

BOX 164. A-16 WARFARE - General Correspondence to Balkan Countries

1. GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

- a. FDR to Secretary of State: May 4, 1942 - outlining statement to French on occupation of Madagascar (operation Ironclad).
- b. Mountbatten to FDR: June 15, 1942.
- c. Air Marshall A. T. Harris to FDR: June 17, 1942: need for concentration on air power.
- d. Memorandum or Agreement Between Lieutenant General Arnold, Rear Admiral Towers and Air Chief Marshal Portal: June 21, 1942.
- e. Memorandum Admiral King to FDR: July 12, 1942.
- f. Note by Marshal Harris on work of Bomber Command: August, 1942.
- g. FDR to Frank Knox: August 12, 1942.
- h. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR on Defense of Greenland: September 14, 1942.
- i. Memorandum General H. Arnold to Captain McCrea: September 16, 1942.
- j. Memorandum Frank Knox to FDR: August 16, 1942 (destroyers vs. cruisers)

## BOX 164. (Continued)

- k. Memo FDR to Admiral Leahy: September 16, 1942.
- l. Memo General Marshall to FDR: October 3, 1942.
- m. Memo General Arnold to FDR re Donald Nelson's report: October 8, 1942.
- n. Memo J. F. Quilter to FDR re aircraft carriers leased to Britain: October 6, 1942.
- o. Report on U.S. Tanks in combat: November 25, 1942.
- p. Memo General Marshall to FDR re Russian report on U.S. tanks: November 27, 1942.
- q. Memo General Arnold to Admiral King and Captain McCrea: November
- r. Memo Admiral Leahy to FDR: December 6, 1942.
- s. Churchill to FDR enclosing his messages from Stalin: November 13, 1942
- t. Letter to Admiral Sir Reginald Hall to "My Dear Amos": November 15, 1942.
- u. Churchill to FDR enclosing a record of conversation between him and the Duke of Alba: January 1, 1943.
- v. Memo Admiral Leahy to FDR -- bombing of surface targets: January 5, 1943.
- w. Memo General Marshall to FDR re submarine warfare: March 18, 1943.
- x. Memo General Marshall to FDR: March 27, 1943.
- y. Memo Admiral King to Admiral Leahy re use of patrol planes: April 3, 1943.
- z. Memo General Marshall to FDR re shipping build-up for Bolers: April 3, 1943.
- aa. Mathews to Secretary of State Hull re North African situation: March 25, 1943.
- bb. List of policy questions (written by FDR?): March 26, 1943.

## BCX 164. (Continued)

- cc. Memorandum Admiral Leahy to FDR re conference action: May 8, 1943.
- dd. Memorandum Admiral Leahy to FDR and Churchill re use of Portuguese Islands: May 18, 1943.
- ee. Proposed message FDR to President Vargas (Brazil): May 19, 1943.
- ff. Secretary of State Hull to FDR re proposed message Hull to Winant: May 27, 1943.
- gg. Letter William Glassford to FDR: June 19, 1943.
- hh. Churchill to FDR: August 10, 1943.
- ii. Draft declaration on gas warfare by FDR and Churchill: September 7, 1943.
- jj. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re Irish bases: August 7, 1943.
- kk. Report of Combined Chiefs of Staff re Hospital Ships: July 9, 1943.
- ll. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re Hospital Ships: August 9, 1943.
- mm. Memorandum re Dutch determination to wage war on Japan (? to?): August 11, 1943.
- nn. Letter Herbert Pell to FDR re War Guilt Commission: August 10, 1943.
- oo. Draft statement: Policy Toward the German People: ND.
- pp. Memorandum Lauchlin Currie to FDR: August 3, 1943.
- qq. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re Mexican participation in War: October 4, 1943.
- rr. Memorandum General H. H. Arnold to FDR: Miscellaneous intelligence reports: October 19, 1943.
- ss. Joint Statement FDR, Churchill and Stalin re Iran: December, 1943.
- tt. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re dealing with enemy reprisals against American airmen: January 27, 1944.
- uu. Memorandum for FDR re Poland's stand in London talks: February 19, 1944.
- vv. Statement by FDR on Finland: March 16, 1944.



BOX 164. (Continued)

- ww. FDR to Churchill re planning for future: February 29, 1944.
- xx. Memorandum Admiral Brown to the Joint Chiefs of Staff re military support for Brazil against Argentina: June 29, 1944.
- yy. Mackenzie King to FDR: June 16, 1944.
- zz. FDR to Mackenzie King: June 29, 1944.
- aaa. Message of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk to Polish people: September 1, 1944.
- bbb. Group of papers re "Procurement of Material for Armed Forces of Other American Republics": August 28, 1944.
- ccc. Two statements, one by FDR to the people of Holland, and the other by the people of Maastrich, Holland to FDR, re liberation of the Netherlands: September 15 and 18, 1944.
- ddd. Memorandum Hewlett Thebaud to Joint Chiefs of Staff re V-3 Weapon: December 9, 1944.
- eee. Admiral Leahy to FDR re V-3 Weapon: December 11, 1944.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

12 Apr. 49

These papers  
were left in  
the map room  
by the President  
for filing on 11 April  
— no further  
comment

File

WT.

*AIG/WAF/PMB*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

I have secured for Mrs. Roosevelt a copy of Franklin Junior's Confidential report of February 1st. It is the only copy available at the Navy Department as they have not yet had time to strike off additional copies for general circulation, so that in order not to delay normal processes I will return it to the Department as soon as Mrs. Roosevelt has finished with it.

The report is mostly technical and describes the attack on an enemy submarine which fully substantiates the report previously made to you that the Department has recognized a "probable" sinking.

The MOORE did a fine job and I will have a copy available for you on your return.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.





*file*  
*Alb/general*

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

**TOP SECRET**

11 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following action has been taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with your memorandum of 7 December.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, on December 8 sent messages substantially as follows to the Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command; Commanding General, First Air Force; Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier; and Commander, Gulf Sea Frontier:

Information received from source of questional reliability indicates possible attack aimed at cities on the Eastern Seaboard by stratospheric V-3 bombs. Attacks might begin within thirty days. You will take all practicable precautions within the capacity of your available forces. Consider this message as precautionary and not the declaration of an emergency.

A copy of this message was delivered to General Haskell, Director of Civilian Defense.

The Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command has directed the Commanding Generals of all East Coast Service Commands to confer as soon as possible with appropriate Civilian Defense authorities to bring to their attention the possibility of robot attacks and to stress the advisability for reviewing their plans to meet such an emergency which would involve primarily fire fighting, prompt rescue and attention to wounded and clearing up of blocked communications.

The intelligence agencies of the Army and Navy have evaluated the possibilities of German robot attack on the Eastern Seaboard and jointly examined the information supplied by Lt. Commander Earle. Their analysis is attached. German attack of the United States by long-range rockets launched in Europe is deemed impossible at this time. The capability

**TOP SECRET**



TOP SECRET

still exists, however, for small-scale attacks by flying bombs or by rockets, smaller than the V-2, launched from specially fitted submarines. Any attack made by the Germans at this time will be primarily for propaganda purposes and to reduce our total war effort by exciting a disproportionate mobilization against a threatened bombing which can achieve at best slight material damage.

Further measures against possible German attacks can be taken, but their effectiveness is doubtful and the implications of such actions need careful consideration. Experience in Europe has shown that the only successful counter to rockets is attack on the launching site, which in this case is the submarine. The Navy is now deployed to meet an increasing submarine threat. On the occasion of the alert of 4 to 10 November 1944 in the New York area against a V-1 threat, long-range reconnaissance planes were withdrawn from the Caribbean, Panama and Gulf Sea Frontiers and concentrated in the New York area. This action reduced the overall reconnaissance coverage. Inasmuch as the present situation applies to the entire Eastern Seaboard, redeployment is not practicable until the locality of the attack is determined. Additional planes are available only at the expense of active theaters and to the detriment of the total war effort.

The Army Air Forces can establish units solely for the air defenses of the Eastern Seaboard but this will seriously affect the supply of replacement fighter crews and planes to the Combat Air Forces in active theaters. The alert of 4 to 10 November caused a marked loss of training although it lasted only six days. In addition, the employment of several thousand anti-aircraft artillery troops during the alert delayed their conversion to infantry replacements for which they were earmarked. These diversions from the war effort were occasioned solely for the protection of the New York area and will be multiplied many times if similar precautions are taken for the entire Eastern Seaboard.

A general reconstitution of the Civil Defense organization will entail the diversion of personnel and material now devoted to war production. Because the scale of attack by robots will at worst be light, the existing municipal fire fighting, police, medical and other services should be sufficient to meet the emergency. The precautionary planning by the Eastern Defense Command in conjunction with the Civil Defense authorities will prepare civil reserves for augmentation of municipal services should they be needed.


TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that to establish an alert over the Eastern Seaboard on the basis of the present information would adversely affect the overall war effort and would only assist the enemy in achieving his probable objectives. The best course of action is to allow nothing to interfere with our assault on Germany.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the present precautionary measures represent the most that can be accomplished without detriment to the overall war effort, are adequate to meet the situation, and recommend that no further reconstitution of alert preparations be required.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Enclosure

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

E N C L O S U R E

9 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Subject: Agreed Joint Evaluation of the Possible Existence of the V-3 Rocket and Probability of Attack against the U.S.

1. The cable from Lieutenant Commander Earle, Naval Attache, Turkey is probably propaganda and represents a plant by the Germans. There is no reliable information available of German development of a long range rocket other than the V-2.

2. The V-3 may possibly be a rocket of smaller dimensions than the V-2 with shorter range. It would be possible to launch such a missile from specially designed or modified submarines. Attached is a sketch of a German submarine based in a southern Norwegian port showing a pair of rails extending from conning tower to the bow and terminating at a flat, rectangular surface. The purpose of this is unknown.

3. German attack from Europe of United States cities by long range rockets is deemed impossible now. Small rocket or flying bomb attacks from specially constructed submarines are considered possible. Any such action would be made with propaganda effect rather than material damage as the primary objective.


/s/ CLAYTON BISSELL,  
Major General,  
A.C. of S., G-2.

/s/ HEWLETT THEBAUD,  
Rear Admiral,  
D.N.I.

**TOP SECRET**



INTERPRETATION REPORT N° S 103  
Appendix A  
German 740 ton U boat with modified deck forward.  
Scale 1" = 50ft.



*Dimensions :-*

Length 244'  
Beam 21'

*Armament :-*

Probably 1-37mm gun  
" 4-20mm guns

*Special features :-*

- (1) Narrowing of deck forward
- (2) "Rails" on deck running from the port side of the Conning Tower forward to the narrow neck of the deck

*Drawn from photographs taken by Coastal Command aircraft on 19<sup>th</sup> Sept '44  
(H.Q.C.C. Ref A.2201-MIL-19<sup>th</sup> Sept 44//Q224-N°H)*

Neg N° 42946

Appendix

Alb/Gew  
Pry

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1944.

INVENTIONS GIVE 4-MONTHS NEW LIFE, BRITISH AIRBORNE.

CONFIDENTIAL  
(By wireless to the New York Times).

My dear Winston, - Air Vice Marshal A. B. Wood,  
Colonel, Royal Air Force

I realize that it is very trying for many people that we should continue to prevent information from leaking out about anti-submarine methods; but our own submarine campaign in the Pacific is playing such an important role that the Barbarian will seize desperately upon any information that will help him in anti-submarine measures. I do hope, therefore, that we may continue to do all that we can to keep anyone from talking too much. I have no doubt that indiscretions are committed in our press but the enclosed has recently appeared under a London date-line.

I will do what I can to keep the lid on here and I know I may count on you for similar measures.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cordially yours,

"F.D.R."

The Rt. Honorable Winston S. Churchill,  
The Prime Minister of Great Britain,  
London, England.

Copy to:

Director of OWI  
Director of Censorship  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

INVENTIONS GIVE U-BOATS NEW LIFE, BRITON ASSERTS.

(By Wireless to the New York Times).

LONDON, Nov. 8 - Air Vice Marshal A. B. Elwood, a senior staff officer of the Royal Air Force Coastal Command, said today that the Germans were fitting an extendable air intake to their U-Boats so that they could recharge batteries and ventilate the submarines without surfacing. This and "certain other improvements" under development have given the U-Boats a new lease on life, he added.

Between May and August, 1943, he said, the Germans lost U-Boats at the rate of thirty a month. The number in the Atlantic was reduced by almost half.

C O P Y



A16/gen

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Secretary James C. Dunn.

The secret memorandum dated August 28, 1944 from the Secretary of State to the President on the subject of "Procurement of Material for Armed Forces of Other American Republics" has been sent to me for filing. It has been marked "CH - OK - FDR" by the President but the document as filed does not indicate whether or not the Secretary of State has been informed of the President's approval.

I send you this information in case the Secretary has not been informed.

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

22 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. RIGDON:

Admiral Leahy did not particularly remember these papers. However, it appears to him that no action is required, and therefore he sees no reason why it should not be filed.

ther

J.V.S.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

August 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Procurement of Material for Armed Forces of Other  
American Republics

The State, War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently agreed that procurement of materials for the armed forces of the other American republics under Lend-Lease credit shall henceforth be limited to certain specific purposes. A statement setting forth the reasons for adopting this policy and the purposes for which procurement may be approved, has been agreed upon and distributed for the use of United States officials directly concerned. This statement, a copy of which is enclosed, also includes a paragraph relating to cash purchases of materials destined for the armed forces of other American republics.

In the first paragraph of the statement under reference it is expressly recognized that "any large threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere has been largely removed". In view of this fact, I am of the opinion that deliveries of materials to the armed forces of those countries, which always involve important political issues, should henceforth be decided upon primarily on the basis of their effect upon the foreign relations of this country, rather than on grounds of hemisphere defense.

I have felt it desirable to clarify my position in letters for the Secretaries of War and Navy, a copy of which is enclosed.

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter, mutatis mutandis, to the Secretaries of War and Navy.
2. Copy of statement.



**Department of State**

OFFICE  
DIVISION

**RL**

ENCLOSURE

TO

LETTER DRAFTED **8-4-44**

ADDRESSED TO

**the President**

GPO 16-50809-1

CH  
JAN  
20/17

AUG 17 1944

In reply refer to  
M.

SECRET

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department of State has recently been giving very careful consideration to the policy issues involved in the procurement in the United States of material destined for the use of the armed forces of the other American republics. In this connection particular attention has been paid to the report of the Joint Advisory Board on American Republics dated December 13, 1943, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted to the Department under cover of a letter of December 30, 1943, from Admiral Leahy, and to subsequent related correspondence.

It is stated in the Joint Advisory Board report "that under the present strategic situation any major threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere has largely been removed". This opinion is reiterated in the policy statement regarding Lend-Lease procurement approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted to the Department under cover of a letter from Admiral Leahy dated May 30, 1944. I gather from these two documents that the highest military authority of the United States considers that, in general, the allocation of military material to the armed forces of other American republics is no longer essential to the security of the American continent against external aggression during the present war or to the successful prosecution of the war. I realize, of course, that specific exception is made in the cases of Brazil and Mexico.

As you

The Honorable  
Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of War.

As you know, the delivery of arms, ammunition and implements of war to the other American republics whether under Lend-Lease or for cash, always involves important political considerations. The relations among other American republics and the relations between the United States and other American republics may be very gravely affected by the allocation of such material to one of those countries. I am of the opinion that, now that any major threat to the security of the hemisphere has been largely removed, considerations of foreign policy should prevail in decisions respecting such allocations. Should the War Department or the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform me in any particular case that the threat of aggression is so acute that important foreign policy considerations must be set aside, I shall, of course, defer at once to your judgment.

Because of the foreign policy aspects of requests for materials for the armed forces of other American republics, I consider it necessary that the Department of State be consulted regarding such requests. In this connection it should be noted that this Department has approved the policy of limiting the assignment of materials to other American republics under Lend-Lease and specifically concurs in the statement of policy transmitted with Admiral Leahy's letter of May 30. In approving this statement, however, the Department of State has not abandoned, and furthermore, because of its responsibility in the field of foreign relations, could not abandon, its right to consider the question of individual assignments from the point of view of their possible effect on the foreign relations of this country.

I am sure that you will agree with me that this matter is one of the utmost importance for the future of the relations between the United States and the other American republics, and that it is necessary that there should be a clear understanding with respect to it.

I am addressing a similar communication as of this date to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull



CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT

(For the confidential use and guidance of United States representatives in conversations with representatives of the other American republics in regard to procurement of material in the United States. Not to be shown or quoted to representatives of the other American republics.)

1. The defensive phase of the war against the Axis has passed, and the United Nations are on the offensive throughout the world. Axis submarine operations have been substantially reduced and any large threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere has been largely removed.

2. Offensive action demands large expenditures of men, money, materials, and equipment, with the result that the United States war effort must be thrown into the offensive to the exclusion of the defense.

3. Huge quantities of materials and equipment are being constantly demanded from the war fronts to such an extent that the amount and type of equipment available under Lend-Lease credit, on Lend-Lease cash reimbursement, or direct contract for cash must of necessity be modified.

4. In view of the necessity for concentrating all productive capabilities in backing up the United Nations' offensive, procurement under Lend-Lease credit shall in the future be approved in general only for the following purposes, and within the period ending June 30, 1945:

a. The development and preparation of such ground, naval, and air forces, with their supporting establishments and installations, as may be required for Joint operations with United Nations forces within this hemisphere.

b. The training and equipping of such American republic forces as may be employed in conjunction with forces of the United Nations in offensive operations overseas.

c. The repair and maintenance of existing equipment essential to the war effort where facilities do not exist for making repairs locally.

d. The shipment of limited amounts of certain armaments and material deemed essential to the successful carrying on of the programs in which United States military and naval missions are engaged.

5. Certain raw materials, semi-finished, and finished products, which are not procurable under the provisions set forth in paragraph four above may be furnished on a cash basis; provided that no material considered as arms, ammunition and implements of war, as enumerated by Presidential Proclamation #2549, dated 9 April 1942 (56 Stat., 1948), shall, without previous approval of the State, War and Navy Departments, be furnished to any American republic except those mutually agreed upon by the three Departments.

6. The procedure to be employed with respect to the procurement of munitions of war or material destined for the armed forces of the other American republics is as follows:

a. No such munitions of war or material shall be procured in the United States without first having been screened and approved by the appropriate agencies of the War and Navy Departments.

b. The requirements which are clearly for Navy use, although procured by the United States War Department, should be presented to the United States Navy Department, which will negotiate with the War Department as to procurement; similarly, those clearly for Army use, although procured by the United States Navy Department, should be presented to the United States War Department, which will negotiate with the Navy Department as to procurement.

c. All requests for materials which are destined for the use of the armed forces of the American republics and which are procurable by agencies other than the United States War and Navy Departments, should first be presented to the War or Navy Department, as indicated in paragraph b above, and the service having cognizance will process for procurement through the prescribed channels.

d. No American republic shall retransfer any munitions of war or material capable of use by armed forces which it has received from the United States to any other government or agency without first having obtained the approval of appropriate United States authorities.



*Ally Gen*

*Mr Rigdon*  
*WS*

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 18, 1944

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
ON THE  
ENTRANCE OF ALLIED TROOPS INTO HOLLAND

For four long years the Netherlands has suffered under the heel of German oppression. For four long years its liberties have been crushed, its homes destroyed, its people enslaved. But the spark of freedom could never be extinguished. It has always glowed in the hearts of the Netherlands people. It now emerges as an avenging flame.

The armies of liberation are flowing across the borders of Holland. A gallant Queen is returning to her gallant people. The Netherlands again stands on the threshold of her ancient liberties.

But the fight will not end with the restoration of freedom to Holland. It will not end with the inevitable defeat of Germany. The people of the Netherlands know as the people of the United States know that final victory cannot be achieved until Japan has likewise been vanquished.

Only then can peace and freedom return to the world.

- - - -



A16 / Pres

Mr. Rigidon

R

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 15, 1944

MAASTRICHT, HOLLAND, SEPT. 15 (ANETA):--The first citizens of Holland to be liberated today sent a telegram to President Roosevelt expressing their thanks that American troops had taken this city, Capital of Limburg Province, and the nearby frontier town of Eysden.

The telegram, addressed to the President at the White House, Washington, said:

"On the hour of their liberation, which struck when American troops entered Holland, the citizens of Eysden and Maastricht, the first Dutch towns to be free again, have asked the undersigned to convey to you, Mr. President, their heartfelt thanks for this glorious moment which they have awaited for so long.

/Signed/ "Robert Kiek, War Correspondent with the Netherlands forces."

The above message to the President from the people of Maastricht, in liberated Holland, was delivered to the White House today by Dr. H. R. van Houten, Counselor of the Netherlands Embassy. Dr. van Houten explained that the people of Maastricht embraced this means of sending a greeting to the President because no other channel of communication was open to them.

- - - - -

4 Sept, 44. From ambassador from Poland P.

A16/General

Broadcast to Poland, made on the occasion of 5th Anniversary of the War, September 1, by Prime Minister S. Mikolajczyk.

with "There are moments in the lives of nations when platitudes must be put aside, when any mention of one's duties, merits or ideals or the paying of homage by rare words is ill-timed. I know that one must speak simply to people who are facing death, who must either endure and win or perish. I know that you have confidence in me, even when, in the throes of a deadly struggle, in spite of a feeling of deception and injustice done to Warsaw, you gave me by a unanimous vote in the Polish Underground Parliament - the Council of National Unity - sanction for my proposals for settlement of Polish-Russian relations, and by so doing testified to your political maturity, which accompanies your sacrifices, heroism and struggles. You may be sure that the Polish Government will not capitulate and resign the rights of Poland to full independence, freedom and sovereignty. I declare this in full realization of the gravity of the tragic situation. As Premier of the Polish Government I take full responsibility for the decisions of your political and military leaders - the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of the Government acting in the Homeland, General Bor and members of the Council of National Unity.

"Having grounds to do so, you arose at the right time to wage an open fight against the Germans for the sake of independence and freedom, and to protect the population. You acted in the same way as your brothers did everywhere east of Warsaw since March, 1944, and as they will still continue to do, at the same time helping the heroic and victorious Soviet Armies in their fight with the enemy. The fate of war has decreed that the liberation of Warsaw has not taken place as soon as was rightly expected by all. The struggle continues. I know that you are fighting - for fight you must and fight you will. You have no other issue and each doubt or breakdown means death instead of victory. You have the right and wish to endure - to win and live. You have right to assistance. No one has the right to lower the value of your struggle, undertaken with the purest intentions, for the sake of some opportunist motive or political intrigue. You did not receive such help as was due you, in spite of all the devotion of British, South African and Polish airmen. Lately the latter have been the only ones who helped you. We are doing all we can to obtain help for you in adequate time and measure. I have not lost hope that it will be obtained. Should this help not be given, I will notify you of it.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to address once again, in public, Stalin Roosevelt and Churchill, leaders of the great powers, the commander of the powerful and victorious land and air armies - Warsaw is waiting, the whole Polish nation is waiting, public opinion throughout the world is waiting. Do all you can to provide the means of further fighting and to liberate this city and the population fighting on her ruins, drenched



with blood. These people fight and die for Poland but their desire to live for Poland is equally strong.

"Heroes of Warsaw - beside all crimes perpetrated upon the civilian population, the Germans wish to demoralize and unnerve you by threatening to burn Warsaw. Those who are murdering you pretend - by spreading false information - to become your defenders.

"I wish to declare, with full feeling of responsibility, that, for burning the remnants of Warsaw, should they ever dare to do so, for murdering the civilian population and the Home Army protected by combatant rights, we will hold them to account. We promise - and will keep our word - if the mortally wounded beast dares to carry out its threat.

"I leave you in the conviction that you will endure until help and liberation comes to you, and that you will have your share in the victory of the Allied nations. We will rebuild our cities and villages in a free and independent Poland and Warsaw shall rise from the ruins, more magnificent than ever. We will do everything to prevent the German beast from menacing the world again by new acts of aggression."



*Alb/gen*

*File*  
*W.M.*  
*del*

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

Serial No. 0143713  
(SC)A17-10/ND14

23 AUG 1944

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have received a copy of your joint memorandum to the Secretary of War and to me with respect to martial law in Hawaii and your conversations with Governor Stainback relative thereto.

This matter has been discussed with the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Under Secretary of the Interior, with a view to presenting you in the immediate future an agreed program for the termination of martial law and the return of civil administration to the territorial authorities, with the reservation to the Military Commander of the necessary powers to assure the security and defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

*Raymond*

Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The President,  
The White House.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

DATE: 29 JUNE 1944.

I have noted your memorandum of 16 June, relative to the relationship of the Canadian forces to the Supreme Allied Commanders and the establishment in London of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission.

I am in full agreement with you and your colleagues in thinking it desirable that the Allied Commanders in Chief in Western Europe should be formally notified that they exercise command over the Canadian Armed Forces in those theatres with the full authority of the Canadian Government, and I shall so inform the United States Chiefs of Staff.

I appreciate the statement that you and your colleagues have no desire to disturb, in any way, the established chain of command whereby the Supreme Commanders receive their instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ROOSEVELT.

*Al/ben*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*adm. Brown to  
file*  
*td.*  
**B 61090**

June 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

To take up with the Joint  
Chiefs of Staff and prepare reply.

F. D. R.

Reply was dispatched via  
State Department on 29 June 1944.

*V Smith*  
*LT Cdr USN*  
*Aide*



B 61088



Washington, D.C.  
June 16th, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I hand you herewith teletype message from my Prime Minister, The Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, which he instructed me to communicate to you.

Yours very sincerely

and

respectfully,

*Stephen Le Carter*

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States of America,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

OTTAWA, June 16, 1944.

""

1. In the light of the replies received from Mr. Churchill and yourself, my colleagues and I have now given further consideration to the questions of the relationship of the Canadian forces to the Supreme Allied Commands and the establishment in London of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission. These questions had been the subject of my communication to you of March 13th last through the Canadian Ambassador, and of an identical message to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

2. In the circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that no public announcement should be made at this time to the effect that General Wilson and General Eisenhower exercise command over the Canadian armed forces within their respective areas. For the same reasons we are not inclined to press our proposal that any announcement should be made that they exercise command on behalf of all participating United Nations. At some later stage we may wish to revive one or other of these proposals.

