

FLASH

Regraded Unclassified

8 December 1944

MR-OUT-622

WF

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

London

The House of Commons gave Prime Minister Churchill an overwhelming vote of confidence this afternoon after the Prime Minister defended British intervention in Greece and Italy. The vote was 279 to 30.

Rome

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson is reported to have told the press today that the fighting in Greece was caused by irresponsible extremists among whom British have found deserters from the German and Bulgarian Armies.

Iwo Jima

Further reports indicate that there was no Jap interception and no losses from the B-29 strike. Sixty-two planes hit the airstrip on Iwo Jima. Oneplane bombed Pagan Island en route.

Local

Press reports that House has passed bill creating five-star rank of General of the Army and Admiral of the Navy. General Pershing still to hold top Army rank.

Major Boettiger has been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

SENT: 082125Z

TOP SECRET

8 December 1944

MR-OUT-621

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

WR

For: The President of the United States

Number: 849

Filed 081728Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top
Secret. Nr. 849. Your telegram Nr. 653. (*map Room Note. 653 Concerns Italian Foreign Relations*)

1. MacMillan is leaving almost at once for Washington and will be able to discuss Italian questions with your people.

2. I have arranged for our views on the general question raised in your telegram to be taken up by the Foreign Office with the State Department. I fully endorse the line taken in the Foreign Secretary's telegram.

End

Recd 081825 Z

Sent 081832 Z

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

8 December 1944

MORNING NEWS, ADMIRAL BROWN TO THE PRESIDENT. FRWESTERN FRONT

Situation in extreme north and in the Aachen sector remains unchanged.

To the south, American Seventh Army of General Patch has pivoted to the northeast on the right of the Third Army and is pressing toward the German border with axis of advance toward the Mainz-Frankfort area.

The French, with one American division attached, continue reducing enemy forces west of the Rhine in the Colmar area.

The enemy now has sixty-six divisions deployed on the western front. Sixteen of these divisions, including the bulk of their armor, are concentrated in the Aachen sector.

Total enemy prisoners of war since D-day: 762,000.

Weather over the continent is bad today and forecast bad for tomorrow.

PHILIPPINES

General MacArthur's communique reports the successful landing of 77th Division in Ormoc Bay. This splits the Japs in two.

Preliminary reports indicate following damage was sustained by our surface units during many enemy air attacks throughout the day. The Destroyer MAHAN was badly damaged and the Destroyer Transport WARD (ex-destroyer) was also seriously damaged. These ships were subsequently sunk by our gunfire after the personnel were removed. The Destroyer Transport LIDDLE (ex-destroyer escort) was damaged by suicide crash but was able to proceed under her own power. Fires were reported aboard the DD WALKE and DD O'BRIEN (Under command of Captain Freseman.) Further details not available at this time. An LST was slightly damaged by a suicide dive and the DD LAMSON was set afire but the fire was brought under control.

JAPAN

The Jap radio admitted today that an earthquake rolled up huge tidal waves and loosed landslides yesterday across a 150 mile belt of central Japan, extending through the Tokyo area. The broadcast insisted that only slight damage had been caused and that practically none of the Capital district's crowded war plants were affected. Domei said the center of the earthquake was in the sea of Enshu, about 100 miles southeast of Tokyo, and reported that a great wall of water rolled inland over coastal areas, flooding some houses. Further inland and extending into Tokyo-Yokohama district landslides caved in streets and houses over a wide area. Domei refrained from mentioning that Tokyo itself had been damaged although its account indicated that the capital was in range of the shock.

Steps are being taken by G-2 to obtain photographs of the Jap quake area by 21st Bomber Command immediately.

B-29 Photo Reconnaissance planes will take pictures of Japan daily and each time drop a few sticks of bombs.

CHINA

It is now known that a portion of the Kaifang-Sian RR line along the Yellow River was removed for replacing the damaged portion of the North-South Peiping-Hankow-Henyang railroad. Part of the latter railroad is out pending construction of destroyed bridges. It is very likely that one of the major missions of the present Jap drive from Liuchow to Kweiyang is to salvage rails from the Liuchow-Kweiyang line which extends as far northwest as Tushan where the fighting is now going on and which town the Japs have captured. Our photo reconnaissance shows many bridges on this line to be out but the rails are intact. Salvaged rails could be used to complete the north-south railroad to Canton or Nanning, thus establishing a new Jap lifeline in China. If Wedemeyer conducts a stubborn defense of Kunming, the Japs may decide to delay the final punch pending the development of the railroad.

B-29 STRIKE

Yesterday before noon, Jap time, sixty-seven B-29's dropped 10 tons each on Iwo Jima by radar through bad weather.

Subsequently, 102 B-24's carried out a raid. Complete results not received. Flight reports indicate that some squadrons bombed visually while others encountered cloud cover. The Navy has announced our ships have bombarded but details are not yet available.

LONDON

According to the radio, Prime Minister Churchill has demanded a vote of confidence from the House of Commons today on his government's interference in the Greek, Italian and other European crises. Churchill announced he was staking the life of his Cabinet on its handling of the Greek situation and every other phase of British continental policy.

PACIFIC SUBMARINES

Our submarines report sinking 2 oilers, 2 transports, 3 freighters, 1 ammunition ship, and 1 large barge; and damaging 1 destroyer and 1 freighter.

081602Z.

amc

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

MR-OUT-619

7 December 1944

WS

EVENING NEWS, ADMIRAL BROWN TO THE PRESIDENT

Three B-29's carrying bombs were over Tokyo at 2:30 a.m., December 8, on a photo reconnaissance mission. Jap radio reports this as a nuisance raid. One fire, started by bombs, was quickly extinguished.

In the B-29 raid reported in this mornings news, later reports indicate that we lost two planes (reported this morning as down by ramming) and four planes are unaccounted for (which probably includes the one ditched in the sea west of Darien.)

In Para four of this mornings news, tonnage unloaded at Antwerp on 5 December, reported as 36,000 tons, should be 26,000 tons.

RECD 072124Z.

- amc

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Send this
WAL

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
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Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Department of State

Washington,

Charge to
\$

December 7, 1944

MR-Ord-618

TO THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WAL
ES

Eden, in a personal message to me, has asked that we issue some form of statement to the press which might help the Prime Minister and himself in the debate on Greece which is coming up in the House of Commons on the eighth. At the press conference this morning, I accordingly made the following statement in reply to a question. The quotation selected for endorsement was suggested by the British Embassy here.

"Q. Is there anything which you can tell us about the situation in Greece?"

"A. I was interested to note that in his statement on the subject on December 5 Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons the following: 'Our own position, as I have said, is extremely clear. Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form a government of the right or left is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them.' With this statement I am in full agreement. It is also our earnest

Enciphered by *ams*

Sent by operator *ams* M. *7 Dec*, 1944, *071958Z*

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Department of State

Washington.

Charge Department:
Full rate
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Night letter

Charge to
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page 2

TO THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

hope that the people and authorities of Greece and our
British Allies will work together in rebuilding that
ravished country."

Stethunis

SECRETARY

S:CB:JG

CB

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

WB.

your 844-

result but complete destruction of the enemy. Our
We are winning on every front of our global battleline except in
air and ground force efforts in the Mediterranean all help in this

China. I agree with you that some of our optimism at Quebec concerning
whittling down of Germany. I think our people understand the situation
speedy victory has not been justified by the subsequent course of events,
as it has developed. I feel hopeful that Eisenhower's increasing

However, our agreed broad strategy is developing according to plan. You
strength and a Russian offensive after the freeze will decisively crush

and I are now in the position of Commanders in Chief who have prepared
German military resistance by spring. //

their plans, issued their orders, and committed all of their resources

I share your concern about the situation in Asia but believe it is
to battle according to those plans and orders. For the time being, it
now too early to attempt to evaluate it. Admiral Mountbatten's operations
seems to me the prosecution of the war and the outcome of the battles
are ahead of schedule, and I think there is a good chance that he may

lie with our field commanders, in whom I have every confidence.
achieve his objectives in spite of immediate transfer of U.S. and Chinese

It is true that our progress in Europe, both in the battle of
resources to China. As to the grave Chinese situation, I do not see how

Germany and in the Mediterranean, has been beset by exasperating delays.
more aid can be given to the Generalissimo than is now being provided by

The winter brings with it further difficulties. However, with the opening
making available to Wedemeyer the resources for which he has asked.

of Antwerp and the assured flow of divisions and supplies to General

My Chiefs of Staff are now devoting all of their abilities and

Eisenhower, I feel the situation is now brighter than it has been for
energies in directing their organizations towards carrying out the plans

some time. In the battle of Germany our ground and air forces are day
we have made and in supporting our forces throughout the world. Gradually

by day chewing up the enemy's dwindling manpower and resources. General
all of these forces are, for the time being, committed. I do not think

Eisenhower estimates that on the Western Front alone he is inflicting
that my Chiefs should leave their posts at this time since we have

losses in excess of the enemy's capability to form new units. I cannot
explain the broad strategic decisions to guide our Chief Commanders in

see clearly just when, but soon a decisive break in our favor will come,
directing the decisive battles. If you disagree, please say so at once.

If the German chooses to continue this battle of attrition to the bitter
even though not completely favorable to them.

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TOP SECRET

end, there can be no result but complete destruction of the enemy. Our
air and ground force efforts in the Mediterranean all help in this
whittling down of Germany. I think our people understand the situation
as it has developed. I feel hopeful that Eisenhower's increasing
strength and a Russian offensive after the freeze will decisively crush
German military resistance by spring. //

I share your concern about the situation in Asia but believe it is
now too early to attempt to evaluate it. Admiral Mountbatten's operations
are ahead of schedule, and I think there is a good chance that he may
achieve his objectives in spite of immediate transfer of U.S. and Chinese
resources to China. As to the grave Chinese situation, I do not see how
more aid can be given to the Generalissimo than is now being provided by
making available to Wedemeyer the resources for which he has asked.

My Chiefs of Staff are now devoting all of their abilities and
energies in directing their organizations towards carrying out the plans
we have made and in supporting our forces throughout the world. Practically
all of these forces are, for the time being, committed. I do not feel
that my Chiefs should leave their posts at this time since no requirement
exists for broad strategic decisions to guide our field commanders in
directing the decisive battles. If you, however, have any ideas or plans,
even though not completely formulated, we should give thought to them at

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TOP SECRET

once. This would make it even more important that my Chiefs should be here during the period of preliminary consideration where their advice is immediately available to me.

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WA

WESTERN FRONT

Allied action on the Western Front yesterday was largely confined to U.S. Third Army's continuing operations in crossing the Saar. General Patton is now employing eight divisions including two armored in this drive. Details as reported in the press.

The position of the enemy 19th Army in the Strasbourg area has further deteriorated with capture of Selestat.

SHAEP estimates that enemy has lost the equivalent of seventeen divisions since the start of Allied November offensive. About the same number of divisions have been brought up during the period. About half the daily losses are being accounted for by prisoners of war. Enemy losses have dropped from 9000 to about 5000 per day. Our losses for the last two weeks average about 3500 per day including about 350 killed.

26,000 tons were unloaded at Antwerp on 5 December.

CRETE

The Germans on Crete, about 8,000 strong, are confined to the western end of the island and apparently have no intentions of extending their control. Two weeks ago a few British patrols, supported by several British destroyers, landed at Herakleion Bay without opposition and are now engaged in feeding the population starvation rations. Although there has been no official "arrangement" the Germans probably won't molest the British as long as they confine their activities to feeding the population. Although the Germans have airstrips it is not believed they have any combat aircraft on station.

PHILIPPINES.

A successful break across a river barrier which has held the 7th Division up since November 17 south of Ormoc and a decided advance by the 11th Airborne Division across the mountains toward Ormoc Bay greatly improves our Leyte position.

American casualties to date: killed 2048, wounded 6462, missing 244.

Present fighter strength now on Leyte airfields; three fighter groups, two fighter squadrons, two night fighter squadrons, and five Marine squadrons. Total planes approximately 500.

During the early morning of 5 December, enemy aircraft continually attacked a number of our surface units in Suriago Strait. The destroyer DRAYTON was slightly damaged and had two men killed by a nearmiss. Later, she sustained additional damage when an enemy plane crash-dived into her No. 1 gun.

In addition to the SS ANTOINE SAUGRAINE's being damaged in the 5 December attack by enemy aircraft against our convoy 70 miles northwest of Mindanao, LSM-20 was sunk and LST-23 extensively damaged.

SAIPAN

Ten Jap planes attacked Saipan. Six shot down. One B-29 destroyed, 2 badly damaged. The attacking planes were first contacted 100 miles out by destroyer picket.

B-29's

About midnight last night our time, eight B-29's bombed the Manchuria Aircraft Manufacturing Plant at Mukden, Manchuria, visually from 28,000 feet with fair to good results, 4 bombed the dock area at Darien, and 4 bombed the rail yards at Chengsien. The results of twelve others still unreported. One B-29 was ditched in the sea west of Darien, and two others were downed by ramming.

RECD 071530Z

- amc

6 December 1944

MR-OUT-615

WR

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

Reference MR-OUT-604 (Prime Minister No. 847). Navy Department and OWI approve anti-submarine statement submitted by the Prime Minister. Your authority to release is requested.

SENT: 062055Z



DEC - 6 1944

TOP SECRET

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-615:

6 DECEMBER 1944.

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN:

REFERENCE MR-OUT-604 (PRIME MINISTER'S NUMBER 847). NAVY
DEPARTMENT AND OWI APPROVE ANTI-SUBMARINE STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE
PRIME MINISTER. YOUR AUTHORITY TO RELEASE IS REQUESTED.

NO SIG.

*Approved
L.R.*

RECEIVED



DEC - 6 1944 PM

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Draft Reply from the President to the
Prime Minister's Message No. 845 of
December 6, 1944.

W.S.

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614

As you know, the letter to Berle merely trans-
mitted Sforza's message to Badoglio and in no way
involved this Government. I see no reason why you
should not use the message itself in any way you see
fit. I believe the message has already been made
public, having been given to the press by Badoglio at
the time of its receipt.

I deplore any offense which the press release
on Italy may have given you personally or any implication
of my lack of understanding of your responsibility
before ^{your} ~~the~~ country. You must recognize, however, the
untenable position in which we were put by Mr. Eden's ^{prior}
statement in the House regarding the British Government's
representations to the Italian Government on the position
of Sforza in any new government. ^{while military operations continued} Italy is an area of
combined Anglo-American responsibility and our silence
on this step made it appear that we agreed with the
action taken. Actually this move was made without prior
consultation with us in any quarter and it is quite con-
trary to the policy which we have tried to follow in
Italy, since the Moscow Conference last year, in
accepting democratic solutions in government worked out
by the Italian people themselves. ^{on the circumstances}
^{we had no other choice than to make our position clear.}
You will remember my feeling on this score expressed
to you at the time Bonomi succeeded Badoglio in forming
a Government last June.

Reply to President. The following draft
reply to Prime Minister prepared by the Secretary of State is
forwarded for your consideration.

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Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-614:

6 DECEMBER 1944.

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY:

THE FOLLOWING DRAFT REPLY TO PRIME'S 845 PREPARED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

"AS YOU KNOW, THE LETTER TO BERLE MERELY TRANSMITTED SFORZA'S MESSAGE TO BADOGLIO AND IN NO WAY INVOLVED THIS GOVERNMENT. I SEE NO REASON WHY YOU SHOULD NOT USE THE MESSAGE ITSELF IN ANY WAY YOU SEE FIT. I BELIEVE THE MESSAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE PUBLIC, HAVING BEEN GIVEN TO THE PRESS BY BADOGLIO AT THE TIME OF ITS RECEIPT.

