

In The Field Of Sports They Feel That The Following
Equipment Is Needed

Basketball	18%
Baseball	17%
Football	14%
Soft Ball	11%
Horse Shoes	9%
Volley Ball	8%
Checkers	5%

Three men in ten say plenty of equipment is now available, but the demand for additional basketball and baseball equipment is particularly high in the Benghazi and Canal Area. It would seem that most men are "fairly well" satisfied with the amount and type of recreational equipment now available, considering everything.

Almost half the soldiers feel that the sports and athletic programs are well arranged and well supervised. Satisfaction with present programs is greatest in the Tripoli and Cairo areas, least in the Benghazi and Canal areas.

When asked the question:

"Are the sports and athletic programs at your station well arranged and well supervised?"

The men answered:

Yes,		No,		
Very well	Fairly well	?	Poorly	Very poorly
11%	32%	21%	22%	14%

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The dissenting minority is considerable, and though complete agreement can hardly be attained, it is well for one to consider the soldier's wants and analyze the sports and athletic programs with that in mind.

The majority feel that the entertainment and recreational facilities are only "fair."

When asked the question:

"In general, how would you rate the entertainment and recreational facilities where you are located?"

The men answered:

Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very poor
8%	20%	47%	16%	9%

They were asked to write the two types of recreation or entertainment most needed that were then inadequate or entirely lacking, and their responses indicated that they want additional dances, swimming facilities, radios, and movies. Their requests for other activities were extremely varied but the largest number requested the four things just mentioned.

Men want to go to dances, and, of course, the lack of opportunity for feminine companionship has served to accentuate this desire. The relatively small number of stage shows which they have seen since being overseas has magnified their desire for this type of entertainment. But movies, which they see regularly, still remain very popular.

DANCES IN CAMP
THEY WANT TO GO TO
DANCES IN TOWN

IN CAMP

Dances	38%
Movies	28%
Stage Shows	27%
Party or Sing	5%
Concert	4%

IN TOWN

Dances	57%
Stage Shows	16%
Movies	12%
Party or Sing	8%
Concert	4%

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ENTERTAINMENT IN CAMP AND TOWN

More than nine out of ten stage shows and movies, and one out of four dances which the men attend are held in camp. More men attend dances at the Red Cross Club than at any other place, (5 out of 10), but about a third also attend dances in town, but not at the Red Cross Club. The number having an opportunity to attend dances was very small in every area except the Cairo area. The number attending parties or sings was very small, but more attended these activities in camp than elsewhere.

About 8 out of 10 said they enjoyed the various types of entertainment they participated in during the week preceding the filling out of the questionnaire, and this proportion ranged from 7 to 9 out of 10 who enjoyed it. More enjoyed movies than dances, dances than stage shows, stage shows than parties.

During a normal week, approximately 9 out of 10 men see a movie and slightly less than 1 out of 10 goes to a dance. They see stage shows with variable frequency and this, of course, is largely determined by the availability of visiting talent, but in the week preceding the giving of the questionnaire, the following proportions of men attended the various activities listed below:

Movies	88%
Stage Shows	34%
Dances	8%
Party or Sing	5%

Eight out of ten men have seen stage shows over here, and more men have seen USO Camp Shows than any other kind.

When the question was asked:

"Which stage shows have you seen since coming over here?"

The men answered:

USO Camp Shows	64%
Soldier Shows	30%
ENSA	25%
Haven't seen a stage show	21%

As has been indicated, many of the men want to see stage shows and it is evident that they enjoy these, but a considerable number of enlisted men criticize the stage shows they have seen for various reasons. Twenty-six per cent of those who have seen stage shows have some criticism to offer. The most frequent criticism is that there is a lack of talent in the shows which are brought into this area. A considerable number makes comments of commendation, but the number of critical remarks exceeds those of praise, though, of course, this is to be expected inasmuch as people are more prone to criticize than to write of their approval. No one show was criticized by many men, with the exception of the Benghazi area where considerable criticism was directed against one of the USO shows.

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SOLDIERS LIKE USO CAMP SHOWS BEST

	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor
USO Camp Shows	40%	32%	22%	6%
Soldier Shows	32%	33%	28%	7%
ENSA	21%	30%	38%	11%

Movie service is much better now than it was in April. Half the men saw more movies in the four weeks preceding the filling out of the questionnaire than in April, and most of the remaining persons either were not in the Middle East in April or else saw about the same number of movies in the two periods.


Mobile movie units have enabled one-fourth the men to see more movies than formerly - this figure is a minimum figure in that many areas, such as Camp Huckstep, have never had a mobile movie unit. Considering only those men who have seen movies provided by this mobile unit, somewhat more than fifty per cent say that it has enabled them to see more movies than formerly. More than half the men in the Middle East say they are in favor of having such mobile movie units for their outfits, and those who object say that they have their own projectors, and, therefore, have no need of the services of a mobile unit.

Comedies and musicals are the most popular types of movies.

When the question was asked:

"Which type of movies do you like best?"

The men answered:




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Western, War pictures, and Murder mysteries are least popular types of movies.

When asked the question:

"Which type of movie do you like least?"

The men answered:



Three out of four men say there is a radio at camp to which they can listen when off duty, but the remaining 25% say they are unable to find an available radio. Less than one man in 10 listens to his own radio most often; one man in 7 listens to a radio owned by another soldier; and almost 9 men in 10 listen to radios in the Service Club, Day Room or other radio supplied by the Army. Somewhat more than 80% of the radios have shortwave as well as longwave bands.

When asked the type of broadcast to which they most often listen, the men replied: rebroadcasts of the U.S. Programs, 28%, local programs in the Middle East, 14%, shortwave from U.S., 29%, and the remaining persons listened most frequently to shortwave broadcasts from various countries, including England, Germany, Italy. These countries can be heard more clearly than programs from the U.S. A considerable number of soldiers listen to programs from France, Russia, Spain, Palestine, Japan, etc.

Somewhat more than half (53%) of the men say that they have heard radio programs specially designed for soldiers since coming into the Middle East. Of the programs they have heard since coming into the Middle East, Command Performance is heard most frequently, and is liked best of the programs they receive here. Bob Hope, Mail Call, and Jack Benny are heard next most frequently; Bob Hope and Jack Benny programs are next most popular.

Of all the programs on the air (whether or not these programs are now heard in the Middle East), the men would most like to hear Command Performance, Jack Benny, Bob Hope, Hit Parade, Bing Crosby, and Kay Kyser. The requests for news, Fred Allen, Red Skelton, Tommy Dorsey, and Charlie McCarthy were also frequent. The men have considerable difficulty in hearing most of these programs, though as was mentioned above they do hear some programs, principally Command Performance, Bob Hope, Jack Benny, and Mail Call.

The best time for listening to the radio is from 7:00 P.M. until 10:00 P.M., about 30% stating that they can listen during this time. The next best time is from 6:00 P.M. until 7:00 P.M. when about 20% say they can conveniently listen to the radio. About 15% can listen from 12 noon until 1:00 P.M. At other times only a very small percentage indicates that there is free time to enjoy the radio.

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When asked to write their comments regarding how to improve radio entertainment the most frequently mentioned item was "more radios", "better radios". The most frequent request for types of program was "more American broadcasts", and this far outranked any other type of program mentioned in the comments section.

It is readily observed that radio is a popular method of entertainment with American soldiers, and though it is only with difficulty that they can get programs direct from the U.S., they consider rebroadcasts of American programs as the next best thing.

Free Comments

Most of the comments pertaining to recreation were critical, though, some of them were constructive at the same time.

"With all the good sports material around I think some one should get wise and organize some decent teams in all sports.

"There are quite a few of the fellows interested in further education. If some arrangement could be made to hold classes of all sorts certain nights a week."

"More types smaller games would help us to pass the evenings. Checkers, chess, monopoly, table tennis, and many more small games. The only kind of books that I can seem to find out here is English stories or detectives novels both of which I have grown to dislike very much. Keep the movies coming strong, very much appreciated by us all."

"While we are actually in combat I don't think we could improve on this situation much. But when we are waiting orders and getting ready for battle, that's when more recreation is needed. For while we are in combat our minds and body are all in our work but as soon as one campaign is over and we have some time to ourself, if no pleasures are handy the men quarrel and scrap among themselves. This may lead to the downfall of a well organized outfit. Therefore I would suggest more movies, etc., during the time we are awaiting orders."

A large number of soldiers asked for additional stage shows, movies, radios, better radio programs, etc.

"Bob Hope is in England now. Why send him there where they certainly have better recreational facilities than we have? More passes, we got damn fed up with this post.

"We believe that everything is being done for the guys at home and we are forgotten. We need a time limit on overseas duty. Even if it is two years it would give us something to look forward to.

"The Government should do less for the jerks at home and more for men overseas."

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"I would suggest to enable the men in advanced areas to benefit by the radio is to get the artists closer to we soldiers. Opening a broadcasting station in Cairo would be an excellent idea and pooling American Artists to appear as guests each week."

"The issue of large combination P.A. & radio tower unit of sufficient wattage to be heard by large audiences, together with a good selection of modern new records to be played over the system in evenings and at times when men are not on duty."

"As to the methods of broadcasting radio entertainment to troops overseas, I'm not acquainted with, but as said before, programs from U. S. were clearly picked up in the combat zone, but at a base as Tripoli, there doesn't seem to be much success."

"In the Tripolitanian area, Middle East stations cannot be heard, but BBC from London can be picked up. Suggest that if possible arrangements be made for BBC to rebroadcast the program we fellows like. Or Algerian stations."

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PART 2

INTEREST OF SOLDIERS IN EDUCATION, TALKS,
AND READING PREFERENCES IN USAFIME

Research Branch, Special Service Division
United States Armed Forces In The Middle East

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Part 2

MAIN FINDINGS

1. Soldiers are very much interested in taking correspondence courses or class work while in the Army. Sixty-five per cent of the men indicate that they are interested in taking such a course. Seventy per cent of high school graduates are interested in this educational plan.

More than half the high school graduates (who make up 55% of all enlisted men in this area as compared with 39% for the Army as a whole) are interested in taking courses at the college level.

Though it is unlikely that all these men would enroll in classes, there is no doubt that large numbers of them are anxious to further their education and would welcome an opportunity to participate in the United States Armed Forces Institute provided the time lag between lessons is not too great.

2. Soldiers appear to attach considerable importance to the need for having a knowledge and understanding of world events.

3. Eight out of ten say they do not have more than a "headline" knowledge of the news. Nine out of ten of these say they would like to keep up better but lack facilities or time.

4. Less than a third have heard orientation talks by their officers; they agree that the talks helped their thinking on the war, and they say they would like such talks regularly - if made by competent speakers.

5. Greatest interest was shown in talks by officers or men who have seen combat in this war. Talks on what is going on in the U. S. today or about the post-war world would interest the majority of soldiers.

6. Soldiers prefer talks followed by discussion. Discussions only, led by someone who knows the subject, are preferred to talks not followed by discussion.

7. Considerable interest is shown in tours to historic places.

8. Life, Readers Digest, Esquire, and Time, in order, are the favourite magazines.

9. Half the men think additional books and magazines are needed. In the Cairo area 5 men in 10 think additional reading materials are needed, but in the Benghazi area 9 men in 10 think more reading material is needed.

10. "Best-seller" novels are the most popular. Mystery or Detective stories, Adventure or Romance stories are also very popular. Problems of the post-war world and books about social conditions, problems, etc., are also requested by many men.

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EDUCATIONAL INTERESTS OF SOLDIERS

Three men in 10 plan to return to school after the war. Sixteen per cent say they plan to go to trade or other vocational school; 3% plan to complete high school, and 14% plan to return to college.

