

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

**1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE - SPECIAL ACTION REPORT - (1 OF 3) -
2 AUGUST 1950 - 6 SEPTEMBER 1950**

Korean War

Korean War Project Record: USMC-1270

CD: 18

United States Marine Corps History Division

Quantico, Virginia

Records: United States Marine Corps

Unit Name: 1st Marine Division

Records Group: RG 127

Depository: National Archives and Records Administration

Location: College Park, Maryland

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

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AO3E-2087-sc
A8-6/1
16 Feb 1953

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MEMORANDUM

From: Archivist, Records and Research Section, Historical
Branch, G-3
To: Headquarters Classified Material Control Officer
Subj: Downgrading of document; request for
Ref: (a) Special Action Report, 1stProvMarBrig, FMF (Reinf),
Korea for period 7 July to 6 September 1950

1. It is requested that authorization be granted for down-
grading of reference (a) to CONFIDENTIAL.

Paul R. Ruger
P. R. RUGER

Copy to:
LtCol Edwards

*Authorization granted 2/16/53
James G. Keating*

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 " Tare - Medical Section

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

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1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, FMF

2 AUGUST - 6 SEPTEMBER 1950

OPERATIONS WITH EIGHTH U.S. ARMY

KOREA

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Basic Report
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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

3;FRS/rsb
2295
Sar. 115
11Sep50

From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: (1) Commanding General, EUSAK
(2) Commander in Chief, Far East
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Special Action Report

Ref: (a) CMC msg 101414 Jul to CG, 1stProvMarBrig
(b) Para 11401.2.a MCM 1949

Encl: (1) Special Action Report, 1stProvMarBrig, FMF (Reinf) Korea for period 7 July to 6 September 1950

1. Reference (a) directed the Commanding General to submit a Special Action Report as required by reference (b). In compliance with these references, enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.

2. Transmission by U. S. Registered Mail or registered guard mail is authorized in accordance with Article 7-5, United States Navy Security Manual for classified matter

E. A. CRAIG

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 IG, FMF Lant
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~~SECRET~~COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE BASIC REPORT1. INTRODUCTION

a. General: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced) was activated on 7 July 1950 as a combined air-ground team for combat duty in the Far East. Practically all of the combat units of the Fleet Marine Force stationed on the west coast were included in this organization. No table of organization and no recent experience were available upon which to organize this Brigade, certain essential combat equipment was still in supply depots, and organizations were below authorized peacetime allowances. Despite these difficulties, ground and air elements were brought to full peace strength plus a third platoon for each rifle company. Loading commenced 9 July and the Brigade sailed from San Diego and Long Beach on the 14th of July.

b. Purpose of Report: The purpose of this report is to set forth in detail the employment of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced), during the period from activation to release from combat employment at 2400Z on 6 September 1950.

c. Next higher unit:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (1) From 7 July to 28 July | - FMF Pac |
| (2) From 28 July to 2 August | - ComNavFE |
| (3) From 3 August to 6 September | - EUSAK (or as directed by EUSAK) |

2. TASK ORGANIZATION - Appendix 1 to Annex CHARLIE3. PRELIMINARY PLANNINGa. Directives:

- (1) CG FMFPAC Top Secret msg 050101Z July to CG 1stMarDiv.
- (2) Dispatch brief FMFPac Opn Plan 1-50 (CG FMFPAC msg 052200Z July), Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE
- (3) FMFPac Opn Plan 1-50 of 5 July 1950
- (4) 1stMarDiv GO #9 of 6 July 1950, "Activation of Command", Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE.
- (5) CINCFE msg 261948Z July to ComNavFE, Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE

b. Operational Planning:

- (1) Activation of the Brigade, Embarkation, and Movement.

Preliminary indications that elements of the 1st Marine Division would be employed in the Far East were received on 3 July.

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The staff of the 1st Marine Division was split to provide a staff for the Brigade when a warning order was received on 5 July to activate the Brigade to consist of one reinforced regiment with appropriate supporting air and headquarters elements. The Brigade staff actually commenced functioning on 5 July though not yet officially activated. Immediate steps were taken to arrange a conference on 5 July with key logistical staff officers, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet concerning the embarkation, and to resolve the overall planning for movement of elements of the 1st Marine Division.

Action was taken immediately on receipt of FMF Pacific directives to organize the Brigade. Recommendations from unit commanders and special staff officers were consolidated and recommendations submitted to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for a Brigade task organization which was approved with a 4500 strength ceiling plus 5% overstrength. Various recommendations submitted included bringing all units of the Brigade to war strength. Particularly stressed was the requirement for a third platoon for each rifle company and the organization of a third company for each rifle battalion.

These recommendations were forwarded by CG, FMF Pac to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for consideration. The Commandant forwarded the recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations, who disapproved the recommendation in view of personnel shortages; however, the Chief of Naval Operations later reconsidered his decision and authorized the organization of a third platoon for each rifle company.

Personnel for the organization of the third platoons of the rifle companies, and other augmentation of units were provided from the 1st Marine Division; Marine Barracks, Camp Pendleton; Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California; and other West Coast stations. The outstanding speed with which these personnel were assembled is noteworthy and commendable.

Steps were taken to request the Commandant of the Marine Corps to provide fourteen (14) M-26 tanks to completely equip Company "A", 1st Tank Battalion with seventeen (17) M-26 tanks; Rocket Launchers, 3".5 for the Weapons and Rifle Companies; and anti-tank mines M-6 and M-7; all of which were considered necessary to successful combat operations of the Brigade.

The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, approved the recommended Tables of Organization for the Brigade subject to the personnel ceiling. The Commandant of the Marine

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Corps authorized the Brigade to carry a five percent (5%) overage in personnel strength.

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific dispatch brief 052200Z of Operation Plan 1-50 was received by the Brigade on 5 July. It directed the Brigade to embark in the San Diego area in ships of a Task Group to be designated by ComPhibPac for movement to the Far East Command, prepared to:

- (a) Disembark ground elements in Korea.
- (b) Disembark ground elements in Japan as necessary to reembark in assault shipping for amphibious employment.
- (c) Disembark and establish air elements ashore in Korea or Japan retaining an operating squadron on board a CVE for close support operations.

The Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was further advised that upon receipt of the plan, the Air Commander, General Cushman, was to report for duty; and that the Commanding General was to report to Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific for planning and for loading as ships became available. In compliance Brigadier General Craig reported to Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific at 061735Z.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated on 7 July by 1st Marine Division General Order Number 9 dated 6 July 1950. Brigadier General E. A. Craig assumed command with the command post located with the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. Headquarters and Service Battalion was activated on the same date.

Indications at this stage of the planning were that the Brigade would be used in an amphibious assault against the enemy. Consequently the Commanding General made a request to Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific, on 7 July, that the SSP PERCH be made available in the target area for possible amphibious reconnaissance and for other amphibious missions, since the Brigade Reconnaissance Company Detachment was well qualified to operate from this type ship. This request was approved by higher authority.

Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific, designated Task Group 53.7 under the command of Captain Louis D. Sharp, Jr., U. S. Navy, for movement of the Brigade to the Far East Command. The scarcity of suitable shipping for movement of the Brigade made it necessary to leave approximately 200 combat vehicles in the San Diego area. This shortage of vehicles later became a very serious operational difficulty in Korea. This shortage of shipping space made it necessary to load ships with a combination combat and administrative load to utilize the maximum space to insure that essential equipment and supplies were embarked. Brigade loading commenced on 9 July and was completed on 13 July. Task Group 53.7 sailed from San Diego at 140900Z July, 1950.

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SECRET(2) Operational Planning of Advance Party at Pearl Harbor, Japan, and Korea.

The Commanding General and his party arrived in Pearl Harbor, T.H., on 16 July and conferred with the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific on future Brigade requirements, and were briefed on the Far Eastern situation. The Commanding General in discussing requirements for combat readiness of the Brigade emphasized the importance of obtaining a third rifle company for each battalion, and stressed the weakness in the tactical ability and in the fighting strength of the present organization. Additional requirements for early replacement of casualties and increased motor transport and artillery support were also discussed at the conference.

Departing Pearl Harbor, the Brigade Advance Party arrived at 191515K July in Japan, and was met by a member of Vice Admiral Joy's staff. The Commanding General reported his presence in Japan to Admiral Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East, and then proceeded to General Headquarters, Far East Command where the Commanding General conferred with General MacArthur.

General MacArthur gave the Commanding General a most thorough resume of the situation as it then existed in the theater and gave an indication of his proposed employment of Marines. The important points are summarized as follows:

a. It was the intention to keep Marine air and ground elements together, and to employ them together except in an emergency situation.

b. It was the intention to employ the 1st Marine Division as a whole if available in September, and it was not intended to commit the Brigade at that time, subject to a change in the situation.

c. General MacArthur expressed a strong desire to bring Marine air and ground elements to war strength as early as practicable. A dispatch to this effect was prepared by his G-3 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the conference he stated that the Brigade would report to Commander Naval Forces, Far East, for operational control. This was indicated as desirable since the Commanding General, Eighth Army, rear echelon, retained occupational control of Japan, and if the Brigade were attached to CG, Eighth Army in Japan, the Brigade would have been subject to call for occupational duties.

d. General MacArthur also stated it was his intention to employ the 1st Marine Division in conjunction with an Army formation in an amphibious operation.

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On 20 July the Commanding General accompanied by General Cushman attended the regular morning briefing at General Headquarters, Far East Command. Following this briefing, a conference with General Wright gave the Commanding General an insight on the proposed location of the Brigade until employed. Initially, General MacArthur had stated that we would be located at Sasebo. Investigation of the various possibilities for a location included the consideration of proximity to the Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which was to be based at Itami, AFB, and the expansion of the Brigade to Division strength. It was therefore suggested to General Wright that we be located in the Kobe - Osaka - Kyoto area. This suggestion met with highly favorable consideration, and as a result it appeared that the Brigade and the Aircraft Wing would be located adjacent to each other in a central area. This would have greatly lessened supply and liaison problems and would have contributed to Marine air and ground continuing to work as a team.

The advance party departed Tokyo and arrived at Itami AFB, 211300K where a detailed reconnaissance of the area was made for billeting and debarkation of the Brigade, and for possible training areas. The advance party returned to Tokyo on 23 July by air with a completed plan for occupation of the Kobe - Osaka - Kyoto area.

The Commanding General was directed verbally on 251600K by G-3, General Headquarters, Far East Command to change plans for occupation of the Kobe - Osaka - Kyoto area, and directed the Brigade to proceed directly to Korea and report to CG, Eighth Army for duty, prepared for withdrawal for amphibious operations on order.

Commanding General and party departed Tokyo 251650K for Taegu, Korea, and arrived 261200K July. Planning commenced immediately with CG, EUSAK for employment of the Brigade in Korea. Planning was greatly hindered by lack of knowledge of when the ships on which the Brigade was embarked would arrive at Pusan, Korea, due to restrictions of radio silence.

The advance party left Taegu at 1030K and arrived in Pusan on 28 July. The Brigade arrived Pusan and completed docking 02213K August. Following a thorough briefing on the existing situation unloading commenced. At 2300K the Chief of Staff, EUSAK, called by telephone and gave orders and the destination to the Brigade Commander. Fortunately the operation plan had been prepared in a manner so flexible that it would fit a move in any direction.

4. Training Aboard Ship:

The short notice with which the Brigade commenced out-loading made it necessary that certain training not accomplished at Camp Pendleton be stressed, reviewed or re-emphasized enroute. As the proposed area of operations was entirely foreign to the majority of the members of the Brigade it was essential that each individual be carefully briefed on the theater of operations.

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The extremely rugged, rough terrain of Korea, in conjunction with high mountains made it a necessity that all troops be in excellent condition. Furthermore, the presence of insects, flies and lice, and unsanitary conditions in Korea, such as contaminated food and water, necessitated the stressing of instruction in field sanitation and personal hygiene. Anti-tank defense and the familiarization of personnel with the Rocket Launcher, 3".5, which were issued to units just prior to embarkation, were also of utmost importance in shipboard training in view of the enemy's reported success in the use of tanks against United Nations' forces. Officer and NCO schools were directed to be held daily while enroute, at which time specialist personnel were called upon to discuss their particular specialty. These schools successfully presented information to all personnel, and helped materially to solve any misunderstandings relative to the use of supporting units.

The most difficult problem in training enroute was the usual limited space available for troops. Since shipping was limited and space unavailable for large groups to gather, the instruction was conducted generally on the squad and platoon level. The high state of training of all units, enabled new personnel to be readily absorbed. This high state of combat efficiency is a tribute to the rigorous training policy pursued by the 1st Marine Division. Had it not been for this exceptional degree of combat efficiency, the Brigade could not have accomplished the many diversified and unusual combat missions and long moves assigned it in Korea.

5. Movement To and Arrival At Objective Area:

Advanced elements of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade consisting of Company "A", 1st Tank Battalion, and 1st Amphibian Tractor Company embarked aboard Task Unit 53.7.3 (FORT MARION, LSD-22 and GUNSTON HALL, LSD-5, respectively) and sailed from San Diego approximately 121100T July. This shipping to rendezvous with main elements Task Group 53.7 prior crossing Longitude 160° East.

The Commanding General received a dispatch report from the Commanding Officer of Troops embarked aboard the FORT MARION (LSD-22) on 13 July, that the tank well-deck of the ship had flooded for about one (1) hour and that fourteen (14) tanks had been damaged by salt water. Seventy percent (70%) of all ammunition was under water for about forty-five minutes. Subsequent reports from the FORT MARION (LSD-22) stated that all tanks were operable except two (2), which required repairs of certain electrical parts for the tank turrets, and that 301 rounds 90mm and some machine gun ammunition had been jettisoned. The Commanding Officer, Co "A", 1st Tank Battalion, estimated that the two (2) inoperable tanks could be repaired in 72 hours providing parts were furnished. Replacement ammunition for that jettisoned was shipped with Task Group 53.7, and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, was requested to provide four (4) tanks in the first re-supply shipment. Arrangements were made to send necessary tank spare parts via air to be at the Brigade destination upon arrival.

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The main elements of the Brigade completed embarkation at San Diego and Long Beach aboard shipping of Task Group 53.7 on 13 July, and sailed for Japan on 14 July.

On 15 July, the U.S.S. HENRICO developed turbine trouble enroute, necessitating the transfer at sea of the 5th Marines' staff to the U.S.S. PICKAWAY. The U.S.S. HENRICO was directed to proceed to San Clemente Island and to effect the transfer of the personnel to the U.S.S. PICKAWAY, and upon completion of the transfer was directed to proceed to the Navy Yard, Mare Island for repairs. Troops of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and remaining elements of the Headquarters Company, 5th Marines embarked aboard the HENRICO were retained on board while at Mare Island during the repair for security purposes. Upon completion of the repairs the U.S.S. HENRICO sailed independently and joined ships of Task Group 53.7 on 1 August just prior to arrival at Pusan, Korea.

Commander, Task Group 53.7 was directed on 24 July to proceed to Kobe, Japan, and debark all Brigade air and ground personnel, supplies and equipment. Brigade administrative headquarters embarked aboard ship received CG, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Operation Plan 2-50 by dispatch which directed that upon arrival Kobe, the Brigade would debark and occupy staging billets in accordance with detailed instructions to be issued, and that arrangements should be made for a conference aboard the U.S.S. GEORGE GLYMER (APA-27) of all unit commanders upon arrival. Bulk supplies and vehicles over ten tons would remain in the dock area to facilitate later embarkation. All units were to maintain readiness for reembarkation on 48 hours notice.

On 25 July Brigade administrative headquarters received dispatch 250702Z directing that ships with air elements embarked proceed to Kobe and debark air personnel, supplies and equipment. The VMF squadrons and VMO squadron were to be prepared to reembark aboard carriers for close air support operations. CTG 53.7 with remainder of shipping was directed to proceed to Pusan, Korea, and debark ground elements non-tactically at Pusan, Korea. The Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade directed Brigade administrative headquarters to cancel his Operation Plan 2-50 and to execute provisions of Brigade Operation Plan 1-50, and upon landing Pusan, Brigade to be prepared for land operations. Non-essential amphibious personnel and equipment were ordered to Kobe, Japan. As a result of this directive, The Commanding Officer, 1st Amphibian Tractor Company with Amphibian Truck Company attached was ordered to debark from the U.S.B. GUNSTON HALL (LSD-5) at Kobe, Japan, and to report upon arrival to the Deputy Commander, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Kobe, Japan.

Ships of Task Group 53.7 arrived in Pusan, Korea on 2 August

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and were met by General Craig and members of the advance party. Conference of the Brigade staff and unit commanders was immediately held aboard the U.S.S. GEORGE CLYMER. All members attending the conference were briefed on the Korean situation and Operation Plan 3-50 as issued for compliance. All unit commanders were directed to commence unloading ships and to be prepared to move to the vicinity of Chang-won, commencing 0600 on 3 August.

On arrival of the Brigade it was learned that a warning order sent by dispatch had not been received due to communication failure. This failure was detrimental to initial planning and movement ashore.

Assault Phase:

Off-loading of equipment and supplies continued throughout the night of August 2. Debarkation of troops commenced on 3 August in compliance with Brigade Operation Plan 3-50. This plan directed the Brigade to debark at Pusan, at HOW hour, DOG day, assemble, and move on order by motor and train to a forward assembly area in the vicinity of Chinju, Kochan, or Kumwan as directed, prepared to relieve and pass through elements of the Eighth Army to be designated, execute other operations as directed. At 2300, 2 August, EUSAK verbally designated Chang-won as the immediate destination of the brigade.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines constituted the advance guard for the movement of the Brigade, with the mission of entrucking in organic trucks and trucks provided by the Army and to cover the movement of the Brigade to the march objective. Upon arrival to occupy favorable terrain and provide security for Brigade entry into the bivouac area. The movement of the advance guard commenced at 0600, 3 August 1950.

The main body of the Brigade began their movement from Pusan by rail at 0630 and moved into bivouac in the vicinity of Chang-won to await further orders from EUSAK. Vehicles under 2½ tons proceeded via road. All elements except one (1) platoon of tanks and miscellaneous service elements were established in the vicinity of Chang-won by 031600K. Subordinate units of the Brigade were ordered to occupy tactical dispositions astride the Masan-Chang-won corridor prepared for further operations. The tactical disposition of the unit was not only desirable in view of the threat of enemy attack down the corridor, but it served as a good training exercise for the Brigade.

All units of the Brigade less certain service elements to remain in Pusan were in position at Chang-won on 3 August, and all equipment and supplies essential to the tactical operations of the Brigade were moved to Chang-won. During the period 3-5 August the Brigade was in Eighth Army reserve and little activity occurred within the Brigade sector. One small patrol action occurred when a routine patrol

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noted the presence of approximately seven (7) North Koreans equipped with radios on a mountain observing activity within the Brigade area. One platoon of infantry was ordered to destroy the observation post, but upon reaching the position the enemy had escaped.

It is of interest that this was the first occasion on which helicopters were used to carry rations and water to a combat patrol and evacuate personnel collapsed from heat exhaustion. Also it was during this small action that it became apparent that many non-battle casualties would result from heat prostration until troops became well conditioned. The rugged terrain of Korea and the high temperatures prevalent during this period indicated the desirability of employing a transport helicopter squadron, equipped with Sikorsky 55 type aircraft. Throughout the operations of the Brigade in Korea this type of aircraft could have been successfully employed in placing and supplying our troops in force on high ground and in evacuating wounded, and would have been of inestimable value.

Brigade was attached to the 25th Infantry Division on 6 August and was ordered to move to an assembly area at Chindong-ni. One battalion of the 5th Marines was to relieve the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment by 061500K. Relief of this battalion was accomplished by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. In accordance with verbal instructions CG, 25th Infantry Division on 6 August and confirmed in writing on 7 August, all troops in the Chindong-ni area were under control of the CO, 27th Infantry until two (2) Marine Battalions had arrived in the area, at which time Brigadier General Craig would resume control of entire Marine Brigade. Shortly after darkness, CO, 27th Infantry directed that one (1) platoon, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines proceed several miles forward and extend and protect the flank of a company receiving heavy pressure. Subsequently, this platoon occupied the positions directed and held them with a loss of 19 casualties.

Remaining elements of the Brigade were directed to move to attack positions during the night of 6-7 August. Upon arrival of two battalions of the Brigade in attack positions, the Brigade was to assume command in the area.

The Army 5th RCT was ordered to pass through and relieve the 27th Infantry and continue the attack to the northwest while the 27th Infantry was to withdraw to division reserve upon relief. When the Army 5th RCT cleared the road junction west of Chindong-ni the Brigade was to initiate its attack southwest toward Kosong.

The attack plan called for an air preparation from H-40 to H-10 and an artillery preparation from H-10 to H hour, at 0630. The Army attack jumped off as scheduled but a flanking attack developed on the Army 5th RCT's right flank. The Commanding General, 25th Division thereupon directed that one battalion of Marines attack and relieve the 2nd Battalion Army 5th RCT in order to permit the Army attack to continue to the west.

The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines jumped off to relieve the 2nd Battalion, Army 5th RCT and met moderate opposition. At 1120, 7 September, as a result of elements of the Army 5th RCT, 27th Infantry and Marines all becoming involved in the action, General Craig was directed by CG, 25th

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Infantry Division to assume command of all elements in the area until further orders. General Craig was later relieved of this responsibility verbally at about 1700 9 September when the Army RCT-5 had cleared the Road Junction West of Chindong-ni. The CO, Army 5th RCT was directed to continue the attack, which met with heavy resistance and at darkness positions gained were consolidated until the following day.

In the meantime the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines were within several hundred yards of their objective at nightfall. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines conducted a night attack to gain their objective and relieved the 2nd Battalion, Army 5th RCT in the early morning of 8 August.

CO, Army 5th RCT was directed to continue the attack on 8 August, which proceeded slowly against continued heavy resistance. By 1645 Brigadier General Wilson, ADC for 25th Division, informed Brigade that one battalion of the 24th Infantry would enter the area at daylight 9 August to occupy the high ground protecting the MSR held by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, and that the Marine battalion should remain in position until relieved due to the importance of that terrain feature.

At 1600, the CO, Army 5th RCT was directed to make a night attack to uncover the road junction so that Marines could initiate their attack. At the same time the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered to make a night attack across rice paddies, short of the road junction, in conjunction with the night attack of the Army 5th RCT and to seize the high ground south of the road junction.

On 9 August, Army 5th RCT and 1st Battalion, 5th Marines continued the attack at 0600. By 0930 the Commanding Officer of the battalion of the 24th Infantry scheduled to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines reported that his unit had been ambushed by four or five automatic weapons and an undetermined number of enemy blocking the Chindong-ni - Masan main supply route. The CG, 25th Division was accordingly informed of the situation and advised that the relief of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines on position would be delayed for an indefinite time until the battalion of the 24th Infantry could pass the road block.

At 1000 CG, 25th Division, directed the Army 5th RCT and the Brigade to continue the attack and that the Brigade clear out a portion of the road block of the MSR by attacking toward the north while elements of the 24th Infantry attacked toward the south. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, previously attacking enemy in the area, attacked with one company to clear the ridge in the assigned area overlooking the MSR. The day was extremely hot and slow progress was made. Half of about 70 casualties were caused by heat exhaustion.

At 1020 two battalions of the 24th Infantry were attached to the Brigade for coordination in clearing the MSR roadblock. By 1320

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contact was made between 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and the 24th Infantry.

Late in the afternoon of 9 August, Army 5th RCT reported that their 2nd Battalion had reached the crossroads and that the other battalions had moved forward without opposition. At this time General Craig was verbally relieved by CG, 25th Division, of responsibility for elements other than the Brigade. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had attacked and secured a position about one-third of the way to Paedun-ni. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was relieved about 1600 on position and was ordered to prepare to continue the advance by night attack, passing through the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

The 5th Marines were ordered to execute a night attack during the night of 9 August with the mission of capturing Paedun-ni prior to daylight 10 August. Subsequently, and at the direction of CG, 25th Division, 5th Marines commenced movement at 2100 with the leading elements passed through the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. During the night a leading tank with infantry aboard crashed through a bridge just north of Paedun-ni. This incident formed a block to the road and a second tank was lost trying to pass around the damaged tank. Later after daylight, infantry was ordered to proceed without tanks and by mid-morning a bulldozer had constructed a bypass.

During the advance the Detachment Reconnaissance Company discovered and destroyed several snipers along the road. Approximately 1500 yards west of the city the Detachment Reconnaissance Company, as point for 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, developed an enemy ambush which resulted in heavy enemy fire by small arms, automatic weapons and mortars, inflicting a number of casualties on one company. The 2nd Battalion, having successfully developed the ambush and driven off or destroyed the enemy, was ordered to reorganize in its present position, and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines passed through them and continued the attack toward Kosong. The Brigade advanced approximately 10 miles during the day.

The Brigade continued its attack 11 August against light to moderate enemy resistance and it became immediately apparent that the enemy was making a hasty withdrawal from the Kosong area as large quantities of enemy equipment and supplies were abandoned or destroyed in our zone of action. Just prior to entry into Kosong an air observer on station fired on artillery concentration into the city and a number of vehicles commenced moving rapidly in retreat westward. Marine air quickly sighted and attacked the column estimated over a hundred vehicles. Most of the vehicles were destroyed in Marine air aggressive attacks.

The Brigade attack moved rapidly toward Kosong and by noon the city was captured by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. Continuing the advance approximately 2400 yards west from Kosong, the 5th Marines were ordered to consolidate and occupy the high ground prepared for a continuation of the attack toward Sachon on 12 August.

Attacking at daybreak on 12 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines passed through the 3d Battalion and continued the advance. Resistance

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was light to moderate to within 4000 yards of Sachon at which time elements of the Detachment Reconnaissance Company which made up the point of the advance, were fired on from enemy defensive positions on the high ground to the north, south, and the west.

Shortly before contact was made a message from CG, 25th Division directed that the Brigade provide a battalion of infantry supported by a battery of artillery, platoon of tanks, and such other support as required to return at once to the Army 5th RCT MSR and clean up a serious enemy roadblock in that area. The order was received at about 1230 and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was returned about 25 miles and jumped off in the attack to capture the first objective prior to dark. The 5th Marines were ordered to consolidate present positions and prepare to continue the attack on 13 August to capture Sachon.

The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines while operating on its detached mission was assigned to operational control of the Division Artillery Commander, 25th Division. Late in the evening of August 12, Brigade was ordered by CG, 25th Division to withdraw immediately all remaining elements from the vicinity of Sachon to Chindong-ni. The 2d Battalion was designated as the Brigade covering force and all elements of the Brigade were withdrawn by motor and LST to vicinity Chindong-ni with the mission of placing one battalion on a MTR in the vicinity of Paedun-ni and of employing the other battalions in a mop-up of the rear area of the 25th Division and to complete clearing the Army 5th RCT MSR without delay. At about 2100 on closing Chindong-ni the Brigade reverted to EUSAK control and was ordered to move immediately to the vicinity of Chang-won. Movement commenced without delay.

The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered at this time to revert to Brigade control. Further orders were received at about 2400 regarding the movement of the Brigade and the destination was changed from Chang-won to Miryang.

The Brigade went into an assembly area at Miryang via rail and motor on August 14 and was ordered upon closing on 15 August by CG EUSAK to pass to operational control CG 24th Infantry Division.

The Brigade was ordered by CG, 24th Division to move from its Miryang assembly area to previously reconnoitered attack positions in the vicinity of Yongsan on 16 August, with the mission of clearing the critical enemy thrust in the Nakdong River bulge. Movement of the Brigade by organic and Army motor to Yongsan continued during the night of the 16th and all elements of the Brigade, less the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and miscellaneous service elements closed in a forward area east of Yongsan prior to 162400 August. Relief of the 35th Infantry Regiment commenced during the same period. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines arrived after daylight, since a return motor trip was required to lift that battalion. Of 144 Army trucks requested and planned for from EUSAK, only 43 were provided and these were three hours late.

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At 0800, 17 August the 5th Marines attack, which was preceded by an artillery and air preparation, jumped off on schedule with the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in advance. Attacking against heavy opposition the 2nd Battalion reached the top of objective 1, but as a result of the well-fortified enemy positions it became necessary for advanced elements of that battalion to withdraw partly from the objective to permit concentrations of air attacks on this target. Close air support during this operation appeared to be the best air support in combat displayed in the history of the Marine Corps. The results obtained by Marine close support aircraft were outstanding in all Brigade operations and particularly this one.

Troops of the 2d Battalion, in view of heavy casualties, were directed to hold their present positions and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines were ordered to pass through and continue the attack to capture objective 1. The 1st Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion and captured objective 1 at 1800. The 5th Marines, upon seizure of the 1st objective, were ordered to consolidate positions for the night, prepared to repel counter-attacks and prepare plans of fire for the night to include plans for fire within and in rear of positions.

During the seizure of objective 1, three (3) enemy tanks attacked our positions. All three of the enemy tanks were destroyed by Co "A" 1st Tank Battalion M-26 tanks with the assistance of 3".5 rocket launcher and recoilless weapons. During the advance on objective 1, which appeared to be the enemy's main line of resistance, great damage was inflicted upon enemy forces. The constant advance of our troops, and of Army troops in their zone of action, plus artillery, tank fire, and close air support so terrorized the enemy that large groups of retreating enemy commenced trying to swim westward across the Naktong River. The casualties inflicted by tanks, artillery and aircraft on the enemy while he was attempting to retreat were tremendous. Estimated enemy casualties were 4000.

Upon seizure of objective 1 by the 1st Battalion, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was ordered to continue the attack and seize Brigade objectives 2 and 3. At 0700 on 18 August, the 3d Battalion continued the attack and captured objectives 2 and 3 against light to moderate opposition. Large caches of ammunition, equipment and supplies were captured in this area. By darkness 18 August, objective 2 and 3 had been secured except for a small pocket of resistance on objective 3, which was cleared by early morning of the 19th. On the 19th, the 1st and 2nd Battalions were ordered to organize and hold objectives 1 and 2 respectively and the 3d Battalion, to organize and hold objective 3 and continue mopping up remnants of the enemy forces by patrols east of the Naktong River.

During the afternoon of 19 August patrols from the Battalions made no contact with the enemy. The Brigade was released from operational control 24th Division and ordered to EUSAK reserve. Movement of the Brigade commenced that date to an assembly area in Yongsan, after the

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Brigade had been relieved by elements of the 24th Infantry Division, prepared for a further move from Yongsan to Miryang. Upon closing the Yongsan assembly area during the night, all units of the Brigade continued the move into an assembly area at Miryang on 20 August. On that same date and prior to closing Miryang orders were received to move immediately to the vicinity of Chang-won and to prepare counter-attack plans in the 25th Division sector. Movement to Chang-won commenced on the night of 20 August and all elements of the Brigade closed assembly area vicinity Chang-won 210100K.

During the period 22 August to 1 September, the Brigade remained in an assembly area in the vicinity Chang-won except for the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. This Battalion was detached on a verbal directive from CG, 8th Army to CG, 25th Infantry Division, on 23 August. The battalion conducted fires against the enemy in support of troops at Chindong-ni until 1 September. Among other elements small unit training, tactical problems, weapons familiarization firing for replacements, and patrolling behind the 25th Division zone of action were carried out. Such training was aimed primarily to indoctrinate several hundred replacements in Korean type operations and to maintain physical condition at a high peak.

0945, 29 August, a ceremony for the awarding of Purple Heart medals to 82 Purple Heart veterans returned to duty was held in the Brigade CP in the vicinity of Chang-won. President Syngman Rhee, of the Republic of Korea, arrived at the Brigade CP at 0945 and after appropriate honors talked with General Craig and was invited to attend the presentation of the Purple Hearts. Mr. Rhee thanked the assembled group for their valiant services in defense of Korea.

On 1 September, as a result of an enemy general attack along the entire front, the Brigade was alerted at 0810 for a possible move by CG EUSAK to an unknown destination. All units were at that time engaged in movement of heavy equipment and supplies to the Pusan area for embarkation aboard ship for a contemplated amphibious operation. Orders were issued to cancel all movements for embarkation and to standby for movement to another area.

At 1109 Brigade was given a warning order to prepare to move by motor to vicinity Miryang. Confirmation of this information was received at 1215 and all units of the Brigade were alerted to commence movement at 1330. Preparations and planning for the amphibious operation had to be suspended. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines which had been supporting the 25th Division reverted to Brigade control, and was ordered to move from its position at Chindong-ni to Miryang. The first elements of the Brigade arrived in an assembly area near Miryang at 1615, and all elements of the Brigade had closed Miryang by 0630, 2 September.

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At 2335 a telephonic warning order was received from EUSAK that one reinforced battalion of the Brigade would move beginning at daylight to the vicinity Yongsan to cover movement of the remainder of the Brigade into an assembly area in that vicinity, prepared for operation in the 2d Infantry Division sector. It was the desire of CG EUSAK that no units of the Brigade be committed to action while moving into the 2d Division sector. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines commenced movement at 020630 to a position east of Yongsan where it took up defensive positions to protect the movement of the remaining elements of the Brigade into the assembly area.

The Commanding General called on the CG, 2d Infantry Division and was briefed on the situation relative to a break-through in the 2d Division sector. General Craig at that time made recommendations as to contemplated employment of the Brigade. The 2d Division scheme of maneuver for employment of the Brigade was for RCT-9, which had successfully cleared the town of Yongsan and held the high ground 800 yards west of that city, to hold along that line until elements of the Brigade had passed through their positions.

The Brigade moved to attack positions commencing at 0300, 3 September, but due to withdrawal of elements of the 9th RCT from the high ground just prior to dawn there was a 30 minute delay at the jump-off since the Brigade had to fight to the previously designated line of departure. The Brigade advanced during the day against heavy enemy resistance consisting of automatic, anti-tank, tank, and artillery fires. The Brigade tanks destroyed four enemy T-34 tanks during the day. An estimated 500 enemy personnel were casualties. Late in the afternoon the 2d Battalion was counterattacked by a force of enemy tanks, and anti-tank guns, and personnel causing heavy casualties in one company. After repelling the enemy counterattack, the 5th Marines resumed the attack until the ground some 3000 yards west of Yongsan was seized and organized for the night. It is of interest that during this attack the Brigade for the first time used a formation in which two battalions were abreast with one in reserve. All previous operations employed a battalion in attack with the other battalions in column to add depth to the formation. In this attack the enemy locations were fairly well established.

The Brigade continued the attack on ~~Sept~~^{Sept} 4 at 0800 when the 3d Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion. The Brigade advanced during the day an average of three to four thousand yards and seized objective one, against light resistance initially and moderate resistance in the afternoon. The Commanding General, 2d Division having been notified that objective one had been seized, authorized continuation of the attack to phase line two. The Brigade continued to advance approximately 1000 yards to the high ground forward of objective one where positions were consolidated for the night. During the day large numbers of enemy were killed, and the roads were littered with enemy dead, equipment, and supplies abandoned by the enemy in his haste to withdraw from the area.

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Marine aircraft rendered outstanding close air support during the day, machine gunning large groups of enemy attempting to move westward. During the day two enemy tanks, four anti-tank guns and much miscellaneous equipment were destroyed by our troops and tanks. Artillery destroyed an estimated nine field pieces by counterbattery and killed several hundred retreating enemy.

The Brigade attack scheduled to commence on September 5 at 0730 was delayed until 0815 because of a heavy enemy counter-attack in the 9th RCT zone of action. The weather that morning was ideal for the launching of an enemy counter-attack since a heavy rain which had commenced during the night of 4 September continued throughout the day, rendering observation by OY aircraft and close air support impossible. Priority of artillery fire was given to the 9th RCT to assist them in repelling the enemy counter-attack. This limited the Brigade artillery preparation for the attack to five minutes.

Brigade advanced during the morning against moderate enemy resistance from small arms, automatic weapons, artillery, mortars and tanks. The Brigade continued the advance approximately 2500 to 3000 yards. Late in the afternoon the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was counterattacked by approximately 300 enemy with three (3) T-34 tanks. Two of the Brigade M-26 tanks which were firing at enemy targets in support of the infantry did not see the approach of the enemy tanks, and when they moved around a bend in the road two of our tanks were disabled by enemy tank fire. The crew were able to escape. All three enemy tanks were destroyed by 3" .5 rockets of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Other Marine tanks could not return the fire of the enemy tanks since the narrow road was blocked by our two (2) disabled M-26 tanks. Brigade secured the high ground and consolidated positions. Early in the afternoon the Commanding General, EUSAK ordered Brigade relieved from operational control of the 2d Infantry Division effective 052400K, and to move by motor and rail to Pusan. Elements of the 2d Infantry Division relieved the Brigade in its zone of action.

At 0155K, 6 September, orders were received from CG, 1st Marine Division to mount out from Pusan in accordance with Division Embarkation Order 1-50. Planning and preparations for embarkation previously had to be suspended during the period of active combat.

Movement of the Brigade to Pusan commenced at 060015. Heavy equipment was moved to Miryang for shipment by rail to Pusan. Upon relief of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines by a battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, all units of the Brigade cleared the Yongsan area and proceeded to Pusan. The Brigade movement to Pusan was completed at 071100K September.

All units of the Brigade began immediately to prepare for embarkation aboard ships for further operations against the enemy.

It will be of interest to relate that this Marine Brigade which was sent into this theater with about 1/3 of its organic

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transportation traveled some 380 miles in less than a month moving to attack positions. This does not include travel while engaged in battle. Only by the Army making available considerable transportation was it possible to make such moves. Lack of sufficient organic transportation for land operations of the type assigned the Brigade was always an inherent handicap both in planning and executing long movements.

7. Enemy Tactics

The enemy has used tactics which are well suited to the difficult terrain of Korea. His objectives are normally the dominating terrain which he can hold with small forces in order to be able to control and cover the narrow roads and defiles which form vital supply routes and routes for military movement of any size. The enemy may infiltrate his forces through our lines which cannot be continuously due to large assigned frontages. His troops may intermingle with refugee groups, dressed in the same garb, and then assemble in rear of our lines and attack artillery, mortar positions, rear areas and command posts. Any direction may become a front and all around security is essential at all times.

The enemy's favorite tactics appear to be to make a frontal attack and then to execute either a double or single envelopment while at the same time rear installations, artillery, mortar positions and command posts are taken under fire by infiltration groups. Many times Army forces have been cut off by this method of attack and after fighting their way out have run into well established roadblocks which have been set up by the infiltrating enemy groups. Where possible the Brigade has maintained a disposition in depth, with service elements closed up well forward, and in this manner has had no critical situations resulting from enemy infiltration. However, there is always danger that small infiltration groups can occupy terrain positions, particularly along the MSR which will seriously interfere with other tactical operations until they are eliminated. Enemy attacks are usually preceded by artillery, mortar, automatic weapons, and large amounts of small arms fire. Also various signals such as whistles, flares and in one instance flaming torches signaled the attack. Small groups employing "banzai" tactics may suddenly appear in front of our lines without warning and conduct a fanatical attack, firing automatic weapons accompanied by screams and shouts to create confusion.

The enemy is adept at organizing controlling terrain features for defense. He will obstinately hold his defensive positions under intense fires up to a certain point at which time he appears to break and to beat a hasty retreat, abandoning his equipment as he goes. When this break occurs he should be followed tenaciously to keep him on the run and prevent his reorganizing on other positions.

ORGANIZATION:

The North Korean Rifle Division is organized as follows:

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Three (3) Infantry Regiments; One (1) Artillery Regiment; One (1) Signal Battalion, One (1) AT Gun Battalion; One (1) Engineer Battalion; One (1) Medical Battalion, and One (1) Training Battalion. For complete details see Intelligence Bulletin #8. ANNEX BAKER.

STRENGTH

The full strength of the North Korean Division is 679 officers and 10,291 enlisted men. Most divisions are at reduced strength. (Best data as of 10 August 1950)

DEPLOYMENT

Little information is available on the deployment of the NK forces. However, it is known that in many cases they have attacked with all three battalions and regiments abreast thereby leaving no reserve. At the present time there are two divisions which are unlocated and it is believed that this force is their main reserve on the entire front.

PROBABLE ORDER OF BATTLE

During the period of 7-15 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was opposed by elements of the 6th North Korean Rifle Division, and the 83rd Motorcycle Regiment which has recently been identified as part of the 105th Armored Division.

During the period 17-19 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was opposed by the 4th North Korean Rifle Division.

During the period 2-5 September, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was opposed by the 9th North Korean Rifle Division, the 16th Infantry Brigade, which was the 101st Separate Regiment up until about 18 August, a security regiment, and the 16th Mechanized Brigade. At the time of this report, it has not been determined whether the infantry brigade and the mechanized brigade are one and the same unit. PW's claim both brigades are separate units.

EQUIPMENT:

Equipment is generally of standard Russian design, down to and including jeeps, motorcycles, telephones and radios. The approximate weapons per division are as follows:

Pistols	1298	AT Guns 45mm	54
Rifles	6089	Mortars 82mm	81
PPSH	3198	Mortar 120mm	18
LMG	385	AAMG 12.7	24
HMG	162	Gun 76mm	30
14.5 AT Rifles	66	Gun-How 120mm	18

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SECRET8. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION:

Despite unusual difficulties resulting from employment in Army type operations, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced), successfully accomplished all assigned missions during the period of its existence. The following specific results are of interest:

- a. The Brigade, including air and ground, commenced embarkation on 9 July for combat duty in the Far East two days after activation, and completed embarkation on 13 July which was ahead of schedule. Prior to embarkation it was necessary to transfer all enlisted personnel below the rank of sergeant with less than six months to serve and to join over 500 new men transferred to the Brigade. In addition, a new Brigade Staff, H&S Company, and six (6) new infantry platoons were organized. New M-26 tanks, 3" 5 Rocket Launchers, M-6 mines, ammunitions, and spare parts for equipment were procured from numerous sources and training conducted on their employment.
- b. The destination of the Brigade was changed from SASEBO to KOBE to KOREA with no effect on the flexibility of Brigade plans for debarkation. The Brigade arrived Pusan as of 2130 2 August. A quick briefing of plans was conducted and unloading commenced immediately thereafter. Orders indicating the destination of the Brigade were received by telephone at 2300, on 2 August. Movement commenced by rail and motor at 0600. By 1600 the Brigade elements necessary to fight had moved some 20 miles and were in position awaiting further orders.
- c. During operations in Korea, the Brigade moved during a thirty day period some 380 miles over narrow, poor, unimproved roads to get to the main areas directed, prepared for assigned missions. The Brigade always met the time schedule but not without difficulty. This fact is of particular interest since Marine Corps organization and equipment is not designed for the prosecution of land campaigns. For land operations considerable augmentation of motor transport is essential. Augmentation of transport was provided by the Army.
- d. The Brigade operations proved beyond doubt the effectiveness and success of the Marine Corps organization for close air support. Marine ground and air elements always worked as a closely coordinated team with outstanding success. It was apparent that the Marine Corps' concept of air providing close air support was sound beyond any doubt whatsoever. It was the envy of Army ground units which witnessed its effectiveness. No doubt can remain of the need of attacking ground units for close air support.
- e. The Brigade infantry supported by all arms attacked and defeated the enemy on the following occasions with results as indicated:

(1) At 2100, 7 August, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines sent one platoon to relieve right flank elements of a battalion of the Army 5th RCT during an attack at night. Relief was successful but we lost 23 casualties of our own. Enemy casualties, if any, were unknown. On 8 August, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, attacked and relieved elements of the 2nd Battalion,

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5th Infantry in the vicinity of Chindong-ni. The estimated enemy casualties were two hundred.

(2) On 8-9 August the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines attacked enemy force establishing a road block on the main supply route north of Chindong-ni. Estimated 600 enemy casualties with 120 enemy dead counted.

(3) On 11-12 August the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines attacked the enemy in a meeting engagement two miles north of Kosong and was later passed through by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. Supported by effective air and artillery support, an enemy force estimated as one motorized regiment was routed and placed in headlong retreat. The complete armament and vehicles of at least one battalion destroyed or captured. It is also believed that certain elements of the enemy 6th Division were destroyed in this engagement. Total enemy casualties estimated were 800.

(4) On 11-12 August, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (Reinf) reduced a serious roadblock on Army RCT-5's rear. Captured initial objectives within two hours after arrival in area. Estimated 300 enemy casualties.

(5) On 17-19 August, The Brigade, making the main effort in a coordinated attack by the 24th Infantry Division, attacked the enemy 4th Division in the Naktong River bulge. The destruction of the bulk of the enemy and seizure of large amounts of enemy material and equipment were accomplished. Objectives were captured in 48 hours. The Commanding General received a letter commending the Brigade for its part in this action from the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, with a most complimentary endorsement by the Commanding General, 8th U. S. Army in Korea.

(6) On 3-5 September, the Brigade, making the main effort as a part of a coordinated attack, attacked the 9th enemy division again in the Naktong River bulge, and estimated the destruction of the bulk of the 9th Division. A great amount of enemy ordnance, engineer, signal and other equipment, and documents of an intelligence value were captured in a deep penetration of the enemy's defensive area. Also observed were more enemy dead in the area recaptured than had ever previously been encountered. It is estimated that there were at least 4500 enemy casualties.

(7) The Brigade was relieved from the front lines at 2400h on 5 September and moved some 30 miles to Pusan via road and rail. Tactical elements arrived on 6 September and all elements had completed the move by 1100 7 September. Commenced embarkation for further operations on 8 September.

9. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade during operations in Korea covered by this report learned many lessons. The following recommendations are made relative to planning and to assist Marine units which may operate in this area in the future.

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a. There should be a permanent table of organization for forming a brigade organization for an emergency such as occurred. Had such a Table of Organization been available many of the difficulties in organizing the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would have been eliminated.

b. Up to date emergency plans should be available for the automatic equipping of units with the latest armament when directed to execute emergency operations. The Korean situation materialized so rapidly that until equipment was requisitioned no action was taken to provide units of the Brigade with such new and necessary items as M-26 tanks, 3".5 rocket launchers, 90mm HV.P tank ammunition, M-6 land mines, and other critical items required for combat operations against a determined enemy.

c. For similar operations in the future, when shipping space is not initially available to lift organic vehicles of Marine units, the vehicles should be shipped to the port of destination by follow up shipping as soon as possible. When a Marine unit is to be employed in the same manner as an Army unit in the prosecution of a land campaign, it must be provided with greatly increased amounts of transportation.

d. Immediate action should be taken to equip reconnaissance elements with such motorized and mechanized equipment as is essential for extended land reconnaissance. The Detachment, Reconnaissance Company with this Brigade was provided with transportation and performed in an outstanding manner. On several occasions it uncovered enemy ambushes by motorized reconnoitering in advance of infantry columns. In no other way can essential reconnaissance be conducted or information of the enemy be gained during rapid moves. Screening missions, road and flank reconnaissance, and similar vital tasks cannot be performed adequately unless reconnaissance companies are properly equipped with vehicles. Seven $\frac{1}{2}$ ton-trucks, 4X4, armed with 50 cal. MG's were acquired from the Army to motorize the Brigade reconnaissance detachment so that it could carry out its essential and critical reconnaissance missions.

e. It is recommended that Marine air always be provided to work with Marine ground units and that it always be considered an integral part thereof. The close air support for the Brigade in Korea was exceptional as a result of Marine ground and air working together as a well coordinated and trained team. The coordinated effort of infantry, air, artillery, and tanks provides the maximum effective offensive power and insures the advance of the infantry with the minimum of casualties.

f. It is considered necessary to increase the total number of OY observation aircraft to 10 to provide for all essential observation functions. OY aircraft performed with outstanding results in spotting artillery and observing the enemy. It has been estimated that at least one half of all intelligence reports flowing into the G-2 and G-3 sections came from either Marine combat air or OY aircraft.

g. Marine helicopters have proven invaluable during the campaign. They have been used for every conceivable type of mission. The Brigade

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utilized helicopters for liaison, reconnaissance, evacuation of wounded, rescue of Marine flyers downed in enemy territory, observation, messenger service, guard mail at sea, posting and supplying of outguards on dominant terrain features and the re-supplying of small units by air. It is recommended that at least eight (8) liaison and two (2) transport type helicopters be added to the observation squadron for employment by Marine Divisions.

h. It is recommended that Marine Observation Squadrons be provided with equipment for taking, developing, and reproducing limited numbers of aerial photos. Fast moving operations require means for taking and reproducing photos on the spot. Extensive facilities are not contemplated. It is desirable to have a small, mobile, compact unit for limited service which can be readily moved as required. Missions requiring extensive photos can be requested in the usual manner.

i. The mountainous terrain of Korea presents a difficult problem for security of flanks and rear and of bivouac areas. The troop carrier type helicopter would be ideal for use in Korea to post patrols and outguards on high, dominating terrain which it would take hours to climb and which quickly exhaust the troops. There are many missions, both combatant and non-combatant which these helicopters could perform. It is believed their use would materially contribute to the effectiveness and security of our operations and insure the earlier defeat of the enemy. They should be made available for use at the earliest possible date.

j. There is a definite and immediate requirement for two officers in each battalion Tactical Air Control Party to permit one forward air controller to observe from a forward position while one remains at the battalion command post. This requirement has long been recognized. Its fulfillment would contribute materially to further improving the effectiveness of the Marine air-ground team.

k. There is a need for observation type aircraft to be equipped with VHF radio equipment. This is necessary to enable the OY type aircraft to contact Marine fighter aircraft, to assist them in locating targets and to permit detailed briefing of fighter aircraft regarding the enemy and observed targets.

l. The shore party organization should be trained not only in their primary function of establishing supply and evacuation from the beachhead, but should also be familiar with the problems and procedures of establishing a railhead. The Brigade Shore Party was assigned the mission of establishing Brigade railheads and required coordinating all service elements within the railhead. This consisted of contacting the Army Rail Transportation Officer and making arrangements for railroad cars, establishing an information and records center, and checking in and delivering to cognizant supply agencies all material shipped to the railhead. A final step in organizing the railhead consisted of providing security for all service elements in the railhead area, including the Medical Company which maintained mobile hospital service on rail cars throughout most of the Brigade's operations.

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m. One of the most serious problems confronting the Brigade for movement to and conduct of the attack was the generally late receipt of orders. Verbal telephonic orders frequently late at night, became almost habitual and many times appeared to be given without due consideration for time and space factors. As a result there was often no time for reconnaissance by Brigade, or by subordinate commanders prior to issuance of orders for a coordinated attack. Without the helicopter to use for messenger, liaison and reconnaissance purposes some of the assigned tasks and movements could not have been accomplished.

n. In the rugged, mountainous terrain of Korea it becomes necessary to utilize supporting arms to the maximum possible extent in order to reduce or neutralize enemy positions. This results in the expenditure of unusually large amounts of artillery, mortar, and 90mm tank ammunition. The present unit of fire for these classes of ammunition should be doubled in this theatre.

o. Considerable difficulty was realized in motor movements due to the narrow unimproved roads. Strict traffic control and establishment of one way traffic on narrow sections is mandatory. Often, time and space factors appeared poorly coordinated at the next higher echelon, undoubtedly due to time limitations, and unit columns sometimes met on narrow roads traveling in an opposite direction with resultant delay and dangerous congestion. It is highly desirable that motor movements, particularly at night, be carefully coordinated and controlled. All drivers must be carefully instructed in and required to observe strict convoy discipline.

p. The present command post tent is one of the most bulky and difficult pieces of tentage to erect. When erected its space is limited and inadequate for the proper function of staff sections down to regimental level. A new type of light, durable command post tent should be designed. It should be easy to erect, supply sufficient space for staff sections to work, and have some means of ventilation when blacked out.

q. Present CP equipment such as bulky and heavy field desks, field safes, lighting equipment which is easily broken, drafting supplies, tentage, and especially field reproduction facilities need great improvement. Methods and means of improving such equipment should be thoroughly explored with the aim of making them light, compact, and practicable under severe field conditions, yet with sufficient durability to withstand the rough treatment which it will receive. A simple, rapid, and easy yet reliable means of quickly reproducing orders and instructions under field conditions is badly needed.

r. The need of a standard pack which individuals could drop in organization dumps and be reissued at appropriate times without reference to name became apparent during the operation. In the pack should be placed common items of use such as a blanket and sleeping bag. The individual should carry his own toilet and personal articles in a light pack which he wears at all times. During extremely hot weather, which causes rapid

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fatigue on long marches or climbing hills, men will discard any equipment which is considered a burden to the accomplishment of their combat mission with resultant loss of the equipment.

s. The "ENERGA" AT grenade, although not fired by the Brigade against enemy vehicles, was tested on an M43 tank and is believed capable of penetrating the enemy's armor. Launchers for the rifle should be provided on a basis of two (2) per rifle squad. The grenade when fired from the rifle has a much flatter trajectory than from the carbine with resultant greater accuracy. It is believed this grenade will give the infantry a suitable anti-tank weapon immediately available for close-in warfare. It should also be valuable for use against fortified positions if encountered.

t. A boot similar in design to the Army boot should be adopted by the Marine Corps. The legging is not comfortable and is unsatisfactory in muddy weather. The boot gives good leg protection, is comfortable, and is easy to put on and take off.

u. Air mattresses of a light and durable design such as those issued by the Army for cold weather operations should be considered for adoption. It would be preferable if the mattress could be made an integral part of a waterproof sleeping bag.

v. There is an important requirement for the redesign of Marine Corps galley equipment to make it much lighter and more compact. The present design is not practicable during combat. A small portable galley capable of being transported in a one ton trailer should be designed for use down to company level. Larger messes are impracticable as well as tactically unsound during combat. The equipment should consist mainly of a coffee urn and a large boiler in which "C" rations could be dumped in hot water to be heated. Hot "C" rations could then be taken forward in sand bags and hot coffee in containers. The boiler could be used for cooking stews and similar preparations when the situation permitted the use of "B" rations.

w. The many bridges and narrow roads of Korea makes it imperative that Marine units bring sufficient bridging equipment to span small bridges. In some cases there are no fords which can be used and bridging materials will be required to cross streams. Otherwise, a damaged bridge may stop the movement of troops and vehicles indefinitely and seriously interrupt the chain of supply.