I DEPLORE ANY OFFENSE WHICH THE PRESS RELEASE ON ITALY MAY HAVE GIVEN YOU PERSONALLY OR ANY IMPLICATION OF MY LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE YOUR COUNTRY. YOU MUST RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THE UNTENABLE POSITION IN WHICH WE WERE PUT BY MR. EDEN'S PRIOR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE REGARDING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REPRESENTATION TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE POSITION OF SFORZA IN ANY NEW GOVERNMENT. WHILE MILITARY OPERATIONS CONTINUE ITALY IS AN AREA OF COMBINED ANGLO-AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY AND OUR SILENCE ON THIS STEP MADE IT

TOP SECRET

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

-2-

APPEAR THAT WE AGREED WITH THE ACTION TAKEN. ACTUALLY THIS MOVE WAS MADE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH US IN ANY QUARTER AND IT IS QUITE CONTRARY TO THE POLICY WHICH WE HAVE TRIED TO FOLLOW IN ITALY, SINCE THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE LAST YEAR, IN ACCEPTING DEMOCRATIC SOLUTIONS IN GOVERNMENT WORKED OUT BY THE ITALIAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAD NO OTHER CHOICE THAN TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR.

YOU WILL REMEMBER MY FEELING ON THIS SCORE EXPRESSED TO YOU AT THE TIME BONOMI SUCCEEDED BADOGLIO IN FORMING A GOVERNMENT LAST JUNE."

Roosevelt

NO SIG.

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DEC - 6 1944 PM

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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~~613~~

6 December 1944

WR

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : 848 Filed 061752Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Number 848 personal
and TOP SECRET.

Thank you for your telegram Number 664.

Although I have always felt that these discussions were premature and throw too heavy a burden on our minds at a time when so many anxieties of war weigh down upon us, yet I can assure you that I sympathise completely with your desire to take advantage of these pregnant negotiations at Chicago. It is our considered view, however, that further and, in the end, swifter progress will be made if we have an opportunity here to review the position in every one of its aspects and in its general setting in the world economy.

It is our desire, as it is yours, to reconcile the greatest possible freedom of air commerce with a broad justice to all nations, large and small.

It is your desire, as it is ours, that the free play of enterprise should not degenerate into an exploitation of national

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

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advantages which would in the end be found generally intolerable.

We are not satisfied, however, that the projects which have succeeded one another in such profusion during the intricate discussions at Chicago represent the final contribution of human ingenuity towards a solution.

Apart from our own views, we have to take account of Parliament and public opinion.

Criticisms of the Chicago proposals are already appearing in quarters of the press which are in no sense reactionary or narrowly nationalistic. These are symptoms which in the interest of ultimate agreement we cannot ignore. They serve to fortify us in our conviction that we should at this stage consult with our people. From such a consultation we shall expect to reach a clearer comprehension of issues which now seem to us extremely confused and to propound fresh constructive approaches.

Prime.

TOP SECRET

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Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-613:

6 DECEMBER 1944.

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

(NUMBER 848 PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET).

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 664.

ALTHOUGH I HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE PREMATURE AND THROW TOO HEAVY A BURDEN ON OUR MINDS AT A TIME WHEN SO MANY ANXIETIES OF WAR WEIGH DOWN UPON US, YET I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I SYMPATHISE COMPLETELY WITH YOUR DESIRE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE PREGNANT NEGOTIATIONS AT CHICAGO. IT IS OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT FURTHER AND, IN THE END, SWIFTER PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IF WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY HERE TO REVIEW THE POSITION IN EVERY ONE OF ITS ASPECTS AND IN ITS GENERAL SETTING IN THE WORLD ECONOMY.

IT IS OUR DESIRE, AS IT IS YOURS, TO RECONCILE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE FREEDOM OF AIR COMMERCE WITH A BROAD JUSTICE TO ALL NATIONS, LARGE AND SMALL.

IT IS YOUR DESIRE, AS IT IS OURS, THAT THE FREE PLAY OF ENTERPRISE SHOULD NOT DEGENERATE INTO AN EXPLOITATION OF NATIONAL

TOP SECRET

No. 7
1942

Signal Corps, United States Army



Received at

TOP SECRET

DEC - 6 1944 m

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ADVANTAGES WHICH WOULD IN THE END BE FOUND GENERALLY INTOLERABLE.

WE ARE NOT SATISFIED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROJECTS WHICH HAVE SUCCEEDED ONE ANOTHER IN SUCH PROFUSION DURING THE INTRICATE DISCUSSIONS AT CHICAGO REPRESENT THE FINAL CONTRIBUTION OF HUMAN INGENUITY TOWARDS A SOLUTION.

APART FROM OUR OWN VIEWS, WE HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION.

CRITICISMS OF THE CHICAGO PROPOSALS ARE ALREADY APPEARING IN QUARTERS OF THE PRESS WHICH ARE IN NO SENSE REACTIONARY OR NARROWLY NATIONALISTIC. THESE ARE SYMPTOMS WHICH IN THE INTEREST OF ULTIMATE AGREEMENT WE CANNOT IGNORE. THEY SERVE TO FORTIFY US IN OUR CONVICTION THAT WE SHOULD AT THIS STAGE CONSULT WITH OUR PEOPLE. FROM SUCH A CONSULTATION WE SHALL EXPECT TO REACH A CLEARER COMPREHENSION OF ISSUES WHICH NOW SEEM TO US EXTREMELY CONFUSED AND TO PROPOUND FRESH CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES.

*Secstate
To prepare reply if necessary*

NO SIG.

GD-703

TOP SECRET

6 December 1944

MR-OUT-612

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

Western Front

The crossing of the Saar in six places by our forces as announced by several press services is not confirmed as yet by official dispatches, nor by SHAEF communique. There is no reason to believe, however, that the crossings have not been made.

SENT: 062047Z

I fully appreciate the advantages which you see in a possible tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet pact. I am somewhat dubious, however, as to the effect of such an arrangement on the question of an international security organization to which, as you know, I attach the very highest importance. I fear that a tripartite pact might be interpreted by public opinion here as a competitor to a future world organization, whereas a more widely organized

611

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER

Your 846

611
You will have seen from my reply to Stalin on his talks with DeGaulle that our views are identical on the two questions which he raised.

I still adhere to my position that any attempt to include DeGaulle in the meeting of the three of us would merely introduce a complicating and undesirable factor.

In regard to your suggestion to Uncle Joe that the question of France's postwar frontiers be referred to the European Advisory Commission I feel that since the Commission is fully occupied with questions relating to the surrender of Germany, it would be a mistake to attempt to bring up at this stage before it any question of postwar frontiers. It seems to me preferable to leave this specific topic for further exploration between us.

I fully appreciate the advantages which you see in a possible tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact. I am somewhat dubious, however, as to the effect of such an arrangement on the question of an international security organization to which, as you know, I attach the very highest importance. I fear that a tripartite pact might be interpreted by public opinion here as a competitor to a future world organization, whereas a ~~more readily understood~~ bilateral

bilateral arrangement between France and the Soviet Union similar to the Soviet-British Pact would be more ~~accept-~~^{understandable} ~~able~~. I realize, however, that this is a subject which is of primary concern to the three countries involved.

Leahy to President

The following draft reply to Prime 846 approved by the Secretary of State is forwarded for your consideration

Map Room-

If the President approves this, Admiral Leahy wishes it sent to London at once without further reference to him.

G.M.S.

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-611:

6 DECEMBER 1944.

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

THE FOLLOWING DRAFT REPLY TO PRIME'S 846 APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

"YOUR 846.

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY REPLY TO STALIN ON HIS TALKS WITH DEGAULLE THAT OUR VIEWS ARE IDENTICAL ON THE TWO QUESTIONS WHICH HE RAISED.

I STILL ADHERE TO MY POSITION THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE DE GAULLE IN THE MEETING OF THE THREE OF US WOULD MERELY INTRODUCE A COMPLICATING AND UNDESIRABLE FACTOR.

IN REGARD TO YOUR SUGGESTION TO UNCLE JOE THAT THE QUESTION OF FRANCE'S POSTWAR FRONTIERS BE REFERRED TO THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION I FEEL THAT SINCE THE COMMISSION IS FULLY OCCUPIED WITH QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE SURRENDER OF GERMANY, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ATTEMPT TO BRING UP AT THIS STAGE BEFORE IT ANY QUESTION OF POSTWAR FRONTIERS. IT SEEMS TO ME PREFERABLE TO LEAVE THIS SPECIFIC TOPIC FOR

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1942

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

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FURTHER EXPLORATION BETWEEN US.

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE ADVANTAGES WHICH YOU SEE IN A POSSIBLE TRIPARTITE ANGLO-FRANCO-SOVIET PACT. I AM SOMEWHAT DUBIOUS, HOWEVER, AS TO THE EFFECT OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION TO WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, I ATTACH THE VERY HIGHEST IMPORTANCE. I FEAR THAT A TRIPARTITE PACT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED BY PUBLIC OPINION HERE AS A COMPETITOR TO A FUTURE WORLD ORGANIZATION, WHEREAS A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION SIMILAR TO THE SOVIET-BRITISH PACT WOULD BE MORE UNDERSTANDABLE. I REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS A SUBJECT WHICH IS OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE THREE COUNTRIES INVOLVED."

NO SIG.

R. B. ...

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DEC - 6 1944 AM

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TOP SECRET

610

WAL
S

Stettinius

~~DRAFT TELEGRAM~~ TO THE PRESIDENT

I have seen the telegram the Prime Minister sent to you about our statement on Italy of yesterday. The Prime Minister has also telegraphed a message to Halifax and I have received a message from Eden.

We simply could not understand why the British took the action they did with regard to Sforza without any consultation with us or with the Soviet Government, particularly in view of the declaration on Italy issued at the Moscow Conference in 1943. We are pledged under that Declaration and our policy to act on the principle of permitting the greatest freedom possible to the Italians in rebuilding their governmental institutions on democratic principles. All the correspondents here overwhelmed us for an immediate clarification of our position. We had no choice but to state promptly our established policy. After all our declarations of policy and protestations of devotion to the democratic principle, unless we promptly made our position clear, it was rapidly being assumed by the press and the public that we were in agreement with the British action. We avoided any reference to British action and merely stated our own position clearly and unequivocally. The general

press and public reaction and that of important Senators has been strong and enthusiastic endorsement of our expression of attitude. The basic difficulty in this whole situation is that the British moved without informing us in any quarter in spite of the many points of contact we have and of our joint responsibility in Italy. Unfortunately, the British have always had the attitude that they had the exclusive right to decide the joint policies with regard to Italy and on many occasions where there was a difference of view we have acceded to their request that we not divulge this difference. Always when consultation takes place we arrive at a joint position and stick to it.

I am drafting a reply in answer to the message the Prime Minister sent you which I shall send across the street immediately.

Stethunius

(Ben CEB)

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED

Col'ect { Full rate
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Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

\$

MR-OUT-609

Department of State

Washington, *WR*

December 6, 1944

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
AIRGRAM

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The Foreign Relations Committee insisted that I appear this morning on five minutes notice to testify on the Palestine Resolution. Senator Connally telephoned me himself saying that unless I came up and made an official statement to the Committee for the Administration saying we thought this legislation was unwise at the present time, it would be immediately voted out favorably and we would have to take the responsibility. He said he had gone as far as he could.

I immediately went over and testified in secret session of the Committee, making clear that this was a highly delicate matter; that I would talk to them in absolute confidence; and that there might be serious repercussions if there was any violation of this confidence.

I explained the delicate situation in the Arab World; that you, yourself, had not yet had an opportunity to deal with this question as exhaustively as you have in mind; and that we felt that passage of the
Resolution

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Sent: - 061900Z

Regraded Unclassified

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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AIRGRAM

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Charge Department: Full rate
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Department of State

Washington,

-2-

Resolution now would tie your hands and not leave you in a flexible position. The general sentiment of the Committee was that they would be willing to leave the entire matter in the hands of the Executive for the time being and not report out the Resolution. However, they insist on a public statement from the Executive, saying that in our judgment the passage of this legislation at this time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation.

We must give Senator Connally a prompt answer since ~~we understand that~~ the Committee will meet again on Friday.

Would you please advise me by wire whether, because of the broad issues involved, you would be willing to make the statement, or whether you prefer that the statement be issued from ^{the State} ~~this~~ Department.

The statement would be simply

QUOTE It is felt that the passage of the Palestine Resolution at the present moment would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation UNQUOTE

Enciphered by S:ERS
Sent by operator M. *NEA*

CS

Stettinius

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO <i>WZ</i>	PRIORITY PPPPPP
DATE 6 DECEMBER 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 061428			DEFERRED
DECODED BY BALDWIN			BASEGRAM
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			BASEGRAM
			15 IF OPERATIONAL
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PAGE 1 OF 4		061227Z	NCR 5036
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

ON MY ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW I FOUND YOUR MESSAGE NR 129 OF 271709 NOV REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A BLACK SEA PORT

FOR THE PROPOSED MEETING. I HAVE NOT YET SEEN MARSHAL STALIN AND THE FOLLOWING IS THEREFORE BASED ONLY ON THE INFORMATION

AVAILABLE TO OUR NAVAL OFFICERS HERE. TWO OF OUR NAVAL OFFICERS VISITED YALIA AND SEVASTOPOL DURING LAST SUMMER. THEY

REPORT THAT YALIA HAS A NUMBER OF LARGE AND WELL BUILT SANATORIUMS AND HOTELS UNDAMAGED BY GERMAN OCCUPATION. BY RUSSIAN

STANDARDS THE TOWN IS EXTREMELY NEAT AND CLEAN. THE HARBOR IS SMALL AND IT IS DOUBTED THAT IT IS ADEQUATE FOR PROTECTED

ANCHORAGE FOR A LARGE NAVAL VESSEL. THE WINTER CLIMATE IS REASONABLY FAVORABLE AVERAGE TEMPERATURE IN JANUARY AND

FEBRUARY 39 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT. THE TOWN HAS GOOD SOUTHERN EXPOSURE AND IT IS PROTECTED FROM THE NORTH WINDS BY HIGH

no. 1 ADMIRAL. no. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____		FOR ACTION CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE 6 DECEMBER 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY _____			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY _____	FOR INFORMATION	6
BY _____	BY _____		PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY _____	DITTOED BY _____		ROUTINE 10
	BY _____		DEFERRED 11
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IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 4