Sixty-five per cent of the men are interested in taking some correspondence course through the United States Armed Forces institute, and among high school graduates 70% are interested in taking some such course. Enlisted men in the Benghazi and Tripoli areas, those who are most isolated and have been here longest and are better educated, are more interested in further education than are the soldiers in the Canal and Cairo areas. Their interests in specific courses are extremely varied but the following list indicated their preferences.

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>%</u>
English for men of foreign birth or parentage	1.2	Diesel engines	11.4
English grammar	7.0	Aviation engines	11.1
Business letter writing	7.3	Airplane maintenance	8.1
American history	4.9	Marine engineering preparatory	1.3
Civics (American Government)	4.1	Plumbing	1.3
Economics	5.8	Machine shop practice	7.0
Arithmetic	6.3	Gas welding	5.3
Algebra	9.1	Mechanical engineering	5.4
Geometry	8.3	Mechanical drawing (use of drawing instruments essential)	4.5
Trigonometry	7.8	Machine design	1.9
Analytic geometry	4.2	Elementary electricity	3.6
Calculus	4.7	Industrial electricity	4.5
Inorganic chemistry (non-laboratory)	2.9	Electrical illumination	2.0
Typewriting (use of typewriter essential)	9.9	Preparatory course for radio, telephony, and telegraphy	4.4
Shorthand, Gregg	5.1	Radio operating, Part I	2.4
Shorthand, Gregg, advanced	1.7	Basic telegraphy and telephony	.9
Bookkeeping and accounting	8.6	Electric welding	9.5
Cost accounting	4.4	Surveying and mapping	1.8
Railroad rate clerk	2.0	Engineering mechanics	2.9
Traffic management	2.8	Structural engineering	1.6
Refrigeration, part I	4.2	Water works and sewage plant operation	.3
Air conditioning	6.2	Carpentry	2.0
Automobiles	4.7	Not interested in taking any such course	34.4
Practical telephony	.9		
Automobile repairing	7.4		
Automobile electric technician	4.3		

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EDUCATIONAL INTERESTS OF SOLDIERS (Contd)

Six out of ten men are interested in attending classes in order to better their education if arrangements can be made for classes. Their principal interests are in subjects relating either to business or mathematics.

If you would like to attend classes for high school or college credit, if facilities were available, check the subjects you are interested in.

Business 26%

Mathematics 26%

Foreign Languages 18%

Social Sciences 15%

English 13%

Science 13%

Not interested 38%

More than half the high school graduates, (who make up 55% of all soldiers) in the Middle East, are interested in taking correspondence courses for college credit. Their interests are as follows:

Business 24%

Mathematics 18%

Foreign Languages 14%

Social Sciences 14%

English 10%

Science 9%

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On the whole there is considerable interest in taking courses to further the education of soldiers even though they are in the Army. It has been pointed out that enlisted men in the Benghazi and Tripoli areas, Air Force men of relatively high intelligence who have been removed from many more of the comforts of life and for a longer time than is true of most men in the Cairo area, are particularly interested in an opportunity to enroll in either correspondence courses or actual classes. If this indicated interest can be guided properly there is an opportunity to permit men to spend their spare time wisely and profitably.

Almost half the men indicate that there is a fairly good place in which to study, but most of them have to list their tents as that place - certainly that is not an ideal place but the mere fact that men are willing to use their tents, or dayrooms which in many instances are tents, as places in which to study is indicative of a real desire to utilize their spare time in some definite fashion. Six out of ten men indicate that they could study two or more hours per day if they were taking a correspondence course or attending classes. The men "in the blue" say they can devote a little more time to study than do the men around Cairo and in the Canal area.

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Subject for Talks.

A list of subjects for talks, chosen as being pertinent to the times and to the soldier, was presented to enlisted men with the request that they check any subjects on the list that they would like to hear about providing the talks were made by competent speakers.

Interest in what is going on in the U.S. today is very widespread, 63% of the soldiers indicating that they would like to hear talks on this subject. This interest was confirmed in the soldier's requests for additional news of the U.S. today in STARS & STRIPES and YANK.

Interest in post-war problems occupies the number two positions with the soldiers, 48% of them stating that they would like to hear talks on this subject. This is a natural interest in that they want to know what life holds in store for them following the war.

The two subjects just mentioned are far more popular than any others, though considerable interest is shown in a variety of subjects as is shown in the following charts.

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Does A Knowledge And Understanding Of Current Events Help a
Man Be A Better Soldier?

Soldiers say yes:

It helps very much	It helps somewhat	No, it's not needed
72%	23%	2 3%

Fifteen per cent of the soldiers admit that they do not keep up with the news:

When asked the question:

"How would you rate yourself with regard to a knowledge of world events and recent news?"

The men replied:

Have a fairly complete and up-to-date knowledge of the news

19%

Have a general knowledge of "headline" events

66%

Do not keep up with the news

15%

Thus it is seen that only one soldier in five feels that he has a fairly complete and up-to-date knowledge of the news while two out of three rate themselves as having only a general knowledge of "headline" events.

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Most soldiers who are not well up on the news wish they were.

Those Who Felt They Did Not Have A Complete And Up-To-Date Knowledge Of The News Were Asked Why Not:

Want to but lack facilities

68%

Want to but don't have time

24%

Not interested

8%

The reasons they give for not knowing more about what is happening in the world today are primarily lack of facilities such as papers and radios. Less than one man in ten says that he is not particularly interested in having a better knowledge of the news. It would appear that on the part of many there is considerable desire to be better informed.

Soldiers Would Like To Hear Regular Talks On Current Events --
By Competent And Interesting Speakers

The question was asked:

"Would you like to hear regular talks on what is going on in the world today, providing that they are made by competent and interesting speakers?"

The men answered:

Yes, once or twice a week

49%

Yes, once or twice a month

42%

No

9%

They do not want to hear talks that have not been well prepared and that are not presented in an interesting manner.

Most soldiers would like to hear talks by American Officers and men who have actually taken part in combat in this war.

Very much interested	Somewhat interested	Not interested
65%	19%	16%

In the free comments many soldiers indicated that they want to hear talks by other enlisted men as well as by officers, and it would seem that this is a feasible method of orientation and indoctrination that would be extremely popular with the men, particularly new arrivals...

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Would be interested in hearing talks on the subjects providing they were made by competent speakers.

What is going on in the U. S. today.	63%
What will happen after the war.	45%
Air power, recent developments in aircraft and air strategy.	29%
What is going on inside Germany today.	26%
Contribution of our Allies to the war effort	22%
What is going on inside the conquered countries of Europe today.	21%
What are we fighting for.	20%
What is going on inside Russia today.	17%
German propaganda and fifth column techniques.	16%

Important military
campaigns of the war.

5%

Commando and guerrilla
fighting.

12%

The Germans, their country
and their customs.

10%

Individual Self Protection.

10%

The British, their country
and their customs.

9%

The French, their country
and their customs.

9%

The Italians, their country
and their customs.

9%

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Are soldiers hearing orientation talks?

The men were asked:

"Since coming over here have you heard any talks on what is going on in the world today?"

Though 65% of the men have heard such talks, only 30% have heard such talks by their own officers.

Have Heard Talks

By officers of own outfit	29%
By English lecturers	7%
By others	20%
Have not heard talks	45%

THE TALKS HELP

Those who had heard talks were asked:

"Did the talks you heard help make clear what this war means to you and how important you are as an individual in helping to win it?"

	Very much	Somewhat	No
Talks by officers	38%	50%	12%
Talks by English lecturers	28%	54%	18%
Talks by other people	29%	45%	26%

The talks by "other" people included visiting officers and notables who have been in this area. It is seen that for the most part the men feel that such talks have been helpful, though the degree of helpfulness depends upon the competence of the speaker. In the following pages, it is shown that men ask for additional talks, and this is further evidence that they are not content to lead a sedentary mental life.

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Soldier interest in armies of allies and axis.

When asked the question:

"Which army are you most interested in hearing talks about, that is with regard to equipment, methods of fighting, tactics, combat experience, etc.?"

The men replied:

German	47%
Russian	34%
Japanese	31%
Chinese	9%
English	9%
Canadian	8%
Italian	7%
Fighting French	6%

Soldiers like discussions.

When asked the question:

"Providing the subject is interesting, which do you prefer?"

The men answered:

Talks followed by
discussion.

57%

Discussion only,
led by someone
who knows the
subject.

25%

Talks not followed
by discussions.

18%

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LIBRARY FACILITIES AND HOW THEY ARE USED

Soldiers were asked if there were any library facilities, army or civilian, available at or near their camp.

Yes, and I use them often	18%
Yes, and I use them sometimes	34%
Yes, but I never use them	9%
Not sure if there are any	15%
No, there are none but I wish there were	21%
No, but I probably wouldn't use them if there were	3%

Some so-called library facilities are available to almost all the men but in several instances the number of books in a unit library was extremely small, and for this reason many of the men consider that no library facilities are available. The feeling that reading facilities are inadequate is widespread.

The question was asked:

"Are the reading facilities adequate where you are stationed?"

The men replied:

Yes

16%

No, we need more magazines

53%

No, we need more books

46%

No, we need more newspapers

34%

BOOKS THAT SOLDIERS PREFER

When asked the question:

"If you were to spend the evening reading in camp tonight, which type of book would you prefer?"

Recent novels of "best seller" type

33%

Mystery and detective stories

15%

Adventure and Romance stories

15%

Problems of post-war world

12%

Non-fiction

9%

Books about social conditions, problems, etc.

8%

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Western novel

8%

Historical novels

7%


Classics

4%

To speak of popularity of "best seller" novels is perhaps redundancy but it is interesting to know that soldiers' taste in this field correspond with that of the civilian population. It is particularly significant that books pertaining to problems of the post-war world and those relating to social conditions are in such great demand relatively. It is well known that today's army is perhaps the most intelligent the world has ever known, but at times there is a tendency to relegate the soldier to the position of a robot. But though the soldier is away from home and away from an environment that is most conducive to intellectual pursuits, there is a considerable demand for books of a more serious type. The previous section on education and this section give evidence that American soldiers will not be satisfied with "detective" and "western" stories only.

LIFE AND READERS DIGEST ARE MOST POPULAR MAGAZINES

Percentages show the number of men checking the magazines as one of their two favorites.



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Free Comments

Some typical comments of those who are interested in taking courses while in the Army are given below:

"I am very much interested in the college courses you mentioned in this survey so why not try and carry it through. It is my desire to finish college after the war, but being a married man, and unable to foresee the future this is an uncertainty; but correspondence courses or resedent classes would certainly be a God-send. Another thing you must realize many of us who would probably be interested in this are not near cities where class-rooms are available, but are in combat zones. To me an offer of college courses while overseas is the best and most worthwhile offer I have received since being in the Army. Best of luck in this and I am hoping to hear of college courses being offered soon."

"I think it is a very good idea to try and prepare men for Post-war employment. Although I don't have much time to myself, when I do, I think I could concentrate on studying more here than I could if I were in the states, for, when I do have time to myself I don't know what to do with it."

"I know that many soldiers would welcome educational courses, either correspondence or regular classes. I personally, would appreciate being able to receive college credits while in the army to cut down the toll of years that will be needed even after my army career in order to get a college degree."

As was pointed out in the statistical analysis many of the men are interested in additional reading materials, and their free comments reinforce their answers to specific questions:

"Reading material, primarily good literature, instead of all detective mysteries, should be furnished the troops. The Pocketbooks are an excellent method, but they are not of the highest type literature."

