


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PRESIDENT'S VIEWS

State Department Reform: Seize the Moment

BY MARSHALL P. ADAIR

Over the last five years we have seen a number of studies on reforming the State Department and the Foreign Service. They have been done by respectable organizations, including the Center for Strategic International Studies, the Stimson Center, McKinsey and Co., and the State Department-commissioned Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.

All of those studies argued that the machinery of U.S. foreign policy making is in serious disrepair. They warned that America's foreign affairs apparatus is ill-equipped to respond to the growing challenges of the post-Cold War era, and insufficient to the task of shaping the international environment of the 21st century. The studies went into the needs of diplomacy and the operations of State in some detail. While they differed in some of their specific recommendations, they were remarkably consistent with each other. One by one, the studies and their authors were praised by the Washington community. And, one by one, the studies were also put on the shelf.

On Jan. 20, a new administration took over. A new secretary of State with a reputation for institution building and for getting things done has announced his intention to pay more attention to resources and to the machinery of diplomacy. That perspective is most welcome, and it will be assisted by two more reports on reform

Marshall P. Adair is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.

*With a new
secretary comes
an opportunity for
new resources
and restructuring.*

that were delivered to the president and to the secretary of State in January. One is from a Council on Foreign Relations task force, chaired by Frank Carlucci, a former Foreign Service officer, national security adviser and secretary of defense. The other is from the congressionally mandated U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, co-chaired by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman.

The CFR report calls for a deal by which the administration commits to reform State, and Congress commits to increase resources. It synthesizes the work of previous studies and makes some very specific action recommendations. These include centralizing State's budget and management authority under the deputy secretary, and engaging Congress more actively by upgrading the Legislative bureau and establishing liaison offices on the Hill. The CFR task force supports establishing the Overseas Facilities Administration advocated by OPAP, fulfilling Adm. William Crowe's security recommendations, and overhauling the department's personnel structure.

Above all, it calls on the president to lead through action.

The commission's report is more extensive because it looks at the entire national security apparatus, but it too makes some very specific recommendations for State. It proposes a complete reorganization that would replace the current mix of geographic and functional bureaus with a new structure designed to integrate most functional operations into geographic regions directed by five under secretaries. Each of those under secretaries would supervise assistant secretaries charged with political, economic and security affairs respectively. The commission recommends creating a National Security Service Corps (NSSC), including Civil Service personnel in all of the national security agencies (also to include Treasury). For the time being, the NSSC would be separate from the Foreign Service, but over time might become more closely integrated. The commission also recommends creating and presenting to Congress a consolidated national security budget, a concept that received support from the CFR task force as well.

The action proposals these reports have presented to the new administration are daunting, but are neither impossible nor impractical. The CFR task force made a special effort to craft proposals that could be implemented immediately. The administration should do so. The commission proposals also make tremendous sense, and are worth a try. Now is not the time to be timid. *Carpe diem.* ■



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LETTERS

Powell and Somalia

As a result of last-minute cuts by editors, the December 2000 issue of the *Journal* omitted some salient facts about the Somalia intervention from my article, "Clinton Was Right, The Establishment Was Wrong."

On Sept. 22, 1993, as the U.S. troop presence in Somalia dropped to 5,000, Gen. Joseph Hoar, in charge of Central Command, passed along a request for reinforcements in hopes of prompting withdrawal of the remaining troops. The request triggered a high-level policy review that led to a decision by President Clinton to limit the U.S. mission in Somalia, in particular, by no longer pursuing warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed. Before the decision was announced, however, a request came in from Mogadishu to attack Aideed's forces. Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had been instrumental in getting President Bush to dispatch troops to Somalia in November 1992 and was about to leave office, recommended going ahead with the attack.

In a hurried conference call, top administration officials, acting on Powell's recommendation and in contravention of President Clinton's new

policy, authorized the ill-fated Delta force operation in Mogadishu that cost the lives of 18 American troops. At a time when Colin Powell is being depicted as opposed to all humanitarian interventions and insistent that troops can only be dispatched on clear missions, it is important to recall that he has experienced first-hand both the promise and the pitfalls of such missions.

Leon V. Sigal
Social Science Research
Council
New York, N.Y.

Don't Dis Civil Servants

I am an FSO who did not share in your jubilation over the grievance

board decision in the Lima DCM case. I don't know all the facts of the case, but if, as appears from AFSA's public statements, this is simply about keeping GS employees out of DCM jobs, it's unfortunate.

Many GS employees already work against a background of second-class citizenship. They may not be treated as such overtly, but the undercurrent exists. They often labor many years developing expertise with little opportunity for promotion, and it is rare to find them above the office director level. We ought to applaud when our system occasionally emerges from the usual bureaucratic straitjacket and exhibits flexibility by rewarding a civil servant for long years of service and

An Invitation For Summer Fiction

The results of the recent *FSJ* survey indicate that you, the reader, want to continue the *Journal's* summer fiction issue. Therefore, once again the *FSJ* is seeking works of fiction of up to 3,000 words for its annual summer fiction issue. Story lines or characters involving the Foreign Service are preferred, but not required. The top stories, selected by the *Journal's* Editorial Board, will be published in the July/August issue and on the *Journal's* Web site. The writer of each story will receive an honorarium of \$250.

All stories must be previously unpublished. Submissions should be unsigned and accompanied by a cover sheet with author's name, address, telephone numbers and e-mail address.

Deadline for submissions is May 1. No exceptions.

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Steven Alan Honley, Associate Editor,
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LETTERS

accumulation of knowledge by appointment to a responsible overseas assignment.

Quite apart from the merits of the case, I was disappointed by the way in which AFSA publicized this case. I was embarrassed by the polarizing approach AFSA took — crowing about the victory in cables to the field, bragging about the high volume of supportive e-mail. We need to respect our colleagues, not dis'em.

*Stuart Hatcher
FSO, EUR/NB
Washington, D.C.*

Wake-Up Call

Combining the Foreign Service and Civil Service may be a terrific idea (President's Views, November *FSJ*), but before anything like that is done, perhaps an examination of the mandatory Foreign Service retirement age is in order. Foreign Service employees face mandatory retirement at age 65, while Civil Service employees do not.

As a Foreign Service employee approaching age 65, I can go to sleep one night, age 64, having put in a full day's productive work. Then I wake up age 65, and I am no longer able to work at the same job. I must now be escorted throughout the Main State building.

If the services were combined, how many Civil Service workers would be subject to immediate retirement?

*Linda Nicholas
OMS
Embassy Lisbon*

Promote the Civil Service Too

All of the suggestions for better coordinating the Foreign and Civil Service systems in Marshall Adair's column "A Tale of Two Services" would benefit the Foreign Service. None of them consider the needs of the department's Civil Service employees.

As an FSO who has held several domestic assignments in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, I have a deep appreciation for the talents of Civil Service employees. I have seen Foreign and Civil Service officers share responsibility for issues with direct impact on the American public — emergencies and crises involving Americans overseas, instances of international child abduction, fraud prevention and interpretations of immigration law. Civil and Foreign Service employees assigned to the department in Washington, as well as hundreds of Civil Service employees at domestic passport agencies throughout the United States, are the department's face to the American public — and they do a terrific job.

In addition to domestic assignments, Civil Service employees play a significant role overseas, stepping in to assist when Foreign Service staffing is not sufficient to meet the demand for services. Currently 150 Civil Service employees are assigned to Foreign Service jobs, primarily in hard-to-fill positions. During the past year Civil Servants from CA volunteered for 31 individual TDY tours overseas, filling in during staffing gaps and rush periods, giving Foreign Service officers time for training, vacation, and home leave. Civil Service professionals do not seek these assignments with any intention of replacing the Foreign Service; they seek them in order to contribute to the overall needs of the department and for their own career development.

If we are to attract the talent we need in the next century, the department must seek an approach that will promote the career development of all our employees by eliminating inflexible rules and procedures that limit opportunities. This would foster the best in both the Civil and Foreign Service, without making them the

same. If there is a Civil Service employee who is the best-qualified person to be a DCM at a particular post, we should facilitate such an assignment, not try to block it.

*Donna Hamilton
FSO, on leave without pay
Former principal DAS,
Bureau of Consular
Affairs
Lima, Peru*

Don't Trust Me Anymore

I empathize with those retired FSOs whose letters in the December issue lamented the department's lack of trust in them. They all served long and honorably and are distressed to find they no longer may wander unescorted through the corridors they once freely roamed.

I retired from the Foreign Service in March 1974, over a quarter of a century ago. While I was employed, my activities were scrutinized by the office of security, and the results of that scrutiny led to the reasonable conclusion that I posed no threat.

But I have not been back for over 26 years. What cutthroats and brigands may I have fallen in with during that time? Keeping in mind the rise in international terrorism, I support the care with which the department guards its portals.

*Robert D. Yoder
FSO, retired
Springfield, Vt.*

You Call This a Salute?

Returning to Washington recently after an absence, I happened to reread Secretary Albright's message to retirees in the June 1999 issue of *State Magazine*. In it she said department retirees should be aware that "you are a national treasure. ... For your years of service and sacrifice, I salute you. For your commitment and contributions to the work of this department, I honor you."

Then I opened Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Carpenter's letter to department retirees stating that for security reasons retirees must now "sign in and be escorted during visits to the department and its annexes." I doubt that is the fashion in which most of us might have wished to be honored and saluted.

*Miles S. Pendleton, Jr.
FSO, retired
Washington, D.C.*

A Year Later

A year has passed since Tony Ieronimo and I shared our reasons for leaving the Foreign Service after only one tour (*FSJ*, December 1999).

Rumor has it that Director General Grossman has shown an active interest in cleaning up the bureaucracy. But institutional interests remain strong. The department persists in its lackadaisical administration of U.S. immigration laws, in spite of recent INS estimates that 50 percent of illegals currently in the U.S. hold (putatively) non-immigrant visas issued by State.

Change will likely have to come from the outside, in the form of legislative reform of the State Department's functions. I did not have the stomach to abide the department's rampant inefficiency and corruption, and opted to save myself, while hoping outside descriptions of bureaucratic putrefaction might bring change. I can only enjoin the Foreign Service's good officers to stand up for what is right.

*Nikolai Wenzel
Former FSO
Annandale, Va.*

Correction

On page 21 of the November 2000 issue, the *Journal* incorrectly referred to Rep. Steve Chabot, R-Ohio, as Rep. Steve Cheviot. ■



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CLIPPINGS



"I now will be up before the Congress letting them know in the most powerful terms that I can muster that the dedicated men and women of the State Department need that same kind of support [as America's military]. They are in the front lines. ... And we must make sure that ... they have the resources that they need. ... And that will be a priority of my stewardship as secretary of State."

— GEN. COLIN POWELL, IN CRAWFORD, TEXAS, DEC. 16, ACCEPTING PRESIDENT-ELECT GEORGE W. BUSH'S NOMINATION OF HIM AS SECRETARY OF STATE

ELECTION FIASCO WON'T HURT U.S.

Is the fact that there was prolonged debate over the rightful successor to Bill Clinton likely to undermine American leadership abroad? Foreign policy experts think not, according to a Nov. 29 report by Joel Melstad on planetgov.com, a Web site that reports on federal government news.

Many foreign governments are not anxious about whether America's strength will ultimately be harmed by the 2000 election. "I've had many conversations with foreign officials who don't think the election will affect our strength in the world," said Louis Goodman, dean of American University's School of International Service.

The State Department concurred. In spokesman Richard Boncher's words: "Nobody ... has raised (the election) as a matter of official concern."

Foreign peace of mind might be attributed to the fact that most foreign governments do not believe there will be a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy with the new administration. However, some Asian governments have expressed concern that the president might not be able to implement effective foreign policies since he lacked an unequivocal victory.

GLOBAL WARMING CONFERENCE FAILS

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol calls for countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to below 1990 levels by 2012 in order to slow global warming. At the

rate things are going, they may need every second until the deadline. Three years after the protocol was signed, a meeting to arrive at strategies for implementing the agreement collapsed, according to a Nov. 29 report by Fiona Morgan on the news Web site salon.com. The United States signed but has not ratified the Kyoto agreement.

Two important issues brought the November meetings to a halt and sent hundreds of representatives packing. First, the issue of countries earning reduction credits for forested land (forested land soaks up carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas): Canada and the U.S., heavily forested countries, wanted such provisions while the Europeans opposed them. Also, the United States lobbied for the establishment of a system to trade financial credits for emissions. This would allow heavy-polluting countries to buy their way into compliance with the treaty by cutting deals with nations whose emissions are much below the limits the treaty mandates. While nations bickered, and then gave up, the earth's temperature continued to rise.

"SOS FOR DOS": A CALL FOR REFORM

As of Jan. 5, more than 1,000 people had signed a petition entitled "SOS for DOS," a call for action to reform the Department of State (aka DOS). The petition, calling the department "ill-equipped and ill-prepared to meet the foreign policy challenges of the 21st century," was written by a steering committee led by FSO Theodore Strickler.

The document broadly calls for updat-



CLIPPINGS

ed procedures and increased resources and "bold and decisive steps to deal with the problems," but is light on the specifics of how to do this. Details, according to Strickler, will come with phase two of the SOS campaign.

The petition began circulating in early November 2000, and has been gaining momentum, largely through e-mail. It is posted on the AFSA Web site discussion forum at www.afsa.org/c-street. Some supporters can be seen sporting blue lapel ribbons, symbolizing a call for an end to blue-ribbon studies about what the State Department needs and the beginning of real reform.

The SOS campaign has been timed to gain the attention of the new administration's leadership at State. It surfaced to the broader public in two articles about Secretary-designate Colin Powell, in the Jan. 3 *New York Times* and the Jan. 5 *Washington Times*.

FORMER U.S. ENVOY FILES FRAUD SUIT

A former U.S. envoy to Taiwan has filed a whistleblower lawsuit, claiming employees at the American mission in Taipei defrauded the United States of more than \$5 million in visa fees and sought sexual bribes from female applicants.

In the Nov. 30, 2000 issue of *The Washington Times*, Jerry Seper reports that James C. Wood, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, said AIT officials had sold visas to people not qualified to receive them, charging as much as \$25,000 for a \$10 visa. Additionally, Wood claimed some AIT personnel demanded sexual favors from

women before they could receive the visas to which they were entitled. Wood made the allegations in a whistleblower lawsuit under the False Claims Act, meaning he is accusing AIT in the name of the U.S. government. Under that law, if the U.S. government agrees with Wood that it was defrauded and recovers money, Wood may be entitled to a share of the recovered funds.

AIT, which assists U.S.-Taiwan diplomacy in the absence of formal diplomatic relations with the contested island, was created by the U.S. government in 1979. Under a State Department contract it processes visa applications and performs other commercial and trade-related functions. Because it is under government contract, the Justice Department has asked the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that AIT is a government "instrumentality." Therefore, for the U.S. to sue AIT for damages, as Wood proposes, would mean the government was suing itself, which it may not do.

Wood has been the source of controversy in the past. His 1995 appointment to head the agency outraged China veterans in the U.S. Foreign Service, from whose ranks former envoys had been chosen, according to a 1996 *Los Angeles Times* article by Sara Fritz. Although he once was a Foreign Service officer, Wood had been practicing international trade law in Washington before the appointment.

Less than two years later he resigned while under investigation by the Justice Department for allegations that he solicited campaign contributions for President Clinton from Taiwanese citizens, Fritz wrote in a 1997 article. The *Los Angeles Times* also reported Wood had offered to broker the sale of sensi-

50 YEARS AGO

"The brief pained silence immediately following our reverses in Korea at the hands of the Chinese Communists has since given way to the crescendo of the Great Debate ... Shall the United States retreat from leadership of the Free World?"

—EDITORIAL IN THE
FEBRUARY 1951 FSJ

"There is a propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of momentary passion."

— ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

tive weapons to Taiwan and that he asked two Taiwanese businessmen to hire one of his friends in Washington. Wood denied all allegations, stating he had been falsely accused by his enemies.

In his whistleblower lawsuit, Wood seeks repayment of an undetermined amount of missing funds and unspecified damages for what he said were "false statements" made to force his resignation.

FASHION DON'TS FOR AFRICAN LEADERS

How do you take the measure of a president? By looking at the clothes he or she wears, says one African tailor.

Pathé Ouédraogo, a clothes designer and tailor in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, has met and outfitted leaders like former South African President Nelson Mandela and

current Ivory Coast president Laurent Gbagbo, writes Norimitsu Onishi in the Nov. 13 issue of *The New York Times*. Ouédraogo says Africa's problems begin with its leaders' fashion choices.

"They all want to wear Western suits," he says. "They are ashamed to wear African clothes. When they come to power and think that everything that comes from outside Africa is good, they are no longer Africans."

There are some exceptions, notes Ouédraogo, a pioneer in designing modern clothing with African cloths and patterns. Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria wears traditional flowing gowns, and former Ghanaian president Jerry Rawlings favors kente cloth. Mandela wears shirts Ouédraogo designed, as did Gbagbo before becoming president. Now he seems to favor Western dress, as do most African leaders — especially those in former French colonies. ■

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SPEAKING OUT

Religiously Informed Diplomacy

BY HENRY T. WOOSTER

While I was pleased to see last month's *Journal* explore the connections between religion and foreign policy, I was disappointed that the survey did not make a stronger case for the importance of religious understanding in U.S. diplomacy.

Nor, with the welcome exception of my friend Bill Davnie, did the authors deal directly with the fact that the Foreign Service generally ignores religion (except under the rubric of human rights), or even disparages it. Indeed, uttering "religion" and "foreign affairs" in the same breath in diplomatic circles these days normally raises the specter of militant Islam — fanatics outside the reach of reason or compromise. In my experience, when FSOs perceive a colleague as "religious" (whatever the particular creed), that tag can elicit similar sentiments about that officer's objectivity (if not rationality).

As you might guess from the foregoing, my faith is a bedrock component of my worldview. But I want to be clear: My purpose in addressing this topic is not to discuss anyone's personal relationship to God — or confirmed atheism. Rather, it is to highlight a problem I first recognized in graduate school, when I began pondering the intersection of religion and politics: Standard political analysis undervalues the importance of religion in most societies. All too often, the result, as I have seen in my subsequent diplomatic career, is uninformed, misguided foreign policy recommendations and choices (e.g., our failure to anticipate or respond appro-

*Foreign Service
officers who
eschew religious
understanding
only flatten their
intellectual
posture.*



riately to the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran).

Religion as a Political Force

All around the world, religious beliefs are a powerful force in the lives of individuals and nations, shaping personalities, historical perspectives and political convictions. In Northern Ireland, religion has long defined one's community, politics and ideology, and it has played a similar role in the former Yugoslavia over the past decade. Since the USSR's collapse, Russian nationalists have used religion to set their traditions apart; some have touted religious distinctions to advance chauvinistic domestic and foreign policies (particularly in the "Near Abroad" or former Soviet Union).

Religious institutions can also act as moral beacons, especially in societies where one faith predominates. To varying degrees, we have seen this

recently played out in the Philippines, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Poland. In each of these cases, the church has reminded the state of its moral obligations. Operating at a level above the body politic, religious institutions can also restrain passions — or stir them up. (Political officers who can recognize this point have come far in judging a country's ripeness for revolution or, as the case may be, reconciliation.)

By attracting people from similar backgrounds, worship services may well forge a common political outlook. Messages from the pulpit can bring latent political tendencies to the surface; continued interaction with like-minded members can reinforce these tendencies. The greater the role the institution plays in defining its members' lives, the greater its potential influence upon their "worldly" activities.

In addition, religious institutions are natural political organizations. Generally, they enjoy legitimacy within a society — prestige that can yield or enhance political credibility. (In many countries, the religious institution might be the only well-organized group to which a citizen belongs.) Religious agencies dispense an array of social services, sometimes through worldwide operations. Thus, the churches, synagogues, mosques and temples supporting them frequently have a keen interest in government policies.

For all these reasons, religious institutions and social structures can promote an interest in politics, though they differ greatly in the degree to



which they assert a connection between faith and political principles. It should also be noted that one finds people of faith on different sides of most issues across the political spectrum. Accordingly, religious faith has inspired loyalty to some governments while it has fomented revolution against others.

Still, if religious institutions want to transmit political messages, they have the means to do so efficiently: professional, articulate leaders, headquarters, membership rolls, and regular meetings and publications.

Religious Disenfranchisement

None of this should be surprising given our own history, of course. After all, U.S. foreign policy reflects American values, and religion has long influenced our national outlook. From this country's inception as a "city on a hill" to the doctrine of "manifest destiny," the United States once asserted its destiny as God's kingdom. For most of our history, Americans have relied on churches and synagogues to imbue people with the moral basis for civic virtue. Similarly, there was once a consensus that world peace could only come about if it were based on the righteousness of God and the brotherhood of all people.

But World War I and the Depression changed that attitude. Platitudes about moral progress and the essential goodness of human nature gave way to interest in public and foreign policies on the part of religious organizations. Beginning in the 1930s, an Evangelical and Reformed Church pastor, Reinhold Niebuhr, became a respected foreign policy sage. Over the next quarter-century, in a series of books, articles and reviews, he made the case that, given the then-looming peril of communism, it was morally incumbent upon Christians to replace their idealistic

FSOs simply cannot afford to misunderstand the character of a society, or how it is governed, by failing to recognize the religious dimension.

progressivism with political pragmatism.

Throughout this century, the debate over American foreign policy has been distinguished by its robust and serious moral (if not overtly faith-based) tone. Just during the past 20 years, for example, the U.S. confronted the ayatollah in Iran, had a go at peacekeeping in Lebanon, and supported the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviets. During the 1980s, revolts by religious minorities threatened various governments friendly to the West, raising the possibility of U.S. diplomatic or military intervention. At the same time, American support for anti-communist governments and movements in Latin America roused opposition from religious leaders concerned about human rights and U.S. hegemony. Meanwhile, U.S. religious leaders urged Washington to negotiate nuclear weapon reductions, admit more political refugees from Central America, and cut economic ties with South Africa.

The tempo of post-Cold War U.S. interventions abroad (often undertaken on explicitly moral grounds) makes it all the more striking that religion is not a better understood element in

our foreign affairs discourse.

I see several factors at work:

- The separation of church and state in American life — a principle I support — can blind FSOs from seeing the extent to which religion and politics mix in the rest of the world.

- The "Establishment liberal" ethos that dominates Foreign Service culture (albeit less than before) declares that religion and enlightenment just don't mix. Rationality, as several of last month's authors rightly noted, is a heralded diplomatic value.

- As modernists, some FSOs accept the proposition that religion is obsolete or irrelevant, claiming that various political ideologies have taken its place. Yet some political philosophers have held that the important concepts of modern political thought are actually secularized theological concepts.

Religion in Foreign Affairs

Despite these sentiments, religion remains a vital force on the world's stage. Accordingly, ideological or social baggage notwithstanding, FSOs simply cannot afford to misunderstand the character of a society, or how it is governed, by failing to recognize this dimension. After all, U.S. decision-makers look to us to interpret all of an issue's social circumstances and historical sources. Officers who eschew religious understanding only flatten their intellectual posture; rationality subordinates all other elements, to the detriment of sound analysis and workable policy.

Such rationalism also tends to foster the dangerous conviction that we can win an easy triumph over non-rational forces. Yet religion is persistent, resisting every attempt of political ideology, technology and the marketplace to supplant it. Thus, whenever religious and political loyalties collide, the choice may well favor the former.

SPEAKING OUT


Furthermore, assessing religion's role in foreign affairs can present formidable difficulties. A religiously minded person's inner faith speaks to life's major issues, but the actions he or she takes as a result may be the result of study and thought, or of obscurantism.

Likewise, differences among religious groups and their approaches to the same questions can be daunting. Theologians have yet to lay down proposals that would gain the united support of even their own corner of the church universal. (One may begin to see parallels with diplomacy!)

Policy debates with a moral dimension do not readily lend themselves to compromise. The inability to compromise may breed support for extremist actions. People who believe they are acting under God's direct instruction may regard compromise as a betrayal of divine intent. Thus opponents are not simply wrong, or even misguided, but evil. Under such conditions, as Scott Appleby discussed in his essay on fundamentalism in last month's issue, one suspends the normal courtesies due an opponent.

I recognize that the mere airing of this topic may make many FSOs uncomfortable. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the ability to get one's mind around the inner logic and force of religion — the grammar of religion, if you will — would allow FSOs to better comprehend many foreign affairs issues. ■

Henry Wooster, currently on the Russia desk, joined the State Department in 1991 as a Civil Service employee. He served excursion tours in the OSCE, Dushanbe, Moscow, Tbilisi and Port-au-Prince before entering the Foreign Service in July 2000. He was one of the authors of Religion: The Mission Dimension of Statecraft (Oxford University Press, 1994).



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GROWING DEMOCRACY



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During the Clinton administration, government rhetoric pledging allegiance to democratic development worldwide reached an unprecedented level. This issue of *FSJ* uncovers the real record on democracy promotion behind the official noise and speculates on the future of democratic development.

President Jimmy Carter was a proponent of human rights and democratization policy at a time when the United States had often preferred to deal with strong authoritarian leaders. His democracy work as president and afterward, which he describes in "Free Elections Are Only the Beginning," undoubtedly made way for, in his words, today's "broad acceptance" of the idea that democracy is worth promoting.

Despite wide agreement that democracy should be encouraged, the United States sometimes has trouble helping other nations democratize. Government infighting and competing national interests can dilute democracy promotion programs. Carnegie Endowment senior associate Thomas Carothers argues that the approaches of the State Department and USAID to this endeavor often con-

flict and suggests how the two agencies can better cooperate.

While the U.S. has had some success in implementing democracy programs, when threats to security and prosperity become pressing, the U.S. slips democracy promotion policy to the bottom of its "To Do" list. In Latin America in the 1990s, democracy policy took second place behind drug policy, immigration policy and economic interests, argues Inter-American Dialogue fellow Michael Shifter. Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellow Amy Hawthorne wonders how the U.S. can promote democracy without shortchanging other interests — Israeli security, access to petroleum, curbing terrorism — in the region.