061227Z

NCR 5036

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CLIFFS. SEVASTOPOL HAS EXCELLENT ANCHORAGE WHICH RUSSIANS STATE THEY HAVE CLEARED OF MINES. WEATHER IS PROBABLY SOMEWHAT COLDER THAN YALTA BECAUSE OF GREATER EXPOSURE TO THE NORTH. YALTA AND SEVASTOPOL ARE CONNECTED BY A WINDING HIGHWAY WITH GOOD SURFACE ABOUT THREE HOURS BY MOTOR. BECAUSE OF ENEMY ACTION DOUBT THAT THERE ARE ANY ADEQUATE FACILITIES ASHORE. ODESSA HAS BEEN VISITED RECENTLY BY CAPTAIN FRANKEL USN NOW ENROUTE WASHINGTON. ANCHORAGE AND HARBOR EXCELLENT BUT WEATHER DURING WINTER MUCH COLDER THAN THE CRIMEA WITH CONSIDERABLE FOG. UNDERSTAND TOWN HAS NOT BEEN BADLY DAMAGED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION ALTHOUGH ELECTRICITY AND SEWERAGE SYSTEMS ARE NOT YET IN FULL OPERATION. ONE OF THE HOTELS COULD BE MADE ADEQUATE. WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION REGARDING CONSTANTZA. NOVOROSSISK HARBOR UNDOUBTDDBLY PROVIDES SATISFACTORY ANCHORAGE. UNDERSTAND THE TOWN HAS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE WAR DAMAGE AND NO SUITABLE BUILDINGS AVAILABLE. PORTS

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

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OPNAV 19-78

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RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE <u>6 DECEMBER 1944</u>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY	WZ	6
BY	BY		PRIORITY 9
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			DEFERRED 11
			BASEGRAM 12
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^P (BATUMI)
OF MOTI AND BATUM PROVIDE ADEQUATE ANCHORAGE AND PROBABLY SATISFACTORY FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE ASHORE. CLIMATE IS SUBTROPICAL AND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE MORE AGREEABLE THAN ANY OTHER AREA IN RUSSIAN BLACK TERRITORY. ALTHOUGH NO AMERICAN HAS VISITED THESE PLACES SINCE THE WAR WE HAVE NOT HEARD OF ANY EPIDEMICS. CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN ALL OF RUSSIA NOT TO EAT LOCAL FRUITS AND VEGETABLES WITHOUT CAREFUL PREPARATION. OTHERWISE HEALTH CONDITIONS SHOULD BE SATISFACTORY CERTAINLY FAR BETTER THAN TEHERAN. UNDERSTAND THERE ARE SATISFACTORY AIRFIELDS NEAR ALL THE PLACES MENTIONED ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING THE AIRFIELDS ADJACENT TO THE CAUCASIAN CITIES. ODESSA AND CONSTANZA ARE NOW ABOUT 500 MILES FROM ENEMY AREAS AND THEREFORE WITHIN BOMBING RANGE. SEVASTOPOL IS 750 MILES FROM NEAREST ENEMY AIRFIELDS AND WOULD THEREFORE BE DIFFICULT OF ATTACK. THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW OPERATING SHIPS FREELY IN THE

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____		CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE 6 DECEMBER 1944			ROUTINE 3
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DECODED BY _____			BASEGRAM 5
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		PRIORITY 9	
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PAGE 4 OF 4 061227Z NCR 5036

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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

BLACK SEA AS FAR WEST AS CONSTANZA AND SOVIET NAVY STATES THAT CHANNELS HAVE BEEN SWEEPED OF MINES. WE ARE INVESTIGATING WINTER FLYING CONDITIONS. WHEN I SEE STALIN I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INDUCE HIM TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO A POINT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BUT AT THE SAME TIME WILL INQUIRE THE LOCATION HE WOULD SUGGEST IN THE BLACK SEA. I AM ASSUMING THAT IF YOU DECIDE TO GO THE BLACK SEA YOU WOULD WISH TO LIVE ABOARD YOUR NAVAL VESSEL.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

NAVAIDE (#1-2).....ACTION

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

December 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MAP ROOM

THE WHITE HOUSE

Will you be good enough to get the
attached message by wire to the President
by the fastest possible means.

Stettin
(5)

be clear of city area by midnight 6-7 December. Failure to do so may be
digitized either before or after 1944. Failure to do so may be

6 December 1944

B

MR-OUT-606

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The following quoted reply to Stalin approved by State Department is forwarded for your consideration.

I think it should be quoted to Prime for his information. We are now preparing a draft reply to Prime's 846.

QUOTE. Personal and Secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.

Thank you for your two informative messages of December 2 and December 3.

In regard to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this Government would have no objection in principle if you and General de Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both your countries and European security in general.

I am in complete agreement with your replies to General de Gaulle with regard to the post-war frontier of France. It appears to me at the present time that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now and that its settlement subsequent to the collapse of Germany is preferable. UNQUOTE.

SENT: 061530Z

MR-OUT-605

6 December 1944

Messages to Salvo's Bay and are starting by an call by the Army to be heard.
MORNING NEWS, FROM ADMIRAL BROWN TO THE PRESIDENT.

WESTERN FRONT

U.S. Third Army bridgehead across Saar River expanded in spite of continued enemy counterattacks. Advances up to three miles were made and an additional crossing of the river has been reported in this sector.

In Huertgen area, U.S. Forces were held to small gains by enemy counterattacks. The northern part of the Roer River sector was quiet.

Further flooding in the Nijmegen salient forced British and Canadians to evacuate more ground. An enemy attempt at infiltration in this area was attacked and 110 prisoners were taken.

Slightly improved weather permitted intermittent air support but traffic is still road bound. Fairly good weather is expected to continue today.

It is estimated that the period of training for all types of German divisions from start to finish now averages four to eight weeks, beginning with bulk of personnel lacking even infantry training. Enemy is now inclined to refit battered divisions in rear of line with replacements rather than form new divisions in far rear areas.

On 4 December, Antwerp unloaded 15,347 tons British and 9,380 tons U.S. Accumulative 28 Nov to 4 Dec, Allied tonnage 51,017.

GREECE

At Greek Government request, British commander in Athens, General Scobie, ordered ELAS irregulars (troops of National Liberation Group--Communists) to be clear of city area by midnight 6-7 December. Failure to obey has precipitated British attack on these forces. Warships present moved out in

TOP-SECRET

Piraeus to Salamis Bay and are standing by on call by the Army to bombard.

ITALY One of our destroyers, on 3 December northeast Sicily, was attacked

by Ravenna occupied by British after German withdrawal from city.

Counterattack forced British to withdraw from bridgehead over Lamone

River. Later that afternoon in Leyte Gulf, the Destroyer USSPCD was hit

LEYTE by a plane. Considerable damage resulted but she is able to proceed

Hq. 8th Army, under General Eichelberger, has moved to Tacloban.

Eichelberger will take over responsibility for Leyte operations, while reports

6th Army, under Walter Kreuger, prepares for next two operations. 7th

Division on west coast of Leyte just south of Ormoc is now conducting this

main attack by 24th (southern) Corps.

CHINA-BURMA Earlier, an amphibious operation will be undertaken to seize a

The 22nd Chinese Division is scheduled to follow the 14th Division

as soon as practicable.

CENTRAL PACIFIC

Iwo Jima. On 3 December, an airboat attack is scheduled against Iwo

Jima. Just prior to noon there will be a fighter sweep of F-51's. From

noon to 1:30, 75 B-29's will be over. From 2 to 3:30, 21 B-29's will be

over. At 4 p.m., 3 heavy bombers plus destroyers will be over. 21

troops will be landed.

Sent: 06/15/52. Rab

- 2 -

TOP-SECRET

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TOP-SECRET

PHILIPPINES

One of our convoys, on 5 December northeast Mindanao, was attacked by enemy torpedo bombers. A 7,000 ton AK was hit by 2 torpedoes and subsequently abandoned. Another vessel was hit.

Later that afternoon in Leyte Gulf, the Destroyer MUGFORD was hit by suicide plane. Considerable damage resulted but she is able to proceed under own power.

23 additional men of COOPER crew rescued by Catalinas. Guerillas report 30 more survivors.

The Hospital ship HOPE reports she was again attacked by planes; this time south of Leyte.

On 7 December, an amphibious operation will be undertaken to seize a beachhead in Ormoc Bay, using the 77th Division less 1 regimental combat team, to destroy Jap force opposing our Leyte advance.

CENTRAL PACIFIC

Iwo Jima. On 8 December, an all-out attack is scheduled against Iwo Jima. Just prior to noon there will be a fighter sweep of P-38's. From noon to 1:45, 75 B-29's will be over. From 2 to 3:30, 95 B-24's will be over. At 4 p.m., 3 heavy cruisers plus destroyers will bombard. no troops will be landed.

Sent: 061515Z. RUB

TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-609

6 December 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : 847 Filed 061020Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and TOP
SECRET Number 847.

I attach our suggestion for the November U-Boat report.
Canada is being informed at the same time.

"Shipping losses from U-Boat action have again
been very small and the number of U-Boats sunk in propor-
tion has again been satisfactory.

The enemy has by no means abandoned the struggle
and has introduced new devices, such as the extensible air
intake and exhaust which enable U-Boats to remain submerg-
ed for long periods and so penetrate into areas denied to
them for the past three years.

Reports that U-Boat construction has been abandon-
ed are probably German inspired and are untrue. On the
contrary, improved types of U-Boats may at any time be thrown
into the battle and retention of our present command of the
sea will undoubtedly call for unremitting vigilance and hard
fighting."

Prime.

Rec'd 06/13/45

Sent - 06/14/45. *AWB*

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

HR-OUT-60B

6 December 1944

WTL

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : 846 Filed 061008Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and TOP
SECRET Number 846.

I have replied as follows to Stalin's enquiry for my advice on the two questions raised with him by De Gaulle:-

"1. Your telegram about De Gaulle's visit and the two questions he will raise. We have no objection whatever to a Franco Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to the Anglo Soviet pact. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government consider it desirable and an additional link between us all. Indeed, it also occurs to us that it might be best of all if we were to conclude a tripartite treaty between the three of us which would embody our existing Anglo Soviet treaty with any improvements. In this way the obligations of each one of us would be identical and linked together. Please let me know if this idea appeals to you as I hope it may. We should both of course tell the United States.

2. The question of changing the eastern frontier of

*Recd: 061348Z
To Pres: 061400Z*

TOP SECRET

Copies to Ad Leahy

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

France to the left bank of the Rhine or alternatively of forming a Rhenish-Westphalian province under international control, together with other alternatives ought to await settlement at the peace table. There is, however, no reason why, when the three heads of government meet, we should not come much closer to conclusions about all this than we have done so far. As you have seen, the President does not expect De Gaulle to come to the meeting of the three. I would hope that this could be modified to his coming in later on when decisions, especially affecting France, were under discussion.

3. Meanwhile, would it not be a good thing to let the European Advisory Commission sitting in London, of which France is a member, explore the topic for us all without committing in any way the heads of governments?

4. I am keeping the President informed."

2. There seems much to be said for a tripartite Anglo France Soviet pact. In that way we can be sure that our mutual obligations to each other are harmonised from the beginning. Public opinion too would think such a joint agreement more satisfactory than an arrangement whereby relations between the French and ourselves were governed

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

- 3 -

by agreements which each of us had entered into separately
with Russia.

3. I should welcome your views.

Prime.

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

602

TOP SECRET

WAZ

6 December 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of the United States

Nr. 845 Filed: 060130Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and TOP SECRET. Number 845.

1. In view of the State Department's communique in Italy issued yesterday, there will no doubt be a debate in Parliament. I shall be called upon to reply to its strictures by implication upon his Majesty's Government's policy and action not only in Italy but in Greece and possibly in Belgium. This I am quite prepared to do and I hope you will realise that I must have all liberty in this matter.

2. I should be very much obliged to you if you would authorise me to read the terms of Count Sforza's letter to Mr Berle of September 23, 1943. It was on the faith of this letter that the British Government withdrew their opposition which they had a right to have considered to the sending of Count Sforza into Italy. When Count Sforza passed through London I went through this letter with him almost line by line, before witnesses who are available, and he made the strongest declaration amounting to a gentleman's word of honour that this represented his position. However no sooner had he got to Italy than he worked busily at the intrigues which destroyed the Badoglio Government. On

Recd 060800Z

Sent: 0013115Z. OUT 602

TOP SECRET

Copies to Ad. Leahy

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

-2-

account of this behavior I have regarded him as a man in whom no trust could be placed. It has never been our policy and we have no power, to veto the appointment of particular Italian ministers to particular positions. But it is certain that were Count Sforza to obtain the Premier ship or the Foreign Secretaryship, the relations between the British Government and the Italian Government would suffer very much from our complete want of confidence in him. If you do not feel able to allow me to quote the letter, I shall none the less feel entitled to mention the substances of the undertakings given by Count Sforza to me.

3. I was much astonished at the acerbity of the State Department's communique to the public, and I shall do my best in my reply to avoid imitating it. I feel however entitled to remind you that on every single occasion in the course of this war I have loyally tried to support any statements to which you were personally committed for instance, in the Darlan affair I made the greatest possible exertions as you may remember to sustain the action of the United States Government and Commander, which was and still is much criticized in quarters ever ready to be critical. Also, in the matter of the division of the Italian Fleet I not only did all in my power to avoid the slightest appearance of difference between us, though the difference was considerable, but His Majesty's Government have actually supplied fourteen out of the fifteen warships lent to the Russians to make up for their one

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

-3-

third share of the Italian Fleet to which you had referred. Finally, it was I who proposed to you the bulk of the mitigations which were introduced into our relationship with Italy as the result of our talks at Quebec and Hyde Park.

4. In all these circumstances I was much hurt that a difference about Count Sforza should have been made the occasion for an attempt on the part of the State Department to administer a public rebuke to His Majesty's Government. In the very dangerous situation in which the war is now it will be most unfortunate if we have to reveal in public controversy the natural differences which arise inevitably in the movement of so great an alliance. I do not remember anything that the State Department has ever said about Russia or about any other allied state comparable to this document with which Mr. Stettinius has inaugurated his assumption of office. I am sure such things have never been said by the State Department about Russia even when very harsh communications have been received and harsher deeds done.

Prime

TOP SECRET

601

TOP SECRET

WAL

6th December 1944

W

From: The U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of The United States

Nr : 844 Filed 06/0130Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and TOP SECRET.

Number 844.

As we are unable to meet, I feel that the time has come for me to place before you the serious and disappointing war situation which faces us at the close of this year. Although many fine tactical victories have been gained on the western front and Metz and Strasbourg are trophies, the fact remains that we have definitely failed to achieve the strategic object which we gave to our armies five weeks ago. We have not yet reached the Rhine in the northern part and most important sector of the front and we shall have to continue the great battle for many weeks before we can hope to reach the Rhine and establish our bridgeheads. After that again, we have to advance through to Germany.

2. In Italy the Germans are still keeping 26 divisions, equivalent to perhaps 16 full strength or more, on our front. They could however at any time retreat through the Brenner and Ljubljana and greatly shorten their line by holding from Lake Garda to (say) Mouth of the Adige. By this they might save half their

Recd: 061010Z.
Sent: 061245Z

TOP SECRET

OUT 601

Copies to Ad
Leaky.

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

Italian forces for home defence. Even after that there are the Alps to which they could fall back, thus saving more men. It seems to me that their reason for standing so long in Italy may have been to extricate the twelve divisions in the Balkans, etc, which are now fighting their way back to Hungary and Austria. Apart from the air and partisans and small commando forces, there are no means of preventing this, and my opinion is that the greater part will escape. About half of these might be available for adding to what may be saved from Italy. This would be a powerful reinforcement to the German homeland available, according to events, either in the east or in the west.

3. We have secured weighty advantages from DRAGOON for the battle on the main front, but the reason why the Fifteenth Group of Armies has not been able to inflict a decisive defeat on Kesselring is that, owing to the delay caused by the weakening of our forces for the sake of DRAGOON, we did not get through the Appenines till the Valley of the Po had become waterlogged. Thus neither in the mountains nor on the plains have we been able to use our superiority in armour.

