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Defense Attache Office-Saigon
RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT FY74/4
1 Apr 74 - 30 Jun 74

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4th QTR FY 74

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⑥ Defense Attache Saigon: RVNAF

DAO QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT, 4th Quarter
FY 74.

⑨ Rept. for 1 Apr ³⁰ Jun 74

⑪ 1 Aug 74

⑩ John E. / Murray
Maximilian / Lamont

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
FPO San Francisco 96620

AOSOP-OR

1 August 1974

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal - RVNAF Quarterly
Assessment

Commander
U.S. Support Activities Group
Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB
Thailand

The attached assessment is forwarded in compliance with
JCS Secret message, 072105Z Mar 73, subject: Continuing
SEA Reports (U).

1 Incl
as

Maximilian Lamont
MAXIMILIAN LAMONT
Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

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 FOREWORD

This is my last assessment.

I'm aware that the modern history of Vietnam is strewn with the bones of mistaken prophets.

I am also aware that hope hallucinates victory. And that past prophets were infatuated with a tunnel light that I, for the life of me, can't see.

It would be prudent to remain silent. But it's hard to resist going out on the limb before going out on the limbo of retirement.

I don't read tea leaves, don't have a crystal ball, and my name isn't Nostradamus. But if I was Jimmy the Greek, in Las Vegas, and laying the odds, I'd put them in favor of our side.

Why?

Because the RVNAF take the big ones.

True they lost Dak Pek. After 400 days seige, Tong Le Chan. And they lost the outposts of Chi Linh, Rach Bap, Base 82, Bach Ma Mountain, Plei d'Jereng, Bu Prang, Bu Bong and Dak Pek. All told, the net loss was 144 outposts. But - contradictory as it may sound - these were largely gainful losses.

This is only relearning what the French learned the hard way two decades ago. As Bernard Fall points out, "at that time, everyone had agreed that sealed off 'hedgehogs' were hardly worth the use of maintaining them".*

Holding all these small places takes too much in life and effort. The big ones count. And each Corps since the Cease-Fire has seen the big ones taken by the RVNAF. The first big fight in I Corps was over the Port of Sa Huynh. The Division size battles at Quang Duc in II Corps, at Tri Phap in IV Corps, and the Iron Triangle in III Corps. All enemy defeats. With only the Iron Triangle less than total.

*Bernard Fall, Hell In A Very Small Place (The Siege of Dien Bien Phu), Vintage Books, 1968, pg. 18.

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
But if - and this a prodigious pivotal if - if we don't support them with the dollar wherewithal, then the end is the opposite. The end, is their end.

I am apprehensive over the GVN future as the enemy builds up and our support of the RVNAF lessens. Their hope as we scrimp the support, is in their Generalship, their basic leadership and courage.

As we take a lesson from the History of War at Dien Bien Phu of two decades ago, we can also take a lesson from the same source and Waterloo, 16 decades ago; where Marshal Ney "the Bravest of the Brave" made a final desperate charge, and ended up -- in frenzied despair -- beating a cannon with a broken sword.

Valor is not enough...

What I'm saying is, they'll win. If we support them as we promised. They won't, if we don't.


JOHN E. MURRAY
Major General, USA
Defense Attache

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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAD	ARVN Associated Depot
ABF	Attack(s) by Fire
ABN	Airborne
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ACFT-A/C	Aircraft
ACI	Analytical Critical Inspection
ACS	Armored Cavalry Squadron
AD	Air Defense
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AGP	Auxiliary General Purpose
AIM	Air Intercept Missile
AIMI	Aviation Intensely Managed Item
ALC	Area Logistics Command
AMC/PAC	Army Material Command/Pacific Area Command
AMSF-V	Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam
AO	Area of Operations
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOSAF	DAO Air Force Division
APC	Aerial Photo Center

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APL	Auxiliary Personnel Lighter
AR	Accommodation Rate
ARDF	Airborne Radar Direction Finding
ARL	Auxiliary Landing Craft Repair
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASGN	Assigned
ASPB	Advanced Support Patrol Boat
AT	Anti-Tank
ATC	Air Training Center
ATLC	Air Technical Logistics Command
AUTH	Authorized
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
BBL	Barrels
BC	Transportation Barge
BCM	Bulk Construction Material
BII	Basic Issue Item
BNH	Bien Hoa
BOA	Basic Ordering Agreement
BOH	Balance on Hand
BOM	Bill of Materiel
BS	Bachelor or Science
BW	Boston Whaler
CALTEX	California Texas Oil Company
CBD	Crash/Battle Damage
CCB	Command Communications Boat

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C-E	Communications Electronics
CG	Commanding General
CHD	Cablehead
CIC	Corps Interrogation Center
CINCPACFLT	Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CLC	Central Logistics Command
CMA	Communications Management Agency
CMD	Capital Military District
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
CONUS	Continental United States
COSVN	Central Office of South Vietnam
CPX	Command Post Exercise
C&P	Care and Preservation
CofS/JGS	Chief of Staff/Joint General Staff
CRDC	Central Reconstruction & Development Council
CRIP	Coastal Radar Improvement Plan
CSB	Combat Salvage Boat
CSC	Computer Science Corporation
CTC	Central Training Command
CTD	Central Telecommunications Directorate
CY	Calendar Year
DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office, Saigon RYN
DASC	Direct Air Support Center

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DCA	Directorate, Civil Aviation
DC/LOW	Frequencies Below Microwave
DER	Destroyer Escort Radar Picket
DF	Direction Finding
DGSC	Defense General Supply Center
DIFM	Due In For Maintenance
DIRCON	Director of Construction
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DODAC	Department of Defense Ammunition Code
DSP	Dependent Shelter Program
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DTC	Division Training Center
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
DTG	Date Time Group
EBD	Engineer Base Depot
ECCOI	Eastern Construction Company International
ECL	English Comprehension Level
EIUI	End Item Use Inspection
ELTP	English Language Training Program
EM	Enlisted Man
FAC	Foreign Aid Chapter
FB	Fuel Barge
FEC	Federal Electric Corporation
FM	Field Manual

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FNC	Floating Naval Club
FSB	Fire Support Base
FTD	Field Training Detachment
FY	Fiscal Year
GCI	Ground Control Intercept
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
HJMA	Highland Junior Military Academy
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
ICS	Integrated Communications System
ICP	In-Country Procurement Program
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
JEC	Joint Eradication Committee
JEIM	Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance
JGS	Joint General Staff
JGS/IG	Joint General Staff/Inspector General
JMA	Junior Military Academy
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
KIA	Killed in Action
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized

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LCMMS	Landing Craft Mechanized Mine Sweeper
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel Large
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Landing Craft Vehicle/Personnel
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LOX	Liquid Oxygen
LSB	Logistics Support Base/Branch
LSIL	Large Ship Infantry Landing
LSM	Landing Ship Medium
LSM/H	Landing Ship Hospital
LSSL	Large Support Ship Landing
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTL	Interprovincial Road
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MED	Materiel Exploitation Division
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation Movement Procedure
MILCON	Military Construction
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisitioning and Issues Procedures.
MLMS	Motor Launch Mine Sweeper
MMC	Medium Maintenance Center/Material Management Center
MOGAS	Motor Gas
MOI	Method of Instruction

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MPCO	Military Property and Construction Office
MR	Military Region
MRMC	Maintenance Repair & Minor Construction Program
MRO	Materiel Release Order
MRTT	Military Region Tri-Thien
MRTTH	Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue
MSC	Military Sealift Command/Minesweeper Coastal
MSM	Minesweeper, Mechanized
MSR	Minesweeper, River
MSS	Military Security Service
MT	Metric Ton/Measurement Ton
MTC	Marine Training Center
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MWV	Ministry of War Veterans
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVILCO	Navy International Logistics Control Office
NC	Not Carried
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NCOIC	Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge
NHA	Nha Trang
NIS	Not In Stock
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NMMA	National Materiel Management Agency
NORM	Not Operational Ready - Maintenance
NORS	Not Operational Ready - Supply

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NTC	National Training Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
NVAF	North Vietnamese Air Force
OB	Order of Battle
OCE	Office of Civil Engineer
OIC	Officer-In-Charge
OJT	On-The-Job-Training
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMA	Operations/Maintenance Army
OR	Operational Ready
ORE	Operational Ready Evaluation
OST	Order and Shipping Time
(P)	Province
PBR	Patrol Boat River
PCE	Patrol Craft Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft Fast
PDM	Programmed Depot Maintenance
PF	Popular Force
PGM	Patrol Gun Boat Motor
PHOTINT	Photo Intelligence
POI	Program of Instruction
POL	Petroleum Oil and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum

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PRC	Portable Radio Communications/Peoples Republic of China
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
QA	Quality Assurance
QL	National Road
R&I	Recognition/Indentification
R&R	Repair & Return
RAMMS	Republic of Vietnam Automated Material Management System
RB	Refuel Barge
RF	Regional Forces
RPC	River Patrol Craft/Reparable Processing Center
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVNAFLS	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SBD	Signal Base Depot
SCARWAF	Special Category Army with Air Force
SCD	Special Collection Department
SEA	South East Asia
SEAS	South East Asia Services
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence

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SIMS	Single Integrated Military System
SLSC	Sector Logistics Support Center.
SOC	Special Operations Center
STCAN	From (French designed river Patrol craft)
STCP	Sector Tactical Command Post
STS	Specialty Training Standards
SVN	South Vietnam
T/O	Task Organization
TA	Table of Allowance
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TAT	Technical Assistance Team
TACAIR	Tactical Air Support
TC	Training Center
TCMD	Transportation Control & Movement Document
TDY	Temporary Duty
TF	Territorial Forces
THAI AM	Thai American
TL	Province Road
TM	Technical Manual
TMDE	Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
TMS	Training Management Center
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOW	Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Missile

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TSC	Tandem Switching Center
TSN	Tan Son Nhut
TTB	Technical Translation Branch
TWV	Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
UB	Utility Boat
UHT	Undergraduate Helicopter Training
UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training
US	Unites States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USN	United States Navy
VAA	Vietnamese Army Arsenal
VARS	Visual Air Reconnaissance Search
VC	Viet Cong
VDA	Vietnam Dredging Agency
VDP	Vehicle Deadlined, Parts
VN	Vietnamese
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNAF-LS	Vietnamese Air Force Language School
VNMA	Vietnamese Military Academy
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNA	Vietnamese Naval Academy
VNNLSC	Vietnamese Navy Logistic Support Center
VNNSC	Vietnamese Navy Supply Center

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VNNSY	Vietnamese Navy Ship Yard
WHEC	High Endurance Cutter
WIA	Wounded in Action
WLV	Floating Radar Site
WPAFB	Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
WPB	Patrol Boat
YFR	Refrigerated Covered Lighter
YLLC	Salvage, Light Lift Craft
YOG	Yard Oiler
FR	Floating Repair
YRBM	Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge
YTL	Small Harbor Tug
YTM	Medium Harbor Tug
YW	Barge Water

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CHAPTER 1

THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. (S) NORTH VIETNAM:

a. North Vietnam (NVN) continues to receive economic aid from its Communist allies at a record-setting pace. The high level of imports noted in the first quarter 1974 continued in the second quarter. In April and May, imports totaled 647,000 metric tons (MT):

Food	268,000
Fertilizer	40,000
POL	88,000
General	<u>251,000</u>
	647,000 MT

A preliminary estimate indicates that approximately 180,000 tons of cargo were delivered to NVN by sea in June, while an estimate on overland imports for that month is not presently available.

b. Imports have steadily increased since the January 1973 Ceasefire and will probably reach a new high in 1974, surpassing the record 2.7 million tons imported in 1973. Reasons for the increase are:

- (1) Cessation of U.S. air campaign .
- (2) Neutralisation of mines blocking major ports .
- (3) Dredging of Haiphong's main shipping channel, permitting large vessels to enter the port.
- (4) NVN's greater need for materiel to aid in reconstruction and development.

c. North Vietnamese officials continue to emphasize the reconstruction and development tasks during 1974 and 1975:

Hoc Tap Editorial: "During the two years of economic restoration and development (1974-1975), we must mobilize and organize the social labor forces to carry out production, practice economy and increase the production rate of the society and of each economic

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branch and unit so that it is equal to or higher than the top rate achieved in 1965 and 1971. We must strive to rapidly increase the total volume of social products and then accumulate capital. Meanwhile, we must properly meet the requirements for supporting the Southern revolution."

It should be noted, however, that Hanoi also makes it clear that support to the "Southern revolution" will continue.

d. A government reorganization designed to facilitate reconstruction and development is currently underway. The following changes have brought about a fundamental restructuring of the government aimed at creating an institutional framework to direct economic reconstruction and development programs:

(1) Appointment of three new Vice-Premiers to direct economy-related ministries.

(2) Appointment of two "old" Vice-Premiers to economy related ministerial positions.

(3) Grouping of economy related ministries into "blocs" directly supervised by Vice-Premiers.

e. The changes began in April 1974 with the naming of three new Vice-Premiers: Phan Trong Tue; Dang Viet Chau; Tran Huu Duc, and the appointment of two other Vice-Premiers: Le Thanh Nghi, Chairman, State Planning Commission; and Nguyen Con, Minister of Machinery and Metallurgy, to important ministerial positions, and the dismissal of Hoang Anh as Chairman of the Central Agricultural Commission.

(1) Economy related ministries have been grouped into "blocs" directed by Vice-Premiers. The three new Vice-Premiers, for example, have been given responsibility for these "super" ministries:

(a) Phan Trong Tue: Light industry, communications and transportation, power and coal, possibly materiel .

(b) Dang Viet Chau: Foreign trade, international trade, finance and the National Bank.

(c) Tran Huu Duc: Public Security, interior, state inspection commission, possibly labor.

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Other pre-April 1974 DRV Vice-Premiers are: Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minister; Nguyen Duy Trinh, Foreign Affairs Minister; and Do Muoi, Construction Minister.

f. Pham Trong Tue, a Central Committee Member and Major General in the NVA specializing in logistics, was elevated from Minister of Communications to head his new "superministry". Dang Viet Chau was moved up from Minister of Finance and is not known to hold an important party position, suggesting, perhaps, that his expertise in financial affairs is more highly valued than party credentials. Tran Huu Duc, a Central Committee Member and ministerial level assistant to the Prime Minister, also directed the recent national census. Even before the public announcement of his elevation to head the so-called "Internal Block", he spoke out authoritatively against mismanagement, corruption and waste. The designation of a Vice-Premier to direct ministries charged with maintaining law and order underscores Hanoi's efforts to deal effectively with corruption and other disciplinary problems.

g. In some cases, lines of authority are not clear, as the exact subordination of several ministries is uncertain. Additional appointments can be expected, as several ministerial positions were vacated by the recent personnel changes, and a more comprehensive and precise picture of the reorganization will probably appear. Nevertheless, the changes that have occurred clearly indicate an attempt to more closely control and manage the North's formidable reconstruction and development tasks.

Economy related ministries have been formed into groups directly under Vice-Premiers, who will have wide responsibility and authority in pursuing reconstruction and development goals. This will result in greater centralized control and improved coordination between almost thirty ministerial level agencies which, in the past, operated independently and often in conflict with each other.

h. Hanoi's most serious immediate economic problem is agriculture, as can be seen in this Nhan Dan editorial (4 June 1974):

"Because the area of our cultivable land is small,

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our population density is high, and our need for grain is very great, we must highly value every inch of grain, considering it as an inch of gold. We must not let any piece of land remain uncultivated anywhere."

i. North Vietnam has never been self-sufficient in food production, but this perennial problem has been aggravated by an especially poor 10th-month rice harvest last year. The problem-plagued 5th-month crop now being harvested is expected to provide little relief, as also noted in a Nhan Dan editorial (4 June 1974):

"The plan for cultivating all the allotted area has not been fulfilled, because several tens of thousands of hectares of rice fields were not transplanted on schedule. Also, due to the unfavorable weather, the yield of secondary crops has failed to fulfill plan targets and is lower than in previous years. For this reason, although the rice in many areas has developed fairly well, the total yield of rice and secondary crops will surely not be very high."

j. Furthermore, the late harvest of this crop is interfering with preparations for the 10th-month crop, which normally accounts for 60 to 70 per cent of the total rice production. This situation was reported over Hanoi radio broadcasts:

(1) Hanoi Radio (20 June 1974): "...as of 20 June, provinces in the North had completed harvesting about half of the 5th-month spring rice crop. By the same time last year, provinces in the North had basically completed the harvest."

(2) Hanoi Radio (21 June 1974): "...the time available for harvesting the 5th-month spring rice and preparing for the 10th-month crop is limited. Therefore, far more intensive efforts must be exerted than in the past."

k. Food supply problems already exist in the western provinces and the lower panhandle, and grain reserves are being depleted, as evidenced in this Nhan Dan editorial (18 June 1974):

"In the recent period between two crops, only by using its grain reserves did our state succeed in giving timely and efficient assistance to the peasants."

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1. Hanoi is taking measures to deal with the problem, including reducing military rations, cracking down on waste and corruption, and increasing imports, as reflected below.

NVN FOOD IMPORTS (Thousand Metric Tons)

<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
798	755	660	616	745	995

m. As indicated, NVN imported almost one million tons of food last year -- a record -- and monthly food imports averages so far this year exceed last year's monthly average. The current measures initiated by Hanoi and the apparent willingness of its allies to supply additional food should prevent the development of a crisis.

2. (S) INFILTRATION.

a. During the third week of April, the NVA began Phase II of its 1973-1974 dry-season infiltration effort. During this phase, infiltration was greatly reduced. Dispatching of regular combat groups to the B-3 Front and COSVN ceased. The Phase II infiltration effort concentrates primarily on dispatching replacement personnel to the northern areas of RVN. This developing infiltration pattern closely follows the onset of the southwest monsoon period, during which time infiltration to the B-3 Front and COSVN is hampered by poor road conditions.

b. The following is the current infiltration arrival totals compared with the corresponding period last year:

<u>Month</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1973</u>
January	7,000	12,500
February	21,500	5,300
March	9,400	20,900
April	16,250	15,500
May	20,750	4,600
June	2,900	2,000
July	100	300
August	-	100
Total	77,900	61,200

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<u>Area</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1973</u>
DMZ/MRTT	900	19,300
MR-5	15,000	7,400
B-3 Front	16,000	9,900
COSVN	<u>46,000</u>	<u>24,600</u>
Total	77,900	61,200

c. The exfiltration of Communist forces continued during the second quarter, but at a rate much lower than during the first quarter:

January	13,600
February	13,900
March	8,000
April	3,400
May	4,600
June	<u>1,700</u>
Total	45,200

3. (S) AIR AND AIR DEFENSE:

a. Over the past year the NVN air and air defense forces have been steadily expanding and improving their capability. Recent developments include the following:

- (1) Dispersal of aircraft .
- (2) Renovation of airfields .
- (3) Southward deployment of aircraft .
- (4) Establishment and improvement of air defense alert facilities.

b. Deployment of aircraft from traditional home bases has allowed NVN to disperse its force while recent MIG shifts seemed designed to enhance NVAF operating capabilities. Aircraft have been gradually deployed into the southern panhandle. Presently, Bai Thuong as well as Vinh and Dong Hoi Airfields have Ground Control Intercept (GCI) facilities. In addition, Bai Thuong has recently been afforded SA-2 protection and Vinh could very well receive similar protection.

c. The present MIG OB in NVN consists of 72 MIG-21's, 71 MIG-19's, and 113 MIG-15/17's. The majority

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of more than 250 jets in the enemy's inventory are combat operational and flown for the most part by experienced and well-trained pilots.

d. In air defense developments, the NVN continue to consolidate command and control and expand their air defense capability southward. NVN also has taken steps to improve air defense alert facilities. These improvements have consisted of the following:

- (1) Establishment of visual observer battalions.
- (2) Establishment of an alert system by rear service units.
- (3) Establishment of an alert system by air defense units.

e. Visual observer battalions provide early warning and tracking data to air defense units. Since early 1973, some 19 battalions, previously subordinate to the 368th Air Defense Division in NVN, have been reassigned to the 673rd Division at Khe Sanh and deployed throughout northern MR-1 and adjoining areas of Laos. An air defense alert network has been established by AD units and rear service entities located through northern MR-1. If properly implemented, the alert system should provide timely data to facilitate necessary precautions against air strikes and preparations to engage VNAF aircraft.

f. Enemy air defense units have the following weapons and equipment in their inventory:

Guns

- * 12.7mm (D-SH-K)
- * 14.5mm (ZPU-1, 2 and 4)
- * 23mm (ZU-23)
- 23mm (ZSU-23-4)
- 30mm (M53)
- * 37mm (M1939)
- * 57mm (560)
- * 85mm (KS-12 and M1939-M1944)
- * 100mm (KS19M2)

Missiles

- * SA-2 (Guideline)
- SA-3 (GOA)
- * SA-7 (Grail)

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Radars

* Firecan (AAA Fire Control)
* Whiff (AAA Fire Control)
* Fansong (Missile Control)
* Spoonrest (Early Warning)
* Kniferest (Early Warning)
Flatface (Early Warning)
Lowblow (Missile Control)
Gundish (AAA Fire Control)
* Sidenet (Height Finder)
Talking (Early Warning)
Flapwheel (AAA Fire Control)
Barlock (Early Warning)
Slotrest (Early Warning)
Bigbar (Early Warning)
Rock/Stonecake (Height Finder)

* Confirmed In-Country

g. Aerial photography confirmed a SAM site some 11 KM east of Khe Sanh, extending the SAM threat to Quang Tri City. In addition, the province has AA threat which includes 18 AAA regiments. A total of approximately 1,000 AA guns and 100 SA-2 missiles are currently concentrated in Quang Tri (P). In the remainder of MR-1, the enemy's air defense threat is represented by the 545th and 571st AAA Regiments with most guns concentrated along the Route 14 logistical complex. These two units control some 100 guns ranging in size from 12.7mm to at least 57mm.

h. Further south, in MR-2, four AAA units with some 200 guns are also deployed along the Route 14 complex. These units have guns ranging in size from 12.7mm to 100mm.

i. Since the ceasefire, Communist forces have been improving their AA capability in MR-3 by adding new units and equipment and by increased training. Current enemy AA OB in MR-3 consists of the 377th AAA Division and three subordinate AA regiments (71st, 210th and 262nd). The enemy has significantly improved his AA posture with the addition of radar-controlled 57mm AA guns. [The addition of radar control to the 57mm AA guns will increase the tactical AA altitude capability of this weapon from about 12-13,000 feet to approximately 19,600,] and doubles the enemy's first strike capability.

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j. In the past six months several new AA threat areas have been confirmed in MR-3, and the most significant of which is in western Hau Nghia Province and SW Tay Ninh Province. Since 1 January 1974, seven aircraft have been lost to SA-7 and light AA fire in this area. VNAF pilots also have confirmed 23mm and 37mm AA fire and have indicated the possibility of 57mm in the area. Two other new areas of AA concentration in Binh Tuy Province along the Long Khanh and Lam Dong Province borders have been noted in the region.

k. Since the January 1973 Ceasefire, enemy gunners have shot down 84 VNAF aircraft:

<u>Aircraft Type</u>	<u>Weapon System</u>	
	AAA	SA-7
AC47	1	-
RC47	1	-
A1	0	5
A37	3	5
O1	7	-
CH47	1	2
UH1	46	3
F5	7	1
C47	-	-
AC119K	-	1
O2	1	-
Total	67	17

l. To date, only three U.S. aircraft and one civil aircraft have been downed while one manned and two unmanned U.S. flights and two civil aircraft have been hit. The enemy's record is somewhat poor, given the number of VNAF air operations and the number of shoot-down attempts. On the other hand, he has not yet employed his radar-controlled, heavy AAA against VNAF. The enemy has, however, achieved these results:

(1) Prohibited VNAF operations over major enemy complexes.

(2) Forced VNAF to increase flight altitudes, thereby limiting the effectiveness of airstrikes, logistical resupply and reconnaissance.

m. Meanwhile, he is improving his capability through the following actions:

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- (1) Streamlining command and control.
- (2) Integrating AAA and SA-7 threats.
- (3) Adding increasingly sophisticated weapons systems.
- (4) Adding early warning radars and visual/aural observer units to air defense forces.
- (5) Holding conferences to exchange experiences.
- (6) Training in combined arms operations.

n. Regarding enemy-held airfields in South Vietnam, recent information indicates there are now 14 considered suitable for use by NVN aircraft: Khe Sanh, Mai Loc, Ba Long, Hau Duc, Ben Het, Dak To, Poley Kleng, Plei Djereng, Duc Co, Bu Prang, Bu Dop, Loc Ninh, Thien Ngon and Minh Thanh. Thirteen of these fields are suitable for use by light to medium transports and helicopters, while Khe Sanh is considered suitable for use by jet aircraft. Seven of the airfields -- Khe Sanh, Ba Long, Hau Duc, Dak To, Duc Co, Loc Ninh and Thien Ngon -- have been improved or renovated by the NVA.

o. While photography has not confirmed NVN aircraft using airfields in SVN, there have been numerous reports of helicopters and light transports on liaison missions.

4. (S) LOGISTICS:

a. Enemy Stockpiles: In January, throughout South Vietnam, the enemy had enough ammunition and supplies to launch and support a major offensive similar to his 1972 effort for over a year. Throughout the first six months of this year, the NVN continued to move large quantities of supplies into SVN. Over 140,000 tons of supplies of all classes have entered SVN this year. The large input of supplies, coupled with low expenditures, has increased the stockpiles. It is estimated that since the first of the year, ammunition shipments into the NVN panhandle have averaged about 3,500 tons per month, or about 15% of the total tonnage of supplies shipped into RVN each month. We believe that if only 3% of the total goods shipped to SVN consists of ammunition, the stockpiles would be growing significantly. In summary, although a firm estimate is not possible, we believe that ammunition shipments into South Vietnam

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exceed current enemy expenditures and thereby augment existing stockpiles.

b. Enemy Logistics Network:

(1) North Vietnam's road, rail and waterway transportation systems, though concentrated in the Red River Delta region and along the southern coast, extend to all major population and economic areas.

(2) The most important international connections are by sea. Between 90% and 95% of import cargo moves through Haiphong, then via well-developed road, rail and inland waterway connections to Hanoi -- NVN's transportation center. Two other major ports -- Hon Gay and Cam Pha -- serve primarily as coal export ports. There are numerous minor ports and coastal transshipment points. The most important of these -- Ben Thuy, Quang Khe, Dong Hoi and Dong Ha -- are used to supply NVA forces in South Vietnam. Although some ocean-going international merchant ships call directly at these ports, most cargo is delivered from the Haiphong area by small NVN coastal freighters.

(3) Inland waterways constitute an important medium for short and long haul transport. The inland waterway network totals over 4,000 miles and is heavily travelled by over 30,000 barges, junks and sampans. Principal routes are concentrated in the delta region. These routes, with their tributaries, provide a dense waterway network which is connected to the southern panhandle by intra-coastal and coastal shipping routes.

(4) Hanoi is the hub of North Vietnam's rail system. From the capital city, main lines radiate NW, North, NE and South. The most densely populated regions, the most important industrial facilities, principal agricultural and mining areas, and the port of Haiphong are served by this system. The most important lines are the Northeast Line over which Chinese and Soviet aid goods are delivered, and the line running between Haiphong and Hanoi. Although severely damaged during U.S. air interdiction campaigns, repair work continues and all major lines are operational. The line which once ran from Vinh to South Vietnam has been unserviceable since the war with the French in the 1950's; however, flange-wheeled trucks are used to pull rolling stock for short distances along portions of the track. The NVN are apparently intent on revitalizing the southern line, as they are constructing railroad facilities both north and south of Dong Hoi. Reconstruc-

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tion of the line south from Vinh to the DMZ, or possibly even into Quang Tri Province, will enhance the North's all-weather logistic support of Communist-held areas in the South.

(5) The basic pattern of the NVN road system centers on the major cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, from which routes extend radially to remote areas and with China, Laos and SVN. The major N-S Line (Route 1A) extends from the China border to Quang Tri Province. The condition and maintenance of the system is uneven. Many roads are in poor condition with movement and speed restricted by a variety of physical bottlenecks and by seasonal flooding. Roads, although a very important means of transportation, serve primarily as short-haul feeders to rail and water transport and, in this context, they are adequate. In effect, NVN has a multimode transportation system which, though poorly developed, adequately supports the requirements of the economy and the war in the South.

(6) Since the 1973 Ceasefire and bombing halt in Laos, the NVA has been expediting construction of strategic supply lines from NVN to COSVN in GVN MR-3 that would be free of effects of the monsoon seasons.

(7) During the Laotian dry season, from October to May, the NVA can concentrate movement of supplies and infiltration groups from NVN to the B-3 Front and COSVN via dual lane highways in southern Laos and in RVN. This route consists of portions of the old Laotian "Ho Chi Minh Trail" plus newly constructed segments and has been under development for over a year. Traffic then moves through the tri-border area to Route 14 and then South to COSVN. During the SW monsoon wet season, June to October, the NVA shifts most of its south-bound truck traffic through RVN on Route 14 between the DMZ and the tri-border area.

(8) Although the system does not yet have an all-weather year-round capability for throughput traffic, the use of a shuttle system permits continued movement, albeit at a reduced level. The NVA has begun asphalt paving portions of Route 9 west of Dong Ha. Working from an asphalt mixing plant on Route 9, the NVA will probably attempt to pave much of its strategic road system.

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(9) To support the logistic flow, the NVA is continuing to extend its POL pipeline system. A new 4-mile segment was observed on photography 35 miles SW of Pleiku. If the NVA continues its current rate of construction, the pipeline should reach northern MR-3 by September or October. The NVA would then have two full months to build storage and distribution facilities before the start of the next dry season's expected logistical and infiltration push to the B-3 Front and COSVN. The extension of the pipeline into MR-3 will facilitate refueling operations and reduce infiltration travel times. In addition, the NVA continues to construct major POL storage facilities in its rear areas. To support traffic along Route 14, the NVA is expected to complete the POL system inside RVN by connecting the pipeline from the A Shau Valley to the tri-border area, giving the NVA a POL system which complements both the S. Laos and Route 14 main logistic routes.

(10) At the time of the Ceasefire, men and materiel were moved into MR-1 via a number of infiltration routes from NVN and Laos. Since that time, the route structure has been greatly improved by construction of new roads and upgrading of existing trails and feeder routes. In developing an alternative in-country logistics system to complement the traditional Laos infiltration system, the enemy has constructed large logistics complexes along major arteries. The most important of these are at Dong Ha, Khe Sanh, the A Shau Valley, Ben Giang and Kham Duc. Large amounts of materiel are now funneled both by sea to the Port of Dong Ha and by overland routes to supply areas for further distribution to field units.

(11) In Quang Tri Province, the route system and base complexes support a force structure consisting of some 35 regiments (including AA) and 50-55,000 combat personnel. Farther South, Routes 547 and 548, along with a recently-constructed route, facilitate the flow of materiel from the A Shau Valley to the 324B Division and supporting elements totalling 15-17,000 combat personnel in nine regiments. In Quang Nam Province, Route 614, recently extended, along with two newly constructed and improved routes, provide logistic support for enemy Front 4 elements operating south of Danang. These forces consist of 1 AAA regiment and 17 infantry battalions with approximately 4-5,000 personnel. In Quang Tin Province, Route 534 and various branch routes provide a logistics corridor that connects both with the Laos Corridor and

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NVA Route 14. These routes serve the NVA 2nd Division, which operates primarily in the Que Son Valley. Supporting the division are independent armor, artillery and AA regiments and four independent battalions. Total enemy strength in the area is estimated at 12-15,000 personnel. Finally, Route 9662 constitutes the backbone of a series of routes leading into Quang Ngai Province to support the 52nd Brigade and 8 independent battalions with some 7-8,000 personnel operating throughout the Province. This system is also a primary corridor for materiel destined for the An Lao Valley in Binh Dinh Province.

(12) In MR-2, since the January 1973 Ceasefire, the enemy has relocated his logistics system almost completely in-country from Cambodia, significantly upgraded his South Laos road system, and expanded his east-west corridors within the region. As an extension of this in-country development, the enemy has also constructed large open logistics complexes to support his forces in the principal threat areas.

(13) The upgraded and improved main road system through South Laos is the principal artery supplying the western highlands through the tri-border area. In Kontum Province, the road system captured by the enemy, during the 1972 offensive has been upgraded. The Post-Ceasefire development of the Dak To open logistics site provides support for the 10th NVA Division and associated B-3 Front elements totaling 10-12,000 personnel, in seven regiments. Additionally, the in-country Route 14 complex is being upgraded and will probably play a greater role in supporting the forces in Kontum and Pleiku in the future.

(14) In Pleiku Province, the enemy continues to use and upgrade the traditional Route 615 complex along the RVN/Khmer border. This system, as well as the extended Route 14 complex, feeds the Duc Co open logistic site, which, in turn, supports the 320th NVA Division and associated B-3 Front elements in Pleiku, totaling 10-12,000 personnel in seven regiments.

(15) Farther south, the enemy has developed a new in-country extension of the Route 14 complex through Darlac and along the Quang Duc border into COSVN. An upgraded feeder line supports the 25th NVA Regiment in central Darlac. Total enemy combat personnel and 546th AA Regiment strength in the area is estimated at 4-5,000 men.

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(16) Enemy external logistics support for Binh Dinh Province is largely funneled through Route 514 from MR-1. New East-West links are being established between the highlands and the coastal provinces. In Binh Dinh, the An Lao open logistics site supports the 3rd NVA Division and associated province unit forces totaling 8-10,000 personnel. Virtually all major LOC's in the region, with the exception of some of the newer east-west links, will at least seasonally support vehicular traffic.

(17) In MR-3, the majority of personnel infiltrated and logistics now enter the region via the Route 14 complex in Phuoc Long Province and are dispersed southward over branch routes to major storage areas in northern MR-3. These logistical centers directly support approximately 12,000 combat personnel in the northern areas. Lesser amounts of supplies, which are mainly procured in Cambodia, also enter Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces on Route 7 and 13.

(18) East of Route 13, a series of feeder routes originating from Bu Dop, Bu Gia Map and Loc Ninh carry supplies primarily to the 7th NVA Division and forward base areas to support a total force of approximately 14,000 personnel.

(19) In Central MR-3, supplies are transported from the center of the enemy's logistical network at Loc Ninh and from storage areas in Katum and Thien Ngon to the Minh Thanh/Michelin Base, a major logistical and training center which serves as a rear base for the 9th NVA Division and other enemy units in central MR-3 which total 9,500-10,000 men. The area is a vital link in the continuous flow of supplies to front line units in Binh Duong, northern Hau Nghia and southwest Tay Ninh provinces.

(20) Enemy forces in central and southern Tay Ninh Province receive logistical support from base areas at Katum, Xa Mat, Thien Ngon and Lo Go, and from the Michelin area.

(21) The nature of the Delta's terrain, with its inland waterways, necessitated the formation of a logistical system distinct from the other three military regions. The major logistics corridors generally follow inland waterways. Normally, only personnel and war materiel are moved down this system, since rice and other provisions are procured locally. From the major base areas in northern MR-3, supplies are moved by water and

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road to Meas (WT7379), Cambodia, which is a major terminal station. From Meas, supplies are sent down two branch routes to the border areas.

(22) Communist forces in the Parrot's Beak feed off this line, although they also receive some supplies from routes running along the Tay Ninh/Cambodian border. In the upper delta, the major logistical networks are corridors 1-A and 1-B. These networks support a force of some 14,000 including the units in the Parrot's Beak. The desire to have secure infiltration routes into Dinh Tuong, and the need to reestablish a new base area at the southern terminus, following RVNAF interdiction of Tri Phap, have been major causes for much of the activity in this area.

(23) In the western half of the Delta, the major route is corridor 1-C. Although the GVN was successful in significantly reducing the major enemy base area in the Seven Mountains area last fall, elements of the 101st NVA Regiment have established a new base area to the west. Differences with their KC counterparts have often resulted in blocked supply lines in the past; however, a high level KC/NVA agreement has apparently been reached, giving the Vietnamese Communists rights of passage through southeastern Cambodia. At this juncture, no significant problems disrupting the mutually profitable arrangement have been noted. If enemy intentions to expand territorial control succeed in the extreme lower delta, the Communists will be able to establish a much more secure logistical network and supply system. This would conveniently interface with seaborne offloading and greatly assist in ironing out periodic shortages.

(24) All available evidence indicates that offshore offloading is taking place, albeit a distinct second to overland routes as an avenue of supply. Despite numerous reports, this activity is almost impossible to detect, and VNN counter-measures are limited due to the thousands of coastal fishing craft and relative paucity of VNN patrol and search craft. In summary, the NVN have developed a highly effective all-weather supply system using rail, trucks, boats and manpower to move goods, primarily of Russian and Chinese origins, from Hanoi to Ca Mau.

5. (S) ENEMY OBJECTIVES:

- a. Concerning enemy objectives, the Communists

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continue to strive toward the overall goal of unifying Vietnam under their control. We estimate that they will eventually be forced to resort to a primarily military option to achieve this goal. Intermediate Communist objectives emphasize the following:

- (1) Reconstruction and redevelopment in NVN.
- (2) Improvement in combat capability in both SVN and NVN.
- (3) Rebuilding of infrastructure and political organization in SVN.

Accomplishment of these objectives requires actions to exacerbate GVN political, economic, and military problems.

b. In March 1974, COSVN Directive 1-74 provided specific guidance for the first half of this year:

- (1) Stand firm near GVN controlled areas.
- (2) Destroy GVN population and resettlement plans.
- (3) Regain lost territories.
- (4) Develop a population base in "liberated" areas.
- (5) Concentrate attacks on sensitive GVN facilities.
- (6) Develop party and infrastructure.
- (7) Motivate the masses and troops to a heightened awareness.

c. Subsequent amplification of COSVN guidance indicated that a period of heightened combat activity was to occur. Initial reporting indicated that this activity was to occur from April to June while subsequent reporting indicated a May to September time period. The apparent initial implementation of this guidance was a series of attacks, most notably in western MR-3, to regain lost territories and, according to the Communist propaganda line, to force the GVN to implement the ceasefire accords "correctly." Western MR-3 was a good choice for an initial effort, since the attacks would support a near-term military objective: Forge a corridor into Dinh Tuong Province to facilitate the infiltration of personnel

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to refill depleted units. These attacks were initially unsuccessful and the subsequent ARVN operation into Cambodia has made future successful attacks there unlikely. This significant increase in combat in MR-3 caused some alarm concerning a possible widespread increase in activity. Nonetheless, despite the dramatic improvements in the Communists' military capability, their guidance still emphasizes that they are not yet strong enough to defeat the GVN. The setbacks in April apparently reinforced this point.

d. Several recent reports allude to an apparent change in emphasis for military actions in MR-3 to counter RVNAF initiatives. Reportedly, the objectives are not to "liberate" or "regain" more territory immediately. Rather, they are to inflict heavy casualties on troops and to disrupt the GVN's goals for 1974:

- (1) Improve territorial security.
- (2) Consolidate political strength.
- (3) Build economic strength.
- (4) Ameliorate social ills.

e. Attacks are to be made primarily against outposts in the contested areas, although enemy plans to penetrate deep into GVN areas to overrun targets and quickly pull out also have been reported. Enemy planning apparently calls for constant attacks against the GVN, designed to attrite both RVNAF personnel and materiel. Meanwhile, stress on improving Communist weaknesses, especially the infrastructure, continues.

6. (S) MILITARY REGION WRAP-UPS:

a. It is within the framework of attriting RVNAF, disrupting the GVN's four goals and improving the Communist position that current enemy activity should be judged. The probable impact of certain recent RVNAF successes against main force units, especially in the Parrot's Beak and in the northern Delta must also be taken into account. These successes had tipped the momentum in favor of RVNAF in MR-3. A short analysis of activity by region may further illustrate the varying implementation of current enemy guidance.

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b. MR-1:

(1) In MR-1, the Communists have been able to tie down ARVN and inflict casualties, threaten key LOC's and disrupt pacification efforts at a fairly minimal cost. Meanwhile, improvement in their military capability continues and activities to accomplish certain other objectives, such as improved access into GVN territories necessary for political development and rebuilding the infrastructure, continue.

(2) Scattered fighting continued throughout the region during the past quarter and there are indications of increased activity in the future. The fighting around Hill 300 and, more recently, along the Song Bo is related to NVA attempts to extend LOC's to the GVN lowlands. The enemy is attempting to reestablish its infrastructure in GVN areas as well as to establish observation posts close to GVN population and military centers. Farther south the GVN pacification and resettlement program has been the primary target in the Ky Tra/Tien Phuoc areas of Quang Tin Province as well as coastal districts of Quang Ngai. Increased activity can be expected during the coming weeks as the NVA/VC realign their forces to meet these problems and exploit RVNAF troop redeployments. Rallier statements and a recently captured document indicate near term intensification of attacks. Outposts on LOC's leading to the coastal Delta, choke points on GVN LOC's and logistical installations will receive the brunt of enemy efforts.

(3) In recent months, a major command and control change has become apparent for NVA forces in northern MR-1. Previously MRTTH and MR-4/B-5 Front were the principal command authorities for NVA/VC forces in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces; MRTTH was apparently disbanded. This move probably reflected the following NVA thinking:

(a) Annexation of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces into NVN.

(b) Streamlining command and control of military forces.

(4) Militarily, the existence of two major headquarters in Quang Tri and Thua Thien was superfluous, so B-5 Front assumed control of military units.

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Collateral reporting at the time indicated that the Communists named this area the Binh-Tri-Thien Inter-region in early '73. Subsequently, the B-5 Front was redesignated MR Tri Thien.

(5) The above changes in NVN command and control in MR-1 provide these apparent advantages for the NVA:

(a) Streamlined and integrated command and control over NVA/VC military forces.

(b) Centralized political authority.

(c) Centralized authority to direct the development of the "liberated areas" of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces as parts of NVN.

(6) The current enemy threat in MR-1 is as follows:

Divisions	4 (+1 AD)
Regiments	30 (+21 AD)
Brigades	1
Battalions	194 (+ 79AD)
Combat	95-105,000
Admin Services	30-35,000
Guerrillas	5-10,000
Total	130-150,000

Armor	355-385
Artillery (122/130MM)	288-324

(7) Enemy short-term intentions in MR-1 are summarized as follows:

(a) Counter ARVN pacification and resettlement programs.

(b) Continue developing logistics base.

(c) Harass and pin down ARVN in defensive positions.

(d) Eliminate exposed ARVN outposts.

(e) Take back areas lost to GVN.

(f) Attempt to expand and develop "liberated areas".

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c. MR-2:

(1) Enemy activity in MF. During the past quarter has been characterized by efforts to protect and develop LOC's and base areas in the lowlands and renewed limited attacks in the coastal area. In the highlands, attacks since mid-May against isolated GVN outposts at Dak Pek in Kontum Province and Tieu Atar in Darlac Province have removed GVN presence in enemy rear areas near vital LOC's. The enemy in Kontum Province has also reacted vigorously to RVNAF threats to logistics centers and LOC's north and northeast of Kontum City. The 10th NVA Division and associated B-3 Front elements are currently massed north of the city. Since 24 May, these forces have blunted an RVNAF push toward their forward supply center at Vo Dinh. In the coastal lowlands, following six months of relative inactivity, the enemy in Binh Dinh Province initiated limited attacks during May designed to challenge GVN territorial and population control. Such efforts thus far have not met with notable success.

(2) During June, enemy activity decreased somewhat in the three principal threat areas. In the highlands, anticipated attacks against GVN outposts in Kontum and Pleiku provinces have not materialized. In Kontum Province, the threat to the isolated outposts at Mang Buk and Chuong Nghia seems to have receded for the present. NVA 10th Division and associated B-3 Front elements continue to oppose RVNAF south of Vo Dinh. Proposed shifts in RVNAF forces and tactics may presage a near-term increase in enemy activity in the area. In Pleiku Province, attacks by the 320th NVA Division elements against GVN outposts SW of Pleiku City have been expected since mid-May. Although low-level reporting continues to indicate attacks in the near future, indicators such as forward deployment of major headquarters have not been noted.

(3) In the coastal lowlands, the enemy highpoint evident during May has subsided. Binh Dinh Provincial Units continue to resist RVNAF clearing operations in Phu My and Phu Cat Districts, but have relinquished control of most of the populated areas seized during May. Most NVA 3rd Division elements have pulled back from Tam Quan and Binh Khe Districts; however, the 141st Regiment has been confirmed in contact recently in Hoai Nhon District for the first time since its return to Binh Dinh.

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(4) OB developments during April included the probable resubordination of the 9th Regiment, 968th Division to the 320th Division in Pleiku and the probable deployment of the T-29th Sapper Regiment back to GVN MR-3 from Quang Duc (P). In June, an element operating in support of the 320th NVA Division in Pleiku Province was identified as the suspected 54th Artillery Regiment. The regimental headquarters, located SW of Pleiku City, is subordinate to the B-3 Front. A possible 54th Artillery Regiment was initially identified in March 1972 in Kontum Province, but was only recently confirmed. Recent sources have referenced a "Lam Dong" Artillery Regiment supporting the 320th Division. DAO Saigon accepts the 54th Artillery Regiment, with a possible cover designator of "Lam Dong". Further South, reporting in early June indicated the 205th Regiment had redeployed to GVN MR-3 from Quang Duc Province. Ralliers and PW's reported the movement of the 205th to Tay Ninh, confirming earlier reports that elements of the regiment have moved back to northern MR-3, after more than six months duty in Quang Duc.

(5) For the near-term, enemy activity in the region will probably continue at current levels. Major attacks against Kontum and Pleiku City are not expected. The pattern of contacts and ABF's evident north of Kontum City and west and SW of Pleiku City is likely to continue. In Binh Dinh Province, the enemy is expected to continue to resist RVNAF clearing operations and to harass LOC's and populated areas in an effort to challenge GVN territorial and population control.

(6) Current enemy strength in the region is as follows:

Divisions	3
Regiments	16 (+ 4 AD)
Battalions	128 (+ 12 AD)
Combat Pers	40-45,000
Admin Services	15-20,000
Guerrillas	5-10,000
Total	60-75,000
Armor	115-135
Artillery (122/130MM)	60-75

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d. MR-3:

(1) In MR-3, Communist forces are trying to implement recent COSVN guidance. Following the 5th NVA Division's unsuccessful and costly attacks in April and May to free enemy logistics corridors into Dinh Tuong, 7th and 9th NVA Division forces initiated a series of attacks in Binh Duong Province in mid-May. Available intelligence indicates these enemy objectives:

(a) Inflict heavy casualties on RVNAF.