And U.S. policy isn't the only outside force that can drive political change. Carnegie associate Shanthi Kalathil wonders if the Internet is necessarily a force for political liberalization in Asia or if it in fact could strengthen the hand of the region's authoritarian regimes.

— Caroline Benner

FREE ELECTIONS ARE ONLY THE BEGINNING



Photograph: Emma Seimmeder

President Jimmy Carter observes elections in Nigeria.

THE EX-PRESIDENCY CAN ALSO BE A BULLY PULPIT FOR PROMOTING BROAD DEMOCRATIC CHANGE AROUND THE WORLD.

BY JIMMY CARTER

he extremely close U.S. presidential election this year brought home dramatically to Americans and the world the importance of good elections to democratic societies. We all watched in amazement as the determination of who would be the next president of the United States depended on a razor-thin margin of votes in the state of Florida.

What was never in doubt, however, was the principle that a free and fair election was the only legitimate and accepted basis for transferring power from the outgoing government to the new administration. Even as the two candidates and their parties struggled in the courts of law and public opinion to prevail, no one ever suggested that the contest could be decided by any other means. America's fundamental democratic principles, so crucial to the protection of

freedom and human rights, are not as deeply rooted in many nations around the world, and it is for that reason that the Carter Center has chosen to promote free elections in the last 20 years.

When we left the White House in January 1981 after being on the short end of an election, Rosalynn and I, being relatively young and in good health, wanted to continue to play a role in promoting world peace. Having had the great honor of serving as president of the United States gave me a special opportunity to do something useful and active in a nonpartisan way in my post-presidential years.

In 1982 we founded the Carter Center to work especially on issues of conflict prevention and resolution. We wanted the Center to be a nongovernmental, neutral place where warring parties could sit down together and with our help try to find ways to move from war to peace. The Carter Center remains actively involved in that work today, with a staff of experts in conflict resolution working with me on such thorny issues as the civil war in Sudan and reconciliation needs in East Timor as it approaches independence. The Center has programs in health and agriculture as well as our peace programs, so our motto is "waging peace, fighting disease, building hope." The peace programs address not only conflict resolution and elections but also the need for greater rule of law, anti-corruption mechanisms, respect for human rights, broad citizen participation in national development strategies, and strengthening of civil society organizations.

Fencing With Noriega

Our election monitoring activities had a dramatic start in Panama in 1989. I led a delegation in partnership with the National Democratic Institute to observe elections orchestrated by Gen. Manuel Noriega. After the balloting had concluded and a "quick count" revealed that the general's candidates were losing badly, I tried to get Noriega to accept that fact, but his response was to bar access to the vote tabulation. When the national election commission began to announce voting results, we could see that

President of the United States from 1977 to 1981, Jimmy Carter chairs the Carter Center in Atlanta, Ga., a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization advancing peace and health worldwide.

***I shouted in my best
high school Spanish,
"Are you honest
people or thieves?"***

they were using falsified tally sheets that were different from the originals we had inspected the night before.

Outraged, I pushed myself onto the stage and shouted out in my best high school Spanish: "Are you honest people or are you thieves? You are stealing the election from the people of

Panama!" After that, Noriega's troops blocked me in my hotel and kept me from crossing the street to the press center where the international press was gathered. I got word to reporters, who came over to our hotel, where I held a press conference to denounce the government's blatant electoral fraud. Noriega ended up nullifying the election results, but his candidates never attempted to take office. Later, as a result of U.S. military action, Noriega was arrested, and the real election victors assumed power. Had a free and fair electoral process been permitted, the invasion, loss of life and damage, and perhaps the imprisonment of the general could have been avoided altogether. Free elections do matter, and we have monitored peaceful and successful subsequent elections in Panama.

In addition, the Carter Center has observed some 30 elections in 20 countries, and for the past four years, we have been monitoring democratic village elections in China. Working alongside other U.S. democracy organizations such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, as well as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the European Union and other regional bodies, we have helped to make international election observation an accepted norm and a powerful tool to help ensure free elections. But we also have learned that election day observation is not enough to prevent fraud.

Nowadays, attempts to rig elections have become more sophisticated, and thus our observation methodologies have evolved accordingly. We place more emphasis on pre-election activities, such as verifying voter registration rolls, eligibility standards for candidates, access to media, and any evidence of intimidation of voters. We put these under the heading of what we call the "level playing field" standard. I meet with candidates, electoral authorities, and heads of state to get their commitments to ensure a fair election and to accept the results of a free election. We also put our observers in place for a longer

time. We had observers in East Timor four to six weeks before the August 1999 referendum ballot so they could report on flagrant electoral abuses that were occurring with the support of the Indonesian military.

The same is true for post-electoral observation. Carter Center staff often will stay in a country to observe final vote tabulation, announcement of results, and graceful acceptance of the results by all parties. Having demonstrated our impartiality, we are sometimes asked to help mediate disputes between the parties. In the controversial presidential elections in Nicaragua in 1990, the Sandinistas, to their utter disbelief, were defeated in an open election by an opposition coalition, UNO. The Sandinistas were reluctant to hand over power to their opponents, especially with the U.S.-supported and armed Contra forces in northern Nicaragua and across the border in Honduras. For two days I mediated between UNO and the Sandinistas about disarmament of the Contras, the future of the Sandinista army, and the status of property seized from the Somozas. The election results were finally accepted by all sides, and Violeta Chamorro became the president of Nicaragua. Nicaraguans will go to the polls again this year for the second free national election since 1990. Countries like Nicaragua are rewriting their democratic histories, previously marked by election fraud and violence.

From Nigeria to Indonesia

Recent elections we have observed have been of great significance to the advancement of democracy. Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, suffered under military dictatorship after a free election in 1993 won by Chief Abiola was aborted. After the sudden death in 1998 of General Sani Abacha, a brutal tyrant, I immediately called the new head of state, General Abubakar, to offer my support for his announced transition to elected civilian government. He was a man of his word. He set a timetable for elections and complied with it faithfully.

I went to Nigeria twice during the electoral process, where the Carter Center partnered with NDI for international monitoring of four rounds of voting. While open and competitive, the presidential election was flawed by serious voting irregularities — not by the government, but by the competing parties, making it ultimately impos-

***In Nigeria, we described
the shortcomings
but supported the
democratic transition
anyhow.***

sible to verify accurately the outcome of balloting. It was one of the toughest observation missions I have undertaken. On the one hand, it was vitally important to help Nigeria make a successful transition from military to civilian rule. On the other hand, international standards for free and fair elections had to be defended. We did what we were duty bound

to do: candidly and honestly describing the shortcomings of the process but respecting the overriding need for Nigeria through that election to put itself back on the path to democratic government. Nigeria's success and its leadership role in Africa are critical to the future of democracy in the entire continent.

The Indonesia national legislature election in June 1999 was truly incredible and equally momentous. The election there literally tipped the balance in favor of democracy in Asia. The civic energy generated by the movement to overthrow the 32-year Suharto regime led to an amazingly high level of participation in the electoral process, especially by young people.

Indonesia, with a population of more than 200 million people and 17,000 islands spanning the Pacific over a distance greater than the east-to-west length of the continental United States, had not held a free election since 1955, if ever. Yet we observed the organization of numerous new political parties and the rejuvenation of the traditional parties. Campaigning was done Indonesian-style with massive, noisy party caravans on alternating days and bright banners and flags in the colors of the parties lining the streets and filling the countryside.

On a peaceful election day, voter turnout was very high, and the conduct of the balloting was quite good under daunting logistical challenges. What was most remarkable, however, was that more than 200,000 trained domestic observers monitored the election in addition to the international observation teams. This gave a much-needed guarantee of the integrity of the process. Vote counting was done in public at the polling stations in the presence of observers and voters. I recall visiting one place where dozens of voters stayed to watch the count, good-naturedly forming cheering sections to cheer as votes for their favored candidates were called out.

Overall, vote tabulation nationally turned out to be tortuously slow, leaving plenty of room for election

administration improvements next time, but what our delegation could certify was a striking expression of the democratic aspirations of the Indonesian people.

Indonesia is the world's largest Islamic nation, and it is hoped that its bold efforts to consolidate democracy can serve as an example to other largely Islamic nations in the Middle East and Central Asia. Indonesia also has a history of religious tolerance among its Muslim, Christian, and Hindu communities, but that value is still being sorely tested by sectarian strife surfacing as a part of the release of pent-up social tensions in the country from the long years of the authoritarian regime.

Nigeria and Indonesia serve as good examples of another important point: one election cannot make a country democratic. In fact, elections alone do not make a country truly democratic. Elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. Nigeria and Indonesia and so many other countries in which free elections are now held have a long road to travel before democracy is consolidated institutionally and democratic social values become paramount.

Establishing the rule of law, protecting human rights effectively, promoting freedom of expression and independent media, accepting the role of civil society in the public arena, among others, all take time and must develop alongside regular, periodic free elections. This is perhaps the main lesson learned by the Carter Center and me after nearly two decades of work promoting free elections and seeing both international and domestic election observation become an accepted international norm with recognized standards.

Exporting American Democracy?

Another lesson learned is that financial assistance to support democratic development in other countries can be effective and is in the national interest of the United States. It is not "exporting democracy, American style;" it is responding to governments and civic groups that want to build democratic societies based on universal principles but adapted to their own national historical and cultural experience.

In today's world, so different from what I faced when entering the White House in 1977, there is broad acceptance of this principle. In the Bamako Declaration of last

The call for democracy is now being taken up by the community of nations.

November, the Francophone nations declared, "Democracy [is] a system of universal values..." and to consolidate democracy, action ought to be based on "international cooperation informed by the practices and positive experiences of each state and member government." Similarly, the final Warsaw

Declaration of the Community of Democracies ministerial meeting in June 2000 endorsed by 106 countries stated: "The Community of Democracies affirms our determination to work together to promote and strengthen democracy, recognizing that we are at differing stages in our democratic development. We will cooperate to consolidate and strengthen democratic institutions, with due respect for sovereignty and the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. Our goal is to support adherence to common democratic values and standards, [as outlined above]. To that end, our governments hereby agree to abide by these principles in practice, and to support one another in meeting these objectives which we set for ourselves today." Support for elections and democratic development has now become mainstream foreign policy, with successive administrations strengthening U.S. efforts in this field.

The new administration, like its Republican and Democratic predecessors, has a key role to play, because the United States is not only a military superpower but also the leading democratic nation in the world. Free elections do matter, as we have seen so recently in Serbia and Croatia. Helping those nations consolidate democracy and helping other nations, including China, make peaceful democratic political transitions is one of the challenging tasks of the 21st century. By definition, it is a long-term task requiring patience, material resources, bipartisan congressional support, and greater public explanation of complex foreign policy goals.

In this effort, springing from the deeply held democratic values of the American people, private organizations also have an important role to play. That is why Rosalynn and I hope to head a Carter Center election observation mission to Guyana in March and an NDI/Carter Center election delegation to Peru in April. This is what we at the Carter Center mean by "waging peace," and we plan to continue doing this for as long as we can.

Oh, by the way, we also need to improve election administration in the United States. ■

DEMOCRACY, STATE AND AID: A TALE OF TWO CULTURES



R THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND USAID OFTEN TAKE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO PROMOTING DEMOCRACY ABROAD. CAN THEY WORK TOGETHER?

By THOMAS CAROTHERS

Recently I was in Eastern Europe researching U.S. democracy assistance (I'll leave the country unnamed to respect the privacy of the interviewees mentioned here). Early in my trip I met with the USAID mission director, who gave me a rundown of the portfolio of U.S. aid projects aimed at advancing the country's attempted democratic transition. It was similar to what I have seen in many other countries — a mix of efforts to bolster independent media, encourage nongovernmental organizations involved in civic advocacy, advance judicial reform, strengthen local government, and other similar programs. The mission director stressed the long-term nature of their efforts, the need for caution and modest expectations, and the value of working outside the capital city at the grassroots level.

A day or two later in the same country I met with the U.S. ambassador and asked him to describe the U.S. government's approach to aiding democracy there. He quickly denigrated what USAID was doing, accusing USAID of being too interested in studies, assessments, and project plans and too enamored of NGOs and local level activity. What the U.S. government should focus on, he said, are key politicians with real influence. The embassy should

send them on study tours to the United States to learn how democracy works and keep the pressure on them at pivotal junctures to make sure they do the right things politically, like not appointing weak or corrupt people to important posts. The U.S. government should also, he emphasized, make sure the political leaders "pull off" the next presidential election with some credibility. And to ensure a visible stamp of approval for that, the U.S. government should sponsor a high-level U.S. electoral delegation to those elections.

These contrasting points of view — variations of which I have heard in numerous countries over the years — showcase two distinct philosophies on how to aid democracy abroad that coexist uneasily within the U.S. government. On the one hand, in dozens of countries USAID underwrites technocratic democracy aid programs, such as efforts designed to improve the efficiency of judiciaries and legislatures or to get nongovernmental organizations to engage in more serious planning and organizational development. These activities are based on a model of democratization as a long-term developmental process consisting of the gradual reform of major state institutions matched by the slow building up of civil society, often with an emphasis on NGO development at the local level. This model is applied all around the world, in very different countries. In Guatemala for example,

Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has written extensively on democracy promotion, including his recent book Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Carnegie Endowment).

There are two distinct philosophies on how to aid democracy abroad which coexist uneasily within the U.S. government.

USAID has been working for 15 years to aid democracy by supporting the reform of the judiciary and the legislature while also trying to bolster the development of NGOs both in the capital and the countryside. In Russia, a country with an entirely different political background, USAID's democracy efforts have been basically similar. The long-term developmental nature of USAID's approach reflects the fact that its democracy programs originate

from the same processes of strategic planning, assessment, and results management as do the more traditional types of U.S. foreign aid, such as public health work, agricultural development, or poverty reduction. The technocratic quality of the programs derives from USAID's continuing hesitancy about doing anything that appears to be too openly political, even in the very political domain of democracy building.

In contrast, many State Department officials who engage in democracy promotion, especially those posted abroad, work from very different instincts and impulses. They want action, not studies and assessments. They focus on politicians and political events, not on developmental processes. They want to concentrate on the here and now, not on long-term change. They are often skeptical about the importance of NGOs. They like to use visitor programs, high-level diplomatic visits, and election observer missions as strategic tools and do not shy away from emphasizing the American model of democracy. In Guatemala, for example, various U.S. ambassadors and State Department officers in the embassy have over the years emphasized jawboning of senior Guatemalan officials as the best way to get positive change on democracy and have often been skeptical about the value of NGO work and other long-term, less direct approaches. In Russia, State Department officials often interpreted democracy promotion as meaning specific support for specific political figures, above all, persistent efforts throughout the 1990s to bolster President Boris Yeltsin.

In some countries, due to particular personalities or circumstances, USAID and State manage to work

F O C U S

effectively together on democracy aid, with visitor programs and political jawboning used to reinforce democracy aid programs aimed at different institutions or sectors. In Bulgaria, for example, cooperation across State and USAID lines on democracy promotion has worked well in recent years, with the ambassador fully on board with the USAID approach and State officials adding their own efforts. More often than not, however, the two agencies do not work so well together. USAID frequently ends up working by itself on democracy aid programs with State officials paying little attention to activities they regard as marginal. Or the two organizations work at cross-purposes, sending conflicting signals in the host country. For example, while USAID is stressing the importance of NGOs and local civic advocacy, State Department

**The State Department
wants action
on democracy,
not studies and
assessments.**

officials may be dismissing the significance of such groups in their meetings with high-level politicians.

State/USAID Differences

The philosophical differences between USAID and State on democracy aid are of course part of a larger divide. Despite the efforts of a few years back to integrate USAID more closely under State Department authority, the two organizations still live in fairly separate worlds. Some critics of USAID argue that USAID refuses to tailor its work closely enough to U.S. foreign policy goals. USAID officials counter that they have made an effort to align their strategic priorities with those of the State Department. They also believe that State does not have an exclusive say in what those goals are and that promoting long-term economic, social, and political development all around the

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world is very much part of America's mission.

Distinct subcultures separate the two organizations as does a regrettable accumulation of mutual dislike. In private, many State officials are prone to express disdain for an aid agency they see as hopelessly bureaucratic and ineffective. USAID officials in turn often view the department as the out-of-date preserve of diplomats interested in little more than "who's in-who's out" political analysis and their own career prospects.

It is tempting to downplay this split over democracy aid by portraying the approaches of USAID and State as complementary halves of a single whole. In fact, however, the two approaches are not mutually reinforcing and both are in need of some revision. State Department officials skeptical of, or uninterested in, democracy aid as practiced by USAID should recognize that using foreign assistance to promote democracy (as opposed to the more direct types of political action that State likes to engage in) has become a real field in the past 10 years, not just in America, but in many aid-giving countries, from Australia to Sweden, and in numerous international institutions as well. This growth of democracy aid does not mean that it is dramatically effective — modest expectations are appropriate — but it does indicate that it is much more than a passing enthusiasm of a few American idealists. Many early democracy aid programs were indeed embarrassingly simplistic and misguided. But those who implement these programs have learned a lot, and the field is growing in sophistication and accomplishment. USAID is certainly too bureaucratic and frustratingly slow in many instances. But State officials should not dismiss as wasted effort all studies, assessments, and evaluations that they see in the democracy field. Promoting democracy is usually a complex business, one that in many cases merits reflection and study before plunging in. And though a long-term approach can be an excuse for lack of focus, in many problematic democratic transitions, whether in Ukraine, Nigeria, Indonesia, or Nicaragua, anything other than a long-term focus is likely to be a recipe for failure.

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At the same time, USAID officials must not retreat into a technocratic, specialized conception of democracy promotion, one that denies the basic fact that such work is inherently political. A focus on politicians and political junctures is inevitably a necessary part of such work. The nature of politics requires democracy programs to move quickly in some circumstances and to use old-fashioned political leverage to gain results.

Although USAID can make a good argument for keeping near-exclusive control within the U.S. government for programs to promote social and economic development, in the democracy domain it must accept partnership with State.

Bridging the Gap

With a new team taking up positions at State and USAID, and continued bipartisan support in our political system for democracy promotion abroad, the opportunity exists for a constructive effort to bridge the gap between the two cultures of democracy aid. The United States can and should play a role in helping democratic transitions succeed in many parts of the world, especially in southeastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. It will do so more effectively if State and USAID understand each other better on this front and work toward a synthesis of approaches.

The challenge in this domain is to avoid a debate over approaches to democracy aid becoming merely a squabble over institutional arrangements. State and USAID must try not to fall into a tug-of-war over whether democracy aid (or all foreign aid) should be brought into the State Department and run out of expanded sections of the regional bureaus or from an enlarged global division. If it is framed as such, the issue will become merely a turf battle, fought on the lines of power, control, budgets, and personalities, like any other bureaucratic turf battle. It is important to recognize that the institutional arrangements for democracy programs do not necessarily determine whether the programs succeed or fail. Both good and bad democracy programs can come out of a USAID operating relatively separately from the State

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Department or from a State Department that has incorporated USAID. It is critical to work first toward a consensus on some fundamental elements of a good approach to democracy aid and then to move toward informed study of what institutional arrangements will most easily and effectively achieve them. I suggest the following basic points as building blocks of such a consensus.


No Place for Amateurs

First, institutional arrangements for democracy aid must be built on a recognition of the fact that this is a domain in which expertise is fast accumulating and the place for enthusiastic amateurs is shrinking. If the U.S. government wishes to continue to be in the business of sponsoring democracy programs, it will have to have a substantial in-house professional capacity to do so

Some critics argue that USAID refuses to tailor its work closely enough to U.S. foreign policy goals.


(unless more radical changes are considered, such as turning over the entire matter to some large new private or semi-private foundation — a complex subject of its own). USAID has developed such a capacity, albeit slowly, as real training for democracy work did not begin until 10 years after USAID began mounting such programs on a broad scale. The notion that State Department officers could simply tack on a few democracy aid duties to their existing work is misguided. If the State Department were to play a dominant role in democracy promotion, it would have to take substantial steps to develop the capacity to do such work, which would be no small task.

Second, to oversee the design, implementation, and evaluation of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of democracy aid projects, an extensive field presence is



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necessary. Attempting to run everything from Washington would be a mistake, despite whatever benefits such an approach would bring in terms of central direction or coordination. This fact implies that whether democracy aid is primarily a USAID or a State function, the U.S. embassy or aid mission in recipient countries should continue to have a major role in the process.

Third, creating institutional arrangements that allow real flexibility and adaptability for democracy programs is essential. Aid providers cannot assume that democratic transitions will unfold in predictable linear paths. Institutional arrangements must allow democracy promoters to set up or shut down their activities quickly, to substantially adjust them along the way, and to take risks. It is also unrealistic to assume that democracy can be broken down into quantifiable bits to fit numerically-based systems of evaluation of the sort that USAID has tried to use in recent years. Evaluation mechanisms, which are certainly necessary, must primarily utilize qualitative rather than quantitative information, preferably generated by genuinely independent evaluators, such as scholars and other research analysts. USAID has struggled to meet such imperatives but has often fallen short because democracy aid has been forced into the same bureaucratic structures as aid in traditional developmental sectors such as health and agriculture. The creation of the Office of Transition Initiatives in the mid-1990s at USAID was a step in the right direction; it established a mechanism somewhat outside USAID's traditional bureaucratic labyrinth that allowed for more flexible, rapid programming.

Needed: More Transparency

Fourth, democracy aid programs benefit from a diversity of actors. The temptation to call for greater order in the rather decentralized world of democracy aid is an understandable reflex but an incorrect one. USAID is sometimes criticized for the welter of organizations that carry out its programs, including non-profit democracy organizations, for-profit development contractors, educational institutions, and advocacy NGOs. There are certainly problems with the ways USAID chooses its partners: The biggest problem is

Too often, USAID and State communicate poorly with people in the recipient countries.

that the organization's contracting processes often limit the bidding for larger projects to a small circle of organizations. Having many groups involved is a plus. These outside groups bring specialized skills in areas such as civic advocacy, media work, and political party development that the U.S. government itself inevitably lacks. They try different methods which can foster a spirit of


healthy competition and experimentalism. The range of organizations involved in democracy promotion should be further increased by simplifying USAID's bidding procedures and avoiding the pattern of omnibus contracting arrangements that favor the few.

Fifth, although it is good to have many American groups taking part in the implementation of democracy programs, an effort should be made to increase the proportion of aid that goes directly to groups or persons in the recipient countries. Neither USAID nor State has a special advantage in this regard. Both have some experience in establishing direct grant mechanisms, experience that should be expanded upon.

Sixth, whether new institutional arrangements are developed or the existing ones preserved, it is crucial that U.S. aid providers be very open about the democracy work they do. Too often, USAID and State communicate poorly with the U.S. public as well as with people in the recipient countries about these efforts. This failing contributes to weak U.S. public support for democracy aid and considerable ignorance and suspicion about it in the places where it is carried out. Democracy aid must exemplify the same good-governance principles of transparency and accountability that it seeks to foster in other societies.

In sum, the right way forward is neither to continue with democracy aid as it is nor to hastily shift it all over to the State Department. There is a need for a serious review of existing approaches in this domain and a consensus-building exercise among State, USAID, other interested U.S. agencies, and the main democracy promotion NGOs, on the fundamental principles and methods of U.S. efforts in this domain. Then and only then should new institutional arrangements be considered or established. With hard work, the "tale of two cultures" in democracy aid can be brought to a close and a more coherent story begun. ■

THE INTERNET AND ASIA: BROADBAND OR BROAD BANS?



ALTHOUGH EAST ASIAN SOCIETIES ARE INCREASINGLY WIRED, THE JURY IS STILL OUT ON WHETHER THE INTERNET WILL BE A REAL FORCE FOR POLITICAL CHANGE.

BY SHANTHI KALATHIL

Analyses of recent political upheaval in authoritarian systems such as those in Peru, Mexico, and Yugoslavia, largely ignore any role the Internet may have played in spurring political change. At the same time, many experts recognize that political activists in various countries may have affected political developments by using Web sites and e-mail lists to communicate and organize — witness such activity in the years leading up to the fall of long-standing Indonesian president Suharto. In sum, there is no consensus on whether there is a clear-cut mechanism that connects the Internet with democratic transitions around the world. Yet the relationship between the Internet and democratization is gaining greater attention in both policy circles and the developing world. Asia's rapid technological development, as well as its growing strategic importance, makes the question of Internet-related democratization especially relevant in this region.

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Some believe that the Internet will play a crucial role in cracking open closed regimes and deepening new democracies, especially those in Asia where access to the Internet is growing rapidly. They point to the use of the Internet by groups such as China's Falun Gong, which marshaled thousands of protesters for a peaceful sit-in in front of the leadership compound in Beijing. They also note that Internet cafes have appeared in abundance everywhere from communist Vietnam to democratic South Korea, offering opportunities for citizens to exchange views and learn about the world beyond their borders.

On the other hand, many Asian countries have created skeins of Internet regulations tangled enough to ensnare even the most enthusiastic proponents of Internet-driven democratization. China's urban centers may teem with new Web startups and hip Internet cafes, but central authorities continue to smother them with restrictive edicts, arrest violators and promote self-censorship. And some governments have gone even further in attempting to control the Internet: They have adopted top-down approaches for promoting the Internet for economic development.

Democracy's New Standard-bearer?

So it is not yet clear if the Internet will become democracy's new standard-bearer. This is partly due to the novelty of the technology — the Internet did not exist in its current form during the democratic transitions commonly referred to as "the third wave," a term used by political scientists to refer to democratic transitions that took place between 1974 and 1990. Also, although a connection has long been posited between the spread of information and communication technology (ICT) and democracy, there have been few academic studies to measure the Internet's role in fostering democracy in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries.