4. On account of the obstinacy of the German resistance on all fronts we did not withdraw the five British and British-Indian Divisions from Europe in order to enable Mountbatten to attack Rangoon in March, and for other reasons also this operation became

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

impracticable. Mountbatten therefore began, as we agreed at Quebec, the general advance to Burma downstream from the north and the west, and this has made satisfactory progress. Now, owing to the advance of the Japanese in China, with its deadly threat to Kunming and perhaps Chungking to the Generalissimo and his regime, two and possibly more Chinese divisions have to be withdrawn for the defence of China. I have little doubt that this was inevitable and right. The consequences however are serious so far as Mountbatten's affairs are concerned, and no decision has yet been taken on how to meet this new misfortune, which at one stroke endangers China and your air terminal as well as the campaign in northern Burma. All my ideas about a really weighty blow across the Adriatic or across the Bay of Bengal have equally been set back.

5. The vast scale operations which you have conducted in the Pacific are at present the only part of the war where we are not in a temporary state of frustration.

6. We have however happily to consider what the Russians will do. We have Stalin's promise for a winter campaign starting I presume in January. On most of his immense front he seems to have been resting and preparing though only about three or four German divisions have come over to face Eisenhower. I am not in a position to measure the latest attacks he has launched to the southwest of Budapest. We may however I think look forward to more assistance

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

- 4 -

from this and other Russian actions than we have had lately, and the German position is so strained that any heavy penetration might bring about a partial if not a total collapse.

7. I have tried to survey the whole scene in its scope and proportion and it is clear that we have to face in varying degrees of probability-

(A) a considerable delay in reaching and still more in forcing the Rhine on the shortest road to Berlin,

(B) a marked degree of frustration in Italy,

(C) the escape home of a large part of the German forces from the Balkan Peninsula,

(D) frustration in Burma,

(E) elimination of China as a combatant.

When we contrast these realities with the rosy expectations of our peoples in spite of our joint efforts to damp them down the question very definitely arises:-

"What are we going to do about it?"

My anxiety is increased by the destruction of all hopes of an early meeting between the three of us and the indefinite postponement of another meeting of you and me with our Staffs. Our British plans are dependent on yours, our Anglo-American problems at least must be surveyed as a whole, and the telegraph and the telephone more often than not only darken counsel. Therefore I

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

- 5 -

feel that if you are unable to come yourself before February, I am bound to ask you whether you could not send your Chiefs of Staff over here as soon as possible, where they would be close to your main armies and to General Eisenhower and where the whole stormy scene can be calmly and patiently studied with a view to action as closely concerted as that which signalised our campaigns of 1944.

Prime

TOP SECRET

5 December 1944

MR-OUT-600

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

Burma

Following is estimate from General Sultan's headquarters:

Generally, the trend seems to be toward complete Japanese evacuation of Northern Burma provided Allied pressure continues as it has in the last month. Japanese plan seems to be delay and withdraw to shorter lines possibly on a general line east and west from Mandalay; this may be substantiated by reports of thinning out of the Namhkam area, apparent withdrawal from the Burma-Yunnan border sector, captured document found in the railroad corridor ordering part of the 53rd Division artillery to withdraw to Mandalay plus the steady southeastward withdrawal on the Chindwin front. The possible outward move of the 2nd Division plus the absence of identifications of the 49th Division in any combat area are significant in themselves to indicate a possible change of Japanese strategy in Burma.

SENT: 052100Z

MR-OUT-599

5 December 1944

ADMIRAL LEAHY TO THE PRESIDENT:

Stettinius suggests that the following be sent to Prime today:

QUOTE. PRESIDENT TO PRIME.

I have received from U.J. messages dated second and third December regarding his talks with de Gaulle and am informed he sent you identical messages.

I would like to have your views before I reply to Stalin.

ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE.

RECD 051937Z

(When reply is received, Admiral Leahy instructed it be sent.)

*Answered by MR-IN-205.
Sent to PM as 667*

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-598

5 December 1944

WB

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : 1088 Filed 05/1259Z

To POTUS serial number 1088 Personal for the President.

Thank you for your thoughtful message. I believe I can help you staying here until Germany is defeated. You made this post a worthwhile war job. No one could ask for more. As always (signed) John Gilbert Winant.

End.

Recd: 051700Z
Sent: 051707Z.
RUB

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-595

3 December 1944

CENTRAL MESSAGE, FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY TO THE PRESIDENT.

MR-OUT-597

4 December 1944

Handwritten initials "LS" and "WS" in the right margin.

FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY TO THE PRESIDENT

Your MR-IN-203 and 204. In view of British interest in proposed Franco-Soviet pact, State Department believes we should await probable message from Prime before replying to Stalin.

Unless otherwise directed I will wait for something from Prime before preparing draft message in reply to Uncle Joe.

051525Z - amc

The 20th Pz Infantry Division has been moved from W. Germany assigned to Third Army.

The German 58th Infantry Division is disintegrated and destroyed at breakthrough. Remnants of war now total over 750,000.

Weather has been rainy and cross country movement still hampered but roads are reported fair. Excellent weather in forecast for today over the entire front and all air bases in England and W. Germany are wet today.

ITALY

Eighth Army, newly regrouped, is now conducting offensive toward Ferrara and is making fairly good progress. Fifth Army is inactive at present but about 7 December is scheduled to begin a major drive on Bologna.

RUSSIAN FRONT

The southern Soviet offensive drive against Budapest has reached the north-east shore of 50 mile-long Lake Balaton. The Soviets in their attempts are covering the Danube for communications toward Budapest. If this drive continues around the north end of Lake Balaton, it will place Budapest in a serious position and if it proceeds around the southern end, Vienna will probably be its goal. A southern drive will have excellent flank potential on the left on the Great Danube.

If this drive is successful and Clarke's armies in Italy are successful in their present offensive, the Germans will be left with 27 divisions from the West and will have to fight the decisive battle of the West.

MR-OUT-596

5 December 1944

MORNING NEWS, FROM ADMIRAL BROWN TO THE PRESIDENT.

WESTERN FRONT

Enemy has flooded area between Nijmegen and Arnhem, forcing Allies to withdraw about three miles. Enemy's continued nervousness about this area shown by presence of valuable 6th Parachute Division.

Bitter fighting continues in Heurtgen Forest area where three crack U.S. Infantry Divisions and one Armored Division all from the First Army are nearing edge of woods and Roer River. Enemy counterattacks with parachute troops and infantry shifted to this sector have been beaten off.

In Saarlautern, small groups of Volksturm troops (civilians) wearing red and yellow arm bands were reported fighting from house to house, but without much organization. The bridge across the Saar River at that point is still in use in spite of efforts by enemy artillery to destroy it. The Seigfried line begins here on the east bank of the Saar River.

Germans still fighting stubbornly to retain bridgehead west of the Rhine at Colmar.

The 87th U.S. Infantry Division has been moved from U.K. and assigned to Third Army.

The German 553rd Infantry Division is claimed destroyed at Strasbourg. Prisoners of war now total over 750,000.

Weather has been rainy and cross country movement still hampered but roads are reported fair. Excellent weather is forecast for today over the entire front and at air bases in England and U.S. bombers are out today.

ITALY

Eighth Army, newly regrouped, is now conducting offensive toward Faenza and is making fairly good progress. Fifth Army is inactive at present but about 7 December is scheduled to begin a major drive on Bologna.

EASTERN FRONT

The southern Soviet flanking drive around Budapest has reached the north-east shore of 50 mile-long Lake Balaton. The Soviets in this maneuver are securing the Danube for communications closer to Budapest. If this drive continues around the north end of Lake Balaton, it will place Budapest in a serious position and if it proceeds around the southern end, Vienna will probably be its goal. A southern drive will have excellent flank security to the left on the Drava River.

If this drive is successful and Clarke's armies in Italy are likewise successful in their present offensive, the Germans will have to withdraw their 27 divisions from Italy and 20 from Yugoslavia, which will result in increasing the density of German defenses.

CHINA

The movement of the 14th Chinese Division from Myitkyina area to Kunming was started today.

Hump tonnage for the month of November was 33,991 long tons.

CENTRAL PACIFIC

Catalinas, covered by fighters, rescued 8 officers (including the commanding officer) and 130 enlisted men on December 3 from the Destroyer COOPER, which was sunk in Ormoc Bay. (A single Catalina rescued 2 officers and 54 enlisted men, setting an all-time record.) Believe other survivors reached shore and will be rescued later.

PACIFIC SUBMARINES

The U.S. submarine BLUEGILL sank 20,000 tons of shipping on her third war patrol. (One inter-island steamer, 2 large freighters and 1 small transport.) She damaged another 1,000 tons by gunfire.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Pulo Anna (between Morotai and Palau) occupied without resistance.

GREECE

So far, British have used show of force in Greece without firing. Greek troops not used yet. Strike in Athens 100% effective.

051502Z - amc

TOP SECRET

5 December 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : 843 Filed 051132Z

Personal and TOP SECRET. Prime Minister to
President Roosevelt. Number 843.

Your number 665:

1. We agree, but we are sure you would not wish to leave SEAC forces in a dangerous plight, especially since operation CAPITAL is the one you favoured. It is most unlikely that there will be any difference between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer, but if this should arise we feel it should be settled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. New subject: We endorse your action.

Prime.

Rec'd 05/1335 Z

OUT- 595 - 051352Z. RMB

TOP SECRET

2 December 1944

Strictly confidential and personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Roosevelt.

SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN

According to all data General De Gaulle and his friends who arrived in the Soviet Union, will put two questions.

I. About the conclusion of Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to Anglo-Soviet pact.

It is difficult for us to object. But I would like to know your opinion on this question. I ask you to give me your advice.

2. Probably General De Gaulle will raise a question about the change of the eastern frontier of France with the expansion of the French frontier to the left bank of the Rhine. It is also known that there is a project about the establishment of the Rhine-Westphalian region under the international control.

It is possible that this control provides the participation of France. Thus the proposal of the French concerning the shift of the frontier to the Rhine will compete with the project of establishment of the Rhine region under the international control.

I ask your advice on this question as well.

I sent a similar message to Mr. Churchill.

RECD 050545Z.
To the President at Warm Springs as
MR-OUT-594.

4 December 1944

MR-OUT-593

SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT.

The meeting with General De Galle gave the possibility for the friendly exchange of opinions on the questions of Franco-Soviet relations. In the course of the conversation, as I had supposed, General De Galle touched two main questions: about the frontier of France on the Rhine and about the conclusion of Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to the Anglo-Soviet treaty.

As to the frontier of France on the Rhine I expressed the idea that this question cannot be solved without knowledge and consent of our main Allies, whose forces are carrying on the struggle for liberation against the Germans on the French territory. I stressed the complexity of the solution of this question.

In connection with the proposal of Franco-Soviet pact I pointed out the necessity of close study of this question, the necessity of clarification of juridical nature of such pact, in particular such questions as who will ratify this pact in France under present conditions. Thus the Frenchmen should still give some explanations which we have not yet received from them.

In sending you this message I would appreciate your reply and your comments on these questions.

Similar message I sent to Mr. Churchill.

I send you my best wishes.

Dated: December 3, 1944.

SENT: 042210Z

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET DISPATCH

GENERAL HURLEY

4 December 1944

MR-OUT-592

BR

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

The Map Room has no significant war news to report this evening.

SECRET

SENT: 042129Z

NAVSTA

NOV 2014

(See R. C. T.)

114 591 ~~ORIGINATOR~~ ORIGINATOR PASSES THIS FROM HURLEY FOR THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ALONE. TOP SECRET.

I WAS ADVISED THIS MORNING THAT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL AND THE GENERALISSIMO HAVE TODAY OFFERED TO APPOINT T. V. EDOMS AS ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN. THE GENERALISSIMO IS CONCURRENTLY PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN. THIS MOVE IS AN EFFORT TO RELIEVE THE GENERALISSIMO OF AS MANY NON-MILITARY DUTIES AS POSSIBLE.

NAVSTA (512/2),ACTIVE

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	GENERAL HURLEY	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		THE PRESIDENT	PRIORITY 2
DATE	4 DECEMBER 1944.		ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM	1601		DEFERRED 5
DECODED BY	GLUNT		BASEGRAM 6
PARAPHRASED BY	GLUNT CHECKED BY TALMAN	<i>US</i>	PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY	GLUNT DITTOED BY GLUNT		ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			BASEGRAM 13
041525 NCR 2811			14
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 15
			<input type="checkbox"/> 16

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

041591 COMNAVGRP CHINA PASSES THIS FROM HURLEY FOR THE EYES OF
THE PRESIDENT ALONE. TOP SECRET.

I WAS ADVISED THIS MORNING THAT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL AND THE GENERALISSIMO HAVE TODAY OFFERED TO APPOINT T. V. SOONG AS ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN. THE GISSIMO IS CONCURRENTLY PRESIDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE YUAN. THIS MOVE IS AN EFFORT TO RELIEVE THE GENERALISSIMO OF AS MANY NON-MILITARY DUTIES AS POSSIBLE.

NAVAIDE (#1).....ACTION

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.

Sent 041907Z

OPNAV 19-78

2

590

TOP SECRET

December 4, 1944

WJZ

WB

LEAHY TO PRESIDENT:

The following draft reply to Prime's 841 is forwarded for your consideration:

QUOTE: Your 841. Generals Wedemeyer and Sultan have been directed to transfer two Chinese divisions to China to meet the emergency.

Wedemeyer has been directed to limit his demands for transport aircraft to those not urgently required for supply of SEAC forces engaged with the enemy unless no other means of meeting the emergency can be found.

New subject - Regarding the bomb line in Balkans, Russians have been notified that we shall attack enemy with bombs up to the line proposed to the Soviet Staff on November 28. UNQUOTE.



TOP SECRET

041550Z. -ame.

Signal Corps, United States Army



Received at

TOP SECRET

DEC - 4 1944 AM

MR-OUT-590:

4 DECEMBER 1944.

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

THE FOLLOWING DRAFT REPLY TO PRIME'S 841 IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:

"YOUR 841. GENERALS WEDEMEYER AND SULTAN HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO TRANSFER TWO CHINESE DIVISIONS TO CHINA TO MEET THE EMERGENCY.

WEDEMEYER HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO LIMIT HIS DEMANDS FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TO THOSE NOT URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR SUPPLY OF SEAC FORCES ENGAGED WITH THE ENEMY UNLESS NO OTHER MEANS OF MEETING THE EMERGENCY CAN BE FOUND.

NEW SUBJECT- REGARDING THE BOMBLINE IN BALKANS, RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED THAT WE SHALL ATTACK ENEMY WITH BOMBS UP TO THE LINE PROPOSED TO THE SOVIET STAFF ON NOVEMBER 28."

LINE RECEIVED

NO SIG.

Lucky
you 590
address
JWR



TOP SECRET

DEC - 4 1944 AM

MR-OUT-589

4 December 1944

MORNING NEWS, FROM ADMIRAL BROWN TO THE PRESIDENT.

WESTERN FRONT

Recent reshuffling of available German armour in Saarlautern area, where U.S. Third Army is across Saar River, indicates enemy is sensitive to pressure at threatened points of penetration.