(b) Arrest GVN progress in consolidating its political and military strength in contested areas.

(c) Halt ARVN momentum achieved by a series of recent operations in MR-3.

(d) Consolidate military and political strength in contested areas of MR-3.

(e) Test combined arms training.

(2) In April, enemy forces forced RVNAF to abandon Tonle Cham and Chi Linh outposts. Such operations are in accordance with COSVN instructions to eliminate all isolated GVN positions. Additionally, both outposts were situated along important Communist supply corridors.

(3) In the SW part of the region, military activity in April remained centered around Duc Hue Ranger Outpost and in northern Hau Nghia (P). Following the initial ground assault against Duc Hue, the enemy conducted frequent bombardments with mortars, rockets, and artillery against this outpost and other GVN outposts in the area. Ralliers indicated that elements of the 5th Division were planning to renew the attacks in western Hau Nghia. At the time it appeared that the 174th and 275th Regiments may have been preparing to attack; however, they probably were pulling out to avoid the planned GVN pre-emptive operation west of Duc Hue. The 275th Regiment evidently pulled out to initiate attacks on the GVN outpost of Long Khot. This leaves elements of the 6th Regiment, probably supported by elements of the 75th Artillery Group, in the Parrot's Beak west of Duc Hue defending against the RVNAF penetration. For the present time, the RVNAF pre-emptive operation into Cambodia has spoiled the 5th Division's plans for Hau Nghia; however, it appears they will continue their effort to secure supply corridors

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into MR-4 through Kien Tuong.

(4) In the southeast part of the region, activity has been concentrated along Route 2 on the Long Khanh/Phuoc Tuy Province border. The 274th and 33rd NVA Regiments are conducting attacks to gain control of contested areas, secure supply and commo-liaison routes running between Hat Dich and May Tao Secret Zone and to tie down ARVN forces.

(5) During May, two regiments from the 9th Division (95C and 272D) conducted combined arms attacks against three company-sized outposts along TL-7 west of Ben Cat and forced the subsequent abandonment of all three camps. A destroyed T-54 tank was the first confirmed use of armor in MR-3 since the Ceasefire; however, the enemy reportedly sustained three additional tanks destroyed and one captured in the ARVN counter-attack. Enemy forces relied heavily on accurate artillery/mortar fire and mines to stall RVNAF attempts to regain control west of Ben Cat and to inflict casualties.

(6) In the Phu Giao area, the 209th and 165th Regiments, 7th NVA Division, attacked south of Phu Giao District Town, especially near the Song Be Bridge. Captured documents indicated that enemy plans called for the severing of all land LOC's into Phu Giao followed by an attack by another regiment, probably the 141st, against the district seat. Enemy attempts to isolate Phu Giao were unsuccessful and in these and subsequent attacks, the 209th and 165th Regiments suffered heavy casualties. Artillery elements continue to conduct attacks against GVN positions along 1-A. On 5 June elements of 165th Regiment were reported moving north towards Song Be Bridge. The 209th Regiment is reported moving into positions east of Ben Cat, and the 141st Regiment is reported moving west towards Route 13 north of Lai Khe.

(7) Enemy planning apparently calls for attacking RVNAF wherever they are vulnerable and it is possible that the Communists, who now have caused the commitment of most of ARVN, might use these units to strike other vulnerable targets. In addition, elements of the 271st Regiment, 9th NVA Division have now been moved into the Iron Triangle.

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(8) During June, the focus of attention remained west of Ben Cat where elements of the 9th NVA Division, supported by the 141st Regiment/7th NVA Division, continued to defend successfully against ARVN attempts to move back to Base 82 and Rach Bap. Enemy forces at Base 82 have been able to conduct a successful defense for these reasons:

- (a) Strong, well-prepared enemy defensive positions.
- (b) Accurate, heavy indirect fire against ARVN .
- (c) Enemy minefields.
- (d) Unfavorable terrain has limited ARVN's use of armor .
- (e) Weather and heavy AA fire have limited VNAF operations.

(9) ARVN was forced to halt the operation temporarily on 20 June in order to regroup, refit and re-deploy forces. This enabled the enemy to improve defensive positions, while also striking ARVN troop formations with accurate indirect fire. With this fire support, we estimate that a relatively small enemy force, perhaps three or four battalions, could put up a very strong defense. Indicators suggest that the 9th NVA Division will continue to defend Route 7, as long as the enemy believes that he is having a favorable psychological impact on RVNAF by inflicting high personnel and materiel losses.

(10) Elsewhere, enemy forces in southeast MR-3, taking advantage of a shift in the balance of power caused by the continued deployment of the 18th ARVN Division to Binh Duong Province, were fairly successful in implementing COSVN guidance to harass key LOC's and resettlement sites and to strike important GVN installations. The enemy successfully interdicted QL-1 near the Rung La Resettlement area for six days and established temporary road blocks along other portions of QL-1 and QL-20. Route 2 south of the Phuoc Tuy/Long Khanh border remains closed. Elements of the 274th NVA Regiment have occupied two hamlets southeast of Xuan Loc for the past three weeks and elements of the 445th LF Battalion were successful in occupying the Tam Phuoc Resettlement site in southern Phuoc Tuy for two days. The early June rocket attack against Bien Hoa Air Base highlighted attacks against GVN installations. Additionally, however,

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sappers attempted to enter both Long Binh and the Thanh Thuy Ha ammo depots and successfully attacked a training center near Bear Cat. A specialized urban area sapper command has reportedly been organized to strike the cities and major installations. By striking these types of targets, the Communists touch very sensitive political nerves of the GVN. Attacks on GVN installations, especially ammo and storage areas, can be expected to continue as the Communists try to exacerbate GVN problems.

(11) The Communists may feel that losses suffered in recent fighting were warranted. The increasing ARVN momentum of May has dissipated and the wear on ARVN is becoming evident. For example, in early April, infantry battalions in the 18th ARVN Division had nearly 600 men, whereas now these battalions have approximately 400 men. We estimate that enemy forces in MR-3 can continue the present level of action for two or three months without additional replacements from NVN.

(12) In April, the most significant OB change was the confirmation of the 27th Sapper Division with six regimental subordinates. This division probably consists of seven sapper regiments (113th, 115th, 117th, 119th 367A, 367B and the 429th). Previously the 429th Regiment was believed to have been involved in the Quang Duc operation prior to the deployment to the Minh Thanh area. The existence of a division headquarters does not significantly increase the total sapper strength in the region. It does, however, allow the enemy to enhance his combat capability through better consolidation and control of existing sapper assets.

(13) Another significant change in the MR-3 OB was the June arrival of the 262nd Air Defense Regiment in the Bu Dop area. This regiment operated in the Hanoi/Haiphong area prior to its deployment to MR-3 and is equipped with radar-controlled 57MM weapons. Recent photography confirms a new AA site in the Bu Dop area, probably belonging to the 262nd AA Regiment. The deployment of the 262nd Anti-aircraft Regiment to MR-3 now provides the enemy with three air defense regiments (71st, 210th and 262nd) plus four or five independent air defense battalions in MR-3.

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(14) The final OB change was confirmation of the 24th Artillery Regiment/75th Artillery Group. The unit, which reportedly infiltrated SVN in March of 1973, is located in northern Tay Ninh Province. It is equipped with 85MM, 122MM and 130MM field guns.

(15) Near term enemy intentions for the region appear to be as follows:

- (a) Recover land lost since the Ceasefire.
- (b) Continue pressure against isolated GVN positions.
- (c) Secure supply corridor to MR-4.
- (d) Continue attempts to expand control in contested areas.
- (e) Increase harassment of resettlement areas.

(16) The enemy force structure in MR-3 is as follows:

Divisions	5 (+ 1 AD)
Regiments	27 (+ 3 AD)
Battalions	147 (+ 11 AD)
Combat	40-45,000
Admin Services	30-35,000
Guerrillas	5,000
Total	75-85,000
Armor	190-200
Artillery (122/130MM)	80- 90

e. MR-4:

(1) During April, there was no significant change in Communist military activity in MR-4. It was highlighted by the usual monthly highpoint, primarily in the southern portion of the Delta. Enemy near-term objectives and tactical doctrine remain the same:

- (a) Defense of Base areas and LOC's.
- (b) Harassment and diversion of RVNAF.

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(c) Utilization of economy of force measures which produce psychological impact and/or create operational difficulties for RVNAF and the GVN.

(d) Improvement and expansion of logistical and procurement systems.

(e) Improvement and expansion of combat capabilities and troop strength.

(f) Assuring capability to tie down RVNAF in the event of a major offensive.

(g) Establishment of secure zones along the border to facilitate infiltration and supply movement.

(h) Targeting outposts for ABF's, harassment, proselyting or elimination.

(i) Avoiding decisive combat.

(j) Shelling of district towns and interdiction of LOC's to force ARVN into static posture and reactionary defensive operations.

(k) Reliance upon ambushes and mines to neutralize riverine Navy.

(1) Avoiding presenting lucrative targets to RVNAF by not occupying overrun OP's.

(2) The most significant activity during April was the Communist comeback effort in Dinh Tuong/Tri Phap. The VC/NVA conducted mobile defensive operations, conserved ordnance, and used guerrilla tactics. They were able to reestablish some commo-liaison routes within and leading into the province. For the near term, the Communists probably will continue to rebuild their forces while conducting diversionary attacks to keep RVNAF off balance.

(3) During May, VC/NVA forces in the northern Delta were primarily concerned with forging an expanded logistical corridor through the Elephant's Foot, and restoring combat capabilities in Tri Phap and Dinh Tuong Province. Aggressive RVNAF operations effectively denied these objectives, especially in northern Kien Tuong and Tri Phap, where Communist forces sustained approximately

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1200 and 300 KIA respectively. Despite these losses, VC/NVA units will continue to receive replacements and enemy strength will fluctuate around these levels:

Divisions	0
Regiments	14
Battalions	90
Combat	20-25,000
Admin Services	12-15,000
Guerrillas	13-15,000
Total	45-55,000
Armor	0
Artillery	0
(122/130MM)	

(4) The qualitative increase will not be proportional; however, as inexperienced replacements fail to demonstrate the expertise and competence of their predecessors. Other serious enemy problems are the inability to re-establish a logistical base area to replace Tri Phap and buildup supply stocks to support a higher level combat. These developments notwithstanding, VC/NVA elements have reacted with flexibility and arrested their backslide by adopting a mobile defensive posture and resorting to guerrilla tactics. The situation remains fluid and will probably produce moderate to heavy activity in these areas.

(5) In June, Communist units in the northern Delta were primarily concerned with blocking RVNAF probes near the Elephant's Foot, while attempting to improve the 5th NVA Division's combat capabilities. Visible results were not overly favorable for the enemy, with VC/NVA taking moderate casualties and realizing no corresponding gains. The Communists have not yet been able to deal with main force RVNAF units and have limited their initiatives to probes and shellings in the Elephant's Foot region and scattered activity in Dinh Tuong/Kien Phong Provinces. Despite the relative lull, the enemy may be preparing to step-up operations, once improvements have been made and rising water levels detract from RVNAF's mobility advantages.

(6) The lower Delta presents a much less optimistic picture as VC/NVA units press on with their campaign to expand domination of contested areas. In contrast to

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their less successful counterparts in other areas of MR-4, Communist elements in the southern Delta initiate the majority of combat incidents, a trend that has become increasingly evident in the past six months. The Communists are not believed to be planning to depart from their strategy to concentrate on dominating rural areas; however, isolated district towns in An Xuyen, Kien Giang and Chuong Thien are highly vulnerable. The enemy has succeeded in beginning to erode GVN control without offering lucrative and fixable targets. To capitalize on the current situation, VC/NVA units have the options of increasing shellings of district towns and initiating sapper attacks against key installations and LOC's thus forcing RVNAF into a more defensive role than before. Although a critical threshold has yet to be reached, the established trend is a definite plus for the Communists.

(7) At this juncture, despite undesirable trends, a crisis point is still off in the distant future. VC/NVA success is due to their superior aggressiveness, mobility and tactical discipline, complemented by GVN and RVNAF shortcomings and an immense resource sapping defense burden. The extent to which Communist forces can capitalize on these factors is limited by RVNAF numerical and firepower superiority and, more significantly, VC/NVA inability to increase their personnel strength rapidly or permanently, not to mention supply stocks. Despite movement of a reported 7000 infiltrators to the lower Delta and local recruitment, which may produce several thousand troops a year, constant enemy battle-field commitment exacts an equally constant toll of Communist casualties. Furthermore, enemy supply lines are lengthy and unmechanized and, barring voluminous seaborne shipments, can not bring in sufficient cargo to radically upgrade firepower capabilities.

(8) Almost no district towns and key LOC's can be seized or held by the enemy for any length of time. VC/NVA progress will be measured in treelines, hectares and hamlets.

(9) Developments are progressing to the point, where enemy systematic coordinated harassment attacks against vital LOC's become feasible, albeit at the cost of an upswing in enemy casualties. This would probably push RVNAF into a still greater reactionary

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defensive posture and create convenient military/political vacuums in rural areas. This has not been reflected in known plans; however, it has become an available option. Through his actions, the enemy has been able to expand and improve efficiency across the entire range of covert organizational operations: taxation, recruitment, unit formation, civil development, etc. More significantly, he has prevented RVNAF from duplicating their successes in the upper Delta and disrupted GVN consolidation efforts. Moreover, by keeping RVNAF committed throughout the area, the Communists assure themselves relatively secure supply lines, an advantage which is not equally enjoyed by their counterparts in VC MR-2, where ARVN is more free to patrol and strike logistical convoys.

(10) VC/NVA progress, however, has not produced irreversible enemy gains, and, what is perhaps the most critical factor, RVNAF combat capability affords the GVN a controllable variable with which it can directly influence future developments. Having been forced to recognize their own shortcomings, RVNAF could combine qualitative improvements with their numerical superiority and bring a halt to further deterioration and eventually zero in on main force enemy units. In doing this, deeply rooted malpractices and inadequacies will have to be reduced in scope and dealt with determinedly. Should RVNAF and the GVN seriously implement and follow-up with their battery of corrective programs, they should succeed in eliminating some degree of historical counter-productive deficiencies and provide the Communists with a much more formidable opponent. Until such time, the VC/NVA will be more than able to hold their own while the GVN expends its resources and suffers from economic stagnation and foreign aid uncertainties. The problem should be viewed in terms of its potential impact, as measured by Communist progress and, perhaps more importantly, by opportunities lost by RVNAF to improve pacification in the lower Delta. Neither aspect rates a plus at this time.

(11) Taken from a country-wide perspective, even a total GVN victory in the lower Delta would not be decisive in "winning" the battle with the Communists; however, GVN failure to secure and control this rich and fertile area would have an extremely serious negative impact on the GVN's ability to survive.

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7. (S) ENEMY STRENGTH:

a. The current estimate of the enemy OB within SVN is as shown:

	<u>MR-1</u>	<u>MR-2</u>	<u>MR-3</u>
Divisions	4 (+1 AD)	3	5 (+1 AD)
Regiments	30 (+21 AD)	16 (+4 AD)	27 (+3 AD)
Brigades	1	0	0
Combat Pers	95-105,000	40-45,000	40-45,000
Guerrilla	5- 10,000	5-10,000	5- 5,000
Admin Services	30-35,000	15-20,000	30-35,000
Total	130-150,000	60-75,000	75-85,000

	<u>MR-4</u>	<u>COUNTRY-WIDE</u>
Divisions	0	14
Regiments	14	88
Brigades	0	1
Combat Pers	20-25,000	195-220,000
Guerrilla	13-15,000	38- 40,000
Admin Services	12-15,000	87-105,000
Total	45-55,000	310-365,000

The above totals represent an increase of almost 100,000 in enemy strength since March 1972.

b. Additionally, North Vietnam has seven reserve divisions with an estimated deployment strength of 56,000 personnel, which could be committed to the conflict in the South in record time.

<u>Division</u>	<u>Deployment Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>
308	8,500	Hanoi area
308B	8,500	NW of Hanoi
312	8,500	Thanh Hoa (P)
316	8,500	Upper Panhandle (1 Regt remains in N. Laos)

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<u>Division</u>	<u>Deployment Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>
320B	8,500	MR-3 Right Bank
341	8,500	Lower Panhandle
968 (2 Regts)	5,000	S. Laos (1 Regt deployed B-3 Front)
Total	56,000	

8. (S) CONCLUSION:

a. In conclusion, North Vietnam continues, unabated, to build and support the largest military threat to the Republic of Vietnam in the history of the war. Current intelligence, however, does not indicate that the DRV will use this force for a general offensive in the next two to three months.

b. All indications point to a continuation of phased attacks in all military regions, similar to those initiated during the past two months. We expect actions in MR-1 and MR-4 to increase in the coming month. Enemy initiatives in MR-2 will reflect changes in friendly dispositions. The shift of the 22nd Division to Binh Dinh could open up the highlands for new enemy attacks. Additionally, an increase in activity in Binh Dinh is expected when the ARVN 22nd initiates operations. Enemy attacks in MR-3 will probably continue at a high level, with increased sapper attacks against urban areas, LOC's and logistical installations. Regardless of the outcome of the Iron Triangle battle, the 9th NVA Division will need some time to refit. NVN is undoubtedly evaluating the outcome of current operations, the GVN economic situation, as well as international developments during this critical period.

c. Should the enemy decide to increase the level of his activities radically, DAO Saigon estimates that he would have to reinforce his southern forces with one or more divisions from NVN. We would expect to receive advance warning of the southward move of major units.

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CHAPTER 2

1. (C) OVERVIEW. Communist offensive activity soared in all four military regions setting a record high since Ceasefire II. The heaviest fighting, in MR 1, took place in Quang Tin as NVA units overran Ky Tran Village and attempted to isolate Tien Phuoc District town. Fighting broke out south of Hue when NVA forces seized a series of hills adjacent to QL 1. They were subsequently retaken by ARVN. Quang Ngai continues to experience a moderate level of activity as Communist units attempt to interrupt the pacification program and collect rice in the lowlands. In MR 2, the Central Highlands was the scene of heavy fighting as Dak Pek Ranger Camp and An Tan border post fell into enemy hands. OP 5, north of Kontum, changed hands several times. Heavy clashes erupted south of Pleiku when division-sized forces fought over Base 711. In the coastal lowlands, Binh Dinh continues active as the Communists targeted Phu Cat District, where the air base was shelled several times and four nearby outposts overrun. The Parrot's Beak, along the Cambodian Border in MR 3, was the center of large-scale military activity, as ARVN task forces reacted to the threatened Duc Hue outpost. After being under siege for more than a year, Tonle Cham fell to Communist control. Large-scale fighting broke out in Ben Cat District, Binh Duong Province, as regimental-sized ARVN units attempted to retake three RF outposts which had previously fallen to NVA attacks. VNA units suffered a defeat in the Elephant's Foot in the northern Delta. However, in the southern Delta, MR 4 territorial forces time and again lost outposts. LOC's through the country were interdicted as key bridges were frequently damaged or destroyed and sniperfire temporarily halted traffic. VNAF continued to increase TACAIR support and preemptive strikes. Civilian casualties increased as communists attempted to disrupt the resettlement program in all four regions. Again public meeting places, shools and village officials were high priority targets for terrorists.

2. (C) MILITARY REGION 1.

a. Activity North of the Hai Van Pass increased to a moderate level with the majority of reported incidents occurring in Thua Thien Province. The northern province of Quang Tri remained relatively quiet with only occasional minor incidents reported. In mid-May the VN

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Joint General Staff ordered the rotation of one Airborne Brigade to Saigon as JGS reserve. Plans call for rotation, at 60-90 day intervals, of all three brigades. The transfer of the 1st Airborne Brigade, with its three Battalions, required a realignment of regular units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The Marine Division AO was extended southward to include about ten kilometers in Thua Thien previously occupied by an Airborne Brigade. The Airborne AO was adjusted to the south and now covers the Bo River Valley. The transfer of an Airborne Brigade and the realignment of units was accomplished on 3 June 74. The 1st ARVN Division reported heavy fighting in and around hill 144 (YD8701) and hill 273 (YC9299). The area was reinforced by elements of the 3d Infantry and hill 144 was retaken on 7 May 74. ARVN units, using small unit tactics, interdicted lines of communications into the hill 300 area and successfully sealed it off. Hill 300 was retaken on 4 June 74. Hill 273 continues to be occupied by the Communists and heavy shellings are reported daily. There has been no GVN attempt to retake Bach Ma Mountain; however, ground action is periodically reported north of the mountain.

b. Activity south of the Hai Van Pass increased markedly during the quarter. Heavy enemy resistance to the GVN pacification program occurred in Quang Nam Province. The majority of enemy actions were targeted against subsectors and populated areas to disrupt program administration and to reduce the people's confidence in the ability of the GVN to provide adequate security. On 1 May 74, ARVN attempted to clear the Communists from Go Noi Island southwest of Hoi An City. This operation failed with heavy ARVN casualties. A more elaborate operation began on 31 May, with infantry and armor and succeeded in clearing the Island, long a VC stronghold. NVA/VC forces began attacks by fire on the Ky Tra Village complex in southern Tam Ky District of Quang Tin Province on 4 May 74. The communist overran Regional and Popular forces defending the area and continued to shell GVN forces to the North. Additional ARVN units were deployed into the area and a counter-attack was initiated which proved unsuccessful, with heavy ARVN losses. The 2d ARVN Division abandoned plans to recapture Ky Tra Village on 20 May and redeployed units to counter the increased communist threat to Tien Phuoc District town and the road connecting Tien Phuoc and Tam Ky. Heavy action was reported in this area until the end of June. GVN forces were successful in foiling communist attempts to capture Tien Phuoc and interdict

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Para 535. Military activity in Quang Nam Province continued at a moderate level throughout the quarter with the Communists putting emphasis on the disruption of RVN's pacification and resettlement programs. The two northern districts, Binh Son and Son Tinh, were the hardest hit. The majority of incidents consisted of shellings; however, there were incidents of the enemy entering resettlement sites, killing officials and residents and destroying houses. The airfield at Quang Ngai City was subjected to sporadic 122mm rocket fire, which caused little damage.

c. During the quarter, the Communists increased their efforts to disrupt rail service between Da Nang and Hue and to halt traffic on the important LOC, QL-1. There were 18 reported interdictions of the National Railroad, primarily between Lang Co and Phu Bai. Rail service has been temporarily suspended between Lang Co and Hue because of the large unrepaired sections. Rail repair crews refuse to enter this area until security is improved. QL-1, the main LOC in MR 1, was interdicted six times; however, traffic was halted only for brief periods. There were two unsuccessful attempts to interdict QL-1 with explosives on rafts. Security forces detonated them without incident. There were three province roads in Quang Nam Province interdicted temporarily.

d. On 20 June, Marine coastal artillery, VNN gunboats, VNAF gunships and elements of the 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron sank a North Vietnamese supply ship which had strayed south of the Cua Viet River. The ship, equivalent to an LCM-6, was apparently carrying munitions, as it exploded before sinking.

e. Activity trends over the period are shown in figure 2-1.

3. (C) MILITARY REGION 2.

a. In the Central Highlands military activity continued at a relatively low level with isolated highpoints occurring throughout the quarter. Other than these highpoints, activity was confined to minor incidents with the majority resulting from aggressive GVN security operations and patrols. In mid-April, the 711 base area northeast of Plei Me, Pleiku Province, received heavy enemy attacks, which were repulsed. In mid-May, the Communists attacked and overran the

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


Figure 2-1

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Ranger Camp and subsector headquarters at Dak Pek in northern Kontum Province. On 30 May, Communists attacked and overran the An Tan border camp in Tieu Atar, northern Darlac Province. On 8 May, the 22d Ranger Battalion reoccupied outpost 5, located 13 km northeast of Kontum City. The outpost dominates an area near the Vo Dinh/Kon Braih road and was used by the GVN for observation and harassment of Communist traffic on the road until it fell to the Communists during the first week of April. On 10 June, Communists shelled and attacked FSB 261, 15 km west of Pleiku City, and forced the Ranger unit occupying the FSB to withdraw. The 90th Ranger Battalion counterattacked later in the day and retook the FSB. With the fall of Dak Pek, there was great concern over the isolated outposts at Mang Buk and Chuong Nghia. In an effort to draw communist attention away from these outposts, the ARVN 41st and 44th Infantry initiated an operation northwest of Kontum City, along the axis of QL-14, toward Vo Dinh. Communist forces immediately retaliated with heavy shelling and ground attacks. Even though the continuous resistance caused the ARVN operation to be blunted, it evidently achieved its main objective of taking pressure off the two isolated outposts.

b. In the Coastal Provinces, almost all significant activity occurred in Binh Dinh Province. In northern Binh Dinh, in the vicinity of Tam Quan District town, Ranger units met stiff resistance to their area-denial operations and remained active throughout the quarter. Highway QL-1 was interdicted at two locations in Tam Quan District, northern Binh Dinh. Communist sappers successfully destroyed the Gia Huu and Cong Thanh highway bridges. Traffic was temporarily halted. In the southeast of Phu My, the Communists conducted shellings and ground attacks against territorial forces and occupied five villages. The 47th Infantry was moved from Pleiku into the area and, with territorial forces, began making a strong effort to reoccupy these villages. GVN forces have managed to reclaim some of the lost territory and hurt the Communists in doing so. Extensive TACAIR support was employed in support of these ground operations. In mid-May, territorial forces occupying outposts west and northwest of Phu Cat Air Base were attacked by Communist forces and four outposts were overrun. Phu Cat Air Base came under heavy rocket attack causing only minor damage and casualties. The quick reaction of GVN forces permitted the reoccupation of two of these outposts within 48 hours. The 43d Ranger Battalion was deployed to the area and successfully diverted

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the Communists from further advancement toward the airbase. The effective use of military aircraft, both day and night, dealt the enemy serious blows and foiled any attempt to overrun the Phu Cat Air Base.

c. On 15 April, elements of the 82nd Ranger Battalion and 19th ACS came under a heavy Communist attack north of Plei Me in southern Pleiku Province. GVN forces moved into the 711 Base Camp area, north of route TL-6C; however, the Communists continued the attack and the Rangers were forced to withdraw with heavy casualties and materiel loss. The ARVN 42nd and 47th Infantry were deployed into the area and counterattacked from the north. Heavy fighting was reported and Communist forces were forced to withdraw to the west suffering heavy casualties. The Communist attempt to interdict QL-1 south of Pleiku was averted. Continued aggressive patrolling by Ranger and ARVN units has prevented the Communists from massing forces in that area.

d. At 2340 hours on 15 May, the Communists began a coordinated attack against Dak Pek Ranger Camp and district headquarters in northern Kontum Province. The attack consisted of heavy shelling combined with ground attacks from the north and east. The 88th Ranger Battalion was supported by flareships, but the camp was overrun. Three tanks were observed moving toward the camp from the northwest and were later reported to have crossed the eastern defense of the camp. The Rangers were ordered to withdraw, and radio contact was lost, with the exception of contact maintained by PRC-25 radio with L-19 aircraft. Fifty percent of the troop strength at Dak Pek was killed or wounded and the remaining rangers withdrew to the west. Subsector Headquarters and PF units also withdrew and the isolated outpost was completely in Communist hands on 17 May.

e. At 0635 hours, 30 May, Communist forces heavily shelled and attacked the An Tan border outpost at Tieu Atar in northern Darlac Province. The territorial forces defending the camp were unable to withstand the attack and withdrew. Previously, the Communists had forced the majority of the civilian population to move south into VC controlled territory. Village officials, with their families, fled to Ban Don. This last border outpost to fall has given the Communists uncontested access to the border area in MR 2.

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f. Activity trends for the period are shown in figure 2-2.

4. (C) MILITARY REGION 3.

a. Reported activity in MR 3 increased sharply. The activity in Duc Hue and southern Tay Ninh during the first few days of June gave way to a cross-border operation by the GVN to reduce the enemy threat in that area. Tonle Cham in Tay Ninh and Chi Linh in Binh Long fell within one week in early April. The Bien Hoa Air Base and surrounding area was the target of an extensive rocket attack in early June. The enemy's capture of three outposts along route 7 between the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers in Binh Duong, and the subsequent GVN operation to retake these outposts developed into the most significant confrontation of forces since Ceasefire. This development is not yet resolved. The enemy's interdiction of QL-1 and attempts at QL-20 created concern for the economy in Saigon. Sapper activity continues to threaten the POL and ammunition storage areas.

b. With the Duc Hue operation ongoing as the quarter began, and the threat to Tay Ninh and northern Hau Nghia seemingly imminent, ARVN's 3rd Armored Bde was tasked to eliminate or reduce the threat by forming combined infantry-armor task forces and strike the enemy in a cross border operation in the Parrot's Beak/Angel's Wing area. Airstrikes and artillery preparation were conducted for two days as a prelude to two task forces penetrating into Cambodia. One task force screened along the frontier and the fourth task force was held in reserve, in the vicinity of QL-1/QL-22 intersection in Hieu Thien. This highly successful operation terminated on 10 May. Friendly casualties were very light and intelligence reports indicated the 5th NVA Division had suffered heavily. The operation also caused a shift of forces in MR 4 to the border area. (See ARVN operation in the Elephant's Foot MR 4). Friendly losses were reported as 35 KIA, 108 WIA, one F-5 destroyed and four armored vehicles damaged. Enemy losses reported were 390 KIA and 12 DTN. Additionally 28 CS, 63 SA, a substantial number of rockets, mortar rounds, AT-3 missiles, mines and other equipment were captured.

c. Chi Linh, formerly a Special Forces outpost along LTL-13 west of Don Luan, was overrun by an enemy

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


Figure 2-2

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force on 5 April 74. The camp at the time was defended by 117 personnel from an RF Company and an artillery platoon. The ground attack was preceded by an intense ABF that set off the mine bunker. Seven days after the attack, a total of 32 personnel had reached the safety of Don Luan and Thon Thanh. The fate of the remainder is unknown.

d. The siege of Tonle Cham ended on 11 April, after an ABF of 900 rounds was followed by a ground attack. The 92nd Ranger Battalion successfully withdrew to An Loc. Of a total of 268 arriving in An Loc, 32 were wounded, five reported killed and four missing. The siege lasted from 1 March 73 thru 11 April 74 during which the camp received 20,000 rounds of incoming artillery, 59 minor ground attacks and 11 attempted infiltrations. The 92nd Ranger Battalion remained in An Loc until late June, then they were sent to the Ranger Training Center at Duc My, Khanh Hoa for retraining and refitting.

e. On 3 June 74, the Bien Hoa Air Force Base and surrounding area was hit with 42 122mm rockets. The main launching site was three km northeast of Tan Uyen District town. Thirty two of the rockets hit the Bien Hoa Air Base, damaging both runways, destroying 500 napalm bombs and one fire truck, and wounding 12. Nine rounds fell in various villages surrounding the air base killing 12 civilians and wounding 20. One rocket hit the Tan Hiep Rehabilitation Center killing 30 women and children, and wounding 35.

f. The most costly operation, casualty and equipment-wise, for both GVN and the VC/NVA since Ceasefire, began in Binh Duong Province on 16 May 74. A coordinated enemy attack began on the east and west sides of the province almost simultaneously. The 322 RF BN providing security for the bridge on the Be River was attacked in an effort to interdict ITL-1A south of Phu Giao. This was a diversionary attack, as the main effort was launched southwest of Ben Cat along route 7 between the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. Rach Bap outpost, adjacent to the Saigon River and Base 82 midway between the two rivers, fell on the evening of 16 May followed by An Dien village and an RF outpost on 17 May. The GVN immediately started a counter-attack to retake the lost OP's. The efforts met very stiff resistance and the enemy used extensive ABF against Ben Cat. The subsector town was subsequently evacuated. The 12th Division (minus one battalion), two ranger battalions, two ACS and one tank battalion were committed in an

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effort to retake the area. Elements of the 18th Division crossed the river south of An Dien and met stiff resistance. Reconnaissance elements crossed the bridge between An Dien and Ben Cat, then two additional battalions of the 18th Division crossed the river north of An Dien. A three pronged attack then was successful in retaking An Dien on 4 June. Subsequent efforts to retake Base 82 and Rach Bap fell short of Base 82 by one kilometer. The operation was halted on 25 June with all except two ARVN battalions pulled back to the Ben Cat area. An additional artillery allocation enabled Phase II to start on 27 June; however, this effort was stopped in the same area as Phase I by well entrenched enemy elements. Reported losses for the operation were: GVN-353 KIA, 2016 WIA, 180 MIA, 238 SA, nine CS weapons lost, one F-5, two A-1, one UH-1H, one M41 tank, three M-48 tanks, five M113 APC's and two M125 mortar carriers destroyed. A substantial number of armored vehicles were damaged. Enemy losses, reported by the GVN: 1264 KIA, 34 DTN, 188 SA, 88 CS weapons and one T54 tank captured, six T54 and two PT76 tanks destroyed. Civilian casualties were 11 killed, 102 WND and 30 MIA. VNAF TACAIR in support of this operation were 461 F-5 and 724 A-1 sorties.

g. On 11 June, an enemy force entered the Rung La resettlement village in eastern Long Khanh on QL-1. The enemy forced the villagers to construct earthen barricades across the vital route. This was the first time since the Ceasefire began that the enemy attempted to hold a portion of QL-1. At the same time, minor attacks and attempts to interdict QL-20 were made in northeastern Long Khanh. Enemy elements successfully resisted territorial force attempts to clear the road. Elements of the 8th Regiment and a ranger battalion were reinforced with an armored cavalry unit and moved to the area as a road clearing force. The enemy gave up their hold on the road after seven days; however, through the end of June they continued to threaten traffic on the route and have caused ARVN forces to close the route several times due to sniper fire.

h. Sapper activity continued throughout the MR during this period. The Caltex POL depot was attacked by sappers in mid-May. One sapper was killed, but not before two three-million liter tanks were destroyed. One tank was empty, the other was one third full of MOGAS. Sappers and floating water mines have also sunk

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two small POL tankers (Mekong Convoy vessels) and damaged several other craft at Nha Be. A POL barge was damaged and 90,000 liters of gasoline lost due to an unknown type mine at the Long Binh POL Pier. Numerous attacks on rivers from Vung Tau to Binh Duong have been reported as water sapper activity. Several attempts against the ammunition depots at Long Binh have been made by sappers. An attempt was foiled at Ton Thuy Hoa when a bulldozer caved in a tunnel that had already been dug more than 100 meters with only 25 meters remaining to be inside the depot.

i. Activity trends for the period are shown in figure 2-3.

5. (C) MILITARY REGION 4.

a. Activity in MR 4 has continued at a slightly higher daily rate than last quarter. The high level of incidents is misleading due to the fact that many are very small AEF and reports of small arms fire with few or no casualties. Terrorist attacks as well as abductions were prevalent throughout the Delta. The establishment of three new districts has caused a substantial number of incidents to be reported. Hau My was established during last quarter in Dinh Tuong Province from what was before the VC/NVA stronghold of Tri Phan. During this period, Phung Hung has been built out of central Kien Hoa Province, also from an area formerly controlled by the enemy. The third district, Hung Long, which began operation on 24 April between the Cai Lon and Rach Nga Ba Cai Tau rivers in Chuong Thien, is only able to administer to the village where the district headquarters was established. The other villages in Hung Long must be administered by their former districts. This is due to the lack of route security to the new district headquarters. The most intense activity was reported in the Elephant's Foot area and in the Song Ong Doc area of An Xuyen Province, where several outposts were evacuated due to heavy shellings and enemy pressure. In late May, the airfield at Binh Thuy was hit by a sapper attack. One UH-1 helicopter was destroyed and six others damaged.

b. The Cai Lay primary school yard was hit by one 82mm mortar round on 9 March causing heavy casualties among the school children that were lined up to enter classrooms. 23 were killed and 43 wounded; three adults were also wounded. FICM investigation into the matter

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


Figure 2-3

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came on 30 March, three weeks after the fact. A second school incident occurred on 4 May when eight 82mm rounds hit the school in Song Phu, Vinh Long. This incident resulted in six children dead and 28 injured. Nine adults were also injured. The ICCS, at least the INDEL representative, was on the spot for an investigation the next day.

c. The operation in the Elephant's Foot was a reaction rather than a pre-planned cross-border attack. The activity began on the evening of 28 April 74, when an enemy force supported by captured M113's attacked the RF outpost at Long Khot. Several 7th Division elements and two ACS units had been shifted north of Moc Hoa in response to the activity in the Parrot's Beak and Angel's Wing. These elements had been formed into two armor infantry task forces and reaction to the enemy attack was instantaneous. The 15th Regt, 9th Div, was also shifted into the area in support. This area was intensely active through 9 May and ARVN reported casualties of 39 KIA, 253 WIA, one MIA, 14 small arms lost, one M113 destroyed and six damaged. Enemy losses were reportedly much heavier: 350 KIA, 31 DTN, 110 weapons, two radios and a substantial amount of ammunition and demolition equipment captured. This area continued to be sporadically active for the remainder of the quarter with two reinforced regiments remaining there. The 11th Regt, 7th Div, is in Moc Hoa area and the 15th Regt, 9th Div, in Tuyen Binh. The coordination between MR's was the highlight of this operation, when considered with the cross-border operation from MR 3. 414 TACAIR sorties were flown in support of the operation from MR 4 during the ten days of intense contacts.

d. Activity trends for the period are shown in Figure 2-4.

6. (C) THE OUTPOST WAR.

a. The term outpost has many different connotations in Vietnam. It could be as simple as a few sandbags and a sheet of corrugated metal, to a slightly larger position along a road or infiltration route, using crew-served weapons and supporting troops, to the large outposts located along the political frontier. All these different types are used and reflect the spectrum of security requirements in South Vietnam. Two general types of outposts are defined for purposes of discussion - strategic and tactical. Strategic outposts were located along the political frontier to combat

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


Figure 2-4

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major infiltration from outside SVN. In totc. they were considered strategic, as together they were established to protect the entire SVN frontier.

b. After the ceasefire, these outposts began to lose their strategic significance. Operations conducted from the outposts became less effective as enemy infiltration increased. Once consisting of small groups and backpacking supply bearers, infiltration became more sophisticated and consisted of large troop formations with motorized support. The outposts were no longer able to cope with an enemy who could mass units and supporting artillery quickly at the time and place of his choosing. In essence, the posts became tactical liabilities rather than strategic assets. Most required air resupply and could not be reinforced except by extraordinary effort.

c. There are several types of tactical outposts located throughout the country which vary according to size and function. Major regular units establish outposts to provide security. Those in a conventional defensive posture might have some permanent outposts and several temporary ones. All are situated in supporting range of artillery weapons located within the main defensive positions. Some outposts are manned only seasonally, as enemy activity decreases during the rainy season. While most tactical outposts are resupplied by surface, others occasionally require air resupply due to enemy activity. Outposts are found in and around hamlets, along critical lines of communications and in proximity of government and military installations. There were 5,522 known Ranger, RF and PF outposts in May. Many outposts are not reported as such; additionally, the changing security situation results in establishment of new posts and abandonment of others.

d. In MR 1, there are two different situations. North of the Hai Van Pass, units are oriented to a conventional defense, much like WW II or Korea. Subordinate units of the Marine, Airborne and 1st ARVN Division have established numerous outposts to protect against infiltration and provide early warning of enemy attack. There have been two prime areas of activity in which the tactical outposts of these major units have been involved throughout the ceasefire. Northwest of Hue, the Bo River corridor has long been the site of numerous outposts, located on key terrain to protect against infiltration along the traditional route to the lowlands. In April, the enemy captured the outposts on Hill 300 and other key terrain in the vicinity. Fighting continued for almost two months before the positions were

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retaken. On the high ridge line extending west from the Hai Van Pass, an RF outpost was located on Bach Ma Mountain. The position provided excellent observation both north and south during the dry season. The outpost was overrun last fall. Since there are many other available positions, the loss was more psychological than tactical. South of Hai Van Pass, outposts around villages and in hamlets have been particularly singled out as targets, as opposed to the six larger, long established strategic outposts. These former SF posts located at Thuong Duc, Tien Phuoc, Tra Bong, Da Trach, Son Ha, Minh Long and Gia Vuc are manned by SF and Ranger units and seldom experience contact. These latter camps are located outside of firm GVN control astride traditional infiltration routes into the coastal lowlands. The camp at Gia Vuc is particularly isolated in southwestern Quang Ngai, near the Kontum border. This outpost and 11 others in MR 1 routinely require air resupply. The Tien Phuoc - Tam Ky area recently has been the scene of heavy fighting after a long period of relative calm. The action began in late April, with successful enemy attacks against PF outposts protecting the Ky Tra Village complex south of Tam Ky. However, the area of activity rapidly expanded to the entire Tien Phuoc - Tam Ky area and has been primarily directed toward the population. To the south, Quang Ngai Province is inhabited by a large population which is not entirely under GVN control. Outposts are located to protect areas where control is firm. In other areas, particularly to the south, outposts are located to establish GVN presence where GVN control is not consolidated and positive. These outposts are subjected to frequent attacks by fire. An assessment of outpost effectiveness is difficult in MR 1. There are fewer posts than in other regions, partially due to the conventional defense north of Hai Van Pass; and partially to the relatively low number of LOC's which require protection. They have established an essential presence south of Hai Van Pass and kept QL-1 open most of the time.

e. MR 2 presents a somewhat different picture. There are several isolated outposts in the Central Highlands. Many of these have been targeted by the enemy and six outposts which could once be described as strategic have been captured. Isolated on the Cambodian frontier in Pleiku, Plei D'Jereng (now known as Le Minh) was overrun 22 September 1973. Le Minh, while under siege, required air resupply. A II Corps operation to relieve Le Minh was interrupted when an unexpected enemy attack on two outposts in Quang Duc required deployment

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of the 23d Division south to maintain lines of communication, a key mission of the Quang Duc outposts. Two more outposts protecting QL-14 in Quang Duc were overrun and subsequently retaken. Again in Pleiku, a major enemy attack placed the camp at Plei Me in danger of isolation. However, nearby ground reinforcement was available to defeat the incursion. After months of complete isolation, the outpost at Dak Pek was overrun 16 May. Located in northern Kontum, the outpost was an ineffective liability. Recently, the camp at Tieu Atar, Darlac, was overrun. Heavy fighting has occurred around a Ranger/RF tactical outpost overlooking an enemy road construction project northeast of Kontum. After months of changing hands, the post is again in GVN control.

f. Northeast of Ban Me Thuot, several GVN outposts protecting villages were overrun just after the beginning of the ceasefire. Their recapture required a major deployment of regular units. Many RF/PF outposts located along QL-19 protect the vital overland route to Pleiku and Kontum. These outposts play an important role in keeping QL-19 open. Lowland outposts have been a frequent target of enemy attacks. Northern Binh Dinh Province is similar to Quang Ngai in that much of the population is not under firm control and is easily influenced by the side in control. Numerous outposts are located on either side of QL-1 to maintain GVN presence in a traditional area of enemy activity. Outposts in the area east of Phu My have been under frequent pressure throughout the ceasefire. Their role became more important when the 22d Division was deployed to the highlands in November. Outposts around Phu Cat Air Base were overrun 16 May and required redeployment of several regular and territorial units to be recaptured and reestablish stability. RF/PF outposts protecting critical lines of communication along the coast south of Binh Dinh have been successful in maintaining the route. The role of outposts has been critical in MR 2, especially in the lowlands, and has gone on unnoticed while the more heralded conventional war raged in the highlands. The line of outposts along QL-19 has maintained the overland resupply route to the highlands, QL-1 to MR 3, and QL-11 to Dalat. The fewer regular troops in this, the largest region, attests to the effectiveness of the outposts in MR 2.

g. In MR 3, posts once considered strategic and still outside GVN control are located at Song Be near the Province Headquarters, Phu Cuong and Don Luan. An Loc and Chon Thanh, while not ever in the strategic

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category, are outposts in the sense they are isolated and maintain GVN presence in otherwise enemy controlled Binh Long Province. Nui Ban Den, a high mountain north of Tay Ninh, protects a communication relay station. Chi Linh, in Eastern Binh Long, fell in April. Shortly after, the long siege of the celebrated outpost at Tonle Cham came to an end when that post was overrun. Throughout the first year of the ceasefire, troops from outposts along lines of communication, especially the Bien Hoa - Xuan Loc Railroad, were heavily committed as interdiction attempts were frequent. QL-1 and QL-22 were interdicted in several locations and over 100 hamlets were occupied or infiltrated throughout the MR soon after the ceasefire. Within ten days, these hamlets were retaken and all outposts were re-established. The outposts, and active patrolling by their troops, have kept the major roads open and maintained security for the population. With the attack on Duc Hue outpost in early April, a new dimension came to MR 3, major conventional warfare. RF/PF outposts in the area of the major combat were overshadowed by the escalation to major unit confrontation. However, those outposts in areas away from the large engagements, became more significant as they enemy tried to divert ARVN from the area of major engagements. As a result, outposts, protecting hamlets and resettlement areas in Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy and Binh Tuy came under heavy pressure during the fierce fighting around Duc Hue and Ben Cat. Their ability to hold has determined the requirement for deployment of regular units to reinforce them. The increased population, the presence of the capital city, and the many critical LOC's, both land and water, compound the security function of outposts in MR 3. Their effectiveness has determined the extent to which ARVN troops are free to operate in a mobile role.

h. MR 4 is replete with outposts. The task of maintaining security is compounded as enemy forces have exploited every available means to infiltrate men and supplies, and to get their share of the rich rice crop. Because of these problems, RF/PF outposts are located along the numerous canals and natural waterways and at their critical intersections, along the extensive road network and near critical bridges and installations. A few outposts, which once were considered as strategic, lost their value when US forces departed the country. These outposts have difficulty interdicting the large unit moves of the NVA/VC. Because of the geography of the Delta, these outposts were isolated camps along the frontier as in other military regions. None require routine air resupply. These outposts have been

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important in detecting infiltration into the northern and western Delta. Other outposts are located in coastal hamlets and at the mouths of rivers leading to the interior. Outposts near hamlets and cultivated areas have been constant targets. Enemy units infiltrated numerous hamlets and overran or forced abandonment of outposts during the early months of the ceasefire. During the 1 April - 30 June period, hamlets in Chau Doc, Kien Phong, Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien were targeted. When the hamlets were cleared they continued to receive frequent standoff attacks by fire. Outposts in Dinh Tuong are critical in protecting QL-4, the vital land LOC to Saigon. Toward the end of 1973, General Nghi, the IV Corps Commander, directed regular unit operations be conducted to relieve the serious interdiction threat to QL-4 and upgrade security. When success was achieved, some outposts were abandoned deliberately and others relocated astride enemy resupply routes. The success of the QL-4 operations permitted the attack on Tri Phap, long an enemy stronghold. When Tri Phap was penetrated and held, new outposts were established to provide security within the area. Outposts along the Khmer frontier, especially those contiguous to the Parrot's Beak and Elephant's Foot areas, bore the initial brunt of initial attacks in May when they enemy appeared to be attempting to reinforce in the northern Delta. RF/PF outposts were under constant pressure as enemy units hit them regularly. The constant harrassment of the outposts has been oriented both to acquisition of rice and movement of forces to new locations. The 21st Division is highly dependent on the outposts because of the size of its AO and its importance as the major rice producing area. The degree of security and GVN troops deployed indicates the effectiveness of the outposts in the region. The boxscore of outposts reported to have been overrun, abandoned and retaken since the ceasefire shows a net loss of 144 outposts. The 144 reflect the six major outpost actions such as the smaller outposts which often go unnamed. These numbers are only an indication of the constant activity involving the over 5,500 RF/PF outposts throughout the country; nor are the numerous outpost attacks which were repulsed or those that were lost and retaken within hours, always reported. As an example, in April, 188 outposts came under attack in the Delta alone. Of these, 125 successfully defended and 62 were overrun or evacuated. Most were quickly reoccupied. Sixty of the attacks

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occurred in Dinh Tuong. Although the conflict involving major units has most often drawn attention, a continuing conflict goes on day after day throughout the country, not always statistically recorded, but significant by its anonymity. The ability of the GVN to meet its goals will depend to a large degree upon the capability of outposts to protect the population and permit regular units to confront major enemy units.

