Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions

Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe

Edited by
ANDREEA MARCULESCU AND
CHARLES-LOUIS MORAND MÉTIVIER

Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions

Series Editors
David Lemmings
School of History and Politics
University of Adelaide
Adelaide, Australia

William M. Reddy
Department of History
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina, USA

Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions includes work that redefines past definitions of emotions; re-conceptualizes theories of emotional 'development' through history; undertakes research into the genesis and effects of mass emotions; and employs a variety of humanities disciplines and methodologies. In this way it produces a new interdisciplinary history of the emotions in Europe between 1100 and 2000.

More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14584

Andreea Marculescu
Charles-Louis Morand Métivier
Editors

Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Andreea Marculescu
Department of Women's
and Gender Studies
University of Oklahoma
Norman, OK, USA

Charles-Louis Morand Métivier
Department of Romance
Languages and Linguistics
University of Vermont
Burlington, VT, USA

Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions
ISBN 978-3-319-60668-2 ISBN 978-3-319-60669-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017944711

Cover illustration: © Peter Horree/Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Andreea Marculescu is a Lecturer in Women's and Gender Studies at University of Oklahoma. She got her Ph.D. in French Literature from Johns Hopkins University, and before teaching at OU, Andreea was a Visiting Assistant Professor of French at UC Irvine and an ACLS New Faculty Fellow at Harvard University. Her work focuses on medieval drama, the history of psychiatry and narratives of mental illnesses in medieval and early modern European literature, disability studies, history of witchcraft and demonology, and affect studies and emotions. Andreea has published articles on such topics in *Critique*, *Literature Compass*, *Mediaevalia*, *Studies in Early Modern France* and in other peer-reviewed edited volumes. Her monograph titled *Vulnerable Bodies: Demonic Possession, Intercorporeality, and Performance in Medieval Drama* is under advanced contract with Peter Lang.

Charles-Louis Morand Métivier is an Assistant Professor of French at the University of Vermont. His research focuses on medieval and Renaissance French literature and on the history of emotions. He is particularly interested in the literary representation of the extreme emotions begotten by extreme massacres. He has published on Pierre de Ronsard, Joachim du Bellay, Philippe de Mézières, and Christine de Pizan, and is working on two books.

Contributors

Tracy Adams received a Ph.D. in French from Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1998. An Associate Professor in European Languages and Literatures at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, she has also taught at the University of Maryland, the University of Miami, and the University of Lyon III. She was a Eurias Senior Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies from 2011 to 2012, an Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in the History of Emotions Distinguished International Visiting Fellow in 2014, and a fellow at the Herzog August Bibliothek fellowship in Wolfenbüttel, Germany in 2016. She is the author of *Violent Passions: Managing Love in the Old French Verse Romance* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), *The Life and Afterlife of Isabeau of Bavaria* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), and *Christine de Pizan and the Fight for France* (Penn State University Press, 2014). With Christine Adams, she edited *Female Beauty Systems: Beauty as Social Capital in Western Europe and the US, Middle Ages to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015). Also, with Christine Adams, she is completing *Theatricality, Power and the Creation of the French Royal Mistress.*

Kim Bergqvist is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at Stockholm University, where he is completing his doctoral dissertation provisionally entitled *Aristocratic Ideology and Political Morality: The Courtly and Chivalric Ethos in Castile-León and Sweden, c.1275–c.1350.* He specializes in political, cultural, and comparative history, medieval history writing, and the history of gender and emotions, with a particular focus on the high and late Middle Ages in Scandinavia and the Iberian Peninsula.

Susan Broomhall is the Director of the Centre of Medieval and Early Modern Studies at The University of Western Australia. She is a historian of early modern Europe whose research explores gender, emotions, material culture, cultural contact, and the heritage of the early modern world. She was a Foundation Chief Investigator in the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions. In 2014, she became an Honorary Chief Investigator, having taken up an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship, researching emotions and power in the correspondence of Catherine de Medici.

Beatrice Delaurenti is a Professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris. Her research focuses on medieval intellectual controversies at the crossroads of religion, science, and magic, dealing specifically with the question of action generated at a distance. She is currently working on doctrinal debates surrounding imagination, emotional contagion, and fascination in the fields of medieval medicine and natural philosophy. She has published *La Puissance des mots. "Virtus verborum," débats doctrinaux sur le pouvoir des incantations*, Paris, Cerf, 2007, and *La contagion des émotions.* Compassio*, une énigme médiévale*, Paris, Garnier Classiques, 2016.

Jennifer Hillman is a Lecturer in Early Modern History at the University of Chester (UK). She is interested primarily in lay piety in the Counter-Reformation Era, with a particular focus on France.

Emily J. Hutchison is an Associate Professor of History in the Department of Humanities at Mount Royal University (Calgary, AB, Canada). She holds a doctorate in Medieval Studies from the University of York (2006). Her dissertation examined the Burgundian propaganda in the first phase of the Burgundo-Armagnac civil war. She has published articles in the *Journal of Medieval History* (2007) and *French Historical Studies* (2012) on early civil war factionalism, and an article in *Speculum* examining the political function of grieving in the outbreak of civil War between 1407 and 1413 (2016).

Kathleen Long is a Professor of French in the Department of Romance Studies at Cornell University, and Director of the Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program. She is the author of two books, *Another Reality: Metamorphosis and the Imagination in the Poetry of Ovid, Petrarch and Ronsard* and *Hermaphrodites in Renaissance Europe*, and editor of *High Anxiety: Masculinity in Crisis in Early Modern France*, *Religious Differences in France*, and *Gender and Scientific Discourse in Early Modern Europe*. She has written numerous articles on the work of Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné, on gender in early modern Europe, and on monsters. She is preparing an English translation of *The Island of Hermaphrodites (L'isle des hermaphrodites)*, a book-length study of the works of Agrippa d'Aubigné, and another on the relationship between early modern discourses of monstrosity and modern discourses of disability.

Sarah Kathryn Moore Independent Scholar, holds a Ph.D. in English Literature from the University of Washington. Her poetry has appeared or is forthcoming, and has most recently been published in *Cutbank*, *The Seattle Review*, and *Poetry Northwest*.

Stephanie Trigg is the Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in English Literature at the University of Melbourne. She is also a Chief Investigator with the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions. Her most recent book is *Shame and Honour: A Vulgar History of the Order of the Garter* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2012) and she is also co-editor of two special issues of *postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies*, in 2016 and 2017.

Angela Warner is a Ph.D. student at the Centre for Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto. Her research centers on emotions in medieval French and Occitan literature.

Natalia Wawrzyniak is a Ph.D. holder from the Faculty of Artes Liberales, University of Warsaw and is a former fellow of the Foundation for Polish Science. She was a visiting scholar at the Centre Roland Mousnier (Université de Paris–Sorbonne), the French and Italian Department (University of Madison–Wisconsin), and Centre d'Études Supérieures de la Renaissance in Tours. Currently, she works as a scientific coordinator at the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) in Paris. Her book on lamentation and polemics during French Wars of Religion is forthcoming from Classiques Garnier. She is now working on an anthology of early modern French polemical complaints.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Andreea Marculescu and Charles-Louis Morand Métivier

"What are emotions?" This seemingly simple question generated a lot of discussion in the field of emotion studies.[1] Darwin and, later, Freud regarded emotions as internal drives that produce outbursts of feelings and sensations that need to be tamed or channeled.[2] Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists demonstrated the shortcomings of such models. The neurobiologist Antonio Damasio asserts in *Descartes' Error* that emotions are far from being simple, uncontrolled impulses, but are instead wired in the human body.[3] Emotions, per this narrative, have a strong cognitive aspect. Anthropologists[4] and historians,[5] in contrast, argue that emotions are neither sensorial nor cognitive, but are constituents of social and cultural practices. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum acknowledge the quintessential role that emotions have in evaluating such practices.

A. Marculescu (✉)
Department of Women's and Gender Studies, University of Oklahoma, 1715 Oklahoma Ave, Norman, OK 73071, USA
e-mail: marculescu.andreea@gmail.com

C.-L. Morand Métivier
Romance Languages and Linguistics, University of Vermont, Waterman 511, 85 S. Prospect St, Burlington, VT 05405, USA
e-mail: cmorandm@uvm.edu

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_1

For Nussbaum, emotions have a strong cognitive dimension because they allow subjects to reflect on external events: "they (emotions) are our way of registering how things are with respects to the external (i.e., uncontrolled) that we view salient for our well-being."[6] In other words, events are uncontrollable, but emotions represent a map that facilitates further reflection on normative ways of constructing forms of existing and being in the world in a particular society. [7]

In their endeavor to coin a theory of emotions pertinent to medieval sources, medievalists retained Nussbaum's understanding of emotions as a map providing evaluative narratives. Such is the case of Barbara Rosenwein, one of the first medievalists to read early medieval texts through the lenses of contemporary theories of emotions. She argues that emotions are evaluative in the sense that they are social barometers through which different socio-cultural groups form their own identity.[8] Building on poststructuralist terms of "discourse" and "habitus" but also on contemporary historical notions of "emotional regime"[9] and "textual community,"[10] Rosenwein defines the term "emotional communities" as:

> An emotional community is a group in which people have a common stake, interests, values, and goals. [They] are in some ways what Foucault called a common "discourse:" shared vocabularies and ways of thinking that have a controlling, disciplining function. [They] are similar as well to Bourdieu's notion of "habitus:" internalized norms that determine how we think and act and that might be different in different groups.[11]

If we follow Rosenwein's perspective, emotions seem to be rather static discursive practices of hegemonic character. Subjects, on the other hand, have a certain mobility in appropriating such normative practices dependent on their own stakes and goals. However, despite Rosenwein's accommodating definition of emotions as discourse, one wonders if such a model does justice to the dynamics of discourse formation following its poststructuralist lineage. From Michel Foucault's *Archeology of Knowledge*, we know that a discourse does not reflect the unity of what a subject—individual, group, or institution—thinks.[12] In fact, for Foucault the idea of unity is not epistemologically conceivable. Contrary to that, discourses lack teleology and synthesis but encompass dispersed, disjunctive interventions.[13] In this light, emotional norms that fabricate individual and group subjectivities are not already pre-established, as Rosenwein argued, but are impacted by different discursive ruptures, negotiations,

and practices. It was in this sense that Piroska Nagy, while recognizing the heuristic value for the study of emotions as dynamic discursive conglomerates,[14] questioned the very teleology and exact demarcation of "emotional communities."[15] Nevertheless, Reddy's notion of "emotional regime," together with Rosenwein's "emotional community," paved the way for what medievalists like Nagy and Boquet labeled as "émotionologie": the domain of acculturated emotion that is captured within a web of discursive norms and practices.[16]

Sociality of Emotions

A majority of papers in this volume engage with the analysis of emotions precisely in this perspective of an acculturated ensemble of multilayered norms, interventions, and hybrid practices. In this sense, one main direction of our project is to explore how given emotional norms and regimes are dislocated, and how individual discursive strategies are used in fashioning emotional narratives. Historians such as Michel de Certeau provide a useful heuristic framework to capture the dynamics of how norms can be constituted, reshaped, and, ultimately, contested by those subjects and socio-economic groups that are not necessarily in a position of power to create them.[17] In the *Practices of Everyday Life*, de Certeau distinguishes between "strategies" and "tactics."[18] The former designates "the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated."[19] Consequently, the strategy represents the visible language through which panoptic types of institutions fabricate their technologies of power. Tactics, on the other hand, refer to the "calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus."[20] They do not stem from the hegemonic concerns of institutions endowed with power but, as de Certeau argues, are situated on the axis of the consumer who operates within the logic of assemblage rather than that of clear Cartesian choices.[21] Similarly, we argue that certain normative emotional discourses are the result of the more or less conscious efforts of particular religious and secular institutions to shape their own emotional style. Such emotional strategies produce alternative emotional tactics that communities or even individuals use in constructing their own identities. Some of the papers in the volume investigate how these binomial emotional strategies-tactics organized the emotional lives of medieval and early modern subjects. Among the questions they

ask are: how do hegemonic emotions get assembled to become coherent strategies? How do disparate groups that are not necessarily in a position of power fabricate multilayered, hybrid regimes that can be placed under the umbrella of emotional tactics?

Affective Encounters

The second direction that this volume follows concerns the somatization and the embodiment of emotions. While we acknowledge the tremendous heuristic practicality of considering emotions as discourses, we believe that in assessing any type of emotional behavior, one cannot efface the role of the body. From the work of neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists, we learn that emotions are wired within our bodies either in the form of universal facial expressions, as psychologists like Paul Ekman suggest,[22] or as "somatic markers," as Antonio Damasio points out in *Descartes' Error*.[23] More recently, the newly established field of Affect Studies, under the influence of neurosciences, also brings biology within the domain of social sciences and the humanities. Theorists like Brian Massumi[24] consider that subjectivities are not exclusively the result of hegemonic discourses that place bodies on a grid defined according to gender, racial, or socio-economic criteria.[25] Contrary to that, for Massumi and other theorists of Affect Studies,[26] bodily experiences are neither exclusively social nor pre-social but are "open-endedly social"; that is, "social in a manner 'prior to' the separating out of individuals."[27] In fact, Massumi adopts a Spinozist understanding of the body as a relational entity that has the capacity to affect and be affected.[28] This means that the body develops its own autonomic responses that materialize through a certain "visceral perception" that is different from conscious states of perception, often preceding perception itself.[29] Therefore, affect resides within the indeterminacy of bodily autonomic responses, being a conglomerate of:

> mind and body, but also volition and cognition, at least two orders of language, expectation and suspense, body depth and epidermis, past and future, action and reaction, happiness and sadness, quiescence and arousal, passivity and activity, and so on.[30]

Medievalists have been rather reticent to accept such a model of understanding "affect" in terms of bodily materiality and autonomy

outside the realm of conscious perception and language.[31] Rightfully so, they have pointed out that the scholastic anthropology of the Middle Ages developed its own vocabulary and conceptual framework to place the notion of "affect" and "emotions." In this sense, medieval conceptions about emotions derive to a certain extent from classical frameworks of theorizing affective phenomena. The Stoic theory of emotions as disturbances of the soul,[32] filtered through the theology of church fathers, acquires a moral and pedagogical dimension for medieval thinkers. Labeled as "first movement," "titillation," "pre-passion," "movements of the soul," or "accidents of the soul," emotions were equated to a form of sin by twelfth century theologians such as Peter Lombard (c.1095–1160) and Hugh of St. Victor (1096–1141).[33] Under the influence of the Aristotelian treatise *De Anima*, doctors like Avicenna and scholastic philosophers such as St. Thomas Aquinas define emotions in physiological and psychological terms. Indeed, for Avicenna, emotions are the result of judgments performed once an exterior object produces perceptive traces. These perceptive judgments are accompanied by somatic changes at the level of the body.[34] Following Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas refers to emotions as passions that occur in the act of perception that are necessarily echoed by bodily changes.[35] As Simo Knuutilla puts it, for twelfth and thirteenth century scholastic thinkers, "emotions have cognitive causes, and they involve feelings, behavioral suggestions, and bodily affections."[36]

It is outside the scope of this volume to put the medieval physiological and cognitive framework of conceptualizing emotions and affects in dialogue with the findings from contemporary fields like Affect Studies that prioritize the emergence of affect within the realm of unconscious or semi-conscious perception. Attempts of placing emotions and affects within an intellectual history already exist. We mention here the work of cultural historians like Thomas Dixon[37] and Susan James[38] who have analyzed the intellectual and historical trajectory that emotions had from Augustine until the late nineteenth century when secular disciplines such as psychology enter the arena and shape different, more "scientific," meanings for classical affects.[39] However, while contextual awareness is important and, in this sense, emotions as discourses do stem from particular intellectual and historical circumstances, the heuristic impact of contemporary approaches such as Affect Studies should not be neglected either. In this sense, some articles in this volume indirectly engage with vocabularies and approaches that theorists of Affect Studies touched

upon. The capacity of the body to affect and be affected when in contact with other bodies or the notion of "visceral unconscious perception" are dealt with by some of the authors. Other papers engage more directly with the medieval physiological and psychological framework of conceptualizing emotions.

Emotional Textualities

The third main aspect of *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* deals with the ways in which emotions, both as discourses and somatic experiences, are embedded in the fabric of the text.[40] Emotions are present in the writing of texts, literary or not. The words that are used and chosen to depict a context are, obviously, the first emotional markers that the author leaves to convey ideas. However, the absence of certain ideas or notions is also an emotional marker that creates spaces of strong affective and emotional force.

Words—or lack thereof—are not the only features of the emotional fact in a text. The context in which they are written and expressed, and toward whom they are directed, are also important. Whether the medium is literature, nonfiction, or documents that would now be defined as historiographical sources (e.g., chronicles, minutes, treatises), the particular emotional impact of events has been shared by the audiences who have lived through and been impacted by them. Indeed, in the aftermath of 9/11, Don DeLillo explains that "the writer wants to understand what this day has done to us…The writer tries to give memory, tenderness, and meaning to all that howling space."[41] The howling space that an event like 9/11 leaves is the place that literature and emotions can and do investigate. Processing emotions through literature is one of the actions that enables not only understanding, but also their explanation and dissemination to a whole new audience which may not have experienced such events exactly. Literature can be viewed as an intellectual somatization of felt emotions, in the sense that the act of writing takes its roots in the way emotions impacted the person. Thus, their representation in writing embodies them in a way that enables their dissemination. To a certain extent, emotions are socially constructed, in and through the relations that they imply with fellow receivers. Michelle Rosaldo explains that "what individuals think and feel is overwhelmingly a product of socially organized modes of action and of talk."[42] Processing an emotional event through literature, then, allows for its

discussion through a double set of eyes, those of the reader and of the writer. But emotions are not necessarily universally acknowledged. If, to continue the metaphor on 9/11, the reactions of shock, sadness, and despair have shown a general consensus, the interpretation of these imaginations have also garnered debate. The recent controversy over a "Literature of 9/11" class taught by Neel Ahuja at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill is a perfect example of this problem. Some students complained that the books assigned to this seminar were biased, expressing sympathy toward terrorists, and presented a one-sided view of the events.[43]

The thorny subject of the reception of emotions is clearly at the core of this controversy. The interpretation of the emotional depiction differs based on the reader's point of view, while the original emotional setting is the same. Literature and emotions are then intricately linked, as they are the essence of feeling and of its representation, the medium through which the dissemination is possible. The example of 9/11 shows us the importance of not only the emotional reaction, but also its representation and embodiment. Emotions and their representation, as well as their comprehension for a larger audience are not a contemporary, or even modern concern. Since the 1980s, researchers have demonstrated that emotionology and its constituents could be traced and examined as far back as the Middle Ages.

The word "emotion" by itself did not exist in the Middle Ages in its current meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary explains that the first iteration of the word dates from 1562, with the meaning of "public agitation, civil unrest." Its modern meaning did not appear until 1602.[44] Likewise, the French word "émotion" had a meaning close to its Latin root of movement ("movere"), and does not appear until the fifth edition of the Dictionnaire de l'Académie Françoise in 1799, where it is defined as "alteration, trouble, excited movement of the humors, in the spirits, in the soul."[45]

These issues are central to Barbara Rosenwein's research. She points to the absence of a single, easily identifiable term that would refer to emotions in a medieval context. She explains that she uses the word *emotion* "with full knowledge that it is a convenience: a constructed term that refers to affective reactions of all sorts, intensities, and durations."[46] While we start this multidisciplinary, cross-century project, the very concept of defining emotions is not an easy task. Just like the term "emotions" bears a different meaning in the medieval and early

modern context, we must accept that our modern notions and views on emotions may not directly correspond to what they were at that time, or with how they were explained in text. It is important, then, to take this issue into consideration while dealing not only with the words, but also with their context. In the *Song of Roland*, emotions are deeply embedded in the fabric of the text, as Angela Warner explains in her analysis of the text present in this volume. After hearing of the ambush in which his armies fell, Charlemagne angrily rides toward the site of the ambush ("Charlemagne was riding with great ire"[47]), his anger comparable to the passions that are described by Hyanthe in the fourth book of Ronsard's *Franciad* when she explains the importance of emotions:

> From the Body spring our sadness and fear
>
> It engraves joy in our hearts,
>
> As well as love, hatred, and ambitions.
>
> Whence spring all our passions.[48]

The same emotions, or seemingly common ones, might be considered in a completely different way. The sadness that encompasses, for instance, the death of the knights during the Battle of Agincourt (1415) has been perceived by many French sources, such as Christine de Pizan (*Epistle of the prison of human life*) or Alain Chartier (*Book of the four ladies*) as a national tragedy, while English texts, such as William Shakespeare's *Henry V* depict it as a glorious victory worthy of celebration. Context and continuity are crucial to understanding how seemingly universal emotions can lead to different expressions of their feedback.

William Reddy argues that "emotion words…have a direct impact on what they are supposed to refer to; this fact separates the question of emotion decisively from the question of perception."[49] However, simply considering words and emotion-related lexical fields would definitely not be enough. Indeed, even though they convey the meaning and the idea of what an emotion may be, the essence of that word may be lost to us. As previously explained, a seemingly common emotion could garner different kinds of reactions. An important point is that medieval and early modern emotions can be studied and scrutinized by modern methods. Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy explain, "emotions are objects of history, in the sense that the past can be scrutinized through modern

problems."[50] However, emotions should not be considered in their modern sense, but, on the contrary, should be interpreted according to the meanings they were given during a particular historical period. As for historians, they argue that they should not invest themselves as contemporary tokens in a discussion on medieval or early modern emotions. They argue, "…rhetoric will never abolish detachment, a necessity for the historian to remain lucid…The historian is a surveyor. It is by measuring these distances that he grants himself the means to establish means of contact, of communication."[51]

If a study or survey of the lexical representation of emotions is not enough, what else can help the reader understand medieval emotions? Indeed, as Rosenwein and many others, including Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, pointed out, it is impossible to truly know through the text what was really felt at the period, and text is the only medium that enables the reader to have a first-hand understanding of a situation. Through reading, the world in which the texts were written unfolds for the reader to understand and analyze. Donald Wesling argues, "there's a relation between fictive and real, between literary character and ordinary person. We must then explore emotions in literature and text as a complex carefully constructed/orchestrated."[52] Furthermore, Wesling explains, "the multidimensional nature of emotions requires a scholarship fully aware that the human being cannot be reduced to biology, social construction, or discourse alone, but belongs to all of these."[53] Literary texts both as content and as material objects are at the intersection of this grid of factors and, therefore, good barometers of emotional scripts.

Contributions

The selection of the papers in this volume reflects, therefore, the three main directions in which *Affective and Emotional Economies* aims to intervene in the field of the history of medieval emotions and affects: (1) dislocation of particular emotional norms and regimes belonging to different socio-cultural communities (courtly, academic, and urban elites); (2) affects and the somatic appropriation of emotions at a corporeal level; and (3) textual strategies in fashioning emotional narratives. The papers are organized around several common questions: why do hegemonic political organisms such as governments become oblivious to the emotional languages and strategies of those who lack power,

such as the representatives of the Third Estate? What kind of emotional script does medical knowledge create, and how are these scripts performed at a corporeal level? Finally, how is the construction of gender, notably of masculinities, impacted by traumatic events such as war? How do literary texts capture these emotional traumatisms? The first part of this book, Subverting Emotional Norms, examines how certain normative emotional discourses were distorted by new conceptions and personal or group emotional strategies. Emily Hutchison, in "Passionate Politics: Emotion, Affect, and Identity Formation among the 'Menu Peuple' in Early Fifteenth Century France," aims to shed light on how the narratives that emerge in the official documents and chronicles of the period—troubled by the French civil war between the Orléans and the Armagnacs—"archive" the feelings they claimed to document among the *menu peuple* (especially in Paris). What do these documents reveal about the manner in which collective emotions of urban bodies contributed directly to local and broader political formations, not as revolutionary bodies, but as critical constitutive elements in the political climate of fifteenth century France? Natalia Wawrzyniak, in "Pity and Political Emotion in Early Modern Europe," examines how politics could be considered an "art of the emotions" that sees pity and compassion as one of the basic social affects. Straying away from classical rhetoric, she argues that Renaissance Europe, facing religious and political crisis, pushed thinkers to formulate quite a different view of the role of pity in attaining not only inner moral balance but also political harmony. Erasmus, Juan Luis Vives, Philippe Melanchton, Montaigne, or Michel de L'Hospital consider pity, as well as the pitiful discourse, an important part of the political *praxis.* Tracy Adams, in "'Issuing from the great flame of this joy': Louise of Savoy, Marguerite of Navarre, and Emotional Intimacy," examines the difference between contemporary impressions of Marguerite of Navarre and her mother Louise of Savoy, and the fearful personae that they adopt in their descriptions of themselves and each other. Assuming a formidable political persona gave noble women like Marguerite and Louise the courage to defend their families. The examination of Marguerite's and Louise's personal interaction offers a fascinating glimpse of how this powerful team drew comfort from each other to survive in a period fraught with difficulty for women of higher rank. Finally, Susan Broomhall, in "Histories of Emotion and Power: Catherine de Medici's Advice to her Sons" focuses on Catherine's letters to analyze how these documents orchestrate what Broomhall calls

"emotional work" consisting of emotional scripts embedded in the rhetoric of the texts. This "emotional work," argues Broomhall, can be seen as a true political language in itself through which Catherine prepares her sons to assume a particular normative model of masculinity based on royal ideology or what, Broomhall calls, an emotional history of father figures.

Part II, Affective Encounters, focuses on the way the body becomes central to filtering and reshaping emotional discourses and creating somatic scripts. In "Emotional Contagion: Évrart de Conty and Compassion," Beatrice Delaurenti analyzes how the notion of compassion, manifested at the level of somatic changes, and disseminated in Europe through the translation of Aristotle, is encompassed in Évrart de Conty's *Livre des Problemes*. She studies the mechanism of compassion and proposes physiological interpretations according to which emotion is studied in the form of its somatization. This discourse on intersubjectivity and emotional contagion leads to far-reaching interrogations of the articulation of body and soul, the dialectical balance between will and passion, the role of desire in human actions, man's relationship to animals, and the idea of universal harmony. In "Love Conventional/Love Singular: Desire in Middle English Lyric," Sarah Moore examines romantic love or desire as it appears in several later Middle English lyrics, arguing that desire is expressed in the lyrics though language that creates a powerful sense of embodied subjectivity. The highly conventional nature of the lyrics creates in many instances an "abstract" desire that, while purportedly focusing in minute detail on the body of the beloved, actually effaces the physical presence of both the lyric's love object and its speaking subject. Select poems create for those experiencing the lyrics an intimately tangible sense of their individualized textual subjects, even through conventional language. Finally, Jennifer Hillman, in her paper entitled "Internal Theatre and Emotional Scripts in Early Modern French Meditative Literature," examines Pierre Chastellain's *Affectus Amantis Christum seu Exercitium amoris erga Dominum Jesum* (Sainte-Marie, c.1641), and Louis Richeome's *Le Pélerin de Lorète* (Paris, c.1603). She argues that these texts create an internal theater that was the scripting of an emotional dialogue between the reader and Christ, aiming to nuance understandings of the early modern "religious emotions."

The final part of the volume is entitled Authoring Emotions. The papers in this section examine how war-and violence-related trauma

and the extreme emotional responses they carry disrupt and reimagine normative concepts of masculinity. Kathleen Long proposes an emotional reading of one of Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné's most well-known works, *Les Tragiques*. In "Cruelty and Empathy in Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné's *Les Tragiques*," she examines how emotions function within the frame of a relationship between the authorial persona and a reader based on manipulation, and even interrogation, of the reader's motives. Through strategic perversion of some of the most cherished literary forms of the period, in particular Petrarchan poetry and classical epic, the reader is continually kept off balance, shocked, and perhaps even distressed by what is read. In the end, Agrippa d'Aubigné may be revealing an "ethics of affect" in the reader, thus left with the choice to be cruel or to be kind. Charles-Louis Morand Métivier analyzes how genre and emotions play a role in retelling, reporting, and/or distorting history. In "Narrating a Massacre: The Writing of History and Emotions as Response to the Battle of Nicopolis (1396)," he analyzes how this resounding defeat was related in three literary genres: memoir, chronicle, and travel narrative. The emotional response and writing of the three works, argues Morand Métivier, is highly impacted by the emotional message that the authors want to convey to their readers. Such a mechanism enables a shaping of the events that allows them to fit in various—sometimes opposed—historical and political narratives. In "'*Doel*' In Situ: The Contextual and Corporeal Landscape of Grief in *La Chanson de Roland*," Angela Warner explores how the poet understands and conveys grief to the male members of the emotional community to which he and his audience belong. In her discussion and analysis of the text, she confronts and compares her own reading of emotional representations in *Roland* to the concepts of emotives developed by William Reddy. She explains how they do not fully encompass the total breadth of the multifaceted human emotional experience, focusing instead on aspects of that experience. Warner evaluates each of these theories as they relate to the expression of grief in *La Chanson de Roland*, emphasizing the locus of their strengths and weaknesses and their role in the making of a certain type of feudal masculinity. To conclude this section, Kim Berqvist analyzes in "Performing Chivalric Masculinity: Medieval Affective Behavior and Emotional Scripts in the Madrid and Paris Manuscripts of the *Libro del Caballero Zifar*" how emotions and affective behavior are portrayed in relation to masculinity in the book of *Zifar*, the first domestic book of chivalry composed in Castile, written

in the first decades of the fourteenth century. His focus is chiefly on the performativity of lay elite masculinity—how chivalric manhood is constructed—and what marks knightly affectivity. Berqvist thus explains how *Zifar* responds to a community with particular notions of gender and a specific model of hegemonic masculinity.

As Stephanie Trigg emphasizes in her "Afterword: Reading Historical Emotions," the papers in the volume show that emotions are fundamentally intersectional in nature and are orchestrated by a grid of factors and contexts in which they are performed: public and private, individual and collective, male and female, contemporary and historical. The body is also important in conceptualizing emotions, not only as makers of discourses and subjectivity, but equally as affective links between a biological determinism and modes of somatic connections with others. Moreover, as Trigg states, emotions, given their multifarious character, must necessarily bring together interdisciplinary vocabularies, methods, and primary sources which traditionally have been the prerogative only of historians, specialists of literary studies, or anthropologists. *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* aims, therefore, to capture this hybridity of emotions as cultural, historical, and *affective* assemblages that put into dialogue various epistemological and historical fields.

Notes

1. For a detailed historiography of the field of emotions studies, see Jan Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, translated by Keith Tribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
2. Quoted in Barbara Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 13.
3. Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, (New York: Penguin, 1994).
4. Catherine Lutz and Leila Abu-Lughod, *Language and Politics of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Renato Rosaldo, *Ilongot Headhunting: A Social History, 1883–1978* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1980).
5. William Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
6. Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 4.
7. Nussbaum, *Upheavals*, 6.

8. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 1–28.
9. William Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 122–130.
10. Brian Stock, *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
11. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 24–25.
12. Michel Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 76–78.
13. Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir.*
14. Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet (ed.), *Le Sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Beauchesne, 2009).
15. Piroska Nagy, "Les Émotions et l'historien: de nouveaux paradigms," *Émotions médiévales. Critique* 716–717 (2007), 10–22.
16. Nagy and Boquet (ed.), *Le Sujet*, 38.
17. Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
18. de Certeau, *The Practice*, 34–39.
19. de Certeau, *The Practice*, 36–37.
20. de Certeau, *The Practice*, 36–39.
21. de Certeau, *The Practice*, 37–38: "a tactic boldly juxtaposes diverse elements…Cross-cuts, fragments, cracks and lucky hits in the framework of a system [tactics are] consumers' ways of operating."
22. Paul Ekman, "An Argument for Basic Emotions," *Cognition and Emotion*, 3–4 (1992), 169–200. For a detailed historiographical analysis of how neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists have approached emotions, see Plamper, *The History of Emotions*, 147–250.
23. Antonio Damasio, *Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), reprinted in 1995. Damasio defines somatic markers as physical emotions localized in the peripheral areas of the body that leave traces in particular areas of the brain. For a critique of Damasio's notion of somatic markers, see Plamper, *The History of Emotions*, 214–219.
24. Brian Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2002).
25. Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual*, 8–9.
26. *The Affect Theory Reader*, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2010), 6–9; Patricia T. Clough, "The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia, and Bodies," in: *The Affect Theory Reader*, 206–225.
27. Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual*, 9.
28. Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual*, 15.

29. Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual*, 60–61 and Clough, "The Affective Turn," 208–209.
30. Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual*, 33.
31. Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, "Medieval Sciences of Emotions during the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries: An Intellectual History," *Osiris* 31 (2016), 21–45, 24; Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, *Sensible Moyen Âge: Une histoire des émotions dans l'Occident medieval* (Paris, Seuil, 187–224); Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *Passioni dell' anima. Teorie e usi degli affetti nela cultura medieval* (Florence: SISMEL Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2015).
32. Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
33. Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 181–184.
34. For a larger discussion about Avicenna and the role of medical thought in the medieval discourse about emotions, see Boquet and Nagy, *Sensible Moyen Âge*, 194–204.
35. Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 239–255.
36. Knuuttila, *Emotions*, 225.
37. Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
38. Susan James, *Passion and Action; The Emotions in Seventeenth-century Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
39. Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 1–25.
40. Barbara Rosenwein, in her latest book, *Generation of Feeling* analyzes the context of constellations of emotional words and the way they are captured in texts.
41. Don DeLillo, "In the Ruins of the Future: Reflections on Terror and Loss in the Shadow of September," *Harper's Magazine*, December 2001, 39.
42. Michelle Z. Rosaldo, "Towards an Anthropology of Feeling," in *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotions*, ed. Richard A. Shweder et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 147.
43. See Michael Schaub, "Literature of 9/11 college class accused of being 'sympathetic towards terrorism,'" The Los Angeles Times, September 1, 2015. Accessed on September 19, 2015 at http://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-et-jc-literature-of-9-11-course-under-fire-20150901-story.html. Alec Dent, a freshman journalism major at UNC, explained to the *Los Angeles Times* that "The readings mostly focus on justifying the actions of terrorists—painting them as fighting against an American regime, or mistaken idealists, or good people just trying to do what they deem right…None of the readings assigned in the freshman seminar present the Sept. 11 attacks from the perspective of those who died or from American families who lost loved ones." However, it also

garnered a lot of positive reactions from students like Alec Dragelin, who also considers himself a conservative, but who argued that "this course was amazingly valuable because it challenged [his] opinions and allowed [him] to explore what [he] thought [he] knew in a deeper way."

44. *Oxford English Dictionary*, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61249?rskey=7AtW87&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid, consulted on November 30, 2015.
45. *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Françoise, cinquième édition* (Paris: J.J Smits et Co, 1799), 479. Translation CLMM ["altération, trouble, mouvement excité dans les humeurs, dans les esprits, dans l'âme."]
46. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 4.
47. *La Chanson de Roland*, ed. Ian Short (Paris: Librairie générale française, 1990), 138. Translation CLMM ["Par grant irur chevalchet Charlemagnes."]
48. Pierre de Ronsard, *Franciad*, ed. and trans. Philip John Usher (New York: AMS Press, 2010), 197. Translation from "De là nous vient la tristesse et la crainte,/De là la joye en nos coeurs est empraínte,/L'amour, la haine et les ambicions:/De là se font toutes nos passions." Pierre de Ronsard, *La Franciade*, in *Oeuvres Complètes* I, ed. Jean Céard et al. (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléïade, 1993), 1128–1129.
49. Reddy, *The Navigation*, 104.
50. Damien Boquet, and Piroska Nagy, "Une Histoire des émotions incarnées," *Médiévales* 61 (2011): 12. Translation CLMM ["l'émotion est objet d'histoire dans la mesure où le passé peut être mis à l'épreuve des problématisations du present."]
51. Boquet and Nagy, "Une histoire des émotions," 43. Translation CLMM ["…jamais la rhétorique n'abolira la distanciation, nécessaire à la lucidité de l'historien…L'historien est un arpenteur. C'est en mesurant les distances qu'il se donne les moyens d'établir des modalités de contact, donc de communication."]
52. Donald Wesling, *Joys and Sorrows of Imaginary Persons* (*On Literary Emotions*) (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), 16.
53. Wesling, *Joys and Sorrows*, 16.

PART I

Subverting Emotional Norms

CHAPTER 2

Passionate Politics: Emotion and Identity Formation Among the *Menu Peuple* in Early Fifteenth Century France

Emily J. Hutchison

The civil war between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs (1411–1435) began during the turbulent reign of the French king, Charles VI (r. 1380–1422).[1] Its root cause was a quarrel between two princes and their supporters, the king's brother, Louis Duke of Orleans (d. 1407), and their first cousin, John Duke of Burgundy (d. 1419). On November 21, 1407, Burgundy had Orleans assassinated, and by the summer of 1410 Orleans' family and their allies, later called Armagnacs, militarized their party in the name of justice. In early October of 1411, the civil war began when the feud drew citizens of all socio-economic statuses in Paris and throughout the realm into the conflict.[2] However, even prior to the autumn of 1411, the king's urban subjects were implicated in the affairs of the ruling elite and invited to engage in the emerging conflict between

An earlier version of this paper was first presented at the 50th International Congress on Medieval Studies (Kalamazoo, MI), May 14–17, 2015.

E.J. Hutchison (✉)
Department of Humanities, Mount Royal University, Calgary, AB, Canada
e-mail: ehutchison@mtroyal.ca

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_2

Burgundy and Orleans.[3] Interestingly, as they archived the *menu peuple*'s ongoing involvement, the letters patent, royal ordinances, and chronicles of the period also took the time to track and express anxiety over incidents of significant collective emotional expression throughout the evolution of the conflict. They were right to be apprehensive: the affect that various groups generated and the emotional responses that consequently emerged alongside it created the necessary space for voice and action, which enabled citizens to form strong groups and shared identities. Affect produced opportunities for social bonding, even for individuals and small groups normally separated by class. Certainly, the Duke of Burgundy nurtured a strong affective connection between himself and a significant number of Parisians by promoting himself as the people's champion and reformer.[4]

It is clear that the ruling elites recognized that urban affect and its accompanying emotions simultaneously posed a threat to political stability, and offered some clear benefits if it could be used effectively.[5] Regarding the former, we note that a great number of documents of the early fifteenth century mainly disparage collective emotionality. By framing urban emotion of the *menu peuple* as frenzied, monstrous, and irrational, authors used it as a tool for delegitimizing the political actions of the *menu peuple* when they directly challenged the status quo. However, when we examine royal policy more closely and scrutinize the strategies of political leaders like the Duke of Burgundy, it is equally evident that the ruling elites recognized that collective, urban affect was a concrete political force that had to be taken seriously. At times, they tried to anticipate and subsequently prevent an emotional reaction of diverse urban bodies, but they also tried to stabilize conventional power formations by working with it whenever possible. In Paris, the two strategies frequently overlapped and are most visible in the anxieties surrounding the public readings of letters and information sharing, spontaneous or organized assemblies of the people, and the rights the citizens claimed for self-protection (namely, their city chains). These phenomena and the spaces in which they occurred produced the right conditions for subversion; therefore, they had to be carefully managed. The *menu peuple*'s affect could, therefore, be a potent counterweight to the power of the ruling elites, and this last group knew it well.

By the first decade of the fifteenth century, the king's subjects were kept well informed about politics: they were informed regularly of new laws, reasons for taxation, the relationship between the crown and the

papacy, and the latest developments in various wars.[6] Towns also communicated with each other. For example, a letter from Paris to the other towns in which the city set the record straight about what had been going on in the aftermath of the violent Cabochien Uprising (April–July 1413) ended by asking them to send on news of what was happening in their own towns.[7] We learn from the royal ordinances that there were "customary places" carved out specifically for publishing information in every town of late medieval France.[8] As in Paris, these typically included the dominant crossroads of the city, important church forecourts, and the primary markets (such as Place de Grève and the Halles in Paris).[9] To publish a document, one generally read it out loud, presumably in front of a crowd, and typically posted it for future reference there, on church doors, or on town gates.[10] Furthermore, there were official town criers whose profession was to cry out news.[11] In Paris, one of the primary responsibilities of the elected leaders of the sixteen *quartiers* (sectors), the *quarteniers*, was to dispatch formal information.[12] The *quartiers* were very well organized, and even informal news spread rapidly in the streets; it could therefore travel tremendously fast throughout the whole of the city, given its great size.[13] For very important information issued by the king's Parlement of Paris, instructions would be included that the crier pronounce the news "to the sound of the trumpet," so that "none can feign ignorance."[14] These "ceremonies of information," as Michèle Fogel called them, were designed to inform a large breadth of people, and the assumption hereafter was indeed that all would be made aware of the content.[15] In this sense, knowledge was every citizen's own responsibility.[16] This might explain why town deliberation records suggest that when the official communication towns received required debate or discussion, they were read in formal political assembly places.[17] Based on the infrastructure in place to disseminate news as rapidly as possible, information sharing was evidently a critical component of the political landscape of late medieval France. However, the reading of letters and the assemblies they relied on were also dangerous threats to the ruling elites because of the effect the content could have on the *menu peuple*. Hence, there was a constant attempt to neutralize the potential for disruption that might follow in the wake of news.

For example, on February 18, 1408, the king and the *Parlement de Paris* published an ordinance that strictly forbade all assemblies whose purpose was information sharing.[18] The reason for alarm was that the Duke of Burgundy would soon arrive in the capital to justify why he ordered the

assassination of the Duke of Orleans (November 21, 1407). The king and his royal council were nervous that the well-loved duke would use his popularity to destabilize the Parisian community.[19] The ordinance singled out the University of Paris for posting inflammatory letters on churches and elsewhere, which it claimed it did "to induce, incite and move the People to assemble in a certain place and at a certain time…"[20] Apparently, the men leading the assemblies intended to "say and propose among other things to the said People, many prejudicial and damaging words against Us, our aforesaid realm, our subjects and the public good, which [sets] a very bad example, and from which very great damages and inconveniences could ensue, if a hasty remedy is not put in place by Us [soon]." The document explained that it was the king's duty to ensure that no "form of discord" emerged, as it was his responsibility to "govern and maintain our aforesaid subjects of our aforesaid Realm in good peace and tranquility."[21]

The king's mandate suggests that either the university scholars were actively provoking the populace, or that the royal council was at least worried they soon would. They feared that any spark among the people—anything that could incite them—would lead to disharmonious agitation, which would threaten the common good. The document exposes an implicit prejudice against the *menu peuple* for being so easily provoked and a judgment against the academic community for preying on the former's alleged irrationality and predisposition for violent anger. However, despite these disparaging assumptions the letter also acknowledged the material power of affect once it is generated among a crowd. In an already tense political climate, the royal council was trying to maintain peace and harmony by removing all the tinder that might ignite the *menu peuple*. In other words, this was about the king's duty to protect his capital city by removing any potential for disturbance; prohibiting assemblies and the reading and posting of letters were the best strategies the royal council could come up with for preventing the *menu peuple* from coming together and self-detonating.

During a similarly difficult time politically, at the end of January 1414, the king sent a letter forbidding his royal towns from publishing any letters the Duke of Burgundy might send them.[22] At that time, Burgundy was organizing a military campaign against the then-Armagnac-controlled government. Importantly, ahead of his campaign, Burgundy had disseminated letters to numerous towns across the realm to explain his pending military campaign against Paris. He claimed it was a rescue

mission to set the Dauphin (Louis of Guyenne) free from his supposed captors, the Armagnac princes.[23] This was dangerous messaging indeed. The Armagnac princes accused Burgundy of trying to provoke the people, to elicit some "commotion" among them (*pour faire commocion*).[24]

Thus, in the royal letter the king sent at the end of January, he first explained that he had to deploy his royal army against Burgundy in self-defense. The letter concluded by forbidding the towns from offering entry to Burgundy or his people, and from giving him "counsel, comfort, nor aid, in any form that it might be (*conseil, confort, ny aide, en quelque maniere que ce soit*)." Crucially, it also insisted that if Burgundy sent any of his "seditious and contrived [letters]" (*seditieusement faites et controuvées*), they disregard them entirely. The king's letter explained that since "our people have in times past been maliciously seduced as it is well known to everyone," they were to refuse the communiqués outright. If they did not obey his order he assured them that the punishment would be severe enough to serve as an example to all (*sera exemple à tous autres*).[25]

Evidently, what concerned the king and his council the most was the intrinsic power of the letters to incite people to act in ways the royal government could not control. According to the document, the citizens had already proven themselves vulnerable to seduction. While the king's letter was referring specifically to the violent 1413 Cabochien Uprising from a few months before, he had even more experience with the Parisians' susceptibility to their political passions. In the first years of his reign, the king and his council suppressed the 1382 Maillotins revolt; this was undoubtedly influencing the author(s) of the royal letter.[26] The unpredictability of collective anger, which the king and his council knew could be stimulated by letters, was precisely why they insisted in 1414 that the towns refuse to publish anything Burgundy sent. Interestingly, six days before the king published his own royal letter patent, the urban government of Paris wrote to the mayor, the aldermen, the bourgeois, residents, and inhabitants (*mayeur, eschevins, bourgeois, manans et habitans*) of various unnamed towns in which they made many of the same points. They, too, identified how dangerous reading subversive letters could be, and they likewise insisted that their addressees reject Burgundy's attempts to communicate with them. Just as the royal letter referred to previous moments of seduction, the Parisians prefaced their plea by describing the ruinous consequences of collective emotionality during the Cabochien Uprising in the spring of 1413. They claimed:

> Several seditious [men] and destroyers of the peace, obstinate in their malice, and who cannot abstain from conspiring…tried to move a great tumult of people in the city of Paris, and to create divisions and discord…and to do other things and novelties equally perilous and damaging to this kingdom; for which there is little doubt that very great evils and irreparable inconveniences against the king our aforesaid lord, his lordship, and the whole public thing (good) emerged.[27]

Here we are witness to the belief that the *menu peuple* could be "moved" by a small number of evildoers and allow themselves to be overwrought by anger until they themselves produced "divisions and discord." The assumption was clear that they were far too easily swayed. However, as with the royal letter, the negative portrayal of the people's weakness does not negate the acknowledgment of the power of the *menu peuple*'s collective emotional reaction. Indeed, it is identified plainly as the primary cause for "great evils and irreparable inconveniences": when it is out of control, collective emotion destroys the common good. Hence, the Parisians urged all townspeople to have their "hearts and affections rightly [directed] toward the king, his lordship, and to the conservation of the said peace, just as you always have, and to resist with all your powers all those who want to ruin the said peace in any way."[28] What would best illustrate loyalty and their commitment to peace and harmony was to reject the Duke of Burgundy's letters and to prevent him from entering their town.