3. Nevertheless, as indicated in Mr. McCarthy's communication to you of March 13th, we think it desirable that the Allied Commanders in Chief in Western Europe and the Mediterranean should be formally notified that they exercise command over the Canadian armed forces in these theatres with the full authority of the Canadian Government. I have informed Mr. Churchill to like effect.

4. You are no doubt aware that the United Kingdom Government has welcomed the establishment in London of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission to act as a link with the British Chiefs of Staff and also with the Supreme Allied Commanders. We have already taken steps to establish the Mission which, at the outset, will consist of Vice-Admiral Percy Nelles,



head of the Canadian Naval Mission and Senior Canadian Flag Officer Overseas; Air Marshall L. S. Breadner, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas; and Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, Chief of Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters, London.

5. We have noted that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff regard it as necessary that the appropriate channel of communications between Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commands must be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not directly through the Canadian Mission to the Supreme Commands. We have no desire to disturb, in any way, the established chain of command whereby the Supreme Commanders receive their instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. At the same time there can, we believe, be no objection to the Canadian Mission having regular contact on liaison matters with the Supreme Commands, so long as matters of high policy are dealt with through our contacts with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. I may say that our view, in this respect, is shared by the United Kingdom Government.

6. We note that your Joint Chiefs of Staff regard the Supreme Commanders as deriving their authority from the "Governments concerned" through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and not directly from the Governments.

I feel bound to point out that, while we have recognized that the higher direction of the war should be exercised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, under Mr. Churchill and yourself, the relationship of the Canadian Government and armed forces, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, has never been defined with any degree of precision. Nor, specifically, has the Canadian Government ever been requested to recognize the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the source of authority of the



Supreme Allied Commanders.

In drawing attention to this state of affairs, which is somewhat unsatisfactory from the Canadian point of view, I need hardly say that we have no desire to upset existing arrangements, particularly at this critical time.

7. We trust that the establishment of the Canadian Mission in London will result in improved collaboration in all matters affecting the disposition and use of Canadian forces. In this belief we have gone forward with its establishment.

8. It is assumed that matters of high policy will continue to be dealt with between governments through whatever channels are most appropriate to the questions in hand, while our staff missions in London and Washington will provide ready and constant means of consultation and communication on military matters.

""

Alger

September 7, 1944.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State.

Subject: Publication in the United States Statutes at Large of Documents Agreed Upon at Teheran and Cairo.

Reference: The Secretary's Memorandum to the President, dated July 20, 1944.

1. The records of the White House Map Room do not indicate that any international agreements were reached at Teheran or at Cairo. The military agreements are part of the Joint Staff records.

2. The statements made at Cairo on November 26, 1943 and December 6, 1943, and at Teheran on December 1, 1943, were press communiques. These statements were not part of White House Map Room records but it is understood from those who took part in the discussions that these statements, while agreed to by all parties, were not signed documents. All three statements are believed to have been released in exactly the same form as agreed upon.

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

*Hold until  
the President's  
return to Wash.*


July 20, 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Subject: Publication in the United States Statutes  
at Large of documents agreed upon at  
Tehran and Cairo**

Publication in the United States Statutes at Large of all international agreements to which the United States is a party is required by Public Law 657, 75th Congress, approved June 16, 1938 (52 Stat. 760; 44 U.S.C., sec. 196). The Department of State is accordingly endeavoring to obtain true copies of any documents agreed upon for the United States at the conferences at Tehran and Cairo in November and December 1943 which constitute international agreements.

I should be very grateful if you could conveniently supply the Department with signed originals, certified copies, or photostats of any such documents.





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY  
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Message, dated March 10, 1944,  
from Prime Minister Mackenzie King,  
sent through Ambassador McCarthy, re  
arrangements made by the President  
and Prime Minister Churchill for the  
establishment in the United Kingdom  
of a Supreme Headquarters Allied  
Expeditionary Force, in order to  
exercise command over the forces  
organized for the liberation of the  
Allied countries in Europe and the  
assault upon Germany.

A16/ben

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

June 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Subject: Military Support for Paraguay and Uruguay.

1. The Secretary of State has informed the President that a communication has been sent from the State Department to the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking whether or not the United States could provide military support for either Paraguay or Uruguay, or both, if they should be attacked by Argentina. The President directs me to say that he hopes the Joint Staffs will be able to answer in the affirmative. He suggests that the weakness of the Argentine air force is such that with the help of Brazil we should be able to provide sufficient air force to counter any threat by Argentina without serious interference with our major war effort.

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to:  
Admiral Leahy

TOP SECRET

JUNE 29, 1944

The President has received the following report from General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold, three United States Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A16/Gen

On our return from the Front in Normandy we perceive a state of mind in this country against which we believe the public should be warned.

The progress of our armed forces on all fronts, against fanatical and determined enemies, should be a source of the highest gratification to the American people. Our forces of land, sea and air, many of them recently in action for the first time, have shown not only the courage that was expected of them but a toughness and a technical skill that has made them more than a match for the veterans whom they opposed. Backed by the enormous material production that has been made possible by American industry and labor, we can look forward to an eventual complete victory over all our enemies.

This depends, however, on a continuance of the full support now given to the fighting forces by the home front. The battles now in progress entail heavy losses in material which American industry must replace, and any slackening in the needed production will only delay ultimate victory. No effort required in the home-front battle should be diverted by any element in the production machine -- whether it be ownership, management, rank-and-file workers, or those in the service of the government itself.

The recent favorable course of the fighting seems to have persuaded some people that the war is as good as won, and that accordingly they can throw up their war jobs and go back to civilian life. No doubt most of the men at the front would also like easier and better paid peacetime jobs; but they are sticking to the jobs they have now.

There is still a tough fight ahead of us. Anyone can see that desertions on the fighting fronts would protract the war and reduce our prospects of victory. Desertions on the home front would tend to the same result. The war is not yet won; it will be won the sooner if everybody in war work sticks to his job till complete victory has been attained.

MARSHALL

KING

ARNOLD

Regraded Unclassified



Alb/Gen

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 75

22 May 1944

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

CHANGE IN CLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN C.C.S. PAPERS

Note by the Secretaries

The classification of the following C.C.S. papers is hereby downgraded from "U.S. SECRET - BRITISH MOST SECRET" to "CONFIDENTIAL".

C.C.S. 228	dated 7 June 1943
C.C.S. 228/1	dated 22 June 1943
C.C.S. 228/2	dated 6 July 1943
C.C.S. 228/3	dated 9 July 1943 - <i>done Rg</i>
C.C.S. 228/4	dated 11 August 1943
C.C.S. 228/5	dated 20 August 1943
C.C.S. 228/6	dated 31 August 1943
C.C.S. 228/7	dated 4 September 1943
C.C.S. 228/8	dated 11 September 1943

The classification of the following C.C.S. paper is hereby downgraded from "TOP SECRET" to "CONFIDENTIAL".

C.C.S. 228/9      dated 3 May 1944

H. REDMAN,  
A. J. McFARLAND,  
Combined Secretariat.

*Hospital Ships*

COPY

A16/bene

February 29, 1944.

Dear Winston:-

I have been worrying a good deal of late on account of the tendency of all of us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives.

As you doubtless remember, at Quebec last Summer the Staff people took a shot at drawing up terms of surrender for Italy. The American draft was short and to the point and was finally adopted and presented.

But later on the long and comprehensive terms, which were drawn up by your people, were presented to Badoglio.

I did not like them because they attempted to foresee every possibility in one document. But, as so often happens, when such an attempt is made, certain points were omitted and additional protocols with respect to naval and other questions had to be later presented.

That is a good deal the way I feel about all this detailed planning that we are jointly and severally making in regard to what we do when we get into France. I have been handed pages and pages with detailed instructions and appendices. I regard them as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible.

Therefore, I re-drew them with the thought of making the Commander-in-Chief solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the maintenance of law, order and reasonable justice for the first few months after we get into France. I have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and with representatives of the French National Committee in such places as they have military status, but that he and his Staff bear the sole responsibility.

Now comes this business of what to do when we get into Germany. I understand that your Staff presented a long and comprehensive document — with every known kind of terms — to the European Advisory Commission, and that the Russians have done somewhat the same.

DEPT. OF DEFENSE:-

RECEIVED 30 JAN 44

COPY

-2-

My people over here believe that a short document of surrender terms should be adopted. This, of course, has nothing to do with the locality of the occupying forces after they get into Germany, but it is an instrument of surrender which is in conformity with the general principles.

I am enclosing (a) an argument -- facts bearing on the problem and (b) a proposed acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by Germany.

*no copies  
rec'd for file  
Rigdon*

I hope much that you will read the argument. I think it is very cogent.

I am trying as hard as I can to simplify things -- and sometimes I shudder at the thought of appointing as many new Committees and Commissions in the future as we have in the past!

I note that in the British proposal the territory of Germany is divided up in accordance with the British plan. "Do please don't" ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now!

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain,  
London,  
England.

(Enclosures)



*A16/ben*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*WJ*

FROM: STATE DEPARTMENT  
TO : CNO

24 APRIL 1944

Following received from London dated April 24, 1944.

Admiral King's report to Secretary of Navy is widely reported in London Press today. Article by Naval correspondent of TIMES referring to Admiral King's chapter on essential character of team spirit throughout all arms and services in current operations declares that this is indeed dominant note of his whole report, and that "it is evident that in the vital province of integration of the separate services, the U.S. Forces have made progress which could with advantage be emulated by their Allies."

Editorial in DAILY SKETCH asserts that Admiral King, in his WAR PROGRESS REPORT, has provided another blow to the enemy. Calling his narrative "both remarkable and illuminating" editorial states that "we should be ungracious if we did not pay the highest tribute, as a nation ourselves, to the magnificent achievement of the U.S."

(Signed) WINANT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

A16/General

CLW

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MARCH 16, 1944

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

It has always seemed odd to me and to the people of the United States to find Finland a partner of Nazi Germany, fighting side by side with the sworn enemies of our civilization.

The Finnish people now have a chance to withdraw from this hateful partnership. The longer they stay at Germany's side the more sorrow and suffering is bound to come to them. I think I can speak for all Americans when I say that we sincerely hope Finland will now take the opportunity to disassociate herself from Germany.

- - - -

A16/General

February 19, 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Subject: Polish Reply to the Prime Minister**

The attached has just been handed to us by a representative of the Polish Government. It is very discouraging.

It seems that little headway has been made at 10 Downing Street and that the Poles have about turned down all requests, not only as to boundary questions, but likewise as to moves that have been suggested for a change in government.



CONFIDENTIAL

On February 18th, Prime Minister Mikolajczyk communicated to Prime Minister Churchill the text of two Resolutions adopted by the Polish Council of Ministers on February 15th. The texts of the Resolutions was read to the American Charge d'Affaires in London, who was informed that they would be cabled to the Polish Ambassador in Washington who would communicate them confidentially to the Secretary of State. These texts, as received by the Ambassador, are as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. I. - In its declaration of January 14, the Polish Government declared its readiness to take up conversations with the Soviet Government, "with the participation of the British and United States Governments, of all outstanding questions, the settlement of which should lead to a friendly and permanent cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union." Thereby, the Polish Government did not exclude territorial matters from such conversations, with the understanding that these would extend to Poland's Eastern, Western and Northern frontiers.

The demand dictated by the Soviets that the Polish Government should agree to the so-called "Curzon Line" as the future Polish-Soviet frontier is unacceptable to the Polish Government.

The final result of the conversations regarding frontiers can only be effected after the war. Immediately, however, - still in the course of war activities, - a demarcation line

running

running to the East of the Cities of Wilno and Lwow should be agreed upon with the Polish Government who will consult the Polish underground authorities in Poland on this matter. To the West of the demarcation line the Polish authorities would take over the administration of the territories liberated from German occupation; the territories to the East of this demarcation line would, for the time being, be administered by the Soviet military authorities with the participation of representatives of the other United Nations.

The Polish Government regards it as its duty to state that the intention of granting to Soviet Russia of a part of East Prussia including the port of Krolewicz (Koenigsberg) is contrary to the interests of the Polish State, as it would greatly limit Poland's free access to the sea.

RESOLUTION NO. II. - No personal changes in the composition of the Polish Government and of the Polish High Command can be made dependent on demands of a foreign Power.

February 19, 1944.



**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

27 January 1944

*File*  
*OK*  
*FDR*  
*(marked on*  
*copy which*  
*was returned*  
*to General*  
*Marshall*  
*1/29/44.*

*A16*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

**Subject: Enemy Reprisals against American Airmen.**

(Reference General Marshall's memorandum of December 29th and the President's memorandum of January 10th on this subject)

I am glad that you approve of the proposed joint statement in my memorandum of December 29th. It should, I think, be issued only when and if we have concrete evidence of the Germans' purpose to take action, and I shall hold it for your further consideration when that moment arrives.

Germany

In accordance with your note we have endeavored to reach an agreement as to just what would be, as a practicable proposition, the "most drastic measures" to be taken by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States. It has been suggested that we could strike at the perpetuation of the German people by delaying the return of their men after the Armistice. By such a procedure we would punish large masses of people in whom family sentiments are strong. If credible evidence should be received that the German Government has initiated trials of our airmen for war crimes allegedly constituted by the bombing of targets in Germany, the British and United States Governments might issue some such statement as the following:

"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States having learned of the intention of the German Government to bring to trial Allied airmen on charges identified with the bombing of targets in Germany, wrongfully termed war crimes, issued on \_\_\_\_\_ a solemn warning to the German people as well as to their military and civil officials that the most drastic measures would be adopted to bring home to the German people a realization that any treatment of American or British prisoners not in strict accord with the recognized laws of warfare would be fatal to the future of the German people.

**SECRET**



# SECRET

"This warning has been disregarded and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States now notify the German Government and the people of Germany that for each Allied airman sentenced as the outcome of the proposed trials, 10,000 German prisoners or other German males who will later be taken into custody, will be selected and detained subsequently to the imposition of peace terms, for such substantial period as these Allied Governments deem proper. Should the German Government commit additional crimes against Allied prisoners of war, the period of detention will be increased accordingly.

"These prisoners of war will be employed anywhere in the world that the interests of the various Allied nations dictate. Moreover, upon the conclusion of hostilities every person found responsible for these trials, including the judges, will be pursued, arraigned before Allied courts and punished accordingly.

"The United States and British Governments reaffirm their intention to intensify attacks upon Germany, making every effort of which their rapidly expanding means are capable."

## Japan

In the case of Japan the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already recommended to you that atrocities committed by the Japanese be publicized. I do not believe that any official statement by our Government is desirable at this time since you have already given warning as to the punishment of all persons guilty of war crimes. However, in the event of a Japanese threat to mistreat prisoners in order to deter us from bombing Japan or as reprisals for alleged war crimes committed against them, we shall have to take a course different from that indicated for Germany because of the lack of Japanese prisoners and the fact that the Japanese Government would be ruthless in consideration of the hazard to their nationals. The following statement is suggested:

"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have taken notice of the repeated acts of barbarism committed by the Japanese authorities against British and American prisoners of war despite the agreement of the Japanese Government to abide by the terms of the Geneva Conventions. These brutal reprisals upon helpless victims evidence the shallow advance from savagery which the Japanese people have made.


"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States reaffirm their intention to bring the present hostilities to an

# SECRET

SECRET

end by the use of every effort of which their rapidly expanding means are capable. We serve notice upon the Japanese military and political leaders as well as the Japanese people that the future of Japan as a nation, in fact that of the Japanese race itself, depends entirely and irrevocably upon their capacity to progress beyond their aboriginal barbaric instincts which are manifested by the treatment accorded to British and American personnel in Japanese hands. Every person, irrespective of rank, who is responsible directly or morally for the mistreatment of American and British prisoners of war will be relentlessly pursued, arraigned before Allied courts, and punished as they deem fit."

This matter has been discussed with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, who are in accord with it.

  
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

- 3 -

Regraded Unclassified



*A16/General*

December 1, 1943.

BRUSH STINK BHT  
MOTOMINEAN

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

Winston S. Churchill

J. V. Stalin

Franklin D. Roosevelt.

COPY MADE BY LT. W.M. Rigdon, USN.



A 16/General

SECRET

SECURITY

19 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information was believed to be so secret by the author that he wrote it to me in long hand and had it delivered from England "for my eyes only".

While I cannot guarantee the accuracy of the reports, from their general tone I am inclined to believe they are correct and believe that you will find them of interest.

October 9 - Hannover very hard hit by R.A.F. They have asked for a great deal of help from other cities, even from Berlin - 50,000 loaves of bread, 40,000 lbs of sausages - extensive fires are out of control and city asking for fire fighting apparatus from other towns - also in need of drinking water to be brought in - 50,000 people homeless - (Note: All places called on for help were to the east - this may indicate Bremen badly hit in U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. raids.)

October 10 - Now 200,000 homeless in Hannover - an area of 3 or 4 square kilometers is a complete furnace - no rescue work in area possible.

October 11 - Most telephone and teletype lines at Hannover knocked out - state fires worst ever occurred in Reich - occurred right in center of town and spread all over - many armament industries destroyed. Telephone, gas, water, electricity all gone - R.F. burst water mains.

October 10 - Special orders have been issued rerouting, etc., of No 109, and F.R. 190 direct from factories to the front line operational stations - flights must be made regardless of weather, also at night and during air raids - (Note: A clear indication of existing shortage of these types.)

October 11 - Instructions to Luftflotte IV (South Russia Front) state "in view of lack of No 109's use of Macd 202 (captured Italian planes) will be made for fast reconnaissance purposes.

October 11 - In August 9 Ju 87 and 1 Ju 88 failed to return from attack on Allied Naval Units on October 9th - (Note - These

SECRET

SECURITY

SECRET

SECURITY

aircraft were intercepted by 20 Beaufighters and 60 P-38's who claimed destroyed 15 Ju 87 and 1 Ju 88, probably destroyed 3 Ju 87, and damaged 5 Ju 87 - this is one of the rare occasions where claims can be verified as to their exactitude.)

October 11 - German officers proceeding through Sweden in civilian clothes (similar to our arrangements in Eire) have lately been involved in brawls. Swedes more and more upset and opposed to this traffic which they have threatened to stop completely if further incidents occur."

H. H. ARNOLD,  
General, U. S. A.,  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

SECRET

SECURITY

*A16 (Revised)*  
*Admiral Johnson*  
*to file*

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On September 24th you mentioned in a memorandum to me your wish that we could think up some method of using a token Mexican force.

General Cardenas, Mexican Minister of National Defense, raised the question of employment of Mexican troops overseas with the United States Delegation of the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission upon the occasion of the Commission's visit to Mexico City on September 17th of this year. Vice Admiral A. W. Johnson, Senior U. S. Member of the Commission, advised General Cardenas that the Mexican Government might present a concrete proposal as to what it felt capable of doing and what assistance it would require from the United States to carry out its proposal.

Thus far the Mexican Government has not submitted a plan, but of course its proposal will receive most careful consideration when it is submitted.

The following is a quotation from General Cardenas' remarks at his meeting with the Defense Commission of September 17th.

"Some months ago I was approached by a newspaper man and asked when Mexican troops would participate in active combat. Jokingly, I replied that they were armed with sticks and stones and could not participate in modern war. This statement has been widely quoted.

"Now, thanks to the generosity of the United States Government and the work of the Defense Commission, the Mexican Army is reasonably well equipped with modern implements of war and we have worked hard to give it good training. I realize that after this war, no nation can hold its head up which has not participated to the best of its ability in the war; only by the sacrifice of blood and the stress of combat can adequate participation be made and I hope Mexican troops will be given an opportunity to do their fair share in combat. I believe that President Avila Camacho agrees with these views."

  
Chief of Staff.

**SECRET**

Regraded Unclassified



A16/General

Admiral Glassford's letter to the President, dated 9-28-43,  
re report on activities of the American Mission to Dakar, F.W.A.

See President's File    L-Logistics, General.

**THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON**

August 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

S.T.E.

Give this to me today.  
I think I will give out the news  
of it when I get to Canada.

F.D.R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 13. 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference is made to Mr. Early's memorandum of August 11 transmitting a memorandum dated August 3 from Mr. Lauchlin Currie in regard to a proposed statement concerning the Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada.

The proposed statement quoted in Mr. Early's memorandum is satisfactory to the Department of State.

RF



OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION  
FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.  
ADMINISTRATOR

August 11, 1943


MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Stephen Early, Secretary to the  
President

FROM: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

SUBJECT: Proposed Release on Creation of  
Joint War Aid Committee, U. S.-  
Canada

The proposed release contained in  
Lauchlin Currie's memorandum to the President  
of August 3 enclosed with your letter is en-  
tirely satisfactory to Lend-Lease.



August 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO HONORABLE EDWARD R. STETTINIUS:  
Administrator, Office of  
Lend-Lease Administration

Dear Ed:

Attached is a copy of a memorandum the President has received from Mr. Lauchlin Currie.

The President, as the memorandum states, has been asked to approve this proposal.

Before doing this, he has requested me to check the proposal with the Department of State and the Office of the Lend-Lease Administrator.

I will be grateful to you for any suggestions or comments you care to make.

STEPHEN EARLY  
Secretary to the President

ste-IT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Proposed Joint War Aid  
Memorandum to the Secretary of State:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a copy of a memorandum  
the President has received from Mr. Lauchlin  
Currie.

The President, as the memorandum states,  
has been asked to approve this proposal.

Before doing this, he has requested me  
to check the proposal with the Department of  
State and the Office of the Lend-Lease Admin-  
istrator.

I will be grateful to you for any  
suggestions or comments you care to make.

If you approve of this proposal  
I shall be happy to arrange with  
Steve for simultaneous release of a  
statement in both countries.

STEPHEN EARLY  
Secretary to the President

*Lauchlin Currie*  
Lauchlin Currie

ste-rr



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1943.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Proposed Joint War Aid  
Committee, U.S.-Canada.

This proposal has now been formally approved by the Canadian Mutual Aid Board. The following terms of reference proposed by the Canadians will, I am certain, be satisfactory to the American agencies involved:

"There has been instituted a Joint War Aid Committee, U. S.-Canada, to study problems that arise out of the operations of the United States Lend-Lease and the Canadian Mutual Aid programs, and, where necessary, to make recommendations concerning them to the proper authorities".

If you approve of this proposal I shall be happy to arrange with Steve for simultaneous release of a statement in both countries.

  
Lauchlin Currie

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
RE: [illegible]  
DATE: [illegible]  
BY: [illegible]

WASHINGTON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Aug. 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

S. T. E.

Will you clear with Lend-Lease  
and the State Department? If they  
approve, go ahead with it.

F. D. R.



~~SECRET~~

A16

DRAFT STATEMENT: POLICY TOWARD THE GERMAN PEOPLE

---

1. The objective of the United States is the unconditional surrender of all our enemies. The United States Government will not conclude a peace or armistice, nor will it enter into any negotiations whatever, with the present German government or with any other groups or individuals in Germany.

2. The United Nations have in their possession evidence concerning the crimes committed by officials and agents of the Hitler regime. Persons guilty of such crimes will be suitably punished. The United States will not be a party to any mass reprisals against the German people.

It must be noted, however, that any further executions of hostages or other nationals of the United Nations, whether outside or inside of Germany, must be taken into account. Also that internal disturbances may prevail in Europe at the close of hostilities; and it will be impossible to guarantee the personal safety of any German national in the liberated countries, even if he be innocent of crimes

See A16/Germany I



SECRET

POLICY ON GERMANY -2

against non-combatants, unless he is a prisoner of war of the United Nations armies.

3. The United States will insist on the restoration of all property looted or stolen from the occupied countries, by whatever means.

4. After the end of hostilities German resources will be held in trust for the German people and order will be maintained in Germany by the United Nations.

5. The United States at the end of the war will aid in feeding the hungry and in general economic rehabilitation. Our first responsibility, however, is to our allies, particularly to those who have been plundered, starved, and enslaved by the Nazi Regime. The longer the war continues, the less food will be available for the German people.

6. The United States is not fighting the German people as a race; we are fighting the Nazi and militarist philosophy of aggression, and all persons in whom that philosophy is embodied.

SECRET

POLICY ON GERMANY - 3

Those German people who support their government which has brought war upon the world must be presumed to adhere to that philosophy. German individuals or groups who repudiate it must prove their repudiation not only by words but by acts.

7. The United States and its allies are working for a world based upon the four freedoms. The German people will be encouraged to reorient their lives toward a faith in freedom under law; and will be invited to take part in the free world of the future when and if they demonstrate that they have accepted their share of its duties and responsibilities, and will forego the use of force or the threat of force in their relations with other nations.



A16/6m

"Pellbridge"  
Hopewell, New York  
August 10, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

I have just telegraphed asking you for an appointment, any time this week or next, either in Hyde Park or in Washington.

You appointed me to the War Guilt Commission in June, for which both Olive and I are very grateful to you.

Since then you have in your public addresses more than once referred directly or indirectly to the ultimate fate of the transgressors. It seems to me very important that this committee should get to work at once, and that, even before organized, its members should gather in London, where we could meet informally and do a great deal of preparation.

My original understanding was that I was to get ready and to go as soon as possible. I immediately arranged my private business so that it could be left in the hands of a trustee, and packed so as to be ready for instant departure. Since then, for nearly two months, I have been waiting, and have received no orders from Washington.

I believe very strongly that it would be for the good of all if my party were sent over as soon as possible. The fact that the American Commissioner was in London would mean a great deal to the unfortunate oppressed in Europe. It would show the enemy that we mean business and might check at least some of the outrages. It would also give me a chance to know the leaders of the other governments, which obviously would be better than to wait until the committee was completely organized and then be presented to them after they have made their contacts and developed their plans.

The whole thing is new, and it is, I believe, most desirable that our representative should be in on the ground floor.