7. (C) SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS.

a. Communists continued the elimination of GVN strategic outposts as four more fell to their control during this quarter and determined attempts were made against several others. Psychologically, the loss of the outposts was serious to the RVN as it represented a breach of the Paris accords and eliminated a GVN presence over large areas. Militarily, the outposts were costly to RVNAF as all four had to be resupplied by air. These strategic outposts outgrew their mission of border control and interdiction of infiltration routes because they could no longer cope with sophisticated movement of large enemy units.

b. The Duc Hue operation into the Angel's Wing was professionally planned and executed. It included a cleverly designed deception plan with 3d Armored Brigade withdrawing from Hau Nghia Province to Lai Thieu (10 km N of Saigon) only to return immediately by night road march to execute a night river crossing over the Vam Co Dong River. The operation demonstrated daring and imagination by leaders at all echelons. Complexity of coordinating and executing this plan, which included combined armed ground forces, supporting TACAIR, artillery and gunship support cannot be overemphasized. Credit must be given RVNAF for their mobility, aggressiveness and initiative.

c. Communist efforts to create salients into GVN territory by overrunning three outposts southwest of Ben. Cat has created a major battleground in MR 3. Elements of the NVA 7th and 9th Divisions, supported by tanks and heavy artillery, are determined to hold the outposts. The 18th Division and 3d Armored Brigade equally determined, with heavy TACAIR support, succeeded in retaking An Dien but were stalled short of Base 82 by a well entrenched enemy. Both sides have suffered heavy casualties. With the loss of momentum it now appears that ARVN forces will revert to small

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unit tactics to prevent further losses and concede the two outposts to the communists for the time being.

d. Figures 2-5 through 2-12 update information provided in past assessments.

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
A/C Destroyed by SA 7 from 1 April - 30 June 74

<u>A/C TYPE</u>	<u>\$ COST (EA)</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CH-47	990,717	1	990,717
O-1	34,845	1	34,845
A-1	297,456	2	594,912
EC-47	95,466	1	95,466
A-37	455,000	2	910,000
			<hr/> 2,625,940

Figure 2-5

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**REPORTED SA-7
FIRINGS IN RVN
28 JAN 73 - 30 JUN 74**



MISSILES FIRED

	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4	TOTAL
28 JAN 73 THRU 31 MAR 74	4	23	49	22	98
1 APR 74 THRU 30 JUN 74	2	1	18	13	34
TOTAL	6	24	67	35	132

Figure 2-6

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APRIL-JUN 1974

MAJOR ENGAGEMENT WON-LOST LEDGER

<u>MR</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>LEDGER</u>
1	<u>Hill 300, Thua Thien</u> <p>On 11 April, the communists overran a Regional Force outpost on Hill 300 and secured the surrounding key terrain 12 kilometers south of Phu Bai. After initial unsuccessful attempts by the 54th Infantry, 3d Infantry reinforcements retook nearby Hill 144 on 7 May. After the 1st Division Units sealed off all lines of communication to Hill 300, during the latter part of May, one 3d Infantry company recaptured Hill 300 in a night assault 4 June. All key terrain in the vicinity was recaptured by 7 July.</p>	Win
2	<u>Fire Support Base 711, Pleiku</u> <p>On 15 April, the enemy forced the 82d Ranger Battalion and elements of the 19th ACS off Fire Support Base 711 north of Plei Me. ARVN successfully deployed the 42d and 47th Regiments, 22d Division to the enemy rear precluding their disengagement. Heavy contacts continued through the end of April until the bloodied enemy withdrew to the west. FSB 711 was reoccupied and the threat to the isolated Ranger outpost at Plei Me was alleviated.</p>	Win
2	<u>Dak Pek Outpost, Kontum</u> <p>The Dak Pek Ranger Camp and contiguous subsector, isolated behind NVA lines in northern Kontum, was overrun 16 May 1974. The fate of the almost one thousand defenders and three thousand district population is unknown. VNAF supported the camp with A-37 and AC-47 aircraft during the four days of heavy shelling preceding the loss of the camp and bombed the camp following abandonment by the defending 88th Ranger Battalion.</p>	Loss

Figure 2-7-A

2-26

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2. Phu Cat Air Base, Binh Dinh Win

Following attacks by fire against Phu Cat Air Base 16 May, enemy ground forces overran four outposts northwest of the base. Quick provincial force reaction, coupled with airstrikes and Corps reinforcements, drove the enemy west from Phu Cat by 22 May with heavy losses.
2. An Tan (Tieu Atar) Outpost, Darlac Loss

In mid-May, NVA forces moved over one thousand highland residents from Tieu Atar to a communist controlled area to the south. The isolated An Tan camp, manned by two understrength RF companies was overrun 30 May. To date, 21 RF survivors from the camp and 600 civilians from the area have returned to GVN control.
3. Duc Hue Relief Operation Win

In late April, ARVN launched a combined armor-infantry attack into the Parrot's Beak of eastern Cambodia to relieve enemy pressure against the Ranger outpost at Duc Hue. CG III Corps assured coordinated air support from a forward CP at Cu Chi collocated with a 3d Air Division CP (including a DASC). The 5th NVA Division, caught by surprise, was badly defeated.
3. Tonle Cham Outpost, Tay Ninh Loss.

The year long Communist siege of Tonle Cham ended 11 April with the successful exfiltration of the 92d Ranger Battalion. On 14 April, the Ranger Commander, with his 267 men, including five KIA and 32 WIA arrived at GVN controlled An Loc. During the latter months of the siege only Halo delivered supplies had supported the Rangers who, prior to exfiltration, had been targeted by over 20,000 rounds, and subjected to 11 infiltration attempts and 59 ground attacks.

Figure 2-7B

2-27

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3 Chi Linh RF Outpost, Binh Long Loss

Chi Linh RF Outpost is located on QL-13 in eastern Binh Long. The outpost, manned by an RF Company reinforced with an artillery platoon, was isolated from GVN control and required air resupply. On 5 April, following a night of heavy shelling, the outpost was overrun. About a third of the defenders (32 personnel) reached GVN control at Don Luan and Chon Thanh.

4 Elephants' Foot Operation Win

In late April, communist forces hit a series of outposts along the Elephant's Foot in northern Kien Tuong. Two ARVN armor-infantry task forces rapidly formed, deployed and engaged the enemy in numerous heavy contacts over a two week period. With the help of TACAIR, ARVN forces maintained a 10/1 kill ratio throughout the operation which cost the enemy 850 KIA. The defeat prevented movement of 5th NVA Division elements into the northern Delta to reinforce the Tri Phap area.

Figure 2-7C

2-28
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


Figure 2-8

2-29
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


Figure 2-9

2-31
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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR I

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WEEK	22 MAR 28		5 APR 4		12 APR 11		19 APR 18		3 MAY 9		10 MAY 16		17 MAY 23		24 MAY 30		31 MAY 30		7 JUN 6		14 JUN 13		21 JUN 20		28 JUN 27		5 JUL 4		12 JUL 11		19 JUL 18		26 JUL 25		2 AUG 1	
	INCIDENTS	87	104	81	92	154	207	148	113	205	222	162	150	202	182	148																				
MAY MIN	10	16	7	15	18	35	29	15	33	36	28	30	40	39	27																					
ABF	23	42	33	32	48	81	71	51	90	100	73	51	76	70	48																					
MAY MIN	3	3	4	2	11	8	5	5	11	9	6	3	10	7	6																					
CTX	51	43	37	43	77	83	43	42	71	77	55	66	76	66	67																					
ER ARTY INCOMING	520	850	630	1010	845	2227	1677	1144	2410	2746	1664	1305	2445	1803	1409																					
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	3953	2233	1804	2328	3253	5131	4906	4390	7358	11263	7450	9434	8722	5743	4687																					
SCH FIN SORTIES	154	154	154	154	160	182	150	186	156	154	154	154	152	176	206																					
K W	43	43	48	49	71	135	74	70	148	130	88	73	90	84	51																					
FRD CAS	186	150	184	243	292	391	322	221	398	571	380	309	339	346	295																					
K D	133	107	80	91	161	180	176	84	240	267	246	203	169	186	154																					
K W	6	3	11	1	10	16	11	2	20	9	11	11	16	5	0																					
CIV CAS	28	26	9	4	14	22	10	15	54	44	19	25	33	23	14																					

Figure 2-10A

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 2

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WEEK	MAR		APR		MAY		JUN		JUL		AUG				
	22	28	5	12	19	26	3	10	17	24	31	7			
INCIDENTS	105	75	66	85	86	90	78	89	134	133	116	110	88	99	83
MAJ /MIN ABF	5 24	12 15	7 12	12 30	14 15	8 16	13 13	23 21	25 37	20 45	23 41	16 37	16 25	17 27	11 21
MAJ /MIN CTX	6 70	5 43	1 46	7 36	2 55	8 56	6 46	3 42	8 64	6 62	5 49	4 53	1 46	5 43	3 48
EN ARTY INCOMING	315	551	307	535	553	319	712	2,144	719	1,606	1,697	928	931	757	870
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	12880	15,366	12,659	20,023	26,706	22,937	15,616	9,648	23,846	14,297	17,033	16,692	13,241	17,848	8,591
SCH /FEN SORTIES	456 132	516 340	508 279	522 357	562 164	412 140	440 72	396 222	420 431	404 357	410 270	406 178	364 162	410 205	442 117
K /W FRD GAS	32 112	48 79	107 227	110 245	51 102	35 87	44 128	48 140	66 234	55 168	52 149	41 150	28 90	33 122	25 63
K /D EN GAS	225 2	303 1	462 2	1052 4	320 2	364 4	268 2	297 9	334 3	310 0	275 8	344 0	141 6	199 2	181 2
K /W CIV GAS	5 3	1 4	1 4	15 21	2 9	5 13	9 43	8 9	16 47	5 6	3 6	0 0	2 5	5 7	0 19

Figure 2-10B

SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR 3

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WEEK	22 MAR		29 MAR		5 APR		12 APR		19 APR		26 APR		3 MAY		9 MAY		16 MAY		23 MAY		30 MAY		6 JUN		13 JUN		20 JUN		27 JUN		4 JUL		11 JUL		18 JUL		25 JUL		1 AUG		8 AUG	
	INCIDENTS	155	248	209	157	190	109	75	111	176	225	245	180	177	177	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157		
MAJ / MIN	21 / 47	55 / 113	26 / 101	20 / 65	36 / 71	12 / 64	10 / 25	14 / 50	32 / 73	45 / 98	45 / 104	42 / 68	33 / 53	30 / 80	30 / 66	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22	30 / 22		
EN ARTY INCOMING	9	79	14	7	9	1	1	1	10	10	10	9	14	7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5		
EN ARTY EXPENDITURES	1905	2845	2591	1851	1938	582	460	511	1361	2974	3049	2494	2469	2494	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794	1794		
SCH - VNAF / TR SORTIES	407	442	524	501	478	611	400	360	474	560	593	522	514	491	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	560	
K / W	62	140	100	39	51	60	16	23	104	91	59	116	88	62	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	
K / D	158	198	244	286	337	54	242	79	302	408	352	944	538	381	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	488	
K / W	8	34	25	10	13	3	9	6	9	8	42	10	6	17	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21		

Figure 2-10C

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE MR 4

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WEEK	22 MAR - 28		5 APR - 11		12 APR - 18		19 APR - 25		3 MAY - 9		10 MAY - 16		17 MAY - 23		24 MAY - 30		7 JUN - 13		14 JUN - 20		21 JUN - 27		5 JUL - 11		12 JUL - 18		19 JUL - 25		26 AUG - 1	
	INCIDENTS	480	441	295	333	479	465	309	320	487	405	330	322	407	275	271														
MAJ /MIN	23 228	20 174	9 132	21 144	35 227	23 181	17 135	25 146	41 223	14 203	21 163	30 145	30 198	30 141	8 126															
MAJ /MIN	17 212	19 228	5 149	6 162	11 206	21 240	11 146	6 143	11 212	16 172	20 126	13 134	15 175	4 115	11 120															
EN ARTY INCOMING	2182	1357	999	1113	2269	1590	1178	1627	2796	1731	1478	1574	2220	1009	1085															
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	34929	35253	19837	16682	20995	29395	20981	18000	21189	21839	15932	19330	16694	13598	11114															
SZ /MIN	154	154	154	161	22	154	329	185	168	212	208	159	224	154	168															
FIN SORTIES	125	137	116	96	15	177	123	98	128	138	159	117	104	63																
K /W	131	132	71	63	110	177	57	43	84	118	78	53	82	52	62															
FRD CAS	564	374	379	226	439	480	389	195	409	379	309	257	216	233	248															
K /D	337	243	404	282	422	511	1078	302	285	340	275	337	212	308	236															
K /W	18	24	6	27	21	48	14	4	41	15	10	26	13	13	13															
CIV CAS	51	68	44	48	41	110	71	24	70	34	30	71	32	38	46															

Figure 2-10D

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KILL RATIO 1974

<u>MO</u>	<u>FRD</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
JAN	821	3035	3.70
FEB	821	3324	4.05
MAR	976	3465	3.55
APR	1352	5461	4.04
MAY	1281	5625	4.39
JUN	1118	5451	4.87

Figure 2-11

2-41

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UNCLASSIFIED

KILL RATIO
EN KIA
FR KIA




Figure 2-12

2-43

UNCLASSIFIED

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CHAPTER 3

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES1. (S/NFD) J2/JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

a. Organization:

(Figure 3-1)

b. Personnel: The authorized strength of J2 was reduced from 289 to 288, and actual strength showed a decrease of five officers, an increase of one NCO, and a loss of 14 EM from the last reporting period:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	156	116
NCOs	102	88
EM	<u>30</u>	<u>18</u>
TOTAL	288	222

c. Operational Effectiveness: The operational effectiveness of the Office of the J2 continues at a high level. A contributing factor is the personal integrity and professional competence of the J2 who has been in office since May 1971.

2. (S/NFD) UNIT 306.

(Figure 3-2)

a. Organization: Unit 306 is the designation of the former Military Intelligence Center and consists of Division 1 (Intelligence); Division 2 (Document Exploitation); Division 3 (Military Interrogation); Division 4 (Materiel Exploitation) and Division 5 (Administration/Support).

b. Personnel: The authorized strength decreased by 43 from 457 to 414. The actual strength was reduced by 29, which included a loss of 14 officers and 40 EM and a gain of 25 NCOs.

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J-2, JOINT GENERAL STAFF, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES




Figure 3-1

3-3

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


Figure 3-2

* ALSO SERVES AS DEPUTY J2.

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	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	159	119
NCOs	153	153
EM	<u>102</u>	<u>86</u>
TOTAL	414	358

c. Operational Effectiveness :

(1) Division 1 (Intelligence): Division 1 is the most effectively managed and productive element of Unit 306. The Target Branch is particularly outstanding, and its products are highly professional. However, the Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Branch faces certain problems. It has a new chief who has some knowledge of data processing, but a request for qualified and trained junior officers has not received priority command attention. There has been no input of intelligence information into the system since December 1972 when MACV withdrew its computer. Two DAO-hired computer specialists are tasked with re-programming IDHS files for use in the IBM 360-50 and to train personnel in the use of this equipment. However, a maximum effort will be required to re-program all data, and it is estimated that the project will not be finished until mid-1975. The shortage of qualified personnel and the lack of appreciation by users of the importance and potential of data processing constitute serious weaknesses.

(2) Division 2 (Document Exploitation): The continued increase in the level of enemy contacts during the reporting period has not generated any significant increase in documents available for exploitation. ARVN field elements still do not give priority to the timely transmittal of acquired documents to higher headquarters for exploitation, except for those of high level interest. The plan for document acquisition teams to travel to field units and retrieve significant captured documents has not made any headway due to lack of RVNAF transportation.

(3) Division 3 (Military Interrogation): Division 3 continues to be led by competent, experienced personnel. During this quarter, the Division interrogation facility

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timely basis and it is accepted with due credibility.

4. (S/NFD) MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS).

a. Organization: The MSS is still commanded by Brigadier General Vu Duc Nhuan. It is subordinate to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the Joint General Staff (JGS). Despite MSS subordination to a staff element within the Ministry of Defense, it reports directly to, or receives tasking directly from, the highest levels, including the Office of the President and the Prime Minister. The headquarters element (Military Security Directorate) is located in Saigon and is composed of 662 officers and men. The remainder of the personnel are assigned to either military units or to regular MSS units throughout South Vietnam. There is a detachment of 50 officers and men at the headquarters of each Military region and in the Capital District. A field office of 30 personnel is maintained in each province and in the major cities. A contingent of six personnel makes up the sub-field offices within each district. Also, units of 20 and 25 officers and men are assigned to Corps and Divisions, respectively. MSS personnel are attached to regiment, battalion, company and platoon level.

b. Personnel:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	1,087	1,045
NCOs	2,426	2,009
Enlisted	<u>1,248</u>	<u>1,025</u>
TOTAL	4,761	4,079

The authorized strength represents a loss of 64 personnel while actual strength declined by 306.

c. Operational Effectiveness: MSS efforts have been successful in assisting the government in maintaining a level of political stability. In furtherance of the countersubversive mission, MSS

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has provided valuable information concerning the VC infrastructure. The MSS is co-equal in power and prestige with the National Police and the Central Intelligence Organization. During the reporting period, the MSS continued bilateral operations with US military intelligence elements in RVN for the purpose of satisfying mutual Order of Battle collection requirements in MR-1 and MR-3. Additional bilateral operations are under consideration for implementation in the Capital Zone and in each military region. A new MSS policy of screening all incoming intelligence reports and messages at the Directorate HQ for further dissemination has resulted in a marked increase in the number of reports relating to enemy Order of Battle. In addition, the Directorate prepares two monthly reports which attest to its operational effectiveness within its area of competence. One report covers Communist military, political and economic activities while the other is concerned with the activities of political opposition parties in RVN. MSS continues to provide special services to US military intelligence, including the issuance of MSS passes, performance of national level file checks, and coordinating clearances of indigenous personnel.

5. (S/NFD) UNIT 101.

a. Organization: Under the operational control of J2, Unit 101, JCS/RVNAF, organizes, directs and controls in-country and cross-border military intelligence collection operations with six field detachments and 26 teams operating throughout the country. Detachment 60 is responsible for coverage of the Central Office of South Vietnam (CCSVN). Detachment 67 provides coverage for MR-3, with the exception of the Capital Military District. Detachment 68 is responsible for MR-4. Detachment 69, with headquarters at Thu Duc, was re-organized and some of its operational assets re-targeted during June. As a result, Detachment 69 will have one additional collection team and one additional resident case officer.

b. Personnel: Actual strength of Unit 101 decreased by 17 personnel during the reporting period. Approximately 560 men of the total assigned strength are assigned to field duties.

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	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	--	331
NCOs	--	256
EM	--	146
TOTAL	874	733

c. **Equipment and Facilities:** Most of the Unit's equipment is serviceable and replacements of spare parts are available. The Unit has second echelon maintenance capability for all its equipment. Maintenance above that level is obtained through ARVN support channels. Unit facilities throughout the country are excellent.

d. **Operational Effectiveness:** Unit 101 maintains liaison with US Army Special Activities, Thailand. One project officer is assigned at the headquarters level and provides technical and financial assistance. The Unit's monthly production of intelligence reports is approximately 1,500. The Unit is responsive to ARVN requirements from all consumers. The Unit receives financial assistance through US Military Intelligence Contingency Funds which amount to approximately \$6,000 monthly. Cost effectiveness is excellent; however, Unit 101 could not continue to function without this US financial assistance.

6. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE NAVY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

a. N-2:

(1) **Organization:** The N-2 is an operational staff for the Chief of Naval Operations with four main branches: Administrative/Personnel, Hydrographic Mapping, Intelligence and Exploitation. Its mission is to analyze information received from the special collection detachment, naval forces at sea, naval coastal zone headquarters and other RVN intelligence agencies and to provide estimates of Communist intentions.

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(2) Personnel:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	28	21
Petty Officers	33	14
Seamen	<u>18</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTAL	99	49

The N-2 expects to receive a new TO&F from Vietnamese Navy HQ in July to formalize the personnel strength shown above. Additional personnel will probably be transferred to N-2 to fill vacancies. As personnel become available, six officers, nine petty officers, and three seamen will be assigned to support the riverine forces. The morale of N-2 personnel remains good. All personnel are volunteers and most have completed sea duty.

(3) Equipment and Facilities: A recent DAO/N-2 conference determined a need for cameras for 21 of the Navy's larger ships to assist in ship identification. Agent radios for the Navy's two junks were also requested. Acquisition of these items will upgrade the capability of the naval forces to develop better quality and more timely intelligence.

(4) Operational Effectiveness: The N-2 organization has continued to produce good quality briefings, reports and studies. One of their most significant products is the weekly intelligence summary which contains mainly tactical intelligence. It is based on information obtained from the special collection detachment, naval forces at sea, naval coastal zone headquarters, riverine forces and other RVN intelligence agencies. The N-2 HQ staff plans to establish an interrogation team which can be dispatched from the HQ to exploit captured junk crews; such as, the Thai crew that was recently detained by the Vietnamese Navy for smuggling opium. The interrogation team will be trained by ARVN Unit 306 and will have the capability to interrogate in Vietnamese, Chinese, Cambodian and Thai languages as well as to exploit foreign documents and materiel.

b. Unit 701 - Special Collection Detachment (SCD):

(1) Organization: Effective 1 July 74, the former

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Special Collection Detachment was reorganized and re-designated Unit 701. The Headquarters element of the detachment consists of a command section and three branches: Operations, Signal and Support. It has two field elements. The covert element has six collection teams composed of agent handlers and informants. Because of the mounting Communist threat to Vietnamese Navy warships anchored in the Saigon Port, SCD plans to establish a seventh collection team which will be responsible for the Capital Military District (CMD). At the present time, the CMD is covered by Collection Team 6 which is also responsible for the Rung Sat Special Zone. The overt element consists of 28 naval intelligence liaison officers who are assigned to the various military regions, sector and/or sub-sector headquarters. In the past, the liaison officers functioned in a dual capacity. In addition to contact with official intelligence collection sources, they also worked as covert collection officers and managed the agent handlers in their area. As a result of the reorganization of 1 July, HUMINT collection officers have been assigned to the field to assume the management of the various collection nets. The reorganization will also permit the eventual raising of rank levels in the collection teams and at Unit 701 HQ. The seventh collection team that will be responsible for the Capital Military District will not be assigned until another TO&E is approved by the Joint General Staff increasing the authorized strength and the number of Unit 701 collection teams.

(2) Personnel:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	--	50
Petty Officers	--	129
Seamen	<u>--</u>	<u>19</u>
TOTAL	121	198

The recently revised TO&E provided for 121 positions as shown above. By Jan 1975, JGS will approve a revised TO&E which will authorize the additional personnel. The Unit expects to receive 20 personnel in August 1974 who will be assigned to communications duties.

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(3) Operational Effectiveness: Morale of the unit is excellent and operational efficiency continues to improve. Additional agents have been recruited to obtain intelligence on the Cua Viet area and reporting is good. The two-week Human Resource Intelligence Collection course taken by 80 case officers should contribute to greater efficiency.

7. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE.

a. HUMINT Collection:

(1) Most VNAF officers have developed skills to a point where they can successfully operate on a unilateral basis.

(2) VNAF DOI Personnel:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	249	223
NCOs & EM	<u>389</u>	<u>308</u>
TOTAL	638	531

Twenty-one of the officers are in training status.

(3) The VNAF Special Collection Unit still has an authorized strength of 15 and an assigned strength of 9. The US provides all of the Unit's operational funds. Without this financial assistance, the Unit could not operate.

b. PHOTINT:

(1) VNAF's photo intelligence is limited by number of aircraft and their susceptibility to ground fire. Four RF-5s and four of the 12 authorized RC-47s are assigned to photo collection. These aircraft provide minimum coverage of MRs 2, 3, and 4. The RC-47 can obtain good photography but is too vulnerable to ground fire in most target areas to be used for BDA. The RF-5 operates under the major handicap of its 70mm camera. There is little or no coverage of MR-1 due to the high air defense threat. The RVN relies on the US for all photo coverage of MR-1 and 95 percent of photo coverage country wide.

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(2) To improve VNAF's photo reconnaissance capability, a special reconnaissance committee met in Saigon on 25-26 June 1974. The meeting was attended by representatives from HQ USAF, PACAF, Wright-Patterson AFB, USDAO, USSAG, VNAF HQ and Northrop Corporation. The requirements for a suitable camera system were redefined in order to obtain greater operating altitude flexibility dictated by the increased ground threat. Because of the lead time required for funding and the complexity of the camera system, the Committee recommended both an interim and a final solution. As an interim measure, it was recommended that a KS-121 system be installed in 4 RF-5 aircraft. The KS-121 is electrically and physically interchangeable with the KS-92 which is presently being utilized by VNAF. CONUS flight tests demonstrated that the KS-121 has twice the resolution and 10 times the reliability of the KS-92 plus other advantages. The camera could be available six to nine months after award of contract. If the KS-121 test results prove acceptable, USDAO/VNAF may elect to purchase the KS-121 for the F-5E. However, if the long focal length (KA-95 type) capability is the only type system acceptable and funds are available, FY-77 may be the earliest that this can be programmed. The estimated cost of modifying 18 F-5E's with an internal KA-95 type system is approximately \$7.5 million. The budgetary estimate to provide both the KS-121 low-to-medium altitude capability and the KA-95 medium-to-high altitude capability in each of 18 aircraft is approximately \$13.5 million. The estimate for 18 KA-95 type systems installed in a modified 275 gallon non-jettisonable fuel tank would approximate the internal costs. The pod option degrades the range and performance of the F-5E aircraft to some extent (which was unacceptable with the lower performing F-5A) but avoids airframe dedication. The pod installation of the camera will need to be checked to determine if the camera performance is significantly degraded compared to an internal installation.

(3) VNAF can produce duplicate positives, select prints and photo mosaics. Its capacity to produce paper prints is limited. Laboratory standards have deteriorated in recent months. The poor quality of RF-5 70mm negatives of VNAF aerial photos have resulted in unsatisfactory imagery interpretation. US technical assistance has been requested. VNAF imagery interpretation personnel meet US professional standards.

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(4) There is an average delay of three days in processing aerial photographic film. This delay, which is not acceptable for prompt tactical reaction, is due to the fact that film from all five VNAF divisions must be sent to the Aerial Photo Center (APC) at Tan Son Nhut for processing and then returned to the requestor.

(5) On 061815H Jun 74, the VNAF Aerial Photo Center (APC) caught fire and all films in the library and storage facility were destroyed. The cause of fire was attributed to faulty wiring. The APC has had several recent incidents of shorts and burning in circuit breakers and wiring in and adjacent to the film library/storage area. This building (APC) is approximately 15 meters from the main building. No equipment was lost or damaged. The fire will not affect operations or capabilities of VNAF/APC. J2/JGS has a duplicate of all film lost in the fire. VNAF will have to construct a new library and storage area as there is no other space available for this purpose.

8. (S/NFD) SIGINT.

a. The J7 is responsible for RVNAF SIGINT Collection. This agency provides timely tactical intelligence to field commanders through its 11 ARVN special technical detachments assigned to the 11 ARVN infantry divisions. SIGINT support teams are assigned to Airborne, Marine and Ranger Units. This collection effort is aided by four centers situated in Da Nang, Pleiku, Saigon and Can Tho.

b. Overall RVNAF SIGINT collection continues to make progress in the analytical and reporting fields. However, shortages of personnel and equipment and need for additional secure communications hinder the collection effort. Equipment problems, primarily a 40 percent TO&E shortage in AN/PRC-15 radios, have been resolved and are programmed for purchase. Actual purchase cannot be made until funding becomes available late this year. A one-year lead time is expected between time of purchase and receipt of equipment.

c. Of the 33 EC-47 aircraft originally in the Airborne Radio Direction (ARDF) Program, only 30 remain. One aircraft was destroyed in a landing crash in late 1973; two other aircraft were lost over Tay Ninh Province in May of this year to enemy air defense systems. Since April 1974, the VNAF have been scheduling 15 missions a day over the RVN. While primary cause for

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mission reductions and aborts continues to be weather, the age of both the aircraft and the Direction Finding (DF) equipment also limit collection time. There are plans to augment the EC-47 inventory with seven additional aircraft and improve the DF capability of a portion of the EC-47 fleet. Funding constraints have delayed these improvements and no final decision can be reached until funds from the FY-75 budget are released.

9. (S/NFD) SUMMARY. RVNAF intelligence services benefit from personnel who, on the whole, are highly competent, dedicated professionals. DAO liaison with them continues to improve, and the products received from them are generally satisfactory and timely. Some RVNAF intelligence activities would have to be drastically reduced or eliminated without US funding assistance. DAO is also assisting VNAF in improving their photo reconnaissance capability which has been degraded by the increased ground threat. Procurement of an improved camera system with greater operating altitude flexibility is under consideration. Other weak areas in RVNAF intelligence are the failure to exploit captured documents and materiel in a thorough, timely manner, and the lack of an operational data processing system for intelligence information.

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CHAPTER 4

RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

1. (C) INTRODUCTION. This chapter addressed force structure changes submitted in the Joint Strategic Objective Plan (FY 77-84), and the formation of JGS/RVNAF/DAO working committees to discuss the impact of funding reduction on RVNAF force structure.

2. (S) RECOMMENDED RVNAF MID-RANGE OBJECTIVE FORCE, JSOP FY 77-84.

a. CINCPAC letter 537, serial 0269, dated 13 May 74, forwarded the guidance for Defense Attache Office (DAO) preparation of the country submission of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) annex to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan Fiscal Years 1977 - 1984 (JSOP FY 77 - 84). CINCPAC guidelines for DAO preparation of recommended force levels for Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) for JSOP FY 77-84 were to develop forces within reasonable attainability; to meet realistic needs of the country and in line with current U.S. objectives and strategy.

b. DAO Force Structure Section, Plans Branch, met with representatives from Army, Navy, Air Force, Communications-Electronics and Security Assistance Divisions in developing recommended RVNAF force changes to economize, standardize and improve effectiveness of the force. Recommendations for force changes forwarded to CINCPAC included:

ARVN

ADA AW Battalions - Four battalions to be deleted in FY 78 due to inadequacy and obsolescence of the M55 and M42A1 anti-aircraft weapons. Redeye Missile platoons/sections are proposed as the best and quickest attainable replacement to be programmed into ARVN in 1978.

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Armored Cavalry Squadrons

- M48 tank replaces M41 tank in Armored Cavalry Squadrons in FY 78 due to obsolescence and unsupportability of M41 tank.

VNN/VNMC

Crocodile Viper

- Deleted from VNN because it is uneconomical to maintain.

Landing Ship Tank

- Increased from 6 to 12 beginning FY 77 to provide adequate assets for RVNAF cargo transshipment, troop movement and tactical missions.

Patrol Craft Escort (PCE)

- PCE being phased out of VNN because they are old and uneconomical to maintain. Replacement with Patrol Gunboat (PG-F) will begin in FY 77.

Junk Patrol Forces

- Deletion of the Yabuta Junk and decrease in the number of A&K Junks is being offset by an increase in the number of Coastal Raiders.

Amphibian Tractor Company

- Deleted from the Marine Division force structure in FY 77. Replacement of the LVT-5 with the LVT-7 is uneconomical as is continued maintenance and supply of spare parts for the LVT-5 in the out years.

VNAF

- Reduction of 8 squadrons, from 66 to 58, from FY 75 to FY 79 for a total reduction of 427 aircraft. VNAF force structure changes improve personnel/aircraft ratio and enhance maintenance capability, mission support, utilization and cost effectiveness.

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c. The recommended force level remains at the authorized manpower ceiling of 1.1 million men with significant changes in force structure as outlined in paragraph b, above. No significant changes in Territorial Forces force structure or reduction in strength was recommended because of the continuing threat and the increased role the Territorial Forces are playing in providing local security.

d. The objective force level recommended was developed based on realistic needs of the country, definable threat and reasonable attainability. Specific changes in force structure provide improve standardization, modernization and logistic support.

e. Table B (Security Assistance), JSOP FY 77-84 fiscal data, follows the economic data as submitted in the FY 76-80 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and provides recommended total funding requirements within Office of the Secretary of Defense dollar guidelines, 1.8 billion, the minimum required to support the recommended JSOP FY 77-84 objective force level.

3. (C) FUNDING RESTRAINTS. During the months of May and June, threatened funding reductions caused outside challenges to units within the RVNAF current force structure. Working committees were called to substantiate the requirement for the Airborne Division, the 175mm gun battalions, the M-41 tank trcops, antiaircraft units and some headquarters units. These meetings were hosted by the JGS-3 Force Structure Section and attended by DAO representatives and the knowledgeable and concerned RVNAF representatives. During this series of meetings the RVNAF largely defended the status quo. The specialist representatives justified their arms strongly and expertly. However, by working with the RVNAF JGS through a series of these problems, they became aware of the possibility of funding forced reductions. JGS personnel displayed a good appreciation for equipment costs and unit costs. They are preparing themselves to make hard decisions as required. The original committee work done during May and June will be a good precedent to further more meaningful meetings on RVNAF force structure.

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CHAPTER 5

VIETNAMESE ARMY

1. (C) AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH. Depicted authorized and assigned troop strengths include all combat support, and combat service support units assigned to the divisions.

(Figure 5-1)

2. (S) AREAS OF OPERATION AND UNIT LOCATIONS.

a. MR 1 is subdivided into five Areas of Operation (AO's). From north to south, AO's are assigned as follows: VNMV Division, Airborne Division, 1st Division, 3rd Division, and 2nd Division.

b. MR 2 has no firm divisional AO's. Due to the large geographical area involved, the 22nd and 23rd Divisions are forced to be highly mobile, without defined AO's.

c. MR 3 is subdivided into four AO's and the Capital Special Zone (the area encompassing Saigon). Combat units assigned to AO's are as follows: Ranger Command, 5th Division, 18th Division and 25th Division.

d. MR 4 is subdivided into three AO's. Combat divisions assigned to AO's are as follows: 7th Division, 9th Division and 21st Division.

(Figure 5-2)

e. The locations of tactical units at the regimental level and above are depicted for each MR.

(Figures 5-3, 5-4

5-5 and 5-6)

5-1

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CONFIDENTIAL**AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS**

AS OF 31 MAY 74

DIV	AUTH	OFF	NCO	EM	ASSGN	% AUTH
1st	17102	1195	3611	11022	15828	92
2d	14159	979	2836	8033	11848	84
3d	14159	1074	2974	9160	13208	93
5th	14159	965	2609	8239	11813	83
7th	14175	929	2887	7241	11057	78
9th	14175	966	2852	7331	11149	79
18th	14159	947	2733	8189	11869	84
21st	14175	915	2761	7141	10817	76
22d	17233	1109	3524	9256	13889	80
23d	14168	976	2670	8600	12246	86
25th	14220	890	2834	9074	12848	90
Abn	13684	1017	2990	9268	13275	97
Rgr	34418	2330	5744	23180	31254	91
Mar	14438	1089	2529	11878	15496	107
TOTAL	224424	15381	43604	137612	196597	87

Figure 5-1

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AREAS OF OPERATION





Figure 5-2

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ARVN

MR 1



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Figure 5-3

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



Figure 5-4

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MR 4



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Figure 5-6

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3. (C) COMBAT ARMS.

a. Combat Divisions:

(1) The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) Division remains committed to a defensive posture in the northernmost Area of Operation (AO) in Military Region 1. Until 1 June, the Division occupied defensive positions in Quang Tri Province. At that time, the Marine AO was extended approximately ten kilometers to the south when a brigade was deployed from the Airborne Division AO. With the increase in territorial responsibility, the Marine Division has experienced more combat activity. Enemy forces have probed several outposts on the western periphery of the AO to test the newly assumed Marine positions. Only two of the nine VNMC battalions have participated in the increase in contact with the enemy. The Division has continued improvement of defensive positions and on-site training. Two battalions completed the refresher course at the Dong Da Training Center in Phu Bai. Training emphasis has been placed on antiaircraft defense, squad and platoon leader refresher training, demolitions and crew-served weapons training and maintenance. Tank-infantry training was also conducted. Disciplinary problems have been ameliorated with increased combat activity and morale is high. Battalion rotation to Saigon was discontinued temporarily when the AO was enlarged. However, a leave program was instituted as an interim measure until the rotation program can be reinstated. The effective Combined Action Program continued to improve readiness of Popular Force (PF) and Peoples' Self Defense Force (PSDF) units in the AO. The Division is considered a highly effective, combat ready unit. Protracted employment in a defensive posture is expected.

(2) The Airborne Division also continued in a defensive posture in an AO immediately to the south of the VNMC Division. The Division AO was contracted somewhat 1 June when the 1st Brigade was deployed to Saigon with its organic weapons and equipment. The brigade was assigned as JGS Reserve for a 90 day period. Unit AO's were adjusted to compensate for the redeployed 1st Brigade. One brigade is deployed north of the Song Bo Corridor and south to Hue. Units along the Song Bo continued to experience light attacks by fire, probes

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and patrol skirmishes. 1st Armored Brigade units are responsible for a small section of the AO and maintenance of the tank barrier around Hue. Defensive positions have been completed and are improved on a continuing basis. The improved positions have resulted in reduced casualties from attacks by fire. Rotation of units to Dong Da Training Center for refresher training was discontinued when the 1st Brigade was deployed to Saigon. However, all units have conducted on-site training and both brigades remaining in the AO have conducted two CPX exercises. Rotation of battalions to Saigon for R&R had to be discontinued 1 June upon deployment of the 1st Brigade to Saigon as JGS Reserve. A leave program was instituted to replace the battalion R&R rotation program. Airborne units continued to participate in a civic action program and a training program for PF and PSDF units. Disciplinary problems have abated with increased activity. The Airborne Division is still considered an elite unit and is expected to continue in a defensive role.

(3) The 1st Division is responsible for the southernmost AO north of the Hai Van Pass. The AO extends from Hue to the Hai Van Pass after having been shifted south from the Song Bo corridor upon deployment of the 1st Airborne Brigade to Saigon. However, relief of responsibility for a portion of the Song Bo Corridor did not reduce the combat activity in the Division AO. Two regiments, the 3rd and the 54th, were heavily committed from mid-April to early July south of Phu Bai. Enemy units overran an outpost on Hill 300 and several other positions on the key terrain in the vicinity. Initially in division reserve, 3rd Infantry units were particularly effective in reinforcing 54th Infantry units in sealing off enemy resupply routes and finally retaking all of the lost positions in early July. Small unit tactics were especially effective in isolating the enemy positions and reducing casualties. Division unit defensive positions have been improved and developed to cover avenues of approach. In depth defenses culminate in the main positions around Hue. An excellent trail system has been developed for resupply of outposts manned by forward battalions. The 51st Regiment has been committed to area and railroad security in Phu Loc east to the Hai Van Pass.

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Small unit leadership is no longer a problem. Rotation of battalions to refresher training at Dong Da Training Center and on-site small unit training continued. The 1st Division continued to improve its readiness and performance during the past three months, reflecting increased combat capability. The Division is a reliable unit and is considered combat effective.

(4) The 3rd Division is responsible for Quang Nam and northern Quang Tin province. Though still not completely combat tested, division units have been operating west of QL-1. The 2nd and 56th Infantry have been successful in several operations during the quarter and have demonstrated their willingness to close with the enemy and fight aggressively. The 57th Infantry has experienced little contact in the Que Son Valley where the unit has been deployed. The Division staff is well coordinated and has been effective in directing the pacification program. Go Noi Island, a traditional enemy stronghold, was cleared by the 56th Infantry in early July. The 2nd Infantry was particularly effective in operations against enemy forces in Tien Phuoc District. Active patrolling by all division units has protected the resettlement program and the rice crop. The Division continues to rotate battalions to Hoa Cam Training Center for refresher training, and civic action teams have been active and successful in assisting the population in various service oriented projects. Division teams have also assisted in training PF and PSDF units. The Division has gained experience during the period and is considered combat effective.

(5) The 2nd Division has been heavily committed throughout the period in its AO which includes the southern portion of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The AO has continued to be the most active in the region. When enemy units overran PF outposts protecting Ky Tra Village south of Tam Ky, two 2nd Division battalions, 1/4 and 2/6, were successively deployed to reinforce the area; neither were successful. The 2/6 infantry battalion sustained heavy losses. The 5th Infantry was deployed to the area and achieved limited success before being redeployed to Quang Ngai. All three infantry regiments have been committed to pacification operations in Quang Ngai. Both the 4th and 5th Infantry Regiments have been hit by frequent attacks by fire during these operations. Battalions of the 6th Infantry Regiment have sustained heavy casualties both in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin, although the regiment has not been committed as a

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unit. Pacification operations in Mo Duc and Duc Pho District of Quang Ngai have met with success, but the enemy continues to react strongly. The Division rotated only one battalion to refresher training during the quarter. The Division is committed to continued pacification efforts to facilitate expansion of GVN control. The 2nd Division is the weakest of the divisions assigned to I Corps and is considered only marginally effective due to the losses sustained by the 6th Regiment.

(6) The 22nd Division is one of two divisions possessing four regiments. Three of the regiments have been deployed in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces throughout the quarter. One regiment, the 47th, was deployed to Binh Dinh Province in May. Division units in Kontum have been involved in several heavy contacts while in defensive positions northeast of Kontum and participated in limited objective attacks against enemy units southeast of Vo Dinh. These actions resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. The division was effective in numerous small unit contacts west of Pleiku City, and demonstrated excellent mobility in responding to enemy operations in southern Pleiku, when a serious enemy threat placed the Plei Me Ranger Outpost in danger of being isolated and overrun. Although sustaining heavy losses, aggressive action by the 42nd Regiment defeated the enemy forces and forced their withdrawal to the west. The 47th Regiment also showed excellent mobility in a rapid deployment to the lowlands of Binh Dinh Province, when a renewed enemy threat developed along QL-19 and in the Phu Cat - Phu My area. The regiment inflicted heavy casualties on enemy units and alleviated the threat to QL-19 and Phu Cat Air Base. The regiment has been continually committed to operations against enemy units east of Phu Cat since mid-May. Although the Division has been heavily committed, its units have shown excellent mobility in responding to enemy initiatives. However, the units need rest and have been unable to rotate to needed refresher training. Enemy activity and the potential threat in the highlands will probably preclude any sustained redeployment of the division to the lowlands. The 22nd Division is considered combat effective.

(7) The 23rd Division continued to demonstrate its capability to respond quickly and effectively to enemy initiatives throughout the central highlands. Units have been rotated intentionally between Quang Duc, Darlac

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and Pleiku/Kontum to preclude over-commitment to sustained combat. With the 22nd Division bearing the brunt of enemy initiatives, the 23rd Division has been used often to reinforce and to conduct spoiling operations. Although QL-14 was not reopened along the Khmer frontier, the line of communication through Quang Duc, using alternate routes, was maintained. The 44th Regiment was required in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces for most of the quarter. The regiment's units were able to protect critical facilities in Pleiku, to secure the Chu Pao Pass between Kontum and Pleiku cities and to reinforce 22nd Division units around Kontum both on the offensive and in a defensive role. When an enemy threat developed in northern Darlac, the 45th Regiment responded rapidly and decisively, inflicting heavy casualties and driving the enemy westward away from QL-14, the vital land route running south from Kontum through southern MR 2. The 53rd Regiment has experienced the least combat during the quarter and has had an opportunity to refit and rest its units. One battalion had to be committed to reinforce the Kontum area in late June, but the other two battalions are located in Darlac as Corps reserve. The continual commitment to operations precluded refresher training, but on-site training has been accomplished whenever combat requirements have permitted. This highly mobile division is considered combat effective.

(8) The 25th Division has been committed to more operations during this quarter than in any like period for the past year. However, most activity has been oriented to providing security, participating with other units in offensive preparations and conducting small unit operations while in a reserve posture. The Division has not participated as a unit due to Corps requirements. The 49th Regiment performed well in operations to relieve enemy pressure against Duc Hue Ranger Outpost in western Hau Nghia. The 46th Infantry Regiment has spent most of the period in Tay Ninh conducting small unit security operations. These regiments have rotated units through refresher training at Cu Chi. The 50th Regiment has been in reserve in the vicinity of Cu Chi when not committed to offensive operations with other divisions. Units of the regiment screened for 18th Division units operating in western Binh Duong and two battalions participated in the Ben cat operation. The effectiveness of Division units has been demonstrated in reinforcing RF units to maintain security along QL-1 and QL-22, precluding their interdiction. Leadership has been improved with rotation through refresher training and participation in small unit operations. Inflation has caused morale problems

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which are of deep concern to Division leaders. The 25th Division has again improved its combat capabilities and the battalions are confident in their ability to defeat the enemy. The Division has attained its highest level of combat effectiveness since the ceasefire.