Perhaps all these warnings in January 1414 paid off, for when Burgundy showed up at the gate of St. Honoré on February 8 "thinking that the people would be moved to help him enter into [the city]," the citizens did just the opposite: they denied him entry.[29] In so doing, the chronicler Jean Juvénal des Ursins claimed they showed "diligence in resisting him in every way."[30] It is important, however, that the chronicler pointed to Burgundy's expectation that he could indeed *move* the people to support his cause upon his arrival. It is difficult to know the truth of this rather partisan anecdote, but it nonetheless suggests that influential political leaders like Burgundy looked for help from the townspeople, aspiring, it seems, to draw directly from their shared affect. He assumed it would work to his advantage, but, as the chronicler makes clear, this time the people were unaffected by him. They chose instead to support the king. For this reason the chronicler's appraisal of the citizens is more positive than the depraved or capricious emotions typically assigned to the *menu peuple*.[31]

Together, these first three documents give us some crucial clues regarding how the ruling elites perceived the volatility of the *menu peuple* and its importance in politics. In the first royal ordinance (1408), there was a particular unease that members of the University of Paris would deliberately seek to "move" the *menu peuple*. According to the king's letter patent, the *menu peuple* proved they were susceptible to malicious seduction. The emotion that could emerge from these shared experiences was simultaneously considered a threat and a potential tool of exploitation. Regarding the threat, the fear of any agitation resulting from the assemblies or the reading of letters challenged the king, his sovereign authority, and his lordship; it produced discord; and it destroyed peace. Most importantly of all, these outcomes damaged the "public thing" (*chose publique*)—that is, the common good. Obviously, in characterizing the *menu peuple*'s emotionality in such ways, or worse, as "tumult," "riot," "noise," "divisions," or "debates," the ruling elites denied collective emotional responses any legitimacy.[32] However, in so doing they nonetheless acknowledge its political weight. Regarding the exploitability of emotion, enterprising leaders seemed to think they could further their own ambitions by relying on and managing crowd affect.

Hence, the evidence suggests that the French royal council of the early fifteenth century was cognizant that words and spirited actions could affect other bodies in the spaces of assembly. This perspective is congruent with the understanding of modern affect that theorists have developed. Affect is defined as the "visceral forces, beneath, alongside, or generally *other than* conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension…"[33] As the forces individuals experience through encounters with other bodies (human and non-human), affect explains the "motivational propensity" driving the actions of individuals and collectives.[34] In late medieval France, the verb *-émouvoir* fits well within this frame. It had a nuanced meaning in late medieval France; it referred to both putting something into movement, and to eliciting an emotional response.[35] To be *ému* was to have intrinsic and extrinsic forces inducing one's body to react to some thing(s) or to other bodies also in motion. In line with how current theorists understand the impact of shared affect, the greatest concern for the royal government in 1408 and 1414, and for the urban government of Paris in 1414, was how the energy emerging from a gathering where words would affect bodies convened

together could fuel anti-government passions. This explains why professional criers were trained to anticipate the reactions of their audience and to make modifications to their publication plans as needed.[36]

The above letters stand as examples of the attempts by ruling elites to prevent affect from growing among an urban community because of the disruptive threat it posed. However, there are numerous examples of attempts by ruling elites to deliberately engender an affective response among the citizenry to advance their own agendas, or alternatively, to work with the flow of the affect townspeople had already generated among themselves. Letters were an efficient way to engage with townspeople in the late medieval French realm. As we have observed, distributing letters to the king's subjects was the primary way through which the citizens were informed of important political happenings. However, it was not only the royal council that relied on this emerging practice to connect with the people. Dukes, counts, university scholars, the clergy, and even autonomous town governments engaged in letter writing to keep citizens spread across the realm abreast of news. Indeed, senders used letter writing to win over the *menu peuple* by inflaming the people using fearmongering, or the opposite—earning their affection or loyalty by allaying their fears about a political issue. As far back as August 1405, years before the assassination of Louis of Orleans (November 21, 1407) and before the war broke out in October 1411, letters were critical weapons in Burgundy's arsenal against the House of Orleans.[37] His purpose was to create a strong bond with Parisians and other townspeople in the north and northeast of Languedoïl by casting himself as their tireless champion.[38] The letters thus remained the cornerstone mechanism of his propaganda until his assassination in 1419.[39] The leaders of the Orleanist/Armagnac party, the king, his heir, and sometimes the city of Paris did the same throughout the period (1405–1422), though arguably to a less successful extent.[40]

The letters that were designed to inflame passions were rather formulaic in composition, conforming to a particular structure and drawing from the same pool of rhetorical tropes relating to the most dominant contemporary themes in political discourse. In particular, binaries between good government and tyranny, loyal subject and disobedient rebel, and good and evil helped the originators create a case for their own personal devotion to the common good. Ultimately, the intentions of the senders were to obtain material support for their ambitions (typically financial or military reinforcement).[41] To achieve this end, however,

the originators wanted to influence precisely how the townspeople emoted so that their reactions would be of use, or at least mutually beneficial for both parties.

It is clear that the many intensive letter campaigns had some concrete impact. This is evident in the events leading up to a conviction and later, a pardon, for a baker from Carcassonne in 1416. This example provides insight into how powerful urban affect could be for generating spaces for dissenting voices and for producing political identities.[42] According to the royal pardon, the townspeople of Carcassonne had assembled at their *hotel de ville*, which was where they typically assembled for things "touching the common interest." There they were read a letter from the Duke of Burgundy suggesting they reject a tax raised by the king and his Armagnac council. According to the document, the citizens of Carcassonne were immediately affected by the letter's content and began "murmuring" among themselves. Inspired by the letter, about forty men including the supplicant assembled in arms and decided to refuse to pay any tax. For this act of treason the royal pardon stipulates that the supplicant and his friends were "foolish, simple, and miss-advised (*folie, simplesse et mal advis*)." Whenever a royal representative arrived, they aggressively attacked him and called him an "Armagnac traitor!" (*traitre Armignac!)* Ultimately the city of Carcassonne had enough and suppressed the small-scale rebellion. They eventually captured and imprisoned the rebels.

Even though they were ultimately silenced, it is significant that it was Burgundy's letter that first caused so much discussion between the citizens (here dismissively labeled as "murmurings").[43] Furthermore, it was that initial discussion in that important civic space belonging to the city, a space signifying urban identity and autonomy, that approximately forty men became impassioned enough to put their freedom and their lives at risk. Clearly, they were feeding off each other in a space designated for discussing all that pertained to the common good of the town. Affect tends to grow in such meaningful spaces because they are "soaked with one or [a] combination of affects, to the point where space and affect are often coincident."[44] It was precisely this consequence of collective affect that threatened the royal government and that they tried to contain; yet it was also precisely what the Duke of Burgundy tried to exploit. Both sides speak to an understanding of how explosive political affect could be as soon as there was a significant spark.

The paradox of needing to both contain and go with the flow of affect is likewise observed in a sequence of events in the town of Troyes in 1417.[45] Apparently, a Burgundian partisan named Jean de Fraignant, Lord of Toulonjeon, brought a letter from the Duke of Burgundy to publish in the town of Troyes and he was asked to acquire a response from them. However, the *baillis* of Troyes (an Armagnac) refused to grant the ambassadors leave to enter the town and read the letter publicly. Rumors quickly spread, and within a short time, 6000–7000 armed men compelled the *baillis* to permit Toulonjeon to read the document. Consequently, he read it "in the greatest and highest place in Troyes, named the Wheat Market, after which reading the aforesaid people were very joyous and happy, crying aloud *Noël!* Long live the king and our lord of Burgundy!"[46]

Considering Toulonjeon was writing this report to the Duchess of Burgundy to keep her updated on her husband's campaign to retake the capital, it is likely that he exaggerated the details to enhance his narrative and give the impression of widespread support among the northern towns. Nonetheless, this incident is revealing of the potential disruption the publication of letters (or the refusal to publish them) could generate, and the collective emotional responses that might accompany these events. As Ben Anderson argued, it is clear that "the transmission of affect, its movements, disruptions, and resonances are things that power can harness."[47] In this case, Toulonjeon and his supporters attempted to do just that: they agitated the people by spreading rumors, which in turn created some disruptive movements within the town. This force was most certainly harnessed by the Burgundian faction, but for the *baillis* to maintain any hold on his position of authority, he attempted to stabilize the affect growing in the streets by choosing to cooperate with it. Cooperation with the force of affect is a typical dimension of politics and it can be of mutual benefit to all parties.

Moreover, Toulonjeon was quite clear as to the importance of the shared emotional experience of the townspeople upon the letter's reading. He claimed that they were very happy and in unison cried "Noël!" As a word celebrating the birth of Jesus, to cry *Noël* was a ritualized expression of collective joy typically reserved for the most important events—the birth of a royal child, a royal entry or the parade of a sovereign, or a significant military victory. [48] With it, subjects expressed their loyalty and devotion to something (usually the king), and celebrated the

social harmony the event ostensibly produced. These were, after all, the emotions one was expected to have when thinking about the birth of Jesus.

Even if only a handful of individuals reacted as joyfully as Toulonjeon reported, the response he recorded nonetheless tells us something concrete about the political importance of collective emotional expression and its relationship to identity construction. Emotions are our understandings of the forces of encounter, of affect.[49] They are the cultural interpretations of those forces, and the labels one assigns to them (such as sadness, anger, and joy). These are drawn from a series of normative scripts that individuals reinforce through continuous citation.[50] Therefore, emotions are "social through and through."[51] Because they are embodied acts akin to speech acts, that is, acts that *do something* concrete and that contribute to hailing a subject into being, they are performatives.[52] It is the "emotional community" that determines whether individuals express their emotions appropriately within the given circumstances.[53] The reliance on social exchange is precisely what makes emotion discourse so fundamentally important to power discourse and power structures. The labeling that necessarily accompanies it is an important political tool for reaffirming the power of certain groups or systems (patriarchy as an example), and for the vilification or "othering" of subaltern groups. It is for this reason that the royal pardon claimed the rebels in Carcassonne were foolish, simple, and poorly advised. This denigration served to belittle them and to justify their arrest and conviction (even if the supplicant was now pardoned).

The labeling that was associated with emotional expression was also what made the event described at Troyes one of great significance. Indeed, the large group of Trojans who sided with the supplicant expressed anger first, and then joy, when they achieved their intended goal (to have a letter read out). These collective emotional expressions gave them voice and enabled their group's identity to coalesce. Indeed, the atmosphere of the town of Troyes had shifted; Burgundian supporters—a group who had, prior to this moment, been marginalized—regained their status as the dominant group within the town. Those who did not share in the joy of this moment would hereafter been identified as "the other," in this case, Armagnac supporters. The factional labels of identity (Armagnac and Burgundian) were of critical importance in the civil war: assuming the wrong label could have devastating effects.[54]

Although the labels first emerged in the spring of 1410, it was in October 1411 that the line between the factions had been very clearly drawn, and the period in which all the king's subjects, regardless of their status, had to choose their party.[55] The consequences were severe; by royal decree, many thousands of Armagnac supporters were either killed, had their property confiscated, or were exiled from their towns in 1411–1412.[56] Even uttering words against the Duke of Burgundy could lead to imprisonment, as could wearing the white band of the Armagnac party.[57] This was the beginning of the full-scale civil war. However, identifying as a Burgundian partisan was not always the most advantageous label to bear, particularly from 1414–1417 when the Duke of Burgundy was exiled from Paris.[58] Because of the volatility of the political climate, it is of even greater significance that the previously marginalized Burgundian supporters in the town of Troyes were able to take advantage of the affect their rumors generated in the streets to reassert themselves as the dominant group. It reminds us of the importance of letters and of assemblies as sites of disruption. Whereas Troyes had at least superficially remained loyal to the king and the Armagnac-led government up to this point, the townspeople pledged their full support to the Duke of Burgundy from this time until he regained control of the capital, and eventually the king and his council in May 1418. So powerful an ally was this town hereafter that the infamous treaty of Troyes was signed there in 1420. This treaty disinherited the king's son, the future Charles VII, on the grounds of his unlawful involvement in John of Burgundy's assassination (1419).

It was because letter reading could cause such momentous disruptions that there were attempts to either control the publication of information, or at least to control how that information should be interpreted. We have already seen that in 1414, the king not only prohibited the towns from publishing the Duke of Burgundy's letters, but he also insisted that if they did hear anything, they should not believe it. Only six days before, the urban government of Paris sent a letter to other towns iterating much of the same information, and they too insisted that the towns not believe anything in Burgundy's letters because they were lies.[59] At other points between 1405 and 1418, when letter campaigns were so intensive, the senders of letters had concerns about the "truth" and how adversaries might attempt to spin it in ways that adversely affected the receivers (the townspeople). For example, on August 19, 1405, during the first significant altercation with his first cousin, the Duke of Orleans

(who he would later assassinate), the Duke of Burgundy wrote a letter to the town of Mâcon to set the record straight. He explained, "we inform you freely that these things have occurred so that you will know the truth, and that by [other] sinister reports you are not informed against the truth…"[60] Likewise, the Orleanists also attempted to write letters to clarify truths. In November 1410, they wrote a letter from Tours to the *bonnes villes*, "so that you understand clearly our true intentions and good words that are only directed toward the good and honour of the King and all of his Realm, as it was said."[61] What they hoped to avoid were "inconveniences" that could and did arise from such readings.

Although the term "inconveniences" was used rather vaguely, the letters and ordinances tended to identify a causal relationship between the "murmurings" of the citizens of the realm and the "inconveniences" that they could produce.[62] These had to be curtailed. Moreover, in royal ordinances the "inconveniences" were frequently linked to terrible devastation, associated with "evils and damages" (*maulx et dommages*) or "perils and damages" (*perilz et dommaiges*).[63] One example is found in a royal ordinance dated September 1, 1408 that outlined in detail the rules for the tranquility and surety of Paris.[64] The context is worth noting, for this was the time at which the widow of the Duke of Orleans had arrived in Paris to formally ask the king to intervene and give her family justice for the assassination of her husband.[65] That such a document had to be issued precisely at this time suggests there was some concern as to how the citizens of Paris might react to these political events. The mandate explained,

> We having always been and are still desirous of protecting and holding in good security, peace & tranquility in the cities and countryside of our realm, and also in our good city of Paris, in which many men from diverse nations come and flow through; having similarly a great desire and affection to hold and keep in good security the burgesses and other residents and inhabitants of this city, wanting to impede by all means and manners the inconveniences, perils and damages that could arise, which by default good provisions could overcome, may all know that we have ordered through great and wise deliberation, and by these present [letters] order that which follows…[66]

To ensure the city remained harmonious and tranquil, one of the stipulations in the list was that no foreigners were granted leave to enter. A second item stated that no one was permitted to violently attack another

regardless of the cause, whether it was the result of a feud (*guerre d'amis*), hatred, or malice. Importantly, this particular provision stated also that no one could attack the nobility or their men either with arms, or "by words and defamatory libel (*par paroles et libelles diffamatoires*)." These provisions in Article Five were given to specifically prevent the "great inconveniences that could and might follow (*grans inconveniens qui pevent ou pourroient ensuir*)" from taking root.

While there is nothing directly addressing the potential disruptions that collective emotional expressions of crowds or individuals might generate, it is implicit throughout the document. We have already observed that words were considered by the ruling elites to be triggers for the *menu peuple*. By limiting what people said and equating words to physical attacks, the connection is made plain. Moreover, the tone of the document is revealing. Throughout there is a discernable anxiety about what will happen when people arrive in Paris, or how they will respond to the political events taking place.

Assemblies and the spaces they inhabited were very clearly problematic for ruling elites; they were perceived as threats and with good reason. Affect has been likened to a contagion, sometimes spreading like "wildfire."[67] It is through a process of mimesis, one that is partially conscious and partially unconscious that affect spreads and regenerates, gaining momentum as it moves through a crowd. It is not the product of irrational, uncontrolled emulation, however.[68] This process of mimesis requires some cognitive processing and filtering; it depends on inhibition, and scientific studies have proven there are some biological influences.[69] Moreover, the spaces in which these contagions take root are equally important to the process as the people involved. Spaces are steeped in the affect of those using them; as non-human bodies, these spaces radiate the affect they help to produce.[70] Because spaces are imbued with the meanings assigned to them by the bodies using them, they are also important material actors in all events, such as political assembly, religious ritual, or civic festivals. It is for this reason that Jane Bennett argued that the momentum of a social movement, which is drawn directly from the emergent affect of a crowd and its surrounding material environment, including the noises and the smells, is a source of agency; it is a crucial *material* element in the phenomenon to which it contributes.[71]

As theorists of affect argue, power does not only seek to prevent or prescribe affect; power structures must also seek to stabilize and cooperate with the force of affect to self-sustain.[72] In this way, collective affect

can act as a counterweight to power.[73] Therefore, there is a highly complex dialogue between the pressures that emerge from the affect and demands generated in the streets on the one hand, and the power discourses and systems that are implemented from those governing on the other. A perfect example of this theory in action is the complex dialogue between the citizens and the ruling elites after Burgundy returned to Paris in March 1408. On March 1, he made his entry into Paris with a very large retinue of armed men. It is important to note that John had been expressly forbidden from entering the city in this way.[74] Apparently a large crowd of Parisians met Burgundy at the city gate St. Denis.[75] According to Monstrelet, "At the entry from which arose great joy from the Parisians, and even the little children, who in several crossroads, all aloud cried, *Noël!* This greatly displeased the queen of France and several other princes who were in the said location of Paris."[76] As noted above, joy was an emotion associated with peace, order, and tranquility: it represented harmony between the members of the body politic. That the Duke of Burgundy was both the cause and the object of the joyous affections of the Parisians speaks to his ability to simultaneously benefit from and influence the collective emotions during this highly affective ritual. It reflects the success with which he had manufactured an affective bond with the citizens of the capital by appealing mainly to populist thinking and policy.[77]

In early 1409, the Duke of Bourbon expressed profound anger with the Parisians for greeting Burgundy and shouting "Noël!" He claimed that this honor ought to have been reserved only for the king. The Duke of Bourbon nurtured this anger for almost one year in silence, only finally speaking up during the negotiations for peace between Burgundy and the House of Orleans in February 1409. It was at this point that he chastised a great many of the Parisians for supporting the Duke of Burgundy's entry as they had.[78] He scolded them publicly, and insisted that those who had met him at the gates be paraded through the city with nooses around their neck and submit themselves to a mock execution for high treason (*lèse-majesté*). The problem for Bourbon was that railing against the Parisians, especially a year after the event in question, had absolutely no effect; nothing came of his demands. If the king and his royal government could not really control the emotions or the behaviors of the people, why would an uncle of the king have this power? These types of incidents suggest that the king's subjects recognized their political importance; this is what reinforced their emerging identity as political agents.

There are numerous examples from the early decades of the fifteenth century that illustrate that the king's citizens could use collective action as leverage because the threat of their supposedly capricious emotion lingered like the elephant in the room; it created space for political engagement and challenges to exclusionary practices in politics. For example, on September 10, 1411, the king registered a letter addressed to his Parlement, the Provost of Paris, and all his other officers of justice or their lieutenants responding to a "humble supplication of the provost of merchants and the bourgeois and inhabitants of Paris."[79] The letter justified why he was hereafter giving them permission to assemble. He claimed that because there were many "great and large needs that greatly touched the good honour and profit of Us, our aforesaid realm, and our said city," the Parisians had found it necessary to assemble several times to decide how to proceed in the best interest of all three (the king, his realm, and the city).[80] For this reason, he granted them permission for the next two months "to assemble as many times as it would please them, or seems necessary to them."[81] Interestingly, the letter also retroactively gave them permission for having met throughout the month leading up to the publication of the document, even though these assemblies had taken place illegally.[82] This provision is indicative of how little real power the king and his council had when confronted by an organized group.

The context is critical to understanding specifically why this document is important. In the aftermath of the violent uprisings in both Rouen and Paris in 1382, on January 27, 1383 the king had dissolved the urban government entirely and instituted a new role called the *guard of the provost of merchants*, dismissed all the *quarteniers*, *cinquanteniers*, and *dixainiers*, and forbade all corporations and assemblies except for Church services.[83] The urban government was not restored until January 20, 1412.[84] Therefore, the September 10, 1411 document here cited indicates that even though assemblies had been outlawed since 1383 and there was no formal, legal urban government in place for another three months, the citizens were nonetheless assembling and engaging in political debate. There is little doubt that these assemblies were sites of intense passion, for only two months earlier the Orleanist princes had sent their letter of defiance to the Duke of Burgundy and letters of justification to the king, which they copied and distributed to the *bonnes villes* throughout the realm (July 11 and 14, 1411).[85] Burgundy replied in kind, and also had his letters copied and distributed.[86] The Parisians, therefore, had much to discuss that summer. Furthermore, less than one month after

the September 10 document, the Armagnac princes and all their followers, from the highest nobleman to the lowest laborer, were labeled traitors to the crown, and their bodies and properties were confiscated.[87] Apparently it sufficed to call someone an Armagnac to kill and take his property. As Nicolas de Baye, a clerk in the Parlement who kept a journal of almost daily events explains, many Armagnacs fled the capital to try to save their lives from the Burgundian partisans, the main leaders of whom were butchers and tanners.[88] There is little doubt that emotions were running high in the streets throughout the summer, intensifying week by week. By September 10, factional fault lines were certainly perceptible among the Parisian populace even if they are only implicitly visible in the extant records from the period.

It should be noted that the Duke of Burgundy had a hand in organizing these ordinances, and thus in reforming the urban government that he populated with his sympathizers. After all, he was in firm command of the royal government by this time.[89] The Duke of Burgundy's maneuverings illustrate how ruling powers can seek to work in conjunction with the force of affect. First, as John the Fearless did, those in positions of influence can and do seek to amplify affect spreading in the streets to reaffirm their position of growing power. To accomplish this, John deployed affective techniques to appeal to the broader citizenry's "emotional imaginations" primarily to their fears and anger, and to "hypnotize" or "entrance" them with his fictionalized heroism.[90] All of this served to reaffirm the Parisians' own sense of solidarity, fomenting distinct groups with well-defined identities. For the Burgundians, their leader was paraded as a champion of the common good. In this way, the pressure from below certainly influenced the duke's attempts to engineer the affect of many Parisians and their accompanying emotional performances. Burgundy earned their support by appearing to advance their interests. He gave the citizens more autonomy to retain their long-term loyalty, and in so doing gave them what they wanted: self-governance. It was a mutually beneficial arrangement. Indeed, as a large collective, the Parisians were able to reinforce their autonomy through formal, legal, political means, which only strengthened their identity as important political agents. Moreover, the factional labels further reinforced subidentities, which likewise contributed to the dynamic political landscape of 1411. There is little doubt that collective affect also played a crucial role in these developments. Even if it is not identified directly as a cause, the heightened, tense atmosphere of the summer and autumn months is nonetheless discernable in the above royal record(s).

One last example of where we can observe the force of affect and emotion materializing as constitutive elements in politics is found in the intense anxiety that Parisians shared over their right to self-defense, and specifically to the material forms of this right: their chains (used by them to control their streets and boulevards when under threat) and the town arms. As noted above, after the 1382 *Maillotins* rebellion, the king destroyed the city's chains and confiscated the urban militia's arms.[91] These two acts left the city completely vulnerable, and thus entirely reliant upon the king. The town was not given back its chains and arms until 1405, and its government was not reformed officially until 1412.[92] The circumstances in which these rights and freedoms were restored, and their consequences, are of interest here.

Apparently, in the summer of 1405, it was the growing public enmity between the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans that produced anxiety and fear in the city of Paris.[93] It was within this context that the city officially asked both the Duke of Berry (the king's uncle), who was the captain of Paris at that time, and the Duke of Burgundy to restore their right to produce and control chains.[94] Rumors abounded in the capital that the Duke of Orleans and the queen were conspiring against the citizens. To both appease the Parisians and to advance their own political agendas, the two dukes responded favorably to the request. Six hundred chains were produced and distributed. Hereafter, the chains of Paris played an important role in politics.

This is an important point because chains and the city's arms were symbols of urban autonomy and identity that represented their right to challenge any power (even royal power) that threatened their stability and well-being.[95] Therefore, it was the very issue of self-protection that was the originating force of affective momentum; it was the catalyst for the generation of anger and anxiety, and most importantly a source for urban solidarity in the face of oppressive authoritarianism. Indeed, the affect generated and reproduced in the streets and marketplaces was palpable enough to be detected and feared by the royal council. The citizenry's collective emotion was well directed and strategic to such an extent that it was leveraged to regain a critical symbol of urban autonomy and identity. If the ruling elites had nothing to fear, they would not have felt compelled here or later to acquiesce and restore the objects that the city required to defend itself so well—and, notably, against royal authority if required. Here, then, we see the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy strategically recognizing the merit in drawing

from and stabilizing the affect of the people. Rather than responding in a top-down authoritarian fashion by resisting them, the dukes were able to acquire the agreement of the royal council to implement a policy that would, seemingly, undermine the government's own power. This example affirms the complicated role that affect plays in structuring the relationships between the governed and those who govern them. In this example, one can affirm Ben Anderson's theory regarding affect as the one "guarantee of the aleatory," the power of affect in producing a sphere of contestability and dissensus.[96] The ruling power—in this case, the royal council led by the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy—was forced to bow to the unpredictable and potentially disruptive force of the affect that was generated in the streets, and that gained momentum there as a political force.

Writing on protest, Michel Foucault said, "No one is obliged to support them. No one is obliged to find that these confused voices sing better than the others and speak the truth itself. It is enough that they exist and that they have against them everything that is dead set on shutting them up for there to be a sense in listening to them and in seeing what they mean to say."[97] Foucault's point is relevant because in early fifteenth century Paris, the *menu peuple* did sing, and they did so loudly, violently, and symbolically. Their voices were the result of collective affect and they manifested in group emotion—especially anger, anxiety, or joy. It is now clear that the ruling elite heard them, they feared them, and they effectuated policy accordingly. Though the narratives they produced were hostile and denigrated the populace for emotional vulnerability, the textual responses reflect the authors' apprehension of its power. Nonetheless, their texts also indicate that ruling elites recognized the power of collective emotions. It is evident that they took theses voices and the political identities the emotives (emotions-as-performative) produced for the *menu peuple* very seriously. This is most obvious in how they attempted to control how information was published, the formation of assemblies, and how they dealt with security to prevent affect from growing. Although they did attempt to prevent affect, they were equally forced to find ways to cooperate with it to stabilize the *menu peuple*. The reality was that cooperation was critical to achieving their own agendas. It was certainly not out of compassion that they listened to the songs of the *menu peuple*. Finally, the documents here examined indicate that collective emotional expression was a critical material constituent in the formation of political identities. It gave the king's low-ranking subjects

an opportunity to carve out a space for their voices to be heard in politics; it enabled social bonding between different groups, cutting across socio-economic status; and the collective emotions of the *menu peuple* functioned as a significant counterweight to arbitrary political power of the ruling elites. Therefore, affect was a crucial element in the political landscape of late medieval France and one that we cannot ignore. It was a concrete force that compelled all political actors to confront it and reckon with it.

Notes

1. For lengthy analyses of the developments of the civil war, see: Bernard Guenée, *Un meurtre, une société. L'assassinat du duc d'Orleans 23 novembre 1407* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992); Bertrand Schnerb, *Les Armagnacs et les bourguignons: la maudite guerre* (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1988); Françoise Autrand, *Charles VI: la folie du roi* (Paris Fayard, 1986); Jean-Michel Dequeker-Fergon, "L'histoire au service des pouvoirs. L'assassinat du duc d'Orléans," *Médiévales*, 5, no. 10 (1986): 51–68; Richard C. Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue: crisis at the court of Charles VI, 1392–1420* (New York: AMS Press, 1982); Richard Vaughan, *John the Fearless: The Growth of Burgundian Power* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1966, reprinted in 2002); Michael Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté. Études sur la rivalité des ducs d'Orleans et de Bourgogne 1392–1407* (Uppsala: Studia Historica Upsaliensia XII, 1964).
2. Archives Nationales de France (Paris), K 57, nos. 13 and 13bis (hereafter AN). Also, *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race recueillis par ordre chronologique*, eds. M. Secousse and M. de Vilevaut (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1755) 9: 643–642. For the forfeiture of their "bodies and goods" (*corps et biens*) see AN, X^{1a} 8602, fos. 245–245v, 249–249v, 253v–254, 254–255, 259–260v, 260v–261v, and also K 57, no. 14.
3. For the involvement of the broader citizenry leading up to the outbreak of civil war, consult Emily J. Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds in Early Fifteenth-Century France: Burgundian Propaganda in Perspective," *French Historical Studies* 35, n. 1 (2012): 1–30 and "Partisan Identity in the French Civil War, 1405–1418: Reconsidering the Evidence on Livery Badges," *Journal of Medieval History* 33 (2007): 250–274.
4. Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds," 1–30, and "Partisan Identity," 250–274.
5. In this essay, I use "ruling elites" as a broad label referring to those occupying the highest secular political positions of the late medieval French realm, which includes the king and his royal council, the Parlement de

Paris, and the leading noblemen, such as the Dukes of Burgundy, Berry, Orleans, and Bourbon.

6. Bernard Chevalier, *Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Éditions Aubier, 1982), 46–47 and 95–96.
7. "Et au surplus, nous mandiez [sic] de vos nouvelles, comme nous ferons à vous semblablement, si aucunes en surviennent par deça." Jean Juvénal des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France et de son règne, depuis 1380–1422: Nouvelle collection des mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe*, ed. Joseph François Michaud and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat, 32 vols. (Paris, 1851), 2: 489–491.
8. Regarding the "customary places" for publication, an ordinance stipulating that all the property confiscated from the rebels of the crown (the Armagnacs and their partisans) would remain in the hands of those who seized them was published on November 13, 1412, explaining that the royal officers around the realm "facent crier et publier chascun en droit soy, ès mectes de sondit Office ès lieux accoustumer à faire criz et publicacions de par Nous…" *Ordonnances des rois de la troisième race recueillis par ordre chronologique…données depuis le commencement de l'année 1411, jusqu'à la fin de l'année 1418*, ed. M. de Vilevaut and M. de Bréquiny (Paris, 1763), 10: 34–38, for this quote, 37.
9. Regarding the main crossroads, see Jean Favier, *Nouvelle histoire de Paris au XV^e siècle*, 1380–1500, (Paris: Association pour la publication d'une histoire de Paris, 1974), 51. Favier included a map of the main crossroads on p. 49.
10. For example, in a royal letter restituting the honour and good standing of the Armagnac princes in September 1413, a royal ordinance stipulated that, "plusieurs libelles diffamatoires ont este faiz et baillez a plusieurs personnes, fichez es portes des eglises et publiez en plusieurs lieux" throughout the realm. AN, X^{1a} 8602, fol. 285r.
11. They could be professional criers in service of the king, of a seigneurial lord, or of a town. See Jean Verdon, *Information et désinformation au moyen âge* (Paris: Perrin, 2010), 33–52.
12. F. Rittiez, *L'Hôtel de ville et la bourgeoisie de Paris: origine, mœurs, coutumes et institutions municipales, depuis le temps les plus reculés jusqu'à 1789* (Paris: Durand 1862), 226–240. Simone Roux, *Paris in the Middle Ages*, trans. Jo Ann McNamara, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 22–23.
13. The population was sitting around 200,000 people at the turn of the fifteenth century. For more information on news traveling, see Hutchison, "Knowing One's Place: Space, Voice, and Legitimacy in Early Fifteenth-Century Paris," *The Medieval History Journal* 20, no. 1 (April 2017):

38–88. I reference Michael Sizer's example of the outbreak of the Maillotins revolt in 1382 (p. 51). Apparently, when a royal tax collector mistreated a female watercress seller, a crowd defended her by killing the royal representative. Sizer's point by using this example is that the "commotion" quickly spread to other areas of the city and the revolt began within the day. Michael Sizer, "Murmur, Clamor, and Tumult. The Soundscape of Revolt and Oral Culture in the Middle Ages," *Radical History Review*, n. 121, (2015): 17.

14. Regarding the sound of the trumpet, on September 1, 1408, the king published an ordinance detailing five prohibitive rules designed to protect the "bonne suerté, paix & transquilité" of the city. At the end of the document, he stipulated that he was giving it to the provost of Paris "que nostre presente Ordonnance il face crier & publier à cry solennel et son de trompet, parmi les carrefours de nostredicte Ville de Paris, et partout ailleurs qu'il verra ester expedient et necessaire, incontinen et sanz aucun delaye, et par tele maniere que aucun n'y puisse pretender ignorance…" *Ordonnances des rois de France*, 9: 369–371.
15. Michèle Fogel, *Les cérémonies de l'information dans la France du XVIe au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 23–59. For the importance of the trumpet as a sound of authority, see Martine Clouzot, "Le son et le pouvoir en Bourgogne aux XVe siècle," *Revue historique* 302 (2000): 625.
16. A good example of the onus on the citizens was the criminal record of Jehanette la Grosse, who was found guilty of selling contraband in the Marès of Paris. According to the record, it was due to her low standing and because of "l'eure & le lieu où elle fu prinse, ce qu'il est deffendu que esdiz marez nulle personne ne aille, sur peine d'amende & jugement voluntaire…le crys & defens fait en la ville de Paris & pays d'environ, que nul et nulle ne preigne ou cueille verjus ou roisins quelconques…" that she could not be saved. Here, emphasis is placed on the fact that the grape vines she was selling at that time and place were firmly prohibited. *Régistre criminal du Châtelet de Paris: Du 6 septembre 1389 au 18 mai 1392*, ed. Société des Bibliophiles François (Paris: C. Lahure, 1864) 2: 254. Similarly, in Simonnete La Fourniere's case (August 8, 1391), this point was given as reason to find her guilty. The document declared that this punishment was determined "vue ce que il est publiquement & nottoirement crié, sur la peine du pillory, que nul ne aporte verjus ventre à paris sans avoir cedule & enseignement des jsutices des lieux où eulx auroient prins iceulx", *Régistre criminal du Châtelet de Paris*, 2: 251.
17. Town deliberation records provide extensive information on assemblies and debates. For example, on January 25, the town of Amiens held an assembly to read over letters sent by the king on January 14 relating to the problems he was having with the Duke of Burgundy. Likewise, on

February 16 they assembled to read letters from the king, deliberated on what to do, and recorded their decision (in this case, to forward the letters the Duke of Burgundy had sent them, as the king demanded). Archives communales d'Amiens (Amiens), BB2. For the first record, 32v–33v; for the second record, 36v. For the importance of space and dissent, see Marc Boone, "Urban Space and Political Conflict in Late Medieval Flanders," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 32/4 (2002): 621–640.

18. The actual letter published was from April 7, 1407(8). The editors of volume 9 explained that a similar letter was published on February 18, but to avoid duplication, they selected to print only the second (from April). *Ordonnance des rois de France*, 9: 293. See also 311.
19. Enguerran de Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400–1444*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1857)1:177. For Parisian support in the weeks leading up to, and immediately after, the justification speech in March 1408, see Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds," 18–19; Alfred Coville, *Jean Petit et la question du tyrannicide au commencement du XVe siècle* (Paris: Picard, 1932), 105, 113.
20. For this and what follows, *Ordonnance des rois de France*, 9: 293. See also 311. The full excerpt of interest is: "…pour obvier aux inconveniens qui de ce pourroient ensuir, avons pieça faire crier, proclamer & faire deffendre publiquement en ceste nostre Ville de Paris…aucune convocacions [et] assemblées du Peuple sans noz licence et commandement dessudiz, si comme ce est assez notoire à tous…aucuns Suppos de nostre amée Fille l'Université de l'Estude de Paris…soubz umbre de certaines couleurs, ont mis et atachié ou fait mettre et atachier en pluseurs Eglises de nostredict Ville de Paris, et ailleurs, certaines Cedules pour induire, inciter et esmouvoir le Peuple d'icelle de se assembler en certain lieu et à certain brief jour, en entencion…de dire et proposer entre autres choses audit Peuple, pluseurs paroles grandement prejudiciables et dommaigables à Nous, à nostredit Royaume et à noz Subgez et bien publique d'icellui, qui est chose de très-mauvais exemple, et s'en pourroit ensuir de très-grans dommaiges et inconveniens, se à ce n'estoit par Nous pourveu de hastif remede. Nous qui toute nostre entente et consideracion mettons, comme raison est et faire le devons, à gouverner et maintenir nozdiz Subgiez de nostredit Royaume en bonne paix et transquilité, voulans et desirans prevenir et obvier aux choses dessudictes, afin que aucune matiere de discorde ne sourde entre eulx…"
21. The only exception for the men of the University of Paris was for assemblies *in churches* where they could preach the word of God. Thus, their political engagement was outlawed, but their spiritual engagement was still permissible (in this particular time). Finally, the ordinance stipulated precisely where it would be published so that the copies would receive

the greatest visibility (*église St. Geneviève, Place Maubert, Carrefour St. Séverin, devant le Palais, devant le Chatellet, à les Halles, à Porte Baudoier, à la Croix du Tirouer*). As Jean Favier has shown, these were all crucial sites of social exchange, and in particular, the most important sites for the sharing of information in the city (*Paris au XVe siècle*, 49 and 51).

22. For this and what follows, see Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 491–493. According to the document, those who were present during the drafting and sealing of the letter patent were: the Duke of Guyenne, the King of Sicily, the Dukes of Berry, Orléans, and Bavaria, the Counts of Vertus, d'Eu, Richmond, Vendôme, and "plusieurs du grand conseil et de parlement, le recteur et plusieurs de l'université, les prevosts de Paris et des marchands, les echevins et plusieurs des bourgeois." After the fall of the Cabochiens, in September 1413 the urban government underwent major changes. Tanneguy de Chastel was named the king's royal representative, the Provost of Paris; André d'Espernon was appointed the Provost of Merchants.
23. Elsewhere I have analyzed this situation in depth and have labeled this as "subversive disinformation." See Hutchison, "'*Pour le bien du roy et son royaulme*': Burgundian Propaganda under John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, 1405–1418" (Ph.D. diss., University of York, UK, 2006), 17, 55–56. For John the Fearless' letters regarding the Dauphin's alleged captivity, see Archives Départementale du Nord (Lille), B 65, n. 15.253; Urbain Plancher, *Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne et Preuves*, (Dijon: Editions du Palais Royal, 1748), 3: 294, n. 289. See also Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran*, 2: 434–436.
24. Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 491.
25. "…nostre peuple a esté au temps passé mauvaisement seduite comme ce est à chacun notoire," Juvénal, 491.
26. In January 1383, when Charles VI repealed the rights and freedoms of the city for their insolent rebellion, the royal ordinance stipulated it was the "commotion of the people, done in Paris by many disorderly people of evil intention," that had caused the rebellion to catch on. As I have argued elsewhere, even if the king was calling this type of "noise" evil to diffuse its power, this statement is nonetheless a tacit acknowledgement that the voices of the dissenting population could be an uncontrollable force, and the catalyst for political action. In a rebellion, voice and collective affect are intrinsically connected. See Hutchison, "Knowing One's Place," 38–88.
27. "Aucuns seditieux, et perturbateurs de paix, obstinez en leurs malices, et qui ne se peuvent abstenir de machiner…en s'efforcant de faire esmouvoir grand tumulte de peuple de la ville de Paris, et de mettre divisions et discords…et de faire plusieurs autres nouvelletez moult perilleuse, et dommageables à ce royaume; dont sans doute se fussent ensuivis

tres-grands maux, et inconveniens irreparables contre le Roy nostredit seigneur, sa seigneurie, et toute la chose publique." Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 489–491.

28. "coeurs et affections droitement au Roy, à sa seigneurie, et à la conservation de ladite paix, ainsi que tousjours avez eu, et resister de tous vos pouvoirs à tous ceux qui voudroient aucunement enfraindre icelle paix." Juvénal, 489–491.
29. "cuidant que le peuple se deust esmouvoir, à luy aidant à entrer dedans… mais ils ont montré diligence de luy resister en toutes manieres", Juvénal, 488.
30. Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 488.
31. See for example Christine de Pizan's description of the 1413 uprising: "O! mais quell orreur esce à veoir au partir de la celle diabolique assemblée de innombrable menue gent suivant l'un l'autre comme brebis, prests et appareilléz de tous maulx faire mais que l'un encommence, certes oncques fureur ne cruaulté de senglier ne s'y accompara sans savoir qu'ilz se demandent et quant ilz s'encharnent sur quelque soit, ou sur aucunes gens, là n'a resne tenue ne honneur gardé à prince n'a princesse, à seigneur ne à maistre, n'à voisin ne voisne." Christine de Pizan, *The "Livre de la Paix" of Christine de Pizan: A Critical Edition with Introduction and Notes by Charity Cannon Willard*, ed. Charity Cannon Willard (Gravenhage: Mouton & Co, 1958), 131.
32. All of these terms describing the emotionality of the Parisians in the 1413 uprising were drawn from a letter cited below, written by the urban government of Paris to other unnamed towns on January 24, 1414. It is transcribed in full in Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 489–491.
33. Gregory Seigworth, Melissa Gregg, "An Invention of Shimmers," *The Affect Theory Reader*, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 1.
34. Seigworth and Gregg, 220.
35. *Dictionnaire du Moyen Français (1330–1500)*, in the *Analyse et traitement informatique de la langue française*, ed. CNRS and Université de Lorraine, Centre Nationale de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales (2012), http://www.atilf.fr/dmf/definition/émouvoir (accessed February 3, 2016).
36. Verdon, *Information et désinformation*, 34–39.
37. For a concise overview of how important all these phases were in the evolution of the civil war, see Hutchison "Winning Hearts and Minds."
38. Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds."
39. Hutchison, "*Pour le bien du roy et son royaulme*," 121–152 (especially 121–131).
40. This is the position I took in "Winning Hearts and Minds."

41. For a deeper analysis of the issue of town support, see "*Pour le bien du roy et son royaulme*," 141–150 and 210–211.
42. AN, JJ 169 and 167 cited in Léon Douët d'Arcq, *Choix de pieces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI* (Paris, 1863) 1: 378–381.
43. For the importance of murmurings as a form of political dialogue, see Michael Sizer, "Murmur, Clamor, and Tumult," 9–27. See also, Verdon, *Information et désinformation au moyen âge*, 53–76.
44. Nigel Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory. Space, Politics, Affect* (London: Routledge, 2008), 222.
45. For this and what follows, see Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 248r.
46. "[E]n la plus grand et haulte place de Troyes, appellé le marché de Blé, aprez laquelle lecture ledit peuple fut tres joyeux et content crians à haulte voix: Noël! Vive le roy et monseigneur de Bourgogne!" Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *Collection Bourgogne*, vol. 55, fol. 248r.
47. Ben Anderson, "Modulating the Excess of Affect. Morale in a State of 'Total War,'" in *The Affect Theory Reader*, 162.
48. *Dictionnaire du Moyen Français (1330–1500)*, http://www.atilf.fr/dmf/definition/noël (accessed February 3, 2016).
49. Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory*, 221.
50. As with gender performativity, an emotional *style* or *disposition* materializes over time and forms a "pattern of affective dispositions" that needs constant reinforcement. The performative process "entails citing the relevant normative scripts pertaining to emotions, and is fraught with possibilities for these scripts to be cited in ways that sabotage or resignify them, thus potentially transforming them." Thus, the *experience* of emotion emerges through normative scripts and determines emotional display. Caroline Braunmühl, "Theorizing Emotions with Judith Butler: Within and Beyond the Courtroom," *Rethinking History* 16, n. 2 (June 2011), 224–225.
51. Braunmühl, 224–225.
52. J. L. Austin first used this term when he argued that utterances can and do perform an action. *How to Do Things with Words. Second Edition*, eds. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1975).
53. This was Barbara H. Rosenwein's term. See "Emotional Communities and the Body," *Médiévales* 61 (Autumn, 2011): 55–75; "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions," *Passions in Context. International Journal for the History and Theory of Emotions* 1 (2010): http://www.passionsincontext.de/index.php?id=557; *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, 2006); "Pouvoir et passion. Communautés émotionnelles en Francie au VIIe siècle," *Annales: Histoire, Sciences*

Sociales 58, n. 6 (2003): 1271–1292. For some of the most recent historical works on medieval and early modern history of emotions: Laurent Smagghe, *Les émotions du prince. Émotion et discours politique dans l'espace bourguignon* (Paris Classiques Garnier, 2012); Nicole Eustace, Eugenia Lean, Julie Livingston, Jan Plamper, William M. Reddy, and Barbara H. Rosenwein, "*AHR* Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions," *American Historical Review* 117, n. 5 (December 2012): 1486–1531; In 2011, Damien Bouquet, Piroska Nagy, and **Laurence** Moulinier-Brogi edited a special issue for *Médiévales* called *La chair des emotions. Pratiques et représentations corporelles de l'affectivité au Moyen Âge* in *Médiévales* 61 (Autumn 2011); see also Damien Bouquet and Piroska Nagy, "Pour une histoire des émotions. L'historien face aux questions contemporaines," *Le sujet des émotions au moyen âge*, ed. Piroska Nagy & Damien Boquet (Paris, 2009), 15–51; Élodie Lecuppre-Desjardins and Anne-Laure Van Bruaene (eds.), *Emotions in the Heart of the City (14th–16th Century)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005); William M. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling. A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

54. For example, Nicolas de Baye describes the mass killings, arrests, and exiles of Armagnac partisans in 1411–1412. Baye, *Journal de Nicolas de Baye, greffier du parlement de Paris, 1400–1417*, ed. Alexandre Tuetey (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1885–1888), 2: 83–85.
55. For the labels of the two parties (in use by the outbreak of war in October 1411), see Religieux de Saint-Denis, *Chroniques du Religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380–1422*, trans. M. Bellaguet, 6 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie de Crapelet, 1852), 4: 446 (hereafter RSD), and Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 2: 467. The Bourgeois de Paris chronicler's version of events held that the Armagnacs received their name in 1410. *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris, 1405–1449*, ed. A. Tuetey (Paris, 1881), 10.
56. *Ordonnances des rois de France*, 9: 635–637.
57. This was the case for the "pouvre home aagie de cinquante ans ou environs," who was imprisoned in Sens for having uttered "certain injurious and wicked words." He was eventually released and has his reputation and property formally restored in March 1412. The Parlement had found that he was the victim of malicious gossip from "hateful and villainous enemies." AN, X^{1a} 59, fols. 12v–13r. Likewise, a man accused by his town of Caen for being an Armagnac had his property confiscated. The town demolished the house, and built a fountain. He disputed the label they attached, but in January 1412 the city was officially pardoned for this misunderstanding and Bernard Campion was left with nothing. AN, JJ 165, fols 65–65v. Regarding the bands, see the criminal registers for

the Châtelet (1412) see case number 31, (p. 599) and 45 (p. 602), in Alfred Soman, Claude Gauvard, Mary Rouse, and Richard Rouse, "Le Châtelet de Paris au début du XVe siècle d'après les fragments d'un régistre d'écrous de 1412," *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 157, n. 2 (1999): 565–606.