Enclosure (1)

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ANNEX A BLE

Report of
Brigade G-1 Section

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Annex ABLE to

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinf)

PERSONNEL

1. Purpose

The purpose of this annex to the special action report is to discuss the performance of duty of the G-1 Section during the period 7 July 1950 to 6 September 1950, during which time the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade participated in a series of three (3) major engagements against the North Korean enemy in South Korea.

2. Organization

The G-1 Section was composed of the following personnel during the period covered by this report:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Assignment</u>
SHERMAN, Donald W., Major	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
SCHIMMENTI, Joseph A., 1stLt	Asst G-1; add d; BrigLegalO
WETHERS, Donald A., SSgt	G-1 Section Chief
PUVOCEL, Lawrence D., Cpl	Clerk-Typist

3. Related Special Staff Sections

The G-1 Section exercised normal staff jurisdiction over elements of the Brigade Headquarters as shown below:

<u>Unit or Section</u>	<u>Strength</u>		<u>Unit or Section Commander</u>
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
a. Adjutant's Section	4	23	Captain H. G. SCHRIER
b. Det, Military Police Co	2	35	1stLt Nyo G. RODES
c. Graves Registration Section	1	17	CWO Herbert E. HOTOEKISS
d. Special Services Section	1	4	2dLt W. G. CROCKER
e. Legal Section	1	1	1stLt Joseph A. SCHIMMENTI

Each of the above units or sections functioned in the prescribed manner during the organization of the Brigade, while aboard ship, and during operations ashore. Activities of the Detachment, Military Police Company are covered in detail in Annex PETER to the Brigade Special Action Report.

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Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report

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4. Duties Performed at Camp Joseph H. Pendleton

a. During the period between the date of activation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (7 July 1950) and the date of embarkation (13 July 1950), the G-1 Section accomplished and/or supervised the normal administrative transfers and procedures required by the activation of a Brigade and a Brigade Headquarters and Service Battalion. In conjunction with 1st Marine Division administrative personnel, required intra-division transfers were accomplished to bring the units up to Table of Organization strength plus 5% overstrength and to transfer out of elements of the Brigade those sergeants and below with less than eight (8) months remaining on their current enlistments.

b. The Brigade G-1 Section prepared paragraph 6 of Administrative Plan 1-50 of 7 July 1950 and Annex EASY, Civil Affairs, and Annex HOW, Instructions to Troops, to Administrative Plan 1-50. See Appendix 1.

c. On 9 July 1950, a memorandum was promulgated to all unit commanders, based on CMO message 061838Z of July 1950, authorizing them to promote within occupational fields to ranks of corporal and sergeant to fill Table of Organization billet vacancies. This authority was utilized during the entire period covered by this report to make promotions to the ranks of corporal and sergeant to fill vacancies caused by casualties during operations against the enemy. Speedletter reports were sent to the Commandant of the Marine Corps giving necessary data on each man promoted.

5. Operations Afloat

During the nineteen (19) days that the Brigade was embarked aboard ship, while en route to Korea, the G-1 Section did the following:

- a. Studied the theater of operations and intelligence reports.
- b. Conducted instruction and practical work on G-1 journals, work sheets, and periodic reports.
- c. Promulgated Brigade SOP No. 1-1 on Combat Awards and Decorations. See Appendix 2.

6. Field Operations

In the field in Korea the G-1 Section functioned in what is considered a normal manner. Personnel strength figures and casualty figures were received from subordinate units and transmitted to higher authority daily. Weekly station lists and G-1 periodic reports were distributed to higher echelons. Station lists were published monthly.

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Annex A11E to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report

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Two (2) replacement drafts, one of 2 officers and 300 enlisted and the other of 10 officers and 300 enlisted were airlifted from the United States. These officers and men were assigned mainly to infantry and artillery billets in accordance with their MOS's.

Straggler control and handling of prisoners of war was accomplished largely by the Detachment of the Military Police Company in the prescribed manner. See Annex PETER to the Brigade Special Action Report for further details on straggler and prisoner of war control.

Burials and graves registration were accomplished in accordance with instructions contained in the Marine Corps Manual. Our dead were buried at United Nations Comotories at PUSAN, MASAN, and MIRYANG, Korea.

Morale was at all times considered to be excellent. Postal service was very good with air mail usually requiring from 6 to 9 days to reach this Headquarters from the United States.

Recommendations for awards were forwarded to Headquarters, Eighth United States Army in Korea. As of the closing date of this report, no combat decorations, other than Purple Heart Medals, were awarded to Brigade personnel.

In order to give a complete, continuous, and more detailed account of the factors previously mentioned in this paragraph, the G-1 weekly periodic reports are appended hereto. See Appendix 3.

Station lists of officers for the months of July, August, and September are appended hereto. See Appendices 4, 5, and 6.

Personnel paragraphs were included in administrative orders as personnel procedures changed or the personnel situation dictated. The latest administrative order having a complete personnel paragraph was No. 20-50. See Appendix 7.

A complete summary of casualties received by the Brigade during the period covered by this report is appended hereto. See Appendix 8.

7. Rear Echelon

Upon debarkation at PUSAN, Korea, the Brigade activated an Administrative Rear Echelon composed of the Personnel Section of Brigade Headquarters and personnel sections of each reporting unit of the Brigade.

A small housekeeping detachment from the 1st Combat Service Group established and maintained the rear echelon camp which was billeted on the grounds of Pusan University. This housekeeping detachment collected and stored the personal baggage for all elements of the Brigade.

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Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report

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The Brigade Administrative Unit coordinated the work of the reporting units. Liaison teams were established and posted at all Army Hospitals and on board the U. S. Naval Hospital Ship CONSOLATION for the purpose of contacting and identifying all marine and naval casualties passing through the port of PUSAN. A Brigade Casualty Report was published daily containing all possible reporting information required for daily diaries and other required reports.

Evacuated casualties were transferred to the 1st Provisional Casual Company, Marine Barracks, YOKOSUKA, Japan on date of evacuation. Service record books, health records, pay records, and personal baggage were mailed or shipped by reporting units immediately upon receipt of Brigade Special Orders transferring evacuated casualties.

Close liaison was maintained with the forward echelon of the Brigade for the purpose of exchanging information. Telephone contacts were poor, necessitating frequent trips to the forward areas by rear echelon personnel.

8. Recommendations

The only significant procedure recommended for adoption by the Marine Corps is the Army's method of personnel reporting. The forms utilized for this reporting are the Personnel Daily Summary and the Periodic Report.

a. Personnel Daily Summary. (See Appendix 9). This form is completed daily as of an hour specified by each higher authority in the chain of command and is reported by the most expeditious means of communication available, normally telephone, employing the methods described on the forms.

b. G-1 Periodic Reports are submitted weekly generally following the form prescribed in the Staff Manual, 1948, NAVMC 1022-PD.

c. It is considered that the above reporting procedures enable the highest echelon in the theater to obtain daily strength and casualty figures expeditiously and also furnish a weekly report for record purposes.

APPENDICES:

1. Paragraph 6, Annex EASY, and Annex HOW of BrigAdmin Plan No. 1-50.
2. Brigade SOP No. 1-1, Combat Awards and Decorations.
3. G-1 Personnel Periodic Reports Nos. 1 through 5.
4. Station list of officers for July 1950.
5. Station list of officers for August 1950.
6. Station list of officers for September 1950.
7. Brigade Administrative Order No. 20-50.
8. List of Brigade battle casualties.
9. Personnel Daily Summary Form.

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Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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Paragraph 6 of 1stProvMarBrig Administrative Plan 1-50 of 7 Jul 19506. PERSONNEL.

a. Strength, records, and reports - Later.

(1) Troop lists or changes thereto will be disseminated weekly by this Headquarters for units assigned to the Brigade.

(2) Periodic reports, strength and casualty reports, casualty card forms, graves registration reports, and miscellaneous records and reports. (Later).

b. Replacements

Later.

c. Law and Order.

(1) Stragglers.

(a) Straggler lines, posts and collecting points will be announced by this Headquarters.

(b) Initially Shore Party will exercise Straggler Control.

(c) Brigade MP Platoon will establish Straggler Control inland on order.

(d) Units will prevent stragglers from going forward into the combat area.

(e) Emphasis will be placed on apprehending stragglers at kitchen and ration dumps.

(f) Stragglers will be returned to their units by the most expeditious means.

1. Stragglers who are mentally or physically incapacitated will be escorted to the nearest medical installation.

2. Stragglers will be given written orders on message forms to return without delay to their parent organization reporting upon arrival to the commanding officer. A copy will be forwarded to the unit concerned through the nearest message center, and a copy will be retained in the files of the MP organization apprehending the straggler.

3. Where it is not practicable to return stragglers to their parent organization immediately, or where it is believed necessary to deliver stragglers under guard, stragglers may be used on burial details pending return to their organizations.

(2) Discipline

(a) General court martial prisoners will not be released for combat duty prior to approval by Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

(b) Instructions to Troops, see Annex HOW.

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Appendix 1 to Annex AIII to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

RESTRICTED**COPY****d. Prisoners of War.**

(1) Initially Shore Party will exercise PW control in the beach area on order.

(2) Brigade MP Platoon will establish one (1) PW collecting point in zone of action of assault units and will assume PW control on order.

(3) Evacuation.

(a) PW's will be evacuated from the objective area as directed by this Headquarters. No officer PW's should be evacuated without prior approval of this Headquarters.

(b) Initially Shore Party evacuate to designated ships for interrogation.

(c) Capturing units evacuate to PW collecting point.

(d) Brigade MP Platoon will evacuate PW's from collecting point to Brigade enclosure.

(4) Interrogation - Annex BAKER (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 1-50.

(5) Health and sanitation - Annex BAKER hereto.

(6) Instructions expressed in FM 27-10 (Rules of Land Warfare) will apply.

(7) Reports - (Later).

(8) All enemy political prisoners and civilians will be handled initially as PW's. G-2, Civil Affairs Officer, and Platoon Leader, MP Platoon will coordinate screening and interrogation of all political prisoners and civilians (See Annex EASY hereto).

(9) Handling PW's - TM 19-500 applies.

e. Burial and Graves Registration.

(1) Burials will be by Brigade in Brigade Cemetery (location to be announced). FM 10-63 applies.

(2) Evacuation.

(a) Subordinate units will establish collecting points for deceased near aid stations and will evacuate to collecting points. Report location to this Headquarters.

(b) Brigade will evacuate deceased from unit collecting points to Brigade Cemetery.

(c) Transportation utilized in ration handling shall not be used for evacuation of the dead. Brigade Motor Transport will furnish transportation and drivers as required by Graves Registration units and on order of this Headquarters.

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Appendix 1 to Annex ABLE to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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(d) Subordinate units will submit to this Headquarters location overlay in case of isolated burials. Such burials must be kept to a minimum.

(e) Graves Registration units submit requests for additional personnel details to this Headquarters as needed.

(f) Personal effects of military dead will be gathered and kept separate for each deceased individual and will be forwarded by the unit of the individual concerned to this Headquarters. Personal effects of all military dead will be forwarded by this Headquarters to the Personal Effects Depot, San Francisco, California.

(g) Personal effects of enemy dead will be turned over to G-2. Those effects of no military value will be turned in to Brigade Supply to be made available to Civil Affairs Officer as needed.

(h) Civilian cemeteries for burial of civilians will be used as far as practicable. All labor connected with the burial of civilians will be performed by civilians where practicable.

(i) Reports - (Later)

f. Morale.

(1) Mail

(a) Addressing

1. All Marine Corps and attached Navy units will continue to use the regular unit designation, in care of the Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

(b) Postal Services.

1. Initially from FMFPac Regulating Post Office until establishment ashore of Fleet Post Office, then as directed by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

2. First class mail will arrive with each resupply shipment and by air as facilities become available. No second or third class mail will arrive prior to D plus 15.

3. Money order facilities will not be available prior to D plus 10.

4. Troop commanders will appoint at least one (1) mail orderly to receive mail at ports of call while the Brigade is afloat.

(c) Distribution of mail.

1. Incoming with Class I supplies.

2. Outgoing by units to Brigade Post Office.

(d) Officer Messenger Mail Center will be operated by Army or Navy in conjunction with Fleet Post Office aboard assigned mail ship.

(e) Censorship regulations: To be designated later.

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Appendix 1 to Annex ANLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

RESTRICTED**COPY****(2) Awards.**

(a) Submit recommendations for awards and decorations to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, via this Headquarters in accordance with paragraph 20005, Marine Corps Manual.

(3) Marine Corps Exchanges.

(a) Marine Corps exchanges will not be established ashore prior to D plus 5 unless special circumstances permit their establishment at an earlier date.

(4) Payment of troops.

(a) Payment of troops will be made, insofar as possible, immediately prior to embarkation.

(b) No regular payments to Marine personnel will be made in the objective area prior to D plus 30; emergency payments after D plus 2.

(c) The maintenance of flight logs for purposes of certifying flight pay, in the case of aviators and air observers attached to the Brigade, will be the responsibility of the Senior Brigade Aviator (Brigade Air Officer).

(5) Commanding officers will ascertain that troops are kept informed of the progress of the Brigade and the general plan and objective insofar as information available, opportunity, and the maintenance of security permits.

(6) Individual cameras may be carried provided they are in organizational custody. Regulations regarding taking of pictures will be published by the Commanding General of the destination.

g. Civil Affairs. Annex EASY.**h. Personnel Procedures and Adjustments.**

(1) Personnel evacuated from objective area will be transferred by service records to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

(2) Recommendations for battlefield appointments will be made by message to this Headquarters.

i. Personnel Estimates and Plans.

(1) Quartering and billeting. Billeting will be:

- (a) By assignment as directed by this Headquarters.
- (b) Quartering parties, as directed by unit commanders.

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Appendix 1 to Annex ALE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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(2) Structures and areas for use by higher echelon. Subordinate organizations will be notified at the earliest practicable time as to billeting areas and structures required by this Headquarters and/or higher echelons. Such designated areas or structures will not be used by subordinate units except in cases of urgent military necessity. Annex EASY.

j. Personnel Records and Reports - Later.

(1) Task Organization. See Annex ABLE to OpPlan 3-50.

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Appendix 1 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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4/jjt1st Provisional Marine Brigade
Camp Pendleton, California
0800, 6 July, 1950

Annex EAST to Administrative Plan 1-50

CIVIL AFFAIRS

Maps, Charts and Photos: Same as AdnPlan 1-50

1. a. Control of civilians may become a serious problem if such problems are not anticipated and plans made.
Annex TAKER Intelligence to OpnPlan 1-50.

b. Opn Plan 1-50. A Civil Affairs Section may be established if directed by higher authority. If a Civil Affairs section is not organized the G-1 Section will have cognizance of a provisional CA Section.

2. The Provisional CA Section will support operations of the 1st MarBrig in its zone of action by preventing civilian interference with military operations and relieving combat troops from civilian administration.

3. Provisional CA Section will establish on order a civilian collecting station at points to be designated. Initiate civilian control in Brigade zone of action.

a. Evacuation

- (1) ROT to Shore Party initially; to Brigade collecting point when announced.
- (2) 1st MarBrig to higher authority concentration area when established and as directed.
- (3) Report large concentrations of civilians interfering with operations by dispatch.
- (4) Nationals will be segregated and conducted to higher authority concentration area for repatriation as soon as such concentration area is announced.

b. Labor

- (1) Requisitions for civilian labor will be coordinated by this Headquarters for submission to higher authority. No civilian labor will be assigned unless so requisitioned.
- (2) Payment of labor in accordance with "Theater Wage Guide" to be issued.
- (3) Using units arrange for supervisor, guards, transportation, and food.

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Appendix 1 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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Annex EASY to Administrative Plan 1-50 (Cont'd)

c. Public Safety

- (1) After screening, Civil Affairs Section provide local police, medical, and defense personnel with ID cards and orange arm bands. Such personnel will be permitted to perform duties stated on ID card.
- (2) MSR's will be kept clear of civilians.
- (3) Street curfew will be enforced after sunset except for personnel with "after dark" noted on ID card.
- (4) Civilian travel prohibited except as authorized by MG authorities and for purpose of evacuation.
- (5) Civilian defense organizations will be used for protection of lives and property.

d. Information Control.

- (1) Initially all information to civilians will be by proclamations posted in prominent places.
- (2) Proclamations will be provided by this Headquarters as furnished by higher authority.
- (3) Defacing of proclamations or possession thereof by unauthorized personnel is prohibited.
- (4) Radios, newspapers, and other means of communication will be seized on order, and operation prohibited until otherwise directed.
- (5) CA personnel will assist intelligence personnel in enforcing censorship and security regulations set forth in Annex Dakar Intelligence to Opn Plan 1-50.

e. Law and Order

- (1) This headquarters may establish provost courts as necessary for trial of civilian offenders.
- (2) Higher Headquarters may establish Military Commissions for trial of civilian offenders; Brigade submit cases as necessary.
- (3) Civil courts will be suspended initially if ordered by higher authority.
- (4) Policies expressed in Naval Courts and Boards Appendix D will apply.
- (5) Black market activities will be reported to higher authority via this Headquarters for action.
- (6) Prices of civilian commodities as indicated in "Theater Price Guide". No individual trading with civilians is authorized.

f. Money and Finance

- (1) Occupation currency will be only legal tender in objective areas.
- (2) Rate of exchange - to be announced.
- (3) Commanding Officers of troops are directed to arrange with Navy Disbursing Officers to exchange dollars in hands of troops for occupational dollars prior to debarkation. Maximum exchange per person; 15 DOLLARS.

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Annex EASY to Administrative Plan 1-50 (Cont'd)

(4) Import or export of gold, silver, or other precious metals or stones is prohibited.

(5) Financial institutions including exchanges of all types will be closed initially and their records and funds safeguarded.

(6) No cash disbursements will be made to civilians. CA Sec handles all financial transactions with civilians and issue receipts for services and supplies. CA Sec record all individual receipts and transactions and turn over to agency as directed for settlement.

(7) All money or securities captured, seized, or found will be turned in to this Headquarters.

g. Civilian Supply

(1) Brigade responsible initially for civilian supply, until relieved by higher authority.

(2) CA Sec use local civilian supplies, food stores, and matured crops to maximum extent, coordinating with G-4 on supplies for tactical forces.

(3) A civilian ration component may have been prepared and may be requisitioned and used to feed civilians.

(4) Articles of value to military government in the objective areas will be safeguarded, particularly civilian food stocks, clothing, and medical supplies.

h. Public Health and Sanitation

(1) CA Sec medical personnel responsible for all phases of public health and sanitation.

(2) First aid as necessary and practicable provided by Brigade Surgeon.

(3) Annex EAKER (Medical to Adm Plan 1-50).

i. Reports

(1) Civil Affairs Summary submitted by CA Sec Commander to this Headquarters to arrive not later than 1800.

(2) Summary submitted in duplicate to cover period 1700 to 1700 daily.

j. Miscellaneous

(1) Policies expressed in FM 27-5 Military Government and Civilian Affairs and FM 27-10 rules of land warfare will apply.

(2) Only public buildings will be used for troop installations. No private property will be requisitioned except on order of a military government officer. A file of all property so requisitioned will be maintained.

(3) Only such reconstruction and rehabilitation of civilian installations will be attempted as is essential to the primary mission of the Brigade.

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Annex EASY to Administrative Plan 1-50 (Cont'd)

(4) Senior Civil Affairs Officer of the Brigade is appointed Civilian Property Custodian and will assume control of all civilian property; submit all requisitions to him.

4. a. Location of CA Headquarters: Afloat - Later. Ashore - Later.
 b. Annex KING (Signal Communication) to Opn Plan 1-50.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAIG.

E. W. SNEDEKER
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OpPlan 1-50

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-As

A. A. CHAMSTER
 LtCol, U. S. Marine Corps
 ACofS, 304

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Camp Pendleton, California
0800, 6 July, 1950

Annex HOW to Administrative Plan 1-50

INSTRUCTIONS TO TROOPS

Maps, Charts, and Photos same as AdPlan 1-50

1. The following instructions to troops are to be read to all units of this command on two separate days while in route to the objective area and will be enforced in the objective area.

a. It is expressly forbidden to kill, injure, or mistreat any persons acting in good faith while endeavoring to surrender or after being taken into custody.

b. Civilians and prisoners of war will be treated with humanity and their persons and honor will be respected. Mistreatments will be severely and quickly punished. The clothing of captured civilians will not be removed except in cases of emergency, and then only for the purpose of searching, after which the person will be allowed to reclothe. Women and children will not be required to undress except under the most extraordinary conditions, and then only upon order of and in the presence of an officer.

c. All religious customs and taboos not interfering with military operations will be respected.

d. Churches, temples, and shrines will not be occupied except as military necessity during combat.

e. Dead bodies will not be mutilated.

f. No personal effects, property, or identification will be removed from any allied dead, nor will clothing or body be searched by any person except authorized graves registration personnel.

g. All native and enemy villages, buildings, factories, and homes are declared off limits except for actual tactical purposes during combat or except to authorized intelligence personnel. This is applicable to deserted or occupied areas.

h. Looting and pillaging are strictly forbidden.

i. For the purpose of preventing looting and robbery, and to avoid disruption of civilian economic life, all personal transactions of any nature between service personnel and civilians are strictly forbidden. Any person found in possession of articles which are obviously the former property of civilians, or which can be proved to have been the former property of civilians will be presumed to be a looter.

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Appendix 1 to Annex AILE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

RESTRICTED**COPY****Annex HOW to Administrative Plan 1-50 (Cont'd)**

j. Civilian houses, other civilian property, and enemy property, including public utilities, power plants, and water works, will not be damaged unnecessarily.

k. Personal property of civilians susceptible of military use, such as arms, carems, explosives, and the like, will be taken only upon the order of an officer and a receipt given therefore. It will be remembered that civilians who fight with the enemy lost their civilian status.

l. Subject to examination and approval by duly designated officers, the following types of captured items may be retained as souvenirs; awards, knives, decorations, articles of uniform, and currency not to exceed 25 dollars for any one man. Occupation currency may be retained in amounts not to exceed 10 notes for any one man. Rifles, pistols, carbines or conventional design may be retained as souvenirs unless required to fill quotas requested for training purposes.

m. The location of public buildings, property, and records will be reported and they will be safeguarded until seizure by authorized personnel.

n. All troops will so conduct themselves under any and all circumstances so that no dishonor or stigma will be reflected on this force through the actions of any member of the command.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAIG:

E. W. SIEDEKER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OpPlan 1-50

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:

A. A. CHESTER
LtCol, U. S. Marine Corps
ACofS, G 4

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Appendix 1 to Annex AILE to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

27 July 1950

BRIGADE SOP)
: - Combat Awards
NUMBER 1-1)

Ref: (a) Chapter 20, Marine Corps Manual

Encl: (1) Combat Award Recommendation Card, NAVMC 539-PD
(2) Combat Award Recommendation letter form

1. The Commanding General desires that every individual who displays acts of gallantry, intrepidity, or heroic achievement in battle, above and beyond the normal meritorious performance expected of every marine and sailor in the Brigade, be promptly recommended for an appropriate combat award. It will be noted that to merit a combat award, the battle performance of the individual must be outstanding, exceptional, and unquestionably meritorious.

2. Because of the conditions existing during combat, especially in the front line units, individuals qualified to initiate recommendations for awards for heroic action in combat sometimes become casualties and are unable to serve as initiators or witnesses. As a result meritorious combat acts are not always reported and criticism arises. Reference (a) gives the procedure proscribed by the Marine Corps to alleviate this condition. The procedure to be followed as applied to this Brigade is set forth below:

a. A Combat Award Recommendation Card, Form NAVMC-539-PD, enclosure (1), will be completed by commanders and leaders of units down to and including the squad level or by any other individual who witnesses or has positive knowledge that a meritorious act has been performed as soon as practicable after that act takes place. The completed card will be forwarded at the first opportunity, via the chain of command, to the commanding officer of the individual recommended for the award. The commanding officer will then be responsible for obtaining detailed statements from witnesses to the act at the earliest time such witnesses are available.

b. For the purpose of maintaining equality of awards for acts and services of similar nature, each battalion and regiment will convene a Combat Awards Evaluation Board of officers to evaluate recommendations for awards. These boards will complete a Combat Award Recommendation Form, enclosure (2), which will be signed by the senior member of the board. The unit commander will endorse his recommendation thereon and forward to Brigade Headquarters via the chain of command. Enclosed with the form will be the original Combat Award Recommendation Card with entries completed, statements of all witnesses, and any other information which may be of assistance in evaluating the recommendation.

- 1 -

Appendix 2 to Annex A-1E to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report. C.O.P.-Y

BRIGADE SOP NO. 1-1

27 July 1950

(Contd)

c. All formal recommendations to higher authority for awards to personnel of the ground elements of this command will be prepared by a Board of Awards convened by Brigade Headquarters. These citations and recommendations will be based on the aforementioned cards, statements, and forms.

3. The above procedures apply only to combat awards. Recommendations for non-combat awards will be initiated and forwarded in a similar manner except that a Combat Award Recommendation Card is not required.

4. Headquarters of the Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing will prepare and forward formal recommendations for combat awards for Wing personnel to higher authority, via Brigade Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAIG:

E. W. SNEDEKER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "D" plus CMC, CG FMFPac, CG 1stMarDiv.

O-T-T-I-C-I-A-L

/s/H. G. Schrier
H. G. SCHRIER
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
Brigade Adjutant

C-O-P-Y

- 2 -

Appendix 2 to Annex A11E to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

COMBAT AWARD RECOMMENDATION CARD

NAVIC 539-PD

Time
Date

INDIVIDUAL

(PRINT) Name & Rank

OWN FORCES

Unit involved; strength

ENEMY

Type unit; composition; strength

Identification

Alone
Partner
Leader
Follower

Disposition & Location (Cover; con- cealment, distances)

Weapons Employed

Supporting Action

Opposing action-- Individual

Own forces

Weapons & Fires (Type; caliber, num- ber, intensity)

By enemy

By enemy in attacking unit objective

By individual

1 None	2 Result of act
3 Before Act	4 During Act
X or DOW Missing	

Killed	Wounded	Missing
--------	---------	---------

Personnel	Material
Killed	Wounded
Captured	Unknown

Casualties Inflicted

Wounds:

Summary of Action:

Witnesses
(Name & Rank)

Platoon	Company	Battalion	Regiment	Name & Rank of person making report
				Official relation to individual reported on
				Medal of Honor
				Navy Cross (Distinguished Service Cross)
				Silver Star
				Bronze Star

Award
Recommended

(Unit Heading)

date

Ser: _____

From: Combat Awards Evaluation Board
To: The Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade,
FMF (Reinforced)
Via: Chain of Command

Subj: (1) Combat Award Recommendation; case of _____

- (2) Statement of _____
- (3) Statement of _____
- (4) (5) (6) etc (such other statements as may be necessary)

1. Person recommended for award:

Last Name	First	Middle	Rank	Service No.
_____ (Branch of Service)				_____ (Unit to which attached at time of act)
_____ (Present Station)				

2. Summary of action: (State exactly where and in what capacity the recommended person was acting at the time of the incident. Give the complete details of the basis of the award, including dates and geographical locations of the action upon which the recommendation is based. Describe in detail the part taken by the individual recommended; - this account must be in such terms that the awarding authority can determine whether or not the act or service meets the requirements for the award recommended. If the individual became a casualty give known details. State difficulties, hazardous and adverse conditions under which the act was performed, and results achieved by the individual; if applicable, state what specific damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the person recommended.)

ENCLOSURE (2)

Appendix 2 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

Subj: Combat Award Recommendation; case of
(Cont'd)

3. Previous awards (if none, so state);

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>ACTIONS FOR WHICH AWARD ISSUED</u>	<u>DATES</u>
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

4. Award Recommended;

_____, USMC, Senior Member

1740
Ser

(Date)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on OmbAwardsEvaluationBd,
ltr ser _____ of _____

(Unit)

From: The Commanding Officer, _____
To: (Next Higher Echelon) _____

1.

ENCLOSURE (2)

Appendix 2 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report

COPY

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL PERIODIC REPORT

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1stProvMarBrig(Reinf)
Changwon, Korea
1800, 5 Aug 1950

Personnel Periodic Report No. 1
From 7 Jul 1950 to 1800, 5 Aug 1950

Charts and maps: AM31, sheet 6919IV

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) was activated 7 July 1950. Brigadier General E. A. CRAIG, Commanding, at Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, Oceanside, California.

The Brigade embarked aboard vessels of Task Group 53.7, at San Diego, California, on 14 July 1950, and arrived at Pusan, Korea, on 2 August 1950.

On 3 August 1950, the Brigade (minus rear echelon) in motor and rail convoys moved to present position.

1. STRENGTHS:*

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Int</u>	<u>Casualties</u>			<u>Strength at end of period</u>
				<u>KA</u>	<u>Evac</u>	<u>Total</u>	
H&S Bn	65.8-66.1	1199	1382				1382
5th Marines	65.5-62.4	2399	2407	2	10	12	2395
Co "A" 1stMkBn	61.5-65.6	173	175				175
4.2 Mortar Co	65.4-62.4	128	135				135
75mm Rcl Gun Co	68.2-62.7	85	88				88
1stBn 11th Marines	63.7-64.3	494	526				526

* Includes Rear Echelon

2. REPLACEMENTS:

- A. None received
B. Three hundred (300) replacements requested by airlift from FMF, Pacific, estimated date of arrival 15 August 1950

3. DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER:

A. None

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Appendix 3 to Annex ALE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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4. PRISONER OF WAR:

A. None

5. BURLIALS AND GRAVES REGISTRATION:

A. Two (2) burials (non-battle casualties) uncompleted. Bodies evacuated to Pusan.

6. MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES:

A. Excellent

B. No health and comfort items received.

7. MILITARY GOVERNMENT (Civil Affairs):

A. No civilians encountered.

8. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES AND ADJUSTMENT:

A. None

9. INTERIOR:

A. No public or private buildings used by forward echelon. Rear echelon located in school buildings of Pusan University, Pusan.

10. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES:

A. None employed

11. MISCELLANEOUS:

A. None

D. W. SHERMAN
Major USMC
ACofS G-1

Distribution:

CG, Eusak (original and 3)

CG, FME Pac (1)

CG, 1stMarDiv (1)

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Hq, 1stProvMarBrig, FMP (Reinf)
 In the field, KOREA (Vic CHINDONG-
 NI)
 101800 August 1950

Subj: Personnel Periodic Report No. 2 from 051800K Aug - 101800K Aug

Charts and Maps: KOREA - 1:250,000

1. Strengths*

(a) Organization	(b) Location	(c) Auth	(d) Int	(e) Casualties			(f) Gains	(g) Strength end of prd**
				KIA	WIA	IBC		
H&SBn, Brig	Vic CHINDONG-NI	1199	1382	2				1380
5th Marines	Vic PAEDONG-NI	2785	2804	10	78	12	3	2707
1stBn 11thMar	Vic PAEDONG-NI	494	526	2	6			518

* - Includes RearEch PUSAN

** - For prd ending 091800 Aug

2. Replacemonts.

a. None received.

b. 300 replacemonts airlifted by FMPac due to arrive 15 Aug 1950.
 These replacemonts requested by CINCPAC.

3. Discipline, Law and Order.

a. No military discipline or justice administered.

b. Stragglers light. 10 stragglers apprehended. All returned to parent organization. No unusual problems.

4. Prisoners of War.

a. 3 prisoners (laborers) apprehended by 2dBn, 5thMar on 9 Aug 1950.

b. 1 prisoner (wounded laborer) apprehended by 1stBn, 5thMar on 9 Aug 1950.

5. Burials and Graves Registration.

a. Burials completed - 18.

b. Burials uncompleted - 0.

c. Cometeries located at MASAN and PUSAN, Korea.

6. Morale and Personnel Services.

a. In general, morale is excellent. The intense heat encountered has been extremely detrimental to health and comfort. However, combat efficiency is very high.

b. No decorations have been awarded during this period.

c. Health and comfort items have been sparse.

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- 2 -
C O P Y

Appendix 3 to Annex A4LE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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Personnel Periodic Report No. 2 (Cont'd)

7. Civil affairs - Military government

a. No civilians (with the exception of transient refugees) encountered.

8. Personnel Procedures and Adjustments.

a. No difficulties.

9. Interior Management.

a. No civilian buildings used in forward areas.

10. Civilian Employees.

a. 310 Korean laborers employed as litter bearers and carrying parties by the 5th Marines.

D. W. SHERMAN
Major USMC
A0ofS, G-1

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CG 25thInfDiv (1)
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Appendix 3 to Annex A11E to 1stProvMarDiv's Special Action Report.

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Hq, 1stProvMarBrig, FMF (Reinf)
 In the field, KOREA
 201800 August 1950

Subj: Personnel Periodic Report No. 3 from 101800K Aug - 191800K Aug

During the period covered by this report the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced) was attached to higher commands as follows:

101800K Aug - 141000K Aug	-	25thInfDiv
141000K Aug - 151200K Aug	-	25USAK
151200K Aug - 191800K Aug	-	24thInfDiv

1. Strengths

(a) Organization	(b) Location	(c) Auth	(d) Int	(e) Casualties	(f) Gains	(g) Strength end of period	
				KIA	MIA	MBC	
5th Marines	Vic YONGSAN	2785	2804	79	669	12	1964
1stBn 11thMar	Vic YONGSAN	494	526	3	16	6	501
H&S3n, Brig	Vic YONGSAN	1199	1382	1	12		1369

2. Replacements.

a. None received.

3. Discipline, Law and Order.

a. No military discipline or justice required.
 b. No stragglers.

4. Prisoners of War.

a. Thirty-four (34) prisoners apprehended by 5th Marines.

5. Burials and Graves Registration.

a. Burials completed - 59.
 b. Burials uncompleted - 10.
 c. Cemeteries located at MASAN and MIRYANG.

6. Morale and Personnel Service.

a. Morale - very good.
 b. No decorations awarded during this period.
 c. Health and comfort items sparse.

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Personnel Periodic Report No 3 (Cont'd)

7. Civil Affairs - Military Government.

a. No civilians (with exception of transient refugees and displaced laborers) encountered.

8. Personnel Procedures and Adjustments.

a. No difficulties.

b. The transfer of 110 men under the age of eighteen (18) was directed by Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

9. Interior Management.

a. School buildings at KOSUNG and CHINGDONG-NI utilized for a period of one (1) day.

10. Civilian Employees.

a. Approximately 300 Korean laborers employed as litter bearers and carrying parties by 5th Marines.

b. Approximately 150 Korean laborers employed at manual labor by service elements and H&SM, 1stProvMarBrig.

D. W. SHEPHERD
Major USMC
ACofS, G-1

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CG 24thInfDiv (1)
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1stProvMarBrigado
 Vic MASAN, KOREA
 1158-1362
 261800K

Subj: Personnel Periodic Report No. 4 from 191800K Aug - 261800K Aug

Charts and Maps: AMS 1 Sheet IV - KOREA 1:50,000

During the period covered by this report the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced) was attached to higher commands as follows:

191800K Aug - 200800K Aug - 24thInfDiv
 200800K Aug - 261800K Aug - BUSAK

During the period while attached to the 24th Infantry Division, Brigade Headquarters was located in the vicinity of YONGSAN.

1. Strengths.

(a) Organization	(b) Location	(c) Auth	(d) Int	(e) Casualties				(f) Gain	(g) Strength end of period
				KIA	MIA	MIA	NBC		
H&SBn, 1stProv MarBrigado	Vic MASAN 1158-1362	1199	1382	3	15	3	18	1275	
5th Marines	Vic MASAN 1158-1362	2785	2804	117	451	9	250	494	
1stBn, 11th Marines	Vic CHING- DOI-KI	494	526	2	23	1	11	463	

2. Replacements.

a. 3 officers and 296 enlisted replacements received.

3. Discipline, Law and Order.

a. No Stragglers.

4. Prisoner of War.

a. No Prisoner's of War captured.

5. Burials and Graves Registration.

a. Burials.

<u>Cemetery</u>	<u>Identified</u>	<u>Unidentified</u>
MASAN (25thDivCemetery)	15	2
MIRYANG (24thDivCemetery)	14	
TOTAL	29	2

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Appendix 3 to Annex A-1 to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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Personnel Periodic Report No. 4 (Cont'd)

6. Morale and Personnel Services.

- a. Morale - Excellent.
- b. Recommendations for awards and decorations being processed.
- c. Health and comfort items - adequate.

7. Civil Affairs - Military Government.

- a. No civilians encountered that required civil affairs assistance from this Headquarters.

8. Personnel Procedure and Adjustment.

- a. No difficulties
- b. 103 personnel under the age of eighteen (18) were transferred to non-combat areas. However, they were ordered returned to duty on 25 August.

9. Interior.

- a. None.

10. Civilian Employees.

- a. 302 Koreans employed as laborers by Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1stProvMarBrigade.

D. W. SHERMAN
Major USMC
ACofS G-1

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CG JUSAK (Orig & 3)
CG 24thIndDiv (1)
CG FMFPac (1)
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COPY1st Prov Mar Brigade
1164-1384
021800K Sep 1950

Personnel Periodic Report No. 5

Period covered: 261800K Aug 1950 to 021800K Sep 1950

Map: KOREA 1:250,000

During the period covered by this report the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMP (Reinforced) was assigned to higher commands as follows:

261800K Aug to 021327K Sep - EUSAK
021327K Sep to 021800K Sep - 2dInfDiv

During the period while attached to EUSAK the Brigade was located in the vicinity of MASAN.

1. Strengths.
 - a. (See enclosure (1)).
2. Replacements.
 - a. 4 officers and 180 men received during period.
3. Discipline, Law and Order.
 - a. No stragglers.
 - b. Routine Naval justice and discipline administered.
 - c. No unusual problems.
4. Prisoners of War.
 - a. None captured or encountered.
5. Burials and Graves Registration.
 - a. One (1) burial, MASAN, cemetery.
 - b. No uncompleted burials.
6. Morale and Personnel Services.
 - a. Morale; Excellent.
 - b. Four (4) movies, one (1) native entertainment show, and six (6) band concerts presented.
 - c. Gratuitous post exchange items in limited quantities distributed. Towels in extremely short supply.
 - d. Recommendation for combat awards being processed.
 - e. Seventy-eight (78) awards of the Purple Heart Medal, presented at formal ceremony by the Commanding General.

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Personnel Periodic Report No. 5 (Cont'd)

7. Civil Affairs - Military Government.

a. No civilians requiring processing by this headquarters encountered.

8. Procedure.

a. No problems.

9. Interior Management.

a. No buildings utilized.

10. Civilian employees.

a. Approximately 250 natives employed at manual labor.

D. W. SHERMAN
Major USMC
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CG FMFPac (1)
CG 2dInfDiv (1)
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1. Strengths.

(a) Organization	(b) Location (end of period)	(c) Auth	(d) Initial	(e) Casualties				(f) Gains		(g) Strength end period
				KIA	WIA	MIA	NBC	Repl	Ret'd to duty	
1stProvMarBrigade	1164-1384	4526	4712	122	489	12	300	184	49	4460
H&SBn, 1stProvMarBrig	1164-1384	1199	1382	3	15	3	18	2		1282
5th Marines	1164-1384	2785	2804	117	451	9	269	178	30	2693
1stBr, 11th Marines	1164-1384	494	526	2	23		13	4	19	485

ENCLOSURE (1)
Appendix 3 to Annex A-1E to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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Appendix 3 to Annex APTB to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

021800K August 1950

STATION LIST NO. 1

From 7 July 1950 to 1800, 5 August 1950

Map: SMS1 Sheet 6919IV

SECTION I

Units by Arm or Services

A Units	B Location	C Coordinates	D Assigned	E Attached	F APO
H&SBn	CHANGWON, Korea	65.8-66.1	X		*
HqCo, H&SBn					
Det, 1stOrdBn					
Det, 1stServBn					
Det, 1stReconCo					
Det, 1stMPCo					
Co A, 1stEngrBn					
Co A, 1stMTBn					
Co A, 1stShoreParty Bn					
Co B, 1stMed Bn					
Det, 1stCmbServGrp					
5th Marines	CHANGWON, Korea	65.5-62.4	X		
H&SCo, 5thMar		65.5-62.4			
1stBn, 5thMar		66.1-65.9			
2dBn, 5thMar		62.6-65.5			
3dBn, 5thMar		65.5-62.0			
Co A, 1stTankBn		65.5-64.5			
4.2 Mortar Co		65.4-62.4			
75mm Recoilless Gun Co		68.2-62.7			
1st Bn, 11th Marines	CHANGWON, Korea	63.7-64.3	X		
1st Amph Tractor Co	KOBE, Japan		X		
* - c/o FPO, San Francisco, California					

SECTION II

Forecasts of Units to Come Under Control of Organization.

Unknown

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Appendix 3 to Annex A-11 to 1st Prov Mar Brig Special Action Report.

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STATION LIST NO. 1 (Cont'd)

SECTION III

Forecasts of Proposed Changes.

Unknown.

D. W. SHERMAN
Major USMC
ACofS, G-1

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CG-25thDiv
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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

021800K Sep 1950

STATION LIST NO. 2

Map: KOREA 1:250,000

UNITS BY ARM OR SERVICES

A Units	B Location	C Coordinates	D Assigned	E Attached	F APO
1stProv MarBrigado(-)		1164-1384	2dInfDiv		*
H&SDn, 1stProv MarBrigado(-)		1164-1384	1stProv MarBrig		
H&SDn, 1stProv MarBrigado(Rear)	MIRYANG (Vic)	1177-1394.5	H&SDn, Brigado		
H&SDn, 1stProv MarBrigado(Admin)	PUSAN		H&SDn, Brigado		
5th Marines		1164-1384	1stProv MarBrig		
1stBn, 11th Marines		1164-1384	1stProv MarBrig		

* FPO San Francisco, California

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CG 2dInfDiv (1)
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FIRST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE
FLEET MARINE FORCE (REINFORCED)

STATION LIST

BRIGADIER GENERAL E. A. CRAIG
U.S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING.

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~~Headquarters and Service Battalion,
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF, (Reinf)
C/O FPO San Francisco, California.~~

1 September 1950

<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET NUMBER</u>	<u>STATION LIST</u>			<u>DATE LEFT</u>	<u>DATE JOINED</u>
		<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>U. S.</u>	<u>FMF</u>
<u>COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF</u>						
<u>BRIGADE COMMANDER SECTION</u>						
CRAIG, Edward A.	0196	BrigGen	9903	Brigade Commander	15Jul50	26Jan47
BUCK, John A.	049497	1stLt	0301	Aide-De-Camp	14Jul50	27Jun48
<u>CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION</u>						
SNEDEKER, Edward W.	04082	Col	9902	Chief of Staff	14Jul50	18Jan48
WOODBURY, Levi	010997	CWO	0130	Staff Secry	14Jul50	30Aug48
<u>G-1 SECTION</u>						
SHERMAN, Donald W.	08169	Maj	0302	Ass't Chief of Staff, G-1	14Jul50	29Jul49
SCHIMMENTI, Joseph A.	049106	1stLt	0302	Ass't G-1 add/d BrigadeLegal	14Jul50	1 Apr49
<u>G-2 SECTION</u>						
VAN ORMAN, Ellsworth G.	05433	LtCol	0802	Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2	15Jul50	7Jul50
BRANDON, William E.	021358	Capt	0301	Ass't G-2	14Jul50	11Mar49
<u>G-3 SECTION</u>						
STEWART, Joseph L.	05644	LtCol	0802	Ass't Chief of Staff, G-3	15Jul50	15Jul49
STEWART, Frank R., Jr.	08526	Maj	1802	Ass't G-3 add/d BrigTko&AntiTko	14Jul50	22Oct48

<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEFT US</u>	<u>DTD JD FMF</u>
<u>G-4 SECTION</u>						
CHIDESTER, Arthur L.	05234	ltCol	0301	Asst Chief of Staff, G-4	15Jul50	30Jul48
PROFFITT, Edward L.F.	032446	1stLt	0302	Asst G-4, add d Emb Off	14Jul50	24Aug48
<u>ADJUTANT SECTION</u>						
SCHMIDT, Harold G.	019234	Capt	0302	Brig Adjutant	14Jul50	1Sep48
JAMES, Harold F.	042130	WO	0130	Asst Adj, Pers Clfn & Assng Off	14Jul50	24Feb49
STOCK, Edgar B.	028657	CWO	0130	Asst Adj, S&C Files	14Jul50	4Jun49
BARRY, Joseph F.	025293	CWO	0160	Asst Adj, Postal Off	14Jul50	28Apr49
<u>SUPPLY SECTION</u>						
EAGAN, James K.	07760	Major	3009	Supply Officer	14Jul50	8Jul50
HOLDREN, Wilfred D.	042146	WO	2101	Asst Supply Off & Ord Off	14Jul50	14May48
<u>MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION</u>						
SELLERS, Victor E.	011207	Capt	3520	MT Officer	14Jul50	1Sep47
<u>AIR SECTION</u>						
CUPP, James N.	09004	Major	7302	Air Officer	14Jul50	13Jun49
RIVES, Edwin L.	018979	Capt	0302	Air Observer	14Jul50	8Aug49

COMMUNICATION SECTION

STINSON, Elwyn M. STANLEY, Earl F.	010879	Maj	2502	SigO	15Jul50	21Mar46
	014275	Capt	2502	Ass't SigO, PltComdr, Comm	14Jul50	18Jan49
LAWTON, Fred Jr. O'BANNON, James L. MIS, Charles A. CONNORS, Joseph E.	047338	1stLt	2502	Plt	14Jul50	2Jun50
	042967	1stLt	0302	CommWatchO	14Jul50	3Mar49
	042690	WO	2502	CommWatchO	14Jul50	20Sep47
	012427	1stLt	3030	SigSupO	14Jul50	26May50

LIAISON SECTION

HACENAH, Edward R. WATERS, George F., Jr.	05046	LtCol	0301	Liaison Officer	14Jul50	19Feb50
	06601	LtCol	0302	Ass't LiaisonO & MbrBrigade Board of awards	14Jul50	11Jan50
TUNGERICH, Stevan	049855	2dLt	4660	T/Du Photo Coverage	5Aug50	15Aug50

MEDICAL SECTION

CASTELL, Byron D. KEELAN, Lawrence O.	154989	LtComdr USN		BrigSurg	18Jul50	
	396742	CWO(HC) USN		Admin/ass't	14Jul50	27Sep48

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTALIONHEADQUARTERS COMPANY

SULLIVAN, Richard E.	012717	Maj	0302	BnComdr, HqComdt, add/d BnRO	14Jul50	20Aug47
	035880	2dLt	0302	Bn S-1, Adj add/d BnPostcl CusRegFubs, Sec/TresComm- isioncdOMess	14Jul50	22Aug49
MUNSELL, Vernon S.	039194	1stLt	0302	CoComdr HqCo, add/d BnEduca O BnPersaffO, BnResponsible O, MbrExchangeCouncil, Mbr Boards of awards	14Jul50	23Nov48

<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEFT US</u>	<u>DTD JD FME</u>
ANDERSON, Ralph M.	049032	2dLt	0302	Co Off; BnMessO; BnSavBondO & InsO; BnSSO	14Jul50	26Nov48
KUPEC, Frank Jr.	033109	CWO	3010	BnSupO; BnAccO; MbrBoardsOfAward	14Jul50	10Oct48
<u>1ST TRAFFIC PLATOON MILITARY POLICE COMPANY</u>						
RODES, Nyc G.	048919	1stLt	0302	PltComdr, add d Provost Marshal	14Jul50	11Apr47
DIRST, Loyd V.	030117	CWO	5840	AsstPltComdr, add d Brig Food Director	14Jul50	20Aug49
<u>"A" COMPANY, 1st MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION</u>						
ECKLUND, Arthur W.	031940	Capt	0301	Co Comdr "A" Co, 1stMTBn	14Jul50	26Jan49
BYNUM, Arnold F.	049918	2dLt	0301	Co Off	14Jul50	4Oct49
DOGGETT, Thomas E.	025484	WO	3520	Co Off	14Jul50	7Jul48
LA BAHN, Louis E.	036216	CWO	3510	Co Off	14Jul50	15Nov48
<u>"A" COMPANY, 1st ENGINEER BATTALION</u>						
KING, George W.	018899	Capt	1202	CoComdr "A" Co, 1stEngBn	14Jul50	24Jun49
GOULD, William R.	030419	Capt	1202	Co Off	14Jul50	28Feb49
CANZONI, Nicholas A.	04885E	1stLt	1201	Co Off	14Jul50	27Jun50
HARDICK, Michael J.	014980	1stLt	1110	Co Off	14Jul50	28Feb50
PEPPIN, David D.	04535E	1stLt	1202	Co Off	14Jul50	9Nov49
RICHARDS, Wayne E.	049157	1stLt	1201	Co Off	14Jul50	11Feb50
SKELT, Ernest P. Jr.	042317	1stLt	1201	Co Off	14Jul50	10Jul48
HETRICK, Lawrence	049710	2dLt	0301	Co Off	14Jul50	18Sep48
OWENS, Willard C.	043766	WO	1310	Co Off	14Jul50	8Mar49
<u>"B" COMPANY, 1st MEDICAL BATTALION</u>						
FREYLING, Robert A.	100686	Comdr (USN)		Co Comdr "B" Co, 1stMedBn	14Jul50	5Jul50
METCALF, John	84399	Comdr (USN)		Co Off	14Jul50	10Jul50
BRYANT, Lewis A.	202910	Lt (JG)(USN)	JO 021		14Jul50	15Mar50
O'TOOLE, Daniel M.	503776	Lt (JG)(USN)		Co Off	14Jul50	24Oct49

<u>NAME</u>	<u>J.CKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEFT US</u>	<u>DTD JD FIF</u>
ALLEN, Howard E.	129390	LtComdr	(MSC)	(USN) EP Dis Unit #6		7 Jul 50

DETACHMENT 1st SERVICE BATTALION

SAGAR, Thomas	027832	Capt	0302	DetComdr, 1stServBn	14Jul50	4Sep47
HOTCHKISS, Herbert E.	048589	CFO	3020	Graves Reg O	14Jul50	6Jul49
MC COOL, Felix J.	049274	WO	4130	Laundry O	14Jul50	31 May 50
CONLEY, Wilbur C.	022594	Capt	4130	Brig PX O	14Jul50	1 Apr 50
ANDREWS, Arthur L.	044020	CFO	4130	Asst Brig PX O	14Jul50	4Nov49
HYDER, Luther "E"	049271	WO	3310	Brig B.K O	14Jul50	10Oct49
AGONE, Frank C.	022325	CFO	0310	Co Off	14Jul50	5Jul49
JENSON, Austin C.	049968	2ndLt	0301	Co Off	14Jul50	3 Aug 49
MARLOWE, William H.	049764	2ndLt	0302	Co Off	14Jul50	15Sep49
GORDON, Donald C.	012758	1stLt	3010	Co Off	14Jul50	9Oct48

DETACHMENT 1st ORDNANCE BATTALION

LA BELLMAN, Meyer	015680	1stLt	2201	Det Comdr, 1stOrdBn	14Jul50	22Jan50
ALEXANDER, George N.Jr.	017952	CFO	2310	Co Off	14Jul50	22Sep47
GEBHART, John A.	010797	CFO	3020	Co Off	14Jul50	17Oct45
MC REYNOLDS, Donald I.	015795	CFO	3510	Co Off	14Jul50	2Feb48
STREIT, Harold A.	102551	CDR (USN)		MedOff	14Jul50	10Jul50

"A" COMPANY, 1st SHORE PARTY BATTALION

BATCHELOR, William E.	08259	Major	1202	CoComdr "A"Co, 1stSPBn add d Brig SP OFF	14Jul50	17Nov47
CARVER, Nathaniel H.	019989	Capt	1202	Co Off	14Jul50	2Jul48
CAMPBELL, James W.	042683	1stLt	1202	SP Team #2	14Jul50	1 Apr 47
OLNEY, Orville N.	034143	1stLt	0410	SP Team #1	14Jul50	4Sep45

