operating picture for the medical planners, (2) better assessment of what capabilities should be delivered to the affected area, and (3) improved support to the JTF. This understanding of the C2 construct will ensure AFNORTH is properly incorporated into the Federal and State military DSCA response. Finally, the AFMS will continue to be able to provide their medical capabilities

without requiring modifications to how USAF presents its forces for DSCA operations. DSC command structure will ultimately allow for quicker vertical integration into the JTF DSC and improved horizontal synergy between the military forces.



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