58. For example, in 1417, a small garrison of six Burgundian men-at-arms had a violent altercation with the neighboring village, Sommereux. Apparently, the men-at-arms had tried to seize some cattle. Consequently, sixty men and approximately twenty women from the village threw sticks and rocks at them, calling them "false traitor Burgundians." After the Burgundians killed one of the villagers, one of their own was captured and taken to Sommereux to stand trial for murder. Douët d'Arcq, *Choix de pièces inédites*, 2: 103–105.
59. Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 489–491.
60. "…ces choses vous signiffions voulontiers ainsi estre avenues, afin que vous en saichiez la vérité, et que par sinistres rapports vous ne peussiez estre informéz contre la vérité…" Archives communales de Mâcon, EE 41, n. 1 cited in Léon Mirot, "L'enlèvement du dauphin et le premier conflict entre Jean sans Peur et Louis d'Orléans (juillet–octobre 1405)," *Revue des questions historiques* 45 (1914), 397.
61. "…afin que vous congnoissiez clerem[ent] nos vraies entencions et bons propos qui sont seule[ment] au bien et honneur du Roy et de tout son Royaume comme dit est."AN, K 56, no. 20bis.
62. See for example a letter drafted by Burgundy on August 26, 1405: "il est moult à doubter qu'il n'en aviegne grans inconveniens, attend le murmure qui de ce est entre gens d'eglise, nobles, et autres de vostre royaume, et s'en pourroit ensuire de tres grant commocion, qui seroit moult perilleuse." The mandate forbidding assemblies and convocations in February 1408 cited at the outset of this essay seemed to echo this well, claiming that if such things were not prohibited, the writings would induce, incite, and move the people, and that their words specifically would lead to "très grans dommaiges et inconveniens." *Ordonnance des rois de France*, 9: 293.
63. Another good example is an ordinance from June 31, 1388 in which the king described the violence his royal officers had to endure, and which hereafter clarified that all acts of violence against his representatives would be punished severely. He claims that his intervention was to "obvier aux périlz, dommages et inconvéniens qui pour occasion de ce se sont ensues et pourroient encore plus faire ou temps avenir, se remede n'y estoit mis…" François André Isambert, Mr. Decrusy and Mr. Jourdan, *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l'an 420 jusqu'à la Révolution de 1789…* (Paris: Berlin-Leprieur & Verdière, 1824) 6: 632.

64. *Ordonnances des rois de France*, 9: 370.
65. See Emily J. Hutchison, "The Politics of Grief in the Outbreak of Civil War," *Speculum* 91, n. 2 (April 2006): 437–441.
66. Nous aions toujours esté & encores soyons desirans de garder & tenir en bonne seurté, paix & transquilité les Villes et Païs de nostre Royaume, & mesmement nostre bonne Ville de Paris, en laquelle vienne et affluent gens de divers Nacions; ayans semblablement grant désir et affeccion de tenir et garder en bonne seurté les Bourgois et autres manans & habitans en ycelle, voulans estre obvié par toutes les meilleures voyes et manieres que faire ce peut aux inconveniens, perilz & dommaiges qui par default de bonne provision pourroient sourvenir à ycelux, savoir faisons que Nous avons ordonné par grant & meure deliberacion, & par ces presentes ordonnons ce qui s'ensuit… *Ordonnance des rois de France*, 9: 370.
67. Thrift, *Non-Representational* Theory, 235.
68. Thrift, 229–231, 237–241.
69. Thrift, 221–222, 236.
70. Thrift, 229, 236.
71. Jane Bennett, "The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout," *Public Culture* 17, n. 3 (2005), 447.
72. Anderson, "Modulating the Excess of Affect," 162, 167.
73. Anderson, 167.
74. Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran*, 1: 173–174.
75. RSD, 3: 754; Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran*, 1:1: 111; Juvénal, *Histoire de Charles VI*, 438.
76. "A l'entrée duquel, fut demenée très grant joye par les Parisiens, et mesmement les petis enfans, en plusieurs quarrefours, à haulte voiz crioient: *Noël!* Ce qui grandement desplaisoit à la royne de France et à plusieurs autres princes estans oudit lieu de Paris." Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran*, 1: 176.
77. See Hutchison, "Winning Hearts and Minds," 3–30.
78. RSD, 4: 188–190.
79. AN, KK 1008, fol. 7.
80. "…grans et grosses besognes qui grandement touchent le bien honneur et prouffit de nous de nostre royaume et de nostre dicte ville" AN, KK 1008, fol. 7.
81. "…de eulz assembler par tant de foiz quil leur plaira et que bon leur semblera" AN, KK 1008, fol. 7.
82. "Et aussi les tenons et tenont quitez et deschargiez de toutes les assemblees qui ont faictes depuis un moys enca." AN, KK 1008, fol. 7.
83. *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race race recueillis par ordre chronologique*, ed. M. Secousse (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1741), 6: 685–688.

84. The document was dated January 20, 1412. AN, K 950, 10. On the same day, Pierre Gencien was named Provost of Merchants (by election). AN, KK 1008 10r-v. See below, note 78.
85. See "The Politics of Grief," 448–449.
86. "The Politics of Grief," 448–449.
87. See above, note 3.
88. Baye, *Journal de Nicolas de Baye*, 83–85.
89. See for example Archives Départementales de la Côte d'Or (Dijon), B 11893, no. 13. This document was also dated September 10, 1411, and the men in council named were on his payroll. See "*Pour le bien du roy*," 136.
90. Thrift, *Non-representational Theory*, 241–243.
91. The document specifically mentioned "Masters of the Community of Butchers, the Masters of Change, of Goldsmiths, Drapers, of Mercers, of Furs, of the craft of Cloth Pressing, and of Textile Workers, nor any other craft of any kind no matter what it might be." The king mandated that the Provost of Paris would appoint one man from each "que bon lui semblera" to represent the trade, to oversee with the Provost that no frauds or other problems occurred therein. If these men were handpicked by the Provost of Paris, this new model left open a lot of room for nepotism and bribery. *Ordonnances des rois de France*, 6: 685–688.
92. In AN K 1008, 10r–10v, Pierre Gencien was first given the position of *garde de la prevoste des marchans* from Charles Culdoe. However, the document ends, "Et il soit ainsi que au jour dit par noz autres lectres Nous avons rendu et restitue ausdiz bourgoiz et habitans de la dicte bonne ville de Paris prevoste des marchans et echevinage et parloir aux bourgoiz ainsi comme ils les souloient avoir du temps du Roy Jehan a qui Dieux pardoint." This, the document stipulated, was the result of "ladicte election faicte par les diz bourgeois et habitans de la personne dudit Pierre Gencien." In a second document, (11r–11v), the king explained that he was restoring the rights of the provost, échevins, and their parloir des bourgeois so that they could deal with the "grans peines perilz travaulx et dommaiges," all of which was directed toward the "bien prouffit et seurte de nostredicte ville." Likewise, in a third document publishing the Royal council's decision to restore the rights and liberties of the city of Paris, it was explained, "Nous les choses dessusdictes considerées pour le bien prouffit seurte de nostre dicte ville et par autre causes et consideracions a ce nous mouvans et sur ce grant et meure deliberacion es conseil avecques pluseurs de nostre sang et lignage et autres de nostre grant conseil l'empeschement et main mise ainsi que di test par nous es dictes prevoste des marchans eschevinage, clergier, maison de la ville de

parloir aux bourgeois, juridicion cohercion privileges rentes le revenues et droiz appurtenant dancienneté…" This document was dated January 20, 1411 (1412). AN, K 950, n. 10. See also Alfred Coville, *Les Cabochiens et l'ordonnance de 1413* (Paris: Hachette, 1888), 111–113.

93. RSD, 3: 308.
94. RSD, 3: 308. See also Coville, *Les cabochiens*, 109–110.
95. Chevalier, *Les bonnes villes*, 52.
96. Anderson, "Modulating the Excess of Affect," 167.
97. Michel Foucault, "Useless to Revolt?" in *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: The New Press, 1994), 452.

CHAPTER 3

Pity as a Political Emotion in Early Modern Europe

Natalia Wawrzyniak

Classical authors mention the emotion of pity mainly in the context of poetics and rhetoric, not politics. Aristotle defines pity (*eleos*) as a painful affect felt in the face of unmerited suffering which a person watching could expect to experience as well.[1] Cicero and Quintilian consider the appeal to one's pity (*argumentum ad misericordiam*) a powerful rhetorical instrument.[2] In the famous passage from *Republic*,[3] Plato prohibits lamentation along with other pitiful sounds for they may trigger vengeful desires in the audience and thus endanger the stability of the *polis*. One may therefore say that major classical philosophers consider pity to be useless if not noxious in politics. This, however, seems not to be the case in early modern Europe as it faced religious and political crisis. Several intellectual figures of the Renaissance such as Erasmus (1466–1536), Juan Luis Vivès (1493–1540), John Calvin (1509–1564), Loys Le Roy (1510–1577), or Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), formulate quite a different view on the role of pity in attaining political harmony.

N. Wawrzyniak (✉)
Centre Scientifique de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences à Paris,
74, rue Lauriston, 75116 Paris, France
e-mail: n.obukowicz@gmail.com

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_3

They perceive it as a fundamental emotion that defines balanced civic relations. Moreover, they see pity itself, as well as rhetorical appeals to pity, as an important part of political theory and *praxis*.

This political importance of pity in the Renaissance is unusual—not only in comparison with classical theories, but also with contemporary views on this affect. For a number of today's political philosophers, including Martha C. Nussbaum, Lauren Berlant, Michael Ure, and Mervyn Frost, it is not pity but compassion that stands for the basic social affect.[4] In the literature-centered empathy studies, for instance, compassion is seen as a fundamental human bond[5] and the research on emotional intelligence proposes it is a crucial element in the decision-making process.[6] In current political and social theories, pity is evoked almost only as a counterpart to compassion and is generally associated with negatively viewed condescension.[7]

In sum, while pity acquired an unprecedented role in early modern Europe, it also grew progressively unpopular afterward. In this essay, I argue that in the sixteenth century, pity became a political emotion *par excellence*. The main question that I address here is: how and why did pity become politicized in the early modern period?[8] I will analyze pity in the context of early modern political philosophy and politics, reflecting on its changing role from a historical perspective. Indeed, early modern interpretations of pity derive from classical and medieval vocabularies reshaped at the time of the profound religious and political crisis that overwhelmed Europe. In order to grasp that shift, I will first outline ways in which pity was understood in the classical and medieval periods. In the second part of this article, I will show how the above-mentioned Renaissance humanists—known for bringing passions back to political philosophy—redefined classical and medieval discourse on pity, adapting it to the new political reality. The last part of my essay will focus on the political *praxis* of pity and analyze a popular early modern polemical genre of lamentation.

Pity in Classical and Medieval Discourse

Pity is discussed abundantly in classical theories of discourse: in his theory of tragedy, Aristotle states that pity—along with fear—makes part of the *catharsis* experience, and in his book on rhetoric, he analyzes emotional appeals to one's pity used as a deliberative practice.[9] He does not mention passions directly in his *Politics*.[10] It is clear that for Aristotle,

affects do not have their place in an ideal community and—as he says in Book V of his *Politics*—the excess of emotions may only lead to sedition and civil crisis.[11] In the same vein, Plato's *city-state* was to be governed by philosophers who were not using rhetorical strategies of *pathos* but were simply speaking the truth.[12]

From the perspective of classical ethics, pity is equally to be avoided as it is not paired with reason. In the famous passage of *On mercy*, Seneca claims that pity (*misericordia*) is "a defect in the mind of people who are extraordinarily affected by suffering."[13] In consequence, the appeal to pity is one of the most fallacious arguments in rhetoric. In *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero includes pity into the category of negative emotions (*aegritudini)* that may heavily mislead human judgment.[14]

While pity seems absent from both ethical and political realms, classical authors agree that the appeal to pity is a dangerous rhetorical weapon to be used as courtroom strategy. Cicero presents sixteen pity-arousing commonplaces of *commiseratio/conquestio*, such as comparing a blissful past to the present unhappiness or describing every minute detail of undeserved and unexpected suffering.[15]

Major medieval Christian thinkers, including Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, reshaped these classical conceptions of pity. In their writings, one can observe the integration of pity into the Christian ethics of mercy. Church Fathers adapt classical definitions of pity taken from the theories of discourse to the system of theological virtues and associate them with related terms like compassion and mercy. In *City of God*, Saint Augustine claims that mercy (*misericordia*) is the "compassion in our heart (*in nostro corde compassio*) for another's misery by which, indeed, we are impelled to give succor, if we are able."[16] Mercy and compassion are defined here on the basis of Aristotelian pity. However, in the Augustinian theory of passions as movements of the soul (*motus animi*), the Aristotelian "painful affect" of pity is turned into compassion, meaning co-suffering (*cum patior*) that moves one to relieve another's misery. In other words, while classical pity is a passive state caused by the spectacle of misery, Christian compassion would engage a believer in shared suffering and action toward the less fortunate.

In his *Summa theologica*, Thomas Aquinas refers to the above Augustinian definition of mercy, saying that it "takes its name *misericordia* from denoting a man's compassionate heart (*miserum cor*) for another's unhappiness."[17] Aquinas—himself a translator and commentator of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Aristotle—admits firstly that passions,

including pity, cannot be moral virtues as they do not imply any rational choice.[18] However, later on he explains, after Augustine, that "of all the virtues which relate to our neighbour, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient."[19] For Saint Thomas, we experience pain seeing the suffering of another person and being conscious of our own vulnerability. Mercy, however, results from charity and means that we also take action to relieve others' miseries: "it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants."[20]

We may conclude that Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas consider mercy as the most important virtue that should regulate human acts. Furthermore, mercy is one of the acts of charity (*caritas*), the highest theological virtue which is loving our fellow human beings. In the medieval period, classical pity from Aristotelian writings is thus integrated into Christian ethics and, as such, becomes the basis of human relations.[21]

Renaissance of Pity

The mistrusting view of emotions inherited from classical authors is still present in the sixteenth century. Loys Le Roy, a French jurist and political writer, gives a striking example of this kind of unemotional politics. As a French translator of the political treaties by Aristotle and Plato, he tries to adapt classical theories to the new political reality of a growing dissent. In his introduction to the art of politics, he claims that orators have a subsidiary role toward governors: "Aucuns orateurs gouvernerent estats, et assisterent aux deliberations des affaires, dont ils escrivirent les oraisons, comme Demosthene et Cicéron."[22] (None of the orators governed the cities and assisted the deliberation on public affairs for which they wrote speeches like Demosthenes and Cicero.)[23] According to Loys Le Roy, politics is a part of moral philosophy and as such is a noble science in service of public tranquility. Any use of rhetoric and eloquence is suspect and dangerous as the perfect political order is based on the unchanging governor-governed principle. In other words, to manage civil passions, we need good laws, not good speeches: "Car jaçoit que l'homme soit naturellement civil, et plus sociable que nul autre animal, et soit à cest effect doué de raison et de parole pour la communication: toutesfois estant subject aux passions qui le troublent souvent, et aux convoitises mauvaises qui le retirent incessamment du bien, il a

esté necessaire proposer quelques commandemens, à fin de domter telles affections, et les remettre en la droitte voye de justice."[24] (Despite the fact that man is naturally more civilized and sociable than any other animal and for that purpose was given reason and speech: as he is subject to passions that often trouble him and to evil desires that keep him from good, it was necessary to establish certain laws in order to control such affections and redirect them toward the path of justice.) We may thus conclude that for Loys Le Roy, emotions may move people to question the established order. Passions are synonymous with upheaval and rebellion. Mutinies are caused precisely by antisocial emotions elicited by observing inequalities that "fill the state with hatred, dissent, discontent, hostilities that give birth to sedition and civil wars." ("[…] remplit un estat de haines, dissensions, mescontentemens, inimitiez, dont naissent les seditions et guerres civiles.")[25]

While for Loys Le Roy politics should not be influenced by rhetorical appeal to passions or with passions whatsoever, the early modern understanding of the political role of emotions was in general quite different. The main challenge of early modern politics was to keep political harmony in the context of growing religious dissent in European countries influenced by the development of Protestantism. Early modern political thinkers had to reconsider the public sphere as differences of opinions in religious matters entered public life. Citizens also started to take part in political disputes over proper government, transgressing traditional views on who should express opinions on common matters. Early modern emotions were political in the first place because the act of persuasion with *pathos* as a mode of proof became a center of public life. Language was believed to be the best means to deal with disagreements. In *The Complaint of Peace* (1517), Erasmus summarized this logocentric Renaissance ideal, saying that man has been given the power of speech—"the most conciliating instrument of social connection and cordial love"[26]—to keep social harmony. We may expect that pity, considered to be one of the most intense passions, would serve as a major instrument of the early modern rhetoric.

However, as I argue, the role of pity in the early modern time was extended from merely a tool in the rhetoric of passions into a truly political affect indispensable for maintaining the social order. Pity emerged as an emotion complementary to *eunoia*, a term referring to good will toward others.[27] In *The Complaint of Peace*, Erasmus speaks about *eunoia* as a sort of mild friendship when he describes the nature of

social relation: "Moreover, Nature evidently intended that man should consider himself indebted for the boon of life, not so much to himself as to the kindness of his fellowman; that he might perceive himself designed for social affections, and the attachments of friendship and love."[28] Subsequently, Erasmus claims that pity has a regulatory role in the public sphere because it reintroduces reciprocal friendship and peace: [Nature] "gave him [man] tears, the symbol of clemency and compassion."[29] Pity is thus closely related to the sense of community because it can repair broken social bonds. Surprisingly enough, the same Loys Le Roy speaks in one of his polemical writings about the "common affection" and the reconciliation through pity expressed by tears, bringing peace when the concord between people is lost:

> On qualifie communément d'humain tout ce qui renvoie à l'idée d'une bienveillance mutuelle. À cela la nature a ajouté les larmes, preuve d'un naturel pitoyable, afin que, si survient quelque offense, si quelque nuage vient assombrir le ciel clair de l'amitié, le retour en grâce puisse se faire facilement. Que de moyens la nature a donc utilisés pour enseigner à l'homme la paix et la concorde.[30]
>
> (We call human everything that evokes the idea of mutual benevolence to which nature added tears, proof of empathy, so that, when an offense comes, when a cloud covers the clear sky of friendship, the return to the state of grace may be simple. Nature uses these means to teach man peace and concord.)

These two chronologically distant examples show that the scope of pity at the time of European religious and political cleavage of the sixteenth century went beyond rhetoric—but also beyond Christian ethics. Erasmus and Le Roy believed that the endangered political body, losing the sense of mutual friendship, may be saved by pitiful tears. In this sense, pity becomes a pillar of the political community.

Erasmus and Le Roy argue that political communities are torn apart by hatred and violence, diseases for which pity may be a cure. This claim has undoubtedly a rhetorical background. In the Aristotelian or Ciceronian economy of passions, pity can counter violence and rage.[31] For Aristotle, pity (*misericordia*) is the direct opposite of indignation (*nemesis*), which for Cicero is very close to anger or wrath (*ira*). In the so-called *genus grande,* high rhetorical style used usually in the peroration, the orator should use both. He should arouse in turn pity and rage in order to push

the listeners into action ("*hic iram, hic misericordiam inspirabit.*")[32] Pity for the innocent victims may indeed easily be turned into rage against those responsible for the undeserved suffering. Montaigne refers to this possibility of neutralizing violence and hatred through pity in the very first chapter of his essays entitled "That man by various ways arrive at the same end": "La plus commune façon d'amollir les coeurs de ceux qu'on a offencez, lors qu'ayans la vengeance en main, ils nous tiennent à leur mercy, c'est de les esmouvoir par submission, à commiseration et à pitié."[33] (The most usual way of appeasing the indignation of such that as we have any way offended, when we see them in possession of the power of revenge, and find that we absolutely lie at their mercy is by submission, to move them to commiseration and pity.) It means that the appeal to pity may be extrapolated from rhetoric to politics, pity being conceived as a possible remedy for a political crisis.

Moreover, early modern thinkers reevaluate the nature of pity in an interesting way. If Aristotelian or Stoic pity was vehement and painful, for Juan Luis Vivès, pity is close to love and is definitely gentle. He revives the Augustinian and Thomistic tradition of emotions as movements of the soul associated with bodily changes in the third book of his treatise *On the Soul and Life* (1538), where he claims, among others, that pity arises from love and is a "very gentle emotion given by God to mankind as a great good and for our mutual help and consolation through the various misfortunes of life."[34] Interestingly enough, for John Calvin, who comments on Seneca, pity is an essential character of a wise man, a sign of humanity—even if immediately after, following the Stoic tradition, he rejects the excessive pity and prefers reason and willingness to help the unfortunate.[35] Calvin quotes Augustine ("What then is pity, but a compassion in our hearts for another's misery, by which we are compelled to give whatever help we can?"[36]), stressing the innate capacity of man to "be of help to all and to serve the common good."[37]

One of the proofs that pity in the early modern period is a hybrid notion that encompasses both rhetorical commiseration and Christian compassion is the conflation between these terms in early modern texts. Early modern philosophers do not apply rigorous distinctions between pity and compassion and tend to exchange them in both rhetorical and ethical contexts. Thomas Moore states that a believer experiences both pity and compassion when confronted with the suffering of Christ: "… here is no one, I think, so good or so well-educated, or so proficient in meditation, that they do not find that they are more moved to pity

and compassion upon the beholding of a crucifix than they are when they lack one."[38] On the other hand, Montaigne several times uses pity and compassion as strict synonyms, as in the following fragment of the chapter "Of Democritus and Heraclitus": "Democritus et Heraclitus ont esté deux philosophes, desquels le premier trouvant vaine et ridicule l'humaine condition, ne sortoit en public, qu'avec un visage moqueur et riant: Heraclitus, ayant pitié et compassion de cette mesme condition nostre, en portoit le visage continuellement triste, et les yeux chargez de larmes."[39] (Democritus and Heraclitus were two philosophers, of whom the first, finding the condition of man vain and ridiculous, never went out in public but with a mocking and laughing face; whereas Heraclitus, having pity and compassion on this same condition of ours, wore a face perpetually sad, with eyes filled with tears.) These examples show that in the early modern period, the difference between classical pity associated with passivity, suffering, and weakness, and Christian compassion having a more active and social sense, was blurred.

During the Renaissance period, classical and Christian interpretations of pity merged into political affect. Pity was no longer perceived as a mere human pulsion that can be exploited by a skilful orator or an author of tragedy seeking to move judges and the audience. When hearts were hardened by hatred, pity became a virtue that could be a source of emotional consensus at the time of severe ideological conflicts.

Politics of Pity

The appeal to pity is what brings rhetoric and politic together. One of the most explored genres in early modern political literature is lamentation (Latin: *planctus*, *lamento*, Polish: *skarga*, French: *complainte*, German: *klage*). Polemical lamentation, on one hand, can be defined as an expression of sorrow provoked by a tearful spectacle of religious wars and political crisis and, on the other hand, as an appeal to pity—that of the reader, and in a broader sense, of the whole national community. There is a particular genre that may exemplify this logic—the irenic prosopopoeia inspired by Erasmian *Querela Pacis*. In *The Complaint of Peace,* popularized in a number of translations and adaptations disseminated across Europe throughout the sixteenth century, a character embodying peace appeals to readers' pity in order to make them cease warlike behavior.[40]

Two texts referring to the Erasmian *Querela pacis* are worth mentioning here: *Zgoda* (*Concord*) by the Polish poet Jan Kochanowski (1564) and *L'Irenophile discours de la Paix* (*The Eirenophilic Discourse of Peace*) by the French author Jacques Saint-Germain d'Apchon (1594). They were published in different countries and in different stages of European religious conflicts. Yet, despite their differences (language, form, length, historical context of publication) they have several important characteristics in common, namely the *ethos* of pity, the rhetorical strategy based on the *argumentum ad misericordiam* and the political aim of recreating a national community based on shared suffering.

In the original Erasmian text and in its French and Polish adaptations, a lamenting female figure (Peace/Concord) feels morally obliged to express her pity when seeing human and national misery—as if the complaint was the most natural and the most appropriate mode of discourse at the time of war. Peace in *Querela Pacis* admits being moved by commiseration that pushes her to speak: "I am reduced to the necessity of weeping over and commiserating those whom I wished to view rather as objects of indignation than of pity."[41] Peace of Jacques d'Apchon calls him to relay her complaint to the King ("je veux doncques…que tu te depesches de luy faire entendre mes plaintes"[42]), while Kochanowski's Concord reveals:

> Przyszłam tu, chocia nieproszona
>
> Do was, o potomkowie Lecha słowiańskiego
>
> Lutując niefortuny państwa tak zacnego.[43]
>
> (I came here, although I was not invited / To the descendants of Slavic Lech / Lamenting over the misfortunes of such a respectable state.)

In Erasmian, Kochanowski's, and Apchon's texts, the appeals to pity are orchestrated according to the recommendations of classical rhetoric. The authors show the exemplary use of Ciceronian *topoi,* presenting in detail the tragic condition of Peace and Concord due to the furious anger of their fellow citizens. The noble nature, divine origin, and respectable past of these characters contrast with their present misery. Like the Erasmian Peace, they are both victims of injustice: "Though I certainly deserve no ill treatment from mortals, yet if the insults and repulses I receive were attended with any advantage to them, I would

content myself with lamenting in silence my own unmerited indignities and man's injustice."[44] Their physical appearance is described as miserable and pitiful. Apchonian Peace is "wrinkled, melancholic, hungry and defeated" ("ridee, melancolique, affamee, defaicte"),[45] sentenced to "sad exile" ("triste exil") and exposed to "extreme ingratitude" ("extrême ingratitude.")[46]

Those texts call for the transformation of rage into pity, suggesting that the civil conflict may not be ended by calling to reason. Indeed, rationality is associated with justice, and the sense of justice may involve envy or vengeance, which should be avoided at all cost during civil conflict. Kochanowski's Concord states:

> A Rzym, którego pożyć nie mógł Pyrrus mężny
>
> …Upadł prze dwu niezgody jedno, że równego
>
> Jeden cierpieć nie umiał, a drugi wysszego.[47]
>
> (Rome which valiant Pyrrhus could not vanquish…/Fell as a result of two discords / For it could not stand the equal nor superior.)

Erasmus, Kochanowski, and Apchon develop different forms of lamenting discourse trying to create the "community of pity" in the divided society, to restore lost unity, and to appease hatred and rage.[48]

Conclusion: How Can Pity Challenge the Notion of "Passionate Politics"?

The renaissance of pity ended with the emergence of Neo-Stoic movement at the end of the sixteenth century. The call for rationality and moderation began at a time when emotions—blamed in Europe for the decades of wars—could not be political anymore. Political harmony was to be acquired by controlling passions through reason, exemplified by the king. In *Eikon Basilike* (1649), a polemical text published during the English Civil War, politics is represented by Reason enslaving passions: "Set bounds to our Passions through Reason, to our errors by Truth, to our seditions by Laws duly executed, and to our schisms by Charity, that we may be, as thy Jerusalem, a city at unity in it selfe."[49]

The fall of pity as a political emotion in the early modern period was due especially to Justus Lipsius and his *On Constancy in Times of Public Troubles*, published in 1584 and translated into several European languages. Lipsius adopted a Stoic approach to passions, considering them "inward maladies of the mind" that "betray constancy."[50] In Chapter XII, he interprets pity (*commiseration*) as a vice that should be despised and distinguished from mercy. Lipsius, who put particular emphasis on the role of constancy during times of religious crisis, rejected emotional complaints on civic calamities because in reality they dissimulated private losses and individual interests.[51]

We may conclude that pity, excluded for a long time from the political realm, and considered the pillar of political order in early modern Europe, ceased to be the center of political philosophy and practice by the end of the Renaissance. Such discontinuities in the history of emotions are worth closer attention. Through the study of the political role of pity in early modern times, this essay also aimed at reconsidering the very relation between emotions and politics. The terms "passionate politics" and "emotional politics" became key concepts in the history of emotions. It is common to believe that politics is made of passions. Michael Ure and Mervyn Frost put it clearly: politics is an "art of the emotions."[52] Historians of emotions claim that passions were always at the center of Western political philosophy.[53] Less focus was placed on certain ambiguities concerning the political value of emotions and on the fluctuations of this value over time.[54] In this sense, the study of a specific emotion, such as pity, may challenge the existing framework for studying political emotions and their history.

Notes

1. *Rhetoric*, II, 83–92; *Poetics*, 1385b–1415.
2. *On the Orator*, I, 1, 2; *Institutes of Oratory*, VI, 1, 23.
3. *Republic*, III, 398e–399e.
4. Martha C. Nussbaum analyzes political emotions from the standpoint of a "sensible democracy"; see *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 13 (1996): 27–58. She argues that aesthetic considerations of pity may be useful for discussions

on compassion in political discourse; see *Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997), 65–66. In a similar vein, Lauren Berlant considers compassion a pillar of public life and state policy; see *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion*, ed. Lauren Berlant (New York: Routledge, 2004). Michael Ure and Mervyn Frost claim that compassion is a political virtue that is often abused in political rhetoric; see *The Politics of Compassion*, eds. Michael Ure and Mervyn Frost (New York: Routledge, 2014).

5. *Rethinking Empathy through Literature*, eds. Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim (New York: Routledge, 2014).
6. George E. Marcus, Michael B. MacKuen, "Emotions and Politics: The Dynamic Functions of Emotionality," in *Citizens and Politics. Perspectives from Political Psychology*, ed. James H. Kuklinski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 41–67.
7. Following the Nietzschean distinction as explained in Martha C. Nussbaum, "Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche's Stoicism," in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's* On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 139–147.
8. The scholarship on pity does not discuss this transformation; see David Punter, *The Literature of Pity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
9. *Rhetoric*, II, 83–92; *Poetics*, 1385b–1415.
10. In order to consider Aristotelian emotions as political, one has to make a theoretical extrapolation. On one hand, Marlene Sokolon claims that all of the Aristotelian emotions are political on the basis that Aristotelian politics is made of ethical choices and that emotions discussed in *Rhetoric* are a part of the virtue system; see *Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006). On the other hand, Barbara Koziak considers that politics is deliberative, and deliberation is passionate, thus, Aristotelian passions are political; see *Retrieving Political Emotion:* Thumos*, Aristotle and Gender* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).
11. *Politics*, V, X.
12. *Republic*, VI, 488d.
13. *On mercy,* II, VI.
14. Along with enviousness, emulation, jealousy, distress, mourning, sorrow, hardship, pain, lamentation, anxiety, trouble, affliction, and despair; see *Tusculan Disputations,* IV, 7.
15. *On Invention*, I, 7.
16. *City of God*, IX, 5.
17. *Summa theologica*, II, II, 30, 1.

18. Ibid., II, II, 30, 3.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., II, II, 30, 4.
21. Pierre Audi, *L'Empire de la compassion* (Paris: Encre Marine, 2011).
22. Loys Le Roy, *De l'origine, antiquité, progrès, excellence et utilité de l'art politique* (Lyon: Benoit Rigaud, 1568), 16.
23. All translations are the author's, except where otherwise noted.
24. Le Roy, *De l'origine*, 13.
25. Loys Le Roy, *Les politiques d'Aristote traduictes de grec en françois par Loys le Roy dict Regius* (Paris: Ambroise Drouart, 1599), 277.
26. Erasmus, *The Complaint of Peace to which is added, Antipolemus, or The plea of reason, religion and humanity, against war* (Boston: Charles Williams, Burlington, N.J.: D. Allinson, 1813), 13.
27. Maria Xanthou, "Isocrates' theory of goodwill (*eunoia*) as precursor of emotional intelligence theory," *CHS Research Bulletin*, vol. 3, no. 2 (2015). Available at: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn3:hlnc.essay:XanthouM.Isocrates_Theory_of_Goodwill.2015.
28. Erasmus, *The Complaint*, 31.
29. Ibid., 32.
30. Loys Le Roy, *Exhortation aux Francois pour vivre en concorde, et jouir du bien de la paix* (Paris: J. Dupuis, 1570), 24.
31. *Rhetorics*, II, 1378a; *The Orator*, 28.
32. *Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory*, XII, 10, 62.
33. Michel Montaigne, *The Complete Works: Essays, Travel Journal, Letter*, Donald M. Frame, trans. (New York: Knopf, 2003), I, 1, 3.
34. Quoted in Isabel Jaén, "Empathy and Gender Activism in Early Modern Spain," in *Rethinking Empathy through Literature*, eds. Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim (New York: Routledge, 2014), 190.
35. *Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's* De Clementia, eds. Ford Lewis Battles and André Malan Hugo (Leiden: Brill, 1969), 244. Available at: http://media.sabda.org/alkitab-7/LIBRARY/CALVIN/CAL_SENE.PDF 244.
36. Ibid., 249.
37. Ibid., 251.
38. Thomas Moore, *Dialogue concerning Heresies*, ed. Mary Gottschalk (New York: Scepter, 2006), 79.
39. Montaigne, *The Complete Works*, I, 50, 268.
40. Roland H. Baiton, "The *Querela Pacis* by Erasmus, Classical and Christian sources," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte/Archive for Reformation History*, vol. 42 (1951): 32. Available at: 10.14315/arg-1951-jg04.
41. Erasmus, *The Complaint*, 9.
42. Jacques Saint-Germain d'Apchon, *L'Irenophile discours de la Paix* (Lyon: Benoist Rigaud, 1594), 7.

43. Jan Kochanowski, "Zgoda," in *Dzieła polskie*, ed. Julian Krzyżanowski (Warsaw: PIW, 1989), 49.
44. Erasmus, *The Complaint*, 9.
45. Apchon, *L'Irenophile*, 3.
46. Ibid., 4.
47. Kochanowski, "Zgoda," 50.
48. My use of the term "community of pity" may seem close to the notion of "emotional community" introduced by Barbara Rosenwein that accentuates the emotional bond between members of the politic body. However, Rosenwein's community is a body constituted not by one emotion as would be the case of the "community of pity" but rather by a constellation or a set of emotions; see Barbara Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Modern Ages* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006).
49. *The Pourtraecture of His Sacred Majestie in his Solitudes and Sufferings* quoted in John Staines, "Compassion in the Public Sphere of Milton and Charles," in *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, eds. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 75.
50. *On Constancy in Times of Public Troubles*, II.
51. Ibid., VIII.
52. The notion of politics as an art of the emotions is seen as "emergent political paradigm;" see *The Politics of Compassion*.
53. *Bringing the Passions Back In: The Emotions in Political Philosophy*, eds. Rebecca Kingston and Leonard Ferry (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008).
54. Although the authors of certain collections of essays on early modern emotions advocate for their distinctive character, they study above all the particularities of representation and expression of emotions in early modern literature and art, the emotional experience and forms of political communication, not the theories of emotions and their political significance; see *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion*, eds. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries*, eds. Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), and *The Languages of Political Society: Western Europe, 14th–17th* Centuries, eds. Andrea Gamberini, Jean-Philippe Genet, and Andrea Zorzi (Rome: Viella, 2011). One of the rare collections that evoke early modern theories of emotions is *Emotions, Passions, and Power in Renaissance Italy,* eds. Fabricio Ricciardelli, Andrea Zorzi (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015).

CHAPTER 4

"Issuing from the Great Flame of This Joy": Marguerite of Navarre, Louise of Savoy, and Emotional Intimacy

Tracy Adams

In June 1521, Marguerite, sister of King François I of France, opened a three-year epistolary exchange with the Bishop of Meaux, Guillaume Briçonnet. Her husband, Duke Charles of Alençon, has led the king's army into Champagne, where the men will likely engage in warfare, Marguerite explains, and her beloved aunt Philiberte is about to leave her for Savoy. Involved in things that give her great cause for fear ("*choses qui me doivent bien donner crainte*"), Marguerite intends to involve (*emploie*) Briçonnet in her affairs and requests spiritual aide.[1] The persona of the "anxious female subject" that Marguerite creates in this letter is one that she will adopt throughout the correspondence as well as in some of her letters to the king and in her single remaining letter to her mother, the formidable regent Louise of Savoy.[2]

This fearful persona contrasts poignantly with the more familiar, politically savvy, self-possessed one that emerges from other writings, both by and about Marguerite. Not that the use of such a persona is unusual.

T. Adams (✉)
University of Auckland, 1/40 Sylvia Road, Auckland 1071, New Zealand
e-mail: tarechtschaffen@gmail.com; t.adams@auckland.ac.nz

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_4

Early modern French letter writers routinely represent themselves as small and frightened when they address spiritual advisors, social or family superiors, or, at times, close friends. Louise, too, represents herself as uncertain and frightened in letters to her daughters and the king. What I would like to argue in this essay, then, is not that Marguerite's fearful persona is unusual, but that, far from a simple convention of letter writing, it was an important element of an emotional regime: it was a genuine emotive, in William Reddy's terms, that is, an expression of emotion that acts on the emotional state of the one uttering it.[3] Female political activity demanded a high level of emotional labor, and, I propose, Marguerite and Louise assumed fearful personae within their intimate circles as a means of relieving the burden.

In what follows, I first lay out perceptions of the imposing mother-daughter team in ambassadors' reports and then contrast these with the women's fearful personae in their descriptions of themselves and each other in a variety of letters, focusing primarily on the troubled lead-up to the catastrophic French defeat at Pavia in 1525 and its immediate aftermath. These first two sections are intended to illustrate the two personae under discussion. Analysis of the relationship between the two personae and their interest for the history of the emotions comes in the final section where I argue that, although at first glance the personae seem to fit together as an intimidating public face assumed to cover and quash an authentic inner anxiety, Marguerite and Louise would not have perceived themselves in this way. Noble women were trained to enact their rank and impose their will while maintaining, like diplomats, an inscrutable face in a political context (what we would think of, informally, as controlling their emotions) and also to enact submission and passionately abandon their will to a higher force in a religious context (what we might think of, informally, as giving voice to their emotions).[4] To put it another way, for noble women, the two personae under discussion implied two separate types of emotives serving separate and equally crucial emotional purposes. Assuming a formidable political persona gave noble women the courage and stamina to advocate for their families. This point is obvious enough. Less obvious, however, is the purpose served by the fearful persona, which, I suggest, was as fully developed and significant as—indeed, that it supported—the former. Proclaiming themselves small, frightened, and unable to control the situation, that is, assuming a posture of humble submission to a superior power, be it God or a more highly ranked family member, gave noble women a way to

share and offload distress that might otherwise have overwhelmed them. But if noble women throughout early modern France were trained, broadly speaking, in such an emotional regime, the real interest lies in considering how individual women interacted with the training to manage their own burdens. An examination of Marguerite and Louise's personal interaction offers a fascinating glimpse of how this powerful mother-daughter team drew comfort from each other to survive in a period fraught with difficulty for highly ranked women.

Contemporary Images

Louise of Savoy (1476–1532) was only twelve when she was married to Charles of Angoulême, son of a cadet branch of the Valois, and still in her teens when she bore Marguerite in 1492 and François in 1494. She raised them at Cognac alongside the children of her husband's mistresses. Although no record of discord exists among this extended family, Louise, Marguerite, and François perceived themselves as an inseparable Trinity.[5] Widowed in 1496, Louise never remarried. With the premature death of Charles VIII and ascension of Louis XII in 1498, François unexpectedly became heir presumptive. According to seventeenth-century biographer Hilarion de Coste, however, Louise was not surprised, having earlier learned from the hermit, and later saint, Francesco di Paola that she would give birth to a king.[6] François ascended in 1515, fulfilling the prophecy.

Louise served as Francois I's regent when he led troops into Italy and while he was held by Imperial troops in Spain for over a year after the devastating French defeat at Pavia in 1525. Her right to rule in her son's absence derived from her status as mother of the king, that is, the feudal precedent that made the mother legal guardian for her fatherless children.[7] But in addition to providing a juridical foundation for regency, maternity offered a persona for framing her political activity. As a mother she was expected to educate, protect, and support her son, and to rule on his behalf when he was absent.[8] The iconography that supported Louise in the role has received scholarly attention, most notably from Elizabeth McCartney and Anne-Marie Lecoq.[9] Regarded by some as exemplary and by others as too controlling, Louise was nearly always characterized as a strong, prudent, and watchful mother in works dedicated to her. A treatise on the virtues housed today in the Bibliothèque Nationale of France gives the allegorical figure of Prudence Louise's

face.[10] She is depicted as a powerful, prudent maternal mentor for her son in several manuscripts from her own library, including, *Le Compas du dauphin*, renowned for its miniature of her carrying a compass, a common attribute of Prudence.[11] A manuscript recounting the story of Blanche de Castille, mother of and regent for Saint Louis, associates Louise with Blanche and thus prudent motherhood. The work concludes by lauding Blanche, "whose regency and great prudence and virtue are succeeded by the most high and strong and excellent princess, and my powerful lady, Madame Louise, mother of the most Christian king of France."[12] François evoked his mother's prudence in a letter patent naming her "*regente et gouvernante*" when he set off to conquer Milan in 1523: he had perfect confidence in her "sense, virtue, prudence and integrity."[13] As prisoner, François extended Louise's regency, emphasizing her "long experience" and her "great prudence, honesty and goodness."[14] The English Cardinal Wolsey noted at the time of the Treaty of Madrid in 1526 that Louise had demonstrated a "profound prudence, long and assured experience, unequaled conduct and marvelously great dexterity."[15]

Even when not acting officially as regent, Louise exercised political influence, controlling access to the Royal Council.[16] She was also intimately involved in negotiations related to the triple rivalry among France, England, and the Empire, over which Charles V was elected to reign when his grand father Maximilian died in 1519 despite François I's best efforts to get himself elected. The three-way relationships underwent permutations in the years leading up to the fateful defeat of the French at Pavia, continuing to shift throughout the rest of the decade as François I sought his own release, the return of his ransomed sons and the repossession of Burgundy, which he had ceded to Charles V as a condition of his release. Contemporary observations of Louise at work highlight her health, forceful personality, and sway over her son. A comment made in 1518 by the Cardinal Louis d'Aragon, recorded by his secretary Antonio de Beatis, offers an example. Louise was very tall, with a still-beautiful complexion, lively, and cheerful ("*vive et enjouée*").[17] She appeared to him to be about 40 years old (in 1518, she would have been 42), and he gave her ten more years of excellent health. The cardinal also noted that she accompanied her son and Queen Claude everywhere and exercised "absolute power" over them.[18] In a letter to Cardinal Wolsey, an unnamed clerk describes how he conveyed Henry VIII's interest in making peace with the Pope, François I, and the emperor to the

Pontiff, who replied that the French king could not be trusted until he was no longer ruled by Louise and the seigneur de Bonnivet, Admiral of France.[19] A series of letters by the ambassador to France, William Fitzwilliam, to Wolsey regarding a rapprochement between the English and the Empire of 1521 reinforces these impressions. In response to his question of to whom he should turn for information, Fitzwilliam reports that the seigneur de Bonnivet, Admiral of France had directed him to "my Lady as formerly, and after her Robert Tete [Florimond Robertet]."[20] A few weeks later, Fitzwilliam notes that the French's suddenly unfavorable political situation had caused them to seek peace, commenting that many blamed Louise because it is never good when ladies rule.[21] On the other hand, Fitzwilliam shows this influence in a more positive light when a few months later he remarks to Wolsey that in case of conflict Wolsey should apply to Louise, because "when the king would stick at some points, and speak very great words, and then my Lady would qualify the matter;" the king is so "obeisant" to her that he refuses nothing that she requires him to do.[22] A year later, Fitzwilliam notes to Wolsey that the king "spends his time in the chace with the Cardinal of Lorraine, leaving everything to his mother, the Admiral and the Chancellor."[23] Louise appears especially regularly in ambassadors' reports during François I's captivity.[24] Although these letters report that her regency received serious challenge from the Parlement in Paris, a too-optimistic view on the part of the English as it turned out, Louise remained firmly in control, warning the unruly body that had she not been regent she would not have let them get away with such effrontery, but that she was too powerful to seek vengeance.[25] Louise knew how to exercise her authority by manifesting anger in a carefully controlled and thus effective manner.

Marguerite, too, was believed, like her mother, to be prudent, but her effectiveness was generally attributed to her charm rather than her grit. Although not an exact contemporary, Brantôme knew enough people who had seen Marguerite with their own eyes to be credible in his claim that she had a gift for worming secrets out of ambassadors.[26] Briçonnet believed in her influence, as well, seeking to convert Louise and the king to the cause of the Reform through her.[27] And Marguerite was taken seriously as a politician by fascinated English ambassadors during her brother's captivity in 1525. Although their banter about Marguerite's physical appeal has been much noted, their anxiety that she would win the emperor over indicates their awareness of her reputation

for negotiation rather than any serious fear that she would sweep Charles V off his feet: surely Cuthbert Tunstall's apprehension that Marguerite was on her way to woo Charles V for herself and Eleanor for her brother suggests primarily that he understood her to be persuasive.[28] Similarly, Tunstall's comment to Henry VIII that Marguerite would be inclined to seek out Eleanor to "cackle" with her to "advance her brodyrs matter" signals his anxiety at Marguerite's capacity to press her case to both the emperor and his sister.[29] When she arrived in Spain, Marguerite demanded respect, writing to her brother that she refused to "court" the emperor or play his "servant" by soliciting him but was waiting for him to make the first move.[30]

As for contemporary perspectives on the relationship between mother and daughter, Fitzwilliam saw them as accomplices. Louise directed Marguerite from the sidelines, letting the younger woman charm her interlocutors. In a letter from September 13, 1521, a time of mutual distrust with the French suspecting that the English were siding with the emperor, whose troops sacked Ardres just days before, Fitzwilliam reports that the king would give him no information. Therefore, he spoke first to Louise and then to Marguerite.[31] Louise discussed with him her interest in peace according to Wolsey's terms and tried to extract information about Ardres from him, but, when he replied that he knew nothing, she departed. At that point Marguerite entered to express hope that France and England would not go to war. Fitzwilliam gives the impression that the audience with Louise and Marguerite was strategically planned to impress him, first, with the French's resolve and then, quickly, with a softening of tone. Another letter from September 15 suggests the same strategy.[32] Here Louise first menaced the English by insisting on the French right to let heir presumptive to the Scottish throne, Duke of Albany, John Stuart, leave France to wreak havoc in England. Louise then bade Fitzwilliam farewell, but lingered as the ambassador also said goodbye to Marguerite, who proceeded to question him forcefully about Ardres. The younger woman eventually left off her stern manner and began to speak "fair," assuring Fitzwilliam that she would trust in Henry VIII until he did something to prove her wrong. She continued to speak many "good words." For Fitzwilliam, the scene was "devised" by Louise, who stood within earshot the entire time. Fitzwilliam complains that as a choleric young man, he hardly trusted himself to listen to such words, presumably those of Marguerite, which touch upon his king's honor, and he asks to be transferred from his post.