<u>NAME</u>	<u>J.CKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEFT US</u>	<u>DTD JD</u>
LEESEBERG, Phillip K.	045068	1stLt	2502	SP ComrSect Team #1	14Jul50	17Aug46
GREEN, Melvin K.	04E087	1stLt	0410	SP Team #3	14Jul50	20Oct45
STANLIND, Dever	037666	WO	0410	SP Team #3	14Jul50	24May47
FEDOR, John J.	039603	1stLt	0410	Co Off	14Jul50	23Sep49
HOLLOWAY, Charles X.	259994	LtComdr(MC)	(USN)	Med Off	14Jul50	8Jul50
<u>1st PLATOON RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY</u>						
HOUGHTON, Kenneth J.	013965	Capt	0302	FltComdr, 1stPltReconCo	14Jul50	26Jan49
SHARON, Donald W.	049870	2ndLt	0302	Co Off	14Jul50	10Jun49
<u>DETACHMENT 1st COMBAT SERVICE GROUP</u>						
O'MAHONEY, Thomas J.	07720	Major	0302	CO, DetCmbSerGrp; CORecrEchelon	12Jul50	8Jul49
EME, Richard J.	042318	1stLt	0130	Liaison Off; add d Det ExecO	12Jul50	29Apr47
BICKLEY, Roy W.	042205	2dLt	3010	Supply Off	12Jul50	26Nov48
<u>TEMPORARY ATTACHED FROM 8TH ARMY</u>						
ASANO, Fujio F.	0159694	1stLt	9330	(USA)		
UYEDA, Masao B.	0956827	1stLt	9316	(USA)		
HIGASHI, Roy Y.	01686624	2ndLt	1174	(US)		
<u>TEMPORARY ATTACHED FROM GEN HQS FEC</u>						
DLUGHERTY, Millard F.	01306990	Capt		(USA)		
KIJIMA, Majoru	02135993	WO(JG)		(USA)		
TARBUTTON, Edmund H.	01329197	1stLt		(USA)		
<u>AMERICAN RED CROSS</u>						
COLE, Laron W.		American Red Cross		Field Director		
PIZZARD, Robert		American Red Cross		Assistant Field Director		

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEIT DTD JD</u>	
					<u>US</u>	<u>FMF</u>
<u>TEMPORARY ATTACHED FROM Hq H&S GROUP GEN HQ FEC</u>						
WALTON, Samuel E.	01288653	Capt		USA		
FANNING, Ieland K.	W2131124	WOJG		USA		
FLOOK, Arnold R.	01798919	1stLt		USA		
KINOSHITA, George J.	W2136012	WOJG		USA		
O'NEIL, Thomas F.	W2135976	WOJG		USA		

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Headquarters, 5th Marines,
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, (Reinforced) FMT
APO, San Francisco, California

1 September 1950

NAME	SERVICE NO.	STATION LIST		DUTIES	LEFT U. S.	DATE JD FMT
		RANK	MOS			
MURRAY, Raymond L	05127	LtCol	0302	Regimental Commander	14Jul50	29Jul48
HAYS, Lawrence C Jr	05624	LtCol	0302	Regimental Exec Off	14Jul50	21Dec48
<u>S-1 SECTION</u>						
WEED, Alton C	015835	1stLt	0130	S-1 O; Postal O; Cust Reg Pub	14Jul50	10Oct48
THOMPSON, Paul F	010108	CWO	0130	Pers Clfn & Assgn O; Rectg O; Pers O H&S Co & att CO's	14Jul50	12Aug49
DAVIS, Eugene C Jr	045230	1stLt	0302	Asst S-1 O; Legal O	14Jul50	7Jul49
<u>S-2 SECTION</u>						
ESTERLINE, William C	08207	Maj	0302	S-2 O; R Sec Clfn Cont O; PIO	14Jul50	17Aug48
COOLEY, Richard A	044994	1stLt	0301	Asst S-2 O	14Jul50	14Sep47
<u>S-3 SECTION</u>						
BRUSH, Charles H Jr	05901	Maj	0302	S-3 O	14Jul50	30Oct48
ROBERTS, James F	042640	1stLt	0302	Asst S-3 O	14Jul50	23Aug49
<u>S-4 SECTION</u>						
WALLACE, Harold	09882	Maj	0301	S-4 O	14Jul50	18Jun49
GLOVER, William R	042901	1stLt	0302	Asst S-4 O; Emb O	14Jul50	24Nov48
PRICE, Robert G	046564	1stLt	0301	Asst S-4 O	14Jul50	1Jul50

STATION LIST (Cont'd)

CHAPLAIN

INGVOLDSTAD, Orlando Jr	223739	LtCmdr (P) USN Brigade & Regt'l Chaplain	14Jul50	Unknown
TENNANT, William G	445437	Lt (P) USN Asst Chaplain	14Jul50	Unknown
HICKEY, Bernard L	522073	Lt(jg)(C) USN Asst Chaplain	14Jul50	Unknown

DENTAL SECTION

KELLY, Jack J	175145	LtCmdr USN Brigade & Regt'l DentalO	14Jul50	Unknown
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MEDICAL SECTION

LESSENDEN, Chester M	154480	LtCmdr USN Regt'l Surgeon	14Jul50	Unknown
ENGSTROM, Eugene E	273084	Lt(jg) USN Asst RSurgeon	26Jul50	Jul50
H'DOUBLER, Francis T Jr	490194	Lt(jg) USN Asst RSurgeon	18Jul50	Jul50
May, John F	263353	Lt(jg) USN Asst RSurgeon	Jul50	Jul50

SUPPLY SECTION

HUFF, John V	019062	Capt 3010 RSupplyO	14Jul50	Sep48
STEWART, Gerald H	049850	2dLt 0301 Asst RSupplyO ; CoEmbO	14Jul50	10Oct49
BROWN, Clifford J Sr	040692	WO 3010 RAccountableO	14Jul50	26Jul49

ORDNANCE SECTION

PARRISH, BILL E	032768	CWO 2110 OrdSupO & MunO	14Jul50	23Sep47
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MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

ALISON, James C	048207	1stLt 0301 RMT&MaintO	14Jul50	9Jul50
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SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION

CROCKER, William G	2dLt	2dLt 0302 Brig&Regt'l SSO	14Jul50	24Sep49
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STATION LIST (Cont'd)DISBURSING SECTION

SHAW, Kenneth L	08100	Capt	3010	Brigade & Regt'l DisbO	14Jul50	18Apr49
HANSBERRY, Dean R	016009	CWO	3410	Asst DisbO	14Jul50	19Dec47
ROBERSON, John H	038111	CWO	3410	Asst DisbO	14Jul50	4Jan50

COMMUNICATION SECTION

BOYD, Kenneth B	012683	Maj	2502	RCommO	14Jul50	1Jan47
MICHAEL, Harold J	043754	WO	2610	AsstRCommO	14Jul50	6Nov47

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY

SUDNICK, Ralph M	028548	Capt	0302	CoComdr	14Jul50	1Jul49
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AIR-NAVAL GUNFIRE LIASON SECTION

RAGON, Jerry C	177133	Lt	USM	Regt'1 LANGLICO O	14Jul50	Unknown
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TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SECTION

JILLISKY, Leo R	036978	1stLt	7302	Regt'1 TACP LiaisonO	14Jul50	3Jun50
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"A" Company,
1st Tank Battalion, 5th Marines,
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, (Reinforced) FMF

ENGLISH, Gearl M	021695	Capt	1802	CoComdr	12Jul50	5Jun48
CRAIG, Robert J	034215	1stLt	1802	CoExecO	12Jul50	10May49
POMEROY, William D	041632	1stLt	1802	PltLdr, 1stPlat	12Jul50	1Nov49
SWEET, Granville G	043134	2dLt	1802	PltLdr, 2dPlat	12Jul50	10Sep48
WINTER, Robert M	042117	2dLt	1802	PltLdr, 3dPlat	12Jul50	14Apr45

STATION LIST (Cont'd)COMMUNICATION SECTION

BAUGHMAN, Prentiss H	039886	2dLt	2502	CommO	12Jul50	Sep47
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RECONNAISSANCE SECTION

CARSON, John S	046408	2dLt	1802	ReconO	14Jul50	Feb49
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ORDNANCE SECTION

DOYEL, Grant R	019620	CWO	2110	OrdO	14Jul50	30Aug48
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TANK MAINTENANCE SECTION

PLUMBLEY, Robert J	025207	CWO	1840	TankMaintO	12Jul50	May48
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4.2" Mortar Company,
5th Marines,
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, (Reinforced) FMF

LUCY, Robert M	049345	1stLt	0302	CoCmdr	14Jul50	Nov48
GIBSON, Tom L	049976	2dLt	0302	CoExecO	14Jul50	Oct48
BEARD, Wendell O	050060	2dLt	0302	PltLdr, 1stPlat	14Jul50	Jun50
MC CARTHY, "R" M.	049903	2dLt	0302	PltLdr, 2dPlat	14Jul50	Jun49

GUNNERY SECTION

NEWSOM Rollie D	049997	2dLt	0302	GunO	14Jul50	Aug49
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MEDICAL SECTION

KLEIN, Chester L	504228	Lt(jg)	USN	MedO	14Jul50	Unk
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STATION LIST, (Cont'd)

Anti-Tank Company
 5th Marines
 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, (Reinforced) FMF

BAILEY, Almarion S	041735	1stLt	0302	CoCmdr	14Jul50	2May50
FIELDS, Paul R	049848	2dLt	0301	PltLdr, 1stPlat	14Jul50	21Sep50
JONES, Charles M Jr	050146	2dLt	0301	PltLdr, 2dLt	14Jul50	23Jan50

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1st Battalion 5th Marines
1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) FMF
% Fleet Post Office San Francisco California

1 September 1950

STATION LIST

<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>DATE LEFT US</u>	<u>DATE JOINED FMF</u>
NEWTON, George R.	05786	LtCol	0302	Battalion Commander	14Jul50	26Aug49
OBSON, Merlin R.	08163	Maj	0302	Ln Exec0	14Jul50	14Oct49
<u>S-1 SECTION</u>						
FRITZ, Martin F.	028390	2dLt	0130	S-1;adj; Voting0 Postal0; S-vBond0	14Jul50	29Jul49
RABE, Leroy D.	032059	2dLt	0105	Asst Adj Pers Clfn&Assgn Off; RR; Custodian Registered Pub; CO (REch)	14Jul50	19Oct48
<u>S-2 SECTION</u>						
HANSEN, Dean B.	049626	2dLt	0302	S-2; Security Clfn Control0	14Jul50	23Sep49
<u>S-3 SECTION</u>						
SMITH, Loren R.	040624	1stLt	0302	S-3	14Jul50	26Nov48
YOUNG, James R.	049647	2dLt	0302	Asst S-3	14Jul50	40Oct49
<u>S-4 SECTION</u>						
MORROW, Clark B.	018480	Capt	0302	S-4	14Jul50	2Apr50
<u>COMMUNICATION SECTION</u>						
PETER, William J., Jr.	033632	1stLt	2502	Comm0	14Jul50	14Jun49

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MEDICAL SECTION

HILSON, Bently A.	523633	Ltjg(USM)	Bn Surgeon	14Jul50	
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SUPPLY SECTION

DAVIS, Warren A.	042207	WO	3010 Bn Responsible Plat. Comdr E&S Co	14Jul50	7Sept49
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HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY

GOELMIUS, Walter E.G.	027175	Capt	4960 Co Comdr E&S Co	14Jul50	3Nov49
GRENE, Carl O.	202155	Lt(USM)	MGF Liaison Co	14Jul50	
ALLEN, Merle W.	049793	2dLt	0301 MGF Spotting Co	14Jul50	1Jul49
SMITH, James W.	037073	2dLt	7302 Tactical Air Control Co	14Jul50	3Jan50

"A" COMPANY

STEVENS, John R.	014231	Capt	0302 Co Comdr	14Jul50	Apr47
EUBANKS, Fred F., Jr.	036407	1stLt	0302 ExecO: 60mm Mort Sec Ldr	14Jul50	May49
FOX, George C.	047459	1stLt	0302 3rd Rifle Plat Comdr	14Jul50	Jun49
MUETZEL, Francis W.	049792	2ndLt	0302 MG Plat Comdr	14Jul50	Oct49

"B" COMPANY

BENTON, Francis I., Jr.	015170	Capt	0302 Co Comdr	14Jul50	18Jan49
SCHRYVER, Hugh C., Jr.	049849	2dLt	0302 1st Rifle Plat Comdr	14Jul50	16Sept49
CHRISTOLOS, Jim M.	049920	2dLt	0302 60mm Mort Sec Ldr	14Jul50	3Jan50
MORRIS, Edward C.	050033	2dLt	0302 2nd Rifle Plat Comdr	14Jul50	22Jun49

"Wons" COMPANY

RUSSELL, John W.	07098	Maj	0302 Co Comdr	14Jul50	26Aug49
SOLLON, Almond H.	024382	Capt	0302 ExecO	14Jul50	13Aug50
ALDRMAN, Harry L.	049783	2dLt	0302 81mm Mort Plat Comdr	14Jul50	24Aug50
BROME, Dale I.	050020	2dLt	0302 AT-Aslt Plat Comdr	14Jul50	Jul49
TULEY, Ralph J.	049907	2dLt	0302 Asst 81mm Mort Plat Comdr	14Jul50	19Jul49

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Headquarters,
2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
1st Provisional Marine Brigade,
Fleet Marine Force, (Reinforced),
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco

September 1950
1 September 1950

STATION LIST

<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>DATE LEFT US</u>	<u>DATE JOINED FMF</u>
ROISE, Harold S.	06134	LtCol	0302	Battalion Commander	14Jul50	2May49
STEVENS, John W. II	06180	LtCol	0302	Executive Officer; Bn Sec Clfn0	14Jul50	19Jun50
<u>S-1 SECTION</u>						
ONDEK, Joseph P.	032039	2dLt	0130	S-1; Pers Clfn & Asgt0	14Jul50	23Apr48
MERICANTANTE, John C.	019760	1stLt	0130	Asst S-1; Adj; Custodian of Reg Pubs; Mail0; Rectg0; CO Admin Rear Echelon		
<u>S-2 SECTION</u>						
DEGULIS, Simon I.	049649	2dLt	0302	S-2; Voting0; Ins0; Sav Bond; SSC; PIO; Rad Saf0; Chem War0; Biological Saf0; Assistant S-3	14Jul50	7Jul49
<u>S-3 SECTION</u>						
GALL, Walter (n)	010710	Major	0302	S-3	14Jul50	30Jul49
<u>S-4 SECTION</u>						
GATES, John "J"	047839	2dLt	0302	S-4; Ord0; MTO	14Jul50	15Sep49
<u>SUPPLY SECTION</u>						
UNDERWOOD, Robert A.	048533	1stLt	0301	Bn Sup0; Resp0; Mess0	14Jul50	2Jan50

COMMUNICATION SECTION

OSTERHOUDT, Peter C.	046420 2dLt	2502	CommO	14Jul50	Jun46
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HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY

WALSH, David W.	049470 1stLt	0302	Company Commander	14Jul50	31Aug47
BELOR, Ernest J.	177109 Lt USN		NGFO	14Jul50	4Mar50
CARPER, Esten C. Jr.	049485 1stLt	0302	NGF SpottingO	14Jul50	18Sep49
JETER, Manning "T" Jr.	137287 1stLt	7302	TACP	14Jul50	3Jun50

"D" COMPANY

SMITH, "H" "J"	040623 1stLt	0302	Company Commander	17Aug50	2Aug50
DUNBAR, Michael J.	041497 1stLt	0302	Executive Officer		28Jul50
			*60mmMortarPltLdr		
HECK, Ray (n)	050008 2dLt	0301	1stRiflePltLdr	14Jul50	Jul49
HOWARD, Lee R.	049627 2dLt	0301	2dRiflePltLdr	14Jul50	Aug49
HANIFIN, Robert T. Jr.	048995 1stLt	0302	3rdRiflePltLdr	14Jul50	23Jun49
			*MGP1tLdr		

"E" COMPANY

JASKILKA, Samuel (n)	013973 Capt	0302	Company Commander	14Jul50	3Sep49
SEYDEL, Karle F. (MCR)	043007 1stLt	0302	Executive Officer		13Jul50
			*60mmMortarPltLdr		
DEPTULA, Edwin A.	049893 2dLt	0301	1stRiflePltLdr	14Jul50	
EDDY, Redger I.	049709 2dLt	0302	2dRiflePltLdr	14Jul50	5Jul49
			*3rdRiflePltLdr		
UFFELMAN, Paul R.	049478 2dLt	0302	MGP1tLdr	14Jul50	20Oct48

WEAPONS COMPANY

SPIKER, Theodore F.	08171 Major	0302	Company Commander	14Jul50	
BATEMAN, James W.	030931 Capt	0302	Executive Officer		24Aug50
HARRELL, James E.	049655 2dLt	0302	ATAssaultPltLdr	14Jul50	12Sep49
JANISZEWSKI, George (n)	041440 1stLt	0302	81mmMortarPltLdr	14Jul50	16Sep48
			*Asst81mmMortarPltLdr		

*Indicates vacant billets

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Headquarters,
3d Battalion, 5th Marines,
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, (Reinforced),
Fleet Marine Force,
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California.

1 September 1950

STATION LIST:

<u>NAME:</u>	<u>JACKET NO:</u>	<u>RANK:</u>	<u>MOS:</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEFT U.S.</u>	<u>DT JD FMP:</u>
TAPLETT, Robert D	06678	LtCol	0301	BnComdr.	14Jul50	19Aug48
CANNEY, John J.	06094	Maj	0302	BnExecO; SrMbr Regt'l Exam Bd.	14Jul50	7Oct49
<u>S-1 SECTION:</u>						
WILKERSON, Herbert L.	045163	1stLt	0302	Bn PersO.	14Jul50	21Jun49
<u>S-2 SECTION:</u>						
HERRICK, Donald L.	014548	Capt	0302	S-2; Unit Security Clfn Control O; Alternate Custodian Registered Publications and Classified Documents.	14Jul50	17Aug49
<u>S-3 SECTION:</u>						
SMITH, Lawrence W. Jr.	08907	Maj	0302	S-3; SrMbr Bn Pro Bd.	14Jul50	20Aug49
<u>S-4 SECTION:</u>						
HOUSE, Arthur E. Jr.	045278	1stLt	0302	S-4; Bn MtO.	14Jul50	30Jun50
<u>COMMUNICATION SECTION:</u>						
KELLY, Hercules R. Jr.	048634	2dLt	2502	Bn CommO; PlatLdr Comm Plat.	14Jul50	15Nov48
<u>SUPPLY SECTION:</u>						
SIMPSON, Dale W.	035364	CWO	3025	Bn SupplyO, Bn ResponsibleO.	14Jul50	6Feb50
<u>H&S COMPANY:</u>						
FREDERICKS, Harold D.	049457	1stLt	0302	CoComdr; Hdqtrs Comdt; Bn MessO; S-1; Bn Pers Assign and ClfnO; Custodian Registered Publications and Classified Documents.	14Jul50	1 Oct48
GREENE, Daniel (n)	035559	1stLt	7303	Bn TACP O.	14Jul50	20Mar47
WAYERSKI, Joseph R. Jr.	049874	2dLt	0301	NGF O.	14Jul50	11Jul49

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STATION LIST			(COMP'D)		PAGE (2)	
BANKS, Stanley C.	185544	Lt	USN	NGF Liason O.	14Jul50	UNKNOWN
HARVEY, Robert J.	251999	Lt(jg)	USN	Bn Med O.	14Jul50	UNKNOWN
<u>WPNS COMPANY:</u>						
EHRlich, Murray (L)	012649	Maj	0302	CoComdr	14Jul50	19Jul49
LUTNICK, William A.	031949	1stLt	0302	CoExecO	14Jul50	5May45
WATTERSON, Donald E.	041686	1stLt	0302	P1Ldr, Anti-talk Asslt Plat; BnChemical Warfare and Rad Safety O.	14Jul50	28Feb49
PETERSON, Frank G.	047062	2dLt	0302	P1Ldr 81mm MortPlat; MbrProBd.	14Jul50	9Jul48
<u>"G" COMPANY:</u>						
BOHN, Robert D.	037498	1stLt	0302	CoComdr; MbrBnProBd.	14Jul50	7Feb49
WACHTER, John A.	047984	1stLt	0302	CoExecO	14Jul50	10Mar49
JAWORSKI, Edmund W.	049342	1stLt	0302	Mortar Sec Comdr.	14Jul50	27Jun50
COUNSELMAN, John D.	049744	2dLt	0302	RflPlatComdr.	14Jul50	2Sep49
DUNCAN, Edward F.	049622	2dLt	0302	RflPlatComdr.	14Jul50	15Jun49
WATT, Andrew T.	049932	2dLt	0302	Emer Lv	14Jul50	15Jul49
<u>"H" COMPANY:</u>						
WILDMAN, Patrick E.	024425	Capt	0302	CoComdr.	14Jul50	19Oct48
MIZE, Charles D.	038729	1stLt	0302	CoExecO.	14Jul50	28Jul49
diLORENZO, Lucius V.	049623	2dLt	0302	RflPlatComdr.	14Jul50	8Jul49
POST, Edward C.	049972	2dLt	0302	RflPlatComdr.	14Jul50	22Jul49
WILLIAMS, John O. Jr.	049775	2dLt	0302	RflPlat Comdr.	14Jul50	18Jul49
LENNON, Thomas P.	049774	2dLt	0302	MG Plat Comdr.	14Jul50	19Jun49
TAYLOR, Warren H.	049872	2dLt	0302	Mortar Sec Comdr.	14Jul50	4Aug49.

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION, 11TH MARINES (RELIEF)
1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE (RELIEF) FLEET MARINE FORCE
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

1 September 1950

S-T-A-T-I-O-N L-I-S-T

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SER NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEFT U.S.</u>	<u>DATE JOINED FIF</u>
<u>Headquarters Battery</u>						
WOOD, Ransom M.	05822	LtCol	0802	BnComdr.	14Jul50	6Jul50
SCELESINGER, Francis R.	08167	Major	0802	BnExecO.	14Jul50	13Jan49
VALENTE, Raymond L.	013248	Capt	0802	Bn S-2	14Jul50	6Jul50
PACIULLI, Orlo C. Jr	049634	2ndLt	0801	Asst Bn S-2	14Jul50	16Sep49
SLACK, LaRue C.	019231	CWO	2502	BnCommunicationO.	14Jul50	25Oct48
GALLAND, Robert M.	010673	Major	0802	BnLiaisonO.	14Jul50	20Sep48
PIERCE, Philip N.	013182	Capt	0802	Bn S-3	14Jul50	11Jul49
HENDRICKS, Clayton V.	047854	1stLt	0802	Asst Bn S-3	14Jul50	6Jul50
BRAYSHAY, James W.	026233	Capt	0302	BtryComdr.	14Jul50	5Jul49
DAVIS, Kenneth E.	045004	1stLt	0802	BnSurveyO.	14Jul50	6Jul50
BRAUN, Thomas R.	012237	1stLt	0407	TechAO.	14Jul50	6Jul50
MARKS, Billy C.	010913	2dLt	0801	TechAO.	14Jul50	1Jun49
BONADIES, Daniel (n)	245592	LTJG(DC)		BnDentalO.	14Jul50	13Dec48
TOMLIN, Edwin M.	242336	LTJG(MC)		BnMedicalO.	14Jul50	5Jul50
SPORRER, Otto E.	215778	LCdr(ChC)		BnChaplain	14Jul50	4Jun49
<u>Service Battery</u>						
QUELCH, Kenneth H.	019705	1stLt	0407	BtryComdr; Bn S-4	14Jul50	6Oct47
GOODALL, Jack W.	019759	CWO	0130	Bn S-1; BnAdj	14Jul50	24Jan49
PRICE, Paul H.	019303	CWO	0130	ABn Adj; BnPersClf&AssgtO.	14Jul50	15Jul49
HUMPHREY, Frederick M.	010053	1stLt	0802	BnAmmunitionO.	14Jul50	30Jun49
WARNER, William J. Jr	025313	CWO	3010	PlComdr; BnSupO.	14Jul50	20Jun50
SKAGGS, Harry A.	014988	1stLt	3510	BnMEMaintO.	14Jul50	15Aug49
FORTUNA, Stephen (n)	049276	WO	3501	Bn Ord&MaintO.	14Jul50	12May48

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STATION LIST (LISTEN, 11FEBMAR REINF CONT'D)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SER NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEFT U.S.</u>	<u>DATE JOINED</u> <u>FILE</u>
<u>Battery "A"</u>						
JORDAN, James D.	018891	Capt	0802	BtryCondr	14Jul50	6Aug49
KILGIAN, Robert R.	026663	2dLt	0302	MaintO	14Jul50	22Jan49
STEWART, Kenneth R.	016358	2dLt	0802	Forward Observer	14Jul50	6Jul50
RAGSDALE, Ivieo (n)	014550	2dLt	2110	Forward Observer	14Jul50	6Jul50
SNYDER, Joris J.	048875	1stLt	0801	LiaisonO.	14Jul50	25Feb49
WATERS, Calvin C.	012198	1stLt	0802	ExecO.	14Jul50	24Apr49
<u>Battery "B"</u>						
HOFSTETTER, Arnold C.	010016	Capt	0802	BtryCondr	14Jul50	20Jan47
CARLSON, Allen (n)	022580	CWO	0130	MaintO.	14Jul50	16Aug49
WIRTH, LeRoy K.	049877	2dLt	0801	Forward Observer	14Jul50	29Jul49
SISSON, Donald D.	049807	2dLt	0801	Forward Observer	14Jul50	9Jul49
RAIBER, Mark A.	039642	1stLt	0801	ExecO.	14Jul50	15May49
<u>Battery "C"</u>						
NICHOLS, William J. Jr	028486	Capt	0802	BtryCondr	14Jul50	25Apr49
MYERS, Marvin G.	039932	WO	0810	MaintO.	14Jul50	11Feb50
BOOKER, Dorsie H. Jr	047794	1stLt	0301	Forward Observer	14Jul50	1Jun49
FLY, Jerry D.	049948	2dLt	0801	Forward Observer	14Jul50	6Sep49
PHELPS, Laurence M. Jr	049699	2dLt	0801	Forward Observer	14Jul50	3Jul49
AMMER, Henry G.	046055	1stLt	0802	LiaisonO.	14Jul50	9Jul48
POWELL, Gilbert N.	015926	Capt	0802	ExecO.	19Aug50	20Aug50

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Company "A"
 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
 Fleet Marine Force
 c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

1 September 1950

STATION LIST

<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>LEFT US</u>	<u>DATE JOINED FMF</u>
TREADWELL, James P.	012672	Major	1802	CO; add du BrigPhib0	12Jul50	29Jan50
IRICK, Joseph N.	023984	Captain	1803	CoExec0; add du Security ClassControl0; Comm0	12Jul50	25Aug49
THOMPSON, Roger B.	028556	Captain	1803	PlatLdr, 1stPlt; add du SSO	12Jul50	23Oct48
CARPENTER, Stanley H.	048955	1stLt	1803	PlatLdr, 2dPlat; add du PrevMed0; Emb0	12Jul50	8Nov49
MACHIN, James E.	048124	1stLt	1803	PlatLdr, 4thPlat; add du FireSecurity0	12Jul50	5May49
STRAULEY, Wesley E.	014588	2dLt	1803	PlatLdr, 3rdPlat; add du RadSafe0	12Jul50	9Sep48
VAMOSI, Joseph S.	033253	2dLt	0130	Adj; add du S-1; SavBond O; Postal0; AccInv0; CustodianClassDocuments	12Jul50	29Oct48
MERWIN, Herbert L.	012340	CWO	3010	Supply Officer	12Jul50	29Oct48
SOBOL, Harold	028622	CWO	1870	Maint0; add du Salvage0 Ord0	12Jul50	10Jul48

1st Platoon,
 1st Amphibian Truck Company,
 Fleet Marine Force,
 c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

CONDRA, James E.	045737	1stLt	1803	PlatComdr; AmTrkPlt; add du CoMTO; PlatEmb0	12Jul50	10Jun48
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1stProvMarBrig (Reinf), FMF
 KYURI-GYO, KOREA
 030800 September

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

NUMBER.....20-50)

Maps: KOREA, 1:50,000

1. SUPPLY

a. No change.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. No change.

3. TRANSPORTATION

a. No change.

4. SERVICE

a. No change.

5. PERSONNEL

a. Troop strengths and locations

(1) Units submit unit reports as of 1800 daily to the Brig Adjutant by 2000. Form as outlined in Staff Manual 1948. (page 7-97) will be utilized.

(2) Paragraph (3,a) of unit reports (Troop strengths and locations) will indicate strengths - authorized, initial, effective, casualties as to type, gains and losses. In the even units are unable to submit unit reports in writing by 2000, they will submit personnel casualty and strength figures by telephone or other expeditious means of communication by 1900.

b. Replacements

(1) Replacements will be requested by this Headquarters from FMF, Pac.

(2) OO, Brigade Rear Echelon is responsible for searching, quartering, and messing at PUSAN.

c. Law and Order

(1) Stragglers

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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER 20-50 (CONT'D)

(a) Straggler collecting points will be announced by this Headquarters.

(b) Brigade Provost Marshall will effect return to parent organization or detention of stragglers as required.

(c) Report of stragglers as required by Brigade GenO No. 3 will be submitted.

(2) Discipline

(a) Personnel recommended for trial by General Court Martial will be transferred to H&S Co, 1stProvMarBrig.

(3) Records and Reports

(a) Units reviewing Summary Court Martial records as the Immediate Superior in Command will forward same to this headquarters for information. Records will be returned to submitting unit for further normal processing.

d. Prisoners of War

(1) Prisoner of War enclosures will be established by this headquarters.

(2) PW collecting points will be established by capturing units.

(3) PWs will be evacuated from collecting point to PW enclosure by the Brigade MP Platoon for interrogation by G-2.

(4) Interrogation.

(a) See Annex DAKER to OpPlan 3-50.

e. Burials and Graves registration

(1) The Brigade Morgue will be established by this headquarters.

(2) Units will evacuate bodies to Brigade Morgue.

(3) Personal effects will be handled in accordance with Brigade Memo No. 5-50.

(4) The Graves Registration Officer will submit a Report of Burial to this headquarters.

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Appendix 7 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER 20-50. (CONT'D)

f. Morale

(1) Mail

(a) Addressing

1. All Marine Corps and attached Navy units will use unit designation, in care of the FPO, San Francisco, California.

(b) Franking privileges

1. Units in the combat zone (KOREA) have been provided free mailing privileges for first class letter mail matter not to exceed one ounce. Such mail may be designated air mail by the sender.

(c) Distribution and collection

1. Mail will be distributed by the Brigade Post Office to units of the Brigade.

2. Collection of outgoing mail will be made by units for delivery to Brigade Post Office, Forward Echelon mail clerk.

(2) Awards

(a) Recommendations for awards and decorations will be forwarded to this Headquarters as expeditiously as possible. Units will comply with the provision of Brigade SOP 1-1 and paragraph 20005, MCM.

(3) Payment of troops

(a) Payment of troops will be made at appropriate times as announced by this Headquarters.

(b) Requests for emergency payments will be made by units through unit rear echelon to the Brigade Disbursing Officer.

(4) News dissemination

(a) Commanding officers will ascertain that troops are kept informed of the enemy and friendly situation, the progress of the Brigade and General plans and objectives insofar as security permits.

(5) Post Exchanges

(a) Brigade Memo No. 9-50.

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Appendix 7 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER 20-50. (CONT'D)
-----g. Civil Affairs

(1) Units will have all civilians encountered in forward areas assembled, placed under guard, and delivered to the vicinity of the Brigade CP. Attached CIC teams will screen all civilians and release them to South Korean Police authorities or retain them as appropriate.

h. Personnel Procedures and Adjustments

(1) Personnel evacuated from combat areas will be transferred by service records to 1st Provisional Casual Company, FMF, c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

i. Personnel Estimates and Plans(1) Quartering and Billotting:

(a) Billotting and assembly areas will be assigned by this Headquarters.

(b) Quartering parties will be assembled and will proceed to the designated assembly areas in convoy as directed by this headquarters.

j. Civilian Employees(1) Procurement

(a) Civilian employees will be obtained from local U. S. Army sources, as arranged by Brigade Labor Officer.

(2) Utilization

(a) Payment of civilian employees will be administered by the Brigade Labor Officer.

k. Personnel Records and Reports

(1) Units submit unit reports as outlined in subparagraph 5(a)(1).

(2) Reports as listed in Brigade GenO No. 3 will be submitted. (Negative reports not required).

(3) Graves Registration Officer will submit Report of Burials as appropriate.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. The above orders regarding personnel are to be considered SOP for all future brigade operations. Future Administrative Orders will not repeat the above material, but will indicate "no change" or show changes as necessary.

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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER 20-50 (CONT'D)

b. CO, Shore Party organize and command an improvised infantry company as Brigade reserve on order.

c. Report composition. Upon approval notify units concerned and prepare for employment.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAIG:

E. W. SNEDEKER
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

CO 5th Marines (5)	C/S	CG EUSAK (Courier)
CO, 1st Bn, 11th Marines	G-1	CG PUSAN Log Comd (Courier)
CO Co "A" SP Bn	G-2	CG 24thInfDiv (Courier)
CO Co "A" Tank Bn	G-3	CG 2dInfDiv (Courier)
CO Co "A" Engr Bn	G-4	CG 1stMarDiv (Air Mail)
CO Co "A" MT Bn	Adj (5)	CG FMEPac (Air Mail)
CO Co "C" Med Bn	EngrO	
CO Det Ord Bn	SPO	
CO Det Serv Bn	Surgeon	
CO Rcn Plat	OrdO	
CO MP Plat	SupO	
CO H&S Bn	MTO	
CO Rear Ech MIRYANG	SigO	
CO Rear Ech PUSAN	AirO	
CO VMO-6		
CO MTACS-2		

C-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:

A. A. CHIDESTER
LtCol, USMC
ACofS, G-4

5

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Appendix 7 to Annex ABLE to 1st Prov Marine Brig Special Action Report

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BATTLE
CASUALTY RECAPITULATION

KILLED IN ACTION:	149
DIED OF WOUNDS:	14
MISSING IN ACTION:	9
DIED OF DISEASE:	1
WOUNDED IN ACTION:	<u>730</u>
TOTAL:	903

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

KILLED IN ACTION

7 August 1950

✓ BAENEN, Paul G.	Pfc	669310
✓ BRICKERHOFF, Derick F.	Cpl	1088122
✓ BROOKS, Melvin D.	Pfc	1072744
✓ JOHNSON, John L.	Pfc	1053192
✓ MURPHY Robert E.	Pfc	1073033
✓ PORTER, William R.	Pfc	1090980
✓ POST, Jack L.	Pfc	596512
✓ TOLE William R.	Pfc	1071553
✓ YERCICH, Michael	Pfc	1050254

8 August 1950

✓ ALBERT, John S.	Pfc	665823
✓ BATLUCK, Joseph J.	Cpl	1082444
✓ BROCATO, Sam Jr.	Pfc	1118409
✓ BURNS, Chadwick O.	Pfc	1087728
✓ CHAPMAN, George L.	Sgt	573376
✓ DAVIS, James C.	SSgt	276400
✓ DOUGHERTY, Paul	Pfc	1090332
✓ FINE, Darrell E.	Pfc	1095677
✓ HECKMAN, Charles W.	Pfc	664760
✓ KAUFMAN, Edward K.	Pfc	666408
✓ KELLER, Ronald L.	Cpl	611490
✓ MC GARRELL, Billie J.	Pvt	1123265
✓ OAKLEY, Arthur A.	2dLt	049768
✓ PUTZEK, Herbert	Pfc	1074729
✓ REID, Wallace J.	2dLt	049929
✓ SMITH, James E., Jr.	HM3	752 55 27
✓ THOMAS, Gerald	Cpl	412648
✓ TURNER, Roy D.	HM3	632 15 58
✓ WHITE, Donald C.	Cpl	632782
✓ WURTSBAUGH, Robert E.	Pfc	1082606

10 August 1950

✓ BURKE, Raymond B.	Pfc	665723
✓ SHAMMO, John A.	Cpl	1082259

11 August 1950

✓ ANDERSON, William H.	HN	568 69 75
✓ MARQUEZ, John Jr.	HM3	361 10 14

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

KILLED IN ACTION

12 August 1950

✓ HAWLEY, Richard E.	Cpl	657120
✓ MUNTZ, Edward A.	Pfc	665859
✓ SHEPPARD, James R.	Sgt	628138

13 August 1950

✓ BERKLEY, Patrick J.	Pfc	632789
✓ BOHNKE, Herman C., Jr	Pfc	667226
✓ BUDD, Malcolm L.	Sgt	655158
✓ FORTENBERRY, Roger D.	Pfc	665751
✓ GARCIA, Freddie	Pfc	1079011
✓ GAUDET, Gilbert R.	Pfc	659245
✓ MC COY, Charles A.	Sgt	335858
✓ OSTERGARD, Joseph B.	Pfc	669899
✓ PARRISH, Arkie B.	Pfc	649113
✓ PRITCHARD, Milford H.	Pfc	663408
✓ REMINE, Joseph W.	Cpl	638370
✓ ROBLES, Charles L.	Pfc	611677
✓ RODRIGUEZ Jose R.	Pfc	669874
✓ UPSHAW, Huey E.	Pfc	670776

17 August 1950

✓ BABBICK John L., Jr	HM3	790 80 26
✓ CASAS, Gilberto	Cpl	659863
✓ CLARK, John T., Jr	Pfc	1087518
✓ EADS, Ernest L.	Cpl	1070862
✓ GALLANT, Morris L.	Pfc	1072402
✓ GERHARDT, James W.	Pfc	1095100
✓ GILLISPIE, LeRoy	Pfc	666183
✓ HICKS, John D.	Pfc	1089485
✓ HRIC, George J.	Pfc	1079570
✓ HUNTER, Herbert F.	Pfc	669346
✓ KRANZIER, Marrlyn D.	Pfc	669363
✓ LENZ, Philip I.	Pfc	1113444
✓ MACIOROWSKI, Walter A.	TSgt	271342
✓ MASTERS, Laurence E.	Pfc	1084931
✓ MORRIS, George	Pfc	666768
✓ OSBORN, Charles R.	Pfc	1103159
✓ SPENCER, Albert W.	Pfc	1073153
✓ TAYLOR, David S.	1stLt	048493 (DOW)
✓ TUTTLE, Raymond L.	Pfc	1091349
✓ VAN NORT, Lester H.	Pfc	1074465
✓ YOUNT, Amadore Jr.	Pfc	1084805
✓ LE BLANC Henry T. D.	Pfc	1045274
✓ SKAGGS, Glen W.	Pfc	1091320

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Appendix B To Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

KILLED IN ACTION

18 August 1950

✓ AVERY, Charles R.	Cpl	668124
✓ ASTLEY, Charles A.	Pfc	589438
✓ BERRY, Dennis J.	Pfc	1090604
✓ BLAIR, Paul L.	Pfc	1123262
✓ BRUCE, Jewell C.	Cpl	669078
✓ BUXTON, James E.	Pfc	1095660
✓ CALDWELL, Berlin Jr.	TSgt	283712
✓ CROUCH, Jack O.	Pfc	1115732
✓ CULLIGAN, Joseph C., Jr.	Pfc	1078755
✓ DARCHUCK, Edward D.	Pfc	657179
✓ DE LEON, Ernest A.	Pfc	659600
✓ EADS, Creed L.	SSgt	418447
✓ EDWARDS, Donlad E.	Pfc	1103227
✓ EDWARDS, Thomas A.	Cpl	655000
✓ FAVA, Thomas C.	Cpl	1071429
✓ FLOOD, Richard A.	Pfc	651193
✓ HANSLER, Robert E.	Pfc	665615
✓ HILE, Clarence F., Jr.	Cpl	654516
✓ HILL, Robert L.	Sgt	1082362
✓ HORNE, Raymond L.	Pfc	662116
✓ JOHNSON, Thomas H.	2dLt	049718
✓ KAZMIERCZAK, Arthur R.	Sgt	346574
✓ LEVINE, Albert D.	Cpl	1056837
✓ MC DONOUGH, Howard A.	Cpl	659315
✓ MEDUNIC, Peter	Pfc	1093070
✓ MILLIGAN, Kenneth J.	Pfc	1118440
✓ MOSS, Joseph D.	Pfc	1088743
✓ REYNOLDS, Arthur R.	Pfc	1035082
✓ RUSSELL, David E.	Pfc	659247
✓ SALAZAR, John M.	Pfc	666357
✓ SMITH, Robert B.	Pfc	1091525
✓ TWEDT, Harold A.	Pfc	1113560
✓ WOOD, Donald C.	Cpl	623591
✓ CARLTON, Henry F.	Pfc	1088911
✓ MC CARVER, William L.	Cpl	1078995

19 August 1950

✓ MERCHANT, Stanley B.	Pfc	1073184
✓ ROBINSON, Robert E., Jr.	Cpl	670769

3 September 1950

✓ BRACE, Calvin H.	Cpl	582970
✓ BILLINGS, Frank B.	Pfc	1074062
✓ CAVENDER, John L.	Pfc	1123107
✓ COLT, Charles R.	Pfc	1074973
✓ CARSON, John S.	2dLt	046408
✓ CANCEL, Johnathan J.	Pfc	1088970

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

KILLED IN ACTION

3 September 1950

✓ DAGENAIS, Norman S.	Cpl	661052
✓ FARE, Kenneth W.	Cpl	655990
✓ FLOREY, Daniel	Pfc	611660
✓ FERGUSON, Theodore G.	Pfc	668043
✓ HOBBS, Jack O.	Cpl	638432
✓ HALTER, "P" "B"	Pfc	1099474
✓ KENNEDY, Carl R., Jr.	SSgt	263548
✓ KENNEDY, Richard M.	Pfc	1103283
✓ KING, Keith D.	Pfc	666554
✓ MALACARA, Victor	Cpl	603407
✓ MC GRAW, Lloyd J.	Pfc	1079196
✓ MOORE, William R.	Sgt	328482
✓ PLACE, Duane C.	Pfc	1114121
✓ PACHUCA, Gonzalo T.	Pvt	665727
✓ PEREZ, Jesus J.	Pfc	1118208
✓ PHILLIPS, Charles J.	Pfc	659190
✓ REYNOLDS, Charles J., Jr.	Pfc	1079582
✓ REAVES, Ralph E.	Pfc	1104674
✓ BELLE, Jack H.	Pfc	665089
✓ SPITZ, Clarence E.	Cpl	426773
✓ SCHMIDT, Orie J. C.	Pfc	657198
✓ SIMPSON, Benjamin C.	Pfc	1118407
✓ SPRINGSTEEN, Myron H. P.	Pfc	644088
✓ SHUTE, Raymond J.	Pfc	1097995
✓ SKELLY, John T.	HM3	227 53 04
✓ WELLER, Frank P.	Cpl	1079060
✓ WORLEY, Ronald	Pfc	1093445
✓ WARREN, Courtney V.	Pfc	1086070

4 September 1950

✓ BURKE, John E.	Pfc	1057584
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5 September 1950

✓ ARAGON, James Jr.	Cpl	611764
✓ BROCKER, George A.	Pfc	662181
✓ DE FORGE, George A.	Sgt	539227
✓ HOEY, Weston W.	Cpl	1083503

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

DIED OF DISEASE

31 August 1950

THOMAS, James O.

Pfc

1072503

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Appendix 8 to Annex ARLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

DIED OF WOUNDS

4 August 1950

COZZALIO, Robert J. Pfc 605887

Taylor, David S. 1st Lt.

5 August 1950

CARLSON, Robert E. Pfc 1082416

7 August 1950

BLACKMON, Thomas W., Jr. Sgt 1053191
PITTILO, Patrick D. Pfc 1074736

13 August 1950

ARCHER, David M. Sgt 558191
SLIDER, Delbert C. Pfc 1074736

16 August 1950

MC NEELY, Morgan B. Maj 08153

17 August 1950

BOSWELL, George L. Pfc 1073297

18 August 1950

DE SGISCILO, Anthony J. Sgt 1025835
LEWRY, Richard M. Pfc 1074740

19 August 1950

BRADSHAW, Robert H. Pfc 1072803

21 August 1950

MACKISON, Robert J. Pfc 593387

23 August 1950

JACKSON, Howard L. Pfc 1083792

6 September 1950

ZWARKA, Lewis W. Sgt 253626

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

MISSING IN ACTION

13 August 1950

CARRIZALES, Alfredo	Pfc	659869
GARCIA, Richard D.	Cpl	1083753
LAWSON, Eugene L.	SSgt	291960
MELDRUM, Spencer C.	Pfc	632777
POARE, Bobby R.	Pfc	1117257
SCHICK, Gerald A.	Pfc	1102491
STAVALLY, Bernard U.	Pfc	667574
WILCOX, Lawrence A.	Pfc	1102577

18 August 1950

SALINAS, Alejandro E.	Cpl	650362
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17 Aug
 1 Dow
 183 WIA
 23 KIA

 209

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1st ProvMar Brig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

4 August 1950

FARMER, William O.	Sgt	884027
SMITH, Glenn H.	Sgt	1083255

6 August 1950

EMETERIO, Peter	Pfc	316507
GITS, Vincent R.	MSgt	261648
PRODOUZ, Raymond	Pfc	1090591

7 August 1950

ACTON, Billy D.	Pfc	1095572
BALLAD, William R.	Cpl	654261
BEASLEY, Jimmie C.	HN	351 51 71
BLETHEN, Lynn C.	HM3	302 42 21
BRINCH, Frederick S.	PFC	1071602
BUETTNER, Lee K.	Sgt	548966
COATES, Phillip Jr.	Pfc	1096175
DE CELLIS, George	SSgt	237538
DECKER, Maurice E., Jr.	Pfc	1088265
DIAL, Everett D.	Cpl	587591
DORMAN, Grover D.	Cpl	1070059
EGGIMAN, Robert R.	Cpl	1071773
ERB, John W.	SSgt	277565
HITCHBORN, Charles D.	Pfc	1082196
HOKEL, Carl J.	Pfc	643494
IBERRA, Luis J.	Pfc	1093655
JOHNSON, Reiffil L.	Cpl	528631
JONES, Arnold E.	Pfc	669077
JUDISH, John D.	Pfc	666472
KAUFMAN, Joseph C. G.	MSgt	255710
KING, William P.	Sgt	366763
KINNARD, George L.	Pfc	1065105
KITTREDGE, George E., Jr.	Capt	015575
LYNN, George L., Jr.	Cpl	667086
MARSH, Robert E., Jr.	Cpl	664942
NEW, David D.	Pfc	665764
PILLANTI, Ross A.	Pfc	1050756
MOORE, Hurbert L.	Sgt	537699
MURRAY, Bill	Pfc	1000159
NELSON, Andrew	HM3	798 63 49
NIEMCZYK, Lee C.	Cpl	1088736
ONTIVEROS, Jose	Pfc	1096939
PHILLIPS, Hilliard L.	Pfc	1092408
PLENZICK, Leo P., Jr.	Pfc	1082360
POPLAWSKI, Richard J.	Pfc	1074292
PRICE, Lloyd V.	MSgt	236728
PRUTZMAN, Thomas D.	Sgt	647163

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Appendix 5 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report

WOUNDED IN ACTION

7 August 1950 (Con't)

ROBINSON, Robert B., Jr	SSgt	876421
SMITH, Irving H.	MSGT	198383
SOLAK, Kenneth	Pfc	1093132
TANT, Thelbert M.	Sgt	933182
TURLEY, Robert E.	Pfc	1114319
WHITE, Frederick L.	SSgt	390317
WILLIAMS, Roger	Cpl	662386
WILSON, Aubrey D.	Pfc	1087912
WILSON, Russel C.	Pfc	667303
WYMAN, Robert S.	Cpl	649536
* WYRICK, Burt G.	Pfc	1093389

8 August 1950

AMES, Robert L.	Pvt	1078985
AGAMINE, Frank J.	Pfc	668845
BALDYSKY, Joseph J.	Cpl	1082382
BARRETT, Edward F.	Sgt	1088161
BELL, Douglas L.	Sgt	558184
BUSHNELL, William H.	Pfc	1073945
BUTLER, Albert R.	Pfc	1095774
CANNISSARIO, Domenick B.	Pfc	1088971
CATHERMAN, Bruce W., Jr.	Sgt	1083152
DOMBROSKI, Bernard A.	Pfc	1095105
D'ONOFRIO, Carmine	Cpl	1074296
DOYLE, Ora D.	Pfc	1084654
EMMELMAN, Edward T.	2dLt	049954
ESTELL, Robert A.	Pfc	1079468
FALLON, Hurklyn H.	Sgt	900465
FISH, Charles H.	Pfc	666826
FREDERICK, William J.	Pfc	1083583
HALCOMB, Yance N.	Cpl	1080312
HARFE, Robert N.	Pfc	1074250
HARRPENCE, George D.	Pfc	1082379
HAUSMAN, John M.	Pfc	1117287
HARTSTEIN, Frederick C.	Cpl	1083236
HOLTQUIST, Norbert G.	HN	582 09 42
FINN, John Jr.	Capt	022733
FRATZ, Albert K.	Cpl	1089505
GRINES, Jessie	Pfc	611728
JORDAN, Ralph C., Jr.	Pfc	1083166
KELLER, Keith B.	Pfc	1073220
KEETON, Kenard G.	Pfc	1086972
LITTLE, Leon R., Jr	Cpl	1071540
MARKS, George E.	Sgt	626707
MC NALLY, Lawrence E.	Pfc	670447
MEYER, Robert K.	Pfc	1088507
MERKEL, Joseph Y.	Cpl	588815
MITCHELL, Benjamin C.	Pfc	1072391
MC NAMARA, Ralph G.	Cpl	1072217

* See Enclosure one of Appendix 8 to ANNEX Able
 Appendix 8 to ANNEX ABLE to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

10 August 1950 (Con't)

BANDUCCI, William R.	Pfc	1091396
BARAN, John	Cpl	590211
BASS, Wayne A.	Pfc	1059164
BENES, Alfred J.	Pfc	1118410
BLOMGREN, Donald M.	1stLt	048431
BOLTON, Richard W.	Pfc	1103216
FANNERELLA, Michael	Pfc	667481
GROTH, Cernell D.	Pfc	669264
HANSEN, Dean B.	2dLt	049626
HERRINGTON, John C.	Sgt	590463
JAMESON, Robert D.	Sgt	548051
KEMPER, Donald F.	Pfc	632174
LIBBY, Leonard L.	SSgt	286370
MAYO, George T.	Pfc	1086855
MC KEAN, Kenneth R.	Pfc	1086666
MC NEELEY, Morgan B.	Maj	08153
OLDS, Dwain S.	Pfc	1117180
ORLOWSKI, Richard	Cpl	1071830
REEVES, Harold	MSgt	210302
SHAWN, Donald E.	Pfc	643796
STEWART, Kenneth W.	Pfc	661264
WARREN, Clarence	Pfc	1096758
WARTA, Kenneth F.	Pfc	1078531

11 August 1950

BOHN, Robert D.	1stLt	037498
BRAMBLE, Homer S.	Cpl	1083719
CAMERON, Richard C.	Pfc	1115758
DOANE, Herbert B.	Pfc	1082032
HASTINGS, Donald D.	Cpl	670370
HUNTER, Walter R.	Pfc	666483
KENNY, Robert M.	Pfc	1071535
LEEKE, Billy J.	HN	253 26 11
MC GRAW, Ronald G.	Pfc	660821
MERKLE, Frank N.	Pfc	1086864
RAPONI, Frank J.	Pfc	555397
SALIMENO, Pasquale E.	Cpl	1074260
SAMPSON, Albert R.	Pfc	1072369
SCRIBNER, Charles L.	HM3	954 55 03
SMITH, Horace U.	Sgt	271833
SOWELL, Donald D., Jr.	Cpl	1079103
STEPHENS, Homer K.	Sgt	340975
SULLIVAN, Ralph E.	2dLt	049891
THOMPSON, Howard G.	Pfc	1114602
TROUTON, Richard L.	Pfc	1079436
WESTERMAN, Jack N.	1stLt	049516
ZUPANOVICH, Steve J.	Sgt	1086734