I should be most grateful for the chance of seeing you, and to get off immediately after that.

Olive sends her best.

Respectfully,  
*Herbert Pell*  
Herbert Pell.

The President,  
The White House.



8-12-43

Respectfully referred to  
the President.

E. M. W.

A16/General

Marshall —

Bring Dutch instructors here  
to prepare an approx. force  
of Dutch vs. Japan.

Memorandum.

The Netherlands Government wishes to restate the firm determination to wage war on Japan to the end at the side of the Allies with all the men and resources at the disposal of the Netherlands. These means are at present extremely limited owing to the occupation by the enemy of the two most important parts of the Netherlands Empire, but the recent developments of the war in Europe give rise to the expectation of the liberation of the Motherland in Europe in a not too distant future, when the great mass of the Dutch population will be free again to enter the ring. With this possibility in view, the Netherlands Government has ordered its naval and military authorities to work out a plan for the rapid raising of an army to participate in the war against Japan immediately after the liberation of Holland, as the first step in the remobilisation of Dutch manpower. As soon as this plan has been completed and approved by the Dutch Government, it will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. It can be stated, already, however, that the assistance of the United States and



Britain will be essential in the execution of this plan with regard to the supply of equipment and weapons and to the transport and training of troops. As the mobilisation of these troops can only start properly after arrival in Holland of the Officers and Non Commissioned Officers now prisoners of war in Germany, the assistance of the United States and Britain will also be asked for the rapid repatriation of these prisoners of war.

Washington, D.C.,  
August 11, 1943.

A16

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1943.

SE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

General Marshall,

The President has approved the policies set forth in Combined Chiefs of Staff document C.C.S. 228/3, dated July 9, 1943.

Very respectfully,

Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

5 August 1943.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Immunity for Hospital Ships.

Enclosure: C.C.S. 228/3, Copy No. 60.

Action of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Attached hereto is a copy of C.C.S. 228/3 in which the Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on certain policies in connection with the above subject.

Concurrence of Secretary of State:

The Secretary of State has informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in the opinion of the State Department the policies expressed in C.C.S. 228/3 are in no way inconsistent with the spirit of the existing international agreements on the subject.

Recommendation:

That you give your approval to the policies set forth in C.C.S. 228/3.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*Approved*  
*FJR*

*W. H. H. H.*  
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.



**SECRET**



~~U. S. SECRET~~  
~~BRITISH MOST SECRET~~

360-15  
(C.C.S. 228/3)

9 July 1943

*Confidential*

COPY NO. 60

- 360
- (1) J.C.S. 315
  - (2) J.AD.C. 7/D  
(Withdrawn)
  - (3) J.P.S. 187/D
  - (4) J.M.T. 21/M
  - (5) J.M.T. 21/1
  - (6) J.P.S. 187/1
  - (7) J.P.S. 187/2
  - (8) J.C.S. 315/1
  - (9) J.C.S. 315/2
  - (10) C.C.S. 228
  - (11) C.C.S. 228/1
  - (12) C.AD.C. 2/D
  - (13) C.AD.C. 2/1
  - (14) C.C.S. 228/2

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

HOSPITAL SHIPS

Reference: C.C.S. 101st Mtg., Item 6

C.C.S. 228/3

9 July 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

HOSPITAL SHIPS

Reference: C.C.S. 101st Mtg., Item 6

Note by the Secretaries

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that under present circumstances every effort be made to maintain immunity of hospital ships from attack.
  
2. The following policies are approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but they shall not be communicated to the enemy except as stated in paragraph 3 below:
  - a. In order to acquire right to immunity at night, hospital ships must be illuminated continuously from sunset to sunrise.
  
  - b. In order to acquire right to immunity at night, the funnels and hulls of hospital ships must be illuminated from sunset to sunrise to show the red crosses, white painting and green band. Distinctive markings which must at all times be displayed on the decks for identification from the air must be similarly illuminated at night.
  
  - c. If markings are not illuminated at the time of an attack at night, no complaint can be entertained. It is not, however, illegal for a hospital ship to darken ship at her own risk on necessary occasions such as when lying in a port, passing through defensive minefields or in company with the fleet.
  
  - d. Any form of maneuvers or stratagems at sea such as practiced by naval vessels to deceive an enemy is not permitted to hospital ships, except when alteration of course is necessary in special circumstances to avoid compromising an operation.

e. A ship which has been designated as a hospital ship may carry the following:

(1) The regular personnel assigned to the ship.

\*(2) Combatant and noncombatant personnel only if wounded, sick, or shipwrecked, except that strictly medical corps personnel and personnel of an officially recognized relief society traveling either as units or as casuals may be carried for passage in either direction.

(3) Supplies incident to and for use on board the ship.

\*(4) Regular medical supplies and equipment, exclusive of ambulances and all other vehicles.

(5) No other passengers, materials, mail, or stores may be carried.

f. A hospital ship in company with legitimate targets is not because of that fact a legitimate target for attack, but is placed in jeopardy and accepts the risk of accidental attack under such circumstances.

g. A hospital ship operating in the vicinity of military objectives accepts the risk of damage incidental to attacks upon the military objectives.

3. Having agreed to the above policies, either government may use the terms of that policy in independently lodging or answering protests concerning particular incidents always, however, keeping the other government fully advised of the proceedings. If a protest concerning the same incident is addressed by the enemy to both governments, consultation shall take place before a reply is made.

4. If any important change in the policies regarding hospital ships, other than those agreed upon above, is considered by either government, the proposal shall be submitted in full to the other prior to any communication with the enemy.

\*These paragraphs therefore permit a medical unit with its equipment, less vehicles, to be transported to any theater of operations.

Regraded Unclassified



U. S. SECRET  
BRITISH MOST SECRET

5. Any reprisals taken against Japan will not be extended to Germany and Italy unless the latter show solidarity with Japan, and shall in any case be the subject of prior consultation between governments before being put into effect.

H. REIDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

*Admiral Brown  
file secret*

*A16*

7 August 1943

*Files  
AS*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Irish Air and Naval Bases

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the military aspects of the acquisition of air and naval bases in Ireland.

2. Air transport and air ferry operations will not be materially improved by acquiring such bases. Air operations by very long range aircraft for the protection of shipping would not be appreciably extended in range. In both instances, however, an additional degree of safety and flexibility would be had through the availability of additional fields.

3. Air operations against the European Continent would not be appreciably facilitated by use of bases in Eire except that bases for fighter planes in southwest Eire would be of advantage to the theater commander as bases to which he might move his fighter planes to oppose German air attacks on Allied convoys if they should be routed south of Ireland.

4. This air threat together with that of the German submarines operating from bases in western France are now deterrent factors in the routing of seaborne traffic to England through lanes south of Ireland. Air bases will reduce the air threat but naval bases will not materially reduce the existent submarine threat because present bases in southwest England are closer to the Bay of Biscay. However, naval bases will be useful when it is considered safe enough to route convoys south of Ireland and when invasion operations start in western Europe. They can be quickly established with floating equipment.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that fighter air bases and naval bases in southern Eire will be strategically valuable to the United Nations when shipping is routed past southern Ireland or when an invasion of western Europe is undertaken.



SECRET


SECRET

6. A saving of American lives and the lives of nationals of those countries associated with us in the war, might result from availability of suitable emergency landing fields in Eire, and would result from availability of air and naval bases when it becomes feasible to route convoys south of Ireland.

7. It is recommended that negotiations be conducted without committing the U.S. at this time to a definite program for the establishment of air or naval bases in southern Ireland.

8. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to the Secretary of State, and officers representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been designated to consult with him in this matter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Copy to:

The Honorable,  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

SECRET



AI/

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN.

Tonight, September 7, the President and the Prime Minister together signed the draft declaration about the use of poison gas against the Italians and the President asked that I should send you the original of this for your records. This is attached.

TKR

7. 9. 43.

INVESTIGATION  
THE WHITE HOUSE

File  
WSP  
WSP

DRAFT DECLARATION.

In the name of the U.S. and British Governments, I wish to make it plain that the use of poison gas against the Italians will call forth immediate retaliation upon Germany with gas, using the Allied air superiority to the full.

Roosevelt

Churchill

August 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM

1. Clearing up of manner of dealing with political situation in Italy.

It is necessary to set up some machinery for clearing information and questions arising from the development of the Italian situation, whether this is to be done through the Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by correspondence between the State Department and the Foreign Office, or whether it is to be dealt with by direct communication between the President and Mr. Churchill.

2. Question of whether "Conditions of Surrender" in the case of Italy are going to be divided into

- (a) Military terms, and
- (b) Political and economic terms,

or whether all the terms, military and other, are to be combined in one comprehensive document as desired by the British.

3. Clearing up of manner of relationship with French Committee of National Liberation.

Decision on this question should also include, if the decision is in the affirmative, the character and designation of the representation of the two Governments near the French Committee at Algiers.

4. Decision as to whether a joint statement by the President and Mr. Churchill should be made with respect to the German situation similar to the joint statement made by them with regard to the Italian situation a few weeks ago.

PA/D:JOD:ACK



SECRET  
SECRET

August 12, 1943.

P.M.

WHITE NUMBER ONE (corrected)

From: The Prime Minister. To: The President.

No. 411.

Following is reply being sent to message in my number 410 referred to in paragraph 3 of my number 409. Begins: "Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Most secret and personal. Your telegram of August 9th gives

me the opportunity to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on the recent most important victories gained by the Russian armies at Orel and Byelgorod opening the way to your further advances towards Bryansk and Kharkov. The

defeats of the German armies on this front are milestones to our final victory. I have arrived at the Citadel, Quebec, and start this afternoon

to meet the President at his private home. Meanwhile the Staffs will be in conference here and the President and I will join them at the end of the week. I will show the President your telegram about meeting of our

responsible representatives in the near future which certainly seems to be most desirable. I quite understand you cannot leave the front at this critical period when you are actually directing the victorious

movement of your armies. Thank you for your congratulations on our Sicilian success, which we shall endeavor to exploit to the full without prejudice to OVERLORD. Certainly our affairs are much better in every

quarter than when we met at Moscow exactly a year ago. I am sending you a small stereoscopic machine with a large number of photograph slides

of the damage done by our bombing to German cities. They give one a much more vivid impression than anything that can be gained from photographs. I hope you will find a half hour in which to look at them. This

we know for certain, 80% of the houses in Hamburg are down. It is only now a question of a short time before the nights lengthen and even greater destruction will be laid upon Berlin. This subject only to weather.

This will be continued for several nights and days and will be the heaviest ever known. Finally in the U-boat war we have in the months of May, June, and July destroyed u-boats at the rate of one a day, while our losses have

been far less than we planned for. Our net gain in new tonnage is very great. All this will facilitate the establishment of the large scale Anglo-American fronts against the Germans which I agree with you are indispensable to the

shortening of the war."

NO SIGNATURE.

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

A I D E - M E M O I R E

In November 1942 the United States Government informed His Majesty's Government through the United States Ambassador in London that they looked forward to informal and exploratory talks with representatives of Great Britain and other powers in accordance with Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, and invited His Majesty's Government either to send a delegate for the purpose or to nominate some member of the British Embassy in Washington to represent them. His Majesty's Government at the time nominated Sir Frederick Phillips and Mr. Opie for this purpose but did not otherwise pursue the United States suggestion as discussions of some parts of the ground covered by Article VII viz. monetary policy, were already in progress while other parts were felt by His Majesty's Government to require some preliminary study on their part.

Having now been able to carry further their examination of the various topics, His Majesty's Government feel that the moment has come to initiate with the United States Government informal and exploratory talks on the whole field covered by Article VII and that it is important for these talks to start without delay. They are strengthened in this view by the repeated requests made by some of the Allied Governments in exile for a lead by the United States and United Kingdom. They see great advantage in handling the essentially inter-related matters covered by Article VII as a coherent whole. In pursuance therefore of the United States suggestion mentioned in the preceding paragraph, they intend, if the United States Government see no objection, to send to Washington not later than the first half of September a delegation of senior officials, led by a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, which would be capable of dealing with all these subjects and in particular monetary policy, international investment, the regulation of primary products and commercial policy. His Majesty's Government suggest that the first object of such talks should be to obtain broad United States-United Kingdom agreement on an orderly agenda for the discussion of Article VII. His Majesty's Government continue as in the past to regard as of the greatest importance the attainment of prior agreement on such matters between the United States and United Kingdom Governments before they are discussed in a wide international field. The proposed delegation would also be in a position to push further the talks on

monetary



monetary policy which have already begun so as to pave the way for a general monetary conference which might be followed by further international conferences on other postwar monetary and economic problems which call for solution.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to know whether this suggestion would be open to any objection on the part of the United States Government. If not, they would proceed to nominate their delegation forthwith.

Washington, D.C.  
August 4th, 1943



A16

A16

*File personal confidential*

*FJE WS*

SECRET

THE AMERICAN MISSION  
DAKAR, F. W. A.

June 19, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

I had a very satisfactory talk with Jonas Ingram at Recife on the 14th of June on the general subject of the strategic importance of French West Africa in relation to the South America-Africa line of communication. We feel we are well together in understanding your views and wishes in this regard and in our proposed initial steps for their implementation.

Opportunity will be sought by Ingram to send a Brazilian or other Allied cruiser on the South Atlantic Patrol, into Dakar for refueling. Vice Admiral Collinet of the French Navy with headquarters in Dakar, consents to seek similar opportunity to send a French cruiser, also of the South Atlantic Patrol, into Pernambuco (Recife) for refueling, the British Vice Admiral Rawlings, who commands all Allied forces on the West Coast of Africa (including the French), consenting. Thereafter we hope to be able to arrange periodic naval contacts, thus linking the two continents by water. Once established, we thought the link might prove useful in establishing desirable economic relations between South America and French West Africa, thus furthering the ties between the two continents.

The Governor General (Boisson) is appreciative of your  
confidence....

SECRET

-2-

confidence tacitly expressed by the fact of the presence here of your personal representative. He says he is "on the spot", does not know what is in store for him, and is reconciled to any decision in his regard reached by the North African French authorities. Am bound to say however that our arrival has cheered him considerably and I believe given him a feeling of greater security.

General Barrau, the French Commander in Chief here, and General Falvy, the commander of ground troops under Barrau, both will be relieved in the immediate future. Barrau repulsed DeGaulle and Conyngham in the attack on Dakar in September, 1940. Falvy told me that he expects to be given a "fighting command in North Africa or beyond".

Faithfully yours,

*William Glassford*  
WILLIAM GLASSFORD

The President,

The White House.

Regraded Unclassified

A16-3

File  
JTB

May 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In view of No. 3594, May 25th, from Winant, I suggest that you send the following to Winant for Winant to take up with Eden:

"The President is greatly concerned by report in your 3594, May 25th, relating to you talk with Ronald. The President and the Prime Minister were in complete agreement that our joint present position is that there shall be no armistice but that the policy of unconditional surrender be the sole criterion at this time. Therefore, the President is disturbed at any discussion of armistices in any place. Please advise.

HULL"

O.K.

F. D. R.



A16-3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Admiral Brown  
to file  
W*


June 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A communique in the clear has just been received from Allied Forces Headquarters in North Africa stating that Pantelleria has surrendered.

No further details are available at present.

Very respectfully,



CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

May 19, 1943.

*Admiral Brown  
to file  
not sent*

Memorandum for the President

In accordance with our personal conversation I herewith enclose a draft of the proposed message from you to President Vargas.

Please advise me as to whether you approve its sending.

*CH*



PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TRANSMITTED  
 SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED  
CLEAR  
PARTAIR

Collect (Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter)

Department of State

Charge Department  
Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Washington,

May 19, 1943

Charge to  
\$

AMEMBASSY

RIO DE JANEIRO.

SECRET FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Please communicate orally and in the utmost secrecy the following message from the President to President Vargas:

You will remember that when I had the opportunity of meeting with you at Natal last winter and of talking over with you the problems with which our two countries are confronted, we agreed upon the necessity of taking every precaution to see that certain islands of the Atlantic should not become a source of grave danger to the defense of the interests of the Western Hemisphere.

As you know, this Government has stated officially and publicly to the governments of both Spain and Portugal that it harbored no aggressive intentions against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of any other country. The policy of the United States today, like the policy of Brazil, is based upon the inalienable right of self-defense which we recognize as the rightful policy of other sovereign nations.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNLESS NOTED TO BE SENT



TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED  
CLEAR  
AIRGRAM

Department of State

Washington,

Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge to

\$

-2-

Since the time of our meeting I have become increasingly anxious because of the constantly expanding acts on the part of the German Government to extend the theater of operations of its submarines and particularly because of the efforts which the Germans are making to establish bases either openly or secretly on islands which by their very situation in the Atlantic threaten the shipping routes and, consequently, the security of the Western Hemisphere. As far back as 1941 I pointed out the dangers to our hemisphere which would result if certain of these Atlantic islands were to come under the control or occupation of forces which solely pursue a policy of world conquest.

Information is now at hand which indicates that the German Government has actually under contemplation the establishment of U-boat bases and U-boat supply stations in the Azores without any previous warning to the Government of Portugal. We may at any time be faced with a fait accompli.

Your own deep interest in this question and your own offer of helpful cooperation in the solution of this problem should the need therefor arise leads me now to ask

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED  
CLEAR  
AIRGRAM

Department of State

Washington,

Departments  
Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge to

\$

-3-

whether you would be disposed to consider a secret approach on your part to the Government of Portugal in order to ascertain whether the Portuguese Government would be willing for the period of the war either to lease these islands to the Government of Brazil or to authorize the Government of Brazil together with the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain to establish such air bases and security controls in the Azores as would protect them not only from aggression by the Axis powers, but which would likewise prevent the use of the harbors and local resources of the islands by enemy submarines now preying on United Nations shipping.

Should you be willing to consider such an approach to the Portuguese Government I would of course be glad to have you restate the assurances I have offered in the name of this Government regarding the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Portuguese territories as set forth in my message to General Carmona in November 1942. I would assume that the terms of the British-Portuguese alliance would need no reaffirmation.

Because of the special ties which unite Brazil and

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THE TELETYPE UNIT IS STOPPED BY THE TELETYPE UNIT



TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
RESTRICTED  
CLEAR  
AIRGRAM

Department of State

Washington,

-4-

Department:  
Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter  
Charge to  
\$

Portugal, I feel as I have already said to you that any confidential and friendly approach which you would be willing to make in this matter to the Portuguese Government would be exceptionally helpful.

I shall be most grateful if you will let me have your views with regard to this question and inform me whether you would consider it possible for you now to take the initiative in this matter on behalf of the three Governments, Brazil, Great Britain and the United States, which are primarily concerned in maintaining the security of the Atlantic.

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
E. RA: TMT

*[Handwritten Signature]*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THE COUPON IS DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1943.

SECRET - SECURITY

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Recommended line of action at coming conferences.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following line of action be adopted by the United States at the coming conferences and submit it herewith for your approval. Their recommendations are followed by a brief supporting discussion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

General

I. The agenda must not be limited to 1943, nor to BOLERO as distinguished from ROUNDUP.

II. The close interrelation between strategy against Germany and strategy against Japan must be clearly stated and emphasized early in the conference. It should be intimated that a British course of action in Europe which the United States consider unsound may force the United States to increased attention to the Pacific.

Axis in Europe

III. The United States consider that SICKLE from now on, and ROUNDUP in 1944 constitute the basic strategy against Germany, and must not be delayed or otherwise prejudiced by other undertakings in Europe.

IV. However, they recognize certain advantages in prompt post-HUSKY operations in the Western Mediterranean, and as an alternative or compromise will discuss them with a view to determining the best course of action in that area - provided such action involves a timely reduc-



SECRET

*no closed minds*  
*Don't say Italy out*  
*Turkey*  
*Taking the weight off Russia*

SECRET - SECURITY

SECRET

tion rather than an increase in allied resources committed to that area, tends to support SICKLE, and does not interfere with ROUNDUP.

V. Subject to discussion and future developments, the occupation of SARDINIA is considered less open to objection than other Mediterranean operations.

7  
?  
VI. The United States will not become involved in operations east of Sicily except possibly for special air operations.

VII. If the British insist on doing so, they do it alone.

VIII. Should the British insist on undertaking commitments in the Mediterranean, which the United States considers prejudicial to the overall concept of the earliest possible defeat of Germany and the ultimate defeat of Japan, the British will be informed that the United States may be forced to revise their strategy and extend their operations and commitments in the Pacific.

Japan

no IX. ANAKIM should be undertaken and pressed to successful conclusion.

X. If ANAKIM proves impossible, due to lack of British support or other reasons, and no adequate alternative can be agreed upon, the United States will expand and intensify its operations in the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which Japan gains by Allied failure adequately to support China.

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DISCUSSION

2. The main subjects of the agenda proposed by the British are:

a. "Post-HUSKY strategy in 1943 against Axis in Europe under following heads:

Further action in Mediterranean

SICKLE and BOLERO"

b. "Action against Japan in Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters."

While these subjects are in general satisfactory, the limiting phrase "in 1943," in item (a) is typical of the British tendency to the immediate and short view, in contrast to our belief that agreed undertakings must be based on the over-all or long view. We should see that the words "in 1943" are omitted from the approved agenda, and that it is changed to read "SICKLE, BOLERO and ROUND-UP."

3. The close interrelation between the two principal subjects - the war in Europe and the war against Japan, should be emphasized in discussing the agenda. Our position should be that, while at the present time we accept a strategy which contemplates the defeat of Germany first, we maintain that any proposed course of action against Germany has a direct relation to our proposed course of action against Japan.

4. After these two points concerning the agenda have been decided, the subject of "Further action in Mediterranean" will come up. It appears that the crux of this question will be whether or not the Allied Nations shall be committed to major operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. We should state that such a commitment is contrary to sound strategy and should firmly maintain that the United States will not become so committed.

a. Such action does not offer adequate contribution to the basic concept of the earliest possible defeat of the Axis in Europe.

- 3 -

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b. It will absorb means that are needed for SICKLE, ROUNDUP, and the war against Japan.

c. It will involve longer and more hazardous lines of communication and the application of our effort in an area remote from and having substantially no communications leading to the decisive theater of the war.

*This is  
concerning  
Spain*

d. While purporting to support Russia it can hardly fail to arouse Russian suspicions as to the future of the Dardanelles. It should be noted that because of the advent of air power, supplemented by the submarine, British possession of the Dodecanese with the continuance of the control they have consistently exercised over Greece, would serve to bar the transit of the Straits by Russia substantially as effectively as if the British held the shores of the Straits themselves.

e. It will be increasingly difficult to maintain popular acceptance of such action in the United States -- particularly in view of the continuing threat in the Pacific.

f. It assumes an early and complete accomplishment of HUSKY. This assumption seems less likely of realization than the contrary one that this operation will be long drawn-out and costly.

Should the British insist on operations to the east of Sicily, the United States should inform them (1) that they will have to rely entirely on British resources, and (2) that to the extent such employment of resources detracts from the effectiveness of operations directly against Germany, the United States may be forced to increase its commitments in the Pacific.

5. We are firmly of the opinion that sound basic strategy for conducting the war in Europe requires that the major effort against Germany be made from the United Kingdom

- 4 -

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SECRET - SECURITY

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by SICKLE now and by ROUNDUP in 1944. We realize however that there is some force in the arguments that post-HUSKY operations in the western Mediterranean will --

- a. maintain the momentum of HUSKY.
- b. employ resources available there, which cannot be transferred to the United Kingdom this year.
- c. furnish support to Russia.
- d. tend to knock Italy out of the war.
- e. threaten southern France and Italy.

For these reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff should, as an alternative or compromise, consider further operations in the Western Mediterranean. They should strongly maintain, however, that such operations are of an emergency nature, primarily in support of Russia and that the major effort against Germany must remain SICKLE from now on and ROUNDUP in 1944. As between SARDINIA and ITALY as objectives, SARDINIA would detract less from the essential concentration of our resources in the United Kingdom.

6. The British will continue to depreciate the importance of the effort against Japan and the necessity for support of China. They will argue that ANAKIM is impracticable in 1943 and will probably present unsatisfactory alternatives. The United States cannot do ANAKIM alone. A strong position should be taken as regards the Pacific and ANAKIM - namely, that if ANAKIM should be abandoned the United States must expand and intensify its operations in the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which Japan would gain by Allied failure adequately to support China.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*William D. Leahy*

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

- 5 -

SECRET



SECRET

March 26, 1943

1. Are we going to permit any country in Europe to form a dictatorship after the war?
- X 2. What is our policy to be relative to armaments in a country like Poland after the war?
- ✓ 3. What are our respective and united intentions toward Africa?
- ✓ 4. Are we in agreement that China is to be one of the four controlling powers after the war?
- ✓ 5. What are our joint or respective policies as to Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, Indo China, The Malay States (and Hong Kong)?
- ✓ 6. Have we a meeting of the minds relative to the policy of "Trusteeship" after the war?
- ✓ 7. What shall we do with the Japanese Mandated islands?
- ✓ 8. Are we agreed as to how to treat Germany after the war?
- ✓ 9. What is our policy as regards France after the war?
- ✓ 10. How can we best insure the taking of common political decisions arising out of military operations in Europe?
- ✓ 11. What is likely to be the best procedure for discussion of future civil aviation, transportation, communications?
- ✓ 12. What is the structure of the United Nations organization we visualize after the war?

Chief of the Imperial  
General Staff.

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

*Admiral Brown  
to file  
WB*

SECRET - SECURITY

18 May 1943.


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER:


Subject: Use of Portuguese Atlantic  
Islands.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed as to the tremendous benefits which the United Nations would gain from the earliest possible use of the Azores Islands. They recommend that the Portuguese Government should be approached at once on this subject, but that no guarantee should be given and that every endeavor should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists. They consider that Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula if the Azores Islands are so used, and that the risk is acceptable.

In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails. Plans are therefore being prepared and will be submitted, showing the earliest date for their execution and how, if at all, they will affect operations now in view.



A. F. BROOKE,  
General,  
Chief of the Imperial  
General Staff.



WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

SECRET

HEEL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated March 25, 1943

Rec'd 8 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2146, March 25, 8 p.m.