In Cologne sector enemy's determined fighting has limited Allied gains. However, Germans have been forced to commit another SS Panzer Division from the 6th Panzer Army in this area.

Germans still successfully protecting main route of withdrawal across Rhine east of Colmar.

Weather yesterday reported clear with ground hardening.

CHINA

Rapid Jap drive north from Luichow continues with enemy reported near Tushan, important rail terminal on main road 90 miles south of Kweiyang.

EASTERN FRONT

Red Army breakthrough across Danube in southern Hungary may prove important in envelopment of Budapest. Soviet forces 50 miles from Austria.

JAPAN

More complete reports on B-29 strike on Tokyo area, reported yesterday, indicate that four planes were ditched in addition to the one plane reported lost to enemy fighters. 200 mph winds reported at altitude over target may have caused four ditched aircraft to run out of gas.

Approximately 187½ tons of bombs were dropped and large fires were observed in the target area. Three squadrons report excellent results with 50 to 75% of bombs in target area. Two squadrons report good results with 40 to 50% in target area. Results unobserved by three squadrons.

Casualties on their mission were 13 killed, 1 wounded and 44 missing.

U.S. SUBMARINES

Our subs report sinking 2 large oilers, a large transport and 2 freighters; probably sinking a freighter; damaging a large oiler and a freighter.

U.S. FLEET

The CB Alaska reports to CINCPAC for duty.

041510Z - amc

- 1 -

Regraded Unclassified

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
PARTAIR

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Department of State

Charge Departments:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
(This part sent to U.S. as MR-OUT-588.)

-8-

Washington,

Following is not to be released to press: Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State. Subject: Resignation of G. Howland Shaw. QUOTE Herewith is Mr. Shaw's resignation. As agreed in one of our recent conversations, Mr. Shaw was offered the Ambassadorship to Turkey, but he declined it, preferring to devote his time and efforts in the future to social work and in the field of correctional activity with delinquent youth. Mr. Shaw has been active in this work since 1929. For two years he was President of the National Conference of Catholic Charities and is a leader in the National Catholic Movement. It has been mentioned to me that Mr. Shaw would be interested in serving on the United States Parole Board when there is a vacancy, and that Judge Wood will retire within the next few months.

It would be a satisfaction to Mr. Shaw and to his many friends in the correctional and social fields, if possibly, in your letter accepting his resignation as Assistant Secretary of State it could be mentioned that he will be considered for an important government position in that particular field. The substance of your letter could then be released to the press when his resignation is announced, if you approve.

For your convenience there is attached a suggested letter for your signature accepting his resignation. UNQUOTE

Enciphered by _____

Text

Sent by operator M., 19.....

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
PARTAIR

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Departments
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

-9-

Text of the suggested draft letter to Mr. Shaw is set forth above. Following is the text of Mr. Shaw's letter of resignation: QUOTE My dear Mr. President: I hereby tender you my resignation as Assistant Secretary of State and I respectfully ask that it be accepted at your early convenience and that you approve my retirement in accordance with law. I have been deeply appreciative of the confidence which you have placed in me and it has been not only an honor but a source of keen personal satisfaction to me to have tried to serve you in the Department of State as Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel and during the past four critical years as Assistant Secretary of State. I have come more and more to feel however, that there is a field in which I can now serve more usefully during the rest of my active life than in the Foreign Service to which I have been happy to devote my energies for the past twenty-seven years. The problem of making democratic principles more effective in certain aspects of our national life, the problem of juvenile delinquency and the problem in general of youth--these are the problems which chiefly enlist my interest at present and to which I am anxious to devote all of my efforts from now on. The resignation which is very rightly customary at the beginning of a new Administration furnishes me with the opportunity

to

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
PARTAIR

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Department of State

Washington,

Charge Departments:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

-10-

to write you with complete frankness on matters which have been much on my mind for some time and concerning which I have heretofore not felt free to speak. I need not add how sincerely I wish for the success of both the Department of State and the Foreign Service under your direction and that of Secretary Stettinius during the momentous days that lie ahead of us. Yours faithfully, G. Howland Shaw UNQUOTE.

Stettinius
Per R. J. L.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

MR-DNT-587

Memorandum, Stettinius to President,
with suggested press release +
acceptance letters to Berle, Long, etc.

Mr. Early has copy. Continued
in MR-OUT 588.

MR-OUT-586

3 December 1944

ADMIRAL BROWN TO THE PRESIDENT.

. There is no news of significance to report this evening.

032135Z - rhb

FROM THE SUBMARINE

The 224 (S) reports sinking a large tanker and promptly sinking another on December 2.

RAAF

The 224 (S) reports sinking a large tanker and promptly sinking another on December 2.

RAAF

Preliminary reports on third B-24 mission in Luzon, Luzon, received from 7 of 8 squadrons participating in yesterday's attack.

Eighty aircraft made the flight. Primary target was the Luzon Airfield. Secondary target was the Luzon Airfield. Tertiary target was the Luzon Airfield. Quaternary target was the Luzon Airfield. Quintenary target was the Luzon Airfield. Sextenary target was the Luzon Airfield. Septenary target was the Luzon Airfield. Octenary target was the Luzon Airfield. Nonary target was the Luzon Airfield. Decenary target was the Luzon Airfield.

Japanese reports sinking of submarine in vicinity of Luzon Island.

RAAF

In Colorado area where U.S. 7th Army has crossed the River, Allied headquarters reports Japanese are withdrawing from the area. Japanese in the area are very bitter and angry.

In southern area, French and American are following up on the line.

German radio broadcast from Moscow reports sinking of the ship extremely serious.

032135Z - rhb

3 December 1944

WS

The auxiliary hospital ship HOPE was attacked by Jap plane east of Mindanao. Torpedo passed astern and exploded. No damage.

29 November, Army planes based on Leyte probably sank 1 Destroyer Escort and damaged 1 transport between Leyte and Cebu. Another transport was beached and burning in Ormac.

Night of 2-3 December, surface skirmish between U.S. Destroyers and Japanese Tokyo Express run in Ormac Bay resulted in U.S. Destroyer COOPER (2200 tons, 1944) blowing up. Possibly torpedo or floating mine. No survivors as yet. Air attack forced our withdrawal. Unable to send Catalinas because they lack fighter cover.

Officer in command of ^a3 battleship task force in the Central Philippine Attack Force has recommended that as many heavy ships as possible be removed from Leyte group because ships operating there now cannot operate safely in restricted waters.

PACIFIC SUBMARINES

The SEA DEVIL reports sinking a large tanker and probably sinking another on December 2.

PACIFIC

The ULVERT M. MOORE departed Eniwetok for Ulithi.

JAPAN

Preliminary reports on third B-29 mission to Tokyo have been received from 7 of 9 squadrons participating in yesterday's attack.

Eighty aircraft made the flight. Primary target was Nakajima Aircraft Engine Plant. Bombing began at 2 p.m., Jap time, and weather over target was good. Fighter opposition varied from slight to heavy. One B-29 has thus far been reported lost over the target. Huge fires were observed.

Jap radio reports bombing of Yokahama in addition to Tokyo target.

WESTERN FRONT

In Cologne area where U.S. 9th Army has reached the Roer River, Allied Headquarters reports Germans are suffering 5,000 casualties a day. Fighting in Huertgen forest sector is very bitter and costly.

In southern zone, French and Americans are following up German move to Geigfried Line.

Morning radio broadcast from Moscow reports reception of De Gaulle extremely cordial.

031530Z - amc

TOP SECRET

out 584

3rd December 1944

MSL
WTR

From: The U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of The United States

Nr : 842

Filed 03/0935Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Number 842.

I am deeply grateful to you for your most kind message on my birthday, which gave me the greatest pleasure, and also for the framed quotation from Abraham Lincoln with your own charming note upon it. This reached me, by sure hands, when I awoke.

I cannot tell you how much I value your friendship or how much I hope upon it for the future of the world, should we both be spared.

Prime

TOP SECRET

031255

OUT 583

SECRET

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

You will recall our conversation several weeks ago relative to the Palestine resolution. You will remember Wise had asked me whether you thought he should press at this time and you told me you felt I should quietly pass the word to Wise and Connally and Bloom, if necessary, that you felt it would be a mistake to stir this up and that you should be given a chance to work matters out on a certain trip to be taken in the future. Connally advises me now that certain members of the committee have gotten out of hand and are pressing to have the resolution reported out, Wagner being very active. Connally says the matter is too hot for him to handle and requests that I come up Wednesday to testify on the whole Jewish-Arab-Palestine question.

Would it not be wise for me to say to Connally that I have consulted you and that you still feel strongly it would be a mistake to stir the matter up now and that it should be left in your hands until you were given a chance to work things out and that it would be your feeling that it would be a mistake to have me or anybody else testify exhaustively at this time.

Sent 030130Z

2 December 1944

MR-OUT-582

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

No war news to report this evening.

SENT: 022126Z

TOP SECRET

2 December 1944

MR-OUT-581

W.F.

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : 841 Filed 02/1418Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 841 Personal
and TOP SECRET.

1. I agree fully with your number 663. Events have superseded the views expressed two days ago in my number 839. We must, then, review the new situation created in Burma by these misfortunes at a time when operation capital has opened well. The one request I make at the moment is that, as the two Chinese divisions are to be carried by air, we should be consulted about what air forces are left for the necessary support of Mountbatten's advancing forces. I have the greatest confidence in Wedemeyer but he cannot know the situation in the south at any moment.

2. I also concur with the United States Chiefs of Staff that, our officers in Moscow having received no answer from the Russians, the Russians should be notified that we shall bomb from December 3 up to the bomb line proposed to the Red Staff on November 28.

Prime.

Sent: - 02 15 44
MR-IN-199 directed copy be furnished to
Admiral Leahy.

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

2 December 1944

MR-OUT-580

WBS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

Europe

Of the 86 planes reported missing from the Eighth Air Force bombing of synthetic oil plants and rail yards in Germany, 16 bombers and 17 fighters are now known to be safe, leaving 40 bombers and 13 fighters missing. Eight of these fighters are believed safe in friendly territory.

Only small hard fought gains were made in the 3rd and 1st Army sectors.

11,140 tons American and 5,436 tons British were unloaded in Antwerp on the 30th. As yet no rockets have fallen in the dock area although four or five drop in the Antwerp area every 24-hour period.

Morotai

Sowespac not concerned over alleged Jap landing attempt as reported by Jap radio.

SENT: 021414Z

and twice the Department have asked me to intervene in support of our position at the conference. I did everything I could to persuade the Prime Minister to accept the President's wishes and I am very sorry that I failed to get some what he wanted done. On the other hand, I want you to know that I could have been far more effective in talking with the Prime Minister if I had been properly informed. The British had reams of papers covering every detail of the conference's discussions. I had nothing beyond the President's messages which covered only one or two particular points of disagreement. I

2 December 1944

MR-OUT-579

The State Department has requested that the following message be sent to the President:

QUOTE. Personal and Secret to the Secretary and for the President.

Before receiving Department's 10024 of November 30 late last night, I had already followed up the President's message to the Prime Minister covering agreement on the Aviation program at the Chicago conference and had urged the acceptance of the Canadian compromise. I talked with Eden, Beaverbrook and Churchill. The Cabinet met yesterday afternoon and I was informed by Beaverbrook that before he could communicate their decision to Swinton, the conference had adjourned. The intention of the Cabinet was to accept the compromise but at the same time ask for a small passenger rate differential on pickups on long hauls. This was less than what we wanted. Churchill and Beaverbrook went over with me the message that was despatched to the President this afternoon. Churchill said that he would be glad to reopen the subject at any time convenient to us. Beaverbrook was plainly uncomfortable at this meeting. I blame him most for the failure of the conference.

Once the President and twice the Department have asked me to intervene in support of our position at the conference. I did everything I could to persuade the Prime Minister to accept the President's wishes and I am very sorry that I failed to get done what he wanted done. On the other hand, I want you to know that I could have been far more effective in talking with the Prime Minister if I had been properly informed. The British had reams of papers covering every detail of the conference's discussions. I had nothing beyond the President's messages which covered only one or two particular points of disagreement. I

hope this will not happen again with the man who is chosen to continue in my post. Even our Civil Air Attache had been assigned to the conference.

~~SI-021-572~~

/s/ Winant

FOR THE PRESIDENT (VIA ADMIRAL LEAHY).

The following draft reply to Frise was drafted by the State De-

SENT: 021407Z

partment for your consideration.

NOTE: Thank you for your S.O. I am advised that DeJanten's motion, which Berle accepted, to refer unfinished business to the Council has now been deferred on a motion from the floor. The conference apparently still feels, as do I, that agreement should be reached if possible. I would accordingly appreciate your further urgent consideration of the matter. UNQUOTE.

SENT: 021405Z

W. B.

2 December 1944

MR-OUT-573

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The following draft reply to Prime was drafted by the State Department for your consideration.

QUOTE. Thank you for your 840. I am advised that Swinton's motion, which Berle seconded, to refer unfinished business to the Council has now been deferred on a motion from the floor. The conference apparently still feels, as do I, that agreement should be reached if possible. I would accordingly appreciate your further urgent consideration of the matter. UNQUOTE.

SENT: 021305Z

021305Z 12/44

MR-OUT-577

11 December 1944

6A

TO : No news this evening.

Captain Leavitt has reported that Mr. Cook requested two metal-plates from Captain Spence, of the Navy Yard here to be sent to Ward Springs. Admiral Rosen has perused the order, and wants to know as soon as possible from Mr. Spence by what authority Mr. Cook issued the request and why. Admiral Spence and Mr. Spence have previously discussed such requests and Admiral Rosen thought no such requests were to be made in the future except through him, and by Mr. Spence.

clear. - RUB

012100Z. RUB

MR-OUT-576

1 December 1944

W

TO CAPTAIN GRAHAM FROM COMMANDER TYREE.

Captain Keever has reported that Mr. Cook requested two metal-smiths from Captain Russell of the Navy Yard here to be sent to Warm Springs. Admiral Brown has cancelled the order, and wants to know as soon as possible from Mr. Spaman by what authority Mr. Cook issued the request and why. Admiral Brown and Mr. Spaman have previously discussed such requests and Admiral Brown thought no such requests were to be made in the future except through him, and by Mr. Spaman.

012027Z. - *RUB*

OUT-575

TOP SECRET

December 30, 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Nr : 840 Filed 011532Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and TOP SECRET Nr. 840.

1. We consulted together at once on the issues discussed in your 661. We decided to examine the prospect of an agreement based on the Canadian plan as suggested in the seventh paragraph of your 661, coupled with a further exploration of the differentiation of fares for Fifth Freedom Traffic, of which I spoke in paragraph five of my 836 as a valuable line.

2. By the time we had communicated with Swinton, however, the conference had already decided to approve all the technical decisions and to refer unfinished business to the Council of the International Organization.

3. I must confess to you that we have found it difficult at this distance to form a clear judgment of the rapidly changing phases of a negotiation so complex in character and far-reaching in scope. Swinton's return will give me an opportunity to conduct with him a comprehensive survey of the problem such as cannot

TOP SECRET

See MR-1N-196

Recd 01/17¹⁷⁴⁰40 Z

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

be achieved in an exchange of telegrams.

4. Having reached an understanding, I would propose to give you an account of the plan which we can lay before the council in order to meet your wishes and, as far as may be possible, fulfil your expectations. You may be sure that your own desire to lay a sound foundation for the future civil air transport system of the world is paralleled by our own.