But his mistrust focuses on Louise rather than Marguerite: although the king and Louise "speak fair with their mouths" he perceives "well what they think in their hearts."[33] John Taylor, ambassador to France and Burgundy, reported in a letter of 1526 to Wolsey that Marguerite was "a wise and marvellous well-spoken woman…"[34]

A description of the women's reactions to news of the defeat at Pavia and the king's capture shows them rapidly taking control after initially giving expression to their distress. The two were residing in the Abby of Saint-Just outside of Lyon when, on March 1, 1525, they received the news. Sébastien Moreau de Villefranche, *référendaire général* for the duchy of Milan, recounts that Louise, upon hearing that her beloved only son had been taken and forced to submit to his vassal and great enemy, piteously cried and lamented.[35] Marguerite and the whole court, indeed, all the Lyonnais, followed suit. But urged by her advisors to shake off her melancholy, Louise quickly recovered and ordered borders to be secured to prevent invasion by enemies ready to take advantage of the suddenly vulnerable kingdom. She and Marguerite initiated ransom negotiations. François requested that Louise come to negotiate on his behalf, but, occupied with governing, the regent decided to send Marguerite to face the emperor, accompanying her as far as Aigues-Mortes, where the younger woman boarded a ship on August 28 for Spain.[36]

Louise and Marguerite's Humble Personae

In contrast to the formidable personae that they adopted in their political lives, Louise and Marguerite at times represented themselves to each other and their intimates as small, frightened, ill, and helpless. Cardinal Louis of Aragon's remarks on Louise's robust health notwithstanding, as of 1519 she began to suffer from gout, an organic malady aggravated by stress, and other illnesses, and Marguerite, too, reports frequent sickness.[37]

In the three extant letters from Louise to Marguerite during her trip to Spain to negotiate the king's release, the regent discards her forceful and prudent maternal persona in favor of an anxious one. In the first letter, she worriedly hopes that God will continue to work through Marguerite, allowing the accomplishment of their family goal, the return of François to the kingdom. She prays for Marguerite's good health and begs her to send news of her well-being often.[38] In the second, Louise again worries about divine favor.[39] She also doubts that things

are progressing as well for her children as her informants suggest, telling Marguerite that she has sent "another gentleman" to Spain in order to receive the "*veryté nouvelle*," the real truth, about their health. (Louise had reason to worry that she was not being told the whole story: her attachment to her family was perceived as so intense that her family sometimes shielded her from the truth.)[40] In the third letter she recounts the signing of the Treaty of Moore with the English, one of her greatest foreign policy coups, bringing English support against Charles V.[41] Things have turned for the better, the letter affirms. Peace between France and England has been re-established. But Louise could not have endured the situation had it not been for Marguerite's caring for François in Spain. Mother and daughter have suffered greatly, Louise admits, but the deliverance of François will compensate for that.

Louise's small persona is also prominent in a letter of October 1525 to the king where she worries that she will be unable to keep the Parlement of Paris in line during his absence. She assures him that his affairs are order. Still, she pleads, his presence in France is absolutely necessary. In a letter of November 1525 to Jean de Brinon, her *président du conseil* throughout François' captivity, Louise diminishes her and Marguerite's political activity, describing her daughter's trip to Spain as if it were the visit of one sibling to another's sickbed to "see, visit and console the king her brother" rather than a high-stakes diplomatic trip.[42]

These letters show Louise defining herself as a devoted mother devoid of personal political ambition and freely acknowledging that the family's prosperity depended on Marguerite as much as herself. She is utterly dependent on God and her children's well-being for her own, and the accomplishment of the family's goals is her only desire. Recent social theoretical work emphasizes the inextricability of political and libidinal attachments, and within the context of the Trinity, whose political and familial relationships quite literally overlapped, the family created and maintained political attachments, also quite literally, through avowals of love, and they formulated and diffused their political anxieties through avowals of humble dependence.[43]

As for Marguerite, descriptions of herself and Louise as sick and vulnerable characterize her exchange with Briçonnet. From Paris, while the Imperial army sacked Ardres and then laid siege to Mezières, she asks Briçonnet to look upon the blindest of all the people, that is, Marguerite, with pity, and through writings, prayers, and remembering help pull her from the darkness.[44] From Lyon in 1522 she apologizes for bothering

him but insists that she is constrained by necessity to "importune" him "opportunistically" ("*importuner opportuneement*") for "alms:" the court lacked (spiritual) bread.[45] At a particularly difficult period in October 1523 as the royal army prepared to move into Italy and Queen Claude lay ill (she would die the next year), Marguerite assured Briçonnet that his charity was needed nowhere more than in Blois, asking for comfort for herself, an "ungrateful mirror" in which Jesus sees not his image but only filth ("*ordure*"), a mother (Louise) burdened with cares, and a sick queen.[46] In a letter of that same month, Marguerite begs for more crumbs. After requesting pity, she signs herself "*vostre sterile mere*."[47]

But the events of 1524 and 1525—personal losses and the long wait for news about the royal army in Italy—motivate Marguerite's most pitiful representations of herself and her mother. Shortly after March 9, 1525, Marguerite writes from Blois of Louise's frightening illness: a terrible fever accompanied by extreme pain in her side, head, stomach, and spleen. Fortunately, the fever broke, and Louise survived. But if not for Louise's tranquillity before God, Marguerite could not have borne the "multitude and vehemence" of her mother's sufferings.[48] She writes to *Maréchal* Anne de Montmorency of the same illness, that never before had she seen her mother "so quickly enfeebled."[49] Shortly after March 27, she describes her mother's body completely wracked with new and diverse torments in a letter to Briçonnet.[50] On May 4, Marguerite informs Briçonnet of the death of her beloved aunt, Philiberte, expressing the sorrow of the "*compagnie*." Of herself she writes that her imperfect feebleness cannot bear the "indiscretion" of love (that is, its tendency to make itself felt).[51] On July 26, Marguerite informs Briçonnet of Queen Claude's death. She struggles in the opening paragraphs of the letter with the notion that to make hard hearts feel a single spark of incomprehensible divine charity God became man and suffered. And yet, Marguerite cannot understand God's spiritual language any more, indeed, she understands it even less than unreasoning beasts.[52] Louise took the news so hard, she continues, that she began to hemorrhage as if with a terrible fever to the extent that she would not have survived had it not stopped.

The disasters continued. The king's daughter Charlotte fell ill in August. In early September, Marguerite writes from Blois that she has told neither her mother nor her brother of the child's malady, fearing that Louise will be unable to stand the news and that François I already has too much on his mind.[53] On November 18, 1524, Marguerite

writes to Briçonnet of Charlotte's death, which Louise, knowing nothing of the illness, mourned terribly, with one tear following the other, but all the while giving Marguerite the comfort that she, Marguerite, owed Louise.[54] The final blow arrived on March 1, when Marguerite and Louise learned of the defeat of the French army and the capture of François I.

In response to a letter from her recently-captured brother, Marguerite writes of her and Louise's initial despair and compares news of his survival to the appearance of the Holy Spirit after the Passion. The information had filled Louise with such strength that she had redoubled her efforts in the kingdom on his behalf.[55] In a letter to Sigismund von Hohenlohe, reformer and dean of the Cathedral Chapter of Strasbourg, Marguerite describes herself and Louise as "mother and daughter, poor widows, not without affliction."[56] In a letter to the king just before her departure for Spain, she assures him that her fear will not keep her from him. She is so used to the fear of death, prison, and various evils that she associates these with liberty, life, health, glory, and honor. The fears allow her to participate in his fortune.[57]

But Marguerite's fearful persona is nowhere so evident as in the single extant letter from her to her mother, a verse letter composed in 1530 in celebration of the return home of François's two sons, whose release had been procured by Louise in what has come to be known as the Ladies' Peace, signed on August 3 of that year.[58] Although the princes' return was a momentous event, all the more so because they arrived with the king's new bride, the emperor's sister Eleanor, Marguerite could not accompany her brother and mother to Bayonne, where the group from Spain landed, her pregnancy forcing her to remain at Blois. She imagines the celebrating king, Louise, and new queen, a poignant reminder of the family trinity, and entreats them to remember her and how she longs to remain a small point on that perfect triangle.[59]

Bearing the Unbearable, Sharing the Joy

Courtly education for men and women of the time consisted of two incompatible ethical frameworks mandating two different personae with two sets of practices. As morality became increasingly detached from religion from the twelfth century on, even theologians assumed that, in addition to "salvific" virtue, a parallel type ordered morals in political and social activity.[60] Noble men and women would have developed salvific virtue,

which prized Augustinian-based self-abasement, with the aid of their confessors. They would have acquired the second, which demanded minute attention to rank and worldly goods, by observing courtiers steeped in such works as Denis Foulechat's translation of John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, itself an "adaptation of a Ciceronian rhetorical ethics."[61]

Two guides for female comportment to which Louise and Marguerite would have had access, Christine de Pizan's *Livre des trois vertus* and Anne of France's *Enseignements à sa fille*, which owes much to Christine's work, undertake to resolve the tension between the ethical frameworks and their personae. These guidebooks, I suggest, describe the development of the two personae within the still larger framework of the virtuous habitus.

The guidebooks deal specifically with creating effective courtly personae, Christine devoting sections of her text to worldly prudence ("*prudence mondaine*") and justified hypocrisy ("*juste hypocrisie*"), where she praises the "sense and prudence of the wise woman who knows how to dissimulate wisely ("*dissimuler saigement*").[62] Anne instructs her readers to maintain an impassive, docile face with "eyes to observe all and see nothing, ears to hear all and know nothing, a tongue to answer everyone without emitting a prejudicial word."[63]

And yet, both guidebooks are also deeply invested in creating a female subject who admits her helplessness vis-à-vis worldly matters and abandons herself to divine will. Each emphasizes in its opening chapters the need to be constantly aware of God's watchful eye. Christine's narrator goads her reader: "And you, who are a simple little woman, who has no strength, power or authority except given to you by others, do you think that you can dominate and surmount the world at will?"[64] Anne's narrator issues a similar warning: "[H]ave faith in absolutely nothing: not in the intelligence, strength or discernment that you believe yourself to have; rather, live in great fear and always be on your guard so that you will not be fooled…"[65]

The notion of *habitus* clarifies how the guidebooks understand the relationship between the two personae. Originating in the Aristotelian *hexis* (the term has been made famous by Pierre Bourdieu, who uses it to explain how modern social classes reproduce themselves at the individual level, but I am interested here in its medieval usage), the term *habitus* for medieval thinkers referred to an individual's tendency to act in good or evil ways such that the individual became virtuous or evil. Thus, habits and innate disposition (one's predominant humors in medieval thinking)

stood in a reciprocal relationship: the repetition of good or evil deeds affected one's innate disposition. The notion can thus be productively compared to Reddy's "emotives," to which I referred in my opening paragraphs. For Reddy, emotion occurs when "an array of loosely linked thought material is activated, simultaneously, and translated by the subject into a socially-produced form of expression." But, most pertinent here, these forms of expression, emotives, are self-altering; that is, they both translate the mass of thought material and modify the speaker, the speaker taking on the emotion that she describes.[66]

Ambrose, Augustine, and other Church Fathers refer to *habitus*, but Aquinas gives it a detailed examination in the *Summa Theologica*, placing a long section devoted to it (ST 1a2ae, 49–89) just after an analysis of the passions (ST 1a2ae, 22–48).[67] Passions are of the body, but, in humans, subject to reason. However, reason's control is not absolute, because, being of the body, the passions are incited by organic conditions and may arrive suddenly and intensely (ST 1a2ae, 24). Aquinas then turns to how passions are modulated by reason in a discussion of what he calls *habitus*, the acquired disposition through which an individual processes passion. Drawing on Aristotle, he explains that *habitus*, developed through repetition, integrates passions and reason (ST 1a2ae, 51, especially article 2).

Although Christine and Anne advocate the development of two separate personae, their mandates that the lady obey God and acknowledge her own essential weakness come first in their instructions. Through regular, heartfelt devotion, the lady will develop a virtuous *habitus*, so that even when enacting courtly norms of rank and engaging in politics, she will safely process the passions that come with court life; she will integrate reason and passion, to take up Aquinas's formula.[68] To return to Louise and Marguerite, then, it is not accurate to imagine their double personae as an exterior courtly attitude masking a frightened interior, as I noted earlier. The personae, as Christine and Anne demonstrate, are interdependent, exerting checks on each other, although enacted at different times in different situations. Thus, they both move between inner and outer, all the more so given "premodern beliefs that the body was filled with moving currents of air in the bloodstream, that the air taken within the body became part of the stuff of consciousness"; in other words, that bodies were not tightly contained.[69] I will return to this point.

The purpose of the formidable political persona that I have been describing is evident, and, although much could be said about how

certain words and gestures might create the confidence necessary to act, in what remains I have space only to briefly discuss the fearful persona. As I have just suggested, this persona was central to the ethics of court life that Christine and Anne propose. But to fully appreciate this persona's emotional purpose, it is necessary to turn from Reddy, for whom bodies are bounded (an individual's emotions remain within him or her), to Teresa Brennan. Affective piety of the late Middle Ages prized compassion, redistributing grief through figures like the Virgin at the foot of the cross or the suffering Christ: affects have an "energetic dimension," writes Brennan, and "they can enhance or deplete."[70] The transmission of affect "was once conscious to some degree in Europe (we do not know how far) but is now (generally) unconscious there and throughout the West," she explains.[71] Our ancestors sensed that "complex human affects are communicated by chemical and electrical entrainment…"[72]

Keeping Reddy's emotives and Brennan's transfer of affect in mind, I turn back to Marguerite, first, to a particularly rich set of letters between her and Briçonnet composed during the difficult months in the spring of 1524. Marguerite, describing the burdensome tasks that she had assumed because of Louise's illness, employs the emotives of religious devotion, writing that "all these things that I know to be naturally unbearable to me without any aid, the Almighty carried them without my feeling it in flesh or spirit."[73] It is not important here to make a convincing case for the reality of affective transmission: what matters is that Marguerite is not writing metaphorically. She and Briçonnet believe that pain can be shared, in this case through prayer, and thus mitigated, or, to put it another way, that what we would think of as agency can be dispersed among different subjects. Briçonnet responds by reinforcing Marguerite's idea: "We are relieved of our great tribulations only through conformity to the will of the Almighty. Mere flesh and blood are incapable of bearing the things that He who carries all for us makes us bear joyfully, carrying our sins and even ourselves…"[74] Later he writes that "[s]harpness of infirmity is bearable for the one who has suffered all, carrying and bearing through his mercy our falls and stumblings, having carried all for us, but still suffering with us ('*compatissant*') in our infirmity."[75]

To return now to the points that early modern bodies were filled with moving air and that innate disposition was conceived of as humoral, the transfer of affect is affected in part by means of the humors. Marguerite's language reveals her hope of heating her cold, dark humors so that she will eventually be able to ascend earthly cares. Early in their

correspondence she had marvelled that Briçonnet and Master Michel's letters had opened her eyes, turning her toward the light, and she begs that they continue to write to her so that her "poor frozen heart, dead with the cold, might feel the spark of love and be consumed by it and burn to a cinder."[76] She refers to her frozen heart in a number of letters. The burning love that Marguerite seeks, I suggest, is the literal heat, transmitted to her through the letters, and which, according to humoral theory, could transform cold, dark, and negative melancholy to a positive version, white and natural bile ("*candida bilis et naturalis*").[77] Such fiery love, in turn, had the capacity to generate a vision of true wisdom.

In a more mundane context, Louise and Marguerite speak literally when they note the material effects of good and bad news on their bodies, which transferred emotion in a "two-way, inward and outward movement."[78] Louise expresses her reciprocal transmission of emotion with her captured son through the imagery of a single heart: they share, through their love, one heart, one will, and one thought.[79] Mother and daughter send the newly captured king a joint letter supplicating that the letter presented to François be "received with the affection" ("*afecyon*")—meaning here a literal movement of the soul—that they send him with all their hearts.[80] A more everyday way of expressing the transmission was to describe the physical results of good news. In a letter begging the king that, if God gives her the grace to be able to journey to Spain to see him, he should let her know what she should do and whom she should bring, Marguerite assures her brother that although Louise had been assailed by gout and cares the day before, the pleasure ("*aise*") that hope of his release had vanquished the pain so that it was just bit of inflammation. Louise was so happy that Marguerite had no complaints to pass on ("*que je ne la plains de nul mal*").[81] In December of the same year, Marguerite, then in Madrid, writes to the king that she had received a letter from Louise with the news that, although her gout had been very bad, news of the king's good health had completely cured her of all pain.[82]

To conclude, Marguerite expresses her understanding of how emotion works—as affective transmission and as based in the humors—in the letter of 1530 to Louise to which I referred above. In the first lines of the poem, she assumes her fearful persona, ruefully remarking on the futility of the letter that she is composing and hoping that her mother will not be offended by her, Marguerite's, descriptions of her immense joy at the homecoming. Such description is unnecessary, she writes: Louise

already recognizes Marguerite's happiness because they share the emotion. It is written in Louise's flesh, indeed, engraved on the tablets of her heart ("*Ce que partez escript en vostre chair…gravé sur les tables/De vostre cueur*"). Marguerite thus contents herself with reproducing, although in a fainter version, her mother's experience, explaining that she simply reiterates what is already manifest elsewhere. Although her letter adds nothing new to the happy occasion, which properly belongs to Louise, a thin line of smoke issuing from the great flame of joy ("*yssant de la grant flamme de ceste joye*") in Marguerite's heart, via the "tube" that is her pen, bears witness to the contents of her burning heart.[83] Although the smoke—her writing—disperses quickly in the wind, the fire in her heart causes her to live by, in, and for Louise.[84] Marguerite "burns" in response to the shared joy, and, although she does not speak explicitly of the humors, we can imagine that when thus heated, the black bile that had held her in a negative state of melancholy became yellow, thereby transforming her melancholy into a positive state. The ardent Marguerite shares her family's joy even though physically distant. Louise has her grandsons before her very eyes.[85] Others have described the joy written on Louise's face, but only Marguerite senses the liqueur that flows through her mother's veins, intoxicating her.[86] Marguerite and Louise share a mutual will, so much that Fortune, vanquished by the mother, comes after the daughter; in other words, Fortune has been foiled by Louise's joy and so prevents Marguerite from joining the family reunion, from being in the one place she longs to be.[87]

The royal family drew upon the image of the royal Trinity to glorify the king and authorize Louise and Marguerite's political activity on his behalf. But they also used the image among themselves to express their love for each other. Louise's attachment to her son has been compared unfavorably at times to her feelings for her daughter.[88] And yet, the mother willingly shared her own glory by making her daughter an integral part of royal family politics, something that she did not need to do.[89] The payoff for this inclusion can be gleaned by returning to the image of the Trinity. As Richard of St. Victor had once explained in a treatise on the Holy Trinity to which evangelical author Jacques Lefèvre d'Etaples devoted a commentary in 1519, perfect love shows itself not just in reciprocal love between two, but also in the shared love of two for another.[90] Louise and Marguerite, as I hope to have shown, were each other's pillars of support, their mutual desire to support Francois strengthening their own relationship. In their intense attention to their

own and each other's weakness and their avowals of dependency, they shared their burdens and joys, engaging in a "perfect love" that heartened them until Louise's death in 1531. To return to my opening paragraph, Marguerite's anxious persona was anything but a mere epistolary convention. It was a central element in a sustaining emotional regime.

Notes

1. Guillaume Briçonnet and Marguerite d'Angoulême, *Correspondance, 1521–1524*, eds. Christine Martineau and Michel Veissière and Henry Heller, 2 vols., (Geneva: Droz, 1975–1979), 1:25. All translations are mine except where noted.
2. On Marguerite's correspondence with Briçonnet see Katherine Kong, *Lettering the Self in Medieval and Early Modern France* (Boydell and Brewer: Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK, 2010), especially 153–162, here 157. I use the term "persona," following Gerald A. Bond, to mean the partly-conscious but ingrained adoption of norms of comportment within a particular social situation. It is "something like 'a character/role staged in public primarily through discourse'" which applies "equally well to the sound of individual social existence as to the individual voice of rhetorical invention." The concept, Bond continues "floats between 'a being with speech' and 'a speech with being, sincerity and deception, society and art.'" *The Loving Subject: Desire, Eloquence and Power in Romanesque France* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 6.
3. William Reddy uses the expressions "emotional regimes" and "emotives" (the language used to discuss one's emotions) in *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See especially 121–129.
4. As an example of such emotives, we might recall the laments of the seven penitential psalms, present in Books of Hours. I discuss the similarities between training for diplomats and noblewomen in "Married Noblewomen as Diplomats: Affective Diplomacy," *Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder*, ed. Susan Broomhall (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate), 51–65. Success in both cases depended on the ability to hide one's own emotions while reading those of one's interlocutors.
5. See Anne-Marie Lecoq's discussion of the Trinity in *François I imaginaire: Symbolique et politique à l'aube de la Renaissance française* (Paris: Editions Macula, 1987), 393–433.
6. "[H]e assured her, on behalf of God, that she would have two children, a girl and a boy; he prayed her to raise them well and instruct them to fear

God, especially because her son would be not only a great prince, but also king of the French." Hilarion de Coste, *Les Éloges et les vies des reynes, des princesses et des dames illustres*, 2 vols. (Paris: Cramoisy, 1647), 2: 160.

7. See Elizabeth McCartney, "The King's Mother and Royal Prerogative in Early-Sixteenth-Century France," *Medieval Queenship*, ed. John Carmi Parsons (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 117–141.
8. Female regency was often contested. See McCartney, "The King's Mother."
9. See McCartney, "The King's Mother" and Lecoq, *Francois Ier imaginaire*, 69–117.
10. Bibliothèque Nationale française, français 12247, viewable on Gallica.
11. Bibliothèque Nationale française, français 2285, viewable on Gallica.
12. Bibliothèque Nationale française, français 5715.
13. Aimé-Louis Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité de François Ier* (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1847), 1 and 4.
14. Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, 420.
15. Gilbert Jacqueton, *La Politique extérieure de Louise de Savoie: relations diplomatiques de la France et de l'Angleterre pendant la captivité de Francis Ier* (*1525–1526*) (Paris: Émile Bouillon, 1892), 431.
16. See Cédric Michon, "Le Rôle politique de Louise de Savoie," *Louise de Savoie* (*1476–1531*), eds. Pascal Brioist, Laure Fagnard, Cédric Michon (Rennes: Coédition Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2015), 106–107.
17. "Complexion" here must be understood in Leonardo da Vinci's sense, as "connot[ing] a person's whole physiological and temperamental makeup." See Piers D. Britton, "(Hu)moral Exemplars: Type and Temperament in Cinquecento Painting," *Visualizing Medieval Medicine and Natural History, 1200–1550*," eds. Jean A. Givens, Karen M. Reeds, Alain Touwaide (Ashgate: Aldershot, England, 2006), 177.
18. Antonio De Beatis (1913) *Voyage du cardinal d'Aragon en Allemagne, Hollande, Belgique, France et Italie* (*1517–1518*) trans. Madeleine Havard de la Montagne (Paris: Perrin, 1913), 137.
19. *Letters and Papers*, *Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII*, ed. J. S. Brewer et al., 21 vols. (London: HMSO, 1862–1932), 3: 9 July 1521, no. 1404, p. 566–567.
20. *Letters and Papers*, 3: 28 July 1521, no. 1441.
21. *Letters and Papers*, 3: 5 August 1521, no. 29 (appendix).
22. *Letters and Papers*, 3: 9 October 1521, no. 1651.
23. *Letters and Papers*, 3: 8 September 1522, no. 2522.
24. See, for example, *Letters and Papers*, 4: nos. 1692–1694, 1697, 1701–1702.
25. On the challenge, see the Registers of the Parlement of Paris, printed in Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, 393–402, especially 396–397. On this

period in Louise's career, see also Michon, "Le Rôle politique de Louise de Savoie," 180–181.

26. Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantôme, *Oeuvres completes*, ed. Ludovic Lalanne, 11 vols., (Paris: Renouard, 1864–1882), 8: 117.
27. See for example Briçonnet's letter of December 1522, regarding the denunciation of Michel d'Arande before the Parlement. Briçonnet cautions Marguerite to "couvrir le feu" (cover the fire) for a time. *Correspondance,* 1: 230.
28. *Letters and Papers*, 4: July 8, 1525, no. 1484.
29. *Letters and Papers*, 4: July 9, 1525, no. 1485.
30. Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, 359.
31. *Letters and Papers*, 3: September 13, 1521, no. 1569.
32. *Letters and Papers*, 3: September 15, 1521, no. 1581.
33. See Anne Lake Prescott's fascinating analysis of Marguerite as seen by English diplomats on this letter. Prescott assumes that Fitzwilliam's comment about "my Lady's fair words" refers to Marguerite. However, it must refer to Louise because Fitzwilliam consistently calls Marguerite the "king's sister," applying "my Lady" to Louise. "And then she fell on a great laughter: English Diplomats Read Marguerite de Navarre," *Culture and Change: Attending to Early Modern Women*, eds. Margaret Mikesell and Adele Seeff (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003), 50.
34. *Letters and Papers*, 4: April 4, 1526, no. 2068.
35. Cited in Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, 81. The Registers of the Parlement of Paris report that when news that the king was ill reached her, she retired for a long time to the monastery of the Celestins where no one could reach her. *Captivité*, 394.
36. On this frenzied period, see Cédric Michon et al., *Les Conseillers de François Ier* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011), 199–200.
37. Gout followed sadness, among other causes. See Roy Porter and G. S. Rousseau, *Gout: The Patrician Malady* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 23.
38. Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, 328.
39. Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, 329.
40. In a letter from 1523, Marguerite notes that the little prince Charles was sick and that Louise made herself sick taking care of him. See *Lettres de Marguerite d'Angoulême*, ed. François Génin (Paris: Renouard, 1841), 161. As François observes in a letter to Marguerite, Louise's grandchildren are her *seconde chaire* (François and Marguerite being her *première chaire*). *Lettres de Marguerite d'Angoulême*, 271.
41. See summary in *Letters and Papers*, 4: November 1525, no. 1797.
42. Jaqueton, *La Politique extérieure de Louise de Savoie*, 339.

43. The recent literature on political engagement and love is vast. For an accessible discussion of some of the main stakes of the discussion, see for example Lauren Berlant's "A Properly Political Concept of Love: Three Approaches in Ten Pages," *Cultural Anthropology*, 26 (2011): 683–691.
44. *Correspondance*, 1: 37.
45. *Correspondance*, 1: 194.
46. *Correspondance*, 2: 63.
47. *Correspondance* 2: 66–67.
48. *Correspondance* 2: 134.
49. Pierre Jourda, "Marguerite de Navarre, Lettres inédites," *Revue du seizième siècle*, 15 (1928): 106.
50. *Correspondance* 2: 142.
51. *Correspondance* 2: 155.
52. *Correspondance* 2: 229–230.
53. *Correspondance*, 2: 261.
54. *Correspondance*, 2: 272.
55. *Nouvelles lettres de la reine de Navarre: adressées au roi François Ier, son frère*, ed. François Génin (Paris: Crapelet, 1842), 27.
56. *Lettres de Marguerite d'Angoulême,* 180. On the relationship, see Jonathan Reid, *King's Sister—Queen of Dissent: Marguerite of Navarre (1492–1549) and her Evangelical Network*, 2 vols., (Leiden: Brill), 2: 342.
57. *Nouvelles lettres de la reine de Navarre,* 40.
58. On the Ladies' Peace, see Joycelyne Gledhill Russell, *Diplomats at Work: Three Renaissance Studies* (Wolfeboro Falls, NH: Alan Sutton Publishing Inc, 1992), 94–158.
59. Marguerite de Navarre, *Selected Writings: A Bilingual Edition*, ed. and trans. Rouben Cholakian and Mary Skemp (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 50, line 89.
60. See István P. Bejczy, "The Problem of Natural Virtue," *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, eds. István P. Bejczy and Richard G. Newhauser (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 133–154.
61. Dallas G. Denery II, "Christine Against the Theologians: The Virtue of Lies in The Book of the Three Virtues," *Viator*, 39 (2008): 246.
62. Christine de Pizan, *Le Livre des trois vertus*, eds. Charity Cannon Willard and Eric Hicks (Paris, Champion, 1989), 55.
63. Anne de France, *Enseignements à sa fille. Histoire du siège de Brest*, ed. Eliane Viennot (Saint-Etienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Etienne, 2006), 45–46.
64. Christine de Pizan, *Trois Vertus*, 20.
65. Anne de France, *Enseignements*, 40.
66. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 110–111.

67. All references to the *Summa Theologica* (ST) from http://www.newadvent.org/summa/, accessed 10-20-2015.
68. See especially ST 1a2ae, 54, article 4.
69. Gail Kern Paster, *Humoring the Body* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 41. See also Michael C. Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 10.
70. Teresa Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 6.
71. Brennan, *Transmission of Affect*, 18.
72. Brennan, *Transmission of Affect*, 97.
73. *Correspondance*, 2: 143.
74. *Correspondance*, 2: 144.
75. *Correspondance*, 2: 148.
76. *Correspondance*, 1: 33.
77. Citation of Agrippa of Nettesheim's "Occulta philosophia," *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art*, eds. Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl, (London: Nelson, 1964), 355.
78. Kerns, *Humoring the Body*, 41.
79. Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, 109.
80. Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, 142. As Godefroy defines "affection": "an agreeable or painful modification that the soul feels, a movement that brings the soul towards or distances it from a thing." *Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française, et de tous ses dialectes du IXe au XVe siècle* (Paris: Librarie des sciences et des arts, 1937–1938).
81. *Nouvelles lettres de la reine de Navarre*, 37–38.
82. *Nouvelles lettres de la reine de Navarre*, 53.
83. *Selected Writings: A Bilingual Edition*, 59, line 18.
84. *Selected Writings: A Bilingual Edition*, 60, line 26.
85. *Selected Writings: A Bilingual Edition*, 61, lines 71–73.
86. *Selected Writings: A Bilingual Edition*, 61, line 67.
87. *Selected Writings: A Bilingual Edition*, 63, line 108.
88. It has been assumed that beneath Marguerite's devotion to her brother, her "original radical displacement must still have rankled." See Susan Snyder, "Guilty Sisters: Marguerite de Navarre, Elizabeth of England, and the Miroir de l'âme Pécheresse," *Renaissance Quarterly* 50 (1997): 440.
89. Leah Middlebrook suggests that Louise enlisted Marguerite to guarantee that the older woman's body would not be sexualized: "in celebrating Louise as a mother, the family and their councilors inadvertently brought her image back onto the terrain of female sexuality," "'Tout mon office':

Body Politics and Family Dynamics in the Verse Epîtres of Marguerite de Navarre," *Renaissance Quarterly*, 54 (2001): 1120. The Trinity allowed Louise to "displace associations with the body and sexuality from the Regent onto her daughter" (1111).

90. See Anne Hunt, *The Trinity: Insights from the Mystics* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2010), 63–70, and Jacob Vance, "Twelfth and Sixteenth Century Renaissance Discourses on Meditation and Contemplation. Lefèvre d'Etaples' Commentary on Richard of St. Victor's *Trinity*," *Meditatio—Refashioning the Self: Theory and Practice in Late Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual Culture*, eds. Karl Enenkel and Walter Melion (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 153–180.

CHAPTER 5

Emotions of the Past in Catherine de Medici's Correspondence

Susan Broomhall

This essay explores emotional performances about the past in the letters of Catherine de Medici (1519–1589). It analyzes Catherine's interpretation of emotional experiences at the court of her husband Henri II (1519–1559) and that of his father François I (1494–1547), into which she arrived as a fourteen-year-old in 1533. At various key moments in her correspondence, Catherine recalled either her own feelings during particular historic events, or those of other protagonists at key political and historical moments. In narrating emotional behaviors for a range of specific political purposes in her letters, Catherine produced new interpretations of the past for the present. Her textual emotional performances articulated an almost melancholic longing at times for what Catherine perceived as France's glorious past under earlier Valois kings, a historiography that served her contemporary political agenda.

Catherine's letters were carefully structured creations with a powerful emotional dimension. Not only did she draw individuals into affective

S. Broomhall (✉)
Centre of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, The University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6907, Australia
e-mail: susan.broomhall@uwa.edu.au

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_5

networks through her epistolary practice, but she employed an explicit vocabulary articulating feelings in precise contexts for particular readers and sought to prime their feelings through material qualities such as handwritten passages or missives delivered at key moments. She was thus a skillful rhetorician who employed emotional, social and material strategies to achieve personal, dynastic and national goals through correspondence.[1] Her works, spanning a lifetime engaged in high politics, involved a negotiated textual interlocution between at least authors, amanuenses, and a broad range of readers that included family members, foreign monarchs, ambassadors abroad, and courtly networks, among others. Here I focus on letters from Catherine to her sons, the kings Charles IX and Henri III. These were documents with a relatively restricted audience of courtly retainers and her own family members. The analysis to follow embraces both historical and literary dimensions, exploring her use of literary, textual, and social practices that ranged from explicit emotional word use and management of textual tone to the precise historical and political contexts in which these evocations of historic emotions were now located.

Emotions as Performances of Political Authority

Catherine's rhetorical, material, and social performances of emotion were an active component in her enactment of particular presentations of self for specific contexts, and they functioned frequently to facilitate forms of alignments, connections, and belonging between Catherine and her anticipated interlocutors in these textual interactions. My analysis of Catherine's gendered emotional performances follows insights developed by Judith Butler concerning the construction of gendered selves through the ongoing practice of acts legitimate to that culture, as "performativity."[2] I also draw upon an anthropological literature regarding modern concepts of nostalgia to understand its expression, following Kathleen Stewart, as a cultural practice that creates "a frame for meaning," arguing that to "narrate is to place oneself in an event and a scene—to make an interpretive space—and to relate something to someone: to make an interpretive space that is relationship and in which meanings have direct social referents."[3] Catherine's evocation of the past not only produced a compelling identity for herself in contemporary political events but also for others. As this section explores, Catherine's interpretation of historical emotional experiences emphasized her extensive political experience

as an actor and observer within courtly life for many years, while her rhetorical performances of feelings structured her letters as intimate acts designed to shape the emotional engagement of her readers. They positioned Catherine as an authoritative advisor and persuasively visualized her sons as powerful monarchs and inheritors of a potent Valois political project.

Catherine was a keen student of history and she drew upon relevant examples to perform a particular perception of herself in the eyes of others. In 1569, the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Correro, reported how Catherine had once confessed to him in a moment of seemingly intimate reflection how she managed emotional challenges by situating her experiences in relation to those of queens past.

> si consolava con questa osservanza antica, che sempre nelle minorità de i re i principali son soliti tumultuare, per causa del governo…aver letto… una cronica scritta a penna, nella quale vidde che la madre del re San Luigi rimase vedova col figliulo, che non aveva più di undici anni: e subito i grandi del regno si sollevarno mormorandi di non voler esser governati da una donna, e donna forastiera.
>
> (she consoled herself by remembering that, during the minority of kings, the nobles and grandees of the kingdom always rise up to make trouble because of the state of the government…she had read…a handwritten chronicle that explained how the mother of King Saint Louis found herself a widow with a son who was not more than eleven years old; and immediately the nobles of the kingdom rose up to protest being governed by a woman, and especially a foreign woman).[4]

Blanche of Castille, a mother struggling to protect the political inheritance of her son, was perceived as an outsider, just as was Catherine in many influential propaganda texts, despite being half-French and possessed of substantial territories in the kingdom in her own right through her mother. Catherine's choice of the historic, foreign queen was a powerful exemplar to highlight in a conversation with the sympathetic Florentine ambassador at the French court.[5]

Moreover, Catherine used historical examples to judge her own powers in the French political hierarchy. For example, on the first occasion that Henri left her to preside over his council with the chancellor, Jean Bertrandi, in April 1552, Catherine was quick to assess whether her authority matched that given historically to queens in her place.

As André Guillard du Mortier (c1495–1568), the pre-eminent intendant of finances and a member of the privy council, reported to the *connétable* Anne de Montmorency (1493–1567), Catherine had intimated that she had seen the power given to Louise de Savoy (1476–1531), as regent for François I, and had complained that "*feu madite Dame eut une ampliation telle que l'on n'y eust sçeu rien adjouter: & de plus elle n'auoit point de Compagnon comme il semble que l'on luy veüille bailler Monsieur le garde des Sceaux [Bertrandi]*" (the late Lady had such amplitude that she could not wish for more, and moreover, she had had no Companion as it seemed she was to have in Monsieur the Keeper of the Seals).[6] Catherine's apparent dissatisfaction was reported back to Henri and her powers were clarified. She would go on to serve several more times as a regent during Henri II's absences on military campaign.[7] As these examples suggest, Catherine's knowledge of historical precedents could prove a productive resource of emotional support and political positioning.

A significant target audience for Catherine's emotional history lessons was her own sons. These lessons were implicitly a contribution to contemporary historiography, in the sense that Catherine asserted ideas about a not-too-distant past before the era of the religious wars, a time during which she had been a leading protagonist, although the presentations of her identity created in these works were designed for a restricted and specific readership—her own children—and with the particular pressures of their royal duties and contexts in mind. Women had always passed on courtly ritual traditions and conventions derived from their own observations of earlier courts, but more typically these were shared among women.[8] Catherine, too, was involved in advising on matters of courtly etiquette in just such ways.[9] Likewise, in the examples that are our focus here, Catherine's discussion of the past frequently stemmed from her own observations and experiences at the courts of Henri II and François I. About her own feelings and those of others in these events, she could speak authoritatively in her own right and such examples highlighted her extensive experience at the highest levels of political life for many years. However, here, Catherine crossed over from political advice to other women, to recommendations on courtly behaviors proffered to men, indeed kings. As this section explores, this required particular rhetorical strategies to position herself as a legitimate counselor.

Around September 1563, Catherine produced a lengthy memoir for the young king Charles IX (1550–1574), which provided a practical political blueprint for rule.[10] In August, the young king had reached his

political majority, taking over the reins of government from Catherine. The violence and instability of warring religious and political factions promised a challenging context in which to establish the authority of this inexperienced young man. Importantly, Catherine situated her proposed strategies within male authoritative vocabularies of power, as those of successful Valois dynastic political exercise. Significantly, Catherine's advice for her son was founded upon strategic manipulation of emotions. She located her recommendations for his rule by drawing on her interpretation of emotional practices of the past, principally, but not exclusively, upon her observations of the successful implementation of similar policies in previous reigns, particularly the courts of François I and Henri II. These were strategies that set out a precise structure for the king's schedule and for the entire spatial and social organization of the court: "*ce que j'estime aussi nécessaire pour vous faire obéir à tout vostre royaunme, et … le revoir en l'estat auquel il a esté par le passé, durent les règnes des Rois Messeigneurs vos père et grand-père*" (what I consider necessary so that you are obeyed by all your realm, and … to see it in the state that it was in the past, during the reigns of the Kings your father and grandfather).[11] Her advice offered men whom Catherine had known personally and who had been deeply influential in her own political development as exemplars for her son to follow.[12] She spoke to her sons in the absence of their father, offering them the example of a long line of father figures in her historical presentation. Catherine's document was not an emotional mirror for princes in the sense that it focused primarily on her son's moral development. Rather, it identified emotions as vital to political rule, noting feelings that could threaten the power of the crown, and offering tactics of courtly emotional management that could socialize crucial political participants into alignment with the interests of the king, so that the court be "*remise avec l'honneur et police que j'y ay veue autrefois* while explicitly" (re-established with the honor and governance that I saw in the old days).[13]

Importantly, Catherine set an informal tone in her text. Its phrasing suggested an intimate conversation between mother and son. Catherine subtly lightened the tone of heavy, detailed instructions that she outlined with intermittent rhetorical breaks: "*J'ay oublié ung autre poinct, qui est bien nécessaire qui mectiez peine, et cela se fera aisément, si le trouvez bon*" (I forgot another point, which is most necessary to pay attention to, and it will be easily done, if you find it good).[14] These recommendations were not so much advice that could be considered by her son,

however, but were rather more firm instruction that Catherine likely expected her son to follow. As such, it had to be delicately handled. Catherine repeatedly stressed the love for her son that underpinned her recommendations:

> Je vous ay bien voulu mectre tout cecy de la façon que je l'ay vu tenir aux Roys vostre père et grand-père, pour les avoir veus tans aimez et honorez de leurs subjects, et en estoient si contens, que pour le désire que j'ai de vous veoir de mesmes, j'ay pensé que je ne pouvois donner meileur conseil que de vous régler comme eulx.
>
> (I very much wanted you to put all this in the way that I saw it done under the Kings your father and grandfather, having seen them so loved and honored by their subjects, and being so happy, that for the desire that I have to see you the same, I thought that I could not give you better counsel than to organize yourself as they did).[15]

Her suggestions were also interspersed with reflections and admonitions of Charles' current behavior. She recommended that he "*ne passer les dix heures pour aller à la messe, que comme en avoit accoustumé au Roys voz père et grand-père, que tous les princes et seigneurs vous accompagnassent, et non comme je vous voys aller que n'avez que voz archers*" (not go to mass later than ten o'clock, as the Kings your father and grandfather were accustomed to do, [and] that all the princes and lords accompany you and not as I see you go with just your archers).[16] Beyond disciplining, Catherine exerted pressure upon her son by strenuously emphasizing her own feelings about these recommendations: "*Aussi je vous diray que du temps du Roy Louy douziesme vostre aieul, qu'il avoit une façon que je désirerois infiniement que vous voulussiez prendre*" (also I will say to you that in the time of King Louis XII your ancestor, he had a way that I would very much like you to take up).[17]

Similarly, in August 1574, Catherine produced an important memoir for Henri III (1551–1589), who had assumed the throne of France that year. For example, among the points of advice that she conveyed via his administrator Philippe Hurault, Count of Cheverny (1528–1599), was that Henri should be sure to award offices to those whose merits made them worthy and reliable in such posts, and who would keep control in the regions on behalf of the monarch, "*coment solouit fayre le roy Louys et depuis le Roy son grent père*" (as King Louis and your grandfather

the king since, knew how to do).[18] Catherine's recommendation was to engage officials through self-interest to obedience and service to the king's interest.

The maintenance of Henri's personal authority as monarch was a crucial facet of his rule in Catherine's view, and one she insisted upon repeatedly across her correspondence with him. She continued to be vexed over what she perceived as Henri's lack of attention to his political authority. When Henri had left administration in the hands of his mother and his secretaries while on spiritual retreat, Catherine lamented to secretary of state, Nicolas Neufville de Villeroy (1543–1617), the risks that her son ran: "*la dévotyon ayst bonne, et le Roy son père eun a fets dé voyages à Cléry et à Saint-Martyn-de-Tours; mès il ne layset rien de cet qu'il falloyt pour fayre ses afayres*" (devotion is good, and the king his father made voyages to Cléry and to Saint-Martin-de-Tours, but he never neglected anything that was required for his affairs).[19] Catherine argued that it was a mother's love that drove her to protect her son so fiercely. She had earlier contextualized her work to foster a peace at Étigny that was to be signed on May 7, 1576, by explaining to Henri:

> je panse en vous auvrent mon coeur, et vous diré tousjour librement la verité que je conserve ma vie, car en desirant la pays et le repos de cet royaume, je panse conserver la vostre et vostre aultorité; et par consequant conserver moy-mesme mon aultorité et tout cet que me peult fayr vivre heureuse et contente; car san vous je ne veulx poynt aystre.
>
> (I think that in opening my heart to you and telling you freely the truth, I am saving my life, for in desiring peace in this realm, I am also maintaining yours and your authority; and consequently preserving myself, my authority and all that can make me content; for I do not want to exist without you).[20]

Catherine then exerted additional emotional pressure on her son by reminding him of the challenging circumstances she had faced since the death of his father. She asked him to follow her advice:

> pour l'amour de moy, et me tiendré reconpansaye de tous lé maulx et travaulx que j'é eu depuis la mort du Roy monseigneur vostre pere; lesquelz n'ont aysté que pour vous conserver, avent que fusiés cet que ayste, l'auctorité, que aviés, avent partir, en cet royaume; car pour vous guarder, n'é voleu que neul l'eust, qui ha esté cause de tout le mal que l'on m'a voleu et vault.

> (for love of me, and I will consider myself compensated for all the troubles and work that I have had since the death of the king my lord your father; which has only been to protect you before you were what you are now, the authority that you had, before leaving [for the throne of Poland in 1573], in this realm; to protect you, I wanted nothing but that no one else should have it, which has been the cause of all the trouble that one wished and still wishes on me).[21]

Catherine anticipated the naysayers surrounding Henri who might counter her views. She called upon the debt that he owed his mother for her suffering and tribulations experienced on his behalf in the years past in order to enact authority befitting his role and the dynastic heritage of which he was part.

In these discussions, Catherine voiced an identity that was both a powerful political agent and a mother. These were not oppositional characteristics but part of one identity performance in this instance. She continually reminded her sons of the vast political experience that she brought to bear in her advice, while explicitly positioning herself rhetorically as a mother speaking to her children. In the absence of their own father, she crafted for her sons an emotionally powerful line of father figures upon whom to model themselves. As an experienced political interlocutor and mother caring for sons without a father, Catherine suggested, she was required to speak her mind in their interests and to bring her knowledge of past behaviors and feelings to bear on present political realities.

Emotional and Affective Performances of Rule

Catherine's advice to her sons bears witness to what appears to be a remarkable degree of attention to emotional power. While other contemporaries provided more conventional education and counsel to kings about their political role, Catherine's candid attention to feelings and emotions as a form of power in these texts with a relatively restricted circulation was more unusual. Her documents provide rich evidence, first, of her interpretation of historic emotional and affective rituals, engagements, and tones, and second, of an emotive interpretation of the past for the present. Her recommendations for her sons' comportment as monarchs and as the individual who set the emotional and moral tone for the court were performances of affective as well as emotional practices. The kinds of behaviors that Catherine suggested can be fruitfully

analyzed through the lens of "emotional labor," a conceptualization by sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild, who has argued, in the modern workplace context, that certain roles require particular cognitive emotion work, affective comportment, and emotional expression for successful achievement.[22] As shall be explored in this section, Catherine was likewise recommending to her son a considered performance of particular facial and corporeal emotional display designed to regulate the moral and emotional tone of the court.