(9) The 5th Division has still not realized the improvements which were anticipated after the change of command in November 1973. However, division units have been more active during this quarter than in any like period for the past year. The Division AO was contracted when all of Binh Long Province was assigned to the Ranger Command. This left the 5th Division with only a small but important AO in northern Binh Duong Province, in addition to Phuoc Long Province. However, Division units are seldom deployed to that portion of the AO. The 7th Regiment was committed in Phu Giao when the initial enemy attacks in Binh Duong hit III Corps units 16 May. The regiment was able to fend off the enemy attacks and reopen Route LTL-1A between Phu Giao and Song Be Bridge, after enemy units were able to interdict the road. The regiment performed well under heavy enemy pressure. The 8th Regiment was able to respond rapidly to enemy threats against QL-1 in the eastern portion of the region in Long Khanh Province. Two battalions of the regiment conducted operations and managed, with difficulty, to open the route. Operations south of Xuan Loc resulted in heavy casualties to two of the regiment's battalions. The 8th Regiment has been deployed in the Lai Khe operation during most of the quarter and participated in screening operations to protect the northern flank of operations in the Ben Cat area. The regiment was only marginally effective in this task. All Division units have been subjected to enemy attacks by fire during the period and have sustained significant casualties. In order to combat inflation and morale problems, some units have been engaged in growing their own food in base camps around Lai Khe and Phu Giao. The Division has recently been assigned to maintain contact with enemy units in the Ben Cat area and to conduct small unit operations to retake lost territory west of Ben Cat. Division commitments have precluded refresher training. The 5th Division can still be considered only marginally effective.

(10) The 18th Division has been heavily committed to combat operations throughout the quarter and has maintained its reputation as the best unit in the region.

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However, each of the regiments has sustained heavy casualties and is in need of rest, refitting and training. At the outset of the quarter, Division units were committed to clearing operations in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. However, the Division had to deploy units to Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh Provinces where they participated in the relief of Duc Hue Ranger Outpost and the ARVN operations into Cambodia. The enemy attacks into northern Binh Duong again required redeployment of 18th Division units to stem the enemy advance toward Saigon and initiate operations to retake lost territory west of Ben Cat. All three regiments were heavily committed against strong enemy forces when the Division was assigned responsibility for operations west of Ben Cat. This task lasted for over six weeks and involved daily contact with the enemy. All Division units were subjected to heavy indirect attacks by fire. Frontal attacks against well-prepared defensive positions proved costly as the division sustained heavy casualties. However, heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy did preclude further enemy success. The heavy casualties have not yet affected the performance of Division units. However, the Commanding General is concerned over the potential problems which may develop from the extended commitment to combat. For the present, units are able to rest and refit and conduct on-site training. The long combat commitment has precluded rotation of any units to training. The staff is hopeful for an extended period of less intense combat in order to train replacements and prepare for any renewed enemy initiative. The Division is still considered to be highly combat effective, despite recent casualties.

(11) After a long period of sustained offensive operations, the 7th Division has been less committed the past few weeks. All three organic regiments have been highly mobile. Following successful operations against the enemy stronghold in Tri Phap, the Division has consolidated control in the area. A regiment has remained in the area to preclude reinforcement by the enemy and further consolidate control. Two regiments, reinforced with armored cavalry units, were heavily committed to operations along the Khmer frontier from late April through June. Initial combat was heavy when the 5th NVA Division attempted to infiltrate the northern Delta. Excellent mobility and aggressiveness defeated the enemy attempt. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy

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and a significant number of weapons were captured. Constant small unit patrols and ready reinforcements have continued to deny the enemy access to traditional infiltration routes. Activity has abated recently, except for indirect attacks by fire against units deployed along the Khmer frontier. The division has been able to rotate units to Dong Tam for rest and refit for limited periods. The regiments have conducted local area training, but the continued requirement for deployment of units throughout the AO has prevented rotation of units to refresher training. Heavy casualties sustained in Tri Phap in February and March have been replaced, and the division remains highly mobile and combat effective.

(12) The 9th Division has not been employed as a unit for over a year. The division Headquarters and one regiment, the 16th, has been deployed in the western Delta throughout the quarter. The 16th Regiment has been especially effective in conducting heliborne operations against enemy infiltration attempts along infiltration corridor 1-C in western Kien Giang Province. Sustained deployment of reconnaissance patrols, in addition to other sources, has enabled the 16th Regiment to gain timely information and respond effectively against enemy units. The battalions of the regiment have been effective while fighting alone or as a regiment, when required by the situation. The 14th and 15th Regiments have been assigned to other divisions during most of the quarter. The 14th Regiment was particularly effective while participating in operations with the 7th Division along the Khmer frontier. Recently, the regiment has been conducting effective security operations in eastern Kien Phong Province under the control of the 9th Division. The regiment has been mobile and responsive and has conducted operations aggressively. The 15th Regiment has also been deployed with the 7th Division for most of the quarter. The regiment has been effective and mobile in conducting operations along the Khmer frontier under control of the 7th Division, and for short periods in northern Kien Phong under control of the 9th Division. All of the regiments have been committed to operations or security on a continual basis. This has precluded rotation of units to training. While the Division has not fought as a unit, the Headquarters has had control of all three regiments for brief periods and has demonstrated

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the capability to exercise control of widely dispersed units, essential to assure positive control in its assigned AO. The Division is considered combat effective.

(13) The 21st Division continues to be weak, with little prospect for significant improvement. Constant enemy activity coupled with the size of the AO continue to occupy the Division. The 31st Regiment has been the only unit to demonstrate significant improvement. The unit was deployed in An Xuyen after the enemy overran several territorial outposts and was able to recover most of the positions. The 32d Regiment has still not fully recovered from a defeat in the U-Minh forest in March. The unit was beginning to conduct limited operations at the end of the quarter, however. The 33d Regiment has been marginally effective. The entire division has been on the move throughout the AO on a continually rotating basis. However, except for the 31st Regiment, the battalions have been unable to gain the initiative. The most serious problems have been combat strength of deployed units and corruption. This 21st Division suffers from the "flower and ghost soldier" problem more than any other unit. Recent investigations have not resulted in positive remedial action. Until a solution can be achieved, the 21st Division can be expected to remain only marginally effective.

(14) Ranger Command:

(a) There has been very little change since the previous assessment. Rangers worked primarily within isolated areas throughout RVN. There is a lack of battalion level experience. MR Commanders have misused the rangers in the past and consequently fail to obtain maximum results. The ranger units could be task organized to form brigade size units and serve as a relief for the committed regiments within the military regions. Ranger units, under OPCON to the divisions, complain about the inadequate logistics support.

(b) Ranger units in MR-1 did nothing to distinguish themselves. The 14th Ranger Group was rendered combat ineffective in the Ky Tra/Tien Phuoc operations. Other units were generally used in security operations and not committed to main force clashes with the Communists.

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(c) Ranger elements in MR 2 experienced the highest number of incidents in RVN. They acquitted themselves well in most engagements. Many of the Ranger units remain undertrained and understrength. The Rangers continue to make slow but noticeable progress in logistical and maintenance support. If properly employed and supported, they could become a significant fighting force for RVN.

(d) The Ranger units positioned within MR-3 have experienced little combat activity during this quarter. Most units have been positioned in rear area complexes to provide security. Other than performing routine security patrolling and reconnaissance, the Ranger units have not been committed. The 77th RGR Group was employed in the area SE of Xuan Loc in operations to reopen QL-1. Their overall performance in this operation left much to be desired. The 81st Ranger Group (Airborne) is in a defensive security posture along approaches to Saigon. Due to lack of commitment to combat there is no basis for real judgements as to effectiveness of MR-3 units.

(e) No Ranger units were employed in MR-4 during the period.

(f) Ranger unit locations throughout the Republic of South Vietnam are shown in Figure 5-7.

b. Artillery:

(1) The overall operational ready rate for the Artillery Command has decreased to a still respectable level of 93% (10% above established DA standards). Readiness Condition (REDCON) for the last three quarters is as follows:

ARTILLERY OPERATIONAL READY RATES

	<u>105MM</u>	<u>155MM</u>	<u>175MM</u>
REDCON 2nd Qtr	97%	97%	90%
REDCON 3rd Qtr	97%	97%	90%
REDCON 4th Qtr	93%	91%	87%

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(2) There is still the problem of replacing the "barrels" rather than the "breech & barrel" assembly. This is being pursued actively as a cost saving element and in keeping with approved methods of maintenance performance.

(3) A significant accomplishment by ARVN in maintaining these weapons is the use of machine shops to fabricate or repair many required parts such as spindle assemblies of the 155 and 175MM and handle, breech block operating.

(Figures 5-8 A/B)

c. Armor:

(1) Overall readiness rate of 89% for ARVN Armor is being maintained well above the established standard of 80%.

(Figure 5-9)

(2) Much of this achievement is attributed to pinpointed technical assistance provided ARVN by Third Country Nationals on site and directed at 1st and middle management levels. Recent changes to control and distribution of personnel under contract allows for immediate diversion of available resources to meet or forestall unfavorable developments in readiness condition. Top level managers are continuously being involved in analysis of failure data and planning for improvements.

(3) At this point it appears that an adequate level of technical assistance may have been reached to speed up ARVN's achievement of self sufficiency. However, due to critical shortages of authorized U.S. personnel who generally plan the work load of these maintenance specialists, there is the danger of regressing to a lower level of assistance due to ineffective utilization.

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UNIT	HOW 105mm			HOW 155mm			GUN 175mm			
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	
<u>MR 1</u>										
10th Bn 155mm How				18	17	1				
20th Bn 155mm How				18	16	2				
30th Bn 155mm How				18	18					
44th Bn 155mm How				18	18					
20 Arty Plts 155mm How(TF)	40	40								
10 Arty Plts Rgr Grps	20	20								
3 Arty Bns/1st Inf Div.	54	53	1							
3 Arty Bns/2d Inf Div.	54	50	4							
3 Arty Bns/3d Inf Div.	54	51	3							
101st Bn 175mm How							12	10	2	
102d Bn 175mm How							12	11	1	
105th Bn 175mm How							12	12		
3 Arty Bns/Airborne Div	54	53	1							
3 Arty Bns/Marine Div	54	54								
Sub-Total.....	330	321	9	72	69	3	36	33	3	
<u>MR-2</u>										
103d Bn 175mm How							12	9	3	
37th Bn 155mm How				18	17	1				
220th Bn 155mm How				18	18					
3 Arty Bns/22d Inf Div	54	54								
63d Bn 105mm How	18	18								
69th Bn 105mm How	18	18								
230th Bn 155mm How				18	18					
Arty School	14	14		6	6		2	2		
National Military Academy	2	2								
3 Arty Bns/23d Inf Div	54	54								
60 Arty Plts 105mm How(TF)	120	120								
9 Arty Plts Rgr Grps	18	18								
Sub-Total.....	298	298		60	59	1	14	11	3	

Figures 5-8A

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UNIT	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
<u>MR 3</u>									
180th Bn 155mm How				18	18				
50th Bn 155mm How				18	18				
250th Bn 155mm How				18	18				
46th Bn 155mm How				18	14	4			
Ordnance School	2	2		1	1		1	1	
3 Arty Bns/5th Inf Div	54	50	4						
3 Arty Bns/18th Inf Div	54	46	8						
3 Arty Bns/25th Inf Div	54	51	3						
61st Bn 105mm How	18	18							
44 Arty Plts 105mm (TF)	88	80	8						
7Plts Arty Rgr Grps	14	12	2						
104th Bn 175mm How							12	11	1
Sub-Total	284	259	25	73	69	4	13	12	1
<u>MR 4</u>									
70th Bn 155mm How				18	18				
90th Bn 155mm How				18	18				
210th Bn 155mm How				18	18				
47th Bn 155mm How				18	18				
67th Bn 105mm How	18	17	1						
68th Bn 105mm How	18	18							
3 Arty Bns/7th Inf Div	54	53	1						
3 Arty Bns/9th Inf Div	54	52	2						
3 Arty Bns/21st Inf Div	54	50	4						
64 Arty Plts 105mm (TF)	128	128							
Sub-Total	326	318	8	72	72				
Maint Float/Repair		48			44			26	
Grand Total	1238	1244	42	277	313	8	63	82	7

Figure 5-8B

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UNIT	APC M113			TANK M41A3			TANK M48A3		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
I Armor Bde	6	6							
4 Armor Cav.	42	37	5	17	14	3			
7 Armor Cav.	42	42	0	17	15	2			
11 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	15	2			
17 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	16	1			
20 Tank Sqdn	12	12					54	54	
MR-1 Sub-Total	186	177	9	68	60	8	54	54	
II Armor Bde	6	6							
3 Armor Cav.	42	42		17	15	2			
14 Armor Cav.	42	41	1	17	15	2			
19 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	15	2			
8 Armor Cav.	42	41	1	17	15	2			
21 Tank Sqdn	12	11	1				54	51	3
MR-2 Sub-Total	186	181	5	68	60	8	54	51	3
III Armor Bde	6	6							
1 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	15	2			
5 Armor Cav.	42	42	0	17	17	0			
10 Armor Cav.	58	53	5						
15 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	18	0			
18 Armor Cav.	42	41	1	17	17	0			
22 Tank Sqdn	12	12					54	50	4
Arcor/Ord School	18	17	1	10	10	0	10	10	0
MR-3 Sub-Total	262	251	11	78	77	2	64	60	4
IV Armor Bde	6	6							
2 Armor Cav.	58	58	0						
6 Armor Cav.	58	52	6						
9 Armor Cav.	58	54	4						
12 Armor Cav.	58	58	0						
16 Armor Cav.	58	57	1						
(No tanks in MR-4)									
MR-4 Sub-Total	296	285	11						
Maint. Float/Repair		354			156			99	
Grand Total	930	1248	36	214	351	18	172	264	7

Figure 5-9

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4. (C) SUPPLY/LOGISTICS.

a. During this period, the initial impact of the suspension of funds in Jan 1974 became visible through significant reduction in Depot receipts from the Continental United States (CONUS). Overall supply performance dropped to a 38-40% fill rate and the number of items with zero balance increased. The effort expended by the ARVN in capturing applicable assets through increased visibility of excess provided sufficient assets to meet emergencies in the field. Although still plagued with in-country transport problems and a backlog at the 1st Army Republic of Vietnam Associated Depot (AAD), Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat losses and related battle expenditures were supported. As the quarter approached, funds were made available to provide the ARVN sufficient latitude to generate orders covering requirements for stocked items up to safety and operating levels. In addition, repair parts necessary to support the 1st and 2nd Quarter (FY 75) 5th Echelon rebuild needs were placed on order. However, these orders (rebuild) were placed during the May-June time frame. These rebuild orders only provided 1-6 months lead time, as opposed to the routine 9-12 months usually necessary to meet United States (US) procurement lead times. The availability of combat rations became critically low at various times throughout the period. Problems were overcome through close management and ratio adjustments of issues. Radio battery issues were constrained to 75% of normal issue. In these areas, on hand stocks also dipped to precarious levels. Close management was maintained however and enroute stocks should arrive in time to meet critical needs. Shortages in ponchos and identification necklaces continue; however, shipments now enroute will ease this problem. Track and wheeled vehicle losses to enemy action were replaced through cross levelling and expenditures from emergency stocks at depot level. Shortages in basic issue items (BII) and optics continues to be a significant problem. Fifth echelon rebuild of Engineer combat equipment was essentially on target during the period. Rebuild of Signal and Ordnance items suffered through lack of critical parts such as small electronics, engine cylinder liners, etc. Progress on generation and shipment of excess continues at a slow but steady rate. Approximately 135,000 lines have been reported by field units to the NMMA and 121,000 lines have been processed to date.

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b. Depot Operations: There are currently 234 ARVN personnel on temporary duty (TDY) to the 1st AAD, Long Binh. Of these personnel, 150 are on extended TDY and 84 are students who are here for a period of 2-3 weeks for orientation and training.

(1) Contract DAJB04-73-C-0018 with Eastern Construction Company Incorporated (ECCOI) continues to provide technical Assistance training and operational support in all areas of supply as it pertains to depot operations, including formal training classes.

(2) The 7-man Army Materiel Command/Pacific Area Command (AMC/PAC) Quick Reaction Team provided technical assistance, guidance and recommendations for the overall improvement of depot operations. Significant areas and activities addressed included improvement in Materiel Release Order (MRO) processing, efficiency of rewarehousing, upgrade of care and preservation, location consolidation, depot interface with NMMA/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Automated Materiel Management Systems (RAMMS), review and upgrade of table of allowances, and validation of location survey accuracy.

c. Status of Ammunition: (April to June 1974)

(1) Available beginning of quarter:

Short Tons:	145,094
Dollars	\$282,868,757

(2) Issues during quarter:

Short Tons:	44,355
Dollars	\$72,910,041

(3) On hand end of quarter:

Short Tons:	134,031
Dollars:	\$267,589,775

(4) Requisitions:

Short Tons:	47,418
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Dollars: \$72,032,880

(5) Stockage Levels:

Short Tons: 178,000

Dollars: \$332,583,009

d. Shortfall:

(1) Logistics/Management: The level of operational effort this period was undertaken concurrently with unit deactivations, activations and movements of stock. In addition, the effort was completed while the CSC technical assistance was being reduced in accordance with the scheduled phase down in the contract. The turbulence normally associated with end of Fiscal Year activity was accompanied with a rash of visitors such as GAO, Special Assistance Teams and others, and the performance of the National Materiel Management Agency under these conditions was exemplary. Action is now underway to review records and correct any error conditions which may have occurred during this most trying period.

(2) Depot Operations: The entire operation is still understrength and undertrained. The depot is authorized 2,697 personnel, current strength is 2,314 which includes the TDY personnel. The major problem is that the reading level of the personnel is such that they have difficulty in understanding and implementing techniques even after attending training classes.

(3) The Depot consolidation action continues. Status as of 30 June 1974 follows:

(a) 60th Signal Depot:

Line items moved: 10,686

Short Tons moved: 1,513

Percent complete: 65%

(b) 40th Engineer Annex:

Line items moved: 1,109

Short Tons moved: 1,513

Percentage complete: 53%

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(4) Ammunition Deficiencies: (Term usages: DODAC-Department of Defense Ammunition Code; BOH-Balance on Hand). None are below safe level.

(a)	DODAC	A071 Cartridge, 5.56 Millimeter
	BOH	127.2 Million Rounds
	STOCKAGE	193.3 Million Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	66%
(b)	DODAC	B568 Cartridge, 40 Millimeter M-79
	BOH	1.7 Million Rounds
	STOCKAGE	4.1 Million Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	41%
(c)	DODAC	B627 Cartridge, 60 Millimeter, Illuminating
	BOH	169.4 Thousand Rounds
	STOCKAGE	194.4 Thousand Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	87%
(d)	DODAC	G881 Hand Grenade Frag
	BOH	945.9 Thousand Rounds
	STOCKAGE	2,226.1 Thousand Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	42%
(e)	DODAC	G911 Grenade, Hand MK3
	BOH	135.5 Thousand Rounds
	STOCKAGE	600.0 Thousand Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	22%
(f)	DODAC	H557 Rocket 66MM , Heat
	BOH	67.7 Thousand Rounds
	STOCKAGE	208.6 Thousand Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	32%

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(5) Critical Shortages. See paragraph 4a (Supply/Logistics) above.

5. (C) MAINTENANCE.

a. Field Maintenance:

(1) End item use inspections performed since April 1973 totaled 367. Teams are now being located at each Area Logistics Command (ALC) for more effective coverage and surveillance over management of assets.

(2) The Operational Readiness (OR) rate for ARVN equipment continues to fluctuate. It is, however, steadily improving. The following table depicts the OR trend during FY74:

	<u>O/R (FY74)</u>			
	<u>1st QTR</u>	<u>2nd QTR</u>	<u>3rd QTR</u>	<u>4th QTR</u>
Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE)	55%	65%	63%	66%
Tactical Wheeled Vehiciles (TWV)	65%	74%	79%	80%
Combat Vehicles	80%	80%	84%	85%
Artillery	95%	97%	97%	93%
Communication and Electronics (C&E)	94%	96%	95%	95%

(3) Continued command emphasis is being placed on improving maintenance through better management techniques and work methods. Specific actions identified in prior reports are being pursued aggressively.

b. Artillery:

The overall OR rate for this group of items remains at an acceptable level of 93% as compared with Department of the Army (DA) standards of 83%.

c. Combat Vehicles:

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(1) The OR rate increased slightly during the period. Combat vehicles have been maintained within acceptable OR levels due in large part to additional emphasis on maintenance by commanders and assistance from contract personnel.

(2) Most recurring failures are experienced in the current control system and ballistic computers.

(3) A study to determine the feasibility of repairing computers in-country is underway. Repairs required are primarily mechanical and not too difficult to perform.

d. Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE): The OR rate for MHE appears relatively low in comparison with other items of equipment. However, all factors considered, it is a significant accomplishment maintaining this equipment at a 65% OR level. Equipment is employed continuously and approximately 20% is in a condition requiring complete overhaul. ARVN is being urged to act promptly for overhauling these items by any means available, i.e., contract, military facilities or off-shore.

e. Tactical Wheel Vehicles:

(1) The OR of 80% is within acceptable limits but standards of readiness for these items need to be upgraded considerably. This can be achieved by increasing the re-cycling program so as to withdraw more vehicles from users for depot maintenance.

(2) ARVN is being pressed to improve maintenance performance, particularly in preventive maintenance schedules, replacement of hardware and repair of vehicle bodies.

f. Depot Maintenance:

(1) Engineer Equipment: Progress continues to be made toward the attainment of self-sufficiency in the areas of rebuild and technical supply, although the following problems persist, which require technical assistance.

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(a) Limited number of personnel capable of fully understanding US Technical Manuals.

(b) Inability to establish comprehensive training programs.

(c) Lack of proficiency at the middle management level.

(d) Quality assurance and control.

(2) Maintenance Facilities:

(a) Conversion to production line methods is now underway in many areas. While the remainder of operations continue to be accomplished in bays, plans are also being developed for the accommodation of new items to the Depot Rebuild Program, as well as to provide for related test equipment.

(b) The overall FY74 in-country rebuild program production slipped by 18 percent. However, production in end items slipped by 25 percent. Lack of repair parts was the principle cause for slippage. Repair parts were not available due to long lead time and some were not included in Bill of Materiel (BOM) requirements. Corrective action has been initiated to help prevent omissions in future BOM's.

(3) Technical Supply:

(a) Intensive efforts in identifying location and in inventorying technical supply stock, coupled with a detailed and comprehensive review of Bill of Materiel (BOM) requirements for the 3rd and 4th Quarters FY74 program, allowed reduction in requirements of more than \$550,000.00. Requisitions were adjusted accordingly. The BOM requirements for the FY75 program are currently being reviewed.

(b) Six thousand one hundred lines of repair parts have been declared as excess and reported to the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) for disposition instructions. Since the excess has been reported, disposition instructions have been received on approximately 1,800 lines.

(c) After a delay of approximately ten months, 1st Army Republic of Vietnam Associated Depot (1st AAD) assets have been moved out of warehouse number 71 in

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the 40th Engineer Base Depot (EBD) compound. This has made it possible for the 40th EBD to start re-warehousing BOM assets on hand. Rewarehousing was started on 8 May 74 and as of this date approximately 90 percent of the materiel has been moved.

(d) The Locator Inventory Count is being provided NMMA to be incorporated into RAMMS. A majority of assets on hand at the rebuild facility have been posted to the automated RAMMS asset balance file, however, some items with invalid stock number or non-standard identification are currently not compatible for input. The noncompatible numbers are subject to exception process procedures for proper validation requirements.

g. Vietnamese Army Arsenal (VAA):

(1) Shop Supply: During the period, both a location survey and physical inventory of the stocks within given shops were conducted. Consolidation of locations is now being finalized, and the disposition of excesses is on-going. An arsenal wide inventory, to encompass the remaining parts storage and warehousing areas, is planned for the first quarter, FY75. The newly installed railway network connecting the Arsenal, 1st AAD (Long Binh), and the deep water port at Newport has greatly improved the movement of supplies and assets to and from the VAA.

(2) Maintenance Facilities:

(a) Power Train Shop: Problems encountered during construction and installation of JD500 cross drive transmission test equipment forced postponement of the previously planned shop reorganization. Originally scheduled for June 1974, implementation of the revised layout is now planned for the 1st Quarter, FY75. Training of personnel on the new transmission test equipment commenced in late June.

(b) Tire Shop: Planning is currently underway for a general upgrade in production capability to enable the tire shop to meet programmed requirements. Central to

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the plan will be the acquisition of several major pieces of machinery, the purchase of which will be considered during the FY75 mid-year review.

(3) Phase II Upgrade and Foundry Installation:

(a) A contract for construction and installation of equipment for the new combat vehicle shop was awarded in mid June. Work will commence in July with an estimated construction time of one year to completion. To date, 204 pieces of machinery and equipment have been received from the US Army Depot at Sagami, Japan. The remaining equipment, which will be transported in one final increment, is currently being readied for shipment at Sagami.

(b) Work on the Foundry Installation is progressing satisfactorily. Completion is scheduled for September 1974 (with water system). The project will substantially enhance RVNAF's capability for fabrication of non-standard supply items and linestoppers.

6. (C) PETROLEUM, OIL AND LUBRICANTS (POL).

a. During 4th Qtr FY74 alternatives to continued use of Military Standard Requisitioning and Issues Procedures (MILSTRIP) for supply of special lubricants to RVNAF were studied. Long lead time for procurement by Defense General Supply Center (DGSC) has caused many items to be classified as critically short. This is a serious situation for those products required to keep Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) aircraft in the air. Results of study confirmed that a decision to procure from SEA suppliers was logistically feasible and economically sound.

b. All special lubricants were offered in solicitations to suppliers located in South East Asia. Response to solicitations indicated that all products will be available early in the 1st QTR FY75 at a cost less than DGSC MILSTRIP cost. Action to reprogram MILSTRIP funds to in-country procurement funds is underway and critical supply items should be satisfied in July 1974.

c. Aviation Gasoline Grade (AVGAS) 115/145 requirements that could not be satisfied by RVNAF contracts during 2nd half FY74 were supplemented by shipments from Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC). DFSC notified

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RVNAF that they could not provide assistance during FY75. Negotiations with Eastern Standard Oil Co. (EXXON) has gained the required AVGAS for FY75.

d. During 4th Qtr FY74, extensive investigation and negotiations with POL suppliers have resulted in price decreases amounting to at least \$0.05 per gallon beginning 1 July 1974.

e. From Jan to May 1974, RVNAF was dependent on sole source supply from South East Asia Services (SEAS) to meet fuel requirements. This was an unsatisfactory arrangement for preservation of the fuel supply line and placed RVNAF at the mercy of SEAS. Although SEAS has registered strong protests, contracts have been let to EXXON and California Texas Oil Co (CALTEX) for fuel supply at the expense of SEAS quantities. The breakdown, by percentage of supply by contractor, is shown below:

	<u>SEAS (SHELL)</u>	<u>EXXON</u>	<u>CALTEX</u>
Gasoline, Auto- motive (MOGAS)	46%	28%	26%
Diesel Fuel, Marine (DIESEL)	49%	33%	18%
AVGAS	81%	19%	0
Turbine Fuel, Grade (JP4)	53%	47%	0
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	55%	32%	13%

f. RVNAF contingency storage was completely filled during 4th Qtr FY74. This will allow slight reductions in monthly allocations so as to meet consumption requirements only. Storage now contains 60 days supply at normal consumption level and 30 days at full hostility level. Allocation of product is now at 528,000 BBL per month compared to a previous 540,200 BBL per month.

7. (C) PORT OPERATIONS.

a. On 29 March 1973, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) assumed responsibility for military port operations, less Military Standard Transportation and

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Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) documentation functions. These are being accomplished by US contractor, Alaska Barge and Transport Company. Stevedore services are provided by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) military personnel and Vietnamese under contract with ARVN. Total tonnage handled through ARVN operated ports during period 1 April 1974 through 29 June 1974 amounted to 673,726 Measurement Tons (MT) inbound and 33,884 MT outbound for RVNAF; and 94,673 MT inbound and 81,708 MT outbound for US interest cargo.

b. Shortfall:

(1) In the 3rd Quarter of Fiscal Year 74, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) moved 10,642 MT of RVNAF intra-coastal cargo which had saturated the ports of Da Nang and Newport. This backlog consisted of normal resupply items and return of unserviceable vehicles and components to repair facilities near Saigon. During the 4th Quarter FY74, the Pioneer Crusader (F-8041) departed Da Nang for Newport with 7,185 MT of RVNAF cargo composed mainly of unserviceable vehicles. RVNAF is not presently offering cargo for intra-coastal movement.

(2) Cargo handling operations at ARVN ports is improving but remains substandard when measured against the MSC standard of 1,500 MT per day. The average daily cargo handling rate of 1,210 MT for the 4th Quarter FY74, shows continued improvement over the 1,177 MT rate attained during the prior quarter. Efficiency in cargo operations will continue to be stressed at every opportunity to the Commander, Central Logistics Command (CLC) and terminal supervisory personnel.

(3) Port operations throughout the country must continue to be a subject of prime concern for the appropriate CLC Staff elements.

8. (C) RVNAF FACILITIES ENGINEERING SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM:

a. Satisfactory progress toward achievement of the goal of RVNAF facilities engineering self-sufficiency continued during the 4th Quarter FY74. During the period, technical and operational assistance programs were conducted by teams of contractor personnel located at the Office of the ARVN Chief of Engineers (OCE); the

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13 Military Property and Construction Offices (MPCO's); the Medium Maintenance Centers (MMC's); the Direct Support Groups; and the 40th Engineer Battalion Depot. These teams assist ARVN in developing real-time Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE's); preparing and implementing uniform procedures for managing facilities engineering services; organizing and conducting on the job training programs; managing the Dependent Shelter Program (DSP) and Bulk Construction Materials (BCM) programs; calibrating equipment; assisting in the operation and maintenance of Single Integrated Military System (SIMS) sites and utility systems; performing equipment overhaul/rebuild; and conducting base development.

b. Formal training under the RVNAF facilities engineering self-sufficiency program is being conducted in essential facilities at training centers located in Da Nang and Long Binh. During FY74, a total of 28 courses were conducted with 941 students graduating. Upon graduation from the training centers, students returned to their original unit for continuation of on the job training (OJT) or assignment to critical areas as needed.

c. The self-sufficiency program progressed well during FY74. The current assessment of ARVN capability is:

(1) Manpower: ARVN is still somewhat lacking in sufficient numbers of trained personnel, especially in the skill areas associated with operation and maintenance of utility systems. However, progress is being made in overcoming this deficiency.

(2) Utilities Systems Maintenance: Lack of personnel and spare parts are the main problem areas. Assigned personnel are capable of performing most maintenance functions. However, they still lack the ability to diagnose major engine problems, and they are not yet fully capable of resolving major electrical and control circuit problems. Again, they are progressing.

(3) Utilities Operations: ARVN has made excellent progress in this area, having assumed full responsibility for operation of all power plants transferred by the US. However, more trained personnel are required. Limited technical assistance will continue to be required for the foreseeable future, especially at the large power plants.

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(4) Tools, Equipment and Supply Support: This is still somewhat of a problem area, but the situation is gradually improving. Requirements are known and have been placed on requisition. However, the ARVN supply system has not yet reached the desired level of responsiveness.

(5) Publications: Missing publications have been identified and placed on order. ARVN can satisfactorily perform maintenance on those items for which technical manuals and/or commercial manuals are available.

(6) Work Management: ARVN has demonstrated that they are capable of planning and completing work assignments satisfactorily.

(7) Formal Training: The entire program has progressed satisfactorily.

(8) Base Development: This recently initiated program has progressed satisfactorily. Lack of trained personnel is the prime constraint.

9. (U) DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM:

a. During the quarter, construction of dependent shelters was halted due to lack of receipt of US promised materials.

b. Secretary of Defense message DTG 032158Z Aug 72 caused the initial program setback by deferring expenditures of half the FY73 Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) money and the entire year's Military Construction (MILCON) funds. The problem was compounded by reprogramming actions which effectively eliminated all current OMA money. The program is carried as a \$11.2 million shortfall for FY75.

c. The Office of the Chief of Engineers, ARVN, ordered the halt to new construction and directed that existing material be used to complete units under construction.

d. Program statistics are:

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	<u>Number of Units</u>
Scheduled Construction	69,997
Completed	38,950
Under Construction	7,210
Total Program	46,160

10. (U) ARVN LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC) PROGRAM.

a. The ARVN LOC program progressed well during the fourth quarter of FY74 because of increased availability of asphalt products and improvements in the delivery of crushed rock products in the Mekong Delta. The restraint of short fuel supplies has been overcome and no shortages have been reported.

b. Because of the possibility that MILCON funds would be lost at the end of the fiscal year, all available MILCON funds not required for cement and bridging materials were reprogrammed for use in the procurement of asphalt. Sufficient funds have been obligated to ensure the delivery of approximately 16.5 million gallons of asphalt products (at today's prices) which has the effect of revising the scope of work remaining in the program upwards. With adequate supplies of bitumens, the original 5" pavement design may be constructed rather than the revised 2" design which had been planned because of lack of OMA funds and the increased costs of bitumens.

c. During the period, a contract for the delivery of certain crushed rock products to the Delta worksites was awarded. This expediency was required to provide rock to the engineer units until United States Agency for International Development (USAID) could award other contracts under the Delta Rock Agency to provide the services. At this time, the USAID contract has become effective and rock is being received at all rock ports.

d. ARVNization in the form of asphalt delivery has been put into effect. Engineer units provide drivers and trucks for the pickup and delivery of drummed bitumens, and the RVNAF has leased five bulk asphalt trailers which are operated by the troops for the delivery of bulk asphalt to the worksites.

11. (U) SPECIAL CATEGORY ARMY WITH AIR FORCE (SCARWAF).

The contemplated SCARWAF program faltered shortly after its conception when the Defense Attache Office (DAO)

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was unable to obtain funding from higher commands for utilization in the program. ARVN's role in this program is to assist the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) Base Civil Engineers in accomplishing selected projects required at the nine major VNAF airbases. Preliminary groundwork has been accomplished to permit the ARVN to make contributions to the program in the form of troops and equipment during FY75 and over 100 projects have been tentatively allocated to the ARVN engineers for accomplishment. Over \$2.5 million in materials will be funded from US sources in support of this program.

12. (U) RETROGRADE PROGRAM.

During the quarter, a contract for dismantling and preparing for retrograde DeLong Pier #4 at Cam Ranh Bay was awarded. Preliminary retrograde preparations started on 10 June 1974 with a scheduled tow date of 9 September 1974.

13. (U) ARVN AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY PROGRAM.

The ARVN Engineers inaugurated an ambitious self-sufficiency agricultural program for the purpose of supplementing the food supply available for the troops. The objective of this program is to provide a free breakfast and a free lunch to all engineer troops prior to the end of 1974. Each engineer group has gotten its program underway and some troops are already receiving at least one free meal a day. Sales of agricultural products assist in providing funds for those products not raised by the troops. The program includes the clearing, developing and planting of land and rice paddies. Vegetables and fruits of all kinds are also being grown and animal, fowl, and fish husbandry is being pursued. This program has received the attention of the Political Warfare Command and it is expected that similar programs will be established within other elements of RVNAF.

14. (U) PROCUREMENT.

a. Quality Assurance Training:

(1) During the 4th Qtr, FY74, 38 RVNAF officers were given a 2-week orientation in quality control procedures

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to enable them to perform in-process inspection at contractor facilities. Seven RVNAF officers are actually performing in-process surveillance and inspection in the facilities of contractors who are participating in the In-Country Procurement (ICP) Program. Five additional RVNAF officers will augment the pharmaceutical in-line inspection process at an early date.

(2) The ICP Committee has formalized an agreement to implement this participation by RVNAF in quality assurance (QA) activities. The benefits are two fold: reduced reliance on US QA personnel; and increased capability for RVNAF "in-house" surveillance at all echelons in the logistics chain.

b. Specifications:

It has recently become apparent that, in some cases, specifications for items intended for RVNAF are not well suited to conditions frequently found in the RVNAF logistics system. Unique local conditions frequently invalidate operational, functional, and reliability characteristics of the specification.

(1) Particular emphasis is being given to packing and packaging for both CONUS and in-country procured items. The physical condition of available warehouse facilities frequently is not up to US standards and packaging suitable for US use does not stand up in the RVN environment. Further, commercial-design packaging will not withstand the stresses of handling under conditions found in many areas of RVN.

(2) Because of environmental conditions, some items are not suitable for use in Vietnam, e.g., BA-31 carbon-base dry-cells, which have only a 90-day unrefrigerated shelf-life in a tropical environment. Other items require repetitive procurements, particularly in the case of high volume items which will support economical procurement quantities. Canned food, for example, may have a shelf-life of only a year because of the high storage temperatures experienced as supplies move through the logistical pipeline.

(3) As specific problem areas are identified, these are brought to the attention of the RVNAF requiring activity.

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Through the efforts of the ICP Committee, these activities are providing personnel to assist procurement specialists in the development of specifications which will more nearly meet the needs of the Vietnam environment.

15. (U) SUMMARY.

a. Supply: The initial impact of fund suspension in Jan 1974 has been noted via the marked reduction in depot receipts from Continental United States (CONUS). Overall supply performance has dropped to 38-40% fill rate. ARVN still requires US technical assistance in the areas of requirements, distribution, and depot operations, although some progress was noted in data processing and programs. Depot operations are still under-strength and personnel are under-trained. ECCOI continues to conduct formal classroom training in all areas of depot operations.

b. Transportation: ARVN continues to show significant improvement in the cargo handling aspect of port operations. Mid-management level personnel are demonstrating an interest that had been lacking previously. Improved attention to detail and cost avoidance is obvious. The net result of this has been a steady increase in the cargo handling rate from 650-700 MT per day in July 1973 to approximately 1,200 MT per day at present.

c. Field Maintenance: The OR for artillery continued at a highly acceptable level although weapon calibration continues to be a deficiency. The readiness condition of tactical wheeled vehicles and combat vehicles continued to improve. The OR for MHE increased appreciably during the quarter although a high deadline rate is still being experienced due to nonstandardization of MHE and non-availability of repair parts. The program to utilize local nationals and third country nationals for technical assistance personnel is making satisfactory progress.

d. Ammunition: The ARVN ammunition supply position at the end of the 4th Quarter was 9% below the established stockage level. Four items were well below the cease-fire level; however, shortages in three of these four items were due to manufacturing problems at the procurement plants. Shortages in fragmentation and offensive grenades, when computed on the cease fire level, are excessive; however, the balances on hand, when computed against the

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90-day stockage objective, are within 91% for fragmentation grenades, but only 23% for offensive grenades.

e. Petroleum: RVNAF has been successful in meeting lubricant requirements through their own contracts. This will minimize critical shortages by decreasing the long lead time experienced in MILSTRIP supply. AVGAS 115/145 requirements can now be fully met from in-country contracts. This resulted from an additional supply agreement with EXXON. Great strides have been made in converting POL purchases to a buyer's market by gaining competitive bidding. Lower prices are being obtained through the new competitive bidding program.

f. RVNAF Facilities Engineering Self-Sufficiency Program. ARVN's need to rely on US technical assistance in the performance of facilities engineering services has steadily declined as the capabilities of ARVN technical and managerial personnel continue to improve. The technical assistance effort is now focused almost exclusively on complex tasks, such as equipment calibration and diagnosis of mechanical and electrical problems.

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CHAPTER 6

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. The VNAF strengths, weaknesses, logistics, equipment status, OR rates and the DAO assessment are presented in the following paragraphs.

2. (S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL READINESS.

a. Current overall VNAF manning is as follows:

<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Officers	10180	10273	101%
Enlisted	54725	51837	95%
Civilian	762	694	91%
Total	<u>65667</u>	<u>62804</u>	<u>96%</u>

(Figure 6-1)

b. VNAF pilot manning, which largely reflects manning of other crew positions, is considered sufficient to fly available VNAF aircraft on a sustained surge basis. The 1,778 squadron pilots represent 74 percent of the authorized manning. Figure 2 reflects the current manning by type of aircraft/mission. The special air mission unit figures have been omitted.

c. Personnel readiness of the rated force can be roughly determined by reference to the Figure 2 column labeled "Operational Ready". This figure, however, refers to aircrews which are in continuation/upgrade training. The majority of the aircrews are capable of performing basic combat missions.

3. (S) AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. The authorized Air Order of Battle (AOB) is shown by military region. The AOBs closely represent the areas of operation with the exception of the support aircraft in the 5th Air Division which operate throughout the country.

(Figures 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 and 6-6)

6-1

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VNAF PERSONNEL BY ORGANIZATION

UNIT/DIVISION	OFFICER		ENLISTED		TOTAL MIL		CIVILIAN	
	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN	AUTH	ASGN
VNAF HQS	884	558	1927	1778	2811	2336	45	37
Air Medical Center	62	32	174	102	236	134	6	4
Air Ops Comd	425	275	872	700	1297	975	0	0
AC&W Gp	145	132	882	822	1027	954	1	1
Air LOG Comd	403	251	5932	5167	6335	5418	369	337
Air Tng Cen	487	308	1170	1026	1657	1334	7	7
TSN Prop Const Area	19	13	62	49	81	62	0	0
Air Adm Unit	17	14	117	117	134	131	0	5
Detached Pers	122	178	63	171	185	349	0	0
1st Air Div	1234	811	7030	5799	8264	6610	05	91
2nd Air Div	1019	679	5903	5995	6922	6674	22	22
3rd Air Div	1310	894	7735	6476	9045	7370	70	62
4th Air Div	1350	848	7341	6058	8691	6906	32	19
5th Air Div	1295	1003	6653	5920	7948	6923	95	96
6th Air Div	1109	718	6394	5686	7503	6404	10	8
Sub Total	9881	6714	52255	45866	62136	52580		
Pipeline	299	1167	2470	9634	2769	10801		
Total	10180	7881	54725	55500	64905	63381	762	689

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TYPE A/C	AUTH	ASSIGNED	OR	% OR
A-37	350	302	230	76
A-1	123	78	78	100
F-5	217	117	91	78
Total Ftr/Attack	690	497	399	80
C-7	60	51	45	88
C-130	54	48	24	50
Total Cargo	114	99	69	70
UH-1	944	582	529	91
CH-47	80	75	56	75
Total Helo	1024	657	585	89
VC-47	15	18	8	44
(U-17, O-1, O-2)	329	273	273	100
Total Liaison	344	291	281	97
AC-119K	27	26	25	96
AC-119G	27	26	25	96
AC-47	24	20	15	75
Total Gunship	78	72	65	90
RC-119L	20	14	9	64
EC-47	48	44	43	98
RC-47	19	15	11	73
U-6	10	11	11	100
Total Recce	97	84	74	88
T-37	31	29	29	100
T-41/O1	27	49	49	100
Total Training	58	78	78	100

Figure 6-2

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MR 1

VNAF

**DA NANG
1st AIRDIV**

41 WING	51 WING
110 20 O2	213 38 UH-1
5 01	233 38 UH-1
7 U-17	239 38 UH-1
120 25 O-1	257 24 UH-1
7 U-17	253 38 UH-1
427 16 C-7	247 16 CH-47
718 DET 10 EC-47	
821 DET 8 AC-119K	
61 WING	
516 24 A-37	
528 24 A-37	
550 24 A-37	
538 24 F-5	




Figure 6-3

6-7


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VNAF

MR 2

6th AIR DIV	
PLEIKU	PHU CAT
<u>72 WING</u>	<u>82 WING</u>
118 15 O-2	532 24 A-37
10 0-1	241 16 CH-47
7 U-17	243 38 UH-1
530 24 A-1	259A 10 UH-1
229 38 UH-1	
235 38 UH-1	
259B 10 UH-1	



2nd AIR DIV	
NHA TRANG	
62 WING/ATC	
114 25 O-1	
7 U-17	
215 38 UH-1	
219 38 UH-1	
259C 8 UH-1	
817 16 AC-47	
918 18 T-41	


PHAN RANG	
92 WING/ATC	
259 8 UH-1	
524 24 A-37	
534 24 A-37	
548 24 A-37	
920 21 T-37	
8 UH-1	

Figure 6-4

6-9
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MR 3



VNAF

BIEN HOA 3rd AIR DIVISION	
23 WING	43 WING
112 25 O-1	221 38 UH-1
7 U-17	223 38 UH-1
124 25 O-1	231 38 UH-1
7 U-17	245 38 UH-1
514 24 A-1	251 38 UH-1
518 24 A-1	237 16 CH-47
63 WING	259E 12 UH-1
522 25 F-5A/B	
7 RF-5	
536 18 F-5 AND 6 F-5E	
540 24 F-5	
542 24 F-5	
544 24 F-5	

TAN SON NHUT 5th AIR DIV	
33 WING	
314 4 VC-47	
4 UH-1	
2 U-17	
716 12 RC-47	
2 EC-47	
2 C-47	
8 U-6	
718 20 EC-47	
431 16 C-7	
259G 12 UH-1	
53 WING	
819 18 AC 119G	
821 18 AC 119K	
435 16 C-130	
429 16 C-7	
437 16 C-130	

Figure 6-5

6-11
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VNAF

MR 4

BINH THUY / CAN THO 4th AIR DIV		
84 WING	74 WING	64 WING
211 38 UH-1	116 25 O-1	217 38 UH-1
225 38 UH-1	7 U-17	249 16 CH-47
	122 25 O-1	255 38 UH-1
	7 U-17	259H 12 UH-1
	520 24 A-37	227 38 UH-1
	526 24 A-37	259 I 12 UH-1
	546 24 A-37	




Figure 6-6

6-13
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5. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. VNAF Flying Hour Program:

(1) A comparison of programmed flying hours with actual hours flown, during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1974, is reflected in the following schedule:

ACFT TYPE	APRIL		MAY		JUNE	
	PROG	ACTUAL	PROG	ACTUAL	PROG	ACTUAL
AC-119G	963	787	963	1,160	684	690
AC-119K	414	830	414	739	684	605
AC-47	823	517	823	545	693	462
EC-47	1,398	2,396	1,398	2,079	1,380	1,770
RC-47	477	496	477	491	507	411
VC-47	146	142	145	171	145	141
C-130	1,210	1,343	1,210	1,041	1,196	1,117
C-7	1,485	1,113	1,485	1,170	1,542	1,296
O-1	8,334	11,306	8,333	9,249	8,333	7,632
O-2	1,324	1,430	1,324	1,410	1,352	1,132
U-6	466	458	466	358	368	329
U-17	2,570	2,258	2,569	1,993	2,193	1,858
A-1	2,050	1,857	2,053	1,836	2,397	1,733
F-5	2,367	1,721	2,366	1,652	2,867	1,728
A-77	5,098	3,731	5,098	3,693	4,004	3,166
T-7	189	448	189	491	190	407
T-41	1,053	1,127	1,053	982	900	995
UH-1	22,905	29,540	22,904	27,456	22,520	21,434
CH-47	2,459	1,403	2,458	1,395	1,479	983

(2) Commando Gopher: The Defense Attache advised JGS of the "Commando Gopher" program, which is a three year project to restore all VNAF Navigational Aids and Aircraft Control and Warning Systems to technical order specifications. JGS was requested to ensure expeditious reporting of in-flight noted discrepancies and to take appropriate supply and maintenance actions to effect early correction. The project is 10 percent complete.