Prime.

TOP SECRET

1 December 1944

MR-OUT-574

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN. *VP*

Western Front

In the drive on Cologne, general advances of about a mile were made as enemy withdrew his main forces behind lines of Wurm, Roer and Inde Rivers.

The Third Army is following up German withdrawal to main positions of Siegfried Line in area of Saarbrucken.

In North Vosges enemy positions largely collapsed but the enemy has strongly secured his routes of withdrawal across the Rhine.

Good weather has favored air support and strategic bombing the last two days and today is also good.

China

Chinese position continues to deteriorate according to latest report from General Wedemeyer. At present extreme demoralization of Chinese Forces and breakdown of communications makes it next to impossible to obtain accurate picture of situation in combat areas. Jap is driving north of Liuchow rapidly, with communications center of Kweiyang as evident objective. A second column is moving up west river valley toward Kunming, which is 250 miles west of Kweiyang. A Jap force of unknown strength is reported crossing the Indo-China border in what may develop into a third drive on Kunming. An estimated 100,000 troops are available in these areas.

Leyte

The damaged battleship MARYLAND will require two to three months Navy Yard repair.

Pacific Submarines

The submarine PAMPANITO sank a freighter and damaged another in the South

China Seas on the night of November 18.

20 November 1945

Miscellaneous

Colonel James Roosevelt en route from Pearl Harbor to the West Coast.

Army-Navy Game Chiefs of Staff request your approval of the following message --

Some sources say odds now $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 on Army. Watson stands mute. as reported by Edemeyer, prompt action is indicated as necessary.

NOTE. Message from President to Prime Minister.

SENT: 011600Z receipt of your message No. 874 of November 19th reference Mountbatten's STACUS 205 a message has been received from General Edemeyer outlining the gravity of the situation in China and stating that he concurs in the decision of the Generalissimo to transfer the two best liked divisions of Chinese troops from Burma to the Kuming area. You have undoubtedly seen this message which went to Mountbatten and has been furnished to your Mission here in Washington so I will not repeat it.

We have General Edemeyer's views on the ground as to the gravity of the situation along with his knowledge of the situation and the plans for operations in Burma. I feel that he is better informed as to the general situation and requirements than any other individual at this moment. Furthermore we are faced by the fact that the Generalissimo in a grave crisis which threatens the existence of China, has decided that he must recall these two divisions in order to check the Japanese drive on Kuming. It would avail us nothing to open a land line to China if the Japanese seized the Kuming terminus for air and ground. Under the circumstances I therefore am of the opinion that we are not in a position to bring pressure on the Generalissimo to alter his decision.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff propose to send to General Edemeyer a message which approves his recommendation in support of the Generalissimo's decision but he requests his to endeavor to develop a scheme for using other units which might make possible the retention in India of one or even both of the two best

30 November 1944

MR-OUT-573

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request your approval of the following messages -- one to Wedemeyer and one to Prime. In consideration of the emergency as reported by Wedemeyer, prompt action is indicated as necessary.

QUOTE. Message from President to Prime Minister.

Since the receipt of your message No. 839 of November 29th reference Mountbatten's SEACOS 265 a message has been received from General Wedemeyer outlining the gravity of the situation in China and stating that he concurs in the decision of the Generalissimo to transfer the two best trained divisions of Chinese troops from Burma to the Kunming area. You have undoubtedly seen this message which went to Mountbatten and has been furnished to your Mission here in Washington so I shall not repeat it.

We have General Wedemeyer's views on the ground as to the gravity of the situation along with his knowledge of the situation and the plans for operations in Burma. I feel that he is better informed as to the general situation and requirements than any other individual at this moment. Furthermore we are faced by the fact that the Generalissimo in a grave crisis which threatens the existence of China, has decided that he must recall these two divisions in order to check the Japanese drive on Kunming. It would avail us nothing to open a land line to China if the Japanese seized the Kunming terminal for air and ground. Under the circumstances I therefore am of the opinion that we are not in a position to bring pressure on the Generalissimo to alter his decision.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff propose to send to General Wedemeyer a message which approves his recommendation in support of the Generalissimo's decision but he requests him to endeavor to develop a scheme for using other units which might make possible the retention in India of one or even both of the two crack

Answered by MR-11N-195

Signal Corps, United States Army

Chinese divisions. The U.S. Chiefs have explained their intention to the British Chiefs of Staff and have requested that they concur with this action and inform Mountbatten accordingly. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE. To Wedemeyer Info Sultan and Wheeler from J.C.S.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered SEACOS 265 and CFBX 27686, and approve your recommendation to transfer two divisions of the CAI to China, specifically the 22nd and 38th if you consider other available divisions are not satisfactory.

You should however work out a selection of units to be moved to China which fulfills your requirements while at the same time causing least interference with Mountbatten's operations in North Burma.

Call on Sultan for any U.S. Air Forces including ATC and other U.S. resources required for the transport and support of the two divisions and to meet other requirements arising out of the present emergency in China. Should you and Sultan be unable to agree on any details, radio the facts to us.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff do not propose to question the Generalissimo's decision to use his own forces to defend China in the critical situation depicted in your message. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are informing Admiral Mountbatten that they concur with the instructions to you and Sultan contained in this message. UNQUOTE.

SENT: 010115Z

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-573

NOVEMBER 30, 1944

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES, ONE TO WEDEMEYER AND ONE TO PRIME. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EMERGENCY AS REPORTED BY WEDEMEYER PROMPT ACTION IS INDICATED AS NECESSARY.

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

"SINCE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER 839 OF NOVEMBER 29TH REFERENCE MOUNTBATTEN'S SEACOS 265 A MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM GENERAL WEDEMEYER OUTLINING THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION IN CHINA AND STATING THAT HE CONCURS IN THE DECISION OF THE GENERALISSIMO TO TRANSFER THE TWO BEST TRAINED DIVISIONS OF CHINESE TROOPS FROM BURMA TO THE KUNMING AREA. YOU HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY SEEN THIS MESSAGE WHICH WENT TO MOUNTBATTEN AND HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO YOUR MISSION HERE IN WASHINGTON SO I SHALL NOT REPEAT IT.

WE HAVE GENERAL WEDEMEYER'S VIEWS ON THE GROUND AS TO THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION ALONG WITH HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION

4D-7103

TOP SECRET

Twenty-four planes bombed Tokyo industrial area from 20,000 to 25,000 feet dropping 24 tons each through anti-aircraft which prevented observation of results. Little opposition encountered. One plane hit secondary target. One plane is missing, believed shot down.

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

AND THE PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN BURMA. I FEEL THAT HE IS BETTER INFORMED AS TO THE GENERAL SITUATION AND REQUIREMENTS THAN ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL AT THIS MOMENT. FURTHERMORE WE ARE FACED BY THE FACT THAT THE GENERALISSIMO, IN A GRAVE CRISIS WHICH THREATENS THE EXISTENCE OF CHINA, HAS DECIDED THAT HE MUST RECALL THESE TWO DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO CHECK THE JAPANESE DRIVE ON KUNMING. IT WOULD AVAIL US NOTHING TO OPEN A LAND LINE TO CHINA IF THE JAPANESE SEIZED THE KUNMING TERMINAL FOR AIR AND GROUND. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I THEREFORE AM OF THE OPINION THAT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE GENERALISSIMO TO ALTER HIS DECISION.

THE U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF PROPOSE TO SEND GENERAL WEDEMEYER A MESSAGE WHICH APPROVES HIS RECOMMENDATION IN SUPPORT OF THE GENERALISSIMO'S DECISION BUT REQUESTS HIM TO ENDEAVOR TO DEVELOP A SCHEME FOR USING OTHER UNITS WHICH MIGHT MAKE POSSIBLE THE RETENTION IN INDIA OF ONE OR EVEN BOTH OF THE TWO CRACK CHINESE

GP-7103

TOP SECRET

Twenty-four planes bombed Tokyo industrial area from 30,000 to 33,000 feet dropping 16 tons each through solid undercast which prevented observation of results. Little opposition encountered. Two planes hit secondary targets. One plane is missing, believed down at sea.

- 1 -

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

DIVISIONS. THE U. S. CHIEFS HAVE EXPLAINED THEIR INTENTION TO THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF AND HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEY CONCUR WITH THIS ACTION AND INFORM MOUNTBATTEN ACCORDINGLY."

MESSAGE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO WEDEMEYER, INFO SULTAN AND WHEELER.

"THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE CONSIDERED SEACOS 265 AND CFBX 27686, AND APPROVE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO TRANSFER TWO DIVISIONS OF THE CAI TO CHINA, SPECIFICALLY THE 22ND AND 38TH IF YOU CONSIDER OTHER AVAILABLE DIVISIONS ARE NOT SATISFACTORY.

YOU SHOULD HOWEVER WORK OUT A SELECTION OF UNITS TO BE MOVED TO CHINA WHICH FULFILLS YOUR REQUIREMENTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CAUSING LEAST INTERFERENCE WITH MOUNTBATTEN'S OPERATIONS IN NORTH BURMA.

CALL ON SULTAN FOR ANY U. S. AIR FORCES INCLUDING ATC AND OTHER U. S. RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR THE TRANSPORT AND SUPPORT OF THE TWO DIVISIONS AND TO MEET OTHER REQUIREMENT ARISING OUT OF THE

40-7103

TOP SECRET

Twenty-four planes bombed Tokyo industrial area from 20,000 to 33,000 feet dropping 25 tons each through smoke screens which prevented observation of results. Little opposition encountered. Ten planes hit secondary targets. One plane is missing, believed down in sea.

- 1 -

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

PRESENT EMERGENCY IN CHINA. SHOULD YOU AND SULTAN BE UNABLE TO AGREE ON ANY DETAILS, RADIO THE FACTS TO US.

THE U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF DO NOT PROPOSE TO QUESTION THE GENERALISSIMO'S DECISION TO USE HIS OWN FORCES TO DEFEND CHINA IN THE CRITICAL SITUATION DEPICTED IN YOUR MESSAGE. THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE INFORMING ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN THAT THEY CONCUR WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU AND SULTAN CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE."

NO SIG.



NOV 3 01944 PM

Ad. Ledy
Your 573 approval.
Please send both messages
Russell

GP-7103

TOP SECRET

*Twenty-four planes bombed Tokyo Industrial area from 10,000 to 13,000 feet
 crossing of haze bank through which visibility which prevented observation of
 results. Little opposition encountered. Two planes hit secondary targets. One
 plane is missing, believed down in sea.*

MR-OUT-572

30 November 1944

WF

MOROTAI RESIDENT FROM AIRMAIL BOSS.

On Morotai we have 31st Infantry Division. Also approximately 120 fighters, 75 heavy bombers and 20 night fighters. Reports of Jap landings still unconfirmed but if they have occurred it seems probable troops came from Halmahera.

LEYTE

Latest reports indicate there are nearly 400 U.S. planes at Leyte made up of some 220 fighters, 45 night fighters, 50 medium bombers (all AAF) and 45 Navy Catalinas. Balance are photo planes, tactical reconnaissance planes, etc.

Latest cable information shows Leyte airdrome status on 26 November as follows: 4,800 feet metal at Dulag, 1,700 feet mat unserviceable at Bayug, 5,000 feet grass no facilities at Buri, 6,900 feet metal at Tacloban, and Tanauan strip under construction.

Hq, Far Eastern Air Forces (5th and 13th Air Forces under Lt. Gen. Kenney) arrived at Leyte today.

General MacArthur's latest communique confirms sinking of 13 Jap ships bringing reinforcements to Leyte as reported this morning.

302100Z - amc

30 November 1944

MR-OUT-571

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN. WB

Western Front

Third Army has continued to advance to the east despite unfavorable ground conditions. In some sectors of front frozen ground has facilitated cross country operations but elsewhere ground is still very soggy.

West of Cologne reinforced enemy continues bitter yard by yard resistance. Critical areas undoubtedly judged by enemy, according to SHAEF, to be first Duren and secondly Karlsruhe. At latter, two divisions have arrived from Holland and a third may be on way.

Seventh Army and 1st French Army continue their advances towards the Rhine. SHAEF believes that elements of the 19th Army still west of the Rhine apparently written off as no signs yet apparent of crossing river. Agent reports that enemy document indicated troops in Vosges were to be considered expendable. In any case large number of troops have already been surrounded piecemeal in 2 or 3 pockets.

Weather favorable for air operations predicted for today and Friday. Heavy bombers now over Germany.

At Antwerp a total of 219 berths were reported as cleared by 26 November.

Enemy now has 71 divisions equivalent to 38 of ours opposing our 63.

B-29 Raid

Twenty-four planes bombed Tokyo industrial area from 20,000 to 33,000 feet dropping 2½ tons each through solid undercast which prevented observation of results. Little opposition encountered. Two planes hit secondary targets. One plane is missing, believed down in sea.

Italy

Little change in general situation. Probably due to continued heavy resistance and very unfavorable weather conditions.

Leyte

No confirmation yet received by War Department on Press reports that 13 Jap ships, including three destroyers were sunk in another attempt to reinforce Leyte and that at least 4,000 Jap troops were drowned.

A dispatch from Task Group Commander in Leyte Gulf states that at dusk 29 November a suicide plane crashed between the forward turrets of the battleship MARYLAND. The damage created has interfered with the training of her No. 1 turret and the second deck area is wrecked. Twenty of her personnel are dead and over 30 injured. At the same time the destroyer AULICK was damaged by a bomb topside. There are many casualties.

Pacific Submarines

The USS ARCHERFISH reports sinking large aircraft carrier similar to Hayatka on 28 November.

The USS SCABBARDFISH sank the Jap submarine I-365 and took one prisoner.

Other submarines report sinking one destroyer, six freighters, and one tanker and damaging one freighter and one tanker.

Eniwetok

The ULVERT M. MOORE arrives Eniwetok 2December and will proceed Ulithi 3 December conducting anti-submarine sweep en route.

Central Pacific

Admiral Halsey reports to Cincpac that his forces will undertake operations on the day before, the day of, and the day after the Mindoro operation if absolutely necessary. If support is required on the next two days it will be supplied, but

Admiral Halsey feels that his Task Force should return to Ulithi for servicing and recommends that D-day for Luzon be delayed ten days.

Nine hours later Admiral Nimitz informed General MacArthur that due to the exhaustion of carrier forces, he recommends that the Mindoro operation be delayed until shore-based air is established in strength in Leyte and the carrier forces be given an adequate period of recuperation.

Saipan

At 1:00 a.m. on 29 November, Saipan and Tinian were attacked by eight enemy bombers. No damage was reported. It is stated one enemy bomber was destroyed, one probable and one possible.

SENT: 301520Z

Sent: 300014Z
R/S

570

Secret

November 29, 1944

WB

MR-007-570

To: Miss Grace Tully
From: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Just had a satisfactory talk with the President. Would you please let me know as soon as he receives replies from Clayton, Long and Berle in order that I may send to you for signature the nominations to the Senate.

Sent: 300014 Z.


RWB

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MAP ROOM

Would you please be good enough to have the
attached message sent to Miss Tully.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "E. A. Tamm". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed text of the memorandum.

30 November 1944

MR-OUT-569

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The following message to Prime in regard to the Chicago Aviation Conference is recommended by the State Department to be sent as a matter of urgency as Berle is having difficulty holding the delegates together. If you approve the message we will send it to Prime at once.