SECRET

Roger Cambon who lunched with me today expressed considerable anxiety over the forthcoming negotiations at Algiers on two counts. In the first place he believes that large Gaullist demonstrations will be carefully organized to take place upon the arrival of the General in North Africa in various cities to give the impression of spontaneity and to impress correspondents, and through them the world, that all North Africa is Gaullist at heart and demands the leadership of De Gaulle. He said that most of De Gaulle's missions to Algeria were sent there primarily to organize the Gaullist supporters there and that negotiations with Giraud were in part merely a cover for their more important (from the Carlton Gardens point of view) activities. He mentioned Pechkoff and Pellabon by name in this connection. He said he did not know what preventive measures could be taken but he felt that such misleading public demonstrations would

-2-, #2146, March 25, 8 p.m., from London.

would have an unfortunate effect on opinion here, in the United States, and, of equal importance to him, in France itself.

The second danger he foresees is the propaganda which will emanate from Carlton Gardens during the course of the forthcoming negotiations. There will, he said, probably be prompt and close telegraphic communications between the De Gaulle mission at Algiers and Carlton Gardens and that the latter's well organized and highly effective publicity machine, from which we have suffered so much in the past, will be working at full blast. Whatever proposals and counter-proposals are made, Carbon went on, they will be given to the public here and broadcast to France by Carlton Gardens in a form to show the "democracy" and "conciliatory attitude" of General De Gaulle against which the "Rightest" Giraud and his "Vichy associates" will be pictured as reaction incarnate. To offset this he believes it important that Murphy and his associates be prepared to make public the true facts, if possible in the form of communique, as soon as possible after developments have occurred. He is not optimistic, incidentally, about reaching any real accord. He believes either  
that the



-3-, #2146, March 25, 8 p.m., from London.

that the negotiations will break down or if agreement is reached it will be "entirely insincere" on De Gaulle's side and utilized by him solely as a means of consolidating his power. The British are saying that such pressure will be brought on both sides by the Americans and British that some agreement must be forthcoming but Cambon is highly skeptical both as to effecting such agreement and as to its value.

Cambon went on to criticize in dispassionate terms several recent developments in British policy. First, he said, they forbid De Gaulle to leave England thus stimulating his anglophobe sentiments. Then they first stop Passy from returning to France on the point of taking off at the airport itself and subsequently reverse themselves and let him go. Thus De Gaulle's secret organizer has reached France where he will devote his energies and recognized abilities to building up the De Gaulle organization in France. Paradoxically, he said, the sentiments and policies of this organization will be anti-British and anti-American while it is made effective through the bountiful supply of hundreds of millions of francs which the British furnish Passy for the purpose. "Unfortunately", Cambon said, "De Gaulle is popular in France

-4-, #2146, March 25, 8 p.m., from London.

in France and his claim that he has already been chosen by French plebiscite is taking hold. Passy will send messages purporting to represent adhesions from various groups and parties in France which will serve to build up the myth of French unanimity for De Gaulle. My unfortunate people do not realize the all important difference between Giraud and De Gaulle. The former has no personal ambition and his one aim is to liberate our country: the latter is bent on making himself the future dictator of France" Two other remarks Cambon made seem of interest. Massigli, he said, is charging the United States with delaying all De Gaulle telegrams to and from Guiana. Massigli has, he added, become now completely Gaullist, seems to be much influenced by Plevon and is becoming more and more critical of our government. Incidentally, though no date has yet been set for De Gaulle's departure, I understand that Massigli will accompany him.

The other remark Cambon made was to the effect that Sargent had asked him whether his countrymen he had met coming recently from France were in favor of De Gaulle. Cambon answered: "Of course, if they were not you would not let them get out here." He says Sargent made no reply.

MATTHEWS

KLP .



WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON


April 3, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached memorandum presents the shipping implications as determined by the War Department in connection with the abandonment of ANAKIM in order to provide accelerated build-up of BOLERO.

Admiral Leahy has indicated his full concurrence with the memorandum. Admiral King recommends that we adhere to the decision to implement ANAKIM and that we continue the allocation of shipping for the operation as now envisaged, recognizing, however, the possibility that a modified ANAKIM may be necessary.

Dispatches from General Stilwell and reports concerning the British operations against the Japanese in Burma confirm Admiral King's suggestion that we may be forced to accept a modified ANAKIM operation.



Chief of Staff.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: ANAKIM.

With reference to your comments yesterday on the possible reduction if not omission of the ANAKIM operation commencing late in November or early in December, I submit the following:

## ANAKIM

The agreed strategy for the Pacific was to retain the initiative by maintaining pressure on the Japanese and advancing into a position of readiness for a full-scale offensive following the defeat of Germany.

The abandonment of ANAKIM would to a material extent permit the Japanese to pursue the following courses of action:

Attack our ground installations for the maintenance of air communication into China.

Bomb Calcutta and other Eastern India centers to demoralize their British control and prestige.

Concentrate more heavily against the Southwest Pacific with the possibility of effecting a landing at Port Darwin as a diversionary measure.

Any reverse in the South or Southwest Pacific will immediately compel the diversion of more tonnage to that region with its long turn-around and serious effect on BOLERO shipments. If Chennault's air offensive is punishing to the Japanese, a violent reaction against our air communications with China would be inevitable, and if successful might well have a disastrous effect on the whole Chinese situation.

The British requests for U. S. shipping covering the present plans for ANAKIM amount to 25 ships per month in April, May, and June, and 19 ships per month in July and August. It is possible that we can

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better this outlay by the use of the Mediterranean route, thus shortening the haul and obviating the necessity of the early departure of the ships from England.

## Limited ANAKIM

We have made a superficial estimate of a more limited ANAKIM operation (without reference to Stilwell) which would:

Continue pressure on the Japanese in Burma, compelling a dispersal of their forces to our advantage in the Pacific.

Protect our air installations.

Open a land route to China via LEDO-MYITKYINA - BHAMO - LASHIO (this route plus the contemplated air ferry route would handle approximately 30,000 tons of supplies a month).

The modified operation would involve three phases:

I. Capture of the airfield at Akyab by the British, followed by the capture of Ramree Island. Simultaneously there would have to be a Naval demonstration in the Bay of Bengal to convince the Chinese that we have control of the waters in that area.

II. A British advance towards Pakokku and Mandalay from their present positions in the Imphal - Chindwin River - Chin Hills area.

A Chinese (Ramgarh Force) advance from Ledo to Myitkyina.

III. Chinese advance from Yunnan to Myitkyina - Bhamo - Lashio, to make a junction with the Chinese forces from the Ledo area and eventually with the British at Mandalay.

The Chinese are not now aware of the full extent of the British proposed ANAKIM operation on Rangoon; this at Wavell's personal request. However, I fear that any intimation to them at the present time we are considerably modifying the original ANAKIM proposal would stir up a vigorous reaction, notwithstanding the fact that they

# SECRET



are reluctant to put their troops into an offensive action. What they are insisting on is the Naval concentration and British offensive action, with U. S. troops alongside the British to guarantee, they say, aggressive action.

I have only been able to give superficial consideration to the proposed modified operation, and the matter of tonnage adjustments is still in a fluid state. Therefore I would not wish to commit myself to a fixed opinion at this time as to the pros and cons in this matter.


I might say that the operations and shipping people tell me that at present the situation is as follows: The British have committed to ANAKIM personnel ships sufficient for a lift of 7,000 men per month, and the equivalent of one cargo sailing per month (that is, about 10% of the cargo sailings scheduled for the Indian theater). The British have requested the United States to supply 113 sailings to the Indian theater during the period April - August 1943, inclusive, but General Somervell considers that their needs could be met if 90 sailings were provided during the same period. Our own requirements for that theater are relatively light and their reduction would have little effect on other operations, but if the 90 ships involved in the British request were made available for BOLERO and not diverted to British imports as a result of a cancellation or modification of ANAKIM, the initial equipment and maintenance for approximately 215,000 troops could be transported to the U. K. during the remainder of 1943.

This assistance to Bolero build-up would be especially valuable during the summer when the overall shipping situation is tightest. Likewise, if the British troop ships now programmed for ANAKIM were placed in the North Atlantic run, an additional 10,000 men per month could be moved to the U. K. Thus, while our own commitments to the Indian area have little bearing on BOLERO, the



**SECRET**

overall shipping involved, if applied to BOLERO build-up would materially increase our effective strength in the U. K. before the end of 1943.


A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. Marshall", written in a cursive style.

Chief of Staff.

**SECRET**

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BURMA



MODIFIED "ANAKIM" OPERATION

Phase I.

Capture the airfield at AKYAB by British Forces, followed by the capture of RAMREE ISLAND. Simultaneously there should be a naval demonstration in the BAY OF BENGAL to convince the Chinese that we have control of the waters in the area.

Phase II.

A. A British advance toward PAKOKKU and MANDALAY from their present positions in the IMPHAL - CHINDWIN RIVER - CHIN HILLS area.  
B. A Chinese (RANGARRH Force) advance from LEDO to MYITKINA.

Phase III.

Chinese advance from YUNNAN to the line MYITKINA - SHAMO - LASHIO. Junction with Chinese Forces from the LEDO area, advance to the south and southwest joining the British at MANDALAY.

Prepared by  
Strategy Section, OPD  
31 March '43

Drawn in the Cartographic Section M.E.S. W.D. by D.G.C.A.R.W.S.  
ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C. 18002  
1943

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9135

*File*

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A4-1(2)

Serial: 00625

**SECRET**

APR 3 1943

Subject: Employment of Patrol Planes.

-----

(e) In the "very long range" category, which is much the most critical need under current anti-submarine warfare conditions, the number of PBY and PBM patrol planes that may be available has no bearing. Early increase of B-24's (Navy, Army and RAF) for this purpose is in prospect and should go far to improve the situation.

5. I do not think it possible to make any more of the existing patrol planes available for ASW, but the number assigned to this service will be increased as new construction comes into service.

*E. J. King*  
E. J. KING.



COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Ff1/A4-1(2)

Serial: 00625

**SECRET**

SECRET

APR 3 1943

MEMORANDUM for Admiral Leahy.

Subject: Employment of Patrol Planes.

1. The following is submitted in reply to the question, "Why can the Navy not make more extensive use of its PBV planes for anti-submarine patrol?" in your memorandum of 26 March.
2. As will be seen from the attached simplified summary of all now on hand, there are 178 PBV planes engaged in anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic theater.
3. For the entire Pacific theater, with its many and widely dispersed search and combatant demands, only 175 patrol seaplanes are currently available and so employed.
4. The following points are pertinent to the subject of aircraft employment and assignment for anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic.
  - (a) Ice in northern waters prevents the use of patrol seaplanes there, except the amphibious type, of which the number is limited.
  - (b) Fully effective use of the newer of these two types, the PBM, has been delayed by engine difficulties, now in the course of correction.
  - (c) There is no great disparity now between the number of twin-engine patrol planes needed and the number actually employed in Atlantic anti-submarine warfare.
  - (d) The four-engine patrol plane (PB2Y) has been badly delayed by engine difficulties. These are being corrected and the longer range of this type will be useful.

**SECRET**  
**SECRET**

DISTRIBUTION OF NAVY PATROL SEAPLANES

There are 264 Navy patrol seaplanes in the Atlantic. Of these, 178 are assigned to anti-submarine warfare. The remainder, 86, are engaged in training, experimental or utility work, or waiting acceptance.

The distribution of the 178 patrol seaplanes assigned to anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic is as follows:

Iceland	10
Greenland	4
Newfoundland	9
Eastern Sea Frontier	25
Gulf Sea Frontier	6
Bermuda	7
Panama Sea Frontier	15
Caribbean Sea Frontier	46
South Atlantic	32
Northwest Africa	<u>24</u>
Total	178

There are 271 Navy patrol seaplanes in the Pacific. Of these, 175 are assigned to essential search and combatant operations of various kinds, including anti-submarine measures. The remainder, 96, are engaged in training, experimental or utility work, waiting acceptance or are enroute to active squadrons.

The distribution of the 175 patrol seaplanes assigned to search and combatant operations in the Pacific is as follows:

Aleutians	33
West Coast	25
Hawaii	29
Canton	5
Midway	5
Johnston	3
South Pacific	61
Southwest Pacific	<u>14</u>
Total	175

Summarizing:

Anti-submarine warfare Atlantic	178
Other activities Atlantic	86
Search and combatant, Pacific	175
Other activities, Pacific	<u>96</u>
Total	535

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In addition to the foregoing summary of patrol seaplanes assigned to the Fleet there are 258 of this type employed as follows:

Cadet training establishments	113
PBY's still in development status	60
Naval air transport	26
Modification centers	<u>59</u>
Total	258



*Adm Brown*  
**CONFIDENTIAL** *File 15*

**WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON**

March 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Development of Army operational technique.

In France in 1918 a Division attack order was sometimes fifteen or twenty pages long. After the war continuous efforts were made to cut down this verbosity but even as late as 1927 when I took over the Infantry School I found a battalion order three and four pages in length.

It is very hard to break down a highly developed technique which had indoctrinated a great many officers as a result of trench warfare procedure.

Finally in 1930 I obtained through General von Blomberg (the head of the German Army whom Hitler fired because he married a carpenter's daughter of doubtful reputation), the data on recent German maneuvers where divisional attack orders were not only brief but at times purely oral.

Through the following years the matter still was one of bitter discussion but it was not until the preliminary to the maneuvers in Louisiana in 1940 that we succeeded in cutting divisions down to a simple operational statement based on the high state of training of combat teams (CT's) within the Division, consisting of a regiment of Infantry and a battalion of Artillery with or without attached supporting units.

With this too lengthy explanation I am attaching a copy of the order for the attack on Oran by the First Division (15,000 men) issued shortly after the landing on November 9th by Terry Allen, the Division commander who is now in command of the operation at Maknassy. All our field orders have five paragraphs, each one dedicated to a certain purpose: the first, to information regarding the enemy and our friendly troops; the second, to the general plan; the third, to the details for the operation; the fourth, to supply matters; and the fifth, to the location of command posts (CP's).

Incl.



*W. H. Tamm*  
Chief of Staff.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

Hq 1st Inf Div  
RENAN  
2210, Nov 9, 1942

"FO #3

1. Omitted.
2. Div atks at 0715 Nov 1942 (See operation map scheme maneuvers and time of atk). CC B atks from S at 0730 in conjunction with 1st Div.
3. a. CT 18 see operation map  
1st Bn CT 18 follows CT 18 after mopping up around ST CLOUD
- b. CT 16 less 1st Bn, see operation map.  
1st Bn CT 16 (brought forward in trucks follows in Div res).
- x. Civilian snipers caught red-handed will be summarily shot.  
  
Nothing in Hell must delay or stop this atk.
4. Attached.
5. Div CP initially follows 16th Inf.

ALLEN  
Maj Gen "

CONFIDENTIAL

March 18, 1943.

**SECRET**  
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**MEMORANDUM**

**From:** The President.  
**To :** The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.  
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

**Subject:** Submarine Warfare.

1. Since the rate of sinking of our merchant ships in the North Atlantic during the past week has increased at a rate that threatens seriously the security of Great Britain, and therefore both "Husky" and "Bolero", it seems evident that every available weapon must be used at once to counteract the enemy submarine campaign.

2. It is my understanding that an increase in the number of long-range bombers operating from Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and Great Britain, combined with the increasing use of ACVs, is the most positive step that can be taken at once.

3. Please inform me:-

- (a) How many B-24s can be operated at once from Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland?
- (b) How soon the maximum number will be operating from each of those bases?
- (c) How many ACVs are now being used in the North Atlantic as anti-submarine weapons?
- (d) At what rate the air support of our convoys by ACVs will be increased.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

**SECRET**



SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

*to President  
has seen  
WS  
File*

March 22, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: High altitude bombing in European theater.

The following extracts from messages just received from General Andrews carry, I believe, very important information regarding the efficiency and power of the daylight bombing operations being conducted from the United Kingdom.

March 19th

"Photos from bombings on Vegesack mission yesterday show very high percentage hits on target. British photos now available are the basis of their first summary report as follows:

'Bremer, Vulkan Schiffbau and Maschinenfabrik AP shipyards, Vegesack very heavily damaged. Two buildings at the Bremen Wollkammerei (wool combing works) are also damaged and there are a few incidents of residential damage and many craters on both sides of the river. Fires are seen still burning in the shipyards. At the shipyard the following buildings are either totally destroyed or damaged: power house, ship-building shops, engine-smiths' shops, erecting shops, lathe shops, frame-bending shop and at least 12 more unidentified buildings.'

"British authorities enthusiastic of results.

"Portal telephoned to congratulate on magnificent effort, answering all critics of day precision bombing. Reference fighter action, early reports indicate more than 30 enemy fighters destroyed in what many units refer to as clumsy attacks by second team and junior birdmen. Many attacks were made by many aircraft types but few 190's and none with the ferocity and skill displayed by enemy fighters in Lille or sub-pen areas.

"Yesterday's effort from all information to date appears entirely successful, and almost perfect undertaking. Inferior fighter opposition due to fact that our recent attacks have been in France and most experienced German fighter units



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concentrated there. This attack shows what we could do to German industry and Air Force if we had sufficient force to make such attacks at many widely separated points simultaneously keeping defences extended and saturated.

"Portal's message follows:

'Please allow me to offer you heartiest congratulations of the RAF on the success of the very fine operation of the 8th Air Force against Vegesack yesterday.' "

## March 21st

"Final claims on bomber raid against Vegesack on March 18th as follows:

"52 enemy aircraft destroyed, 20 probably destroyed and 23 damaged. Score reasonable.

"Following message received from Prime Minister:

'For General Andrews and General Eaker.

All my compliments to you and your officers and men on your brilliant exploit of yesterday, the effectiveness of which the photographs already reveal.'

"This is our highest score so far and computed under present methods."

-----

In this present battle over the distribution of air power I think we should keep in mind the fact that the present daylight bombing operations out of England are playing an increasingly important part in the anti-submarine campaign. Also, that however efficient the operations appear at this time, they are being conducted on a definitely inefficient basis. It seems quite apparent that the casualties to be suffered by a larger group of planes would in all probability be no greater than those suffered by the present small groups, and furthermore, that not only would the destructive effect of the larger number of planes be much greater and the enemy's retaliation during the progress of the raid materially reduced, but an immediate repetition of the raid, while the enemy was demoralized by the destruction of communications, antiaircraft, ground facilities, and of fighter planes in that region, could probably be carried out with the very minimum of loss and a maximum of destructive effect.


# SECRET



**SECRET**

Up to the present time the Army Air Forces have never been able to even approximate the technique on which they have built up the proposition of daylight precision bombing.

I might further say, without greatly exaggerating, that Army Air elsewhere in the world, except in the Australian theater, has been somewhat misused by the employment of Army planes and crews in a manner for which the planes were not designed nor the crews trained, all of which has been a constant embarrassment to the Air Corps.

  
Chief of Staff

**SECRET**



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

*Copy to file*

SECRET A16

January 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Bombing of Maneuvering Surface Targets.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have had an exhaustive study made with a view to evolving doctrine regarding the use of high and medium altitude bombing against maneuvering targets.
2. They concur in your thought that this type of bombing has not completely met our expectations. In the period December 7, 1941, through November 15, 1942, direct hits were scored by Army bombers on 231 enemy ships, 83 of which were maneuvering. Of these ships, 51 were sunk, and 21 are believed to have been sunk. Actually, the ratio of hits to the number of bombs dropped on such missions has not been far from our pre-war estimates.
3. Lack of greater success in bombing of this type is attributable chiefly to the inability to lay down bomb patterns of sufficient density to ensure hits. This condition resulted from an initial shortage of aircraft, and was aggravated by the necessity for utilizing heavy and medium bombers on search and other non-combat missions for which these airplanes were not primarily designed. Also of importance was the lack of complete training of some of the crews that had to be used in combat. The necessity for using bomber crews on non-combat missions also denied these crews the further training, and the practice, which is essential for bombing proficiency.
4. They find that bombing methods are constantly being improved. The decision as to what method is to be used in a particular case must be left to the local commander who must consider the nature of the target, the fighter protection available, the distance to the target,



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
- 2 -

the anti-aircraft resistance to be expected, and the risk incurred to gain the results desired. The method which he may prescribe, for heavy as well as medium bombers, can vary from mast level to high altitude attacks.

5. In the Mediterranean Theater within the last month the effectiveness of high and medium altitude bombing has been doubled by a greater use of pattern bombing. Excellent results are beginning to be reported from the use of "skip bombing" at altitudes of 20 feet.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that everything possible is being done to make bombing more effective, and there is already evidence of marked improvement. It is their belief that a constant improvement may be expected as the result of indoctrination concerning new methods and as the training and experience level of our bombing personnel increases.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

SECRET



A 16

Capt. M. C. C. O.  
file secret

C5

Following is the text of a message from the  
Prime Minister to the President dated January 1st.

Lord Halifax will show you a most  
secret document, purporting to record a  
conversation which I had with an Ambassador.  
There is hardly anything in this which represents  
what I said. Most of it is the Ambassador's own  
impressions but a lot of it looks as if it were  
fathered on me. I am sure that I need not tell  
you that I have no claim to paternity.



A 16

Copy to  
file secret

CS

T

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**MOST SECRET**

Special Intelligence Serial No. 75

January 1, 1943.

The Duke of Alba, Spanish Ambassador to London, returned to Spain on the 23rd December for the Christmas holidays, and, in conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on that same date, said the following things about conditions in England.

" Last year at this time the British were feeling pretty badly and the way their confidence has been restored in one year is most remarkable. They are living fine. There is plenty of food for the mouths of everyone. To tell the truth, never once have they doubted that they would finally win. Now no one any longer dreams that Germany would try to invade the British Isles. They say that even if she did, the defenses are so sufficient that the attempt would be immediately frustrated. In British learned circles, particularly scholarly circles, the question of post-war reconstruction is already being aired, and they take it for granted that victory is certain. Before I came home, I had personal interviews with Churchill on the 6th and 11th December. He said ' The war is 50% over. In the battle of North Africa we used 850 ships, 600 of which were troop transports. On the way not a single ship was attacked. That shows there is no more danger from U-boats. That shows that the British and Americans are again rulers of the waves. America's entry into the war, accompanied by the assurance that we would get plenty of arms, makes our victory absolutely beyond doubt.' Churchill said this over and over, I don't know how many times.

" The British and Americans say that by next March all North Africa will be in their hands, and that thus they will have complete freedom of navigation over the Mediterranean; that they will then strike Italy from Syria and in another direction they will plunge forward through the Balkans and Turkey. In order to prevent the Japanese and German forces from meeting in the Near East they will busy themselves to their utmost both

..militarily  
Regraded Unclassified



militarily and politically in that region. They claim that seven million Mohammedans are on their side and this makes them very happy.

" By the way, I want to tell you, there is a rift between London and Washington concerning strategy; I mean the United States still emphasizes the Pacific, while England wants to get things in Europe in hand first. When I talked to Churchill the other day he said 'The United States is certainly anxious to whip Japan. She is going to fight her to the bitter end. She wants to get well-based on Australia, Guadalcanal and New Zealand successively, and then hit the Japanese mainland. But you know in Government circles here in London there are plenty of people who remember the Tokyo-London alliance and who say it was a mistake to have foresworn it for the sake of America. These Japanese have a lot of stamina. I fought in the Boer war and other wars too and have known well warriors of various climes, and judging from what I have seen of Japanese prisoners, I can only express admiration for the fine military spirit of the Japanese race.'

( 3 paragraphs missing, not available).

" There is no doubt concerning the strength of the German army, but they rely upon machinery and their genius for organization. These things they stick to to the very last, lacking strategic flexibility. Last year Moscow and Leningrad, and this year Stalingrad, are good examples of what I mean. Furthermore, their heads are as hard as lead when it comes to diplomacy. There is not one single country who, in its heart, is following the Germans. France, Belgium, Holland - all hate the Germans, and I venture to guess that before long even you Japanese will do likewise. Germany's production and mechanical power reached its peak last year and I feel safe in saying that they are on the down grade now.



" Not long ago, Jordana got me to see what I could do in the way of finding a chance to mediate for peace, but now that the United Nations are so sure of victory they wouldn't talk peace with Germany under any guise whatsoever. Even to dream of such a thing while the Nazis are in would be ridiculous. That is where Hess made his mistake. Needless to say, the time has not yet come when the United States would think of peace. The other day Ambassador Winant said to me, 'This war is not one in which any compromise will take place. It will be either victory or defeat.'" General Smuts also said that this is a 30-year war which began in 1914, and that next year the United Nations would reach their peak of their production and would soon defeat the Axis decisively. An intimate friend of mine who manages the Ford Company in England told me that the Ford plant at Dearborn, and the Packard and the Chrysler plants too, are concentrating on the construction of aircraft, and that even Nelson is astonished at the production rate.

" My final conclusions are these. This year America and England will put forth their last heave and I must say they are utterly certain of whipping the Axis. Although this estrangement between London and Washington will crop up now and then, and although after the war England and the United States may become icy towards each other, during this war we cannot but regard them as one complete solid block.

" Even supposing that Iberia were invaded, it will merely be a camouflage for some vaster action on another scene, just like Dieppe camouflaged the North African stroke. The pressure which the United States is putting on Chile and Argentina is brazen and bold and England is thoroughly disgusted at it. The English say that it would very probably be better to leave these countries alone and let them stay neutral. "

To be returned to: Captain E.G.Hastings, R.N.  
 Room B 31  
 Public Health Building.

W. Mark... 2024198  
 American...  
 NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1943

# Bay Victory Made Possible By 2 U.S. Pilots

**They Spotted Nazi Flotilla; Berlin Reports Sinking of Six British Destroyers**

LONDON, Dec. 30 (AP).—The Royal Navy sought more units of the thinning German surface fleet tonight after the Bay of Biscay battle in which the British reported the sinking of three Nazi destroyers at minor cost and the Germans countered with the unsupported assertion that six British destroyers were sent to the bottom and two cruisers damaged.