(3) Cross Border Communication Circuits: Cross border communication between Royal Thai Air Force Aircraft Control & Warning (AC&W) sites in Thailand and VNAF AC&W sites in Vietnam exchange air traffic, flight plan and weather information for the mutual protection of each country's air space. It also provides clearance for host aircraft in pursuit of intruders.

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6. (C) AERIAL RESUPPLY.

a. There are 17 RVNAF outposts and bases dependent on aerial resupply. Of this total, four are located within MR I, eight within MR II, two within MR III and three within MR IV.

b. In order to accomplish aerial resupply requirements, VNAF flew 206 sorties per month lifting 971 tons of assorted supplies. This effort supported 14,934 military and civilian personnel located within the 17 resupply points. The number of aerial resupply sites is subject to frequent changes due to loss or gain of locations and subsequent relocation of troops. Aerial resupply statistics do not include sites which receive assistance for short periods of time.

c. A variety of delivery methods are used, which include CH-47 and UH-1 helicopters, C-7A and C-130 fixed wing aircraft and air drops. The following schedule reflects a summary of RVN aerial resupply:

	<u>Sites</u>	<u>Population</u>			<u>Monthly</u>	
		<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tons</u>
MR-1	4	7,214	1,343	8,557	97	506
MR-2	8	4,641	1,161	5,802	93	377
MR-3	2	220	50	270	4	18
MR-4	<u>3</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>305</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>20</u>
COUNTRY-17 WIDE		12,375	2,559	14,934	206	971

7. (C) MAJOR EQUIPMENT STATUS.

a. Status of the eight major VNAF weapon systems is depicted in Figures 6-7 through 6-14. The following paragraphs address the Operational Ready (OR), Not Operational Ready Maintenance (NORM) and Not Operational Ready Supply (NORS) rates for each weapon system.

(1) F-37 Aircraft: The OR and NORM rates were the results of increased maintenance requirements between training schedules. The NORS upward trend was caused by problems with the oxygen regulator and fuel pumps. Both items are being received and the NORS trend is now on a decline.

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STANDARD OR: 71.0%

NORM: 24.0%

NORS: 5.0%

AIRCRAFT T-37 OR-NORM-NORS RATES





Figure 6-7

6-17

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AIRCRAFT A-1 OR-NORM-NORS RATES



6-19

Figure 6-8

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AIRCRAFT C-130 OR-NORM-NORS RATES




Figure 6-9

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AIRCRAFT UH-1
OR-NORM-NORS RATES





Figure 6-10

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**AIRCRAFT CH-47
OR-NORM-NORS RATES**



OR
 NORM
 NORS

JUNE*POSSESSED = 54

Figure 6-11

6-25

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AIRCRAFT A-37

OR-NORM-NORS RATES




Figure 6-12

6-27

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AIRCRAFT F-5 OR-NORM-NORS RATES




Figure 6-13

6-29

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**AIRCRAFT O-1
OR-NORM-NORS RATES**




Figure 6-14

6-31

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(2) A-1 Aircraft: The OR rate was consistently above standard. Fluctuations were due to the scheduling of aircraft for fuel cell, flare and communication modifications in addition to IRAN, ACI and CBD repair. The NORM rate was within standard. The NORS rate has decreased from a high of 19.6 percent in September 1973 to 7.5 percent in June 1974. The current NORS rate was caused by forecast errors for time change items. System manager and VNAF are monitoring time change requirements to resolve the forecast problem.

(3) C-130 Aircraft: The OR and NORM rates resulted from major unprogrammed requirements, in addition to programmed depot maintenance (PDM), IRAN and ALE-20 flare modification. The major unprogrammed workload consisted of repairing cracked wing fittings and fixing fuel tank leaks. The NORS rate resulted from similar causes as those affecting OR/NORM rates, plus the lack of in-country repair capability for component items which had no stock on hand. Items causing NORS condition are reviewed weekly by VNAF, stock levels are analyzed and action is taken to replenish exhausted stocks.

(4) UH-1 Aircraft: The OR and NORS rates, through March 1974, were the result of inadequate supply support and late processing of repair cycle items, in addition to aircraft scheduled for fuel cell, gunship and rotor blade modifications, periodic inspections, ACI and CBD repairs. The improvement reflected during the last quarter FY-74 resulted from improved Army supply support, timely processing of repair cycle items through ATLC shops, improved VNAF supply discipline and actions taken to attain and maintain adequate stock levels. The NORM rate was within standard.

(5) CH-47 Aircraft: The OR and NORS rates were results of inadequate supply support and extensive modifications. A high percent of aircraft are undergoing life extension inspection, ACI and/or CBD repair. A review of the component repair policy is in process. In addition, an Army representative has been placed at ATLC to provide direct contact with Army supply sources. The NORM rate was within standard.

(6) A-37 Aircraft: The OR rate was above standard. Fluctuations were due to scheduling of aircraft for radio, flare, AIM-9E and wing modifications, in addition to ACI, corrosion control and CBD repairs. The NORM rate was within standard. The NORS upward trend was caused by errors in forecasting and delays in

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requisitioning for time change items. System manager and VNAF are monitoring time change requirements to resolve forecast errors.

(7) F-5 Aircraft: The OR rate was affected by scheduling of aircraft for AIM-9E capability modification in addition to ACI, corrosion control and CBD repairs. The NORM rate was within standard. The high NORS rate was caused by the lack of generators, valves, gear boxes, supports and tip tanks to satisfy routine maintenance requirements. Requisitioning and follow-up actions are being expedited to assure availability of parts.

(8) O-1 Aircraft: The OR, NORM and NORS rates were within standards.

8. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. Aviation Intensively Managed Items (AIMI): The requirements for AIMI showed a marked decrease from the previous quarter. These reduced requirements are the direct result of enhanced VNAF management, improved inventory controls and a new method to compute requirements. In addition, repair capabilities, both at ATLC and the Air Asia contractor facility in Taiwan, have reduced the dollar value of AIMI buy requirements from CONUS.

b. Common Item Support: The VNAF fill rate on common items requisitioned from the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) remained at approximately 31 percent. Large quantities of requisitions for materiel have either been back-ordered or cancelled. Monthly order reconciliations with NMMA began in May 1974. VNAF personnel are assigned to NMMA to perform liaison for ATLC and tasked to ensure proper execution of VNAF requirements.

c. Supply: A major rewarehousing project of the ATLC Base Support Group property consisting of 8,000 line items has been completed. Follow-up actions will include disposal of unserviceable property and a wall-to-wall inventory. Target date for completion of the inventory is 1 September 1974.

d. Computer Operations: A total of 1,130 hours of computer downtime was experienced as a result of power failure, weather, air conditioning, equipment and component malfunctions. DAO and VNAF personnel improved

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the quality of electrical power in the computer center, which resulted in a drastic reduction in downtime. Plans have been completed for refurbishing the computer room facilities.

e. Maintenance Engineering Wing: The manpower level has increased 60 percent since the cease-fire; from 2,179 to 3,435 personnel. Production manhours have risen from 119,000 to 236,000 for an increase of almost 100%. ATLC shortfalls and accomplishments are cited in the following:

(1) Forecasting the workloads, parts shortages and lack of skilled personnel have hampered production efforts to some degree. In order to attain peak production proficiency, VNAF is concentrating on more precise forecasting and workloading techniques and improving supply discipline by emphasizing in-country on-the-job (OJT) training.

(2) VNAF is accomplishing corrosion control and crash battle damage repairs on A-37 and F-5 aircraft. Repair capability for these aircraft was not available at the cease-fire.

(3) Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance (JEIM) capability has been established and facilities are being expanded to provide JEIM capability for the J85-21 engine used on the F-5E aircraft. No JEIM capability was previously available.

(4) A power train facility has been built for the UH-1 helicopter, and personnel are being trained to accomplish component overhaul. Training is scheduled for completion by December 1974. VNAF plans to produce one-third of UH-1 requirements in FY-75 and all of the requirements in FY-76. Also, a rotor, hub and blade overhaul shop has been established to support power train workloads.

(5) Approximately 40 construction projects are in process for needed improvements at ATLC. Some of these are in the Maintenance Engineering Wing and tend to disrupt production efforts in some areas. However, the improved facilities will result in better distribution of workloads and peak production levels.

(6) Reparable Processing Center (RPC):

(a) To achieve improved control and visibility of

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reparable assets two new programs are being implemented.

(b) The first program is designed to reflect the condition of packaging and documentation of each reparable item received at ATLC. This program will be implemented-1 July 1974.

(c) The second program provides for a supplemental listing to the Due-In From Maintenance (DIFM) Report (R-26). The R-26 listing reflects items in maintenance being reworked and the supplemental listing will reflect items with a low repair priority that are stored in the reparable warehouse. The computer program change for this action is scheduled to be developed 15 August 1974 and implemented 1 September 1974.

f. Crash/Battle Damaged (CBD) Aircraft: A total of 107 CBD aircraft at VNAF bases require repair or salvage. Priorities have been established to concentrate efforts on the recovery of 36 C-7, A-1, A-37 and AC/EC-47 aircraft. Special teams of structural engineers and material estimators have been requested from AFLC to assess conditions and develop repair procedures. A special project code (PACER SCAR) and supply designator code (175) have been established to requisition and aggregate required materials at Bien Hoa. The aircraft will be repaired by contractor and VNAF personnel at the bases and the Bien Hoa depot.

g. Transportation:

(1) The VNAF formulated a disuse (storage) vehicle program designed to improve utilization and to provide a contingency pool. A problem developed in the procurement of spares to keep the vehicle deadlined, parts (VDP) rate minimal. It is necessary that the stored vehicles be in running condition for possible usage at any time.

(2) VNAF vehicle validation personnel are meeting with members of each base transportation office to determine requirements. Realignment of assets will take place when the validation is completed.

(3) Air cargo movement has been satisfactory; however, to assure proper management VNAF has chosen to implement a cargo flow study. This study is designed to uncover any bottlenecks or lags in movement flow and provide solutions to any problems which may exist.

(4) A directive has been written and distributed on

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the Packaging Conservation Program. The main difficulty is lack of qualified personnel in the field. DAO has scheduled a packaging technician to make a field trip for the purpose of providing the needed technical assistance to make the program work.

h. F-5E Program: The program requires major Air Force interest as it is undergoing planning stages, i.e.:

- (1) Program review at Tan Son Nhut
- (2) Activation of the first squadron
- (3) Arrival of six additional aircraft
- (4) Rewrite of the VNAF F-5E Logistic Support Plan.
- (5) A myriad of logistics problems were formally presented and fully discussed. With the arrival of ten additional aircraft in May, the 536th squadron, operating under the 3rd Air Division (Bien Hoa), was activated.

i. Squadron Activations: Seven F-5E Squadrons (18 UE) totaling 126 aircraft are programmed for the VNAF at locations and dates listed:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ACTIVATION DATE</u>
536 ADS	(18)	BIEN HOA	FY 4/74 (May 74)
540 ADS	(18)	BIEN HOA	FY 1/75 (Sep 74)
538 ADS	(18)	DA NANG	FY 3/75 (Jan 75)
522 ADS	(18)	BIEN HOA	(Not firm)
542 ADS	(18)	BIEN HOA	(Not firm)
544 ADS	(18)	BIEN HOA	(Not firm)
552 ADS	(18)	DA NANG	(Not firm)

(1) All units will be activated at Bien Hoa then deployed to permanent locations and are reflected above. Unit activations will take place during the months listed. Initial spares aggregation requisitions for twelve months stockage were based on an aircraft

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utilization rate of 35 hours per aircraft per month, which is the current CSAF approved flying hour program.

(2) Currently, the VNAF F-5A squadrons are authorized 24 UE aircraft per squadron. Planning for the F-5E has been based upon an authorized UE of 18 aircraft per squadron. The JGS and VNAF, with DAO concurrence, have expressed a desire to retain the 24 UE aircraft squadrons, with the exception of the RF-5Es, if approved and funded.

9. (S) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The previous VNAF assessment remains substantially unchanged. Although progress has been made in some of the various programs, as reflected throughout this report, many significant actions are still required to assist VNAF in attaining the desired degree of logistic and operational self-sufficiency. The highest priority is being given to areas identified in the VNAF Logistics Plan, such as:

(1) Development and implementation of material management techniques.

(2) Achievement of full range maintenance support for aircraft, component and aerospace ground equipment.

(3) Improvement of the efficiency and responsiveness of the supply system.

(4) Identification of future training requirements and implementation of training programs.

(5) Activation of the F-5E aircraft squadron and logistic support.

(6) Restoration of NAVAIDS and AC&W equipment to optimum operating condition.

b. Evaluation of training requirements resulted in phaseout of formal contractor training as of 30 June 1974. Emphasis has been placed on in-country OJT training. As training in the various logistics fields is completed and journeyman level proficiency is reached, progress towards VNAF self-sufficiency will accelerate.

c. Continuing effort and support of AOSAF personnel remains essential to assist VNAF in attaining the desired level of combat and operational readiness.

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CHAPTER 7

VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)

1. (C) PERSONNEL.

a. Authorization: The 30 June 1974 VNN manpower authorization remains at 40,181 (5,714 officers, 13,643 petty officers, and 20,824 enlisted personnel).

b. Strength: The actual strength as of 30 June 1974 was 40,131 composed of 5,800 officers, 13,896 petty officers, and 20,435 other personnel, including midshipmen, recruits, and pipeline personnel.

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS.

a. The personnel readiness of the VNN continues to be characterized by such factors as responsiveness to emergency situations, high combat morale, willingness to face personal danger, and active use of formal training programs. Serious general deficiencies, however, persist in such vital areas as the assignment/utilization of trained personnel, unit level training and readiness development, morale and basic shipboard subsistence (food). Despite these traditional problems, encouraging indicators of emergency responsiveness and periodic high performance also persist. Of special interest, in relation to the VNN coastal patrol mission, was the professionalism displayed in the recent interdiction and capture of smuggler craft on two separate occasions. In an incident during late March (reported early April), an effective use of intelligence information and coordinated naval assets led to the capture of a merchant ship with contraband civilian cargo. In late June, the effectiveness of the outer barrier coastal patrol was tested by the interdiction and seizure of a Thai narcotics trawler which was passing through RVN territorial waters with a sizable cargo of raw opium.

b. Various longstanding personnel readiness shortfalls reflected in such areas as maintenance, underway training, utilization of trained personnel, etc., continue to impact on the general VNN combat readiness posture. These problems are considered to further impact on the critical and generally fragile factors of morale, motivation and confidence. This continues

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to be particularly evident in the demanding technical context of Fleet Command ships, where additional morale problems relating to food deficiencies and other economic hardships are encountered. The Warship Armament Study and Improvement Committee, initiated by the VNAF Chief of Naval Operations in March and concluded in April, served to draw attention to such problems as they relate to basic command management deficiencies. As a step in addressing these problems, at Navy Division/DAO Saigon request, CINCPACFLT has arranged for a series of visits to RVN by a sixteen man U.S. Navy underway training Technical Assistance Team (TAT). The TAT is to visit four representative major fleet units of VNN (WHEC, DER, PCE, and LST) to conduct Operational Readiness Evaluations (ORE's) in conjunction with the VNN Fleet Training Group. These visits are planned for the period of 22 July - 30 August 1974. In helping to better determine the operational readiness posture of VNN Fleet Command ships, the TAT visits and joint USN/VNN ORE's are expected to have the effect of helping to better define appropriate readiness standards and a suitable division of responsibilities in maintaining those standards. This is expected to aid the development of improved methods for VNN to monitor, evaluate and properly respond to readiness shortfalls.

c. During the quarter, the VNN reported a total of 1,725 personnel entering and 1,258 completing in-country training courses, with an average of about 933 personnel in training throughout the period. Participation in offshore training courses included 48 officers and 9 enlisted beginning and 52 officers and 8 enlisted personnel completing training. Some of these graduating personnel were enrolled in prior quarters.

3. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS OF SHIPS AND CRAFT.

a. As of 30 June 1974, the authorized number of ships and craft remains at 1,547.

b. Reports of ships and craft figures normally vary from month to month due to combat losses and other mishaps, faulty reporting from the field and faulty tabulation of reports and records. The N4 project to purify records and reconcile the actual number of craft on hand with inventory records by HQ number is continuing and is gradually improving craft accountability. Latest figures for VNN craft by general category (which do not include sunken craft

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awaiting salvage) are as follows:

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND PATROL CRAFT

DER (Destroyer Escort Radar Picket)	2
WHEC (High Endurance Cutter)	7
PCE (Patrol Craft Escort)	7
PGM (Patrol Gunboat Motor)	20
WPB (Patrol Boat)	25
PCF (Patrol Craft Fast)	103
Yabuta Junk	147
Kien Giang Junk	6
Command Junk	31
Coastal Raider - Ferro Cement	89
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	437

RIVER PATROL CRAFT

ATC (Armored Troop Carrier)	69
ASPB (Assault Support Patrol Boat)	72
CCB (Command Communications Boat)	6
Commandement	13
LCM Monitor (Landing Craft Mechanized)	21
LCM Refueler	15
LSIL (Landing Ship Infantry Light)	3
LSSL (Landing Ship Support Large)	4
Monitor	11

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RIVER PATROL CRAFT (CONT)

Monitor Zippo	7
PBR (Patrol Boat River)	294
RPC (River Patrol Craft)	27
STCAN (Fom)	38
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	580

HARBOR AND MINE DEFENSE CRAFT

LCMMS (Landing Craft Mechanized Mine-sweeper)	4
LCPL (Landing Craft Personnel Large)	23
MLMS (Motor Launch Minesweeper)	10
MSM (Minesweeper Mechanized)	7
MSR (Minesweeper River)	6
Picket	18
Vedette Y 3000	1
Vedette I 3600	15
Vedette S 3700	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	85

LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT

AGP (Auxiliary General Purpose)	2
ARL (Landing Craft Repair Ship)	1
APL (Auxiliary Personnel Lighter)	2

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LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT (CONT)

Water Barge	1
CSB (Combat Salvage Boat)	4
FNC (Floating Naval Club)	1
LCM-3	23
LCM-6	105
LCM-8	48
LCM Fire Boat	1
LCM Pusher	12
LCU (Landing Craft Utility)	15
LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel)	39
LCVP Pusher	5
LSM (Landing Ship Medium)	5
LSM/H (Hospital Ship)	2
LST (Landing Ship Tank)	6
Skimmer	28
UB 50 (Utility Boat)	2
UB 100	6
YFR (Refrigerated Covered Lighter)	1
YLLC (Salvage Light Lift Craft)	3
YOG (Yard Oiler)	6
YR (Floating Repair)	1
YRBM (Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge)	4
YTL (Small Harbor Tug)	9
YTM (Medium Harbor Tug)	3

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LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT (CCNT)

Flag Officer Barges	3
RB (Refuel Barge)	4
YW (Transport Craft)	1
FB (Fuel Barge)	5
BW (Boston Whaler)	56
Viper	6
BC (Transportation Barge)	7
WLV (Floating Radar Site - HQ 304)	1
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	418

GRAND TOTAL: 1520

c. From the beginning of the ceasefire (28 January 1973) through 30 June 1974, 78 miscellaneous craft have been lost or sunk by enemy action. Many of these craft have either been salvaged or are awaiting salvage. Latest reports of these losses are as follows:

<u>CRAFT TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS</u>
WPB	1
Command Junk	8
PBR	14
Monitor	1
ATC	11
LCM-6	4
LCM-8	1
Yabuta Junk	4

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<u>CRAFT TYPE (CONT)</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS (CONT)</u>
LCVP	7
STCAN	5
Pickett	3
PCF	4
LCM-3	2
PCE (lost during engagement with PRC)	1
ASPB	4
CCB	2
Coastal Raider	1
LCMMS	1
LCM Monitor	2
Skimmer	<u>1</u>
TOTAL:	78

4. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. General:

(1) A meeting was recently initiated by the VNN to discuss materiel conditions and how these conditions can be improved in the upcoming fiscal climate. The meeting was chaired by the Chief of Staff, VNN, and was attended by personnel from the VNN Operations Division, the VNN Logistics Command and the VNN Shipyard (VNNSY), as well as Navy Division representatives. This is the first time such a meeting was held and future follow up meetings are scheduled. Study groups have been formed to examine a new concept for Fleet Command ship operating and maintenance schedules proposed by the VNN Sea Operations Command, and to examine the merits of continuing the ferro-cement ship building program.

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(2) A final status report is being prepared for the 1973 combined Logistics Development Plan. Monthly status reporting has been discontinued. A 1974 combined Logistics Development Plan is currently in the process of preparation and will carry forward a number of issues contained within the 1973 plan as well as initiate new programs. When promulgated, a new reporting procedure will be established to monitor progress on the various programs and projects.

b. Technical Management :

(1) The implementation phase (Phase III) of the Coastal Radar Improvement Program is in progress. Realistic milestones to achieve all major goals of this program have been established. Completion of all actions for this program are scheduled for late April 1975.

(2) Based on VNN provided data, the availability of the Coastal Radar System averaged 85.8 percent for the quarter.

(3) A schedule has been arranged to begin field overhaul and modification of motor-generator sets at all sites. A total of 42 sets are involved. The overhaul at the first site, Vung Tau, is scheduled for mid-July 1974 and will be done under the supervision of Navy Division personnel. Overhauls at the remaining sites will be accomplished by all-VNN personnel technical teams. Completion of this effort is expected in early October 1974.

(4) The issue of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) watercraft maintenance has been resolved. The ARVN will perform 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance, utilizing repair parts requisitioned from the VNN. All 5th echelon repairs will be performed by the VNN.

c. VNNSY:

(1) Completion of dredging along the forward face of "Lima" pier at the shipyard is progressing satisfactorily. It is currently estimated that approximately 95 percent of all dredging has been completed. The removal of the dolphin outboard of "Kilo" pier has not yet been completed, but some preparatory work has been accomplished. It is now estimated that all dredging and removal of the dolphin will be completed during

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the month of July 1974.

(2) Sea wall repair work is progressing satisfactorily. The remaining work is in the area of the small marine railway slip. A change order has been issued by the Director of Construction to the maintenance dredging contractor for completion of this area.

(3) The construction of additional sanitary facilities for the docking shop is approximately 95 percent complete. Progress on these self-help projects continues to be slow due to a heavy shipyard workload.

(4) Course plan briefs and rough lesson plans for a course on the AN/UQN-1 (Sonar Sounding Set) is now underway. This course will be taught subsequent to the course on the AN/SPS-10 (Surface Search Radar).

(5) Progress has been noted in the area of critical item support, especially for HQ-16 (WHEC) and HQ-501 (LST). The Vietnamese Navy Supply Center (VNNSC) is responding more rapidly to the shipyard's needs and is taking action to increase the material support of ARVN craft by stocking 4216 line items of required repair parts.

(6) The CY 1974 program scheduled ARVN LCM-8's to start overhaul by 1 June 1974. Fourteen have actually started, four craft have been completed and ten craft are under overhaul.

d. Construction and Base Maintenance:

(1) The number of completed U.S. Navy sponsored dependent shelters is now 5044 out of a total of 5144.

(2) The future of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Dependent Shelter Program is still undecided. DAO has queried the office of the Secretary of Defense regarding the critical nature of funding for this program.

(3) The contract for the 15KV commercial power line (exterior portion), from the existing Vietnam Power Co. power line to and including the 5000 KVA transformer station, has been awarded to a local contractor. The interior arrangement will require considerably more work, and will be let later on as a separate contract.

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The two operable generators are still carrying the station load satisfactorily. Repair work by ARVN continues on the other two generators.

(4) The building rehabilitation project at VNN Headquarters was completed during the quarter.

(5) The End Item Use Inspection (EIUI) team has completed surveys of the following bases: Logistic Support Base (LSB) Cat Lo, Intermediate Support Base (ISB) Cho Moi, LSB Cam Ranh, ISE Long Phu, and LSB Binh Thuy. The team found a number of deficiencies which have been listed and sent to VNN Logistic Support Center (VNNLSC) and the contractor for corrective action.

(6) ARVN is now overhauling the electric generation facilities at Cam Ranh. Since earlier field surveys revealed an urgent need for generator overhauls at various bases, both the contractor and ARVN have been alerted to the need for more and better maintenance.

(7) The contract for the VNNSY Industrial Pier was awarded (26 June 1974) to Eiffel Asia for \$284,293, not including government furnished material for \$291,000.

e. Funding: Because of the new Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding procedures and expected fiscal constraints, logistic support activities will be challenged as never before to get the highest possible return on a reduced investment. Every program will have to be questioned in terms of its essentiality, and requirements will have to be carefully prioritized to assure optimum application of resources. Financial managers must carefully justify all items to assist the RVNAF Joint General Staff in apportioning total MAP funds made available among the services to achieve a well balanced posture of defense forces.

5. (C) SUPPLY.

a. While waiting for the Supply Command to be established, VNN Headquarters promulgated a significant change to the mission of the VNNSC. In addition to the original mission, the VNNSC has the responsibility for managing and developing the Navy Supply System including the control and technical guidance of all

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supply organizations and personnel in the Navy in order to increase effectiveness in supply support of naval units.

b. All tasks necessary to accomplish the correlation of federal stock numbers to national stock numbers have been identified and scheduled. A total of 72 data processing programs will require revision and 28 milestones have been established which will be tracked weekly until final conversion on 1 October 1974.

c. VNNSC stock replenishment dues were reconciled with those of Navy International Logistics Control Office (NAVILCO) and a less than one percent match discrepancy occurred (126 dues were recorded at VNNSC which were not recorded at NAVILCO). The 126 unmatched records were forwarded to Oakland for research.

d. Average order and shipping time for VNNSC stock replenishment items during the quarter was about 120.5 days.

e. In an effort to identify obsolete VNN equipment, in May the VNNSC researched all requisitions to CONUS that were rejected since 1 January 1974 because of obsolete FSNs. From this research a list of equipment was prepared which contains one or more obsolete parts. This list was referred to the Logistics Support Branch as candidates for replacement in the VNN modernization program.

f. Average supply effectiveness for the quarter declined slightly from the previous quarter. Demands in the fourth quarter increased by more than 11% over the third quarter. Supply effectiveness data for the fourth quarter are as follows:

<u>DEMANDS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>	<u>NIS</u>	<u>NC</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>EFFECTIVENESS</u>	
					<u>GROSS</u>	<u>AR*</u>
51306	39312	5846	6148	86.9	76.6	88.0

*Accommodation rate = Percent of requisitions received for carried items.

6. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. Coastal Surveillance System:

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(1) VNN reported boarding 120,810 craft during the quarter, which resulted in 446 craft and 2,327 persons being detained for various reasons.

(2) The readiness rate of the coastal radar stations averaged 85.8%, which is a negligible change from the previous quarter. An average of 1.7 of the 16 stations were down per day. Total contacts detected during the quarter were 7,053, of which 6,217 were tracked. A total of 149 Filter King exercises were conducted to test the system of which 114 were considered satisfactory for a detection rate of 76.4%. The readiness rate for the last two quarters continues to be substantially above the previous two quarters, which is considered to be a reflection of the Coastal Radar Improvement Plan (CRIP) progress. The Filter King exercise detection rate for the past two quarters, however, continues to be below the previous two quarters (which had fewer exercises) as this rate typically decreases with an increased volume of exercises. The detection rate during the reporting period has nevertheless increased appreciably over the preceding quarter.

(3) Visual Air Reconnaissance Search (VARS) flights were requested on 611 occasions, but only 359 were actually flown. Additionally, 34 air support missions were requested and 20 provided.

b. Material Readiness: Average material readiness rates developed by the Navy Division for blue water ships were 69% for the Ocean Flotilla, 69.1% for the Coastal Flotilla, and 69.4% for the Logistics Flotilla. The average material readiness rate for brown water craft during the quarter was 81.2%.

c. Tempo of Operations: Average figures for the tempo of operations and days away from home port for major fleet units for the quarter are as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TEMPO OF OPERATIONS</u>	<u>AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS AWAY FROM HOME PORT</u>
DER	33.7%	55
WHEC	41.3%	48
PCE	42.3%	58
LST	24.1%	11
AGP	58.7%	19

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NOTE: Above figures exclude ships which were undergoing regular overhaul during a majority of the period.

d. Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS): VNN ships provided NGFS for tactical operations in 64 missions. A total of 24 ships were assigned to these missions at various coastal areas as requested by field and territorial ground forces, as well as other naval commands. Expenditures included 399 rounds of 5", 1728 rounds of 3", 857 rounds of 81mm, 6550 rounds of 40mm and 4420 rounds of 20mm ammunition. A dramatic increase in requests for NGFS was noted during the quarter, particularly during June. This increase is considered to reflect the general increase in the level of hostilities throughout the country and a growing trend on the part of territorial forces to seek naval support. This trend appears encouraged at least in part by shortages of artillery ammunition available to territorial forces.

e. Combat Operations: During the quarter, VNN units were involved in 81 fire fights, 23 mining incidents, and 20 attacks by fire. These actions led to a total of 133 VNN casualties, of which 20 were KIA. Following the usual pattern, incidents within RVN were initiated by both sides and included unprovoked attacks by enemy forces as well as enemy reaction to joint RVNAF security operations in which VNN units participated. A significant development during the quarter has been a marked increase in enemy mining efforts against naval craft as well as commercial tankers and other obvious priority enemy mining targets.

f. Miscellaneous:

(1) VNN successes in countering smuggling activities in two recent instances were of special interest during the quarter as they reflected favorably on VNN coastal patrol operations. In one incident in late March (reported early April), the merchant ship HIGH TIDE (Panamanian registry) was effectively lured into a position (in RVN territorial waters) to be intercepted and seized with expected contraband cargo. This operation involved the well coordinated use of local intelligence information and naval assets. In a more serious incident in late June, the Thai registered trawler LUANG LAP LUNG SRI was intercepted and searched by an outer barrier patrol ship (DER) while passing through RVN waters at night, apparently enroute to Hong Kong. The trawler was found to have a cargo of 90 bags

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of raw opium weighing 55 pounds each.

(2) Mekong Convoy: During the quarter 11 regular convoys and one special convoy were escorted to the Cambodian border with no incidents in RVN territory.

(3) Cargo moved by LST's under operational control of the Central Logistics Command was as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>AMOUNT (SHORT TONS)</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TRIPS</u>
April	3,972	11
May	4,310	8
June	3,731	12

7. (C) SHORTFALLS.

a. Basic limitations of VNN capabilities continue to include inadequate defenses against North Vietnamese aircraft and missile boats, limited amphibious capability and a shortage of heavy water transportation assets. Additionally, in relation to the routine operational role of VNN, speed limitations significantly hamper the pursuit and interdiction capability of Fleet Command ships.

b. While inadequate food has become a major problem in messes throughout RVNAF, the quality of messes aboard VNN ships continues to be an especially serious problem. The VNN sailor at sea faces a fundamental disadvantage in coping with this hardship because he is less able to supplement his diet from other sources, as is normally done at shore units. Plans are now under review to convert a utility boat into a fishing trawler in order to upgrade the VNN diet supplement program.

c. The most significant shortfall which limits VNN progress toward realizing its potential level of operational proficiency continues to be the general problem of command management deficiencies. This problem is most serious in the lack of consistent, concerted headquarters level emphasis on comprehensive VNN operational readiness. The effects of this deficiency include vagueness in both the minimum acceptable readiness standards and the distribution of responsibilities for maintaining appropriate standards. One of the most tangible examples of inadequate headquarters level support of operational readiness requirements is the excessive personnel turnover rate aboard fleet command

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ships. This turnover rate reportedly is as high as 10% a month. This particularly damaging situation is permitted by senior VNN authorities apparently because of the special hardships and unpopularity of duty aboard VNN ships.

8. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The combat capability of the VNN remains sufficient to meet the current operational requirements of the VNN mission.

b. The ability of the VNN to make effective use of available capabilities of both equipment and trained personnel assets is often lacking due to general command management deficiencies. These shortcomings emanate from senior levels of VNN and impact throughout the chain of command. The Navy Division must continuously address command management deficiencies in liaison and joint program development efforts with VNN. Primary objectives in such an effort must include consistent, concerted command attention from the highest VNN levels to the comprehensive operational readiness posture of the VNN. This attention must focus on clearly defined readiness standards, a clearly defined distribution of supporting responsibilities, and an effective readiness monitoring and evaluation system, to include prompt emergency reaction to readiness shortfalls.

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CHAPTER 8

VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC)

1. (C) PERSONNEL STRENGTH.

a. Authorization: The total VNMC personnel authorization as of 30 June 1974 was 15,882 Marines, with 964 officers, 2,490 non commissioned officers (NCO's), and 12,428 other enlisted. These figures represent a ten percent increase in the manning level approved by the Joint General Staff (JGS) in December 1973.

b. Strength: The VNMC reported a current on board strength of 15,279 Marines at the end of June 1974. This figure includes 1,055 officers, 2,527 NCO's and 11,697 other enlisted Marines. Deducting 1,428 personnel in recruit training status leaves an on board strength of 13,851 Marines filling T/O billets. The personnel authorization and current strength of the VNMC is indicated by grade as follows:

<u>RANK</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Major General	1	0
Brigadier General	1	1
Colonel	9	5
Lieutenant Colonel	34	19
Major	75	45
Captain	262	133
First Lieutenant)		278
Second Lieutenant)	582	212
Warrant Officer)		362
Master Sergeant	49	66
Gunnery Sergeant	326	220
Staff Sergeant	787	836

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Sergeant	1328	1405
Corporal	2213	1052
Lance Corporal	1755	2089
Private First Class	2898	4793
Private Second Class	4118	4763
Pipeline	1444	
TOTAL	15,882	15,279

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS.

a. General: During the continuing period of comparative lull in the general tempo of operations, the VNMC Division remains highly alert; troop morale is high and training is active and superior in quality.

b. Personnel: Noncommissioned officers represent nearly twenty percent of the enlisted strength of units in the field. These NCO's provide steady leadership at all levels throughout the VNMC and are instrumental in maintaining a spirit of unit pride and cohesiveness. Turnover of personnel in the division remains low (at an annual rate of 24%) further reinforcing the strong unit attachment characteristic of the entire division.

c. Training.

(1) Training programs are a tangible reflection of the degree of personnel readiness, and in these programs the VNMC excels. Two infantry battalions completed refresher training during the quarter at the Dong Da Training Center. Training emphasis on position in MR-1 was concentrated on anti-aircraft defense using organic infantry weapons, squad leader and platoon leader refresher training, the use of demolitions, construction of tank traps and operation and maintenance of individual and crew-served weapons. In addition, the 3rd Artillery Battalion conducted

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specialist training, the AT Company conducted concentrated training with the 106mm recoilless rifle and the TOW missile system and the Armored Brigade conducted training for VNMC personnel with the 50 caliber machine gun. Tank infantry tactics were studied in those areas where VNMC and 1st Armored Brigade units are collocated.

(2) Two hundred and twelve students attended formal courses of instruction conducted during the quarter by the Central Training Command.

(3) Recruit and advanced infantry training continues with heavy emphasis on individual weapons training. Training inspections by the Chief, VNMC Logistics Support Branch, reveal that the basic training provided VNMC recruits at the Song Than Base Camp is thoroughly professional, organized, effectively presented and well learned. A marine joining his first combat unit is an immediate asset, familiar with all infantry weapons except the heavier crew-served direct and indirect fire weapons, and schooled not only in basic tactics, but also in the rudiments of amphibious operations.

(4) The VNMC continues to stress amphibious training within its various internal programs, and progress in this area is a primary goal of the VNMC Commandant. Limited sealift assets have restricted Vietnamese Navy (VNN) support of the program.

3. (C) LOGISTICAL READINESS.

a. General: The VNMC continues capable of logistically supporting its assigned mission. However, as the quantity of USMC direct support items still being received from prior year requisitions decreases and as the VNMC becomes totally dependent on the young and still-forming RVNAF supply system, some deterioration in the logistic readiness of the Division is probable. The VNMC Logistics Support Branch is developing (in coordination with VNMC staff officers and with the active participation of Vietnamese civilian employees of the Logistics Support Branch) five projects designed to permit the VNMC to understand, comply with, and gain the maximum possible support from the developing RVNAF logistic systems. These projects are:

(1) Achieve a valid inventory of all equipment

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and supplies in the VNMC with a high level of confidence of accuracy. Prior to the ceasefire agreement, all maintenance of supply records and accountability procedures were physically performed by U.S. advisers, assisted by Vietnamese marines. Records were turned over to the VNMC on relatively short notice and without a physical inventory to reconcile records, locations and materiel.

(2) Validate and redistribute major equipment excess in the VNMC; validate and fill major equipment shortages in the VNMC. The VNMC Logistics Support Branch has identified, from current records, sixty-six major items of equipment shown as excess to requirements with a dollar value of \$581,000, and ninety-five major items of equipment shown as less than requirements, with a dollar value of approximately three million. The data concerning the excesses and shortages must be verified, records must be corrected, and follow-up action must be accomplished to redistribute excesses and fill shortages.

(3) Develop self-sufficiency in internal VNMC supply accountability. Top level insistence on supply discipline and tight accountability in the VNMC is intense, but the internal procedures currently in use are less than adequate to assure not only accountability, but valid usage, requisition and identification data. The VNMC Logistics Support Branch is assisting in establishing organic accounting procedures that will permit efficient, self-sufficient, organic accounting procedures within the VNMC.

(4) Develop financial management procedures adequate to support budgeting and monitor spending. The present lack of procedures for budget formulation and execution makes it exceptionally difficult to develop within the VNMC a capability to get the maximum possible support from the RVNAF system. Significant potential exists for the development of procedures that will permit the VNMC to monitor the financial impact of its operation, respond to the requirements of MAP funding, and when necessary, operate within a total RVN-funded environment.

(5) Develop improved equipment maintenance procedures. The rapid turnover of equipment maintenance responsibility of the VNMC at the time of the ceasefire must be supported by development of standing operating procedures for preventive maintenance,

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organizational maintenance and liaison with ARVN units performing maintenance beyond the capability of the VNMC.

b. Supply and Equipment Maintenance:

(1) During this quarter the VNMC received 700 M16 rifles and 20 M122 machine gun mounts under a current DAO program to reduce overages and shortages through the reallocation of assets.

(2) A major error in accounting within the RVNAF supply system was uncovered during the quarter by the VNMC and contract representatives at the ARVN Central Logistic Command (CLC). Improper procedures had prohibited timely replacement to some using units of combat losses and defined line items worn out in service. Revised procedures are being coordinated between the VNMC and the CLC.

(3) Continued release and issue of critical spare parts resulted in an increased capability for internal equipment maintenance and operation. Lack of publications remains a significant problem, particularly in establishing an adequate communication-electronics repair facility at Song Than Base Camp. Follow-up action on all outstanding publication requests has been initiated.

(4) An additional quantity of Mini-Chargers for the TOW Missile batteries has been received by the missile section, ARVN Depot Arsenal Go-Vap. It is anticipated that the majority of these Mini-Chargers will be issued to the TOW Missile units in the field, including the VNMC.

4. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. A significant change in the operational posture of the VNMC Division during the quarter was its reinforcement by the 1st Armored Brigade and a battery of 155 (SP) howitzers. The Division continued to be reinforced by the 15th Ranger Group and eight Regional Force Battalions and continued to occupy its extended defensive positions in northern MR I. The Division's assigned area of operations (AO) encompasses over 1600 square miles of diverse terrain facing three North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions in defensive positions to the north and west. All three enemy divisions

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occupy their positions in depth with main force Viet Cong units disposed in front of the regular forces. Only minor enemy contacts, however, occurred during the quarter. VnMC casualties were 26 KIA, and 11 WIA.

b. The twelve civic action platoons continue to operate in their assigned villages and hamlets, living with the civilian population. The primary civic action effort was urgently needed rice distribution to the population within the VnMC AO.

5. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Despite some significant maintenance and logistical support shortfalls, the VnMC Division remains a highly effective and combat ready fighting unit. Morale is high and operational readiness is excellent. The pride, professionalism and cohesion of the VnMC, as well as its superb internal training programs, are excellent examples for the rest of RVNAF.

b. Joint ARVN/VnMC effort to improve spare parts and maintenance support provided by the ARVN logistics system must receive continuing emphasis.

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CHAPTER 9

TERRITORIAL FORCES

1. (C) REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE (RF/PF).

a. This chapter presents an updated view of the Republic of Vietnam Territorial Forces (TF) and significant changes and/or modifications in their organization, mission and employment that reflects progress or regress since the previous quarterly assessment. This assessment is based upon a compilation of staff and field activity reports from the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), the Defense Attache Office (DAO) and a reduced U.S. Embassy field operations staff, to determine whether or not the RF/PF have, or are, effectively adjusting to the current ceasefire situation, militarily, politically and psychologically. Cognizance is taken of continuing heavy enemy pressure applied against the TF tactical and defensive positions, the rural populated areas and the impact of continuing enemy initiated ceasefire violations that have occurred during the quarter.

b. General background (RF/PF): In the previous assessment, brief mention was made of the creation of the sub-subsector headquarters, on order of the President, an organization that will provide the Government of Vietnam (GVN) an additional subdivision in the military territorial organization chain of command. The plan, which was approved by the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) and the Joint General Staff (JGS), is being implemented in six separate phases; the fourth phase was completed at the end of June, the fifth and sixth phases are scheduled to be completed in July and August, respectively. The plan as originally approved called for deployment of approximately 7,800 RF officers and NCO's in three-man teams (two officers and one NCO) to nearly 2,600 pre-selected sub-subsectors (villages) throughout the country, in an accelerated effort to extend, consolidate, and re-inforce GVN security programs down to the village/hamlet level. In a recent decision, President Thieu directed that the strength of the sub-subsector team be increased from three men to six men, which significantly increases the total strength from approximately 7,800 men to over 13,000. The projected total

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of 2,600 sub-subsectors as originally established by the GVN, has been revised to a more realistic figure of 2,200 sub-subsectors.

3. (C) REGIONAL FORCES (RF).

a. No significant change since the previous assessment except to revise slightly the former organizational chart to reflect command and control of the RF/PF down to the sub-subsector (village/hamlet) level.

(Figure 9-1)

b. Current RF strength is 292,000 men; a decrease of 9,000 from that reported in the previous assessment. This represents a reduction of approximately 20,000 men (or 9.3%) from an Aug 73 peak strength of 312,000.

(Figure 9-2)

Military Region (MR) field reports reflect that increasing personnel combat losses are continuing to take a steady toll among the RF combat operational units, resulting from increased enemy attacks against RF tactical and defensive positions. In addition to heavy combat losses being inflicted upon the RF operational units in their assigned sectors, the RF have suffered other significant losses as Corps/MR Commanders continue to redeploy and attach the RF in significant numbers to reinforce the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in the field, or to other sectors that require additional RF reinforcement because of increasing deterioration in sector security. There is little room for optimism that the RF will achieve its current force structure strength of 324,799, but rather, it is believed there will continue to be a steady decline in their numbers. Increasing combat personnel losses, continuing high desertion rates, normal attrition, and the on-going assignment of over 13,000 RF officers and NCO's to man and maintain 2,200 sub-subsectors are the major contributing factors to a rapidly declining RF combat strength. Additional losses have resulted as the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) is releasing from active duty those regular force and RF soldiers eligible for discharge, retirement and medically

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REGIONAL FORCES ASSIGNED STRENGTH




Figure 9-2

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disabled. There is reason to believe that part of the new, lower RF assigned and present for duty strength figures is the result of action being taken by commanders to adjust personnel records to reflect truer, more accurately controlled strengths versus the previously inflated figures which resulted from carrying nonexistent "Ghost" and "Flower" soldiers as assigned and present for duty. Emphasis originating from the President, in an effort to crack down on and eliminate personnel manipulations and malpractices, could result in further reported downward adjustments in TF strengths. JGS/Inspector General Directorate inspection teams have been instructed to scrutinize unit strength records and verify them by conducting head-count musters.

c. There was no significant change from the previous assessment regarding JCS participation on the GVN Central Reconstruction and Development Council (CRDC) concerning implementation of territorial security policies. The GVN is, however, continuing in its efforts to restore or increase security in the rural populated areas of the country. This intensified and expanded effort is applied primarily to those areas that have long suffered from enemy incursions, infiltrations, land grabbing, attacks, fear campaigns, taxation, proselyting of the population and areas where trained enemy agent provocateurs have successfully penetrated village governments for the purpose of subverting GVN control. Territorial security in general has increasingly deteriorated since the first of the year, particularly in the enemy's traditional areas of interest. In these areas, he has been able to extend and expand his base areas in order to strike out at government forces, whose ability to operate and defend against enemy attacks has been weakened and impaired where RF forces have been redeployed out of their home sectors. The principal role of the RF (including the PF), as promulgated by Presidential decree, is to insure effective implementation of GVN territorial security policies, and to adequately defend the rural populace against Viet Cong (VC) insurgent forces and enemy main force units. To state that territorial security has been a failure or has been generally ineffective, would be grossly unfair and inaccurate as evidenced by the fact that most of the 12 million rural inhabitants live in relative security. It is accurate to state, though, that field commanders and Government officials who are

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responsible for territorial security are not doing everything that is reasonably possible to insure effective and adequate security to portions of the rural populace. It is reprehensible on the part of the Central Government not to have taken the strong action required to effectively correct long standing shortcomings in implementing territorial security policies stipulated in the GVN Four-Year Community Defense and Local Development (CD&LD) Plan. Enforcement of these policies from the Central Government down to the local village leaders (including the military establishment), coupled with effective and efficient use of the Territorial Forces, would do much to improve the Government's image and create an aura of national unity that has long been tarnished by a state of seeming inertia in certain geographic areas.

d. Organization:

(1) The most significant event that has affected RF operational policy during this quarter, as in the previous quarter, has been the continuing implementation in establishing sub-subsector headquarters throughout the country. A brief outline of the initial plan, with supporting charts, was mentioned in the previous assessment. In summary, the initial plan established that the RF authorized strengths from top to bottom would be traded off (or reduced) to provide the required manpower spaces for this newly created territorial administrative subdivision.