QUOTE. I have given careful thought to your 836 and to the problems you cite. You know that I have no desire for any arrangement by which our people would profit from the sacrifices which yours have made in this war. Your confidence in the justice and fair play of the American people is, I am sure, justified. I have equal confidence that your people have the same qualities in the same measure. I know that they want equal opportunity in the air and unquestionably they should have it. I can not believe that they would want aviation, in which you as well as we have a great future, stifled and suffocated because they were for a moment in a less favorable competitive position.

You say that the British Empire is being asked to put bases all over the world at the disposal of other Nations. Of course it is. Would you like to see a world in which all ports were closed to all ships but their own or open to one foreign ship, perhaps two if they carried only passengers and cargo bound all the way from Liverpool to Shanghai? Where would England be if shipping were subjected to such limitations? Where will it be if aviation is? I am unable to believe that you do not want an agreement at this time.

I can not agree that the answer is to hold everyone back. It must rather be to go forward together. I know the handicaps under which your aviation industry has laboured during the war. We have found ways to help you before and I

am confident that we can find ways to help you in overcoming this. We are prepared to make transport aircraft freely available to you on the same terms as our own people can get them. Our only stipulation is that aviation must be permitted to develop, subject only to reasonable safeguards, as far and as fast as human ingenuity and enterprise can take it.

We have no desire to monopolize air traffic anywhere. I do not see how increased frequencies on long routes would dominate traffic on short ones, when all lines would have the same right to increase their frequencies on the same basis. Nor do I see how in the long term such an arrangement would favor us over others, despite our head start.

You asked that I give further consideration to the fundamentals of your position and that I state the issues as I see them. I have done both and I am more convinced than ever that the answer is not to hold back but to go forward together.

The Conference can still reach an agreement vastly helpful both in the air and in wider fields. Swinton and Berle on November 27 publicly stated our respective positions. The smaller states have spoken and, if I may say so, our position seemed to have by far the greater support. If it is not possible to reach complete agreement when our delegations have so closely approached it, the reasons, despite our best will, would be all too clear.

You speak of impartial arbitration within the general framework. The Canadians undoubtedly see both points of view, have laboured tirelessly to bring us together and on November 27 brought out a new formula which might provide a reasonable line of compromise if the small nations would indeed accept so limited a compromise. I will give Berle latitude for one more try on the lines of that formula if you will give Swinton the same.

Given, on both sides, that spirit of justice and fair play of which you speak, I know that an agreement can be reached which will be equally beneficial to both our interests and to the world. UNQUOTE.

SENT: 292355Z

568

TOP SECRET

29 November 1944

MR-OUT-568

From: U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of The United States

Nr: 1839, 29 November 1944 Filed 291945Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt number 839
Personal and Top Secret.

In a telegram received today (SEACOS 265) Admiral Mountbatten reports that he has received a warning from General Carton De Wiart that Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek contemplates withdrawing the divisions which he requires in China from the Chinese Army in India, which is now engaged in carrying out its share of operation "CAPITAL".

The Chiefs of Staff endorse what Admiral Mountbatten says about the deplorable effect of these withdrawals on our operations in Burma. I suggest that you and I send the Generalissimo the following message of protest. If you agree with this suggestion, and with the terms of the message to the Generalissimo, pray send it off as a joint message from us both, with such minor alterations or additions as you think fit.

"Message from President and Prime Minister to
Generalissimo."

Sent:- 292325Z

MR-IN-192 directed copy be sent to Adm. Leahy
to take up with Joint Board. Done.

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

Page # 2

"Admiral Mountbatten reports that he has received a message from General Carton De Wiart saying that you contemplate the withdrawal of two of your best divisions from the north Burma front as soon as Bhamo has fallen."

"The withdrawal of these forces from north Burma will inevitably bring the southward thrust through Bhamo to a standstill thus jeopardising the success of the whole campaign, and the security of the Mogaung Myitkyina air base."

"Your two divisions are now in contact with the enemy. If they are withdrawn from the battle in Burma by land route they will spend these critical months in weary marches over the rough track northwards. If they are withdrawn by air, they will use up aircraft which might otherwise be carrying to China the supplies you badly need. In neither case could their heavy transport and equipment be moved with them."

"We earnestly request you therefore to reconsider any idea of weakening your gallant forces which are cooperating so successfully with ours with the intention of reestablishing firm communications between China and her Allies."

Sent: 297375Z.

RUB

TOP SECRET

No Sig.

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER 567	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM GENERAL HURLEY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		PRIORITY THE PRESIDENT	PRIORITY 1
DATE 29 NOVEMBER 1944.			ROUTINE 2
TOR CODEROOM 1854/29			DEFERRED 3
DECODED BY GLUNT/BALDWIN			BASEGRAM 4
PARAPHRASED BY GLUNT	CHECKED BY TALMAN	INFORMATION	PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY GLUNT	DITTOED BY GLUNT		ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
			BASEGRAM 12

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE ONE 291430 NCR 7643

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TOP SECRET FROM HURLEY VIA COMNAVGRP CHINA FOR EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ALONE.

PART ONE.

WHAT LOOKS LIKE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNIST TROOPS HAS BEEN PENDING FOR TWO WEEKS. CHOW EN LAI VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN CHINA AND A DELEGATION CAME WITH ME FROM YENAN. NUMEROUS CONFERENCES HAVE BEEN HELD BETWEEN CHOW EN LAI AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE HAS ALSO CONFERRED WITH THE GENERALISSIMO. BOTH PARTIES NOW SEEM ANXIOUS FOR SETTLEMENT. THEY ARE BOTH DISTURBED BY REPORTS OF COMMUNIST-CHINESE INCIDENTS THAT HAVE BEEN OCCURRING IN UNINGJIN SINKIANG. THE RECENT DELAY IN GETTING ACTION HAS BEEN DUE LARGELY TO WEATHER. LANDING A PLANE IN YENAN IS DIFFICULT AT ANY TIME. AT THE PRESENT

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

Copy to Admiral Leahy per directions contained in OPNAV-19-76

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO. **2**

Sent: -292305Z
OPNAV 19-76

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM GENERAL HURLEY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		PRIORITY THE PRESIDENT	PRIORITY 2
DATE 29 NOVEMBER 1944.			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM 1854/29			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY			6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY	INFORMATION	PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
			BASEGRAM 12
			13

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE TWO **291430** **NCR 7643**

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TIME IT IS SNOWING HEAVILY IN YENAN AND CHOW EN LAI AND PARTY ARE STILL GROUNDED IN CHUNGKING. BEFORE REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT CHOW EN LAI MUST RETURN TO YENAN AND GET THE CONSENT AND APPROVAL OF MAO TZE TUNG AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY.

PART TWO.

THE GENERALISSIMO SOMETIME AGO REQUESTED AN AUDIENCE FOR SOONG WITH MOLOTOV. THE GENERAL PURPOSE IS TO BRING ABOUT CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA. SOONG TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT MOLOTOV TOLD THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW YESTERDAY THAT HE WOULD SET A DATE ON WHICH HE WOULD SEE SOONG IN MOSCOW. MOLOTOV STATES HOWEVER THAT THE DATE HE HAD IN MIND WOULD BE LATE IN FEBRUARY OR EARLY IN MARCH. THIS SEEMED TO ME TO INDICATE A DESIRE TO POSTPONE DISCUSSIONS.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM GENERAL HURLEY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		PRIORITY	PRIORITY 2
DATE 29 NOVEMBER 1944.			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROM: 1854/29		THE PRESIDENT	DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY GLUNT	CHECKED BY	FOR ACTION	6
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		7
		INFORMATION	8
			PRIORITY 9
			ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
			BASEGRAM 12
			13
			14
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE THREE	291430	NCR 7643	<input type="checkbox"/>
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CHIANG KAI SHEK HAS NOT IN MY OPINION TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. THE SINKIANG INCIDENTS TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR RECENT CALBE HAVE GONE A LONG WAY TOWARD CHANGING HIS ATTITUDE. HE HAD APPOINTED A KUOMINTANG ANTICOMMUNIST GOVERNOR AND ASSISTANTS FOR SINKIANG. HE IS NOW CONSIDERING THE RECALL OF THAT GOVERNOR AND THE APPOINTMENT IN HIS STEAD OF GENERAL CHIANG CHING KUO, HIS SON, WHOSE BIOGRAPHY I HAVE GIVEN IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU CBF 25629 DATED 7 NOVEMBER. CHIANG KAI SHEK IS FINDING HIMSELF OVERWORKED WITH THE NECESSITY OF CONFERRING FREQUENTLY WITH DONALD NELSON, GENERAL WEDEMEYER, THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE REPRESENTATIVES AND AMBASSADORS OF OTHER ALLIED NATIONS NOT TO SPEAK OF HIS OWN GOVERNMENT MILITARY AND FACTION LEADERS. THIS OF COURSE, IS

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM GENERAL HURLEY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		PRIORITY THE PRESIDENT	PRIORITY 2
DATE 29 NOVEMBER 1944.			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOK 1854/29			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY GLUNT	CHECKED BY	FOR ACTION	6
BY	DITTOED BY		7
ROUTED BY	BY		8
			9
		INFORMATION	PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			BASEGRAM 13

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE FOUR OF FOUR 291430 NCR 7643

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ONE OF THE WEAKNESSES OF A PERSONAL GOVERNMENT. EVERYONE DEMANDS THE RIGHT TO TALK TO THE HEAD MAN. WE HAVE FIVE MAJOR PROPOSITIONS UNDER DISCUSSION WITH CHIANG KAI SHEK. THEY ARE:

- 1. SETTLEMENT WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND USE OF THE COMMUNIST TROOPS IN WEDEMEYER'S PLANS.**
- 2. CHANGING OF THE GOVERNOR OF SINKIANG TO IRON OUT PRESENT DIFFICULTIES THERE AND PROMOTE BETTER RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.**
- 3. THE SENDING OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO MOSCOW.**
- 4. DEFINITE APPROVAL AND COOPERATION IN THE EXECUTION OF MILITARY PLANS PRESENTED BY WEDEMEYER AND**
- 5. THE CONTINUED REFORMATION OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT TO BRING ABOUT EFFICIENCY AND INTEGRITY AND TO ENABLE CHIANG TO DELEGATE SOME OF HIS POWERS.**

NAVAIDE(#1).....ACTION

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Sent in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.

292305Z - RUB

29 November 1944

MR-OUT-566

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

Philippines

Although details are lacking in Washington, it appears that the MARYLAND is damaged "to a degree seriously affecting battle efficiency. Very probably requires yard repairs."

Admiral McCain (CTF 38) reports that analysis of suicide attacks indicates that anti-aircraft fire has not been as effective as it should be; especially from supporting units. This analysis was followed by Task Force interception problems designed to duplicate enemy tactics and to improve fleet coordination and defensive technique. As time allows, large scale exercises are being conducted.

Meanwhile, experience indicates immediate need for five light cruisers, preferably anti-aircraft cruisers, equipped with radar so as to intercept the enemy at greater range from our surface forces. A greatly increased number of fighters is needed also to insure 100% kills on interceptions and at the same time to satisfy requirements for fighter sweeps, strikes and continuous combat air patrols over enemy targets to keep the enemy grounded.

Admiral Kinkaid states that evidence is growing of increasing enemy air strength on Mindanao which indicates the need of strenuous efforts to neutralize Mindanao airfields in order to protect our lines of communication and keep Leyte tenable to surface shipping.

B-29's

Preliminary reports indicate 29 B-29's comprised force dispatched to bomb Tokyo today. Two returned early. No further details as yet.

SENT: 292120Z

SECRET

29 November 1944

WB

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of the United States

Unnumbered File 291640Z

To The President from Winant. Personal for
The President.

Tomorrow is the Prime Minister's birthday.

You will remember that we were with him at Teheran
a year ago.

End.

MR-OUT-565

29/11/44 E.

SECRET

29 November 1944

MR-OUT-564

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN.

Western Front

American 7th Army and French 1st Army continue to advance in Vosges Mountains and on plains beyond, against weakening resistance.

Elements of American 3rd Army made gains up to 6 miles to the northeast towards Saarbrücken. House to house fighting continues in Hurtgen. Little change elsewhere along the front. Still no signs that 6th Panzer Army has been committed.

SHAEF estimates that enemy casualties in recent offensive have approached 3,000 per day on each of main fronts and that current rate of loss is about 5 German divisions a week, not allowing for replacements. Prisoners of War now 736,000.

Eighteen ships arrived safely at Antwerp Tuesday 28th.

Pacific

Drenching rains continue on Leyte. No significant ground developments. Enemy casualties to date: 22,314 killed; 181 Japanese captured.

Tokyo radio claims landings in force have been made by Japs against American-held Morotai. Claim that complete surprise was achieved and that their casualties were minor. No confirmation here as yet.

B-29 Saipan bombers again on way to Tokyo.

A further report by Task Force Commander covering the attack of enemy suicide planes on his force in Leyte Gulf on 27 November indicates that two planes crash-dived close to and another hit the light cruiser MONTPELIER. The battleship MARYLAND dodged an enemy aerial torpedo but shot down the plane

The MONTPELIER suffered no serious structural damage, but two of her men are seriously injured.

Pacific Submarines

The USS PROMFRET reports sinking in the Central Pacific, two destroyers of a five-ship hunter-killer group. One destroyer disintegrated in a 2500-foot column of flame.

The USS ATULE on a war patrol in the Central Pacific has sunk two large transports, two destroyers and one freighter.

SENT: 291435Z

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Mr. Berle dictated the attached telegram by telephone from Chicago at 1:15 A.M., November 29, 1944, and requested that it be sent to the Map Room at the White House for transmission by direct wire to the President as early as possible on the morning of November 29, 1944.

Frances E. Willis
Frances E. Willis,
Watch Officer.

November 29, 1944

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT

SECRET

MR-OUT-563

You have Churchill's wire of November 28th declining to modify the British proposal and asking that we adjourn the Air Conference.

British proposal is reasonable for the United States across the Atlantic but would substantially exclude our or anyone's aviation Eastward from the gateway cities such as Stockholm, Amsterdam, London, Paris and Rome. Prominent limitation is placed by British plan on number of planes which could go between these points and points East, the top limit being the plane capacity efficient to carry through traffic direct from the United States but not including intermediate traffic. There is not much through traffic from the United States to Prague or Cairo or Baghdad. Expert opinion here holds that no American line could pay expenses beyond the populous cities of Western Europe.

Yesterday British argued their proposal in closed committee claiming their plan was needed to protect small states. Fifteen small states promptly got up and supported American position pleading that British proposal would prevent them from ever having self-supporting aviation. The line-up: France supported Britain luke-warm; all others supported United States including all Latin America, all Scandinavia, Netherlands, Spain, Canada, New Zealand. Australia, India, South Africa, stayed on the fence. The position of the smaller countries supporting us is that they want to carry traffic between intermediate points just as we do. In the jargon

- 2 -

jargon of the conference they want an unlimited fifth freedom.

British now want a quiet adjournment. LaGuardia and I think this might be misunderstood by American public and prefer to present the American plan in simple English; get a record vote, and then leave the problem to an interim council. Otherwise we think the British would seek to pose as martyrs trying to protect small nations against us. They raised this issue and we think they should face it rather than we.

Stettinius and I believe you should pass on this question and we would much appreciate your judgement.

Adolph Berle.