In the memoir that Catherine had prepared for her son, Charles IX, one of the key emphases was the political significance of establishing rituals for masculine sociability in intimate courtly spaces. These enabled the formation of "exclusive groups that defined themselves as discrete cohorts through specific social and emotional behaviours."[23] For example, Catherine recollected

> pour contenter vostre noblesse, faire comme faisoit le feu Roy vostre père; car quand il prenoit sa chemise, et que les habillements entroient, tous les princes, gentilzhommes de la chambre, maistres d'Hostel, gentilzhommes servans entroient lors, et il parloit à eux, et le voioient, ce qui les contentoit beaucoup…et au soir, le Roy se désabilloit en la présence de ceulx qui, au matin, entroient, qu'on portoit les habillemens.
>
> (to make your nobility happy, do as the late King your father did, for when he took his shirt, and the clothes were brought in, all the princes, gentleman of the chamber, *maîtres d'hôtel*, serving gentleman entered then, and he spoke to them, and saw them, which made them very happy…and in the evening the King undressed in the presence of those who, in the morning, entered as they carried in his clothing).[24]

Such activities created powerful political, social, and emotional bonds that placated elite men by offering controlled access to political representation. As Catherine suggested, "*Si faisiez de mesme, cela les contenteroit fort, pour estre chose accoustumée de tous temps aux Rois voz père et grand-père*" (if you do the same, this will make them most happy, as the usual practice since the time of the Kings your father and grandfather).[25] These gendered spaces of restricted access and visibility around the king generated deep emotional satisfaction for senior men at the court while also positioning them firmly under the monarch that they served. They were emotionally resonant rituals of sociability that created cohesion between male courtiers while also reinforcing courtly hierarchies and the authority of the king.

Catherine identified further ritualized activities that created other opportunities for a select few to access the king in politically strategic and emotionally satisfying forms. Catherine suggested a range of pleasurable and physical activities, including both sexes, which distracted the court from an appetite for political intervention.

> sur les trois heures après midy, vous alliez vous promener à pied ou à cheval, affin de vous monstrer et contenter la noblesse, et passer vostre temps avec ceste dernière à quelque exercise honneste…cela les contentera tous beaucoup, l'ayant ainsi accoustumé du temps du Roy vostre père, qu'ilz aimoient infiniment.
>
> (At three o'clock in the afternoon, promenade on foot or on horseback, so as to show yourself and make the nobility happy, and pass your time with them in some honest exercise…this will make them all very happy, having been used to do it this way at the time of the King your father, whom they loved so much).[26]

The rides, hunts, jousting exercises, dances, and balls that Catherine recommended were acts and behaviors that she prioritized for the value of their emotional, and thus political, power. They were ceremonial displays intended to reinforce a set of social and cultural values that ritualized the persona and power of the king (both as a figure generally and her son in particular) at the center of courtly life and its emotional fabric. Catherine's ideas were modeled upon practices in which she had herself been involved as a young girl during the reign of François I, participating as a member of an intimate emotional community of learned women who surrounded the king and who engaged in social and cultural rituals together, such as hunting and literary activities.[27] Such socializing activities aimed to shape the mood of the court, as she articulated through the voice of François I:

> car j'ay ouy dire au Roy vostre grand-père qu'il falloit deux choses pour vivre en repos avec les François et qu'ils aimassent leur Roy: les tenir joyeux, et occuper à quelque exercise; pour cest effect, souvent il falloit combattre à cheval et à pied, courre la lance; et le Roy vostre père aussi, avec des autres exercices honnestes èsquels il s'employoit et les faisoit employer; car les François ont tant accoustumé, s'il n'est guerre, de s'exercer, que qui ne leur fait faire, ils s'emploient à autres choses

> plus dangereuses. Et pour cest effet, au temps passé, les garnisons de gens d'armes étoient par les provinces, où toutes la noblesse d'allentour s'exerçoit à courre la bague, ou tout autre exercice honneste.
>
> (For I heard it said by the King your grandfather that two things were needed to live in peace with the French and to have them love their King: to keep them happy, and to keep them busy at something. To do so, it often required combat on horseback or foot, lance throwing, and the King your father also, with other honest pastimes in which he involved himself and had them employed in, for the French were so accustomed to it that if there was hardly anything to make them do exercise, they would busy themselves with other things more dangerous. And for that reason, in times past, the garrisons of men at arms were in all the provinces where all the surrounding nobility enjoyed running the ring, or all other honest activities.[28]

This sophisticated political document harnessed not only Catherine's subtle awareness of emotional labor, performances, and display at earlier courts but also gained authority for these recommendations by ventriloquizing the monarchs who presided over these courts.

Catherine's advice entailed the performance of these ritual behaviors in order to create coherence among courtiers through their shared inclusion in these pleasurable activities while excluding others of lesser status. These sociabilities further demanded affiliation to a particular emotional regime with a specific moral tone. For courtiers, this required a bodily practice of affective control, as part of a framework for appropriate interpersonal behaviors.[29] Other aspects would involve emotional management in particular spaces of the court.[30] As Catherine recalled, while the king was retired from view, his archers paraded courtly spaces "*pour empescher que les pages et lacquais ne jouassent et tinssent les brelans qu'ils tiennent ordinairement dans le chasteau où vous estes logé, avec blasfèmes et jurements, chose execrable*" (to prevent pages and lackeys from playing cards which they do every day in the château where you are currently lodged, with blaspheming and swearing, an execrable thing).[31] She explained to her son how particular sites had been well lit at night and the château locked: "*dès que le Roy estoit couché, on fermoit les portes, et mettoit-on les clefz soubz le chevet de son lit*" (once the King had gone to bed, the doors were locked and the keys placed under the head of his bed).[32] The good order of the courtly household, she insisted, required

visible work of paternal authority from its head of household, the king, for "*du temps du Roy vostre grand-père, il n'y eust eu homme si hardy, d'oser dire dans sa court injure à ung autre*" (in the time of the King your grandfather, there was no man so bold as to dare to say an insult to another in his court).[33] Catherine's memories-as-advice entailed a set of affectively restrained behaviors to be performed by Charles and his courtiers, filtering down through the courtly structure, which established a moral and emotional regime for its sociality.

Catherine also emphasized the critical emotional power of a king who was perceived to know, and care for, key figures in and beyond the court. In this case, the monarch performed a demonstration of care enacted through bodily and rhetorical practice; that is, he conducted a particular emotional labor: "*une des choses la plus nécessaire pour vous faire aimer de vos subjectz, c'est qu'ils congnoissent qu'en toutes choses avez soin d'eulx*" (one of the most necessary things to make your subjects love you is that they know that you will take care of them in all things).[34] Indeed, demonstrable familiarity even with the king's own personnel was knowledge as control that paid rich emotional dividends in Catherine's historical interpretation. Modeling Louis XII in order to be "*mieux servy avec plus de fidellité*" (better served with more loyalty), she reflected that "*il avoit ordinairement en la poche le nom de tous ceulx qui avoient charge de luy, fusse près ou loing, grands ou petitz, comme de toutes qualitez*" (he usually had in his pocket the names of all those who had care of him, be it near or far, great or small, and of all status).[35] Charles was to be prompt in responding to correspondence so that "*voz subjectz congnoistront le soing que avez d'eulx, et que vous voulez estre bien et promptement servy; cela les fera plus diligens et soigneux*" (your subjects will know the care that you have for them and that you want to be well and promptly served; this will make them more diligent and careful).[36] In addition, Catherine recommended that he give regular audiences, "*une chose qui contente infiniment voz subjetz*" (a thing that pleases your subjects very much).[37] For those who came from afar to attend the king at court, Charles was to

> prendre la peine de parler à eulx, leur demander de leurs charges et, silz n'en ont point, du lieu d'où ils viennent: qu'ils congnoissent que voulez sçavoir ce qui se faict parmy vostre royaume et leur faire bonne chère, et non pas parler une fois à eulx, mais quand les trouverez en vostre chambre ou ailleurs, leur dire toujours quelque mot.

> (take the time to speak with them, ask them about their duties, and if they do not have any, of the place where they come from, that they should know that you want to know what goes in across your realm and give them good cheer, and do not speak only once to them but when you find them in your chamber or elsewhere, always have something to say to them).[38]

In case Charles was doubtful, Catherine's advice could once again be supported by her knowledge of his ancestors' practice, "*C'est comme j'ai veu faire aux Roys vostre père et grand-père, jusques à leur demander, quand ilz ne savoient de quoy les entretenir, de leur mesnage, affin de parler à eulx, et leur faire congnoistre qu'il avoit bien agréable de les veoir*" (it is how I saw it done by the Kings, your father and grandfather, even asking them, when they did not know how to entertain them, of their household, so as to speak with them and to let them know that it was pleasurable to see them).[39] Through the courteous attention paid to visitors, Charles could generate long-lasting emotional benefits from these acts, as they were enjoyed and later recounted far and wide across his kingdom. Catherine's recommendation demanded affective and emotional labor in which her son became a king by enacting a suite of corporeal and rhetorical practices demonstrating the notion of paternal care.[40] Catherine appeared to be conceptualizing emotions here as a kind of practice, as Monique Scheer has recently argued.[41] Feelings, in this case about Charles' subjects and his role as their protector, would be made in the doing of these performances.

The benefits of becoming the generous monarch through such emotional practice went some way in the effort to create a network of individuals positively inclined toward the king across the realm. However, Catherine had further historical examples of strategic alignment in the mutual interests of officials and the crown. She reflected upon the careful "*forme que durant les règnes des Roys Messeigneurs vostre père et grand-père tenoit monsieur le connestable, et ceulx qui assistoient audict Conseil*" (form that during the reigns of the Kings, your father and grandfather, the *connétable* and those who attended the Council maintained),[42] to draw in and use these key officials and political elites as support for the program of the crown. In the conspiratorial tone of shared secrets that imbued the missive, Catherine explained a further strategy. "*Je ne veux pas oublier à vous dire une chose que faisoit le Roy vostre grand-père, qui lui conservoit toutes ses provinces à sa devotion*" (I do not want to forget to tell you a thing that the King your grandfather did, which held all his

provinces devoted to him).[43] She suggested that Charles identify three or four leading citizens of the key towns of the realm, "*soubz main, sans que le reste s'en aperçoive ny puisse dire que vous rompez leurs privillèges, les favorisant tellement par bienfaits ou autres moiens, que les aiez si bien gaigniez qu'il ne se fasse ni die rien au corps de ville … que n'en soiez adverty*," (subtly, without the others perceiving or being able to say that you are destroying their privileges, favoring them so much with benefits and other means that you have so well won them that nothing that can happen in the town bodies … that you are not advised of).[44] To make her recommendation more compelling, Catherine played upon the desire of the young monarch determined to make his mark, envisaging the benefits for Charles from such a practice: "*pense que c'est le meilleur remède dont vous pourrez user pour vous faire aisément et promptement bien obéir*" (I think that it is the best remedy you could use to make yourself easily and promptly obeyed).[45] Catherine was providing Charles with positive visualization of how such a policy would unfold for him: "*jamais ville n'aura autre volonté que la vostre et n'aurez poinct de peine à vous faire obéir … en ung mot, vous le serez toujours en ce faisant*" (never will a town have any will other than yours and you will have no trouble in being obeyed … in a word, in doing this, you always will be).[46]

Clearly, Catherine's history via recollection of the emotional practices of past monarchs and their impact were designed to showcase effective, positive achievement. The reigns of Charles' ancestors were here crafted as glorious precedents to his successful political future. Catherine subtly shaped a tone for this text that was didactic, but not daunting to the young man. She carefully situated Charles as the next in a long line of powerful, authoritative Valois monarchs, his father figures, ready to take his place in the history of France. It was a history in which she asserted and inserted herself as an eyewitness, giving power to her memories and authority to her advice.

Conclusions

Evocations of the past played a significant role in shaping Catherine's personal identity in the context of advising her sons. Offering advice to monarchs was complicated for a female political agent. Catherine thus aimed by these reminiscences to create a compelling authority as an elder in the courtly community, transmitting the knowledge of past ages to the leaders of the present and future. As such, she demonstrated an

attentive interest in historical precedents for male and female courtly conduct and political action. Reflecting on the reigns she had witnessed, Catherine could speak about and for kings in powerful acts of royal ventriloquism that were emotionally potent and commanded authority. Her advice sought to produce for her sons an emotionally persuasive history of father figures.

Historical feelings operated as a tool for emotional manipulation in the present, with Catherine's textual rehearsal of historical emotional experiences designed to affect the responses of her sons as readers by convincing them of the veracity of these experiences and the interpretation Catherine gave to them. The provision of Catherine's particular historical insights was frequently constructed rhetorically as an emotional act that enacted intimate, maternal relationships. Her letters performed careful emotional work with her sons as particular interlocutors in this dialogue, visualizing them not only as kings in their own right but also as active protagonists in a historically powerful Valois political project. The past constituted a highly emotive resource of exemplary protagonists and conduct to be modeled by Catherine's sons, the descendants in blood and in practice of the magnificent courtly regimes that she described.

Significantly, Catherine displayed an acute sensitivity to emotion work, past and present, as a tool to regulate courtly atmosphere and influence courtiers to the interests of the Valois—that is, instrumentalizing emotions as a form of power. She identified the importance of ritualized acts of socialization for men and women, creating affiliations defined not necessarily by shared political aims but by strong individual and shared emotional experiences, from honor, loyalty, and devotion, to pride, vanity, and conceit. These documents revealed frank advice to employ explicit strategies of emotional management of the court that involved king, courtiers, key officials, and day-to-day personnel in corporeal performances and emotional labor, enacted both socially and spatially. If, for Catherine, the production of history was founded upon emotions, so too was the creation and wielding of political power.

Notes

1. See Katherine Crawford, "Catherine de Medicis and the Performance of Political Motherhood," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 31, 3 (2000): 643–673; Elizabeth McCartney, "In the Queen's Words: Perceptions of Regency Government Gleaned from the Correspondence of Catherine

de Médicis," in *Women's Letters Across Europe, 1400–1700: Form and Persuasion*, edited by Jane Couchman and Ann Crabb (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 207–222; Denis Crouzet, "'A strong desire to be a mother to all your subjects': A Rhetorical Experiment by Catherine de Medici," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38, 1 (2008): 104–118; Susan Broomhall, "'My daughter, my dear': The correspondence of Catherine de Medici and Elisabeth de Valois," *Women's History Review* 25, 4 (2015): 548–569; Broomhall, "Ordering Distant Affections: Fostering Love and Loyalty in the Correspondence of Catherine de Medici to the Spanish Court, 1568–1572," in *Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder,* edited by Susan Broomhall (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 67–86.

2. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1999). See also interpretation of performativity explored by William M. Reddy in the context of "emotives" in his *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
3. Kathleen Stewart, "Nostalgia—A Polemic," *Cultural Anthropology* 3, 3 (1988): 227–241, 227.
4. 1569, in *Relations des ambassadeurs vénetiens sur les affaires de France au XVIe siècle*, edited and translated by M.N. Tommaseo, vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1838), 108.
5. On Catherine's relationships with Florentine and other ambassadors at the French court, see Broomhall, "Catherine's tears: diplomatic corporeality and gender at the sixteenth-century French court," in *Fluid Bodies: Corporeality in Medieval and Early Modern Europe,* edited by Anne M. Scott, Deborah Seiler and Michael Barbezat (forthcoming).
6. [April 1552], in *Lettres et mémoires d'estat,* edited by Guillaume Ribier, vol. 2 (Paris: François Clozier et la veuve Aubouyn, 1666), 388.
7. Broomhall, "Counsel as performative practice of power in Catherine de Medici's early regencies," in *Queenship and Counsel in the Early Modern World*, edited by Helen Graham-Matheson and Joanne Paul (Basingstoke: Palgrave, forthcoming).
8. See the example of Eleanor of Poitiers at the fifteenth-century Burgundian court, "Gendering the Culture of Honour at the Fifteenth-Century Burgundian Court," in *Women, Identities and Communities in Europe, 1400–1800*, edited by Susan Broomhall and Stephanie Tarbin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 181–193.
9. See Catherine's counsel to Madeleine de Savoie on mourning wear in Broomhall, "Counsel as performative practice of power."
10. [September 8, 1563] in *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, edited by H. de la Ferrière-Percy, vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1885), 90–95.

11. *Lettres*, 2: 91.
12. On Catherine's development from duchess to *dauphine* during the reign of François I, see Broomhall, "Fit for a king?: The gendered emotional performances of Catherine de Medici as dauphine of France, 1536–1547," in *Unexpected Heirs in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Valerie Schutte (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017).
13. *Lettres*, 2: 91.
14. *Lettres*, 2: 95.
15. *Lettres*, 2: 93.
16. *Lettres*, 2: 91.
17. *Lettres*, 2: 94.
18. August 8, 1574 in *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, edited by de la Ferrière-Percy, vol. 5 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1895), 74. On the significant impact of Catherine's advice to Henri, see Estelle Paranque, "Catherine of Medici: Henry III's Inspiration to Be a Father to His People," in *Royal Mothers and Their Ruling Children: Wielding Political Authority from Antiquity to the Early Modern Era*, edited by Elena Woodacre and Carey Fleiner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 225–240.
19. March 19, 1584 in *Lettres*, edited by G. Baguenault de Puchesse, vol. 8 (1901), 178.
20. [April 1576] in *Lettres*, edited by Baguenault de Puchesse, vol. 10 (1909), 406–407.
21. *Lettres*, 10: 405.
22. See Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
23. Broomhall, "Introduction," in *Spaces for Feeling: Emotions and Sociabilities in England, 1650–1850,* edited by Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2015), 1.
24. *Lettres*, 2: 91, 93.
25. *Lettres*, 2: 91.
26. *Lettres*, 2: 92.
27. See Broomhall, "Fit for a King?"
28. *Lettres*, 2: 92.
29. On Catherine's attention to the morality of the women and men at her court, see Una McIlvenna, *Scandal and Reputation at the Court of Catehrine de Medici* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016).
30. See Caroline zum Kolk, "Catherine de Médicis et l'espace: résidences, voyages et séjours," in *Moving Elites: Women and Cultural Transfers in the European Court System,* edited by Giulia Calvi and Isabella Cabot (Florence: EUI Working Papers, 2010), 51–56; zum Kolk, "Les femmes à la court de France au XVIe siècle. La fonction politique de la maison

de Catherine de Médicis (1533–1574)," in *Femmes de pouvoir et pouvoir des femmes dans l'Occident médieval et moderne*, edited by Armel Nayt-Dubois and Emmanuelle Santinelli-Foltz (Valenciennes: Publications de l'université de Valenciennes, 2009), 237–258.

31. *Lettres*, 2: 92.
32. *Lettres*, 2: 92.
33. *Lettres*, 2: 92.
34. *Lettres*, 2: 93.
35. *Lettres*, 2: 94. Catherine likewise practiced an important policy of recognition of key courtiers and international leaders through her commission of many portraits. See Alexandra Zvereva, *Les Clouet de Catherine de Médicis* (Paris: Somogy, Éditions d'Art, 2002).
36. *Lettres*, 2: 94.
37. *Lettres*, 2: 91.
38. *Lettres*, 2: 94.
39. *Lettres*, 2: 94.
40. For an analysis of the exercise of this concept more broadly, see Philip Grace, *Affectionate Authorities: Fathers and Fatherly Roles in Late Medieval Basel* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).
41. Monique Scheer, "Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion." *History and Theory* 51, 2 (2012): 193–220.
42. *Lettres*, 2: 93.
43. *Lettres*, 2: 95.
44. *Lettres*, 2: 95.
45. *Lettres*, 2: 95.
46. *Lettres*, 2: 95.

Acknowledgments This research was conducted with the financial support of an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship, FT 130100070.

PART II

Affective Encounters

CHAPTER 6

Emotional Contagion: Évrart de Conty and Compassion

Béatrice Delaurenti

Yawning is contagious. Likewise, seeing someone crying makes you cry, hearing chalk scraping a hard surface makes you shiver, observing someone eating makes you salivate, feeling the doctor's confidence in the face of illness energises you to recover. These examples highlight how physical and psychological impulses intertwine. They capture the contagion-like dimension of emotion, circulating rapidly among people with tangible physical manifestations.

In medieval sources, there was a specific name for this contagion: *compassio*. The word carried two different meanings. In its common usage, compassion was an act or a state of mercy to someone else's suffering, just as the term is used today. But it also had a mechanical meaning that referred to the involuntary imitation of someone else or of the environment. In this sense, compassion was not a moral category, but a concept deriving from the vocabulary of medicine and natural philosophy. It was

B. Delaurenti (✉)
Groupe AHLOMA, Centre de Recherches Historiques (EHESS-CNRS), EHESS, Paris, France
e-mail: beatrice.delaurenti@ehess.fr

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_6

a reaction induced by the behavior of others, provoked by a principle of sympathy and spurred by sensory perception, before any linguistic interaction occured.

When describing the latter phenomenon, scholastic authors did not employ the term "emotion."[1] Rather, they wrote of "passions," considered as a key element of the mechanism of compassion. Feeling compassion meant feeling the same passions as somebody else. It was a mixed emotion, expressing itself both through passions of the soul and passions of the body. The reaction was at the same time psychological and physical. The two sides of emotion were closely associated.

The present contribution focuses on this broader and technical use of the word "compassion." It involves a familiar, psychosomatic phenomenon, which is known today as "mental contagion" or "emotional contagion."[2] This kind of reaction flirts with the limits of scientific explanation. It is an object of current research in the field of neurosciences.[3] In social sciences, recent works investigating empathy,[4] concern,[5] the sharing of pain and the place of affect in the political sphere[6] echo the medieval notion of compassion. Some historians described the twentieth century as an "era of compassion."[7] Thus, philosophical, scientific and anthropological interests converge today toward this issue.

Emotional contagion will not be explored here through its collective manifestations in the Middle Ages,[8] but through a single example of its scientific interpretation.[9] The work of a French doctor living in the end of the fourteenth century, Évrart de Conty, will be our guide. How did he explain compassion? What did he consider emotional contagion was? These questions belong to a cultural history of emotions and affectivity.[10] The medieval treatment of compassion brings to light certain conceptions of man's relationship to the world and mind-body interactions.

Compassion, in its technical sense, was introduced into medieval culture through the Latin translation of *Problems,* an encyclopaedia attributed to Aristotle that covers a wide variety of topics, predominantly medical. *Problems* was translated for the first time from Greek into Latin in the twelfth century, but it is considered an incomplete and flawed translation.[11] It was not until the following century that this work was introduced to a larger community of Latin medieval scholars. In the 1260s a complete Latin version was produced at the royal court of King Manfred of Sicily (1258–1266) by an Italian translator, Bartholomew of Messina. This version initially received an unenthusiastic response that produced no commentaries.[12] Yet fifty years later, the Italian doctor

Peter of Abano wrote its first complete Latin commentary. The combined efforts of these two authors, Bartholomew of Messina and Peter of Abano, account for the successfull introduction of *Problems* into medieval culture, along with a new, broader, technical signification of the notion of compassion.[13]

Section VII of *Problems* is dedicated to a discussion of compassion.[14] The content of the section is authentic, with a pseudo-Aristotelian title, "*ὅσα ἐκ συμπάθεια*," namely "about sympathy."[15] Bartholomew of Messina translated the Greek title into Latin as "*compassio*,"[16] Évrart de Conty into Middle French as the plural "*des compations.*"[17] Etymologically, "*συμπάθεια*" and "*compassio*" are equivalent: the Greek term for sympathy became compassion in Latin. Nevertheless, the Latin usage was enriched by echoes of Christian values and figures into a matrix of typical philosophical and medical preoccupations relative to the scholastic period.

Six complete commentaries of *Problems* were penned in the Middle Ages, all of them in the fourteenth century.[18] Peter of Abano's was followed by four anonymous Latin commentaries, then around 1380, by Évrart de Conty's *Livre des Problemes*, including both a translation and a French commentary. Évrart taught medicine at the University of Paris from 1353 until he died in 1405. He was also an active practitioner, in particular with King Charles V. His intellectual profile is close to that of Peter of Abano: both were interested in medicine as well as in natural philosophy, music, and magic. They showed the same curiosity for compassion, as it encompassed both ordinary psychosomatic reactions and large-scale phenomena such as epidemics.

Évrart de Conty followed two models, Aristotle and Peter of Abano, to build his interpretation about emotional contagion. His style, his attempt to be accessible to a large audience, and the freedom with which he reorganizes the material lend nonetheless great originality to his commentary.[19] Évrart's singularity also lies in being the last medieval commentator of Aristotle's *Problems* and the only one to write in the vernacular. The *Livre des Problemes* circulated among clergy and academics as well as in princely courts accustomed to reading in French rather than in Latin.[20] Regardless of whether Charles V commissioned it, the work's publication in French was situated within a new trend of vulgarizing works from Latin. The royal policy at the time was to make of French an intellectual language capable of rivalling Latin throughout the Christian world.[21]

The Different Manifestations of Emotional Contagion: An Aristotelian Typology

Évrart de Conty found several forms of compassion in the Aristotelian text. Emotional contagion can consist of the soul being moved by the sharing of pain, i.e., the pain aroused in one's soul after seeing someone else's physical suffering (problem 6).[22] But compassion usually denotes a contagion-like response in the form of a physical movement. This is sometimes manifest in the involuntary imitation of relief observed in someone else. The desire to yawn or to urinate, sexual desire, and the longing for food are contagious (problems 1, 2, 3, and 5).[23] Sometimes compassion expresses itself in the physical form of goose bumps, an unpleasant physical sensation that is reproduced involuntarily: for example, this is the case with the kind of shivers produced by a piercing sound, an bitter taste, a sharp coldness, or at witnessing the spectacle of another person reacting to such sensations (problem 8).[24] Finally, sometimes compassion is the state of a healthy person being physically affected by some sick person's looking or breathing at him/her, or as a result of physical contact with the sick person (problems 4 and 7).[25]

According to this typology, compassion was a heterogeneous notion. It depended on various sensory canals, might have appeared only in the soul, but most often also appeared in the body. In fact, the physical and the psychological tendencies were interwoven. For example, Évrart de Conty attributed a physical location to the psychological pain: when "we suffer in our thought," he said, "it hurts our heart."[26] There were other commonalities between the different forms of compassion. In every case, it consisted in a passive, automatic and involuntary response to a stimulus, what modern medicine would consider a reflex.[27] And in every case, a connection was established with the outside world. The definition that opens Évrart's commentary of section VII underscored this: compassion was described as "*des corporeles dispositions et impressions qui se font pour aucune similitude naturele que li uns ha a l'auctre*" ("certain corporeal dispositions and impressions which are generated by a natural resemblance of certain people with others").[28] Emotional contagion expressed itself as a link established with others, through some sort of imitation.

The purpose of this article is to follow Évrart de Conty's interpretation of compassion from its philosophical structure to its physiological descriptions. First we will examine the three notions he described as the general framework for compassion: resemblance, concordance and participation. Second, we will see how his study placed compassion in

a dialectical equilibrium between nature and will. The various stages of the mechanism of compassion in Évrart's description will guide our final discussion of the senses, the imagination, and the disposition of the receiver.

Resemblance, Concordance, Participation

Any emotional contagion, any compassionate reaction, presupposes an initial resemblance. Aristotle stated that two people sharing pain must have something in common, something like a common nature.[29] Évrart de Conty used this suggestion to describe the complicity between the beings, a universal harmony which makes the sharing of pain possible. This complicity resulted from resemblance and concordance of the individual with the world around him: with other humans because he is intelligent, with animals because he is endowed with sensation and movement, with vegetation because he is alive, with the elements because he exists.[30] The theme of the microcosmic man was expressed in a famous Aristotelian formula: "*Homo dicitur minor mundus*" ("Man is a little world").[31] The human being possesses within himself enough resemblance with the world to feel some compassion. In this argumentation, Évrart's originality was located in his source material. He quoted Aristotle and noted the Neo-Platonic foundation of the idea of universal harmony. He added a third, unexpected reference: the theory of the magic arts of al-Kindī's *De radiis*, based on the harmonious unity of the universe.[32] *De radiis* was an object of repeated condemnations in the 1260s and 1270s, and remained a forbidden reference for Latin scholars.[33] However, Évrart's position carried no hint of disapproving al-Kindī's theory. It indicated, on the contrary, a certain freedom of speech, that of a doctor reflecting upon theological condemnations.

Thus, concordance formed the basis of compassion in natural philosophy. It worked at every level of being, from minerals to mankind, but was stronger between those belonging to the same species because the resemblance is greater.[34] Albertus Magnus mentioned the case of twins "*ita similes, quod nullus nostrum unum recognescere potuit ab altero…Loquebantur similiter et cantabant quasi voce una, et se tantum adinvicem diligebant, quod unus diu sine alio esse non potuit*" ("so similar that we could not distinguish one from the other…They spoke and sang almost with one voice and they loved each other so much than they could not remain one day without each other, and when one suffered, so did the other").[35] Évrart used the same example: the twins' condition

appeared as a perfect illustration of the concordance between two people.[36] The idea of participation completed this analysis, so that compassion became a way of integrating people via the participation by some in the behavior of others. Évrart made a specific point: that the mechanism of compassion is such that the person observing does not feel any physical pain, but at the same time *almost* feels the pain.[37] The example of the tightrope walker illustrated this paradoxical movement: the spectator trembles with fear while looking at him *as if* he himself suffered from dizziness, even if he remains standing on the ground without any other reason for feeling dizzy. The dialogue between distance and closeness was at the heart of emotional contagion.

Natural concordance, however, is not always perceptible. It can be hidden, for example when a person feels a secret attachment for someone else demonstrated by reactions of compassion. In the *Livre des Eschez amoureux moralisés*, Évrart de Conty gave a thorough examination of this idea. Love was explained by the natural concordance of man and woman. The author compared this link with sound consonances:

> Et c'est aussi que on voit es sons qui sont consonans l'un a l'autre, sy come on pourroit dire que .a.b.c seroient troiz sons dont .b. et .a. ensamble comparé feroient la consonancie qui est en musique appellee dyapente, c'est a dire une quinte, et .c. et .a. en feroient une autre appellee dyapason, c'est a dire une double; b donc se acorderoit a .a. et .a. aussi se acorderoit a .b., maiz .a. et .c. se acorderoient enore mielx ensamble, pour ce que la double proporcion fait la meilleur consonancie et la plus doulce qui puist estre et en laquelle les sons mielx se conforment…Ainsy, briefment, est il samblablement des amours dessusdites.
>
> (We also see sounds that are harmonizing one with another. For example, we could say that *a*, *b* and *c* are three sounds, and that *b* and *a* would be harmonizing in a chord that in music we call "dyapente," that is a fifth chord, and *c* and *a* would be harmonizing in another chord called "diapason," that is a second chord. Thus, *b* would harmonize with *a*, and *a* would harmonize with *b*, but *a* and *c* would harmonize even better because the second chord produces the best and the softest chord which can exist, the chord in which sounds are best harmonized. The same applies to love of which we have spoken above.)[38]

For Évrart, secret proportions of a musical nature connected people to one another. This explained particularly the case of a seemingly ill-matched couple: the lovers are attracted by an internal concordance that unites them "*par secrete maniere*" ("in a secret way").[39] The idea of an

occult similarity justified diverse situations of intersubjectivity, from loving interaction to emotional contagion. Resemblance was the keystone of compassion, provoking "*moult de grans merveilles en l'espece humaine*" ("many grand marvels in the human kind").[40]

A Natural and Involuntary Movement

Is the transmission of an emotion caused by nature or is it an effect of human will? It is unquestionably a natural behavior, in Évrart's view: compassion is a movement in which will plays no part. The example of yawning illustrated this point. Why are stretching gestures not contagious like yawning?[41] The difference, Peter of Abano had explained, lies in a distinction between things governed especially by natural virtues and those governed rather by animal virtues.[42] Évrart de Conty added:

> Et pource ne souffiroit mie la memoire ou l'ymagination seule a ainsi mouvoir le pié ou la main, ains y convient sourvenir la volenté qui, par raison meüe, pour la consideration d'aucune fin commande-*ce as autres vertus de les ainsi mouvoir.*
>
> (For memory and imagination alone do not suffice to move one's foot or one's hand, will has to intervene. It is moved via reason and it governs the other virtues and moves them for a certain purpose.)[43]

Two levels of operations are then distinguished. At the upper level, there are the operations of the will: gestures realized consciously, such as sight or speech. At the lowest level, the operations ordered by natural virtue are taken up by memory or imagination in an involuntary and mindless manner. Yawning, urinating, eating, and having sexual intercourse are in this category. Compassion is limited to this lower level of function. It is a rudimentary and irrational movement.

Évrart de Conty returned to analyse human will when answering why disease is contagious while health is not.[44] His purpose was to show that will does not interfere in contagion. To do that, Évrart explained that disease is a movement which in itself carries a sufficient cause to generate a similar disease in a close person, even though this person is healthy.[45] Disease is its own agent of contagion and propagates through the air. The corruption of the air was considered as the main factor of epidemics, according to medicine of the time.[46] This also was a current interpretation for the fourteenth century commentators of Aristotle, but it was developed with more emphasis by Évrart, because he wrotes after

the plague of 1348. On the contrary, health depended on the balance of the humors. It was a stable state that could have an influence: that is why healthy people exercised a beneficial effect on sick people. But health was less likely to propagate than diseases. Évrart thus imposed a medical point of view about contagion. The phenomenon of compassion was part of his description of epidemics.

The Mechanism of Sensory Perception

Évrart de Conty also described emotional contagion step by step. First, the response of compassion is activated by external senses. The example of shiver offers him the opportunity to examine precisely the role of sensory perception in this transmission. In that case, Aristotle described two related forms of compassion. The first resulted directly from a sensory stimulation, as when a sound induces shivering: "the iron when we sharpen it, the pumice when it is cut, a pebble when it is ground."[47] The second one was generated by the same causes, but in an indirect way: it affects the one who observes the scene and shivers only because of looking. In both cases, a disagreeable sensation activates a disagreeable physical movement, resulting in goose bumps.

The first group led Évrart to expose his conception of auditory perception. The analysis reflected, to a certain extent, medieval discussions about hearing.[48] Sound was defined as "*a percussion*,"[49] a shock impressed upon ambient air. It was proportional to the air's own movement.[50] According to *Problems*, a sound was "*ventus*" ("a wind").[51] Évrart followed Peter of Abano and distinguished two kinds of winds: those soft and measured, and those passionate and strong.[52] They did not produce the same impression in the organ of hearing: "*les choses sonnans font lors sons proportionnés a lor nature*" ("resounding things produce their sounds in a way proportionate to their nature"),[53] that is why some horrible and abominable sounds provoke our horror and displeasure.[54] Compassion thus presupposes a proportional relationship between the sensory stimulation and the physical response. This reflection led Évrart to study musical effects: "*Diverses musiques et diverses melodies nous esmoeuvent et enclinent a diverses moers et a diverses fins*" ("some music and melodies move us and lead us to various behaviours and aims").[55] The soothing virtues of music appeared as the positive side of compassion's shivering: melody also generated shivering, but of pleasure and well-being. Consonance was at the heart of Évrart's vision of the world.[56] It nourished his analysis of compassion.

The second group of examples about shivering concerned another sense: sight. Yawning, sexual desire and suffering were considered to pass from one person to another through sight, which is the privileged medium of emotional contagion. Évrart de Conty took up Peter of Abano's comparison between sight and hearing:

> La veüe est li plus notables sens qui soit en nous, et c'est pource que c'est li plus soubtils et li plus esperitueus des autres, et qui est de plus grant vertu et de plus grant efficace en tant que sa vertus s'estent dusques au firmament.
>
> (Sight is our most notable sense, ecause it is the most subtle and the most spiritual, and because it possesses a higher virtue and a better efficiency, for its virtue extends up to the sky.)[57]

This particular range of abilities explained how sight "*nous fait congnoistre plus de diverses choses*" ("allows us to know a greater diversity of things").[58] It turns out to be a relay for the other senses. In another passage, the visual organ was described to explain the contagious character of ophthalmic disease:

> L'oeil est de tres noble et tres esmerveillable nature et ce dit il pource qu'il est de rare et soubtille et transparente substance et ausi comme celestial… Sa substance est necte et polie comme un fin myreoir sur toutes autres choses, et par ainsi est il fais ausi comme samblables a choses de dehors qui se mirent en li.
>
> (The eye is of a very noble and impressionable nature, because it is made of a rare, subtle and transparent substance, almost celestial…Its substance is clear and polished like a subtle mirror of all other things, so that it becomes similar to the things from the outside which are reflected in it).[59]

Évrart used the metaphor of the mirror to establish the mechanism of compassion: the eye transmits a resemblance and provokes a reaction of imitation.

Should it be direct or indirect stimulation, for Évrart, explaining sensory perception was essential to understanding emotional contagion. The study of the basic principles of sensory activity supplied the doctor with concrete elements of understanding. It helped him place the phenomenon of compassion within a general description of how sensory stimulation can produce an emotional response consisting of a physical movement.

The Relay Effect of Imagination

Sensory perception is the first stage of emotional transmission. But what happens next, *inside* the body? How does the soul take over? Sight, said Évrart de Conty, "*fait grant impression et notable en l'ame et en l'ymagination*" ("produces a high and notable impression in the soul and in the imagination").[60] It is at the level of the faculty of imagination that the main part of the process of contagion is formed.

Évrart used the term "*ymagination*" in its Avicennian sense to indicate one of the internal senses as opposed to the external senses. The faculty of imagination has the function of collecting the sensitive forms and recomposing them once the sensation has disappeared. It allows to make up imaginary forms independent from the sensation.[61] Imagination plays an essential role in the phenomenon of compassion. It is powerful and effective, indicated Évrart, because it is the lord among all other faculties and it commands them on numerous occasions.[62] To support this interpretation, he cited the treaty *On animal movements* (*De motu animalium*), which contains a famous passage on imagination. According to Aristotle, to imagine a sensation produces the same effect on the body as if one really perceived it. The physical movements can result directly from a real sensation, or indirectly from an imagined rather than perceived sensation.[63] The explanation of the contagious yawn echoed this argument. A man who considers somebody yawning remembers the relief he himself feels while yawning, and he imagines the benefit he could obtain from it. His imaginative faculty then provokes a similar reaction in his body, and he yawns.[64]

Évrart de Conty made an extensive argument about imagination in the problem about shivering. When a man shivers with cold from observing somebody else who is cold, imagination is the principal cause of his movement, because the natural virtue of the cold mentioned above would not suffice on its own to provoke such a thing.[65] A series of examples illustrated the point:

> Uns enfes resamblera a celi au quel la fame pensera et tornera s'ymagination a le heure de la conception, et que li fluxs de sanc s'engendre par regarder choses vermeilles trop ententivement ou il s'en fortefie en celi qui l'a; le jaunice se garist par regarder choses citrines et jaunes; les dens s'entommissent et engelent par veïr mengier choses aygres… la salive en sourvient a la bouce du fameilleus quant il voit autruy mengier; on en aquiert ausi aucune fois la maladie que uns autres soefre ou la dolour, quant on y ha trop forte ymagination.

> (The child will look like the person about whom the woman was thinking and imagining when it was conceived; blood flow is generated by looking too attentively at red things, or blood flow is increased for one who already suffers from it; jaundice is cured by looking at yellow things; teeth become numb and frozen if seeing someone eating bitter things;…saliva comes into the mouth of a starving man when he sees someone else eating; we also sometimes acquire the disease from which someone else is suffering, or the pain associated with the disease, when our imagination is too strong.)[66]

The paradigm of compassion was here enriched by new medical examples. In the *Canon*, Avicenna alluded to the influence of maternal imagination on the fetus. He also mentioned the morbid or therapeutic effects of seeing colours: to cure jaundice, to stop bleeding, he suggested observing or avoiding the sight of similar colours.[67] Évrart de Conty paid special attention to situations where imagination creates a relay between sensory perception and physical movement. Along with Peter of Abano, he accorded a central place to the theme of imagination, which barely appeared in Aristotle's *Problems*, section VII. These two scholastic doctors considered imagination to be at the heart of the mechanism of compassion.

Disposition

We know by experience that emotional contagion does not affect everybody uniformly. Some remain impassive; others feel the passions of those around them intensely. How to explain this disparity? Évrart de Conty had his idea on the issue. To understand why emotional contagion varies from person to person, he felt it necessary to consider the physical state of the receiver *before* the interaction, in other words, his disposition.

Disposition was an important preoccupation in medieval thought. It regularly conveyed the description of a process of influence.[68] Évrart de Conty referred to this notion by commenting on a suggestion by Aristotle: "*Propter quid oscitantibus econtra oscitant ut frequenter? Aut quia, si recordati fuerint cum expedierint, agunt, maxime autem bene mobilia*?" ("Why do we yawn in a repeated way in the presence of someone yawning? Is it because we act when we remember what we expelled, especially when we expelled some very mobile particles")?[69] This allusion to the mobility of breath provoked Évrart's observation:

> Sans faille, il convient que la matere soit a ce disposee; c'est qu'elle soit soubtille et bien mouvable, comme Aristotes dit, et non pas visqueuse ne fort aherse as membres, et qu'elle soit ausi pres du lieu de la purgation et assamblee, et non pas semee ne esparse par tout le cors.
>
> (Undoubtedly, the matter has to be predisposed to this, that is, to be subtle and very mobile as Aristotle says, and not viscous or sticking strongly to the members, and also to be close to the place of purgation and collected rather than sowed or scattered into the whole body.)[70]

The transmission of yawning is only possible when the body is prepared for it, which means that the breath expelled when yawning is likely to move because of its composition and location. The imaginative faculty, even though strong, cannot make the body move if it is not predisposed to move. In cases of compassion, the observer's reaction will be indexed along his physical situation. Thus, the disposition of the body appears to be a *sine qua non* condition of emotional contagion.

For a practitioner like Évrart de Conty, the disposition of the patient's body was not a detail. Someone's physical disposition determined his or her internal strengths and his or her ability to resist disease. It was considered an element of the therapeutic relationship, similarly to the patient's state of mind:

> Li physiciens meismes, se li malades ha en li bonne fiance et bonne ymagination, poet moult valoir a la cure de sa maladie pour la vertu et le efficace de sa bonne halaine et des bons esperis qui yssent de son cors, pource qu'il rectefient et alterent l'air de entour le malade et le malade ausi, per consequens, et le ramainent a bonne disposition.
>
> (If the sick person has confidence and a good imagination, the doctor can easily facilitate the cure of the disease by the strength and the efficiency of his good breath and the good spirits which seep out of his body, because they fix and alter the air which surrounds the sick person, and consequently also the sick person himself, and they bring him back to a good disposition.)[71]

Évrart thus recommended acting both on the physical disposition and on the feeling of confidence of the sick person. The practitioner should use his charisma, his aura, his radiant health, to exercise a good influence on his patient. On these themes, the *Livre des Problemes* followed a medical tradition present in the Galenic, Arabo-Persian, and Salernitan

medicines, especially on the therapeutic role of confidence.[72] The study of compassion took place within the framework of this interest in the interactions between a sick person and his doctor.

Conclusion

What was emotional contagion according to Évrart de Conty? He approached the issue from the Aristotelian notion of "sympathy," which became the Latin "compassion." The concept was developed in Bartholomew of Messina's translation and in Peter of Abano's inaugural commentary; it was studied in fourteenth century European universities, enough to influence the thought of a scholar practicing in the court of the King of France. Starting with the examples presented in *Problems*, section VII, Évrart gathered under a single paradigm a whole constellation of phenomena: from yawning to sexual desire, from bleeding to urinating, from psychological suffering to shivering, from teeth going numb to ophthalmic disease. Under one single concept, these examples assembleed two kinds of transmission that we distinguish today: emotional contagion and infectious contagion.

Évrart developped three models to explain compassion. The first one was philosophical. It was based on the idea of a natural concordance that would unite people and make it possible for one person's emotions to participate in the emotions of others. The second one was physiological. Évrart developped this argument thanks to a description of sensory perception, the physical flows and the powers of the soul, in particular imagination. Compassion was one way of articulating man's external and internal senses. The third model could be qualified as contagionist. It was based on a Galenic notion of health and disease and on an interpretation of air as a vector of contagion. It applied specifically to epidemical transmission. These explanatory models represented three different manners of understanding compassion. They were not paradoxical. Rather, they represented three complementary ways that Évrart summoned successively, sometimes collectively, to account for the functioning of compassion.

His commentary sketched the contours of medieval emotional contagion. It appeared as a movement concerning the soul, the body and their mutual implications. Évrart's analysis also underlined a form of interaction with the outside world: a passive, spontaneous and involuntary relation between two people who share a form of resemblance.

Nevertheless, the notion did not apply to groups or crowds. Évrart de Conty was not interested in a possible collective dimension of the phenomenon. Yawning, for example, was never considered as a mechanism of social communication. To Évrart, compassion was a singular manner by which the body adapts and reacts to the sensorial stimuli of its environment, and to the emotional reactions of the soul to this environment. It was an individual practice of intersubjectivity, the mode of expression of one person who feels the outside world through the prism of his passions. The man he portrayed was one living in a constant, open exchange with the world around him, being the place of interactions between the soul and the body, the outside and the inside.

Notes

1. On the usage of the term 'emotion' in the medieval period, see Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet, "Medieval Sciences of Emotions during the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries: An Intellectual History", in *History of Science and the Emotions*, eds. O. E. Dror, B. Hitzer, A. Laukötter and P. Leon-Sanz, *Osiris* 31 (2016): 21–45, esp. 23–24. On the vocabulary of emotion in the Middle Ages, see Barbara Rosenwein, "Emotion Words," in *Le Sujet des émotions,* eds. P. Nagy, D. Boquet (Paris: Beauchesne, 2009), 93–106. On medieval discourses concerning passions, see Carla Casagrande et Silviana Vecchio, "Les théories des passions dans la culture médiévale," in *Le Sujet des émotions,* 107–123.
2. See for example André Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (Paris: 1926, repr. 2002), 179, "contagion mentale."
3. Olivier Walusinski, ed., *The Mystery of Yawning in Physiology and Disease* (Bâles: Karger, 2010); Jean-Didier Vincent, *Le Cœur des autres. Biologie de la compassion* (Paris: Plon, 2003); Jean Decety and William Ickes, ed., *The Neuroscience of Empathy* (Oxford, MIT Press, 2011); Jean Decety, "Le sens des autres ou les fondements naturels de la sympathie," in *Qu'est-ce que la vie psychique*, ed. Y. Michaud (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002), 71–102.
4. Alain Berthoz and Gérard Jorland, ed., *L'empathie* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004); Michael Slote, *The Ethics of Care and Empathy* (New York, 2007); Patricia Attigui and Alexis Cukier, ed., *Les Paradoxes de l'empathie. Philosophie, psychanalyse, sciences sociales* (Paris: CNRS, 2012).
5. Gérôme Truc, *Le 11-septembre européen. La sensibilité morale des Européens à l'épreuve des attentats du 11 septembre 2001, du 11 mars 2004 et du 7 juillet 2005* (Ph.D diss., EHESS, 2014).
6. Luc Boltanski, *La souffrance à distance* (Paris: Métaillé, 1993); Guillaume Erner, *La société des victimes* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006); Alain

Caillé and Philippe Chanial, ed., "L'amour des autres, *care*, compassion et humanitarisme," *Revue du MAUSS* 31 (2008); Myriam Revault d'Allones, *L'homme compassionnel* (Paris: Seuil, 2008); Didier Fassin, *La raison humanitaire. Une histoire morale du temps présent* (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2010).