(2) The initial accepted Sub-Subsector Plan called for an RF force of approximately 7,800 men, (5,200 officers and 2,000 NCO's) that, in six separate phases, would be assigned to nearly 2,600 sub-subsectors throughout the country to activate the plan. The sub-subsectors (village/hamlet complexes) were to be selected on the basis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) ratings, starting with the lesser security rated villages, i.e., D and E, then gradually increasing to the more secured C, B and A rated villages.

(3) Significant progress has been made to date in implementing the initial plan. Approximately 7,100 of the 7,800 RF selectees have graduated from a special, two week, 110 hour course of training conducted at five National Training Centers (NTC's) in the four Military Regions, and have been assigned to their

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respective sub-subsectors.

(4) As of the end of June 1974, MR commanders have completed activation of 88% of the 2,200 sub-subsectors (reduced from an originally projected total of 2,500). Phase four of the six phase plan was completed at the end of June 1974 with the total assignment to date of 7,100 RF soldiers, and the activation of nearly 2,000 sub-subsectors.

(5) President Thieu, in a recent decision, directed the Chief, JGS to increase the strength of the sub-subsector teams from three men (two officers and one NCO) to six men (two officers and four NCO's). This increase is to be completed by the end of CY 74. The new adjusted strength requirement is as follows:

Original number of sub-subsectors required	2,593
Revised sub-subsector requirements	2,200
Difference in sub-subsector requirements	-393
Revised difference in space requirements (393 x 3)	1,179
Revised spaces required (2,200 x 3)	6,600
Actual spaces required (6,600 - 1,179)	5,421
Actual RF spaces required to man and maintain 2,200 sub-subsectors:	
Officers - 2,200 x 2	4,400
NCO's - 2,200 x 4	8,800
Total	13,200

(6) To achieve the additional sub-subsector spaces needed, the Chief/JGS will be required to deactivate 46 of the current 372 RF separate companies; each RF company consists of 118 men (reduced from 119

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to support the initial Sub-Subsector Plan). The revised plan will be implemented at the end of August 1974, when completion of the initial plan is anticipated.

(7) The following depicts the revised Sub-Subsector Plan, number of RF companies to be deactivated and total number of subsequent spaces available by Corps/MR:

<u>MR</u>	<u>Number of Sub-Subsectors</u>	<u>Number of RF Companies to be Deactivated</u>	<u>Total Spaces Available</u>
1	380	8 (x 118)	944
2	560	12 "	1,416
3	460	9 "	1,062
4	<u>800</u>	<u>17</u> "	<u>2,006</u>
Total	2,200	46 "	5,428


(8) Figure 9-3 depicts the proposed revised organizational chart of the Sub-Subsector Headquarters and composition of the six-man team. Figure 9-4 showing the Sub-Subsector Signal Communications System remains unchanged for the present. However, J-3 sources stated that the Central Telecommunications Directorate (CTD), the National Police, and J-6/JGS, are currently studying various plans for future integration of currently assigned signal assets at the sub-subsector.

(9) The JGS is completing a Sub-Subsector Handbook which will provide instructional guidelines to sub-subsector commanders on how to administer, direct and manage their activities, and on how they will assist village chiefs in providing adequate security with available village assets (PF, National Police and People's Self-Defense Force Combat Interteams).

e. Mission: The RF support the GVN national goals and nation building programs at the rural level by providing and maintaining adequate territorial security; conducting mobile, offensive, reconnaissance and intelligence operations against enemy main force and VC local force units. JGS has continued to direct MR commanders to place command

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REVISED ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF SUB SUB-SECTOR HEADQUARTERS
(SIX-MAN TEAM)



NOTE: The RF Command Element of each Sub Sub-Sector presently consists of 2 Officers and 1 NCO (Opns NCO). Under recent presidential order the team strength is being increased to 2 Officers and 4 NCO's.

(a) Strength/Supply NCO will revert from Village PF to RF NCO.

(b) & (c) Newly created positions resulting from presidentially ordered increased team strength.

(d) Planned but not yet implemented. Currently, Signal Communications are provided collectively by PF, PSDF, National Police, and Village Administrative Committee (Village) Hamlet Radio System - VHRS). Eventually, Signal assets will be integrated to form a Signal Team and will be OFCON to Sub Sub-Sector Commander.

Figure 9-4

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emphasis on intelligence collecting and effective, improved reconnaissance and analysis of enemy movements, to be used as a basis for attacking the enemy when he is moving into GVN controlled areas, or to organize nighttime patrols and ambushes. The degree to which this mission is being effectively implemented by Corps/MR Commanders, tactical and sector commanders and RF commanders, varies generally between MRs and from sector to sector, and depends largely on the local situation that confronts the RF and the aggressive manner in which they execute territorial security policies. Many of the mission oriented problems that have been outlined in previous assessments continue to plague the RF system and remain basically unchanged and uncorrected. However, top command action to correct long-standing shortcomings and inadequacies that have adversely affected overall RF operational capabilities is being pressed. Effective execution of GVN territorial security policies that has long been given only lip service is gradually being enforced by the JGS.

f. Ceasefire Situation: Information that was outlined in previous assessments remain basically unchanged. Although there was a substantial reduction in the overall number of enemy initiated ceasefire violations during the quarter, particularly in June, the enemy continued to increase his efforts to usurp and subvert GVN control at the village/hamlet level. Infiltrations, ambushes and harassing attacks against the territorial forces continued, particularly in lightly defended rural populated areas where normally deployed RF units have been redeployed outside their assigned sector Area of Operations (AO) to reinforce ARVN. During this quarter (as in the previous quarter), RF reinforcing operations occurred in the provinces of Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, An Xuyen, Chuong Thien and Kien Giang (MR 4); Binh Tuy, Long Khanh, Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Binh Duong (MR 3); and Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh (MR 2).

(1) ARVN tactical commanders continued during the second quarter (as they did in the first quarter) to request MR Commanders to redeploy RF to reinforce their combat units. The largest number of RF unit redeployments occurred in Quang Duc and Binh Dinh Provinces (MR 2), and Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, Chuong Thien, and An Xuyen Provinces (MR 4). MR 3, an area that for the most part was normally quiet through most of CI 73, became a hotbed of enemy offensive activity

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during the first quarter CY 74. To help cope with this new activity, several RF units and supporting Sector Tactical Command Posts (STCP's) previously deployed along major infiltration routes leading into MR 3, Lines of Communications (LOCs) and defensive perimeters guarding the approaches to the Saigon Capitol Military District (CMD), were re-deployed to support ARVN forces. During most of April and part of May 1974, the RF distinguished themselves fighting courageously while reinforcing the ARVN Task Force in Duc Hue District, Hau Nghia Province. For their acts of heroism, the RF units involved in this operation were cited by President Thieu for gallantry in the face of the enemy. As Corps/MR Commanders and tactical commanders are forced to react to enemy initiatives and deploy ARVN combat forces in their Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR), RF battalions and STCP's will continue to be used to fill the void created by the departure of ARVN Regular Forces, or to augment these forces.

(2) During the second quarter CY 74, enemy forces initiated a total of 7,482 incidents against the Territorial Forces, and inflicted a total of 9,001 combat casualties. This reflects an increase of 592 and 1,519 respectively from the first quarter. Of this total 3,927 incidents and 4,490 combat losses occurred in MR 4. The most significant increases in enemy initiated incidents and TF combat losses occurred in MR's 1, 2 and 3. In MR 1, enemy incidents increased nearly 300%, while TF losses increased 200%; in MR 2, enemy incidents decreased by 200% and TF losses increased nearly 150%; and in MR 3, enemy incidents increased nearly 200% while TF losses increased nearly 190%. Field commanders continue to be generally critical of RF/PF operational performance, but RF/PF organization, mission and capability are not comparable with ARVN units. J-3/JGS and RVNAF Inspector General sources have stated, during recent meetings with DAO staff officers, that field visits and inspections of RF/PF have reflected a significant overall improvement in TF battlefield performance compared to what it was during the first six months following the signing of the Paris Accords. These sources also admit that the TF have a long way to go, but increased efforts are being conducted at all command levels to insure that improvements in TF performance continues. The Chief, JGS continues to closely scrutinize the Territorial Force System and is clearly taking the lead to insure that MR Commanders

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continue to place command emphasis on RF/PF performance.

g. Concept of employment remains basically unchanged from the previous assessment. However, JGS staff field visits and JGS, MR and Sector Inspector General (IG) inspection reports, reflect slight overall improvement in established RF employment/deployment policies. Although slight, it does reflect that the Chief, JGS is turning the screw a little tighter to force MR Commanders to substantially improve their TF organizations from top to bottom. Aggressive and responsive command leadership is still required at all levels if the RF/PF are to be quickly raised to an acceptable level of effectiveness. J-3/JGS sources state that current concepts of employment and operational tactics and techniques are presently being studied in an effort to achieve this goal.

(1) RF field operations employ 45 STCP's, 360 battalions which include 1,440 RF rifle companies, and 372 separate companies, throughout the 44 provinces (sectors) of the four MR's. Additionally, RF are manning and maintaining a total of 1,286 various size outposts (up slightly from February 1974), ranging in size from major operating bases of battalion level down to and including squad size. The problem of command and control of such a large and widely dispersed force continues to inhibit solutions of complex logistical, maintenance and operational problems. J-3/JGS is in the process of preparing a plan that will be presented in the very near future to the Chief, JGS recommending the dissolution of a substantial number of outposts presently manned by the TF (source estimates approximately 45-50%). If approved, this plan should contribute significantly to a reduction in overall operational, resupply, equipment, and maintenance costs that have long plagued the TF. Continuous manning of this large number of outposts has not insured or improved territorial security of the rural populace, as evidenced by the large number of these outposts that have been overrun or abandoned since January 1974. If anything, security of the rural areas has declined, and combat personnel losses among the TF in defending or retaking those outposts have remained high. In some areas these losses represents approximately 30-35% of their total monthly losses. Experience has borne out that whenever the RF are successful it has usually been when they have been completely mobile, and when they

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have been given the authority to pursue the enemy within their assigned TAOR. They have enjoyed over the years a significant degree of success when deployed primarily on mobile offensive or security operations, and reconnaissance, intelligence and interdiction operations, as established in territorial security policies.

3. (C) POPULAR FORCE (PF).

a. There has been no significant change in the PF organization. Current strength is reported at over 196,000, a slight decrease from that reported in the previous assessment. Monthly strength of the PF has varied only slightly since September 1973, and their combat losses still remain high, particularly in Wounded-in-Action (WIA) statistics. This attests to the fact the PF experience little trouble in replacing their losses. Authorized strength remains at 206,000 consisting primarily of 6,699 29-man platoons. Actual number of platoons reported during the quarter remains the same as the previous quarter, 6,587, of which 6,356 were deployed, the remainder held in zero balance reserve, allowing spaces for pipeline replacements.

(Figure 9-5)

b. There has been no significant change that would alter PF performance in manning and maintaining 4,200 various size outposts throughout the country. More than one-third of their operational strength is still used for this purpose. This continues to cause a degradation in their primary mission to provide territorial security, defend their assigned villages/hamlets, prevent internal VC infiltration, conduct ambushes, interdict enemy local force units in and around village perimeters, protect resources, LOC's and vital installations.

c. Overall PF performance remains basically unchanged, although JGS sources stated that PF operational performance has shown a marked improvement, as evidenced by the number of villages/hamlets that were attacked and successfully defended during this quarter. Field activity reports reflect that enemy attacks against PF positions significantly increased over those reported during the first quarter. Although their overall performance remains basically unchanged from the previous assessment, battlefield

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POPULAR FORCES ASSIGNED STRENGTH




Figure 9-5

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performance (if MR reports are accurate) reflects that PF continue to inflict more than twice the number of enemy casualties than they sustain. JGS sources stated that Sector IG offices are continuing in their efforts to conduct inspections of all PF units coincidental to inspections of the RF. Results of these reports are submitted through channels to JGS/IG who forward them to the Chief, JGS. Concerted efforts at all command levels are being exerted at eliminating long standing deficiencies that have plagued operational and tactical performance of the PF. J-3/JGS continues to monitor the PF program (as well as the RF) for the Chief, JGS and has during the quarter conducted a substantial number of field visits to ensure compliance with JGS directives. J-3/JGS states that, depending upon the security situation and availability of transportation means, a fixed number of PF platoons will be visited each month at the same time visits are being made to deployed RF battalions. A review of recently conducted JGS/IG field inspection reports reflects significant overall improvement in support of the PF and its assigned objectives, compared to the 1973 annual inspections. To a certain degree, problems are being identified and significant corrective action is being taken.

4. (C) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

a. The most significant improvement in support of the Territorial Force system, since the signing of Ceasefire Agreement, has been in logistics. Much of this recent improvement can be attributed to the dynamic and forceful leadership of the Commander, Central Logistics Command, concurrently Chief of Staff, JGS/RVNAF. Previous ineffective operational performance and tactical capabilities could, until recently, be substantially blamed on inadequate and inequitable logistical support, or more correctly, the lack of it. The RF/PF logistical system of CLC, including its Area Logistics Commands (ALC's) and Sector Logistics Support Centers (SLSC's) has been undergoing a modernization and improvement program, as a result of a most singular effort on the part of the Commander, CLC.

b. The Commander, CLC, has solicited and encouraged active support from all JGS staffs, subordinate commands and separate departments, to organize and consolidate their experience and expertise in a joint, coordinated effort to improve and upgrade the RF/PF logistical system. This collective effort

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is now beginning to produce positive results as evidenced by reports of recent CLC (and ALC), JGS/IG, JGS/J-3 and CTC command inspections. The Commander, CLC, has established logistical objectives based primarily on targeted and identifiable problems. Corrective action is being taken by the five ALC's and 44 SLSC's, and when required, the Surgeon General's Office, the Ordnance, Quartermaster, Purchasing and Contracting, Engineer and Signal Departments. Monitoring and technical guidance is provided by senior staff offices of JGS. The Inspector General offices at all command levels will conduct annual, periodic and special inspections and report all discrepancies through their respective reporting channels to the Chief, JGS. Significant improvements have been made in recent months, as noted in the latest CLC Progress Report on RF/PF Logistical Support. The salient points in this report are as follows:

(1) Fourteen targeted objectives and tasks have been established by CLC that are aimed at improving, upgrading and modernizing the RF/PF logistical support system throughout the country. Monthly progress reports will be submitted by the five ALC's and 44 SLSC's to CLC to be incorporated into a quarterly progress report that is forwarded to the Chief, JGS. These objectives will remain on the list until such time as the Chief, JGS, and Commander, CLC, are satisfied that all corrective action has been taken.

(2) Current RF/PF strength assigned to the Sector Logistics Support Centers is 14,819 of the authorized total of 16,066 (or 92%). Of the assigned strength, 8,753 are assigned as Logistics Specialists, and 8,110 have completed logistics training. Periodic familiarization training is mandatory for all logistics specialists to keep current and abreast of the continually changing requirements, directives and procedures of logistical support.

(3) CLC developed and established the Logistical Improvement Plan in CY 1973, and updated it for CY 1974. This plan is aimed at the entire RVNAF with primary effort at troop unit level support. With decreasing US financial support, the Chief, JGS, has directed improvement plans and policies throughout RVNAF to streamline and modernize wherever possible. CLC has taken the lead in this matter and has placed increased emphasis at improving and upgrading the RF/PF logistical system.

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This subject is covered in Chapter 12.

8. (C) SHORTFALLS.

a. There has been no significant change in previous reported shortfalls during this quarter. The following, however, capsulizes some of the more prevalent shortfalls previously reported that continue to hamper RF/PF operational and tactical capabilities.

(1) Inadequate and inequitable logistical support of RF/PF continues to be a pressing problem; however, logistical command field status reports reflect that many major problems have been identified, and corrective action is now being taken. Improvements, meager as they might be, can be attributed to continuing command emphasis, and the steadfastness of the Chief, JGS.

(2) Logistical support of RF/PF units that man and maintain nearly 5,000 widely dispersed outposts and installations remains a serious problem, due to extremely limited surface transportation and dedicated air assets required to furnish essential and high priority support. A significant number of these outposts are situated in areas that can only be supported by helicopters.

(3) The RF/PF continue to be plagued by many of the same problems reported in previous assessments. A high rate of desertions and absenteeism, poor morale, inadequate subsistence allowance (when compared to an ever increasing cost of living), a lack of adequate and effective leadership, inadequate unit refresher training and leadership training and inconsistent equipment and maintenance support. In varying degrees, these problems continue to contribute to marginal and mediocre RF/PF performance and a low state of combat readiness. In view of this, the Chief, JGS continues to place command emphasis on MR Commanders and sector commanders to upgrade and improve the TF program.

(4) Inconsistent and ineffective command and control of the RF/PF at all levels still remains a problem, as MR Commanders continue to redeploy or attach RF units outside their home sectors for prolonged and unspecified periods of time. The JGS

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policy that prescribes time limitations that RF units may be redeployed outside their home sectors continues to be abused by MR Commanders, as reflected in the JGS monthly RF deployment reports. This problem can be reduced significantly if MR Commanders direct RF units to stand down in rotation from operations, and with more frequent unit replacements. This would provide more time for required training, rest and recuperation and replacing of equipment.

9. (C) SUMMARY.

a. The substantive inputs to previous quarterly assessments remain basically unchanged. There continues to be slow but noticeable progress in logistical and maintenance support of the RF/PF, if reports from the MR's are valid. Admittedly, progress has been slow, but JGS continues to identify and address these problems, and MR Commanders continue to be prodded by the Chief, JGS to improve and upgrade RF/PF performance and support.

b. RF/PF continue to be a significant fighting force in the defense of South Vietnam against Communist aggression when employed and supported properly and adequately. Their principal and legitimate role of defending assigned sectors and the rural populace against enemy encroachment is essential to ensuring that the GVN can successfully carry out its national policies and programs of rehabilitation and reconstruction, village self-development, village self-defense and village self-government. Long term re-deployments of RF/PF outside their assigned operational areas for the purpose of reinforcing ARVN forces, if uncorrected, will have far reaching effects on achieving the established RF/PF goals under the GVN Four-Year Plan, particularly as enemy main force units and VC local force units increase their efforts at subverting GVN control at the village/hamlet level.

c. Noticeable improvements in RF/PF performance have been seen in the past six months, when compared to the first six months of CY 73. The JGS remains firm in its continuing efforts at modernizing and improving the Territorial Force organization.

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CHAPTER 10

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

CAPABILITY

1. (U) C-E SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

a. The skill level of RVNAF technicians is slowly but steadily improving as they gain operational and maintenance experience on the Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System (SIMS). Presently, all requests from MR III for technical assistance are being performed without contractor assistance. Minimal contractor assistance was required on technical assistance requests from MR IV for the second quarter of 1974. Due to transportation problems and lack of experience on some of the troposcatter systems in MR I and MR II, contractor personnel usually accompany RVNAF technicians on technical assistance trips to these regions.

b. Current drawdown of US contractor support can continue as the RVNAF increase their technical proficiency. During the second quarter of 1974, Area Maintenance Supply Facility (AMSF-V) completed 99 technical assistance requests, 30 of which required no contractor assistance. It is not known how many of the remaining requests actually required the assistance provided.

2. (U) COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT AGENCY (CMA).

a. The RVNAF CMA personnel have made excellent progress towards self-sufficiency with the assistance and training provided by US Contractor personnel. However, it is not realistic to expect that they should be completely self-sufficient and capable in the relatively short period of time they have managed and controlled the diversified and complex communications system which comprises the SIMS. In many cases, they are capable of all routine actions which are required on a day-to-day basis. However, when confronted with a problem they have not previously faced, and especially if detailed analysis of several alternatives is involved, they still need considerable technical and management assistance. This need is not surprising since most of the RVNAF CMA personnel have less than two years experience and many less than a year. Further, most of the CMA personnel are lacking in technical background; therefore, their training to attain the

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required technical ability must take a much longer period of time.

b. Consequently, the current level of contractor effort should be continued through calendar year 1974. The cost of this effort, approximately \$37,400 monthly, is negligible when compared to the hundreds of millions of dollars the US Government has invested in providing a telecommunications system for the Republic of Vietnam. This relatively minor cost will help insure that the planning, engineering, management, direction and operational control of the SIMS is performed so that a viable telecommunication system is in being while the RVNAF CMA personnel gain the experience required for complete self-sufficiency.

c. An additional factor which requires continuation of the US contractor effort is the normal manpower attrition which occurs in any military organization - whether US or Vietnamese. The attrition rate of approximately thirty percent annually brings many inexperienced personnel into the system who must be trained and assisted while they gain the necessary technical experience. Up to the present date, 25 US contractor trained CMS personnel have departed CMS for one reason or another, such as attending offshore schools, transfer and termination/dismissal from the service. Approximately 25% to 30% of these personnel have been replaced with new personnel who required the training already given their predecessors.

d. This problem will be especially acute during the next few months because of a command levied quota of 15 CMA officers to attend required courses at the ARVN Vung Tau Signal School. Efforts to spread the training over a longer period to lessen the impact on the CMA mission have been unsuccessful.

e. A significant manning short-fall exists in the drafting section of the Project Engineering Branch of the Programs Division. At the present time there are eight (8) unfilled civilian draftsman positions. This shortage of draftsmen has a substantial effect on CMS self-sufficiency and engineers must produce drawings by hand sketching. The result is that there is a lowering of the professional standard of the engineering drawings and, in addition, this extra drafting task on the part of the engineer detracts from his time available for producing his normal workload products and results in delayed projects. The US contractor is unable to assist

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in alleviating this problem because of the deletion of the drafting capability from the CMA support contract. The most logical solution to this problem is for CMA to actively pursue attempts to fill the civilian drafting slots but this has been unsuccessful because of the low wage scale offered.

f. During the period covered by this assessment, the US contractor effort in CMA has been reduced from 27 to 22 personnel. Little or no impact would have resulted from this drawdown had CMA been manned to their full TO&E strength. However, current RVNAF policy is to man such agencies to 80 percent of TO&E authorized strength. Currently, CMA has only 73% of their authorization. The ARVN have provided the bulk of the manning, currently 88 percent of ARVN authorization, while VNAF and VNN are manned at 15 and 50 percent of authorization respectively. It is anticipated that the 8% ARVN excess (to RVNAF policy) will be withdrawn by reassignment. Of course, this will make the VNAF and VNN shortages more critical. CMA will attempt to have VNAF and VNN manning increased to the full 80 percent of TO&E authorizations.

g. Due to the above manning problem and scheduled training mentioned in paragraph d above, action will not be taken on two projected drawdowns of US contractor personnel until a full assessment of CMA self-sufficiency is made.

3. (U) SINGLE INTEGRATED MILITARY TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (SIMS).

a. Reliability:

The management, operations and maintenance of the SIMS is the responsibility of the RVNAF. A limited amount of technical assistance is provided to the RVNAF by US contractor personnel. This assistance is being reduced at a rate commensurate with the RVNAF's demonstrated ability to maintain and operate the system entirely by themselves. The monthly reliability for the second quarter of 1974 was as follows:

<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
99.91%	99.87%	99.74%

This indicates a slight downward trend which was partially due to lack of repair parts.

(Figure 10-1)

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


Figure 10-1

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b. Undersea Cable System:

(1) The RVNAF operate five undersea cablehead (CHD) terminals on the 439L and 484N undersea cable systems. The multiplex equipment at the cableheads had functioned well whether operated by US contractor personnel or RVNAF personnel. Assessing RVNAF maintenance capabilities on the multiplex is difficult due to the high reliability of the equipment.

(2) The no break power system and frequency monitoring unit does not have the reliability of the multiplex equipment. Periodic failures occur, especially with the no break power automatic bus selector equipment. The RVNAF personnel continue to require US contractor maintenance assistance in this area. Assistance is required in supply for spare parts identification and in the performance of other than routine maintenance and repair.

(3) A cable break occurred in the 439L "G" link, Vung Tau - Vayama, cable system on 28 April 1974. This is a US owned link providing channels from CONUS and Vietnam into Thailand. When the link fails, circuits/groups are rerouted over the SIMS through Pleiku and Monkey Mountain to Warin. Restoration of the system is accomplished in three phases. Phase I, rerouting highest priority circuits was completed, except for one circuit, 40 minutes after the order was received to implement the restoration plan. Phase II of the restoration plan reroutes a group through Monkey Mountain to Warin. Due to noise and crosstalk on the reroute path, the group was not restored until 1155 hours 2 May 1974. However, indications are that all the problems were not in the SIMS. The one remaining circuit from Phase I was restored with this group. Phase III involves rerouting a group through Nha Trang to Pleiku over an AN/MRC-85 troposphere scatter system. At the time the cable break occurred, this system was in a hazardous condition with one side down with a defective power amplifier and the primary power breaker tripping intermittently on the other side at Nha Trang. The system could not be restored because all required parts were not available in-country. RVNAF rerouted or preempted 9 special interest circuits, over an alternate restoral path, Gia Dinh, Phu Lam, Nui Pr'Line, Pleiku to Warin. This alternate path was noisy and required time to isolate the source of the noise. Through RVNAF efforts, the group was restored at 0840 hours 2 May 1974. Although US contractor assistance was available at the communications management agency Operations Control Center and System Control Office, RVNAF

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handled the situation at the sites without US contractor assistance. The RVNAF displayed high level interest for US circuitry as well as flexibility in establishing an alternate reroute path for Phase III of the cable restoral plan. While they have not attained the highest level of proficiency in all facets of the operation, they cannot be faulted for desire and dedication. The successful completion of this operation raised their confidence level.

(Figures 10-2 and 10-3)

c. Tandem Switching Centers (TSCs):

(1) The RVNAF operate four TSCs which provide long distance direct dial telephone capability throughout the RVN. Difficulties experienced in placing calls through the tandems in FY4/74 led to a technical assistance visit to the Can Tho tandem by ARVN Signal Department personnel. This was the second such visit paid to a tandem (the previous one was reported in the FY3/73 assessment). Results of that visit indicate that the Can Tho tandem is in good condition. Equipment appeared to be well maintained and the only problems discovered were in the supply area. These problems were resolved, for the most part, with the assistance of the signal department representatives who expedited the acquisition of parts from the AMSF-V.

(2) As mentioned earlier, this was the second technical assist visit made to a tandem by RVNAF personnel. Results of these two visits indicate that the RVNAF are capable of performing QA visits to their own tandems, identifying and correcting deficiencies as required.

(3) During the past FY, the tandems ranged in condition from poor to good. Problems outside the direct control of the sites (i.e. engineer support, transportation, supply etc) undoubtedly affected site operations. However, the varying conditions at the TSCs indicate that aggressive leadership and management is the key to upgrading the service provided by the tandems.

d. Dial Telephone Exchanges (DTEs):

(1) RVNAF DTEs provide dial telephone service to authorized subscribers in and around RVNAF bases and sites. These DTEs, in conjunction with tactical exchanges and switchboards, serve 124 areas in the RVN.

(2) RVNAF telecommunications (as opposed to civil) engineers are currently reengineering DTEs to reduce

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


Figure 10-2

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- CABLE BREAKS SINCE MAR 1973
- RYNAF OWNED AND OPERATED CABLES
- US OWNED AND OPERATED CABLES

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capacity as telephone requirements have been significantly reduced since the withdrawal of US Forces. The first such engineering package, reducing the Long Binh DTE from 5000 lines to 2000 lines, is expected to be completed in July, 1974. While US contractor provided technical assistance was required in accomplishing this transition, it is expected that RVNAF personnel will grow in proficiency and self-sufficiency as subsequent projects are undertaken and completed.

(3) Inside Plant:

(a) 19 RVNAF DTEs are equipped with Stromberg-Carlson X-Y switching equipment. For the most part, this equipment has been fairly well maintained. However, increased attention must be paid to performing preventative maintenance routines as some equipment degradation has been noted.

(b) The RVNAF will not be able to support the four OKI Denki DTEs past FY79 due to non-availability of parts. Programming action to replace these four DTEs is underway. Implementation will depend upon successfully reengineering the Stromberg Carlson DTEs to allow removal of excess equipment.

(4) Outside Plant:

(a) The Inspect, Repair as Necessary Program (IRAN) for RVNAF outside plants is continuing. This program is designed to assist RVNAF cable maintenance personnel develop their skills in outside plant fault location and trouble shooting techniques as well as increase the reliability of RVNAF cable plant.

(b) During FY74, VNAF maintenance personnel successfully completed the pre-IRAN survey of the outside plant at Binh Thuy AB. This is the fifth such survey completed by the RVNAF. More surveys will be scheduled as priorities for cable repair work are established.

(c) Lack of adequate supply support continues to plague outside plant improvement and expansion efforts. Numerous outside plant projects, including cable IRANs have been adversely affected by lack of material. This situation was affected by FY74 funding constraints; however, more efficient use of available in country assets would have lessened the impact of the material shortage.

(d) The ARVN Signal Department is to be commended in their recent efforts to recover abandoned cable for reuse

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in cable projects throughout the RVN. Approximately \$179,000 worth of cable has been recovered by signal department personnel. This effort demonstrates outstanding initiative and willingness to accomplish the signal mission despite having limited resources.

e. Quality Assurance (QA):

(1) The ARVN Signal Department QA program continued during the last quarter of FY74. QA teams from the Signal department and the regional signal groups conducted approximately 60 inspections during this period. Teams from area signal battalions also visited both the SIMS and tactical sites. Major areas of concern were supply, engineer support (power and air conditioning) and O&M.

(2) The program is well established and is indicative of the signal department's desire to improve site conditions and performance.

f. Air Conditioning and Power Generating Equipment:

(1) Surveillance visits to SIMS sites to evaluate the status of air conditioning and power generating equipment revealed the following:

(a) Problems resulting from the energy crisis continue to have an adverse effect on operations. Non-availability of lubricants and solvents continues. It is also apparent that there is room for vast improvement in the matter of fuel conservation. In several cases it was noted that daily fuel consumption was excessively high for the capacity or consumption rate of the generator employed. In other cases, it was noted that more than one generator was running when one would suffice. Improved conservation thru effective procedures, and better security and control of fuel stocks is in order.

(b) In spite of the previous training many power plant and air conditioning maintenance personnel have received, it is reported that they continue to ignore requests and suggestions concerning O&M and will not change bad practices which make effective 3d and 4th echelon support impossible. Failure to follow emergency and normal procedures in this area does nothing to enhance the progress of the RVNAF toward self-sufficiency.

(2) Equipment logs, charts and records continue to be improperly maintained.

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4. (C) SELECTED C-E EVALUATIONS.

a. During this reporting period, Prime Minister Khiem officially approved the formation of a Sensor Branch in the Special Operations Center (SOC), J3/JGS. The SOC is responsible for setting up the new branch with a mission that includes operations control, training and management of all sensor resources in RVNAF.

b. Surveys to determine sensor requirements for perimeter defense of vital installations are continuing. Currently there is a shortage of line sensors designed primarily for perimeter defense. Tactical sensors are being used wherever possible as gap fillers around perimeters. The additional line sensors required for perimeter defense are in country, but missing component parts. All component shortages are on valid due-in requisitions.

5. (U) LOGISTICS.

a. Maintenance:

(1) Area Material Supply Facility-Vietnam (AMSF-V):

(a) AMSF-V production of repaired components continued at a monthly rate of 400 plus, except for May. The drop in May to 285 was due to a sharp decrease in CONUS spare parts receipts. The status of unserviceable components at AMSF-V is depicted on the chart.

{Figure 10-4}

(b) The current backlog of 544 items at AMSF-V represents a 1.2 month workload based on the monthly completion rate of 450 items per month over the past 12 months. The monthly maintenance shop backlog at the AMSF-V includes those items deadlined for parts.

(Figure 10-5)

(c) During this period, SIMS has been deteriorating seriously. Conditions at some sites reveal that little or no preventative maintenance is being performed. Consequently, many sites are in a hazardous condition, although not reported. Callouts to Pleiku and Long Binh sites have revealed the need for regular visits to sites by highly qualified maintenance and logistic

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AMSF MAINTENANCE RECEIPT OF UNSERVICABLE AND COMPLETIONS




Figure 10-4

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


Figure 10-5

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technicians. Such visits would be for the purpose of improving the capability of on site technicians to do maintenance. The result would be improved equipment operation and reliability.

(2) 60th Signal Base Depot (SBD):

(a) Operations during this quarter have mainly involved transfer of equipment and supplies to the Associated Army Depot, Long Binh. Additional space will be available at 60th SBD upon completion of this action. This additional space will permit use of tools and test equipment required for the development of a total depot repair and rebuild capability. A marked increase in ARVN self-sufficiency in depot maintenance would be a direct result.

(b) The Depot Maintenance Rebuild Program is currently 48 percent behind FY-74 (revised) programmed goals. The rebuild program, for all items except modules, is 21 percent behind goals; for modules, 54 percent. Shortages of reparable assets (particularly modules) and repair parts have caused the shortfall in this program. It is apparent that prompt turn-in of reparable assets must be even more strongly stressed and supervised in the future.

(Figures 10-6 and 10-7)

(c) Repair and Return Program: National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA), Maintenance Division, has revised its FY75 repair and return program for radars, radar subassemblies and radar modules. The program for radar subassemblies and modules for the AN/PPS-4&5 has been revised, the repair and return of these items is now to be performed by 60th SBD. CONUS repair and return will be continued for AN/MPQ-4A Counter Mortar Radar Sets in FY 75.

(d) Depot Expansion and Improvement:

1 The review of the revised Depot Upgrade Plan has been completed by the 60th SBD. A revised list of TO&E equipment to implement this plan has also been compiled. The revised program was submitted to the signal department for approval in May. A decision is anticipated by August.

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60th SIGNAL BASE DEPOT
MAJOR COMPONENTS REBUILD PROGRAM
JUNE 1974




Figure 10-6

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60th SIGNAL BASE DEPOT
 MODULE REBUILD PROGRAM
 JUNE 1974




Figure 10-7

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2 The movement of equipment and supplies from the 60th SBD Storage Division to 1st Army Associated Depot (AAD) began 12 March 1974. As of 14 June, 1435 tons, 65% percent of the total 2200 tons, had been moved. The move is not anticipated to meet the scheduled completion date of 15 July. Documentation in-process reports indicate a backlog at the 1st AAD in processing 60th Depot move receipts. Emphasis has also been placed on an inventory of 29,000 lines which indicate a 60th SBD warehouse location but no Asset Balance File records. The move is approximately 45 days behind schedule. Completion is projected by mid-September.

(e) Test Measuring and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE): The ARVN has achieved a high degree of in-country self-sufficiency in on-the-job training and cross training is progressing with good results. There continues to be a need for assistance from qualified US technicians specialized in microwave and DC/Low repair. Some technical publications, formerly obtained through regular channels, are not being kept up to date.

b. Supply:

(1) Improvement of the NMMA system was hampered during the period by funding problems. Workload has also been increased by the required conversion from Federal Stock Number system to a NATO Stock Number System. The target date for this conversion is 30 September 1974. NMMA personnel, in coordination with VNAF and VNN representatives, developed an aggregate list of common items consisting of 21,000 line items which ARVN will provide through common supply support. A listing and punch cards identifying these common items which will be requisitioned through NMMA was furnished to the VNAF and VNN 15 May 1974. The listing is to be reviewed quarterly and revised as necessary.

(2) Changes in reporting procedures have improved the accuracy of data submitted. Further changes, particularly in the breakdown of requisitions, should more truly reflect supply posture.

(Figure 10-8)

(3) The number of dues-out to SIMS sites decreased from 3902 in April to 434 in May. This decrease was due to a wholesale cancellation of requisitions by the AMSF-V to purify existing supply records.

(Figure 10-9)
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AMSF SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS (ASL ITEMS)




Figure 10-8

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SIMS SITES SUPPLY STATUS IN COUNTRY SUPPORT




Figure 10-9

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6. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. RVNAF C-E personnel are continuing to gain technical competence on the operation and maintenance of the SIMS and tactical equipment/systems. They are nearing a state of self-sufficiency in some areas such as TIDE calibration and sensors. As they gain additional experience, RVNAF technicians will acquire the skills required to maintain all RVNAF C-E equipment/sites/systems at an adequate operational level. Total self-sufficiency is not a goal attainable in the near future. This statement is not intended to be derogatory. The US military was not self-sufficient in their operations in Vietnam (or anywhere else), therefore it is not realistic to expect the RVNAF to attain a goal the US military has not yet attained. As RVNAF proficiency increases, US technical assistance will be reduced, but it must be recognized that there is a minimum, beyond which, further reductions should not be made.

b. Technical expertise in the RVNAF has continued to increase; however, ineffective management is reducing the readiness posture and reliability of the systems and equipment. Many OICs and NCOICs are not providing the direction and leadership to effectively implement preventive maintenance and quality assurance programs. Higher levels of management have been unable to correct the situation. The unusually high outage rate experienced recently on the primary trunk groups results, in part, from this lack of positive leadership. Unless positive action is taken at all levels of management to solve logistic and maintenance problems, we can expect a continuing decline in the readiness posture of systems and equipment.

c. The effects of the FY74 funding constraints are beginning to impact on operations. The supply situation is now critical. With the depletion of the CONUS-RVN supply pipeline, operational readiness of both fixed and tactical C-E equipment will further decrease. Funds which became available at the end of FY74 will provide some relief. However, it cannot be expected that those supplies will make up for a near five month disruption of the CONUS-RVN supply pipeline.

6. (C) SUMMARY.

a. As the AMSF-V technical assistance teams gain experience, they are relying less on US contractor assist-

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ance. The CMA is making excellent progress toward self-sufficiency, but is handicapped by an approximate thirty percent annual personnel attrition rate. Their capability is further reduced because the VNAF and VNN are providing only 15 and 50 percent respectively of their manning requirements.

b. The reliability of the SIMS is on the decline, primarily for two reasons: ineffective management and poor logistical support. It is anticipated that the reliability factor will continue to decline until effective measures are taken to correct the major deficiencies.

c. The supply situation is now critical and will become more critical before the CONUS-RVN supply pipeline is refilled. The austere logistic support has hurt the RVNAF readiness posture to a degree beyond which conservation efforts have been able to compensate.

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CHAPTER 11

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) TRAINING

1. (C) OFFSHORE TRAINING.

a. Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN):

(1) Objectives of the ARVN Fiscal Year 1974 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) remain as previously reported.

(2) The following is a brief summary of the ARVN FY74 SATP as of the end of FY4/74:

<u>FY74</u>	<u>SPACES</u>	<u>COST</u>
Beginning Program FY4/74	489	\$2,053,712
Additions	19	
Deletions	6	
Current Program	502	\$2,063,042

(3) ARVN operational requirements necessitated making 19 additions to the program during FY4/74 as follows:

<u>ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIRED</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL SPACES</u>
Obs Maint Tng - CONUS (Tank Overhaul)	7
MOI Training	2
Command and General Staff	4
Sr Off Preventive Maint	4
Obs Comm/Elect Tng-CONUS	2
	<hr/>
	19

(4) The spaces originally programmed and the additions made to the program produced a total figure of 508. Six of these spaces were deleted from the program as follows:

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<u>REASON</u>	<u>DELETED SPACES</u>
English Language Disqualification	2
DA cancellation	4
	<hr/>
	6

(5) The following offshore training course were attended by ARVN personnel during FY4/74:

<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Operations	Psy Opns Units Off	6/O
Operations	Map/Chart/Geodesy Off	1/O
Operations	Arty Survey Off	2/O
Operations	Ranger	4/O
Operations	Ranger OJT	4/O
Operations	Camera Equip Rpr	1/E
Comm/Elec	Tactical Microwave Sys Rpr	2/E
Comm/Elec	Dial Central Office Repair	1/E
Comm/Elec	Fixed Plant Carrier Rep	1/E
Comm/Elec	Comm Elect Systems Eng	2/O
Maintenance	Engr Equip Rpr Tech	1/O
Maintenance	Calibration Tech and Spec	4/O
Maintenance	Elect Instr Rpr	1/E
Maintenance	Obs Maint Tng CONUS (Tank Overhaul)	3/O
Maintenance	Obs Maint Tng CONUS (Tank Overhaul)	4/E
Maintenance	Turret Maintenance	2/E
Maintenance	Tank Turret OJT	2/E

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<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Maintenance	Elect Instr Rpr	2/E
Maintenance	Sr Off Preventive Maint	4/0
Logistics	Trans Movement Spec	1/E
Logistics	Trans Movement Spec OJT	1/E
Logistics	Def Proc Mgt	3/0
Administrative	Personnel Mgt-Non US	10/0
Professional	Lang Lab Maint	3/E
Professional	Engr Equip Off	1/0
Professional	Lang Instr Ref	15/0
Professional	Arty Survey Off OJT	2/0
Professional	Engr Off Adv	6/0
Professional	Def Proc Mgt OJT	3/0
Professional	Contract Admin-175	3/0
Professional	Language Instructor	6/0
Professional	Infantry Off Adv	5/0
Professional	Ordnance Off Adv	3/0
Professional	Med Obs Tng	2/0
Professional	Command & General Staff Off	4/0
Professional	Civilian University Training	62/0*

177

* Includes 49 carryover students from FY73.

(6) The number of students sent to CONUS for training in FY4/74 is as follows:

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>COST</u>
APRIL	61	\$166,515
MAY	25	113,590
JUNE	8	53,520
TOTAL	94	\$333,625

(7) Statistical Summary of FY74 ARVN offshore training as of the end of FY4/74 is as follows:

<u>COURSES COMPLETED</u>	<u>COURSES IN PROGRESS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
258	171	429

(8) The increasing ability of ARVN to plan effectively for offshore training was again demonstrated during FY4/74, as no spaces were cancelled due to unit operational requirements.

(9) The close of FY4/74 brought a successful conclusion to the ARVN FY74 SATP. No major problems developed during FY74, and continued success during FY75 is anticipated.

b. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF):

(1) The Fiscal Year 74 SATP objectives for VNAF remain as previously stated. The offshore training summary below shows the VNAF SATP at the end of FY74.

<u>TYPE TRAINING</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>COST</u>
Aircrew	804(106)*	\$23,119,660
Operational	90(20)*	227,350
Communications/Electronics	46	247,360
Maintenance	120	223,170
Logistics	35	95,930
Administrative	10	35,740
Professional/Specialized	94(32)*	2,572,620

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Orientation Tours	8	10,720
Other Training Costs	-	810,380
Training Aids	-	539,130
<hr/>		
TOTALS	1207(158)*	\$27,882,060

* Indicates spaces filled by students already in CONUS.

As the training requirements of VNAF changed, adjustments were made in the offshore training program. Also, the program was changed; when VNAF was unable to provide qualified candidates; and because of student eliminations. The total cost of the VNAF SATP as of 30 June 1974 was \$27,882,060; this amount will be reduced as students are eliminated subsequent to that date.

(2) The DAO Training Management Section (TMS) conducted an extensive review of the VNAF FY74 SATP in an effort to identify and delete training that was superfluous to minimum essential requirements. It was determined that 78 UPT/T-41/T-37 CONUS training spaces could be deleted. The initial decision to train 396 UPT/T-41/T-37 pilots in CONUS was made at the February 1973 Pilot Planning Conference in Thailand. This plan, if followed, would have resulted in training an excess of fixed-wing pilots. The following training spaces were deleted from the FY74 SATP, resulting in the savings indicated:

<u>TYPE TRAINING</u>	<u>SPACES</u>	<u>SAVINGS</u>
UPT/T-41/T-37	78	\$2,406,300
English Language (CONUS)	85	98,000
Electrical Power Specialists	2	10,470
Lab Maintenance Officer	1	2,450
<hr/>		
TOTALS	166	\$2,517,220

The TMS, following the policy of maximum utilization of in-country training resources, increased the English Comprehension Level (ECL) requirement from 55 to 65

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for Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) and Undergraduate Helicopter Training (UHT) candidates going to the CONUS. This requirement resulted in selection of better qualified candidates, fewer eliminations from CONUS training, and better training for the dollars spent. In the non-flying courses TMS reprogrammed the training sequences whenever possible to eliminate unnecessary CONUS English language training. Such reprogramming was based on the in-country capability to train students to an English Comprehension Level (ECL) of 70. The ARVN Central Training Command assumed training responsibility for VNAF of certain training courses common within RVNAF. This training includes the fields of power production, civil engineering, military police, and other general support-type training. In view of the aforementioned changes in training responsibility, CONUS training for VNAF personnel in these areas was deleted from the program.

(3) During FY4/74, 256 students were scheduled and of these, 248 students were processed for CONUS training; eight spaces were cancelled as a result of VNAF's inability to provide qualified candidates. A total of 28 spaces was cancelled in all of FY74 for this reason (2.3% of the total program). Although the percentage of cancellations was a marked improvement over previous years, most of the cancellations could have been avoided if VNAF had identified candidates early and placed them in language training in sufficient time to qualify. Also, there were 30 training spaces rescheduled for later entry dates so that candidates could have more time to qualify.

(4) During FY4/74, 28 students were eliminated from CONUS training for academic deficiencies, flying deficiencies or disciplinary reasons. The total for the year was 58 (32 for flying deficiencies and 26 for academic and disciplinary reasons). Additionally, one Country Liaison Officer and 14 students did not return to Vietnam upon completion of CONUS training; five of the students were undergoing four-year nurses training programs.

(5) The FY75 SATP was reviewed in light of VNAF's in-country training capability. It was determined that VNAF has the capability to transition UH-1 pilots into CH-47 Aircraft. VNAF has 10 CH-47 instructor pilots who were trained in CONUS. Accordingly, CH-47 pilot training in CONUS was decreased from 50 to 12 spaces, resulting in a savings of approximately \$870,000.

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(6) FY74 proved to be a good year for VNAF in terms of fulfilling the offshore training program. Programmed spaces filled by qualified candidates ran 97.7 percent. The selection/processing of candidates for offshore training was generally satisfactory. Long-range planning of personnel training requirements was adequate. The execution of plans in terms of timely personnel screening could be improved, in order to have sufficient time to qualify candidates for offshore training. VNAF showed improvement in most functions related to the offshore training program.