Additionally, it would be premature to discuss the Internet's political impact without mentioning its pene-

tration, defined generally as Internet users per capita. In Asia, Internet use is growing in newly industrializing countries like Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, as well as in developing countries such as China and India. Yet this does not mean that all of Asia will be wired at the same time or speed. According to estimates in the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, Internet penetration is expected by 2004 to top 50 percent in the more developed countries of Japan, Australia, South Korea,

Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Malaysia, which has enthusiastically promoted a wired economy, is expected to see penetration of around 23 percent by the same year, while elsewhere in east and southeast Asia, such as in the Philippines, penetration is not predicted to reach six percent or, in some cases, even one percent, as in Indonesia. Even in China and India, both huge countries that are emphasizing the incorporation of ICT into development strategies and their economies as a whole, penetration is not expected to exceed six percent by 2004.

Such numbers help encapsulate technology's reach, but they reveal little about the Internet's political impact. In order to understand the role the Internet may play in democratization, it is important to examine who is using the Internet, where it is used, and for what purposes. While there are several ways to disaggregate the Internet's political impact, here it can be analyzed in two key areas: civil society and government.

Civil society, broadly defined as a political realm of ideas and actors separate from state influence or control, is now generally recognized by many scholars as a necessary condition for the democratization process. Civil societal uses of the Internet can be broken down into use by domestic and transnational advocacy groups, civic groups without explicitly political agendas, fledgling opposition movements in authoritarian regimes, and more broadly the mass public. Non-governmental organizations and other civil societal organizations are expanding their use of the Internet in a number of ways. These range from South Korean civic groups holding online membership drives to Indonesian protesters using e-mail to coordinate activities. Internationally, advocacy groups also maintain pressure on authoritarian regimes through e-mail campaigns that connect expatriates and dissidents while keeping

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Western governments informed of developments on the ground.

Governments, on the other hand, are both reacting to the Internet's use by civil society and using it as a tool to further their own agendas. Authoritarian countries such as China walk a fine line between reaping the economic benefits of the technology — for instance, through increased and value-added productivity, skill modernization and job creation — and surrendering a measure of political control. Many governments are trying to regulate the Internet. They are also taking advantage of the Internet to streamline bureaucracy and combat corruption. Opposition political parties are using it to organize support and disseminate information.

Fighting Suharto by E-mail

When considering the Internet's impact on democratization, it is easy to imagine networks of dissidents furiously coordinating protests through rapid-fire e-mail while the prevailing power structure groans and buckles under the weight of these political electrons. In practice, of course, things aren't quite so simple. Yet this scenario does contain a grain of truth.

In China, where independent associations are still technically forbidden, groups have used the Internet to communicate and organize. The Falun Gong, a controversial spiritual movement that disseminates its teachings in part through Web sites and e-mail, has used these Internet resources to organize protests. In April 1999, over ten thousand practitioners staged a silent protest — enabled in part by Internet-based organization — in front of the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing. (The government reacted by suppressing the Falun Gong's Internet presence in China, shutting down its domestic Web sites and setting up its own counter-propaganda on the Web.)

Technology has also played a role in Indonesia's civil society. Anti-Suharto protesters coordinated their message through interactive forums such as news groups and chat rooms during the final years of the Suharto regime. E-mail discussion lists, often based outside Indonesia, became essential to political communication between critics of Suharto's regime inside and outside the country. According to authors David Hill and Krishna Sen, the Maryland-based e-mail list popularly known as *apakabar*

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(meaning "what's news?") which contains uncensored and uncited Indonesian hard news, political gossip and commentaries, helped non-governmental organizations share information with each other. By the end of 1995, Hill and Sen note, the list reached over 10,000 people, most of them Indonesians living in Indonesia.

Certain Indonesian political groups, such as PIJAR (meaning "flame"), a student anti-Suharto group, also used the Internet to e-mail supporters abroad.

Internet-based organizing may help grassroots networks gain enough momentum to coalesce into formal political opposition. When Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad had his deputy Anwar Ibrahim wrongly dismissed and arrested, the immediate outcry was amplified by online protest, both within and outside the country. Web sites set up by Anwar's supporters challenged the official government line on the incident. They kept local Malaysians informed of news that might not otherwise have penetrated, such as criticism of Anwar's arrest by neighboring southeast Asian countries. Ironically, this Internet-aided mobilization would not have been possible had the Malaysian government not made a point of pushing technology as a development tool. It is for these reasons that authoritarian neighbors in Asia are wary of the Internet's modernization potential.

The international community pays the most attention to Internet use by civil society when it occurs in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries. But civil societal groups which use technology to enhance their influence may find the most fertile ground for their activities in relatively recent democracies. South Korea, one of the newer and more vibrant democracies in Asia, boasts an active civil society that is starting to use the Internet in innovative ways to sustain and deepen the process of democratic consolidation. Certain civic groups now use e-mail to influence government officials and political parties. In January 2000, for instance, more than 500 civic groups and NGOs came together in a successful effort to demand the revision of the electoral code. Such groups are also using the Internet to publish reports on politicians' voting records as well as poor attendance records in the legislature. Meanwhile, although political demonstrations are restricted, civil societal groups have hosted "Internet rallies," during which they recruit new mem-

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bers, organize letter writing campaigns, and debate policy.

The Internet's impact on civil society is not limited to its use by non-governmental political advocacy groups. The Internet also makes possible the proliferation of unfiltered news channels through which a country's people can be informed and influenced. Take Indonesia, where online groups and e-mail lists that interpret and recast domestic news for local audiences continue to thrive, years after the collapse of the Suharto regime which they were created to protest.

The International Community

The international community has played an important role in mobilizing support for (usually) democratic causes on the Internet. In Burma (Myanmar), for instance, where the ruling military junta closely controls the Internet, international pressure makes itself felt through the involvement of groups such as the Free Burma Coalition. Activists have told Western media that the Internet enables the Burmese communities outside

the U.S. to connect with each other, stay informed about events within Burma, and act quickly to protest government abuses of power as they happen. One online Burma news service based in Japan compiles news from Burma using various sources and e-mails it to several thousand mailboxes daily.

The international community can also use the Internet to pressure undemocratic governments indirectly. By drawing the attention of policymakers in their own countries to human rights violations and abuses of power in specific regimes, they can exert influence through diplomatic channels or through the international media. The Committee to Protect Journalists circulates and posts on its Web site letters protesting certain governments' restrictions on Internet free speech. These letters go to entities such as the U.S. State Department, the American Society of Newspaper Editors, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, though tangible results from these activities are hard to measure. And Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy has noted that,

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when Cambodian ruler Hun Sen ordered him arrested and forced him to flee to United Nations headquarters, e-mails sent to the U.N. and journalists by the international community pressured Hun Sen's security apparatus to halt the arrest at the last minute. "Because of the e-mail, people could move in time to warn Hun Sen (about the repercussions of his ordering my arrest)," Rainsy told the online magazine *Salon*.

Big Brother on The Web

Civil society is not the only group of actors which recognizes the potential political power of the Internet. Authoritarian governments are wary of the political communication the Internet makes possible. Many have pushed measures to control the technology and shape the Internet's development to their needs. In some cases, an authoritarian regime deals with the problem of new technology by simply not allowing any Internet penetration at all, save for members of the society's political and business elite. Given that North Korea prevents its citizens from accessing the Internet, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's recent request for former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's e-mail address seems especially ironic.

Some countries, such as Burma and Laos, have embraced measures designed to prevent the Internet and even simpler technologies such as fax machines from reaching the majority of citizens. Laos recently set up a government body to regulate the Internet which prohibits online data theft, pornography, the publication of national secrets and using the Internet to protest against the government. Burma's ruling junta regularly taps telephone lines and intercepts those few authorized e-mails that are allowed — ordinary citizens generally do not have access to the Internet. It also mandates that fax machines, computers, and satellite dishes be registered with the government. In 1996, Burma passed a law that promises seven to 15 years in prison for anyone who attempts to use the Internet without prior permission from the proper government authority. New sets of Internet regulations which prohibit the use of the Web for political speech were introduced in January 2000.

As might be expected, the most extreme examples of

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Internet regulation come from regimes most fearful of uncontrolled communication and organization. China, which has adopted a slightly more measured approach than Burma to regulating Internet use, has blocked certain Web sites such as that of *The Washington Post* and published exhaustive guidelines for Web site operation and content. Yet the Chinese government actively encourages the development of Internet businesses and an Internet-

savvy culture, primarily to ensure that the technology's economic benefits don't pass the country by. To reconcile its economic interest in promoting the Internet with its political need to squelch free-flowing information, the government relies on broad regulatory phrases — such as making it a crime for anyone to publish "state secrets" on the Internet — to leave itself plenty of room for maneuver when deciding how and where to selectively crack down. The possibility of being shut down by the government has encouraged self-censorship by Internet companies — which in turn has dampened online political communication.

The Uses of E-Government

Many Asian governments, both authoritarian and democratic, have also made concerted efforts to implement e-government measures, some of which rival those of the most wired countries in Europe and North America. Such measures include everything from putting the minutes of administrative meetings online to allowing members of the public to find and contact local officials easily through government Web sites. Proponents of e-government say it can make the inner workings of government more transparent and ease communication between local branches of the bureaucracy, leading to quicker government processes and more effective policy. Asian democracies believe e-government measures enhance open and representative government while authoritarian regimes see them as a way to consolidate central power.

Even a relative newcomer to the concept like Japan, which lags among developed nations in terms of Internet infrastructure and content, is trying to make ICT development a national goal. A proposed five-year plan set to

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begin immediately would set up an accessible, low-cost nation-wide public Internet framework which includes a proposal for an online government initiative. This e-government initiative would create a more efficient bureaucracy and be better able to connect citizens to government services online.

But online government is not limited to democracies. A strengthened bureaucracy in China, for instance, may enhance the power of the central government by helping it keep a tight grip on the economy through better control of provincial taxation, an area with which it has had problems in the past. The country implemented a "Government Online" project in early 1999 which aims to get a majority of government organs online. The project's goals include posting online government functions, duties, organizational structure and administrative procedures, making available government documents and archives, releasing the daily activities of government departments, and implementing an electronic filing system for documents to improve administrative efficiency.

Chinese officials have also been discussing ways to effectively implement an online taxation system, which could significantly increase the central government's financial strength and give it more power over the richer and more economically independent coastal provinces. The government is also considering having online auctions to combat corruption in awarding government contracts.

Singapore, whose tiny size makes the balance between ICT promotion and control somewhat more manageable, has adopted a sophisticated approach to handling new technology. In the past, it has developed laws to encourage business and elite use of technology — such as permitting large companies the use of satellite dishes — while steering the public toward government-approved (and more easily filtered) channels, such as cable television. With the Internet, the government has relied on monitoring media content and a censorship-friendly national culture to promote non-offensive online political communication. At the same time, the government is promoting the use of the Internet by all its citizens, and has

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overtaken most industrialized countries in putting government services online; it is planning to spend around 1.5 billion Singapore dollars (US\$1.16 billion) in the next three years on its e-Government Action Plan. This plan already offers consumer services, such as the ability to apply for telephone, utilities and television licenses. The plan will further invest in technology, train public servants to use new ICT, and adapt decision-making and administration systems to the information age. Already, 40 percent of Singapore's tax payers submit returns via the Internet. According to *USA Today*, just 28 percent of U.S. tax returns were filed online in 2000.

Even rulers of the most restrictive regimes are doing more than simply worrying about and trying to regulate the Internet. In Burma, for instance, the Internet is being used to disseminate propaganda. The *New Light of Myanmar*, the Burmese government's online English newspaper, carries military propaganda and daily updates on foreign goodwill visits by Burma's

leadership. The government also runs the official Web site Myanmar.com, which attempts to legitimize the current government by offering "the golden land" as an ideal tourist destination.

Opposition parties in democracies and semi-authoritarian countries are trying to use the Internet to mobilize popular support and publicize their political views internationally. However, their success in using the Internet to share their politics depends on how severe, and how well enforced, their government regulations on Internet use are. In Singapore, the ruling People's Action Party dominates use of the Internet for political purposes. Opposition parties have nonetheless attempted to use the medium to disseminate their messages. Two such parties set up Web sites in 1996, although they were subsequently ordered to remove candidate biographies and posters from the sites and accused of having contravened the Parliamentary Elections Act, which did not provide for campaigning on the Internet (although it did not specifically forbid it either).



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LEGISLATIVE WRAP-UP 2000

How the Foreign Service Fared

After two and a half months and 21 Continuing Resolutions to keep the government funded in the new fiscal year, the 106th Congress completed its work on Dec. 15, providing FY2001 appropriations for the Department of State and several other federal agencies. According to AFSA's Congressional Relations Director, Ken Nakamura, in general the Foreign Service did well in the second session of the 106th Congress. Considering what it was like four or five years ago, Nakamura said, we are defining "doing well" as having the appropri-

ations close to the administration's request, rather than in terms of what funding should be to meet the actual needs of the Foreign Service.

In terms of "bread and butter" issues, the Foreign Service was covered by several new laws that can make a material difference in the lives of employees. Here is a summary of how the Foreign Service fared on these issues:

Long Term Care Insurance: PL 106-265 was signed Sept. 19, authorizing OPM to negotiate with insurance companies to

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GRIEVANCE BOARD ■ BY SHARON PAPP, AFSA GENERAL COUNSEL

Department Must Produce OIG Records

The Foreign Service Grievance Board, by an Oct. 23, 2000 order, directed the State Department to produce records of interviews prepared by the Office of the Inspector General. The order follows an earlier ruling in the grievance in which the board held that the State Department could be liable for the OIG's violation of recognized professional standards for conducting investigations. (*AFSA News*, June 2000.) The board's ruling is important for grievants seeking to challenge disciplinary action stemming from an OIG investigation or negative post inspector evaluation reports.

The grievant sought production of records of interviews conducted by the OIG in the course of its investigation of his alleged misconduct. Section 1108 of the Foreign Service Act empowers the Grievance Board to order access to

Continued on page 3

READY TO SERVE

Welcome Words from Powell

Secretary Powell said the right things during his acceptance of the nomination to serve as secretary of State on December 16. Here's an excerpt.

"I spent a good part of my life helping GIs get ready for battle, and I spent a good part of my life up before Congress, working hard to get those troops what they needed. ... But I now will be up

before the Congress, letting them know, in the most powerful terms that I can muster, that the dedicated men and

women of the State Department need that same kind of support. They are in the front lines, they are part of the battle, and

we must make sure that when they go to do the work of the American people they not only have the support that they need, but they have the resources that they need, and that will be a priority of my stewardship as secretary

of State."

AFSA stands ready to assist and support our new secretary. □

The dedicated men and women of the State Department are in the front lines, and we must make sure that they have the support they need.

AFSANewsBriefs



Focus on Scholarships

AFSA Announces New Scholarship

A new AFSA scholarship, the Robert and Evelyn Curtis Memorial Scholarship, has been established through a \$40,000 bequest from the Evelyn Curtis Revocable Trust.

Each year a financial aid scholarship in Mr. and Mrs. Curtis' name will be given to a qualified Foreign Service child to help defray this student's undergraduate expenses. Only the interest from this gift will be bestowed, so the scholarship will go on in perpetuity.

Robert Curtis was born in 1909 and married Evelyn Fillmore in 1942. He served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945 and then worked in purchasing and various accounting firms as a C.P.A. prior to working with the U.S. Army Audit Agency from 1948 to 1951. He then joined the U.S. Agency for International Development in 1951 and served in various controller positions in Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Korea, India, and Brazil from 1951 to 1970. Mr. Curtis retired in 1972. In retirement, he and his wife lived in Oceanside, Calif. Mr. Curtis passed away in 1999, followed by Mrs. Curtis in 2000.



JOSH

Barbara Bell Black Memorial Scholarship

In November, Robert Black made another generous gift of \$25,000 to the Barbara Bell Black Memorial Scholarship that he established in 1997 with the same donation amount. Both gifts were given in memory of his late wife. Mrs. Black died in December 1993 at the age of 92. The Blacks served in Egypt, Japan, Mexico, Indonesia, Nova Scotia and Thailand during Mr. Black's over 30-year career as a Foreign Service officer. While overseas, Mrs. Black was involved in many activities, including substitute teaching in Cairo and helping Japanese women learn and practice English. The Blacks retired to Cape Neddick, Maine, in 1970.

This is a financial aid scholarship. It will be given to a Foreign Service child, with preference to a student attending Vassar College in New York.

REMINDERS

Foreign Affairs Fellowship Applications Due in February

Applications for the State Department's Foreign Affairs Fellowship Program (undergraduate and graduate) are due Feb. 16 for college sophomores and Feb. 26 for students who will be entering graduate school in September 2001. This program seeks to attract outstanding students who represent all ethnic and social backgrounds and have an interest in pursuing a Foreign Service career in the Department of State. For more information, contact Dr. Richard Hope, Director, U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Fellowship Program, The Woodrow Wilson Foundation, P.O. Box 2437, Princeton, NJ 08543-2437, or go to the Web site: <http://www.woodrow.org>.



DACOR-sponsored Dreyfus Scholarships

Applications for Dreyfus scholarships and fellowships to study at the Hotchkiss School and Yale University for the 2001-2002 academic year are due March 15. For information on the Hotchkiss School scholarships contact the school directly at: The Hotchkiss School, Lakeville, CT 06039-0800. For information on the Yale scholarships, contact the DACOR Bacon House Foundation, 1801 F St., NW, Washington, DC 20006.

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"agency records" which are relevant and material to a grievance and not protected by privilege. The OIG objected to the grievant's request, claiming the board did not have the authority to compel production of OIG documents since, by statute, the OIG is independent from the agency. Therefore, the OIG argued, its records are not "agency records" under section 1108 of the Foreign Service Act. The OIG also claimed the documents were irrelevant and protected from disclosure by the deliberative process and investigatory files privileges.

The board ordered the department to give the records of interview to the grievant or to the board for an in camera inspection.

The board rejected the OIG's objections and ordered the department to give the records of interview to the grievant or, in the alternative, to give the records to the board for an in camera (private) inspection. The OIG chose to submit the documents for an in camera review. After reviewing the records, the board ordered the department to make five of the 12 withheld records of interview available to the grievant. (The board found the other seven records to be irrelevant.)

The OIG has routinely asserted in grievance proceedings that the State Department and Grievance Board have no authority over its operations, procedures, or records. Despite numerous requests by AFSA, the State Department has not challenged the OIG's assertions. In addition, several years ago, at the OIG's request, the department sought an amendment to section 1108 of the Foreign Service Act that would have barred the Grievance Board's authority over OIG records. AFSA successfully opposed the proposed amendment. The board's latest ruling firmly establishes the State Department's general supervisory authority over the OIG and its records as well as the Grievance Board's jurisdiction over such cases. □

State Department Values

Every successful organization strives to create a work environment that allows its employees to put forth their best effort. To do so, most organizations identify a list of core values to guide both employees and the organization itself towards mission accomplishment. For example, each of the high-tech firms in which I own stock mails out annual shareholder reports that consistently highlight their core values. As one put it recently, "Our values and beliefs are woven into the fabric of our company culture. They define us, inspire us, and drive us every day to do what we do and do it well."



You may not know it, but the State Department has its own statement of values (published in its "Strategic Plan" dated September 2000). The good news is that, despite what some critics have alleged, those values do not consist of "kiss up and kick down." The bad news is that those values (i.e., impact, expertise, discipline, dissent, diversity, partnership, and commitment) mostly focus on what the department expects employees to give to it. In contrast, most successful organizations also include in their core values things that they promise to give to their employees. Common examples include empowerment, trust, open communication, and a positive (even fun) work environment.

The State Department's corporate culture (which gives rise to many of its maligned management practices) simply has not kept up with changes in its operating environment. Many of the well-entrenched characteristics that helped the department wage the Cold War from the 1950s to the 1980s are now holding it back from responding to the challenges of diplomacy in the 21st century. Study after study in recent years has criticized the State Department for being inwardly focussed, bureaucratic, hierarchical, and over-centralized. In a word, the department is risk-averse.

State's dysfunctional relationship with the Congress provides a good example. Members of Congress and their staffs complain bitterly about State's unresponsiveness. The department, they say, has one of the worst relationships with the Hill of any federal agency. As the 1998 report issued by the Washington-based Stimson Center (signed by George Shultz, Cyrus Vance, Warren Christopher, Colin Powell, and Condoleezza Rice, among others) put it:

"State urgently needs to abandon the culture of secrecy that often pervades its communications with the Hill ... There are too many levels of clearance for State Department communications to Congress. State's deliberative process is often too slow to be of timely use to Hill staff."

To restate the problem in terms of core values, much of the blame rests on State's risk-averse culture. Because the department insists on processing most responses through a multi-level clearance and transmittal process, the department's response is often "a day late and a dollar short." To fix this, the department needs to empower its mid-level country desk officers and other action officers to respond directly to congressional inquiries. Fortune 500 companies call this attitude "responsible risk-taking" and actively promote it.

State can no longer afford to waste precious personnel resources. Senior managers need to delegate authority to empower individuals to perform to their full capacity. In so doing, the department will become a more nimble and effective organization. □

Commerce vs. FCS

Twenty years ago the heart of the FCS officer corps was made up of former State Foreign Service officers. From FCS's inception these officers felt strongly that State would quickly recognize the error of giving up the commercial service function and move to reclaim FCS. Over the years there have been numerous examples of actions by State which left FCS officers claiming that "They're trying to take us back again." In this post-election period where conspiracy theories abound, I offer another view of the State/Commerce relationship. Perhaps it is not that State is trying to reclaim FCS but rather that Commerce is trying to rid itself of the international part of US&FCS.



Why else would Commerce implement a program to fill overseas positions with Civil Service employees, taking promotion opportunities away from FSOs in the up-or-out system? Why else would Commerce make offers of employment to over 50 career candidates that are inconsistent with existing regulations and policy, and then spend over 14 months "discussing" (they refuse to "negotiate") possible solutions to the problems this created? Why else would Commerce recruit and train new FCS officers only to require them to spend their first tour in a domestic office? Why else would management acknowledge career-affecting problems in their effort to integrate the domestic and overseas field organizations, and then rather than work to find a solution, tell the officers involved they should file a grievance? After a two-year study of the personnel system, a director general-appointed task force pointed out many serious problems and inconsistencies. Why else

would Commerce lawyers not agree to implement the agreed-upon changes?

The above actions are certainly not those of an organization that is concerned about its human resources. In fact, the management of the Office of Foreign Service Human Resources is an excellent example. While the officer corps has increased approximately 30 percent during the Clinton administration, the human resources staff responsible for the "care and feeding" has not. Lacking sufficient training, software and resources, OFSHR cannot adequately support officers. Some fiscal claims, such as damage to HHE, have been pending for over a year. In this Catch 22 situation, officers are frustrated by the lack of action by OFSHR, and OFSHR is frustrated by a lack of resources, training and management direction.

Commerce management, which at times seems to overrule FCS management, has done little to support our officers. While Commerce and specifically ITA enjoy the budget benefits accorded to FCS, they are not enthusiastic about the management challenges FCS presents. It may well be that Commerce management is seeking a way to "spin off" FCS without complete loss of FCS funding. Our filing of an Unfair Labor Practice charge based on the past year of failure to negotiate or sign an agreement may have played right into their hands. It is possible that Commerce would like the Federal Labor Relations Authority to decide against them and order the transfer of FCS back to State. Strange, you say! But why else would Commerce act as they have? □

Wrap-up • Continued from page 1

develop a discounted rate long-term care insurance package for active and retired federal civilian and uniformed employees.

Correction of Those in the Wrong Retirement System: PL 106-265 will help individuals affected by retirement coverage errors.

Immediate Thrift Savings Plan Participation: P.L. 106-36 was signed into law Oct. 27, authorizing federal employees to begin participating in the TSP immediately after they are hired. It also allows for transfer of private sector 401(k) accounts and certain other tax-deferred savings to the TSP.

D.C. College Access Act: The Foreign Service will be included in P.L. 106-98, which allows eligible D.C. students to attend post-secondary participating schools around the nation at in-state rates for state colleges and universities or under large grants for private schools in the D.C. area. Foreign Service employees domiciled in the District, even if stationed abroad, will be able to participate.

Commuter Benefits: As of Oct. 1, 2000, federal agencies in the D.C. metropolitan area began offering eligible federal employees up to \$65 per month of Metrocheck to be used on the Metro, buses, commuter rail and vanpools. The State Department participates in this program.



Capital Gains Tax Exclusion for FS Employees on the Sale of a Principal Residence: AFSA worked hard on this in 2000, but will have to wait and try again with the 107th Congress. AFSA found general support for the bill, but election year politics got in the way of passage. There is a strong chance this will pass in 2001, according to Nakamura. □

DehArt

INSIDE THE FS COMMUNITY

Ambassador Todman Receives Public Diplomacy Award

Ambassador Terence A. Todman received the Public Diplomacy Award from the Public Members Association of the Foreign Service at a ceremony at the State Department Nov. 14, 2000. Todman, who retired with the rank of Career Ambassador, was the fifth person ever to receive this award. It was presented in recognition of his outstanding service to increasing public appreciation, nationally and globally, of the foreign policy of the U.S., and for his ceaseless efforts on behalf of women and minorities in the Foreign Service. Todman served as U.S. ambassador to Denmark, Spain, Costa Rica, Chad and Argentina, and as assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs. The Public Members Association is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational association dedicated to public service.



From left: PMA/USA President Rita Z. Johnston, former president Joseph Dukert, Amb. Todman, Erska H. Poston.

Charity Grants around the Globe: An Invitation for Proposals

The J. Kirby Simon Foreign Service Trust is a charitable fund established in the memory of Kirby Simon, an FSO who died in 1995 while serving in Taiwan. The trust seeks to support projects initiated and carried out, not in an official capacity and not on official time, by Foreign Service personnel or members of their families. The trust will also consider proposals from other U.S. government employees or family members, regardless of nationality, who are

located at American diplomatic posts abroad.

Grants were made in 2000 to 26 projects, which provided: equipment to an HIV-positive children's shelter in Zimbabwe; a physical therapy room for disabled Pakistani children; a freezer and desks for an orphanage in Madagascar; blankets and books for an orphanage in Poland; occupational training for battered women in Botswana; literacy and skills training for "untouchable" girls in Bangladesh; a classroom for a Kenyan orphanage; and more.