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

12 August 1950

ARCHER, David M.	Sgt	558191
BACHOVICH, Robert G.	Pfc	1091435
BAILEY, Lemuel A.	Sgt	321812
BRISTOL, David D.	Pfc	1089612
BUCHMAN, Phillip L.	HM3	227 52 77
CALLAN, William P.	Cpl	652282
COLBECK, Walter J.	HN	954 78 67
COOPER, Robert H.	Pfc	659222
COWLING, David R.	2dLt	049804
DAVIS, William R.	Pfc	1114317
DE FAZIO, Ernest L.	TSgt	284645
FUNK, Carl R.	Cpl	570647
HALL, Edward O., Jr.	2dLt	049867
HOLT, Cleburn L.	Cpl	1073166
KENDRICH, David A., Jr.	Sgt	340606
LESTER, George S.	Pfc	1089586
LEWIS, Carson R., Jr.	Pfc	1079097
LEWIS, John S.	Pfc	1099938
MC GRATH, Francis N.	Pfc	1073943
MARTIN, Charles O.	SSgt	851917
MELETTA, Arthur Jr.	Cpl	665038
MORWOOD, Richard B.	Pfc	669366
OLSSON, Victor L.	Sgt	595373
PAGE, Billy J.	Pfc	1082927
REED, James A.	Pfc	665515
SCHMIDT, Charles M.	SSgt	295070
SCHULTZ, Jerry A.	Cpl	588226
SMITH, Charles R.	Pfc	670653
STRADER, Richard H.	Cpl	1079053
TOBIAS, Frank E.	Cpl	1088922
MAGGONER, Roy L.	Sgt	341106
YOUNG, William J., Jr.	Pfc	1116354
MWALT, Boyd R., Jr.	Sgt	643659
BOYA, Earnest P.	Pfc	666442

See Enclosure one to Appendix 8 to ANNEX Able

13 August 1950

BELL, Delbert R.	Pfc	1102413
BUMPUS, Sanford J.	Pfc	637935
CALDERON, Edmondo S.	Pfc	611789
COLLIER, Kenneth D.	Cpl	559691
FEAR, Herbert H.	Pfc	627664
HOOPER, Gerald D.	Pfc	1082191
JARNIGAN, James M.	Pfc	1123375
LA ROCCO, Anthony R.	Pfc	1123229
LEDBETTER, Frank O., Jr.	Pfc	1079717

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

15 August 1950 (Con't)

MELING, Clifford L.	Pfc	1088557
MC KAY, Dwight W.	Sgt	662633
SHERMAN, Donald	Pfc	1091080
SIX, Eberette G.	SSgt	303300
STEWART, Charles H., Jr.	Pfc	663597
STEWART, William D.	Pfc	664087
TRICKLE, Joseph G.	Pfc	1088386
WEST, Ray L.	Pfc	669886

17 August 1950

AKMAN, William T.	Cpl	669656
AIKINS, Lyman K.	Sgt	930047
ALLEN, Warren D.	MUS	211 51 50
ALLEN, Ralph G., Jr	Sgt	422268
ANDERSON, Adnan	Cpl	632439
ARKADIS, Nicholas D.	2dLt	049915
BANDERA, Valentine	Pfc	1095098
BARBERIS, Edward J.	Pfc	1103278
BOORAS, Ted L.	SSgt	260712
BIVINS, Earnest S.	Pfc	1087745
HERRY, Charles W.	Pfc	1074833
BEESON, Harry H.	Cpl	345490
BECK, Robert G.	Pfc	1082894
BLOCKER, Floyd J.	Cpl	1082123
BORCOMAINENO, Russel J.	SSgt	308408
BOUTWELL, Johnnie G.	Pfc	1084668
BOYD, William P.	Pfc	1089019
BOZELL, Jerry L.	Pfc	458540
BRATEN, Richard D.	Cpl	1073142
BRANSON, James M.	Sgt	326029
BRESTER, Melvin	Pfc	1073209
BREWER, Ralph M.	Pfc	668556
BROWN, Horrell E.	Pfc	611758
BROWN, Roy T.	SSgt	204649
BUTLER, Charles E., Jr.	Pfc	669089
CABELLO, O	Pfc	959056
CARR, Ira T.	1stLt	048824
CEMIGEROS, Henry	Pfc	1079025
CHRISTIANSEN, Charles A.	2dLt	049741
CLEM, George A.	Pfc	1087824
COLEMAN, Donald L.	Pfc	627179
COSS, William D., Jr.	Pfc	1090795
COTA, Johnny	Sgt	840250
CRAWFORD, Aubert R.	Pfc	1079044
CUTLIP, Donald A.	Pfc	665529
DANIEL, Ray T.	Pfc	1083342
DAVILA, Jose L.	Pfc	666269

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Appendix 8 to Annex AHE to 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

17 August 1950 (Con't)

DE MELLO, Joseph Jr.,	Pfc	1090401
DENNIS, James M.	Sgt	665779
DENNIS, William G.	Pfc	1095220
DESCISCILO, Anthony J.	Sgt	1026835
DE WITT, Robert E.	Cpl	1079466
DIAZ, Alex	Cpl	596578
DICKERSON, Sidney S.	TSgt	254740
DORFIELD, William R.	Pfc	1071667
ELLIS, Dale W.	Cpl	1079428
ELLSWORTH, Perc W.	Pfc	667508
ERB, John W.	SSgt	277565
FARMAN, Eugene V.	Cpl	669679
FORSYTHE, Clarence H.	Sgt	629087
FRANKLIN, Billy R.	Pfc	1083409
FRENCHMAN, Jimmie E.	Pfc	1088028
JAMBOA, Eduardo V.	Pfc	661009
MARCIA, Ernest A.	Pfc	517195
GARCIA, Martin	Pfc	1006963
GAUGHT, Jacob H., Jr.	Pfc	670823
GLASER, Ronald R.	Cpl	646482
GREEN, Alford L.	HM3	372 91 51
GRUBER, Charles R.	Pfc	667196
BROWN, Richard E.	Cpl	1078973
DE PIETRO, Alphonse F.	Pfc	1090504
HALDERMAN, Harley J.	Pfc	1073089
CORNELIUS, John J.	Pfc	1093408
DUNKIRE, Ray C.	Cpl	656255
HARDIMAN, Calvin J.	Pfc	324827
HARPER, Guy M.	Sgt	500719
HARVEY, Daniel A.	Pfc	661467
HATTON, William G.	Pfc	669790
HEADLEY, Ernest D.	Cpl	981029
HEARON, Kenneth R.	Pfc	1061829
HEIMER, Edward J.	Pfc	1113449
HENNIGAN, Burnell D.	Sgt	1086801
HITZ, James C.	Cpl	1072627
HRUZ, Stephen J.	Pfc	1090286
JILLIES, Robert F.	Pfc	669369
JACKSON, Howard L.	Pfc	1083792
JALUFHA, Leonard D.	Pfc	1069926
JARRELL, Horace E.	Pfc	1091361
JENKINS, Jerry J.	Pfc	1118241
JEWETT, Jene R.	Pfc	649402
JONES, William G.	Cpl	633843
JORDAN, Alfred R.	Pfc	1088949
ELLY, James F.	Pfc	638446
KELLY, Richard L.	Pfc	1078903
KEELER, Gilmer F.	Cpl	669240

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Appendix B to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

17 August 1950 (Con't)

KEMP, Van P.	Pfc	668187
KENNISON, Edwin C.	Pfc	1103166
KINSHELLA, Marvin L.	Pfc	1099362
KNIGHT, Carl A.	Pfc	664746
KOEHLER, Phillip Jr.	Cpl	1079377
KONG, Robert G.	Pfc	1095624
KOZLOWSKI, Jacob B., Jr.	Pfc	1071514
LANE, Vernon H.	Pfc	622373
LANG, William J.	Sgt	276430
LARKIN, James E.	Pvt	599936
LAWRENCE, Gilbert L.	Pfc	1123105
LAWSON, Frank J.	TSgt	275630
LEEKE, Billy J.	HN	253 26 11
LEHRTER, William C.	Pfc	655804
LENZ, Robert L.	Pfc	1091314
LEON, Antonio M.	Cpl	623754
LOPEZ, Carlos	Pfc	1120469
LUBOLD, Herbert H.	Cpl	1082367
LUSTER, Herbert R.	Pfc	670784
MACHISON, Robert J.	Pfc	593587
MAC LAREN, Thomas E.	Pfc	1092748
MALONE, Millard C.	Pfc	1100279
MARTAIN, John L.	Pfc	1103268
MATEO, Lenerd M.	Pfc	1091533
MAYBERRY, Vandal J.	Pfc	668259
MAZOTTI, Louis J.	Pvt	666359
MC CLOSKEY, Donald V.	2dLt	049711
MC CUSKEY, Wayne H.	Sgt	522782
MEYER, Lewis K.	Pfc	1037882
MILLER, Raymond V.	Pfc	1082188
MILLS, Robert H.	Pfc	661248
MITCHELL, "V" "D"	Sgt	955103
MONFORTE, Joseph J.	Pfc	669535
MUNDT, William F.	Cpl	667071
NANCE, Elmo C.	Sgt	402884
NORTON, Donald J.	Pfc	1117177
NICHOLS, "A" "J"	Pfc	1115759
OGAN, Billy J.	Pfc	964005
OLSON, Vernon L.	Pfc	666602
O'ROURKE, Edward F., Jr.	Pfc	1024051
OSTERBERG, Neil R.	Cpl	566597
PACHECO, Albert E.	Pfc	1056200
PAPAS, George L.	Cpl	573075
PAULSON, Richard H.	Pfc	1074209
PARKER, Ray K.	Pfc	660040
PENNINGTON, William D.	Pvt	1093314
POWERS, Donald E.	Pfc	490276
PRESLEY, Donald R.	Pfc	667046

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

17 August 1950 (Con't)

PRINCE, Ronald	Pfc	603270
RAMIREZ, Vincente R.	Pfc	1083735
RAY, Andrew M.	Sgt	534153
RAY, James L.	Pfc	666565
REED, George D.	Pfc	1080825
REESE, Richard A.	Sgt	506517
RIORDAN, Harold L.	Pfc	1071521
ROCHE, Charles P.	Pfc	665217
SANDERS, Robert W., Jr.	Pfc	666410
SCHAEDEL, Treadwell R.	Pfc	1062410
SCOTT, James R.	Sgt	995511
SEBILIAN, Robert C.	1stLt	049292
SHADLE, Robert L.	Pfc	1090781
SHEHAN, John J., Jr.	Pfc	1073751
SHINKA, Michael J.	2dLt	049786
SILVERMAN, Robert H.	Pfc	1071448
SLY, Calvin	Pfc	395044
SMITH, Jack W.	Pfc	667172
SMITH, Lester W.	SSgt	292720
STEEVES, Karl J.	Cpl	651959
STEIGER, John H.	Pfc	1082348
STEVENS, William E.	Cpl	656329
STRAND, Robert W.	Pfc	644779
STREETMAN, Ray L.	Pfc	667796
TAFOLIA, Ralph A.	Pfc	1083736
TATE, Harvey	Pfc	1083808
TAYLOR, Troy W., Jr.	Pfc	669896
TESSMER, August Jr.	SSgt	997975
TESTER, Robert C.	Pfc	669228
TOBIN, John L.	Capt	011073
TROUGHTON, Herbert E.	Cpl	579255
TRYON, Richard W.	Pfc	1073950
TURNER, Alfred R.	Pfc	660360
TURNER, Herbert R.	Pfc	537378
UNDERWOOD, Harry W.	Pfc	1080030
WALSH, Leonard T.	Cpl	660698
WALTON, Robert	Sgt	652334
WAMPLER, Elton R.	Sgt	647030
WHITNEY, Alden F.	Cpl	661786
WILLIAMS, Herald B.	HM3	798 58 73
WRAY, Benjamin F.	Pfc	666045
WIRTH, Leroy K.	2dLt	049087
YADON, Louis A.	Pfc	633505
YOUNG, Bobby E.	Pfc	618724
ZIMMER, Andrew M.	Capt	010678

TOTAL WIA
17 Aug
183
[Signature]

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See Enclosure one of Appendix 8 to ANNEX Able

WOUNDED IN ACTION

18 August 1950

ADAMS, Robert F., Jr.	Sgt	663591
ALCALA, Jesus E.	Cpl	660859
ALLEN, Raymond K.	Pfc	1056450
ARMUJO, Richard Z.	Pfc	1095620
ARMSTRONG, Robert T., Jr.	Pfc	665935
BASTIAN, John N.	Sgt	589320
BAUGHAM, John R.	Pfc	1062616
BOULDIN, Robert W.	Cpl	669274
BURLINSON, Loyd D.	Pfc	1090783
BRUCE, Thomas C.	Pfc	1100294
CABALLERO, Ruperto	Pfc	1088545
CASHEON, Jay W.	Pfc	1070566
CHANDLER, Bobby J.	Pfc	1056791
COWLES, Charles E.	Cpl	665945
COX, Raymond E.	Pfc	1079098
COGLEY, James P.	Pfc	1093987
COLLENS, Albert A.	Pfc	1088126
CORRISE, Phillip Jr.,	Pfc	1096175
COYNE, Alfred M.	Pfc	1084616
DANIELS, Grady G.	Pfc	1086815
DAWSON, Edward S.	Cpl	667702
DE LUCA, Anthony F.	Pfc	1100284
DE MORE, Matthew W., Jr.	Cpl	666866
DUFFRENE, Robert E.	Pfc	631842
ELLIOTT, Gene F.	Pfc	1103147
ESLICK, Robert E.	Pfc	1123270
FEGAN, Joseph C., Jr.	Capt	013485
FIRLEY, Lewis R.	Pfc	668861
GARDEA, Rodolfo	Pfc	1086936
GLENN, James B.	Pfc	657652
GRIHART, John P.	Pfc	1079446
GRADILLAS, Jesse G.	Cpl	650580
HOLGM, Paul A.	TSgt	265977
HOLTHUS, Elmer H.	Pfc	1098449
HOLTZ, Olen G.	Pfc	1083460
KESLER, John T.	Cpl	269116
LAWSON, Frank J.	TSgt	275630
LALIO, John P.	Pfc	1079446
LARSON, Luther L.	Pfc	1117151
LECROY, Carl R.	Sgt	570238
LIVINGSTON, Charles L.	Pvt	1089605
LOCHARD, Bobby J.	Pfc	657125
LOPEZ, Richard A.	Pfc	1090692
LOPEZ, Richard V.	Sgt	667636
LUBOLD, Herbert H.	Cpl	1082367
MAIDEN, Charles A., Jr.	Pfc	669150
MARTINEZ, David L.	Cpl	667843
MC DOWELL, John F.	Pfc	1088567

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig. Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

18 August 1950 (Con't)

MILLER, Stanley G.	TSgt	253957
MILLER, Robert I.	Sgt	624741
MILLER, Raymond W.	Pfc	1072646
MUETZEL, Francis W.	2dLt	049792
NEVILLE, Douglas C.	Pfc	1102513
NOBLES, Vernon L.	Cpl	603401
O'DONNELL, John J.	Sgt	267368
OLSON, Richard A.	Cpl	669333
PUTMAN, Garnett L.	Pfc	670613
RAY, Tommie S.	Cpl	670815
REED, James A.	Pfc	665515
RIDENHOUR, Sylvan L.	Pfc	647660
ROGERS, Allen G.	Cpl	599959
SADOWSKI, Edward G.	Sgt	909466
SALAS, Santos	Pfc	1083733
SANDERS, Edgar L.	Pfc	1095516
SAUNDERS, William R.	Pfc	1039365
SCHLICK, Kenneth P.	Pfc	667894
SCHRYVER, Hugh C., Jr.	2dLt	049849
SMITH, Leo I.	Pfc	1100545
SULLIVAN, Bernard V.	Sgt	652062
NECPONSKE, Henry J.	Pfc	1117289
SUTTON, Richard A.	Pfc	646538
STURMAN, Robert R.	Sgt	590928
TURNER, Wilber	Tsgr	245067
WAHLEN, Robert F.	Pfc	1072837
WHATLEY, William G.	Pfc	1118423
WILLIAMS, Tommie R.	Pfc	665910
WILLINGHAM, Jack E.	Pfc	662595
WORKMAN, Cecil G., Jr.	Cpl	1088043
TREBILCOCH, William C.	Pfc	649558

See Enclosure one of Appendix 8 to ANNEX Able
19 August 1950

CAHILL, John J. H.	2dLt	049898
CREEL, Lawrence H.	Pfc	1073113
DAWSON, Marvin O.	Cpl	1072918
DICHINSON, Derwood L.	SSgt	522952
GIPSON, Ralph H.	Pfc	670756
GOLDAHER, Eugene G.	Pfc	601033
GUERRERO, Isidro	Pfc	665749
HARRIS, Clarence R.	Sgt	946630
HULETT, David L.	Pfc	1082176
JASKA, Wesley F.	Pfc	1083306
KUSCHKE, Christian, B.	Pfc	1082446
POTTER, James E.	Pfc	1071439
RICHMOND, Robert F.	Sgt	605877
ROSENTHAL, Jerome C.	Pfc	669394
SAPPINGTON, Johnnie J.	Pfc	1045205

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report

WOUNDED IN ACTION

19 August 1950 (Con't)

SMITH, James R.	Pfc	1099499
SOUTH, Ernest E.	Pfc	667999
STIDHAM, Earl J.	Pfc	1087755
WEIKERT, James C.	Pfc	1080307
WELLS, Marvin E.	Cpl	1072732
ZIMMERLE, James M.	Cpl	659841

26 August 1950

NORTON, Monte R.	Pfc	1117179
SIVERT, Patrick G.	2dLt	049245

1 September 1950

PAUL, Jessie	Pfc	938095
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3 September 1950

ADAMS, Robert L.	Cpl	661258
ADKINS, "U" "R"	Pfc	668917
AGUILAR, Luis	Pfc	659733
ALEXANDER, Quintin N.	Cpl	572898
ARMSTRONG, Robert E.	Pfc	1091547
BARSELOW, Donald J.	Pfc	630072
BOHLKE, David J.	Pfc	1084750
BOZELL, Jerry L.	Pfc	655540
BREAUX, Joseph J.	Pfc	1045209
BROWN, Coy G.	Pfc	663264
BROWN, Karvin L.	Pfc	665570
BROWN, Richard E.	Cpl	1078973
BRUNER, James C.	Cpl	660682
BRYAN, Jesse Jr.	Cpl	635275
BURNS, Robert P.	Cpl	907868
CALLAHAN, Clyde	Cpl	662498
CAMPBELL, Billie D.	Pfc	1095724
CAMPER, Cleylon H.	Pfc	630930
CANN, Donald E.	Pfc	669512
CARBAJAL, Henry	Pfc	1082915
CENTENNER, Raymond J.	Pfc	1074188
CHARNOK, Victor	Pfc	667395
CHILDRESS, Josse R.	Pfc	1095878
CLARK, George W., Jr.	HM3	358 56 80
COOKE, Frank T.	Pfc	1074764
COOPER, Andrew J.	Pfc	1099471
CORLEY, John M.	Pfc	1117172
COTTRELL, Johnnie C.	TSgt	522901
DE GROUT, John J.	Sgt	346709
DI NOTO, Paul F.	Pfc	1114185
DODGE, Walter A.	Pfc	578903

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

3 September 1950 (Con't)

ECHOLS, Frank E.	Sgt	630871
EDDY, Roger I.	2dLt	049709
EVANS, Edward	Pfc	1096898
FARMER, Robert J.	Cpl	626020
FORBES, Robert E.	Pfc	1078330
FOX, George C.	1stLt	047459
FREIBURGER, Richard H.	Pfc	1093568
GARCIA, Rudy G.	Pfc	659652
HALL, William A.	Pfc	1083390
HAMMERSLEY, Donald R.	SSgt	375903
HANNUHSILA, Arnold G.	SSgt	575592
HARLOFF, George R.	Pfc	669362
HATTON, William C.	Pfc	669790
WJKINS, Marion R.	Cpl	1003337
HEADRICK, John R.	Sgt	572024
HENDERSON, Virgil W., Jr	Cpl	1003370
HERRIN, Richard R.	Cpl	893856
HILTZER, John	Pfc	667224
HOBSON, Robert B.	Pfc	1078962
HORN, Edward	Pfc	408206
HUTCHESON, Jesse R.	Pfc	670793
JAGLOWSKI, Francis D.	Cpl	1071058
JENKINS, Cecil W.	Pfc	583367
JEWETT, Harry R.	Sgt	596714
JOHNSON, Henry C.	Pfc	1074213
JORDAN, Alfred R.	Pfc	1000949
KEARNS, John A.	Pfc	1090028
KEELE, William T.	Pfc	1003670
KELLY, Everett	Pfc	1079139
KISSELBACH, James W.	Cpl	1002421
OT, Stanley	Pfc	1079398
LARSEN, Peter C., Jr	Pfc	651199
LITTLE, Orb D.	Cpl	670773
LUSTER, Roy E.	Pfc	1095717
LARSEN, Frederick L.	Pfc	669299
LA VORONA, William	Pfc	1094726
LEON, Antonio M.	Cpl	623754
LINDLEY, Billy D.	Pfc	617509
LUCIANO, Angelo D.	Pfc	664462
LEWIS, Joseph H.	Pfc	348487
LEWIS, Lee J.	Pfc	666669
LOUDON, Marvin L.	Pfc	669017
LOWREY, Billy J.	Pfc	667020
MC KINNON, Murray E.	Pfc	669839
MAC DONALD, Jackie W.	Pfc	1095035
MALIN, Murray S.	Pfc	1078975
MARTINEZ, Arnulfo	Pfc	615545
MATEO, Leonard M.	Pfc	1091532

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

3 September 1950 (Con't)

MC CORKEL, Charles C.	Pfc	1093780
MC KNIGHT, Phillip L.	Pfc	611262
MIKKELSON, Larry E.	Pfc	1091960
MOODY, John D.	Pfc	1073601
MILLER, Richard W.	Pfc	658422
MORROW, Clark O.	Capt	018480
NAIL, Charles W.	Pfc	670386
NICHOLSON, Saterio G.	Sgt	497197
OBERDING, Eugene W., Jr.	Pfc	661209
ORR, John T., Jr.	Cpl	648090
PAYNE, Doc N.	Pfc	501093
PERKINS, Raymond C.	Pfc	1051035
POSTOAK, Leonard W.	Pfc	666277
REED, Frank J., Jr.	Pfc	669089
REYNOLDS, Oliver Jr.	Pfc	668464
RICE, "J" "D"	Sgt	861301
ROBINSON, William E.	SSgt	606160
ROSSON, Thomas W.	Pfc	1086672
ROZET, Herbert A.	Pfc	611670
RYAN, Thomas J.	Pfc	669308
SANDS, Wayne A.	Pfc	659239
SCHULTEN, John J.	Cpl	669068
SIMPSON, Richard J.	Cpl	670441
SKINNER, Lindell	Pfc	1095654
SMITH, Horace	Sgt	271833
SOLOMON, Raymond W.	MSgt	287507
SPERRY, Joseph H., Jr.	Pfc	1113480
SPINO, Anthony	Cpl	670425
STRAND, Loren L.	TSgt	266948
STEPHENSON, Joseph B.	Pfc	1087769
STEWART, Charles A.	Pfc	1091064
TAUGE, Robert R.	Pfc	655944
TERRELL, Kenneth W.	Pfc	1083708
TRACH, John A.	Pfc	1074557
TREBILCOCK, William C.	Pfc	649558
VARNER, Howard M.	Pfc	1082604
WINTER, Robert M.	2dLt	042117
WRIGHT, Leonard A.	Pfc	1086609
YATES, Clifton P.	Sgt	526982
YESENKO, Thomas	Sgt	551510
ZWARKA, Lewis W.	Sgt	253626

4 September 1950

ALLEN, Edwin Jr.	Pfc	645785
BELTO, Frank J.	Cpl	649594
BUONO, Michael J.	Pfc	1090758

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Appendix 6 to Annex ABLE to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

4 September 1950 (Con't)

BLEVINS, Richard E.	Pfc	1072854
BOSQUEZ, Alberto Jr.	Pfc	659816
BURSAU, Glen A.	TSgt	267690
CHERSKOV, John S.	Pfc	1114538
CREASON, William F.	Pfc	1086842
DIXON, Brookshire	Pfc	1096557
DIXON, Robert E.	Pfc	1086320
FARNHAM, David D.	Cpl	1092252
FREDERICKS, Harold D.	1stLt	049457
FITE, Teddy G.	Pfc	657043
GILLIS, Sterling L.	Pfc	1097694
GRAMMAR, Louis F.	Pfc	1049607
GRAHAM, Marshal R.	Pfc	1126857
HEISS, George W.	Sgt	649722
HUDDLESTON, Johnnie E.	Pfc	1095841
JACKSON, Willie J., Jr.	Pfc	1070197
KELLY, Hercules R., Jr.	2dLt	048634
KIKTA, Robert J.	SSgt	290994
MATTHIESON, Marvin E.	Cpl	1071651
MASULLO, Nickolas Jr.	Pfc	1097506
MC GALL, William M.	Cpl	648741
NAGELHOUT, Marvin J.	Sgt	640480
NEMECZ, Bela	SSgt	918949
PAGAN, Robert	Cpl	1088935
PIPER, Russell W.	Pfc	1112461
RIDDLE, Richard P.	Pfc	1084042
SCHMELSKI, Harold L.	Cpl	1084623
SCOTT, Robert G.	Pfc	1100867
THOMPSON, Johnnie C.	Pfc	665947
VULGARIS, George N.	Pfc	657971
WISE, Jack L.	Pfc	1114370

5 September 1950

ACKERSON, Douglas E.	Pfc	1088500
BALDWIN, Richard J.	Pfc	662376
BOOTH, Joe C., Jr.	Pfc	1083689
BOWMAN, Claude H., Jr.	Pfc	1053237
BRUCE, William E.	Pfc	1084644
BIFFLE, Thomas H.	Sgt	252069
CARNS, Jack E.	SSgt	294261
CATTERINO, Leo P.	Cpl	1088102
CERNEY, Melvin L.	Pfc	640506
CHANDLER, Bobby J.	Pfc	1056791
CHRISTOPHERSON, Robert G.	Cpl	1049808
CROSBY, James L.	Pfc	1103176
QZAJKOWSKI, Raymond M.	Pfc	663346

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Appendix 8 to Annex A to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

5 September 1950 (Con't)

DANIELS, George E.	Cpl	990168
DE RIZE, Vincent E.	Pfc	1070040
DIAS-RUBIN, John Jr.	HM3	566 78 87
FONSEN, Keith L.	Sgt	367835
FIETZ, Lavern H.	Cpl	1071797
FORTIN, William E.	Pfc	663899
GEIB, Gene L.	Pfc	1084074
GEIWITZ, Charles E.	Cpl	1087954
HICKS, Dillard F.	Sgt	934904
HOLMES, Norman O.	Cpl	1074363
JONES, Wendell H.	Pfc	662341
MAMES, Howard A.	Pfc	1072810
MC GUIRE, Robert C.	Cpl	1083349
MERLINO, Jack A.	Cpl	1083151
MC CARTHY, Michael R.	2dLt	049903
MAYES, Howard A.	Pfc	1072810
MISHOUL, Harold J.	Pfc	1072445
MITCHELL, Donald R.	Cpl	611068
NORRIS, William J.	Cpl	1090982
O'BRIEN, Joseph L.	Pfc	1073958
O'CONNOR, Frederick C.	Pfc	1074161
PFEIFFENBERGER, Robert G.	Pfc	1079682
RAY, Ronald G.	HM3	339 96 07
RASMUSSEN, Melvin A.	Pfc	649452
REYNOLDS, Murkel W.	Cpl	589219
RIPPY, Billie R.	Pfc	1084059
SPURLOCK, Clarence L.	Pfc	1027923
SANDY, Walter E.	TSgt	272200
SMITH, Carl E.	Pfc	1079131
SMITH, Larry R.	Pfc	603125
SHELTON, Gilman L.	Pfc	667781
SLAVIK, Ernest S.	Pfc	1083879
SNELL, Chadwick L.	Pfc	1102581
THIBAUT, Paul V.	Pfc	641383
TRUJILLO, Francisco	Cpl	667710
TRUMLEY, William E.	Pfc	1091433
WALLEY, Gerald R.	Pfc	669352
WEST, Roy L.	Pfc	659586
WOLFE, Walter L., Jr.	Sgt.)	530887
WARREN, Robert T.	Cpl	632776
WILLIAMS, Fowler S.	SSgt.	284209
WRIGHT, Delbert A.	Sgt	584969
YOUNG, James R.	2dLt	049647
YOUSE, Burl R.	Pfc	1082569
YOUNG, Leonard R.	MSgt	254876

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1stMarProvBrig Specil Action Report.

WOUNDED IN ACTION

7 August 1950

BLACKMON, Thomas W., Jr	Sgt	1053743
WHITE, Frederick L.	SSgt	390317

8 August 1950

REVEILLE, Cloys H.	Pfc	1083487
TENNISON, Kenneth A.	Pfc	1141018

12 August 1950

OLSSON, Victor L.	Sgt	595373
SUMWALT, Boyd R., Jr	Sgt	643659

17 August 1950

BOSWELL, George L.	Pfc	1073297
GEPHART, Donald F.	Pfc	1072909
LAVORGNA, William	Pfc	1094726
MILLER, Raymond W.	Pfc	1072646
UNDERWOOD, Harry W.	Pfc	1088030

18 August 1950

TURNER, Wilber	TSgt	245067
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ENCLOSURE ONE OF APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX ABLE

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Appendix 8 to Annex ABLE to 1st ProvMarBrig Special Action Report

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INCL 1, Annex A, Administrative Order No. 25-1A, 1 Aug 50

Report 123 (Dog) Personnel Daily Summary As of _____ (Time((Date) Page _____ of _____ pages Consolidated Types of Units (a)	Strength		Daily Casualties						Cumulative Casualties					Gains			Prisoners of War.				Other Daily Losses						
	Actual (b)	Authorized (c)	Battle					Nonbattle (i)	Battle					Days in Combat (o)	Replacements (p)	Return to Duty (q)	Prisoners of War.										
			Killed (d)	Wounded (e)	Missing (f)	Captured (g)	Total (h)		Killed (j)	Wounded (k)	Missing (l)	Captured (m)	Total (n)				Nonbattle (o)	Captured (r)	Evacuated (s)	On Hand (t)		Total Taken (u)					
Line 1. Lowest numbered Regiment																											
Line 2. Lowest numbered Battalion																											
Line 3. Next numbered Battalion																											
Line 4. Highest numbered Battalion																											
Line 5. Next numbered Regiment																											
Line 6. Lowest numbered Battalion																											
Line 7. Next numbered Battalion																											
Line 8. Highest numbered Battalion																											
Line 9. Highest numbered Regiment																											

INSTRUCTIONS FOR TELEPHONIC TRANSMISSION: Column (a), consolidated types of units, will be indicated by the predesignated line numbers, followed by the remaining column alphabetical identifications with their respective amounts. EXAMPLE OF TELEPHONIC TRANSMISSION: "This is Report Peter Dog Sugar paren Dog Peter paren: Line 1; Baker, 12,340; Charlie, 12,317; Dog, 127; Easy, 140; Fox, 13; George, 0; How, 170; Item, 14; etc."

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SECRET

INCL 1, Annex "A", Administrative Order No. 25-"A", 1 Aug 50

SECRET

Report FDS (DF) Personnel Daily Summary As of _____ (Time) (Date) Page _____ of _____ pages Consolidated Types of Units (a)	Strength		Daily Casualties					Cumulative Casualties							Gains			Prisoners of War		Other Daily Losses (w)						
	Actual (b)	Authorized (c)	Battle					Battle					Days in Combat (v)	Replacements (c)	Returned to Duty (f)	Captured (s)	Evacuated (t)	On Hand (r)	Total Taken (q)							
			Killed (d)	Wounded (e)	Missing (f)	Captured (g)	Total (h)	Nonbattle (i)	Killed (k)	Wounded (l)	Missing (m)	Captured (n)									Total (o)	Nonbattle (p)				
Line 10. Lowest numbered Battalion																										
Line 11. Next numbered Battalion																										
Line 12. Highest numbered Battalion																										
Line 13. Division Artillery																										
Line 14. Organic Troops																										
Line 15. Other non-organic combat troops																										
Line 16. Other non-organic service troops																										
Line 17. Total Division																										

INSTRUCTION FOR TELEPHONIC TRANSMISSION: Column (a), consolidated types of units, will be indicated by the predesignated line numbers, followed by the remaining column alphabetical identifications with their respective amounts. EXAMPLE OF TELEPHONIC TRANSMISSION: "This is Report Peter Dog Sugar paren Dog Peter paren; Line I; Baker, 12,340; Charlie, 12, 317; Dog 127; Easy, 140; Fox, 12; George 0; How, 170, Iten, etc."

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX BAKER
Report of
Brigade G-2 Section

9

CB

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

2: EGVO: js
8 Sep 1950

INTELLIGENCE

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

Encl: Periodic Intelligence Reports 1 through 17,
covering period 031800 Aug 1950 to 051800
Sep 1950.

1. The period covered by the periodic reports contained in this annex may be divided chronologically into three operational periods. They are generally as follows:

a. Operations in the Chindong-Ni - Kosong Area,
7 through 12 Aug 1950.

b. Operations in the Yongsan - Naktong River area,
16 through 19 Aug 1950.

c. Operations in the Yongsan - Naktong River area,
2 through 5 Sep 1950.

2. During period 1 a. the Brigade as part of the Task Force KEAN was assigned a zone of advance along the Chindong-Ni - Kosong-Sachon axis, with Sachon as the final objective. Preliminary estimates of the enemy strength in our zone indicated elements of two North Korean Infantry Regiments supported by an undetermined amount of artillery and probably tanks. Enemy resistance to our initial advance consisted of stiff small arms and automatic weapons fire with sporadic mortar and artillery shelling. An enemy pocket which built up during the first night's action 500 yards behind the Brigade CP in rough, high ground succeeded in severing the MSR to Masan. This road block offered stubborn resistance in the form of small arms and automatic weapons fire before the enemy was forced to withdraw to the northwest by our infantry, artillery and air action. Documents from dead indicated elements of the 13th and 15th Regiments had opposed our advance during the day. Our advance toward Kosong continued against light resistance until our forward elements were fired on in the vicinity of Paedun-Ni by an estimated enemy Motorized Reconnaissance Company which utilized the usual infantry

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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weapons plus 82mm mortars and 45mm AT guns camouflaged in haystacks. Our entrance to Kosong was gained against moderate resistance and simultaneously our air reported an estimated 80 vehicles withdrawing along the Kosong-Sachon Road. An estimated 41 motorcycles and 24 jeeps were destroyed or captured, in addition to much enemy material. Documents revealed that Kosong had been defended by the 83d Motorized Regiment, 105th Armored Division. Our advance was halted two miles from Sachon and a retrograde movement was ordered when friendly elements on our right received heavy enemy attacks from the rear along their MSR. The enemy tried to block our forward movement by an attempted envelopment. The attack was repulsed with heavy enemy losses resulting. Enemy losses for this entire operation are estimated at 200-1000.

During the period 1 b. the Brigade was assigned the mission of driving the enemy out of the Yongsan - Nakdong River bulge. Preliminary estimates of enemy strength indicated elements of one infantry division supported by artillery and tanks. It was known that the enemy occupied the favorable high ground in this general area. Enemy resistance throughout the operation period was generally heavy, easing up slightly as the operation drew to a close. He contested our advance up our first objective with heavy resistance, staging his defense in the rocks and crevices of the high ground, employing small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and AT weapons and by tossing hand grenades down-hill onto our forces. The enemy finally withdrew to the next high ground under heavy infantry, artillery and air attacks. Three enemy tanks were knocked out late in the same day, and an enemy counterattack in force the following morning was repulsed. The enemy began a withdrawal but still tried to delay our advance with moderate resistance in the high ground. He suffered heavy casualties as he fled from the high ground and crossed the Nakdong River, under infantry and artillery fire and air strikes. Estimated enemy casualties for the period were 2500. In addition a large amount of enemy weapons and equipment was captured, including 4-122mm Guns, 6-U.S. 105mm Howitzers, 6-45mm guns and 6-76mm SP guns, plus many small arms. The following day saw our troops complete the task of clearing the bulge of any remaining resistance. There was little remaining resistance. There was little resistance during the day. The enemy had tried one last blow by staging a 20-man "banzai" attack in which most of the group were wiped out. Enemy casualties for the entire period were estimated at 3,000. The 5th, 16th and 18th regiments of the 4th NK Division were identified as opposing our advance in this operations.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT.

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4. During the period 1 c. the Brigade was against committed in the Yongsan - Naktong River area to stop the enemy offensive and to drive him back in this area. The estimated strength of the enemy was one division with artillery and tanks. The first day's action was marked by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fires in resisting our movement from Yongsan westward. He also employed hand grenades, AT guns, mortars and artillery pieces. Our tanks succeeded in knocking out 4 enemy Medium Tanks with a fifth as a probable. Artillery probably knocked out a tank. Estimated 500 enemy casualties for the day. The following day was marked by withdrawal action on the part of many enemy troops retreating toward the high ground east of the Naktong River. Resistance to our advance was moderate, stiffening late in the period when the enemy defended the high ground tenaciously with his small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. Several enemy mine fields were encountered and cleared and many booby traps were found in his abandoned positions. Enemy casualties were estimated at 2,000. The third and last day's action saw moderate enemy resistance, stiffening, slightly late in the period, and heavy artillery and mortar fires. Rain prevented the use of aircraft during most of the day and limited observation. A counterattack was tried late in the day and was repulsed. One enemy tank was knocked out by our tanks and 1000 casualties estimated. Our action in this area was called to a halt when Army troops over the front lines to set up a defense. The estimated enemy casualties for the entire period was 3,500. The enemy units which opposed our advance were the 9th NK Division, the 16th Independent Brigade and elements of the 16th Mechanized Brigade.

5. The overall estimate of enemy casualties is 7,500, with a total of 69 PW's being captured.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
4 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #1

Period covered: 031800 to 041800, Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Point of contact. Negative.
- b. Identifications. Negative.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. The only enemy action during this period consisted of an enemy OP of undetermined size approximately 3,000 yards north of Brigade CP. The enemy pulled off of the high ground prior to contact by our combat patrol late in the period.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Negative.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

(3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.

(4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.

(5) Armored and motorized units. Negative.

(6) Artillery. Negative.

(7) Infantry. 041330 Estimated enemy OP of unknown strength in high ground north of Brigade CP.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. Negative.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. Negative.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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SECRET

- c. Morale. Negative.
- d. Status of enemy administrative support. Negative.
- e. Weather. Clear.
- 4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.
- 5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD. Negative.

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

G. Van Orman
G. VAN ORMAN
Col., USMC
CORS, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (5)
CO 1st Bn., 11th Marines (1)
CO H&S Bn (5)
FILE (3)

- c. Morale. Each Staff Section (1)
Fwd Ech 1st MarAirWing (1)
- d. Status. CG FMFPAC (1)
CG 1st MarDiv (1)
- e. Weather. CG 24th InfDiv (1)
CG 25th InfDiv (1)

E. A. CRAIG

BrigGen., USMC

Commanding

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
5 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 2

Period covered: 041800 to 051800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
 - a. Point of contact. Negative.
 - b. Identifications. Negative.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
 - a. Summary. Negative.
 - b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Negative.
 - c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.
 - (1) Air Force. Negative.
 - (2) Administrative Units. Negative.
 - (3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.
 - (4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.
 - (5) Armored and Motorized Units. Negative.
 - (6) Artillery. Negative.
 - (7) Infantry. Negative.
 - (8) Other elements. Negative.
3. ~~OTHER~~ INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.
 - a. Estimated enemy losses. Negative.
 - b. Enemy combat efficiency. Negative.
 - c. Morale. Negative.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

SECRET

d. Status of enemy administrative support. Negative.

e. Weather. Clear.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD. Negative.

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

E. A. Craig
E. G. VAN ORMAN
Col., USMC
SofS, G-2DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (5)
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ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

- 4 -

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1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
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6 Aug 1950

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PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #3

Period covered: 051800 to 061800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Point of contact. Negative.
- b. Identifications. Negative.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. The only enemy action consisted of an enemy patrol of undetermined size attacking the OP of 1st Battalion 5th Marines. Enemy drew back with no casualties.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Enemy patrol action initiated by loud whistles.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

- (1) Air Force. Negative.
- (2) Administrative Units. Negative.
- (3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.
- (4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.
- (5) Armored and Motorized Units. Negative.
- (6) Artillery. Negative.
- (7) Infantry. 052200 1st Battalion OP rushed by unknown number enemy vicinity 75-65.8.
- (8) Other elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Estimated enemy losses. Negative.
- b. Enemy combat efficiency. Negative.

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- c. Morale. Negative.
- d. Status of enemy administrative support. Negative.
- e. Weather. Clear.
- . COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.
- 5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD. Negative.

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
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ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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7 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 4

Period covered: 061800 to 071800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. See overlay.
- b. Point of contact. See overlay.
- c. Identifications. None reported.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Enemy resistance to our advance during the period was moderate, consisting of S/A and automatic weapons fires, with sporadic mortar and artillery fires against our artillery batteries and troops.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Negative.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

(3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.

(4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units. Negative.

(6) Artillery. Sporadic artillery fire fell on our positions throughout the period.

(7) Infantry. Enemy resistance has consisted of infantry troops using mortars, machine guns and small arms fires to our front and flanks.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Estimated enemy losses. Estimated 50 enemy killed.
see enclosure (1).
- b. Enemy combat efficiency. 90%.
- c. Morale. Good.
- d. Status of enemy administrative support. Negative.
- e. Weather. Clear.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

- (1) Continue to defend his present position with elements of one infantry division supported by artillery and armor.
- (2) Attack at any time against our front or flanks with elements of one infantry division supported by artillery and armor.
- (3) Reinforce either of the above capabilities with elements of undetermined strength.

b. Discussion: The enemy force in our sector is still considered well organized and capable of a strong defense or attack in this area. However, since our attack has probably thrown him off guard, he can be expected to defend until the opportunity is presented for a strong counter-offensive.

c. In view of the foregoing, the capabilities are listed in their order of probability; 5 a.(1) concurrently with 5 a.(3).

E. A. CRAIG
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Commanding

ENCLOSURE: (1) Report of Tactical Air Support by Marine Air during the period.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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O F F I C I A L :

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 4

Report of Tactical Air Support by Marine Air during the Period
Aug 1950.

Badoeng Strait. Destroyed 6 mortar positions (1140-1355) buildings and 2 warehouses Kosong (1132-1330) vehicle (1129-1330) fuel dump (1130-1330). Damaged several buildings Chog-ye (1125-1401) and TaneDong-Ni (1140-1332) burned 60 percent with explosions. Sicily. Destroyed 40 vehicles and few tanks near Pansong (1126-1353). Vehicles camouflaged with canvas and straw. Light AA. Started six fires Bangmun-Ni (1353-1117). Struck Chinju (1355-1108) and villages (1133-1392). Results undetermined. Large concentration vehicles, artillery, troops these villages. Pilots report camouflage of mortars area (1140-1355) darker color than surrounding cover. Continues 8 plane coverage maintained in target area 0710K to 1930K. All flight able to work through Marine TACC.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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8 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #5

Period covered: 071800-081800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000; sheet 6819 II.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. See overlay for enemy dispositions.

At end of period, enemy is showing little signs of activity except in the area in rear of Brigade CP. Enemy withdrew from the high ground and moved towards the NW.

b. Identification. Negative.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Light enemy resistance was encountered to our front. In our rear along the MASAN-CHINDONG-NI MSR, heavy enemy resistance was encountered in form of automatic weapons and S/A fire. Enemy succeeded in cutting MSR temporarily. After stubborn resistance, enemy was driven from high ground in vicinity of (49.0-48.5). Enemy fired mortars - machine guns into our positions from vicinity of IMONG-NI (43.5-46.8).

b. New Enemy tactics, weapons and materiel. Enemy feigned as dead until our troops passed by and then fired into our forces from the rear.

c. Operations of component elements.

(1) Air Forces. Negative.

(2) Administrative units. Negative.

(3) AA defenses. Negative.

(4) AT units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized units. Negative.

(6) Artillery. Negative.

(7) Infantry. Enemy estimated at 200-400 in rear of Brigade CP vicinity of 49.0-48.5. 8 enemy observed retiring

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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on IMONG-NI vicinity of 43.5-46.8 at 081300. Air reported enemy pulling out of present position and moving to 49.5-49.5 at 081600. Air reported enemy moving to North from vicinity 49.5-49.5 at 081750.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Estimated enemy losses. 50 enemy killed in action.
- b. Enemy combat efficiency. 80%.
- c. Morale. High due to recent successes.
- d. Status of Enemy administrative support. Negative.
- e. Location and nature of enemy administrative installations. Not known.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

ENEMY CAPABILITIES. No change.

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2. EGVO: is
9 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #6

Period covered: 081800 to 091300 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. See overlay.

b. Point of contact. 47.3-49.7; 39.3-42.3.

c. Identifications. Documents from dead indicate:
2d Co., 1st Bn., 13th Regt., 6th Div.
2d Co., 1st Bn., 15th Regt., 6th Div.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Primary point of enemy resistance during period located 500 yards in rear of Brigade CP where estimated enemy company had severed Masan-Chindong-Ni MSR with machine gun fire. Enemy forced to withdraw after offering stiff resistance all through the day. Elsewhere, enemy resistance was light consisting of small arms and automatic weapons. Gradual withdrawal of enemy forces of undetermined size. He increased use of sniper fires and employed counter-battery fire against "C" Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and 15 rounds of probably 122mm howitzer on Brigade CP at 091730.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other material. Enemy is utilizing excellent camouflage for both individuals and machine guns, generally operating in groups of from 20 to 30 men.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

(3) Anti-Air craft defenses. Negative.

(4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units. TAO: Tk or SP gun vicinity 47.3-49.0. Possible tank 48.6-50.8.

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(6) Artillery. 091015 suspect battery at 44.5-50.7. RCT 5 POW reported 2-120mm mortars, 4-45mm AT guns & 1-76mm gun plus ammo vicinity 44.8-47.4; 44.5-47.5. Possibly artillery vicinity 44.5-50.7. Artillery piece vicinity 48-47.2 at 091325. 15 rounds 122mm Howitzer landed CP 091730.

(7) Infantry. 090845 enemy dug in vicinity 48-49 with 3/A and machine guns. 081900 enemy moving North along road vicinity 49.8-50.5. 091000 machine gun positions & trenches vicinity 44.2-50.8 & 49.8-50.2. RCT 5 POW reported 150 troops in wooded area vicinity 44.8-47.4, at 091100. Troops emplaced vicinity 44.6-49.0, 5 machine guns & 1 mortar at 091220.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. Estimated 150 enemy killed.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. 80%.

c. Morale. Good.

d. Status of enemy administrative support. Negative.

e. Weather. Clear and hot.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Continue to defend his present positions with the estimated strength of one regiment supported by artillery.

(2) Attack our front or flanks or sever the MSR at any time with the elements of one infantry regiment supported by artillery.

(3) Reinforce either 5 a.(1) or 5 a.(2) with elements of undetermined strength.

b. The enemy is considered strong in this immediate area and capable of resisting our advance into the objective area with a strength of one infantry regiment. He is also considered to have several small units of undetermined size operating in this general vicinity that are capable of hampering rear area operations.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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c. In view of the foregoing, the enemy capabilities are listed in their order of probability, 5 a.(1) concurrently with 5 a.(3).

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10 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #7

Period covered: 091800 to 101800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. See overlay.
- b. Point of contact. 1134-1334.
- c. Identifications. None new.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Zero to light resistance faced our advance most of the period. Leading elements of our forces were fired on at 101600 vicinity 33.8-33.4 (one mile North of Paedun-Ni). As they advanced over a hill they were fired on by mortars and machine guns from haystacks. Enemy force estimated at one motorized company.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Fired machine guns and mortars from positions concealed in haystacks.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

- (1) Air Force. Negative.
- (2) Administrative Units. Negative.
- (3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.
- (4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.
- (5) Armored and Motorized Units. Negative.
- (6) Artillery. 091945 TAO reported 4 artillery pieces knocked out by napalm at 1148-1352. 091915 air reported possible artillery position vicinity 44.5-50.8. 3rd Battalion reported receiving heavy mortar or artillery fire at 101620 vicinity 33.8-33.4.

(7) Infantry. 100735 air reported 50 enemy troops vicinity 33-55. 5th Marines reported undetermined number enemy

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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near Majon vicinity 31.7-34.9 at 101030. ROK police reported 50 enemy took over police box in Kosong at 101240.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. One wounded POW (?) taken by 5th Marines. Estimated 50 enemy killed. Two machine guns and two 82mm mortars destroyed by ground forces. 4 artillery pieces destroyed by air vicinity 48-52 at 091945.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. 80%.

c. Morale. Good.

d. Status of enemy administrative support. Negative.

e. Weather. Clear.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Continue to defend his present position with strength of one Infantry Regiment supported by an unknown number of artillery pieces.

(2) Attack our front or flanks at any time with the elements of one infantry regiment supported by artillery.

(3) Reinforce either his defense or attack with elements of undetermined strength.

b. The enemy is still considered well organized and to have at least one infantry regiment in front of our forces, including an undetermined amount of artillery.

c. In view of the foregoing, the enemy's capabilities are listed in their order of probability, 5 a.(3) concurrently with either 5 a.(1) or 5 a.(2).

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

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O F F I C I A L :

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2:EGVO:js
11 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #8

Period covered: 101800 to 111800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. See overlay.
- b. Enemy front lines - vic of 2000 yds. NW of KOSONG - (32-30).
- c. Identifications - 120mm Mortar Co., 13th Inf. Regt., 6th Rifle Division.

Elements of 83d Motorized Regiment (Tentative).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Resistance was moderate during the entire period. Enemy made use mostly of small arms, automatic weapons and some mortars. Small groups of snipers continued to operate along the KOSONG-CHINGDONG-NI Road. At approximately 1515, air observed enemy column of about 80 vehicles proceeding NW on the KOSONG-SACHON (1109-1342) road. This force, estimated to be 1 infantry regiment, was attacked by marine air and artillery, damaging or destroying at least 40 vehicles. Remainder proceeded towards SACHON.

- b. Enemy Tactics and Weapons or other materiel. Negative.
- c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.
 - (1) Air forces. Negative.
 - (2) Administrative Units. Negative.
 - (3) Anti Aircraft defenses. Negative.
 - (4) Anti Tank Units. Air reported possible tank trap vic of 34.9-25.6 at 111020.

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(5) Armored and motorized units. 18 trks and 2 jeeps camouflaged at vic 1135.4-1324.3 at 101940. Air reported 2 tanks damaged vic of 07-54 at 111045. Motorized column of 80 vehicles reported vic of 2000 yards NW of KOSONG heading for SACHON.

(6) Artillery. ROKA reported 2 artillery pieces, caliber unknown, vic of 36.5-25.0 at 111000. PW states 3 240mm tractor drawn cannons due in this area soon. Air reported gun emplacement vic 07-45 at 111045.

(7) Infantry. 40 troops reported vic of 36-24.8 armed with 82mm mortars, machine guns and small arms at 111940. ROKA reported 150 troops vic of 36.5-25.0 at 111000. Air reported large number of troops in fox holes vic of 07-54 at 111045. Large number of troops estimated as 1 regiment moving towards SACHON at high speed vic 30-32 at 111515.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. 200 enemy dead and 1 PW, Capt. "Cultural Advisor" to 120mm mortar company of 13th Inf Regiment.

b. Air and artillery destroyed or damaged 40 trucks and damaged 2 tanks. 51 motorcycles and 21 jeeps destroyed or captured. 57mm anti-tank guns with limbers captured.

c. Enemy combat efficiency. 70%.

d. Morale. PW states some units retreated because after contact with American forces, he realizes they are superior. Therefore, it is believed morale has been lowered lately by his recent setbacks.

e. Status of Enemy Administrative Support. Not known.

f. Weather. Clear with early morning ground haze.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Political. 3 communist sympathizers were apprehended by SIC in PAEDUN-NI (37-40).

ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Causes of Action.

(1) Defend along the KOSONG-SACHON Road with the elements of 1 infantry or Motorized regiment.

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(2) Delay in successive positions along the KOSONG-SACHON Road and establish main defensive positions in vic of SACHON and CHINJU.

(3) Attack with elements of one infantry regiment.

(4) Reinforce with unknown number of troops.

(5) Limited air attack.

(6) Conduct strong attacks and harassing activities along lines of communication.

b. Discussion of capabilities.

Since the enemy was surprised and apparently completely disrupted, it seems improbable that he will be able to stop long enough to construct a defensive position along the KOSONG-SACHON Road. It appears that he will attempt to organize hasty defensive positions while his main elements establish a defensive position in SACHON-CHINJU area with other elements of the 6th MK Division. It is not believed he can execute his attack capability until a major reorganization has taken place.

c. Probability of Adoption.

5 a.(2) concurrently with 5 a.(6).

5 a.(4) concurrently with 5 a.(6).

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2:EGVO:js
12 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #9

Period covered: 111800 to 121800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Point of contact. 1114-1339.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Enemy resistance to our advance was light throughout most of the period, delaying with automatic weapons and small arms. Resistance became moderate when a road block was encountered late in the period.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Negative.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

(3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.

(4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units. Negative.

(6) Artillery. Gun positions vicinity 09.7-47.8 at 121305.