"Would like very much to have more reading material as it takes three months to receive them from the States, think the government could supply a few of the most popular, and get him to us a lot sooner. Our mail is coming through fair, why not magazines?"

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The men are interested in hearing talks on various subjects provided the talks are made by competent and interesting speakers.

"Would suggest that talks be given by interesting persons on the behavior of American Forces and its contribution to the peace that is to come. It is amazing to know that so many people look up to the United States. So we as troops should treat the conquered people of different nationalities and the prisoners of war with consideration. Thus we act in the capacity of Ambassadors of the U. S. I believe one soldier is worth more than ten Ambassadors thus securing, as we all hope and pray for an everlasting peace. Would like to go into further details but for the shortage of space."

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PART 3

SOLDIER OPINION OF STARS AND STRIPES AND YANK

Research Branch, Special Service Division
United States Armed Forces in The Middle East

- 41 -

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Part 3

MAIN FINDINGS

1. About four men in ten read STARS AND STRIPES weekly; about three men in ten read YANK weekly.
2. The primary reason for not reading these publications is difficulty in obtaining copies - the distribution system has been altered somewhat since this survey was made and it is hoped that most of the men now have an opportunity to obtain copies of the publications every week.
3. Only one man in a hundred rates either publication as "poor."
4. In STARS AND STRIPES soldiers like "News from Home" best.
5. In YANK soldiers like "News from Home" and "Pictures" best.
6. Additional news from the U. S. is wanted more than anything else in both publications.

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YANK - STARS AND STRIPES

Slightly more than one-half the soldiers say they read STARS AND STRIPES every week. Almost all the remaining enlisted men say that the paper does not get to their camp every week, or else they do not know where to buy it. Distribution has proved to be a very considerable problem and it is thought that changes during the past few weeks will have improved the situation somewhat, but at the time of the survey the predominant reason for not reading STARS AND STRIPES regularly was that the paper was not available.

Almost three-fourths the soldiers think that STARS AND STRIPES is a good newspaper, and when asked:

"On the whole, how would you rate STARS AND STRIPES?"

The men answered:

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Haven't read it enough to judge
27%	46%	20%	2	5

In STARS AND STRIPES, "News From Home", Ranks First In Popularity.

Like it very much	Like it somewhat	No Opin- ion	Don't Care for it	
66%	21%	12%	1	News from the United States
51%	31%	14%	4	War News
51%	28%	16%	5	News of Yanks in the Middle East
49%	28%	16%	6	Cartoons
35%	29%	24%	12%	Sports News
23%	36%	33%	8%	Editorials
21%	38%	32%	9%	Articles by Staff Writers
17%	23%	31%	29%	Poetry

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YANK Is Slightly More Popular Than STARS AND STRIPES.

When asked the question:

"On the whole, how would you rate YANK?"

The men replied:


Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Haven't read it enough to judge
38%	41%	16%	1	4

"News From Home", Is The Most Popular Feature In Yank

Like it very much	Like it somewhat	No Opinion	Don't care for it	
67%	21%	10%	2	News From Home
63%	24%	12%	1	Pictures
53%	29%	16%	2	Yanks at home and abroad
53%	29%	15%	3	War News

Soldiers want more news about the United States.

Asked what features they would like to see in STARS AND STRIPES, and YANK in the future, the soldiers replied:



In this question men were given the first five alternatives above to check and a space was provided to write in any other features they desired. No concensus was found for "other" mentions.

CONFIDENTIAL

Like it very much	Like it somewhat	No Opinion	Don't care for it	
31%	40%	25%	4	Feature Articles
40%	31%	24%	5	Action Feature stories
35%	28%	27%	10%	Sports
23%	33%	35%	9%	Editorials
26%	28%	33%	13%	Letters to the editor
19%	23%	31%	27%	Poetry

(1734 - Signed original to the Secretary of War)
(1735 - Signed original to the Secretary of the Navy)
(1736 - Carbon copy to Admiral W. D. Leahy)

War Dept. folder
2-43
BSF

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

CLS
10-27-66

September 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of the Navy.


Subject: Japanese Atrocities - Reports of by Escaped Prisoners.

1. I agree with your opinion that any publication of Japanese atrocities at this time might complicate the present and future missions of the GRIPSHOLM and increase the mistreatment of prisoners now in Japanese hands. I request, therefore, that you take effective measures to prevent the publication or circulation of any stories emanating from escaped prisoners until I have authorized a release.

2. It might be well for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make recommendation as to the moment when I should inform the country of the mistreatment of our nationals.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Copy to:
Admiral Leahy



War Dept. folders 2-43

file

PSF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 15. 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject:

Repatriation of members of former American Missions at Vichy and other nationals of the United States and certain of the other American Republics, now held as hostages in Germany, in return for German nationals held in the United States.

The War and Navy Departments and the Department of Justice having taken the position that they cannot acquiesce in the release of certain persons demanded by the German Government, we are continuing our negotiations on this basis. If further difficulties should be encountered, I shall again bring the matter to your attention.

I return herewith the original letters from the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Attorney General, dated September 1, August 16, and August 20, respectively, which under cover of your memorandum of September 3 you sent me for my comments.

Hull

Enclosures:
As stated.


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR COMMENT.

F.D.R.



WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SEP 1 1943

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

I have canvassed with the utmost care the situation presented by your secret letter, regarding the latest demands which have been presented by the German Government for the repatriation of its nationals now in this country in return for nationals of the United States and other American Republics detained in Germany, with which was inclosed the Secretary of State's letter of August 10, 1943, to you on the same subject.

I find that of the approximately 750 German nationals whose possible repatriation is in issue, 15 were received by us from Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, under formal commitment from the Department of State to those countries that we would not hold those individuals here in detention. Their names, together with a statement of the countries from which they were received and of their military or technical qualifications and status, are appended to this letter. Their repatriation will manifestly be of value to the enemy, but in view of the commitment referred to, the War Department cannot and does not interpose any objection.

The remainder of the 750 German civilians in question, to whose repatriation the several intelligence agencies have objected, are held here without any commitment which would bar their continued detention. Whether they shall be returned presents a question of policy which this Government is free to decide in its own best judgment. Certainly the return of skilled aviators, technicians, espionage agents and saboteurs will result in substantial military advantage to the enemy. I fully appreciate the weight of the several considerations mentioned in your letter, by reason of which you suggest that it may, possibly, do no great harm to release these men at this time. I do not feel that the lapse of time since they were taken into custody is decisive, since the danger in returning them does not lie in the information, but in the potentialities, which they will take back to Germany, nor do I consider that the changed military situation in Europe will materially diminish their capacity to do us harm. Nevertheless I have concluded that if, in order to



secure the return of the American and Latin American nationals now interned by the German Government, it is necessary to repatriate the civilians in question, then the objections heretofore made by the War Department may be deemed withdrawn. I would earnestly recommend, however, that any agreement which is finally arrived at should yield the enemy only the minimum necessary concessions, and should in no event go so far as to accept extravagant exactions on his part.

The last paragraph of the Secretary of State's letter to you recommends that the Department of State shall have a free hand to release the military members of the former German and Italian Armistice Commissions captured in North Africa. Your letter, however, confines itself to the question of the return of the civilians referred to above, and the notes from the Swiss Legation conveying to the Department of State the demands of the German Government which form the basis of the current negotiations do not indicate that the German Government is insisting upon the return of any of the military members of the Armistice Commissions. It would therefore appear that this point is not presently presented for decision. If, however, I am in error in that respect, then I must state that it is the view of the War Department that any enemy demand for the return of military members of the Armistice Commissions should be unequivocally rejected. This view is not based solely upon the fact that these individuals are military personnel and not entitled to diplomatic status or immunity, (as pointed out in my letter to you of June 26, 1943, and in the data attached to my further letter to you of August 13, 1943), but also upon considerations of such gravity and secrecy that I feel it would be distinctly imprudent to make a written record of them. It goes without saying, that I shall be glad to lay those considerations before you in person, at your convenience.

Respectfully yours,

W. D. Ladd
acting Secretary of War.

COLOMBIA

BETHKE, Rudolf
EIKHOF, Wilhelm

EVERS, Franz
LANGE, William
(Wilhelm)
MARGGRAFF, Joachim

SCHMIDT, Helmuth
BECK, Alfred
BERG, Walter

DOBE, Gustav Sr.

Reservist in German Air Force
Leading Nazi agent—Goajira
Peninsula
Scadta Pilot and Instrument Maker
Flight Mechanic and Radio Operator
for Scadta
Former German Naval Intelligence
Officer
Former Scadta pilot
Optical Expert; Mechanic; Chemist
Former Chief Engineer of Panamanian
Motor Tanker
Gestapo Leader

ECUADOR

BOSSAREK, Anton
ELL, Georg

LOESCHNER, Henry

Radio Operator, Mechanic and Pilot
Electrical Engineer, Knowledge of
Canal Locks
PYL group member; knowledge of
contacts

PERU

BODECHTL, Georg
WESTHOFF, Ferdinand

Outstanding Espionage Agent
Outstanding member of P.Y.L. radio
espionage

MEXICO

NICOLAUS, Georg

Leading Espionage Agent in Two
Americas



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

4
SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 31 1943
MR. LONG
SD

SPECIAL
DIVISION
SEP 1 1943
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE August 20, 1943
AUG 21 11 39 AM '43
RECEIVED

SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 31 1943
NOTED

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your letter, dated August 10, 1943, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Secretary of State to you, and asking whether all the German nationals from other American Republics included in the latest German repatriation proposal might not now be repatriated without danger to national security.

Your letter points out that it is improbable that these German nationals while in detention have been able to obtain information which would endanger us and that the military situation in Europe has altered since last year. You suggest that for these reasons it may be far less harmful to repatriate these persons now than it would have been some time ago. These facts decrease, although they do not entirely eliminate, the potential threat of these persons to the internal security of this country.

There is, however, another aspect of the proposed exchange which deserves consideration. This proposal requires us to exchange 750 to 900 German nationals for 266 nationals of the United States and other American Republics. The group we receive in exchange consists of some officials and their families, but it is composed largely of clerical employees and persons engaged in Red Cross and similar activities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has objected to 38 of the 586 German nationals whose names the State Department has submitted for consideration. These 38 persons include not only leaders and members of the German espionage and propaganda organizations in Latin America but also airplane pilots, radio technicians, engineers, military reservists, and others with special technical training which could be used to assist the German war effort. I recognize that the question whether the exchange should be made is primarily one for decision by the State Department, but I take this opportunity to raise the question whether it is possible for the State Department to avoid repatriating these relatively few skilled German nationals whose training and experience will be of direct assistance to the German military forces.

Respectfully yours,

Frank B. Rowley
Attorney General

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
Serial No. 093713
(SC)P1-4/EF30

16 AUG 1943

My dear Mr. President:

Reference is made to your secret letter concerning the proposed repatriation arrangement with the German Government and enclosing a letter from the Secretary of State on this subject. It is understood that the Secretary of State desires to arrange for the repatriation of approximately 266 nationals of the United States and other American Republics in return for approximately 750 German nationals now in this country.

The Secretary of State believes that the German authorities intend to hold our nationals as hostages for captured Germans whom we might prosecute under the war criminal procedure. This same view could readily be taken concerning every prisoner of war that may fall into the hands of the Germans in the future and I do not believe that it is an impelling reason for conducting this repatriation unless a reasonable agreement can be reached. } ✓

A list of individuals for repatriation to Germany has been thoroughly examined again by the Office of Naval

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D. C.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Intelligence and the objections are withdrawn in the case of all on the list except in that of George Nicolaus.