Sent: 291230Z

Copy of this message sent to Admiral Leahy for request of commander Smith in view of MR-IN-190.

562

SECRET

29 November 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of The United States

Nr: 1080, 29 November 1944 Filed 282300Z

From MILATTACHE Ldn Sr. Nr. 1080. Winant to The President personal and secret.

You will have received the Prime Minister's message in relation to civil aviation.

If you care deeply about the issues which have divided the Chicago Conference I believe that it would be possible to work out a friendly solution if you could personally discuss the differences with the Prime Minister.

A white paper has been released today by the British Government which is in part covered by the evening papers and which will appear in more complete form in tomorrow mornings papers detailing the immensity of the British war effort. I feel that the timing of this release is related to actions which may be taken by the respective governments in the immediate future.

SECRET

No Sig.

Recd: 290415Z.

RMB

Sent 1-291230Z

Regraded Unclassified

561

SECRET

28th November 1944

From: The U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To : The President of The United States

Nr : 1081 Filed 28/2300Z

To the President from Winant. Number 1081. Personal
and SECRET.

The other day Mr. Stettinius asked me to forward to
you my resignation as Ambassador to Great Britian. This I
now do. I would appreciate your accepting it within your
present term of office at your convenience.

Winant

SECRET

290230Z.

RUB

TOP-SECRET

NOVEMBER 28, 1944

510

MR-007-560

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRY HOPKINS

I HAVE TALKED TO BRECKINRIDGE LONG. HE DOES NOT WANT TO GO TO MEXICO. HE SAYS HIS EUSTACHIAN TUBES, IF YOU KNOW WHAT THAT MEANS, WILL NOT STAND THE PRESSURE OF EIGHT THOUSAND FEET ALTITUDE.

ED TELLS ME THAT BRADEN COULD GO TO MEXICO AND LONG TO CUBA. I DO NOT BELIEVE ANYBODY BUT YOU CAN HANDLE BRECK. I THINK HE WILL DO WHAT YOU WANT HIM TO DO BUT THINK YOU WILL HAVE TO CALL HIM UP YOURSELF.

I HAD A GOOD AND VERY FRANK TALK WITH BERLE IN CHICAGO. HE DOES NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF GOING TO BRAZIL VERY MUCH BUT HE SAYS IT IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT POSITIONS THERE IS BUT HE SIMPLY IS UNWILLING TO GO IF IT IS MERELY PROVIDING HIM WITH A NICE EXIT FROM THE GOVERNMENT. HE IS QUITE WILLING TO RESIGN BUT I TOLD HIM THAT YOU DID NOT WANT HIM TO RESIGN AND THAT YOU HAD NO NOTION OF PERMITTING HIM TO LEAVE THE DEPARTMENT AND THAT YOU WANTED HIM VERY MUCH TO GO TO BRAZIL.

ED IS GOING TO TALK TO BERLE TONIGHT AND I TOLD ED TO BE COMPLETELY FRANK WITH HIM BECAUSE BERLE REALIZES A NEW SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD CHOOSE HIS OWN ASSISTANTS.

CLAYTON HAS MADE SOME KIND OF A COMMITMENT TO JIMMY BYRNES TO WORK FOR HIM BUT CLAYTON TOLD ED TODAY THAT HE WOULD COME TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT IF THAT WAS YOUR WISH. I THINK THE THING TO DO IS FOR YOU TO SEND A WIRE TO CLAYTON TELLING HIM YOU WANT HIM TO GO TO THE DEPARTMENT AND, AT THE SAME TIME, EXPLAIN TO JIMMY WHY YOU

TOP-SECRET

2921452

Regaded Unlcassified

TOP-SECRET

-2-

WANT CLAYTON OVER THERE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS UNQUESTIONABLY THE PLACE FOR CLAYTON. I THINK HE WOULD GET IN DIFFICULTY IN THE DOMESTIC SCENE BUT BE A GREAT SUCCESS IN THE FOREIGN FIELD. IN THIS AREA HIS VIEWS ARE IDENTICAL WITH YOURS AND HULL'S.

ED TELLS ME THAT JIMMY DOES NOT WANT TO LET BEN COHEN GO WHICH IS UNDERSTANDABLE AND THAT HE, JIMMY, IS WRITING YOU DIRECT IN REGARD TO THIS. I THINK PERHAPS NOTHING NEED BE DONE ABOUT THIS FOR A FEW DAYS.

ED IS ANXIOUS TO GET THE LONG AND BERLE BUSINESS SETTLED AT ONCE.

THE APPOINTMENT OF STETTINIUS WAS TAKEN EXTREMELY WELL.

HENRY MORGENTHAU IS CLEANING UP THE AFFAIRS WITH LORD KEYNES NICELY.

HARRY

*Harry L. Hopkins
per P. H. K. G. S.*

*See also memo to Miss Tully from Mr. E. R. Steettinius,
MR-OUT-570.*

TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

28 Nov 44

MR-OUT-559

original copy to Admiral
Leahy who will return same
when draft answer has been
finished. Sent to the President
at Warm Springs at 281915Z.

Answered by Dr-190 - reply sent
to Pres in MR-OUT-569. President's
release in MR-IN-191. To PM
as # 66

- 1 -
TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP-SECRET

28 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

At the direction of Admiral Wilson
Brown, the attached message from the Prime
Minister to the President, Number 836, is for-
warded for your information.

Respectfully,

J. A. TYREE, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP-SECRET

28 November 1944

TOP SECRET
COPY

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President

No. : 836

1. Winant has brought me your message about the air in reply to my number 827, and naturally it has caused me much anxiety. I agree with you that this is a grave matter in which not only governments but parliaments and peoples may become deeply agitated, with consequences which cannot fail to be disastrous both to the prosecution of the war and to the prevention of future wars. I feel it my duty, therefore, to place before you in simple terms the issue as it presents itself to me after hearing all the advice of the special committee under Beaverbrook, of which Stafford Cripps is an important member, as well as the unanimous views of the War Cabinet.

2. The foundations of our position at this conference, which is being held at the time and place which you proposed, are:

(A) The British Empire is asked to put invaluable and irreplaceable bases for air transport all over the world at the disposal of such nations as are capable of using them. This means of course primarily and in bulk placing them at the disposal of the United States.

(B) It was agreed between us as a war measure that you should make the transport aircraft and specialize upon them on account of the character of the war, the need to supply China over the Hump, the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean, etc., and that we should concentrate our efforts upon fighting types. In consequence the United States are in an incomparably better position

TOP-SECRET

TOP-SECRET

than we are to fill any needs of air transport that may arise after the war is over, and to build up their civil aircraft industry. We would venture most earnestly to suggest that these two points are not receiving adequate consideration.

3. However, in partial recognition of the above two points, Lord Swinton believed that he had reached an agreement with Mr. Berle at Chicago on November 17th about the amount of aircraft capacity that should be put into service by our respective countries (frequencies) on a basis of "embarked traffic". Agreement was also reached about fares to prevent undercutting, unfair subventions, etc.

4. All the above was satisfactory to us and, I think, to the world. On November 18, however, your side of the table put forward an entirely new set of ideas and arguments which, in our judgment, took away with one hand what had been given with the other in consideration of our fundamental position set forth above in paragraphs 2 (A) and (B).

5. For instance, the escalator clause was sought, not only for traffic to and from your country but also for traffic between any two foreign countries. This meant that the number of services on any route could be increased when an airline achieved a load equal to 65% of its full capacity. We had already agreed, reluctantly, that this escalator clause should apply to traffic to and from an aircraft's own country. We had also agreed to a so-called fifth freedom which would grant to an aircraft on through services the right to pick up and set down traffic between foreign countries at intermediate stops. It is true that provision was made for a differentiation of fares to safeguard the local traffic. That seemed to me a valuable line to explore.

TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP-SECRET

6. Mr. Berle then asked for a combination of the escalator clause and the fifth freedom which would enable American aircraft to carry most of the traffic between the United Kingdom and the Dominions of India and all foreign countries, as well as between all nations of the Commonwealth. It would, in fact, give to United States airlines the right to everything save cabotage.

7. We must accept the fact that the arrangements about frequencies will very soon be completely different from those agreed upon before the escalator clause was proposed. There is very little doubt that our position relatively to yours is markedly injured thereby. This applies not only to Great Britain but to many other durable powers who are now in a weak condition to design and build suitable transport aircraft and to embark traffic.

8. On top of this escalator clause, which we have conceded for traffic to and from your country, Mr. Berle now demands the right of duplication over any section of any through route and also provision for increasing frequencies so that any airline could carry all the intermediate traffic it could get. This might well mean that aircraft embarking traffic in the United States would not only excel, as they are welcome to do on merits, but dominate and virtually monopolise traffic not only between our country and yours, but between all other foreign countries and British Dominions besides.

9. I have the opinion that both this point of linking the escalator clause and the fifth freedom together, and the claim for duplication on foreign air routes, require further patient study with a view to reaching agreement between our two countries. Thus, we could make sure that Great Britain and the Dominions and many other countries as well are not in fact run out of the air altogether as a result of your flying start with no regard to the fact that we are willing to throw all our bases all over the world into the common pool.

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TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP-SECRET

I am sure I could not obtain the agreement of the Cabinet or of either House of Parliament to anything which wore that aspect. Nor would I try.

10. It may be that you will say I have not rightly posed the issues. If this be so, I should be most grateful if you would state them in your own words. It is suggested, for instance, that we are going to challenge the right of all nations of innocent passage in Freedom I, or the consequential right of refueling and repair in Freedom II, except in so far as these are mixed up in the much more refined issues arising out of your doctrines of escalator and duplication? There may well be other simplifications which could be made.

11. Should it not be possible for us to reach an agreement at this stage on Freedoms III, IV and V, when great battles in which our troops are fighting side by side are at their height and when we are preparing for immense new further efforts against Japan. I cannot see that a temporary adjournment to allow of the aforesaid patient discussions would do any serious harm. On the contrary, I believe that it would be as readily understood as was the postponement of final decision at Dumbarton Oaks. There is always the great body of technical matter upon which agreement has been secured. Therefore, unless complete agreement is reached, I plead that there shall be an adjournment. Such adjournment for a short time, if asked for by an intimately-allied power like us, ought not to be denied, nor ought we to be confronted with such very serious contingencies as are set out in your message received on Saturday. An open dispute carried out by Parliament and Congress, both of which would have to be informed and in our voluble free press on both sides, would do far more harm to the war effort and to our hopes of the future than an adjournment of a few weeks or even months, while both parties persevered behind the scenes for a settlement.

- 4 -

TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

CONFIDENTIAL
I AM SURE I CAN

TOP-SECRET

12. It is my earnest hope that you will not bring on this air discussion the prospect of our suffering less generous treatment on Lend-Lease than we had expected from the Quebec discussions. But even if I thought that we were to be so penalized, I would not feel myself able to agree to a decision contrary to the merits, as we see them, on this matter.

13. I should be ready, of course, to accept impartial arbitration on the points outstanding at the Chicago conference, provided that they were discussed in relation to the general framework. We have not yet got our World Court again, but there are friendly states and neutral states from whom competent judges might be found.

14. Let me say also, that I have never advocated competitive "bigness" in any sphere between our two countries in their present state of development. You will have the greatest navy in the world. You will have, I hope, the greatest air force. You will have the greatest trade. You have all the gold. But these things do not oppress my mind with fear because I am sure the American people under your re-acclaimed leadership will not give themselves over to vainglorious ambitions, and that justice and fair-play will be the lights that guide them.

- 5 -

TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

WR

November 28, 1944.

MR-OUT-558

From: Admiral Brown.
To : The President.

You may remember that Mr. Churchill's birthday occurs on 30 November. I thought perhaps you might like to send him a message somewhat as follows: "Once again I send you my sincere personal and official best wishes for many happy returns of your birthday. I shall always remember your birthday dinner at Teheran a year ago as one of the important milestones in friendship and good understanding of the peoples of the world. May we have many more together."

Sent 4-28/600 Z

President sent greetings as written in MR-IN-194. President also received message from Brant, MR-OUT-565.

MR-OUT-557.

28 November 1944

WESTERN FRONT

Methodical progress made at many points on southern end of active battle front. East of Aachen small but significant gains were toward the Roer River defenses.

SHAEP believes enemy resistance at Mulhouse and general area is only to protect flanks of army in Vosges to permit orderly retreat back to Rhine. There are no indications of reinforcements west of the Rhine in this sector, this despite fact captured documents indicate enemy was confident of holding Vosges for the winter.

Indications continue that bulk of 6th Panzer Army is well SW of Cologne. One reason for its non-commitment may well be, as German publicists suggest, that a second Allied offensive south of the first is feared.

In increased air activity over Germany our planes claim destruction of over 200 enemy aircraft in air combat during the last two days.

First 3 coasters arrived Antwerp PM 26 Nov.

PHILIPPINES

LEYTE. The continuing rains have brought ground operations to a practical standstill. Air activity was minor. Four enemy planes were shot down.

On 27 November a destroyer squadron made a foray into Camotes Sea and shelled Ormoc on the western side of Leyte Island. This group also sank a Jap submarine. Leyte planes sank two Jap destroyers at Martinique, Central Philippines, on the 24th.

MOROTAI

Morotai suffered a bombing attack which destroyed or damaged several Navy search planes.

PELELIU

Enemy pockets further compressed and add additional caves cleaned out or sealed with approximately 40 remaining in enemy hands.

The heavy bomber runway on Peleliu is reported completed. The rate of progress on Anguar Field is still less than normal but progress satisfactory.

VLADIVOSTOK

Indications that Red Army in Far East is being gradually reinforced with units from the European Front. Transportation via special hospital trains of 16 to 18 cars three times a week.

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
RELEASED BY _____		FOR ACTION CNO	PPPPPPP 2	
DATE 28 NOVEMBER 1944			ROUTINE 3	
TOR CODEROOM 281149			DEFERRED 4	
DECODED BY BALDWIN			BASEGRAM 5	
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY GARDNER			6
BY BALDWIN	DITTOED BY BALDWIN			7
ROUTED BY BALDWIN				8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			PRIORITY 9	
			ROUTINE 10	
			DEFERRED 11	
			BASEGRAM 12	
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			17	
281025Z		NCR 6316	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>	

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(TOP SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KENNAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES MOSCOW)

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN HAS NOT YET ARRIVED IN MOSCOW. TELEGRAM NR 129, 271709Z, WILL BE HELD HERE PENDING HIS ARRIVAL UNLESS INSTRUCTIONS ARE RECEIVED TO THE CONTRARY. HIS ARRIVAL IS EXPECTED IN FOUR OR FIVE DAYS.

Recd 281300z

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

NAVAIDE (#1-2).....ACTION

Sent 281320z

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO

OPNAV 19-78

281025Z

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

MR-OUT-555

28 November 1944

From: The U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of The United States

Nr: 838 Filed: 28/1010Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and TOP SECRET. Number 838.

Your 659. I had not heard of this, but of course
all action will now be suspended till you and I have
discussed the matter.

Prime

Recd 281230 Z

Sent: 281325Z

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

28 November 1944

MR-OUT 554

From: The U.S. Military Attache, London, England

To: The President of The United States

No: 837 Filed: 28/1010Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and TOP SECRET. Number 837.

Your Number 660. Thank you so much.

Prime

Recd 281230 Z

Sent 281325Z

TOP SECRET

FLASH

Regraded Unclassified