7. Christophe Prochasson, *L'empire des émotions. Les historiens dans la mêlée* (Paris: Démopolis, 2008), 104.
8. On this topic, see Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet, *Sensible Moyen Âge. Une histoire des émotions dans l'Occident médiéval* (Paris: Seuil, 2015), "L'émotion commune (XIII^{e}–XV^{e} siècle)," 303–346.
9. On this issue, see Béatrice Delaurenti, *La contagion des émotions. Compassio, une énigme médiévale* (Paris: Garnier Classiques, 2016). The present contribution explores further the analysis of Évrart of Conty's position.
10. The so-called "history of emotions" is a rapidly growing field of research. For a historiographical picture, see Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet, "Una storia diversa delle emozioni," *Rivista Storica Italiana* 128/2 (2016): 481–520. See also Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions," *Passions in Context: Journal of the History and Philosophy of the Emotions* 1/1 (2010), http://www.passion-sincontext.de/; Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet, "Pour une histoire des émotions: l'historien face aux questions contemporaines," in *Le Sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge*, 15–51.
11. Janine Bertier, "*Problemata physica,*" in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, *Supplément*, ed. R. Goulet et al. (Paris, 2003); Elena Casadei, *I testi di David di Dinant: filosofia della natura e metafisica a confronto col pensiero antico. Introduzione ed edizione dei testi* (Spolète, 2008).
12. Michèle Goyens and Pieter De Leemans, "La transmission des savoirs en passant par trois langues: le cas des *Problemata* d'Aristote traduits en latin et en moyen français," in *La transmission des savoirs au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance*, 1, ed. P. Nobel (Besançon, 2005), 234–238.
13. On the various steps of introduction of the concept of compassion in medieval culture, before and after Bartholomew of Messina and Peter of Abano, see Delaurenti, *La contagion des émotions.*
14. Aristotle, *Problemata physica*, VII, 886a24-887b7.
15. Cf. Pierre Louis, ed. (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1991–1993), 1, 119–122.
16. Aristotle, *Problemata physica*, VII, 886a24 (tr. Bartholomew of Messina), ed. B. Delaurenti. All the quotations from Aristotle's *Problemata* in the medieval Latin translation of Bartholomew of Messina are drawn from my edition of Peter of Abano's *Expositio Problematum* (forthcoming). I follow the problems' numbering of the Latin version. When a problem's number in Latin differs from a problem's number in Greek, the corresponding number in the Greek version is indicated in parentheses.

17. Évrart de Conty, *Livre des Problemes*, VII, ms. Paris, BnF fr. 24281, 135v. This source is still unedited. I use Françoise Guichard-Tesson's transcription of the Parisian manuscript.
18. Maaike van der Lugt, "Aristotle's *Problems* in the West," in *Aristotle's "Problemata" in Different Times and Tongues,* eds. M. Goyens and P. De Leemans (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006), 71–112.
19. Françoise Guichard-Tesson, "Pietro d'Abano traduit et recyclé par Évrart de Conty," in *Between Text and Tradition. Pietro d'Abano and the Reception of Pseudo Aristotle's Problemata Physica in the Middle Ages*, eds. P. De Leemans and M. Hoenen (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016), 201–254.
20. Françoise Guichard-Tesson, "Évrart de Conty, poète, traducteur et commentateur," and Joëlle Ducos, "Lecture et vulgarisation du savoir aristotélicien: les gloses d'Évrart de Conty," in *Aristotle's "Problemata,"* 145–174 and 199–226.
21. Elsa Marmursztejn, "Nicole Oresme et la vulgarisation de la *Politique* d'Aristote au XIV^{e} siècle," in *Thinking Politics in the Vernacular. From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, eds. G. Briguglia and T. Ricklin (Fribourg, 2011), 103–107.
22. Aristotle, *Problemata physica*, VII, 6 (=7), 886b15-17 (tr. Barthélémy de Messine), ed. B. Delaurenti: "Propter quid, si cum aliquid inciderit uiderimus aliquem, aut cum aduritur, aut cum obtunditur, aut cum patitur aliquid periculosorum, condolemus mente?"
23. Aristotle, *Problemata physica*, VII, 1, 886a24-25: "Propter quid oscitantibus econtra oscitant ut frequenter?"—VII, 2, 886a29-31: "Propter quid, si aliquem quidem uiderimus manum tendentem aut pedem aut aliquid aliud talium, non econtra facimus idem?…Quemadmodum et ad coitum et comestionem"—VII, 5 (6), 886b4-5: "Propter quid oscitantibus econtra oscitant, et quando mingentem uiderint, mingunt, et maxime subiugalia?"
24. Aristotle, *Problemata physica*, VII, 8 (5), 886b9-14: "Propter quid tristium que sunt per auditum quedam horrescere nos faciunt, ut ferrum cum acuitur et pumex cum inciditur et lapis cum molitur? Signa autem passionum que sunt per uisum ipsa nobis passiones efficiunt. Congelantur autem dentes cum uiderimus acetosa comedentes, et congelatos quidem uidentes infrigidantur."
25. Aristotle, *Problemata physica*, VII, 4, 886b4-5: "Propter quid ab egritudinibus quidem quibusdam egrotant approximantes, a sanitate autem nemo sanatur?"—VII, 7 (8), 887a22-24: "Propter quid a ptisi et obtalmia et scabie approximantes inficiuntur, ab ydropisi uero et febre et apoplexia non occupantur, neque ab aliis?"

26. Évrart de Conty, *Livre des Problemes*, VII, 6, 138r: "Nous nous en dolons en notre pensee et nous fait mal au coer."
27. Cf. for example the *Tresor de la Langue Française*'s definition of the french term "reflexe" in its physiological meaning: "Réponse automatique, involontaire et immédiate d'une structure ou d'un organisme vivants à la stimulation d'un récepteur sensible déterminé."
28. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 135v.
29. Aristotle, *Problemata*, VII, 6 (7), 886b15-17: "Aut quia natura nostra communis omnibus?"
30. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 6, 138r.
31. Aristotle, *Physica*, VIII, 2, 252b26-27 and *Auctoritates aristotelis*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Louvain/Paris, 1973), 156, 205. On the theory of the man-microcosm, see Aaron J. Gourévitch, *Les catégories de la culture médiévale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), 61–73.
32. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 6, 138r: "Et pource, pluseur philosophe, Aristotes meismes et Platons et Alkindes et pluseur autre appelerent le homme petit monde." On al-Kindī, see Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny and Françoise Hudry, "al-Kindī, *De radiis*," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 41 (1974): 139–260 (141).
33. See for example Thomas Aquinas, *Contra gentiles*, III, 104–105 (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882); *Errores philosophorum*, IX–X, ed. J. Koch (Miwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1944), 50–57; David Piché, ed., *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* (Paris: Vrin, 1999). *De radiis*' influence remained underground, for example in the work of Roger Bacon: see Irène Rosier, *La parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et la sémantique au XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1994), 215–223. For al-Kindī's influence on Latin magic, see the contributions of Alejandro García Avilés, Nicolas Weill-Parot, and Julien Véronèse in *Images et magie. Picatrix entre Orient et Occident*, ed. J.-P. Boudet et al. (Paris: Champion, 2011), 95–116, 117–137, and 163–186.
34. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 6, 138r–138v: "Entre les choses ou la similitude est plus grande, est la compassion ausi et la dolour par nature plus grande, et plus legierement se fait."
35. Albert the Great, *De animalibus*, IX, 1, 6, 64, 699.
36. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 6, 138r–138v. Also in Peter of Abano, *Expositio*, VII, 6, ed. B. Delaurenti (forthcoming).
37. Id. 138v: "Et devons savoir que a ce que une personne soit esmeüe a tel compassion ou a dolour pour la misere de l'autre, il ne convient mie que la personne soeffre-ce le mal de fait, ains soufit qu'elle soit assés pres du mal soufrir."
38. Évrart de Conty, *Livre des Eschez amoureux moralisés,* eds. F. Guichard-Tesson and B. Roy (Montréal, 1993), 601–602.

39. Évrart de Conty, 549.
40. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 6, 138v.
41. Aristotle, *Problemata*, VII, 2, 886a29-31: "Propter quid, si aliquem quidem uiderimus manum tendentem aut pedem aut aliud aliquid talium, non econtra facimus idem?"
42. Peter of Abano, *Expositio*, VII, 2: "In quo apparet differentia inter ea que magis sunt uirtutum naturalium et que animalium."
43. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 2, 136v.
44. Aristotle, *Problemata*, VII, 4, 886b4-5 (cf. n. 25).
45. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 4, 137v: "Pource dont que la maladie pestilenciele porte avoec li la cause souffissant d'engendrer en celi qui l'aproce, ja soit ce qu'il soit sains, samblable maladie."
46. See Danielle Jacquart, *La médecine médiévale dans le cadre parisien* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 250–258; Jon Arrizabalaga, "Facing the Black Death: Perceptions and Reactions of University Medical Practitioners," in *Practical Medicine from Salerno to Black Death*, ed. L. Garcia-Ballester et al. (Cambridge, 1994), 237–288; Joëlle Ducos, "L'air corrompu dans les traités de peste," in *Air, miasme et contagion: les épidémies de l'Antiquité au Moyen Âge*, ed. S. Bazin-Tacchella *et al.* (Langres, 2001), 87–104.
47. Aristotle, *Problemata*, VII, 8 (5), 886b10-11: "ferrum cum acuitur et pumex cum inciditur et lapis cum molitur."
48. Cf. Jacques Paul, "Sur quelques textes concernant le son et l'audition," in *Jérôme de Moravie. Un théoricien de la musique dans le milieu intellectuel parisien du XIII^e siècle. Actes du Colloque de Royaumont 1989*, eds. M. Huglo and M. Peres (Paris: Créaphis, 1992), 117–143.
49. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 8, 141r: "De celle percussion est li airs esmeüs."
50. Évrart de Conty: "Tels que li mouvemens desus dis de l'air est, tels est li sons proportionnelment."
51. Aristotle, *Problemata*, VII, 8 (5), 886b14.
52. Évrart of Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 8, 141r: "Li vent ou li son desus dit souef et amesuré…font plus grant immutation; mais li vent et li son impetueus et fort…n'y font il pas impression parfaite."
53. Évrart de Conty, 141v.
54. Évrart de Conty: "Sons horibles et abhominables qui nous esmoeuvent a le horreur desus dite et a la desplaisance."
55. Évrart de Conty, 141v.
56. Cf. Amandine Mussou, "Le médecin et les sons. Musique et magie dans *Le Livre des Eschez amoureux moralisés* d'Évrart de Conty," in *Music and Esotericism*, ed. L. Wuidar (Leyde: Brill, 2010), 23–43.
57. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 8, 142r.

58. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 8, 142r.
59. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 7, 139v.
60. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 8, 142r.
61. See Carla Di Martino, *Ratio Particularis. Doctrine des sens internes d'Avicenne à Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 2008); Deborah Black, "Psychology: soul and intellect," in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, eds. P. Adamson and R.C. Taylor (Cambridge, 2004), 308–326; Meriem Sebti, *Avicenne, l'âme humaine* (Paris, 2000); E. Ruth Harvey, *The Inward Wits. Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (London, 1975). On imagination, the Latin terminology of Avicenna is ambiguous: see Jacqueline Hamesse, "Imaginatio et phantasia chez les philosophes du XII^{e} et du XIII^{e} siècle" and Olga Weijers, "Le pouvoir d'imagination chez les philosophes néerlandais du XV^{e} siècle," in *Phantasia—imaginatio. V° colloquio internazionae de Lessico Intelletuale Europeo,* eds. M. Fattori and M. Bianchi (Rome, 1988), 153–181 and 205–220.
62. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 1, 136r: "L'ymagination est dame des autres vertus et lor commande en moult de cas."
63. Aristotle, *De motu animalium*, VII, 701b16-23 (tr. Guillaume de Moerbeke), ed. P. De Leemans (Turnhout, Brepols), 59–60. See Martha Nussbaum, *Aristotle's* De motu animalium. *Text with translation, commentary and interpretative essay* (Princeton, 1978); P. De Leemans, "Medieval Latin Commentaries on Aristotle's *De motu animalium*. A Contribution to the *Corpus commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum*," *Recherches de philosophie et de théologie médiévales*, 67/2 (2000): 272–360.
64. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 1, 136r.
65. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 8, 141v: "C'est la plus principal cause de tels choses, car la naturele vertu de la froidure desus dite ne souffiroit pas a ceste chose."
66. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 8, 141v-142r. Most of these examples are already in Peter of Abano's commentary (Peter of Abano, *Expositio*, VII, 8).
67. Avicenna, *Liber Canonis* I.1.4.2, I.2.1.8 et I.2.2.1.14 (Venise, 1490). On the cure of bleeding and jaundice, see Delaurenti, *La contagion des émotions*.
68. See Hélène Bouchardeau, "La disposition. Un autre point de vue sur l'efficacité de la parole," in *Le pouvoir des mots au Moyen Age. Actes du colloque Lyon, 22–24 juin 2009*, ed. N. Bériou et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 491–507.
69. Aristotle, *Problemata*, VII, 1, 886a25-26.
70. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 1, 136r.
71. Évrart de Conty, *Problemes*, VII, 4, 137v.

72. On Urso of Salerno's work, explicitly quoted by Évrart, see Maaike van der Lugt, "The Learned Physician as a Charismatic Healer: Urso of Salerno (Flourished End of Twelfth Century) on Incantations in Medicine, Magic, and Religion," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 87/3 (2013): 307–346. On the role of confidence in therapy, see Béatrice Delaurenti, *La Puissance des mots: "Virtus verborum." Débats doctrinaux sur les incantations au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Cerf, 2007), 354–365; Aurélien Robert, "Le pouvoir des incantations selon les médecins du Moyen Âge (XIII^{e}–XV^{e} siècle)," in *Le pouvoir des mots au Moyen Âge*, 459–490.

CHAPTER 7

Love Conventional/Love Singular: Desire in Middle English Lyric

Sarah Kathryn Moore

This study examines the affect of desire as it appears in several Middle English lyrics from the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, arguing that desire is expressed in the lyrics through language that connects the affect to the body and to embodied subjectivity in intimate, although sometimes surprising, ways. Desire, in the lyrics, is often powerfully individuated, even through language that is at times very formulaic. In many cases, lyric experiencers, through reading or hearing the lyrics, are able to empathize with and respond to the textual subject and/or love object of a poem as an individual, despite language that is highly conventional.

Although "love" and "desire" are (at least potentially) disparate in both theory and practice, for the purposes of this study, *love* will mean "romantic love" and *desire*, "sexual desire." The two are often conflated in Middle English lyric, and if I conflate them here it is not because I assume they are indistinguishable but because it is often impossible to tell, in the lyrics, whether "love" or "desire" is being expressed.

S.K. Moore (✉)
Oakland, CA, USA
e-mail: sarahkathrynmoore@gmail.com

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_7

In order to explore the ways in which desire in Middle English lyric can be simultaneously conventional and differentiated, I will investigate (through the work of A.C. Spearing, Barbara Rosenwein, and Lauren Berlant) how conventional language can be used toward the purpose of creating an individuated lyric subject.

The Corpus of Middle English Lyrics

In a recent interview, theorist Lauren Berlant provocatively equates the scholarly object of study with the love object:

> The critical object is unbearable much like the object of love is: too present, distant, enigmatic, banal, sublime, alluring and aversive; too much and too little to take in, and yet, one discovers all this only after it's been taken in, however partially, always partially, and yet overwhelmingly even at the smallest points of genuine contact. ("Conversation: Lauren Berlant with Dana Luciano")

The corpus of surviving Middle English lyrics can indeed be overwhelming to approach: enigmatic, nearly always anonymous, and often lacking in all but the most basic context. However, this very lack of context makes the lyrics (especially those with desiring subjects) appropriate case studies in embodied poetics, as the disorientation and intensity experienced by present-day readers mirrors the disorientation and intensity of their medieval textual subjects.[1]

Defining "lyric" (notoriously problematic for scholars of any era) is particularly difficult for medievalists. Medieval experiencers of what we call "Middle English lyric" certainly would not have called it that; the word "lyric" probably did not exist in English until the 1580s (Spearing, *Textual Subjectivity*, 176; see also Woolf, 1, and McNamer, 70). Moreover, the lyrics are usually very difficult to date. In fact, in scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s, Middle English lyric is often defined by what it is not (see, for example, Raymond Oliver's 1970 monograph *Poems Without Names* and J. A. Burrows' 1978 article "Poems Without Contexts"). More recently, definitions proposed by lyric theorists (such as Jonathan Culler, Susan Stewart, Heather Dubrow, Yopie Prins, and Virginia Jackson) generally obtain for most medievalists, particularly brevity, oral/aural features linking the genre to song, and above all an emphasis on subjectivity marked by strong emotion.

In her introduction to the 2002 collection *Medieval Woman's Song: Cross-Cultural Approaches*, for example, Anne L. Klinck posits that the Old English poems "Wulf and Eadwacer" and "The Wife's Lament" "are lyrics not in a formal sense but by virtue of their intensely personal emotion and their focus on the lyric moment" (6). Yet the "formal features" that define a lyric (and any discussion of their absence from these poems) remain unspecified. What are these formal features, and when do medieval English poems become, "formally," lyrics? How can we evaluate the presence or absence of "intensely personal emotion" in a poem, especially one from which we are separated by more than a thousand years of changing emotional norms?

Although many scholars have conducted careful codicological and paleographical analyses of the manuscripts from which these lyrics are drawn (including the few well-known manuscripts in which many lyrics appear: Harley 2253, Rawlinson D.913, the Findern manuscript, Sloane 2593, and the "Red Book of Ossory"), much contextualizing information for these lyrics is simply impossible to recover, as scholars from the mid-twentieth century through the present are quick to note.[2] The lyrics are ubiquitously described by twentieth century critics as "charming" and "simple," but they are also somewhat discomforting, couched in unanswerable questions. Were the lyrics primarily spoken or sung, written down or read aloud? How were they used? Are they to be read straightforwardly or parodically? These mysteries complicate the oft-cited "accessibility" of Middle English lyric.

The related debate, waged with gusto in scholarship from the 1960s and 1970s, regarding whether Middle English lyrics are more individualized than they are conventional, is of limited interest today, as scholarly trends have moved toward new models of authorship and textual experience. Certainly, Middle English lyrics are often highly formulaic. The extent to which they arise from collective tradition, though ultimately unknowable, is undoubtedly significant. However, treating the varied "I"s of the songs as textual subjects subverts the need (and perhaps the desire) to determine if the "I" of any given poem does or does not represent an individual person. A.C. Spearing emphasizes that medieval poems spoken from a particular viewpoint are "textual performances, not the spoken words issuing from the living, conscious bodies that they sometimes imitate" (*Medieval Autographies*, 97).[3] He also emphasizes that, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Europe, although autobiography did not exist and so medieval authors could not have been working

toward it, there did exist "a culture that was growing more interested in individual lives and especially in individual interiorities" (99). Thus the body of extant Middle English lyrics is, in some ways, an ideal textual corpus in which to examine how desire is created and maintained by a purely textual "I." Largely lacking in context, likely often produced collectively, the lyrics were created by a society increasingly interested in subjectivity and interiority; many medieval people probably responded to and empathized with the textual "I" as an individual, as we do. Spearing emphasizes especially the freedom of the "I" in medieval texts:

> …the first person singular pronoun need not be referential (referring consistently to an individual who uses the word "I"); it may only be deictic, its function being to convey proximality and experientiality without specific reference to a pragmatic center or *origo*. (*Textual Subjectivity* 14)

This "purely deictic I" is significant precisely because many of the lyrics are anonymous and devoid of context. For medieval (as for some strains of contemporary) poetics, the author is radically decentered. We must treat the speaking "I"s of these poems as textual subjects with their own personhoods and embodied experience. It makes no practical difference whether the "I" of a poem does in fact represent a single, literally embodied subject expressing genuine feelings, as in most cases it is impossible to attach such a person to the text. Even looking for an author is a flawed undertaking: medieval singers and scribes freely stole, copied, invented, reinvented, and hybridized in ways that are perhaps unmatched until our own contemporary period. Mary Carruthers reminds us that in the medieval period authorities (*auctores*) were texts, not people, so that it is anachronistic to speak of "extra-textual authorial intention" (190). The necessarily conventional and collaborative nature of many medieval lyrics makes it more productive to treat the "I" of the text itself as *auctor*—both "author" and "authority."[4] It is eminently sensible, then, to view the "I"s of these poems as embodied subjects in their own right.

Following Spearing, here the term "textual subject" refers to the "I" of the text, who expresses emotion in inherently embodied ways. The reader or hearer of a lyric is able to identify and empathize with the poem's subject through the use of the deictic pronoun "I," through which we have access to an embodied textual subject. The idea that lyric is uniquely tied to a speaking "I" (or, more rarely, a "we") is so

fundamental to our understanding of the genre that Susan Stewart has suggested that "it is almost unbearable to imagine lyric outside of [the] terms of subjectivity" ("Preface to a Lyric History" 212).[5] Lyric has been associated with subjectivity in the popular and scholarly mind since at least the late eighteenth century; the Romantic notion of lyric equates it with an intense expression of the poet's innermost thoughts, feelings, and desires. This sense has never disappeared from conceptions of lyric, and the expression of deeply held personal feelings is usually considered a, even the, definitive feature of the genre. A New Critical addition to this model of intense subjectivity is the construction of a speaking "persona," an imagined speaker divorced from the author's biography, transforming all lyrics into dramatic monologues. The association of lyric with the intense, felt experience of a real, individual person (the "I" of Romantic poetry and dramatic monologue) is no longer in vogue in academia; neither is it very useful in reading Middle English lyric. Nevertheless, it remains for many a defining feature of the form.

Spearing, however, is interested in "not how the poems express or represent individual subjectivities, whether of their writers or of fictional characters, but how subjectivity is encoded in them as a textual phenomenon" and questions the assumption that any literary text is "the utterance of a speaking subject, so that in it a human consciousness is given a voice, and evaluation of that voice and identification of its origin will form the necessary guidelines for interpretation" (*Textual Subjectivity*, 1). For Spearing, crucially, the "I" of the text is, in and of itself, authoritative. There is no need to look for authors or even dramatic speakers "behind" the text; the text's "I" should be approached on its own terms as an authoritative, unified narrator. When I speak here of a "subject," I mean, then, a textual subject in Spearing's sense; that is, "the I of the text," who must be considered on his (these textual subjects are overwhelming male) own terms, unburdened by an imagined individual author or "speaker." While it is true that various Middle English lyrics "present [themselves] as a direct expression of [a] poet's thoughts and sentiments" (*Textual Subjectivity*, 188), the phrase "present themselves" is key; it is an exercise in futility to search for the "real" speakers of these anonymous texts. The "I" of the text must nonetheless be treated as embodied and volitional, since that is how we, as embodied text experiencers (medieval and modern readers, hearers, translators, transmitters, and performers) empathize with that "I." Spearing's textual "I," authoritative in its own right, freed from the lurking presence of an

author or persona, perhaps approximates how medieval readers would have understood that "I." Rosemary Woolf speaks, for example, of the "abnegation of individuality" and "self-effacing" nature of much Middle English religious poetry (6, 15) and William Tydeman notes of late medieval poets writing in English that "individual experiences were rarely their starting-point" (12). Louise Bishop further reminds us that "in late medieval England, the word 'self' worked not as a concept of embodied separate consciousness…but as a grammatical nominative intensifier" (192). Spearing's concept of textual subjectivity is, then, immensely useful in approaching the "I" of Middle English lyric and, in this study, the word "subject" always refers to the "I" of the text.

Love and Desire in Middle English Lyric

The distinction between "religious" and "secular" lyric has long been questioned (see, for example, the work of Barbara Newman); however, the persistent (and problematic) distinction between "courtly," "love," and "erotic" lyrics persists. Especially striking are the many anthologies in which erotic lyrics are clearly demarcated from "courtly" love lyrics, each relegated to separate chapters or sections.[6] This suggests an implicit judgment on the part of editors that "courtly love" and "sexual desire" are separate and even opposed, although whether this reflects editorial opinion or rather an evaluation of how medieval authors, singers, and scribes viewed the lyrics, and love, is unclear. In any case, in practice the boundary between the "courtly" and the "erotic" in Middle English lyric is often extremely blurred. In the lyrics here discussed, descriptions of loved women are both very conventional and very "courtly," in the sense that they draw heavily on language and tropes associated with love that are depicted in high medieval troubadour and trouvère poetry and later in vernacular poems of England and elsewhere. These conventions include, for example, a male speaker (usually unmarried) who loves a noble lady (often married); that love as unrequited; a situation that purports to focus on the love object but is in fact focused firmly on the suffering subject himself; impassioned declarations that the speaker will die if the lady does not return his love. In some of these same poems, however, a particular trope—imagining oneself under or between layers of the lady's clothing—while also conventional, certainly cannot be considered a "courtly" idealization of an untouchable love object. The image derives its considerable power from its surprising and intimate

engagement with the lady's sexualized body. Thus any neat classification of these lyrics into the opposed categories "courtly" and "erotic," like the distinction between "religious" and "secular," is artificial. While the latter division, however, has long been recognized as false, "erotic" and "courtly" lyrics are still generally treated as distinct even by scholars of Middle English lyric.

At first glance, desire may seem like the most likely emotion to be agreed upon as inherently embodied. However, the highly conventional nature of much Middle English love poetry creates in many instances an "abstract" or "non-embodied" desire that, while purportedly focusing in minute detail on the physical body of the beloved, actually effaces the physical presence of both the lyric's love object and its speaking subject.[7] In other lyrics, though, love or desire as a felt sensation is expressed through the body of the lyric's textual subject in some remarkably strange and powerful ways. Selected lyrics create an intimately tangible sense of their individualized textual subjects, even through conventional or formulaic language.

Form and Convention

To explore the ways in which desire in Middle English lyric can be simultaneously conventional and differentiated, I will demonstrate how conventional language can be used toward the purpose of creating an individuated, embodied lyric subject. By "conventional" language, I mean language and tropes that recur frequently in Middle English love lyrics from many different manuscripts and eras. Conventional tropes include, for example, a male lovesick subject who addresses a female love object, a catalogue of the love object's virtues, and a close focus on her physical features. Not only are these tropes highly conventional, but often so too is the specific imagery used to communicate these tropes; the words used to the describe the love objects' facial and bodily features, for example, are frequently identical or near-identical from lyric to lyric.

To understand how lyrics can be most individuated at their most conventional, it is first necessary to rethink received notions of "conventional" versus "authentic" emotion and forms of literary expression. Barbara Rosenwein, in a recent interview, interrogates our instincts regarding conventional and "genuine" emotion (*AHR Conversation*, 1495–1497). Why, she asks, does it seem more authentic when an interview subject says "I am in love" than when eleventh-century troubadour

Peire Vidal sings "Through love I am so strongly full of love that all my wishes are of love"? She suggests that four factors play into our perception of "authenticity" of emotional expression, namely:

1. *Form*. The interview subject does not seem to be speaking in a formal genre, whereas Vidal in his lyric clearly is doing so.
2. *Context*. We can observe the interview subject's face and gestures, and hear her tone of voice and spoken inflections. The ability to gain information from her physicality bolsters our perception of the sincerity of her felt emotion. Obviously, we cannot observe historical subjects.
3. *Responsiveness*. As living text, the interview subject responds to our questions, whereas the Vidal text cannot respond.
4. *Empathy*. Crucially, "we think we know what she means because we too have been in love, and we can empathize…But when Vidal goes on to say 'You are beautiful to me, lovely lady…for I am in your lordship [*senhoriu*],' we know for sure that his 'love' is not our 'love.'"

Rosenwein goes on to systematically complicate each of these perceived differences in the "authenticity" or "sincerity" of the interview subject and the troubadour lyric. She first notes that although we do not think of ourselves as expressing emotion in form or genre (rather, assuming that we are able to express emotion spontaneously), in fact we are constrained in our modes of emotional expression by the norms of our cultures. We are unable to elicit "unpremeditated" emotion outside the emotional vocabulary and gestures with which we have been inculcated; Rosenwein reminds us, crucially, that even the assertion "I am in love" is a convention. For her, this constriction is not, functionally, a limitation but rather a necessary structure that allows us to be understood: "Emotions are largely communicative tools, and if we are to understand one another, we are wise to express ourselves through well-worn paths that all of us are familiar with."

Rosenwein here provocatively suggests that emotional expression can indeed be most powerful *at its most conventional*. Precisely because the primary function of emotion is as a "communicative tool," it makes perfect sense for a lyric subject to express himself, at his most sincere, through currently circulating formulae that his audience will readily understand.[8] Individuals and collectives of singers and scribes (both professional and amateur) could (and still can) easily tweak these tropes to fit a particular situation or simply to express an individualized artistic or

cultural sentiment within their own textual and emotional communities.[9] This must have occurred in practice far more often than any surviving textual evidence suggests, and was more than likely frequently improvisatory. As Rosenwein puts it,

> I cannot know if Vidal himself was "really" in love with a "real" lady who was "really" his lord. But I can know that he was expressing himself in a way that was highly appreciated; that being in love with a lord was an emotional expectation within his community; and that Vidal certainly knew what "being in love" meant (at least on his own terms), whether or not he was "in love" at the moment. I'm not so sure that we can know much more than this about our lady on the other side of the microphone.

It is not incidental, then, that in many Middle English lyrics, the moment of deepest convention is also the moment of deepest embodiment. As Rosenwein suggests, form and convention are always at play in any expression of emotion, textual or lived, observed or solitary. The options available to us for emotional expression are dictated by the overlapping emotional communities within which we live and the generic options afforded by our culture. Middle English love lyrics surprise us with their portraits of individualized subjects where we expect conventional ones; even through formulaic language, empathy is created and maintained.

Theorist Lauren Berlant has this to offer on the subject of the conventional:

> …how can we love singularly? How can we love…without being general? I don't think we can…I think the relation between the personal and the impersonal is not a relation of antithesis, but that we are always trying to find forms so that we can be found. And if you want to be found by others, the form that you find is not the form of your radical singularity, [it's] the form that you make available, both consciously and unconsciously, to other humans. And so it's not about getting outside of convention and finding something original, because, you know, the language of love, there's a reason it's not very original…it's because you want to be found, and you want to find. (Lauren Berlant on *Desire/Love*)

Like Rosenwein, Berlant here suggests that we communicate, inevitably, through form; we cannot avoid participating in the culturally-specific modes of emotional expression available to us. It can hardly be coincidental that both Rosenwein and Berlant make this case through the

affect of desire. Romantic love is the emotion linked most closely in both the scholarly and the popular mind with lyric poetry and with subjectivity; certainly the number of Middle English lyrics addressing romantic and sexual love is striking.

Blazons and Lovesick Subjects

Here's Berlant, again on convention:

> What does it mean about love that its expressions tend to be so *conventional*, so bound up in institutions like marriage and family, property relations, and stock phrases and plots?…[this conventionality] suggests…that love can be at once genuine and counterfeit, shared and hoarded, apprehensible and enigmatic. (*Desire/Love* 7)

The question of whether lyric desire is physically felt by a lyric speaker (in Berlant's terms, "genuine") or is rather purely conventional ("counterfeit") is, of course, impossible to answer. However, it is certainly possible to trace how, in the lyrics, desire is expressed as embodied by a textual "I." Two instances in which embodied desire can be seen most clearly as conventional are the blazon (which focuses on the body of the love object, who is nearly always female) and in descriptions of the effects of lovesickness (in which the focus is firmly on the body of the medieval speaking subject or lover, usually male). In both tropes, desire is frequently experienced by the poem's reader or hearer in a way that is abstract, non-physiological, due to extremely conventional language that does not allow any access to an individualized subject or love object. As is readily apparent to anyone with even minimal experience with Middle English lyrics, all lovesick subjects behave in more or less the same manner: they are unable to sleep, eat, or stop thinking about the love object; they "groan" and "sorrow" and pine; they feel and act as if insane. The objects of desire in these poems are often no more individuated; in fact, most are conventional to the point of absolutely effacing any individualized traits of a particular woman. Characteristics of the love object usually include grey eyes; high, arched eyebrows; a sweet, kissable mouth; a rosy complexion; long hair; a slender waist; long, thin fingers; plump arms; and skin that is white as a lily or as whalebone. In *Desire/Love*, Berlant notes that in psychoanalytic thought "the will to destroy (the death drive) and preserve (the pleasure principle) the desired object are

two sides of the same process" (25). Indeed, the most conventional of these poems, while purportedly immortalizing the love object, in fact efface or destroy her entirely, eliding any distinguishing marks of embodied individuality even in their quest to praise and preserve her as the exemplar of idealized beauty.

However, in some lyrics, experiencers are able to empathize with and respond to the textual subject and/or the love object as an individual even through conventional language. To close, I will examine several poems that include divergent variations on the same image. Although variants of this image appear frequently in surviving Middle English lyrics, slight differences in phrasing in each poem provide subtle but significant changes in the ways readers or hearers receive the lyric on an embodied level. This image is variously expressed, but in all cases refers (usually somewhat obliquely) to the beauty of a woman under her clothing. In every instance addressed, the image appears at least two-thirds of the way through the lyric, and, in the first two lyrics, in the last three lines (of poems that are between thirty and forty lines, independent of refrain). All of these lyrics display a close focus on the love object's body as well as on the physical effects that imagining or viewing it causes in the subject's own body. They also all emphasize the love object's unattainability, and thus in these poems the speaker's body is suffused with longing; desire in these lyrics is closely connected to the frustration of its fulfillment. This is, of course, a truism for love lyrics generally, and certainly in many ways these poems are highly conventional. However, what has been largely overlooked is the extent to which subtle variations on conventional language, as well as a close focus on the love object's body in sometimes surprising ways, can create the powerful sense of an individualized and embodied lyric subject.

"Bytuene mersh & aueril," is perhaps best known for its refrain:

> An hendy hap ichabbe yhent,
>
> ichot from heuene it is me sent—
>
> from alle wymmen mi loue is lent,
>
> & lyht on Alysoun.[10]
>
> (I've had a lucky chance, / I know it's come from heaven— / From all women my love is fled / and lit on Alison.)

Within the poem, the speaking subject describes Alysoun in a way that is firmly within the blazon tradition,[11] subsequently painting a complementary picture of himself as a conventional lovesick suitor. In the poem's final stanza, he makes the conventional declaration that he will die if deprived of his lady's love. The surprise here comes in the last two lines of the poem, their own sentence: "Geynest vnder gore," says the subject, "herkne to my roun."[12]

The Middle English Dictionary translates "geynest under gore" as "kindest in clothing," but given the close focus on the lady's body in this poem "kindest under the skirts" is perhaps more evocative.[13] This is a variation on a stock phrase; we will soon see several similar variants. It is nonetheless significant, however, that the focus moves beneath the lady's clothing at the end of the poem. This is at least mildly surprising in its insistence and desperation (both for reciprocated love and to get under Alysoun's skirts) and, in this highly conventional poem, gives readers and hearers a clear sense of the textual subject's embodied desire, which is linked at its most candid to the slightly-more-particularized body of the love object. Although all other descriptions of Alysoun in this poem give us little sense of her as an individual, the minor scandal of imagining her beauty under her clothing goes a bit farther in particularizing her.

This image, and its placement, recurs in several other poems. A similar lyric in the same manuscript, "With longing I am lad,"[14] follows the same trajectory as "Bytuene mersh & aueril," detailing in tortured specificity both the lady's alluring physical characteristics as well as the familiar hyperbolic symptoms of the subject's own lovesickness. The subject's desperation reaches a climax at the poem's end, when his last description of the lady is as "most brilliant under her linen (skirt)":

> Brightest under bis;
>
> Hevene I tolde all his,
>
> That o night were hire guest.
>
> (Loveliest in linen; / I would say heaven is his / Who for one night were her guest.)

The phrase "brightest under bis" is every bit as conventional as "geynest under gore" and in fact the two phrases appear contiguously in the middle of a different lyric in the same manuscript. In this poem, though, "brightest under bis" is the culmination of the speaker's frustrated

desire; readers are, at this point, connected intimately to his body as the subject reaches out (perhaps literally) to the inaccessible body of his love object, most beautiful, he imagines, under her clothing.[15] Although this is a variation on a stock phrase, due to its placement at the end and climax of the lyric, as well as the fact that it gestures toward the beautiful features of the woman that are unseen and undescribed, it is tantalizingly more individuating than her conventional lily-white skin or rosy complexion. In this way, even a formulaic phrase can differentiate the woman, bodily, from other women and further connect the speaking subject (and thus too us, his eavesdroppers) most intimately to his embodied desire.

In "Gracius and gay,"[16] preserved in a fifteenth century Irish manuscript, the formula is altered a bit. The phrase appears in the penultimate of five stanzas, again at the end of a traditional blazon for the love object. In this iteration, alliterative like the previous two but with the added singsong element of rhyme, the lady is "sweet under schete." The "sheet" in question is, in one sense, a bed sheet, but also refers to the woman's dress or skirt.[17] In this way the word gestures toward the speaking subject's wistful imagining of what the lady is like under the sheets (as in nearly every poem of this type, the subject clearly has no firsthand knowledge of the love object in this regard).[18] As in the previous two instances, the conventional phrase "sweet under schete" connects us more closely than any other image in the poem to the woman's body and to the subject's embodied desire.

As a final example, a variation on this image is torqued toward an even stronger creation of empathy in "A wayle whit as whalles bon."[19] This lyric is also a blazon, with a close focus on the objectified body of the lady as well as the suffering body of the textual subject. Here is its final stanza:

> Ich wolde ich were a threstelcok,
>
> A bounting other a lavercok,
>
> Swete brid!
>
> Bitwene hire curtel and hire smok
>
> I wolde ben hid.
>
> (I wish I were a thrush, / A bunting or a lark— / Sweet bird! / Between her kirtle and her shift / I'd like to hide.)

Although syntactically this trope is unlike the others we have seen (geynest under gore, brightest under bis, sweet under schete) its kinship with those phrases and status as a variant on that image is clear. And, as in the preceding instances, this is the moment in which the subject's embodied desire is least conventional and most individuated. In imagining himself, bird-formed, nestling between his lady's kirtle and shift, the speaking subject and his love object are at their most embodied, their most individualized, their most empathetic, and their most lovable.

Conclusion

Some highly conventional Middle English love lyrics, then, convey a clear sense of an individualized, embodied love object and speaking subject, giving lyric experiencers the sense of individual subjects possessed of their own uniquely expressed, embodied subjectivities. In the trope in which a woman is imagined as most beautiful under her clothing, for example, the image of the beloved at her most embodied is paradoxically expressed through a variation on a stock phrase. The affective category of desire allows lyric experiencers to empathize with the "I" of a text in a way that is powerfully felt, both kinesthetically and psychologically. Although "love" and "desire" no doubt had different resonances for medieval as for twenty-first century audiences, their considerable power to inspire empathy, has remained stable over the centuries, explaining the lyrics' continued appeal. Love and desire in Middle English lyric, then, are expressed though conventional language that connects us to the embodied desire of the medieval textual subjects in occasionally surprising ways. Through the variously expressed image of the love object under her clothing, we are able to relate (not only in spite of convention but because of it) to the speaking subject who physically reaches out toward the body of his beloved. At the same time, this image (and other images that connect the reader to the body of the textual "I") also reaches out across time, to the lyric experiencers reading, hearing, and engaging with these lyrics today.

Notes

1. Although I will here address exclusively lyrics that speak to love between humans, the desirous "I" of love lyrics addressed to Mary or Christ is well worth further study. For further exploration of carefully-crafted emotional narratives intended to inspire piety, see Jennifer Hillman's article in this volume.

2. See, classically, J.A. Burrow's "Poems Without Contexts" (1979).
3. Spearing is referring in this instance to the prologue to the "Canterbury Tales," but his observation holds equally true for lyric.
4. This is not to suggest, of course, that approaches looking at manuscript authors and scribes are valueless. See, for example, the current debate on the possible female authorship and/or copying of several poems in the Findern manuscript, with compelling evidence for various possibilities of authorship, adaptation, and scribing.
5. Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins, however, have expressed doubt about this. See "Lyrical Studies," in *Victorian Literature and Culture*.
6. See John Hirsh's 2005 anthology of Middle English lyrics, ballads, and carols, which makes no distinction between religious and secular lyric in chapters entitled, for example, "Poems of Mourning, Fear, and Apprehension" and "Poems of Joy and Celebration" but clearly distinguishes "Poems Inviting or Disparaging Love" from "Poems about Sex." Similarly, in the most recent anthology of Middle English lyric, Thomas Duncan's 2013 *Middle English Lyrics and Carols*, most poems dealing with sex are relegated to "Miscellaneous Lyrics" rather than appearing with "Love Lyrics" (themselves demarcated from later "Courtly Lyrics").
7. Again, Middle English love lyrics are often "conventional" in the sense that there is a great deal of overlap in the corpus in terms of theme, tropes, imagery, and language. Some conventions include a springtime setting, a desirous male speaking subject, a female love object whose features are remarkably similar from poem to poem, and stock words and phrases that recur in many poems from manuscripts of disparate eras.
8. Further, if (as Béatrice Delaurenti explores in her article on compassion in this volume) emotions are "contagious," then the most conventional expressions of emotion are perhaps the most contagious; that is, the most likely to be "caught" by the widest audience. A contemporary analogue might be love songs of our own era, whose popularity is due precisely to the fact that their sentiments appeal to the broadest possible audience.
9. Rosenwein coined the phrase "emotional community" in her 2006 monograph *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* to describe "groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value—or devalue—the same or related emotions" (2).
10. Harley 2253 (fourteenth century); ed. Oliver (22).
    All translations are my own.
11. This term comes from heraldry; blazons praise women in parts, feature by feature, in a way that is analogous to heraldic descriptions. Perhaps the best-known blazon today, Shakespeare's Sonnet 130, is a parody of this poetic tradition.
12. Kindest in skirts/Listen to my song [/plea]!

13. "Gore" refers to the lower part or skirts of a gown, coat, or robe, and is not necessarily gendered. However, it can also mean "a triangular piece of cloth," in this case a clear double entendre cheekily alluding to what is, literally, under the love object's skirts.
14. Harley 2253 (fourteenth century); ed. Luria and Hoffman (24).
15. As in the previous phrase, "brightest under bis" is a double entendre—"bis" can mean not only linen but dark fur, thus simultaneously referring both to the woman's clothing and what the speaker wistfully imagines is underneath, with a sort of double (or x-ray) vision.
16. Kilkenny Castle, Ormond (fifteenth century); ed. Luria and Hoffman (48).
17. The Middle English Dictionary's relevant definition is "any length of cloth, esp. linen; also, a piece of cloth used as a receptacle."
18. I should note here, however, the lyric usually called "The Fair Maid of Ribbesdale" ("Most I riden by Ribbesdale," ed. Luria and Hoffman, 25), in which the textual subject goes rather farther in his description of the love object: "Hire tittes aren anunder bis,/As apples two of parays,/ Youself ye mowen seo." ("Her breasts are under linen/Like two apples of paradise/As you yourself may see"). Given that the subject admits he is seeking out "wilde wimmen" it is perhaps unsurprising that he dares so much in his description; indeed, this is the first but not the only time in the poem the woman's breasts are praised. In this instance the familiar image of the woman under her clothing is extended and further specified, resulting in a very different tonal effect from the other poems here addressed.
19. Harley 2253 (fourteenth century); ed. Luria and Hoffman (28).

CHAPTER 8

Internal Theater and Emotional Scripts in French Jesuit Meditative Literature

Jennifer Hillman

Imagining Christ Our Lord present and placed on the Cross, let me make a Colloquy, how from Creator He is come to making Himself man, and from life eternal is come to temporal death, and so to die for my sins. Ignatius of Loyola, *Spiritual Exercises.*[1]

Introduction

The Jesuits were experts in the evocation of emotion and the manipulation of the senses in the early modern period. Religious theater was one medium through which the Jesuits sought to appeal to the emotions of early modern Catholics to augment their piety.[2] Yet in addition to such "external" techniques, Jesuit writers also directed "inward" piety in meditative texts designed to encourage mental participation in imaginary scenes and dialogues. The Jesuit founder Ignatius Loyola's (1491–1556) *Spiritual Exercises* laid the cornerstone for this through the visualization technique known as the *compositio loci* (or composition of place). This required exercitants to imagine themselves in various scriptural scenes,

J. Hillman (✉)
Department of History and Archaeology, University of Chester, Parkgate Road, Chester, Cheshire CH1 4BJ, UK
e-mail: j.hillman@chester.ac.uk

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_8

as well as other scenarios, and encouraged them to activate the senses in order to enhance these virtual encounters.[3] As many scholars have already noted, Jesuit writers such as Loyola recognized the power of the imagination and the senses for augmenting devotional life.[4] A more neglected theme, however, is the way Jesuit writers sought to elicit certain emotional responses from the meditating reader through the use of dramatic techniques.[5] This essay proposes that these strategies might be explored using the idea of the "internal theater" and focuses, in particular, on the way Jesuit authors strove to "stage-manage" their readers' affective experiences through the use of "emotional scripts."

The emotional script has been significant in the field of the history of emotions in recent years as a term for denoting culturally-specific affective norms. In the recent work of Sarah McNamer on the medieval meditative literary canon, the concept has been given a more focused definition as, "quite literally scripts for the performance of feeling."[6] McNamer has shown that medieval affective meditations on the passion, in particular, taught readers how to feel and "perform" compassion—which, she argues, was gendered as feminine. An important part of performing compassion, she has revealed, was first-person, present tense statements which were crafted by the authors and designed for the reader. In other words, whereas emotional scripts were previously treated as broad cultural patterns establishing normative ways of feeling, McNamer used the term to denote actual scripts.

This essay seeks to build on this important work and explore the role of cognate emotional scripting in the early modern Jesuit meditative tradition.[7] In this context, it is argued here, emotional scripts operated in two ways. First, following a pattern established by the colloquy in Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises*, meditating readers were inserted into virtual scenes as spectators, witnessing emotive dialogues between biblical figures. Second, as an extension of this, meditating readers were sometimes brought into dialogues with figures in the imagined scene and asked to utter emotive statements designed to control the affective, spiritual experience. As William Reddy observed in his seminal work on "emotives," emotional utterances could directly impact the sensed or experienced emotion.[8] By extension, I am suggesting here that emotional dialogues in meditative literature functioned in a similar way; the very act of imagining oneself utter emotional statements was designed to induce certain affective experiences. Affective devotions were, of course, integral to meditation—particularly in the contemplation of Christ's suffering. Yet going beyond the more standard monologues in meditative texts such

as Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises*, this essay tries to show that readers were sometimes invited to be part of a truly dramatic—and sometimes dialogic—internal sequences, where Christ also conversed.