The Admiralty acknowledged only minor damage to the two light cruisers Glasgow and Enterprise and the loss of two planes in the running action against the German flotilla of eleven destroyers. In its final stage the action was handled by the two British cruisers with aerial support, the British said.

The Admiralty was noncommittal on the Berlin reports, which some London quarters believed might have been exaggerated to console the German home front for a week of naval losses, beginning with the sinking off northern Norway of the 26,000-ton Nazi battleship Scharnhorst.

No mention has been made by the British that any of their destroyers participated in the Bay of Biscay action which followed the sinking by air action Monday of a laden Nazi blockade runner. Communications from both sides indicated that the action had ended.


The Admiralty said the surviving eight Nazi destroyers had been dispersed and fled and that some were damaged.

Conceding the loss of one German destroyer and two torpedo boats, a broadcast special German communique said these "went down in an historic battle against the superior artillery of the British cruisers." The Germans added that several other of their destroyers and torpedo boats were damaged, and asserted that one of the two damaged British cruisers was set ablaze.

Nazi submarines were credited by the German communique with sinking six British destroyers with all placed torpedo attacks. Berlin also asserted that U-boats operating on the other side of the Atlantic sank another British destroyer off the Newfoundland banks.

[The British Broadcasting Com-

# Nazi Blockade Runner Sunk in the Bay of Biscay



*This ship, presumed bound from Japan to France, was sighted by planes in the Bay of Biscay on Monday and set afire and sunk by Czech flyers attached to the British Coastal Command*

pany said that two German destroyers and a U-boat, damaged in the engagement Sunday during which the Scharnhorst was sunk, have been beached along the Norwegian coast.]

Meanwhile, it was disclosed today that two American Navy flyers first spotted the German flotilla of eleven destroyers in the Bay of Biscay and shadowed it for six hours while flashing the signals that brought the British warships in for the engagement.

The Americans, Lieutenant Stuart D. Johnston, of Upper Darby, Pa., and Ensign Hugh M. Greeley, of Boston, were flying a patrol in a Liberator named V for Victory when they discovered the Nazi ships that apparently were intended to form an escort for the blockade runner. Johnston said the two Americans had an aerial view of the battle below them, and altogether were in the air about twelve hours.

Unknown to the Germans, apparently, the blockade runner had been attacked by a Liberator of the Coastal Command Monday. The Czech pilot of that plane said he scored a direct hit with his first bomb, crippling the vessel and leaving it afire and sinking.

see how they are going on the of-

# Britain's Adds to In Pa



*Ensign Hugh M. Greeley, left, of Boston, navigator, and Lieutenant Stuart D. Johnston, of Upper Darby, Pa., pilot of a Navy Liberator, are credited with the sighting of three German destroyers which were sunk by British warships in a Bay of Biscay battle on Tuesday*

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Cavalry School - Infantry School

of Entertainment in New Guinea



### Bolivia Advises De Lozada to Seek Red Amity

#### Wants Agent Here to Ask U. S. Aid; Moves to Prove It Has No Axis Leanings

WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 (AP).—In an apparent effort to clear itself of any suspicion of Axis leanings, the new Bolivian government instructed its representative here today to initiate Bolivian recognition of the Soviet Union through the intermediary of the United States.

"That is proof that the new government has no contact with Argentina—but not proof enough for me," Enrique de Lozada, the representative, said.

De Lozada has asserted he will resign if he discovers evidence that Argentina or any outside influence had a hand in the coup which established Major Gualberto Villarroel's government.

The instructions placed de Lozada in an awkward position since he can scarcely ask the United States, which does not recognize his government, to act as intermediary in approaching the Soviet Union.

Also it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would interfere with the inter-American policy already approved by this country providing for a delay in accepting the new Bolivian regime until investigations regarding the revolution have been made.

The Soviet Embassy said no official word had been received of the La Paz decision, stated in a cable to De Lozada which said, "We desire to recognize the government of the Soviet Union initiating gestures through the intermediary of the United States."

De Lozada said that he would be convinced of the democracy of the new government when the P. I. R. (Revolution Party of the Left) is included in the government.

He called attention to reports that Jose Antonio Arze, leader of the P. I. R. had left Mexico City for Bolivia.

#### Argentina Plans Recognition

MONTEVIDEO, Dec. 30 (AP).—An official source said today a diplomatic report had been received that Argentina would recognize the new revolutionary government of Bolivia momentarily.

In fact, said the source, the report indicated a communication of Argentine recognition already might have been received by the La Paz regime of President Major Gualberto Villarroel, who was

### Hero of Wake Isl



Associated Press wirephoto  
Lieutenant Colonel James P. Devereux, who led the marines during the sixteen days they fought overpowering Japanese forces attacking Wake Island early in the war, has sent this picture of himself, made in a prisoners' camp at Shanghai, to his son, Patrick, who is living with relatives in Burlingame, Calif.

### Post-War Drive Against Trusts Being Planned

#### Relaxations To Be Ended; U. S. May Break Patent Curbs to Move Surpluses

By John Chabot Smith  
WASHINGTON, Dec. 30.—The anti-trust division of the Justice Department expects to go back to strict enforcement of the anti-trust laws after the war in an all-out "trust-busting" drive, on the theory that the freest possible competition in industry offers the best hope of solving the problems of post-war reconversion, it was learned today.

Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the anti-trust division, told the New York Herald Tribune that the division's activities were now being scaled down by a man-power shortage, but that within eighteen months he hopes to have the largest staff in the division's history to work on the backlog of indictments and prepare new ones.

Although suggestions have been made in some quarters in indus-



A16

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**SECRET**

SECRET

23 December 1942.

MEMORANDUM for Captain J. L. McCrea, U.S.N.

The U. S. Navy is requesting the Air Ministry to help satisfy an urgent need for night fighters in the South Pacific by furnishing the Navy planes and special radio equipment for one squadron of twelve planes. In previous cases the British have solicited United States assistance to meet special situations by messages from the Prime Minister to the President. Is it expedient for the United States to make an appeal on that level in this instance? As you know the enemy is harrassing our forces by night bombing and I expect the tempo of such activity to increase.

Duplicate

Signed by  
J. L. McCRAIN

**SECRET**

A16

ASW 004.003 Shipping

December 19, 1942

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY STIMSON:**

Here is an interesting letter from Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, now retired, whom I have known for many years. From time to time I have seen letters from him on the development of the war and he has always been right. He was, you may recall, the Chief of British Naval Intelligence in the last war. Will you send it back to me after your have read it.

(SIGNED) JOHN J. McCLOY

J.J.McC.

Inc.

Honorable Henry L. Stimson  
Room 3E-880  
Pentagon Bldg.

JJMcC:jhs

A  
X  
X Hall, Admiral Sir Reginald

12-19-42

Admiral Sir Reginald Hall  
Dockhead  
Beaulieu  
Tel: 281

November 15th, 1942

My dear Amos,

Very many thanks indeed for your letter which was just what "The Doctor ordered"!

Events are moving so fast that one hesitates to comment on them at such a distance; but the general feeling over here is that the staffwork worked out between your men and ours has shown the world what the Allied Nations can do in war time - a pretty good augury for the future I think; for it means that once you have an objective to which both nations can subscribe fully, there is no difficulty that cannot be solved by good will. As you know Staff work can lead to hopeless tangles - but in this wonderful instance everything was cleared away to secure the main object; now we and you are once more happy as soon both our forces will be at the only useful thing - killing Germans! Some people seem to forget that this is the only way of winning; we won the last war by killing so many that they had to surrender; and this war must be won in the same way; sounds brutal but I am not sure that it won't in the long run lead to a simpler way of solving the German problem. I don't myself believe that you can reeducate many of the young Nazis; they only understand force; any suggestion of the milk of human kindness is translated by them into weakness which they promptly try to exploit - how can you educate such folk?

I am so glad that Smuts called special attention to the U boat problem; it is the one real menace and has not yet been properly attacked; I regard the <sup>secret</sup>escorts with our convoys as



mere palliatives; they stave off attacks but have to keep with the convoys; what is wanted is a real hunting force under a skilled leader; I can visualize several small squadrons of special ships working where possible with their own air craft; in a very short time these hunters would establish a real panic with the U boats; it would take I expect about six separate squads each under a thruster and I would give a real prize for the sinking of each U boat; last war we gave £1000 when we were satisfied that the U boat was sunk; it would be dangerous and trying work but with the right men and ships, I can't see why we should not have the pests where we want them in a very short time. I wonder whether we can get these hunters started; one has to remember that the morale of U Boats is not what it was and a really fierce series of attacks would begin to shake them badly; allowing that the hun can produce say 16 to 20 U boats a month - they were turning out 12 a month in 1918 and were working up to 16; well, with six squads at work we ought to count on a kill for each squad a week; a loss of this size would soon have its effect on the morale and I should not hesitate to publish the numbers sunk by the hunters; the very fact that these relentless hunters are working in an area would have a deterring effect on the actions of the U boats. I feel very strongly that we cannot lose any more time in organizing this attack on these pests; it is absurd to count on replacements to save us from disaster; far better to build fewer merchant ships and devote the work to that of building a force to destroy U boats; once this is done, we shall require fewer merchant ships!!

I don't fancy that the morale of the German army is  
In the last war, we had such a force under a real thrust:  
and though they were only a short time at work, they did their  
task well; it is for designers and the scientists to put their  
heads together to produce what is wanted and meanwhile we ought  
to improvise with what we have.

I have been helping Faith to get in to her new little house  
very comfy inside and suits her well; Peter is somewhere abroad and  
I fancy had a biggish job with the landing in North Africa; she is  
very brave about it all though one can see that it is a heavy strain  
on her; I wish you could see the little granddaughter; she is a  
picture and quite a character; Faith runs her house entirely by  
herself; does all the cooking too; she occasionally gets half a days  
help but it is hard to get and she does not count on it; on the whole  
I can't help feeling it is a good thing as she is so busy that she  
does not have time to worry too much about things; I told her I was  
writing to you and she asks me to send you both her dear love.

To go back to the war again; we are taking our present suc-  
cesses very soberly; for we all realize that there is some very hard  
fighting ahead; some disappointments and heavy losses to face so  
though we rang the church bells yesterday, we did not give way to  
any ballyhoo but stuck our chins up and kept at the job.

You will of course have seen the statement in the German  
press that Rommel is advancing to the West without encountering any  
opposition!! Is not that truly humnish? He has been outgeneralled  
and outfought; the remains of his army will not be fit for much for  
some time and by the time they reach Tripoli, we ought with luck to  
be somewhere there ready to hammer them again.



I don't fancy that the morale of the German army is any too high; in fact, I would almost say that it is no higher than it was in 1918 when the Germans made their advances in March to June; then, though they had victories, the colossal losses had so reduced the morale that there was nothing left but a sort of fatalism amongst them. Hitler says he will never capitulate; I don't want him to; I want to see them smashed and a premature capitulation would be a disaster for the world. We **MUST** carry the war into Germany; they have never known war in their own country since Napoleon's time; and they have to be taught what it means and give them a distaste for Prussianism and all that it stands for.

I am afraid there is a long row to hoe in the far east; longer even than over here; the distances are so great that it must take time before Japan can be brought to book; they will fight to the last to prevent you getting across their supply lines - once you do that, they know the game is up; and I am wondering what point has been agreed on by the joint staffs at which the offensive will be taken in Burmah; your end of the pincers will have to be a bit further West before the Japs begin to try to save their southern flank at the expense of their western; I am wondering which will be your next Halma move; when you have cleared up New Guinea and the Solomons you will want at least three spearheads in order to support each other - that was the real fault about Singapore!! What a wonderful strategic game it is. My own feeling is that a



threat to the Phillipines timed to fit in with an offensive in Burmah would puzzle the Japs; they would have to concentrate most of their fleet against your threat which would leave our fleet in the Indian Ocean free to attack from the West.

As regards a new front next year on the continent, I have made some notes but after North Africa, I must confess that if the matter is handled in the same spirit as this last landing we have nothing to fear; Petain has finally sold out to the hun; he was always a defeatist and also a most ambitious man; there is rather an interesting pamphlet written in French about the Petain-Laval plot; I am ordering a copy for you, and Dody will exercise her French in reading it aloud!

All well here; I have been trying to get some of your lads to stay here for their leave but they are all so busy that none have yet come but I still hope to have some here for Christmas.

Love to you all, my dear Amos and may the New Year prove to us all that every cloud has its silver lining.

Ever yours most cordially

W. R. Hall

A16  
KENSINGTON 7194

OFFICE: CENTRAL 7424

*Trenchard*

KINGSTON HOUSE SOUTH  
ENNISMORE GARDENS,  
LONDON, S.W.7

16th December, 1942.

Dear *Winant*

I send you two copies of a paper I have written as I know what an interest you take in the Air. I am sending it to a few of my friends.

I would ask you to read it very carefully because I was in the thick of the arguments on this question when your country, as far as I can remember, and Lloyd George in 1918 completely defeated the arguments of the French and enabled the unified Air Command to be set up. I have no objection to your showing it to a few people.

All good wishes for Christmas and the New Year and may the end of next year show very clearly movements towards the end of the war.

Please remember me to Mrs. Winant when you see her.

Yours *my Sincerely*  
*Trenchard*

The Hon. J. G. Winant,  
The American Embassy,  
1 Grosvenor Square, W.1.

A16-3 *ben*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. FLEET.

The President asked if there is any working arrangement between the Navy and the Army Ferry Command whereby the latter in ferrying planes between the Brazilian bulge and the west coast of Africa report sightings of surface ships.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.



A16

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET** December 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

This is the memorandum about which I spoke to you yesterday.

When it has served its purpose, will you please return it to me?

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

General Arnold's memorandum on subject of Bombing of Maneuvering Surface Targets, dated November 29, 1942. and copy of one to Admiral King, same subject, dated November 27, 1942

● A16 Gen

Copy to file

BRITISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 14th, 1942.

Most Secret

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of a  
message for you from the Prime Minister  
which reached this Embassy late last night.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

*Halifax*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States

of America,

Washington, D. C.

Message from the Prime Minister to the  
President dated November 13th, 1942.

I send you herewith copies of two friendly  
messages I have received from Stalin and my reply  
thereto.

One

Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill - November 9th.

Begins:

1. Your message received on November 5th.
2. My congratulations on the successful development of the military operations in Egypt. Let me express my confidence that now you will be able to complete the annihilation of Rommel's gang and his Italian allies.
3. We all here hope for the success of TORCH.
4. Many thanks for your communication that you and President Roosevelt have decided to send in the near future to our Southern front the twenty British and American squadrons. A speedy arrival of these twenty squadrons would be a very valuable help. Necessary consultation between British, American and Soviet representatives on preliminary arrangements could be best organised at first in Moscow and later in case of need direct in Caucasus. I am already informed that the United States will send for this purpose General E.E. Andler. I will wait for your communication on who will be appointed to represent Great Britain.
5. The situation on our Caucasus front deteriorated somewhat as compared with October. Germans succeeded in capturing the town of Malchik. They are approaching Vladikavkas where severe fighting is going on at

present/  
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present. Our difficulty here is our weakness in fighting aircraft.

6. Let me express my gratitude for your congratulations in connection with anniversary of U.S.S.R.

Two

Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill - November 10th.

Begins:

We are delighted at your successes in Libya and at the successful beginning of TORCH. I wish you full victory.

Many thanks for your warning concerning Baku. We are taking necessary measures to combat the danger.

Three

Premier Churchill to Premier Stalin - November 13th.

Begins.

Many thanks for your messages of November 8th and November 10th which have both reached me.

2. I have appointed Air Marshal Drummond to represent Great Britain in staff discussions between Soviet, American and British representatives on preliminary arrangements for the employment of the twenty British and American squadrons on your Southern front. Air Marshal Drummond has been ordered to leave Cairo for Moscow with a small party of staff officers forthwith.

3. Important success has rewarded our operations both in Egypt and in French North Africa. We have already penetrated deeply into Cyrenaica. Tobruk has just been recaptured. So-called Panzer Army is now reduced to a very small, hard-pressed band with hardly a score of tanks, and we are in hot pursuit. It seems to me almost

Regraded Unclassified

certain/

certain that Benghazi will soon be recovered and that the enemy will try to escape into Tripolitania holding a line at Agheila. He is already evacuating stores from Benghazi and is endeavouring to open new improved and restricted bases in Gulf of Sirte. TORCH is flaming well and General Eisenhower and our own Commanders have every hope of obtaining complete control of French North Africa and building up a superior air power at the tip of Tunisia. This is all in the intention of further aggressive operations. All the great troop convoys have been moved or are moving so far safely across the ocean and from Great Britain. We hope to create a strong anti-German French army in North Africa under General Giraud.

5. Political reactions in Spain and Portugal have been most satisfactory and danger of Gibraltar harbour and air-field being rendered unusable has ceased for the present to be a grave anxiety. The German invasion of Vichy France which was foreseen by us and also by you in our conversation is all to the good. The poisonous and paralysing influence of Vichy on the French nation will decline and the whole people will soon learn to hate the Germans as much as they are hated in the occupied zone. The future of Toulon fleet is obscure. The Germans have not felt themselves strong enough to demand its surrender and are reported to intend to respect the entrenched camp of Toulon. Admiral Darlan who is in our power has asked the fleet to sail for West African ports. Whether this order will be obeyed is still doubtful.

6. A great reversal of the situation along the whole African shore has taken place and may be counted on. If

we can open a passage for military traffic through the Mediterranean, our shipping problem will be greatly eased and we shall come into far closer contact with Turkey than has hitherto been possible. I am in communication with President Roosevelt, who is delighted at the success of the American enterprise. The whole position must be reviewed in common with the intention of further vehement action. I will let you know as soon as possible what our ideas for the future are. You know, I am sure, how anxious we are to take off you some of the undue weight which you have steadfastly borne in these last hard months. Meanwhile I am proceeding on the assumption that you are still confident that the Caucasus range will not be penetrated in the winter months.

Ends.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 5, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

This is to remind you of our conversation of a few days since at which time I communicated to you the President's thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider the formulation of a directive having to do with the employment of high and medium altitude bombing against maneuvering surface targets. You will, no doubt, recall that I informed you that the President had stated that over the past few months he had gathered the impression from the despatches that such bombing had been relatively ineffective.

Very respectfully,

/s/

JOHN L. McCREA,  
Captain, U.S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

(copy)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
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DECODED BY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

211300 WHITE SIX GR-- BT

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

FOR MCCREA FROM VOTT X

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**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-23513-1

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

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DELIVER TO CAPTAIN MCCREAXX

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**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-22515-1

Regraded Unclassified



A16/Gen  
**SECRET**

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Return of Australian and New Zealand  
Divisions from the Middle East.

Enclosure: Study Approved by the Combined Chiefs of  
Staff re the Above Subject.

1. Enclosed is a study approved by the Combined Chiefs of  
Staff on the above subject.

2. Moving these two divisions from the Middle East after  
Rommel's force has been decisively defeated would necessitate  
replacing them in order to have sufficient force available to  
reinforce the Persia-Iraq Command; or to meet an Axis advance  
through Turkey; or to conduct further operations in the Eastern  
Mediterranean Area.

3. The shipping implications present the most serious  
aspect of the matter. Under the most favorable circumstances,  
that is, returning them on large ships en route from the Middle  
East to the United States via Australia, and without including  
their equipment in such shipment, the loss in troop lift would  
be the equivalent of moving 75,000 troops from North America to  
the United Kingdom or the Mediterranean Area.

4. This unnecessary loss of troop lift can have no other  
effect than to weaken the defenses of Australia. Lack of shipping  
is the greatest deterrent at the present time to building up  
strong offensive forces in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands,  
or to sending adequate forces for a serious effort to retake  
Burma. Any of these moves would have a much greater military  
value in the defense of Australia and New Zealand than the return  
of their Divisions.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff conclude that every mili-  
tary argument is against the move of the 9th Australian and the  
2nd New Zealand Divisions. Such a move would involve a definite  
reduction of the impact upon the enemy in 1943 and a major diver-  
sion of shipping resources which are urgently required for other  
troop movements.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

*William D. Leahy*  
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

**SECRET**

A16-316 en

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

December 12, 1942.

**UNDER SECRETARY HAS SEEN**

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

This is the memorandum about which I spoke to you yesterday.

When it has served its purpose, will you please return it to me?

Very respectfully,

*J. L. McCrea*

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

*Sec Nav might like to see*

*at*

*W*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

December 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The Under Secretary has suggested that you might be interested in reading the attached memorandum.

The return of this memorandum is requested when you no longer have use for it.

Very respectfully,

*J. L. McCrea*

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

*Thanks  
JK*



**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Subject: Bombing of Maneuvering Surface Targets.

You recently expressed concern about the effectiveness of our medium and high altitude attacks against maneuvering surface targets. I believe you will be interested to learn that from December 7, 1941, through November 16, 1942, Army bombers operating in the main from high and medium altitudes scored confirmed direct hits on 231 enemy ships (including 83 known to be maneuvering), of which 51 were sunk and 21 are believed sunk. These are not spectacular results.

I am sure you understand that our bombing methods are not static, but are constantly being improved. Of greatest importance is the fact that our bombing is adaptable to the nature of the target by the commander on the spot; it may vary from mast level to high altitude attacks. The method of operation selected by him must take into consideration the degree of threat to us, and the losses which we can accept. Most targets are too distant for fighter escort. By flying at medium or high altitudes, bomber range is increased, effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire is reduced and interception by enemy fighters is rendered more difficult and less effective. Of course, bombing accuracy against maneuverable targets decreases at higher altitudes but the increased safety necessary outweighs the disadvantages of a lesser degree of accuracy. Most of our bombers must return from the missions in order that they may fight again another day - possibly a thousand miles from that point.

The fact that the effectiveness of our medium and high altitude level bombing is being materially improved is shown by reports from the theaters. In the Mediterranean theater within the last month, the effectiveness has doubled, largely because of pattern bombing. It will continue to improve as our increasing strength enables us to employ proper pattern bombing, to reduce the numbers used on purely reconnaissance missions, and to increase the training and the experience level of bombing personnel.

In conclusion, let me assure you that we not only consider high and medium altitude bombing as fulfilling a need for which there is now no substitute, but we also utilize all other types of bombing such as skip bombing at 20' altitude depending upon the particular condition at the target. Those bombing methods are producing progressively better results and will continue to improve as we get further experience.



*H. H. Arnold*  
H. H. ARNOLD,  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

November 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING:

Subject: High Altitude Bombing of Maneuvering Targets.

There has been considerable discussion and controversy about the effectiveness of high altitude bombing against maneuvering surface craft. For your information, the following has been received on this subject from General Andrews, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Middle East:

"Using modified 3 ship element pattern bombing and within the last 30 days from 6 and 9 ship formation pattern bombing, this Command has dropped 450,000 pounds of bombs on maneuvering targets, speeds varying 8 to 12 knots with the following results: For the period June 15th - October 14th, except the attack on the Italian Fleet, 15 hits by 13 participating aircraft were claimed. The heavy bombers of this Command claim one hit for every 10 aircraft employed when attacking targets on the open sea. Of total number of bombs dropped, 2 percent are claimed hits. From October 15th to November 15th we have made 32 sorties against against this type of target and claim 6 hits. Claims made by this Command have proved reliable by other intelligence sources. Top high level bombing methods as outlined in FM-10 could not have been used initially due to the state of training of crews prior to their arrival in this theater. . . . (This part of the message refers to difficulties they had in connection with training or lack of training prior to entry in the theater and bomb rack failures.) "With use of 3 ship pattern bombing, our attacks have been considerably more effective. We are in complete agreement that patterns of at least 9 bombers must be used against maneuverable targets. We have used 27 aircraft against ships in open sea because of the importance of preventing certain ships from reaching North Africa. However, these aircraft attacked in a column of 3 ship elements. . . . In conclusion, within the last month, using such pattern bombing as is within our capabilities and using American bombs, our effectiveness has doubled, but prior to that time, our bombing of maneuvering targets was discouraging and resulted in making it necessary to attack targets in highly defended harbors in order to accomplish desired destruction, the task however has been accomplished."

H. H. ARNOLD,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

COPY FOR CAPTAIN McCREA

*VAN*  
**SECRET**

Regraded Unclassified



*A16-3/600*

**SECRET**

November 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Subject: Bombing of Maneuvering Surface Targets.

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In conclusion, let me assure you that we not only consider high and medium altitude bombing as fulfilling a need for which there is now no substitute, but we also utilize all other types of bombing such as skip bombing at 20' altitude depending upon the particular condition at the target. Those bombing methods are producing progressively better results and will continue to improve as we get further experience.

H. H. ARNOLD,  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

**SECRET**

Regraded Unclassified



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

12/3/42

Ad Cooke:-

may I have back, please

Very resp.  
Mc Clea

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

November 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Russian report on vulnerability of American tanks due to fire hazard of gasoline engines.

A detailed comment on General Faymonville's recommendations on the substitution of diesel engines for gasoline engines in our tanks cannot be made at present as we have no information as to which models have been in actual operation in Russia. Only the M3 medium tank is referred to in his report.

Reports from other theaters. Reports we have indicate that while the British also like the diesel engine, they have been equally well satisfied with a gasoline engine of the airplane type. No reports have come from Egypt concerning the relative vulnerability of tanks using these two types of engines although both types have been employed in recent operations which have been reported as most successful. We understand that the great majority of the German tanks are also equipped with a gasoline engine.

New M3 and M4 tank models. Our later model M3 tank and our new M4 tank are less vulnerable to burning than the earlier model of the M3 type. The Ordnance Department believes that the majority of tank burnings develop from ammunition fires when the hull is pierced rather than from the fuel. In the new models a special armor plate protection has been provided around the ammunition racks. Some of the new M4 tanks are powered with gasoline and some with diesel engines. The percentage powered with gasoline engines is increasing because it has been necessary to divert large numbers of the only satisfactory diesel engine for this tank, manufactured by General Motors, to meet the requirements of the landing craft program. The remainder of these diesel engines will be utilized in the medium tanks, and the Services of Supply inform me that we can do this to a sufficient extent to meet the greater proportion of Russian requirements. I do not believe that our new M4 tank, whether




**SECRET**

**SECRET**

equipped with diesel or gasoline engine, is more vulnerable to burning than other tanks.