Proposals should include a description of the project and what it is intended to achieve; the role to be played by the applicant(s); a preliminary plan for disseminating the results of the project; a budget; other available funding, if any; and a brief biography of the applicant(s). Proposals should be no longer than five double-spaced pages

(exclusive of budget and bio material). They should be sent either by mail to the J. Kirby Simon Foreign Service Trust, 82 Edgehill Rd., New Haven, CT 06511, by fax to (203) 432-0063, or by e-mail to john.simon@yale.edu. Proposals for 2001 must be received no later than Feb. 28. For more information call (203) 432-2698 or check the Web site at www.kirbysimon-trust.org. □

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

Service Need Differential Grandfathered

State management has extended the Service Need Differential benefits to those employees who had already extended for a third or fourth year at one of the 38 designated posts prior to the announcement of the new program. Now employees who made early commitments to one of those posts will not be disadvantaged in relation to their colleagues at post.

Need Payroll Assistance?

Contact the new American Payroll Resolution Center if you need assistance regarding salary payments, withholdings, or leave accounts. The APRC can be reached via the department's e-mail global address at American Payroll Resolution Center, via regular e-mail at APRC@state.gov, or by phone at (703) 875-6610.

AFSA Insurance Covers More

The AFSA Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan coverage has been extended to include medical evacuation and repatriation costs. While traveling outside the United States, you, your spouse, and dependents are covered in the event of a medical emergency. For more information, write to The Hirshorn Company, 14 E. Highland Ave., Philadelphia, PA 19118, fax (215) 242-8200, call (800) 242-8221, check the Web page at www.hirshorn.com, or e-mail afsainfo@hirshorn.com.

Don't Forget to Vote!

In order to be counted, your ballot for the AFSA Governing Board Election must be received by February 28. Please notify the election committee by phone at (202) 944-5510 if you have any problem with your ballot.

Putting a Face on the Foreign Service

AFSA's "Putting a Face on the Foreign Service" campaign is designed to spread the word to the American public about the role of the Foreign Service. Part of the campaign involves placing stories of Foreign Service officers in their hometown newspapers and alumni magazines.

Have you experienced a newsworthy event on the job? Would your career be of interest to your hometown paper? Do you have a message for the American public? If so, we want to know. Please contact us by e-mail at paintern@afsa.org, fax (202) 338-6820 or phone (202) 338-4045 ext. 523. Another option is to fill out a form on the AFSA Web site at www.afsa.org/pffs.html and submit it directly or print it out and send it to AFSA's Public Affairs Department, 2101 E St. NW, Washington, DC 20037. □

Giving Something Back to the Service

She had a successful and rewarding 26-year Foreign Service career, he an outstanding 26-year military career. They wanted to give something back to the services that meant so much to them. This year, retired FSO Myriam Hallock has initiated a new scholarship, funded by the Richard R. Hallock Foundation. Two recipients — one from a Foreign Service family and one from a military family — will be chosen each year for a full two-year scholarship to attend West Nottingham Academy in Colorado, Md. for their junior and senior years of high school.

The Hallocks attended Oberlin College in the late 1930s, but did not marry until 1991, after both had retired from government service. Mrs. Richard Hallock, known in the Foreign Service by her maiden name "Mim" Johnston, joined USIS in 1953. She served in Saigon for three years, and then Paris for 10. Then she served in Washington, Abidjan, Yaounde, Saigon again, and retired after a posting to Bangladesh.

Col. Hallock, who passed away in 2000, joined the military in 1942, attended parachute school at Fort Benning, and served with distinction during World War II. After the war he was sent to Berlin as personal assistant for intelligence to Gen. Lucius Clay. During the Korean War, he was the youngest major to command a U.S. battalion there.

West Nottingham and the Scholarship

Col. Hallock was a West Nottingham graduate, valedictorian of the class of 1937, who felt that the school taught him how to study and gave him the values that served him for the rest of his life.

Established in 1744, West Nottingham is now the oldest boarding school in the country, and was attended by two of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence. The school attracts students from around the world and boasts a close-knit environment with a student/teacher ratio of seven to one.

The idea for the scholarships is two-fold: to give FS and military family children the chance to study at West Nottingham, and to expose the students there to FS and military children, thus broadening their horizons.

The two new recipients chosen each year will be fully funded for their junior and senior years. Applicants for the scholarship need not already be students at West Nottingham.

West Nottingham will select the scholarship winners, and is cur-



Mr. and Mrs. Richard R. Hallock in 1996.



Mrs. Hallock in Vietnam in 1971.

rently accepting applications for the 2001/2002 academic year. The school is seeking well-rounded individuals with strong academic records who have participated in some type of community service. Applicants must be children of active FS or military personnel.

For more information, please contact: The Hallock Selection Committee/Office of Admissions, West Nottingham Academy, 1079 Firetower Rd., Colora, MD 21917, call Heidi K. L. Sprinkle in the admissions office at (410) 658-5556 ext. 210, or check the Web site at www.wna.org. The deadline for applications for the 2001/2002 academic year is March 15. □

TAX RETURNS ON THE NET

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AFSA 2000 TAX GUIDE

Federal and State Tax Provisions for the Foreign Service

Federal Tax Provisions

Under the Tax Acts of 1997 and 1998, there are several tax relief segments that may apply to Foreign Service employees and their families. Foreign Service employees most frequently ask AFSA about home ownership, tax liability upon sale of a residence, and state of domicile. We have devoted special sections to these issues.

AFSA's Tax Guide is designed as a reference tool. It does not presume to be any more than that. Many of the new provisions of the tax code and implementing IRS regulations have not been fully tested. Therefore, use caution and consult with a tax adviser as soon as possible if you have specific questions or an unusual or complex situation.

For 2000, the five basic tax rates for individuals remain applicable: 15, 28, 31 and 36 percent, and a top rate of 39.6 percent. The 15 percent rate is for taxable income up to \$43,850 for married couples, \$26,250 for singles. The 28 percent rate is for income up to \$105,950 for married couples, \$63,550 for singles. The 31 percent rate is for income up to \$161,450 for married couples and income up to \$132,600 for singles. The 36 percent rate is for income up to \$288,350 for married couples and singles. In addition, there is a 10 percent surtax for certain high-income taxpayers. It is computed by applying the 39.6 percent rate to taxable income over \$288,350 for singles and married couples and for married couples filing separately whose income is over \$144,175. Long-term capital gains are taxed at a maximum rate of 20 percent and are reported on Schedule D. This rate is effective for all sales in 2000 unless you fall within the 15 percent bracket, when the rate becomes 10 percent.

Personal Exemption

For each taxpayer, spouse, and dependent the personal exemption has been increased to \$2,800. There is, however, a personal exemption phaseout of two percent for each \$2,500 of adjusted gross income (AGI) over \$128,950 (singles), \$161,150 (head of household), \$193,400 (joint) and \$96,700 (married, filing separately). For those



taxpayers in the last category, the phaseout is two percent for each \$1,250 of adjusted gross income over \$96,700.

Extension for Taxpayers Abroad

Taxpayers whose tax home is outside the U.S. on April 15 get an automatic extension until June 15 to file their returns. When filing the return, these taxpayers should write "Taxpayer Abroad" on the first page and attach a statement of explanation. There are no late filing or late payment penalties for returns filed by June 15, but the IRS will charge interest on any amount owed from April 15 until the date they receive payment.

Standard Deduction

The standard deduction is given to non-itemizers. It has been steadily increasing since 1987. For couples it is \$7,350; for singles the deduction is \$4,400. Married couples filing separately get a standard deduction of \$3,675 and head-of-household filers receive a \$6,450 deduction. An additional amount is allowed for taxpayers over age 65 or blind.

Most unreimbursed employee business expenses must be reported as miscellaneous itemized deductions, which are subject to a deduction of two percent of adjusted gross income (AGI). This includes professional dues and publications, employment and educational expenses, home office, legal, accounting, custodial and tax preparation fees, home leave, representational and other employee business expenses, and contributions to AFSA's Legislative Action Fund. Unreimbursed moving expenses are no longer an itemized deduction. As of Jan. 1, 1994, moving expenses are an adjustment

to income, which means that you get to deduct them even if you are taking the standard deduction. However, the deduction has been narrowed to include only the unreimbursed costs of moving your possessions and yourself and your family to your new location.

Medical expenses (including health insurance) are subject to a deduction equaling 7.5 percent of AGI. This means that any deductible medical cost would have to exceed \$2,250 for a taxpayer with a \$30,000 AGI. There is also an additional three percent reduction of itemized deductions (excluding medical, casualty, theft, and investment interest) if the AGI exceeds \$128,950. This three percent is applied to the AGI over \$128,950 and not to the total of itemized deductions on Schedule A. The maximum loss of deductions is capped at 80 percent.

State and local income taxes and real estate and personal property taxes remain fully deductible for itemizers, as are charitable contributions (to American charities only) for most taxpayers. Donations to the AFSA scholarship fund are fully deductible as charitable contributions. Donations to AFSA via the Combined Federal Campaign are also fully deductible. Individuals may also dispose of any profit from the sale of personal property abroad in this manner.

For 2000 tax returns, any interest paid on auto or personal loans, credit cards, department stores and other personal interest will not be allowed as an itemized deduction. Interest on educational loans will be allowed as an adjustment to gross income. If the above debts are consolidated, however, and paid with a home equity loan, interest on the home equity loan is allowable. Mortgage interest is, for the most part, still fully deductible. Interest on loans intended to finance investments is deductible up to the amount of net income from investments. Interest for loans intended to finance a business is 100 percent deductible. Passive-investment interest on loans in which the taxpayer is an inactive participant, i.e. a limited partnership, can be deducted only from the income produced by other "passive income." Interest on loans that do

not fall into the above categories, such as borrowing money to buy tax-exempt securities, is not deductible.

Home Leave Expenses

Employee business expenses, such as home leave and representation, may be deducted as a miscellaneous itemized deduction and claimed on Form 2106. In addition to the two percent floor, only 50 percent for meals and entertainment may be claimed (100 percent for unreimbursed travel and lodging). Only the employee's (not family members') home leave expenses are deductible. Maintaining a travel log and retaining a copy of home leave orders will be helpful, should the IRS ever question claimed expenses. It is important to save receipts: without receipts for food, a taxpayer may deduct only \$34 to \$42 a day (depending upon the per diem rate at the home leave address), no matter how large the grocery or restaurant bill. Lodging is deductible, as long as it is not with friends, relatives, or in one's own home. The IRS will disallow use of per diem rates and any expenses claimed for family members. If a hotel bill indicates double rates, the single room rate should be claimed, and, if possible, the hotel's rate sheet should be saved for IRS scrutiny. Car rental, mileage, and other unreimbursed travel expenses, including parking fees and tolls, may be deducted. The rate for business miles driven is 32.5 cents for miles driven during 2000. Those who use this optional mileage method need not keep detailed records of actual vehicle expenses. The only thing necessary will be a detailed odometer log to justify the business use of the vehicle and percentage of business use. From 1998, this optional mileage method applies to leased vehicles.

Official Residence Expenses (ORE)

Since Oct. 1, 1990, employees who receive ORE have not been allowed to reduce their reportable income by 5 percent. The IRS ruling regarding ORE states that "usual expenses," defined as 5 percent of salary, are not deductible. Therefore the only expenses that are deductible are those above the 5 percent paid out of pocket. Employees should save receipts for any out-of-pocket expenses associated with their representational duties. These expenses can be deducted as miscellaneous business expenses.

Home Ownership

Employees may deduct interest on up to \$1 million of acquisition debt for loans

secured by a first and/or second home. This also includes loans taken out for major home improvements. On home equity loans, interest is deductible on up to \$100,000, no matter how much the home cost or what the loan is used for. The \$100,000 ceiling applies to the total of all home equity loans you may have. The same generally applies to refinancing a mortgage. Points paid to obtain a refinanced loan cannot fully be deducted the same year, but must be deducted over the life of the loan. It is advisable to save the settlement sheet (HUD-1 Form) for documentation in the event your tax return is selected by the IRS for audit.

Qualified residences are defined as the taxpayer's principal residence and one other residence. The second home can be a house, condo, co-op, mobile home, or boat, as long as the structure includes basic living accommodations, including sleeping, bathroom, and cooking facilities. If the second home is a vacation property that you rent out for fewer than 15 days during the year, the income need not be reported. Rental expenses cannot be claimed either, but all property taxes and mortgage interest may be deducted.

Rental of Home

Taxpayers who are overseas and rented their homes in 2000 can continue to deduct mortgage interest as a rental expense. Also deductible are property management fees, condo fees, depreciation costs, taxes, and all other rental expenses. Losses up to \$25,000 may be offset against other income, as long as the AGI does not exceed \$100,000 and the taxpayer is actively managing the property. Retaining a property manager does not mean losing this benefit.

Sale of a Principal Residence

The new capital-gains exclusion on the sale of a principal residence on or after May 7, 1997, applies to all homeowners, regardless of their age. Previously, qualified individuals who were age 55 or older were allowed a one-time capital gains exclusion of \$125,000. Also, under previous law, if you had a gain when you sold your home, you could defer all or part of the gain if you purchased or built another home (of equal or higher value) within two years before or after the sale.

The new tax laws allow an exclusion of up to \$500,000 for couples filing jointly and up to \$250,000 for single taxpayers on the gain from the sale of their principal resi-

dence. All depreciation taken after May 7, 1997 will, however, be recaptured (added to income) at the time of sale, and taxed at 25 percent.

The only qualification for this new capital-gains exclusion is that the house sold must have been the taxpayer's principal residence for at least two of the last five years prior to the date of the sale. There are some exceptions to this two-year requirement. This exclusion is not limited to a once-in-a-lifetime sale, but may be taken once every two years.

When a principal residence is sold, capital gains realized above the exclusion amounts are subject to taxation. This new exclusion replaces the earlier tax-law provision that allowed both the deferral of gain and a one-time exclusion of a principal residence sale.

Many Foreign Service employees are hurt by the "two out of five years" residence provision. Despite repeated attempts, AFSA has so far been unsuccessful in persuading Congress to grant an exemption for Foreign Service personnel who cannot meet this requirement due to prolonged overseas service.

Temporary rental of the home does not necessarily disqualify one from claiming the exclusion. The new tax law requires only that you have occupied the house as your principal residence for the required period (two years out of five).

Under Internal Revenue Code 1031, taxpayers whose U.S. home may no longer qualify for the customary residence replacement rule may be eligible to replace the property through a "tax-free exchange" (the so-called Starker exchange). In essence, one property being rented out may be exchanged for another, as long as that also is rented. In exchanging the properties, capital gains tax may be deferred. Technically, a simultaneous trade of investments occurs. Actually, owners first sell their property, place the equity proceeds in escrow, identify in writing within 45 days the property they intend to acquire, and settle on the new property within 180 days, using the money held in escrow as part of the payment.

It is important to emphasize that the exchange is from one investment property to another investment property - the key factor in the IRS evaluation of an exchange transaction is the intent of the investor at the time the exchange was consummated. The IRS rules for the exchanges are complex and specific, with a number of pitfalls that can nullify the transaction. An exchange should never be attempted without assis-

tance from a tax lawyer specializing in this field.

Calculating Your Adjusted Basis

Many Foreign Service employees ask what items can be added to the cost basis of their homes when they are ready to sell. Money spent on "fixing up" the home for sale may be deducted from the sales price. To qualify as legitimate "fixing-up costs", the following conditions must be met: 1) the expenses must be for work performed during the 90-day period ending on the day on which the contract to sell the old residence was made; 2) the expenses must be paid on or before the 30th day after sale of the house, and 3) the expenses must not be capital expenditures for permanent improvements or replacements (these can be added to the basis of the property, original purchase price, thereby reducing the amount of profit). A new roof and kitchen counters are not "fix-up" items. But painting the house, cleaning up the garden, and making minor repairs qualify as "fixing-up costs."

State Tax Provisions

Every active Foreign Service employee serving abroad must maintain a state of domicile in the United States, and the tax liability that the employee faces varies greatly from state to state. In addition, there are numerous regulations concerning the taxability of Foreign Service pensions and annuities, as each state has different rules about the conditions under which individuals are liable for taxes on such income.

This state guide briefly reviews the laws regarding income tax and tax on annuities and pensions as they affect Foreign Service personnel. Please note that while AFSA makes every attempt to provide the most up-to-date information, readers with specific questions should consult a tax expert in the state in question at the addresses given. Information is also available on the states' Websites listed below.

Most Foreign Service employees have questions about their liability to pay state income taxes during periods posted overseas or assigned to Washington. It is a fundamental rule of law that all U.S. citizens, because they have the right to vote, retain a state of domicile even if residing abroad. There are many criteria used in determining which state is a citizen's domicile. One of the strongest determinants is prolonged physical presence, a standard that Foreign Service personnel frequently cannot meet, due to overseas service.

In such cases, the states will make a deter-

mination of the individual's income tax status based on other factors, including where the individual has family ties, where he or she is registered to vote or has a driver's license, where he or she owns property, or where the person has bank accounts or other financial holdings. In the case of Foreign Service employees, the domicile might be the state from which the person joined the service, where his or her home leave address is, or where he or she intends to return upon separation. For purposes of this article, the term domicile refers to legal residence; some states also define it as permanent residence. Residence refers to physical presence in the state.

Foreign Service personnel must continue to pay taxes to the state of domicile (or to the District of Columbia) while residing outside of the state, including during assignments abroad, unless the state of residence does not require it.

A non-resident, according to most states' definitions, is an individual who earns income sourced within the specific state but does not live there or is living there for only part of the year (usually, less than six months). Individuals are generally considered residents and are thus fully liable for taxes, if they are domiciled in the state or if they are living in the state (usually at least six months of the year) but are not domiciled there.

Foreign Service employees residing in the metropolitan Washington area are required to pay income tax to the District, Maryland or Virginia in addition to paying tax to the state of their domicile. However, most states allow a credit, so that the taxpayer pays the higher tax rate of the two states, with each state receiving a share.

There are currently seven states with no state income tax: Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. In addition, New Hampshire and Tennessee have no tax on personal income but do tax profits from the sale of bonds and property.

There are also six states which, under certain conditions, do not tax income earned outside of the state: Connecticut, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. The requirements are that the individual not have a permanent "place of abode" in the state, have a permanent "place of abode" outside the state, and not spend more than 30 days in the state during the tax year. Also, please note that these six states require the filing of non-resident returns for all income earned from in-state sources.

Pennsylvania holds that "quarters provided by the government at no cost to petitioner cannot be considered as maintaining a permanent place of abode." Thus members of the Foreign Service domiciled in Pennsylvania who occupy government housing overseas must pay income tax to Pennsylvania. If they rent their own home overseas, however, they will be exempt from these taxes. California, Oregon and Minnesota also have rules excusing their domiciliaries from filing a resident tax return while living outside the state.

The following list gives a state-by-state overview of the latest information available on tax liability, with addresses provided to write for further information or tax forms. Tax rates are provided where possible. For further information please contact AFSA's Labor/Management Office or the individual state tax authorities. As always, members are advised to double-check with states' tax authorities.

State Overviews

ALABAMA: Individuals domiciled in Alabama are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the State. Alabama's tax rate ranges from 2 to 5 percent, depending on income and filing status. Write: Alabama Department of Revenue, PO Box 327460, Montgomery, AL 36132-7460. Phone (334) 242-1170.

Website: <http://www.state.al.us>. E-mail: erohelpdesk@revenue.state.al.us.

ALASKA: Alaska does not tax individual income, or intangible or personal property. It has no sales and use, franchise or fiduciary tax. Write: State Office Building, 333 Willoughby Ave, 11th Floor, PO Box 110400, Juneau AK 99811-0400. Phone: (907) 465-2300.

Website: <http://www.state.ak.us/tax>

ARIZONA: Individuals domiciled in Arizona are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Arizona's tax rate ranges from 3 to 5.6 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Arizona Department of Revenue, Attention: Forms, 1600 West Monroe, Phoenix, AZ 85007-2650. Phone: (602) 255-3381 or 1-800-352-4090.

Website: <http://www.state.az.us/revenue>

ARKANSAS: Individuals domiciled in Arkansas are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Arkansas's tax rate ranges from 1 to 7 percent depending on income and filing sta-

tus. Write: Department of Finance and Administration, Income Tax Forms Division, P.O. Box 3628, Little Rock, AR 72203-3628. Phone: (501) 682-1100 or 1-800-882-9275.

Website: <http://www.state.ar.us/dfa/taxes>

CALIFORNIA: Recent changes in FTB Publication 1031 mean that Foreign Service officers domiciled in California must establish non-residency to avoid being liable for California taxes. However, a "safe harbor" provision was introduced in 1994 which provides that anyone who is domiciled in-state but is out of the state on an employment-related contract for more than 546 days will be considered a non-resident. This applies to FS employees and their spouses, but California residents are advised to study FTB Pub 1031 for exceptions and exemptions. Non-residents use Form 540NR. Write: Franchise Tax Board, Tax Forms Request, PO Box 307, Rancho Cordova CA 95741-0307. Phone: 1-800-852-5711. Website: <http://www.ftb.ca.gov>

COLORADO: Individuals domiciled in Colorado are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Colorado's tax rate is a flat 4.63 percent of federal taxable income attributable to Colorado sources. Write: Department of Revenue, Taxpayer Service Division, State Capitol Annex, 1375 Sherman St., Denver, CO 80261. Phone: (303) 232-2416.

Website: <http://www.revenue.state.co.us>

CONNECTICUT: No tax liability for out-of-state income if the individual has no permanent residence in Connecticut, has a permanent residence elsewhere, and is not present in the state more than 30 days during the tax year. No tax liability for those with permanent residence in Connecticut who live in a foreign country 450 days out of 548 days, without spending over 90 days in Connecticut.

For details, see <http://www.drs.state.ct.us/Forms/Individual Income Tax Forms/Form CT-1040 NRPY/Booklet>. Write: Department of Revenue Services, 25 Signourney St., Hartford, CT 06106. Phone: (860) 297-5962. Fax: (860) 297-4929.

DELAWARE: Individuals domiciled in Delaware are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Delaware's tax rate ranges from 2.2 to 5.95 percent depending on income and filing status. The first \$2000 of income is exempt. Write: Division of Revenue, Taxpayers Assistance Section, State Office Building, 820 N. French St., Wilmington, DE 19801.

Phone (302) 577-8200.

Website: <http://www.state.de.us/revenue>

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Individuals domiciled in the District of Columbia are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence there. Individuals domiciled elsewhere are also considered residents for tax purposes for the portion of any calendar year in which they are physically present in the District for 183 days or more. The District's tax rate ranges from 6 to 9.5 percent. Write: Office of Tax and Revenue, 941 N. Capitol St., N.E., Washington, DC 20002. Phone: (202) 727-4TAX.

Website: <http://www.dcfcfo.com>

FLORIDA: No state income tax. However, Florida taxes "intangible assets", (which include stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc.), and real property. For details, write to Tax Information Services, Florida Department of Revenue, 1379 Blountstown Highway, Tallahassee, FL 32304. Phone: (850) 488-6800 or 1-800-352-3671.

Website: <http://sun6.dms.state.fl.us/dor>

GEORGIA: Individuals domiciled in Georgia are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Georgia's tax rate ranges from 1 to 6 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Georgia Income Tax Forms, P.O. Box 740389, Atlanta, GA 30334-0389. Phone: (404) 656-4188.

Website: <http://www2.state.ga.us/Departments/dor>

HAWAII: Individuals domiciled in Hawaii are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Hawaii's tax rate ranges from 1.6 to 8.75 percent depending on income and filing status, reducing from 1.5 to 8.5 percent for 2001. Write: Oahu District Office, Taxpayer Services Branch, P.O. Box 3559, Honolulu, HI, 96811-3559. Phone: (808) 587-4242 or 1-800-222-3229.

Website: <http://www.state.hi.us/tax>

IDAHO: Individuals domiciled in Idaho for an entire tax year are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income. Idaho provides a safe harbor provision where a resident individual who is outside Idaho for a qualifying period of time will not be considered a resident. If an individual qualifies for the safe harbor, he would report as a nonresident and be taxed only on income from Idaho sources. A nonresident must file an Idaho income tax return if his gross income from Idaho sources is \$2,500 or more. For tax year 2000 Idaho's

tax rate is between 1.9 and 8.1 percent depending on earned income. To request forms write: Idaho State Tax Commission, P.O. Box 36, Boise, ID 83722-0410. Phone 1-800-972-7660.

Website: <http://www2.state.id.us/tax>

ILLINOIS: Individuals domiciled in Illinois are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Illinois's tax rate is a 3 percent flat rate. Write: Illinois Department of Revenue, Forms Division, 101 West Jefferson St., Springfield, IL 62794-9044. Phone: (217) 782-3336 or 1-800-732-8866.

Website: <http://www.revenue.state.il.us>

INDIANA: Individuals domiciled in Indiana are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. However, a credit is granted for any taxes paid to the state where the income was earned. Indiana's tax rate remains 3.4 percent. Write: Department of Revenue, 100 N. Senate Ave., Indianapolis, IN 46204. Phone: (317) 232-2240.

Website: <http://www.state.in.us/dor>

IOWA: Individuals domiciled in Iowa are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income to the extent that income is taxable on the person's federal income tax returns. Iowa's tax rate ranges from 0.36 to 8.98 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Department of Revenue and Finance, Forms Division, Hoover State Office Building, Des Moines, IA 50319. Phone: (515) 281-3114 or 1-800-367-3388.

Website: <http://www.state.ia.us/tax>

KANSAS: Individuals domiciled in Kansas are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Kansas' tax rate ranges from 3.5 to 6.45 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Kansas Taxpayer Assistance Bureau, 915 SW Harrison, 3rd Floor, Topeka, KS 66625-0001. Phone: (785) 368-8222.