These themes will be explored in two texts produced within this Jesuit tradition, in France and New France, respectively: Louis Richeome's *Le Pélerin de Lorète* published in 1603 in Paris, and Pierre Chastellain's *Affectus Amantis Christum seu Exercitium amoris erga Dominum Jesum*, composed in Sainte-Marie, New France in 1641.[9] Louis Richeome's widely read *Pélerin de Lorete* was composed in the vernacular for the literate, urban elite and the wealthy aristocratic patrons of the Jesuit order, and was translated into English as early as 1629.[10] The book guides pilgrims through a twenty-one-day journey before they arrive at the House of Loreto on the Adriatic coast of Italy: the idea being that the reader performs their own mental pilgrimage.[11] Louis Richeome's reader is in the *Pélerin de Lorete* and is thus essentially a "virtual pilgrim." Spiritual (otherwise known as "mental" or "virtual") pilgrimages were also regarded as potentially as spiritually fulfilling as literal ones and provided an alternative to travel for those unable to undertake journeys.[12] The internal theater in which pilgrims are asked to participate is a moving one which reflected their journey to Loreto.[13]

The *Affectus Amantis* takes the form of a series of meditations, written during Chastellain's time as the spiritual father of the Jesuit mission at Sainte-Marie in New France.[14] Pierre Chastellain (1606–1684) had joined the Jesuit order in 1624 and attended the Jesuit *Collège de Clermont* in Paris where he was also part of the Marian *Congregation de la Sainte-Vierge*.[15] Perhaps motivated by some of the other Jesuit missionaries he knew in Paris, Chastellain left France for Canada in April 1636, arriving in Québec in June, before departing for Huronie on July 21.[16] In 1640, Chastellain became spiritual father of the mission and went to Sainte-Marie, until he left Quebec in 1650.[17] He probably composed the text between 1641 and 1646.[18] Chastellain is known to have written other devotional texts, such as a book for prayers for a Marian congregation, but these are now lost.[19] His *Affectus Amantis* follows the rhythm of a week, where each day is dedicated to a particular part of Christ's life.[20] Although it was authored at the Jesuit residence in Sainte-Marie, strictly speaking the text was intended for a European audience, since Chastellain dedicated his work to members of the Marian congregations to which he had belonged during his youth in France. Yet it is clear from a close reading that the impact of the location permeated the text, which permits its comparative use for our purposes here.

In drawing attention to the way dialogue functioned in these texts, this essay essentially adopts a more literal approach to the concept of the emotional script. Just as McNamer has shown for medieval England, here it is argued that seventeenth century Jesuit meditative texts set out emotional dialogues for readers to participate in. Following Reddy, these scripts sought to determine the types of "emotives" readers imagined themselves uttering, and thus the kinds of emotions they felt. However, this essay also aims to make links between the scripting of emotional dialogue in Jesuit texts and the construction of broader *confessional* emotional scripts in the era of the Reformations. Here the recent work of Susan C. Karant-Nunn is of particular importance. Karant-Nunn proposed—in her study of preaching in post-Reformation Germany—that there were discernible and distinct confessional emotional scripts within the Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist traditions.[21] Karant-Nunn found that in the Catholic context, audiences were encouraged to feel an emotional identification with Christ through contemplation of his physical suffering on the cross. Readers of both Richeome and Chastellain were similarly encouraged to feel sorrow and empathy for Christ, but this essay also points to a range of other emotions through which both texts sought to guide the meditating reader. Like Karant-Nunn, I suggest that these religious emotions tended to reflect the "affective earmarks" of post-Tridentine Catholicism by addressing the treatment of the Virgin Mary in both texts.[22] The Council of Trent renewed the veneration of the Virgin in the wake of Protestant criticisms, after all, which perhaps made emotional experiences surrounding Mary something characteristically post-Tridentine. The Jesuits also had something of a special relationship with the Virgin, as we will see, through the Marian sodalities: associations dedicated to the Virgin Mary and originally intended for students at Jesuit colleges.[23] This focus on the use of the Virgin Mary as an affective stimulus in early modern Jesuit meditative literature also aims to engage with Miri Rubin's recent reflections on Marian devotions as an "enabling site for reflection on the expression of emotion."[24]

Making use of two texts from both within and beyond Europe permits a comparative study of a significant post-Tridentine genre during a period when the Catholic Church had begun to expand through its missions to the non-European world: a venture which was dominated by the Jesuit order. A comparative exploration of Richeome and Chastellain thus not only tells us something about the significance of Jesuit

meditative literature in the creation of this broader Counter-Reformation emotional script then; it also reveals more about the dynamics of the non-European contribution to the shaping of this confessional discourse.

Meditation and the Internal Stage

The vast theatrical program of the Jesuits enacted upon the world stage can be, and has been, conceived by scholars as an "outer form" of Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises.*'[25] Plays were being staged in French Jesuit colleges from their foundation in the sixteenth century and the *Jesuit Relations* also tell of the variety of performances in New France.[26] The intersection between Jesuit meditative literature and the stage was not one-way, however, and Jesuit drama seems to have impacted upon this genre of spiritual literature in significant ways. In exploring the dramatic techniques employed by two French Jesuit authors, it is important not to conflate works coming from the meditative tradition with Jesuit drama. Nonetheless, it is not incomprehensible that if Jesuit drama could reach audiences in urban centers across the post-Tridentine world, Jesuit meditative literature coached those who could imagine scenes independently through reading, and participate on their own "internal stage."

Susan Karant-Nunn has shown how Jesuit drama produced in Germany in this period was designed to evoke certain emotional responses, and she cites the example of the passion plays in the *Dramata Sacra* of the Jesuit Andreas Brunner (1589–1650).[27] It seems fairly clear, however, that Jesuit dramatists were cautious about the kinds of emotional experiences their audiences had. Michael A. Zampelli has shown that one of the ways Jesuit authors critiqued the professional early modern theater was to condemn its lasciviousness, sensuality, and affecting nature.[28] Just as the desire to control, or at least direct, emotions was central to the edifying function of the Jesuit stage then, it was also part of the spiritual experience of the meditating reader.

A number of scholars have already highlighted the dramatic method pioneered (though not necessarily invented) by Loyola, who has been dubbed a "directorial genius."[29] The Jesuits, and indeed Loyola, were not the first to advocate devotional meditation as a spiritual undertaking. Its Christian origins can be found in the Patristic era and the practice blossomed with the medieval *Devotio Moderna*. While many of the features of mental prayer which historians have identified within the

Exercises were not original to the Jesuits, the publication of Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* in sixteenth century Spain strongly influenced the practice in the post-Tridentine Catholic world. Most scholarly discussions of the "internal performance" coached by the *Spiritual Exercises* have centered upon the practice of the composition of place, as we have noted. This is something that has been expertly discussed in recent years by Pierre-Antoine Fabre and Gauvin Bailey.[30] As they have both shown, this method necessitated the use of the imagination so that readers might place themselves mentally and emotionally at the scene of their meditation.[31] Particularly useful here is Pierre-Antoine Fabre's acknowledgement that visual contemplation is focused on a physical space, creating a stage for sacred bodies.[32] Invisible contemplation, in contrast, started with figures of speech (metaphor) and then placed them within a physical setting.[33] The meditating reading thus focused on certain scenes, whereas religious contemplation required reflection on a broader picture.[34] Readers were sometimes encouraged to use pictures as mnemonic aids to their imagination, when they could not conjure up a mental image.[35]

At the start of the book, Richeome explains the practice of imagining the structure, or composition, of the place where the subject of our meditation occurred. He goes on to give examples of spaces we might "compose" when meditating on certain scenes, such as the desert where the Savior fasted if we were meditating on his victory against the Devil; Mount Calvary where he was crucified if we were meditating on his death; the Virgin's chambers where the Angel Gabriel appeared to her, if we were meditating on the Annunciation.

Richeome was himself an expert in the use of physical, as well as mental, images for meditation—his use of engravings in the text has been carefully analyzed by Jeffrey Chipps-Smith. Early in the text, for example, Richeome describes the transportation of the Loreto shrine to Italy—a section accompanied by engravings sketched by Léonard Gaultier (d.1641). This mirrored the earlier use of engravings of the Annunciation in Jerónimo Nadal's *Annotations* and *Meditations on the Gospel* (1593). For example, in the third engraving in Richeome's text, the transportation of the house in 1291 from Nazareth to Dalmatia, and then to Italy, is illustrated. In the engraving, Angels are depicted carrying the house toward a hillside and a new church was built to protect the house.

Richeome also made provisions for his reader when the subject of meditation was spiritual. He adopts this strategy, for example, on the second day of the journey, during a meditation on an "invisible" subject—the human life. The sinful life is represented by a troop of pilgrims

who are following a traitorous, miserable "guide" across a desert, who are contrasted with another company following the way of a "good" and "faithful" Captain. The pilgrim is to imagine themselves in this vast desert as they watch the respective fate of the two groups. The moral message of the meditation takes shape as the second group fall prey to "cruel beasts," lions, and wolves.[36]

The composition of place is just one way the meditating reader of the *Pélerin de Lorete* and the *Affectus Amantis* become players on their own internal stage, however. There are a number of performative elements to the role of the meditating reader in both texts that are worth noting. On the nineteenth day of meditations in the *Pélerin de Lorete*, for example, the pilgrim is to envision a scene before the judge at his "bureau." The reader is then directed to meditate on several scriptural citations, but to say them aloud "emphatically."[37] As the nineteenth day concludes, he advised that while meditating on these sentences, the soul pricks itself and questions what must a "poor, sinful creature" do.[38] Similarly, during the meditations before the departure from Loreto, the reader is asked several times to close their own meditations with a spoken colloquy in the form of a prayer. Richeome clearly intended this to be an aural exercise, as demonstrated by the colloquy celebrating the marriage of Mary and Joseph: "O noble bride/groom! O noble pair! O noble spouses!… O sovereign Lord, creator of these virginal nuptials, be praised hereunto for ever, in all your works."[39] The *Pélerin de Lorete* is also punctuated with songs. The first day of the pilgrimage, for example, closes with a "cantique du pélerinage du monde" of seven stanzas. Similarly, in the *Affectus Amantis*, the reader is similarly invited to read verses aloud.

There are thus a range of strategies adopted by Richeome and Chastellain which invite the meditating reader to "perform" emotional responses to the scenes they imagine in these texts. However, this essay will focus on one aspect of this internal performance which was central to the affective devotional experience of the meditating reader: the role of dialogue. As outlined in the introductory discussion to this essay, dialogues with holy figures were part of a medieval tradition of *sacra conversazione* fully explored by Sarah McNamer. Its origins lay in the early affective devotions of the twelfth century, which invited meditations on the life of Christ.[40] One aspect of this which is yet to be explored is the way in which early modern Jesuit authors built upon this authorial strategy in the meditative texts of the seventeenth century. The next part of this article will explore this at work in the scripting of emotional exchanges within Richeome's *Pélerin de Lorete*.

Emotional Dialogues: Reader as Spectator in Richeome's *Pelerin de Lorete*

The insertion of a meditating reader into scriptural scenes as a witness or spectator is a characteristic of affective devotional literature which has already been observed by scholars. Historians such as Miri Rubin have shown how readers of fourteenth century meditations were made exclusive witnesses to Passion scenes and were encouraged to "listen and see" to heighten the devotional experiences.[41] This mode of meditation was, of course, part of the tradition of *Imitatio*—or the Imitation of Christ—which emphasized his human suffering. Within this genre, the compassion of the reader (as spectator) for the bereaved mother of Christ is pivotal. The *Pélerin de Lorete* necessarily hinges on the experiences of the Virgin Mary because the shrine itself serves to venerate significant moments in her life. For Richeome's pilgrim, emotional identification with Mary was one of the ultimate spiritual objectives of the mental journey to Loreto. Yet because the climactic moment in the *Pélerin* was not the Passion of Christ, but the sacred motherhood of Mary, it is there that Richeome most explicitly seeks to manage the affective experience of his reader.

The (mental) arrival of the reader at their destination of Loreto on the twenty-second day of the pilgrimage is therefore a turning point in the text. The first day of the stay at Loreto follows a similar formula to preceding days, with meditations on the Eucharist, a series of devotional exercises and a "colloque." The twenty-third and twenty-fourth days are more significant. Although there is no dialogue in these chapters of the pilgrimage, they serve as a precursor to celebrating the immaculate conception and motherhood of the Virgin by addressing the conception of the Virgin herself by Anne and Joachim. The immaculate conception of the Virgin herself was a contentious issue in Counter-Reformation Europe, because it had no scriptural basis and originated in apocryphal narratives and hagiographical texts—something criticized by Protestant reformers.[42] The absence of this scriptural precedent is perhaps why Richeome's meditating reader was asked to reflect on the purity of the Virgin's own birth and conception in these chapters, rather than to imagine the dialogue at her conception. Similarly, the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth days deal with the presentation of the Virgin to the temple and her marriage to Joseph respectively—which both seem to serve as the backstory to her conception of Christ.

The twenty-seventh day sees a real departure in the text. The reader is presented with instructions to meditate at Loreto at three points in the day: midnight, morning, and evening. It is during the daytime meditation that Richeome's reader first takes on the more discernible role of reader as spectator (of dialogue). This transitional point in the spiritual journey is also reemphasized by Richeome, who advised the reader that there was no longer the need to imagine the place where events unfolded—as in previous meditations—because they "will meditate the mystery in the same place that it was announced and accomplished."[43] At this moment in the mental pilgrimage, then, the reader addresses their meditations to the "holy house" in front of them and witnesses the events that unfold between the Virgin Mary and the Angel Gabriel at the annunciation. Richeome thus casts the reader as spectator within certain biblical scenes, as witnesses to emotive exchanges between scriptural figures.

> When the angel had entered into the house, he greeted her in this way: Joy be to you, the grace of the Lord is with you, you are blessed among women.
>
> Then, the angel said to Mary, do not fear because you have found favor before God, here you will conceive in your womb and be delivered of a son and will call him Jesus. Now, Mary said to the angel how will this be, seeing as I have never known a man?[44]

The dialogue contains no real embellishments and is faithful to scripture throughout—largely replicating the use of reported speech in the *Spiritual Exercises.* That these were intended to be read (or "heard") as dialogues rather than simply excerpts from the Bible, however, is reinforced by the italicized text, which functions to differentiate the speech. Richeome also used these moments in the life of the Virgin to elicit certain emotions from his reader; it was a way of rendering a reading of scripture more affective. Richeome draws attention to the emotional experiences of the characters and the significance of these dialogic exchanges, for example:

> The angel seeing this holy virgin blush, and seeing in her face and in her silence, her astonishment, called her familiarly by her name, reassured her, advised her not to fear.[45]

In doing so, he tries to shape the reader's emotional experience of the meditation by highlighting the trepidation and fear felt by the Virgin—which Gabriel recognizes and tries to allay. Richeome also goes on to ask the reader to reflect on the significance of what they "hear." They are invited initially at least to consider the Virgin's doubts and her own distress at her pregnancy when she had never "known" a man. Then he invites the reader to rejoice when she obeys God's will, with "*O bien-heureux colloque*!"[46]

The joy of Mary's conception is reinforced by Richeome on the twenty-eighth day of the meditation when the reader is asked to imagine the visitation of the Virgin at the house of Elizabeth.

> It is said that the Virgin, entering into the house of Zacharius greeted Elizabeth. And as Elizabeth had heard Mary's greeting, the child leapt in her womb and Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit and exclaimed with a loud voice you are blessed among women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb. And who am I that the mother of the Lord comes to me? Because here, as the sound of your salutation entered into my ears, the child in my womb leaped with joy. Blessed are those who have believed.[47]

Here, the child in Elizabeth's womb—John the Baptist—leaps with joy as Mary (who is now pregnant with Jesus) enters the household. In response to Elizabeth's dialogue, the reader then becomes spectator to the *Magnificat*—or the song of Mary—with which Mary responds, according to the Gospel of Luke. "Mary said, my soul magnifies the Lord." Richeome's gloss similarly allows the reader to revisit the dialogue they witnessed, as he seeks to continue to encourage the meditating reader to feel Elizabeth's joy: "In these words, one must note the admirable virtue of the greeting of the virgin."[48] Joy is the overwhelming emotion that Richeome is asking his reader to feel, as spectator, in these imagined scenes—even if this joy is inflected with Mary's doubts and anxieties about motherhood. In this case, Mary's emotions are presented as maternal, human reactions. This was, as Miri Rubin has already noted, part of a broader emotional script surrounding Marian devotions that combined the joy of Christ's conception and birth with her suffering at his crucifixion.[49] The joy of the Virgin Mary was also, of course, part of a literary and devotional trope venerating the seven joys and seven sorrows of the Madonna.[50]

As well as intensifying the reader's own affective devotional experience during mental pilgrimage, these emotional scripts which were—as we have noted—intended to be imagined and performed internally by Richeome's reader, also allowed him to speak to a broader, Counter-Reformation emotional script taking shape in the post-Tridentine era. The pilgrimage to Loreto was itself a reflection of renewed Marian devotions in the post-Tridentine period. The shrine itself encapsulated part of the Counter-Reformation agenda: to distinguish Catholic devotional tradition from Protestantism and respond to reformers' critiques of the Marian cult. The "holy house" was celebrated in notable pieces of Counter-Reformation art and devotional music such as the "voguish" litany of Loreto.[51] There had been doubts about the authenticity of the house of Loreto itself before it became one of the major pilgrimage sites in Counter-Reformation Europe.[52] It also became a more important site in the practice of spiritual pilgrimage reflected in the publication of other versions of interior pilgrimage to Loreto—such as that by Giovanni Bellarino in 1608.[53] Mary thus represented, as Bridget Heal has put it, "a rallying point for the Catholic cause."[54] The Jesuits were particularly instrumental in the promotion of her cult, as demonstrated by the growth of the Jesuit Marian sodalities and the revival of Marian shrines across early modern Europe.[55]

One particularly strong Counter-Reformation objection to the Protestant critique of the Marian cult, was the dispute surrounding her own purity (as she herself was the product of an immaculate conception in Anne's womb) and her own virginity.[56] The Dutch Jesuit Peter Canisius (1521–1597) had written a defense of Marian devotions in the sixteenth century and also sought to clarify the Catholic position on her own immaculate conception in the womb of St. Anne, as well as visiting Loreto on pilgrimage regularly.[57] In the post-Trent period too, the most common iconographic theme was the motherhood of Christ—perhaps best captured by Federico Barocci's "The Visitation."[58] In scripting the joy his readers witnessed and felt at the news of Mary's motherhood, Richeome was in this way engaging with the post-Tridentine revalorisation of the Marian cult of motherhood.

Richeome's meditating reader was thus not only practicing a visual, sensory composition of place, they were also encouraged to imagine themselves as spectators in these emotional, climactic moments in the life of the Virgin. What is significant here is that at the moment when his

reader reaches Loreto in this mental spiritual journey, Richeome chose to add these dialogic encounters to the composition of the scene. In doing so, he sought to shape the emotions of his reader as spectator, while simultaneously ensuring their affective experiences conformed to those considered appropriate for post-Tridentine Catholics. His reader was to empathize with the Virgin as a new, joyous, but fearful mother—something which also mirrored the Counter-Reformation reincarnation of Mary as more human.[59] In the next part of this paper, let us now consider the dramatic strategies presented to readers across the Atlantic in Pierre Chastellain's *Affectus Amantis.*

Conversations with Christ: Reader as Interlocutor in Chastellain's *Affectus Amantis*

If Richeome used dialogues to connect his reader with the joy experienced by the Virgin Mary at the news of her motherhood by making them witnesses and spectators, Chastellain's readers are encouraged to feel her sorrow at His crucifixion by conversing with Christ. In other words, in this text, dialogue takes on a more explicit role in meditations as readers were made interlocutors during the scenes they were to imagine.[60] Dialogue had, of course, played a significant role in the practice of meditation for centuries—from the twelfth century writings of Hugh St. Victor to the colloquy which Loyola's reader was to have in the final stages of each meditation in the *Spiritual Exercises.* Sarah McNamer found that in late medieval affective meditations on the passion of Christ, first-person clauses were intended to shape the reader's affective experiences. Readers were also sometimes cast as eyewitnesses and participants in the Passion through "interpellation"—where they were addressed as "you."[61] However, in the *Spiritual Exercises* and many other meditative texts, as Nicolas Standaert has shown, "even though Ignatius says that this is a conversation, the actual words and examples he gives are more truly a monologue directed to Christ by the person meditating."[62] What is more remarkable about the *Affectus Amantis* is that these are dialogic encounters in which Christ also speaks.

At the beginning of the week's meditations, the reader is not presented with any specific temporal or geographic scene to which they are to transpose themselves. Instead Chastellain concentrates on preparing them for a dialogic encounter they are about to experience with Christ. The reader is prompted to ask themselves of their worthiness, to speak

familiarly with the Lord and "King" after being invited into such "inner solitude" where he talked sweetly to the heart.[63] This is illustrative of a recurrent theme within the text: communication with Jesus as a crucial part of this introspective experience. The use of the first person allows the meditating reader to address Christ in a way that is presented as dialogue and Christ also talks "sweetly" to the reader's heart in this interior solitude. Within the same meditation, Chastellain invites his reader to reflect upon how they might be permitted not only to *listen* to God, but also to *speak* to him.[64]

Throughout the rest of the week, Chastellain then goes on to script the reader's imagined dialogue with Jesus. On day five, Thursday, they are exhorted to meditate on the sacrament of communion, imagining themselves at a banquet scene. The reader was to visualize and also speak to other guests present, and importantly, to participate in a discussion with Jesus during the banquet. Conversely, Chastellain not only sketches the words that the reader is to imagine themselves uttering to Christ and other figures, they are part of a truly dialogic performance in that the internal conversation occurs within the scene itself and Christ also has lines. To take an example of this, we can turn to the most dramatic encounter, which occurs on the Friday—the day devoted to reflections upon Christ's Passion. The reader is invited to imagine themselves at the foot of the cross, spectating alongside the Virgin Mary, and to feel her grief and sorrow during his crucifixion:

> Lord Jesus, here you remain…I am afraid to count the number of your extraordinary torments…and so I should declare more clearly [that] I regard your mother and indeed even your father, not [as] barbaric torturers but most loving and sacrificers and spectators of the sacrifice. Indeed you do not conceal the same, when seeking, "What are those wounds in the middle of your hands?" you acknowledge and respond, "These wounds are from the house of those who loved me, from the house of my mother and also from the house of my father."[65]

The reader's emotional responses to the scene of the Passion is scripted here by Chastellain in a way that initially acknowledges the mixed emotions the reader might have toward other spectators at the scene. Yet, the reader is exhorted not to look upon them as having condoned the crucifixion, but as having made a sacrifice. This is reinforced when Christ also speaks from the cross to confess that the wounds on his hands came from the love of his mother and father. Crucially, in this passage, Chastellain

explicitly refers to both the reader and the Virgin Mary as "spectators of the sacrifice" and in doing so locates the reader within the audience to whom Christ speaks from the cross.

At the heart of Chastellain's text was the internal performance of dialogue between the reader and characters within the imagined scene—namely, Christ himself. The crafting of this internal performance, enacted through imagined speech, could have been informed by Chastellain's own exposure to Jesuit, Latin drama during the ten years he spent at the Collège de Clermont.[66] Learning the "speech arts" was, after all, an important function of Jesuit plays for pupils in the Jesuit colleges, as the performance of scripted Latin plays was intended to help students learn the language and the art of oratory, according to the *Ratio Studorium,* the body of rules governing their pedagogic methods. The scripting of a literal dialogue in these meditations is also a testament to the way in which readers of meditative literature in this period were being "taught" to feel.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the Virgin Mary was central to the emotional experiences of the reader in both Richeome and Chastellain's texts. Richeome's text reflects the broader role of Jesuits in the promotion of Marian shrines in early modern Europe, while Chastellain's membership in a Jesuit Marian congregation during his noviciate has been regarded as a formative influence on his spiritual writings.[67] Mary's own life provided readers with an affective model and taught them how to experience a range of emotions—from her own "happy motherhood" at the annunciation, visitation, and nativity, to her "tragic motherhood of loss and mourning" (*pietà*) at the crucifixion.[68] Scholars working across the medieval and early modern periods have already drawn attention to the emotional potential in the veneration of Mary's life—especially for women who were believed to be naturally predisposed to affective modes of religious expression. Here, Richeome and Chastellain's spiritual writings have not been viewed through the lens of gender because it seems clear that the Jesuits were presenting a more universal role for Mary as a symbol of post-Tridentine Catholicism.

Conclusion

The recent surge of historiography on the early modern senses is responsible for a renewed interest in the way the Jesuits assisted the practice of meditation with the application of the senses.[69] This essay has tried to balance this scholarship with an exploration of the centrality of affect

to the creation of the internal stage in French meditative literature. This reading of texts within this genre produced in France and its colonies also intersects with recent work on French drama in this period. Joseph Harris has shown that the ideal in seventeenth century French theater was that spectators believed they were witnessing real events—that is, that they were transposed to a real scene. He has also revealed that theorists believed that spectators could engage with stage characters as real people and even formed emotional relationships with these characters.[70] What this reading of Richeome and Chastellain has highlighted is that just as the dramatic techniques of the *Spiritual Exercises* were seen to have provided a template for the theater, meditative texts composed in France and its Empire also operated within this realm of performance. A brief comparison of Chastellain and Richeome's strategies as "internal playwrights" brings the various dramatic techniques evident in meditative texts, produced within and beyond Europe, into sharper focus. Not only does it serve as an illustration of the way in which texts within the meditative tradition in the Francophone world operated as guides for internal performance in similar ways to the *Spiritual Exercises*, it is also indicative of a more reciprocal, or dialectic, relationship between meditative literature and Jesuit drama.

Unlike Chastellain, Richeome was more cautious about advocating communication with Christ and does not script a part for the meditating reader in the *Pélerin de Lorete*. The different degrees to which each author permitted their readers to participate on their own mental stages was perhaps a reflection of their positioning as authors. It may have been Chastellain's perceived displacement from Catholic holy sites in Europe which discouraged him from situating his reader within any specific locale. The function of a more direct conversation with Christ in the *Affectus Amantis* too may have been, in a text produced outside of Europe, a way of mitigating the location. In the final series of meditations on Saturday, for example, the importance of the locale is stressed as Chastellain proclaims the Jesuit missionary ethic that salvation is accessible to all, but also that those in far and remote locations could "access" Christ as easily as those closer by.[71] More research is needed on texts designed to direct interiorized piety in the Counter-Reformation era, however, if we are to draw any firmer conclusions about the impact of locale upon affective strategies.[72]

By turning attention to the shaping of more literal emotional "scripts" in dialogues within Jesuit meditative literature, this essay has also tried

to make a contribution to the growing literature on the early modern religious emotions. Both Jesuit authors, it has been argued, tapped into the emotional scripts that the Counter-Reformation promoted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as part of its own reforming agenda. While joy and sorrow in the life of the Virgin were part of devotional traditions with long histories, this essay has argued that they were also significant in new ways in the post-Tridentine era. Comparing texts composed both within and beyond Europe, as this essay has done, may allow historians to glimpse a more comprehensive picture of what it meant to "feel" like a Catholic.[73]

Notes

1. The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius of Loyola translated from the autograph by Father Elder Mullan, SJ (New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1914), 16, emphasis mine.
2. This was part of a broader Counter-Reformation emphasis on affective and sensory religious experiences—something which has been reconstructed by many scholars. See the synthesis in Simone Laqua-O'Donnell, "Piety and Community in Early Modern Europe," in Alexandra Bamji, Geert H. Janssen, Mary Laven (eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Counter Reformation* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 294–295.
3. For example, the exercitant was to imagine themselves at the scene of the Last Supper and to "hear what they are talking about," The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius of Loyola, 23.
4. See Pierre-Antoine Fabre, *Ignace de Loyola: Le lieu de l'image* (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1992). On the Jesuit use of the imagination, see Marc Fumaroli, "The Fertility and the Shortcomings of Renaissance Rhetoric: The Jesuit Case," in John O'Malley (ed.), *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1775* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 96–106. For a recent essay on one particular meditation in the *Exercises*, see Adriano Prosperi, "The Two Standards: The Origins and Development of a Celebrated Ignatian Meditation," *Journal of Jesuit Studies*, vol. 3, no. 3 (2016): 361–386.
5. There is some interesting discussion of emotion in Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* in Maureen A.J. Fitzsimmons, "A Pilgrim's Staff Versus a Ladder of Contemplation: The Rhetoric of Agency and Emotional Eloquence in St. Ignatius's Spiritual Exercises," in Cinthia Gannett and John C. Brereton (eds.), *Traditions of Eloquence: The Jesuits and Modern Rhetorical Studies* (New York: Fordham, 2016), 94–95.

6. Sarah McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 12.
7. For our purposes here, I have used the word "meditative" and "meditation" throughout this essay to describe the practices that Jesuit authors advocated; there were, in some contemporary texts, discussion of the differences between meditation and contemplation. On this, see Nathan. D. Mitchell, *The Mystery of the Rosary: Marian Devotion and the Reinvention of Catholicism* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 99–100.
8. William Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 104–105.
9. Louis Richeome, *Le Pélerin de Lorète: Voeu à la glorieuse Vierge Marie Mère de Dieu pour Monseigneur le Daufin* (Paris, 1603). Pierre Chastellain, *Affectus Amantis Christum seu Exercitium amoris erga Dominum Jesum* (Paris: D. Bechet, 1648.). There are only six extant copies of the Latin work in the world: three in Montreal, two in Europe, and one in China. I consulted the edition held at the British Library, London. There is also a more recent French translation with a good critical introduction, *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus ou exercices de l'amour envers le Seigneur Jésus pour toute une semaine; Traduction, introduction et notes par Joseph Hofbeck* (Paris: Guérin, 1999).
10. Mitchell, *The Mystery of the Rosary*, 98–99.
11. Jeffrey Chipps Smith, *Sensuous Worship: Jesuits and the Art of the Early Catholic Reformation in Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 50.
12. On virtual pilgrimages in the medieval and early modern period, see Kathryn M. Rudy, *Virtual Pilgrimages in the Convent: Imagining Jerusalem in the Late Middle Ages* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011); Richard G. Newhauser and Arthur J. Russell, "Mapping Virtual Pilgrimage in an Early Fifteenth-Century Arma Christi Roll," in Lisa H. Cooper and Andrea Deny-Brown (eds.), *The Arma Christi in Medieval and Early Modern Material Culture* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014); Marie-Luise Ehrenschwendtner, "Jerusalem Behind Walls: Enclosure, Substitute Pilgrimage, and Imagined Space in the Poor Clares' Convent at Villingen," *The Medieval Journal*, vol. 3, no. 2 (2013): 1–38.
13. Kathryn. M. Rudy, "A Guide to Mental Pilgrimage: Paris Bibl. Arsenal MS 212," *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte*, 63, no. 4 (2000): 494.
14. For his biography, see Georges-Émile Giguère, S. J. "Chastellain, Pierre," in *Dictionnaire Biographique du Canada* (Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1966), vol. 1, 208–209.
15. *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, xi–xii.
16. *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, xiv.

17. François Roustang, *Jesuit Missionaries to North America* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 187.
18. *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, v.
19. *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, xxii.
20. *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, v.
21. Susan C. Karant-Nunn, *The Reformation of Feeling: Shaping the Religious Emotions in Early Modern Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
22. The "affective earmarks" of Catholicism is Karant-Nunn's phrase in *The Reformation of Feeling*, 62.
23. For a clear and brief definition of the Marian sodalities, see Céline Drèze, "Musical Practices among Marian Sodalities in the Gallo and Flandro-Belgian Provinces from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries," *Journal of Jesuit Studies*, 3 (2016): 401.
24. Miri Rubin, *Emotion and Devotion: The Meaning of Mary in Medieval Religious Cultures* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 79–80. The literature on Marian devotions in the late medieval and early modern period is vast. As a starting point, see Marina Warner, *All Alone of Her Sex: The Myth and the Cult of the Virgin Mary* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976); Miri Rubin, *Mother of God: A History of the Virgin Mary* (London: Penguin, 2009). I have also benefitted from discussions about the affective significance of Mary with Dr. Ananya Chakravarti during a Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellowship at the European University Institute, Florence in 2012–2013; see her research on affect and the Virgin Mary in devotional poetry "Between *bhakti* and *pietà*: Untangling Emotion in Marāṭhī Christian Poetry," forthcoming, *History of Religions*, 2017.
25. Joohee Park, "Not just a University Theatre: The Significance of Jesuit School Drama in Continental Europe, 1540–1773," in Kevin J. Wetmore Jr. (ed.), *Catholic Theatre and Drama: Critical Essays* (North Carolina: McFarland, 2010), 34.
26. On Jesuit drama in the early modern period, see, as a starting point, J. M. Valentin, *Les Jésuites et le théâtre, 1554–1680: Contribution à l'histoire culturelle du monde catholique dans le Saint Empire romaine germanique* (Paris: Desjonquères, 2001).
27. Karant-Nunn, *The Reformation of Feeling*, 42.
28. Michael A. Zampelli, "'Lascivi Spettacoli': Jesuits and Theater (From the Underside)," in John. W. O'Malley, SJ, Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris, and T. Frank Kennedy (eds.), *The Jesuits II: Cultures, Sciences and the Arts, 1540–1773* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 557–558, 563.
29. Fumaroli, "The Fertility and the Shortcomings of Renaissance Rhetoric," 96.

30. Fabre, *Ignace de Loyola*; Gauvin Bailey, *Between Renaissance and Baroque: Jesuit Art in Rome, 1565–1610* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); Gauvin Bailey, *Art on the Jesuit Missions in Asia and Latin America 1542–1773* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). See also Smith, *Sensuous Worship*.
31. Terence Cave, *Devotional Poetry in France 1570–1613* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 27.
32. Fabre, *Ignace de Loyola*, 33–38.
33. Cave, *Devotional Poetry in France*, 27.
34. Wietse De Boer, "Invisible Contemplation: A Paradox in the Spiritual Exercises," in Karl Enenkel and Walter S. Melion (eds.), *Meditatio: Refashioning the Self Theory and Practice in Late Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual Culture* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 236. On this, see also Judi Loach, "The Teaching of Emblematics and Other Symbolic Imagery by Jesuits within Town Colleges in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France," in John Manning and Marc van Vaeck (eds.,), *The Jesuits and the Emblem Tradition* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 169–170.
35. Karl Enenkel and Walter S. Melion, "Introduction: Types and Functions of Meditation in the Transition from Late Medieval to Early Modern Intellectual Culture," in Enenkel and Melion (eds.), *Meditatio*, 14–15.
36. Richeome, *Pélerin*, 169.
37. Richeome, *Pélerin*, 344. The words he actually used were "avec quelque exaggeration de langage." The biblical quotations the meditating reader is to reflect upon include Job: "What shall I do when God judges? And when he questions, how can I respond to him?"
38. Richeome, *Pélerin*, 344.
39. Richeome, *Pélerin*, 462–463.
40. Roberta L. A. Clark, "Spiritual Exercises: The Making of Interior Faith," in John H. Arnold (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 276.
41. Rubin, *Emotion and Devotion,* 93.
42. Emilie L. Bergmann, "Learning at Her Mother's Knee? Saint Anne, the Virgin Mary, and the Iconography of Women's Literacy," in Anne J. Cruz and Rosilie Hernández (eds.), *Women's Literacy in Early Modern Spain and the New World* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 248.
43. Richeome, *Pèlerin*, 480–481.
44. Richeome, *Pélerin*, 485.
45. Richeome, *Pèlerin*, p. 486.
46. Richeome, *Pèlerin*, p. 488.
47. Richeome, *Pélerin*, pp. 505–506.
48. Richeome, *Pélerin*, 506.
49. Rubin, *Emotion and Devotion*, 99.

50. See, for instance, David J. Rothenberg, *The Flower of Paradise: Marian Devotion and Secular Song in Medieval and Renaissance Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 22.
51. Trevor Johnson, *Magistrates, Madonnas and Miracles: The Counter Reformation in the Upper Palatinate* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 240.
52. P. Renée Baernstein, *A Convent Tale: A Century of Sisterhood in Spanish Milan* (London: Routledge, 2002), 166–167.
53. Baernstein, *A Convent Tale*, 168.
54. Bridget Heal, *The Cult of the Virgin Mary in Early Modern Germany: Protestant and Catholic Piety 1500–1648* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 149.
55. On the origins of the sodalities, see Louis Châtellier, "À l'origine d'une société catholique: Le rôle des congré-gations mariales aux xvie–xviiie siècles," *Histoire, économie et* société, 3, no. 2 (1984): 203–220.
56. Donna Spivey Ellington, *From Sacred Body to Angelic Soul: Understanding Mary in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 171.
57. Johnson, *Magistrates, Madonnas and Miracles*, 240.
58. Sara F. Matthews Grieco, "Models of Female Sanctity in Renaissance and Counter-Reformation Italy," in Lucetta Scaraffia and Gabriella Zarri (eds.), *Women and Faith: Catholic Religious Life in Italy from Late Antiquity to the Present* (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 161. Ian F. Verstegan, *Federico Barocci and the Oratorians: Corporate Patronage and Style in the Counter Reformation* (Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2015), 78.
59. This is something that has been noted by Mitchell in his work on the mysteries of the rosary, where he notes that they are "profoundly human and accessible motives, conflicts and emotions," *The Mystery of the Rosary*, 4.
60. This is also noted in the critical introduction to the French translation of the text *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, xxix.
61. McNamer, *Affective Meditation*, 12.
62. Nicolas Standaert, "The Composition of Place: Creating Space for an Encounter," *The Way*, vol. 46, no. 1 (January, 2007), 17.
63. Chastellain, *Affectus Amantis.*
64. Chastellain, *Affectus Amantis.*
65. Chastellain, *Affectus Amantis*, 315. I am indebted to Thomas Pickles, who edited my translation from the Latin.
66. This is also recognized by the biography in *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, xxx.
67. On Marian shrines in Germany, see Marc R. Forster, *Catholic Revival in the Age of the Baroque: Religious Identity in Southwest Germany*

1550–1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 92–93; on Chastellain and the Marian sodality, see *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, p. xii.
68. Rubin, *Emotion and Devotion*, 84–99.
69. See, in particular, the essays in: Wietse de Boer and Christine Gottler (eds.), *Religion and the Senses in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2013) and Wietse de Boer, "The Counter Reformation of the Senses," in Alexandra Bamji, Geert H. Janssen, Mary Laven (eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Counter Reformation* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 243–260.
70. Joseph Harris, *Inventing the Spectator: Subjectivity and the Theatrical Experience in Early Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
71. Chastellain, *Affectus Amantis*.
72. It has been suggested, for example, that Chastellain's use of dialogue may reflect the influence of Franciscan texts; see *L'âme éprise du Christ Jésus*, xxx.
73. Here I borrow McNamer's construction to "feel" like a woman, in *Affective Meditation*, 3.

Acknowledgements This essay grew out of conversations with Dr. Ananya Chakravarti about Jesuit drama and "internal theater" in the European and non-European world. Earlier research for this essay was presented as part of a collaborative paper with Dr. Chakravarti in Trento in October 2013. Further research and revisions were carried out during a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Chester. I am grateful to the editors of the volume for constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this essay. I am also indebted to Professor Elizabeth Tingle for helping to refine the arguments presented here; and to Dr. Thomas Pickles for proofreading the final draft and editing my Latin translations.

PART III

Authoring Emotions

CHAPTER 9

Cruelty and Empathy in Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné's *Les Tragiques*: The Gaze of and on the Reader

Kathleen Long

The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in France were dominated by the Wars of Religion (1562–1629) between Catholics and Protestants, in the course of which as many as two million people died.[1] These wars were characterized by unprecedented cruelty in the form of widespread massacres and new forms of torture and execution. Such violence increasingly became a spectacle or entertainment, whether in the form of public executions in which spectators became increasingly distanced from the victims,[2] or theatrical productions that represented horrific violence in distant contexts, historical or mythological.[3] It should be noted that late sixteenth century tragedies may well have also served the purpose of defying the royal injunction against publishing on or speaking about the religious wars. While the authors of Classical tragedy may have sought to move their audience in order to calm the impetus of unrest or

K. Long (✉)
Department of Romance Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
e-mail: kpl2@cornell.edu

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_9

violence and promote reconciliation under the aegis of absolutist rule, as Andrea Frisch has pointed out,[4] sixteenth century tragedy raised the specter of state-sponsored violence against its own citizens, and the question of the legitimacy of a monarch who presented a threat to his people. Robert Garnier's *Les Juives* is the clearest example of this use of the tragic form, representing the massacre of Jews by Nebuchadnezzar and produced in a period defined by the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacres of 1572, which spread throughout France and lasted for months.

In this context, a number of authors, among them Michel de Montaigne, expressed concern about sthe cultural validation of cruelty, and meditated on how a more ethical stance toward religious (and cultural) difference might be inculcated in an increasingly cruel population.[5] This idea is suggested in the opening lines of his essay "Of Cruelty":

> Celuy qui, d'une douceur et facilité naturelle, mespriseroit les offences receues, feroit chose tres-belle et digne de louange; mais celuy qui, picqué et outré jusques au vif d'une offence, s'armeroit des armes de la raison contre ce furieux appetit de vengeance, et apres un grand conflict s'en rendroit en fin maistre, feroit sans doubte beaucoup plus. Celuy-là feroit bien, et cettuy-cy vertueusement: l'une action se pourroit dire bonté; l'autre, vertu.[6]
>
> (He who through a natural mildness and easygoingness should despise injuries received would do a very fine and praiseworthy thing; but he who, outraged and stung to the quick by an injury, should arm himself with the arms of reason against this furious appetite for vengeance, and after a great conflict should finally master it, would without doubt do much more. The former would do well, and the other virtuously; one action might be called goodness, the other virtue.)[7]

Montaigne believes that people can train themselves to be more humane, but that they can train themselves to be inhumane as well: "*Les naturels sanguinaires à l'endroit des bestes tesmoignent une propension naturelle à la cruauté. Apres qu'on se fut apprivoisé à Romme aux spectacles des meurtres des animaux, on vint aux hommes et aux gladiateurs*"[8] ("Natures that are bloodthirsty toward animals give proof of a natural propensity toward cruelty. At Rome, after they had become accustomed to the spectacle of the slaughter of animals, they proceeded to that of men and of gladiators").[9] Spectators can be trained to enjoy violence inflicted on humans through exposure to spectacles of violence against animals. Montaigne hates cruelty precisely because it becomes pleasurable, and masters those who experience it:

> je hay, entre autres vices, cruellement la cruauté, et par nature et par jugement, comme l'extreme de tous les vices. Mais c'est jusques à telle mollesse que je ne voy pas égorger un poulet sans desplaisir, et ois impatiemment gemir un lievre sous les dens de mes chiens, quoy que ce soit un plaisir violent que la chasse. Ceux qui ont à combatre la volupté, usent volontiers de cet argument, pour montrer qu'elle est toute vitieuse et desraisonnable: que lors qu'elle est en son plus grand effort, elle nous maistrise de façon que la raison n'y peut avoir accez…[10]
>
> (Among other vices, I cruelly hate cruelty, both by nature and by judgment, as the extreme of all vices. But this is to such a point of softness that I do not see a chicken's neck wrung without distress, and I cannot bear to hear the scream of a hare in the teeth of my dogs, although the chase is a violent pleasure. Those who have to combat sensual pleasure like to use this argument to show that it is wholly vicious and unreasonable: that when it is at its greatest pitch it masters us to such an extent that reason can have no access.)[11]

He thus compares violent impulses to pleasurable ones, and feels that these impulses can be controlled, but that this requires self-control: "*Je sçay qu'il en peut aller autrement, et qu'on arrivera par fois, si on veut, à rejetter l'ame sur ce mesme instant à autres pensemens*"[12] ("I know that it can go otherwise, and that we may sometimes, if we will, cast our soul back to other thoughts at this very instant").[13] Such a response to the pleasure elicited by violence calls for self-awareness, the gaze turned in upon the self in response to cruelty toward others. Montaigne presents himself as compassionate: "*je me compassionne fort tendrement des afflictions d'autruy*"[14] ("I sympathize very tenderly with the afflictions of others").[15] He sees the ethical demands of compassion as extending well beyond the human realm, even into that of the trees and plants:

> Quand tout cela en seroit à dire, si y a-il un certain respect qui nous attache, et un general devoir d'humanité, non aux bestes seulement qui ont vie et sentiment, mais aux arbres mesmes et aux plantes. Nous devons la justice aux hommes, et la grace et la benignité aux autres creatures qui en peuvent estre capables. Il y a quelque commerce entre elles et nous, et quelque obligation mutuelle.[16]
>
> (Even if all this were lacking, still there is a certain respect, and a general duty of humanity, that attaches us not only to animals, who have life and feeling, but even to trees and plants. We owe justice to men, and mercy and kindness to other creatures that may be capable of receiving it. There is some relationship between them and us, and some mutual obligation.)[17]

Montaigne argues, then, that compassion and kindness are owed to all those with whom (and which) we interact; this is a strongly ethical stance to take, one that flies in the face of the normalization of pleasure taken from the suffering of others.

Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné also explicitly endeavors to counteract this pleasurable response to the spectacle of violence in his epic about the Wars of Religion, *Les Tragiques* (*The Tragic Ones*; this title is also a play on the *histoires tragiques* tradition). When only the eye is engaged with the spectacle of violence, the conscience remains silent. The reader must be made aware of his or her complicity in the spectacle, and the emotions must be elicited for an ethical response to violence even to be possible. One possible solution was to find ways to make people understand or even feel the suffering of others, rather than remaining merely spectators, and thus induce them to engage with others in a more ethical and sympathetic manner. This is the effect that Agrippa d'Aubigné claims to be seeking in some of the more controversial passages of his epic. Thus, *Les Tragiques* elicits the reader's sympathy for civilians in the opening books, but is a polemical work, one which, in the end, turns that sympathy for the victims into hatred for the perpetrators of violence.

This essay will examine the twists and turns of emotions in this epic,[18] in particular some instances of its representation of cruelty, and trace the relationship between these representations and authorial cruelty toward the reader, in the form of aggressive interrogation and manipulation by the authorial persona. He expresses the clear desire to shake the reader out of his or her indifference to violence, or even distanced enjoyment of it, by inciting discomfort. This cruelty might even function as a spur to empathy, forcing the reader to face and at least try to understand the suffering of the victims of war and of religious persecution. Aristotle, in the second book of his *Rhetoric*, provided one model for the understanding of emotions. He emphasized what Barbara Rosenwein has called "the sociology of emotion," and saw emotions as "cognitive responses to lived experience in the world."[19] For him, the emotions seem not only to be the product of particular social contexts and interactions, but also to be social tools. He states that "Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain." This emotion can be mingled with pleasure, "because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance."[20] It is clear from his description of this emotion that he understands it as leading to action in the form of vengeance, with the goal of reaffirming one's place in the social order.

Another aspect of Aristotelian emotions is their pairing in opposites. Anger is balanced by calm; friendship and enmity are two sides of the same coin, as are fear and confidence, and shame and shamelessness. Aristotle also associates pity and indignation. He defines pity "as a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves."[21] Indignation, on the other hand, "is pain caused by the sight of undeserved good fortune."[22] These pairings of emotions signal their role as a social response in a very hierarchized society.