New gasoline-diesel engine. There has been some disagreement among the experts as to the desirability of using diesel engines in tanks due largely, I understand, to belief by some that no really satisfactory diesel engine had been developed. Recently the Army has developed a new engine which uses either diesel oil or gasoline and which our Armored Force believes to be a superior tank engine. Facilities are being provided to manufacture this engine. However, it will be available for only a small percentage of our medium tank requirements for 1943. The production situation definitely indicates that we must depend in major part on gasoline engines for at least another year, with a strong effort being made to meet the Russian requirements of diesel engines.

  
Chief of Staff.

*Fogminville report is attached.*

**SECRET**



✓ 7  
FMW  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Moscow

Dated November 23, 1942

Rec'd 2:27 p.m., 24th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

493, November 23, 9 p.m.

SECRET TO STETTINIUS FROM FAYMONVILLE.

One. During many recent conferences with officials of Soviet tank administration most important question has been suitable power for tanks in battle. During seventeen months of warfare on Russian front under various conditions, more tanks and crews have been destroyed by fire than by all other causes. American built tanks, especially medium tank M-3 ignite and burn more easily than British, German, Italian or Russian tanks. This greater vulnerability of American tanks attributed primarily to gasoline power plants and especially to use of highly inflammable 90 octane gasoline for fuel.

Two. Red Army commanders now emphatic in stating that all tanks should be powered by diesel engines and this conviction is rapidly becoming an obsession. They are willing to sacrifice if necessary some mechanical reliability and accept additional maintenance difficulties rather than use gasoline powered vehicles on battlefield.

-2- #493, November 23, 9 p.m., from Moscow.

battlefield. British technical experts here agree and opinion seems to be shared also by American observers who have seen conditions in the Middle East.

Three. In my opinion, battle experience here justifies and requires change over to diesel exclusively for tanks even though this change involves major increases in production of diesel engine plants at the expense of gasoline engine production and in spite of necessary dislocation of distribution of petroleum products.

Four. This is the most important single lesson we can learn from the Russian front and question is so serious that no time should be lost in making the change.

HENDERSON

WWC

A16-3

In reply address not the signer of  
this letter but Bureau of Aeronautics,  
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS  
WASHINGTON

Refer to No.

Aer-E-351-EP  
EE1  
A16-4

SECRET

6 October 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT:** Operations of Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers  
Lend-Leased to British Government.

1. In answer to your request, the following information is furnished relative to operations to date of BACV's:

BACV-1 HMS Archer. Delivered in December 1941. Prior to arrival in United Kingdom suffered collision and major damage. Repairs at Charleston Navy Yard completed in March 1942. First active employment was in delivery of U.S. built fighters to HMS Illustrious at Freetown and in Indian Ocean. Subsequently did convoy duty basing on Freetown using 4 Swordfish torpedo planes. At present at Hoboken, N.J., repairing damage from bomb handling casualty (not incurred in battle).

BACV-2 HMS Avenger. Delivered in March 1942. Has been engaged in convoy duty out of Scapa Flow. On a recent Northern Russian convoy her 12 Sea Hurricane fighters and 4 Swordfish torpedo planes claim 4 certain, 3 probable, and 14 damaged out of 38 German aircraft destroyed.

Avenger aircraft in addition assisted in anti-submarine activity. 4 Avenger airplanes were shot down but 3 pilots were recovered. The Avenger was the main objective of most attacking airplanes.

BACV-3 HMS Biter. Delivered in June 1942. Proceeded with convoy on leaving U.S. No report of operations to date.

BACV-4 Retained as ACV-30. U.S.S. Charger. Used for pilot training in Chesapeake Bay.





SECRET

Aer-E-351-EP

EE1

Al6-4

SUBJECT: Operations of Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers  
Lend-Leased to British Government.

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BACV-5 HMS Dasher. Delivered in July 1942. No report of  
operations to date.

11 additional BACV's are now converting. The first of these

BACV-7 HMS Attacker was delivered September 30, 1942, and  
has not departed from U.S. Others are due to com-  
plete within the next 6 months.

Complements of aircraft in BACV's depend upon duty  
assigned. 15 Hurricane fighters have been used on occasion  
and at other times 6 Martlet fighters and 6 torpedo planes.

Respectfully,

J.F. Quilter  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.

*Shown to the President  
File*

A16/82m  
**SECRET**

October 8, 1942

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

**Subject:** Letter from Mr. Donald Nelson to the President,  
dated October 3, 1942.

1. Mr. Nelson's report shows that we can build an air force of the size required to secure air supremacy.
2. Air action as the dominant factor, properly supported and extended by the action of surface forces will win the war.
3. The Army Air Forces are prepared to operate the required equipment provided for in the Air War Plan '42, a copy of which you have.
4. Almost all of our combat air units can reach the point of employment under their own power. Shipping requirements for the remainder and accessory equipment described in the Air War Plan can be met.
5. To obtain decisive results, air power must be employed en masse - half measures will not do. Working with the RAF we can apply the mass necessary when the equipment is available.
6. To apply direct pressure against Japan, advances must be made by utilizing air strength supported by surface forces so that we can obtain bases from which air power can hit at the heart of Japan.
7. This advancing of bases must be relentless and must be limited only by the availability of forces not required to crush Germany.
8. I realize the drain of this plan on the Nation's productive capacity, but I have every confidence in it. Therefore, it is urgently recommended that you direct Mr. Nelson to give aircraft production an unassailable priority over the other programs outlined in his letter and that we adhere to the Air War Plan with steadfastness and confidence.

Incl: Memo for Gen. Arnold from  
F.D.R., 10/6/42 /w/  
Ltr to the Pres. from Mr.  
Nelson, 10/3/42 /w/ Memo  
to Mr. Nelson from Joint  
Aircraft Planning Com., 9/28/42  
subj: Aircraft Prod. in 1943 /w/  
Exhibit A /w/ Tables 1 thru 11.

H. H. ARNOLD  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON


October 14, 1942

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Returned herewith is the paper on the role and work of  
Bomber Command, by Sir Arthur Harris.

Thank you very much for loaning this paper to me.

  
H. H. ARNOLD,  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl: Copy #35 above paper,  
8/24/42, W.P.(42) 374



**SECRET**



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

14 October 1942

**SECRET**


MEMORANDUM FOR

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD, U.S.A.  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Enclosed herewith is the paper which you  
requested in your memorandum of 13 October 1942.

In view of the fact that this paper belongs  
in the personal files of the President, it is requested  
that it be returned to me when its purpose has been served.

Very respectfully,



JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Naval Aide to the President

Enclosure



ADDRESS REPLY TO  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

508.0  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON


October 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN MCCREA:

Subject: Role and Work of the  
Bomber Command.

I am anxious to borrow, for a short time only, a paper prepared by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris on the role and work of the Bomber Command which is identified as "WP(42)374". I believe this was sent to the President around the middle of September by Air Marshal Evill.

If you do have this paper, will you loan it to me for a short time?

  
H. H. ARNOLD,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.



RECEIPT CARD

Registered or delivery No. 50600

Please sign and mail as soon as possible.

Received the accompanying letter(s) as listed:  
File Reference Date

Secret memo to  
Sen. Arnold  
dated 10-14-42

*C. B. Peterson*  
(Signature or name of addressee)

(Signature of addressee's agent)

Date of delivery \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_  
(To be filled in by person signing receipt)

GPO 16-0308



*A16/General*

**SECRET**

*Cape Thule  
to fall*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The Stockholm Line.

I have made a careful study of the matter of evacuation of Norwegians from Sweden by the Stockholm Line.

Analysis of the Air Transport situation shows that, including the two recently given to them, the Norwegians have four transports. These they feel are inadequate because of their low ceiling (18,500 feet). They desire transports with 25,000 foot ceilings, We have only six of such a type (C-87) at present, with a predicted production of ten per month.

Benefits from evacuation of the Norwegians would not be commensurate with the harmful effect of diverting the necessary transport planes from other operations.

I recommend that the King of Norway be advised that the United States is at this time unable to provide planes to accomplish this operation.

*W. H. D. Day*  
Chief of Staff.

**SECRET**

## UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 4, 1942.

S E C R E T**SECRET**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.


Subject: The Stockholm Line.

I have carefully considered the matter of evacuation of Norwegians from Sweden by means available to the United States Navy.

Analysis of evacuation by means of submarines shows that method to be entirely unfeasible and the advantages to be gained incommensurate with probable loss. The extreme hazards of a voyage through waters controlled almost entirely by Germany, with particular reference to surface and air patrols and probable existence of minefields, and the probability that German espionage in a Swedish port would result in the loss of the vessel on return voyage, make the venture too dangerous to risk submarines so badly needed in other theaters.


The U.S. Navy does not possess aircraft, either transport or combatant, suitable for the mission.

I recommend that the King of Norway be advised that the United States is at this time unable to undertake the mission.

  
Admiral, U.S. Navy.

A16-3

CONFIDENTIAL



WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Subject: Sending of Troops to England and Australia Even Though They Have Completed Only Basic Training.

Captain McCrea has transmitted to me your thought on the above subject.

At the present time, all available troop transports are being used to their limit of capacity for overseas movements.

Service units, in most cases, are now being dispatched upon completion of only the essential phases of their basic training, such as the firing of familiarization courses with their weapons and the assimilation of sufficient technical information to enable these units to perform their primary functions.

Combat units scheduled for overseas movements, however, have in most instances completed sufficient additional training to insure their functioning as a team. They are brought to full organizational strength just prior to dispatch by personnel reporting direct from Replacement Training Centers. The delays in movements have been due to lack of transports rather than to lack of training.



Chief of Staff.



CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION  
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

AIR STAFF

U.S. SECRET  
BRITISH MOST SECRET

18th September 1942.

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to forward, on the instructions of the Prime Minister, the enclosed copy of a paper on the Role and Work of Bomber Command, which was prepared for the Prime Minister by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

Believe me, My Dear Mr. President

Yours sincerely,

*F. MacNeece Foster*

W.F. MACNEECE FOSTER  
Air Vice-Marshal

U. S. SECRET  
BRITISH MOST SECRET

Receipt is acknowledged of Copy No.35

of

W.P.(42) 374

titled

"Note by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, K.C.B., O.B.E., A.F.C.,  
on the Role and Work of Bomber Command."

Original copy of this  
receipt filled in and  
forwarded to Squadron  
Leader Millbourn while  
on the trip of the  
President 17 Sept-  
1 October 1942.

Signed ..... John L. McCrea

Office ..... Captain, U. S. N.,  
Naval Aide to the President

Date .....

Please return  
this receipt to:

Squadron Leader Millbourn  
P.A. to Air Marshal Evill  
Room 304  
British Joint Staff Mission  
Offices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff  
Washington, D.C.

A16-3

September 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

I do not know who in the Navy Department prepared this reply, but when you read it and re-read it you will find it is no reply at all.

There is one exception to this. At the end of the second page and the top of the third page the comparison between three cruisers and 9 2100-ton destroyers begins to look favorably to the destroyers.

Even that is not a wholly fair picture because on a tonnage basis three CAs or CLs would be equal to twelve or thirteen DDs. In the last analysis, there are only two advantages that three CAs or three CLs have over twelve DDs:

- (a) 8 inch or 6 inch guns, to be used against enemy surface craft.
- (b) Greater ability to maintain speed in seaway.

I still feel that if I were in command of a carrier I would rather be protected by from eighteen to twenty modern DDs than I would by two or three CAs or CLs and with them six to ten modern DDs.

I think this should receive further study -- don't you?

F. D. R.



ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
AND REFER TO INITIALS  
AND NO.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

(SC)A3-1  
(036600A/GRC)

**SECRET**

August 16, 1942

*Sent "copy"  
to Adm Leahy*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Via: Admiral Leahy.

Subject: Composition of Carrier Task Groups - Cruisers vs 2100-ton Destroyers.

Reference: Your memo of August 12th.

1. Copies of the reference were sent by your office to Admiral King and to Admiral Leahy, the latter then discussing the matter directly with Admiral King. This reply was prepared in the Headquarters of the U.S. Fleet.

2. The normal composition of a carrier task group is 1 CV, 2-3 CAs or new CLs, and 6-10 modern DDs. This composition is based on the premise that circumstances are likely to arise where the carrier is subjected to:

- (a) air attack by bomb or torpedo, as from land-based or ship-based plane;
- (b) torpedo attack by submarine;
- (c) surface attack by gunfire, as from cruisers or other surface ships.

3. The CV herself can, to some degree, ward off air attack by use of her own planes and battery, but requires assistance in countering submarine and surface attack. The cruisers (CAs or new CLs) provide protection against surface attack and against air attack. The destroyers provide protection against submarine and air attack and, to some degree, against surface attack.

4. The concept - and the effect - of the composition of the normal carrier task group is therefore one of team-work, offensive as well as defensive, and so is not to be viewed from anti-aircraft considerations alone, as anti-submarine and anti-cruiser considerations must enter into its composition. Further, considerations of weather,

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
AND REFER TO INITIALS  
AND No.

(SC)A3-1  
(036600A/GRC)

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Via: Admiral Leahy.

Subject: Composition of Carrier Task Groups - Cruisers vs 2100-ton Destroyers.

-----  
sea conditions, low visibility, etc., must be included in order that we may be reasonably prepared for eventualities.

5. In the carrier group, the cruisers are disposed relative to the carrier so as to cover known or suspected "danger bearings" of enemy surface or air forces. Destroyers are disposed so as to counter submarine and/or air attack; their disposition is flexible and their positions are diversified as necessary to counter the type of attack most likely to be expected. When the number of destroyers per carrier task group can be increased or is as large as 8-10, it may be practicable to use from 3 to 5 of them against surface attack.

6. The new 2100-ton DDs are expected to be employed in carrier task groups as they become available and as operating needs and circumstances permit. The armament of these ships, and that of the CAs and new CLs is:

	<u>2100 ton DD</u>	<u>CA</u>	<u>CL (new)</u>
Surface:	5 5 inch	9 8 inch	12 6 inch
	Torpedoes	-	-
Anti-air:	5 5 inch	8 5 inch (Note 2)	12 5 inch
	4 40 mm	16 40 mm	8 to 16 40 mm

N. B. - (1) 20 mm. AA guns are considered useful primarily for own ship defense.

(2) New CAs have AA battery of 12 5 inch and 16 40 mm. in 4 quadruple mounts.

7. The comparison between 3 CAs or new CLs and 9 2100-ton DDs, as to anti-aircraft fire alone, is:

	<u>Cruiser</u>	<u>Destroyer</u>
No. of gun platforms (or gun groups)	3	9

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
AND REFER TO INITIALS  
AND No.

(SC)A3-1  
(036600A/GRC)

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON


**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Via: Admiral Leahy.

Subject: Composition of Carrier Task Groups - Cruisers vs 2100-ton  
Destroyers.

	<u>Cruiser</u>	<u>Destroyer</u>
Total 5 inch	24 for CA; 36 for CL (Note 1)	45
Total 40 mm	48	36



Secretary of the Navy.



**SECRET**

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

A16-3

WAR DEPARTMENT  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: CAPTAIN JOHN L. McCREA, U. S. N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.


SUBJECT: High Level Bombing in Western Europe as  
Compared with High Level Bombing in the  
Southwest Pacific.

1. The high level bombing conducted during the past few weeks has been better in Western Europe than in the Southwest Pacific for the following reasons:

a. The targets in the Southwest Pacific were smaller than those in Europe. This, combined with the fact that the Pacific targets were in many instances fleeting, increased the difficulties in securing hits to a considerable extent.

b. The strategic offensive such as exists in Europe permits the bombardment commander to select his target and time of attack, enabling him to take advantage of all variable conditions such as weather, etc. The strategic defensive such as exists in the Pacific does not permit the bombardment commander to do this.

2. High level bombing effectiveness varies directly with the above. The status of training of units and crews dispatched to both theatres has been practically equal.



H. H. ARNOLD  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces



**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

14 September 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

LT. GENERAL HENRY H. ARNOLD, U. S. A.  
Chief of the Army Air Forces  
Room 2018 - Munitions Building  
Washington, D. C.

The President remarked a night or so ago that from reading the despatches and the intelligence reports he was distinctly of the impression that the high level bombing being conducted in Western Europe was superior to that being conducted in the Southwest Pacific.

He asked that I inquire of you if you shared this impression and if so, if you could assign a reason for this apparent difference in results.

Very respectfully,

*J. L. McCrean*

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Naval Aide to the President

(Room 2078  
Navy Department)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Joint Plan for the Defense of  
Greenland.

Did not  
receive this  
for filing  
C

Supplementing the report furnished August 7, 1942\* regarding the proposed plan for the establishment of Army stations on the Greenland Ice Cap, it is desired to inform you that a primary station has been established at approximately 66° N, 42° W, about 150 miles west of Angmagssalik.

Method of Establishment

The establishment of this station was effected by traveling up to the Ice Cap from a beach-head station set up on the East Greenland coast. The next phase of the plan is to consolidate at this point on the Ice Cap and then move southward to establish a second station.

The location is reported to be excellent for aircraft warning equipment installations since the surface is nearly level that far inland. Immediate steps have been taken to push this. The coming of winter may slow up activities on the Ice Cap, but next spring should see two stations installed and operating.

Airdrome Possibilities on the Ice Cap

Surveys so far have indicated that it will be more difficult to establish airdromes than was first expected. However, that possibility need not yet be ruled out.

An outline map giving the location of the stations mentioned above is attached.

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
Chief of Staff.



SECRET




SECRET

SECRET

GREENLAND



SECRET



SECRET

SECRET

SEP 14 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Joint Plan for the Defense of  
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An outline map giving the location of the stations mentioned above is attached.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

Copy for the President

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

Al6-3 (General)

August 13, 1942.

CROSS-INDEX SHEET

For memorandum from Admiral King to the  
President regarding transfer of Naval  
units from the Atlantic to the Pacific  
(Reinforcements to replace loss of 3 CA  
at Tulagi) see file

Al6-3 (Pacific)



A16-3

**SECRET**

August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

In view of the latest developments in the Southwest Pacific, I should like to have a study made in regard to two problems, both relating to task forces engaging in a limited objective operation.

1. Should the Navy consider using, in part or in whole, 5 of the new 2,000 ton D.Ds. in place of 1 C.A. or C.L.? This problem would assume, of course, the use of C.Vs. by our own forces and by enemy forces as well.

2. What is the relative anti-aircraft total fire of 5 of the new D.Ds., with full anti-aircraft batteries, as against the total anti-aircraft fire by one of the latest type C.As. or C.Ls.?

In such an evaluation weight should be given to the fact that 5 new D.Ds. can be completed in about one year, whereas one C.A. or C.L. cannot be completed for about two years.

F. D. R.

Copies to:

Admiral Leahy  
Admiral King

Printed for the War Cabinet. August 1942.

SECRET.

Copy No. 35

W.P. (42) 374.

August 24, 1942.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document

WAR CABINET.

BOMBER COMMAND.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY.

THE attached note on the Rôle and Work of Bomber Command was prepared by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris at the request of the Prime Minister, and is circulated for the information of the War Cabinet by direction of the Prime Minister.

(Signed) E. E. BRIDGES,  
*Secretary of the War Cabinet.*

*Great George Street, S.W. 1,  
August 24, 1942.*

NOTE BY AIR MARSHAL SIR ARTHUR HARRIS, K.C.B., O.B.E., A.F.C.,  
ON THE ROLE AND WORK OF BOMBER COMMAND.

1. THOSE who advocate the breaking-up of Bomber Command for the purpose of adding strength to Coastal and Army Co-operation Commands and overseas requirements are like the amateur politician who imagines that the millennium will arrive through the simple process of dividing available cash equally between all. Ignorance of what is available for distribution is such that he does not realise that the outcome would be to give every individual £50 once at the cost of wrecking the entire industrial organisation and income of the country. Similarly, if the Medium and Heavy Bomber Operational Squadrons of Bomber Command were distributed between the many claimants for favour on the one hand, none of these claimants would receive anything more than a mere morsel towards the satisfaction of their alleged requirements. On the other hand, our only offensive weapon against Germany would be destroyed. One cannot win wars by defending oneself. The defensive use of offensive weapons must therefore be reduced to the irreducible minimum necessary to survival.

2. There is surprising ignorance about the effective strength of Bomber Command. On an average, it is able to produce about 30 operational medium and heavy night bomber squadrons and six light bomber squadrons, the latter with no reserves of aircraft behind them. The first-line strength of the operational squadrons of Bomber Command represents no more than 11 per cent. of the total operational first-line strength of the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm, and well over half of the effort of this 11 per cent. is directed against Naval and Military targets. (See Appendix "A.")



3. People often point to the vast training organisation behind Bomber Command. It is truly and necessarily great. What such people fail to realise, however, is that the Bomber Command training organisation provides the whole requirements for reinforcing all the bomber forces overseas and much else besides. At present, for instance, it provides 148 pilots per month for overseas bomber squadrons, including 95 complete crews. In the past this quota has at times been even higher. In addition to this monthly output for overseas requirements, Bomber Command has trained, equipped, and then given away or lent to Coastal and Overseas Commands and other claimants, 24 squadrons in the last year. It also provides the crews of 2 squadrons employed on special S.O.E. and S.I.S. duties, and crews to man a great number of experimental and special training Units, which work for all Commands, at home and overseas. Finally, it is required from time to time to find from 300 to 400 operational aircraft in order to make up the 1,000 or so required to carry out specially heavy attacks against objectives of major importance.

4. Another common error is to suppose that the effort of the Command is devoted to the bombing of targets in Germany remote from and chosen without reference to the general military and naval situation. Nothing could be further from the truth. Approximately 50 per cent. of the total operational effort of Bomber Command during the twelve months April 1941-March 1942 was directly employed against the enemy's sea power. (For details, see Appendix "B.") During the last three months the proportion has been well over 50 per cent. All the remaining efforts of Bomber Command have great direct effect on the Naval and Land war situations as a whole.

5. For all practical purposes the squadrons of Bomber Command have done almost all the air-sea mining throughout the War. They have laid some 2,000 odd mines from the beginning of the War to December 1941, which accounted for one known enemy ship per 20.2 mines (it can be reasonably assumed that at least one unknown ship was sunk or damaged for every known one). The Command has enormously increased its mining efforts since the beginning of March this year. It is now laying mines at the rate of over a thousand a month, and already the reports on sinkings are greatly increased over anything previously achieved. Amongst particular mining successes can be counted the closing of the Kiel Canal to heavy enemy ships for some four months and the damaging and sinking of several of the highly specialised Baltic train ferries and ice-breaker ferries on which the enemy is peculiarly dependent. Also, the sinking by mining and bombing, according to the evidence from German wreck charts, of something over 300 enemy-employed ships, and damage to a large number more. The mining of both *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and also other enemy war vessels and troop transports, some of which are known to have resulted in great loss of life, must also be taken into account.

6. The story of the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau* is perhaps an outstanding incident of the vast effect of the small Bomber Command force on the Naval war. These two ships, on their one and only raid into the Atlantic, did appalling damage to our shipping, sinking no fewer than 19 vessels, totalling 150,000 tons. They returned to Brest to refuel and turn round prior to repeated forays, but since that date, over fifteen months ago, and almost entirely due to the efforts of Bomber Command, they have never been able to sink another British or Allied ship. They have only just been able to escape and stagger home, both of them striking air-laid mines on their return journey. Since their arrival in Kiel for repair, *Scharnhorst* is known to have been further hit and heavily damaged. *Gneisenau* has been so heavily hit and damaged by bombs that she has been taken away to Gdynia and largely dismantled. There are circumstantial reports that it has been decided to abandon repair on her. *Prinz Eugen* was also hit at Brest by Bomber Command. The direct result of the damage to these important ships is that throughout the war the German Fleet has never been able to operate as an entity, with all that that implies. It was directly due to the immobilisation of *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* that *Bismarck* essayed her lone raid in the Atlantic and to that fact can be largely credited her subsequent destruction. To Bomber Command, therefore, can also largely be credited the fact that *Tirpitz* in her turn is now a lone wolf.



7. Additional and direct effects on the war efficiency of the German Fleet arising from the efforts of Bomber Command are as follows:—

- (i) The main enemy Naval base at Kiel has been repeatedly and very heavily damaged by bomber attacks. A large number of workshops have been destroyed and the dockyard workers' quarters have received vast damage, with all that that implies in regard to delay in Naval supply and repair work.
- (ii) Amongst other instances the depot ship *Monte Olivia* was bombed and burnt out, with reported heavy loss of life to submarine ratings and some of *Gneisenau's* crew who were living on board.
- (iii) There is no doubt that the morale of enemy Naval personnel, who largely come from the German coastal ports, has been seriously affected by the heavy damage, and the raid-fear inflicted on these ports and their populace.

8. The six light bomber squadrons of Bomber Command are responsible for the close support of the Army in the event of invasion, or in the event of the Army proceeding overseas. They provide the bait for Fighter Command without which the fighter sweeps would be ineffective, because the enemy often refuses battle unless bombers are present. They also provided the detachments at Malta which so successfully attacked the enemy's lines of communication. They are known to have sunk some 51,000 tons of enemy shipping on that supply line. By direct bomber attack in European waters, these light bomber squadrons have sunk some 250,000 tons, seriously damaged 287,000 tons and damaged a further 380,000 tons.

9. The effects on the enemy's submarine activities have been equally important. It is known that repeated interference with submarine crew training resulted from our mine laying in the Baltic and the Bight. It is known that, from time to time, considerable damage has been done to submarine building yards at Hamburg, Kiel, Rostock, Emden and other ports. Heavy damage has been done to the three main submarine Diesel engine factories at Augsburg, Deutz, and the Germania yards at Kiel. Damage has also been done to one of the two main submarine accumulator factories. In addition, the widespread damage done to German industry by Bomber Command, perhaps especially in Cologne, must have profoundly affected the submarine campaign. It is known that, at the submarine building yard at Le Trait, three submarines under construction were reported destroyed and between 150 and 200 workmen employed on them were killed.