(7) Infantry. 2 enemy companies forming vicinity 41.3-51.3 at 120630. 121300 air reported Sachon full troops and camouflaged vehicles at 121300. 120645 CIC reported 10 trucks, 20 carts and large number enemy troops vicinity 23-44. Air reported troops digging in 1107.8-1345.3. Troops and gun positions vicinity 1109.7-1347.8. Troops digging in on hill vicinity 1108-1350. Air reported at 121305. Troops and vehicles vicinity 1108-1344 at 121400. 30-40 troops at 12.8-38.6 at 121410.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

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3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. Estimate 50 enemy killed. 41 motorcycles and 24 jeeps captured or destroyed.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. 60%.

c. Morale. Low.

d. Status of enemy administrative support. Negative.

e. Weather. Cloudy.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Continue to withdraw, retarding our advance with series of delaying actions with elements of one motorized regiment.

(2) Defend his present positions with elements of one motorized regiment.

(3) Attack our front or flanks at any time with elements of one motorized regiment.

(4) Reinforce any of the above with elements of undetermined strength.

b. Discussion.

In view of his recent hasty withdrawal out of the Kosong Area and his loss of many vehicles and equipment, the enemy is considered to be disorganized and on the defensive without prepared defensive positions within our zone of advance.

c. In view of the foregoing, the enemy capabilities are listed in their order of probability; 5 a.(1) concurrently with 5 a.(4).

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

ENCLOSURE (1): Summary of Air missions by Marine Air during the period.

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OFFICIAL:

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #9.

Summary of Air missions by Marine Air during the period.

12 August, 1950.

50 sorties maintaining 12 strikes 1 TAC on station 0710K to 0850K. 3 strike 1 TAC 0840K to 1020K & strike 1 TAC 1010K to 1835K in close support of troops. One strike flight cancelled due to weather. Badoeng strait flew 23 sorties. 21 vehicles one supply dump damaged Sachon Area 1109-1342 by 1 500 Gp 26 HVAR 3500 20mm. Large troop concentration covering south side of road to Sachon 1113-1339 neutralized by 31 HVARs 3600 20mm. Enemy position in buildings 1113-1340 50 percent destroyed by 1 500 Gp. Sicily flew 27 sorties. 3 buildings NW Chinju burned by 2 500 Gp 2 napalm 24 HVAR. Strafed troops in bridge. Troops on hillside 1353-1134 hit with 3 500 Gp 1 napalm 12 HVAR. 3 trucks destroyed near Tundok 1139-1355. 2 ammo dumps damaged near Chojen-Ni 1107-1340 burned but no explosion. SE sector Sachon set afire. Attacked large number troops on slope north Logan-Ni 1140-1347 results not apparent. 75 to 100 vehicles observed in and around Sachon at 1530K. 20 vehicles in Sachon area did not burn when strafed. Possibly no gas.

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2:EGVO:1s
13 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #10

Period covered: 121800 to 131800 Aug 1950.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Point of contact: 37.5-49.5 to 38.8-48.8 to 40.0.

b. Identifications: No new.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Contact with enemy forces was generally light throughout most of the period. The withdrawal of our forces from the Sachon area was met by stiff enemy machine gun and small arms fires approximately 4 miles south east of Sachon along the Kosong-Sachon road. An estimated 17 machine gun positions were concentrated on our forces. Following the initial fires, the enemy attempted an envelopment which resulted in an estimated 150 enemy dead and which was stopped by our troops. The flanking action was begun by the enemy use of 3 green flares followed by 1 orange flare and much noise and shouting by the attacking enemy. In one local sector 32 enemy dead were piled up in a small draw by friendly grenade action before movement through that defile was stopped. An estimated 200-300 enemy took part in the attack.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Captured materiel included many flares similar in appearance to our very flares, probably used as referred to above.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air forces. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

(3) M. defenses. Negative.

(4) AT units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units. Negative.

(6) Artillery. Negative.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(7) Infantry. Enemy strength in front of our forces estimated to be 400-500. Some automatic weapons and small arms and sniper fires throughout area.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Estimated enemy losses. 150 enemy dead.
- b. Enemy combat efficiency. 60%.
- c. Morale. Good.
- d. Status of enemy administrative support. Not known.
- e. Weather. Cloudy.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. No change.
- b. No change.
- c. No change.

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

E. G. Van Orman

E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2

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ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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2:EGVO:js
14 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #11

Period covered: 131800 to 141800 Aug 1950.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
 - a. Point of contact. 40.4-48.6.
 - b. Identifications. None new.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
 - a. Summary. Enemy resistance continued light throughout the period, consisting primarily of small arms and sniper fires.
 - b. Enemy tactics and weapons or other materiel. Negative.
 - c. Operations of enemy component elements.
 - (1) Air Force. Negative.
 - (2) Administrative Units. Negative.
 - (3) AA defenses. Negative.
 - (4) AT units. Negative.
 - (5) Armored and Motorized Units. Negative.
 - (6) Artillery. Negative.
 - (7) Infantry. Enemy infantry of unknown strength located throughout this general area.
 - (8) Other elements. Negative.
3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.
 - a. Estimated enemy losses. Unknown.
 - b. Enemy combat efficiency. Unknown.
 - c. Morale. Good.
 - d. Status of enemy administrative support. Unknown.
 - e. Weather. Rainy.

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4. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE. Negative.
5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.
 - a. No change.
 - b. No change.
 - c. No change.

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

(Handwritten signature)

E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2

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ANNEX BAKTER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
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14 Aug 1950

Period from 141800-161800 is not covered by Periodic
Intelligence Report due to movement of Brigade from
Chindong-Ni Area to Miryang Area.

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMP (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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2:EGVO:is
18 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #12

Period covered: 161800 to 171800 Aug 1950.

MAF: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. See overlay.
- b. Point of contact. 42.5-86.5 to 43.5-84.5.
- c. Identifications. Solbuch from enemy killed 16 August, indicated 2d Co., 40th Engineer Battalion, 4th (Brigade) Division.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Enemy resisted heavily our advance during daylight hours. He used hand grenades intensively from his position in the high ground, plus machine gun and small arms fire, mortar and 37mm AT gun. He employed usual tactics plus a reverse slope defense.

b. Enemy Tactics and Weapons or other materiel. Extensive use of hand grenades and reverse slope defense. Enemy used friendly air panels 45-85.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

- (1) Air Force. Negative.
- (2) Administrative Units. Negative.
- (3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.
- (4) Anti-Tank Units. 37mm AT guns used vic 44.5-85.5 against troops.
- (5) Armored and Motorized Units. 5 enemy vehicles observed 50-82.
- (6) Artillery. Artillery positions vicinity 42.3-86.8. One position believed destroyed by air. Artillery vicinity 42-84 and 43-82. One piece knocked out (171240). One gun knocked out vicinity 41.7-85.5 (171650).

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(7) Infantry. At least 1 battalion with artillery opposed advance of our troops. Camouflaged foxholes 44.5-82.5. Enemy CP 44.9-86.0. Enemy dug in 45-85. Using friendly parcels. Enemy troops 42.3-86.8 and 100 enemy 44-85. Several machine guns camouflaged 44.8-85.1. 300 enemy reported 52-83. Enemy moving heavy equipment 41.8-87.2. Mortar, machine guns and 20 enemy (possible CP) vicinity 42.9-86.8.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Estimated enemy losses. Estimated 400 enemy killed.
- b. Enemy combat efficiency. Good.
- c. Morale. Good.
- d. Status of enemy administrative support. Not known.
- e. Weather. Clear.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Defend in our zone of advance with at least elements of a division supported by artillery, Center of resistance vicinity objective two (area around 42-85.5).

(2) Attack our front or flanks with elements of a division supported by armor and artillery.

b. In view of stiff resistance of past period and his apparently well prepared positions, it is to be expected that the enemy will continue his defense, using counterattacks in an effort to expend our forces.

c. Based on the above, (1) above is the most likely capability.

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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O F F I C I A L:

E. G. Van Orman
E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
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ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FME (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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2:EGVO:js
19 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #13

Period covered: 171800 to 181800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. See overlay.

b. Point of contact. At close of period the front line ran generally right to left from points 41.8-87 to 40.8-85.

c. Identifications, Documents and POW's identify the following:

Mortar Co., 1st Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Division.
1st Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Division.
4th Co., 2d Bn., 18th Regt., 4th Division.
7th Co., 3rd Bn., 18th Regt., 4th Division.
82mm Mortar Co., 3rd Bn., 18th Regt., 4th Division.
Mortar Co., 4th Separate Brigade ??

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. The enemy began withdrawing to the southwest in front of our advance late in the period, suffering heavy casualties. At 172000, the enemy attempted to penetrate our lines with three medium tanks, all of which were knocked out by our tanks. An enemy counterattack was staged at 080600 in strength using machine guns, hand grenades and artillery and was repulsed. Enemy resistance to our advance during daylight hours was light. At close of period our troops were pushing up objective three against moderate resistance against small arms and machine gun fire.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other material. None.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

(3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(4) Anti Tank Units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units. 3 tanks destroyed vicinity of 42.6-86.8 at 171940. Air reported 3 to 6 tanks vicinity of 42-86 and along valley to 41.5 at 181230. 9th RCT reported unknown number of tanks vicinity of 40-84 at 181230. Air reported 5 of above tanks destroyed.

(6) Artillery. Enemy counterbattery appeared throughout area 180740. Possible artillery position 43.2-81.8 at 180730. 8 120mm mortars 41.3-86.7 at 181050. 180830 artillery positions 31.2-86.1 and 38.1-86.5. Guns vicinity 40.5-86.5 at 180830. Heavy artillery battery vicinity 33.8-85.8 at 181130.

(7) Infantry. Our advance was opposed by infantry elements throughout the period at 181315. Air reported large numbers of infantry withdrawing to SW without arms, at 171900. Units of battalion strength reported (B-2) vicinity 42-83.4, 43-83 and 43-84. One company infantry vicinity 41.3-84.2 at 181120. 500 enemy moving toward high ground vicinity 40.5-84.5 at 181155. 2 companies dug in on high ground vicinity 40-86 at 181320.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. Enemy casualties: Air estimates 1400; Ground 500. Weapons destroyed: air; 2 tanks destroyed and one damaged vicinity 40.5-84.5. One artillery piece destroyed. Ground; 3 tanks destroyed 42.6-86.8 at 172030. 18 machine guns, 7 mortars, 30 AT guns, 1 field piece and 7 OP's destroyed by artillery fire. Six POW's taken.

b. Enemy Combat efficiency. Low.

c. Morale. Low.

d. Status of enemy administrative support. PW reports indicate enemy is low on supplies and ammunition on east bank of NAKTONG River.

e. Weather. Clear with early morning ground haze.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The Enemy can:

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(1) Defend his present position east of Naktong-gang with elements of 3 disorganized infantry regiments supported by artillery.

(2) Attack our front or left flanks with elements of 3 disorganized infantry regiments supported by artillery.

(3) Withdraw west of NAKTONG RIVER with elements of 3 disorganized infantry regiments.

(4) Reinforce his units on the east bank of the Naktong-gang with unknown elements.

b. The enemy is definitely disorganized. It is believed he is attempting to maintain his defensive position east of the NAKTONG RIVER in order to cover the withdrawal of the main bulk of his forces from the bridgehead. 1000-2000 enemy of 3 disorganized infantry regiments are believed remaining in the bridgehead area.

c. In view of the foregoing the probability of adoption of enemy capabilities are a. (1) and (3) concurrently.

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

ENCLOSURE (1): Interrogation Report #0009.

O F F I C I A L:

E. G. Van Orman
E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2

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ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #13.

HEADQUARTERS 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE
163rd Military Intelligence Service Detachment
FPO San Francisco, California

18 August 1950

INTERROGATION REPORT #0009.
PLACE OF INTERROGATION: YONGSAN, KOREA.
DATE OF INTERROGATION: 18 August, 1950.

Name: PAK, HYO SAM

Rank: Pvt.

Ser. No.: None.

Age: 28

Unit: 2nd Squad, 3rd Platoon, Mortar Co., 1st Bn., 16th Regt,
4th Div.Home Address: Hwang Ae-do, Anna-gun, Bung San Myon, Shing Dan
Ri, #22.Where captured: Captured at about 2 km S of TO-KOK-RI, Korea.
Date of capture: 1000 hrs. 18 August, 1950.

Enemy were located on the hill about 2 km S of TO-KOK-RI
School house. However, the prisoners unit started withdraw-
ing to the West early in the morning of 18 August, 1950. PW
did not know the destination of his unit. Prior to their
withdrawal, there were approximately 1000 troops, however,
due to the heavy casualties, the present strength of the unit
was unknown.

16th Regiment had twenty-seven (27) 107mm M-1938 Mountain
Mortars when they arrived at TO-KOK-RI; however, up to mid-
night of 17 August, 17 mortars were lost. PW saw 7 (seven)
76mm M-1943 Howitzers but he heard that there were only three
(3) left which were usable. Position of the artillery was
about 4 km W of the place where PW was captured. PW believed
that 16th Regt had approximately three-hundred (300) M-1891/30
rifles, thirty (30) D.P. light machine guns, eighty (80) PPSH
M-1941 Tommy Guns, twenty (20) company Light Machine Guns
M-1946, also the PW's Regt were using about fifty (50) US Car-
ines which were captured at TAEJON. Up until 16 August,
enemy troops had about 70 rounds of ammunition each. PW stated
that there were no supply of ammunition on 17 August.

PW's Regt had four (4) tanks (Joseph Stalin-1 or 2 Heavy tanks)
but three (3) were damaged by the US airplanes yesterday (17
August), and the other one was unable to move because of the air
attack by the US planes.

Information is fairly reliable.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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PW was fairly cooperative during interrogation.

Memo B. U.S. de 900
/s/ FUJIO F. ASANO (OA)
1st Lt., Inf.
Commanding

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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2:EGVO:js
19 Aug 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT #14

Period covered: 181800-191800 Aug 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Point of contact. No enemy contact east of NAKTONG RIVER.

b. Identifications. 3 documents indicate tentative identification of 4th Independent Brigade, assumed to be the same unit as the 4th Division prior to redesignation. Other identifications not previously listed include:

6th Arty Co., 2d Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Div.
2d Co., 1st Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Div.
1st Co., 1st Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Div.
Sig Co., 5th Regt., 4th Div.
1/2 Tk Plt., 3rd Bn., 5th Regt., 4th Div.
5th Co., 3rd Bn., 5th Regt., 4th Div.
Mortar Co., 3rd Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Div.
9th Co., 3rd Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Div.
8th Co., 3rd Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Div.
2d Co., 1st Bn., 18th Regt., 4th Div.
3rd Co., 1st Bn., 18th Regt., 4th Div.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Banzai attack by 10-20 well armed enemy at 182100 on objective three vicinity 40.3-87. No resistance during day. Light artillery fell on CP 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines late during period. Enemy placed 6 rounds of smoke projectiles on NAKTONG RIVER apparently trying to cover his retreat.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. None new.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

(3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units. Negative.

(6) Artillery. See 3a below.

(7) Infantry. 10-20 man Banzai attack on "G" Company vicinity 40.3-87 at 182100. Air reported suspected enemy collecting point West of NAKTONG RIVER vicinity 37.2-84.8.

(8) Other elements. Negative.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. Estimated 700 enemy casualties in addition to those previously reported. 24 POW's taken during period. Following enemy ordnance recovered: 4-122mm guns; 2-105mm Howitzers; 6-47mm guns and 1 SP 76mm gun.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. Low.

c. Morale. Low.

d. Status of enemy administrative support. Negative.

e. Weather. Clear with early morning haze.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Negative.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Defend his present positions west of NAKTONG RIVER with disorganized elements of 3 infantry regiments supported by an undetermined amount of artillery and armor.

(2) Reinforce his defense with elements of undetermined strength.

b. In view of his general withdrawal from the Yongsan area, the enemy is believed to be still disorganized and on the defensive. His forces are believed to consist of the remaining elements of three infantry regiments of the 4th Division.

c. In view of the foregoing, the enemy's capabilities are listed in their order of probability; 5 a.(1) concurrently with 5 a.(2).

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT.

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E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

E. G. Van Orman
E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2

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ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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2:WEB:js
031800 Sep 50

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 15

Period covered: 021800-031800 Sep 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. See overlay.

b. Point of contact. Vicinity of 49.3-90.2 to 50.8-87.7.

c. Identifications. (1) 3rd Bn., 1st Regt., 9th NK Div.
(2) 3rd Bn., 2nd Regt., 9th NK Div.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Enemy resistance to our advance, which began at 0800, 1,000 yds west of Yongsan, was moderate throughout most of the day. The enemy used small arms, automatic weapons, hand grenades, anti-tank guns, mortar and artillery to oppose our advance westward from Yongsan area. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell in only one sector vicinity 50.6-89.7. Our tanks succeeded in knocking out three enemy medium tanks and a fourth was probably knocked out while artillery accounted for one and a probable. The enemy defense of the high ground was typical.

b. Enemy tactics and weapons or other materials. Negative.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Enemy fuel dump believed hit by artillery preparation at 0750 vicinity 51.5-90.1.

(3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.

(4) Anti-Tank Units. Air reported AT Gun 50.5-88.1 at 031145. Confirmed by 5th Marines. 2/5 reports being fired on by AT Guns.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units. Air reported 3 enemy tanks vicinity 50-88.8 at 031145. 5th Marines reported tanks vicinity 51.7-88.9 at 031150. 3 enemy tanks destroyed by our

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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tanks and 1 by our artillery vicinity 49.9-88.9 (reported 031400). 1 tank probably knocked out by our artillery and 1 probably knocked out by tanks, vicinity 49.5-87.1 (reported 031400). A seventh tank observed also in this general area.

(6) Artillery. 030900 Air reported 12 enemy artillery pieces vicinity 44.2-88.2 to 44.2-88.7. Parked hub to hub. 030945 our artillery fired on 12 artillery pieces. Large explosion followed. Believed mostly neutralized. Air reported 8 camouflaged guns vicinity 43.2-88.3 at 031400. 2/5 vicinity 51.4-88.9 under artillery fire approximately 031500. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell approximately 031630 vicinity 50.6-89.7. Air reported one artillery piece destroyed vicinity 44.2-88.9.

(7) Infantry. Air reported 100 enemy vicinity 47.5-89.4 at 030915. Enemy positions vicinity 52.3-89.5 NW to 51.5-90.0 across road junction 50.9-89.5 to 50.6-88.4. 5th Marines reported at 031100 200-300 enemy with vehicles vicinity grid square 51-82. 1/5 received stiff small arms, automatic weapons fire and hand grenade action. 2nd Infantry Division reported many enemy troops crossing river vicinity 51.3-80.2 at 031155. Air reported 200 enemy troops moving west from 50-82.8 at 031400. Enemy dug in on ridge line vicinity 49.5-89. 5th Marines reported enemy troop concentration undetermined size vicinity 49.5-89.3 to 49.4-89.7 and in vicinity 50-90 to 50-91. Air reported possible withdrawal in southern sector near river, with 300 enemy troops moving westward on road vicinity 52.2-81.8 at 031600, with 2 horsedrawn artillery pieces. 5th Marine reported stiff resistance from enemy pocket vicinity 50-89.9 at 031700.

(8) Other elements. Two PW's captured during period. From 1st and 2nd Regiments, 9th NK Division. One was 1stLt. political officer.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. 500 enemy casualties. 4 tanks destroyed, 2 probables. Undetermined number artillery pieces. Possible enemy fuel dump.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. 75%.

c. Morale. Low, according to PW's.

d. Status of enemy administrative support. Food supply poor. Ammunition supply good.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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e. Weather. Heavy haze and smoke early morning.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

4,000 refugees screened in vicinity Yongsan during the day.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Continue to put up a determined defense in the sector to our front with elements of one division supported by an undetermined amount of artillery and supported by tanks and SP guns.

(2) Counterattack our positions to the front or left flank at anytime with elements of one division supported by artillery and armor.

(3) Reinforce either of the above with elements of one division from across the Naktong River reinforced by elements of the 105th Armored Division.

b. Discussion. The enemy is considered somewhat spent following his drive into this bulge and is believed not too well organized as result of his losses in the offensive and as result of our air and artillery during the past three days. While he is capable of minor counterattack and action in our rear areas against supply installations and the MSR, he is not believed strong enough to push his earlier offensive drive. In view of his condition and the favorable nature of the terrain he is thought to be more capable of trying to stop our advance westward.

c. In view of the foregoing the capabilities are listed in their order of probability; 5 a.(3) occurring concurrently with 5 a.(1) or 5 a.(2).

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

O F F I C I A L:

E. G. VAN ORMAN
E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2

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VMO 6 (1)
CG MFPAC (1)
CG 1st Mar Div (1)
CG 24th Inf Div (1)
CG 25th Inf Div (1)
CG 1st Cav Div (1)
CG 2d Inf Div (1)

ENCLOSURE: (1) Prisoner of War Interrogation Report #0035.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 15

HEADQUARTERS 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE
163RD MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DETACHMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION REPORT

REPORT NO.: 0035
TEMP PW NO.: 1-M 0035

3 September 1950
Evaluation: C-3

I. PRISONER AND DESIGNATION:

Name: SO, Chung Gun Rank: 1st Lt. Age: 34 Ser No.: Unk
Place and Date of Capture: YONGSAN, on 3 September 1950.
Capturing Unit: H&S, 2nd Bn., 5th Marines.

II. ORGANIZATION:a. Own Unit:

1. Organization: 9th Div., 1st Regt., Hq, 3rd Bn.,
at YONGSAN, on 3 Sep 50 (Code No: 317)
2. Strength: Original strength: 600. Crossed the NAK-
TONG RIVER at 2100 hours on 30 Aug 50.
Walked across near "Shimban-ni".
3. Disposition: Troops all dispersed. Disposition unk.
4. Weapons and Artillery: Originally had four 82mm
mortars three 45mm AT Guns;
six M16's, nine PPSH SMO's,
and remainder had Mosin M-
1891/30 rifles. Present
weapon status unknown.

b. Other Units:

1. Supporting Units: 1st Bn, 1st Regt, 9th Div, (lo-
cated 4 kilometers W of YONGSAN);
2nd Bn, 1st Regt, 9th Div.
2. Right Flank: 2nd Bn., 1st Regt, 9th Div, located on
right flank of 3rd Bn area.
3. Left Flank: No units known to POW.
4. Armor in Support: 3 tanks in 1st Regt, 9th Div.
Observed on 30 Aug 50.
5. Remarks: 2nd Bn, 1st Regt, 9th Div was considered
the crack battalion of the 1st Regt.

III. ENEMY INTENTIONS:

- a. POW: Follow unit to objective.
- b. UNIT: Reach MERYANG by 2400, 3 Sep 50.
- c. Hearsay: None.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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IV. INSTALLATIONS AND ESTABLISHMENTS:

- a. Regimental Headquarters was located 6 kilometers west of YONGSAN (approx. 1144-1384.).
- b. 1st Battalion Headquarters was located approximately 2 kilometers west of YONGSAN.

V. ENERGY PATROL ACTIVITIES: Unknown.VI. CASUALTIES:

Troops of 3rd Battalion, 1st Regt, 9th Div retreated over the hill with civilian clothes carrying only their weapons at 1200 hours, 1 September 1950. Of these, there were the following casualties as of 3 September 1950:

- a. KIA: Approx. 400.
- b. WIA: 80
- c. MIA: Unknown.

VII. REPLACEMENT: Unknown.VIII. AMERICAN POW:

POW observed 6 US Army personnel on 23 Aug 50 at SINBONG-

NI.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS:

- a. Morale; Low
- b. Personalities: 1st Reg'tal CO: Col. CHUN, Sun Il.
3rd Bn CO: Major CHUN, Uk Chon
- c. Training received: Oral rifle training in Seoul, Korea.
- d. Chemical warfare: Unknown.
- e. Biological warfare: Unknown.

REMARKS:

The 3rd Bn CO (Major CHUN, Uk Chon), changed clothes along with other MC troops and retreated over the hill NE of YONGSAN.

POW was very cooperative but due to immediate disposition to higher headquarters, the interrogator was unable to obtain detailed information.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER QUESTIONING: In regards to supporting units, personalities, and general information.

INTERROGATED: Cpl. Shinomura
BY

/s/ MASAO B. UYEDA
1stLt., MI

ANNEX DAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
4 Sep 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 16

Period covered: 031800-041800 September, 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. See overlay.
- b. Point of contact. 46.5-39.6 to 46.5-36.4.
- c. Identifications. PW's from the following enemy units were captured during the period:

3rd Bn., 1st Regt., 9th Div.
1st AT Co., 1st Bn., 1st Regt., 9th Div.
3rd Bn., 2nd Regt., 9th Div.
3rd Bn., 3rd Regt., 9th Div.
1st Bn., 1st Regt., 16th Brig.
Recon Patrol, Ind. Co., 16th Brig.
Signal Bn., 9th Div.
2nd Repl. Co., 9th Div.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Enemy action during the period was characterized by light resistance which stiffened late in the period on the right flank and by groups of 250 to 300 enemy retreating westward toward the Naktong River. Enemy attempted counterattack against our left flank at 0430 but was easily repulsed. His resistance to our advance during the daylight consisted of small arms, automatic weapons and sporadic mortar fires, staging a stiff defense on our right flank toward the end of the period using automatic weapons in the high ground.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Enemy observed withdrawing at 041215 laying mines behind them.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

- (1) Air Force. Negative.
- (2) Administrative Units. Negative.
- (3) Anti-Aircraft defenses. Negative.
- (4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(5) Armored and Motorized Units. 031945 2 tanks, apparently unmanned, reported 49.4-88.9. 041015 enemy tanks reported 46-88. Air strike made. Results unknown. 041330 2 groups of 2 tanks each 40.6-85.0. 041530 5 tanks and vehicles moving NE 40.6-84.5. 041130 1 tank at 44.6-86.4. Unknown number enemy tanks destroyed during period.

(6) Artillery. 040850 Air reported 3 enemy artillery pieces 42.5-86.5. At 040930 air reported 2 enemy artillery pieces vicinity 44.3-88.7. 032000 enemy mortar, 6 artillery pieces observed vicinity 43.7-86.7 and 44.0-87.9 by 2nd Infantry Division personnel coming back through our lines. Air made strike on many artillery pieces during period. Number destroyed is unknown at close of period.

(7) Infantry. Resistance consisted chiefly of small arms and automatic weapons fire. Used automatic weapons fire heavily during last two hours of period utilizing high ground to our right front. 032215 enemy mortar fire fell on 5th Marines CP. Enemy counterattacked 1/5 at 040430. Occasional small arms fire throughout night. 041015 air reported 15 to 20 enemy around AT gun. Strafed. Gun out of action and enemy scattered. Air reported enemy OP 48.2-89.2 at 041145. Also troops at 47.7-89.5 and 200 troops at 45.8-88.6. At 041215 air reported 200 troops moving westward vicinity 44.3-88.6 laying mines after them. Hit by artillery. Many dead. Groups of 300 reported moving westward from vicinity 44.8-88.7 along road. Air reported at 041530 estimated 2,000 enemy vicinity 45.6-88.6 and 2,000 enemy milling around vicinity 38-88. 5th Marines reported at 1800 that enemy was retreating in groups of 250-300 toward the NAKTONG RIVER.

(8) Other elements. Information on mine fields laid by enemy to be submitted tomorrow.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. 2,000 enemy casualties. 18 PW's taken during period. Several truck loads of enemy equipment reported late in period. Undetermined number of tanks and artillery pieces knocked out by end of period.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. Low.

c. Morale. Low.

d. Status of enemy administrative support. Fuel supply systems east of Naktong River reportedly poor. Supply of artillery ammunition poor. Small arms supply adequate.

e. Weather. Rainstorm early in period. Early morning fog and haze. Broken clouds throughout day.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

See appendix (1).

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Undertake a determined defense along the high ground to our front and left flank with elements of one infantry division and one brigade supported by artillery and armor.

(2) Continue to withdraw toward the Nakdong River, delaying in successive positions our advance, with elements of the 9th North Korean Division and the 16th Brigade, supported by an undetermined amount of artillery and armor.

(3) Attack our present positions at any time along our front or against our left flank, utilizing the trails in the low ground which lead into our positions, with elements of an infantry division and a brigade, supported by artillery and armor.

(4) Reinforce any of the above with elements of one infantry division, possibly the 2nd North Korean Division supported by artillery and armor.

b. Discussion. Although the enemy's strength is considered somewhat depleted after his own offensive drive to establish the bridgehead in this area and after being subjected to strong ground, artillery and air attacks for the past two days, he is still thought to be of sufficient strength to establish a determined defense against our advance, especially in this true when considered in conjunction with the favorable high ground onto which he has fallen during this period. It is believed he will try to hold the bridgehead so that reinforcements can be brought across the river. It is not believed that he can make a complete organized attack with elements of the division and brigade simultaneously, but he is considered capable of offensive action against limited areas, and is especially capable of attacking administrative installations and blocking the MSR.

c. In view of the foregoing, the capabilities are listed in their order of probability, 5 a.(1) occurring concurrently with 5 a.(4).

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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APPENDICES: (1) CIC report.
(2) Interrogation Report.

O F F I C I A L:

E. G. Van Orman

E. G. VAN ORMAN

Lt Col., USMC

CofS, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (5)
CO 1st Bn 11th Marines (1)
CO H&S BN (5)
FILE (3)

Each Staff Section (1)
CG Fwd Ech 1st MarAirWing (1)
CG FMFPAC (1)
CG 1st MarDiv (1)
CG 24th Inf Div (1)
CG 25th Inf Div (1)
CG 1st Cav Div (1)
CG 2d Inf Div (1)

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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APPENDIX (1) TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 16

EXTRACT FROM DAILY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY #9

Period covered: 0001/4 to 1800/4 September, 1950.

PAK, Nak Soo, 2dLt., North Korean People's Army (NKPA), age 24, captured by the 5th Marines Regiment at YONGSAN (1163-1388) was interrogated and revealed:

A cultural Guidance Unit is an organic part of the NKPA. This unit is composed of 3 sections: (a) library (2) movie and (3) publications section, and exists down to the company level. Duties of the Cultural Guidance Officers are (a) post propaganda posters prepared by monitoring radio broadcasts and distribute hand bills concerning the news.

PW entered Kim Il Sung University at Pyongyang in 1948 and graduated 30 June 1950. 200 students of his class volunteered for the NKPA and were accepted as Cultural Guidance Officers. An unknown number of those accepted were female. No formal report. PW turned over to 2nd Inf Div.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

APPENDIX (2) PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 16

PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION REPORT

REPORT NO.: 0043.

DATE: 4 September

TEMP. PW NO.: 1-M 0043.

EVALUATION: C-3

1. PRISONER AND DESIGNATION:

NAME: SHIN, Jong Ku RANK: Pvt. AGE: 18 Ser No.: None.

PLACE & DATE OF CAPTURE: 0930 hrs. 4 Sep 1950.

CAPTURING UNIT: S-2 1st Bn., 5th Marines.

2. ORGANIZATION:

a. Own Unit:

(1) Organization (Composition): 9th Div, 2nd Replacement Co., 1st Platoon, 4th Sq. There were three (3) Replacement Co. at YONGSAN on 2d September and he was shot by his platoon leader when he tried to retreat. Replacement Co's came from SEOUL. PW was captured when he hid in a destroyed NK T-34 Tank on the 4th of September. PW was inducted at YUNG DUNG POH, outskirts of SEOUL on 2 August, 1950. Source domicile address is #709 PYONG JUN NI, AN AK GUN, WHANG HAI DO. He received 10 days of Infantry Rifle Training with 100 men to become non-commissioned officers.

(2) Strength: PW estimated the 9th Div strength at nine thousand (9,000) men and heard that 900 of these were wounded. Of the 100 men who took training with him about 50 men died and of the remaining 50 men, 30 died and 20 were wounded.

(3) Disposition: Unknown.

(4) Weapons & Artillery: PW said that his company was only armed with MOSIN M/1891 Rifles. PW said that he saw six (6) 120mm guns in the division and did not know of any other artillery because they traveled during the nights only.

b. OTHER UNITS:

(1) Supporting Unit: PW stated that the 4th Division was supporting the 9th Div. and heard that it's strength was up to about 50%.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(2) Right Flank: PW stated that the 2nd Regt., 9th Div, was located on the right flank of his company.

(3) Left Flank: Unknown.

(4) Armor in Support: PW stated he only saw two (2) T-34 Tanks when he crossed the Naktong River on 1st September at 2300 hours.

5. ENEMY INTENTIONS:

a. PW: Unknown.

b. Unit: PW said that the unit objective was PUSAN. No further information.

c. Hearsay. Unknown.

INSTALLATIONS & ESTABLISHMENT: PW did not know anything concerning OP's or CP's. They gathered food supplies from villages. Source were given only 50 rounds of ammunition. Did not know about supply and ammo dumps.

6. ENEMY PATROL ACTIVITIES: PW stated that his company dispatched 5 men patrol every night at 2200 hours. Information on Guerrillas unknown.

7. CASUALTIES:

a. KIA: Out of his company of 100 men, 50 men died and out of the remaining 50 men, 30 were killed.

b. WIA: Out of the remaining 50 men, 20 were wounded. PW heard that 900 men of the Division were either dead or wounded.

c. Missing: Unknown.

8. REPLACEMENT:

a. Personnel. Unknown.

b. Materiel. Unknown.

9. AMERICAN POW: POW stated that he saw about fifty (50) American POW's at YUNG DUNG POH, outskirts of SEOUL about 15 days ago.

10. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Morale; PW said that regular army troops were willing to fight but troops recently inducted despised fighting.

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b. Personalities: Unknown.

c. Training Received: PW received about 10 days of Infantry training on rifle only. No other units trained with PW.

d. Chemical Warfare: Unknown.

e. Biological Warfare: Unknown.

REMARKS: POW spoke Japanese and has no information of value because of short length of service.

INTERROGATED BY: Sgt. Yoshio Ishii.

/s/ MASAO. B. UYEDA
1stLt., MI
Team Commander

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
5 Sep 1950

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 17

Period covered: 041800 to 051800 September, 1950.

MAP: AMS L751 KOREA 1:50,000.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Point of contact. 43.5-87.3 to 44.5-86.6. 43.6-87.7 to 43.9-88.8.

b. Identifications. PW's from the following NK units were captured during the period:

3rd Bn., 1st Regt., 9th Div.
2nd Bn., 2nd Regt., 9th Div.
3rd Bn., 2nd Regt., 9th Div.
1st Bn., 1st Regt., 9th Div.
1st Bn., 16th Regt., 4th Div.
4th Bn., 5th Regt., 4th Div.
2nd Bn., 16th Brigade.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Enemy resistance to our advance moderate throughout the period, stiffening slightly late in period. The enemy continued to use small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and artillery fires, hitting 5th Marines OP with heavy mortar fire at 1530. Moderate to heavy artillery fires were received along entire front lines and forward CP's at 2400. Enemy attempted to stop our advance by launching a counter-attack with an estimated 100-150 men and 3 tanks at 1330.

b. Enemy Tactics and weapons or other materiel. Numerous instances of enemy booby traps were found during period. Hand grenades were most commonly used and with enemy dead, weapons and communication equipment. Deliberate minefield reported using wooden mines.

c. Operations of Enemy Component Elements.

(1) Air Force. Negative.

(2) Administrative Units. Negative.

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(3) Anti-Aircraft Defenses. Small arms and possibly 50 caliber fire from large enemy concentration vicinity 8.5-89.5 cut fuel line on one of our planes early in period, forcing pilot to abandon plane.

(4) Anti-Tank Units. Negative.

(5) Armored and Motorized Units. Enemy counterattacked our lines at 1330 vicinity 42.7-87.2 with 100-150 men and 3 tanks. 1 tank knocked out by our tanks.

(6) Artillery. Enemy artillery fire fell on front lines and forward CP's at 2400. Light mortar and flat trajectory artillery fire (possibly tank) received by our troops at 1505 vicinity 42-87.

(7) Infantry. 3/5 reported 2,000 troops vicinity 45.5-8.6. Possible enemy pocket of unknown size reported by 2nd Division vicinity 54-81. 10-15 enemy observed on hill 116 49.5-89.8 at 0805. 5th Marines estimated 3,000 to 4,000 withdrawing to high ground vicinity 86-40 during early morning hours. PW stated 16th Brigade crossed river westward during last night. He preferred to surrender. Air reported at 1110 that there was no evidence of enemy crossing river. 1/5 counterattacked at 1330 by 100-150 enemy.

(8) Other Elements. Negative.

OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. 1000 enemy KIA during period. 14 POWs. 3 enemy tanks knocked out during last period, 2 probable. 3 tanks knocked out this period. All by our tank action.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. Low.

c. Morale. Low.

d. Status of enemy administrative support. Enemy dead appeared to be well fed with excess food on them.

e. Weather. Clear during night. Heavy rain throughout day. Tactical air could not operate.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. See appendix 2.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD.

a. The enemy can:

(1) Conduct a determined defense in the high ground to

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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our front and east of the Naktong River with elements of the 9th Division and 16th Brigade, probably with two regiments strength, supported by an undetermined amount of artillery and armor.

(2) Attack our present positions at anytime from his positions in the high ground against small sectors on our front or left flank with elements of the 9th Division and 16th Brigade, with two regiments strength supported by an undetermined amount of artillery and armor.

(3) Conduct delaying action from his present positions to cover his withdrawal westward across the Naktong River.

(4) Reinforce any of the above with elements of unknown size from across the Naktong River, and elements east of the river.

b. Discussion. Due to inclement weather the enemy has been spared attacks by our air during daylight hours, thereby being allowed a chance to reorganize his units and to develop his defensive positions against our further advance. In addition, there have been no reports of his withdrawal across the river but rather indications that he is moving to the favorable high ground and one report that he is digging in. One PW stated that the 16th Brigade had withdrawn across the river, however, this is not considered factual since the PW preferred to surrender and left them early. There have also appeared during the period 2 PW's from the 4th Division, one from the 16th Regiment and 1 from the 5th Regiment. He is probably capable of mustering two regiments at this time with a good reinforcement potential.

c. In view of the foregoing, the capabilities are listed in the order of probability, 5 a.(1) concurrently with 5 a.(4),

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

APPENDICES: (1) POW Interrogation Reports.
(2) Extracts from Daily Counterintelligence Summary.
(3) Extracts from Station list of 2nd Regt.,
9th Div.

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O F F I C I A L:

*Lt Col Van Orman*L. G. VAN ORMAN
Lt Col., USMC
ACoPS, G-2DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (5)
CO 1st Bn 11th Marines (1)
CO H&S Bn (5)
FILE (3)Each Staff Section (1)
CG Fwd Ech 1st MarAirWing (1)
CG 1st MarDiv (1)
CG FMFPAC (1)
CG 24th InfDiv (1)
CG 25th Inf Div (1)
CG 1st Cav Div (1)
CG 2d Inf Div (1)

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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APPENDIX (1) TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 17

PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 0045

DATE: 4 September 1950

SERP. PW NO: 1-M 0045.

EVALUATION: C-3 Ser. No; Non

1. PRISONER AND DESIGNATION:

Name: SU, Sung Bong Rank: Pvt. Age: 19
 Place & Date of Capture: YONGSAN 4 September 1950.
 Capturing Unit: "B" Co., 5th Marines.

2. ORGANIZATION:a. Own Unit:

(1) Organization: 1st Sqd., 3rd Co., 1st Bn., 16th Brigade. The PW's 16th Brigade was formerly located in CHORWON. This whole Brigade came on foot through SEUL, TAEJON, KOCH'ANG, KORYONG and crossed the NAKTONG RIVER on 1 Sep 1950 at 1900 hours.

The 16th Brigade consisted of the following:

- 3 Infantry Battalions.
- 1 Signal Battalion.
- 1 Tank Battalion
- 10 Medical men to 1 Battalion.

(2) Strength: Approximately 2000.

(3) Dispositions: The whole Brigade was in YONGSAN.

(4) Weapons & Artillery: One infantry Battalion of the 16th Brigade composed of:

- 3 Rifle Co. (100 rds ammo per man).
- 1 HMG Co. (amount HMG unk). (800 rds per gun).
- 1 Mortar Co (amount of mortar unk).

NOTE:

There were 20 artillery pieces brought as far as the NAKTONG RIVER but this was not brought across because of no transportation or bridges. Size of these artillery was approximately 6 inches in diameter and 6½ feet long. The location of these artilleries on the other side of the river was unknown.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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b. Other Units:

(1) Supporting Units: None.

(2) Right flank: 3rd Bn., 16th Brigade.

(3) Left flank: 2nd Bn., 16th Brigade.

(4) Armor in Support: There were estimated 50 (approx. 20 ton) tanks that came with the 16th Brigade, reaching the NAKTONG RIVER, 18 tanks crossed on the eve of 1 September 1950 (1900 hours). Other tanks remained on the other side of the river.

PW saw 3 tanks withdrawing west on 3 September 1950 at 1400 hours due to air bombing and artillery shelling. The other 15 tanks that crossed the river was unknown to the PW.

5. ENEMY INTENTIONS (Attitude):

a. PW: No intention except to take orders.

b. Unit: The 16th Brigade orders was to reach TAEGU, pushing through MIRYANG within 3 days after crossing the NAKTONG RIVER.

c. Hearsay: None.

4. INSTALLATIONS & ESTABLISHMENTS:

a. OP: The OP was located on top of a hill East of YONGAN. (Hill location unknown). One person was posted on shift of every 2 hours).

b. CP: There was no separate CP with the 16th Brigade. 11 Battalion CO's came across on 1 September 1950 at 1000 hours. The CO of all battalions was intermixed with the soldiers.

c. Fuel Supply: Ample fuel was hauled up to the NAKTONG RIVER but due to no transportation nor bridges increasing, all this was still on the other side of the river. The storage area of these fuels on the other side of the river was unknown.

3. ENEMY PATROL ACTIVITIES: Unknown.5. CASUALTIES:

a. KIA: 100 Infantry men.

b. WIA: 100 wounded.

c. MIA: Unknown.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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7. REPLACEMENTS:

- a. Personnel: Unknown.
- b. Material: Unknown.

8. AMERICAN POW:

PW saw one American PW in KO CHANG, KOREA. This American PW was seen 15 days ago. No other information on this American PW was known.

9. MISCELLANEOUS:

- a. Morale. Very low.
- b. Personalities: The 16th Brigade CO was a full Colonel. This CO and his Ass't did not cross the NAKTONG RIVER. Name of the Colonel and Ass't was unknown.

REMARK:

PW stated that after crossing the NAKTONG RIVER, they all had no food. Due to this, they went to the fields which was surrounding their area and ate potatoes. Occasionally rice was obtained from the village.

INTERROGATED: PFC. Matsushita,
BY

/s/ MASAO B. UYEDA
1stLt., MI
Team Commander.

REPORT NO: 0046

4 September 1950

TEMP. PW NO.: 1-M 0046

EVALUATION: B-3

1. Prisoner and Designation:

Name: SON, Yong Chel - Rank: Pvt. Age: 21 Ser No: Nono.
Place and Date of Capture: Right of 1st Bn Marine Obj #2
on road, 4 Sep 1950.
Capturing Unit: B Company, 1st Bn Marines.

2. ORGANIZATION:

a. Own Unit:

(1) Organization: Plt (1st., 1 Anti-Tank Co., 1st Bn,
1st Regt., 9th Div.

Original strength of the Regt. was 2,400. The
Regiment Commander was unidentified Col. Regt. Hqs was located

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approximately 4 kil. W of 1st Bn obj #2. Three tanks came with the Regt. 30 Aug 1950 and crossed the NAKTONG RIVER (location unknown). The bridge was constructed underwater to conceal it. One tank was destroyed, but the remaining 2 retreated toward the NAKTONG RIVER, 3 Sep 1950.

1 Bn & 1 Co HQs was located where the PW was captured 4 Sep 1950. Strength of the Bn & Co was unknown. The Bn Commander was PAK, Nak Soo who was wounded on the shoulder and sent to the rear. The company Commander was an unidentified Captain (killed in action). The 1st Anti-Tank Company had originally nine 14.5mm Anti-Tank guns which were used to destroy tanks. At 100 meters, it can only penetrate 3mm of steel.

The 1st Anti-Tank platoon originally consisted of 22 men. There were 9 anti-tank platoons in the 1st Bn. Two men were assigned to each anti-tank gun.

b. Other Units: Unknown.

3. ENEMY MISSION:

9th Division was to replace the defeated 4th Division. The mission was to advance to CHINHAE (date unknown). Reason for heading toward YONGSAN instead of CHINHAE was to confuse the UN Troops.

4. INSTALLATION AND ESTABLISHMENT:

Unknown.

5. ENEMY PATROL ACTIVITIES. Unknown.

6. CASUALTIES:

a. MIA: Unknown.

b. MIA: Unknown.

c. MIA: Unknown.

7. REPLACEMENT: Unknown.

8. AMERICAN POW: On 15 August 1950 the POW observed about 30 American POW's near PYEN TIAK BEING MARCHED northward. Also, 50 American POW's were seen transported on the same day on a 2 1/2 ton truck heading north at PYONGYANG.

9. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Morale. Troops morale was very low after seeing US tanks, planes and vehicles while the NK Army had none. Reason for not deserting was fear of being killed by own men.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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REMARKS: POW was very cooperative and gave all information concerning his unit.

BRIEFED BY: Cpl. ANDO.

INTERROGATED BY: PFC. NIKIDA.

/s/ MASAO B. UYEDA
1st Lt., MI
Team Commander

REPORT NO.: 0054

Date: 4 September 1950

TEMP. PW NO.: 1-M 0054

EVALUATION: C-3

1. PRISONER & DESIGNATION:

Name: HON, Yol Po Rank: Pvt. Age: 19 Ser No.: None
Place & Date of Capture: KUMA Primary School near YONG-
SAN, 1700 hrs., on 4 Sep 1950.
Capturing Unit: 1st Bn, "B" Co., 5th Marine Regiment.

2. ORGANIZATION:

a. Own Unit:

- (1) Organization: 2nd Sq., 1st Plt., 45mm Gun Co.,
9th Div. PW Co. located at about 1
or 2 km W of KUMA Primary School
near YONGSAN. Code of unit unk.
- (2) Strength: 56 men started to cross NAKTONG RIVER
with his Co and 39 were killed while
crossing 17 remained.
- (3) Disposition: Div CP was located about 4 km behind
of PW Co.
- (4) Weapons & Artillery: In his Co., there were six
(6) 45mm Guns, thirty six
(36) PPSH, twelve (12) rifles,
in PW squad the leader had a
pistol, twelve (12) men car-
ried PPSH, and four (4) men
carried rifles.

b. Other Units:

- (1) Supporting Unit: 76mm Co., was located about 2 km
back of PW Co and the 120mm gun
Co., was located about 2 km back
of the 76mm Gun Co.
- (2) Right Flank: PW heard that either the 7th or the
2nd Inf Div was located in one of the
flanks.

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(3) Left Flank: (Refer to above paragraph).

(4) Armor in Support: Unknown.

3. ENEMY MISSION:

a. PW: Was told that they were going to PUSAN so just kept on advancing.

b. Unit: PW did not know what route, but all he knew was that their objective was PUSAN.

c. Hearsay: All the men in the PW's co was talking about the superiority of the American Air Force and the inferiority of the American Infantry Men and that is the reason why the NK although without airplanes, are charging on the ground with thoughts that they can beat the infantry man.

4. INSTALLATIONS & ESTABLISHMENTS: Unknown because of their retreat.

5. ENEMY PATROL ACTIVITIES: Unknown.

6. CASUALTIES:

a. KIA: 39 men.

b. WIA: 17 men.

c. MIA: None. (Figures from his Co.)

7. REPLACEMENTS:

a. Personnel: Heard that replacements were conscripted from the SK population. Figures unknown.

b. Materials, Unknown.

8. AMERICAN POW'S.

About 15 to 20 of July, PW heard that there were about 60 American POW's in PENGYONG.

9. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Morale. Low.

b. Personalities; PW's commanding officer was LEE, Hik Sun, Age about 25-27; about 5'6" and slim.

c. Training Received: 2 months training as rifleman at ORWON.

d. Chemical Warfare: Unknown.

e. Biological Warfare: Unknown.

REMARKS:

PW was a farmer and had no education beside self study.

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Drafted into NK Army 1 Feb 1950 at CHORWON. His travel to YONGSAN was through KIM CHON, SEUL, SUWAN, TAEJON, HYOPCHON, to YONGSAN. PW was healthy and cooperated during interrogation.

INTERROGATED BY: ST

/s/ MASAO B. UYEDA
1st Lt., MI
Team Commander

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APPENDIX (2) TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

EXTRACTS FROM DAILY COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 10

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY: Pak Chun Shin, Pvt. (NKPA) stated that he had been conscripted from his home at Shilchon Myon, Kwangjoo-kun, Kyonggi Do, located in South Korea, by North Korean troops on 6 August, 1950 and informed that if he did not serve with them his family would be liquidated. Pak also stated that thirty (30) others from his town had also been conscripted in the same manner.

BACKGROUND LOYALTY: Background check completed on 4 Koreans Nationals with negative results. All are prospective employees of Mess Section, 1st PMB. Interested officer and G-2, 1st PMB notified; no formal report.

REFUGEES: 250 refugees screened in vicinity of Panggok (1148.5-1388.9). These refugees were removed to Kugya (1155-1389.8).

MISCELLANEOUS: Won, Sung Kun, a 1stLt. Cultural Officer in the NKPA stated that on 23 April, 1950, he and three-hundred (300) other Koreans who were members of the 8th Route Army in China were ordered to prepare to leave China to fight for their homeland (North Korea). During Won's return he observed fifteen (15) Russian Army personnel in Pyongyang about the 1st of July 1950 who had been instructors in the operation of tanks.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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APPENDIX (3) TO PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 17

EXTRACTS FROM STATION LIST OF 2ND REGT 9TH DIV.

<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE (?)</u>
Commanding General	PAK HYO SAM	15
Ass't Commander	PAK SEI SEUN	10
Adjutant	KIM CHENG KIL	4
Chief of Staff	TAI JOO HAK	10
Chief, G-3	JEUN JOO TAIK	9
CO 1st Regt.	HYUN CHOON IL	9
CO 2nd Regt.	TAK YEUN DO	9
CO 3rd Regt.	SIN KUM CHUEL	9
	2nd Regiment	
CO 2nd Regt., CofS	TAK YEUN DO	9
CO 1st Bn.	KIM MOON CHIN	8
CO 2nd Bn.	HA KANG MOO	7
CO 3rd Bn.	CHO YOUNG TAIK	7
	CHOI BYENE CHOON	7

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DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

4 Aug 1950

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #1

1. Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

a. Armored Units. The North Korean Tank Regiment is believed to be of strength equivalent to the U.S. Tank Battalion. Tanks normally precede the Infantry by 15 to 45 minutes in the attack, press through our forward positions to the rear searching out heavy close support weapons and tanks. In one known case however, the tanks did not spearhead the attack but came in about an hour later from the flanks. Infantry in this case used rifles and automatic pistols. North Korean tanks move generally along secondary roads and trails to evade aerial observation and attacks. Infiltration plays a large part in these attacks. Small groups infiltrate during darkness and then rally for an attack in coordination with the frontal attack by tanks and Infantry. Tanks use thatched straw roofing and hay stacks as effective camouflage.

b. Infantry. It is believed that Division tactics include a frontal attack with a strong flanking movement supported by artillery and tanks. The unit attacking frontally is widely dispersed and keeps up heavy fire, while strong flanking elements constitute the main effort. Unconfirmed reports indicate that enemy Infantry infiltrates our lines disguised as refugees in white clothing carrying unassembled fire arms and uniforms in bundles. Ammunition and supplies are generally believed to be transported by carts mostly at night. Infantry sometimes moves toward our lines along the tops of mountain ridges disguised as farmers whose dress is predominately white. Women and children usually accompany these groups. When the enemy reaches a point adjacent to and behind friendly lines they assemble weapons that are hidden in baggage. Upon a given signal, fire is directed from ridges upon friendly flanks and rear forcing friendly forces to retire. Further to the rear the withdrawing forces are cleverly ambushed. Weapons normally carried by disguised infiltrating elements are rifles, .30 caliber machine guns, mortars and grenades. Logs or barbed wire road blocks are not normally used but concentrated and increased fire is utilized to shoot up personnel and cripple equipment attempting to retreat through this and only avenue of escape. It has been reported that usually the enemy has had observation sufficient enough to determine very accurately what the withdrawal route will be and has his automatic and heavy weapons all set for the kill. At the same time the enemy main body is moving forward to mop up behind retreating friendly units. Road blocks are selected behind our lines in defiles through which our heavy equipment must go in retreat.

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Camouflage technique on the part of the North Korean Infantryman is superior when in close contact with patrols and security outposts. The fact that the enemy is camouflage conscious and is taking advantage of all possible tricks is borne out by statements from our Liaison and Reconnaissance planes who have stated on occasion that "No enemy observed in certain sections". It has been reported that the enemy will camouflage his vehicles in villages and towns to look exactly like the Korean huts or houses. In one instance pontoon bridges were used for foot traffic at night and removed during day light hours. Towed ammunition vehicles have been observed as "honey carts".