George Nicolaus, a resident of Mexico, is the exception to the above clearance. Nicolaus was the head of the German espionage organization south of the Rio Grande. He is a thoroughly trained operative and dangerous to the welfare of the United States and the other nations in the Western Hemisphere because of his far flung personal contacts and influence, covering as it does persons in Central and South America and many persons in the States of the Union adjacent to Mexico. Returned to Germany, Nicolaus could easily organize and direct the activities of several echelons of espionage agents and operatives in the Western Hemisphere. In addition, because of his training and experience, he would be dangerous to the welfare of the United States as an evaluator of information transmitted by espionage operatives to Germany. His value is attested by the repeated efforts of the Nazi Government to obtain his repatriation.

I recommend against meeting every German demand in this matter and specifically in this case recommend that Nicolaus be not considered eligible for repatriation. ✓

Previously the Office of Naval Intelligence has acted to coordinate the work of all the Investigative Agencies

for clearing repatriation lists. The recommendations
made in this letter are only those of the Navy Department.

Very sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Frank Knox". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Frank Knox

War Dept folder 2-42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSF

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

7

17 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

I understand from McCarthy that you asked him to get a copy of a waiver of the statute of limitations which Admiral Kimmel had signed and call it to the attention of General Marshall. In General Marshall's absence from the city, I have had the waiver called to the attention of General McNarney and have been advised that a retired officer has been directed to approach General Short with a view to obtaining a similar waiver from him.

Incidentally, you may be interested to know that Admiral Kimmel did not initiate the matter of supplying a waiver to the Navy Department. On the contrary, the Navy requested Admiral Kimmel to sign a waiver prepared for his signature stating that he agreed not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial. Admiral Kimmel replied to the Secretary of the Navy stating that it was his desire to be brought to trial as soon as practicable. He enclosed a signed waiver by which he agreed not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial should his trial be held "during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter".

B. W. Davenport

B. W. DAVENPORT,
Major, General Staff,
Asst. Secretary, General Staff.

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DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-13-59

Signature- *Carl F. Spicer*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

PSF War Dept folder
2-43

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON


SEP 17 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Japanese Atrocities - Reports of
by Escaped Prisoners.

1. Conforming to your desires as to restrictions on publication of Japanese atrocities, I have taken positive measures to prevent publication or circulation of any stories now in the possession of Army personnel.

2. In addition, I have acquainted the Chief of Staff with your wishes for a recommendation from The Joint Chiefs of Staff as to when the country might properly be informed of the mistreatment of our nationals.



Secretary of War

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-16-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

and
(1767) - Secy. War.
(1768) - Secy. Navy
(1769) - General Marshall
(1770) - General Arnold
(1771) - Admiral King

PSF War Dept folder 2-43
(1772) - Admiral Jacobs
(1773) - Lt. Gen. Holcomb
(1774) - Surgeon General of the Army
(1775) - Surgeon General of the Navy

September 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I know that the Army and Navy are doing the best they can with the subject of fatigue and stress in both Services, but I wish that further special consideration be given in all combat services.

(a) Relating to the Army, I wish that further consideration be given to officers and men in tropical commands with the thought that we seek a more definite schedule in relieving units from those combat areas where there has been much fighting and where malaria and other diseases are serious factors.

I would like further study made of commands in out of the way places such as small islands which are not in the active combat zone. This applies to all such islands no matter what the climate. For instance, I think it is just as necessary, this coming winter, to move people out of Attu or Kiska to Alaska for four or five weeks -- say one third of the garrison at a time -- as it is to relieve personnel in Christmas, Palmyra, Johnson, or even Fiji or New Caledonia or Espiritu Santo, if they have been there much over one year.

(b) On naval vessels, the principal problem is that of the submarines, and I think we should do more than we are doing now, not only to give periods of rest in Honolulu, etc. but to relieve personnel which has been doing submarine work for more than two years.

Consideration should also be given to the personnel of smaller ships like Navy tugs and patrol vessels in distant parts where the officers and men have been away from a well-equipped base for a long time.

RECORDED

(J.M.J.) - Adjutant
(J.M.O.) - General
(J.M.C.) - General
(J.M.B.) - Secy. War
(J.M.A.) - Secy. Mil.

(c) In regard to aviation, Army, Navy and Marine Corps, we have not yet reached the point of having enough personnel to provide two crews for every plane. The subject of fatigue and stress in flying is a new one and I think that it should be given further special study both for the sake of the officers and men themselves and also for the sake of a greater efficiency.

Roosevelt

F.D.R.

- Copies to General Marshall
- General Arnold
- Admiral King
- Admiral Jacobs
- Lt. Gen. Holcomb
- Surgeon General of the Army
- Surgeon General of the Navy

CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE
LONDON

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DDO 011-5200-8 (3943)
August 21, 1977/58)

Date-
Signature- JKD

7-20-70

From: Captain E.F. Du Bois (M.C.) U.S.N.R.
To: Rear Admiral H.W. Smith (M.C.) U.S. Navy.

Subj: Flying Stress and Lack of Moral Fibre.

Enc: (1) (HW) Memorandum No. 75-2 of 25 July 1943 Headquarters
8th Air Force "Combat Crew Personnel Failure".

Ref: (a) Air Ministry Letter S 61141/s7C(1) (British Secret)
regarding lack of moral fibre and disposition of cases.
(b) War Cabinet, Expert Committee on the Work of Psychologists
and Psychiatrists in the Services Paper (PP(S.C.)31 of
6th August 1943. Interim Report on Follow-up of
"Annexure" Cases.

1. Sources of Information. Commander Korb and I have visited British and American Bomber Commands, have consulted with the medical officers at the U.S. Eighth Air Force Provisional Medical Field Service School and have attended a meeting of the "Expert Committee on the Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the Services". In addition we have had access to many British and American reports on flying stress and lack of moral fibre. We have had the opportunity of hearing Air Commodore R.D. Gillespie of the R.A.F. Central Medical Board interview one officer suspected of lack of moral fibre and have ourselves examined an American sergeant who was frankly afraid to make his first sortie. It is obvious that a long study of the subject is necessary and this cannot be more than a preliminary note. I understand that Major Donald Hastings (M.C.) U.S.A. of the 8th Air Force is preparing an extensive report from his large experience with such patients. I have heard that 28 case reports in detail have been sent to General Eugen Reinartz (M.C.) U.S.A. at Randolph Field and to the Office of the Air Surgeon in Washington. It is to be hoped that many case reports will be made available to all who are responsible for the investigation of this condition.

2. Studies in flying stress. A great deal of work has been done on this subject and the reports are on file at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. Methods of selection are being improved. We noticed that Air Commodore Gillespie questioned the officer closely regarding his swimming as to whether or not he dived head first and swam beyond his depth. He had found this one question regarding civilian life most helpful. Lieutenant Wright (M.C.) U.S.A. is making an interesting survey of American pilots of proven courage who have completed their 25 sorties. It is said that a high percentage of them give frank histories that would have caused their rejection according to the strict printed standards.

Flying Stress and Lack of Moral Fibre

The number so interviewed is not yet large and the study is far from complete but it gives food for thought. We obtained one good index of lack of moral fibre. If a pilot makes two successive abortive flights the diagnosis is almost certain, three successive abortives makes it absolutely certain.

3. Situation in British Bomber Command. As might be expected flying stress is fairly common, lack of moral fibre rare and not a serious problem. Lack of moral fibre is more apt to appear in the first five sorties, flying stress due to fatigue comes after many sorties or after several bad sorties. The British bomber crews make 30 sorties, have a period of 6 months with instructional duties and then return for 20 more sorties. They are not expected to make more than a total of 50 but those who present urgent requests are allowed more. This system seems to work well even though relatively little is done to provide recreation at the flying stations. Most of the men live on the British Isles but there are many Colonials at Bomber Command.

4. Situation in U.S. Bomber Command. Night bombing is hazardous but everyone realizes that it is not nearly so dangerous or terrifying as day bombing. Our bombers have taken a frightful punishment and there are few survivors of the original squadrons. The chance of living through 20 sorties is very low. In spite of this morale is good and there seems to be about the same proportion of cases with flying stress and lack of moral fibre as in the British Command. It is of course impossible to make any exact comparison. Morale rises and falls according to the weather and enemy action. With good weather there may be four or five sorties in one week, in the winter perhaps only two in one month. The crews formerly were expected to return home after 25 sorties, recently increased to 30 and this additional task is felt by many to be an imposition. The one thing the men really want is a chance to visit home. They seem to have no particular hatred of the Germans but admire them as aviators. A few good talks on the importance of their work as a factor in ending the war and thus saving lives might help morale. Their living conditions are good and there are movies and opportunities for athletic sports.

5. Efficiency of Crews. It is difficult to obtain an estimate as to the number of sorties required to bring a Fortress crew to its greatest efficiency. Everyone agrees that there is an improvement in the first five and probably in the first ten. After that there is a slight increase or plateau and then a tendency to fall off and the last few sorties are taken without enthusiasm. This subject deserves a great deal of study and it may be found that our crews making sorties Nos. 20 - 25 are not even as good as crews making sorties Nos. 1 - 5. If such is the case it would be more efficient to rest crews after 15 or 20 sorties and then give them 10 or 15 in a second series.

6. Methods of disposal. Most of the cases of lack of moral fibre show up in the first five sorties. If a man breaks down after 10 or 15 he is treated with great consideration and few or none are subjected to loss of rank or insignia. In both British and American forces a large proportion of cases of stress recognized early have been returned to flying (Ref. a). More serious cases in the 8th Air Force have been treated with narcosis, apparently with considerable success. The British have been handling men with lack of moral fibre firmly and rather

Flying Stress and Lack of Moral Fibre

severely since they cause a marked fall in morale if allowed to remain on the station or if they are given soft jobs. Our 8th Air Force on 25 June 1943 (Enclosure 1) adopted a similar policy. In the R.A.F. the final decision is made by the Air Council after the man has been ordered to a Central Board for a complete physical examination and a personal appraisalment by a psychiatrist.

7. Disposal of Rejects. I do not have any clear picture as to what the British and Eighth Air Forces will do with men dropped for lack of moral fibre. Presumably they would be subject to the draft and might turn up anywhere in the Army or Navy. Neither one of these services would be particularly happy to receive them. I understand that the British Army has a group of Pioneers, some armed, some unarmed, that can get a great deal of use from men who are too dull or too timid for the other branches. The Royal Navy does not have any similar group that can be employed as a waste basket. I do not know the policy of our Navy but a waste basket is a very useful article. It would seem advisable to have some group where timid persons would be forced to work in the presence of danger. This would let a man know that if he showed lack of courage in the Air Force he would not get a soft job elsewhere.

8. "Annexure". The British Army also has a system of reassignment of misfit soldiers to other military jobs (Ref. b.) This is called "Annexure" from a term attached by accident to this procedure. It is working well.

9. Morale. In the Air Force it is of the utmost importance to provide promptly the best personal equipment that is available, to provide good hatches for escape and the best facilities for air-sea rescue. If these are not the best the men soon learn that better equipment has been furnished their British Allies and their German enemies. The responsibility rests with various persons sitting at safe desks in Washington. There may also be a danger to morale if the public press talks too much about "flying stress" and starts worrying anxious parents and wives. The Americans at the stations know about the condition but treat it as a regular hazard of the job. They refer to a serious breakdown as being "Flack Happy" and a rest home for the neurosis is called a "Flack House".

10. Civilian Committee on Flying Stress. I have not yet found any medical officer in the services who felt that a civilian committee could accomplish much in the study or treatment of flying stress or lack of moral fibre. A group consisting of psychiatrists and psychologists with a few civilians and a preponderance of medical officers from the armed services could coordinate and expedite the work. Such a group established in England about a year ago is getting out some good reports. It is called the War Cabinet Expert Committee on the Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the Services.