10. It can also be safely assumed that damage has been inflicted on submarines operating from the French West Coast ports. Although the actual cause of loss of a submarine which does not return can seldom be determined, the known losses inflicted on German shipping remove any shadow of doubt that some losses, possibly considerable losses, have been inflicted on the enemy submarine fleet by Bomber Command's minelaying. (For details see Appendix "C.")

11. By smashing up the invasion ports and the invasion barges and shipping concentrations, there is little doubt that Bomber Command had impressed upon the enemy the difficulties, if not the impossibility, of invasion. Indeed, history may yet show that invasion was prevented by the Command. It certainly can be if it is attempted in future.

12. The known results of the bombing raids on Germany show that they cause vast destruction and vast embarrassment to the enemy. It would not be possible in a note to detail a tithe of the known immense damage occasioned in Germany. Whilst it takes approximately some 7,000 hours of flying to destroy one submarine at sea, that was approximately the amount of flying necessary to destroy one-third of Cologne, the third largest city in Germany, in one night, a town of vast industrial import. 250 of its factories were damaged or destroyed. This must have gravely embarrassed the enemy war effort in every direction. The towns of Rostock, Lübeck, Emden and Cologne have all been destroyed to or beyond the point where they can be counted as a liability rather than an asset to the enemy. The very heavy damage to the Heinkel Aircraft Factory at Rostock is known to have gravely affected the Heinkel output, and is reported to have

had the most serious effect on the enemy's air war on all fronts, and also at sea. The Focke Wulf works at Bremen have also been very seriously damaged.

13. The destruction of the Renault Factory might be counted as an astounding achievement of Bomber Command. Achieved in a few hours with practically no loss it is clearly a major victory against the enemy's land forces such as no other of our forces has yet achieved. Through the loss of this factory and the Matford works at Poissy, the enemy is known, according to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, to have been permanently deprived of the armoured fighting vehicles and transport equipment sufficient for the formation and maintenance of 10/11 motorised divisions.\* The important enemy aircraft factories at Gennevilliers and Salmsons have been destroyed. The Goodrich rubber factory, and the Thomson Houston and Ericsson Electrical gear factory have also been destroyed, and 16 neighbouring factories damaged, some "on a tremendous scale" (Interpretation Report K. 1351).

14. One of Germany's most pressing problems is to maintain her system of internal transport. The German Transport Minister recently stated that, unless the problem of improving the transport facilities inside Germany were solved, Germany's victory would be imperilled. He said that in the western and north-western regions of Germany, where frequent bombing raids had taken place, the transport service was carried out under extremely difficult conditions. An additional strain is thrown upon the railways by the diversion of traffic caused by sea-mining, while the bombing of ports and industrial towns has been shown to do much incidental damage to the transport services. It is known that the internal transport system has recently been put under the control of the German Minister responsible for armaments production and that very high priorities, which must interfere with other production, have been given to locomotive and wagon construction, and repair. Concomitant with this declaration by the Reich Minister, Bomber Command virtually destroyed the important rolling-stock works at Cologne and severely damaged another such works at Bremen.

15. To the negative, but very worthwhile, credit of Bomber Command can be counted the strain upon the enemy of maintaining an enormous and ever-increasing mine-sweeping effort, and also the establishment and maintenance of the largest anti-aircraft and A.R.P. organisation in the world. Some three-quarters of a million personnel are employed on anti-aircraft duties in Germany. If one adds to that the A.R.P. services, the damage and repair organisation and the manufacture of guns and their anti-aircraft ammunition, and also the mine-sweeping and mined ship repairing organisation, there is little doubt that the very existence of Bomber Command costs the enemy the whole-time services of at least three million able-bodied personnel. In addition, Bomber Command forces the enemy to maintain a large and rapidly increasing force of night fighters, which now amounts to some 300 aircraft. Many of these are Ju. 88's, a type which, if released, could be used effectively for the attack of our shipping. There is no doubt that, if the Bomber policy was to be abandoned, the release of this vast man-power for other essential work would be of the greatest value to Germany. The release of the twin-engine fighter bombers and the anti-aircraft guns for service on the eastern front and in the Mediterranean would have a powerful and perhaps even a decisive effect on those campaigns.

16. The purely defensive use of air power is grossly wasteful. The Naval employment of aircraft consists of picking at the fringes of enemy power, of waiting for opportunities that may never occur, and indeed probably never will occur, of looking for needles in a haystack. They attempt to sever each capillary vein, one by one, when they could, with much less effort, cut the artery. Bomber Command attacks the sources of all Naval power, rather than the fringes of the one type of enemy Naval operation which obviously menaces us—the submarine. An outstanding example of waste of air effort is the taking away from Bomber Command of all the Hampden aircraft for conversion to torpedo bombers for the defence of this country. These squadrons have, for more than two years, exercised continuous and direct pressure on Germany. Since allocation to Coastal Command they have done practically nothing. It is within the bounds of

\* More than our Libyan operations have destroyed in the whole course of the war, almost as much as we lost at Dunkirk.



possibility that they will never get an opportunity to achieve anything. The enemy is not such a fool as to flaunt valuable ships within reach of shore-based aircraft otherwise than when compelled by circumstances to do so, and then only on his own terms as to weather and fighter cover.

17. To sum up, Bomber Command provides our only offensive action yet pressed home directly against Germany. All our other efforts are defensive in their nature, and are not intended to do more, and can never do more, than enable us to exist in the face of the enemy. Bomber Command provides the only means of bringing assistance to Russia in time. The only means of physically weakening and nervously exhausting Germany to an extent which will make subsequent invasion a possible proposition, and is therefore the only force which can, in fact, hurt our enemy in the present or in the future secure our victory. It is the only type of force which we shall ever be able to bring directly against Japan.

18. Finally, it is apparent that an extraordinary lack of sense of proportion affects outside appreciation of the meaning, extent and results of Bomber Command's operations. What shouts of victory would arise if a Commando wrecked the entire Renault factory in a night, with a loss of seven men! What credible assumptions of an early end to the war would follow upon the destruction of a third of Cologne in an hour and a half by some swift moving mechanised force which, with but 200 casualties, withdrew and was ready to repeat the operation 24 hours later! What acclaim would greet the virtual destruction of Rostock and the Heinkel main and subsidiary factories by a Naval bombardment! All this, and far more, has been achieved by Bomber Command; yet there are many who still avert their gaze, pass by on the other side, and question whether the 30 Squadrons of night bombers make any worth-while contribution to the war.

June 28, 1942.

SECRET.

APPENDIX "A."

APPROXIMATE ALLOCATION OF OUR AIR RESOURCES ON JUNE 15, 1942.

Command.	Operational Squadrons.	I.E. Aircraft.	Percentage of Total First-line Strength.
Bomber Command ... ..	36	584	11 per cent. (Over half the available effort of this 11 per cent. is employed on naval targets and mining.)
Fighter Command ... ..	97½	1,564	30 per cent.
Fleet Air Arm ... ..	45	453	30 per cent.
Coastal Command ... .. (Including Iceland and Gibraltar)	32 + P.R.U.	533	
Overseas Coastal Command and G.R. ...	53	570	
Army Co-operation Command ... ..	14	168	29 per cent.
Overseas engaged in support of land operations—			
Fighter ... ..	49	1,368	
Bomber ... ..	32		
Army Co-operation ... ..	13		
Transport ... ..	5		
	99		



SECRET.

## APPENDIX "B."

## TOTAL BOMBING AND MINING EFFORT.

*April 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.*

—	Sorties.	Mines.	H.E. in Tons.	Incend. in Tons.	H.E. and Incend. in Tons.	Mines, H.E. and Incend. in Tons.
1941—						
April-June ... ..	6,711	323	8,294.2	1,182.1	9,476.3	9,694.6
July-Sept. ....	9,060	306	9,963.5	1,359.8	11,323.3	11,528.2
Oct.-Dec. ....	4,939	224	6,001.2	683.8	6,685.0	6,835.9
1942—						
Jan.-Mar. ....	4,619	724	5,346.5	694.2	6,040.7	6,529.9
Total ... ..	25,329	1,577	29,605.4	3,919.9	33,525.3	34,588.6

## NAVAL WARFARE EFFORT (INCLUDING MINELAYING).

*April 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.*

—	Sorties.	Mines,	H.E. in Tons.	Incend. in Tons.	H.E. and Incend. in Tons.	Mines, H.E. and Incend. in Tons.
1941—						
April-June ... ..	4,051	323	4,275.8	573.5	4,849.3	5,067.6
July-Sept. ....	3,017	306	3,105.1	296.8	3,401.9	3,606.8
Oct.-Dec. ....	2,632	224	3,383.2	296.8	3,680.0	3,830.9
1942—						
Jan.-Mar. ....	2,289	724	2,284.9	125.9	2,410.8	2,900.0
Total ... ..	11,989	1,577	13,049.0	1,293.0	14,342.0	15,405.3

	Per cent.
Percentage of total sorties directed against Naval targets ... ..	47.3
Percentage of weight of H.E. and Incendiaries dropped on Naval targets ...	42.8
Percentage by weight of H.E., Mines and Incendiaries dropped on Naval targets	44.5

NOTE.—Since March 1942 the directly Naval effort of Bomber Command has largely increased.

SECRET.

## APPENDIX "C."

## THE CONTRIBUTION OF BOMBER COMMAND TO THE ANTI-SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN.

*Introduction.*

1. Over half the effort of Bomber Command has been, and still is, directed on targets appertaining to sea warfare. During the 12 months April 1941 to March 1942 no less than 12,000 sorties were carried out against harbours, ship-building yards, docks and submarine bases, while 1,577 mines were laid. The last three months have seen an immense increase in the mining effort, over 2,700 having been laid. The same period has also witnessed the virtual destruction by Bomber Command of the vital ports of Rostock, Lübeck and Emden, the attack on the submarine diesel engine factory at Augsburg and the devastating raid on the city and suburbs of Cologne, with its submarine component factories.

2. It is important at this time, when the enemy's submarine production has reached the figure of 22 a month, to review the damage and dislocation caused by bombs and mines to the sources of submarine production and to submarine repair, resting and training bases. The evidence of damage is, however, derived mainly from air photos, which are capable of showing only a fraction of the concrete results of bombing and give no indication of the interruption to building processes and training of crews, of the effect of bombing on the efficiency and morale of workers and of the number of submarines sunk by mines. These intangible results, which are likely to decrease the output and activities of submarines even more than the actual destruction of vessels on slips or fitting out, can only be assessed in the light of our own experience and from occasional reports from most secret sources and agents.

*Submarine Building Yards and Output.*

3. Emden (7), Wilhelmshaven (11), Bremerhaven (6), Bremen (29), Vegesack (18), Le Trait (3), Hamburg (95), Kiel (44), Flensburg (11), Lübeck (10), Rostock (2), Stettin (3) and Danzig (29).

The numbers indicate the building capacity at each yard.

*Advanced Bases:—*

Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux and Trondheim.

All these building yards and bases, with the exception of Danzig, Trondheim, Lübeck and La Pallice, have been objectives of Bomber Command attacks, and they are referred to in detail below.

*Emden.*

4. At Emden is the Nordseewerke, which has a building potential of seven 500-ton submarines a year. In the Summer of 1941 three submarines were damaged beyond repair and were later seen being dismantled. In February 1942 a submarine which was on the point of departure was destroyed.

5. On the night of 6th/7th June the majority of the workshops were completely destroyed, and on the night of 20th/21st June further destruction was achieved. Before these two attacks the yard contained six large shops, 11 medium-sized shops and about 14 smaller buildings. Now, all that is left is one large shop, which has received a direct hit and is very badly damaged, four medium shops and three small buildings.

6. In these two nights the town, docks, and suburbs of Emden were destroyed to the extent of about 75 per cent. of built-up area including the main railway station; while the Schulte and Bruns Yard, which built small craft, was wiped out, the Herings Fischerie almost completely destroyed and Gassen's barge building yard razed to the ground.

7. In fact, Emden has ceased to be a going concern and its submarine building yard, in view of the almost complete destruction of its buildings, can be confidently claimed to have been put out of action. How long it would take to rebuild and to re-stock with components, jigs, and machine tools cannot be assessed, but it is reasonable to suggest that it will take a long time.

*Wilhelmshaven.*

8. Most successful attacks were made on this Naval base early in 1941. 5,000 men were put out of work in January; three Naval barracks were destroyed with severe casualties; the equipment depot was damaged and large quantities of clothing were lost and 35 per cent. of the houses in the port area were rendered uninhabitable. Moreover, out of eight submarines which should have been launched by the end of July only three had left the slips and the average date of completion was then three months behind schedule. In January 1942 it was reported that four submarines had been sent to another port owing to damage in recent attacks.

*Bremen.*

9. The three yards at this port are responsible for 17 per cent. of submarine output. In the raids at the beginning of 1941, the Atlas Werke suffered considerable damage and an informant present at the time confirmed that three of its four slipways were seriously damaged and that store sheds were burnt out. All work at this yard stopped for several days. The total destruction of Bremen is scheduled and has commenced.

*Vegesack.*

10. This is an important yard 11 miles down the river from Bremen. It is a difficult target to locate and has only been lightly attacked. A report in June 1941 stated that three slips, which had been badly damaged, were being repaired.

*Hamburg.*

11. Twenty-two 750-ton and seventy-three 500-ton submarines are produced annually from Hamburg's two building yards. Kiel has the next largest annual output, amounting to 44.

12. In the summer and autumn of 1941, Blohm & Voss (the largest yard) was hit several times. Five submarines on the slips were severely damaged; a gas container was blown up and various workshops, together with workers' homes near the yard, were partially or completely destroyed with heavy casualties.

13. In March 1941 the foundry at Blohm & Voss received a direct hit, while damage was done to the engine erecting shop, the galvanising shop, the administrative offices and to submarines on the slips. The Vulcan Yard sustained more widespread damage, while Siemens Electrical Equipment Factory was burnt out.

14. It is known that this raid held up work at Blohm & Voss for 3 weeks and at the Vulcan Yard for a fortnight.

15. Blohm & Voss Yard was again hit during two raids in May 1941, when a large building near the power house was partly destroyed and the power house itself damaged. In September the engine testing shed at Howalts yard was so seriously damaged that 20 submarine engines were rendered useless and, in addition, two out of the six submarines on the slips were almost completely destroyed. In October two floating docks were damaged, together with a 1,400-ton destroyer and a 500-ton submarine which were in them. 1

*Kiel.*

16. A Naval Engineer states that, as a result of the raids on the docks during April 1941, work on several vessels under construction was suspended for ten days and that casualties were between 800 and 1,000. The Germania and Deutsche yards had to close down for a period owing to damage to the electrical system. In the raid of the 1st May ships and submarines on the slips were damaged.

17. Later in May it was learnt that the raids had been most effective and that the production of submarines had been delayed. The Germania works were concentrating at that time on increasing production at Danzig on account of the severe damage they had suffered at Kiel; the German Admiralty took over two large buildings in Oslo with a view to transferring their important Naval offices from Kiel.



18. It is known that a 1,000-ton submarine already on the slips on the 7th April was still present in August and that two 750-ton submarines were seen to have been on the slips for 11 months, whereas the normal time should have been only eight months.

19. In October 1941 the Deutsche Werke yard sustained severe damage, and, although production continued, 1,000 employees remained unemployed until repairs to shops had been effected. On the 16th February, 1942, a bomb fell on the assembly shed at the Marine Werft and the majority of the night workers were killed.

20. The above information about damage and delays to submarine production at Kiel has been obtained from reliable ground sources, but photographic evidence, which is too extensive to enumerate in this paper, amply bears it out. In addition, no less than 33 acres of heavily built-up residential areas of the city have been completely devastated, and there are many isolated incidents. This factor alone must considerably affect output in the yards. One report stated that 400 submarine ratings were killed when the "Monte Olivia" class depot-ship was bombed and burnt out in Kiel Harbour.

#### *Lübeck.*

21. The submarine-building yards north of Lübeck were not a specific target on the night when this city was destroyed, but the important Dragerwerke, which manufactured oxygen apparatus for submarines, were seriously damaged.

22. There is little doubt that the output of all undestroyed factories near Lübeck must have stopped for a considerable time after the attack for lack of transport, power and labour, and it is inevitable that the general dislocation of industrial, domestic and transport facilities seriously affected the output of the submarine yards.

#### *Rostock.*

23. The elimination of Rostock by the four attacks at the end of April is likely to have stopped work on the two submarines then building at the Neptune Yard, apart from the fact that the yard itself sustained severe damage. Whether it will be considered possible or expedient to continue shipbuilding in this dead city remains to be seen.

#### *Le Trait.*

24. Most of the important workshops at this French building yard, together with the three submarines then under construction, were destroyed by a small-scale daylight raid on the 25th March; 150 to 200 workmen are said to have been killed.

#### *Brest.*

25. On the 24th July, 1941, a submarine under repair was hit and seriously damaged. In October of that year the submarine shelter was damaged. Photographs indicate extensive damage to dockside workshops and warehouses.

#### *Lorient.*

26. In 1940 two submarines were sunk and two damaged by bombs; in December another submarine was sunk and in March 1941 another was damaged. In July 1941 the torpedo section of the arsenal was damaged.

#### *St. Nazaire.*

27. In May 1941 the submarine shelter and torpedo depot were hit and a submarine and other vessels damaged. Many workshops have been damaged since then, and it is probable the roof of the submarine pen has been hit.

#### *Bordeaux.*

28. In 1940 a German submarine in dock was damaged by bomb splinters, when three Italian submarines also sustained damage. Later it was reliably reported that two Italian submarines and the submarine depot ship *De Grasse*

had been sunk. In January 1941 six Italian submarines suffered damage and, in the same attack, many workshops in the area were hit.

*Augsburg.*

29. The daylight attack on the M.A.N. Submarine Diesel Engine Factory in April 1942, although carried out by only 8 aircraft, achieved remarkable success. Even the air photographs show substantial and vital damage not only to the main assembly shop, which appears to be gutted, but also to six other buildings and shops. A.A., Berne, has confirmed that the assembly shop is completely destroyed, and a civil engineer who was commissioned to report on the damage estimated that normal work could not be resumed for three months. He also said that quantities of stores and material had been destroyed and that there was a heavy death-roll among the employees. This factory is the most important of its kind and produces 20 submarine engines a month. The engines for all U-boats built by Blohm and Voss are made by the M.A.N. firm.

*Cologne.*

30. The Humboldt Deutz and the Hagen Gottfried works adjoin each other in the Kalk suburb of Cologne. The former, together with the other Humboldt works at Cologne-Deutz, is the third largest producer of submarine engines, whilst the latter produces submarine accumulators.

31. The great attack on Cologne in June this year, in which a third of the city was devastated, must seriously affect the output of these component factories. Apart from transport, feeding and housing difficulties, the morale, and therefore the efficiency of the workers must have been lowered. Moreover, all three of these works have sustained damage. A long warehouse was almost gutted and six others damaged at the Kalk works in April; a large shop was damaged at the same works in May and, during the big attack, both the Kalk and the Deutz works were hit, six buildings at the latter being completely destroyed.

*The Effect of Mining.*

32. Bomber Command had laid 1,577 mines in the approaches to German harbours and to French West Coast bases up to the 1st March, 1942. Since that date it has laid no less than 3,011 mines, including 715 in Baltic areas.

33. In the period 1st May-14th June (45 days) 26 ships are known to have been sunk by these mines and 12 damaged. There is little doubt that unreported losses at least equal known losses. Only one instance is known of a submarine having been sunk by a mine, and this was in the mouth of the Gironde, in May 1941. How many have in fact been mined will, of course, never be known, for only in exceptional circumstances could there be survivors or other evidence of such incidents. It is not unreasonable, however, to suggest that a substantial number have been lost to this weapon, in view of the heavy casualties in enemy-employed merchant shipping.

34. The presence of mines in the approaches to submarine bases and in training waters is in itself a disturbing factor to submarine activities. Not only must channels be swept before they leave or enter harbour, but there is convincing evidence that when mining operations have taken place the movements of training submarines are restricted or suspended until the whole of the suspected area has been swept.

*Conclusion.*

35. The information in the foregoing paragraphs has been extracted from C.I.U. Reports and from Air Ministry Damage Assessment Reports. Photographs only tell part of the story, while ground observers and agents are by no means always reliable. Nevertheless, the weight of evidence is sufficient to prove that the Command has substantially restricted submarine output and activity, even with the small forces which have so far been available. With the improved tactics and aids to navigation which have recently been developed it is certain that destruction can be achieved to submarine yards, bases and factories and to their parent cities which will play a vital part in the anti-submarine campaign. Emden is the first example of what is intended.



File  
Diurnal

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET

MEMORANDUM

Date 12 July/42

From: Admiral King  
To: The President

I refer to your inquiry of some weeks ago as to whether carrier catapults were brought into use during the actions in the Coral Sea and off Midway - which I said I would take up with Nimitz in due course.

Carrier catapults were not used in either the action in the Coral Sea or in that off Midway - hangar deck catapults were removed to be installed in AVG's (escort carriers) as were some of the flight deck catapults.

The increase in number of fighters per carrier (18 to 27) and the larger size of new types of carrier planes make it advisable to equip carriers



with catapults as soon as they can  
be made available. This will be done

E. J. King

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER IN CHIEF

21 June 1942

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN LT. GEN. ARNOLD,  
REAR ADMIRAL TOWERS AND AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL.

1. It is the policy of the President of the United States, which is concurred in by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, that powerful United States Air Forces must be created and maintained and that every appropriate aircraft built in the United States should be manned and fought by American crews, subject to the following conditions:

- (a) that our combined aim shall be to create and bring into decisive action as quickly as possible fully trained United States and British Air Forces adequate for the defeat of our enemies, and that the combined aircraft production, trained man-power and shipping available to the United States and British Commonwealth should be used to the best advantage in creating and employing those air forces to that end.
- (b) that the revision of previously agreed allocations of aircraft to Great Britain shall be made so as to avoid weakening the combined strength in any theatre.

2. In accordance with this policy the United States will:

- (a) Allocate aircraft to Great Britain to equip and maintain certain existing and projected squadrons of the Royal Air Force, and of Dominion Air Forces operating in theatres of British and Combined strategic responsibility, for which units of the United States Army Air Forces cannot be substituted - these allocations are set out in Annex 'A'.
- (b) Assign to and maintain in theatres of British and Combined strategic responsibility certain United States Air Forces by dates which have been agreed; these Air Forces and dates are as set out in Annex 'B'.

MOST SECRET.

COPY No. 4.

3. The United States undertakes to continue in 1943 the allocation of the necessary aircraft to meet attrition in British squadrons using American aircraft operational on 1st April 1943 as a result of the allocations in Annex 'A', and in their supporting Operational Training Units, provided there is no abnormal increase in units from accumulated reserves or other sources. This undertaking shall be open to review in June 1943 at the request either of the United States or British Government.

4. To conform to the policy laid down in para. 1 of this agreement, it is essential that United States Air Forces shall be established and ready for operations in the appropriate theatres by the dates shown in Annex 'B'. To this end the movement of personnel and equipment will be provided for in suitable priority to ensure arrival in appropriate theatres by the dates specified.

5. American air combat units assigned to theatres of British strategic responsibility will be organized in homogeneous American formations. They will be under the strategic control of the appropriate British Commander-in-Chief.

6. Dominion air requirements. It is the duty of the United States Chiefs of Staff to define the strategic requirements of those Dominions falling within United States spheres of responsibility. The conclusions of the United States Chiefs of Staff on this head will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval. (At this stage the British Chiefs of Staff will have the opportunity of satisfying themselves that Dominion interests are adequately safeguarded).

7. When the strategic requirements of these Dominions have been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the United States will make the necessary allocations of aircraft, through the machinery of the Combined Munitions Assignment Board. Allocations to the Dominions of aircraft of British types made in the Dominions will be a matter for agreement by the Combined Munitions Assignment Board.

Regraded Unclassified



8. When Dominion personnel are available these aircraft may be manned by such personnel. When the aircraft allocated exceed the Dominion personnel available they will be manned in accordance with arrangements agreed between the United States Government and the Dominion Government concerned.

9. The production of transport aircraft in 1942 is insufficient to meet the requirements of both American and British forces. The Transport Groups assigned to the United Kingdom will be regarded as a pool available for employment with British as well as American airborne forces. The services of transport aircraft are essential to afford strategic mobility to the Air Forces in British overseas theatres, particularly in the Middle East. The General Officer Commanding American Transport Groups in the Middle East and India will afford the fullest possible facilities to the appropriate Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief for this purpose.

10. The allocations of transport aircraft to Great Britain for 1943 remain open to discussion and will be revised later in this year.

11. Aircraft and allied equipment supplied to the British under this agreement will be accompanied and maintained by a full range of spare parts, including spare engines, spare propellers and other spare units, according to the current scales approved by the Joint Aircraft Committee.

12. This agreement shall not disturb the existing arrangements for export to the United Kingdom and other parts of the British Empire of engines, propellers and other component parts for aircraft of British types duly authorised by the Joint Aircraft Committee and required to balance the aircraft programme in these countries.

13. It is recognised that a renewed air offensive on a large scale against the British Isles might quickly deprive the British of a substantial proportion of their own production of aircraft. In the event of any serious disturbance of British production from this cause a new position will have arisen and new allocations would be necessary.

14. The present allocations of trainer aircraft will hold good until the repercussions of this agreement upon requirements in crews have been analysed, when the trainer allocations will be adjusted by agreement.

15. Allocations of communication aircraft for the remainder of 1942 are not covered by this agreement and remain open to discussion.

**Signed:**

**H.H. Arnold**

Lieutenant General,  
U.S.A.  
Commanding General,  
Army Air Forces.

**J.H. Towers**

Rear Admiral,  
U.S.N.  
Chief of the Bureau  
of Aeronautics,  
Navy Department.