Enemy night patrols are reported to be controlled by whistles. Two positive instances indicate that a white flare means a flanking attack by small enemy forces.

2. Enemy Material.

a. Tanks. T-34-85 is Russian built, mounting a 85mm gun and 2 7.62mm Machine Guns. Weight is 35 tons combat loaded, carries 56 rounds of primary ammunition and 2574 rounds of secondary ammunition. 1 Machine Gun is coaxially mounted and 1 is mounted in right front hull.

Crew - 5 man
Rate of fire - 7 or 8 rds. per minute.
Speed (Cruising) - 34.3 mi per hour.
Cross Country Cruising Range - 150 miles.

BA 64 - Armored Car (Small)

Crew - 5 man
Weight - 2.6 tons
Maximum Speed - 50 miles per hour
Cruising Range - 372 miles.
Armament - One (1) 7.62mm Machine gun.

b. Self-Propelled Assault Gun. SU 76. Weight 10 tons, mounts 76mm gun with a velocity of 2200 feet per second. Sides lightly armored and can be penetrated with .50 cal. AP, belly can be ruptured with HE mines, frontal plate can be penetrated with bazooka ammunition.

c. Artillery. 122mm Field Gun. Muzzle velocity is 2625 FPS, maximum range 22750 yards, weight of projectile is 55.1 lbs.

76mm Field Gun M1927. Muzzle velocity is 1247 FPS, maximum range 9400 yards, weight of projectile is 13.6 lbs. Rate of fire is 12 rounds per minute.

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d. Anti-Tank Guns. 45mm M1937 AT gun. Muzzle velocity is 2500 FPS, can penetrate 1.9 inches armor at 500 yards, rate of fire 25 rounds per minute, weight of projectile is 3.1 lbs.

e. Machine Guns. 7.62mm Heavy Machine Gun. Weight 145 lbs. Practical rate of fire is 250-300 RPM, cyclic rate of fire 480-600 RPM, effective range ground targets is 1100 yards direct fire, effective range against aircraft is 1650 yards, muzzle velocity is 2844 FPS and is belt fed.

12.7mm DSHK M1938 Machine Gun. A dual purpose gun, weight 379 lbs. with mount and shield, practical rate of fire 125 RPM, cyclic rate of fire 550-600 RPM, effective range 1650 yards against aircraft, 1100 for direct fire, muzzle velocity 2772 FPS and is belt fed.

f. Sub-Machine Guns and Carbines. 7.62mm Shpagin PPSH M1941 Sub-Machine Gun. Drum and box fed, automatic recoil with gas assist. Cyclic rate of fire 1000 rounds per minute, muzzle velocity 1600 FPS. Capacity of drum is 71 rounds, capacity of box is 35 rounds, maximum effective range 330 yards, weight 10.1 lbs.

g. Rifles and AT Rifles. 7.62 (cal. 30) M1891/30 Rifle. Manually operated, 5 round clip, barrel is 6" longer than the American M-1, very crudely made but serviceable, muzzle velocity 2838 FPS, effective range 440 yards, effective rate of fire 10 rounds per minute, weight 9.9 lbs.

14.5mm PTRD AT RIFLE. Five (5) round clips, muzzle velocity 3350 FPS, effective rate of fire 8 - 12 rounds per minute. Effective range against light armor 550 yards. Maximum range against fixed ground targets 880 yards, will penetrate 1.8" armor at 110 yards.

h. Mortars. 82mm M1936. Maximum range 3499 yards, weight 136 lbs, rate of fire 15-20 rounds per minute, weight of shell 7.4 lbs.

120mm Mortar M1938. Maximum range 6236 yards, weight of piece 606 lbs. Mounted on 2 wheel transport limber with solid rubber tires, weight of projectile 35.05 lbs, rate of fire 6 rounds per minute - 15 rounds without relaying, can drop or trigger fire.

3. Signs and Countersigns for period:

061200 to 071200 - ANT EATER

071200 to 081200 - BAD ACCIDENT

081200 to 091200 - ACCURATE COUNT

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091200 to 101200 - ACID	TEST
101200 to 111200 - ACORN	TREE
111200 to 121200 - FIRST	ACT
121200 to 131200 - AFTER	EFFECT
Alternate signs and countersigns for period:	
061200 to 071200 - AFTER	THOUGHT
071200 to 081200 - FREE	AGENT
081200 to 091200 - AIR	TIGHT
091200 to 101200 - PENNY	ANTE
101200 to 111200 - WIRE	ANTENNA
111200 to 121200 - HEART	APPETITE
121200 to 131200 - APRON	STRING

E. G. Van Orman
 E. G. VAN ORMAN
 LtCol., USMC
 ACofS, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (10)
 CO 1st Bn., 11th Marines (2)
 CG Forward Ech 1st MarAirWing (5)
 CO H&S Bn (10)
 Each Staff Section (1)

CMC (2)
 CG FIFPAC (2)
 CG MCS (2)
 CG 1st MarDiv (2)
 CG FMFLANT (2)
 CG 2d MarDiv (2)
 FILE (2)

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FM¹ (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
6 Aug 1950INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #2

1. Order of Battle and Identification.

a. 105th Armored Brigade.

(1) The following order of battle report (incomplete) was compiled through interrogation of three (3) prisoners of war, two (2) of whom were from the 303rd Motorcycle Reconnaissance Battalion, 105th Armored Brigade:

(a) The 105th Armored Brigade, reportedly the only armored unit in the North Korean Forces, is composed of the 107th, 109th (APO 4035), and 203rd Armored Regiments, the 207th Training Regiment, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, the 303rd Motorcycle Reconnaissance Battalion, and a medical company.

According to a report, each regiment is equipped with forty-one (41) T-34/85 Tanks with thirteen (13) assigned to each of the three (3) battalions and four (4) in each of the three (3) companies. Information relative to personnel strength is unavailable.

The battalions are numerically designated 1st thru 3rd in each of the regiments. The companies are numbered 1st thru 3rd in the 1st Battalion, 4th thru 6th in the 2nd Battalion, and 7th thru 9th in the 3rd Battalion.

The 105th Brigade, employed primarily as infantry support, is assigned by battalion or regiment to the rifle division, depending on expected opposition.

(b) Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the entire 105th Brigade spearheaded the advance of North Korean Forces in the western sector arriving in the vicinity of CHONAN (1010-1550) by 8 Jul 50. From this point, the 1st and 3rd battalions, 109th Armored Regiment, were ordered to MUNGYONG (1100-1540) while the 2nd Battalion and the main body of the brigade advanced towards KONGJU (1010-1500). One (1) prisoner, a tank driver captured 27 Jul near MUNGYONG, claimed that the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 109th Armored Regiment, have lost nine (9) tanks in combat to date. Of these, three (3) may have been salvaged. Losses of other units of the brigade could not be determined. The prisoner also stated that anti-tank mines accounted for most of the tanks knocked out of action, secondly air strikes, and third artillery fire.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(c) The present disposition of the 105th Brigade, with the exception of the 1st and 3rd Battalion, 109th Armored, is unknown.

(d) The following personalities were identified with this brigade: (Names are indicated phonetically)

Brigadier General (one star) YU, Gyung Su
 Commanding General, 105th Armored Brigade.
 Colonel KIM, Tae Ryung
 Commanding 109th Armored Regiment

(e) Other identifications:

Tank Number	500	-	Brigade Commander.
"	"	300	- 109th Regimental Commander.
"	"	301	- 1st Battalion Commander, 109th Armored.
"	"	313	- 2nd Battalion Commander, 109th Armored.
"	"	327	- 3rd Battalion Commander, 109th Armored.

NOTE: Tank Numbers for the 107th and 203rd Regimental Commanders were three (3) digit series ending with "00".

b. 13th Rifle Division:

(1) The following order of battle report (incomplete) was compiled through interrogation of four (4) prisoners of war from the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry, 13th Rifle Division:

(a) The 13th Rifle Division is composed of the 19th, 20th and 21st Infantry (Code 719 APO 3521) Regiments, an unidentified artillery regiment, a self-propelled gun battalion (approximately ten (10) 76mm SP guns), and other organic service units.

(b) The following personalities were identified with this division: (Names are indicated phonetically).

Colonel LEE, Sun Chun
 Commanding, 21st Infantry.
 Sr. Capt. KIM, Su Sik
 Commanding, 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry.

c. 766th Infantry Regiment (Separate):

(1) The following order of battle report (incomplete) was compiled through interrogation of eleven (11) POW's:

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(a) The 766th Infantry Regiment (Separate) (APO 33-45), originally composed of three (3) battalions, now consists of (6) Infantry battalions. Due to conflicting reports, the composition of each battalion has not been determined as yet. The minimum strength of this regiment is, however, estimated at one thousand five hundred (1,500) troops. The regiment is also known to be equipped with an undetermined number of 82mm and 60mm mortars; light and heavy machine guns, and rifles of various types, including an undetermined amount of dynamite.

(b) The 766th Infantry is primarily a guerilla warfare unit comprised mostly of recently recruited but well-trained personnel led by about four hundred (400) battle-wise Koreans from the Chinese Communist Forces. Reports indicate that some of the men were trained to handle demolitions with particular emphasis on night operations. This has been proven by undetected penetrations of these units deep into friendly territory. Elements of this regiment now in friendly territory have been specifically ordered not to engage South Korean forces until arrival at respective objectives. Significance is attached to the fact that this organization is the only known unit of regimental size which is commanded by a General Officer.

(c) Several prisoners of the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, 766th Infantry, captured in the vicinity of KONGSAN MYON (approx. 1665-1455), stated that the mission of their company was to destroy the railroad bridge located in the outskirts of TAEGU (1150-1430). "After accomplishing this", continued one of the prisoners, "the 6th company was to withdraw to nearby mountains and await the arrival of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th companies of the 2nd battalion. Then we were to continue southward by companies and destroy all bridges on the TAEGU to PUSAN route". Other prisoners from this regiment have stated that the mission of the 766th was to destroy all supply routes utilized by friendly forces.

(d) The present disposition of the 766th Regiment, other than the 6th Co, 2nd Battalion, is unknown at this time.

(e) The following personalities were identified with this regiment: (Names are indicated phonetically).

Brigadier General (one star) OH, Chin Wu
 Commanding General, 766th Inf. (Separate).
 Sr. Capt. CHE, Chung Kuk
 Commanding, 2nd Battalion, 766th Infantry
 Sr. Capt. YUN, Mun Wun
 Commanding, 3rd Battalion, 766th Infantry.

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2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Espionage:

(1) Information has been received that prostitutes are being used by the enemy as a source of information regarding the location, strength, and order of battle of the United Nations forces. These agents are instructed to gain employment in officer's and enlisted men's quarters when possible.

(2) Interrogation of a recent espionage agent reveals that the enemy is dispatching agents through our lines disguised as students. Male espionage agents are also reported to be operating with women that are actually assigned to the North Korean Army who pose together as refugee brother and sister.

b. Propaganda and Rumors:

(1) Enemy military personnel are being sent to provinces in South Korea disguised as civilians with verbal instructions to pass on the following information to the public:

(a) The People's Army has taken PUSAN and CHIN HAE (1165-1352).

(b) The South Koreans should stay at their homes; if they run away they will be shot.

(c) Do not be afraid of the People's Army as they will release you and give you freedom.

(2) For contact purposes between persons operating on the above type of assignment, the following means of identifications are used; CHUNGCHONG NAMDO (approximate center of province (990-1520)).

Male: Wear a white bandage on the little finger of the left hand; this bandage to be spotted with blue ink.

Female: Wear a black jacket, a black shirt and have a piece of white cloth and two apples.

KYONGSONG NAMDO, HYONGSANG PUKTO (approximate center of province) (1160-1500).

Male: Wear a straw hat with a white line below the band of the hat.

Female; Wear a white jacket, a black skirt and have a piece of red cloth and two apples.

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3. DOCUMENTS.

a. EUSAK and ADVATES Translation Team are particularly interested in obtaining documents of the following classifications:

(1) Soldiers Identification books. Approx. 2½"x 3½" in size. Fourteen pages found in blue cloth cover. Two types of this book are believed to exist.

(2) Personal documents such as postcards, letters and diaries.

(3) Morning reports.

(4) Pay records.

(5) Sick books.

(6) Rosters of all types.

(7) Sketches and maps.

(8) Enemy tactical and technical regulations.

b. Documents should be removed from PW's at time of capture and evacuated to the rear in the custody of the guard evacuating the PW's. Documents not captured from PW's should be evacuated to the rear thru intelligence channels as soon as information of tactical value to the capturing unit has been extracted.

4. WEATHER OUTLOOK FOR AUGUST.

a. The following climatological outlook for TAEGU and the surrounding area within a 100 mile radius was prepared by AIR WEATHER SERVICE DETACHMENT 20-27, HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH AIR FORCE ADVANCE. This outlook is based on Climatological data available to the Weather Detachment. This data covers a 20 year period. It must be remembered that the following information is NOT a forecast based on synoptic information, but it is an average picture of weather conditions for the month of August based solely on historical data.

b. General Outlook. The month of August will be slightly more favorable for ground and air operations than was the month of July. The total of cyclonic systems affecting this area will be slightly less during August than it was during July. This factor will decrease the number of cloudy days and decrease the amount of fog and precipitation. This area should be under the influence of one typhoon during August. However, in the past 20 years only 10 typhoon centers have passed over Korea. In addition to the one typhoon affecting

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this area we will be affected by one cyclonic system resulting in 4 to 5 days of overcast skies, 2 of which will be associated with precipitation.

c. Specific Data.

(1) Air Operation Data:

Number of full days suitable for air operations - 17

Number of days suitable for part-time operations - 8

Number of days fully non-operational - 6

(2) Number of days with cloud coverage 20% or less - 4

(3) Number of days with skies overcast (8/10th or greater) - 17

(4) Number of days with visibility less than 3 miles - 7

(5) Number of days during which rain will occur - 14

(6) Surface Wind

Prevailing direction - E. S. E.

Mean force - 0.8 MPH

Maximum - 38 MPH

(7) Precipitation - 6.7 inches.

(8) Surface temperature:

Mean - 79 degrees F.

Mean maximum temperatures - 88 degrees F.

5. SUNRISE AND SUNSET TABLES:

The following solar and lunar data was obtained by the Fifth Air Force from indigenous sources. Due to the language barrier minor discrepancies appeared in the data and are reflected in the table. These discrepancies are of little consequence under present conditions.

DATE	SUN RISE	SUN SET	MOON RISE	HIGHEST	MOON	
					MOONSET	PHASE
Aug 3	0538	1940	2220	0412	1036	
Aug 4	0539	1939	2243	0453	1137	

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DATE	SUN RISE	SUN SET	MOON RISE	HIGHEST	MOONSET	MOON PHASE
Aug 5	0540	1938	2308	0535	1237	HALF
Aug 6	0540	1937	2337	0618	1338	
Aug 7	0541	1936	0002	0708	1439	
Aug 8	0542	1935	0027	0751	1539	
Aug 9	0543	1934	0052	0843	1637	QTR
Aug 10	0544	1933	0141	0936	1730	
Aug 11	0545	1932	0238	1030	1816	
Aug 12	0546	1930	0342	1124	1856	
Aug 13	0547	1929	0449	1215	1931	DARK
Aug 14	0547	1928	0558	1305	1000	
Aug 15	0548	1927	0707	1352	2027	
Aug 16	0549	1925	0815	1439	2052	
Aug 17	0550	1924	0924	1526	2117	1st QTR
Aug 18	0551	1923	1034	1614	2144	
Aug 19	0551	1922	1146	1705	2215	
Aug 20	0552	1920	1301	1759	2253	HALF
Aug 21	0553	1919	1415	1856	2337	
Aug 22	0554	1918	1526	2000	*	
Aug 23	0555	1916	1630	2102	0032	
Aug 24	0556	1915	1724	2203	0137	3RD QTR
Aug 25	0557	1913	1807	2300	0246	
Aug 26	0558	1912	1843	2352	0358	
Aug 27	0558	1910	1912	*	0510	FULL
Aug 28	0559	1909	1937	0040	0616	
Aug 29	0600	1908	2000	0124	0721	

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DATE	SUN RISE	SUN SET	MOON RISE	HIGHEST	MOONSET	MOON PHASE
Aug 30	0601	1906	2022	0206	0823	
Aug 31	0602	1905	2044	0248	0923	3RD QTR

* Indicates no record.

6. ENEMY TACTICS, WEAPONS AND MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

a. PW states that 603rd Motorcycle Regiment is committed only to pursue a routing enemy and is never committed in less than platoon strength.

b. The 25th Division reports that the enemy has used timed fire with mortars. 1st Cav. Division reports that one tank, manned by an enemy crew destroyed in their sector was a U.S. M-24 tank.

c. The following is an estimate of the number and type of artillery pieces available to the enemy at the present time:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER ON HAND</u>
76mm How.	410
122mm How.	180
120mm How.	180
85mm Guns.	170
82mm Mortars.	810

d. The 27th Infantry reported the following:

(1) Scaling Cliffs - one instance of the following activity reported in the HWANGGAN (1089-1482), area. To attain what appeared to be inaccessible high ground enemy used a device similar to the whale harpoon. Shooting a form of harpoon or anchor, with a rope attached to the high ground enemy troops then climbed the rope and attacked our positions from the rear. Our troops had not covered this area because they believed the vertical cliffs prevented infiltration from this direction.

(2) Utilization of refugees - In one case about 200 refugees consisting of women, children and old men walked into the battle position from the direction of the enemy. They proceeded through the battle position creating some confusion as they were being rounded up and processed. At this time the enemy launched a frontal attack. The leading elements mingled with the stragglers of the refugee group. Refugees had no weapons or uniforms and upon interrogation revealed they were directed by the North Koreans to proceed in the direction taken.

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(3) Enemy in villages - Patrolling indicates enemy does not stay in villages during the daytime but disperses to the hills. As night patrols are fired on from villages it is presumed the enemy returns to the villages at night. One dawn patrol came across a group of North Korean soldiers eating in a village. This patrol captured two bundles; each bundle contained a complete change of civilian (white) clothing and a package of money (approximately 5000 S.K. Won). Military equipment, hand grenades and small arms ammunition were found in the same area.

E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2

Encl: (1) Photos of T-70 and T-34 Tanks.

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (10)
CO 1st Bn., 11th Marines (2)
CG Forward Ech 1st MarAirWing (5)
CO H&S Bn (10)
Each Staff Section (1)

CMC (2)
CG FMFPAC (2)
CG MCS (2)
CG 1st MarDiv (2)
CG FMFLANT (2)
CG 2d MarDiv (2)
FILE (2)

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DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:is
11 Aug 1950INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #31. Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

a. One instance has been reported that upon driving the enemy from high ground, many enemy feigned as dead and then ambushed our troops from the rear when they are off guard.

b. Enemy armored tactics:

(1) Orders are generally received from the infantry division commander by the tank regimental commander.

(2) Infantry moves out approximately one kilometer; tanks move up in line, take defensive positions and shell enemy positions. When the infantry moves out, tanks move up and take up new positions.

(3) Light movement, with no lights has been the rule since 18 July.

c. Signal Flares:

NK are using the following signal flares to request supporting fire to commence or end; three flares request artillery and/or mortar fire to commence; five flares request supporting fire to cease.

d. Notes on the North Korean Infantry Soldier:

The following is taken from a study, compiled by EUSAK on the basis of interrogations and observations of PWS and the examination of miscellaneous captured documents:

(1) The ages of captured NK soldiers have varied between 16 and 30, with the average being 22. Large numbers of them were conscripted in early 1950, and received four to six weeks of basic training prior to being assigned to a company. Those with civilians skill suitable to direct military use were sometimes assigned directly to units without basic training. Marksmanship training was extremely limited. Political indoctrination was a part of basic training.

(2) Unit training included both field exercises and group training, to include night fighting, but was not standardized through out the army, and varied considerably within the various divisions. Political education was conducted at company level by a cultural officer. Most divisions have three to four Russian officers as advisers.

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(3) According to U.S. standards, the results of the above type training are poor. Individuals are lacking in the ability to think and act with initiative; they are poorly informed, and are obedient through fear of their superiors. On the other hand, the cultural officer appears to have succeeded in inculcating a belief that he must do his job for the benefit of the masses and that individualism is a secondary and undesirable factor. Yet, if the soldier has any firm political ideology, it is so minute as to be undetectable. Officers may be different in this respect.

(4) The NK infantryman is nevertheless, a rugged individual accustomed in his ordinary daily life to hardship. His equipment is scant and light; he has one uniform, a hand weapon, and ammunition plus a few personal effects in his pockets. He wears light canvas and rubber shoes in which he can negotiate difficult terrain (mountains, rice paddies, etc) with more speed and endurance than a soldier equipped by our concepts. He subsists on a relatively small amount of food, which he obtains largely by foraging; when he is tired he lies in the nearest shelter or in the open. A straw mat is his accustomed bed.

(5) The enemy infantryman is well supported by heavy weapons as long as his unit remains intact and organized. However, when his unit becomes disorganized and he is not supported by heavy weapons, he continues on as an individual or in small groups, frequently resorting to guerrilla tactics. It is not unusual for him to discard his uniform and don civilian clothing obtained from the nearest house. This persistence in combat appears to be a result of training bolstered by fear rather than personal belief in the cause for which he is fighting.

(6) Unlike the World War II Japanese the NK PW shows no humiliation because of his capture. He talks freely, but lacks education and military knowledge and his information has little value. He apparently has not been taught to keep silent when captured.

(7) In general, the NK soldier lives in a state of fear. He has been beaten, slapped, and kicked whenever he failed his superiors. He fears punishment and he expects brutal treatment if captured. One PW, when questioned about his head wound, stated that a ROK soldier had hit him with a buckle attached to a belt. The PW gave no indication of feeling he had been treated unjustly. It should not be believed the NK soldier will stop fighting but it appears that he will surrender if he is out of contact with his leaders. Two deterrents exist which make him reluctant to surrender:

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(a) An abortive surrender attempt would bring severe punishment from his leaders.

(b) NK soldiers expect abuse and worse from UN forces. Comment: Recent PW reports indicate that many of the NK troops in combat received considerably less than a months training and in many cases only a few days.

e. Additional Notes by 25th InfDiv:

(1) NK forces have darkened their faces and acted as guards over white clad refugees and infiltrated into our lines.

(2) Enemy has surprisingly large amount of automatic weapons.

(3) Three flares (green) were signal for enemy to attack.

(4) In some instances enemy advanced in waves on whistle signal.

(5) All enemy activity and fire fight ceased on 4 amber flares.

2. Unit Identification and OR:

a. 2d Co; 1st Bn., 15th Regt., and 9th Co., 3d Bn., 13th Regt. was positively identified as operating against units of the 5th Marines.

b. The following major NK units have been identified as located in Soviet Korea and are reserves capable of intervention:

(1) 9th NK Div - TONJONG Area.

(2) 14th NK Div. - MUNGYONG Area (?).

(3) 303d Ren Bn., 105th NK Tank Brig; N Yongdong.

(4) 206th Mecz Inf Regt., 105th NK Tank Brig; N Yongdong

c. New code numbers and APO's have been determined for the following units:

(1) 1st Rifle Division code 115 APO 414.

(2) 2d Rifle Division APO 505 17th Inf Regt - code 274.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(3) 3d Rifle Division - code 395-201 9th Inf Regt -
APO 3503.

(4) 4th Rifle Division - 17th Inf. Regt - APO 4233.

(5) 6th Rifle Division - code 655.
1st Inf Regt (14th Regt) - code 659.
2d Inf Regt (13th Inf Regt) - code 661.
3d Inf Regt (15th Inf Regt) - code 667.
Div Arty - code 668?

3. Sign and Countersign:

<u>PERIOD COVERED</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
131200 to 141200 Aug	BACHELOR	BUTTON
141200 to 151200 Aug	BACK	STAGE
151200 to 161200 Aug	BAFFLE	PLATE
161200 to 171200		

E. G. Van Orman
E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (10)
CO 1st Bn 11th Marines (2)
CO Forward Ech 1st MarAirWing (5)
CO H&S BN (10)
Each Staff Section (1)

CMC (2)
CG FMFPAC (2)
CG MCS (2)
CG 1st MarDiv (2)
CG FMFLANT (2)
CG 2d MarDiv (2)
FILE (2)

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
16 Aug 1950

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 4
(Extracted from FEC Summary No. 2879)

1. Order of Battle Notes: The organization, development and operations of the 4th Rifle Division, North Korean People's Army (NKPA).

a. Origin: The 4th Rifle Div of the NKPA was formed in 1949 by expansion of the former Independent Mixed Brigade. The home station of the unit was Chinnampo. Approximately one regiment of the division is made up of former members of the 166th Chinese Communist Div who entered North Korea in July 1949. These soldiers of Korean ancestry were members of the so-called Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) in Manchuria. Border Constabulary (BC) units and recruits were used to bring the Division up to strength.

b. Organization: The Division has a standard organization for a NKPA Division, i.e. three rifle regiments, an artillery regiment; signal, medical, engineer, and AF battalions; reconnaissance and transport companies. PW reports to date indicate the standard complement weapons and equipment. While standard numbering procedures would place the 10th, 11th and 12th Rifle Regts in the 4th Div, the few PW's interrogated to date refer to the regiments as the 16th, 17th and 18th. The latter is reported to be made up of the KVA elements referred to above.

c. Personalities: The Division CO is reported to be a MajGen LEE, Kwon Mu, about 45 years old, reported to have formerly served in the Soviet Army. His C/S is Col. HO Pong Hak.

d. Recent movements: The Division Hq, one regiment and the artillery regiment left Chinnampo on 15 Jun and moved by rail and truck to Yonchon. The two other regiments came from Pyongyang and Kyonipo and rendezvoused at Yonchon. The 38th parallel was crossed at 0500 hours 25 Jun, and the Division moved to Seoul via Uijongbu, arriving on the 29th. The Division passed Suwon on 7 Jul, Chonan 9 Jul, and reached Nacchonni on 11 Jul. Since 11 Jul, the Division has moved south and east.

e. Morale and Losses: The morale of the unit was high until they encountered US troops and artillery fire at SUWON. Since that time it has been gradually getting lower.

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Losses are described by PW's as "heavy" with no firm estimates. The Division has learned to move at night to avoid strafing.

f. Code Numbers and Unit Commanders (Not fully confirmed)

(1) 4th Infantry Division

Hone Station: CHINRAMPO (North Korea)
 Commanding: Major General LEE, Kun (Kwan) Nu or
 (Li1),
 Chief of Staff: HWANG, Myong Chong (or) HU, Bong
 Hak.
 Code: 486.

(2) 16th Rifle Regiment:

Commanding: Col. CHOI, In Duk
 Code: 478,
 APO 4431.

(3) 17th Rifle Regiment

Code: 472 or 482

(4) 18th Rifle Regiment

Commanding: Chang, Jyo Dok
 CO of 1st Section: Song, Dok Man
 Code: 476.

(5) Artillery Regiment

Code 469

(6) Reconnaissance Company

Commanding: 1stLt. Kim, San Chon
 CPO 4431.

g. Strength: The actual strength of the 4th Inf Div was last estimated at 8000 on 18 July. It is not known whether replacements have been received since then. There is a possibility that losses have been replaced by semi-compulsory recruiting of South Korean "volunteers" or by regrouping with "independent" North Korean Units or guerilla bands.

2. The following is the countersign for the period indicated:

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
161200 to 171200 Aug	BAMBOO	SHOOT

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
181200 to 181200 Aug	BANE	STAND
181200 to 191200 Aug	BANK	TELLER
191200 to 201200 Aug	BANTAM	WEIGHT

E. A. CRAIG
BrigGen., USMC
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

E. G. Van Orman
E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (10)
CO 1st Bn., 11th Marines (1)
CO, H&S Bn (10)
MILE (3)

Each Staff Section (1)
CG Fwd Ech 1st MarAirWing (1)
CG FMFPAC (1)
CG 1st MarDiv (1)
CG 25th Inf Div (1)

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
19 Aug 1950

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 5

1. Enemy Tactics:

a. Enemy has placed strong defensive positions on reverse slopes and used them effectively in the 24th Infantry Division zone and 5th Marine zone of action.

b. On 17 August, the enemy used great quantities of hand grenades for the first time in close-in fighting with the 5th Marines. Grenades were rolled down sides of the hill which the 5th Marines had as their objective.

c. The enemy has been observed to use camouflage material of the local area by sticking such material into various places in his clothes. This makes it extremely difficult to observe his movement from the ground or air.

2. Counter Intelligence:

a. Information has been received from CIC that the following listed checks may be useful in determining suspected enemy agents:

(1) Examine all money carefully. If persons searched have Japanese Yen notes, they maybe possible agents. The NK forces are believed to be well supplied with Jap Money.

(2) Shirts of suspects should be examined carefully. The second button from the top of the shirt may be attached by red thread.

3. Miscellaneous:

a. NK soldiers have been reported to use sand in their shoes to toughen their feet. Inspection of feet might determine the difference between a bonafide refugee and a NK soldier.

b. NK Security Forces - (EUSAK PIR #33).

(1) The following is a report of North Korean Internal Security Forces directly subordinate to the Department of Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs. The report is based on information obtained through confidential sources over the period 5 August thru 13 August 1950.

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(a) The Internal Security Force, a quasi-military organization, is charged primarily with security of lines of communication, civil control, and elimination of isolated or by-passed friendly units within newly acquired territory. Reports also indicate that elements of this force are committed by battalions along with line units as flank security when no reserves are available. The same source also stated that the enemy is encountering difficulties in controlling anti-communist elements and/or friendly guerrillas now operating behind their lines. Significance is attached to this organization in that the total troop strength, assuming a relatively conservative figure of five hundred (500) per battalion, would be thirteen thousand (13,000) for the identified twenty-six (26) battalions.

(b) The table of organization and equipment of these units has not been determined as yet.

(c) Major components are indicated below by sectors, including last report position and/or date:

SOUTHWEST SECTOR

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
706th Brigade	Unlocated	11 Aug 50
102nd Regiment	Unlocated	11 Aug 50
3rd Battalion	PUAN	11 Aug 50
4th Battalion	YONGDONG	8 Aug 50
5th Battalion	Unlocated	8 Aug 50
25th Battalion	IRI	11 Aug 50
105th Regiment	NAMWON	6 Aug 50
9th Battalion	Unlocated	10 Aug 50
13th Battalion	MOKPO	6 Aug 50
15th Battalion	HAMPYONG	10 Aug 50
16th Battalion	TASAN-NI (1010-1330)	10 Aug 50

Subordination Unknown:

1st Battalion	HAMYANG (1070-1390)	9 Aug 50
2nd Battalion	Unlocated	12 Aug 50
14th Battalion	UIRYONG	9 Aug 50
18th Battalion	Unlocated	10 Aug 50
21st Battalion	HAMYANG	9 Aug 50
22nd Battalion	Unlocated	2 Aug 50
23rd Battalion	KOCHANG	9 Aug 50

CENTRAL AND EASTERN SECTORS:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
101st Regiment	YONGYANG (1203-1537)	13 Aug 50
6th Battalion	YECHON	13 Aug 50
7th Battalion	VIC YONGDOK	13 Aug 50

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10th Battalion	ELEMENTS UISONG	12 Aug 50
11th Battalion	Unlocated	13 Aug 50
12th Battalion	ANDONG	13 Aug 50
103th Regiment	ANDONG	12 Aug 50
17th Battalion	HANCHANG	8 Aug 50
19th Battalion	YONGWOL	10 Aug 50
20th Battalion	YONGWOL	10 Aug 50
26th Battalion	CHECHON	6 Aug 50
108th Regiment	ANDONG	12 Aug 50
28th Battalion	ANDONG	12 Aug 50
29th Battalion	ANDONG	12 Aug 50

4. Identifications and Order of Battle:

a. PW captured by another unit positively identifies the 83d Independent Light Motor Regiment as the unit opposing the Brigade in its attack toward SACHON. This unit had been previously identified by the Brigade as the opposing enemy unit. Interrogation shows this regiment is composed of 4 infantry battalions. Two were in the attack on KOSONG. Each battalion had three motorcycle companies with 47-48 motorcycles per company, plus 12 HMG's. 1 Mortar Company of 6 82mm Mortars was also part of the battalion. Other composition not known.

b. The following NK Divisions have disappeared from Order of Battle along the Army front. It is possible for these units to be used as reinforcements in the bridge-head area:

2d Rifle Division.

14th Rifle Division.

5. The Sign and Countersign for the period ~~201200~~ to ~~271200~~:

<u>DATE EFFECTIVE</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
201200 to 211200	FANCY	GADGET
211200 to 221200	GAMBLE	BET
221200 to 231200	GAS	FIXTURE
231200 to 241200	GATE	KEEPER
241200 to 251200	GEAR	SHIFT
251200 to 261200	GOLF	TEE
261200 to 271200	GOLD	SMITH

E. G. Van Orman
 E. G. VAN ORMAN
 LtCol., USMC
 ACoS, G-2

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

SECRET

ENCLOSURE : (1) Interrogation Report #0006.

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (10)
CO 1st Bn 11th Marines (2)
CG Fwd Ech 1st MarAirWing (5)
CG H&S Bn (10)
FILE (3)
Each Staff Section (1)CMC (2)
CG FMFPAC (2)
CG MCS (2)
CG 1st MarDiv (2)
CG FMFLANT (2)
CG 2d MarDiv (2)

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #5.

HEADQUARTERS 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE
163d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DETACHMENT
FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

18 Aug 1950

INTERROGATION REPORT #0006.

PLACE OF INTERROGATION: One mile E of YONGSAN.

DATE OF INTERROGATION: 18 August, 1950.

Name: LEE, Ki Suk.

Rank: Pvt.

Ser. NO.: Unknown.

Age: 18

Unit: 7th Co, 3rd Bn, 18th Regt., 4th InfDiv.

Home Address: Pyongan Nando, Chung-an gun, Yangchon-Myon,
Shinni-ri, #18.

Where captured: About 2 km E of YONGSAN.

Date Captured: 18 August 1950, at 1000 hours.

Summary: The North Korean troops are located about 6 kms W of the present USMC Brigade CP area. The informant stated that they were about 3,000 strong, including the reinforcements located to the rear of the front lines.

The 4th Infantry Division is composed of the 18th Regiment (the source was a member of this Regiment), the 5th Regiment, located to the south of the 18th Regiment and the 16th Regiment, located to the North of the 18th Regiment.

Each Regiment of the 4th Division is armed with 45mm AT Guns right on the front lines and 76mm and 120mm guns are located E of the NAKTONG RIVER. The number of guns within a unit was unknown to the informant.

The 4th Division had about 100 tanks located E of the NAKTONG RIVER north of the town of SONGSAN-NI on the side of the main roads, camouflaged by the trees. These tanks were observed by the informant about ten days ago when he was on his way to the front lines. The disposition of these tanks were unknown to the source after he had departed this area. Of the 100 tanks, 40 were the Joseph Stalin-1 heavy tanks and the remainder were the T-34/85 Medium Tanks. The informant identified the tanks by the bogey wheels and the Manual, 30-2. (G-2 Brigade comment - doubtful).

The informant heard from other members of this unit that there were about 50 Chinese Communist troops in each of the Battalions of the 4th Division. These Chinese Communist troops came from the 8th Communist Army.

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The informant stated that there were approximately 80 men in the same company as he and further stated that 3 of the men were armed with the Russian PPSH Tommy Guns and the rest of the men were armed with the Russian Mosin M1891/30 rifles. These weapons were brought from SINUIJU in North Korea when the 4th Division departed that area.

The informant stated that on 17 August, approximately 20 men died and about 100 men were wounded by artillery fire and the machine gunning from the airplanes in the area the source was in.

LOGISTICAL INFORMATION:

The informant stated that food supplies (rice) was taken from the nearby farms. The informant stated that the last meal that he had eaten was on 17 August during the evening. The food supplies were stored in the nearby villages in the houses of the former residents.

Water was taken from the rivers and the streams and the troops drank it only when it was available. Otherwise, the troops went without it because they did not carry it around with them.

Ammunition supplies came by trucks every 2 to 3 days and when all the ammunition was utilized, they had to wait until the next shipment. Until such time, they did without the ammunition.

All transportation was done by vehicles and foot. The 45mm 76mm and the 120mm guns were pulled by the jeeps.

The informant stated that there was no bridge across the NAKTONG RIVER and boats were utilized to cross it.

/s/ FUJIO F. ASANO (SS)
1stLt., Inf.
Commanding

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
22 Aug 1950

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #6.

1. ENEMY TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES.-

a. Booby Traps:

It has been reported that the enemy has been booby trapping his equipment and dead as he retreats. Extreme care should be exercised when handling this equipment or searching the dead for documents.

34th RCT recovered an EES telephone which had been booby trapped. Charge was placed down head set well so when crank was turned the phone would blow up.

b. The enemy still has a limited air capability and has strafed the 1st Cavalry Division and the city of MASAN. All attacks occurred during darkness.

c. Two incidents have been reported where attacks have been made on U.S. mortar positions in the past 72 hours by envelopments.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE AND IDENTIFICATION. -

a. PW's have been captured in the Chinju area which state that elements of the 7th Rifle Division are operating within the 25th Infantry Division's sector. This further ties in with the fact that a PW stated he had heard of a conference between the 7th Division, 4th Division, and 2d Division commanding generals west of the budghead area in the 24th Infantry Division's sector. The 7th Rifle Division has been previously located in the northern area in the vicinity of ANDONG. The 7th Division is known to still have elements in that area.

Order of Battle of the 7th Rifle Division is as follows:

(1) The 7th Rifle Division, of approximately ten thousand (10,000) troops, is composed of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Infantry Regiments, an unidentified artillery regiment, an anti-tank battalion, a self-propelled gun battalion, an Engineer Battalion and a Signal Battalion. The 7th Division, reportedly subordinate to the North Korean Second Army, is the former 7th Border Constabulary Brigade expanded to divisional strength with a large number of Koreans who formerly served with the Chinese Communist Forces in Manchuria and China. The date of

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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activation of this division could not be determined, however, prisoners have variously reported dates between October 49 and April 1950.

(2) The division departed WONBAN (1040-1837) on or about 16 June 50 for KOSONG (1120-1770) closing about 20 June 50. Departed KOSONG the following day and marched to INJE (1110-1700), arriving at the location about 23 June, 1950. From this vicinity the division on 25 June 50 assaulted South Korean positions on the 38th Parallel. They drove towards HONGCHON (1085-1659) arriving about 3 July 50. The next objective was PYONGANG-NI (1070-1500) which was occupied on about 12 July 50. The division arrived at its present position PUNGGI (1140-1560) on about 15 July 50 via CHUNGJU (1092-1572) and TANYANG (1120-1560). According to reports, the 1st and 3rd Infantry Regiments are at present deployed on the PUNGGI (1140-1560) - YONGJU (1150-1550) road with the 2d Infantry deployed immediately north of YECHON (1140-1530). The division objective rumored to be ANDONG (1168-1524).

(3) As far as can be determined, the 7th Rifle Division has been engaged by South Korean forces twice prior to its entry into the PUNGGI area: First at the 38th Parallel near INJE and second at PYONGANG. It is also reported that of the original sixteen (16) self-propelled guns in the SP Battalion, eight (8) were left when the division arrived at PUNGGI. A report further asserted that approximately one thousand (1,000) recruits of this division were conscripted from the SEOUL area.

(4) The division commander has been reported as Brigadier General (one star) PAEK, Nak Chil (phonetic), former commander of the 7th Border Constabulary Brigade.

b. It is believed the 104th Infantry Regiment may also be in this area supporting the 6th Rifle Division.

c. The 6th Rifle Division is still the main force opposing our troops in this sector. While the strength of the division is undetermined, it consists of the 13th, 14th and 15th Rifle Regiments and an artillery regiment. The 13th and 14th Regiments may have served in the Chinese Communist Forces in China.

d. Two battalions of the 83rd Light Motor Regiment are still operating within the 25th Infantry Division sector. There are also reports of additional North Korean units in the vicinity of the Chinju area. However, these reports have not been confirmed.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT.

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9. Eighth Army has for the past 48 hours indicated that elements of the 11th and 12th Rifle Division may also be operating in this general area.

3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. The following is an extract from a CIC Interrogation Report of a North Korean Agent:

On 9 August, 1950, upon accomplishing his mission in CHISUBE (1122-1358), KOO, Tuck Huai reported to Lt. GONG that he had seen seven (7) American soldiers asleep in the field in the vicinity of CHISUBE. Therefore, Lt. CHONG, KOO, an interpreter, KIM Su Tong (Korean) and three (3) troops, immediately proceeded to CHISUBE to apprehend the American Soldiers. On the second trip to CHISUBE and to the American soldiers, KOO Tuck Huai stated that the seven (7) American troops were still asleep in the field. Interpreter KIM awoke the Americans and after preliminary inquiries, Lt. CHONG instructed the Americans to proceed with him. The American were escorted to the headquarters of the intelligence headquarters. KOO Tuck Huai stated that the American were escorted to the intelligence headquarters at approximately 1800 hours, 9 August 1950, and they were further questioned by Lt. CHONG through interpreter KIM. As the Americans would not reveal the location of American troops, they were beaten, and kicked by approximately fifteen (15) soldiers in the yard of the headquarters. KOO confessed that he had also kicked the Americans. Then at dusk on the same day, the seven (7) Americans were individually ordered to stand with hands extended upward, and were shot by one of the soldiers with a rifle the Americans had possessed. At dark, the bodies were taken into a mountain. Subject did not possess information as to where they were taken, however, SUBJECT stated that he did witness the execution.

On 10 August 1950, KOO, Tuck Huai was ordered on a mission to investigate the American troops in the vicinity of TAMU-RI (1127-1355), and was ordered to return on 13 August, 1950. On 11 August, 1950, however, while KOO and his group of two members (mentioned previously) were investigating American troops locations at PUKCHI-RI (approx. 1127-1358), they were observed by American troops and a chase ensued. KOO stated that the other two (2) members escaped.

E. G. Van Orman
E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-2

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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ENCLOSURE (1): Translation of Regimental Combat Diary (16th
Regt.), 4th Division.

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (10)
CO 1st Bn., 11th Marines (2)
CO Fwd Ech 1st MarAirWing (5)
CO H&S Bn (10)
Each Staff Section(1)

CMC (2)
CG FMFPAC (2)
CG MCS (2)
CG 1st MarDiv (2)
CG FMFLANT (2)
CG 2d MarDiv (2)
FILE (2)

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 6

Translation of Regimental Combat Diary (16th Regt., 4th Division.) Dated 14 Aug 50;

One week had passed since our Regt crossed NAKDONG RIVER. Successful advance had been carried from boundary of 16th Regiment and occupied the area as we planned. 3rd Bn which had joined Regiment in combat on 7 Aug 50 got largest number casualties including the Bn CO. This caused great trouble in preparing future Regimental operations. According to Div Co's Opn O on 11 Aug, our Regimental mission to attack the RABBIT HILL and DOG HILL under artillery concentrations. 2nd Bn mission-right flank, 1st Bn, left flank, 3rd Bn in reserve and artillery fire for 2nd and 1st Bns.

Enemy occupied such good terrain and gun positions we could not advance fast but soon after sunset our troops occupied O O high hill. In this operation we lost good opportunity to chase up enemy due to the shortage of artillery ammunition. 3rd Bn on our right flank got air attack this morning and retreated down slope of hill. Mortars and heavy machine guns destroyed by air. Division Opn O has changed due to 16th Regiments retreat.

Co. E 2nd Bn and 3rd Bn stopped advancing due to enemy air bombing. 1640 hours - Division CO's order sent each unit by telephone "set up complete defensive positions where you are now." "Stay on present positions". I requested each squad leader to understand Div CO's order. Biggest trouble is lack of ammunition and food.

I wrote my recommendation to Division CO that all our supply be moved to our unit in the midnight to prevent air attack.

Enemy's several air planes attacked our CP all day long. None of our troops got fed today and none fired any ammunition. I wish we could send our air force to fight enemy air force. We can't fight without air plane. I so much wonder how we will fight in future.

Operation Order No. 1 4th Division

Enemy Situation

(1) 2 American Infantry Div and some Korean unit Artillery Bn, one tank Brigade (37 tanks) placed front of our LD and their reinforcement still coming from TAEGU, and PUSAN

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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(2) Div final object is to cut off the traffic between TAEGU, and PUSAN and also land to PUSAN.

(3) Nonfriendly troops located left flank and right of Div.

(4) Discussion.

Tanks, heavy weapons will be carried under the well covered and keep a temporary defense position until whole Div cross the river.

(5) 18th Regt missioned right flank 16th Regt left flank of Div. Boundary line of 16th and 18th Regt is NOO MYUNG HILL (2147). 3rd Bn artillery will be support these 2 Regts. by 45mm, 76mm, 120mm.

(6) 5th Regt will be placed as the Div reserve and Div defense.

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT NO

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
26 Aug 1950

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #7

1. Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

a. According to documents captured by 25th Infantry Division on 19 August, there is no shortage of any type of ammunition in the 15th North Korean Regiment of the 6th Rifle Division.

b. Enemy has been known to use trip flares in front of defensive positions.

c. A ROK patrol has reported that the enemy is burning the area around artillery pieces in order to give the impression from air the field piece has been destroyed and to camouflage flash of gun when firing.

d. According to PW reports, the North Koreans are using women for reconnaissance and sniper missions.

2. Order of Battle and Identifications.

a. The following is a report relative to the approximate strength and equipment of the North Korean 6th Rifle Division identified opposite the US 25th Infantry Division: (This is based on prisoner of war reports and estimates by G-2 25th Division):

(1) As of 1 Aug 50, the effective strength of the 6th Rifle Division was carried at six thousand five hundred (6,500) troops. Since then, however, the division has received an estimated three thousand, three hundred (3,300) replacements boosting the strength up to a minimum nine thousand eight hundred (9,800) troops of which, approximately eight thousand (8,000) are infantry. G-2, 25th Infantry Division estimates total enemy casualty during operations in the southwestern sector on 21 Aug 50 as exceeding three thousand seven hundred fifty (3,750) -- two thousand nine hundred fifty (2,950) infantry and eight hundred (800) artillery and service troops. Accordingly, the present effective strength of the 6th Rifle Division is six thousand fifty (6,050) troops. The 83d Motorized Infantry Regiment (motorcycles) and at least one (1) other infantry regiment are attached to the division. Strength of those two (2) regiments is a minimum three thousand (3,000) troops. Based on the above figures, the present effective strength and equipment of the 6th Rifle Division is as follows:

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CHINJU-MASAN CAMPAIGN

INFANTRY (Including atchd units)	Beginning of operations	11,000
	Estimated Casualties	8,950
	Effective	8,050
ARTILLERY AND SERVICE	Beginning of operations	1,800
	Estimated casualties	800
	Effective	1,000
CONSOLIDATION	Beginning of Operations	12,800
	Estimated Casualties	3,750
	Total effective as of 2124//K-9,	8,050
EQUIPMENT	Original Number of pieces	35
	Estimated Destroyed by Counter- battery fire	5
	Estimated destroyed by Air	1
	Number remaining as of 2124//K	29

- b. 105 Armored Division (formerly 105 Armored Brigade) -
- 107 Tk. Regiment
 - 109 Tk. Regiment.
 - 203 Tk. Regiment.
 - 206 Mecz. Regiment.
 - 603 SP Gun Regiment.
 - 208 Training Regiment.
 - 303 Reconnaissance Battalion.

3. Signs and Countersigns.

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
2712// to 2812//	GINGER	BREAD
2812// to 2912//	GLOW	WORM
2912// to 3012//	GOLD	BRICK
3012// to 3112//	GORGEOUS	GEORGE

4. Essential Elements of Information (Chemical Materiel).

a. The following EEI for chemical material have been listed by G-2 EUSAK:

(1) Requirement: The following information regarding each item of Chemical Warfare weapons and equipment listed in paragraph 2, under the North Korean Army Control:

(a) (a) Characteristics (model number, dimensions, weight, capacity, performance, filling component parts, markings, etc.).

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(b) Quality and quantity of each item on hand..

(2) Chemical Materiel:

(a) Agents, chemical (wargases, toxic and screening smokes, incendiaries).

(b) Bombs (chemical, incendiary, smoke).

(c) Candles (Chemical, smoke).

(d) Clothing, protective.

(e) Covers, protective -- (capas, envelopes).

(f) Collective protectors.

(g) Decontaminating agents.

(h) Decontamination equipment.

(i) Flame throwers (portable, mechanized).

(j) Fuels (flame thrower, incendiary rocket).

(k) Generators, mechanical, smoke.

(l) Grenades (chemical, incendiary, smoke).

(m) Identification and detection devices for war gases.

(n) Kits, anti-gas.

(o) Masks, gas (include canister).

(p) Mines, land, chemical.

(q) Ointment, protective.

(r) Pots, (chemical, smoke) include floating.

(s) Rockets, (chemical, incendiary, smoke) all others.

(t) Shells, (chemical, incendiary, smoke) include mortar, all calibres.

(u) Tank, airplane, spray (incendiary, smoke, toxic agents).

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(3) Collection guidance and special instructions:

(a) Stocks of weapons and equipment obtained from another country should be identified by the model number of the using country and the country of origin.

(b) Notify G-2, Brigade immediately of the capture of any chemical materiel.

5. Uniforms of North Korean People's Army.

The summer uniform worn by North Korean Officers is a yellow brown khaki uniform, which resembles the Russian Type, and a olive drab type, choked neckline, for winter. The winter uniform consists of cotton padded shirt and trousers. A red strip is sewed on the seam of the trousers. The summer uniform is also marked with red strips along seam of trousers and on the sleeves on the cotton shirt. Officers wear black riding boots. Officers are identified by yellow epaulets on which red stars and piping are found according to grade. The branch of service is placed on the epaulets, tanks for armor branch and yellow metal wings for Air Force.

Rank insignia for Company Grade officer are almost identical to that of the Russian with the exception that Red Stars on epaulets of North Korean Forces are arranged in a single row.

Enlisted men's uniform consist of a 2-piece yellow brown khaki set and fatigue clothes. The winter uniform is a padded olive drab materiel.

The rank of EM is similar to that of Russian rank which is found on the epaulets. Tank crews are identified by red epaulet with black piping and yellow metal tank. The infantry and artillery is identified by green epaulet with black piping. Other branch of services similar to that of epaulets of infantry and artillery.

Russian type steel helmets are reported to be used in combat.

North Korean troops today consists to some extent of replacements obtained in ROK, south of the 38°. Consequently these elements, which are placed in the front lines, seldom are issued uniforms and when captured will only have shirt, pants, and rubber shoes. Some, who have stripped U.S. PW's and dead, will wear U.S. Army clothing and equipment.

E. G. Van Orman
E. G. VAN ORMAN
LtCol., USMC
A-2, G-2

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ENCLOSURE: (1) MISD Interrogation Report #0015.
 (2) Republic of Korea Aircraft Insignia.
 United States " "
 Great Britain " "
 Australia " "
 North Korea " "
 Chinese Nationalist " "
 " Communist " "

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (10)
 CO 1st Bn., 11th Marines (2)
 CG Fwd Ech 1st MarAirWing (5)
 CG I&S BN (10)
 Each Staff Section (1)

CMC (2)
 CG FMFPAC (2)
 CG MCS (2)
 CG 1st MarDiv (2)
 CG FMFLANT (2)
 CG 2d MarDiv (2)
 FILE (2)

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ENCLOSURE (1) TO INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 7

HEADQUARTERS 1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE
163RD MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DETACHMENT
FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Date: 19 Aug 1950

INTERROGATED BY: CPL. T. ANDO

INTERROGATION REPORT #0015.

PLACE OF INTERROGATION: YONGSAN.

DATE OF INTERROGATION: 19 Aug 1950.

EVALUATION BY INTERROGATOR: Fairly Reliable.

SOURCE:

Name: PAK, Yi Yong

Rank: Private.

Serial No: None.

Age: 22

Unit: 1st Sq., 3rd Plt, Mortar Co, 3rd Bn, 16th Regt, 4th Div

Home Address: PYON GAN BUK DO, MYONG BUN GUN, DUK SAN MYUNG
SONG SUNG DONG, #570.

Where captured: Approx. six kilometers west of YONGSAN.

Date captured: 18 Aug, 1950. 1600 hours.

TACTICAL INFORMATION:

The mortar Company, which PW belonged to was equipped with 9 (nine) mortars and composed of 60 (sixty) troops when it first arrived at a point 6 (six) kilometers west of YONGSAN. Due to many casualties inflicted by heavy artillery fire and also due to lack of ammunition this company retreated toward the NAKTONG RIVER at noon, 18 Aug 1950. During retreat 6 (six) of it's 9 (nine) mortars were left behind and of the 60 (sixty) men about 40 (forty) were killed or wounded.