(7) During recent years VNAF and U.S. advisors have emphasized pilot training programs (both offshore and in-country). This emphasis led to a projected excess of pilots and the readjustment of training requirements as pointed out in paragraphs b(2) and b(5) above. In view of the low Operational Readiness (OR) rate of certain aircraft, added emphasis has been placed on training of logistics and maintenance personnel. This shift in training priorities is reflected somewhat in the FY75 SATP and will be further emphasized in the FY76 SATP. More training at the technician level was recommended as an intermediate training goal intended to improve the OR rate. Long-range training goals in the area of resource management remain the same.

c. Vietnamese Navy (VNN):

(1) Objectives of the VNN Fiscal Year 74 SATP remain the same as previously reported.

(2) Continued efforts by personnel of the Training Management Section, VNN Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, and the Armed Forces Language School resulted in progress in obtaining language-qualified candidates for CONUS courses during FY4/74. A total of 199 candidates were tested and 170 qualified to attend scheduled FY4/74 and FY5/74 CONUS courses. To insure qualified candidates for the FY75 program 99 personnel are presently enrolled in English language training.

(3) The following offshore training courses were attended by VNN personnel during FY4/74:

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<u>NAME OF COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Medical Officer/Urology	1/0
Medical Officer/Pharmacy	1/0
Senior Foreign Officer Intelligence	1/S
Personnel Management (Non-US)	1/0
English Language/Management PG MS	2/0
Foreign Officer Naval Intelligence	2/0
Medical Officer/Internal Medicine	1/0
Medical Officer/Radiology	1/0
Senior Officer International Defense Management	2/0
On-the-Job Training/Aspirant Orientation and Indoctrination, aboard US Seventh Fleet units	26/0
OJT Afloat Overseas Repair Department Operations/Management, aboard US Seventh Fleet units	10/0
Construction Electrician CL-B/Instructor ALFA	1/E
Engineering Aids CL-A	1/E
Machinery Repairman CL-A/QJT Tech/ Administration CONUS Shop Procedures	2/E
Teletypewriter Maintenance Mod 28 ASR CL-C Instructor AFLA	2/E
Interior Communication Electricians CL-B/Instructor ALFA	2/E
Hospital Corpsman CL-A/X-Ray Technician CL-C	1/E

(4) A total of 52 VNN officers and eight VNN enlisted personnel returned from attending the following CONUS training courses during FY4/74:

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<u>NAME OF COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Senior Officer International Defense Management	3/S
Foreign Supply Officer/Functional Supply	5/O
Senior Foreign Officer Amphibious Warfare	1/S
Engineering BS/University of South Carolina	4/O
English Language/Medical Department Diving Officer	1/O
Special Gunnery Training Package	2/O
OJT/Aspirant Orientation and Indoctrination, aboard US Seventh Fleet units	26/O
OJT Afloat Overseas Repair Department operations/Management, aboard US Seventh Fleet units	10/O
Data Processing Technician CL-A/Basic Programming Concepts Enlisted and IBM 360 Computer System Programmer	1/E
Machinery Repair CL-B/OJT Tech/Admin CONUS (Skill Enhancement)/Instructor ALFA	2/E
Radioman CL-B/Instructor ALFA	2/E
Basic Electricity and Electronics/Construction Electrician CL-A	2/E
Engineman CL-A/EN General Motors Diesel Technician/EN CL-C (FM 38081/8)	1/E

(5) Five CONUS courses and 15 spaces were cancelled during FY4/74 due to VNN inability to provide language-qualified candidates:

<u>NAME OF COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Foreign Officer Naval Intelligence	2/O (Course Cancelled)
OJT Tech/Admin Afloat O/S	1/O (Course Cancelled)
Dental Assistant Basic CL-A/Dental Equipment Repair Technician CL-C	1/E (Course Cancelled)

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Hospital Corpsman CL-A	1/E (Course Cancelled)
OJT ORTHOPEDIC Cast CL-A	1/E (Course Cancelled)
Data Processing Technician CL-A	1/E (Spaces Cancelled)
OJT Afloat Training O/S Repair Dept Opns	4/0 (Spaces Cancelled)
OJT Afloat Training O/S Aspirant O&I Cruise	4/0 (Spaces Cancelled)

(6) No VNN courses were rescheduled during FY4/74.

(7) Following is a summary of programmed training for the VNN FY74 SATP as of the end of FY4/74:

<u>TYPE TRAINING</u>	<u>STUDENTS/SPACES</u>	<u>COST</u>
Operations	1/2	\$4,190
Communications, Electronics	14/18	20,560
Maintenance	5/11	8,330
Logistics	19/29	34,980
Administrative	3/25	12,090
Professional/Administrative	78/120	450,550
Orientation		30,000
Operations O/S	42/42	23,400
Professional/Specialized O/S	7/7	8,620
Other, O/S (MTT), etc	4/6	18,320
Training Aids		64,800
TOTALS	173/260	\$875,840

d. Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) :

(1) Objectives of the VNMC Fiscal Year 74 SATP remain the same as previously reported.

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(2) No VNMC personnel attended offshore training during FY4/74.

(3) A total of three VNMC officers returned from attending the following CONUS training courses during FY4/74:

<u>NAME OF COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Observership Medical Officer/General Surgery	1/0
Basic Course USMC/Embarkation for Amphibious Operations	2/0

(4) Thirteen CONUS courses and 21 spaces were cancelled during FY4/74 due to VNMC inability to provide language-qualified candidates:

<u>NAME OF COURSE</u>	<u>SPACES/STUDENT CODE</u>
Command and Staff College	1/S
Field Artillery Officer Advanced	1/0
Foreign Officer Naval Intelligence	2/0
Landing Force Staff Planning	1/0
Basic Course USMC/Embarkation for Amphibious Operations	2/0
Teletypewriter Maintenance Mod 28 ASR CL-C/ Instructor ALFA	4/E
MARCORPS Recruiting Enlisted/Infantry Training School USMC	3/E
Operations Communication Chief USMC	1/E
Basic Electronics USMC/Radio Fundamentals USMC	1/E
Machinist	2/E
Basic Electronics USMC/Radio Fundamentals USMC/Ground Radio Repair USMC	1/E
Hospital Corpsman CL-A/Operating Room Technician CL-C	1/E

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Hospital Corpsman CL-A/Preventive Medicine
Technician CL-C

1/E

(5) During FY74, due to inability of VNMC candidates to meet English-language prerequisites, 27 CONUS courses affecting 40 students and 41 spaces were cancelled. Due to the level of military activity, continuous field maneuvers reduced VNMC capability to acquire English-language training provided in garrison. VNMC is aware that continuous emphasis on in-country English-language training is required in order to meet mandatory language requirements for offshore training. Nineteen VNMC personnel are presently enrolled in the RVNAF Armed Forces Language School.

(6) Following is a summary of programmed training for VNMC FY74 SATP as of the end of FY4/74:

<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>STUDENTS/SPACES</u>	<u>COST</u>
Operations	7/9	\$24,650
Communications/Electronics	1/1	2,710
Maintenance	1/1	1,040
Administrative	0/2	660
Professional/Specialist	3/10	8,260
TOTALS	12/23	\$37,320

2. (C) IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.

a. ARVN :

(1) General:

(a) The recruit training program at the National Training Centers (NTCs) is considerably short of the program goals for the first half of the CY. The shortfall at the NTCs is being partially eliminated due to an increase in the number of recruits undergoing training at Division Training Centers (DTCs). Unit training is progressing slowly due to extreme reluctance on the part of division commanders to release their battalions for the necessary five weeks.

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(b) Of particular significance in CY2/74 is the rapid acceleration of anti-armor training and the effective role it is playing in increasing troop morale. Word is filtering down to front-line units that they have the means available to kill any known tank. ARVN Air Defense (AD) improvements have not been nearly so dramatic.

(c) Although the groundwork was laid for major AD improvements during this quarter, few actually took place.

(2) National and Division Training Centers :

(a) Recruit Training: Of the 96,500 recruits programmed for training in the first six months of CY 1974, 66,537 recruits have completed training at NTCs. The difference indicates a short-fall of 29,963 recruits not trained at the NTCs. The DTCs were programmed to train 5,000 recruits in the first six months of CY 1974 and already have trained 14,704 recruits. This difference indicates a long-fall of 9,704 recruits trained at the DTCs. The Division Commanders requested, and obtained from the Joint General Staff (JGS), permission to recruit and train within their own DTCs; as a result this long-fall currently exists. Reasons given for the request to recruit and train were the division casualty and desertion rates and the lack of transportation to convey new recruits to NTCs. Of the two NTCs visited during this quarter, recruit training Programs of Instruction (POIs) were excellent. Morale, discipline and acceptance of training rated high. Self-help was very predominant, with the units constructing recreation centers, unit clubs, chapels, additional shower rooms, and various other improvements.

(b) Unit Training. In the first six months, 35,650 were programmed for unit training and 34,057 attended, leaving a short-fall of 1,593. Division unit training, phase I is divided into five steps as follows:

<u>STEP</u>	<u>TYPE TRAINING</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
1	Individual	98
2	Team	24
3	Squad	52
4	Platoon	60
5	Company	81

(Includes 79 hours of night training)

315 (5 weeks)

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On completion of phase I unit training, battalions rotate through their DTCs for battalion-level training, consisting of 338 hours (5 weeks), which includes 63 hours night training (phase II unit training). Unit refresher training follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CY 1974 PROGRAMMED</u>	<u>COMPLETED PHASE II</u>
Infantry Bn's	105	99	19
Ranger Bn's	45	32	13
Airborne BN's	9	9	4
Marine BN's	9	9	3
Armored Cavalry Sqds	63	Not programmed	3
Artillery Bn's	68	Not programmed	6
Regional Force Bns	358	83	28
Regional Force Separate Companies	361	159	87
Popular Force Platoons	6,644	1,640	543

(1) The short-falls in refresher training were attributed to lack of transportation, POL shortages, and tactical commitments. The armored squadrons and artillery battalions, due to their tactical employment, are receiving in-place training by Mobile Training Teams (MTT).

(2) Of particular significance is the unit training program conducted for the Ranger Battalions. The program was increased to eight weeks for those battalions badly mauled recently in heavy contact with enemy forces in Military Regions (MR) 2 and 3. Additional time was allotted to allow for re-equipping and for motivational training.

(c) Peoples Self Defense Forces (PSDF) Training. The PSDF training is for key cadre personnel who, on completion of training in NTCs, return to subsectors and conduct basic military training. The POI is four weeks duration, consisting of 233 hours. In the first six months of CY74, 10,654 cadre completed training out of 12,675 programmed. The training received by the

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PSDF cadre is of the same high caliber as that of recruit training given at NTCs. Optimistically, the results of this training will be of benefit to the PSDF in the provinces and autonomous cities.

(d) Popular Forces (PF) Training. During the first six months of CY74, 35,323 personnel were programmed to receive training at NTCs. This training was attended and completed by 15,296 personnel. Five-week platoon refresher training was programmed for 3,777 platoons in the first half of CY74 but 4,135 platoons completed the refresher training. This training was of high quality, with excellent POIs.

(e) Regional Forces (RF) Training for assignment as security for villages. During this reporting period 7,056 Officers and NCOs received special training at five NTCs; they will be assigned security for 2,352 villages. The breakdown follows:

<u>REGION</u>	<u>OFF & NCO</u>	<u>VILLAGES</u>
1	993	331
2	2,106	702
3	1,554	518
4	2,403	801
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	7,056	2,352

The POI for this special course is two weeks, with training continuing through August 1974.

(3) Service Schools:

For CY74, 54,220 personnel were programmed for the 28 In-Country Service Schools. The actual input for the first six months of CY74 was 23,000 personnel. The attendance breakdown follows:

<u>SERVICE SCHOOL</u>	<u>CY 1974 PROGRAMMED</u>	<u>CY 1974 ACTUAL (APR-JUN)</u>	<u>CY 1974 ACTUAL (JAN-JUN)</u>
National Defense College	40	0	0

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Command & General Staff	300	303	303
National Military Academy	987	0	222
POLWAR College	2,459	320	850
Infantry School	4,405	747	1,997
NCO School	5,084	2,962	4,206
Armor School	1,065	410	930
Artillery School	2,837	514	1,136
Women Armed Forces Corps School	360	231	319
Junior Military Academy/Vung Tau	1,400	0	0
Junior Military Academy/Pleiku	400	0	0
Ordnance School	2,387	95	451
Quartermaster School	1,213	448	531
Medical School	2,249	967	1,709
Intelligence School	2,404	376	530
Military Police School	2,734	538	764
Military Band School	687	120	185
Transportation School	6,015	1,029	2,322
Signal School	3,035	770	1,424
Engineer School	3,291	1,172	1,899
Adminstration & Finance-School	1,210	160	334
Adjutant General School	4,545	778	1,202
Armed Forces Language School	1,400	397	881
Logistic Management School	500	60	224

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Social Service School	210	10	10
Martial Arts & Physical Training School	780	11	11
Dog Training School	373	36	50
POLWAR Training Cadre	1,850	267	510
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TOTALS	54,220	12,721	23,000

(4) Anti-Armor Improvements:

(a) Major improvements in anti-armor defense registered highly during CY2/74. Command emphasis on training of "Tank-Killer" teams throughout MRs 1, 2, and 3 has up-graded their anti-armor readiness. The individual soldier has gained the confidence that he can effectively counter enemy armor. One such instance was proved when in one day's battle four enemy tanks were destroyed. Two of these tanks were hit with the Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) (M-72) and two with the Tube-Launched Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided (TOW) missile system. Quang Trung National Training Center has developed a sub-caliber range for firing at a simulated tank target propelled on rails. This new anti-armor range system has been demonstrated to the other national training center instructors and will be used throughout all training centers in the near future.

(b) TOW missile training has greatly improved during this quarter. TOW missile instructors from the NTCs have completed their recycle training and are presently recycling all TOW missile crews in MRs 1, 2, and 3. The instructors' recycle training was highlighted by the firing of two live TOW missiles for demonstration purposes. Both scored direct hits on targets at 2,000 meters. The JGS released 40 additional live missiles for firing. Of these 40 missiles 22 were allocated to the Central Training Command (CTC) for training and 18 were equally divided between MRs 1, 2 and 3 for crew-refresher training. Emplacements, alternate firing positions, and ammunition storage have been greatly improved by utilizing effective overhead cover and concealment. TOW missile mobility has taken a long stride forward with locally-manufactured mounts for jeeps and Armored Personnel Carriers. Mounts have been field-tested and proven adequate. The JGS ordered the

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Vietnamese Army Arsenal to fabricate 135 jeep mounts and 130 Armored Personnel Carrier mounts for the TOW missile systems.

(c) During CY2/74, 20 TOW missile Mini Battery Chargers arrived in-country and were distributed throughout MRs 1, 2, and 3. With the arrival of these Mini Battery Chargers, issued to division and support group levels, the recharging time of the TOW missile-system batteries has been greatly reduced.

(d) Recent inspections of the deployed TOW missile systems revealed that approximately 80 percent of them are operationally ready. During the next quarter (CY3/73) they should be 95 to 100 percent operationally ready.

(5) Air Defense (AD): The assessment conducted by the Air Defense Team from Fort Bliss, Texas in January 1974 was a thorough and well-conducted evaluation of the VN Air Defense. The recommendations from this team were forwarded to the JGS by the Defense Attache (DATT). General Vien issued an AD improvement directive dated 22 Feb 74 to the Corps Commanders. From that time it appears the kindled flame burned out. Approximately 70 percent of the M42 twin 40mm Self-Propelled weapons are in poor condition. The wiring harnesses are frayed and corroded and unable to electronically track aircraft, necessitating manual tracking--which is too slow against fast flying jets. The reflex M18 sights are also in poor condition. M42 parts are scarce and .55 spare parts are almost nonexistent, due to the obsolescence of the weapons system. Considering its present training and maintenance capability, ARVN AD would not pose a major threat to attacking aircraft.

b. VNAF:

(1) As of 30 June 1974, 4,595 VNAF personnel were in all types of VNAF-conducted training, excluding US contractor-administered training. During CY2/74, 3,840 VNAF personnel entered formal training and 3,527 graduated. For various reasons, 622 personnel were eliminated from training. A total of 1,441 VNAF personnel entered on-the-job training (OJT) during CY2/74 while 2,058 personnel completed the OJT program. Currently, 1,947 personnel are undergoing OJT.

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(2) The number of VNAF personnel that entered ARVN-conducted training is 509, while 568 graduated. Currently, 312 VNAF personnel are undergoing ARVN-conducted training.

(3) VNAF In-Country Training improved in some areas, slipped in others, but held static in most. Overall, the trend was up, especially in 3- to 5-level manning due to VNAF formal school production and contract OJT. On 31 Dec 73, CY74 programmed training was 2,512 students, but as of 1 Jul 74, 4,595 were in training. This number is in addition to the 3,527 graduates who completed training in CY2/74.

(4) Following is a summary of personnel in VNAF-conducted formal training for CY2/74:

<u>Pilot Training</u>	<u>Entry</u>	<u>Eliminated</u>	<u>Graduated</u>	<u>In-Training</u>
T-37 JPT	0	4	15	53
UH-1 UHT	0	11	44	115
O-1 Liaison	0	0	23	39
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Totals	0	15	82	207
<u>Crew Training</u>				
Navigator	17	0	0	17
Observer (FAC)	0	0	0	57
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Totals	17	0	0	74
<u>Technical Schools</u>				
Air Tng Cen (ATC), Nha Trang (NHA) 114		11	183	200
3rd Air Div Bien Hoa (BNH)	0	3	7	0
5th Air Div Tan Son Nhut (TSN)	10	1	19	30

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Sub-Tech Sch, TSN	77	15	144	99
Sub-Tech Sch, BNH	66	2	168	64
Totals	<u>267</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>521</u>	<u>393</u>

<u>Communication & Electronics</u>	<u>Entry</u>	<u>Eliminated</u>	<u>Graduated</u>	<u>In-Training</u>
ATC, NHA	50	7	83	105
HQ VNAF, TSN	0	0	20	0
5th AIR DIV, TSN	0	1	41	11
Totals	<u>50</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>116</u>

General Service Schools

ATC, NHA	396	2	355	212
3rd AIR DIV, BNH	25	1	79	25
5th AIR DIV, TSN	<u>116</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>116</u>
Totals	537	11	497	353

Civil Engineering School

3rd AIR DIV, BNH	34	0	58	34
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<u>Air Command and Staff School, TSN</u>	84	0	72	84
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<u>Basic Military Training</u>	1,410	44	95	1,387
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<u>OJT</u>	1,441	512	2,058	1,947
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(5) As the Offshore spaces were phased out, VNAF resorted to in-country training. UH-1 co-pilot undergraduate helicopter training is a good example. Another is ARVN training spaces in base support/civil engineering. The progress from a 3 to 5-level air force is slowly becoming apparent. Enlisted basic Air Force Speciality Code (AFSC)

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programmed training has already exceeded the CY73 shortfall and continues to train more basic trainees than programmed.

(6) Summary of VNAF in ARVN-Conducted Training: ARVN has allocated 2,738 spaces in 140 (AFSCs), officer and enlisted, to VNAF for specialized skills because VNAF cannot justify setting up a duplicate school. This training requirement has been made more apparent with the reduction of offshore officer training and VNAF's inability to provide qualified NCOs for CONUS training in critical billets. Examples are base development, civil engineering and continuing maintenance support of existing facilities. To date in CY74, VNAF has provided 891 students (938 graduates, which includes entries from CY73, and 312 in training) in 62 AFSCs. The potential for this program is great but results will depend in large part on service interface. Following is a breakdown of VNAF in ARVN schools:

	<u>Entry</u>	<u>Eliminated</u>	<u>Graduated</u>	<u>In-Training</u>
1 JAN - 31 MAR 74	382	10	373	395
1 APR - 30 JUN 74	509	22	568	312

(7) Pilot Training:

(a) T-37 Undergraduate Pilot Training program:

(1) The T-37 UPT program produced its first 15 graduates 16 Apr 74.

(2) The second class of 20 UPT students are behind schedule in the program because the available Operational Ready (OR) T-37 aircraft were used to complete the training of the first class.

(3) The Non-Operational Readiness Supply (NORS) and Non-Operational Readiness Maintenance (NORM) rates are exceptionally high. During the period 9 May through 15 Jun 74 the NORS-NORM rate averaged 28.3 and 35.8 percent, respectively. The OR rate during this period was 35.9 percent (daily. 8.6 of 24 aircraft).

(4) A minimum of 35 hours is required daily to support the 20 students in UPT, and 8.6 aircraft will not meet this requirement. In July a third class of 20 students will enter training, making a total student

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load of 40 and a daily required minimum of 70 hours to support the UPT. The above OR rate of 35 percent is not expected to exceed 50 percent, if past experience is an indicator.

(5) Lack of skilled personnel contributes to the high NORM rate and lack of logistic support to the high NORS rate. Skilled maintenance personnel will require time to upgrade 3-level personnel to the 5-level.

(6) Until recently, five U.S. contractor personnel were augmenting production, with little time for OJT of VNAF personnel. The contractor personnel were scheduled to phase out 30 Jun 74. To hold or decrease the NORM rate, these five personnel were extended to 31 Dec 74 and the number of assigned personnel increased to eight.

(7) Logistic support for the T-37 aircraft has never reached the proper level of proficiency; possibly time will reflect some improvement, although highly doubtful. The T-37 jet engine (J-69) is a logistic-support problem. No overhaul capability exists and there are no back-up J-69 engines. The above condition creates a dangerous situation and jeopardizes the whole program. Currently, the T-37 UPT program is unsatisfactory.

(b) UH-1 Undergraduate Helicopter Training program:

(1) The UH-1 copilot training program is a "first of a kind" in VNAF. The obvious pride of accomplishment at every level of command, from student to instructor to operational-support element to VNAF Hqs, is readily apparent and rewarding to observe. The program is excellent to outstanding.

(2) The training program is on schedule. Three classes have produced 119 graduates out of 122 candidates (a production rate of 97.54 percent as compared with an expected attrition rate of about 15 percent).

(3) Three additional classes are presently in training (120 students) with three more classes (180 students) programmed to complete training in CY75.

(4) If present attrition rates continue, the projected production of rated UH-1 copilots from this program is 412 against an original projection of 375 (a gain of 37 graduates).

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(5) The students receive a great deal of personal instruction from VNAF pilots who are highly seasoned combat veterans. The desire to excel is matched by the desire to teach. The only eliminations to date have been for medical or disciplinary problems.

(6) The concept of using a nucleus of highly-qualified instructors and regular squadron aircraft, furnished by operational units in lieu of training aircraft, demonstrates that this approach to flight training could be expanded to other types of flight training within VNAF.

(c) F-5E program is progressing steadily but is behind schedule. See Air Defense training (para (8) below).

(1) The Field Training Detachment at Bien Hoa AB is in place and maintained at pre-contractor departure levels by CONUS-trained 5- and 7-level NCO's of highest available quality.

(2) The Phase III class began 1 Apr 74 and completed on schedule 1 Jun 74. To date 512 students (including 5 failures) have trained in 22 AFSCs.

(3) During the remainder of CY74, 305 more students are scheduled in Phases IV and V. Phase VI is not scheduled until CY75 but should complete the prescribed course (60-days duration) by early March 1975.

(d) The O-1 liaison UPT program at Nha Trang is on schedule and excellent.

(e) The Forward Air Controller (FAC) and Navigator courses have only recently been regenerated and no realistic assessment can be made at this writing.

(8) Technical Schools:

(a) The ATC Technical School has an extensive and impressive program; however, the quality of graduates has diminished. The school lacks sufficient funds to support a student training material handout program. The student must devote several hours of each day in the classroom to hand-scribing notes and diagrams. Time spent on practical demonstrations by instructors and on student performance and evaluations must be correspondingly reduced. This condition exists at all VNAF formal schools. The ATC Technical School is satisfactory.

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(b) All technical schools located at sites other than the ATC provide in some respect a duplication of courses conducted at the ATC. Although this fragmentation has been pointed out to VNAF, it continues. This fragmentation exists for several reasons, as follows: Within VNAF the majority of personnel at each location are recruited locally, with the condition (promise) that they remain there to live and work, with continuing and direct support of their families while soldiering part-time. This arrangement is good for morale, minimizes absenteeism, and reduces the AWOL rate. It is almost a volunteer force and explains one of the main reasons why VNAF personnel levels are among the highest in RVNAF. The VNAF has encouraged this local autonomous concept, either accidentally or by design, through their overall program. Commanders at the various locations are reluctant to assign personnel to centrally-located schools, especially 5- and 7-level NCO's and even 3-level in many instances. Three recent command personnel manning reports indicate a large shortfall in the 5- and 7-level AFSCs and a large overage in the 3-level AFSCs. Upgrading of 3-level personnel is the solution and can be accomplished either or both of two ways. With the assistance of contract personnel, VNAF is de-emphasizing formal classroom training and concentrating on upgrading thru OJT, because release of trainees to formal schools results in their permanent loss to their home bases. Another solution is command direction to release 3-levels for formal 5-level schooling, with the stipulation that 5-level graduates be returned to their home bases upon completion of training to effect release of 5-level skilled personnel for 7-level schooling, etc. The lag in the personnel pipeline (orders, transport, billeting, etc.) can be as much as three to six months, with the individual EM doing little or nothing to help or even adding to the delay himself. This flow pattern, manning/training concept, while slow and wasteful, is VNAF's system but from all indications seems to be working. If trends continue, VNAF should conservatively be a 5-level air force by the end of FY75.

(9) AD training in VNAF is minimally satisfactory due to ten major areas of inadequacy:

(a) Virtually no Recognition/Identification training program exists. Only some poor reproductions/pictures (mostly as decoration) of enemy aircraft exist. No real training aids (slides, cards, transparencies) can be found in-country, although some scale models are used in ARVN AD and infantry training.

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(b) Transition training to the F-5E has slipped. Transition training began with 6 vice 12 students on 10 Jun 74 vice 20 May 74.

(c) The F-5E OR rate has been running 83.3 percent. The OR rate is expected to decline as utilization increases. Northrop has 138 personnel in-country with primary F-5E production tasking and F-5A retrograde production. Some OJT is being conducted but OR production takes precedence.

(d) Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) centers under the Tactical Aircraft Control Center (TACC) are conducting, on a daily basis, maximum live and simulated intercepts. Order of Battle (OB) does exist but has not been fully implemented.

(e) Remoteness of live-firing areas (offshore) and towed-target (Darts) supply shortages and AIM9B&E (Sidewinder) missile shortages precludes all but minimal aerial gunnery/missile practice.

(f) Due to increased enemy activity, Direct Air Support Center (DASC) high-priority requirements necessitated a corresponding reduction in AD activity.

(g) Logistic deficiencies--such as spare parts, Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE), Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant (POL), AC&W/TACC spare parts, and communications networks--will continue to hamper training.

(h) Enemy tanks and troops have high visibility, enemy aircraft none to date. Therefore, lack of support of the overall AD situation by JGS will continue.

(i) Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF)/VNAF cross-border AC&W communications/operations interface is working from the VNAF side but not within RTAF. VNAF will abrogate subject agreement if no improvement is realized between now and 15 Sep 74.

(j) Interface between VNAF AC&W and civilian ATC (for practice intercepts of high-flying aircraft) is excellent, but Directorate Civil Aviation (DCA), parent authority of ATC, refuses to respond to training requests within commercially-controlled airspace (i.e., Bien Hoa-Long Binh-Tan Son Nhut-Saigon area below 5,000 feet).

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c. VNN:

(1) Significant progress in training professional naval personnel has been made since the fleet's expansion three years ago. During FY4/74 this progress continued, but there were marked deficiencies in VNN shipboard damage control, the naval supply system, and the middle management upgrade program. A review follows of each of these naval specialties and the training actions taken during FY4/74:

(a) The VNN has an 18-week damage control course at Nha Trang. The course graduated 82 NCOs and 50 EM during the 1st half of CY74. These personnel, when assigned to the fleet, will continue damage-control training exercises which presently are scheduled to average 45 hours a month. On the basis of the number of students graduated from this course over the past two years, shipboard damage-control stations should be adequately manned and personnel trained. The VNN believed its level of training adequate, as it discontinued its CY74 Damage Control Course for EM. However VNN and DAO inspection tours of ships have identified damage-control problems. Deficiencies identified and corrective actions:

- (1) Shipboard damage-control equipment.
- (2) A 10 percent turnover in ship's personnel each month.
- (3) A high percentage of cancellations of shipboard training drills.

(4) Damage control officers and men lacking actual experience. To remedy training deficiencies which may exist, 15 VNN personnel will soon attend the U.S. Navy Damage Control School at Treasure Island Naval Base. Following their return, they will provide OJT to damage-control teams aboard all VNN ships. In addition, VNN will start a damage-control course in the Saigon Naval Shipyard and use simulated ship's compartmental training aids to effect realistic training. Positive results from these two training actions should become apparent no later than FY2/75.

(b) Another area where marked improvement should soon be realized is naval supply training. Primarily, the VNN Supply School supplements the ARVN Supply School. The main reason for the VNN Supply School's existence

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is that the ordering of naval ship equipment is incompatible with the ARVN logistics system. However, ARVN logistic support is compatible for the shore-based Navy. Problems emerged when the U.S. Navy supply teams left Vietnam in 1973. To fill this void 52 VN Naval Officers were sent to the U.S. Navy supply school at Oakland, California. Additionally, a VNN supply school was established in-country (at Cat Lai) with three weeks training for EM's and six weeks for officers. In FY2/74 it was discovered that VN naval officers who attended the Oakland school or the VNN supply school were not given credit for having earned a military supply or logistics school certificate. In consequence, when assigned as supply officers, their time was not credited towards promotion. To correct this inequity, an agreement was reached during FY4/74 whereby VN naval officers attending the VNN supply school would not lose promotion credits. Also, officers who remain as supply officers will later attend the ARVN logistics school and receive due credit. Resulting from this issue of receiving credit, the VNN supply school at Cat Lai expanded during FY4/74; its curriculum has been broadened to cover three more weeks: six weeks for EM and nine weeks for officers.

(c) The training of VNN middle management personnel is in essence the training of the professional naval officer corps. Since the VNN's inception in 1952, the training and professionalism of career officers has not followed a designated sequence of schooling. This lack of sequence changed in CY2/74. Career policies were established that require each naval officer to spend 12 months at sea duty (not including riverine boats) to qualify for staff officers course (middle management training). Attendance at the senior officer course requires 36 months sea duty. All officers must have completed these two courses to establish eligibility to attend the RVNAF Command and General Staff College and later to qualify as candidates to the National Defense College. To meet the needs of the service, training of middle management personnel was enlarged during FY4/74. Previously, 50-60 officers attended this 16-week school at one time. Now 100 officers will be assigned at one time, with three scheduled courses a year. Adequate classroom space, according to recent estimates, will now be available for all junior officers; they attend this course not later than two years after graduation from the VNN Academy.

(2) During FY4/74, 215 officers and 882 NCO's/EM graduated from in-country service schools and training

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centers. As interpreted from (figures 11-1 through 11-3) officer professional training fell behind schedule with 23 percent of programmed instruction completed during CY1 and 2/74. Refresher training accomplished only 18 percent of its annual goal during the 1st half of CY74. EM training was at 13 percent of its yearly projection and NCO training at 29 percent. Basic recruit training was 31 percent during the last six months of FY74.

d. VNMC :

(1) Marine training continued in FY4/74 with only minor changes in the program. Training emphasis centered on team-leader development and basic-recruit instruction. At the Marine Training Center (MTC), 1337 recruits, 521 team leaders, and 30 NCOs completed training. No officers attended refresher training during FY4/74.

(2) In riverine assault training coordination continues between the VNMC and VNN in the use of LTV-5 (landing craft), but no joint maneuvers were held during FY4/74.

(3) VNMC received funds during FY4/74 to complete the construction of a large water tank for use as an amphibious landing training aid. The water tank will be used to instruct Marines in proper procedures when off-loading from ships and boats into deep water while carrying back packs and weapons. Training is expected to begin during FY1/75.

(4) The MTC at Song Than Base Camp continues to meet its CY74 programmed personnel needs. The chart below indicates that training schedules are being met, with little deviation from input quotas established in November 1973.

<u>COURSES</u>	<u>CY1/74 GRADUATED</u>	<u>CY2/74 GRADUATED</u>	<u>CY74 PROGRAMMED</u>
Officer Refresher	138	106	200
NCO Refresher	30		100
Team Leader, Enlisted	537	420	1,800
Squad Leader	95		200
Recruit Training	794	1,337	4,000

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VNN COURSES	GRADUATED		CY74 PROGRAMMED
	CY 1/74	CY 2/74	
<u>OFFICER</u>			
Senior Command & Staff Course	23		75
Junior Command & Staff Course/ Line	33	41	105
Junior Command & Staff Course/ Engine		15	90
Midshipman			386
Naval Officer Special Training Program	50		400

Figure 11-2

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VNN COURSES	GRADUATED		CY74 PROGRAMMED
	CY 1/74	CY 2/74	
<u>REFRESHER COURSE</u>			
Supply Officer		41	144
Instructor (NCO)		20	180
Crypto (EM)		23	120
Anti-Aircraft (NCO & OFF)			25
CIC Watch Off		22	120
Radar TPS-62 (EM & NCO)		32	140
Radar SPS-53 (EM & NCO)		21	120

Figure 11-3

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3. (U) IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM (ELTP)

a. Intensive ELTP:

(1) FY4/74 was marked by pressure on the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School (RVNAFLS) to qualify students for all remaining unfilled CONUS-training spaces. Efforts to qualify all Navy and Marine Corps candidates were hampered by difficulties in identifying and programming personnel for timely ELT in-country. Nevertheless, the overall capability of RVNAFLS to qualify candidates for direct entry into CONUS training remains high.

(2) New English-language screening procedures were initiated at the request of TMS in order to reduce over-exposure and subsequent compromise of the ECL test. RVNAF was informed that weekly ECL testing would be reduced to once a month. Furthermore, only those candidates and their alternates identified for specific CONUS spaces would be tested. Except for some minor adjustments connected with meeting the end of the FY requirements, the new testing procedures appear to be working well.

(3) The quality of instruction at RVNAFLS remains excellent; however, the number of qualified military instructors is being reduced. The staff now includes nine civilian instructors. Although they lack formal training at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), English Language Branch, they are receiving in-service teacher training from the DLI personnel attached to the school.

(4) A breakdown of intensive ELTP data for FY4/74 follows:

(a) Total instructor strength at RVNAFLS, including standby personnel and lab monitors, is 151 military and 9 civilians. Approximately 90 instructors are teaching full time. NCO instructors are being phased out in favor of an instructor staff composed entirely of officers.

(b) Peak load of students at RVNAFLS: 968; at the Vietnamese Air Force Language School (VNAFLS): 183.

(c) Number of ECL tests administered: 499.

(d) Number of students sent to DLIELB, Lackland AFB for additional language training: 216.

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(e) Number of students sent for direct-entry into CONUS training: 190.

b. Non-Intensive ELTP.

(1) The following units of the RVNAF conduct SATP-supported ELTPs: Vietnamese National Military Academy (VNMA) in Dalat, Political Warfare (POLWAR) College in Dalat, Vietnamese National Naval Academy (VNNA) in Nha Trang, Highland Junior Military Academy in Pleiku, Junior Military Academy in Vung Tau, and the naval training centers in Cam Ranh and Saigon.

(2) Technical assistance visits were made by members of the DLI Language Training Detachment to the NTCs in Saigon and Nha Trang, VNMA, POLWAR College, and VNNA. Language teaching methods were monitored and found satisfactory at all schools. Instructor evaluation methods were in need of reinforcement at VNAFLS and a short in-service training program was conducted by DLI personnel. In cooperation with the U.S. Information Service, the film "Only in America" was shown to the instructors and students of VNAFLS, VNMA, and POLWAR College.

c. Accomplishments:

(1) An in-service teacher training program designed to strengthen RVNAF language instructors' capabilities in the areas of methodology, teaching skills, and fluency was successfully completed by DLI personnel. A total of 136 military and civilian instructors at RVNAFLS and VNAFLS received 1,570 student hours of training. Subsequent visits to the classrooms revealed marked improvement in teaching effectiveness and instructor motivation.

(2) At the request of TMS, Federal Electric Corporation conducted a technical survey of all RVNAF language laboratories in Saigon, Dalat, and Nha Trang in order to determine equipment status and spare parts requirements. A final report, with recommendations for improving the overall status of the RVNAF laboratory equipment, has been submitted to TMS for consideration and action.

(3) A shipment of 30 language-laboratory spare-parts kits (valued at \$18,000) originally ordered in 1972 and lost somewhere in Vietnam was located in a Signal Corps Depot near Dalat. An inventory indicated that most of the shipment was intact and still usable. Distribution of these spare parts to their intended sites will considerably improve the RVNAF language laboratories.

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4. (U) TECHNICAL TRANSLATION BRANCH (TTB).

a. The TTB has provided the RVNAF with technical translations of U.S. military field and technical manuals (FM/TM) since 1955. Under DAO, the TTB has additionally been the main source for training-material translations for the Vietnamese CTC. During FY4/74, the TTB operated with 63 DAO local-national civilian personnel after a one-third reduction of its work force in FY3/74. Additionally, TTB personnel provided OJT for 17 military translators. These 17 military translators were assigned as the vanguard of CTC's own technical translation element. DAO discontinued direct funding and staffing of the TTB on 22 Jun 74.

b. Production of translated copy fell appreciably during FY3/74 and continued downward during FY4/74. Work output in FY3/74 was down to 8,500 translated pages, while in FY4/74 7,000 pages were translated. This production lag had been anticipated, as Vietnamese DAO employees took leave to search for new jobs and the military translators had not gained enough experience to produce normal weekly translation quotas. Nevertheless, TTB's reduced translation productivity in FY4/74 was still in excess of what the CTC Production Review Board could program for printing.

c. During the TTB's 19 years of existence, the following has been accomplished:

(1) Translated and published 10 military reference dictionaries/glossaries.

(2) Translated special training materials for 300 projects related to ARVN unit, corps, and division training.

(3) Translated for dubbing into Vietnamese the sound tracks of more than 200 training films.

(4) Translated in excess of 3,000 military manuals and reference materials.

(5) Printed more than 500,000 translated editions of military field and technical manuals.

d. The above translation and printing accomplishments have become the day-to-day training and reference nucleus for the RVNAF. There will always be a need for translated FM/TM as long as RVNAF uses American-made

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equipment and their armed forces personnel attend U.S. military schools. However, the largest part of the FM/TM translation task has been accomplished and future requirements will be accomplished by RVNAF translators.

5. (U) CONTRACT TRAINING.

a. Contracts Monitored by DAO C&E Division:

(1) Eastern Construction Company, Inc (ECCOI): During the months of April, May, and June, ECCOI's instructors provided formal and practical training at the RVNAF Vung Tau Signal School, the ARVN 60th Signal Base Depot, and at five medium maintenance centers (MMC). This training was designed to increase proficiency and bring the RVNAF closer to complete self-sufficiency in repair of tactical Communications-Electronics (C-E) equipment.

(a) ECCOI technicians and instructors conducted formal classroom instruction for 287 students in various types of signal equipment. One-hundred-thirty (130) repairmen at depot and field locations received OJT in 17 different areas.

(b) ECCOI instructors conducted a special course in repair and maintenance of R-390/URR and AN/TNH-11/4 for 13 students from RVNAF signal intelligence.

(c) The ECCOI instructor assigned to the RVNAF Vung Tau Signal School provided instruction to ARVN students in third and fourth echelon maintenance of the AN/MPQ-4A counter mortar radar. The course was designed to assist ARVN personnel in increasing quality of radar repair and in establishing a comprehensive maintenance program at the MMC level.

(2) Federal Electric Corporation (FEC):

(a) Training Section:

(1) Two members of the FEC training staff conducted a patching & wiring class at the signal school annex for 13 students. The FEC personnel then assisted signal school instructors who conducted a subsequent class for 20 students. The RVNAF instructors are now fully qualified to teach this course with no further contractor-provided assistance required.

(2) Personnel assigned to Dial Telephone Exchange

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(DTE) sites at Saigon and Gia Dinh also received OJT during this quarter.

(b) Area Maintenance Supply Facility - Vietnam (AMSF-V):

(1) Daily technical/OJT was accomplished in the following shops:

Tropo/Microwave Equipment/Systems

Multiplex Equipment/Systems

Technical Control Facilities

Antenna Systems

Supply Warehouse Operation

Stock Research

Shipping & Receiving

Data Processing Procedures/Operation

Records Control

(2) All management level personnel received side-by-side technical assistance from contractor management personnel. Objective was to improve ARVN management of AMSF-V functions.

(3) Assistance/Training was provided in performing Preliminary Inspect and Repair as Necessary (Pre-IRAN) surveys at Pleiku and Binh Thuy ABs. Assistance is currently being provided the VNAF at Bien Hoa AB in performing a pre-IRAN survey. The Pre-IRAN tasks involve visual plant inspection, electrical, continuity and insulation tests of cable systems, Main Distribution Frame (MDF) and Central Office (CO) cable vault inspection, preparation of Bill of Materials (BOM) required to accomplish repair work, research of federal stock numbers, material item identification, and preparation of pre-IRAN reports.

(3) Page Communications Engineers, INC. (PCE):

(a) During the months of April, May and June, PCE personnel provided instruction at the RVNAF Communications Management Agency (CMA):

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(1) Eight students were instructed under phase II of the Systems Analysis OJT program.

(2) Two NCOs received instruction in plugboard wiring.

(3) Performance Monitoring Program (PMP): Students began the preparation of the first CMA-originated monthly-outage summary and analysis for the month of June.

(b) PCE personnel assigned to the Evaluation Branch/CMA are continuing with the test and measurement equipment training task. Work continues on draft lesson plans and training program schedule.

(4) Kentron Hawaii, Ltd. A Kentron Hawaii instructor began a formal course in operation and maintenance of 439L/484N submarine cablehead terminals. Instruction was conducted at the Vung Tau Signal School with practical training given at the Vung Tau cablehead. Designed to meet both ARVN and VNAF training requirements, the course covers operation and alignment of the AN/GJQ-29 no-break power system, FGF remote feeding equipment, T.F. 1900.2 terminal bay and undersea cable test equipment. Seven students from ARVN and one from VNAF are in attendance.

b. Contracts Monitored by DAO Air Force Division :

(1) Lear Siegler, Inc :

(a) SMO-2 (Acft repair and maintenance and VNAF training/maintenance augmentation):

(1) VNAF, DAO, and the contractor have concurred on training requirements for the first half of FY75. Increased production through production-OJT is taking some of the "sting" out of training commitments.

(2) Vehicle overhaul and maintenance is progressing well with an 80 percent trained manpower expected upon completion of training of the 60 students currently in training.

(b) No further progress has been made in the building and equipping of three accessory repair shops (pneudraulic, egress, and oil cooler). Schedule for completion is Oct 74.

(1) VNAF has excellent student files on all training phases, with follow-up records to insure utilization of trained personnel within correct AFSCs.

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(2) In general, all shops are progressing well, but they are still experiencing special tool shortages and supply problems.

(2) Pacific Architects & Engineers:

(a) In accordance with the statement of work, supply training was phased out on 30 Jun 74. One-hundred-sixty-nine (169) students were released to their units after receiving 70 percent of the intended training. Slippage in establishing the Economical Order Quantity (EOQ) computer system dictated the decision to release the students without requesting an extension for completion of training.

(b) Operations and Maintenance are continuing well with plans of consolidating contract F62272-73-C-0072 with two other contracts in Aug.

(3) Page Communication Engineers report training is 70 percent completed of the 75 percent of authorized manning in the navigational aids (NAV-AIDS) area. Some problems remain in losing of best students to higher-level training.

(4) Parsons of California, Corp : Student input, progress, and completions are much improved. Planned phase out of U.S. personnel is not considered a problem to progress of the rotor-blade repair facility.

(5) Northrop Worldwide Aviation Services Inc : Plans underway to expand the number of F-5 squadrons are causing some planning turmoil, but the 138 students in training are progressing well.

(6) Sierra Research, Inc : Some difficulty that had been encountered replacing two nonqualified and nonmotivated students was recently overcome. Resolution was delayed not by reluctance on VNAF's part but by VNAF manpower problems.

(7) Systems Development Corp : Requirements have been submitted for FY75, with training continuing on a 60-day option in the meantime. VNAF is requesting updated (faster) tape programs.

(8) Kentron Hawaii, Ltd : Both contracts will be consolidated 1 Sep 74 under one contract.

(a) Base Civil Engineering : Thirty-nine percent of students are now in training, with 54 percent graduated thru 30 Jun 74.

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(b) Power Production: The 46 students in training will bring the overall percentage of completions to over 90 percent.

c. Contracts Monitored by DAO Navy Division: The VNN no longer has any active, ongoing contractor training efforts.

d. Contracts Monitored by DAO Army Division:

(1) Eastern Construction Company, Incorporated:

(a) Under Contract DAJB04-74-C-0018, formal instruction and OJT were provided in the following areas:

(1) Organizational and support-level maintenance of major weapons systems and combat vehicles.

(2) Maintenance management techniques at the organizational and support levels, to include the effective utilization of organic reports and data.

(3) The employment of special tools and test equipment (organizational and support levels).

(4) Supply operations and management (organizational, support, and depot levels).

(b) Assessment: Training has been effective, although a lack of training aids and incomplete reference material continue to present minor disruptions. These difficulties have been minimized through improvisation, and satisfactory instruction is being accomplished.

(2) Hughes Aircraft Company:

(a) Under Contract DAJB02-73-0009, training in TOW system direct-support maintenance was provided through both formal instruction and OJT. Hughes personnel also participated in inspection tours conducted by the RVNAF IG and provided informal instruction and technical assistance during visits to field units.

(b) Assessment: The instruction provided by the Hughes engineers is considered satisfactory.

(3) Dynalectron Corporation:

(a) Under Contract DAAK01-70-C-5873, formal

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instruction in the operation and maintenance of Material Handling Equipment (MHE) was conducted.

(b) Assessment: Training has been highly effective as evidenced by the reduction in the number of deadlined MHE assets.

(4) Vinnel Corporation.:

(a) Under Contract DAJB11-72-C-0333, continued OJT was provided at the 40th Engineer Base Depot in the following general areas of the depot maintenance operation:

(1) Rebuild of major end items and secondary components.

(2) Quality assurance and production control.

(3) Depot supply management.

(b) Assessment: Training continued to be effective.