Website: <http://www.ink.org/public/kdor>

KENTUCKY: Individuals domiciled in Kentucky are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Kentucky's tax rate is 2 percent on the first \$3,000 of taxable income, plus 3 percent on the next \$1,000, plus 4 percent on the next \$1,000, plus 5 percent on the next \$1,000, plus 6 percent on all income over \$8,000. Write: Revenue Cabinet, PO Box 181, Station 56, Frankfort, KY 40602. Phone: (502) 564-4581.

Website: <http://www.state.ky.us/agencies/revenue>

LOUISIANA: Individuals domiciled in Louisiana are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Resident individuals are entitled to a tax credit for income tax paid to another state on the amount of income earned in the other state and included in that state's taxable income. Louisiana's tax rate ranges from 2 to 6 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Department of Revenue and Taxation, Forms Division, P.O. Box 201, Baton Rouge, LA 70821-0201. Phone (225) 925-4611.

Website: <http://www.rev.state.la.us>

MAINE: Individuals domiciled in Maine are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Maine's tax rate ranges from 2 to 8.5 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Bureau of Taxation, Forms Division, State Office Building, Augusta, ME 04333. Phone (207) 626-8475.

Website: <http://state.me.us/revenue>

MARYLAND: Individuals domiciled in Maryland are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Individuals domiciled elsewhere are also considered residents for tax purposes for the portion of any calendar year in which they are physically present in the state for six months or more. Maryland's tax rate is a graduated tax up to a maximum of 4.85 percent depending on income and county of residence. Baltimore City and the 23 Maryland counties also impose a local income tax, which is a percentage of the Maryland taxable income. The Maryland taxable income is the amount on line 23 of Form 502 or line 5 of Form 503. The local factor varies from 0.0125 and 0.0301 depending on the subdivision of domicile. Write: Revenue Administration, Income Tax Division, Annapolis MD 21411. Phone (410) 260-7980 or 1-800-638-2937.

Website: <http://www.marylandtaxes.com>. E-mail: taxhelp@comp.state.md.us

MASSACHUSETTS: Individuals domiciled in Massachusetts are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Salaries and most interest and dividend income are taxed at 5.85 percent. Write: Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Forms Supply, P.O. Box 7010, Boston, MA 02204. Phone: (617) 887-MDOR; within Mass: 1-800-392-6089.

Website: <http://www.state.ma.us/dor>
MICHIGAN: Individuals domiciled in Michigan are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Michigan's tax rate is 4.2 percent, down from 4.4 percent in 1999. Write: Department of Treasury, Forms Division, Treasury Building, Lansing, MI 48922. Phone: 1-800-487-7000.

Website: <http://www.treas.state.mi.us>

MINNESOTA: Individuals domiciled in Minnesota are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Minnesota exempts domiciliaries who meet the foreign earned income exclusion, even though they may be federal employees. Minnesota's tax rate ranges from 5.35 to 7.85 percent depending on income and filing status. Joint filers with taxable income of at least \$25,680, where each spouse has earned, pension or social security income of at least \$14,250, may be eligible for a marriage credit. Write: Department of Revenue, Forms Division, Mail Station 5510, Saint Paul, MN 55146-2220. Phone: (651) 296-3781 or 1-800-652-9094.

Website: <http://www.taxes.state.mn.us>

MISSISSIPPI: Individuals domiciled in Mississippi are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Mississippi's tax rate is 3 percent on the first \$5,000 of taxable income, 4 percent on the next \$5,000, and 5 percent on taxable income over \$10,000. Write: State Tax Commission, Forms Division, P.O. Box 1033, Jackson, MS 39215. Phone: (601) 923-7390.

Website: <http://mstc.state.ms.us>

MISSOURI: No tax liability for out-of-state income if the individual has no permanent residence in Missouri, has a permanent residence elsewhere, and is not physically present in the state for more than 30 days during the tax year. Missouri calculates tax on a graduated scale up to \$9,000 of taxable income (TI). Any TI over \$9,000 is taxed at a rate of 6 percent. File a return yearly with an attached "Statement of Non-Residency" (Form 1040C). Also use this form if you have income of more than \$600 from Missouri sources. Write: Tax Administration Bureau, Forms Division, PO Box 220, Jefferson City, MO 65105-2200. Phone: (573) 751-3505 or 1-800-877-6881.

Website: <http://dor.state.mo.us>. E-mail: dormail@mail.dor.state.mo.us

MONTANA: Individuals domiciled in

Montana are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Montana's tax rate ranges from 2 to 11 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Montana Department of Revenue, PO Box 5805, Helena, MT 59604. Phone (406) 444-6900.

Website: <http://www.state.mt.us/revenue>

NEBRASKA: Individuals domiciled in Nebraska are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state with credit allowed for tax paid to other states. Nebraska's tax rate ranges from 2.51 to 6.68 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Department of Revenue, Forms Division, 301 Centennial Mall South, P.O. Box 94818, Lincoln, NE 68509-4818. Phone 1-800-742-7474.

Website: <http://www.nol.org/revenue>

NEVADA: No state income tax. Address: Nevada Dept of Taxation, 1550 E. College Pkwy, Suite 100, Carson City NV 89706. Phone: (775) 687-4892. Website: <http://tax.state.nv.us>

NEW HAMPSHIRE: No personal income tax. No capital gains tax on sale of principal residence, 8 percent on sale of rental property, 5 percent on profits from in-state sources, including the sale of property and bonds. Applicable taxes apply to part-year residents. Write: Taxpayer Assistance Office, 45 Chenell Drive, P.O. Box 2072, Concord, NH 03302-2072. Phone: (603) 271-2186. Website: <http://www.state.nh.us/revenue>

NEW JERSEY: No tax liability for out-of-state income if the individual has no permanent residence in New Jersey, has a permanent residence elsewhere, and is not physically in the state for more than 30 days during the tax year. Filing a return is not required, but is recommended in order to preserve domicile status. Filing is required on Form 1040 NR for revenue derived from in-state sources. Tax liability is calculated as a variable lump sum plus a percentage between 1.4 and 6.4 percent of taxable income. Forms may be requested by writing to: Department of the Treasury, Division of Taxation, PO Box 266, Trenton, NJ 08625-0266. Phone: (609) 292-6400.

Website: <http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation>

NEW MEXICO: Individuals domiciled in New Mexico are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. New Mexico's tax rate varies from 1.7 to 8.5 percent based upon income and fil-

ing status. Write: New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, Tax Information and Policy Office, 1100 St. Francis Drive, PO Box 630, Santa Fe, NM 87504-0630. Phone: (505) 827-0700.

Website: <http://www.state.nm.us/tax>

NEW YORK: No tax liability for out-of-state income if the individual has no permanent residence in New York, has a permanent residence elsewhere, and is not present in the state more than 30 days during the tax year. Filing a return is not required, but it is recommended to preserve domicile status. Filing is required on Form IT-203-I for revenue derived from New York sources. Write: Department of Taxation and Finance, Technical Services Bureau, W.A. Harriman Campus, Albany, NY 12227. Phone: 1-800-225-5829.

Website: <http://www.tax.state.ny.us>

NORTH CAROLINA: Individuals domiciled in North Carolina are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. North Carolina's tax rate ranges from 6 to 7.75 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Department of Revenue, PO Box 25000, Raleigh, NC 27640. Phone: (919) 733-4684.

Website: <http://www.dor.state.nc.us>

NORTH DAKOTA: Individuals domiciled in North Dakota are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Tax rates vary according to income and whether a short or long tax form is used. Write: Office of State Tax Commissioner, State Capitol, 600 E. Boulevard Avenue, Bismarck, ND 58505-0599. Phone: (701) 328-2770.

Website: <http://www.state.nd.us/taxdpt>

OHIO: Individuals domiciled in Ohio are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income. Ohio residents are given a tax credit to reduce the Ohio income tax due if another state or the District of Columbia taxed part or all of their income. Ohio part-year residents are allowed a tax credit for income not earned or received in Ohio for the period of time they resided in another state. Ohio's tax rate ranges from 0.743 to 7.5 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Ohio Department of Taxation, Taxpayers Services Division, P.O. Box 182382, Columbus, OH 43218-2384. Phone: 1-800-282-1780.

Website: <http://www.state.oh.us/tax>

OKLAHOMA: Individuals domiciled in Oklahoma are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state.

Oklahoma's tax rate is based upon income and various exemptions. Write: Oklahoma Tax Commission, Taxpayer Services Division, 2501 Lincoln Blvd., Oklahoma City, OK 73194-0009. Phone: (405) 521-3160.

Website: <http://www.oktax.state.ok.us>

OREGON: Individuals domiciled in Oregon are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. However, under a 1999 law, Oregon exempts domiciliaries who meet the foreign residence requirement for the foreign earned income exclusion, even though they may be federal employees. Oregon's tax rates range from 5 to 9 percent of taxable income. Write: Department of Revenue, Revenue Building, 1st Floor, Room 135, 955 Center Street N.E., Salem, OR 97310. Phone: (503) 378-4988.

Website: <http://www.dor.state.or.us>

PENNSYLVANIA: No tax liability for out-of-state income if the individual has no permanent residence in the state, has a permanent residence elsewhere, and spends no more than 30 days in the state during the tax year. Filing a return is not required, but it is recommended to preserve domicile status. File on form PA40-NR for all income derived from Pennsylvania sources. Pennsylvania does not consider government quarters overseas to be a "permanent place of abode elsewhere," so Foreign Service PA residents abroad in government quarters must continue to pay Pennsylvania income tax. Pennsylvania's tax rate is a flat 2.8 percent. Write: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue, Taxpayer Services Department, Harrisburg, PA 17128-1061. Phone: (717) 787-8201. Website: <http://www.revenue.state.pa.us>. E-mail: pavev@state.pa.us

PUERTO RICO: Individuals who are domiciled in Puerto Rico are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the Commonwealth. Normally, you may claim a credit against Puerto Rico tax for any federal taxes paid. Address: Departamento de Hacienda, PO Box 50065, San Juan, PR 00902-6265. Phone: General Inquiries: (787) 721-2020, Ext. 3611 or 1-800-981-9236. E-mail: hacienda@www.hacienda.gov.pr.

Website: <http://www.hacienda.prstar.net>

RHODE ISLAND: Individuals domiciled in Rhode Island are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Rhode Island's tax rate for the 1998

tax year is 26 percent of the Federal Income Tax liability. Write: Rhode Island Division of Taxation, Taxpayer Assistance Section, One Capitol Hill, Providence, RI 02908-5801. Phone: (401) 222-1040.

Website: <http://www.tax.state.ri.us>

SOUTH CAROLINA: Individuals domiciled in South Carolina are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. South Carolina's tax rate ranges from 2 to 7 percent, depending on income. Write: South Carolina Tax Commission, Forms Division, 301 Gervais Street, P.O. Box 125, Columbia, SC 29214.

Website: <http://www.sctax.org>

SOUTH DAKOTA: No state income tax. Address: South Dakota Dept of Revenue, 445 E. Capitol Ave., Pierre, SD 57501-3185. Phone: 1-800-829-9188.

Website: <http://www.state.sd.us/revenue>

TENNESSEE: No personal income tax. Tennessee imposes a 6 percent tax on dividends and certain types of interest income received by Tennessee residents. Write: Department of Revenue, Andrew Jackson State Office Building, Nashville, TN 37242. Phone: (615) 253-0600.

Website: <http://www.state.tn.us/revenue>

TEXAS: No state income tax. Write: Tax Policy Division, Comptroller of Public Accounts, PO Box 13528, Austin, TX 78711-3528. Phone: 1-800-252-5555.

Website: <http://www.window.state.tx.us>

UTAH: Individuals domiciled in Utah are considered residents and are subject to Utah state tax. Utah requires that all federal adjusted gross income reported on the federal return be reported on the state return regardless of the taxpayer's physical presence in the state. Utah's highest tax rate is 7 percent. Write: Utah State Tax Commission, Taxpayer Services Division, 210 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84134. Phone: (801) 297-2200 or 1-800-662-4335.

Website: <http://www.tax.ex.state.ut.us>

VERMONT: Individuals domiciled in Vermont are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of their physical presence in the state. Vermont's tax rate is 24 percent of the individual's federal tax. Write: Vermont Department of Taxes, Taxpayer Services Division, Pavilion Office Building, Montpelier, VT 05609-1401. Phone: (802) 828-2865.

Website: <http://www.state.vt.us/tax>. E-mail: vttaxdept@tax.state.vt.us

VIRGINIA: Individuals domiciled in Virginia are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regard-

less of their physical presence in the state. Individuals domiciled elsewhere are also considered residents for tax purposes for the portion of any calendar year in which they are physically present in the State for 183 days or more. Individual tax rates are: 2 percent if taxable income (TI) is less than \$3,000, \$60 plus 3 percent of excess over \$3,000 if TI is between \$3,000 and \$5,000, \$120 plus 5 percent of excess over \$5,000 if TI is between \$5,000 and \$17,000, and \$720 plus 5.75 percent of TI over \$17,000. Write: Virginia Department of Taxation, Taxpayer Services Division, P.O. Box 1317, Richmond, VA 23210. Phone (804) 367-8055.

Website: <http://www.state.va.us/tax>.
E-mail: taxes@state.va.us.

WASHINGTON: No state income tax. Address: Washington Dept. of Revenue, General Administration Building, PO Box 47450, Olympia WA 98504-7450. Phone: (360) 786-6100 or 1-800-647-7706.

Website: <http://dor.wa.gov>

WEST VIRGINIA: No tax liability for out-of-state income if the individual has no permanent residence in West Virginia, has a permanent residence elsewhere, and spends no more than 30 days of the tax year in West Virginia. Filing a return is not required, but it is recommended to preserve domicile status. Filing is required on form IT-140-NR for all income derived from West Virginia sources. Write: The Department of Tax and Revenue, Taxpayer Services Division, P.O. Box 3784, Charleston, WV 25337-3784. Phone: (304) 558-3333 or 1-800-982-8297.

Website: <http://www.state.wv.us/taxdiv>

WISCONSIN: Individuals domiciled in Wisconsin are considered residents and are subject to tax on their entire income regardless of where the income is earned. Wisconsin's current tax rate ranges from 4.73 to 6.75 percent depending on income and filing status. Write: Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Audit Bureau, P.O. Box 8906, Madison, WI 53708-8906. Phone: (608) 266-2772.

Website: <http://www.dor.state.wi.us>

WYOMING: No state income tax. Address: Wyoming Dept. of Revenue, Herschler Building, 122 West 25th St., Cheyenne, WY 82002-0110. Phone: (307) 777-7961.

Website: <http://revenue.state.wy.us>.
E-mail: dor@missc.state.wy.us.

State Pension & Annuity Tax

The laws regarding the taxation of Foreign Service annuities vary greatly from

state to state. In addition to those states that have no income tax or no tax on personal income, there are several states that do not tax income derived from pensions and annuities. Idaho taxes Foreign Service annuities while exempting certain portions of those of the Civil Service.

ALABAMA: Full exemption. Federal pensions are not taxable.

ALASKA: No personal income tax.

ARIZONA: Up to \$2,500 of U.S.

Government pension income is exempt.

ARKANSAS: Up to \$6,000 exempt.

CALIFORNIA: Fully taxable.

COLORADO: Up to \$24,000 exempt if over age 65 or over. Up to \$20,000 exempt if aged between 55 and 64.

CONNECTICUT: Fully taxable for residents.

DELAWARE: Two exclusions: (1) Up to \$2,000 exempt if earned income is less than \$2,500 and Adjusted Gross Income is less than \$10,000; if married and filing jointly, up to \$4,000 exempt if earned income is less than \$5,000 and AGI is under \$20,000. This is applicable if 60 years or older or totally disabled. (2) If under age 60, the amount of the exclusion is \$2,000 or the amount of the pension (whichever is less) and for age 60 or older, the amount of the exclusion is \$12,500 or the amount of the pension and eligible retirement income (ERI) whichever is less. The combined total of pension and ERI may not exceed \$12,500 per person age 60 or older.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Up to \$3,000 exempt, only if 62 years or older.

FLORIDA: No personal income tax, but Florida has an "Intangibles Tax."

GEORGIA: Up to \$13,500 exempt for those 62 years or older and permanently or totally disabled, rising to \$14,000 for the 2001 tax year.

HAWAII: Government-funded portion not taxed; employee-funded portion taxed at standard rates.

IDAHO: Foreign Service retirees whose annuities are paid from the FSPS are fully taxed on their pensions. Those persons retired under the Civil Service Retirement act are exempt up to \$17,196 for a single return and up to \$25,794 if filing jointly. Up to \$17,196 is exempt for unmarried survivor of annuitant. Must be 65 years or older, or 62 years or older and disabled. Amount reduced dollar for dollar by social security benefits.

ILLINOIS: Full exemption, U.S. government pensions are not taxed.

INDIANA: Up to \$2,000 exemption for most 65 or older, reduced dollar for dollar

by social security benefits.

IOWA: Fully taxable. However, there is a pension/retirement income exclusion of up to \$5,000 for individual and up to \$10,000 for married taxpayers who are disabled or are 55 years of age or older, or are a surviving spouse or other survivor of the annuitant. The same income tax rates apply to annuities as other incomes.

KANSAS: Full exemption, government pensions are not taxed.

KENTUCKY: Government pensions attributable to service before 1/1/98 are not taxed. In future, the portion of annuity income attributable to service after 12/31/97 will be taxed at the appropriate rate. There is an exemption for 2000 of up to \$37,500 (changed from \$36,414 in 1999).

LOUISIANA: Up to \$6,000 exempt if 65 years or older. (\$12,000 if both filers over 65).

MAINE: From 1/1/00, each recipient of pension income may deduct up to \$6,000 of pension income that is included in their federal AGI, reduced by all social security and railroad benefits.

MARYLAND: For individuals 65 years or older or permanently disabled, federal pensions and annuities, including Social Security, are excluded up to \$16,500. Eligibility determination is required. For other annuitants, the total amount is taxable.

MASSACHUSETTS: Full exemption, U.S. government contributory pensions are not taxed.

MICHIGAN: Full exemption, government pensions are not taxed.

MINNESOTA: Certain persons over 65 with incomes under \$42,000 may be eligible for a subtraction. The maximum subtraction is \$12,000 married joint and \$6,000 single, which is reduced dollar for dollar by untaxed social security benefits, and by one dollar for each two dollars of income over \$18,000 for married and \$14,500 for single.

MISSISSIPPI: Full exemption, U.S. government pensions are not taxed.

MISSOURI: Up to \$6,000 exempt if the pension income is less than \$32,000 when married filing jointly, \$16,000 if married filing separately, or \$25,000 for a single or head of household filer.

MONTANA: Up to \$3,600 exemption if the pension income is less than \$32,000.

NEBRASKA: Fully taxable.

NEVADA: No personal income tax.

NEW HAMPSHIRE: No personal income tax; federal pensions are not taxed.

NEW JERSEY: Pensions and annuities

are subject to state income tax with the following exemptions for those who are age 62 or older, or totally and permanently disabled, as follows: singles can exclude up to \$9,375; married filing jointly up to \$12,500; married filing separately up to \$6,250 each.

NEW MEXICO: All pensions and annuities are fully taxed.

NEW YORK: Full exemption, U.S. government pensions and annuities are not taxed.

NORTH CAROLINA: Up to \$4,000 of any federal annuity income is exempt.

NORTH DAKOTA: All pensions and annuities are fully taxed, except first \$5000 is exempt less any Social Security payments, but only if the individual chooses to use Form 37 (long form). Individuals are cautioned to check both Form 37-S and Form 37 to ascertain which one yields the lowest tax for the year. Qualifying for the exclusion does not mean that Form 37 is the better form to choose.

OHIO: Gives a tax credit based on the amount of the retirement annuity. If the annuity is below \$500 then there is no credit. Annuity of \$500 to \$1,499 merits a \$25 credit; \$1,500 to \$2,999 merits \$50 credit; \$3,000 to \$4,999 merits \$80 credit; \$5000

to \$7,999 merits \$130 credit; and any annuity over \$8,000 merits a credit of \$200. The maximum credit per return is \$200.

OKLAHOMA: Up to \$5,500 exempt on all federal pensions.

OREGON: Generally, all retirement income is subject to Oregon tax when received by an Oregon resident. This includes non-Oregon source retirement income. Oregon source retirement income received by nonresidents, who are not domiciled in Oregon is not subject to taxation by Oregon.

PENNSYLVANIA: Full exemption for government pensions and social security.

PUERTO RICO: There is an exemption of \$5,000 on pension payments if you are under 60. Over 60 the exemption is \$8,000.

RHODE ISLAND: Fully taxable.

SOUTH CAROLINA: On retirement income: under age 65 a \$3,000 exemption may be taken; over 65 years of age a \$10,000 exemption may be taken and an additional \$11,500 exemption may be taken on income regardless of source.

SOUTH DAKOTA: No personal income tax.

TENNESSEE: Full exemption, government pensions are not taxed.

TEXAS: No personal income tax.

UTAH: Under age 65 a \$4,800 exemption may be taken. However, the deduction is reduced \$.50 for every \$1.00 that the Federal Adjusted Gross Income exceeds \$32,000 (married filing joint) or \$25,000 (single). Over 65 years of age a \$7,500 exemption may be taken for each individual. However, the exemption is reduced \$.50 for every \$1.00 that the Federal Adjusted Gross Income exceeds \$32,000 (married filing joint) or \$25,000 (single).

VERMONT: Fully taxable.

VIRGINIA: Age deductions of \$12,000, plus an additional personal exemption of \$800, if over age 65, and \$6000 if aged 62 to 64.

WASHINGTON: No personal income tax.

WEST VIRGINIA: Up to \$8,000 exempt, only if 65 years or older.

WISCONSIN: Pensions and annuities are fully taxable. However, benefits received from a federal retirement system account established before 12/31/63 are not taxable.

WYOMING: No personal income tax. □

James Yorke, who compiled the tax guide, would like to express thanks to M. Bruce Hirshorn, Foreign Service Tax Counsel, for his help in preparing this article.



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It seems, then, that the Internet can be conducive to both the institutions of democracy and the institutions of authoritarianism. It is true that penetration is growing, and that as more people gain access to the technology, they will be able to participate in forums such as e-mail discussions and chat rooms. There have already been instances of grass-roots organizing aided or even enabled by the Internet, and in some cases, the public may actually be able to petition a government that may be responsive to their views. Yet it would be unwise to assume that the effects of technology can flow in only one political direction, toward democracy. A quick look at the controversy over online privacy in the U.S. gives a chilling glimpse of the potential for surveillance that the Internet also provides — potential which authoritarian governments are certain to recognize.

As evidenced by many Asian countries, governments both dictatorial and democratic are eager to put technology to their own uses — and those in the former category are not quite as unsophisticated in their methods as

those in the latter might hope. China's combination of outright censorship, extensive regulations, selective arrests, and promotion of self-censorship by the private sector shows that it is at least attempting to work out a nuanced method of control, even if the success of its strategy has yet to be proven. Even a military junta like Burma's has demonstrated that it is growing proficient at using the Internet to draw in tourists and hard currency.

As these examples show, one must be cautious about drawing easy conclusions. Freedom of expression does not automatically lead to a full-blown constitutional democracy. It is possible that in Asia and other regions, the Internet may help destabilize authoritarian regimes but not necessarily pave the way toward liberal democracy, leading to an as-yet-unforeseen political situation. Moreover, many other factors weigh heavily in the process of democratization, and the Internet, if it plays a role at all, should not assume a place of unwarranted importance simply because it happens to be a buzzword. ■

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DRUGS, DEMOCRACY AND LATIN AMERICA



DESPITE THE RHETORIC, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IS NOT ALWAYS A TOP U.S. PRIORITY IN LATIN AMERICA.

By MICHAEL SHIFTER

In 2000, dramatic events in Latin America and the United States raised questions about what has been for the past several decades a guiding principle of U.S. policy toward Latin America: the promotion of democracy. Few analysts anticipated the growing political uncertainty and turmoil in Latin America, concentrated especially in the Andean countries. Moreover, the confusion surrounding the 2000 presidential elections in the United States did little to enhance the credibility of U.S. efforts to advance democracy abroad. These developments upset conventional assumptions about the progressive improvement of democracy in Latin America and the leadership role of the United States in contributing to this improvement.

From the beginning, the Clinton administration claimed to attach high value to promoting liberal, representative

democracy along the lines of the U.S. model. The framework for democracy promotion that the U.S. has followed in Latin America since the early 1990s has emphasized building democratic institutions (the judiciary, executive and legislature), free and competitive elections, human rights guarantees, the rule of law, and a system of checks and balances among democratic institutions.

In the early 1990s, these democracy promotion policies enjoyed increasing public acceptance throughout Latin America. The political climate in Latin America at the time was markedly optimistic. In 1989, Chile was the last country (with the exception of Cuba) to make its transition to a democratically elected government. However, in the latter years of the 1990s, the Clinton administration's model for liberal representative democracy has been challenged by new leaders. The changing political climate in Latin America had also created public dissatisfaction with this democracy promotion model in the region.

In the early 1990s, the Clinton administration not only gave more weight to democratic institution building, but also embraced the notion of democratic defense — that is, countering threats such as a coup to a democratic political system. The concept of democratic defense was broadly endorsed by Latin America's civilian constitutional governments. In June 1991, during the Bush administration, the Organization of American States made a significant legal advance in Latin American democratic development with the adoption of Resolution 1080. The resolution declared that, for the first time, an interruption of a country's constitutional process would be a matter of hemispheric concern and would at a minimum trigger a meeting of the region's foreign ministers. The resolution came into play in response to four cases — Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996). The new OAS mechanism worked best in the cases of Guatemala and Paraguay, where outside pressure, together with the mobilization of constituencies in each country, helped prevent successful military

***Appealing directly
to "the people,"
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institutions such as
political parties.***

takeovers. The OAS denounced Haiti's illegitimate government for three years, though it would ultimately take the use of force by the United States in 1994 to bring military rule to an end. The hemispheric community's initial condemnation of Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori's 1992 "self-coup," — in which he suspended the constitution, closed the congress, and took over the courts — eventually gave way to acquiescence. Though the overall

record on democratic defense was mixed — the hemisphere's governments might have been more forceful in dealing with some of these situations — the OAS nonetheless reacted swiftly and positively on all four occasions.