**J.C. Slessor**

Air Vice-Marshal,  
R.A.F.  
for  
The Chief of the  
Air Staff.

**21st JUNE, 1942.**

ALLOCATIONS OF AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN FLEET AIR ARM  
TYPES TO GREAT BRITAIN.

1. All aircraft allocated to Great Britain up to 31st May 1942 shall remain at the disposal of the British Government, including 19 B.17 Fortress, 6 B.24 Liberator and 24 B.25 which have at different times been temporarily transferred on loan to U.S. Air Forces from British allocations, but excluding 387 Bostons from British allocations transferred to Russia.

2. The following aircraft (excluding Flying Boats) will be allocated to Great Britain from production in the United States in 1942.

	B.24	B.34	Boston A20C	Hudson	Baltimore	Bermuda	Vengeance	P.39	P.40	P.51
June	28	-		47	60	34	60		100	80
July	6	-	37	80	60	39	60		150	40
Aug.	4	-	49	78	60	57	60		50	40
Sept.	4	17	19	96	60	63	61	60	50	40
Oct.	4	63	52	42	60	48	100	60	50	-
Nov.	4	20	24	12	60	61	167	60	50	-
Dec.	4	-	-	-	60	61	117	70	50	-
Total 1942	54	100	181	355 (a)	420	363	625	250 (b)	500	200 (c)

(a) Includes 200 troop carrying and transport versions.

(b) In exchange for 150 Spitfires to equip and maintain one group.

(c) In exchange for 200 Spitfires to equip and maintain a second fighter group. The figure of 200 P.51 may be increased as a result of a review later in 1942.

3. Additional allocations of types included in para. 2 above up to 1st April 1943 will be as follows:

B.24            4 a month or enough to meet attrition  
                  on 80 U.E.

B.34            Nil

Boston        19



Hudson	45
Baltimore	180
Bermuda	387
Vengeance	418 (a)
P.39	Nil
P.40	50 a month
P.51	Nil (b)

(a) British would accept 3/4 of this figure to enable U.S. to meet their S.W. Pacific commitments.

(b) Subject to revision if additional production is created using Merlin 61 engines.

4. British squadrons using American aircraft operational under this agreement on 1st April 1943 shall be allocated the aircraft necessary to meet their attrition and that of their supporting O.T.U.'s after that date.

5. Flying boats will be allocated to Great Britain as follows:

	<u>1942</u> <u>Catalinas</u>	<u>1943(b)</u> <u>Catalinas</u>	<u>PBY.3</u>	<u>PEM.3 &amp; 4.</u>
January		27		
Feb		29		
March		30	5	6
April		30	8	6
May	10	30	12	6
June	30	30	15	10
July	30	20	18	12
August	20	20	18	12
September	20	20	18	12
October	25	20	15	12
November	20	4	15	12
December	20	-	15	12
Total	175 (a)	260	139	100

(a) Plus 27 in exchange for an equal number of Venturas, the dates of these allocations to be agreed separately.

(b) These allocations for 1943 will be subject to review at the end of 1942.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES ASSIGNED  
TO BRITISH AND COMBINED THEATRES  
OF STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY.

The following United States forces will be established and ready for operations in British and Combined theatres of strategic responsibility by the dates shown:

1. Middle East.

<u>Heavy Bombers:</u>	One group to be completed to full strength (35) by October 1st 1942.
<u>Medium Bombers:</u>	One medium bomber group (57) will be available for "fly away" from the United States by 15th July and will be operational in Middle East by September 1st 1942. A second medium bomber group (57) by December 31st 1942.
<u>Pursuit:</u>	One group (80) by September 1st 1942
	One group (80) by October 1st 1942
	Two groups (160) by January 1st 1943
	Two groups (160) by April 1st 1943.
<u>Total:</u>	Six groups (480).

2. India.

<u>Heavy Bombers:</u>	One group (35) completed in September 1942 (a)
<u>Medium Bombers:</u>	Two additional squadrons will be established, bringing U.S. medium bomber strength to one group (57) in September 1942.
<u>Pursuit:</u>	Two groups (160) completed by October 1942.

The role of these groups will include collaboration in offensive operations in Burma to relieve pressure on China. In the event of a threat to India they will be used to defeat that threat.

Note (a) As soon as this group is established as part of the defence of India, one of the two British heavy squadrons on B.24's will be rolled up.

3. United Kingdom.

<u>Heavy Bombers:</u>	Seventeen groups (595) by April 1st 1943.
<u>Medium Bombers:</u>	Ten groups (570)
<u>Light Bombardment:</u>	Six groups (342)
<u>Observation, Photo Mapping.</u>	Seven groups (399)
<u>Pursuit:</u>	Twelve groups (960)
<u>Transport:</u>	Eight groups (416).



A16-3 (General  
Employment)

2  
Jackson 10352

S 3

PERSONAL AND SECRET.

PRIME MINISTER.

Maybe it should not be for  
me to send you this. It is personal. But  
of course for you to do as you will with.

If it incurs your wrath I  
shall indeed be sorry, but unrepentant.

Keep Handy

R

A.T. Harvey

ATH/DO/5.  
17th June 1942.

Air Marshal,  
Commanding-in-Chief,  
BOMBER.....COMMAND.

neral  
ployme

APPENDIX "A".

APPROXIMATE ALLOCATION OF OUR AIR RESOURCES.  
on JUNE 15th, 1942.

S E C  
Prim

Command.	Operational Squadrons.	I.E. Aircraft.	Percentage of Total First Line Strength.	
Bomber Command.	36	584	11%	
Fighter Command.	97½	1564	30%	
Fleet Air Arm. Coastal Cmd. (Including Iceland and Gibraltar) Overseas Coastal Command and G.R.	45 32 + P.R.U. 53	453 533 570	} 1556 30%	
Army Co-operation Command.	14	168		
Overseas engaged in support of land operations.	(Fighter 49 ) (Bomber 32 ) (Army Co-op. 13 ) (Transport. 5 )	99 1368		} 1536 29%

SECRET & PERSONAL.

Prime Minister.

Victory, speedy and complete, awaits the side which first employs air power as it should be employed.

Germany, entangled in the meshes of vast land campaigns, cannot now disengage her Air power for strategically proper application. She missed victory through Air power by a hair's breadth in 1940. She missed it then only through faulty equipment and training and the tactical misdirection of an Air Force barely adequate for the purpose. That is historical fact.

We ourselves are now at the crossroads.

We are free, if we will, to employ our rapidly increasing air strength in the proper manner. In such a manner as would avail to knock Germany out of the War in a matter of months, if we decide upon the right course. If we decide upon the wrong course, then our Air power will now, and increasingly in future, become inextricably implicated as a subsidiary weapon in the prosecution of vastly protracted and avoidable land and sea campaigns.

Only some 10% of our squadrons are employed offensively against Germany. (See Appendix 'A' for distribution of our Air resources). Even that ridiculous proportion has in the last three months destroyed LUBECK and ROSTOCK, and virtually destroyed COLOGNE with all that means in its effect upon all forms of enemy war effort. It has partially destroyed the submarine building resources of AUGSBERG, DEUTZ, KIEL, HAMBURG and EMDEN. It has partially destroyed OBERHAUSEN. It has done vast additional damage to enemy material and morale in other places. It has knocked out RENAULT'S, (the fighting vehicles and transport of five motorized divisions). It has knocked out GENNEVILLIER, MATFORD's and HEINKEL's. It has practically destroyed GNEISENAU and seriously damaged SCHARNHORST. It has taken enormous toll of enemy-employed shipping. That, and much more, has been done by a mere thirty squadrons in three months. It is the only British force that has yet fetched a squawk out of Germany.

Yet the immediate reaction to the successful COLOGNE attack is to deprive my Command (which would be 50% stronger to-day, but for a continual series of similar diversions within the last six months) of a further one-eighth of its striking power for the comparatively futile purpose of carrying a few paratroops on one side-show and to bolster further the already over-swollen establishments of the purely defensive Coastal Command.

Involvement in Land campaigns, especially Continental campaigns, serves but to reduce us to the level of the Horde. We are not a Horde. We are a highly industrialised, under-populated, physically C.3 small nation. Our lead is in science, not spawn; in brains, not brawn. To enter upon a Continental land campaign, other than on a mopping-up police basis, is to play right into Germany's hands; to invite her, without need or reason, to take best advantage of the one superior asset remaining to her, a vast and efficient army. It is to meet her on her own terms.

Once we get a footing on the Continent our last bomb will have been dropped on Germany. Thereafter the whole of our Air effort will be required to bolster up our land struggle in France. It will not be enough.

The outcome might in the long run, in the very long run, be in our favour, aided as we would be by the mass armies of America and uprisings of the oppressed nations. But only if Russia maintains an Eastern front.

/At best, however, ...



At best, however, such a course must lead to the easily avoidable immolation of the flower of the youth of this under-populated country in the mud of Flanders and France. At worst it would lead to withdrawal, under difficult conditions, involving the loss of a large part of our painfully acquired equipment. The moral effect of another Dunkirk on the people of this country and on the world, would be disastrous. We might even be left in no condition to resist an invasion. We might be wrecked back into the summer of 1940.

It is a fact that the only substantial successes that we have achieved in this War, apart from the destruction of the VON SPEE, have been entirely or chiefly due to our air power. When the Army has met any but the Italian enemy it has invariably been defeated. Norway, France, Greece, Crete, Malaya and Burma. Even in Libya where a lavish provision of sea and air power has limited the enemy's resources, when he, not we, has been at the disadvantage, we have failed after 18 months to obtain a decisive success. The avoidance up-to-date of complete defeat in Libya, the damaging bomber offensive against Germany, the virtual immobilization of the German Fleet for nearly three years, and the near-destruction of Germany's merchant fleet, are all entirely or mainly due to the efforts of the Air Force. To these can be added the rescue of the Army from Dunkirk, and the Battle of Britain.

It is imperative, if we hope to win the War, to abandon the disastrous policy of military intervention in the land campaigns of Europe, and to concentrate our Air power against the enemy's weakest spots. But, instead, we are displaying a growing inclination to revert to old and archaic methods of war. Wilfully to reduce ourselves to the level of the Horde by engaging in Continental gladiatorial combat. Such a decision history will show to have been grievously wrong. We need now only the wisdom and the courage to make a decision which both swift event and history will show to be right.

The German Air Force is rapidly going down hill. Because of that, and its now hopeless entanglement in land campaigns, we can ignore the possibility that they may do to us what we can now so easily and so simply do to them.

The utter destruction of LUBECK and ROSTOCK, the practical destruction of COLOGNE (a leading asset to Germany turned in one night into a vast liability), point the certain, the obvious, the quickest and the easiest way to overwhelming victory. The over-strained, far-stretched and militarily compromised condition of Germany plays right into our hands - if we now employ our air power properly.

The success of the 1,000 Plan has proved beyond doubt in the minds of all but wilful men that we can even to-day dispose of a weight of air attack which no country on which it can be brought to bear could survive. We can bring it to bear on the vital part of Germany. It requires only the decision to concentrate it for its proper use.

The whole vast might of American Air power looms close over the horizon. But of itself it will not attain the weight necessary to our purpose for a year, even if it is not progressively subordinated and dissipated, as ours has been, in the interim.

The strength of Coastal Command, which is composed largely of suitable bomber types, is to-day almost the equal of Bomber Command. It achieves nothing essential, either to our survival or to the defeat of the enemy. It abates little, not even the possessiveness of the Admiralty. It aids by preventing a few shipping losses. A very few. These few losses we can bear awhile if we do not further embarrass our shipping position by adding to our difficulties the

transportation and support of vast armies overseas. It achieves nothing that cannot and would not be in a very short time far surpassed by the direct effect on the submarine war of the first blasts of a full-out Air offensive. It achieves nothing even remotely comparable to the direct effects on the submarine campaign already achieved by Bomber Command. Its work is entirely defensive. The adoption of defensive postures is not, as you have so rightly emphasized, a gesture of war. They may become a necessity of war, but they are not now a necessity to us in this war.

The criterion of the correct employment of Coastal Command is this - Bomber Command, as a side line to the prosecution of the Air offensive proper, has done far more damage to the enemy Naval effort in the last few months by sea mining, by damaging Scharnhorst, by destroying Gneisenau, and by attacking AUGSBERG, DEUTZ, KIEL, EMDEN, LUBECK, ROSTOCK, BREMEN and COLOGNE than the whole of Coastal Command has done to the enemy Naval effort during the whole of the war. Or will do if the war lasts another five years. Coastal Command does nothing but search for the needle in the haystack, month after month, year after year, when it could corner the whole needle output in a few months, as a mere sideline to other and vast contributions to our military situation.

Coastal Command is therefore merely an obstacle to victory. By re-directing Coastal Command to the offensive, it could, in conjunction with Bomber Command, do more in a month towards the defeat of the enemy's submarine campaign, and more harm to the enemy naval situation and the enemy war situation as a whole, than it can do or has done in years of waste and misemployment in its present wrong and mainly futile occupations. Why nibble at the fringes of the enemy's submarine and sea power when we can obliterate with comparative ease the very sources of that power? Of all enemy power.

The EMDEN submarine building yards were practically knocked out in one night as a side line to a bomber operation. BREMERHAVEN, WILHELMSHAVEN, HAMBURG, KIEL and BREMEN could be swiftly eradicated. In the course of doing so a vast contribution to victory by the simultaneous destruction in these towns of the air and all other material and moral resources of the enemy would also accrue.

Once the decision has been made, we should and could accept the slight extra shipping loss that will temporarily ensue until the offensive gets under way.

We should turn Coastal Command from its wasteful defensive to a fruitful offensive role. We should persuade the United States and Russia to send over to this country every aircraft and crew capable of bombing Germany. We should add to the bomber offensive those suitable types, now being increasingly diverted to Army Co-operation Command, for an airborne force which can never be large enough to achieve anything except the further emasculation of our own Air power.

With these combined resources we could during the next year, beyond any shadow of doubt, grind into dust and ashes a sufficiency of the enemy's major cities and resources to make the further prosecution of the war impossible to him. We could produce a state of chaos within his country which would ensure the disruption and destruction of the whole political and industrial system upon which he depends.

/If I speak plainly.....



If I speak plainly the times require it.

I recommend:-

- (i) The immediate return of all Coastal Command bomber types to Bomber Command. (A Corps of Coastal and Naval observers could remain standing by for use in Bomber Command aircraft should any urgent Naval occasion arise).
- (ii) The return of all Middle East and other overseas bombers to Bomber Command as soon as the present battle in the Middle East stabilises.
- (iii) The return of all suitable types of aircraft and aircrews from Army Co-operation Command leaving only the fighter-reconnaissance aircraft.
- (iv) Obtaining every possible bomber from the United States, and bombers only.
- (v) Asking Stalin to subscribe all or part of his long-distance heavy-bomber force, to be used from bases in this country to penetrate at short range into the most sensitive parts of Germany.
- (vi) Giving the highest possible priority in production to the heavy bombers.

As this force is made up:-

- (i) Progressively and utterly to destroy BREMEN, BREMERHAVEN, WILHELMSHAVEN, HAMBURG, KIEL. That will stop at once any further serious submarine threat, and do much else besides towards winning the war.
- (ii) Wreck the RUHR and BERLIN.
- (iii) Finally turn on JAPAN.

Given the necessary force, and the resources exist and can be made available as I have indicated, there could be no doubt as to the result. LUBECK, ROSTOCK, COLOGNE, RENAULT'S, MATFORD'S, EMDEN, OBERHAUSEN. There is the proof for all but the wilfully blind to see. Proof provided by a piddling force of thirty squadrons.

Once the balance begins to tip, the end can be predicted. The whole vast strength latent in the operational and other aircraft at present employed in training for an as yet unpredicted future, can then be confidently thrown into the scales. Germany would be swung off her feet. As high as Haman. And within months.

That is not only the right course to pursue, from all practical and strategical considerations. It is the only course offering either a quick or a certain victory. It is the only course which can bring any ponderable aid to Russia in time. It is the only way to deal with Japan.

On the other hand, premature landing on the Continent, before the



- 5 -

bomber has done its work and landing becomes a mere police operation, spells disaster. Let us all well remember that we have yet to meet on land the German Army on the defensive, and all that that implies. It will not only ensure another defeat beside which past misadventures will pale into insignificance, but by compromising the whole of our Air resources it will deprive us of the obvious, the only, the best and indeed the hitherto agreed means to victory.

As I have said, we are now at the cross roads.

ATH/DO/5.  
17th June, 1942.

*A. I. Harris*  
Air Marshal,  
Commanding-in-Chief,  
BOMBER.....COMMAND.



Telephone:  
Whitehall 5422

In reply: Q.330.

SECRET

COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS,

WAR CABINET OFFICE ANNEXE,

1A, RICHMOND TERRACE,

WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

15th June, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I was so very grateful to you for giving me the opportunity of such a long and interesting talk last Tuesday and I did my best to convey all that you told me to the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. In order to make sure that I correctly conveyed your points I propose recapitulating here what I told the Prime Minister.

I pointed out that you stressed the great need for American soldiers to be given an opportunity of fighting as soon as possible, and that you wished me to remind the Prime Minister of the agreement reached last time he was in Washington, that in the event of things going very badly for the Russians this summer, a sacrifice landing would be carried out in France to assist them. I pointed out that no landing that we could carry out could draw off any troops since there were some 25 German divisions already in France and Landing Craft shortage prevented our putting ashore an adequate number. The chief German shortage lay in fighter aircraft and all our efforts were being bent towards provoking fighter battles in the west.

I said that you had asked for an assurance that we would be ready to follow up a crack in German morale by landing in France this autumn and that I had given you an assurance that such an operation was being planned and was at present held at two months' notice.

I pointed out that you did not wish to send a million soldiers to England and find, possibly, that a complete collapse of Russia had made a frontal attack on France impossible. I said that you had asked whether we could not get a footing on the Continent some time this year, even as late as December, in which case you would give the highest possible priority to the production and shipping of Landing Craft, equipment and troops. The need for securing a port for supplying the troops under winter weather conditions made it clear that we should have to capture a port such as Cherbourg and hold a suitable line such as the Cherbourg Peninsula possibly expanding across towards St. Nazaire and eventually holding the whole of Brittany.

I made a point that you were sure that, in any case, when the operation came off we should have to secure the Atlantic ports and not go rushing off in the direction of Germany until we were firmly established, unless German morale had really cracked.

I pointed out that you did not like our sending out divisions from England while American troops were still being sent in and that you suggested that we should leave about six divisions in England and that the corresponding six American divisions should be sent straight to fight in North Africa, either round the Cape to fight in Libya or straight into Morocco with a view to joining hands with the Army of the Nile and re-opening the Mediterranean. In the latter connection, I told the P.M. how much you had been struck by his remark in a recent telegram: "Do not lose sight of GYMNAST".

This would mean that Dakar would fall into our hands without having to fight for it and I mentioned that you considered this important because the climate was not suitable for European soldiers to fight in.

As a result of the recent losses inflicted by the U.S. fleet on the Japanese fleet, particularly their aircraft carriers, there was a general desire to take the offensive from Australia using the existing U.S. marine forces and combat shipping. General Marshall had suggested going for TIMOR and General MacArthur had telegraphed on his own suggesting making for Rabaul. I said that you and General Marshall were anxious that two British aircraft carriers with their destroyer screen should join the American naval forces in Australia to support these operations, and that there had also been a suggestion that the amphibious force which had assaulted Madagascar should be used for operations against/



the Japanese.

I told the P.M. that you were taking a personal interest in Mr. Pyke's Snow Plough scheme and that you had promised to see Mr. Pyke about it personally. I told him that the Canadians and Norwegians were actively associated with this scheme and that M. Molotov had promised to send an officer to be an attache to M. Litvinov and be lent to give advice. Action is required by the American authorities under four headings:-

- (i) Production of the necessary vehicles.
- (ii) Planning the operation.
- (iii) Preparation of Intelligence and a topographical survey.
- (iv) Training of combined American and Canadian forces.

I told the P.M. that General Marshall was already giving this matter the highest priority but even so it was not certain whether the vehicles could be ready for 1942.

It was so very nice of you to have my daughter Patricia down to stay at the White House. I told her that you and Harry accused her of leaving the White House without saying good-bye. She was very distressed but said that she had said good-bye to Mrs. Roosevelt and had not dared to disturb you by sending round to ask for permission to say good-bye. I hope you will forgive her, she is still very young!

I was so thrilled and heartened by all I saw in America, particularly by the American army which is forging ahead at a quite unbelievable rate.

Yours very sincerely,

*Dickie Merritt*

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.



A16-3 General

SECRET

May 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please send an immediate message to the U. S.

Charge d'Affaires at Vichy as follows:

There may be some important message  
going to you tonight which you would get  
in the early hours of Tuesday, May fifth,  
Vichy time. Please stand by to receive it.

F. D. R.

May 4, 1942.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE ONLY

Captain McCrea will give you this and explain to you verbally what it relates to. I do not want even to put it on paper. Captain McCrea will explain to you what the blank spaces mean.

If word is received by the Navy late this evening, Monday, May fourth, it will be communicated to you and I would like to have the following message, with the blank spaces filled in, sent in duplicate to Vichy and to Ambassador Henri-Haye here. It is important that these be delivered both in Vichy and to Henry-Haye here just as soon as it is possible after our receipt of the expected notification, so that the French Government will surely receive it before they get word from the place in question.

"To Charge d'Affaires  
Vichy

Please present following statement to

Pétain or Laval immediately on receipt  
of this:

'The President of the United States  
has been informed that \_\_\_\_\_ has been  
occupied by British forces. This occupation  
has the full approval and support of the  
Government of the United States. The Island  
of \_\_\_\_\_ presents the definite danger  
to the United Nations of occupation or use  
by the Axis Powers, especially Japan. Such  
occupation by the Axis Powers would con-  
stitute a definite and serious danger to  
the United Nations, in their fight to  
maintain the kind of civilization to  
which France and to which the United  
Nations have been so long accustomed.

The Government of the United States  
is at war with the Axis Powers and if it



becomes necessary or desirable for American troops or ships to use \_\_\_\_\_ in the common cause, the United States will not hesitate to do so at any time.

The United States and Great Britain are in accord that \_\_\_\_\_ will, of course, be restored to France after the war or at any time the occupation of \_\_\_\_\_ is no longer essential to the common cause of the United Nations.

In view of the fact that the Island of \_\_\_\_\_ will be held in trust for France, in order to protect it from attack by any one of the Axis Powers, any war-like act permitted by the French Government against the Government of Great Britain or the Government of the United States would, of necessity, have to be regarded by the

Government of the United States as an

attack upon the United Nations as a whole".

The above should go also to Henry Hays.

The message to Vichy should I think go en claire  
as secrecy need not be maintained after the event. Also,  
I think it could well be given to our Press even if it  
is late at night.

F. D. R.

Addressed: BRYTMAN Washington.

From: Air Ministry.

IMMEDIATE

MOST SECRET

Personal to Field Marshal Dill from Chiefs of Staff No.C.O.S.(W) 166.

1. Zero for Ironclad is early morning 5th May.
2. President Roosevelt has agreed that United States will associate themselves with this enterprise and will present statements to Vichy Ambassador, Washington and Vichy Authorities in France as soon as we know that the operation has begun.
3. It is most important that U.S. Ambassador, Vichy should present statement to Petain or Laval before news reaches them from Ironclad sources. This will mean very rapid action in London and Washington on night 4/5th May or a subsequent night if operation is postponed.
4. Prime Minister has suggested to President that the U.S. message to Vichy should be telegraphed "en clair" to U.S. Ambassador Vichy as soon as we get the first information from Force Commanders that they are committed to the assault.
5. We think it dangerous that any prior cypher notification should be sent to U.S. Ambassador in Vichy except possibly a warning on Monday that he may have to take instant action any time after 3.0 a.m. Tuesday 5th May Vichy local time.
6. We expect to receive a signal from Force Commanders sent off any time after 3.0 a.m. local Ironclad time on 5th May to the effect that he is committed to the operation. We shall pass this information direct to you through Admiralty signal channels by code word as mentioned in immediately following telegram. The news should reach you any time after 8.0 p.m. Monday evening 4th May (Eastern Standard Time). On receipt of this code word it is important that no time at all should be lost in the transmission of the "en clair" message to U.S. Ambassador Vichy.
7. If for any reason such as weather, the operation is postponed the Force Commanders will obviously maintain wireless silence and you will hear nothing from us but should expect to receive the code word 24 or even 48 hours later



- 2 -

8. Please confirm that arrangements can be made in Washington as outlined above.

1840Z/1.

ROUGH DRAFT OF TEXT

The Government of the United States hereby informs the French Government that the occupation of \_\_\_\_\_ by the British forces which has been undertaken to forestall the occupation of \_\_\_\_\_ by the enemy, has the full approval and support of the Government of the United States. In support of this position the Government of the United States will take an early opportunity to send United States forces to participate in the occupation of \_\_\_\_\_.

If, in prosecuting the war against the Axis powers, it becomes necessary or desirable for American troops or ships to use \_\_\_\_\_ in the common cause of the civilized peoples of the world, the Government of the United States shall not hesitate to do so at any time.

The governments of the United States and Great Britain jointly undertake and pledge to restore \_\_\_\_\_ to France after the war or at any time the governments of the United States and Great Britain consider the occupation of \_\_\_\_\_ is no longer essential to the common cause of the United Nations.

The Government of the United States wishes to make it plain that any warlike act taken or permitted by the French Government against the government of Great Britain in consequence of the occupation of \_\_\_\_\_, will be regarded by the Government of the United States as an attack upon the United Nations as a whole, from which the Government of the United States will so conclude and take appropriate action in the premises.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET

MEMORANDUM

Date 2 May 42

From: Admiral King

To: Capt. McAra

Please show this despatch to the President as it contains certain passages (marked) which may or may not have appeared in exchange of despatches between the President and the Prime Minister.

It is apparent that a definite understanding as to method and procedure is needed.

I will attend to the "mechanics" of release dealt with in 777 6, 7. Note that 778 requests confirmation which I will pass along when received from the President via you.

EJK.