(5) Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E):

(a) PA&E conducted formal training for RVNAF personnel under the RVNAF Facilities Engineering Self-Sufficiency Program at contractor operated training centers in Da Nang and Long Binh. Courses taught included Prescribed Load List Management, Facilities Engineering Management, High Voltage Switchgear Repair, and High Voltage Line Repair.

(b) PA&E also continued to conduct an OJT program of significant magnitude in the repair and overhaul of large generators and air conditioners at the 40th Engineers Base Depot and the Medium Maintenance Centers in each of the five Area Logistics Commands. A total of 291 trainees are participating in this program, and training is progressing satisfactorily.

(c) On-site OJT is also being conducted for approximately 100 ARVN personnel in power plant operations and maintenance at the Newport Power Plant, the Cam Ranh Main Force Plant, and the Cam Ranh Navy Transmitter Site Power Plant. Trainees at all three sites continue to show improvement.

(d) In addition, OJT in Logistics management and in the operation, maintenance, and repair of facilities, to include installed equipment and utility systems, is being

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conducted at the 13 military property construction offices located throughout Vietnam. More than 2,000 ARVN personnel are benefiting from the OJT.

(6) Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall (DMJM): Under the ARVN-LOC program, the technical assistance contractor, DMJM, is conducting OJT in operation of construction equipment, bridge design, materials and soils testing. Approximately 500 ARVN personnel are benefiting directly and indirectly from this OJT.

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ARVN
TRAINING CENTERS




Figure 11-5

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VNN AND VTRIC TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




Figure 11-6

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VNAF TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




Figure 11-7

CONFIDENTIALBREAKDOWN OF REPLACEMENTS RECRUITED AND
TRAINED BY UNIT 1974

<u>MR 1</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>
1ST DIV	188	377	406	252	313
2ND DIV	58	548	496	333	330
3RD DIV	217	459	466	303	417
ABN DIV	57	348	685	445	478
MARINE	114	747	684	506	288
<u>2</u>					
22ND DIV	170	464	471	325	396
23RD DIV	181	513	549	479	458
<u>3</u>					
5TH DIV	42	134	1120	206	226
18TH DIV	0	168	842	687	589
25TH DIV	0	0	491	269	257
81ST ABN GRG	0	0	0	0	32
<u>4</u>					
7TH DIV	299	798	684	656	598
9TH DIV	224	195	480	415	417
21ST DIV	89	295	266	190	233
<u>FOR ALL MR's</u>					
RANGER	455	1826	1941	2044	1791
AF	0	0	0	238	1447
VNN	0	0	350	586	165
RF	2146	5344	5966	5774	6187
PF	538	2090	3449	2084	2755

Figure 11-8

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VNAF TRAINING TRENDS
AS OF 31 MAY 1974




Figure 11-9

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Category	END FY70	FY71	FY71	FY72	FY72	FY73	FY73	FY74	FY74	END FY75
SATP	1608	2761	1337	674	1108	1256	1829	754		
IN-COUNTRY FORMAL	24976	2618	18083	20802	18886	3272	11462			
IN-COUNTRY OUT	1806	2749	13771	18886	1821	3000	2331			
US CONTRACTOR TNG			5198	1821	5707	5932	5077			
TOTAL	30139	30139	20192	24855	21254					

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CHAPTER 12

RVNAF PROGRAMS, PLANS AND MORALE

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Chapter 12 contains topics concerning all services including:

- a. Lines of Communication (LOC)
- b. Military Construction (MILCON)
- c. RVNAF Retirement Plan CY74
- d. RVNAF Morale
- e. RVNAF Medical Evacuation
- f. Chieu Hoi Program
- g. Terrorism
- h. Refugee Program
- i. Property Disposal
- j. Corruption

2. (U) LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Waterways:

(1) Cargo: A cheaper means of transporting military cargo is still a major concern of the RVNAF. Members of the Central Logistics Command (CLC) have been meeting with DAO representatives to seek means of reducing costs and to improve overall management of the transportation system. Commercial cargo continued to flow; primarily POL, cement and hardware from Saigon to the Delta and rice and other agricultural products from the Delta to Saigon.

Commercial Cargo (as reported by the GVN Directorate of Navigation):

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	Saigon-Delta	Delta-Saigon
April	11,539 Tons	22,504 Tons *
May	8,141 "	16,091 "
June	13,061 "	13,366 "

(* Note: Mostly rice, after the spring harvest.)

(2) Dredging: A major accomplishment was achieved with the completion of clearing operations for the primary Saigon-Ca Mau canal. Reopening ceremonies for this major rice route took place on 26 May 1974.

Debris removed, as reported by the Vietnamese Dredging Authority (VDA), totaled 584,000 tons. Although the five dredges employed on the Saigon-Ca Mau canal were not operating in June, dredging and other improvement operations compared favorably with the previous quarter's total of 798,400 tons. Combined Foreign Aid Chapter (FAC) and GVN funds appear to be adequate to sustain continued dredging and other improvements. Increasing enemy activity in the Delta poses a threat and hampers waterway navigation, however no major shipping incidents have occurred during the quarter. Waterway Patrol and Riverine Forces have been providing reasonably good security.

b. Railways: RVN railroad operations, which were drastically curtailed in the previous quarter, were diminished even further due to enemy activity and RVNAF inability to provide adequate security. Approximately 130 Km of track remains in operation, as compared to more than 600 Km during the 2nd quarter of FY-74. The enemy has targeted the railroad in MR 1 and has severed the line between Hue and Da-Nang, 50 Km is all that remains operational. A 35 Km stretch of track remains operational in MR 2 between Phu Cat and Qui Nhon. The principle stretch of track presently in operation is the Saigon to Long Binh run, with spurs to the Cholon commercial center and the Go Vap military complex. This totals approximately 45 Km. The negative impact of diminished railway operations on the RVN is difficult to fully assess, obviously the economy and transportation costs are affected. Moreover, the ease and ability for RVNAF to transport bulk war materiel cargo is greatly reduced. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph on "Waterways", the JGS/CLC is currently reviewing

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transportation management. Transportation management is complicated further by the regional and provincial commanders' prerogatives in establishing local security priorities. The indications of personal and vested commercial interests opposed to the railroad also persist. Traffic during the last quarter was reported as follows:

Freight 11,747 Metric Tons Passengers 1,317,263

(Figure 12-1)

3. (U) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MILCON).

a. The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)/ Military Construction (MILCON) Program provided for construction and major rehabilitation of RVNAF facilities. Although MAP type funding will be instituted in FY-75, obligated MILCON dollars will continue to be expended through FY-76.

b. Projects under construction are administered by the Director of Construction (DIRCON). All work is done by fixed-price contractors. Problems arise for Vietnamese contractors when offshore procurement is required due to long lead times and complicated importing procedures set by the GVN.

c. The present program consists of the following:

(1) Projects Under Construction:

	<u>No.</u>	<u>\$ Value*</u>
Hospital	1	2387
Logistics Depots	3	1558
Training Facilities	1	3938
Construction Battalion	1	185
Port Facilities	<u>1</u>	<u>993</u>
Total	<u>7</u>	<u>9061</u>

(2) Projects Funded, on hold by SECDEF:

Ammo Depots	5	4360
-------------	---	------

*Thousands of dollars.

d. Inflation during FY74 has posed severe problems for construction contractors in Vietnam. The price of cement has doubled twice from VN\$610 to VN\$2400 per

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

MAP SHOWING VIETNAM RAILWAY SYSTEM

UPDATED AS OF JUNE 1974

MAIN LINE


SAIGON TO DONG HA 1,109Km

SPUR LINES LEGEND:

BIEN HOA TO LOC NINH	117Km
THAP CHAM TO DALAT	84Km
MUONG MAN TO PHAN THIET	12Km
DIEU TRI TO QUI NHON	10Km
NGA BA TO BA NGOI	5Km
BA REN TO AN HOA	20Km

TOTAL 1,357Km

STEEL BRIDGES OVER 20M	112
CONCRETE BRIDGES OVER 10M	221
TUNNELS	27



LEGEND :

- OPERATIONAL
- UNDER RECONSTRUCTION
- DISCONTINUED SINCE FEB 1965 DUE TO FLOOD DAMAGE AND INSECURITY
- DISCON INUED SINCE 31 DEC 1973 DUE TO LAC. OF SECURITY FORCES
- REHABILITATION - 50% COMPLETED - 1973 WORK STOPPED 1974 - DUE TO LACK OF SECURITY FORCES
- RAILROAD STATION
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- OPERATING WITH DAILY RUNS AS OF 30 JUNE 1974 (ALL OTHER SECTIONS NOT OPERATING)

Figure 12-1

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bag and there are periodic shortages due to inability of local manufacturer to meet demand. The price of reinforcing steel and other construction materials has increased rapidly; likewise, the price of POL products has skyrocketed.

4. (U) RVNAF RETIREMENT PLAN CY 74.

a. As mentioned in previous assessments, the RVNAF Demobilization Plan for CY 74 is based on three Laws; #58, 59 and 486; Laws #58 and 59 signed 26 December 1972 and Law #486 signed 26 May 73 by President Thieu.

b. The last assessment reported 9,751 personnel were demobilized during the first quarter CY 74. Personnel demobilized during the second quarter CY 74 is shown in Figure 12-2.

c. There has been no change in the military pension regulations.

d. The scope of responsibility of the Ministry of War Veterans (MWV) remains unchanged. All 44 Provincial City Service Centers are staffed and functioning throughout the country.

5. (C) RVNAF MORALE.

a. A prime indicator of the declining morale of RVNAF troops is the rising (since July 1973) desertion rates most noticeable in the critical Territorial Force categories - those closest to the GVN population. Although the desertion rate from regular ARVN units has not changed substantially from the latter half of 1973, the increase in the number of desertions monthly from the Popular Forces (up 100%) and the Regional Forces (up 30%) has been striking.

b. These results are not surprising when viewed in terms of the overall declining economic situation within SVN during the last fiscal year. RVNAF desertions might be even higher were it not for the negative but saving factor that the economic situation of the lower civil servant, fixed income citizen, and urban poor is, in that order, progressively worse.

c. Tentative findings from field studies presently underway by the DAO, indicate a preponderance of RVNAF officers are independent of their salaries

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DEMOBILIZATION DURING SECOND QUARTER CY 74

a. Over Age Personnel

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Regular Forces	157	415	1,491	2,063
RF	50	137	2,208	2,395
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>110</u>
Total	207	556	3,805	4,568

b. WAC Contract Expiration and Retirement 2

c. Category # 2. Physically unfit.

Regular Forces	177	433	1,610	2,220
RF	7	114	891	1,012
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>565</u>	<u>565</u>
Total	184	547	3,066	3,797

d. Category # 3. Disabled

Regular Forces	179	306	1,111	1,596
RF	17	197	266	480
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>106</u>
Total	196	503	1,483	2,182

e. Grand Total of all Category.

Regular Forces	513	1,154	4,212	5,879
RF	74	448	3,365	3,887
PF	0	4	777	781
WAC	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	587	1,607	8,355	10,549

Figure 12-2

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and identify with the "have" class. This, coupled with the continuation of commanding officers to indulge the Vietnamese propensity for expecting tribute from, rather than providing service to, their troops, forbodes even more problems in the face of expected continuing national economic crises.

d. Inseparable from the purely fiscal plight of the RVNAF serviceman is the sudden loss of benefits which he shared with much of the GVN population - air and ground transportation, American consumables, medicine and MEDEVAC, and a US generated supplementary income from a family member. Adjusting to this loss is not easy when his officers still fly to Saigon for the best of free medical care for the same injuries from which his "buddies" are left unattended to await death. What hithertofore was a quantitative tolerable difference in benefits, privileges and wealth (prior to and during the large influx of American troops and their largesse) is now a qualitative intolerable difference in standard of living. The RVNAF trooper that saw his CO eating foreign apples in 1963 could fill his stomach with local grapefruit. If the CO topped his desert with Scotch, he drank local beer until the difference disappeared. These are not the problems facing the GVN today. Today, the average serviceman knows that there is sufficient rice for either trading with the enemy or exporting but that there may not be enough on his family's table.

e. Desertions:

(1) During the months Mar-Apr-May 1974, RVNAF losses due to desertion were as follows:

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>DESERTIONS</u>
ARVN	26,122
VNAF	563
VNN	244
VNMC	732
RF	16,725
PF	6,051
Ranger	4,858
Airborne	562

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(2) Desertion Rates (Percent) for three consecutive quarters.

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>SEP-NOV 73</u>	<u>DEC-FEB</u>	<u>MAR-MAY 74</u>
ARVN	2.31	2.38	2.11
VNAF	.23	.19	.31
VNN	.26	.22	.21
VNMC	1.74	2.16	1.58
RF	1.49	1.72	1.90
PF	.57	.67	1.03
Ranger	5.71	5.72	5.17
Airborne	2.87	1.84	1.39

f. Desertion Trends are shown in Figure 12-3.

g. Another more elusive but rather hard indicator of present RVNAF morale problems is the percentage of "flower" soldiers - that is those listed by unit CO's as present for duty or on other assignments but actually working elsewhere in the private sector. This problem requires collusion between classes. Normally the "flower" soldier relinquishes his pay to his superiors in return for the greater wealth of his other occupation be it even as a humble farmer. Statistics on this problem are not readily obtainable from JGS. One special DAO study in MR-2, however, found that about 65% of the authorized regular ARVN unit strength was present for duty or justifiably excused. When compared to the average regular ARVN unit assigned strength of 85% of authorized strength, the magnitude of the problem is evident. Resolution of this problem, as with other forms of corruption, must await the highest will of the GVN. In the meantime, in the lack of plenty, endemic SVN corruption continues to sap the strength and morale of RVNAF as it does the population as a whole.

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


Figure 12-3

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5. (C) RVNAF MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC). As previously discussed, the UH-1 is RVNAF's primary MEDEVAC vehicle. MEDEVAC figures for 1974 to date are as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>WIA MEDEVAC</u>
JAN	3771	1775	2552
FEB	3606	1636	2540
MAR	3796	1894	2631
APR	2990	1703	2588
MAY	3452	1706	3461

7. (C) CHIEU HOI PROGRAM. Figure 12-4 depicts Chieu Hoi trends for 1974.

8. (C) TERRORISM. Terrorism continues unabated. The populace has been subjected to increased terrorist activity during this quarter. Casualty trends for the year are shown in Figure 12-5.

9. (C) REFUGEE PROGRAM. Communist efforts to disrupt the Vietnamese resettlement program were especially noticeable this quarter. Resettlement areas in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Long Khanh Provinces were the main targets. Despite these interruptions, the program to resettle refugees continues to progress. Figures 12-6 and 12-7 depict the current reported status of this vital project.

10. (U) PROPERTY DISPOSAL.

a. Considerable progress has been made in the area of property disposal. The major remaining problems are in the areas of accountability, use of Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMDs) to facilitate export shipments of property sold to contractors, implementation of more effective programs for recovery of precious metals and tightened control over demilitarization procedures. All can be resolved internally within DAO with the exception of TCMDs. The latter problem is directly related to an all-out effort now being made by the GVN to prevent unauthorized export of unrecovered scrap and the resulting loss of revenue to the GVN. In-country sales of USG excess property for export may be

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CHIEU HOI TREND





Figure 12-4

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* Casualties shown include killed, wounded and abducted.

Figure 12-5

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


Figure 12-6

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


Figure 12-7

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seriously impeded for some time to come. In that event, it may be desirable to reconsider the present plan to close out the off-shore sales office which has been maintained in Singapore since early CY 1972.

b. The current long range goal is to accelerate Vietnamization of property disposal operations. In order to achieve this goal, it is now planned to reduce the American personnel ceiling (currently 29) to 15 by 30 June 1975 and effect a smaller proportional reduction in the Vietnamese personnel ceiling (currently 650). It appears that substantial additional personnel reductions will not be feasible without significant modification of the current legal basis for property disposal operations in Vietnam as provided by the Federal Property Act of 1949, Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (and successor legislation), piece-for-piece replacement provisions of the Paris Agreement and 10 May 1955 USG-GVN Agreement on Disposal of Excess Military Property in Vietnam.

11. (C/NFD) RVNAF CORRUPTION.

a. Programs to control pilferage have been instituted. The Joint Eradication Committee (JEC), established specifically for this mission, has made progress in this area. To prevent black marketing of military items, units were inspected and JEC agents were placed in supply depots with high consumption rates. Reported results, in MR 1, show substantial amounts of confiscated clothing, hardware, POL, tires, batteries and commissary items. If the JEC is effective in all Corps areas, as reported in MR 1, pilferage can be substantially reduced.

b. Joint General Staff Adjutant General inspection teams have found cases of mismanagement and misuse of manpower in many RVNAF agencies and units. Preliminary reports indicate that there are as many as 20,000 personnel bribing superiors in order to remain at home. Obviously the fighting spirit of the remaining personnel, unwilling or unable to pay, is adversely affected. Specialized units were found to be particularly guilty of the practice. Steps have been taken to revise the Table of Organization and Equipment to remedy this state of affairs. There is evidence that some field commanders retain casualty/deserter reports in order to pocket personnel salaries.

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c. The shift of Chiefs of Staff (1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions) seems to be related to corruption. Reports indicate Colonel Huan, 1st Division, had been involved in toleration of "Ghost" or "Flower" soldiers while Colonel Lôi, 2nd Division, had covert connections with businessmen in Quang Ngai. Colonel Bao, 3rd Division, was moved to the 2nd Division to share his proven experience in staff procedures.

d. The Graft/Corruption subject is frequently talked about while essentially nothing is done. This deep-seated problem permeates all levels of Vietnamese society. The current economic situation does not deter the urge to "take" a little on the side to supplement income. Until steps are taken to curb inflation, recompense honest effort and severely punish offenders, the problem of corruption will continue.

e. Reports from North Vietnam indicate similar problems within the communist sphere of influence. Quoting from one report, "If the State does not take firm and urgent measures to check this situation, it will not be able to satisfactorily fulfill the tasks of restoring and developing our economy and stabilizing the people's living conditions, and successfully implementing the 1974 State plan."

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CHAPTER 13

JGS COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. (U) CHAIN OF COMMAND.

a. Previous quarterly assessments covered the organization for national defense within the Government of Vietnam (GVN) from the President as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, down to the Military Regions/Corps (MR/Corps). Those assessments provided information that covered the relationship between the Joint General Staff (JGS) and the Vietnamese Air Force and Navy (VNAF and VNN), the Airborne and Marine Divisions, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Combat Branches; the Artillery, Armor and Ranger Commands. This chapter now outlines how the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Inspector General organization (IG) and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5 (Plans) are organized and function in respect to accomplishment of their stated missions.

b. The RVNAF/IG organization is diffused down through the echelons of command from the JGS, MR/Corps, Divisions, and Sectors, and laterally co-exists across the major service headquarters of the VNAF and VNN, plus the Marine Division and Airborne Division Headquarters. Each part of the whole will be addressed in this chapter.

(1) The following is the broad mission statement of the Joint General Staff, Inspector General Directorate (JGS/IG) extracted from the Directorate's organization and activation authority:

(a) Represent Chief of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF in the conduct of inspections and investigations.

(b) To receive, review and process complaints, allegations and requests for assistance from servicemen of various grades.

(c) To report to the Chief of Joint General Staff, RVNAF the results of RVNAF IG inspections and investigations with recommendations for appropriate action.

(d) To insure corrective action is taken on

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discrepancies and irregularities.

(2) The JGS/IG, in conjunction with all other subordinate offices which make up the total Directorate, has the stated capability:

(a) To inspect all units of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, Army, Navy and Air Force in respect to command and leadership, general operations, organization, personnel, training, logistics, polwar activities, security, defense and fire prevention.

(b) To make an impartial appraisal or evaluation and report to the Chief/JGS on the performance of mission, the state of discipline, efficiency and economy of the Armed Forces.

(c) To investigate irregularities and/or allegations against the Armed Forces resulting from the inspections of units or made known from other sources.

(d) To analyze inspection reports and reports of corrective action taken to insure that proper follow-up action is taken on recommendations.

(3) The mission of the Joint General Staff, Inspector General Directorate, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, is very similar to that of the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S. Armed Forces. The two most significant differences are as follows:

(a) The JGS/IG monitors, directs and inspects elements of all Arms of Service (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) within RVNAF.

(b) An inspecting officer may reward an outstanding individual or unit and may also administer punishment to those who fail to meet acceptable standards.

(4) The JGS/IG is adequately staffed and equipped to accomplish its assigned mission. The exception is the Air Force and Navy inspection teams of the General Inspections Division. Each team has only one officer assigned from their respective arm of service. However, the subordinate IG offices are not sufficiently staffed to carry their share of the inspection workload. The Inspector General offices below the JGS level are currently staffed with between 50 and 60 per cent of their authorized strength.

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(5) Faced with the necessity to tighten control of personnel and materiel, and spurred by an order from the President of the Republic to economize and insure maximum return from each dollar spent, increased emphasis is being placed on upgrading the Inspector General organization at all levels. [On 28 November 1973, LTG Le Nguyen Khang, Special Assistant for Operations to the Chief, Joint General Staff, was appointed to be concurrently the RVNAF Inspector General.] Additionally, general officers were assigned as Inspector Generals at each of the four Corps. This was the first time in the history of RVNAF that general officers have been assigned as Inspector Generals at Corps level. LTG Khang divides his time equally between his responsibilities as Special Assistant for Operations and the JGS/IG. In January 1974, LTG Vinh Loc became the full time Deputy IG to LTG Khang. LTG Vinh Loc spends a great part of his time in the field with the Corps Commanders and their staffs, attempting to emphasize the necessity of a well staffed and equipped IG as a management tool at all appropriate levels of command. In a further effort to upgrade the inspecting officers entering the Inspector General service, the following criteria must be met: the officer must make application expressing a desire to join the Inspector General Corps, company grade officers must have successfully completed the advance course of his branch of Service and field grade officer must have completed the Command and General Staff College. When officers are selected, they attend a one month course conducted at the JGS/IG Directorate, Saigon. This course is scheduled twice each year.

(6) The organization of the JGS/IG, RVNAF, is as depicted in Figure 13-1 and consists of Study and Plans Division, reports Analysis Division, a General Inspections Division, a Territorial Forces Inspection Division, a Technical Inspection Division and an Investigation Division. These Divisions have inspection teams as depicted (Figure 13-1); each team consists of three to four officers except the teams of the Investigation Division, which consist of only two officers. During the conduct of an investigation by these teams, the team is supplemented with two additional officers, one each from the Military Police and Military Security Service. An example of the use of the IG system by the Chief, JGS, occurred during November 1973, when a visiting U.S. Army Anti-Armor

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I.G. DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION CHART




Figure 13-1

13-5

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Technical Assistant Team discovered numerous technical, tactical and training deficiencies within the RVNAF anti-armor capabilities. During this period, there were indicators that the enemy would increase the use of armor in his ceasefire violations. The IG was directed to establish a sound inspection program for this important area of concern. A team of experts in the field of armor warfare was established to draft the inspection program and checklist. Within a week this was accomplished. The JGS/IG organized three special inspection teams consisting of a team chief from Office of the IG, an officer instructor in anti-armor weapons (Central Training Command) and two officers who had received anti-armor weapons training in the U.S. These three teams were dispatched to the three northern Corps areas (area of threat) to inspect selected units and training centers to assure their anti-armor plans, the implementation of these plans, training at the centers and units, maintenance and ammunition storage all conformed with appropriate directives. Each of the subordinate IG offices were directed to organize special inspections and inspected those units within their jurisdiction as indicated above and in accordance with the prescribed checklist. Within a two month period, all units to include the tank-killer teams of the Regional Force (RF) companies and separate artillery platoons, had received this special inspection. This inspection procedure was also made a part of the Inspector General's regular annual inspections at all levels.


(7) The JGS/IG relations to subordinate IG offices are depicted in Figure 13-2. The JGS/IG monitors all inspections and investigations conducted by subordinate offices. Copies of reports of inspections and investigations are forwarded to the Reports Analysis Division, JGS/IG, where the reports are monitored to insure that appropriate, corrective follow-up action is taken. These reports are also provided the J-Staffs, Central Training Command (CTC) and Central Logistics Command (CLC). These staff sections are responsible for correcting deficiencies in their functional areas which are beyond the responsibility or capability of the inspected organization. All corrective measures taken must be reported to the JGS/IG, through the Reports Analysis Division.

(8) During CY 1974, the JGS/IG will conduct the

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RVNAF IG SYSTEM RELATIVE TO COMMAND
(REORGANIZED BY DECREE #1244/TCTT/ND DATED 5 JUNE 1971)



REMARKS: _____ COMMAND LINES

-----ACTIVITY COORDINATION, PROFESSIONAL TECHNICAL SUPERVISION AND TRAINING SYSTEM

Figure 13-2

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Inspector General's annual inspections of units indicated below:

<u>Major Organizations</u>	<u>Units to be Inspected by JGS/IG</u>
1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 7th, 9th, 18th, 21st, 22nd, 23d and 25th Inf Divs.	Two Regiments from each Division plus the Armored Cavalry Squadron, Division Artillery Command and Battalions, Logistical Battalion, Division Training Center and Division Headquarters Companies. The 1st and 22nd Divisions will have three regiments inspected as they have four regiments each while the other Divisions have three.
Airborne and Marine Divs.	Two Brigades, Support Battalions, Training Centers, Division Artillery Command and Battalions plus the Division Headquarters of each Division.
Central Logistics Command	The Central Logistics installations, the Logistical units subordinate to the five Area Logistics Commands (ALC), Engineer Construction units, Military and General Hospitals.
Central Training Command	Military schools and training centers.
Regional Forces (Consists of 360 battalions and 372 company size units.)	The JGS/IG will inspect 50% of the RF units. The 50% to be inspected by JGS/IG will be those units that were inspected by the Corps/IG during CY 73.
Air Force and Navy Headquarters	Headquarters and Technical elements.

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(9) The JGS/IG Directorate also conducts most of the follow-up inspections of those units listed above which fail to meet acceptable standards on the initial inspection. In some cases, the reinspection may be delegated to the Corps/IG, Div/IG or Sector/IG, as appropriate, but this is done only when the deficiencies were not serious. The Investigation Division investigates those complaints and allegations that are of a serious nature. Investigation of less serious complaints may be delegated to the appropriate subordinate IC office.

(10) The Air Force and Navy Inspector General offices, as depicted in Figure 13-3, are responsible for conducting an annual IG inspection of each tactical element of their respective Arm of Service. This includes follow-up inspection of those units which fail the initial annual inspection. These offices are responsive to the JGS/IG Directorate. They may investigate complaints or allegations when received directly or as directed by the JGS/IG.

(11) The Corps/Military Region (MR) Inspector General Offices for the four Corps/MRs differ slightly in the number of inspection teams allocated for each of the Corps, as indicated in Figure 13-4. The Corps/IG will conduct the annual Inspector General inspections of units organic to the Corps which were not inspected by JGS/IG, plus one regiment of each assigned Infantry Division, and the 50% of assigned RF units that were inspected by JGS/IG during the previous year. The Corps/IG also conducts follow-up inspections of the above units, and others, when directed by the JGS/IG. The Corps/IG also investigates complaints and allegations of assigned personnel or may direct the appropriate Division/Sector IG to conduct the investigation, then monitor the outcome.


(12) The Division Inspector General, Figure 13-5, is responsible for conducting the annual Inspector General's inspection of the Division's support and technical units, i.e., Engineer Battalion, Medical Battalion, Signal Battalion, Transportation Company, Recon Company, Military Police Company, Intelligence Detachment and Scout Dog Platoon. This office also conducts limited Command Maintenance Inspections of organic units and investigates complaints and allegations within the Division's jurisdiction. The Airborne and Marine Div/IG offices will also inspect one organic Brigade each (the brigades that were not inspected by JGS/IG).

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ORGANIZATION CHART OF ARMED SERVICES IG OFFICE

(AIR FORCE & NAVY)

-



- * Chief of IG Office : Major General
- * Chief of IG Management Office : Colonel
- * Inspection & Investigation Group: 1 Team Chief (LTC +
3 Inspection Officers
(Major, Captain)

Figure 13-3


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ORGANIZATION CHART
OF
IG OFFICE OF CORPS & MR



Corps/MR Inspector General: Brig. Gen.
Assistant Inspector General and concurrently
Chief of IG Office: Colonel

Inspection Group: 1 Chief of Inspection Group (LTC) +
2 Inspection Officers (Major)

- Remarks:
- a. I Corps & MR 1 : 5 Inspection & Investigation Groups + 2 Technical Inspection Groups.
 - b. II Corps & MR 2 : 6 Inspection & Investigation Groups + 4 Technical Inspection Groups.
 - c. III Corps & MR 3 : 6 Inspection & Investigation Groups + 3 Technical Inspection Groups.
 - d. VI Corps & MR 4 : 6 Inspection & Investigation Groups + 3 Technical Inspection Groups.


Figure 13-4

13-13

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ORGANIZATION CHART OF IG OFFICE OF INFANTRY, AIRBORNE & MARINE DIVISIONS



- * Chief of IG Office : Colonel
- * Chief of IG Management Office: LTC
- * Inspection Group : 1 Team Chief (Major) +
1 IG Officer (Captain)

Figure 13-5

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
(13) The Sector Inspector General's Office (Provincial), Figure 13-6, is the lowest level of command to have an organic inspectorate. The main function of this office is the annual inspection of the Sub-Sectors, the newly created Sub-Subsector, and Popular Force platoons. On rare occasions some Sector/IGs may be directed to inspect selected RF units. The complaint investigations conducted by Sector/IG offices are very limited as the majority of complaints/allegations are addressed to the Corps/IG or the JGS/IG.

c. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5 functions directly under the Chief of Staff/JGS, and is organized and staffed as shown in Figure 13-7. The Chief is an ARVN Colonel and his deputy is a Navy Captain. The J-5/JGS is responsible to the Chief/JGS for compiling, evaluating and publishing, on a recurring basis, reports covering the full spectrum of RVNAF activities that graphically portray the current status and trend lines of programs and activities within RVNAF Services and Branches. Primarily, the J-5 is engaged in strategic and long range military planning. Additionally, the J-5 coordinates planning and estimates resource requirements to implement RVNAF programs, compiles military history and conducts special projects as required. As with other JGS Sections, the J-5 is dominated by ARVN personnel. Navy and Air Force representatives serve as special assistants to the Chief, J-5, and as liaison to the G-5 of their respective services. Unlike other J-sections, e.g., the J-2 and the J-3, the J-5 does not have a corresponding staff section nor does it have specific responsibilities in the military regions or at the division level. However, each military region and ARVN division maintains a small historical section which ultimately provides inputs to the J-5/Historical Division. The present J-5 Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) personnel authorization is established at 55 officers, 20 noncommissioned officers and four enlisted men, a total staff of 79. Actual strength, at present, is approximately 75% of authorized strength. A proposal is under consideration, by Ministry of National Defense to reorganize the J-5 which would increase the staffing authorization and include the establishment of an Information Management Center.

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ORGANIZATION CHART OF SECTOR IG OFFICE



- * Chief of IG Section: LTC
- * 1 IG Officer : Major
- * 1 IG Management NCO: Sergeant Major

Figure 13-6

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J5/JGS ORGANIZATION CHART




Figure 13-7

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(1) During 1972-1973 the GVN/MOND placed greater emphasis on long term planning towards improving RVNAF. Correspondingly, the J-5 increased in importance as an integral element of the JGS. A measure of this importance is reflected in the list of current primary responsibilities:

- (a) RVNAF Improvements (as required).
- (b) CY 1975 Military Plan.
- (c) Long Range (1974-1979) Military Plan (Planning, Programming and Budgeting).
- (d) RVNAF Improvement, Management and Modernization System (RIMMS).
- (e) Strategic Objectives Plan.


In the performance and accomplishment of its responsibilities, the J-5 necessarily maintains close liaison and coordination with the other sections of the JGS, particularly the J-2 (intelligence reports) and J-3 (operational activities), both of which provide major inputs for analysis. Although there are few strict guidelines, standard procedures include direct cooperation between the various divisions of the J-5 and other JGS elements in an exchange of reports and studies, combined study discussions and joint staff meetings in planning sessions. Plans, proposals and recommendations are forwarded to the MOND through the CS/JGS. Upon approval by MOND, the CS/JGS staffs out plan requirements to appropriate elements of the JGS for further development and implementation. Figure 13-8 reflects the relationship of the J-5 with the MOND, JGS and RVNAF elements.

(2) The stated missions of the J-5/JGS are:

- (a) Formulate strategic plans, Armed Forces organization, and military development programs, plans and policies.
- (b) Coordinate planning and estimate resource requirements for carrying out the programs of the Armed Forces.
- (c) Conduct special projects or plans in compliance with the instructions of higher commanders.

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RELATIONSHIP OF THE J-5 WITH THE MOND, JGS & RVNAF



———— = Command
----- = Coordination

Figure 13-8

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- (d) Compile history of the Armed Forces and the present war.
- (3) The stated functions of the J-5/JGS are:
- (a) Study and prepare strategic estimates and strategic objectives.
 - (b) Develop RVNAF military policies.
 - (c) Establish organization and development programs and plans.
 - (d) Prepare strategic offensive plans.
 - (e) Prepare national strategic defensive plans.
 - (f) Propose Foreign Aid employment plans.
 - (g) Prepare special plans directed by higher commanders.
 - (h) Record military history.
 - (i) Supervise the Military Museum.
 - (j) Supervise the RVNAF leadership program.

2. (C) SHORTFALL AND ASSESSMENT.

a. Shortfalls enumerated in previous quarterly assessments remain valid. The Joint General Staff primarily coordinates RVNAF resources. While the Chief/JGS and the JGS headquarters staff exercise little day-to-day command and control, they continue to allocate resources to Corps/MR Commanders. Even though Corps/MR Commanders use the resources given them as they see fit to accomplish their missions, the JGS has in the IG Directorate system, the ability to assess and measure the status of those resources regarding important areas concerning command and leadership, conduct of operations, personnel, training, logistics, political warfare activities and security. With the increased need to tighten control of personnel and materiel, to economize in every area and to insure maximum return from each defense dollar spent, the IG Directorate is being relied on more heavily to assist in the accomplishment of this goal, and emphasis on upgrading its ability to do so is coming to fruition. The

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RVNAF/IG system is very similar to the U.S. Armed Forces system in organization and is similarly sound in principle. The major shortcoming has been the failure of many commanders below the JGS level to understand the importance of a competent and authoritative inspection/redress system as a management tool. This shortcoming has been reflected by a long standing failure to ensure that sufficient, qualified and competent officers are assigned to the offices of the Inspector General. In the past, in numerous cases, officers assigned to IG positions have been cast-off rejects who were released from responsible assignments because of failure to demonstrate the leadership, drive and other qualities required. The current emphasis being placed on upgrading the IG offices throughout the chain of command should help halt and reverse malassignments within the system, educate commanders to the importance of an effective organization with command backing and authority, and bring the IG to fulfillment of its potential. At the JGS/IG level, a study group was recently formed to investigate and find ways to improve the inspection system, discover malpractices and cut costs throughout RVNAF. An early recommendation from this group to the RVNAF Inspector General was to form two special inspection teams with unprecedented authority to travel and make unannounced spot inspections. The underlying purpose of these unannounced inspections would be to discover commanders carrying "Ghost and Flower Soldiers" (nonexisting soldiers carried on unit payrolls and soldiers surrendering their pay in order to work in safe jobs or at better paying jobs outside the military). The present system of scheduling inspections calls for a minimum of two weeks prior notice, and this affords ample time for offending commanders to cover malpractices. This recommendation alone, if favorably considered, will be an auspicious beginning to putting greater efficiency and meaningfulness into the present inspection system.

b. Currently the J-5/JGS is insufficiently manned to carry out its mission and responsibilities (approximately 75% of its authorized TOE strength of 79). Shortfalls in manning will be further compounded when the J-5 absorbs responsibility for the MOND Information Management Center, and when its overall mission, as proposed by MOND, is significantly broadened and increased. The J-5 needs officers assigned

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with skill and experience in the plans and programs field, particularly economists, logisticians and manpower experts. The current absence of officers with planning related specialist backgrounds impacts heavily on the J-5 ability to quickly define and resolve planning problems. This problem will be increased if the proposed expansion of mission and responsibilities is approved. As with other JGS staff sections, the J-5 is predominantly Army, with only minimal representation from the other services. When plans or programs are being developed which include or will impact on VNAF, VNN or Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC), the Chief, J-5/JGS must request temporary assignment of officers from those services. There is no continuity of research experience or problem familiarity applied from one requirement to the next. The final problem facing the J-5 is the lack of close coordination between the MOND and Prime Minister's Office, where requirements originate and are subsequently approved, and those in the J-5 who must develop the required plans and programs. Requirements and responses pass up and down through cumbersome and bureaucratic channels, often causing delay and confusion. Lateral staff coordination, review and assistance also lacks the close, harmonious working relationship that could avoid unnecessary delays and provide enlightened input by specialists in areas of concern outside of the J-5 section limitations.

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CHAPTER 14

DAO DISTINGUISHED VISITORAPRIL 1974:

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1-3 Apr 74	MGen Robert E. Hails	Commander, Warner Robbins Air Materiel Area
	COL Thomas F. Blake, Jr.	Staff member
	COL Jay T. Edwards, III.	Staff member
1-4 Apr 74	COL Jared B. Schopper	Assistant Chief of Staff, Resources Management Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taipei
2-4 Apr 74	RADM Henry P. Glindeman	Chief, Fleet Coordinating Group, Nakhon Phanom
3-4 Apr 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
	COL Thomas Henry	Staff member
4-5 Apr 74	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
08-12 Apr 74	Capt Charles M. Mayes, USN	United States Coast Guard
	Capt A.P. Manning, USN	United States Coast Guard
08-26 Apr 74	COL John P. Thuemmel	Chief, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Force Team
11-13 Apr 74	BG Joseph E. Fix, III.	Director of International Logistics, Headquarters, Army Materiel Command
12-13 Apr 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
14-20 Apr 74	COL I.L. Hylton	Chief, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Team
15-17 Apr 74	COL Russell J. Anderson	Chief, Targets Division, United States Army Support Activities Group
16-20 Apr 74	CPT Robert L. Hall	Chief, United States Army Logistics Assistance Office, Pacific

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
19 Apr 74	COL Ewald G. Kruggel	Director of Safety, 13th Air Force
19-21 Apr 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
22 Apr 74	Dr. John J. Brady, Jr.	Staff Consultant, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
	Dr. John H. Sullivan	Staff Consultant, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
22-23 Apr. 74	MGen Jack Bellamy	Chief of Staff, United States Support Activities Group
22-24 Apr 74	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
22-25 Apr 74	COL Duane H. Smith	Chief, Operations Division, Plans, Doctrine and System Division, Office Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Department of the Army

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
23-26 Apr 74	COL Eugene Hollis	Deputy Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
	COL Charles Beckwith	Commander, Control Team A, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
24-27 Apr 74	COL C. W. Boyd, Jr.	Chief, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Force Planning Division.
25-27 Apr 74	MG John R. Guthrie	Deputy Chief of Staff, Pacific Command
	BG Charles A. Jackson	Director, Security Assistance, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
26 Apr 74	RADM McClendon	Carrier Task Force 77
	RADM Boyd	Carrier Task Force 77
26-28 Apr 74	Capt John E. McNearney	Chief, Joint Petroleum Office, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
27-29 Apr 74	Mr. Gerald W. Collins	National Defense Transportation Association
	Mr. Everett Hutchinson	National Defense Transportation Association
28-29 Apr 74	Capt R.M. Fluss, USN	Vice Commander, Pacific Division
	Capt A.G. Sutherland, USN	Staff member
28Apr-2May74	Capt Chong Sum Fong, USN	Commander, Naval Shore Electronic Engineering Activity, Pacific
29-30 Apr 74	Mr. L. J. Haugh	Director, Procurement Analysis and Planning, Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations & Logistics)
	COL Jack W. Gould	Procurement, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific

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MAY 1974:

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1-2 May 74	COL R.L. Burnell	Defense Attache, Phnom Penh
	COL Opfer	Staff member
1-3 May 74	LTG Lew Allen, Jr.	Director, National Security Agency
1-3 May 74	BGen H. L. Jacobson	Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, United States Support Activities Group
5-9 May 74	Capt O. A. Porter, USN	Head, Foreign Security Assistance Plans and Policy
6-10 May 74	COL Alvin L. Meredith	Research Development Test and Evaluation Division, Commander- in-Chief, Pacific Staff
7-9 May 74	Capt D. D. Ruebsamen, USN	Commander, Military Sealift Command, Far East

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
7-12 May 74	COL Charles Beckwith	Commander, Control Team A, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
10 May 74	RADM Henry P. Glindeman	Chief, Fleet Coordinating Group, Nakhon Phanom
10 May 74	Capt Craven	Carrier Task Force 77
	Capt Shup...	Carrier Task Force 77
10-12 May 74	COL P.A. Marinelli	J1, United States Army Support Activities Group
10-12 May 74	EG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
13-15 May 74	COL Nicholas H. Howell	Headquarters, Pacific Air Force
14-15 May 74	Mr. Delmas D. B. ...	Headquarters, Department of the Army Procurement Management Review Team

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
15-24 May 74	Mr. Richard M. Moose	Staff Delegate
	Mr. Charles F. Meissner	Staff Delegate
19-21 May 74	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander, United States Support Activities Group
19-21 May 74	RADM R. E. Fowler	Director of Logistics, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
19-23 May 74	Mr. Paul H. Kattenburg	University of South Carolina
20-24 May 74	COL William H. Brownlee	Head, Commander-in- Chief, Medical Assistance Team
	COL William H. Brownlee	Team member
22-24 May 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
24-25 May 74	RADM H. ... Glindeman, Jr.	Chief, Fleet Coordinating Group, Nakhon Phanom

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
25 May 74	MGen H. L. Price	Director, Military Assistance & Sales, Headquarters, Pacific Air Force
26-28 May 74	Honorable Hadlai A. Hull	Assistant Secretary of Army (Financial Affairs)
	Mr. Joseph H. Sherick	Deputy Comptroller of the Army
	COL Howard M. Steele, Jr.	Executive to Honorable Hull
26May-1Jun74	Mr. Werner Crosshans	Associated Director, General Accounting Office
	Mr. Fred Lyons	Staff member
	Mr. James T. Kurihara	General Accounting Office, Honolulu Office
31May-4Jun74	COL David M. Murane	J5. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific

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JUNE 1974:

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
2-30 Jun 74	Mr. M.A. Meling, GS-15	Chief, Pacific Audit Division, Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Audit)
3 Jun 74	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
3-4 Jun 74	Mr. Morton Abramowitz	Political Advisor, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
3-4 Jun 74	GEN Timothy F. O'Keefe	Commander, United States Support Activities Group/ 7th Air Force
4-6 Jun 74	COL H.B. Lundin	Joint Casualty Resolution Center, Liaison Officer to Hanoi
5-9 Jun 74	COL Robert L. Ventress	Commander, 7602 Air Intelligence Group

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
5-10 Jun 74	COL D. Tadich	Deputy J2, United States Support Activities Group
8-14 Jun 74	Mr. George Roberts	Customs Official (US Customs Service)
10 Jun 74	MGen Earl J. Archer	Chief of Staff, United States Support Activities Group
13-14 Jun 74	LTGen Wallace H. Robinson, Jr.	Director, Defense Supply Agency
13-23 Jun 74	Col. Samuel B. Spicely	Chief, Department of Army Technical Assistant Team
15-22 Jun 74	Capt Irving J. Green, USN	United States Representative to 13th South East Asia Regional Seminar on Tropical Medicine, Saigon University
16-19 Jun 74	COL P. L. Mason	Editor-in-Chief, Pacific Stars & Stripes, Tokyo

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<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>DISTINGUISHED VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
20-22 Jun 74	COL Elbert M. Stringer	Program Director, F5E Program Review Conference
23-27 Jun 74	COL Gerald W. Davis	Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army, Pacific
24-26 Jun 74	COL Elbert M. Stringer	Program Director, F5E Program Review Conference
24-26 Jun 74	COL Charles W. Nyquist	J2/United States Support Activities Group
24-28 Jun 74	COL L. R. Wasmund	Headquarters, United States Support Activities Group
28-30 Jun 74	COL Sullivan Fontaine	Commander, Control Team B, Joint Casualty Resolution Center

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CHAPTER 15

DEFENSE ATTACHE ASSESSMENT

1. (S) GENERAL. The overall situation has deteriorated this quarter. Logistically speaking, RVNAF has improved and corrected many deficiencies. Economically and militarily, RVN has shown weaknesses not previously evident.

2. (S) IMPROVEMENTS. Defense Attache staff elements agree that supply/logistics methods have improved. POL consumption, while high, has been brought under control and is monitored carefully. Operational Ready rates of strategic equipment are within acceptable limits. Training in technical and supply fields is progressing smoothly.

3. (SNFD) PROBLEMS.

a. Economics: Inflation is rampant. Prices have risen 28.8 percent this year alone. Drastic action has been suggested from some quarters but all solutions currently being considered have inherent deficiencies which warrant detailed consideration before implementation. Meanwhile, the civil servant, fixed income annuitant and military inductee must survive the storm (a 14 percent government pay raise did little to soften the effects). Corruption abounds, judging by reports from reliable sources.

b. Military: Militarily, the enemy has taken the initiative. Although not waging a general offensive, he has held RVNAF at bay not 35 miles from Saigon, taken control of the Ky Tra/Tien Phuoc area in MR-1, gained a greater foothold in the Southern Delta (Kien Giang and Chuong Thien Provinces) and disrupted RVN resettlement programs country wide. RVNAF has exacted a heavy toll but there are indications of weakening resolve within RVN military forces. If the present trend continues the enemy could construe this as an opportune time for an all-out push. The "flower soldier" problem has surfaced frequently and commanding officers are increasingly linked to underhanded businessmen.

c. Civilian Populace: The common people see no end to hostilities. Nationalism, while not forgotten, is overshadowed by the daily struggle to survive. Government agencies are lackadaisical although propaganda is plentiful. Refugees are subjected to constant

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harassment from Communist troops and artillery.

4. (S) SUMMARY. RVNAF has taken the U.S. materiel cutback in stride. In our estimation, the current logistical improvements will continue. Training of personnel is following a satisfactory course and self-sufficiency is approaching. The reported ARVN success in Cambodia is overshadowed by continuing stalemates or losses within RVN. The Communists have traded propaganda/military victories at Tonle Cham, Chi Linh, Rach Bap and Dak Pek for the setback suffered in Cambodia. The skies over South Vietnam have clouded.

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