11. It is recommended that this letter be made available to the Committee on Aviation Medicine and other committees of the National Research Council interested in these problems.

EUGENE F DU BOIS

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General

C
O
P
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MEMORANDUM)
)
NO...75-2)

25 June 1943

COMBAT CREW PERSONNEL FAILURES

1. The purpose of this Memorandum is to prescribe dispositions of Combat personnel who are unsuitable for further combat duty because of lack of moral fibre, or because of operational exhaustion.

2. Procedure:- a. The immediate Commanding Officer of any individual who is unsuitable for further combat duty because of either of the reasons cited in par. 1 above will determine, assisted by his Unit Flight Surgeon, which of the cited reasons is applicable. If determination is doubtful, the individual accompanied by a full case history, will be ordered sick in quarters to the 302nd Dispensary at Sta. 101 for Medical Board determination. Determination will be expedited and reported to the Unit Commander by the Medical Board. Report will include whether treatment is indicated. If treatment is not recommended, or upon completion of treatment, the individual will be returned to his unit without delay.

b. If the reason for failure is determined to be lack of moral fibre, the immediate Commanding Officer will take the following action:

- (1) Officers:- Initiate reclassification proceedings under AR 605-230 and ETO Circular #16, dated 17 February 1943 and take action in accordance with par. 12, AR 35-1480, suspending the officer from flying status.
- (2) Enlisted men:- Reduce to grade of private, remove from flying status, and assign to basic duty.

c. If the reason for failure is determined to be operational exhaustion not susceptible to rehabilitation, the immediate Commanding Officer will take the following action:

- (1) Officers:- Reassign to appropriate duty other than combat, or reported to higher Hqrs, as excess. If reported as excess, the report will be accompanied by AGO Form 66-1, and will include amplifying remarks according to the personal knowledge of the reporting officer.
- (2) Enlisted men:- Relieve from combat duty assignment, remove from flying status, and either assign to other than combat duty or reported to higher Hqrs. as excess.

If reported as excess, the report will be accompanied by AGO Form 20 and will include amplifying remarks according to the personal knowledge of the reporting officer.

3. Reclassification proceedings for officers who have failed in combat duty because of lack of moral fibre will not involve reassignment. Action on such proceedings will be expedited by all intervening Hqrs.

4. The provisions of this memorandum are not applicable to combat crew personnel who have failed because of lack of adequate technique or training. Neither will such personnel be sent to the Medical Board for examination.

5. Any existing instructions contrary to the provisions of this memorandum are rescinded.

By command of Major General EAKER:

C.C. CHAUNCEY
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

/s/ H.G. CULTON,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: *e B*

Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum of September 20th regarding rotation of personnel in the battle areas.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, on June 4th, 1943, established an eighteen months' rotation policy for enlisted personnel who have been performing hazardous duty aboard ships and at outlying stations.

This policy has not been in effect long enough to give you any report of numbers of men returned to the continental United States.

In addition to the rotation plan an average of 6,000 rated men per month have been returned from the fleets for manning new construction and receiving instruction in service schools, preference being given to men of the required ratings who have served longest on board.

400 to 500 casualties per month are evacuated to the United States and when hospitalization is no longer necessary, but convalescence is indicated, they are granted 60 days' convalescence leave with their families. On completion they report to the nearest Naval hospital before being returned to duty.

Survivors are returned to the United States and granted 30 days' leave before being assigned to other duty. Approximately 6,000 survivors have been so returned in the last 18 months.

Submarine relief crews have been provided permitting men to be rotated for submarine patrols. Relief crews are provided for submarines operating in the combat area, on the basis of one relief crew for three submarines. A percentage of the crew is rotated for each submarine patrol and rest and recreational centers are established where men may recuperate between patrols. Operating submarine personnel have also been returned to man new construction and to attend service schools. The rotation policy will provide for a percentage of submarine personnel who have been longest in combat service returning in the near future.

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WS.

Fleet Air Operating Squadrons have 50% additional plane crews and pilots. Rotation periods of duty provide for one month in active combat zone, one month in secondary combat zone, and one month of recuperation and training behind the lines. After three such rotation periods totaling nine months overseas, the squadron is returned to the United States for rehabilitation and reorganization. Personnel receive a month's leave; one month is set aside for drawing new planes and reforming into a new squadron; with a final month's concentrated training and readiness period prior to departure for duty outside continental United States.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel is continuously studying the effects of the eighteen month rotation policy and with your memorandum of 20 September in mind will continue to place emphasis on securing adequate rotation.

Enclosed is a copy of the Bureau of Naval Personnel's letter on rotation of enlisted personnel.


James Forrestal

Acting

the area and approximately 8,000 men have received such furloughs. It is believed that present policies will be adequate for personnel on Attu and Kiska.

The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, initiated a study prior to Pearl Harbor of the stress and fatigue of operational flying on air crew personnel. A policy for the rotation of air crew personnel was published in July 1942, for at that time a considerable number of such personnel had been actively engaged with the enemy overseas. This policy is based upon the amount of operational flying or numbers of missions, and varies with operating conditions and battle hazard in each of the several theaters, however, in general it provides for the return to the zone of interior of members of combat crews who have completed a prescribed number of operational missions or who have completed one year of operational duty. The time limit for individuals in group staffs or higher commands is usually eighteen months' duty. Rotation under this policy has been made as promptly as replacements would permit. Since the bulk of the transfers were made by air, shipping limitations were not a controlling factor. To date, approximately 5,000 rated officers and 11,000 enlisted men of the Army Air Forces have been returned under this plan. Up until the present, the general course of the war and the requirement to build up our large air forces have made it impossible to undertake under a regular policy, the relief of ground elements and staffs. However, recently officers and men have been sent to the theaters as replacements at the rate of one and one-half per cent of the theater air force strength in addition to the combat crew replacements. This flow of replacements is only now reaching the point that will permit the theater commander to begin to rotate this additional category of personnel also.

The War Department will continue present measures for the rotation of personnel to the maximum extent that available transportation will permit.


Secretary of War.

Inclosures
Tabs A to D
inclusive

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-16-59

Signature- Carl J. Spicer

(92/22/e) 5-00229 4117

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CIRCULAR:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 28 June 1943.

ROTATION AND RETURN OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AS INDIVIDUALS (EXCLUSIVE OF AIR CREW PERSONNEL) ON DUTY OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. **General.**—In order to coordinate present policies relative to the rotation and return of military personnel as individuals (other than air crew personnel) from overseas and to bring such policies into agreement with the oversea replacement system, all extant communications and policies relative to the rotation and return of such personnel are rescinded, and the provisions of this circular substituted therefor. Instructions contained herein will apply to all officer and enlisted personnel overseas except Army Air Forces air crew personnel. Instructions relative to the rotation and return of Army Air Forces air crew personnel are contained in separate publications. (Existing directives relating to the return of specific cadres will be carried out. Upon execution of these directives, no additional cadres will be returned under the cadre policy (A. G. 320.2 (2 Oct 42) OB-S-E-M, 9 Oct 43).)

2. **Considerations relative to rotation and return of personnel.**—a. The rotation and return of military personnel from overseas must, of necessity, conform to current military requirements, and, in particular, with over-all replacement considerations based upon available shipping.

b. The return of military personnel from overseas is normally effected for the following purposes:

- (1) To return personnel for hospitalization.
- (2) To increase the efficiency of a command by replacing personnel whose morale or health has been adversely affected by prolonged periods of duty under unusually severe conditions, even though not requiring hospitalization, and whose effectiveness cannot be restored by rotation within the theater. Men who have been wounded in action more than once, even though released from hospital, should receive consideration under this paragraph.
- (3) To return to the continental United States experienced and trained personnel in order to utilize them in the training and formation of new units, or for other purposes.
- (4) To return personnel for emergency reasons.
- (5) To enable oversea commanders to dispose of personnel who are definitely unqualified for duty in such commands.
- (6) To effect the most efficient distribution of the most highly qualified and senior officers of the arms and services.

c. Personnel will not be returned from oversea commands for the primary purpose of making promotions within the theater.

3. **Rotation within theaters.**—Commanders of theaters, departments, defense commands, and independent oversea bases will utilize means available to them to maintain the efficiency of their commands by rotating personnel from station to station within such commands. Particular consideration will be given to the relief of personnel on duty at remote and small stations.

4. **Return of personnel for hospitalization.**—The return of personnel for hospitalization will be effected in accordance with current instructions.

5. Return of trained personnel to continental United States.—*a.* As a guiding policy, personnel returned under the provisions of this paragraph normally will be those with the longest service in the command or those with the longest continuous oversea service.

b. Commanders of independent oversea forces will, as the military situation permits, report to The Adjutant General (attention SPGAR) personnel available for return to the United States, for the purposes outlined in paragraph 2b(2) and (3). Letters from individuals requesting return will not be forwarded to the War Department. All individuals, except general officers, available for return will be included in consolidated reports submitted periodically at approximately monthly intervals, consolidated separately for Army Air Forces personnel (including arms and services with the Army Air Forces). Reports will designate the dates when such personnel can be made available for shipment from the theater, and will include—

(1) *For officers in field grade.*—Name, grade, serial number, arm or service, military classification number (see AR 605-95), age, whether white or negro, whether general or limited service, and a statement as to whether the officer has or has not demonstrated his fitness for promotion.

(2) *For officers below field grade.*—The number in each grade by arm or service, whether white or negro, and whether general or limited service.

(3) *For enlisted men.*—The number in each arm or service. White and negro enlisted men will be reported separately.

c. (1) General officers available for return to United States for purposes indicated in paragraph 2b(2) and (3) will not be included in the consolidated reports described in *b* above, but will be reported separately by the theater commander at such time as he desires. The general officer report will contain names, grades, full statement of reasons for return of each general officer listed, whether each is qualified for general or limited service, whether a replacement in grade is desired, the statement required by *d* below, and the approximate date the officer may be released.

(2) Upon receipt of the above report, the War Department will issue instructions to the theater commander as to the date the officer may be returned. The return of those general officers for whom a replacement in grade is not desired will necessarily be deferred until an appropriate vacancy occurs in the United States.

(3) Except when returning for hospitalization or in case of emergency, no general officer will be returned to the United States from an oversea command without specific authority from the War Department.

d. Officers reported under the provisions of this paragraph will include only those definitely qualified in every respect to perform efficiently the duties of their grade (or higher grade) in their arm or service and a statement to this effect will be included in the report.

e. (1) Upon receipt of the War Department directive authorizing the return of personnel under the provisions of this paragraph, shipments will be made to the United States (or such other destination as may be directed) in accordance with existing

Instructions. (See "Procedure Concerning the Movement of Troops Overseas.")

(2) Normally, personnel returned under the provisions of this circular will be granted leaves of absence or furloughs for approximately 20 days by commanders of ports in the United States.

6. Individuals whom a theater commander desires to return to the United States for emergency reasons will be made the subject of separate communications which will include in detail the reasons necessitating such return.

7. In order to effect efficient distribution of the most highly qualified and senior officers of the arms and services, the War Department may, from time to time, direct the reassignment of certain officers to stations in other theaters or in the United States. Replacement of such personnel will be made the subject of separate communications, if necessary.