A Gloomy Political Landscape

As the decade progressed, the Clinton administration had to confront a number of serious problems in its democracy promotion policy in Latin America. The most important of these was the increasingly complicated and unexpectedly gloomy political landscape that began to characterize the region. New, more subtle and ambiguous threats to democracy called into question precisely what sort of political system the United States was seeking to promote in the region. The model for democracy promotion that the U.S. had embraced in the early 1990s seemed at variance with the political trends in the region.

Indeed, seven months before President Clinton was elected, Fujimori had engineered his self-coup in Peru. Though the OAS invoked Resolution 1080 and the United States government applied sanctions to express American disapproval, once the Fujimori administration held new elections in November 1992, international pressure on Fujimori substantially diminished. Yet after the 1992 elections, and especially after his reelection in 1995, Fujimori's authoritarian grip on power tightened. He succeeded in extending control over key institutions such as the media and electoral authorities.

Although Clinton administration officials publicly raised concerns about a variety of troubling setbacks to Peru's democratic progress — including restrictions on press freedom, the weakening of judicial independence and the violation of electoral rules — U.S. policy was chiefly ad hoc and reactive. The American democracy

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promotion framework offered limited guidance for dealing with Peru's constantly shifting, retrogressive politics. Fujimori's machinations challenged the very conception of democracy held by U.S. policy-makers. Did Fujimori's May 1997 dismissal of three judges on his constitutional court who had questioned his run for a third term warrant a regional, or U.S., response? And if so, what should the response have been?

Setbacks in democratic development in Latin America during the Clinton years were not restricted to Peru. In February 1997 the Ecuadoran congress, in a constitutionally dubious action, ousted its then-president, Abdala Bucaram. Was this an interruption of the constitutional process and, if so, what should have been the appropriate response from the United States and other hemispheric governments, all of which remained silent? Then in January 2000, the Ecuadoran military removed the democratically elected president Jamil Mahuad from power. In part as a result of Clinton administration pressure — the U.S. threatened sanctions against any military-led government — the transition was orderly and Mahuad's vice president took over. To be sure, the country under Mahuad was unquestionably suffering a profound crisis of governability. Still, this marked the first time in a quarter of a century that the military forced the removal of a democratically elected head of state in South America.

The December 1998 election of Hugo Chávez as Venezuela's president challenged the conventional concept of democracy held by U.S. officials even more sharply. Chávez, a former lieutenant colonel and a populist, seems like a throwback to a previous period in Latin American politics. Appealing directly to "the people," he has bypassed democratic institutions such as political parties and given a greater role in public works and development projects to the armed forces. In his speeches he has attacked unions, media and civil society. He has publicly repudiated the idea of representative democracy and the importance of checks and balances, which he sees as responsible for the country's ills. His message has captivated the Venezuelan people, at least the mass of poor Venezuelans who overwhelmingly support him.

Chávez's rhetoric hardly reflects the spirit of Resolution 1080 on democratic defense. In fact, in January 2000 Chávez viewed the Ecuadoran military's actions with considerable sympathy. In response to Chávez's positions, the Clinton administration has main-

tained a "wait and see" posture — a posture not unrelated to considerable U.S. oil interests in Venezuela — preferring to permit Chávez to exercise his rhetorical excesses as long as his actions fall strictly within constitutional and legal bounds.

Questions about the effectiveness of U.S. democracy promotion efforts in Latin America are not limited to the Andean countries. To be sure, countries such as Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and also Colombia (where democracy has long been under siege from left-wing insurgencies and right-wing paramilitary groups) have experienced the most noteworthy departures from democratic standards. Other Latin American countries may be closer to pursuing a democratic path but are nonetheless cause for concern. Paraguay, Haiti, and such Central American countries as Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras, where democratic institutions are precarious, especially stand out. The upbeat mindset that shaped the Clinton administration about the direction of Latin American democracy when it began its work in January 1993 seemed considerably less appropriate for the region's political realities as his second term came to an end.

The Clinton administration had to deal not only with unanticipated political developments in Latin America but also with the difficulty of coordinating an effective democracy promotion policy. The problem of coordination is evident in two key areas. First, there is a problem of creating a coherent policy from among the competing interests (in Latin American policy, drugs, immigration, trade, human rights and the environment are especially relevant) of different U.S. government agencies. Discipline is often elusive, and confusion can result. The second is the problem of the United States coordinating its democracy promotion efforts with those of other hemispheric governments, organizations such as the OAS, and nongovernmental actors. On both of these scores, the Clinton record has been mixed at best.

Domestic Concerns Trump Democracy

The most common critique of the Clinton administration's Latin American democracy policy is not that policy flounders because of the government's coordination problems, but rather that the goal of strengthening democracy was often subordinate to the high priority of fighting drugs. Fighting drugs, after all, is a politically powerful impulse that reflects a U.S. domestic concern. Promoting democracy, in contrast, is considered to be

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part of foreign policy. When the two aims collide, the former is likely to trump the latter.

The conflict between these interests played out during the Clinton years in Peru and Colombia. To be sure, the U.S. government took a number of steps — such as making public statements of concern and expanding pro-democratic AID programs — designed to advance democracy in Peru following the 1992 self-coup. But at the same time, the U.S. government valued its relationship with Vladimiro Montesinos, President Fujimori's principal security adviser and anti-drug chief. Montesinos is generally credited with achievements in Peru's anti-drug operations such as reducing coca production and intercepting drugs in transit. Yet as revelations in 2000 made clear, Montesinos' enormous power came with a heavy cost. Serious allegations of human rights abuses and wide-

In Latin America, the goal of strengthening democracy is often subordinated to fighting drugs.

spread corruption against him (including involvement with arms and drug trafficking), make it difficult to reconcile the United States's long association with Montesinos with a strong American commitment to democratic progress in Peru.

In Colombia, too, when the goal of fighting drugs has conflicted with that of promoting democracy, the former has taken precedence. South America's oldest democracy has long been under siege, yet the policies fashioned under the Clinton administration have taken this fact into account mainly as an afterthought. As a result of credible accusations that Colombian president Ernesto Samper received \$6 million in his 1994 campaign from the Cali drug cartel, the United States not only "decertified" the country (i.e., declared that it failed to cooperate with the U.S. in the fight against drugs) in 1996 and 1997, but also revoked

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Samper's U.S. visa. Decertified countries are subject to sanctions and denied foreign assistance and U.S. votes for loans at international financial institutions. Such punitive measures may have projected U.S. toughness on drugs, but they dealt a major blow to an already weak government, struggling to contain Colombia's various violent, lawless actors — and struggling to keep together a democracy at great risk. The harsh U.S. treatment of the Samper government did little to build international and national confidence at precisely the moment when Colombia needed every bit of support to resist escalating lawlessness.

With the election of Andrés Pastrana as Colombia's president in 1998, the U.S. became more committed to supporting the troubled country. In 2000, the U.S. approved an aid package of \$1.3 billion for a two-year period; to underscore the importance of such assistance, President Clinton went to Colombia, the first U.S. president to do so in a decade. Still, although the rhetoric of some high officials attributed the aid to the U.S. goal of shoring up Colombia's threatened democracy, the central thrust of U.S. support focuses on military aid to fight drugs. While these objectives are not incompatible, they are distinct, and often in tension with one another. For example, insisting on the practice of fumigating coca crops is not the best way to build stronger democratic practices for two reasons. First, the military and police, not civilian political authorities, play an important role in crop fumigation. If promoting democracy were a priority for the U.S., it would direct its limited resources away from these law-enforcement institutions and toward strengthening political authority. Also, fumigating coca hurts small coca farmers. Their livelihood destroyed, these farmers may react by supporting insurgents and other lawless actors, further fueling conflict and straining Colombia's democracy.

Immigration policy is another domestic interest that has conflicted with U.S. democracy promotion aims. The U.S. regularly deports significant numbers of criminals to fragile democracies such as the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Honduras. Such a policy may be defensible, but few dispute that its democracy promotion consequences are troubling. Journalistic accounts, diplomats, observers and government officials in affected countries have concluded that an influx of criminals has a harmful effect on struggling

democracies. Weak institutions such as judicial systems are especially strained when trying to manage the higher levels of gang violence, common crime, and drug trafficking that these countries are already experiencing.

Economic interests also weigh heavily in U.S. calculations on democracy promotion. For example, though there can be little hard evidence in support of this theory, most observers agree that the fact that Venezuela is a chief supplier of oil to the United States has affected the way the U.S. has dealt with Chávez's defiant leadership style. The U.S. has been reluctant to take a tough stance on many of Chávez's decisions even when his actions displease the U.S.: Witness the restrained U.S. reaction to Chávez's meeting with Saddam Hussein in August 2000 or Chávez's close friendship with Cuba's Fidel Castro.

At the same time, American economic interests have also reinforced U.S. democracy promotion objectives. The adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993 and the substantial financial support extended to help Mexico in 1995 — neither of which was politically popular — not only bolstered the economic position of our southern neighbor, but also helped prepare the ground for democratization. This process culminated in the election of Vicente Fox on July 2, 2000, the first time an opposition party defeated the ruling party in more than seven decades.

The trade imperative, widely seen by our hemispheric partners as a high priority in U.S. policy, dominated the two Summits of the Americas, in Miami in 1994 and Santiago in 1998, during the Clinton years. Though many considered this emphasis on expanding hemispheric trade to be supportive of democracy aims, the gains in trade were limited and opportunities for even further progress were lost because the U.S. Congress failed to grant President Clinton "fast-track" authority to negotiate agreements. In short, in assessing the Clinton record on democracy in Latin America, the trade issue could be considered both an achievement and a disappointment.

Multilateralism Needed

Many Latin American governments were, moreover, troubled by the way the United States promoted democracy in the region during the Clinton years. In general, they prefer a more collaborative approach,

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marked by consultations and consensus building, which they believe tends to result in more constructive policies. In the early 1990s, there was a growing expectation that the United States might well move toward adopting such an approach. However, unilateralism has prevailed on important issues such as the Cuba embargo and drug policy; many Latin American countries believed that the U.S. approach to these issues did little to promote stable democracy in the region.

Even in the cases in which the United States has taken important steps to promote democracy in Latin America, the effectiveness of such measures has sometimes been undermined by lack of adequate consultations and coordination with other hemispheric partners. This is the case with the April 2000 elections in Peru when, for the first time ever, an OAS mission reported that the elections

The U.S. regularly deports significant numbers of criminals to fragile democracies in Latin America.

were neither free nor fair. In this instance, the United States took a firm stand in defense of democracy, but it did so in a way that upset other Latin American governments. In Brazil particularly, which often frets about projections of American power in South America, there was considerable suspicion about U.S. motives in the region. Some Latin American governments questioned the United States's excessive meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign country; the Peruvian government was especially resentful of OAS and U.S. criticism of its elections. Latin American dismay at the way the U.S. responded to Peru's elections demonstrated the tension that exists between promoting democracy and protecting sovereignty. In light of the asymmetry of power in the Western Hemisphere, such tensions can be especially acute and need to be managed with utmost sensitivity.



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Haiti: A Textbook Case

The case of Haiti is the classic illustration of democracy promotion during the Clinton era. In September 1991, the Haitian military ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the country's democratically elected president. Despite economic and diplomatic pressure applied by the United States for three years, Gen. Raoul Cedras, head of the Haitian armed forces, refused to budge. Following the deployment of a U.S.-led multinational force to Haiti, constitutional rule was restored in October 1994.

Several aspects of Haiti policy are worth underlining. First, this was the only case during the Clinton years in which force or the threat of force was employed in Latin America. Second, the United States succeeded in securing U.N. authorization for such an action. Third, Haiti policy was the only hemispheric policy in eight years where there was a clear, marked difference in the position assumed by the Democratic and Republican parties. And finally, more than any other policy in the hemisphere, the return of President Aristide to Haiti in 1994 was explicitly justified in terms of promoting democracy. Whatever the real motives behind the Clinton administration's Haiti policy, there is a serious dispute about its outcome. More than six years after the use of force in the name of restoring democracy, the country is experiencing a profound crisis of governance, and the prospects are not bright. If Haiti is any more democratic than it was in 1994, it is only marginally so. The real difficulty for the United States is the wide gap between the stubborn institutional problems in the country, and the lofty, inflated rhetoric that promised a democratic transformation or restoration. The disparity has contributed to partisan bickering and has cast doubt not only on what may have been a defensible policy towards Haiti, but on what is indeed a worthy enterprise: democracy promotion.

Lessons Learned

Three lessons can be distilled from the Clinton administration's democracy promotion performance in Latin America. These might be taken into account as

***Democracy promotion
is a sound and
important goal that
should continue to
shape U.S. policy
toward Latin America.***

the administration of George W. Bush confronts an enormously challenging and complex landscape throughout the region.

First, democracy promotion is a sound and important goal that should continue to shape U.S. policy toward Latin America. While some political developments in the region over the past eight years have fallen short of expectations, it is at least arguable that conditions in a number of countries — especially Mexico but also

Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay, Guatemala and perhaps even Colombia and Haiti — might have been even more troubling if the United States had pursued another approach. Democracy promotion not only helps advance U.S. interests and values, but also contributes to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

Second, it is crucial to temper expectations about what democracy promotion policies can accomplish. The U.S. should be open and honest about competing concerns in the region and recognize that sometimes advancing democracy is subordinate to, say, fighting drugs or protecting economic interests. Such dilemmas should be resolved in favor of democracy promotion, unless other concerns are unusually pressing. Moreover, the United States should resist the temptation to make exaggerated claims. The chaos of the U.S. presidential elections should encourage greater humility, keep occasional ethnocentrism in check, and deflate the zeal sometimes attached to democracy promotion. It should not, however, detract from the value of the enterprise itself.

Finally, the United States should resist the instinct to resort merely to democracy programs or technical formulae in pursuing larger democracy promotion goals. To the extent possible, the Bush administration should keep democracy promotion as a central guide or reference point as it attempts to grapple with the complex political challenges in Latin America. An effective policy will require great subtlety and sensitivity, with the keen understanding that, despite the disproportionate power enjoyed by the United States in the hemisphere, in the final analysis the course democracy takes depends fundamentally on the ongoing, often unpredictable, struggles within each society. ■

DO WE WANT DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST?



Peter Sin

THE "DEMOCRACY DILEMMA" IN THE ARAB WORLD:
HOW DO YOU PROMOTE REFORM WITHOUT
UNDERMINING KEY UNITED STATES INTERESTS?

BY AMY HAWTHORNE

American policymakers have long grappled with the so-called "democracy dilemma" in the Arab world: How should the United States promote political liberalization without threatening core U.S. interests in the Middle East? These interests include maintaining Israel's security and well-being, ensuring reliable access to petroleum reserves in the Gulf, preventing terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and supporting U.S. investment. Encouraging a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace and supporting the stability of friendly Arab countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and the Gulf monarchies, have been the main tools for achieving these goals since 1991.

Many recognize that the lack of political freedom in the Arab world (according to Freedom House, a non-profit

group that promotes political freedom, this region is home to more authoritarian regimes than any other) may endanger U.S. interests in the long term. Repression and exclusion from meaningful political participation sow the seeds of hopelessness, extremism and violent upheaval. And as the connection between economic development and good governance becomes increasingly clear, the U.S. is concerned that the Arab world's sclerotic political systems are inhibiting the region's integration into the global economy.

Yet supporting genuine democratic change may not only provoke tension with Arab regimes whose cooperation is essential to the achievement of U.S. interests, it also risks bringing to power leaders who would actively reject American values. Across the region, free elections might replace current regimes, whether monarchies or secular republics, with some kind of Islamist leadership. The U.S. considers this a worse option since many Islamists reject U.S. influence in the Middle East. Throughout the Arab world, with a choice between a less-than-democratic status quo and the potential outcome of a democratization process — a power transfer to an anti-U.S. Islamist-oriented government — the U.S. has preferred the former.

Because of this "democracy dilemma," Clinton, like his predecessors, has avoided the full-fledged promotion of democracy in the Arab world. The Clinton administration recognized, however, that limited political reform could help to maintain the stability of the region. Expanding participation in politics and decision-making could decrease opposition to unpopular regimes and thereby contribute to the long-term viability of key Arab governments, especially moderate regimes friendly to the U.S.

Limited Liberalization

Accordingly, during the Clinton era the U.S. calibrated its position toward Arab world democratization to support specific aspects of a liberalized political system while shying away from promoting full-fledged democracy. Far more often than their predecessors, Clinton administration officials spoke of "improved

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governance," "political participation," "pluralism," and "greater openness" in the Middle East. They also raised concerns about human rights and political reform in their dialogue with friendly Arab governments. In many Arab countries, the administration launched democracy assistance initiatives to promote political reform and improve the quality of governance. In sum, the administration has tried "to improve the climate for political liberalization in the region," according to a 1995 statement by then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert H. Pelletreau.

Unfortunately, the Clinton administration's efforts did not achieve this objective: Across most of the Arab world political reform has stalled and the underlying structures of authoritarianism are intact. Some U.S. initiatives took the wrong approach; many could achieve little when confronted by Arab governments' strong resistance to real reform. Most notably, U.S. efforts to promote Arab democracy seemed but an afterthought to the main objectives of U.S. policy in the region. Pro-democracy initiatives remained at the level of "low policy," meaning that they were neglected or undermined at the more influential diplomatic level when they conflicted with core "high policy" interests such as regional security, oil and terrorism among others.

The Clinton administration supported limited political reform in the Arab world for three reasons. First, Clinton has repeatedly professed his enthusiasm for "democratic enlargement" as a major foreign policy goal. The U.S. lent significant support to countries in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Latin America that were transitioning from authoritarian rule and encouraged nations in Africa and Asia to adopt democracy as well. It seemed impossible to exclude the Middle East from the administration's global democracy-building efforts.

Second, the end of the Cold War altered the lens through which the U.S. viewed key Arab states, such as Egypt and Morocco, that had been bulwarks against the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East. With the Soviet threat gone, the U.S. believed it had more latitude to address these countries' need for internal political reform.

The most important factor in Clinton's decision to promote political reform in the Middle East was the political situation in many Arab nations in the early

1990s. Arab regimes faced severe socio-economic problems, popular demands for political rights, and the increasing strength of Islamist opposition movements. Several governments were forced to begin painful economic restructuring programs. To gain support for these controversial programs and to quell popular unrest, many Arab leaders lifted restrictions on political activity and expanded participation in formal political processes. Countries including Algeria, Jordan and Yemen held multiparty elections, which increased opposition parties' presence in parliament. In Morocco, Qatar and elsewhere, regimes accepted greater media openness. Throughout the region, non-governmental organizations monitored human rights violations, conducting public opinion research, and fighting corruption, activities which had been too risky to engage in previously.

Some policymakers and regional experts argued that despite these signs of political change, Arab culture was inherently inhospitable to full democracy. Many Arab leaders also expressed their belief that Western-style democracy was inappropriate for their political culture. On balance, however, the U.S. decided that a pre-emptive, tightly controlled process of political liberalization deserved U.S. support, particularly if it helped to decrease the appeal of Islamist groups.

Support for Democracy

This support manifested itself in several ways. In dialogue with friendly countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. raised sensitive matters such as human rights, press freedom and women's rights. The U.S. justified its policies toward so-called rogue states such as Iraq and Libya by faulting these states for their human rights abuses and repressive governments. The Department of State's annual human rights reports on Arab governments' undemocratic practices became more critical.

The U.S. also began to incorporate democracy-related initiatives into many of its foreign assistance and public diplomacy programs in the Arab world. Overseen by the Department of State, USAID and the former USIA and implemented by U.S. non-profits and contractors, these democracy aid programs provided

Democratic change risks bringing to power leaders who would actively reject U.S. interests.

Arab governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations with technical assistance, training, equipment, strategic advice, and sometimes funding. They aimed to support political reforms already under way in the region by improving the quality of governance, making political institutions such as parliaments more accountable to their constituencies, and strengthening civil society organizations' ability to contribute to local and national policy-making. Total funding for these programs from fiscal years 1993 through 1999 exceeded \$250 million. While in comparative terms this was not much — more than five times this amount was spent on democracy-building in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union — it was a dramatic increase over previously negligible levels.

The lion's share of Arab world democracy assistance went to programs in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority. In the case of Egypt, there were simply more resources available overall, since Egypt's total aid package is so substantial. Further, many democracy programs aimed to support Egypt's economic reform process, which was a major priority for the U.S. in the 1990s. Programs in Egypt supported judicial reform and helped to strengthen labor unions and civil society organizations as well as government institutions. With the Israeli-Palestinian peace process under way, fostering a viable Palestinian Authority was also a priority for the Clinton administration. Aid for the West Bank and Gaza included initiatives such as assistance for the 1996 legislative council elections, for the council and judicial system, and for the spread of democratic ideas and values among the Palestinian public. Elsewhere in the region, numerous smaller-scale programs focused on judicial reform (Yemen, Morocco and Oman); civil society organizations (Yemen, Morocco); parliamentary strengthening (Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Lebanon); elections (Algeria, Yemen) and women's participation (Yemen, Qatar, Morocco).

Generally the design and implementation of these programs was professional and serious, reflecting lessons learned from earlier democracy-building efforts elsewhere. Technical management was better as well. Some programs, such as a judicial reform pro-

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ject in Egypt and a civic awareness program in the West Bank and Gaza, have even been labeled aid success stories. In general, many democracy aid projects achieved positive results. They exposed Arab government officials to new ways of doing things, helped to keep beleaguered human rights and democracy organizations afloat, created new spaces for dialogue and debate, and injected discussion of political liberalization into the public discourse. All this helped to endorse reform and openness as the norm.

Efforts Came Up Short

Despite these bright spots, however, on balance Clinton administration democracy promotion efforts came up short. In some cases, there were shortcomings in the democracy aid programs themselves. Many had objectives that went far beyond what could realistically

Limited political reform could help to maintain the stability of the region.

be expected from limited time frames and small amounts of technical assistance, especially considering many Arab nations' deeply entrenched resistance to reform. Such programs aimed to renovate undemocratic institutions and produce deep structural transformations quickly, instead of focusing on the more modest but appropriate goal of encouraging incremental changes in attitudes and behavior of key individuals within those institutions. For example, technical assistance to several moribund Arab parliaments set out to remake them into credible and influential institutions in a matter of two or three years. This was an overly ambitious short-term goal, given the overwhelming weight of countervailing factors such as resistance to change among parliamentarians themselves, the questionable legitimacy of electoral processes that produced their membership, and — most crucially — the weakness of legislatures in



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the face of overwhelming executive branch powers.

In other cases, democracy aid targeted institutions that did not enjoy much local credibility. Because part of the Clinton administration's democracy strategy involved counteracting the appeal of Islamist movements, much U.S. democracy assistance took place far away from many grass-roots initiatives that were associated with the Islamists. Instead, the U.S. sometimes focused on institutions that many Arabs themselves considered ineffective, such as ossified political parties or "non-governmental" organizations whose leaders had been co-opted by government officials. This meant lost opportunities to encourage alternative media and anti-corruption movements, for example. Another limitation was the uncomfortable fact that, in contrast to Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, many Arab pro-democracy activists also happened to be anti-American, or at least included criticism of U.S. policies in the Middle East as part of their platforms. Arab democrats by nature oppose the political status quo in their countries, which often means they oppose regimes with close ties to the U.S. or those that are subject to U.S. influence.

Less Democracy to Promote

Other programs were based on overly optimistic assumptions about the willingness of regimes to embrace change and undertake meaningful reforms. Such endeavors faltered when events followed a less rosy trajectory than expected. For instance, in Egypt, the U.S. announced a multi-million-dollar civil society support project after the Egyptian government repeatedly stated its intention to liberalize a law that had hindered the activity of many NGOs involved in human rights and democracy activities. Months later, a new NGO law was indeed issued — one considered far worse than the original legislation. In Yemen, the success of programs designed to build a sustainable multi-party election system later seemed doubtful when the Yemeni government moved to control an election commission it had vowed would be "independent" and to postpone long-scheduled parliamentary elections.

In fact, such failings of U.S. democracy promotion

In the Arab political world, the underlying structures of authoritarianism are intact.

are not surprising considering that as the 1990s continued there seemed to be less democracy to promote in the Arab world. While the formal trappings of democracy existed, there was little substantive political liberalization. This was because most Arab governments failed to move beyond the initial steps toward political reform to genuine liberalization, which would include regular competi-

itive elections leading to power sharing or alternation in leadership. Because such moves might have threatened a regime's hold on power, most Arab leaders did not make them. By the late 1990s, the momentum for political reform had stalled in countries where earlier trends toward democracy had seemed so promising.

However, some important changes have occurred. The mushrooming of civil society organizations, the rise of the Arab human rights movement, the growth of new media, and generational shifts all may ultimately shape a new Arab political culture. And Morocco, which has moved more steadily towards reform than any other Arab country in recent years, may prove an important exception. But in many key countries, the depth of political will among the political elite to move toward real structural change — still a critical factor for a peaceful process of liberalization — is uncertain.

The most significant deficiency of the Clinton record on democracy promotion in the Arab world is the absence of meaningful diplomatic efforts to encourage Arab governments to achieve reforms. Such political engagement is essential in any successful democracy promotion strategy.

To be sure, during the Clinton era, many priorities in U.S. policy toward the region — specifically, the containment of Iraq, the support of friendly regimes in their struggles with violent extremists, and the peace process — made it politically difficult for the U.S. to push harder on political liberalization. To maintain Arab support for United Nations sanctions on Iraq and for U.S.-led containment of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Clinton administration relied on the cooperation of Arab governments in the Gulf and beyond. This, along with the need for reliable access to oil and gas from the Gulf, required the U.S. to jettison calls for political reform that might cause inordinate tension with these

governments. In the face of the political threat posed to Arab regimes by extremist movements, the U.S. closed ranks with friendly governments and avoided pressuring them for reform when they appeared vulnerable. Unfortunately, this approach also required the U.S. to downplay the fact that regimes such as Egypt's were also repressing the non-violent opposition and clamping down on civil liberties.