About 10 (ten) days prior HQs of the 4th Division was located somewhere in the hills behind a Primary School which was located approximately 6 (six) kilometers west of YONGSAN. HQs was also believed to have been withdrawn at noon 18 Aug, 1950.

The 4th Division was composed of the 5th., 16th and the 18th Regiment. There were 3 (three) battalions to a regiment. A Heavy Machine Gun Co. and a Mortar Co. was attached to each battalion. It was believed that each mortar company consisted of 60 (sixty) men, equipped with rifles and 9 (nine) mortars.

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Six artillery guns and 4 (four) light tanks were utilized by the 16th Regt.

The 16th and the 5th Regt. retreated toward NAKTONG RIVER at noon 18 Aug 1950. Whereabouts of the 18th Regt. was not known.

LOGISTICAL INFORMATION.

The 16th Regt. received no ammunition supply for the past 10 (ten) days. Reason unknown.

All travelling by troops was done on foot.

Only division Hqs. utilized radio communication. Subordinate units communicated by runners.

Troops crossed the NAKTONG RIVER in small fishing boats which were formerly owned by village fishermen. Transporting of tanks was unknown.

Food and ~~water~~ supply was obtained from villages nearby the units.

COMMENTS:

PW was cooperative during interrogation; however, he did not have accurate information.

/s/ FUJIO F. ASANO
1stLt., Inf.
Commanding

ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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Headquarters
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

SECRET

2:EGVO:js
28 Aug 1950

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #8

1. Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

a. PW states that North Korean soldiers of his division (1st North Korean Division) were informed that relatives of MIA or deserters would be executed. This action is taken to prevent North Korean soldiers from using Safe-Conduct passes.

b. Air reports 3 enemy T-34 Tanks were observed being placed in deep emplacements with only turret above ground. Pilot believed enemy using tanks emplaced as such for direct fire support.

c. A guerilla unit attacked elements of 82d AW Bn., of 2d Infantry Division. An English speaking individual led the attack. Control was obtained by whistle blasts - three blasts to move - six to fire.

2. Astronomical Data for September 1950. (KING TIME)

Date	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Highest	Moonset	Moon Phase
Sep 1	0659	1957	2208	0424	1114	
2	0700	1955	2236	0507	1215	
3	0701	1954	2309	0551	1315	3d Qtr.
4	0701	1953	2347	0638	1414	3d Qtr
5	0702	1951	0053	0728	1513	
6	0703	1950	-----	0820	1608	
7	0704	1948	0126	0913	1658	
8	0704	1947	0226	1007	1741	
9	0705	1946	0330	1059	1819	
10	0706	1944	0437	1150	1851	
11	0707	1943	0546	1239	1920	

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Highest</u>	<u>Moonset</u>	<u>Moon Phase</u>
Sep 12	0707	1941	0655	1326	1947	New Moon
13	0708	1940	0803	1414	2014	
14	0709	1938	0913	1503	2042	
15	0710	1937	1025	1554	2114	
16	0710	1935	1139	1648	2150	
17	0711	1934	1254	1747	2234	
18	0712	1932	1407	1848	2326	
19	0713	1931	1514	1950	0027	1st Qtr.
20	0713	1929	1611	2051	-----	
21	0714	1928	1658	2149	0135	
22	0715	1927	1736	2241	0245	
23	0716	1925	1808	2330	0354	
24	0717	1924	1835	0015	0500	
25	0717	1922	1900	0057	0603	
26	0718	1921	1923	-----	0704	Full Moon
27	0719	1919	1946	0138	0803	
28	0720	1918	2010	0220	0903	
29	0720	1916	2037	0302	1003	
30	0721	1915	2107	0345	1103	

3. ORDER OF BATTLE AND IDENTIFICATIONS (G-2 EUSAK:).

12th Rifle Division (Formerly the 7th Rifle Division)

a. Redesignation: Nine (9) prisoners of war recently captured in the POHANG DONG (1230-1460) area report (4 hearsay) that the 7th Rifle Division was redesignated as the 12th Rifle Division in the latter part of July 1950. Further, six (6) reliable source reports place the 12th Rifle Division in the general area occupied by a unit believed previously to have been the 7th Rifle Division. Moreover,

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no mention of the 7th Division was made in these reports although they were concerned with operations in that sector.

b. Organization.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CODE-APO</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
12th Rifle Division	825	MajGen PAK, Nak Chil, C/S SrCol. CHI, Pyong Hak.	(1210-1480) CHUNGNAM- MYON
1st Infantry Regiment	-827	Col. CHOE, Hyok	
2d (51st Infantry Regiment)	829	LtCol. KIM Chol.	
3rd Infantry Regiment	-831	LtCol. LEE, Song Jin	
12th Artillery Regiment	-833	Col. SONG, Hung Sam	

c. Movements:

During the period 1-5 August, the 12th Rifle Division departed ANDONG (1160-1520) for POHANG DONG via KIGYE (1210-1460), with elements arriving at the latter location on or about 11 August, 1950. On or about 13 August, those elements were driven out of POHANG DONG by friendly action. By 16 August, the entire division had been driven back to its present location, northwest of KIGYE, in the CHUNGHAM MYON area (1210-1480).

d. Effective Strength:

Personnel - IPW reports reveal a total of approximately six hundred (600) replacements received by the division as of 18 August, 1950. Reports also show an estimated total of two thousand (2,000) casualties as of that date. On 1 August, 1950, the effective strength of the division was estimated at seven thousand six hundred (7,600) troops. Based on these figures, the present strength of the 12th Rifle Division is six thousand two hundred (6,200) troops or fifty-seven (57) percent combat effective.

e. However, one regiment of the 7th Division has been identified opposite the 25th Infantry Division. This is the 3d Regiment or 77th Regiment. This unit may be independent or attached to the 6th Rifle Division.

4. REPORTS OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT BY MARINE AIR FOR DATES INDICATED.

21 August 1950: Planes operated with second ROK Corps, ANNEX BAKER TO BRIGADE SPECIAL ACTIONS REPORT

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24th Div., 25th Div. 5 F4U over target area 072-0905K. Badoeng Strait struck enemy positions Samhak-Tong 11517-14595 4 500 GP 20mm. Troops moved out into hills. 5 F4U strafed troops 4 slopes 11508-14602 to 11502-14535. Results undetermined. Strafed camouflaged vehicle 11347-14555. Attempted seal mine containing troops 5 mi. southwest Hanan 1135-1356 22 50 GP 1 500 Gp. Valuation undeterminable from air. Bombed troops Taejong-Ni 1 500 GP. Fire started. Torched M2 trucks 11374-13496. Bombed troops 11378-13905 22 50 GP. Strafed yellow bulldozer on road 2 mi. northeast Chogyo. Left smoking. Strafed troops near Hyopchong. Burned truck 11343-13884. Sicily hit 2 trucks 1127-1463. 1 kill 1 probable. Controller reported good coverage reverse slope 12 mi. northwest Taegu 1140-1463 5 500 GP 20mm on ridge near Hanan 1140-1363 just taken by enemy hit 4 500 GP 20mm. Troops caught innocen. Estimate large casualties. Troops in houses near Kangjuru-Ni strafed. 1 artillery piece knocked out. Command post near Chung Chow-Ni hit 1 500 GP 20mm. Command post 1356-1122 hit by 2 500 GP 20mm. Fire started. Destroyed artillery piece near Pkkkong-Ni 2 500 GP 4 ATAR. Controller 24th Div area reports enemy troops switching to white civilian clothing. Total sorties 37.

23 August, 1950: Planes operated with 1st, 2d ROK Corps, 25th Div. 4 or 5 F4U over target areas 0725K to 1905K. Badoeng Strait planes destroyed artillery position 11658-14950 22 50 GP 20mm. South end railroad tunnel 1165-1483 reported containing tanks bombed 15 hundred GP hit near mouth. No closure. Fired one ATAR Rpt ATAR in north end. Results not apparent. Strafed troops around village 1164-1488. Coverage good. Strafed on road side 1150-1464. Strafed and bombed troops nose and ridge 1154-1465 45 hundred GP 3 ATAR. Strafed and bombed ridge positions 1142-1351 45 hundred Gp. Ground control reported excellent coverage. Strafed troops in and around buildings 1140-1353. 1430K launched 4 F4U to provide air cover for comus. Unable locate comus on estimated track. Sicily plane set fire to 5 groups storage buildings 1126-1372 65 hundred GP four ROAS mm and burned 1 truck. Hit troops and stored in 3 small towns 1135-1435. All burned vigorously. Controller said 300 troops killed supplies destroyed. In preparation ROK reports ROK advanced at hill 324 1168-1482 near Juchon-Dong 45 hundred GP 20mm strafed troops 1172-1482 struck mortars on hill 1155-1468 45 hundred GP 4 ATAR 20mm. Coverage reported good. Badoeng Strait 24 F4U. Sicily 22 F4U. Total sorties 46.

24 August 1950: 20 strike sorties 1 strike TAC sorti 10 CAP sorties total 31 sorties. Expended 19 500 pound bombs to Napalm 39 sdar 83-5 in CR. 0800K strike able 4 F4U 1 F4U TAC Struck two small towns 1125-1404 7 mi.

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east of Hyopchon containing troops supplies 5500 pound bombs 10 HVAR 20mm. Controller stated coverage road strong fire started Kegst and Myphchon 1115-1402 troops supplies 10 HVAR 20mm. Large fire started. 0943K Strike baker 4 F4U struck ridge 12 mi west Masan 1137-1379 4500 bombs (pound) 15 HVAR 20mm. Close support for infantry heavy attack. 2 F4U provided air cover for HMS Comus. Released at 1230K. 1201K strike Charley 4 struck ridge north Chindong-Ni 1144-1354 4500 pound bombs 16 HVAR 20mm Very close air support for infantry attempting to dislodge infiltration. Returning strike observer 80-100 box cars Marshalling yards Yosu 1075-1305. 1352K strike Dog 4 F4U strike small town in Yohang-Myon 1138-1352 just rear of front lines 4500 pound bombs 20mm. Large fire domain ACK smoke. Struck ridges same area gun emplacement troops. 4 weapons assessed as anti-tank knocked-out. 1515K strike Easy 4 F4U struck ridge previously hit north Chindong-Ni 1144-1354 2500 pound bombs two napalm 20mm.

25 August, 1950: 26 strikes sorties 12 Capdptuap sorties to 238 sorties expended 305 hundred lb bombs 7 napalm 15 HVAR 10 AR 10 ATR 0630K strike able 4 F4U struck tunnel 1128-1353 1 napalm 20mm smoke observed coming from opposite end of tunnel under water bridge north of surface bridge wreckage Nam-Gang River east of Yiryong. 15 hundred bomb 105mm artillery piece destroyed 1135-1366 3 HVAR 2 RAM 20mm transformer station west side Chungam-Ni 1134-1365 burned out 1 RAM 20mm sorti Baker 0830K 4 F4U struck tank at Chong-gang-dong 1165-1484 4 HVAR RAMs 25 hundred lb bombs direct hits 20mm near mission assessed damage troops in ditches near Kun-wi 1164-1483 25 hundred lb VT fuzed bomb 20mm results unknown strike C 1033K 4 F4U struck stores 1139-1349 2500 lb bombs large secondary explosion indicating ammo or fuel dump buildings 1130-1352 near Taechon-Ni 6500 lb bombs 4 20mm targets left burning sorti D 1232K 4 F4U hit village 10 mi east Uiryong 1135-1373 2 napalm 2500 pound bombs 20mm struck Uiryong 1125-1372 2 HVAR 2 AR 2500 lb bombs struck Oejori 1374-1118 2500 lb bombs 2 HVAR 2 AR. Targets all burned no other assignment. In 326K strike E 4 F4U struck 8 artillery pieces in camouflaged orchard TABU-Dong 1150-1460 2 napalm 2500 lb bombs 20mm. 2 milkingse some gidy 6 AR 20mm good hit small ordnance no positive assessment of damage. 1643K MF 6 F4U struck bridge at Chinju which has been rebuilt 1108-1346 8 500 lb bombs 3 direct hits. Hits put 3 large holes in surface damaged supports. Tank under repair or being stripped and repair truck outside of Nungchow-Ni 1121-1352 2 napalm 1 500 lb bomb. Direct hit on truck with napalm tank hit 20mm burned supplies in Napyong-Dong 1111-1354 20mm small fires started Sang-dae 1111-1355. BAS strafed 1111-1352 Kaeyang-Dong 20mm assets.

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26 August 1950; Sicily Group TE 96.82 replenishing Sasobo. Badoeng Strait group TE 96.81 maintained 3 to 5 F4U's over target area 0725K to 1905K Ukhvdng cas to 1st, 2d ROK Corps, 24th, 25th U.S. Divisions destroyed camouflaged artillery in center river bed 11555-1460 32 50 GP 11 HVAR. Strafed troops on slopes both sides of road 1155-1469. Intense inaccurate automatic field piece firing encountered. Strafed 2 jeeps 11362-13762. Probable burned 1 warehouse damaged another 1137-1361 19 HVAR. Strafed on slope 1141-1357. Bombed rockets strafed artillery position 1222-1477 32 50 Gp 4 HVAR. Destroyed gun. Gun had fired 2 rounds AA at planes. Inaccurate. Strafed rocketed troops in valley 1233-1471 22 HVAR. Excellent coverage reported by ground controller. Intense machine gun fire this area. Blasted troops in village 1198-1491 with 32 50 GP 24 HVAR. Estimated 30 percent destruction of area. Fuel and stores beside road 11585-14775 set fire with 20mm strafed many troops on ridge 11595-14780. Ground controller enthusiastic excellent coverage. Supply dump 1157-1478 destroyed 32 50 GP 16 HVAR. Burned 10 vehicles destroyed 3 damaged 4 beside road 3 to 5 mi southeast Hyopchon with 4250 16 HTAR 20mm. Set fire fuel dump 11212-13928 with 20mm. Bomb reported position vehicle 1207-1477 4250 Gp 18 HVAR. Results not visible to planes. Strafed and rocketed 3 troops positions 6 HVAR 20mm near 1207-1477. Badoeng Strait 39 FU sorties.

5. Before a proper evaluation can be made of information certain pertinent facts must, be furnished if known. In receiving a report of enemy activity, movement or installations, an informant may fail to give important information that he had or known. It is therefore necessary to question the individual to get a more complete and accurate report.

a. The following questions should be answered concerning an enemy convoy. If the answer to any question is unknown, so state. (see 1 thru 10).

1. Number of vehicles. _____.
2. Type _____.
3. How many of each type _____.
4. Direction of movement _____.
5. Head of column at _____ time _____.

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6. Tail of column at _____ time _____.

7. If trucks, what type of cargo

Troops _____

Supplies _____

Empty _____

8. If tanks, with Inf. _____ Riding _____.

9. Source of information _____.

10. Is source usually reliable _____.

b. The following is considered the minimum description information on enemy artillery pieces. (See 1 thru 5).

1. Where located _____.

2. How many _____.

3. Estimate of Caliber _____.

4. Towed gun _____ Self propelled _____.

5. In firing positions _____ moving _____

other _____.

c. In reporting on enemy troop concentrations or positions, the following is considered the minimum. (See 1 thru 4).

1. Where seen _____.

2. How many _____.

3. What were they doing _____.

4. Source _____.

E. G. Van Orman
 E. G. VAN ORMAN
 LtCol., USMC
 ACoS, G-2

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ENCLOSURE: (1) T/O & T/E Charts of North Korean People's Army Units.

DISTRIBUTION: CO 5th Marines (10)
CO 1st Bn., 11th Marines (2)
CG Fwd Ech 1st MarAirWing (5)
CO VMO-6 (1)
CO H&S BN (10)
Each Staff Section (1)

CMC (2)
CG FMFPAC (2)
CG MCS (2)
CG 1st MarDiv (2)
CG FIFLANT (2)
CG 2d MarDiv (2)
FILE (2)

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ANNEX CHARLIE

Report of
Brigade G-3 Section

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALANNEX CHARLIEBRIGADE G-3 SECTION

In summarizing the activities of the Brigade G-3 Section no account of the overall Brigade operations will be repeated since a narrative of operations is covered in the Commanding General's basic report. Instead an account of the organization, equipment and functioning of the G-3 Section will be emphasized. Basic operational directives, operational summaries and task organization are placed in appendices for reference. During the period from 7-11 July, the G-3 Section was organized and equipped. Due to personnel limitations imposed, every attempt was made to eliminate non-essential personnel and equipment to enable the section to be highly mobile and compact, and to be able to accomplish it's mission. The organization of the G-3 Section as finally resolved was as follows:

Assistant Chief of Staff G-3	-- (LtCol)
Assistant G-3	-- (Major)
Infantry Operations Assistant	-- (SSgt)
Stenographer	-- (Sgt)
Draftsman	-- (Cpl)
Clerk -- Typist	-- (Cpl)

Items of equipment embarked by this section for operation in Korea were as follows:

2 Chests, typewriter, complete	1 Tent, blackout, complete
2 Desks, field	1 Chest, illuminating, complete
1 Chest, fiber, filing	2 Chairs, folding, director
1 Box, drafting, battalion	4 Stools, camp
1 Table, drafting w/trestle	1 Net, camouflage
2 Boards, map	1 $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton, cargo truck, 4XL
1 Locker box w/drafting supplies	1 $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton, cargo trailer
1 Box, metal	3 Tables, folding

Upon arrival in Pusan, Korea, on August 2, Brigade was informed that it would commence unloading equipment immediately and that the Brigade would be moved forward on 3 August. In view of the Brigade's contemplated employment in land warfare of movement, rather than amphibious employment, it became increasingly apparent that the equipment of the G-3 Section would have to be even further limited. Gear not required forward was left in the rear echelon Pusan, and G-3 equipment capable of being transported in one (1) $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton cargo trailer was all that was retained. This equipment was as follows:

1 Chest, typewriter, complete	1 Tent, blackout, complete
1 Locker box w/drafting supplies	1 Chest, illuminating, complete
2 Boards, map	4 Stools, camp
3 Tables, folding	2 Chairs, folding, director
1 Box, metal	1 Net, camouflage

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One of the most difficult problems confronting the Brigade G-3 Section was the necessity for preparing plans for rapid over-land movement of the Brigade by rail and motor and the extremely limited notice the Brigade was given as to its proposed employment. Almost every move was urgent and immediate. Almost all orders issued to the Brigade were verbal orders which required almost immediate execution. This made it impossible to formalize operations orders or plans in the complete form desired for deliberate coordinated attacks or movements. However, habitual warning orders, issuance of fragmentary orders and the use of dispatch orders bridged the gap without confusion. The Brigade moved so many times that procedure became standardized and expeditious. Telephone, radio, messenger, conferences, and personal staff visits were used to the fullest in insuring that instructions received were passed on. The helicopter proved indispensable for staff visits to obtain orders, issue orders and reconnoiter. Formalized orders were issued on those occasions when there was sufficient time. In all cases written orders were issued to confirm verbal orders in order to improve coordination.

During the period of this report the Brigade was attached at various times to three (3) U. S. Army Divisions; the 25th Infantry Division, 24th Infantry Division and the 2nd Infantry Division. In all cases the cooperation and assistance rendered the Brigade by the Army units was outstanding. Army units which were attached to the Brigade during operations in Korea were as follows:

3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry, 25th Division
 5th RCT, 25th Infantry Division
 159th Field Artillery Battalion
 539th Truck Company
 73rd Truck Company

It should be noted here that one of the most difficult situations for the staff to overcome in Korea was the location of command post sites with adequate space to tactically locate all elements of the Brigade Headquarters. Cover and adequate area was generally not available, and road turn-arounds and entrances into suitable CP areas were difficult to find. This was a constant problem and whenever possible a TD 14 dozer was used to construct turn-arounds and routes into suitable command post areas.

It is interesting to note that interrogation of prisoners discloses that the enemy is very proficient in locating command posts, and OP's. As a positive indication, the command post came under fire on numerous occasions and at times disturbed operations. Sections must habitually dig in and have some protection for duty personnel. Since it was extremely difficult to camouflage a command post due to the limited vegetation in the Brigade's zone of action, a most important consideration was to locate the CP in an area from

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which it could receive some protection from enemy fire, while having sufficient area to permit dozing of positions for the operation sections.

Since it was desirable to keep well forward, the Brigade finally adopted the plan of displacing only the essential elements required to control the tactical employment of the Brigade, leaving most of the administrative and service elements in the rear. This method proved highly satisfactory throughout the entire operation.

Limited space and poor road nets created a great problem in the movement of troops by motor, and the displacement of CP's and supplies forward. Careful consideration must be given to time and space factors involved to avoid troops waiting for transportation for long periods of time since it takes two or three times as long to move troops in Korea as it would where roads are good. Road space was so critical that the 8th Army had a standing order that in the event that movement of troops or supplies was delayed by stalled or disabled vehicles the vehicles would be pushed off the road to permit traffic to move.

Another difficult problem confronted in Korea is the effect of high terrain on communications. It was extremely difficult for the Operation Section to keep abreast of the situation at the front since telephonic communications were continually being disrupted by movement of vehicles and tanks; or the wire could not be laid fast enough on occasions to keep up with the advance of the troops. As a result, the Commanding General and the G-3 spent most of their time forward to obtain desired information. The use of the Weasel and helicopter for laying of wire can improve the situation some. Also, when the rice paddies have become hardened, the restriction to roads will not be so great.

Placing telephone calls through a series of Army unit switchboards in attempting to contact units of the Brigade were extremely difficult. Clearing all circuits for a call was almost impossible and purely a matter of coincidence. Radio communications were generally unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the G-3 Section as a result of poor operating conditions.

The high terrain in Korea while having a bad effect on communications, had an excellent effect as regards observation by all elements of the command. Sharp terrain features and lack of underbrush or trees gave extremely good observation and control. Identification on the ground was excellent even though the maps were poor.

G-3 participation in supporting arms coordination was mainly

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supervisory and of a planning nature. The overall plan of supporting of fires and the availability of air and artillery was established by Brigade, and Regiment executed or requested the details. There was no artillery officer at Brigade headquarters at all times, --- only when command liaison was desirable. There was a Brigade air officer who arranged all close air support and coordinated the use of the helicopters and OY aircraft in a highly effective manner. There was no Brigade Naval Gunfire Officer, and those in subordinate units were not required and remained at Pusan.

The state of training of the Brigade prior to entry into combat could be considered high and the results in combat substantiate this consideration. However, poor physical condition of the men initially resulted in a large number of cases of physical exhaustion. This is probably a result of a long period aboard ship, inadequate physical conditioning program and the very hot weather. Later the number of heat exhaustion cases dropped off considerably.

When replacements commenced arriving on 22 August, the Brigade was in reserve. All units immediately initiated an intense program of small unit training and test firing of weapons was undertaken. Training is a continuous requirement, and is more effective during periods between combat when the men rest up than at any other time.

Liaison was always maintained with the higher echelon and is a requirement for any operation. Liaison officers should have means of communication and transportation, and when these facilities are not provided by existing means, it should be arranged if liaison is to be effective. Subordinates should maintain liaison when required -- particularly when in contact and when communications are not good. In this connection, the G-3 Section must always have adequate space and means to take care of briefing of observers, liaison personnel, visiting dignitaries and other personnel visiting the G-3 office.

The G-3 Section should be organized for 24 hour operations. The allowance of officers and enlisted personnel was inadequate for continuous operations in the Brigade G-3 Section.

Appendices:

1. Task Organization
2. Dispatch brief FMFPac Opn O 1-50
3. 1st MarDiv GO #9
4. CinCFE msg 261948Z to ComNavFE
5. Brigade Periodic Opn Reports

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Appendix 1 to Annex CHARLIE

UNIT	COMMANDING	STRENGTH	
		OFF	ENL
1ST PROV MAR BRIG, FMC (REINF)	BrigGen E. A. CRAIG		
H&S Bn	Maj R. E. SULLIVAN	32	183
Det, 1st Sig Bn	Capt E. F. STANLEY	4	99
Co "A", 1st Inf Bn	Capt A. W. ECKLUND	6	112
Co "C", 1st Med Bn	Cdr R. A. FREYLING, USN	5	94
Co "A", 1st SP Bn	Maj W. E. BATCHELOR	12	213
Co "A", 1st Engr Bn	Capt G. W. KING	9	209
Det, 1st Ord Bn	1st Lt M. La BELLMAN	5	119
Co "A", 1st Trk Bn	Capt G. M. ENGLISH	9	173
1st Bn, 11th Mar	Lt Col R. M. WOOD	44	474
4.2" Mortar Co, 1st Wpn Bn	1st Lt R. H. LUCY	6	129
75mm Recoilless Gun Co	1st Lt A. S. BAILEY	3	85
5th Marines	Lt Col R. L. MURRAY	123	2238
Det, 1st Serv Bn	Capt T. M. SAGAR	11	161
Det, 1st CSGrp	Maj T. J. O'LAHONEY	5	104
Det, Reconnaissance Co	Capt K. J. HOUGHEN	2	37
Det, Military Police Co	1st Lt N. G. RODES	2	36
1st Amphibian Trac Co	Maj J. P. TREADWELL	10	244
1st Amphibian Trk Plat	1st Lt J. E. CONDRA	1	75
VMO-6	Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK		
MEACS-2	Maj C. LEE		
	TOTAL:	289	4785

Notes

1. 1st Amphibian Tractor Co and 1st Amphibian Truck Platoon left convoy enroute for Kobe and did not operate in Korea.
2. Combat Service Group served as Rear Echelon for Brigade in Pusan.
3. Remaining elements of the Brigade were engaged in operations against the enemy.

Appendix 1 to Annex CHARLIE

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Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE
Directives

FM:	CG FMFPAC	<u>PRECEDENCE</u>
TO:	CG 1ST MARDIV CG AIRFMFPAC	<u>PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION</u>
INFO:	COMPHIBPAC COMAIRPAC CINCFE COMDTMARCOR COMNAVFORFE COMSERVEFORPACFLT CINCPACFLT	RESTRICTED

052200Z

THIS IS DISPATCH BRIEF OF MY OPERATION PLAN 1-50 X
TASK ORGANIZATION FIRST PROV MARBRIG FMF REINF X
COMDR BRIGGEN CRAIG X DEPUTY COMDR AND AIF COMDR
BRIGGEN CUSHMAN X ORGANIZATION GROUND ELEMENTS AS IN
MY 050101Z NOTAL X AIR ELEMENTS AS IN CG AIRFMFPAC
050302Z NOTAL X PARA ONE X SEE FMFPAC AND FECOM G-2
SUMMARIES X CINCPACFLT CMA COMWESTSEA/FRON AND FECOM
WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MOVEMENT AS REQUIRED X
PARA TWO X FMFPAC ORGANIZES AND EMBARKS BRIGADE
COMPRISES ONE REINFORCED REGIMENT WITH APPROPRIATE
SUPPORTING AIR AND HQ ELEMENTS FOR COMBAT SERVICE IN
FAR EAST X PARA THREE X FIRST PROV MARBRIG REINFORCED
EMBARKS SAN DIEGO AREA IN SHIPS OF TASK GROUP TO BE
DESIGNATED BY COMPHIBPAC FOR MOVEMENT TO FECOM X BE
PREPARED TO X ABLE X DISEMBARK GROUND ELEMENTS IN
KOREA X BAKER X DISEMBARK GROUND ELEMENTS IN JAPAN
AS NECESSARY TO REEMBARK IN ASSAULT SHIPPING FOR
AMPHIBIOUS EMPLOYMENT X CHARLIE X DISEMBARK AND ESTAB-
LISH AIR ELEMENTS ASHORE IN KOREA OR JAPAN RETAINING
OPERATING SQUADRON ABOARD CVE FOR CLOSE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS X THIS PLAN EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT FOR
PLANNING WITH RELATED NAVAL ECHELONS AND ON SIGNAL FOR
EXECUTION X PARA FOUR X MOUNTING OUT SUPPLIES AS IN
FMFPAC ADMIN PLAN 1-50 EXCEPT AVGAS ON WHICH DETAILS
TO FOLLOW X RESUPPLY INSTRUCTIONS LATER X SHIPPING
ALLOCATED PICKAWAY APA 122 X CLYMER APA 27 X HENRICO
APA 45 X GENERAL ANDERSON AP 111 X FORT MARION LSD 22 X

Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE

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Directives

GUNSTON HALL LSD 5 X BEGOR APD 127 OR BASS APD 124 X
WHITESIDE AKA 50 X ACHERNAR AKA 53 X ALSHAIN /KA 55
X PARA FIVE X COM SOP X DETAILS FECOM COM SITUATION
LATER X ON RECEIPT OF THIS PLAN AIR COMMANDER REPORT
CG FIRST PROVIMARBRIG REINF FOR DUTY AND CG FIRST PROV
MARBRIG REINF REPORT COMPHIBPAC FOR PLANNING AND FOR
LOADING AS SHIPS BECOME AVAILABLE X ON ARRIVAL FECOM
REPORT CINCPAC FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL X ADMINISTRATION
FIRST PROVIMARBRIG AND FIRST MARAIRWING UNITS REMAIN
WITH PARENT ORGANIZATIONS X COMPLETE PLAN FOLLOWS BY
MAIL

Appendix 2 to Annex CHARLIE

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Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE

Directives

Headquarters
1st Marine Division, FMF
Camp Joseph H. Pendleton
Oceanside, California

3/tlp
1975
6 July 1950

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DIVISION GENERAL ORDER)
: Activation of Command
NUMBER.....9)

Ref: (a) CG FMFPac Sec Dis 050101Z

Encl: (1) Organization, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade(Reinf)
(2) Table of Organization, Headquarters and Service Bn,
1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinf)

1. In compliance with reference (a), the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) is hereby activated effective 7 July 1950.

2. Brigadier General Edward A. CRAIG, 0196/9903, U. S. Marine Corps is hereby designated as Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced).

3. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) will consist of units listed in enclosure (1). By authority of the Commandant of the Marine Corps Secret Dispatch 231520Z, units are authorized 5% overstrength of those listed in enclosure (1). Required personnel augmentation will be provided by this Headquarters. Only enlisted personnel, the rank of sergeant or below, whose enlistments expire subsequent to February 28, 1951 will be included in this organization.

4. a. The Commanding General is directed to activate a Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) immediately. This provisional battalion will include a Headquarters Company and provide an administrative headquarters for such units as may be attached to it. Enclosure (2) represents the troop list and table of organization for the Headquarters and Service Battalion.

b. Supplies and equipment required for initial and mounting out will be provided by this Headquarters.

5. The Commanding Officers of Units attached to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced) will report to the Brigadier Commander at 0800, 7 July for operational and administrative control.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAIG:

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1.

Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE

Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE
Directives

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J. H. COOK, JR.,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: "B", PLUS:
CG FIIFPAC
CNO
CG, Air, FIIFPac
ComPhibPac
ComAirPac
CincFE

OFFICIAL:

/s/ P. J. COSTELLO
P. J. COSTELLO
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Division Adjutant

Appendix 3 to Annex CHARLIE

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Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE
Directives

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY

DTG 261948Z SECRET
TOR 271920K
PREC PRIORITY

Date 27 July 1950

Page 1 of 1 pages

MSG FROM: CINCPAC

TO: JEMAF
COMNAVFE
CG IUSAK
CG EIGHTH ARMY

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION : G-3 (2)

INFO: G-1
G-2
G-4
1st MarBrig
DC/S

INFO: WAR
7th TakFlt
Cin PacFltCom Destroyer Div 142
Destroyer Div 92

OTG 90 0

CX 58763

Kobe Base not addre crypto pass to CG 1st Marine AirWing
Forward for info CINCPAC msg CX 58628, 25 Jul 50, notal Mag in 7
parts. CG IUSAK pass to CG 1st Prov Marine Brigade.

1. 1st Prov Marine Brigade (Reinf), less fwd ech 1st Marine AirWing (1stMAW) and less such other atchd units peculiar to amph opns to be designated by CG 1st Prov Marine Brigade, is atch to CG IUSAK upon debarkation in Korea.
2. Fwd ech, 1st Marine Air Wing upon arrival at Kobe is atch to COMNAVFE and will be prepared to furnish close support to 1st Prov Marine Brigade. Land based olms and acft when not carrier borne will be based at Itani AB.
3. Amph units designated by CG 1st Prov Marine Brigade and such other Marine units as may subsequently arrive are atch to COMNAVFE upon arrival at Kobe and will occupy fac prov selected by adv party, 1st Prov Marine Brigade in the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area.
4. CG 8th Army will prov nec housing and tng areas in Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto Area and furn logistic support as outlined in CINCPAC msg CX 57341, 7 July 50. Plans will be made to prov fac for expansion to 1st Marine Div (Reinf) less 1 ROT in the same area.

AG IN NO. C-1142

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Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE

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Directives

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5. CG FEAF will make aval existing fac at Itani AB for the fwd oeh, 1st Marine Air Wing and will furn resupply support as outlined in CINCPAC nse CX-57341 plans will be made to prov fac for expansion of fwd oeh, 1st Marine Air Wing to able full Marine Air Wing (Approx twice present strength).

6. COMNAVET will prov noc fac for reception, processing, and forwarding of replacements to 1st Prov Marine Brigade and prov class 1 A supplies for Marine Air olms.

7. Dir coky between adcos to accomplish mission is authorized.

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AG IN NO : 0-1142

Appendix 4 to Annex CHARLIE

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Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE
Periodic Operations Report

ACTION CG EUSAK 032335Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 1 FROM 0600 TO 2000 3 AUG X PARA 1 X 1STPROVMARERIG CP OPENED NEW LOCATION CHANGWON 1600 X ALL ELMS EXCEPT ONE THIRD TK CO AND MIS SERV ELMS VIC CHANGWON BY 1600 X PARA 2 X COMPLETE MOVEMENT ELMS AND SUP TO CHANGWON X PARA 3 X SUBORDINATES ORDERED OCCUPY TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS ASTRIDE MASAN CHANGWON CORRIDOR PREPARED FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS X PARA 4 UNIT STRENGTH 100 PERCENT MORALE AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY HIGH

ACTION CG EUSAK 032125Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 2 X ALL UNITS IN POSN CHANGWON X OTHER PARAS NEGATIVE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPN RPT NO 3 X ONE CLN AIR SUPPORT GRP TACRON 1 REPORTED FROM 1ST MAW X WILL MOVE BY TRAIN TO CHANGWON 5 AUG X ONE NAVAL GUNFIRE LN TEAM ATD 25TH DIV X TWO CLN NEGATIVE X THREE CLN PLAT COMBAT PATROL SENT TO INVESTIGATE KNOWN EN OP DUE NORTH BRIG CP NEGATIVE RESULTS AS EN HAD EVACUATED X FOUR CLN NEGATIVE

ACTION CG EUSAK 050701K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 4 X FOR PERIOD 1800 4 AUG to 1600 5 AUG X ALL PARAS CLN NEGATIVE

ACTION CG EUSAK 052340K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 5 FOR PERIOD 0800 TO 1800 5 AUG X ONE CLN NEGATIVE TWO CLN ONE BLT MOVES BY MOTOR TO VIC OF CHINDONG-NI 1148-1347 COMMENCING AT APPROX 0900 AUG 6 X PREPARED MOVE FORWARD TO CROSSROAD 1144-1345 AND ATK TO SW X REMAINDER BRIG PREPARES TO MOVE TO ATK POSNS VIC CROSSROAD 1144-1345 DURING NIGHT OF 6-7 AUG X THREE CLN SAME AS PARA 2 X FOUR CLN MORALE AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY HIGH

ACTION CG 25TH DIV USA

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 6 X PERIOD 1800 5 AUG to 0600 6 AUG X ONE CLN NEGATIVE X TWO CLN SEE THREE BELOW X THREE CLN BRIG OPN PLAN FOUR DASH FIFTY X BRIG MOVES BY MOTOR TO CHING DONG NI ATK S AND W AND SEIZES SUCHON X FOUR CLN CONTACT WITH SMALL EN PATROLS UNDER PERIOD CMA NO CASUALTIES CMA OTHERWISE NEGATIVE

Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE 1

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ACTION CG 25TH DIV 06194OK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 7 X FOR PERIOD 0600 TO 1800 6 AUG X ONE CLN NO CHANGE X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN OPN PLAN FOUR DASH FIFTY BEING EXECUTED X FOUR CLN BLT THREE SLASH FIVE RELIEVED BLT ONE SLASH TWENTY SEVEN IN LINE X OTHERWISE NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 8 FOR PERIOD 1800 TO 2400 7 AUG X ONE CLN NO CHANGE X TWO CLN OPN PLAN 5-50 DIRECTS CONTINUATION OF ATK X THREE CLN SAME AS TWO X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 9 FOR PERIOD 080001 TO 080600 AUG X ONE CLN 2D BN 5THMAR REL 2DBN 5TH INF X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN BRIG EXECUTES OPN PLAN 5-50 WHICH CONTINUES ATK X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 10 X FROM 080600 TO 081800 AUG 50 X ONE CLN 5TH RCT USA REVERTED TO CONTROL 25TH DIV AT 1000 X 2D BN 24TH INF ATTACHED EFFECTIVE 1020 THIS DATE ORDERED TO REL 2DBN 5THMAR IMMEDIATELY CMA AMBUSHED ALONG MSR BY SEV AUTO WPNS AND DID NOT MAKE REL DETACHED TO PARENT CONTROL PRIOR TO END OF PERIOD X PRESENT STATUS NOT KNOWN X 1STBN 5THMAR MOVED TO VIC 1146-1346 X 2DBN 5THMAR ON HIGH GROUND VIC 1147-1348 X 3DBN 5THMAR ON HIGH GROUND VIC 1150-1348 X REAR ECH BRIG H&S BN CLOSED CHINONGNI X TWO CLN 1STBN 5THMAR SECURE RJ 1144-1346 DURING DARKNESS NIGHT OF 8-9 AUG X 2D AND 3DBN 5THMAR PREVENT EN INFILTRATION PROTECT MSR TO E - W GRID LINE 1350 X THREE CLN 1STBN 5THMAR SECURE RJ 1144 - 1346 X 2DBN 5THMAR REMAIN PRES POS UNTIL REL BY 2DBN 24THINF X 3DBN 5THMAR CONDUCT COMBAT PATROLS TO PREVENT EN ELMS INFILTRATION MSR X 1STBN 11THMAR SUPPORT ACTION X FOUR CLN 1STBN 5THMAR MARCH HELD UP ALONG RD VIC 1146-1346 BY EIMS RCT-5 USA X 3DBN 5THMAR ATK EN UNITS ON HIGH GROUND VIC 1150-1348 STILL IN CONTACT X 95% X MORALE VERY GOOD X COMBAT EFFICIENCY VERY GOOD

ACTION CG 25TH DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 11 X FROM 081800 TO 082400 AUG 50 X ONE CLN NO CHANGE X TWO CLN 2DBN 24THINF TO REL 2DBN 5THMAR TOMORROW X 1STBN 5THMAR ATK FROM HIGH GROUND VIC RJ 1144 - 1346 SEIZE NEXT TACTICALLY IMPORTANT HIGH GROUND X ONE DD FOR NAVAL GUNFIRE SPT REQUESTED BEGINNING 9 AUG X THREE CLN NO CHANGE X FOUR CLN RCT 5 USA RPTS THEIR 2DBN OBJ AND OTHER ASSAULT BN MOVING AGAINST NO OPPOSITION X OTHERWISE NO CHANGE

Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE

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ACTION CG 25TH DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 12 X PERIOD COVERED 090001 TO 090600 AUG 50 X ONE CLN MSG RECD FROM 2DBN 24TH INF RPT ADV ELMS ARRIVED CHINDONG-NI 0800 CLN MAIN BODY WILL NOT ARR UNTIL SEVERAL HRS LATER X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN NO CHANGE X FOUR CLN 1STBN 5THMAR AFFECTED REL 1STBN 5TH IN AT 0425 X AT 0605 1STBN 5THMAR MOVED FWD TO SECURE NEXT HIGHER GROUND X 2DBN 5THMAR NO ACTIVITY X 3DBN 5THMAR RECD ONE CASUALTY

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 13 X PERIOD 090600 TO 091800 X ONE CLN BRIG TRPS CLN H AND S BN NO CHANGE CMA ENGRS 48.5 DASH 47.3 CMA SHORE PARTY ONE TANK CHANGWON ONE TANK ON 1ST VIC CHINDONG NI CMA DET SERV BN AND MT CO MOVING CHANGWON TO CHINDONG NI CMA DET CSG FUSAN X 5TH MAR CP 43.8 DASH 46.7 CMA 1ST BN VIC SOKCHOWCHI 43 DASH 42 CMA 2D BN IN ASSEMBLY AREA VIC 46 DASH 48 CMA 3D BN ASSEMBLY AREA VIC 47 DASH 49 CMA TK CO CMA A DASH T CO CMA 4.2 MORTAR CO VIC 43 DASH 45 X 1ST BN 11TH MAR VIC 43 DASH 45 X TWO CLN 5TH MAR EXECUTE NIGHT ATK AND CAPTURE PAEDUNNI PRIOR DAY LIGHT 10 AUG PREP CONT ATK ON ORDER X 1ST BN 11TH MAR DISPLACE PRIOR DARKNESS PREP SUPPORT NIGHT ATK 5TH MAR X PREP DISPLACE BRIG CP 10 AUG X THREE CLN RGN CO ORDERED DESTROY EN OP X BRIG RELIEVED MOPPING DASH UP OPNS 091600 X FOUR CLN RGN CO WOUNDED ONE EN AND REPORTED THREE OTHER EN ESCAPED X 3D BN REPORTED CONTACT WITH 24TH 1130 X 2D BN 5TH MAR SECURED FROM MOPPING DASH UP OPERATIONS 1600 X 1ST BN 5TH MAR SECURED REGT OBJ ABLE 43.0 DASH 42.5 X 95 PERCENT X MORALE EXCELLENT X COMBAT EFFICIENCY VERY GOOD X

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 14 X PERIOD 091800 TO 092400 X ONE CLN 1ST MAR DIV GEN ORDER NO TEN DIRECTED UNIT REDESIGNATION EFFECTIVE 5 AUG AS FOLLOWS CO B FIRST MED BN TO CO C 1ST MED BN CMA 4.2 MORT CO FIRST WFN EN TO 4.2 MORT CO 5TH MAR CMA 75 RCL GUN CO FIRST WFN BN TO ANTITANK CO 5TH MAR X H AND S NO CHANGE X 2D BN 5TH MAR COMMENCE MOVEMENT 2100 X TWO CLN IN COMPLIANCE WITH VERBAL ORDERS CG 25TH DIV 5TH MAR EXECUTE NIGHT ATTACK CAPTURE KOSONG PRIOR DAYLIGHT PREPARED CONTINUE ATTACK ON ORDER X THREE CLN NEGATIVE X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 15 X PERIOD 100001 TO 100600 AUG 50 X H&S NO CHANGE X 3D BN 5TH MAR NO CHANGE X 2D BN 5TH MAR LEADING ELEMENTS PAEDUN DASH NI CMA MAIN BODY EN ROUTE KOSONG ON FOOT FROM VIC DAMAGED BRIDGE ONE MILE NE PAEDUN DASH NI X 1ST BN 5TH MARCHING ALONG RD TO PAEDUN DASH NI X OTHERS NO CHANGE X TWO CLN ENGRS REPAIR BRIDGE ACROSS CHASM ONE MILE NE PAEDUN DASH NI RECONNOITER FOR ALTERNATE ROUTE X MOVE 5TH MAR MINUS 3D BN TO PAEDUN DASH NI PREP CONT ADV KOSONG ON ORDER X THREE CLN NO CHANGE X FOUR CLN MOTORIZED PATROL 2D BN 5THMAR HALTED ONE MILE NE PAEDUN DASH NI WHEN LEAD TK WENT THROUGH BRIDGE 25 FT LONG 20 FT HIGH X FOOT TRPS 2D BN 5TH MAR OCCUPIED PAEDUN DASH NI

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ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

100105Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 16 X PERIOD 100600 TO 101800 AUG 50 X ONE CLN BRIG TRPS CLN CO 4 MT BN AT CHINDONG NI CMA SHORE PTY CP CMA DET SERV BN CMA AMMO FLT ORD BN ABOARD LST OFF CHINDONG NI X ARTY DISPLACING FWD X 5TH MAR X 1ST BN VIC PAEDUN NI REGT RES X 2D BN 33 DASH 33 IN CONTACT X 3D BN PASSING THROUGH 2D BN X OTHERS NO CHANGE X TWO CLN TO BE ISSUED WHEN SIT CLARIFIES X THREE CLN ARTY BN DISPLACED FORWARD TO MORE FAVORABLE POSITION X 5TH MAR CONDUCT ACTIVE PATROLS X AIR CONDUCT IRI PLANNED RCN TRIP TO DARKNESS AND BEGINNING AT DAWN WITH CONTINUOUS COVER X FOUR CLN BRIG ADVANCED APPROX 10 MILES THIS DATE X AT APPROX 1545 BRIG RCN CO COVERING ADV 2D BN WAS FIRED UPON BY EN SNIPERS AND AUTO WFN ONE MILE N PAEDUN NI X RCN CO DESTROYED BOTH AND CONTINUED ADV X 1610 LEAD VEH RCN CO FIRED ON BY AUTO WFN FROM THREE DIRECTIONS X RCN CO DESTROYED TWO BUT UNABLE TO OVERCOME EN RIFLE AND MORTAR FIRE X 2D BN DEPLOYED AND BROUGHT EN UNDER FIRE WITH MORTARS CMA TWO SUPPORTING TKS AND ARTY X AIR STRIKE OF TWENTY PLANES SCATTERED AND KILLED MANY EN X TWO EN MORTARS DESTROYED X EN FORCES EST ONE CO X CASUALTIES EST 12 KIA X SIX JEEPS DESTROYED BY MORTAR FIRE X 3D BN PASSING THROUGH 2D BN CONTINUES ATK X 93 PER CENT X MORALE EXCELLENT X COMBAT EFFICIENCY VERY GOOD

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 17 X PERIOD 101800 TO 102400 AUG 50 X ONE CLN BMS RCN CO RETURNED CHINDONG NI X OTHER BRIG TRPS NO CHANGE X 5TH MAR X 1ST BN 34 DASH 34 X 2D BN 33 DASH 33 X 3D BN IN LINE WITH 2D BN X ARTY DISPLACING X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN CPN PLAN NO 8 ISSUED 2130 X BRIG CONTINUES ATK NO LATER THAN DAYLIGHT X 5TH MARINES CAPTURE KOSONG CONTINUE ATK SUCHON X ONE CO REINF EXECUTE COMBAT PATROLS OF LARGE PENINSULA EAST OF KOSONG X ARTY SPT ATK X FOUR CLN PRE PLANET AIR SEARCH TRIP TO DARKNESS REVEALED NUMEROUS TRKS NEAR BLDGS IN KOSONG AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE A UNIT IN DIVUAC 1/4 MILES N OF TOWN X OTHER NEGATIVE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 18 X PERIOD 102400 TO 110600 AUG 50 X ALL PARAS NEGATIVE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

110902Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 19 X PERIOD 110600 TO 111800 AUG 50 X ONE CLN BRIG RCN CO EN ROUTE KOSONG FOR ATTACK 5TH MAR X OTHER BRIG TRPS NO CHANGE X 5TH MAR CP 34.5 DASH 36.5 X 1ST BN IN KOSONG X 2D BN EN ROUTE KOSONG X 3D BN CONTACT WITH EN 2500 YDS W KOSONG X ARTY BN 1000 YDS N KOSONG 32.0 DASH 31.2 X TWO CLN CONTINUE ATK TRIP DAYLIGHT ALONG AXIS KOSONG - SACHON CAPTURE SACHON X RCN LARGE PENINSULA E OF KOSONG CLEAR OF EN X SECURE LST LANDING SITE AT SILLYONG X MOVE BRIG CP TO KOSONG BEGINNING DAYLIGHT X THREE CLN CONTINUE ATK UNTIL 1900 THEN SECURE FAVORABLE GROUND FOR NIGHT PREPARED CONTINUE ATK TRIP DAYLIGHT X FOUR CLN BRIG ADV APPROX

Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE

4

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5 MILES THIS DATE IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH EN X RESISTANCE MODERATE AGAINST SA A/W AND MORTAR FIRE X NUMEROUS LARGE SCALE FIRE FIGHTS AGAINST EST EN BN X CAPTURE SIX 4 DASH T GUNS X 8 DASH 10 JEEPS X 8 DASH 10 MOTORCYCLES X AIR ATK EST 80 VEHICLES ON RD KOSONG HEADED TOWARD SUCHON X EST 50 PER CENT VEHICLES DESTROYED X FEWS IN VEHICLES KILLED OR SCATTERED RESULTS INCOMPLETE X EN CASUALTIES EST 200 X 92 PER CENT X MORALE EXCELLENT X COMBAT EFFICIENCY VERY GOOD

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 20 X PERIOD 111800 TO 112400 AUG 50 X ONE CLN 5TH MAR CP 29.9 DASH 30.5 X 1ST BN VIC OF 29.6 DASH 30.3 X 2D BN LESS ONE CO 30.4 DASH 30.3 X ONE CO SE KOSONG X 3D BN VIC 29.2 DASH 30.2 X ARTY BN 32.7 DASH 29.9 X FWD ELMS BRIG CP 32.5 DASH 29.8 X REMAINING PARAS NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 21 X PERIOD 112400 TO 120600 AUG 50 X PARAS ONE COM TWO AND THREE NEGATIVE X PARA FOUR ROAD BLOCK REPORTED IN THE VIC OF 1144 DASH 1346 CONSISTING OF MORTAR AND SNIPER FIRE STARTING AT 120300

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV 121521Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 21 X PERIOD 120600 TO 121800 AUG 50 X ONE CLN BRIG TRPS 1CLN CO B MED BN AT M. SAN COM OTHERS AT KOSONG X ARTY CLN CP AND ONE BTRY VIC 16.2 DASH 36.6 COM ONE BTRY VIC 14.9 DASH 37.4 COM ONE BTRY 4TTD 3D BN AT 43.3 DASH 45.9 X 5TH MARINES CLN CP 15.7 DASH 37.8 X 1ST BN VIC 14 DASH 39 X 2D BN MINUS EASY COM 15.4 DASH 37.4 X 3D BN REINF WITH BAKER BTRY ARTY AND ONE PLAT 14.2 MORTARS UNDER LIGHTNING CONTROL 42.4 DASH 45.9 X TWO CLN MOVE BAKER CO MED VIA SEA ON LSU TO VIC KOSONG X THREE CLN 3D BN REINF MOVE BY TRUCK TO VIC RJ 1144 DASH 1536 PERFORM MOPPING UP IN 5TH RCT TOWN X 5TH MAR MINUS CAPTURE SACHON X FOUR CLN 1ST BN WITH BRIG RCM CO 4TTD AFTER MEETING LIGHT RESISTANCE ALL MORNING RAN INTO EN DEF POSN VIC 14 DASH 39 CONSISTING OF WELL CAMOUFLAGED MGS IN STRONG NATURAL DEF POSN X EN STRENGTH EST 200 TO 300 X REGT CDR ORDERED HLT FOR NIGHT ALONG HIS LINE 14 DASH 39 X 3D BN ARR NEW AREA 1600 X 91 PER CENT X MORALE GOOD X COMBAT EFFICIENCY GOOD

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV 121523Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 22 X PERIOD 121800 TO 122400 AUG 50 X ONE CLN SERVICE TRPS COMMENCE WITHDRAWAL VIC CHINDONG NI DURING PERIOD X 2D BN 5TH MAR DESIGNATED BRIG COVERING FORCE X TWO CLN EXECUTE MY OPN PLAN 10 DASH 50 FOR PROVISION OF MOPPING UP FORCES IN CHINDONG NI AREA AND WITHDRAWAL TO THAT AREA X THREE CLN SAME AS TWO X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE 5

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ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 23 X PERIOD 130600 TO 131800 AUG 50 X ONE CLN 3D BN 24TH INF AND 159TH ARTY BN ATTD 1ST PROV MAR BRIG X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN OPN PLAN NO 10 DASH 50 COMPLETED 1700 X GEN CRAIG NOTIFIED AT 1615 HE WAS IN COMMAND ALL MOPPING UP OPN IN VIC BY GEN BRIG 25TH INF DIV X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV 132391K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 24 X PERIOD 131800 TO 132400 X ONE CLN 1ST BN 5TH MAR EMBARKED 1ST FOR MOVEMENT TO M.S.N X TWO CLN BRIG ORDERED TO IMMEDIATELY MOVE TO VIC CHANG WON FOLLOWING RELIEF OF BNS ON THE LINE X THREE CLN ISSUED OPN PLAN 11 DASH 50 FOR MOVEMENT X FOUR CLN NEGATIVE