8. Officers who are not definitely qualified in every respect to perform efficiently the duties of their grade (or higher grade) in their arm or service, and those whose service has not been completely satisfactory in every respect, will not be returned to the United States under the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, and 7. Reassignment within the theater, with or without demotion, will be utilized to the maximum extent possible, in conjunction with reclassification proceedings when appropriate. Disciplinary cases must be settled locally. When it is determined that an unsatisfactory officer cannot be used in any position in the theater and that his return to the United States is necessary, report will be made by radio or cable (attention SPGAR) that the officer is being returned under the provisions of this paragraph. A complete report of the circumstances, including reclassification proceedings, if any, action taken with respect to demotion, and a special efficiency report will be forwarded immediately to the commanding general of the service command in which the officer's port of arrival is located.

9. Replacements.—Requirements for personnel to replace those returned under the provisions of this circular will be included in routine replacement requisitions.

10. Requests for return of personnel.—Requests by continental agencies for the return of personnel from overseas will be addressed to The Adjutant General and will contain detailed information as to the present assignment and the necessity for the return of the individuals in question. Only in the most exceptional circumstances will requests for the return of named officers be submitted.

[A. G. 210.31 (11 Jun 43).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

A.P.O. 501
29 July 1943

FECC 210.68

SUBJECT: Return of Personnel to United States.

TO : All Commanders, United States Army Units, Southwest Pacific Area.

1. The necessity for an indefinite period for using all available shipping for the transportation to this theater of additional units and of replacements to maintain the strength of the command will operate to prevent the return of individuals or units to the United States under any rotation policy or at the end of any specified period of duty. Except for the physically unfit, for air crew personnel returned under a special policy, and for personnel definitely unqualified for duty in the command, personnel can be returned only under the most exceptional circumstances.

2. Every effort will be made to alleviate the situation by rotation of individuals and units within the theater, to provide relief of personnel at remote and isolated stations and in localities where climatic conditions are severe. It must be recognized, however, that the mission of this command will require that an increasingly large proportion of the troops serve during the immediate future in undeveloped tropical areas. In consequence, a spirit of fortitude and of determination to go forward regardless of sustained discomfort and hardship, must be developed and fostered. The time which must be spent under such conditions will be the time needed to defeat the enemy.

3. It is desired that all commanders explain fully and frankly to all members of their commands the situation which exists, emphasizing the urgent need for the use of all shipping to transport the means, in men and materials, by which to end the war in the shortest possible time. The return to the United States of any appreciable numbers must await the final defeat of the enemy. Concentration of every possible effort by every member of the command will hasten that defeat and bring nearer the day when return will be possible.

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(Sgd) Douglas MacArthur

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
General, United States Army.

Date- 3-16-59

Signature-

Carl I. Spica

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-16-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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LRC/fb

HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 534

CIRCULAR :
:
NUMBER 156 :

10 August 1943

ROTATION AND RETURN OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AS INDIVIDUALS (EXCLUSIVE OF
AIR CREW PERSONNEL) ON DUTY OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. This circular supersedes Circular 107, this headquarters, as, which is hereby rescinded.
2. Attached hereto is a copy of War Department Circular dated 28 June 1943, subject as above. (Tab A to this memorandum).
3. In applying the provisions of this circular to personnel of this theater, the following instructions will apply:
 - a. Commanders will not ordinarily submit recommendations for rotation unless the individuals so recommended have served at least six months continuous overseas service. Personnel coming within the classification of paragraphs 2b (1), 2b (2), and 2b (5), of the above quoted circular, are exempt from this requirement.
 - b. Enlisted men who have been wounded in action or who have been awarded the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Legion of Merit, Silver Star, or the Soldier's Medal, will be given preference for rotation.
 - c. No officer will be recommended for return to the United States under paragraph 8 of the above quoted circular, unless disciplinary action or reclassification proceedings have been completed, and then only under exceptional circumstances, since it is the policy to absorb such personnel and reassign them within the theater.
 - d. Under 2 b (3) of above quoted circular the following class of enlisted personnel will not be recommended for return:
 - (1) Those who are habitual disciplinary cases.
 - (2) Those convicted for infraction of any of the Articles of War. This class may become eligible after they have accumulated six months continuous overseas service from the date of violation exclusive of the time required to be made good.
4. The number of individuals who can be returned under this policy is dependent upon:
 - a. Requirement for maintaining all units operational.

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Par 4, cont'd.

b. The availability of replacements within the theater to replace personnel for rotation.

c. Amount of shipping space which can be made available periodically for the return of rotation personnel.

5. Consolidated reports will be submitted on the first of each month by Army, separate corps, separate divisions, separate brigades, and similar commands, the Commanding General, SOS, and base section commanders not directly under the control of task forces, on a form substantially as attached, to include all individuals available and recommended for return at any time within the subsequent sixty day period. Initial monthly reports should be made on the basis of not to exceed 1% of eligibles within command. Officers of field grade and below will be included on the same report. Reports for enlisted men will be made separately and in order of priority. Names submitted on a monthly report will not be repeated the subsequent month, as all names submitted will be considered active until they are cleared, unless organizations request changes or corrections in writing making reference to the specific report concerned, or unless cancellation of all names previously submitted is directed by this headquarters. General officers will not be included on these reports. (For form see Appendix "B".)

6. An application initiated by an individual requesting to be returned under the rotation policy, will be returned "disapproved" by the first headquarters receiving it. All selections of individuals recommended to be returned are to be made by the chain of command concerned without reference to the individual.

7. Replacement requisitions will not be required for personnel reported under this policy. All such personnel will be replaced by this headquarters either in grade or in a lower grade prior to the departure of personnel recommended for rotation. As long as personnel is available in the theater or surplus in the United States it will be the policy to replace rotation personnel in grade.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

E. L. FORD
Brigadier General, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. V. ROBERTS

H. V. ROBERTS
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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[Cir. 211]

CIRCULAR
No. 211

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July 1, 1942.

	Section
Engineer officer candidates.....	I
Report of damage to or loss of public buildings—Changes in AR 210-10.....	II
Transfer of air transport activities from Services of Supply to Army Air Forces.....	III
Pay and allotments—Dependents.....	IV
Trained replacements for experienced officers occupying key positions.....	V
Army Air Forces personnel in combat theaters—Combat crews.....	VI

I. Engineer officer candidates.—1. In connection with section II, Circular No. 187, War Department, 1942, attention is again directed to the vital necessity for searching out, encouraging, and securing qualified applicants from all arms and services for the engineer officer candidate school.

2. Recent reports of unfilled quotas indicate a definite laxity in this regard on the part of a great many commanders to whom quotas are allotted. Despite the known numbers of qualified men in the Army, many units fail to fill quotas and very few units are maintaining a reserve pool of accepted applicants with which to meet unexpected quotas. It is imperative that this condition be corrected at once.

3. All commanders of units, regardless of arm or service, will initiate an immediate survey of qualified men in their commands who are eligible to attend an officer candidate school with a view to determining those best suited for duty with the Corps of Engineers. These men will be interviewed and have explained to them the opportunities afforded qualified officers for advancement by the rapid expansion of this service. Those best qualified will be encouraged to apply for the engineer officer candidate school, and each command to which quotas are allotted will make every effort to establish a reserve pool of accepted applicants for this school with which to meet the increasing officer requirements.

4. Commanders of all echelons are charged with giving this subject their personal attention to the end that these instructions are complied with in letter and in spirit.

[A. G. 352 (6-24-42).]

II. Report of damage to or loss of public buildings—Changes in AR 210-10.—Pending the revision of AR 210-10, December 20, 1940, paragraph 18 of those regulations, as changed by section I, Circular No. 156, War Department, 1941, is amended by requiring that the reports of damage to or loss of public buildings and records be made direct to the Chief of Engineers instead of to The Adjutant General.

[A. G. 323,741 (6-29-42).]

III. Transfer of air transport activities from Services of Supply to Army Air Forces.—1. Circular No. 168, War Department, 1942, is rescinded.

2. To assure the effective utilization of air transport facilities of the Army Air Forces as required to accomplish the mission of the Army, the Army Air Forces Ferrying Command is redesignated Air Transport Command.

3. Effective July 1, 1942, the responsibility of the Services of Supply for the transportation by air of personnel, material, and mail of all War Department agencies is transferred to the Army Air Forces.

4. All air activities (including the establishment of priority for air travel on commercial and military aircraft) at present handled by both office and

field forces of the Transportation Service are transferred from the Transportation Service to the Army Air Forces, effective at 0001, July 1, 1942. On the effective date, the Air Division, Transportation Service, including all activities, establishments, personnel (military and civilian), and supplies pertaining solely to the Air Division, Transportation Service, is transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

5. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, will be responsible for establishing the priorities for air transportation of all personnel and material to be transported by air.

6. In the performance of its mission, both within and without the continental United States, the Army Air Forces will utilize to the fullest extent possible the services, facilities, and personnel of the civil air carriers.

[A. G. 580.81 (6-29-42).]

IV. Pay and allotments—Dependents.—1. Definition of dependents.—a. Section 4, act June 16, 1942 (sec. I, Bull. No. 28, W. D., 1942), defines dependents of military personnel as follows:

SEC. 4. The term "dependent" as used in the succeeding sections of this Act shall include at all times and in all places a lawful wife and unmarried children under twenty-one years of age. It shall also include the father or mother of the person concerned provided he or she is in fact dependent on such person for his or her chief support: *Provided*, That the term "children" shall be held to include stepchildren and adopted children when such stepchildren or adopted children are in fact dependent upon the person claiming dependency allowance.

b. Effective June 1, 1942, pending revision of AR 35-3420, AR 35-4220, AR 35-4520, and AR 35-5320, the pertinent portions of those regulations will be interpreted as *not* requiring proof of dependency in cases of a wife and/or legitimate unmarried children under 21 years of age and as permitting claims to be submitted, supported by proof of dependency, in cases of a father, mother, and stepchildren or adopted children.

2. Procedure.—*Effective June 1, 1942*, paragraphs 3 and 4, Circular No. 97, War Department, 1942, are rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

3. Vouchers covering dependent allowances in the cases of enlisted men will continue to be presented to local disbursing officers. All vouchers covering cases other than lawful wife and legitimate children will be supported by the evidence now required. Before making payment thereon vouchers and supporting papers, other than those pertaining to a lawful wife and/or legitimate unmarried children under 21 years of age, will be transmitted direct to The Adjutant General for determination of the fact of dependency under the provisions of section 10 of the above-quoted act.

4. Vouchers covering dependent allowances in the case of officers, other than on account of a lawful wife and/or legitimate unmarried children under 21 years of age, will continue to be submitted to the Chief of Finance as heretofore under prior existing statutes.

[A. G. 240 (6-26-42).]

V. Trained replacements for experienced officers occupying key positions.—1. It is the responsibility of every commander to organize and train his subordinates so as to insure that the efficiency of his command will not be seriously impaired by the loss of a few key individuals. Every officer should be trained to assume the duties of his next superior whenever the services of the latter are temporarily or permanently lost. This is

essential to insure continuity in efficient training and administration in spite of normal attrition and temporary absences, and becomes doubly important during combat. No organization of the Army can afford to have an "indispensable" officer, and material loss of efficiency in an organization resulting from the unexpected loss of a single key individual is a serious reflection upon the ability and foresight of the commander.

2. The expansion of the Army is creating many key positions that must be filled by trained and experienced officers. Properly qualified individuals for these positions are relatively few in number, and trained officers for new or relatively new units, installations, and activities must be obtained by the transfer of the necessary personnel from older commands and activities. As a general rule the required officers already occupy positions of relative importance, and commanders concerned are reluctant to release them for positions of equal or greater importance because trained replacements are not readily available.