The peace process also constrained the United States' ability to promote democracy, especially in the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. The U.S. needed close coordination with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Accordingly, U.S. officials did little to combat the political repression of Palestinians critical of Arafat — several of whom were participants in U.S. democracy promotion programs. This gave the impression, whether fair or not, to Palestinians that the U.S. wanted "peace first, democracy later" in the West Bank and Gaza. An aversion to placing undue pressure on the Jordanian leadership, which serves as a critical interlocutor between the Palestinians and the Israelis, is one reason why democratic reform was not an important element in the U.S.-Jordanian relationship during the 1990s.

Despite numerous democracy aid programs and lofty pro-reform rhetoric, nowhere in the Arab world was democracy promotion, or the lack of it, a decisive force in U.S. policy. At no time did an Arab regime's restriction of civil liberties (such as in the Palestinian Authority or Egypt), cancellation of an electoral process (such as in Algeria), or the arbitrary detention of leading human rights figures (as in Egypt, Tunisia, or the Palestinian Authority) prompt the Clinton administration to undertake any punitive measures. In contrast, Clinton punished rulers in Latin America, Asia and Africa with sanctions in response to similar violations of liberty. At no time was democracy elevated to the level of other key U.S. interests, or — more crucially — integrated with them. (In Russia the U.S. viewed democracy not only as valuable in and of itself but also as essential to achieve economic reform and arms control.) This gap between rhetoric and action was not lost on Arab leaders or Arab democracy activists, who tended

*The Department of
State's annual human
rights reports on
Arab governments'
undemocratic practices
became more critical.*

to view the Clinton administration's democracy promotion efforts in their region with great skepticism.

In the final analysis, during the Clinton administration, the costs of pushing democracy hard were deemed too high; "excessive" democracy in the Arab world was still considered an impediment to securing top U.S. objectives. During Clinton's tenure, the Catch-22 of Arab world democratization became increasingly evident: The

U.S. largely depends on the cooperation of undemocratic regimes to secure its regional interests, yet the greatest long-term threat to these interests may stem, directly or indirectly, from a lack of real political freedom.

Looking Ahead

To achieve a more effective Arab world democracy promotion strategy, the next administration should take several lessons from previous U.S. experiences. First, the U.S. should not try to address too many issues in too superficial a manner. It should carefully and thoughtfully determine its top democracy-related priorities and push these issues consistently at a political level. The message here is political discussion with decision-makers first, democracy aid second. The next administration should consider seriously where and how authoritarianism may harm U.S. interests during the next decade and should think creatively about where pushing the envelope slightly on key issues may be worth a short-term risk.

Second, geographically, the U.S. should focus on Egypt, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority. By virtue of its close, multi-layered ties and large foreign aid package, the U.S. has the greatest leverage with Egypt. Egypt also remains the most influential Arab country; what happens there deeply affects the rest of the Arab world. Egypt needs less of the kind of democracy aid provided so far by the U.S.; it needs more gentle but consistent discussion of key concerns raised at the highest levels, on a regular basis. Morocco presents a different opportunity. At this time, Morocco seems to be the Arab country the most firmly on the road to meaningful political reform, so outside support may help to further a process with more internal

momentum than exists elsewhere. With the Palestinian Authority, the U.S. has a major stake in encouraging a democratic authority (and future Palestinian state), and should place priority upon preparing for democracy to take hold in a post-Arafat era.

Third, operationally, the U.S. should develop democracy aid strategies that pay much more attention to the presence (or absence) of political will. It should start small and make clear that a larger investment will be made only when it is clear that internal commitment is present and reform has a momentum of its own. No amount of external democracy assistance will make a leader, whether a president, minister or an election official, undertake political reform he or she is uninterested in. In addition, the U.S. needs to adopt a much longer term frame through which to view its


*The lion's share of Arab
world democracy
assistance went to
programs in Egypt and
the Palestinian Authority.*

democracy promotion efforts. The reality is that real structural change and deep transformations in political culture will take a generation, at best. The U.S. should develop programs foremost with an eye toward incremental, gradual change, with the bottom line goal always being to change values and behavior at the level of individuals.

Fourth, high level political efforts and democracy aid should make real efforts to tap into pockets of change already present in the region, especially those at a grass roots level. Initiatives that encourage tolerance, freedom of speech, pluralism, and space for dialogue are the best bet. Rather than trying to revive marginalized state institutions, a better approach under the present circumstances would listen carefully to the voices of youth and cutting edge activists to build on momentum already present in the Arab world. ■

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IRAQI KURDS ENJOY GOOD TIMES, FOR NOW

KURDS LIVING IN NORTHERN IRAQ ARE THRIVING COMPARED WITH IRAQIS UNDER SADDAM'S RULE, BUT THEIR SPECIAL PROTECTED STATUS MAY NOT LAST.

By WARREN P. STROBEL

A first-time visitor to the land of the Kurds in northern Iraq has to get used to intellectual double takes. There is the Muslim cleric in Sulimaniyah, almost an Osama bin Laden look-alike, who praises the U.S. warplanes flying overhead. Then there are the impossibly remote mountain villages that proudly sport small blue-and-white signs announcing United Nations aid projects. And in the regional capital of Irbil, there is the refurbished headquarters of the Kurdistan Regional Government. It has no sovereign powers but operates with all the quiet efficiency of a government ministry anywhere in the world.

Iraqi Kurdistan holds a special — and, it must be said, checkered — place in modern American foreign policy. Abandoned by the Shah of Iran and then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Baghdad's whims in the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq, Iraq's Kurds were left to the genocidal impulses of Saddam Hussein. After the U.S. military triumph in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 (and with encouragement from President George Bush) they rose up again, only to be crushed by Saddam. The Bush administration balked at intervening militarily in an internal Iraqi dispute. But in April 1991, with CNN broadcasting images of freezing Kurdish refugees clogging the border with Turkey, the United States offered succor and protection under Operation Provide Comfort. Thus began an engagement with Iraq's Kurds that continues a decade later. Today, U.S. Air Force jets patrol a "no-fly"

zone that keeps Saddam's military at bay, while American diplomats help the Kurds consolidate their tenuous self-government. Despite its history of unmet promises, Washington is still seen as the great hope of a stateless people. In Sulimaniyah, a Kurdish dinner companion, a few beers under his belt, suggests the Americans establish a permanent military base here. He describes the resources, including oil, that Iraqi Kurdistan has to offer. He is not joking.

Thanks in no small part to U.S. diplomacy and military power, Iraq's 3.5 million Kurds are now, for the first time in a generation, at peace. There is prosperity, too, although decades of war and neglect make that relative. Whether the good times can last is an open question at best. They are built on a convergence of temporary circumstances: the four-year-old U.N. oil-for-food program, a brisk oil smuggling trade, an end to interminable Kurdish fighting, and the "no-fly" zone. "Where do we go from here?" asks Shafiq Qazzaz, minister for humanitarian aid and cooperation in Irbil, a position that makes him somewhat akin to foreign minister. "I don't know."

A Massive U.N. Presence

The oil-for-food program has helped Iraq's Kurds more than anyone imagined. Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 986 (the number, like a talisman, is on signs everywhere), Iraq's three Kurdish-run governates, Dohuk, Irbil and Sulimaniyah, receive 13 percent of the country's oil revenues. Unlike in the rest of Iraq, where Saddam's regime controls distribution of food and medicine, aid in the north is administered by U.N. agencies in close coop-

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Warren P. Strobel is a senior editor with U.S. News & World Report. He has visited Iraq three times.

TWO VIEWS

SOUTHERN IRAQ SUFFERS UNDER SANCTIONS AND SADDAM

THOSE WHO LIVE IN SADDAM-CONTROLLED SOUTHERN IRAQ FACE SANCTIONS, A DROUGHT,
AND LITTLE SYMPATHY FROM THEIR GOVERNMENT.

By KEVIN WHITELAW

Only two of the 24 bumper cars still run at the dilapidated amusement park in the desperately poor southern Iraqi town of Nasiriya. The merry-go-round relies on a gearbox cannibalized from a tractor. Many of the park's 13 rides are frequently broken, having long ago run out of spare parts. Admission might be a mere three cents, but only one family roams the park on a sweltering summer evening.

Fun is a precious commodity in southern Iraq. For most residents, life after a decade of suffocating international sanctions is a daily struggle for survival. Nasiriya boasts Iraq's largest power station, but the town is beset by daily power outages, silencing the air conditioners in summer temperatures that regularly top 110 degrees. Sewage often goes untreated and the dearth of drinkable water has turned towns into breeding grounds for disease. The only recreation for the town's boys comes on the pebble-strewn dirt soccer fields.

Iraq spent much of the 1990s living under one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes in history. In recent years, with international support for the embargo fading, the restrictions have been gradually loosened, while smuggling has increased dramatically. This fall, Baghdad reopened its airport to receive humanitarian flights from around the world despite an air embargo. But even as the Iraqi government punches more and more

holes in the sanctions, the Iraqi people have not felt much of a change.

The Mother of All Droughts

As Baghdad and Washington trade accusations over who is to blame for the suffering, the people of Saddam-controlled Iraq are caught in the middle. While the Kurdish-held provinces in the north are thriving in relative terms, most of the economy in the south has ground to a halt. Child mortality is significantly higher in Saddam's Iraq according to a recent UNICEF study. One in four children is malnourished. Improvements in the United Nations oil-for-food program have brought more food to the population, but health care remains a problem as hospital wards in the south are still filled with cases of chronic malnutrition and serious diseases like leukemia. The pediatric hospital in Karbala, housed in a dingy former hotel, is a true house of horrors. One mother leads me to her 10-year-old son lying on his rank bed. She tries to stand him up, but his twiggy legs cannot support his own weight — only 22 pounds, the average weight for a healthy one-year-old.

It is the young that suffer the most. Schools are physically collapsing and books, paper, and equipment are in short supply. Most teachers work second or third jobs. Even worse, enrollment has dropped. In the dilapidated historic district of the southern city of Basra, only three of Suhilla Hattam's seven children are still in school. The other four work in the market every day selling nylon bags and other goods. She has already sold all of her furniture, even her bed, to pay medical bills. Only a stove and tele-

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Kevin Whitelaw covers international affairs for U.S. News and World Report. He recently spent two weeks traveling throughout central and southern Iraq.

STROBEL

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eration with local officials. It is, perhaps, the first time in modern history that the Kurds have been given a fair cut of Iraq's resources. "Our share of the oil for the last three or four decades was bombs and missiles," says Sami Abdulrahman, a pesh murga, one of the fierce Kurdish warriors, who is now a top official in the Kurdish regional government.

The contrast with Saddam-controlled Iraq is stark. Northerners in need of serious medical operations still travel to Baghdad where the best doctors are, staying in low-rent hotels in the capital's Kurdish districts. But they return north where medicines, scarce in most of Iraq, are plentiful and reasonably cheap. "The situation is better than the situation in Baghdad," says Susan Hassan, proprietor of the Susan Pharmacy in Sulimaniyah, as customers file in and out with their prescription slips.

Down the street at Nawzad Hassan's electronics shop, well-dressed customers look over boom boxes, vacuum cleaners and rechargeable fans. Hassan, who has a computer on his desk with a scanner and a 40-speed CD drive, opened the shop six months ago. He sells about 40 Samsung televisions a month and has been able to cut the price of a \$245 model to \$205 thanks to the vibrant economy. "Making money is good here," he says. Refrigerators are a less popular item because of the frequent power outages. And indeed, as I prepare to leave the shop, the electricity cuts out — a reminder, perhaps, of the fragility of Kurdistan's good times.

Eight U.N. agencies, with more than 200 international employees and 1,400 local staff, work in Kurdistan. They help renovate 150 schools a year, fund primary health care centers, and are rebuilding the

region's pathetically insufficient electric power grid. Villages, deserted and destroyed during Baghdad's 1987-1988 campaign against the Kurds, in which more than 100,000 may have died, and in which Saddam's troops used poison gas, are being restored. John Almstrom, the top U.N. official in the region, prais-

The oil-for-food program has helped Iraq's Kurds more than anyone imagined.

es Kurdish officials' cooperation. The U.N. programs, in fact, have prodded the Kurds to develop counterpart government ministries, deepening their separation from Baghdad. And they have drawn in locals with technical skills to contribute. "Those people are still around," says Qazzaz, adding: "It took a little while for the U.N. to find that out."

Industrial-Strength Smuggling

All this raises questions about why the oil-for-food program has not similarly alleviated the pain of the 10-year-old sanctions in the 15 central and southern Iraqi governates controlled by Saddam. (An example of the contrast: A 1999 UNICEF study found that child mortality, which has fallen slightly in the Kurdish lands, has doubled in the rest of Iraq over the last decade.) It may be because Saddam refuses to let foreign aid workers in — Iraq's health minister told a colleague and me that aid workers are "spies." Saddam recently rejected an independent team that was to assess the

humanitarian situation in Iraq. It may also be, as U.S. officials charge, that Saddam manipulates oil-for-food to keep his people impoverished and thus keep up the pressure to lift sanctions. But a well-placed diplomat in Baghdad says there is no hard evidence of this.

There may be more mundane reasons for the gap between Kurdish Iraq and Saddam's Iraq. Goods flow across Kurdistan's porous borders with Turkey and Iran, as a quick visit to the border checkpoint near Zakho confirms. Much of the cross-border trade is illegal under U.N. sanctions. (Smuggling through Iraq's southern gateway in the Persian Gulf is tightly controlled by Saddam's regime and its cronies, and benefits ordinary Iraqis much less, if at all). The air at the northern border checkpoint is thick with oily fumes. In the distance, in Turkey, a long line of oil tankers, their metal skins gleaming in the sun, wait to enter Iraq. They will drive to the city of Mosul, inside Saddam's territory, and fill up with oil. While the oil goes out, consumer goods flow in. A truck whose driver is completing customs formalities is piled high with Samsung TVs. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two major political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, which controls the trade, will take a \$10 tariff on each set. The border complex is clean and efficient, and it is being expanded. There is no baksheesh, or bribery, here, not "even one cigarette," customs official Mehuan Dosky, 26 and clean-cut, assures us. "We're just starting to rebuild Kurdistan," he says, with obvious pride.

The Kurds have another advantage over other Iraqis: Almost everyone you meet has a relative abroad, in Europe or the United States. The Kurds' stateless status, and decades of attacks on them by successive regimes in Baghdad and neighbor-

ing countries, have created a sizeable diaspora worldwide. The expatriates send hard currency to their families at home. With unemployment still high and the U.N.'s monthly food basket insufficient for a family's needs, it makes a crucial difference. This aid from abroad, says electronics shop owner Hassan, is the main reason for the difference between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. In a rare meeting of the minds, officials in Baghdad agree. "It would be difficult for them (to survive) without any foreign support," Riadh Burhan, dean of political science at Baghdad University, says of the Kurds.

While it frequently crosses the gray line into development assistance, oil-for-food is supposed to be strictly a humanitarian aid program. And like many aid programs, it has impacted the local economy in unintended ways. Because of the sanctions, the United Nations cannot buy from Kurdish farmers — even though the Food and Agricultural Organization is trying simultaneously to revitalize local agriculture. "We're working on the agriculture sector on one hand, and tearing down the market with another," says U.N. official Almstrom. More worrisome, the entire economy is predicated on (or, more bluntly, addicted to) the 13 percent oil revenue solution. Asked what should happen if the sanctions on Iraq are lifted, as some day they will be, Sami Abdulrahman replies without hesitation: "Keep the no-fly zone, and 13 percent."

A Truce Among Rival Kurds

The other major — and shaky — pillar supporting the comfortable status quo is the fact that Iraqi Kurds are no longer fighting one another. The KDP, led by Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal

Talabani, have vied for control since the 1975 debacle, and have frequently let themselves be manipulated by outside powers. KDP and PUK military forces battled for most of the 1990s. In 1996, Barzani, saying he feared elimination by an alliance of the PUK with nearby Iran, asked for help from Baghdad.

U.N. workers renovate 150 schools a year, fund primary health care centers, and are rebuilding the region's power grid.

Iraqi troops entered the region in large numbers and then quickly rolled up a CIA operation that was using Iraqi Kurdistan as a base to overthrow Saddam. In 1997, under pressure from the United States, the two major parties agreed to a ceasefire. The next year, they signed the Washington Agreement, committing to share revenues, unite their territories and reconstitute a Kurdish parliament.

But today, the KDP and PUK control competing tracts of Kurdistan, and run rival administrations. Barzani's KDP rules over Irbil and Dohuk governates, and Talabani's PUK over Sulimaniyah in the northeast. The two groups maintain separate militias, and travelers must negotiate armed checkpoints to cross between their domains. They cooperate mainly on implementing the oil-for-food program through a Higher Coordinating Committee.

Much of the Washington Agreement has never been imple-

mented. Though they are no longer at war, mistrust between the two old battlefield rivals remains high, primarily because each side is suspicious of the other's role in smuggling and generating other revenues. With the KDP controlling the main trade routes from Turkey, the PUK complains its rival does not fairly divide the \$1.5 million it makes each day on fuel smuggling. "They are not ready to share all the income in this region," says Sadi Pire, head of the PUK's foreign relations office in Sulimaniyah. He suggests that the smuggling enriches mainly Barzani and his tribe. The KDP has its complaints, too — over electricity, which is in chronic short supply in Irbil. The major source of electricity for the region, a pair of dams, is in PUK territory. Abdulrahman, who before I interviewed him had just met with U.N. officials on the electricity issue, says Irbil pays dam authorities the equivalent of \$75,000 each month, and in return is supposed to get 48 percent of the power generated by the dams. In reality, it gets just 10 percent, he says. The PUK charges that Barzani and top KDP officials hog electricity, leaving little for the rest of their own population. And on it goes.

Shafiq Qazzaz, the only member of the KDP-dominated cabinet in Irbil who does not belong to a political party, is openly frustrated with the two competing Kurdish administrations. Having two power bases is not just impractical, he says, but dangerous. Fifteen years ago, the KDP and PUK were conducting guerrilla warfare against Saddam from the mountains, Qazzaz says. "Today, they are ruling elites" who must live up to their new responsibilities. "If this thing (Kurdish self-government) is gone, they will be gone with it," he warns. The PUK's Pire agrees. The international community, he notes, long ago divided Kurdistan into four pieces — it constitutes parts of Iraq,

Turkey, Syria and Iran. "Now (there) is one piece under Kurdish control, and we divide it into two pieces. It is stupid."

Trappings of Statehood

Kurdistan has long been isolated, backward and repressed by governments that fear an independent Kurdish state. However, that may be changing, thanks to modern telecommunications. At the new Internet shop in Dohuk, regular customer Dr. Farhad Sulayvani, dean of the local university's medical college, cups his hand around a CD case marked Power Point '97. "We have Kurdistan here," he says, illustrating the geographic barriers that have always penned in the Kurds. The Internet, he says, "is a good way to bypass all these political obstacles."

Nor is the Internet the only technology that benefits the Kurds. In Kurdish cities, satellite dishes, which bring a six-month prison term in Saddam-controlled territory, sprout from the roofs of houses and hotels. International phone calls to Europe and the U.S. — routed through London, not Baghdad — are affordable for many. The impediments of geography "are no longer there," says Barham Salih, the PUK's Washington representative, who is in daily contact with his counterparts in Iraq.

With such freedoms have come the trappings of statehood. Iraqi Kurdistan uses its own currency, the old Iraqi dinar that does not bear Saddam's image. In fact, Saddam's grinning face, blindingly ubiquitous throughout the rest of Iraq, is absent north of the armed checkpoints that separate the two. Instead, portraits of Barzani or Talabani appear frequently but are somehow less chilling. The Iraqi flag too has been replaced by the fluttering yellow banner of the KDP or the green-and-red of the PUK. A businessman in Irbil hands one of my colleagues some Kurdish postage

stamps, for decoration only, but a powerful symbol of statehood all the same.

Still, most Kurds know from bitter experience that complete independence is not an option, and residents often go out of their way to remind visitors that they are Iraqis as well as Kurds. "It is the dream and hope of

One advantage the Kurds enjoy is that everyone has a relative abroad, in Europe or the United States.

Kurds to have an independent state. But we are thinking logically," says Hassan in his Sulimaniyah electronics shop. Having seen revolts brutally crushed before, and with life better now, the Kurds are unlikely to be on the leading edge of another risky bid to overthrow Saddam, say U.S. government and private experts. Quietly, U.S. officials have urged Kurdish political leaders at the very least not to seek an accommodation with Baghdad while Saddam remains in power.

Saddam's tanks and guns lurk just over the horizon, one of many reasons the future of Iraqi Kurdistan is very much in question. "They can make life hell ... just by shelling," says Abdulrahman, the deputy prime minister in Irbil. Without the "no-fly" zone and other outside assistance, a decade of work by Washington and its allies could "be shattered in a day or two," he says. Abdulrahman, once and always a pesh murga, seems ready to return to the mountains to fight if he has to.

Saddam is not the Kurds' only worry. The good times, built as they are on a convergence of temporary circumstances — oil-for-food, sanctions and smuggling, the "no-fly" zones — raise a host of questions for which Iraqi Kurdistan's political leaders have no easy answers. What happens when the sanctions, or Saddam, or both, go? How will this protected enclave eventually reunify with the rest of Iraq when the gap between the two grows by the week? Is its success a model for the rest of the country once Saddam and his family leave power? Or just a brief interruption in the region's troubled history of unrest and bloodshed? While politicians in Irbil and Sulimaniyah cannot quite say what comes next, they are sure of one thing, they say: In the last few years, Iraqi Kurdistan has changed forever, its citizens no longer willing to be vassals, or targets, of Baghdad. "We have proved we can take care of our own people better than Iraqi governments have done previously," says Qazzaz. "One day, there has to be some kind of a dialogue, some kind of an accommodation. ... It's not enough for Saddam or anybody else to say, you as brothers come back to the national fold, as good citizens."

One possibility is a sort of federalism that gives the Kurds substantial self-government within Iraq. Abdulrahman cites the United Kingdom's modest devolution of power to Scotland and Wales as an example. It is far preferable, he notes, to the alternative scenario: societies like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union that blew apart with ethnic violence. Aside from an independent state, which is unattainable, this is many Kurds' preferred future. But Iraq has never been known for such power-sharing arrangements. Holding the country's motley collection of Sunni Arabs, Sh'ia, Kurds and various Christian sects together has always been a challenge that leaders resolved

with brute force. For now, the Kurds are in a hurry to stabilize their portion of Iraq so it will withstand the inevitable changes to come.

U.S. policymakers, and the new Bush administration, have limited options toward Iraq's Kurds, but they are not impotent. Breaking off northern Iraq from the rest of the country

**Most Kurds know
from bitter experience
that complete
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not an option.**

and using it as a beachhead to overthrow Saddam, as some in Washington have suggested, risks another disaster. Turkey, a key regional and NATO ally, would be violently opposed. Military action by the weak, ever-feuding Iraqi opposition would more likely than not result in a "Bay of Goats," in the memorable words of retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni. But the United States can continue the largely unheralded work of diplomacy and aid that has helped Iraq's Kurds achieve peace and limited self-government. It can maintain the "no-fly" zone and live up to its word when it threatens Saddam with reprisals if his military moves against the Kurds again. When Saddam goes, Washington, as the most powerful outside force, can make sure the Kurds' needs are not forgotten in the world's inevitable rush for Iraq's oil resources and strategic position. At the very least, the United States owes it to Iraq's long-suffering Kurds to make sure there are no more promises that cannot be kept. ■

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vision remain in her small house in the crumbling historic district of Basra.

To make matters worse for rural Iraqis, the country is also suffering from the mother of all droughts. The village of Zurfat on the banks of the Euphrates was once a veritable greenhouse, producing wheat, barley, vegetables, six kinds of fruit, and dates. It had 24-hour electric power and would have to occasionally protect itself from flooding. Zurfat was even a favorite picnic spot for people from all over Iraq drawn by its greenery and date palm tree canopy.

Today, with rainfall at record lows, only the date trees are producing anything. The ground is so hard that villagers weren't even able to plant vegetables last year. The farms are irrigated by electric pumps from the Euphrates, but Zurfat often has less than one hour of power a day. The river is 45 percent below its usual depth. And villagers have been forced to sell more than half of their animals. But with farmers throughout the south selling off their herds, prices have dropped by two-thirds. "All of our children are slowly dying, like our plants," says Safi Abed-Salman, head of the village's tribe.

For the vast majority of Iraqis, the effects of sanctions will harm their country for years to come. For example, Basra University's medical school is turning out only half the number of doctors it used to produce before the embargo. Fifteen students are forced to share one microscope and up to 50 share precious textbooks. Simply keeping up with the latest medical research is a near impossible task. The library of medical journals is a decade out of date and the Iraqi government restricts access to the Internet to an elite few.

**Nasiriya boasts
Iraq's largest power
station, but the town
is beset by daily
power outages.**

Saddam's Iron Grip

Despite the suffering of the Iraqis under Saddam's rule, 10 years of sanctions have, if anything, strengthened the regime's hold on power. Because the government controls the distribution of all the food and medicine purchased under the U.N. program, Iraqis are forced to rely on the regime for their survival. (In the Kurdish areas, the U.N. hands out the rations.) With Iraq's middle class reduced to poverty, very few families can afford to fend for themselves.

When it come to its own survival, the regime appears quite confident these days. Tensions among the Muslim Shi'a minority had boiled over into isolated riots in recent years, sparking fears that an Iranian-backed resistance could topple the regime. Two years ago, the holy town of Najaf was rocked by Shi'a protests. But today, Najaf is quiet, thanks to the ruthless efficiency of Saddam's military and police. Anti-aircraft guns are positioned prominently in the middle of many towns, more for crowd control than for threatening the U.S. jets patrolling the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. While undercover security officers still patrol the Shi'a mosques, the police presence is muted. In fact, the Iraqi government felt comfortable enough to abolish the four special military districts that were created

three years ago in response to the Shi'a disturbances.