ACTION CG 25TH INF DIV 132251Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 25 X PERIOD 132400 TO 140600 AUG 50 X ONE CLN UPON RELIEF 3D BN 5TH MAR ARMY ATT. THRENTS PASS TO 5TH RCT CONTROL X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN DESTINATION MY OP 10 DASH 50 CHANGE CHANG DASH 10N TO MIRYANG X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 26 X FOR PERIOD 140600 TO 150600 AUG 50 X ONE CLN BRIG OP 5TH MAR CP 1ST BN 2D BN CO A 1ST LT BN MINUS VIC MIR YANG X BALANCE EN ROUTE X TWO CLN NEGATIVE X THREE CLN NEGATIVE X FOUR CLN 2D BN RELIEVED WITHOUT CONTACT WITH ENEMY

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 27 X PERIOD 150600 TO 160600 AUG 50 X ONE CLN 3D BN 5TH MAR CLOSED BIVOUAC 2130 X MISC SER ELMS EN ROUTE X TWO CLN PASS TO CP CONTROL 24TH INF DIV MOVE TO ATK POSNS BY OP PLAN 12 DASH 50 X ATK TO CLEAR EN E OF NAKTONG X THREE CLN SEE MY OP PLAN 12 DASH 50 X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 24TH INF DIV 161230Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 28 X PERIOD 160600 TO 161800 AUG 50 X PARA ONE CLN 1ST PROV MAR BRIG ATTD 24TH INF DIV EN ROUTE TO ATK POSN TO RELIEVE ELMS 34TH INF X BRIG ADVANCE CP VIC YONGSAN 1150 DASH 1389 X PARA TWO CLN PLAN TO COMPLETE MOVE POSITION AND EXECUTE ATK IN ACCORDANCE MY OPN PLAN 13 DASH 50 X PARA THREE CLN SAME AS TWO X PARA FOUR CLN TRKS FOR MOVEMENT TO ATK POSITIONS ABOUT TWO HOURS DELAYED ARRIVAL TO BIVOUAC OTHERWISE MOVEMENT PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO PLAN X MOBILE EXCELLENT COMBAT EFFICIENCY EXCELLENT

Appendix 5 to Annex CHARLIE

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ACTION CG 24TH DIV 170500K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 29 PERIOD 161800 TO 162400 AUG 50 X PARA ONE CLN ALL ELMS 1ST MAR BRIG LESS 1ST BN 5TH MAR AND MISC SERV ELMS CLOSED IN FWD AREA E OF YONGSAN BY END OF PERIOD RELIEF OF 34TH INF IN PROGRESS X PARA TWO CLN NO CHANGE X PARA THREE CLN NO CHANGE PARA FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 24TH INF DIV 170815K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 30 X PERIOD 170001 TO 170600 AUG 50 X ALL ELMS 1ST MAR BRIG LESS 1ST BN 5TH MAR AND MISC SERV ELMS PRESENT IN FWD AREA X 3D BN RELIEVED 34TH INF X 2D BN IN ASSEMBLY AREA X TWO CLN NEGATIVE X THREE CLN MY CPN PLAN 13-50 X FOUR CLN OF 144 TRKS REQUESTED TO MOVE BRIG FROM MIRYANG TO YONGSAN 43 WERE RECEIVED AND THESE WERE TWO TO FOUR HOURS LATE X 24TH DIV THROUGH EMERGENCY MEASURES SUPPLIED 29 TRKS X AS RESULT OF SHORTAGE AND LATENESS OF TRKS 1ST BN DID NOT CLOSE YONGSAN UNTIL 0730

ACTION CG 24TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 31 X PERIOD 170600 TO 171800 AUG 50 X ONE CLN BRIG TRKS DET 1ST CSG TUSAN X ADMIN REAR ECH MIRYANG X OTHERS YONGSAN X 5TH MAR CP 45.8 DASH 88.6 X 1ST BN ON OBJ ONE X 2D BN VIC 43.5 DASH 87.1 3D BN 45.2 DASH 88.2 1ST BN 11TH MAR 49.0 DASH 89.8 TO 51.2 DASH 89.0 X TWO CLN 5TH MAR CONTINUE ATK TO OBJ TWO PREPARED FURTHER OPNS ON ORDER X THREE CLN MY CPN PLAN 13-50 X FOUR CLN 1ST BN 5TH MAR JUMPED OFF ATK 0800 PRECEDED BY ARTY AND 4 IF X DCG CO ON THE RIGHT EASY CO ON THE LEFT X DCG CO REACHED TOP OF OBJ ONE ELMS WITH MAIN TO RUN AIR STRIKE AND ARTY CONCENTRATION X 2D BN REACHED ABOUT 3/4 WAYS UP THE HILL RECEIVED MODERATELY HEAVY CASUALTIES ABOUT 180 FOR DAY FROM SMALL ARMS HAND GRENADES AND MORTARS X 1425 1ST BN PASSED THROUGH 2D BN X 2D BN CAPTURED OBJ AT 1800

ACTION CG 24TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 32 X FROM 171800 TO 172400 AUG 50 X ONE CLN NO CHANGE X TWO CLN FOUR NIGHT FIGHTERS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED ON STATION AT DAWN AND DUSK DAILY X THREE CLN CONSOLIDATE POSNS FOR NIGHT BE PREPARED REPEL COUNTERATK X PREPARE PLAN OF FIRES FOR NIGHT TO INCLUDE PLANS FOR FIRE WITHIN AND IN REAR OF POSITION X WIRE IN WHERE POSSIBLE IN FRONT LINE ELMS X CONTINUE ATK 180700 AUG TO CAPTURE OBJ TWO PREPARED FOR FURTHER OPN ON ORDER X FOUR CLN THREE EN T DASH 34 TKS DESTROYED AT 2015 BY OUR M DASH 26 TKS AND LEFT BURNING VIC 42.3 DASH 86.8 X 88 PERCENT X MORALE GOOD X COMBAT EFFICIENCY GOOD

ACTION CG 24TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 33 X PERIOD 180001 TO 180600 AUG 50 X ALL PARAS NEGATIVE

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ACTION CG 24TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPN RPT NO 34 X PERIOD 180600 TO 181800 AUG 50 X ONE CIN BRIG TRPS CIN NO CHANGE X 5TH MAR CIN 1STBN ORGANIZED AND OCCUPIES OBJ ONE X 2DBN ORGANIZED AND OCCUPIES OBJ TWO X JUST PRIOR TO SEIZURE OBJ THREE CMA TANKS KILLED EST 250 IN FLEEING ACROSS R AHEAD OF ATK X PRECEDED BY SUCCESSFUL TK CMA ARTY CMA AND COORD AIR ATK X 3DBN SEIZED LEFT NORTH END OF OBJ THREE X ATK ON RIGHT OF OBJ THREE HELD UP BY MG AND SA FIRE EST WILL BE SECURED PRIOR TO DARKNESS

ACTION CG 24TH DIV

190013K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 35 PERIOD 181800 TO 182400 AUG X ONE CIN NO CHANGE X TWO CIN 1ST AND 2DBN ORGANIZE AND HOLD OBJ ONE AND TWO RESPECTIVELY X 3DBN ORGANIZE AND HOLD PRESENT POSN AND COMPLETE MOPPING UP OBJ THREE TOMORROW X THREE CIN ACCOMPLISHED ALL ASSIGNED MISSIONS EXCEPT MOPPING UP ON OBJ THREE X FOUR CIN STRENGTH 83% MORALE EXCELLENT COMBAT EFFICIENCY GOOD

ACTION CG 24TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 36 X PERIOD 190001 TO 190600 AUG X ONE CIN NO CHANGE X TWO CIN MOPPING UP OPNS IN Z OF A X THREE CIN SAME AS TWO X FOUR CIN TEN OR TWELVE FDS ARTY FIRE RECD FROM ACROSS RIVER DURING NIGHT NO CASUALTIES X G CO REC SA FIRE DURING NIGHT NO CASUALTIES

ACTION CG 24TH INF

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 37 PERIOD 190600 TO 191800 AUG X ONE CIN BRIG TRPS CIN CO 4 ENGR BN ENROUTE MIRYANG OTHERS NO CHANGE X 5TH MAR 1STBN E OF YONGSAN 2DBN ENROUTE TO ASSEMBLY AREA E OF YONGSAN 3DBN ON OBJECTIVE THREE CO A 1ST TRBN 4.2 MORT CO AND REGT TRAIN ENROUTE MIRYANG X 1STBN 11TH MAR NEW LOCATION 44.2-87.2 X TWO CIN MOVE BRIG TO ASSEMBLY AREA VIC MIRYANG X THREE CIN 5TH MAR WHEN REL MOVES TO ASSEMBLY AREA E OF YONGSAN PREPARED FOR FURTHER MOVE ASSEMBLY AREA MIRYANG X HEAVY EQUIP AND TRAINS MOVE VIA ROAD VIC MIRYANG COMMENCING 1700 X FOUR CIN PATROLS FROM 1ST 2D 3D BNS MADE NO CONTACT DURING DAY X BRIG ORDERED DISPLACE TO ASSEMBLY AREA E OF YONGSAN TO WAIT FURTHER ORDERS FOR MOVEMENT TO NEW LOCATION X OBJ THREE SECURED AT 0630 WITH NO OPPOSITION X 80% X MORALE GOOD X COMBAT EFFICIENCY GOOD

ACTION CG 24TH INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 38 X PERIOD 191800 TO 192400 AUG X ONE CIN 1STBN 11TH MAR ARTY MOVED TO MIRYANG X 5TH MAR COMPLETED MOVEMENT E OF YONGSAN OTHERS NO CHANGE X TWO CIN PREPARE TO COMPLETE MOVEMENT OF BRIG TO ARMY RESERVE VIC MIRYANG X THREE CIN SAME AS TWO X FOUR CIN NO CHANGE

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ACTION CG 24TH DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 39 PERIOD 200600 AUG X ONE CLN NEGATIVE X TWO CLN
NEGATIVE X THREE CLN NEGATIVE X FOUR CLN NEGATIVE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 40 X PERIOD 200600 TO 201800 X ONE CLN ADV PTY
ALL UNITS AND BRIG RCN CO ENROUTE MASAN X OTHER UNITS DIVUAC VIC
MTRYANG X TWO CLN MOVE TO VIC CHANGWON X PASS TO 8TH ARMY RESERVE X
PREPARE C&TK PLANS FOR 25TH DIV SECTOR X THREE CLN MY OPN PLAN 15-50
X FOUR CLN NEGATIVE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 41 X PERIOD 201800 TO 210600 AUG 50 X ONE CLN
ALL ELMS OF BRIG CLOSED ASSEMBLY AREA VIC CHANG WON 0100 THIS MORNING
EXCEPT MISC SERV UNITS X TWO CLN PREPARED PLANS TO COUNTER C&TK IN THE
25TH INF DIV SECTOR X THREE CLN SAME AS PARA TWO X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 42 PERIOD 220600 TO 221800 AUG 50 X ONE CLN BRIG
COMPLETED CLOSING VIC CHANG WON 1200 THIS DATE X ALL OTHER PARAS
NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 43 PERIOD 221800 TO 230600 AUG 50 X ONE CLN
NEGATIVE X TWO CLN PREPARATION OF C&TK PLANS IN 25TH INF DIV SECTOR
THREE CLN NO CHANGE X FOUR CLN RCN CONDUCTED BY BRIG CMA BN CMA AND
GEN AND STEC STAFF OFFICERS IN PREPARATION OF C&TK PLANS IN 25TH
INF DIV SECTOR

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 44 X PERIOD COVERED 230600 TO 240600 AUG 50 X
PARA ONE CLN NO CHANGE X PARA TWO CLN CONTINUING RCN OF 25TH DIV
SECTOR IN PREP OF C&TK X PLAN TO MOVE ARTY TO VIC CHINDONG NI THIS
DATE X PARA THREE AND FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 45 X PERIOD COVERED 240600 TO 241800 AUG 50 X
ALL PARAS CLN NEGATIVE

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ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 46 X PERIOD COVERED 241800 TO 250600 AUG 50 X
PARA ONE CLN NO CHANGE X PARA TWO CLN CONTINUE PREP OF CATK PLNS 25TH
INF DIV SECTOR X PARA THREE CLN NO CHANGE X PARA FOUR CLN ONE IN TNG
EX AND SMALL UNIT TNG AND TEST FIRING OF WPNS BEING CONDUCTED IN BRIG
AREA

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 47 X PERIOD 250600 TO 251800 AUG 50 X ALL PARAS
CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 48 X PERIOD COVERED 251800 TO 260600 AUG 50 X
ALL PARAS CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 49 X PERIOD 260600 TO 261800 AUG 50 X ALL PARAS
CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 50 X PERIOD 261800 TO 270600 AUG 50 X ONE CLN NO
CHANGE X TWO CLN CONTINUE SMALL UNIT TNG AND REPL INDOCTRINATION X SERVICE
AND REPAIR OF EQUIP X RCN FOR CATK BY ELMS TO CC ECHELON X THREE CLN NO
CHANGE X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION EUSAK

271935

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 51 X PERIOD COVERED 270600 TO 271800 AUG 50 X ALL
PARAS CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION EUSAK

280824K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 52 X PERIOD COVERED 271800 TO 280600 AUG 50 X
ONE CLN NO CHANGE X TWO CLN C/S AND SMALL PTY EN ROUTE TO TOKYO FOR
PLANNING CONFERENCE X THREE CLN NO CHANGE X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

280831Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 53 X PERIOD COVERED 280600 TO 281800 AUG 50 X
PARA ONE CLN NO CHANGE X PARA TWO CLN CONTINUE SMALL UNIT TNG AND TEST
FIRING OF WPNS X PLANNED PLATOON TNG PATROLS COORD AND IN REAR OF 25TH
DIV SECTOR X PARA THREE CLN NO CHANGE PARA FOUR CLN 11TH MAR ARTY BN
CONTINUE SPT OF 25TH

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ACTION CG EUSAK

290817K

SECRET

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 54 X PERIOD COVERED 281801 TO 290600 X ALL PARAS
CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

291850K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 55 X PERIOD COVERED 290600 TO 291800 AUG X ONE CLN
NO CHANGE X TWO CLN PLANNING COMMENCED IN CONNECTION CG 1ST MARDIV TOP
SECRET MSG 280358Z X THREE CLN CONTINUED TNG AND TNG PATROLS AS ORDERED
FOUR CLN PATROLS RPT NO CONTACT

ACTION CG EUSAK

292202Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 56 X PERIOD COVERED 291801 TO 300600 AUG X ALL PARAS
CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

300910K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 57 X PERIOD COVERED 300600 TO 301800 AUG 50 X PARA
ONE CLN NO CHANGE X PARA TWO CLN G/S AND SMALL PARTY RETURNED FROM TOKYO
PLANNING CONF X CONTINUED TNG PATROLS AND OTHER SMALL UNIT TNG X PARA
THREE CLN NO CHANGE X PARA FOUR CLN 11TH MAR CONTINUE REINFORCING FIRES
25TH DIV ARTY

ACTION CG LUSAK

310225K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 58 X PERIOD COVERED 301800 TO 310600 AUG 50 X ONE
CLN NO CHANGE X TWO CLN CONTINUE OPERATIONAL PLANNING X THREE CLN NO
CHANGE X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

310925Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 59 X PERIOD COVERED 310600 TO 311800 AUG 50 X PARA
ONE CLN NO CHANGE X PARA TWO CLN CONTINUE OPERATIONAL PLANNING X PARA
THREE CLN NO CHANGE X PARA FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

312215Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 60 X PERIOD COVERED 311800 AUG TO 010600 SEPT 50 X
ALL PARAS CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 61 X PERIOD COVERED 010600 TO 011800 SEPT X ONE CLN
1ST BN 11TH MAR REVERTED CONTROL BRIG AT 011300K X ERIG CP CMA HQ 5TH
MAR CMA 2D BN 5TH MAR CMA 1ST BN 11TH MAR LOCATED MIHYANG X REMAINING
ELMS ERIG EN ROUTE CR CHANGWON X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN ERIG
ORDERED BY EUSAK AT 1300 MOVE VIC MIHYANG PREPARED FOR FURTHER OPNS ON
ORDER X FOUR CLN STRENGTH 94 PER CENT X MORALE AND CONDIT EFFICIENCY HIGH
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ACTION CG EUSAK

020706K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 62 X PERIOD COVERED 011800 TO 020600 SEP 50 X ONE
 IN ALL UNITS MUYANG X TWO CLN SEE OPN O 18-50 X THREE CLN BRIG
 ORDERED BY EUSAK DISF 012345K TO MOVE INTO ASSEMBLY AREA VIC YONGSAN X
 MOVEMENT ONE BN PAREN REINF PAREN TO COVER BRIG MOVEMENT COMMENCES
 020700 X FOUR CLN STRENGTH 94% CMA MORALE AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY HIGH

ACTION CG 2D INF DIV

021310Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 63 X PERIOD 020600 TO 021800 SEP 50 X ONE CLN
 2DN 5THMAR VIC 1161.9 - 1385.1 X REMAINDER BRIG IN ASSEMBLY AREA
 VIC 1160 - 1386 AT 1515 X TWO CLN NEGATIVE X THREE CLN OPN O 19-50
 X FOUR CLN STRENGTH 94% X MORALE AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY EXCELLENT

ACTION CG 2D INF DIV

030731K

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 64 X PERIOD COVERED 021800 TO 030600 SEP 50
 X ONE CLN RON CO RELIEVED 0415 X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN TWO
 BNS IN POSN THIRD DN COMMENCING MOVEMENT X FOUR CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 2D INF DIV

031100Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 65 X PERIOD 030600 TO 031800 SEP 50 X ONE CLN
 5THMAR CP 1152.1 - 1388.1 1STBN 5THMAR CP 1151 - 1387.9 X 2DN 5TH
 MAR 1151.5 - 1388.6 3DN 5THMAR CP 1152.5 - 1388.2 X DET RON CO
 CP 1150.3 - 1387.1 X 1STBN 11THMAR CP 1153.8 - 1387 X BRIG CP SAME
 X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN CONTINUING ATK IN ASSIGNED Z OF A
 Z SEP X FOUR CLN BRIG MOVE TO ATK POSITION COMMENCING 0300 3 SEP X
 RE TO WITHDRAWAL ELMS 9TH RGT DURING NIGHT THERE WAS 30 MIN DELAY
 IN JUMP OFF IN OCCRD ATK X BRIG ADVANCED SOME 3000 YDS DURING DAY
 AGAINST HEAVY EN RESISTANCE CONSISTING OF LARGE AMOUNT AUTO WINS
 FIRE CMA ANTI TANK CMA TANK CMA MORTAR CMA ARTY AND SMALL ARMS FIRE
 X BRIG TKS DESTROYED FOUR EN TKS CMA SEVEN AT GUNS EST 500 EN
 DESTROYED DURING DAY X CONSOLIDATED POSNS AND TIED IN ELMS RIGHT AND
 LEFT AT 1800 PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATK AT 0800 X STRENGTH 93% CMA
 MORALE AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY VERY GOOD

ACTION CG 2D INF DIV

031320Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 66 X HD COVERED 1800 TO 2400 3 SEP X ALL PARAS
 CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 2D INF DIV

032235Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 67 X PERIOD COVERED 2400 TO 0600 4 SEP X ONE
 CLN NO CHANGE X TWO CLN NO CHANGE THREE CLN 3DN 5THMAR PASSES THROUGH
 2DN 5THMAR AND CONTINUES ATK 040800 X FOUR CLN SMALL CATK CO 4 1STBN
 5THMAR SECTOR X ATK REPELLED

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ACTION CG 2D INF DIV 041110Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 68 X PERIOD COVERED 040600 TO 041800 SEP 50 X ONE CLN 1STBN 5THMAR OCCUPIES HIGH GROUND VIC 1146.2-1388.4 TO 1146.9-1388.6 X 2NDIN 5THMAR OCCUPIES HIGH GROUND VIC 1149.2-1388.5 TO 1149.7-1389.4 X 3DBN 5THMAR OCCUPIES HIGH GROUND VIC 1146.5-1389 X 5THMAR CP 1150.3-1388.7 X 1STIN 11THMAR CP 1150.7-1388.7 X BRIG OP NO CHANGE TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN NO CHANGE FOUR CLN BRIG CONT ATK AT 040900 AFTER 10 MIN ARTY PREP X 3DBN PASSED THROUGH 2DIN X BRIG ADVANCED AVERAGE 3 TO 4000 YDS TO OBJ ONE AGAINST LIGHT RESISTANCE INITIALLY MODERATE RESISTANCE AT END OF PERIOD CONSISTING OF AUTO AND SA FIRE X 2 EN TKS AND 4 AT GUNS DESTROYED DURING PERIOD X 8 EN ARTY HORSES HIT OR CAPTURED X CORSAIR PILOT SHOT DOWN BY GROUND FIRE IN EN POSNS RECOVERED BY HELICOPTER 3 MIN AFTER PARACHUTING X MARINE AIR ON STATION STRUCK EN TARGETS ALL DAY OUTSTANDING RESULTS X REPORT EN BUILDUP ENTIRE AREA EAST OF RIVER WITH SEVERAL GROUPS EST 2000 SPOTTED X BRIG GROUND RAN INTO GREATLY INCREASED EN DEFENSES AT END OF PERIOD X EST TOTAL EN CASUALTIES SINCE ATK COMMENCED 2000 X ROADS LITTERED WITH EN DEAD CMA MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT ABANDONED IN GREAT HASTE X STRENGTH 93% X MORALE AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY HIGH

ACTION CG 2D INF DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 69 X PERIOD COVERED 041800 TO 042400 SEP X ONE CLN NO CHANGE X TWO CLN NO CHANGE X THREE CLN OPN O 21-50 X BRIG CONT ATK AT 050730 SEP FOLLOWING ARTY PREP AND CAPTURE OBJ 2 OBANGI RIDGE DESIG SEPARATELY PREPARED CATK ON ORDER X FOUR CLN SORTIES FLOWN BY MAR AIR X TOTAL SORTIES 61

ACTION CG 2D INF DIV 042315Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 70 X PERIOD FROM 050001 TO 050600 SEP X ALL PARAS CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG 2D INF DIV 050928Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 71 X PERIOD 050600 TO 051800 SEP X ONE CLN 3DBN 5THMAR FRONT LINES 43.5-87.3 TO 44.5-86.6 1STEN 5THMAR FRONT LINES 43.6-87.6 TO 43.9-88.8 X ONE CO 44.8-88.5 TO 44.7-89.2 X LOCATION 2DIN 5THMAR CMA 5THMAR CP CMA 1STEN 11THMAR CP CMA BRIG CP NO CHANGE X TWO CLN 1ST PROVMA BRIG RELIEVED ATTACHMENT TWO INF DIV EFF 052400 X BRIG UPON RELIEF BY ELMS TWO INF DIV MOVE BY MOTOR AND RAIL TO PUSAN FOR FURTHER OPNS AGAINST EN X BRIG OPN O 22-50 X THREE CLN SAME AS TWO X FOUR CLN BRIG ATK 050730 DELAYED TO 050815 BY CATK IN 9TH RCT Z OF A X BRIG ADV AGAINST MODERATE RESISTENCE CMA SA CMA AUTO WPNS CMA ARTY CMA MORTARS AND TKS X 1STEN 5THMAR CATK BY SMALL EN FORCE WITH THREE T-34 TKS VIC 43.7-87.4 X TWO M-26 TKS DISABLED MOVING AROUND BEND IN ROAD BY EN TKS X ONE EN TK DESTROYED X RCN DET PATROLLED TO VIC 47.1-84.9 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS X BRIG ADVANCED 2500 YDS X STRENGTH 92% X MORALE AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY EXCELLENT

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ACTION CG 2D DIV

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 72 FROM 051800 TO 052400 SEP X ALL PARAS CLN NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 73 FROM 060001 TO 060600 SEP X ONE CLN 2DBN CMA 3DEN 5THMAR CMA HD CO 5TH MAR CMA BTACS-2 ENROUTE PUSAN X PARAS TWO THREE AND FOUR NO CHANGE

ACTION CG EUSAK

061030Z

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 74 FROM 060600 TO 061800 SEP X ONE CLN 1STBN 5TH MAR ENROUTE PUSAN X TK CO AND HVY EQUIP VIA RAIL MIRYANG - PUSAN X REMAINING ELMS PUSAN X TWO CLN AND THREE CLN NO CHANGE X FOUR CLN STRENGTH 93% MORALE AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY EXCELLENT

ACTION CG EUSAK

PERIODIC OPNS RPT NO 75 X PERIOD COVERED 061800 TO 062400 SEP X PARA ONE CLN ALL ELMS BRIG PUSAN EXCEPT TK CO AND MISC SERV ELMS ENROUTE X PARAS TWO THREE AND FOUR NO CHANGE

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Headquarters, 1st ProvMarBrig(Reinf)FIF
8 September 1950
PUSAN, KOREA

Annex DCG to 1st Marine Brigade Special Action Report

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1st ProvMarBrig (Reinf), FIF
8 September, 1950
PUSAN, KOREA

Annex DOG to 1st Marine Brigade Special Action Report

LOGISTICS

1. Logistic support in operations inland with the Army in Korea in fast moving situations poses special logistic problems for Marines.
2. The significant problems and together with the recommended solutions are summarized as follows:

a. UNLOADING AND COMMON STOCK ITEMS

(1) We unloaded at the Port of Pusan. In accordance with EUSAK orders our supplies of like kind with the Army were placed into common stock with the Army in the Pusan Base Command (later renamed Pusan Logistical Command). Items peculiar to the Marine Corps were kept separate. Our rear echelon to remain in Pusan was small. It was made up of 4 officers and 100 enlisted of 1st Combat Service Group. Our supplies were moved by the Army into Army warehouses and stockpiles. The work was done largely by indigenous labor. As a result our supplies were mixed with Army stock. Army divisions had been fighting for a month with limited logistic support. Supplies which we brought, formerly in short supply, were immediately issued to units which needed and requisitioned them. Later when we requested Class II and IV items there was some delay and confusion in obtaining them. It might have been better to have had a complete balanced rear echelon, capable of taking full and complete responsibility for our Class II and IV items. A full Combat Service Group is indicated. The Pusan Base Command was cooperative and helpful to the highest possible degree and we received the best kind of logistic support available under the circumstances.

b. TRANSPORTATION

(1) Rapid moves of 10 to 100 miles require much more transportation than is available in organic transportation of a Marine Brigade. Due to shipping limitations we were unable to bring even full organic transportation. We received 42 trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6 initially and employed them throughout all operations.

(2) For long moves we generally had the use of one additional truck company, containing 50 trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, from the unit providing logistic support.

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Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report (Cont'd)

- (3) Roads were narrow, rough, very poor.
- (4) Traffic was congested. Traffic problems were chronic.
- (5) It is mandatory:
 - (a) Vehicles keep 25 yards distance.
 - (b) Vehicles stop on extreme right side of road.
 - (c) Dozer follow immediately after tanks to make by-passes over broken bridges.

c. MESSING

(1) Providing food in a fast moving situation is a serious problem. Recommend obtain additional 2½-ton trucks and 1-ton trailers, so that when they come into area they merely turn on fuel, cook hot meal for company without long hand-carry or delay. Truck should hold 2 days "B" rations. Hot food should be taken forward, if necessary, in Marnite cans.

d. PERSONAL GEAR

- (1) Too much personal gear was carried by all hands initially.
- (2) Let each man carry only the clothes on his back, his weapon, ammunition, belt, helmet, change of socks.
- (3) Let remainder personal clothing and equipment be in his company or battery transportation. Possibly 2 1-ton trailers per company is enough. When time permits men can have access to their clothing for changes.

e. LAUNDRY

(1) Laundry should exchange clean clothes for dirty with troops. Disadvantages lie in rank chevron discrepancies. Advantage lies in speed and convenience. Exchange should be made when opportunity presents promptly after engagement with the enemy.

f. SPARE TIRES

(1) Tires in Korea are cut to ribbons fast. Especially when heavily loaded and roads are steep. Additional spare tires and tubes are required. Many tires are punctured rapidly. Recommend

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 Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report (Cont'd)

puncture-proof tires on all combat vehicles.

g. CLASS III

(1) Insure enough additional fuel is carried in order to top off all vehicle tanks prior to entry into combat. Especially M-26 tanks.

(2) Insure airplane gas is carried forward for helicopter - 91 octane.

(3) Insure white gas is available for Coleman lanterns.

h. INDIGENOUS LABOR

(1) Not very effective unless skillfully used.

(2) They run when first shot is fired unless guarded.

(3) However, the infantry wanted 100 men per battalion and engineers wanted about 100 to work on roads and air strips. These were provided by Brigade Labor Officer.

(4) Payment was made in Won. Payrolls to EUSAK Finance Officer were required. Money was obtained in advance and prompt payment was made.

i. MAPS

(1) Insure all service and supply people have plenty maps. All should be same scale for any one operation. This was a most difficult problem since maps were very scarce and very poor.

(2) We had elements lost several hours because they had taken wrong roads, inadequate, or no maps.

(3) Recommend every officer who needs maps have:

(a) KOREA, 1:1,000,000 - (1 sheet)

(b) KOREA, 1:250,000 - (The several sheets of local area)

(c) KOREA, 1:50,000 - (The several sheets of local area) This was done in the latter parts of the operation.

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 Annex DOG to 1st Mar Brig Special Action Report (Cont'd)

j. LOGISTICS REPORTS

(1) Were generally neither complete nor on time from subordinate units.

(2) Brigade therefore made reports to higher authority based on reports of urgent shortages from units, estimates and personal observations.

k. AMMUNITION

(1) Every unit tends to want to carry too much. When time comes to displace they cannot move it. Therefore they have the choice:

- (a) In the advance - 1. Move it by shuttle run of their transportation.
2. Leave it to Ordnance Battalion to pick up and move.

- (b) In withdrawal - 1. Destroy it.
2. Destroy something else in order to carry ammunition.

(2) In withdrawal from KOSONG several units destroyed their galley gear. This was a difficult decision by the unit commanders and its effects were slow to be corrected.

l. SUPPLY POINTS

(1) Army policy generally places Supply Points 6-12 miles to rear. We do not have transportation to accomplish this length of haul. Our supply point was up close, from 3-5 miles from front lines. We concentrated service and supply elements and provided all around security by Shore Party.

m. WATER

(1) In August the drinking water problem was very acute.

(2) Men must have a lot of water and a lot of salt tablets.

(3) Water points must be opened by engineers very early and very close to rear of troops line. This was done.

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Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report (Cont'd)

(4) There are many streams in Korea. Good water points are easy to find.

(5) Pools and stagnant water are to be and were avoided. There was reported to be danger of poisoning by enemy.

(6) Adequate chemicals for water purification must be held on hand. Always keep 10 days supply ahead with the purification units.

n. SPARE PARTS

(1) We had good results with our level spare parts and spare parts trailers. Since we acquired 42 Army trucks we had to obtain spare parts from Army sources. Army ordnance facilities are cooperative and cordial and have given us almost anything we needed which they had.

o. DAILY TELEGRAM

(1) The daily telegram for Class I and III should be and habitually was sent a full 72 hours in advance of need. It should be paralleled by phone to the Rear Echelon in Pusan. Even then there is no certainty of obtaining food and fuel, unless there had previously been stock-piled, a two- or three-day level at the railhead.

p. UNIT LIAISON OFFICERS

(1) Best means for coordinating logistic support in a rapidly shifting situation is to have liaison officers report at a special hour daily with full details of their units location, situation, operations and problems in connection with logistic support.

(2) At the same time plans and orders for the following day can be issued and discussed and questions answered. Liaison officers should bring maps and overlays of their own situation.

q. CHANNELS FOR SUPPLY

(1) Various individuals went, without authority, directly to Army supply sources to draw supplies. This caused confusion.

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 Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report (Cont'd)

and should not be tolerated. All supplies must be obtained from Marine Corps sources to the limit of capabilities. Thereafter, only authorized representative such as G-4, ITO, SupO, OrdO, EngrO were authorized to deal with Army supply sources.

r. ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(1) In a rapidly moving situation an administrative plan should be issued daily or more often if needed. This to insure that all concerned know where and when to draw supplies and obtain logistic support.

s. SIGNS

(1) LPs must have ample signs made and used to mark new or strange and different routes. Signs are needed for each unit, staff section, service and supply facility. They should be made uniform for the division. Certain sections who displaced frequently should have two sets of signs, one to be used by reconnoitering party forward.

t. HEAT PROSTRATION

(1) More casualties occurred from heat prostration in August than any thing else. Plenty of salt tablets, about four per man per day, were required. Ample water is needed. All water trailers should be kept filled and as far forward as circumstances permit.

(2) Every opportunity must be taken to move up 5-gal tins of water to near in the front. This can be and was done by a team of Korean laborers attached to each battalion.

u. WATER DISCIPLINE

(1) This one problem will be as important as enemy gunfire. Local water is contaminated. Those who drink untreated local water get dysentery. Many cases existed in Brigade.

(2) It was necessary to be strict in preventing men from drinking untreated local water. The best solution is always to have drinking water forward and available.

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Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report (Cont'd)
-----v. TRAIN MOVEMENTS

(1) Train movements are slow. It took as much as 24 hours to move 60 miles. It is necessary always to have two days of rations and water accompany troops moving by train. Their basic load of ammunition should of course also be taken.

APPENDIX: 1 - Representative Periodic Logistic Reports during periods in combat.

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Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report

REPRESENTATIVE PERIODIC LOGISTIC REPORTS
DURING PERIODS IN COMBAT1stProvMarBrig (Reinf), FIF
YONGSAN, KOREA
171800K August 50.

Periodic Logistics Report No. 16

Period covered - 161800K to 171800K Aug

Maps: Korea, 1:50,000

1. LOGISTICAL SITUATION AT END OF PER.Class I, III and V - Forward sup point two days level R.J.
51.2-88.8.Water Point - Forward sup point R.J. 51.2-88.8. Production
60,000 gals.All classes at Marine Brigade 24th Division Railhead - MIRYANG
NSR - YONGSAN - R.J. 64.2-85.3. - MIRYANG2. SUPPLY

a. Supported Strength

Personnel 5100
Korean Laborers 350
Korean Police 75
Korean Army 20

b. (1) Levels

1 Day in hands unit
2 Days in Forward Dumps
4 Days in Railhead

(2) Short Supply Items

No critical items.
Following in Short Supply:
2 Tanks, M-26

1

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

9 Trucks, 6x6
 1 1-ton trailer
 3 Trucks, 1/4-ton
 1 Stock room trailer
 1 Ambulance 1/4-ton

c. Local Procurement

Local labor about 350 men at rate 15,000 Won/month

3. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

On hand start of period	0
Received	128
Evacuated	121
Dead	7
Remaining end of period	0

4. TRANSPORTATION

Highway

Following moved over road MIRYANG - YONGSAN area

Personnel	3500
Vehicles	250
Tons supplies	625

5. SERVICE

No change

6. MISCELLANEOUS

AdPlan 11-50 issued

CRAIG

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 24thInDiv
 G-1
 G-3
 File

CHIDESTER

G-4

2

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

1stProvMarBrig (Reinf) FIF
 YONGSAN, KOREA
 181800K August 1950

Periodic Logistics Report No. 17

Period Covered - 171800K to 181800K Aug

Maps: KOREA, 1:50,000

1. LOGISTICAL SITUATION AT END OF PRD - No change.

2. SUPPLY

a. Supported strength

Brig Troops	4041
Korean Laborers	350
Korean Police	75
Korean Army	20
TOTAL	<u>4486</u>

b. Supply

(1) Shortages in prescribed and basic loads: None

(2) Other shortages: Same as last report plus following:

3 Trucks 2 1/2-ton, 6x6
 5 Trailers, 1-ton, 2-whl water
 No critical shortages.

c. Evacuation and Hospitalization

In clr sta start of prd	0
Recd during prd	188
Evac to rear during prd	149
Returned to duty	12
Deaths	21
In clearing sta close of prd	6

4. TRANSPORTATION

a. Vehicles used to move Class I and V to fwd sup point.

5. SERVICE - No change except bakery now in oprn at rear CP,
 LIRYANG

CRAIG

DISTRIBUTION: CG, 24thInfDiv; G-1; G-3; File

CHIDES TER
 G-4

3

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

1stProvMarBrig (Reinf), FIF
 YONGSAN, KOREA
 191800K August 1950

Periodic Logistics Report No. 18

Period covered - 181800K to 191800K Aug

Maps: KOREA, 1:50,000

1. LOGISTICAL SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD: No change

2. SUPPLY

a. Supported Strength

Brigade Troops	4041
Korean Laborers	400
Korean Police	75
Korean Army	20
TOTAL	<u>4536</u>

b. Supply: No change

c. Local Procurement

About 800 lbs of rice procured locally.

3. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

In clearing sta start of period	6
Received during period	40
Evacuated to rear during prd	39
Returned to duty	7
Deaths	0
In clearing station close of prd	0

4. TRANSPORTATION

a. Vehicles used for moving supplies, some personnel and for salvage of own and enemy equipment.

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig. Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

5. SERVICEa. ENR

- (1) Repaired MSR in Brigade area
- (2) Removed anti-personnel mine field.

b. Salvage Plat

- (1) Established Salvage Coll points in Dn, Regtl, and Brig CP areas.
- (2) Used 120 Korean laborers to assist in salvage.
- (3) Salvaged much own and enemy material.

c. Ord

- (1) Collected quantities of ord equipment by contact parties.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Captured Equipment:

(1) Major Equipment:

- (a) 4-122 mm guns
- (b) 6-47mm A.T. Guns
- (c) 1-SP 76mm Gun
- (d) 2-Arty pieces, caliber not reported
- (e) 2-37mm A.T. Guns
- (f) 1-120mm Mortar

(2) Other Equipment:

- (a) Uncounted quantities of rifles, carbine and machine guns.
- (b) About 6 mortars, 82mm
- (c) About 12 heavy, water cooled machine guns
- (d) Uncounted anti-tank rifles.

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

(3) Recaptured from enemy forces:

(a) 2 - U.S. 105mm Howitzers

CRAIG

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 24thInfDiv.

G-1

G-2

G-3

War Diary

CHIDESTER

G-4

1stProvlarBrig (Reinf), FIF
 LIKYANG, KOREA
 202000K August 1950

Periodic Logistic Report #19

Period Covered - 191800K to 201800K Aug

Maps: KOREA, 1:50,000

1. LOGISTICAL SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. No change

2. SUPPLY

a. Supported strength

Brigade Troops	4041
Korean Laborers	200
Korean Police	75
Korean Army	20
TOTAL	<u>4336</u>

b. Supply - no change

c. Local Procurement - none

3. EVACUATION - Zero (0) throughout

6

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

4. TRANSPORTATION -- Vehicles used to move from YONGSAN to
 MIRYANG.

5. SERVICE

a. Supply points, water points, salvage coll points closed
 YONGSAN 201200K and moved to MIRYANG.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Captured equipment (addition to last report)

(1) Major equipment:

- (a) 1 - 122mm guns
- (b) 6 SP - 76mm guns
- (c) ~~6~~ - 76mm AT guns
- (d) 1 - 120mm mortar tube.

(2) Recaptured:

- (a) 3 U.S. 105mm Howitzer

CRAIG

DISTRIBUTION:

CG EUSA-K
 CG 24THINFDIV
 G-1
 G-2
 G-3
 War Diary

CHIDESTER
 G-4

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

1stProvlarBrig(Reinf), FIF
 KYUN-GYO, KOREA
 032100K Sept 50

Daily Logistics Report No. 25

Period covered: 021800 to 031800 Sept 50

Map: KOREA, 1:50,000

1. LOGISTICAL SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD -- Annex ABLE, Sit Map

- a. RHD, MIRYANG
- b. Fwd Sup Point level - 2 days Class I, III, and V (1162.7 - 1385.6)
- c. Water Point R.J. (1164.2-1385.2).

2. SUPPLY

Supported Strength:

Brig Trs 4460

Atchd Trs:

Korean Labor 350

Korean Army 15

Korean Police 40

405

Subtotal 4865

PWs

2

Total 4867

Supply - Critical shortages - none

Other Shortages:

81mm HE light - 300 rds

81mm Iq1 - 200 rds

81mm W.P. - 200 rds

60mm Ill - 200 rds

60mm W.P. - 200 rds

4.2 H.E. - 300 rds

4.2 W.P. - 200 rds

Flares, trip,

M-48 - 100

Flares, trip,

M-49 - 100

Local Procurement - Rice 1200 lbs. from MIRYANG. Payment made
 in Won by Brigade LaborO.

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Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
(Cont'd).

3. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION -- Personnel Casualties

In Clr Sta start of period	0
Recd in Clr Sta during period	104
Evacuated to rear during period	96
Returned to duty during period	0
Number deaths at Clr Sta during period	6
In Clr Sta close of period	6

4. TRANSPORTATION

a. 50 trucks of 24thInfDiv augmented Brigade for Inf troop movement 0300-0800.

b. Brig veh with augmenting transportation moved 5thMar Regt fwd to YONGSAN from KYUN-GYO.

c. Moved 85 truck loads supply fwd from Rhd to troops and for Fwd Sup Point.

5. SERVICE

a. Engr opened OY (L-5) strip 1/2 mile south of R.J. KYUN-GYO (1164.2-1385.2)

b. Vehicle maintenance satisfactory.

c. Ordnance maintenance satisfactory.

6. ORDERS.

a. Administrative Orders 19-50 and 20-50 issued.

E.A. CRAIG
Brig Gen

Annex: ABLE -- Sit Map

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, 5th Marines (5)
 CO 1stBn, 11thMar
 CO Co "A" SP Bn
 CO Co "A", Tank Bn
 CO Co "A" Engr Bn
 CO Co "A", MT Bn
 CO Co "C", Med Bn

C/S
 G-1
 G-2
 G-3
 G-4
 Adj(5)
 EngrO

CG EUSAK (COURIER)
 CG PUSAN LOG COID (C)
 CG 24THINFDIV (COURIER)
 CG 2dINFDIV (COURIER)
 CG 1stMarDiv (Air Mail)
 CG FIF PAC (Air Mail)

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Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
(Cont'd)

CO DetOrdBn
CO Det Serv Bn
CO Rcn Plat
CO HP Plat
CO H&S Bn
CO Rear Ech PUSAN
CO Rear Ech HIRYANG
CO VMO-6
CO LITAC-2

SFC
Surgeon
OrdO
SupO
LTO
SigO
Airo

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

A. A. CHIDESTER
LtCol, USMC
ACofS, G-4

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Appendix 1 to Annex ABLE to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
(Cont'd)

1stProvMarBrig(Reinf), FMF
KYUN-GYO, KOREA
042000K Sept 50

Daily Logistica Report No. 26

Period Covered: 031800 to 041800 Sept 50

Map: KOREA, 1:50,000

1. LOGISTICAL SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD -- Annex ABLE, Detail
of Air Strip, KYUN-GYO

2. SUPPLY

a. Supported Strength

Brig Troops.	4500
Attached Troops	
Korean Labor	425
Korean Army	30
Korean Police.	209
USA.	139
Subtotal.	803
PWs.	25
Total	5328

b. Supply - Critical Shortages - None

Other Shortages:

81mm HE light -	300 rds
81mm Ill	- 200 rds
81mm W.P.	- 200 rds
60mm Ill	- 200 rds
60mm W.P.	- 200 rds
4.2 W.P.	- 200 rds
Flares, TripM48-	100

On Hand in Fwd Supply Point

Class I	
B -	2450
C -	108

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Appendix 1 to Annex ADLE to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
(Cont'd)

Class III

- 80 Oct - 29 drms
- 72 Oct - 1 drm
- Diesel Fuel - 9 drms
- Oil, SAE 10 - 4 drms
- Oil, SAE 50 - 4 drms
- NS 1120 Av Oil - 1 drm

Class IV

- Sandbags - 1450
- Concertina - 16 rolls
- Drive Posts, long - 55

Class V

- 30 cal., Carbine - 105,600
- 30 cal., M1 - 53,760
- 30 cal., bolted - 175,000
- 30 cal., BAR - 55,500
- Rockets, 2.36 HE - 260
- Rocket, 2.36 Smoke - 108
- Rocket, 3.5 - 105
- Mortar, 60mm, HE - 24
- Mortar, 60mm, Iq1 - 40
- Mortar, 81mm, HE, Heavy - 394
- Mortar, 4.2, HE - 297
- Mortar, 4.2, W.P. - 32
- 75mm Recoiless, HE - 154
- 75mm Recoiless, W.P. - 42
- 90mm, HE - 640
- 90mm, APCT - 50
- 90mm, HVAP - 100
- 105mm, HE - 300

c. Local Procurement - Rice 1200 lbs. MIRYANG. Payment made in Won by Brigade Laboro.

3. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION - Personnel Casualties

In Clr Sta start of period	6
Recd in Clr Sta during period.	57
Evacuated to rear during period.	63
Returned to duty during period	0
Number of caths at Clr Sta during prd.	0
In Clr Sta close of period.	0

Received unconfirmed reports of 15 deaths at the front. No names, ranks other data available.

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

4. TRANSPORTATION

a. 539th Army Truck Company attached. This company has been of invaluable assistance to this Brigade. Without it operations would be gravely handicapped.

b. Moved 38 truck loads supply fwd from Rhd to troops and for Fwd Sup Point YONGSAN.

c. One tank M-26 disabled by enemy mines. Repairs expected completed 051200K. One weapons carrier destroyed by enemy mines.

5. SERVICEEngr

- a. 80,000 gal water issued.
- b. Maintenance and repair of Engr equipment.
- c. Repaired O.Y. strip, Brigade CP area.
- d. Cleared mine field, 3rd Dn area.
- e. Delivered 100 rolls concertina, 180 drive posts, long, to 5thMar (1st & 2d Dns).
- f. Engr Plat, 1 tractor, TD-18 in support of leading elms in attack.

Ordnance

Maintenance satisfactory. Field maint as follows:

- a. 5 launchers, M7, Grenade
 10 launchers, M8, Grenade
 32 Rifles, Cal. 30, M1
 2 Pistols, Cal. 45, M1911A1
 1 DG cal. .30, M1919A4
 1 MG, cal. .50 H.B. M2
- b. The following were unserviceable weapons:
 - 1 Carbine, cal. .30, M2
 - 1 Launcher, Rocket, 2.36
- c. The following were repaired:
 - 1 Pan M2A2
 - 1 Pan M2A2 to 11thMar
 - 5 watches, wrist (Elgin)
- d. Vehicle maintenance satisfactory. 5 trucks, 2½-ton, unserviceable

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

Salvage - following salvaged.

a. The following items received from 5th Marines for processing:

Ordinance Items

- 2 BAR, cal 30, M1918A2
- 3 BFG, cal 30, M1919A4, w/mount, tripod, M2
- 1 BFG, cal 30, M1917A1, w/mount, tripod, M1917A1
- 4 Launchers, rocket, 2.36, M9A1
- 1 Tube, Mortar, 60mm, M2
- 1 Base plate, mortar, 60mm, M2
- 7 Rifles, U.S. cal. 30, M1903A4
- 1 Sight, M4 (For 60 & 81 mm mortars)
- 438 Miscellaneous ordnance accessories.

Miscellaneous Items

- 2 Repellant, insect, cases
- 2 Illuminating sets, chests
- 500 Bags, sand
- 1 Case, radio aerial

CRAIG
 EGen

ANNEX: Able, Detail of Air Strip

DISTRIBUTION: "A", "B", plus:

CO Rcn Plat	CO LP Plat
CO RearEch PUSAN	CO RearEch HIRYANG
CO MTAC-2	CG EUSAK (COURIER)
CG PUSAN LOG CO/D	CG 24THINFDIV
CG 2DINFDIV	CG 1stMarDiv(AirM)
CG RIF PAC(AIR M)	

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

CHIDESTER
 G-4

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
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Appendix 1 to Annex ABLE to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
(Cont'd)

Annex ABLE to Daily Logistics Report No. 26

DETAIL OF AIR STRIP, KYUN-GYO



CARSON FIELD
OF LIAISON STRIP

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DOG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

1stProvlMarBrig (Reinf), FIF
 KYUN-GYO, KOREA
 052000K Sept 50

Daily Logistics Report No. 27

Period covered: 041800K to 051800K Sept 50

Map: Korea, 1:50,000

1. LOGISTICAL SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. No change.

2. SUPPLYa. Supported Strength

Brig Troops		4451
Attached Troops		
Korean Labor	425	
Korean Army	30	
Korean Police	209	
USA	139	803
Subtotal		5254
PWs		5
Total		5259

b. Supply - Critical Shortages, none

Other Shortages: Class II

150 KNIFE, fighting, utility w/sheath
 450 LEGGINGS, canvas
 2 TENT, CP, M1942
 500 TACKS, thumb
 15 ACETATE, sheet
 4 EQUIPMENT, illuminating
 50 TRAYS, mess, CRS
 400 SPOON, haversack
 15 Pliers, TL13
 15 POUCH, CS-34 f/pliers TL 13
 2 TYPEWRITERS, portable
 300 CANS, expeditionary, water only

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

500 JACKETS, Field
 200 IODINE, small vial
 200 KIT, medical, jungle
 2 HALLS, long handled
 2 SPOTLIGHT, portable

On Hand in Fwd Supply Point

Class I

B Rations - 3600

Class III

80 Oct - 46 drms
 Diesel Fuel - 8 drms.
 Oil, SAE 10 - 4 drms
 Oil, SAE 30 - 5 drms
 Oil, SAE 50 - 4 drms
 NS 1120 AV Oil - 1 drn

Class IV

Sandbags - 1423
 Drive Posts, long - 55

Class V

30 cal carbine - 104,000
 30 cal M1 - 13,440
 30 cal belted - 230,000
 30 cal, BAR - 25,500
 Rocket 2.36 HE - 260
 Rocket, 3.5 - 54
 Mortar, 81mm HE, Heavy - 513
 75mm Rcls, HE - 104
 75mm Rcls, HEAT - 134
 90mm HE - 340
 90mm APCT - 32
 90mm HVAP - 98
 105mm HE - 53

3. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION - Personnel Casualties

In Ctr Sta start of period	0
Recd in Ctr Sta during period	78
Evacuated to rear during period	78
Returned to duty during period	0
Number of deaths during period	2
In Ctr Sta close of period	0

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarDrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

4. TRANSPORTATION

a. Moved 38 truck loads supply fwd from Rhd to troops and for Fwd Sup Point YONGSAN.

b. Two tanks M-26 disabled by enemy tank action. Salvage in process.

5. SERVICEa. Engr

- (1) 50,000 gal water issued
- (2) Maintenance and repair of Engr equipment - normal

b. Ord

- (1) Maintenance normal and satisfactory.
- (2) Salvage and Captured Material:

- 1 Clinometer, machine gun, M1917 w/case
- 54 Rifles, cal 30, M1
- 3 Carbines, cal 30, M2
- 3 Carbines, cal 30, M1
- 2 BAR, cal 30, M1918A2
- 1 BMG Cal 50, H.B., M2
- 9 Bayonets, M1
- 11 Scabbards, for bayonet M1
- 15 Magazines, BAR
- 1 Magazine for TSMG

(3) Miscellaneous activities: - Inspected and repaired following items:

- 31 Rifles, cal 30, M1
- 9 Carbines, cal 30, M1
- 11 Carbines, cal 30, M2
- 3 BAR, cal, 30, M1918A2
- 1 BMG, cal 50, H.B., M2
- 39 Bayonet, M1
- 33 Scabbards, M7
- 20 Magazines for TSMG
- 1 Magazine for cal 45 pistol
- 5 Lights, Inst M14
- 1 Light, Inst, M37
- 1 Sight Quadrant, M4
- 1 Plug, filling
- 1 Firing pin holder

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 Appendix 1 to Annex DCG to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report
 (Cont'd)

c. Motor Transport

- (1) Vehicle maintenance normal and satisfactory.
- (2) Five trucks, 2½-ton, unserviceable.

d. Salvage

(1) Salvage Section received the following from the 5th
 Marines:

26 Helmets	27 Liners, helmet
19 Belt, Cartridge	2 Knapsack
7 Canteen	4 Cup, canteen
2 Leggings, pr	10 Cover, canteen
1 Shovel, intrenching	1 Head net, mosquito
2 Suspenders	2 Bayonet, M3
3 Scabbards, bayonet, M7	2 Belt, pistol
3 Carriers, intrenching tool	5 Packet, 1st Aid
4 Kit, jungle	12 Pouch, 1st Aid Packet
1 Spoon	2 Heat Can and cover
4 Cover, camouflage, helmet	7 Grenades, MK2
1 Grenade, hand, illuminating	9 Rifles, Cal 30, M1
3 Carbine, cal 30, M1	3 Shoe, field, pr, unserv

CRAIG
 IGen

DISTRIBUTION: "A" and "B" plus:
 CO RearEch PUSAN
 CO RearEch MIRYANG
 CO MTAC-2
 CG EUSAK (COURIER)
 CG PUSAN LOG COLD (COURIER)
 CG 24thInfDiv (COURIER)
 CG 2ndInfDiv (COURIER)
 CG 1stMarDiv (Air Mail)
 CG FMF PAC (Air Mail)

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

CHIDESTER
 G-4

Appendix 1 to Annex ABLE to 1stMarBrig Special Action Report.

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