3. In the continuing expansion of the Army the demand for experienced officers to occupy important new positions will increase, and it is imperative that every command, activity, and installation be prepared to lose any officer therein on short notice, irrespective of the importance of the position he may occupy. To this end, each officer occupying a key position will train an assistant or understudy who may be called upon to assume the duties of the position at any time. Commanders of every echelon will see that subordinates are given frequent opportunity to perform the duties of a higher position.

4. The head of each activity and installation and the commander of each echelon in units of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, theaters, departments, defense commands, and Services of Supply is charged with the responsibility of strict compliance with the intent of this directive by their commands.

[A. G. 210.31 (6-23-42).]

VI. Army Air Forces personnel in combat theaters—Combat crews.—1. Complete combat crews will be relieved after 100 to 125 hours of combat operational flying and returned to a rest area for a period not to exceed 1 week if the local situation permits.

2. Individual members of combat crews who show definite indications of approaching the war-weary stage will be relieved promptly. If the normal rest period of 1 week does not mentally and physically restore the crew member, he will be transferred to the zone of the interior.

3. Individual members of combat crews in active theaters who have completed 1 year of operational duty will be returned to the zone of the interior.

4. Individuals who have completed 18 months' duty in active theaters in a group or higher command or a wing or higher staff will, if in the opinion of the theater commander such action is advisable, be returned to the zone of the interior.

5. Individuals by qualifications will be returned to the zone of the interior on the request of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, for the performance of specific duties in furtherance of the Army Air Forces mission, upon concurrence of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

6. Individuals listed in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 who are returned by theater commanders, upon arrival in the zone of the interior, will report to the commander of the nearest Army Air Forces station. The commander

of that station will interrogate each individual and will report by radio to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, the name, grade, serial number, leave address, and the particular qualifications and experience of each individual. He will also grant the individual not to exceed 15 days leave of absence or furlough.

7. Individuals returned to the zone of the interior at the specific request of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, for a specific assignment will report immediately in accordance with his orders. He will be granted not more than 10 days leave of absence immediately upon reporting unless the urgency of his assignment is such as to require his services at once.

8. The theater commander will advise the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, of any individuals returned under the provisions of paragraph 2.

9. Upon the receipt of the report of the Army Air Forces station commander nearest the port of embarkation, the director of personnel will issue appropriate orders to the individual by wire to his leave address.

10. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, upon request from the theater commander, will ship to the theater to arrive 1 month in advance, replacements for those individuals to be returned under the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. Replacements for individuals mentioned in paragraph 2 are included in estimated normal loss replacements.

11. The theater commander will requisition by qualification the personnel required to enable him to comply with the above instructions.

[A. G. 372 (5-19-42).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

[PSP: War, 1943]

In reply address not the signer of this letter, but Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. Refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 4, 1943.

PERS-630-Nd-8
P16-3/MM

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
 To : Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. (Via Airmail).
 Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
 Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
 Commandant, First Naval District.
 Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
 Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
 Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
 Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
 Commander, South East Pacific Force.

Subject: Rotation of duty of enlisted personnel.

1. With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, the Bureau announces a policy regarding rotation of duty for enlisted men who have been performing hazardous duty aboard ship and at outlying stations, and establishes eighteen (18) months in such duty as the minimum period after which enlisted personnel may, commensurate with the fighting efficiency of the service, be considered available to return to the United States for rehabilitation leave and assignment to duty. Administrative commands shall determine the types of duty in order of priority which warrant consideration under the rotation program.

2. It should be understood clearly that this policy does not establish a right, but is entitlement only, depending upon the exigencies of the service, the enlisted personnel situation, available transportation, and the prosecution of the war. Transportation facilities and individual ship requirements will admittedly determine how much relief may be afforded. Experience will indicate the extent to which the policy can be carried out.

3. Administrative commands addressed are requested to formulate plans, and promulgate instructions within their respective commands to carry out the spirit and intent of this policy. Details in regard to transportation and the method of diluting crews are left to administrative commands to be worked out as circumstances permit. Information copies of all instructions issued should be forwarded to this Bureau.

4. This plan will be initiated and activated by the Bureau of Naval Personnel ordering additional personnel to Administrative

1075

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of Confidential*

*RSF War Dept folder
2-43*

12 Sept. '43

Admiral Leahy

*This paper was agreed
upon at yesterday's JCS
Meeting*

Stearns

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Date- 3-16-59
Signature- *Carl S. Speier*

Handwritten notes in the top left corner, possibly including a date or reference number.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-16-59

Signature: *Carl S. Spicer*

Faint, mostly illegible text from the document's body, appearing as bleed-through or light impressions.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

22 September 1943.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Japanese Atrocities - Reports of
by Escaped Prisoners.

By your memorandum of 9 September 1943 relating to the above subject, addressed to the Secretaries of War and Navy, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff make recommendations as to the moment when you should inform the country of the mistreatment of our nationals.

As you have stated, the release of this information at this time might increase the mistreatment of Americans now in Japanese hands. It is difficult, however, to reach any clear-cut decision on this point because it cannot be anticipated how the Japanese would react to the publication of this information.

American officers who have escaped from Japanese prison camps have stated that conditions in these camps could scarcely be much worse and that unless such conditions are improved within a short time very few of the American prisoners will survive. They agree that Red Cross food and supplies are of paramount importance to these prisoners at the present time.

Such relief is a part of the present mission of the Gripsholm and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur that no action should be taken which will in any way jeopardize this and any subsequent similar missions. It has been estimated that it will take from three to six months for the Japanese to distribute the food and packages carried by the Gripsholm. For the time being, therefore, it is felt that the release of this information should be delayed.

This matter will be kept under consideration and a recommendation regarding publication of this information will be made to you when it is felt that the opportune time has arrived.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

SECRET



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P
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PSF: War Dept. folder 2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Under what authority are sentences carrying the death penalty in overseas court martial cases carried out without reference to the Judge Advocate General, the Secretary of War and the President? The Navy Department asked for this authority on the ground that the Army uses it -- and I have disapproved the request.

F.D.R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of War.

(Orig. of this & Cover filed - Navy Folder 2-43)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

← file

war Dept. folder 2-43
PSF

FEAR OF GERMAN WEAPONS

Based on
A Survey of Enlisted Men
Recently Evacuated from North Africa

Joint Study by
NEUROPSYCHIATRY BRANCH, SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE
and
RESEARCH BRANCH, SPECIAL SERVICE DIVISION
ARMY SERVICE FORCES, WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 1, 1943

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FEAR OF GERMAN WEAPONS

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SUMMARY

This report deals with American soldiers' attitudes toward German weapons. Results are based on questionnaires answered by more than 700 enlisted men who had recently been evacuated from the North African Theater. In briefest outline the findings are:

1. The German 88 mm. gun is considered by the men to be both the most frightening and most dangerous German weapon.
2. Men rate the dive bomber as the second most frightening weapon, despite the fact that they consider it relatively ineffective in inflicting casualties.
3. The light machine gun and rifle are seldom rated as most frightening or most dangerous weapons, although their effectiveness is shown by the fact that they account for a high proportion of the wounds among the men interviewed.
4. Only about half of the men say that combat experience reduced their fear of the weapon that was most frightening to them.
5. The proportion of men considering bombing most frightening decreases with increased combat experience, while the proportion fearing artillery increases.

Suggestions made by the men themselves as to what type of pre-combat training would lessen men's fear of enemy weapons tended to approve practices currently employed by the Army, particularly training under live ammunition.

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A WORD ABOUT THE SAMPLE

This study is based on a sample of 771 enlisted men recently evacuated from the North African Theater, a large majority of whom had been wounded in action. The men were interviewed at various General Hospitals in the United States.

An important consideration in the planning of the study was whether these men would be typical of all soldiers seeing action in North Africa, or whether the fact that they had been wounded would make them regard the particular weapon which wounded them as the most frightening and most dangerous. Only a slight tendency for this to occur was found in the data. Omitting all cases in which the men rated as most frightening the weapon which wounded them leaves the general picture essentially unchanged. The differences between the corresponding percentages obtained by this procedure and the one using all of the men averaged less than two per cent. (*See Appendix.*)

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FEAR OF GERMAN WEAPONS

Military leaders have frequently observed that under certain conditions troops fear enemy fire far more than is either necessary or conducive to their self-protection. It is no less common to hear reports of troops under-estimating enemy weapons and recklessly exposing themselves. To bring about some balance between the known effectiveness of weapons and the degree to which men fear them is a major problem of soldier training.

Several studies bearing on this problem have recently been reported by the British Army. To throw additional light on this problem, the Neuropsychiatry Branch of the Surgeon General's Office and the Research Branch of the Special Service Division were recently asked to interview American soldiers who went through all or part of the Tunisian campaign. The present report presents the findings of a survey carried out in response to this request. Answers were sought to the following questions:

1. What German weapons do these soldiers consider the most frightening?
2. What German weapons do these same soldiers consider the most dangerous?
3. What characteristics of the most frightening weapons seem to make them the most frightening?
4. Does fear of enemy weapons decrease with more battle experience?
5. What suggestions do men who have been in action make as to pre-combat conditioning to reduce fear of enemy weapons?

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HOW TO READ THE CHART OPPOSITE

The chart on the right is to be read as follows: Of all men exposed to the 88 mm. gun, 48 per cent rated it as the most frightening weapon. Of all men exposed to the dive bomber, 20 per cent rated it as the most frightening weapon. Those exposed to the 88 mm. gun are not in all cases the same men as those exposed to the dive bomber. Since each percentage shown in the chart is calculated from a different base, depending on the number of men exposed to the weapon, they do not total 100 per cent. The same method of calculation is used in determining which weapons are rated most dangerous.


This method of analysis includes all men regardless of how many or how few of the weapons they had been exposed to. An alternative method of analysis would be to use only men who had been exposed to all of the weapons and therefore had a more complete basis on which to judge dangerousness and frighteningness. This could not be done for all of the weapons because too few of the men had experienced all of them. A selection of the five most frequently experienced weapons was made: 88, mortar, bomber, land mine, and light machine gun. The ratings of dangerousness and frighteningness were determined for all men who had been exposed to all five of these weapons. The results obtained by this procedure parallel closely those obtained by the method used to compile the chart on the right and the one which follows. (See Appendix for results using alternative method.)

WHICH GERMAN WEAPONS ARE
CONSIDERED MOST FRIGHTENING?

Almost half of the men believe that the German 88 mm. gun is more frightening than any other German weapon used against them in the North African campaign. The next three in order of frequency are the dive bomber, the mortar and the horizontal bomber. The low frequencies for the remaining weapons do not necessarily mean that they are not feared, but only that they are found to be most frightening by relatively fewer men.

PERCENTAGES OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON
WHO RATE IT MOST FRIGHTENING

QUESTION: "What enemy weapon used against you seemed most frightening to you?"




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ARE MEN MOST FRIGHTENED BY THE WEAPONS THEY BELIEVE MOST DANGEROUS?

The men were asked what enemy weapon they thought most dangerous, in terms of the number of our men they believed it killed or wounded. The results obtained are presented in the table below.

PERCENTAGES OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON WHO RATE IT MOST DANGEROUS†

QUESTION: "Judging from what you yourself saw, what weapon used by the enemy caused the most casualties (killed and wounded), among our men?"



† This chart is to be read in the same way as the preceding one. See note on page 4.

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It will be seen that in general the weapons which are considered most dangerous are also rated high in terms of frighteningness. The most important discrepancy is in the case of the dive bomber, which is considered most frightening by 20 per cent of the men although only 4 per cent of the men rate it most dangerous. Similarly, the horizontal bomber is rated most frightening by 12 per cent, but as most dangerous by only 5 per cent of the men.