One indication of just how confident the regime feels these days is that it has allowed thousands of Iranian pilgrims (in the past accused of being spies) to visit religious sites daily. And for the much-persecuted Iraqi Shi'a, it is a religious boom time. The largest Shi'a mosque in Basra, which was doubled in size to accommodate 12,000 worshippers three years ago, is regularly overflowing. In fact, mosque attendance throughout the country—for both Shi'a and Sunni—is higher than ever as more Iraqis are turning to religion to cope with their suffering.

Financially, Saddam's regime is flourishing under sanctions. With oil prices high and oil production nearly at pre-Gulf War levels, Saddam and his cronies are raking in money from their smuggling operations. The elite few who are becoming wealthy off lucrative smuggling operations can spend their loot on anything from designer perfume to jet skis in trendy Baghdad stores. Saddam can easily afford to build ornate new palaces and government ministries. The police are equipped with brand-new Hyundais throughout southern Iraq, a stark contrast to the ancient rust heaps other Iraqis drive, which are sometimes literally held together with chicken wire. Soldiers wear crisp, new uniforms. Saddam relies on UNICEF to rebuild his schools, yet there is money for palaces, government ministry buildings and certain symbolic public works projects. Nasiriya, for example, received government funds to rebuild a bridge that was destroyed by U.S. bombs during the Gulf War, even though a new bridge already spans the Tigris River less than 500 meters away.

Sanctions have become so hollow for the regime's elite it is as if they do not exist at all. Take the Al Said

Trading Co., which opened a sparkling new television store six months ago. Mariwan Said, the assistant manager, traveled to China to finalize a deal to become the exclusive Iraqi agent for Konka, a Chinese TV maker. After returning to Baghdad, he signed up 12 dealers throughout Iraq to sell Konka TVs and opened his own showroom. The TVs (and the store's fixtures, including a three-story neon sign) are imported from China through neighboring Jordan. Customers are flocking to the store and now Said is bringing in the latest high-tech digital televisions to respond to customer demands. "The Iraqi authorities are encouraging us by any means possible," he told me happily. "There were no obstacles at all."

Awash in wealth, the regime has largely ignored the suffering of its people — and removed itself from responsibility for their problems. Saddam has successfully laid the blame for Iraq's conditions on sanctions and at the doorstep of the United States. "You are creating a generation of people who hate America," Nazar Ali, a father of four, warns me over a game of backgammon in Basra. There is no overt hostility towards me as an American journalist, but in the poorer areas, the anger at the U.S. government is heartfelt. Despite the desperation, there is no overt political opposition to Saddam. After all, his regime runs mostly on fear, stoked by a vast network of informers and snitches. In private conversations, the most people would say is that Saddam and Washington share the blame for their suffering. "It takes two to tango," says one former civil servant who refused to provide his name.

Surviving by Cooperation

Amid the gloom, there are encouraging signs that people are fighting to improve living conditions:

Ten years of sanctions have strengthened the regime's hold on power.

The Women's Federation of Nasiriya has begun offering courses for women on everything from making sweets and giving injections to how to turn burned out lights into flower pots to use or sell at the group's charity auction. "Iraqi women learn how to make everything themselves, not buy it," says Rabab Daib, president of the independent women's group, which has grown dramatically during

the embargo and now boasts more than 13,000 members. Women volunteer to monitor conditions in every neighborhood in town in an intricate neighborhood watch network. If a child drops out of school, they make sure to visit both the mother and the teachers. They also regularly bring complaints about drinking water, sewage, and the endemic power cuts to the government.

Two years ago, the federation launched a twice-weekly health clinic with a local doctor to treat the poorest families. Afrah Abdnisi, the volunteer doctor, works from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. every day of the week because she also teaches at the local hospital and runs her own private clinic to make enough money to feed her four children. "I only have one hour to play with them," she says. That doesn't leave much time for amusement parks. ■

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BOOKS

HIS NOT SO BRILLIANT CAREER

Our Man in Vienna

Richard Timothy Conroy,
St. Martin's Press, 2000, hardcover,
313 pages, \$24.95

REVIEWED BY
JAMES THOMAS SNYDER

When we left Richard Timothy Conroy at the end of his first volume of memoirs about the lower reaches of American diplomacy, *Our Man in Belize* (1997), he was waist-deep in muck hurled onto the streets of Belize City by Hurricane Hattie in 1961. Though just a lowly vice consul, he was the top U.S. envoy to battered British Honduras, albeit only because his boss — the consul in that two-man shop — had fled the country well in advance of Hattie.

As Conroy ruefully acknowledges, his career in the Foreign Service effectively peaked at that moment. Yet sympathy for an upstart vice consul who endured, besides the hurricane, swan-diving cockroaches, an unglued piano and numerous other tribulations, seems to have motivated the State Department to reassign him to the consulate in Vienna. This follow-on account is mostly a collection of stories about an unusual and amusing assortment of characters — including con artists, delinquents, innocents abroad, and just plain insane people — who even 40 years later

will still be instantly familiar to those in government service anywhere.

For starters, the two local women whom Conroy (putatively) supervises in the visa office both claim nobility from the Hungarian end of the Hapsburg empire. They routinely promote Conroy ("Herr Konsul") when they want something from him

*Conroy's cast includes
con artists, delinquents,
innocents abroad, and
just plain insane people.*

and just as quickly demote him ("Herr Visikonsul") when they don't get it.

Then there's Tio, the perpetually drunk but otherwise competent local legal adviser to the consulate who once invaded Russia alone on a bicycle. We learn that Conroy needs Tio, for the thicket of immigration and asylum law sorely tests him. One case involves an alleged Czech agent and former naturalized American who returns to the consulate carrying, in succession, Yugoslav, Honduran and Austrian passports. In another mind-bending case, Conroy attempts to apply the old

immigration quotas to an ethnic Armenian woman born in the Sudan, schooled in Egypt and married to an Anglo-Egyptian.

Conroy sympathetically records the crazy people who, he writes, seem to collect in Vienna. One is a Yugoslav who claims to have invented a submarine that can submerge to any depth (using hull perforations and U-shaped pipes that would reverse pressure) and a silent airplane (on a similar principle, he cancels out the engine noise with huge audio speakers). And in case the consequences of Foreign Service life aren't clear by the end of the book, Conroy describes a child-like "Cowardly Lion" dance student — really an FSO on disability after falling on his head — who visits the consulate without fail for his monthly disbursement.

Vienna in the 1960s was a peculiar place, officially neutral but farther east than Berlin and host to its share of cross-border intrigue. American suspicion of the locals was consequently high, and the law about visa applications was strictly enforced: any allegation of Communist sympathies instantly disqualified the applicant. Convinced that "the sport lies in trying to make the system mete out justice," Conroy usually manipulated the reluctant CIA station into clearing his innocent visa applicants by arguing that if the applicant's file claimed he or she was a covert agent and the CIA wasn't tailing him, then they couldn't possibly be doing a



good job, could they? So the suspect would quickly get a tail and soon would be cleared for visa issuance.

All in all, *Our Man in Vienna* shares with Lawrence Durrell's *Esprit de Corps* the refreshing irreverence and appreciation of the absurd often lacking in the memoirs of former diplomats.

James Snyder is a former congressional aide currently studying international law in France.

ALONGSIDE THE MUJAHIDIN

War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet

Eric S. Margolis, Routledge, 2000, hardcover, 250 pages, \$26.00

REVIEWED BY RICHARD K. MCKEE

The dust jacket photo of journalist Eric Margolis in *War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet* shows him outdoors in Afghan garb and aviator sunglasses, casually holding a machine gun. It's no pose. Alongside the mujahidin, he enthusiastically lobbed mortar shells at Afghan government troops outside Jalalabad in 1992. Seven years later, he schmoozed at 20,000 feet with Pakistani Army officers defending the Siachen Glacier in Kashmir from the Indians.

Fittingly, the men he memorably recalls in this account are all fighters: Fadil the itinerant Kurdish mujahid; Nadji the Egyptian "Afghani" guerrilla, also far from home; and Col. Youssef of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, discreetly directing Islamic insurgents in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Margolis

writes movingly of the jagged beauty of the Himalayas and despairingly of the altitude sickness that lays him low in Lhasa and precludes his returning to the mountain heights he loves. These are far and away the best parts of the book.

His adventures set the stage for

Margolis sees little chance that diplomacy can halt the "hatred of brothers" in Central Asia.

his analysis of "The Fate of Asia," as his last chapter is portentously titled. He reports that Muslim and tribal militants in the mountains are backed by regional powers — Pakistan and, around India's eastern salient, China — locked in a struggle with the Hindu nationalist state for survival and supremacy, respectively. As these rivals stockpile conventional weapons, send fleets ever further from home ports, and perfect their nuclear arsenals, Margolis contends, miscalculation or arrogance will almost certainly spark a cataclysmic conflict.

To support his case, he offers a helpful, if tendentious, overview of Chinese and Indo-Pakistani history. He sees little chance that diplomacy can halt "the hatred of brothers" (another chapter title); nor does he foresee a role for the U.S. as an honest broker in the region's many conflicts. In fact, Margolis views America as a declining power,

increasingly unable to manipulate or influence — let alone impose solutions on — nations competing for a larger place in the Asian sun.

Although these gloomy predictions about the likely culmination of those trends are plausible, they are not convincing. In fact, readers may conclude that Margolis spent so much time in the company of the mujahidin that their parochial perspectives came to affect his own. His assertion, for example, that Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq, the greatest champion of the Afghan mujahidin, fell victim in 1988 to "a secret compact between Washington and Moscow" to kill him is literally incredible.

It does not help that the writing is padded with lengthy digressions, tired clichés (Kipling's "great game" metaphor appears early and often; one Afghan tribe is described as "vicious" half a dozen times in as many pages), and many small but irritating errors. To name but a few: Indian Sikhs have not swaggered through the bazaars of Peshawar since 1947; the Durand Line is not the de jure boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and the name of the alleged mastermind and financier of many mujahidin may be transliterated from the Arabic as "bin Ladin" or "bin Laden," but never "bin Ladeen."

Ultimately, Margolis's first-hand descriptions of these bloody skirmishes will give American readers an unforgettable whiff of their acrid aroma. Students of Asian geopolitics, however, should take his geopolitical musings the way Kashmiris do their tea — with a grain of salt. ■

Richard McKee, a retired Foreign Service officer, is now working as an analyst in State's Bureau of Intelligence & Research.



IN MEMORY

Patricia R. Stammerman, 55, wife of retired FSO Kenneth Stammerman, died of cancer on Oct. 31, 2000 at their home in Louisville, Ky.

Mrs. Stammerman was a native of Perryopolis, Pa. and a graduate of Robert Morris College and California University of Pennsylvania. She accompanied her husband to posts in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In the 1970s, she accompanied her first husband, a Foreign Service communicator, to Israel and Thailand. She taught in elementary schools in Maryland, Texas, Virginia, and at the American Schools in Bangkok and Kuwait. She was community liaison officer at the embassy in Kuwait.

She was active in church activities wherever she lived and taught religious education to children of the diplomatic corps in Tel Aviv and Kuwait. In May 1991, Mrs. Stammerman received the AAFSW Secretary of State's Award for Outstanding Volunteerism in recognition of her extraordinary efforts during the Persian Gulf crisis. At that time, she also received the Department of State Points of Light Certificate of Appreciation.

During retirement, she was a founder and co-coordinator of a church-affiliated cancer survivors' group, Touched by Cancer, in Louisville.

Survivors include her husband, Kenneth; stepson Clifford, of Washington, D.C.; sister Rose Matty of Chicago; and nieces Heather

Correa and Holly Matty of Chicago.

Memorial contributions may be made to the Sisters of the Visitation, 2300 Spring Hill Ave, Mobile, AL 36607, or to Father Watrin's Ministries in Nepal, c/o Ms. Helen Klohe, 9052 Shadetree Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45242.



Judy A. Robinson, 57, wife of retired FSO Thomas L. Robinson, died of an aortic aneurysm Aug. 30, 2000 in Dryden, Mich.

Mrs. Robinson was a graduate of the University of Michigan. She accompanied her husband to postings in Libreville, Manila, Medan and Jakarta. She also lived in Manila while her husband was serving in Vietnam during the war there. Mrs. Robinson was an elementary school teacher, a mother and homemaker, and loved to teach children to read. Both overseas and in the U.S., she regularly tutored children. A deeply religious person, she was active in the United Methodist Church in both Virginia and Michigan.

Survivors include her husband Tom; daughter Beth of Athens, Ohio; son Andy of Fairfax, Va.; brothers Terry and Mike of Dryden, Mich.; and sisters Paula and Michelle of Dryden.



Harald R. Marwitz, 61, retired FSO, died at his home on Sept. 23, 2000.

Mr. Marwitz, originally from Germany, worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development from 1967 to 1994. He served as program officer for the Bureau of Management, the Africa and the Latin America bureaus, where he served with distinction and diligence in carrying out USAID's mission. Mr. Marwitz is remembered for his outstanding service in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Liberia, and Barbados. He retired from USAID on Sept. 29, 1994, and lived in Arlington, Va., during retirement.

He is survived by his wife of 31 years, Antoinette Swain Marwitz, a Foreign Service officer with the Department of State.



Monique DeMartin, 75, retired FSO for USAID, died Nov. 20, 2000 at her home in Gig Harbor, Wash.

Mrs. DeMartin was born in Paris on July 7, 1925. She retired from USAID in 1986. She served primarily in Africa and Asia, and at USAID headquarters in Washington. During her career, she received many awards and had friends around the world. She was a naturalized American, seen by friends as more patriotic, faithful and dedicated to the United States than many native-born Americans.

She is survived by her companion Dr. Douglas W. Butchart; daughter Elaine Webster; son Phillip DeMartin; granddaughter Marika DeMartin; brother Pierre Gourjon,

and sister Isabelle Gourjon. Both siblings live in France.

Remembrances may be made to: The Franciscan End of Life Program, 6401 Kimball Drive, Gig Harbor, Wash. 98335. Tel: (235) 858-4380.



Edward Peter Noziglia, 78, retired FSO, died Nov. 19, 2000 at his home in McLean, Va.

Mr. Noziglia was born in Brooklyn, N.Y. and served with the U.S. Navy during World War II. He received his bachelor's degree from Lawrence University and a master's degree in education from Columbia University.

He joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served as a political officer and representative to international organizations while stationed in Barbados, Belgium, England, Nigeria, Austria, and Kenya.

Mr. Noziglia retired in 1977, earned a law degree from George Washington University, and practiced law in McLean until 1996. He also served as a Fairfax County court-appointed attorney.

Mr. Noziglia's wife Sheila preceded him in death by three months. He is survived by five children, two brothers, and six grandsons.



Roger Charles Brewin III, 74, retired FSO, died of complications related to cancer Oct. 26, 2000 at his home in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Brewin was born in Philadelphia. He graduated from Miami University of Ohio and received a master's degree in political science from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He also attended Stanford University and the National War College. During World War II, he served in the Army as a dental technician aboard a hospital ship. He served three years in the Central Intelligence Agency before joining the Foreign Service in 1951. He married Mary Tolleson Brewin in

Bombay in 1955. She passed away in 1992.

Mr. Brewin retired in 1981. Postings included Zurich, Bombay, La Paz, Tehran, and Asunción. He was deputy chief of mission in La Paz and Asunción. He also served in the State Department, including a post as liaison officer with the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.

In retirement, Mr. Brewin did work for the Foreign Service Board of Examiners, the State Department's Freedom of Information Act compliance unit, and the Bureau of Asylum Affairs.

Survivors include two children, Barbara A. Brewin of Washington, D.C., and Roger C. Brewin IV of Seattle; and three grandchildren.



Sarah H. Booher, 81, former wife of FSO Ralph A. Booher, died Nov. 5, 2000 of emphysema at Caton Merchant House, an assisted living facility in Manassas, Va.

Mrs. Booher was born in Boston. She accompanied Mr. Booher on assignments to Spain, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Liberia,

Cameroon, Pakistan and Singapore. She was active in volunteer work overseas and in the U.S., and assisted Eleanor Roosevelt in Geneva at the first United Nations Human Rights Conference.

After her divorce in 1978, she was a member of the Displaced Foreign Service Wives group, which succeeded in getting legislation passed to provide pensions to divorced and widowed Foreign Service spouses. She retired in 1987 from bookkeeping work and moved to North Fort Myers, Fla., for nine years. She moved back to Virginia in 1996.

Mrs. Booher's son Philip died in 1982. She is survived by her son Charles Booher, of St. Augustine, Fla., and her daughter Sally Booher, of Midland, Va.



Robert C. Huffman, 84, retired FSO, died July 22, 2000.

Mr. Huffman was born in 1916 in Cedar Falls, Iowa. He received his B.S. from the University of Iowa and his master's degree from Columbia University. He joined the State Department in 1940, and served in

An Invitation For Summer Fiction

The results of the recent *FSJ* survey indicate that you, the reader, want to continue the *Journal's* summer fiction issue. Therefore, once again the *FSJ* is seeking works of fiction of up to 3,000 words for its annual summer fiction issue. Story lines or characters involving the Foreign Service are preferred, but not required. The top stories, selected by the *Journal's* Editorial Board, will be published in the July/August issue and on the *Journal's* Web site. The writer of each story will receive an honorarium of \$250.

All stories must be previously unpublished. Submissions should be unsigned and accompanied by a cover sheet with author's name, address, telephone numbers and e-mail address.

Deadline for submissions is May 1. No exceptions.

Please send submissions to the attention of

Steven Alan Honley, Associate Editor,
preferably by e-mail at Honley@afsa.org.

Stories will also be accepted by fax at (202) 338-8244, or by mail:
Foreign Service Journal, 2101 E St., NW, Washington, D.C., 20037.

IN MEMORY

Moscow and New Delhi before joining the U.S. Navy in 1944. He was honorably discharged in 1946, and returned to the Foreign Service. Between 1946 and 1974, he served in Singapore, Frankfurt, Bonn, Washington, Lagos, Zurich, Bern, Vancouver, and Düsseldorf.

After retiring, he founded the Foreign Service Retirees Association of Southern California and was chairman for 25 years. He served as deacon at the LaJolla Presbyterian Church.

Mr. Huffman is survived by his beloved wife of 53 years, Jean Noble Huffman, and by his devoted family.

Albert Schoenberg Watson, 89, retired FSO, died Oct. 25, 2000, at Eden Park Nursing Home in Vermont. He was born in Chicago and grew up there with his two brothers, John and William. He attended the Experimental College at the University of Wisconsin and in his early 20s moved to New York City. There he worked at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Later he moved to Washington, D.C., where he worked in various capacities for the United States government. In Washington he met his future wife, Margaret Chase Greene, whom he married in 1947. Together they raised five children and were married for 45 years until her death in 1992.

In 1954 he became executive director of the U.S. mission to the United Nations, and the family moved to Connecticut. In 1959 he transferred into the Foreign Service and served in Rome, Canberra, and Taipei. In 1970 he retired from the State Department and moved to West Brattleboro, Vt. to work briefly as director of development at Marlboro College. He and his wife

Peggy became extensively involved in the Brattleboro community, and in the fellowship of the All Souls Unitarian Universalist Church. In retirement he pursued lifelong interests such as anthropology, music, and tennis, which he played well into his 80s. In particular he was an avid student and observer of birds, trees and wildflowers, and was for many years president of the Southeastern Vermont Audubon Society, often leading bird and wildflower walks.

He is survived by his brother John Watson of Park Forest, Ill.; his children: Stephen Watson of Houston; Kate Bernier of Londonderry, N.H.; Andrew Watson of Mountain View, Calif.; Samuel Watson of Cambridge, Mass.; and Margaret Dee of Rose Valley, Pa.; six grandchildren; and four nieces and nephews.

Gerrit J. W. Heyneker, 86, retired FSO, died Oct. 30, 2000 of natural causes in Denison, Texas.

Mr. Heyneker served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945, in the European Theater of Operations. He joined the State Department in 1946 and served in Brussels, 1946-51; Calcutta, 1951-55; Guatemala, 1955-58; the department's Office of Finance, 1958-64; Kinshasa, 1964-66; and as deputy director of the Regional Finance and Data Processing Center in Paris, 1966-73. He received a meritorious honor award in 1966, and retired in 1973.

His wife of 50 years, Mary Skalecki Heyneker, preceded him in death June 28, 1998. He is survived by his daughter, Rose-Margaret Hayden; sons Theodore J. Heyneker, W. van der Veer Heyneker, and Jan M. Heyneker; and four grandchildren.

Frank A. Magary, 87, retired FSO, died Sept. 23, 2000 of cancer in Hollywood, Fla.

Mr. Magary was born July 12, 1913 in San Francisco, Calif. He graduated from the University of California at Berkeley with Phi Beta Kappa honors, and earned a master's degree from Stanford University in classics, also with honors. After teaching in California for 10 years, he spent a year as a Fulbright exchange teacher in London. He served in the U.S. Marine Corp Reserves from 1936 to 1940.

Mr. Magary joined the Foreign Service in 1957, working for the U.S. Information Agency. He served as a cultural attaché in Buenos Aires, Bogotá, and Panama City. During his career, he worked on cultural exchanges; bilingual education; distribution of American books, films, and other media; operation of American libraries and bicultural centers. He also served in the Latin American division of the Voice of America in Washington D.C.

Mr. Magary retired in 1973 and relocated with his family to Miramar, Fla.

Survivors include his wife, Edie Magary, and their three children: Carol Carpenter and Virginia Magary of Florida, and James Magary of New York; sons from a previous marriage Frank (Mac) Magary Jr. of Port Townsend, Wash., and Alan Magary of San Francisco; three grandchildren; and one great-grandson.

Donations in his memory can be made to the American Cancer Society at (800) 227-2345. ■

Note to Foreign Service Personnel and Families

The *Foreign Service Journal* publishes "In Memory" every other month, and welcomes submissions of obituaries on State, USAID, FCS, FAS and USIA employees or retirees and their spouses.

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An Invitation For Summer Fiction

The results of the recent *FSJ* survey indicate that you, the reader, want to continue the *Journal's* summer fiction issue. Therefore, once again the *FSJ* is seeking works of fiction of up to 3,000 words for its annual summer fiction issue. Story lines or characters involving the Foreign Service are preferred, but not required. The top stories, selected by the *Journal's* Editorial Board, will be published in the July/August issue and on the *Journal's* Web site. The writer of each story will receive an honorarium of \$250.

All stories must be previously unpublished. Submissions should be unsigned and accompanied by a cover sheet with author's name, address, telephone numbers and e-mail address.

Deadline for submissions is May 1. No exceptions.

Please send submissions to the attention of

Steven Alan Honley, Associate Editor,
preferably by e-mail at Honley@afsa.org.

Stories will also be accepted by fax at (202) 338-8244,
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POSTCARD FROM ABROAD

A New Capital for a New Millennium

By JEFFREY GLASSMAN

America has always corrected its mistakes. The Articles of Confederation. Prohibition. Disco. In that spirit, we should take immediate steps to fix the doozy we made in 1790. That's when the first Congress voted to move the capital southward from New York to Philadelphia and then to a new planned city on the banks of the Potomac River.

Let's now admit that Washington, District of Columbia, was a good try but an utter failure. We should cut our losses and move the capital back to New York City where it belongs.

The world's only superpower deserves a superpower of a capital. The new millennium cries out for a city that doesn't sleep instead of one that often dozes in the afternoon. We need a real city for a capital, one with pizzazz and chutzpah and maybe a touch of agita.

The myth is that New York is unrepresentative. People always say this about their capital city. But capitals are capitals because they include everything the country is, good and bad. And New York City (not just Manhattan, mind you) does just that. The Bronx is up and the Battery's down and with polyglot Queens and Republican Staten Island, they repre-

Jeffrey Glassman is an FSO who has served only in posts beginning with the letter M: Monrovia, Moscow, Minsk and Manhattan. The stamp is courtesy of the AAFSW Bookfair "Stamp Corner."

How can the capital of the United States not have a major league baseball team?

sent the entire spectrum (and then some) of American life and experience. And Brooklyn? Fuhgedaboutit.

According to New York historian Kenneth T. Jackson, New York and San Francisco have been the only major cities in America to retain almost all their population from 1950 without incorporating additional territory. People keep coming to New York and many of them stay. Within the city's 304 square miles, 196 ethnic groups speak over a hundred languages and get along (in a New York fashion) remarkably well.

Can we talk baseball? How can the capital of the United States of America not have a major league baseball team? Washington had a rich baseball tradition – albeit a losing one. But there's been no baseball in Washington since 1971. How embarrassing in the year of the first Subway Series since 1956.

To be sure, Washington is a cosmopolitan city: All those embassies and the diplomats that inhabit them

ensure that. But I would trade a brace of World Bank economists for a striving Korean family that can satisfy a desperate need for chervil at three o'clock in the morning.

There is precedent for this sort of move. Germany is in the process of returning to its traditional capital Berlin from 50 years' exile in the provincial academic town of Bonn. Peter the Great moved the capital of Russia from Moscow to St. Petersburg, not only as an act of self-aggrandizement, but also to locate it closer to the West he revered. It was over 200 years before Lenin moved it back to old Moscow.

But where would the government go? Isn't New York awfully crowded already? Well, the feds already own Governor's Island and nobody in New York seems to know what to do with it. And the security guys would love an island.

But that would defeat the idea of the feds being in New York and up to their armpits in street falafel and three-card mountebanks. No, what the federal government has to do is move itself, lock, stock and three branches to the crossroads of the world: Times Square. Build a tower, everyone is doing it. As the worlds of entertainment and politics (as well as fashion, sports and journalism) all seem to morph into one vast enterprise, what better place to join Disney and Condé Nast and Reuters and the All-Star Café than right there in Times Square. A new capital for the new millennium! ■

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