That the relationship between frighteningness and dangerousness is far from perfect may be seen both from the two exceptions noted above and from the fact that only 38 per cent of the individual men rated as most frightening the same weapon they rated most dangerous.

ARE MEN MOST FRIGHTENED BY THE WEAPONS WHICH ACTUALLY INFLECT MOST CASUALTIES?

The weapon which caused the greatest number of wounds among the men in the present study was the 88 mm. gun. This was also rated as the most frightening by a majority of the men. There is little correspondence in the list[§] beyond this point. Particularly important is the fact that few men rated the light machine gun or rifle fire high in the list for either their frighteningness or dangerousness, in spite of the fact that a fifth of the men wounded had themselves been injured by these particular weapons.

[§] For a list of the rest of the weapons in terms of their wound-inflicting effectiveness, see Appendix.

WHAT CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS DO MEN FEAR?

The reasons given most often by the men for fearing the particular weapon that they found most frightening are summarized below, for the five weapons named most frequently. The numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of men, out of those who named each weapon, who gave the particular reason stated.

- MORTAR** The mortar, the men say, is to be feared for its "deadly accuracy" (24 per cent), and because it "is right on top of you before you know its coming" (19 per cent).
- 88 MM. GUN** The 88 is most frequently feared for its accuracy (21 per cent)--"they could hit a dime at a thousand yards with it."
- LIGHT
MACHINE GUN** The light machine gun impresses men with its "rapid rate of fire" (42 per cent). As one man said, "Our gun sounds like a slow motor boat, theirs like a buzz-saw."

The above reasons are seen to be more or less in line with casualty inflicting characteristics that the weapons actually possess. On the other hand:

- DIVE
BOMBER** The dive bomber is feared because of its siren (32 per cent) and "terrible shrieking noise" (16 per cent).
- HORIZONTAL
BOMBER** The horizontal bomber is feared because of its noise (21 per cent) and the fact that it leaves many men with a "feeling of helplessness--you can't fight back at it" (14 per cent).


It will be seen that reasons most often given for fearing air attack have little or no relationship to the casualty inflicting characteristics of these weapons, but are of a purely "psychological" character.

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HOW DOES BATTLE EXPERIENCE AFFECT FEAR?

Only about half of the men reported that the weapon they feared most became less frightening as time went on. For the rest of the men, the weapon remained just as frightening or got even worse. The chart below is based on the replies of only these men who had been under fire for at least two weeks, since it was presumed that men with less exposure might not have had time to get over their fear appreciably.

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: "Did this (most frightening) weapon become more frightening or less frightening as time went on?"




It is interesting to compare these results with those obtained from a small group of 48 psychiatric casualties, who also had experienced at least two weeks of combat. Of this group of men, only 25 per cent reported that their fear of the weapon they rated most frightening was reduced -- as against nearly twice this proportion for the other group of men. The fact that these men were the ones that did actually break down under stress of combat offers good evidence that what men say about their adjustment may be taken as an indication of the way they behave under fire.

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Changes in frighteningness of particular weapons with increased combat experience.

With more experience the men became relatively more afraid of weapons with real striking power. Men with the longest battle experience are less likely than green troops to regard as most frightening a weapon like the dive bomber and more likely to regard as most frightening a weapon like the 88 mm. gun. In the graph below, the percentages of men considering artillery most frightening as contrasted with those who consider air attack most frightening are classified according to the length of time the individuals were in combat.†



†The data were examined for the possibility that these results may reflect a decreased use of air attack by the enemy as the Tunisian campaign progressed. If this assumption were true, men who entered combat in the later phases should show less fear of air attack than those who had come in earlier. This was not borne out by the data. Neither did it turn out that men who were in combat for a very short period were relatively any more exposed to bombing than to artillery fire. The statement as made above is not, therefore, the result of the particular course of the African campaign, nor of any greater use of bombing on troops who were first entering combat.

Air attack has previously been shown to be rated more frightening than dangerous and for reasons that have little to do with its casualty effectiveness. Shelling, on the other hand, is rated more in line with its effectiveness and for reasons that make sense in terms of its killing and wounding power. These additional facts, when taken together with the chart opposite, tend to support the frequent assertion that fears unwarranted by the real effectiveness of weapons are short-lived. They are in conflict with results reported by the British who found that "the 'morale' weapons--mortar, dive-bomber, and other forms of air attack--all show increases in the number of dislikes [both absolute, and relative to other weapons] with increased experience, whilst the 'wounding' weapons--machine guns, artillery, and rifle--all show decreases".§

The chart illustrates the point that statements of men's attitudes toward enemy weapons depend in part on the point in combat experience at which the men are questioned. Thus the graph on the preceding page suggests that had the men been asked on the first day of combat which weapon they thought most frightening, they would have rated dive bombers first. The present opinions are for the most part those of men who have been two weeks or more in combat. Fortunately for our study, the men's opinions seem, as the curve shows, to have crystallized by this time.

§ The Morale Effect of Weapons (Confidential Report)

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WHAT TRAINING PROCEDURES DO THE MEN THINK WOULD REDUCE INITIAL FEAR IN COMBAT?

The men were asked what type of training would, in their opinion, lessen the initial shock of combat. Most frequent answers were the following:

1. GIVE MEN MORE TRAINING UNDER LIVE AMMUNITION.

This reply was given by about one-third of the men. A typical remark was: *"Make it as real as possible using real ammunitions. A few will get killed but the others will learn. They will know the scare that this is war and no picnic."*

The men's answers indicate that the "infiltration course" and similar devices now in use in Army training are considered to have real value.

2. SHOW WHAT ENEMY WEAPONS CAN DO--SO THAT MEN WILL KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT OF THEM IN COMBAT.

This was suggested by 18 per cent of the men. A representative quotation expresses the suggestion this way: *"Show them every enemy weapon and fire it. Show them how it operates and what to expect. [Show them] its deficiencies as well as its better qualities. . . let them see German planes and hear their motors. . . so it makes a lasting impression."* Or as another man said: *"They should be told what they are to encounter and how to fight their weapons. Fear comes with ignorance of the weapons that they are fighting."*

Some men felt strongly that the high quality of German weapons was not adequately stressed during their training. *"[We need] to explain to our men the value of the enemies' weapons--not to under-estimate them."* That this is not an isolated opinion is supported by the fact that 57 per cent of the men interviewed reported that they found German equipment *"better than they had expected."* (Sixty-six per cent of the men, however, still believed American equipment superior to German.)[§]

[§]It is interesting in this connection that the men's evaluation of American and German equipment differed according to arm of service (see Appendix).

3. GIVE MEN EVEN MORE TRAINING IN HOW TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM ENEMY WEAPONS.

This was suggested by 15 per cent of the men. The following statement typifies the kind of concrete suggestion given: *"More instruction on how to protect themselves from machine fire and how to dispose of machine gun nests."*


4. OTHER SUGGESTIONS.

A few thought that talks on fear by men with combat experience would be the most useful training device (7 per cent). This would provide a means of informing soldiers of the dangers of particular weapons which they might otherwise under-estimate, and explaining on the basis of experience that some weapons like dive bombers are likely to be more frightening at first than later.

A small number (3 per cent) recommend sham dive bombing with sirens attached or setting off of loud explosions to simulate combat (6 per cent).

5. SOME OF THE MEN FELT THAT LITTLE CAN BE DONE IN TRAINING TO REDUCE FEAR.

These men expressed doubts that any device which did not include actual risk of death or injury could simulate combat conditions. Some of these stressed the fact that *"fear is a good thing"* because it makes men less reckless about exposing themselves. Belief that experience itself is the best teacher was expressed by one man as follows: *"I don't believe you can cut down man's fear during training. He won't believe anything until he is actually in the thickest of it. After a few hours of fighting and going through artillery fire, he will get over it."*



APPENDIX

	Page
TECHNIQUES OF QUESTIONING.	16
BIOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE OF MEN STUDIED.	17
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON THE FRIGHTENINGNESS OF WEAPONS	20
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON THE MEN'S ESTIMATES OF DANGEROUSNESS OF WEAPONS.	22
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON THE CASUALTY-INFLICTING EFFECTIVENESS OF WEAPONS.	24
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE MEN'S RATINGS OF FRIGHTENINGNESS OF WEAPONS AND THE WEAPONS WHICH WOUNDED THEM	25
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON THE REASONS FOR FEARING WEAPONS.	27
DIFFERENCES IN THE WAY MEN IN DIFFERENT ARMS OF THE SERVICE EVALUATE AMERICAN AND GERMAN EQUIPMENT.	28

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TECHNIQUES OF QUESTIONING

The questionnaire consisted of 23 items of which most appear in the preceding text. The remaining items dealt mainly with biographical data (age, education, etc.) The questionnaire was self-administering and required about fifteen minutes to fill out. Two forms were used which were identical in content but which required, in the case of three of the questions, written answers on one form and check-list answers on the other. The two forms were given out alternately to the men so that approximately the same number of men filled out each form. Results obtained by these two different methods of questioning have been averaged to obtain the values presented in the text of the report, since the two sets of data gave comparable results.

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BIOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE OF MEN STUDIED

Six hundred and eighty-two enlisted men evacuated from the North African Theater were questioned during June and July, 1943 in six Army Hospitals within the United States. Almost all had experienced action and a large majority had been wounded. In addition, 89 psychiatric casualties were separately examined. The men varied in age between 17 and 52 years with the majority in the 20-30 year age group. Their Army service ranged from 5 months to 26 years; most of the men had been in the Army for more than two years. Experience in battle varied from half a day to 250 days, and more than half had experienced 15 or more days in battle. Over half the group were Infantrymen, another 15 per cent were in Field Artillery and Armored Force and the rest were composed of Engineers, Air Corps, Coast Artillery and the various Service Forces. The exact composition of the group by age, education, length of service, branch of service and experience is summarized in Appendix Tables A and B. Analysis of the several subsamples drawn from different hospitals failed to reveal any important differences among them.

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TABLE A

BIOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEN STUDIED

(Based on 682 cases; psychiatric cases excluded)

EDUCATION:			CIVILIAN OCCUPATION:		
	NO.	%		NO.	%
Grade school	229	33	Professional	26	4
Some high school	209	28	Clerical	76	12
High school	166	26	Service	37	6
College	63	13	Agriculture	110	18
TOTAL MEN §	667	100	Skilled trade	121	19
			Semi-skilled trade	122	19
			Unskilled trade	75	12
			Managerial	36	6
			Student	22	4
			TOTAL MEN §	625	100
AGE:			LENGTH OF ARMY SERVICE:		
18	2	*	3 months or less	0	0
19	8	1	4-6 months	2	*
20	12	2	7-9 months	5	1
21-24	261	39	10-12 months	24	4
25-29	235	35	13-18 months	148	22
30-34	85	13	19-24 months	105	16
Over 35	71	10	Over 24 months	383	57
TOTAL MEN §	674	100	TOTAL MEN §	667	100
BRANCH:			COMBAT EXPERIENCE:		
Engineers	44	6	Less than 1 day	41	8
Field Artillery	71	10	1-4 days	90	16
Quartermaster	12	2	4-8 days	59	11
Infantry	385	57	8-15 days	69	13
Medical	23	3	15-31 days	114	21
Armored Force	40	6	Over 31 days	162	31
Signal Corps	9	1	TOTAL MEN §	535	100
A.A.A.	26	4			
Air Corps	37	6			
Ordnance	14	2			
Others	19	3			
TOTAL MEN §	680	100			

*Less than 0.5%

§Totals are somewhat less than 682, the number of men surveyed. The discrepancy between the total and 682, in each table, depends on the number of cases for which no data were available.