Agrippa d'Aubigné undoubtedly owes some of his understanding of emotions to Aristotle's descriptions. Certainly, he calls upon the social aspects of emotions in the passages from *Les Tragiques* analyzed below. He also deploys emotions—pity, shame, and anger most frequently—as tools to induce action on the part of the reader. But his use of emotions differs starkly from that of Aristotle in its reversal of the usual social hierarchies. The reader is called upon to feel pity or sympathy for the poor, who frequently behave more nobly in this epic than their princes; and to feel shame or anger at the powerful who prey upon their own people. Rather than a conscious use of emotions to affirm the dominant social hierarchy, he deploys them to question a hierarchy gone bad and destroying society.

Sara Ahmed deftly reviews various modern theories of emotions, their sensorial, cognitive, and social aspects, and weaves them together to demonstrate the complex interactions among "bodily sensation, emotion, and thought."[23] She suggests that emotions are neither purely social, coming from without, nor psychological, arising from internal drives: "Rather, it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made."[24] *Les Tragiques* redraws boundaries and reforms surfaces by means of the complex emotional communities created in the text. In this paper, I will explore the emotional reconfiguration of the reader as a vulnerable witness to horror, which rebounds upon him throughout the text. *Les Tragiques* is not merely an archive of emotions, even though it does serve as register of many pitiable, horrific, shameful, and even triumphant moments—after all, an entire book is dedicated to "vengeances." It is also composed as a means of conveying those emotions to a larger community through vivid and disorienting descriptions of horrific violence in a manner that frequently seems to place the reader within the scene of action.

This strategy is supported by deliberate perversion of some of the most cherished literary forms of the period, in particular Petrarchan poetry and classical epic. Agrippa d'Aubigné creates certain expectations by the use of well-known Petrarchan and epic images and forms, and then destroys those expectations by twisting the images and forms to very different uses. In this way, the reader is continually kept off balance, shocked, and perhaps even distressed by what she reads; this is the goal stated by the authorial persona throughout his epic.

In the end, by acting in what seems to be an inhumane manner toward his reader, Agrippa d'Aubigné may be revealing an ethics of affect in that reader, inculcating empathy through shared suffering and vulnerability. While Aristotle defines pity as a feeling aroused by the suffering of someone for whom we already have an affinity, someone we know does not deserve pain because he is a friend or a family member, the poetic persona in *Les Tragiques* demands that pity be extended to all who suffer, as we shall see below. More specifically, he makes statements and asks questions that imply tht the sight of suffering should automatically elicit sorrow ("*Quel oeil sec eust peu voir les membres mi-mangez*?" "What dry eye could observe these half-eaten members?"—cited and analyzed below). Suffering should thus *create* a connection between the victim and the witness, and elicit the ethical response of sorrow, rather than require a pre-existing connection in order to induce sympathy or pity. His emphasis on the suffering of mothers and children throughout the epic would support this reading, underscoring not only the vulnerability of these groups in war, but also the destruction of the one relationship almost all of his readers would have experienced. In deploying all of these strategies for upsetting the reader's expectations, *Les Tragiques* uses a range of means to convey the horrors of war, means that operate on an emotional and perhaps even physiological level, and that teach in a more immediate manner how to feel the pain and suffering of others. In this way, he seeks to convert those who have chosen cruelty as a *modus operandi* to a more ethical mode of thinking.

This paradoxical use of cruelty to invite kindness informs the poetic persona's relationship with the reader from the opening scenes of the epic. He makes his overall agenda clear in his early addresses to the readers, reversing the process of turning pain into pleasure that Freud observed in artistic imitations of painful experiences:

> Finally, a reminder may be added that the artistic play and artistic imitation carried out by adults, which, unlike children's, are aimed at an audience, do not spare the spectators (for instance, in tragedy) the most painful experiences and can yet be felt by them as highly enjoyable. This is convincing proof that, even under the dominance of the pleasure principle, there are ways and means enough of making what is in itself unpleasurable into a subject to be recollected and worked over in the mind.[25]

Les Tragiques would seem to be reversing this process, for example in the famous statement in "Misères," the first book of the epic: "*Vous n'estes spectateurs, vous estes personnages*" ("You are not spectators, you are characters in the play").[26] Witnessing suffering with the indifference of theater-goers at a play, without pity or any form of action, simply perpetuates the violence that caused the pain, as the episode of the cannibal mother, analyzed below, makes clear. Furthermore, the notion that this suffering, because it happens to those the reader does not know personally, is somehow acceptable, renders the reader himself vulnerable. This line is part of a much longer critique of the distancing process of spectatorship, which allows for pleasure to be received from witnessing experiences that are painful to others:

> Car encore vous pourriez contempler de bien loin
>
> Une nef sans pouvoir lui aider au besoin
>
> Quand la mer l'engloutit, et pourriez de la rive,
>
> En tournant vers le ciel la face demi-*vive,*
>
> Plaindre sans secourir ce mal oisivement;
>
> Mais quand, dedans la mer, la mer pareillement
>
> Vous menace de mort, courez à la tempeste,
>
> Car avec le vaisseau vostre ruine est preste.
>
> ("Misères," 171–178)
>
> (For still you might be able to contemplate from afar a ship in need without being able to help it when the sea swallows it up. Turning your half-alive face to the sky, you can regret the unfortunate event at your leisure, from the safety of the shore. But when you are at sea, and the sea menaces you with a similar death, run into the storm, as your ruin and that of the boat are inevitable.)

The poetic persona drives his point home by comparing France to a ship that is foundering; therefore, all of his readers are implicitly trapped in the same shipwreck, although they think they are merely spectators.

He attacks the reader more directly in "Vengeances," the sixth book of the epic:

> J'ay crainte, mon lecteur, que tes esprits lasses
>
> De mes tragiques sens ayent dit: C'est assez!
>
> Certes ce seroit trop si nos ameres plaintes
>
> Vous contoyent des romans les charmeresses feintes.
>
> Je n'escris point à vous, serfs de vanité…[27]
>
> ("Vengeances," 1103–1107)
>
> (I fear, my reader, that your spirits, tired of my tragic bearing have said "That's enough!" Of course, it would be too much if our bitter complaints recounted to you the feigned charms of novels. I'm not writing for you, slaves of vanity…)

This passage echoes lines in the second book of the epic, "Princes," which tell of the author, himself tired of the tragedy, and clapping his hands in hopes of ending the "play." But the Wars of Religion drag on, repeating themselves seemingly endlessly: "*où tant d'actes passez/Me font frapper des mains et dire: c'est assez!*" ("when so many acts have already taken place/they make me clap my hands and say 'that's enough!" "Princes," 80–84). The unpleasant nature of this repetition takes us, according to Freud, beyond the pleasure principle to the domain of the repetition compulsion, which he sees as an attempt to "master the stimulus retrospectively." When a stimulus overwhelms the capacity to absorb or control it, it is thus returned to in dreams or other symptoms (including hallucinations and repetitive acting out of the event that caused the stimulus) in the attempt to develop "the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis."[28] In similar fashion, the early modern audience, perhaps already traumatized by the Wars themselves, re-experiences the trauma by means of any number of literary and artistic representations of violence. In some cases, this repetition may result in mastery of the stimulus, but in the case of *Les Tragiques*, the authorial persona uses this repetition to enter into and reiterate a confrontational

relationship with his reader, making it clear that he is not writing to entertain or comfort his audience, but to provoke or even re-traumatize it. For this persona, as well as for the author of *Les Tragiques*, the Wars never ended (Mack Holt gives the dates of these Wars as 1562–1629; see note 1), and the epic keeps them fresh in the minds of the reader for this reason.

After the initial positioning of the reader as a participant rather than spectator, the authorial persona seems to want to co-opt the sympathies of his reader, and he uses familial imagery, particularly of mother and child, to both personalize and universalize the violence that he is representing. From the opening allegory of France as an afflicted mother whose twin sons, wishing to deny each other maternal sustenance, tear her breasts until only blood is left ("Misères," v. 130), mothers dominate the first book of the epic, and return in other books as well. This depiction of "Mère France" also links the seemingly intimate drama between mother and child to trauma on a national scale, as Marcus Keller has demonstrated.[29] The use of the mother/child dyad to depict catastrophic events, a device Agrippa d'Aubigné uses frequently throughout "Misères" not only in the figure of "Mère France" but also in various scenes of mothers and children victimized by massacres and wars, links such events to more common experiences.

In the depictions of victimized mothers and children, sometimes the authorial persona serves the double role of witness and object of a judging gaze, sometimes he brings the reader along as a double of himself and as another witness to these horrific events. These relationships are not comfortable ones; the reader may be the narrator's double, but he also finds himself becoming the object of a judgmental gaze—his own as well as the other's. The doubling of the authorial persona is first evident in the scene of a family massacred by soldiers raiding their town for food: "*Cet amas affamé nous fit à Mont-moreau/Voir la nouvelle horreur d'un spectacle nouveau*" ("This famished crowd made us view the new horror of a new spectacle").[30] He has become the very audience that he decried only a few hundred lines before, as he intrudes onto an intimate but terrifying family scene. He is drawn further into the scene by a dying father's suggestion that there is worse to be seen: "*Ma femme en quelque lieu, grosse, est morte de coups…si vous avez encore quelque envie/De voir plus de malheur, vous verrez là dedans/Le massacre piteux de nos petits enfans*" ("My pregnant wife lies somewhere, dead from blows…if you wish to see even more suffering, you will see, inside, the pitiful massacre

of our tiny children").[31] The witness is caught in the act of voyeurism, sees himself seeing (and being seen by the dying father), and is rendered an uncomfortable, guilty participant in the act of crossing the threshold: he chooses to be a spectator of the violence, but is made painfully aware of this choice. In fact, the father also begs him to finish the work the soldiers started, and kill him quickly in order to cut short the suffering, putting the witness into the position of persecutor and making him a guilty participant.[32] Thus, when at the end of the scene he calls on God to judge "*les violeurs de paix*" ("the violators of peace"),[33] he is acknowledging himself as well as the murderers as the object of this judging gaze.[34]

Within this scene, the narrator finds one child still dying of hunger:

> …qui de sa pasle bouche
>
> Poussoit et retiroit cet esprit languissant
>
> Qui, à regret son corps par la faim delaissant,
>
> Avoit lassé sa voix bramant après sa vie.[35]
>
> (…who from his pale mouth pushes and pulls back the languishing spirit, which, regretfully departing his body through hunger, had worn out his voice screaming for his life.)

The pathos of the child's death is underscored by the complete normalcy of its reaction to deprivation; having lost the maternal breast, it wears itself out by crying. The child's voice dies with him.

The mother is depicted in a depersonalized manner, as an already dead and dried-out corpse ("*l'horrible l'anatomie/De la mere assechee*"),[36] who insists nonetheless upon attempting to fulfill her maternal function. She rolls her broken body into the room in the effort to comfort her child: "*une amour maternelle/L'esmouvant pour autrui beaucoup plus que pour elle*" ("maternal love/moving her more deeply for another than for herself").[37] Her movement into the child's space, as she drags herself up to the cradle, is a movement outside of herself, mirroring the breath that escapes the child and returns to it. As in the case of "Mère France," her blood takes the place of mother's milk: "*de ses playes mortelles/Le sang mouilloit l'enfant; point de laict aux mamelles*" ("the blood from her mortal wounds soaked the baby; there was no milk in her breasts").[38] This final attempt at nurturing, before the death that unites mother, father, and child also links the dying mother to the general misery of

France: "*ce corps seché, retraict,/De la France qui meurt fut un autre portraict*" ("this dried-out, withered body was yet another portrait of a dying France").[39] The empty breast is replaced by devouring death, a persecuting figure of absolute hunger, which engulfs experience and creates a void. Confronted by this void, the poet/witness turns to face himself again, and depicts himself as watching cold-blooded witnesses, doubles of himself:

> Là je vis estonnez les coeurs impitoyables,
>
> Je vis tomber l'effroi dessus les effroyables.
>
> Quel oeil sec eust peu voir les membres mi-mangez…?[40]
>
> (There, I saw pitiless hearts astounded, I saw terror fall upon the terrifying. What dry eye could observe these half-eaten members?)

By means of this splitting of the witnessing subject, persecutory power becomes helpless, merely another object of the judgmental gaze of God, terrified by the open exhibition of its act. The emptiness of this scene of death leaves the actors alone with themselves, "seeing themselves seeing."

The double role of the authorial persona in this scene is additionally complicated by the inscription of a reader-companion in the scene that follows it, the tale of the cannibal mother who devours her child in order to stave off famine.[41] This scene is dominated by a disturbing economy of giving and taking between the mother and child, the authorial persona and the reader. Even the act of witnessing is equivocal here: everyone has seen such an event ("*tout oeil*"), but only in the act of reading ("*en lisant*"), and even then, the reader did not believe his eyes ("*a douté*"). The horror imposed upon the reader in this scene is veiled by a double distancing: she is only witnessing this event second- or thirdhand, by means of a written account, and does not even believe that account. This disbelief is underscored by the language of the account:

> Cet' horreur que tout oeil en lisant a douté,
>
> Dont nos sens dementoyent la vraye antiquité,
>
> Cette rage s'est veuë, et les meres non-meres
>
> Nous ont de leurs forfaicts pour tesmoins oculaires.[42]

> (This horror that every eye has doubted when reading of it, for which our senses denied the true antiquity, this madness has made itself seen, and the unmotherly mothers have us as eyewitnesses of their misdeeds.)

The reader gains access to the role of "eyewitness" by passing through the impersonal and fragmented "*tout oeil*." The first person singular narrator of the previous scene thus comes to share his role with the reader, becoming part of the first person plural "*nous*" that then dominates the passage. In short, the reader becomes the witnessing companion of the authorial persona. This pair (or group, since the "*nous*" seems to become very capacious at moments in the text) at first refuses to see what is evident, that the practice of cannibalism is a longstanding one, not an unusual event. The present horrors are thus made unexceptional in a way, even as their horrible nature is underscored by violent and excessive rhetoric. The initial denial is countered by the statement, "*cette rage s'est veuë*," in which the use of the reflexive verb gives the act agency as it seems to impose itself upon the reader. While this seems to present the reader as a reluctant witness, that role will be complicated over the course of the scene. Finally, the reader and authorial persona are positioned as eyewitnesses of this crime, even though they are only seeing the event narrated in a text, and the non-mothers have the active role in the sentence, leaving the reader and authorial persona as the objects of the verb "*ont*." The effect of the syntax throughout this passage is of seeing and being held against one's will in the horrific scene; of sharing the role of the victim. In fact, throughout this scene, the reader oscillates between the roles of persecutor and victim, identifying first with the mother, then with the child, in an echo of this introductory dilemma.

At the same time as the reader is held (with the narrator) in the position of a passive victim, he is associated with the mother through the repetition of the prefix of undoing that recurs everywhere in the scene. His denial ("*dementoyent*") is thus linked to her untying the baby to take it out of the cradle (*deslie*, 501), unwrapping him, *desbandoit* (502) and *desveloppe* (503), an act that this time separates her from natural law and undoes her as a mother:

> La mere du berceau son cher enfant deslie;
>
> L'enfant qu'on desbandoit autres-fois pour sa vie
>
> Se desveloppe ici par les barbares doigts

Qui s'en vont destacher de nature les loix.

La mere deffaisant, pitoyable et farouche,

Les liens de pitié avec ceux de sa couche,

Les entrailles d'amour, les filets de son flanc,

Les intestins bruslans par les tressauts du sang,

Les sens, l'humanité, le coeur esmeu qui tremble,

Tout cela se destord et se desmesle ensemble.

L'enfant, qui pense encor' aller tirer en vain

Les peaux de la mammelle, a les yeux sur la main

Qui deffaict les cimois: cette bouche affamee,

Triste, soubs-rit aux tours de la main bien-aimee.[43]

(The mother unties her dear (but also a play on *chair*, or flesh) infant from the cradle; the infant that was formerly untied to give it life, is unwrapped now by savage (unknown, strange) fingers, who as they proceed separate themselves from the laws of nature. The mother, pitiable and fierce, undoing the ties of pity along with those of the bed, undoing the ties of love from her entrails, the ties of her flanks, the intestines burning with pulsing blood, all sense, humanity, the heart trembling with emotion, all this is twisted and mixed and separated together.)

This is the scene of which the reader is eyewitness, a scene in which both mother and child are more things than people, dehumanized by being represented as flesh, body parts, and animalistic (as the word *flanc* suggests), in which mother and child become a confused mass both separate and joined (*se desmesle ensemble*), thus emphasizing the affective dimension of their relationship, may seem to distance the reader from this pair. But in fact, the continuity of the prefix *de-/des-* ties the reader in with the scene, particularly in the word *desveloppe*, meaning "unwrap" in this passage, but also paradoxically both "undo" and "grow," as well as the narrative sense of the term, to develop an argument. This term thus links the mother's behavior to the narrator's role. Similarly the detachment of the mother's fingers from the laws of nature recalls the doubting reader, who tries to distance himself from the event at the beginning of the passage. The reader and the mother are united in their ability to detach

themselves from the suffering other, thus instigating and perpetuating the suffering.

The reader at first witnesses this scene from the perspective of the mother:

> La mort qui d'un costé se presente, effroyable,
>
> La faim de l'autre bout bourrelle impitoyable.
>
> La mere ayant long-temps combatu dans son coeur
>
> Le feu de la pitié, de la faim la fureur,
>
> Convoite dans son sein la creature aimee
>
> Et dict à son enfant (moins mere qu'affamee):
>
> "Rends miserable, rends le corps que je t'ay faict;
>
> Ton sang retournera où tu as pris le laict,
>
> Au sein qui t'allaictoit r'entre contre nature;
>
> Ce sein qui t'a nourri sera ta sepulture."[44]
>
> (Death presents itself on one side, terrifying, while pitiless hunger tortures her from the other side. The mother, having long fought the flame of pity, the fury of hunger in her heart, desires the beloved creature in her belly and says to her child (less of a mother than a famished one [or a non-woman, *affamee*]): "Give back, you wretch, give back the body I made for you; your blood will return to where you took milk, into the breast which nursed you, return against nature; this breast which nourished you will become your tomb.")

The reader, privy to the mother's internal conflict, might pity her, except for the perverse reversal of nature that this particular act of cannibalism denotes, and upon which the language plays with odd puns (*affamee*, or "non-woman") and paradoxes such as the nourishing breast/womb which becomes the child's tomb.

As the mother pulls out the knife to slit the throat of her lamb (*agneau*—a word that links the child to Christ), he tries to speak: "*qui gazouille/Quelques mots sans accents, croyant qu'on la chatouille*" ("who burbles several garbled words, thinking he is being tickled").[45] It is with this observation that the narrator's perspective begins to shift, as the

mother is compared to a wolf, tearing with her teeth the child she once kissed with her lips. She is seen from the outside, and briefly, as the child dies, the scene is presented at least partly from his perspective: "*Il pousse trois fumeaux, et n'ayant plus de mere/Mourant, cerche des yeux les yeux de sa meurtrière*" ("He heaves three breaths, and, having no more mother, dying, searches the eyes of his murderer with his own").[46] In this act, the child becomes the ultimate witness to his own death.

Both the mother and the child are repeatedly reduced to fragments in the representation of this violent act; she becomes savage fingers, a hungry mouth, tearing teeth, while he becomes "morsels." The more they are portrayed as the pure embodiment of emotions and impulses (desperation, hunger, pain), the less human they seem to be. They become pure affect, or even animal drives, rather than people cognizant of their own actions. Thus, the reader could easily depersonalize this event, and turn away, but for the intervention of the authorial persona:

Suivrons-nous plus avant? Voulons-nous voir le reste

De ce banquet d'horreur, pire que de Thyeste?

Les membres de ce fils sont conus aux repas,

Et l'autre estant deceu ne les connoissoit pas.

Qui pourra voir le plat où la beste farouche

Prend les petits doigts cuits, les jouëts de sa bouche?

Les yeux esteints, ausquels il y a peu de jours

Que de regards mignons embrazoyent ses amours!

Le sein douillet, les bras qui son col plus n'acollent,

Morceaux qui saoulent peu et qui beaucoup desolent?

Le visage pareil encore se fait voir,

Un portraict reprochant, miroir de son miroir,

Dont la reflexion de coulpable semblance

Perce à travers les yeux l'ardente conscience.

Les ongles brisent tout, la faim et la raison

> Donnent pasture au corps et à l'ame poison.
>
> Le soleil ne peut voir l'autre table fumante:
>
> Tirons sur cette-ci le rideau de Thimante.[47]
>
> (Will we follow this further? Do we want to see the rest [the remains] of this banquet of horror, worse than that of Thyestes? The body of this son is known at the meal, and the other [Thyestes] having been deceived did not know his own. Who could watch the dish where this savage beast takes the little cooked fingers, the cheeks with (of) the mouth? The extinguished eyes, from which several days ago, the sweet little looks enflamed her love! The soft little breast, the arms which no longer hug her neck, morsels which satisfy little, but cause great grief? The similar face can still be seen [makes itself seen], a reproachful image of the mother, mirror of her mirror, from which the reflection of a guilty resemblance pierces through the eyes to the burning conscience. The fingernails break everything, hunger and reason give nourishment to the body and poison to the soul. The Sun could not gaze upon the other steaming table; let us pull Thimante's curtain over this scene.)

At the point at which the reader might choose to look away, after the death of the child, he is asked whether he wants to see the rest. To continue to read thus becomes a guilty act, one of desire to see more, pleasure taken in someone else's pain. The text then pushes the horror of the scene beyond what is "decent," describing the body parts of the infant on a platter—the little fingers, the cheeks, the eyes, the breast, the arms. In doing this, the authorial persona reminds the reader that these pieces were once part of a living child, smiling and hugging its mother. He also engaged in an act of resistance; ordered by the King's command not to write of the horrors of the Wars of Religion, he does so anyway, going into excruciating detail as if to mock the command of silence. The reader becomes a co-conspirator in this act of resistance when he chooses to read further.

We (remember the *nous*) have already been caught looking at this horrific scene, but now if we choose to continue reading, we are the ones perpetuating the horror, rubbing our own noses in the event, as it were. At first, we might feel the shame of being caught or catching ourselves looking, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick puts it, "Shame floods into being as a moment, a disruptive moment, in a circuit of identity-constituting identificatory communication."[48] But the effect of this continuation of the scene well past the point of the bearable becomes quite different. Whereas we sought to be satisfied or receive pleasure in reading, we are

the ones left with the "*morceaux qui saoulent peu*" (the "morsels that hardly satisfy"). Not only are we not satisfied, but we are disgusted, not only with the mother, with ourselves. The face we are looking at reflects not only that of the mother, but our own, reproaches us, holds a mirror up to our pleasure-seeking cruelty. It is at this point, where the game of reflections turns toward us, that the authorial persona finally pulls a curtain over the scene. Throughout this passage, the reader has not been allowed to settle into a comfortable role, neither identifying with the victim and thus avoiding guilt if not pain, nor with the perpetrator and thus avoiding pain if not guilt. Rather, he oscillates between the two in a profoundly uncomfortable way, in the end becoming the focus of the authorial persona's accusatory gaze. In this way, Agrippa d'Aubigné renegotiates a culture of compassion and asks questions such as: what is the right emotion to experience when viewing such horrific sights? What sort of emotion is evoked, and how should a vulnerable body be gazed upon? He is thus returning to questions raised by Montaigne in his essay on cruelty. He is also asking the reader to monitor and judge his own response to the suffering of others.

This game of pain, pleasure, shame, disgust, and perhaps guilt is replayed throughout *Les Tragiques*, often with the explicit end of making the reader ill at ease, refusing to write within the constraints of genre norms, avoiding the androcentric narrative that justifies violence in the context of nation-building.[49] For *Les Tragiques* is an anti-epic, one that dismantles the comforting rules of epic writing, refusing to accept reasons of state or even of dire need as excuses for cruelty. In this refusal, the epic continually puts the reader off balance, defying his expectations and pushing him beyond any possible satisfaction in the act of reading.

Once the reader is positioned as complicit in this violence, the epic returns regularly to scenes where self-consciousness about the act of seeing is played upon in a range of ways. One striking instance is Agrippa d'Aubigné's account of the massacre at Tours that took place in 1562, which is based on a 1570 print of the event made by Jean Perrissin and Jacques Tortorel as part of their series of *Quarante tableaux* representing the early years of the Wars of Religion in France. This print seems to be the earliest extant account of the massacre, and thus it was an important source for all subsequent histories. The version in *Les Tragiques* depicts all of the events in the print: the massacre of Protestants at the temple, the right to shoot children in the river being sold for one *écu*, the child in the river pointing to heaven, the President of Parliament

being disemboweled, the woman who is stripped and killed. But Agrippa d'Aubigné's version privileges first and foremost the judgmental gaze—nothing happens without being seen—and the killing of women and innocent children. In this way, he carries through the imagery of "Misères" into the later book, "Les Fers," in which war and massacres are recounted in a more precise historical context.

The passage begins with a reference to Scythians as hypothetical witnesses to the brutality of this massacre: "*brutes cruautés,/Dont les Scythes gelés fussent espouvantés*" ("brutal cruelties which would have terrified even the frozen Scythians").[50] The eye of God also falls upon this scene: "*Là, de l'oeil tout puissant brilla la claire veuë/Pour remarquer la main et le couteau qui tue*" ("There, the clear sight of the all-powerful eye shone, to note the hand and the knife which kill").[51] The act of seeing pervades the scene: one sees 300 starving Protestants brought to the river to be massacred "*on void tirer d'un temple des faux-bourgs/Trois cens lies, mimorts, affamés…quand la bande bouchère/Les assomma…*"[52] Children watch the murders of their mothers: "*ils avisoyent percer les tetins de leurs meres*" ("they watched their mothers' breasts pierced").[53] The gaze even follows a child torn from his mother's womb and thrown into the river, as he is carried off by the currents: "*Des meres qu'on fendoit un enfant avorté/S'en alla sur les eaux, et sur elles porté,/Autant que les regards le pouvoyent loin conduire,/Leva un bras au ciel pour appeler son ire*" ("A child aborted from the mothers they were cutting open went along, carried by the water, as far as the eyes could accompany him, and lifted an arm toward the heaven to call down its wrath").[54] All of these exchanges of looks, from distant witnesses to God to impersonal observers to children back to God, envelop a multiplication of the threatened mother/child dyads of the first book, "Misères." It is as if, once the contagion of violence has taken hold, it spreads rapidly, controlled only by the gaze of the heavens, which records evil deeds for future repayment.

The longest passage in this account tightly binds the gaze with guilty action, using Petrarchan imagery to twist the scene into an uncomfortable version of the *innamoramento*, the moment that the courtly lover beholds the beloved for the first time. In so doing, *Les Tragiques* transforms a conventional, socially acceptable representation of emotion into a truly disturbing and wrenching moment, thus taking the reader out of a comfortable zone of emotional expression into one that asks him to re-evaluate his ways of viewing suffering:

Ces fendans ayant fait rencontre d'un visage

Qui de trop de beauté affligeoit leur courage,

Un moins dur laissa choir son bras et puis son fer,

Un autre le releve et, tout plein de l'enfer,

Desfiant la pitié de pouvoir sur sa veuë,

Despouilla la beauté pour la dechirer nuë,

Print plaisir à souiller la naïve blancheur.[55]

(These "splitters" having encountered a face which, being too beautiful, weakened their courage, a less hardened man let his arm drop, and then his sword. Another man picked it up, and full of hell, defying the power of pity over his sight, stripped the beauty so that he might tear it naked, and took pleasure in sullying the innocent color, watching this living whiteness darken in death.)

The perpetrators of this rape/murder are presented as "*ces fendans*," the ones who have been splitting mothers open so as to kill the unborn children in a sort of perverse double murder that violates the tie that the epic consistently presents as the most sacred. The word "fendre" is repeated three times in the passage (the first instance is "*les tragiques voix l'air sans pitié fendoyent*"), so this idea of splitting is somehow significant to this account. This repetition also connects the young woman not only to the larger body of victims whose cries pierce the air, but to the mothers who are split open to give unnatural birth. This connection troubles the Petrarchan language used not only to convey her innocence but also her violation; her virginal beauty is pre-doomed by the word "*fendans*" and linked to the previous violations. Yet this troubling connection in some ways merely redirects violence already inherent in the Petrarchan scheme of things.[56]

The Petrarchan intertext for this disturbing moment is also troubled by another intertext, one from the history of the Roman Empire. This monstrous act has a clear predecessor in the accounts of the death of Sejanus's daughter. Tacitus tells briefly of the end of Sejanus's children, after Tiberius had him executed for treason:

Accordingly they were carried off to prison, the boy, aware of his impending doom, and the little girl, who was so unconscious that she continually

> asked what was her offense, and whither she was being dragged, saying that she would do so no more, and a childish chastisement was enough for her correction. Historians of the time tell us that, as there was no precedent for the capital punishment of a virgin, she was violated by the executioner, with the rope on her neck. Then they were strangled and their bodies, mere children as they were, were flung down the Gemoniae.[57]

The "*naïve blancheur*" hints at the innocence of Sejanus's daughter, too young even to understand what was happening to her, thus linking the woman killed at Tours with the dying children who surround her. Thus the whiteness for which the Petrarchan beloved is prized (in thirtieth canzone, among other poems in the *Rime*) is linked to the vulnerability of youthful innocence, rather than the stunning beauty of the beloved.

This passage not only contaminates Petrarchan imagery with echoes of one of the most heinous acts of state-sponsored violence in ancient Rome, but it reverses the usual Petrarchan power relations, in which the beloved holds sway over the lover's every deed and word. At first, the "too great" beauty of this woman assaults the attackers, just as Laura's beauty assaults the poetic persona of Petrarch's twenty-third canzone.[58] This encounter is presented as a skirmish ("*le rencontre*"), in which, briefly, beauty seems to take the upper hand. This is in keeping with the dynamics of Petrarchan lyric. But if the horrors leading up to this encounter were not indication enough of the peril this woman is in, the phrase "*trop de beauté*" would hint that it is her beauty itself that endangers her. The first assailant responds to the beauty in a typical Petrarchan fashion; he is literally disarmed. But in *Les Tragiques*, we are not in the universe of the *Rime*, we are in hell, literally embodied by another solider who denies the power of beauty or pity on his gaze. The momentary glimpse of a kinder, Petrarchan universe is swept away by the violence of events around it. The stripping of the woman is confused in the image with the stripping off of her beauty ("*despouilla la beauté*"), as she is reduced to this one quality. The phrase "*pour la dechirer nuë*" seems to repeat this action, but also to intensify its sinister nature by suggesting that it is also the body itself that is being ripped. This voyeuristic encounter between beauty and violence is thus rendered literal and inescapable, as the soldier takes pleasure in soiling this beauty as he kills her ("*Print plaisir à souiller la naïve blancheur*").

In the accounts of the death of Sejanus's daughter, the violation of the girl in order to justify her execution is portrayed as the height of cruelty and lawlessness being perpetrated on the people of Rome by

their own rulers. This murder is presented by Tacitus as the gratuitous destruction of innocence. Agrippa d'Aubigné presents events at Tours as perverse, as the soldier takes pleasure in this particular act of violence. In fact, in a revision of the order given in the key of the Perrissin and Tortorel print, which tells the viewer how to "read" the scene of the massacre, he presents this as the penultimate act of violence in the massacre.

In this print, as in Agrippa d'Aubigné's account of the massacre, the viewer/reader becomes engaged in the action as he seeks out each aspect of the scene. The gaze begins outside of the scene, with the eyes of the Scythians and of God, moves into the scene as the children watch their mothers die, and becomes actively engaged in it, watching the baby float downriver. With the scene of the innocent beauty ravaged and then killed, the viewer/reader is also presented as participating in a moral choice. One soldier drops his weapon when faced with beauty; the other chooses to destroy that beauty. The gaze is not that of a distant judge, but rather of an active participant, for better or worse. Here, it is not only part of the action, but integral to it. Once more, the reader is pushed out of the comfort zone of being a detached spectator, into the role of making active choices, and detached inaction is presented as an unacceptable choice.

Agrippa d'Aubigné states several times over in *Les Tragiques* that love poetry has no place in this epic, but in fact it does, particularly in "Les Fers," the book concerning massacres and battles of the Wars of Religion. The innocent whiteness of the woman massacred at Tours is complemented by the red dawn of Saint Bartholomew's Day:

> L'aube se veut lever, aube qui eut jadis
>
> Son teint brunet orné des fleurs de paradis;
>
> Quand, par son treillis d'or, la rose cramoisie
>
> Eclatait…[59]
>
> (Dawn wishes to rise, the dawn which once had its dark complexion ornamented with flowers of paradise; when, through its trellis of gold, crimson red burst through…)

Here again, the language of Petrarchan love mixes with that of horror. Dawn is darker than the innocent woman of Tours, but she is decorated with flowers (from Paradise). A crimson red rose splatters her golden

trellis. The verb "*éclater*" of course recalls the *éclat* of a strikingly beautiful face, but it also signifies a violent explosion or striking; Agrippa d'Aubigné found the perfect term to join striking beauty with shocking violence. The opening scenes of the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacres are predominantly colored white and red, the stereotypical colors associated with the Petrarchan notion of beauty, here used to evoke blood and death. In the course of these massacres, the flames of love and death are inseparable. These images are set in the context of perverse sexuality, as the Valois Princesses leave their murdered lovers in their beds, victims of a false love, in order to gaze upon the masses of bodies strewn around the city and floating in the river.[60]

This scene is followed by the account of a couple finally reunited in death. The wife, whose hair has caught on a bridge, floats half above the water until her husband's body is also thrown into the river, catches on hers, and pulls her down into the water with him. This is the most "loving" moment in the book, and much of the language of love poetry is deployed in this passage: "*un sien bien aimé*" ("a beloved breast"), "*chère compagnie*" ("cherished company"), "*sa moitié*" ("his other half"), "*douce prise*" ("sweet capture"). The lesson offered at the end of this tale is that man should not attempt to separate that which God has joined together: "*Apprends, homme de sang, et ne t'efforce point/A désunir le corps que le ciel a conjoint*" ("Learn, man of blood, and do not strive to separate the body that heaven has brought together").[61] The authorial persona speaks to this "man of blood" just as he has spoken to the reader in previous books, seemingly assuming the guilt of his interlocutor.

In the following passage, the focus returns to the women of the court going out to view the dead bodies, and remarking on the beauty of one and the infirmity of the other: "*Remarquent les meurtris, les membres, les beautés,/Bouffonnent salement sur leurs infirmities*" ("Noted the ravaged bodies, the members, the beauties/Mock in filthy fashion their infirmities").[62] The gaze has again become a perverse one in this passage, and perhaps this is a caution to the reader, who has been portrayed from the beginning of the epic as complicit in the violence arising from the Wars of Religion.

If "Misères," the opening book of the epic, is dominated by mother-child relationships destroyed by war, "Les Fers" features love and sexuality as a recurring but somewhat submerged theme. The depiction of the massacre at Tours is a turning point in this regard, as the mass killing of mothers and children is replaced at the end of the passage by the

violation and death of the beautiful woman. The rest of the book seems to echo this last image, redirecting the epic from its previous focus on mothers and children. Petrarchan imagery pervades this book, much more so than in the other books, but this imagery is invariably twisted to evoke horrific violence and the perversion this violence inflicts on human relationships. The aesthetic of striking beauty is repeatedly suggested, and then struck down, raising the hypothetical reader's expectation of reading charming or uplifting love poetry, which he has been denied in previous books, and then dashing his hopes. Agrippa d'Aubigné's love poetry is dominated by images of war and violence, often blurring the distinction between the "war of love" already present in Ovid's *Amores* and references to the immediate historical context in which he is writing. The frequent presence of Petrarchan imagery in *Les Tragiques* serves a different purpose, at least according to the epic itself.

At the end of "Les Fers," the poetic persona, in a near-death experience, rises to heaven to witness scenes of the future and to be told by God to relinquish his more frivolous literary pursuits (i.e., his love poetry) in favor of the epic itself:

> Retourne à ta moitié, n'attache plus ta vue
>
> Au loisir de l'Eglise, au repos de Capue.
>
> Il te faut retourner satisfait en ton lieu,
>
> Employer ton bras droit aux vengeances de Dieu.
>
> …
>
> Escris fidellement: que jamais autre ouvrage,
>
> Bien que plus délicat, ne te semble plaisant
>
> Au prix des hauts secret du firmament luisant.
>
> Ne chante que de Dieu, n'oubliant que lui-même
>
> T'a retire: voilà ton corps sanglant et blême
>
> …
>
> Rapporte-lui la vie en l'amour naturelle
>
> Que son mâle, tu dois porter à ta femelle.[63]

> (Return to your other half, remove your gaze from the peace of the Church and the cease-fire from eternal war. You must return, satisfied, to your place, to use your right hand in the service of God's vengeance… Write faithfully, let no other work, even if more delicate, seem pleasant to you than the high secrets of the shining firmament. Sing only of God, never forgetting that it is he himself who saved you: here is your bloody and pale body…Bring life back to her with the natural love that as her male, you must bring to your female.)

While Petrarchan imagery is evoked, for example in the concept of "*la moitié*," the other half, which also recalls the married couple thrown into the Seine, this passage overtly marks the refusal of love poetry. Red and white become the colors of the dead body. And the two halves of this relationship are body and soul, so that the revived individual is whole in himself like the Aristophanic original humans of Plato's *Symposium*.

This passage is often read as depicting the moment Agrippa d'Aubigné turned from writing love poetry to writing his epic. In fact, archival evidence would suggest that he continued writing and revising his love poetry for the rest of his life. But this love poetry became part of an elaborate fiction of the author as a converted sinner, and thus informs all of his writing. It also informs his relationship with his reader, positioned as a sinner obsessed with love poetry as well, a double of the authorial persona. This persona occupies the same position he put his reader in, as the Angel narrates the celestial tableaux of the future to the not-yet-converted poet. This convoluted association of poet and reader brings the two full circle, as the shame felt at voyeuristic interest in the violence presented in "Misères" gives way to sympathy for beauty destroyed and horror at its destruction, finally to arrive at the call for vengeance. Although this vengeance is in fact fulfilled by God alone in the final book of the epic, "*Jugement*," the persona and his double, the reader, are called upon to participate, if only in the form of writing and reading. This outcome may seem disappointing for a modern reader seeking more empathy and less war, but it is not so surprising when one knows more about the Wars of Religion and the life of Agrippa d'Aubigné; in this context, empathy has its limits.

Still, *Les Tragiques* continually demonstrates mastery of various social and textual models of emotion, particularly those presented in tragedy, myth, and Petrarchan love poetry. The epic uses these models only to subvert them, often to shock the reader by twisting these representations

of emotions to evoke very different feelings: the indifference of the spectator comfortably distant from the action becomes sympathy if not shame, love gives way to anger. By moving the reader from a comfortable, well-rehearsed emotional stance to a less familiar one, he converts the reader from the role of passive spectator to that of active participant. How the reader chooses to play that role remains to be seen, but he is truly transformed by the emotional power of this extraordinary and disturbing text.

Notes

1. See Mack Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
2. For this shift in the function of executions, see Mitchell B. Merback, *The Thief, the Cross, and the Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
3. See, for example, Jean Bastier de la Peruse's *La Médée*, first published in 1555, modern edition by James Coleman (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1985). See also Robert Garnier's *Hippolyte*, first published in 1574 (Paris: Garnier, 2009). Over the course of Garnier's career, his work evolves to take on a more political aspect, as he focuses on the Roman civil conflicts in *Porcie* (1568; Paris: Champion, 1999), *Cornélie* (1574; Paris: Garnier, 2002), and *Marc Antoine* (1578; Paris: Garnier, 2010), as well as Greek tragedies concerning war and civil war, such as *Antigone* (1580; Paris: Champion, 1997) and *La Troade* (1579; Paris: Champion, 1999). His masterpiece is *Les Juives* (1583; Paris: Garnier, 1964), on the subject of Nebuchadnezzar's massacre of the Jewish king Zedekiah and his children.
4. Andrea Frisch, *Forgetting Differences: Tragedy, Historiography, and the French Wars of Religion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), in particular the chapter "From Emotion to Affect," 141–171.
5. For an excellent analysis of Montaigne's meditations on cruelty, see David Quint, "Cruelty and Noblesse: 'De la Cruauté' and 'Couardise Mere de la Cruauté,'" in *Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy: Ethical and Political Themes in the Essais* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 42–74.
6. Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*, Pierre Villey and V. L. Saulnier, eds. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978), 2.11, 422. All references to the *Essais* are to this edition.

7. Michel de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, Donald Frame, trans. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965), 2.11, 306–307. All translations of the *Essays* are from this edition.
8. *Essais*, 2.11, 433.
9. *Essays*, 2.11, 316.
10. *Essais*, 2.11, 429.
11. *Essays*, 2.11, 313.
12. *Essais*, 2.11, 430.
13. *Essays*, 2.11, 313.
14. *Essais*, 2.11, 430.
15. *Essays*, 2.11, 314.
16. *Essais*, 2.11, 435.
17. *Essays*, 2.11, 318.
18. I will not, however, analyze the term "esmouvoir" itself, as Andrea Frisch has done this in her excellent article on "Agrippa d'Aubigné's *Tragiques* as Testimony," from the volume on *Memory and Community in Sixteenth-Century France*, eds. David P. LaGuardia and Cathy Yandell (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2015). Frisch also offers a very different reading of the role of the reader/witness in the scenes I am analyzing.
19. Barbara Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 35–36.
20. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, from *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Jonathan Barnes, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. 2, Book II, 2, 2195.
21. *Rhetoric*, II, 8, 2207.
22. *Rhetoric*, II, 8, 2210.
23. Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 6.
24. Ahmed, *Emotion*, 10.
25. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 18, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), 16.
26. Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné, "Misères," *Les Tragiques*, in *Oeuvres*, ed. Henri Weber (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 25, v. 170. All references to *Les Tragiques* are to this edition, and the translations are my own.
27. "Vengeances," 214, v. 1103–1107.
28. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 31.
29. For a superb analysis of the figure of "Mère France" and its religious and political signification in *Les Tragiques*, see Marcus Keller, "Mother France and Her Dysfunctional Family: Religious and National Imagery in Ronsard's *Discours* and *Continuation* and in d'Aubigné's *Tragiques*,"

Figurations of France: Literary Nation-Building in Times of Crisis (1550–1650) (Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 41–76.

30. "Misères," 30, v. 375–376.
31. "Misères," 30, v. 400–408.
32. In this reading, I differ somewhat from Frisch's interpretation in her essay cited above, note 18.
33. "Misères," 31, v. 431.
34. See Jacques Lacan's discussion of "Je me voyais me voir," from his section on anamorphosis in *Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1973), 76–78. This reflexive action creates a self-consciousness which is at its limits destructive ("un pouvoir de néantisation"), most particularly of the subject itself.
35. "Misères," 30, v. 410–413.
36. "Misères," 30–31, 414–415.
37. "Misères," 31, v. 417–418.
38. "Misères," 31, v. 421–422.
39. "Misères," 31, v. 423–424.
40. "Misères," 31, v. 433–435.
41. See also Zahi Zalloua, "From *Le Printemps* to *Les Tragiques*: Trauma, Self-Narrative and the Metamorphosis of Poetic Identity in Agrippa d'Aubigné," *Dalhousie French Studies*, special issue on *Representations of Trauma in French and Francophone Literature*, eds. Nicole Simek and Zahi Zalloua, vol. 81 (Winter 2007): 29–39. See also my essay on "The Representation of Violence in the Works of Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné," in *Repossessions: Psychoanalysis and the Phantasms of Early Modern Culture*, eds. Timothy Murray and Alan K. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 142–167.
42. "Misères," 32, v. 495–498.
43. "Misères," 33, v. 501–513.
44. "Misères," 33, v. 517–526.
45. "Misères," 33, v. 529–530.
46. "Misères," 34, v. 541–542.
47. "Misères," 34, v. 545–562.
48. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Shame, Theatricality, and Queer Performativity: Henry James's *The Art of the Novel*," in *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003), 36.
49. Jean-Raymond Fanlo discusses the highly original approach that Agrippa d'Aubigné takes to the epic form in his magisterial study, *Tracés, Ruptures. La Composition instable des* Tragiques (Paris: Champion, 1990). See in particular his "Introduction," the section on "Ordre et désordre dans les *Tragiques*," 13–28, and the first chapter, "Du tableau politique au cantique," 43–105.

50. "Les Fers," 165, v. 607–608.
51. "Les Fers," 165, v. 609–610.
52. "Les Fers," 165, v. 611–614.
53. "Les Fers," 165, v. 625.
54. "Les Fers," 165, v. 631–634.
55. "Les Fers," 166, v. 637–644.
56. I have already traced the use of Petrarchan and Catullan elements in Agrippa d'Aubigné's love poetry, published under the title *Le Printemps*; see "Victim of Love: The Poetics and Politics of Violence in 'Le Printemps' of Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné," in *Translating Desire in Medieval and Early Modern Literature*, eds. Craig A. Berry and Heather Richardson Hayton (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005), 31–48. This imagery recurs frequently in *Les Tragiques*, particularly in the fifth book, "Les Fers."
57. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, *Annals*, book 5, paragraph 9. Available at: http://classics.mit.edu/Tacitus/annals.5.v.html. This was considered to be one of the vilest acts committed by a Roman emperor by many of the historians of the time. Montaigne remarks on the vileness of the act in his essay, "De l'utile et de l'honneste," *Les Essais de Montaigne*, ed. Pierre Villey (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1965), 799: "Outre la vilité de telles commissions, il y a de la prostitution de conscience. La fille à Seyanus, ne pouvant estre punie à mort en certaine forme de Jugement à Romme, d'autant qu'elle estoit Vierge, fut, pour donner passage aux lois, forcée par le bourreau avant qu'il l'estranglat: non sa main seulement, mais son ame est esclave à la commodité publique" ("Besides being low, such functions also prostitute one's conscience. Since Sejanus's daughter could not be punished with death in a certain type of judgment at Rome because she was a virgin, she was, to give way to the laws, violated by the executioner before he strangled her. Not only his hand but his soul is slave to the public convenience." *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald Frame [Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965), 606.
58. "dal dì che 'l primo assalto/mi diede Amor" ("since the day when Love gave me the first assault"), Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca), *Petrarch's Lyric Poems. The* Rime sparse *and Other Lyrics*, trans. and ed., Robert M. Durling (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), 61.
59. "Les Fers," 169, v. 771–774.
60. "Les Fers," 171, v. 857–864.
61. "Les Fers," 172, v. 901–920.
62. "Les Fers," 172, v. 935–936.
63. "Les Fers," 184, v. 1417–1430.

CHAPTER 10

Narrating a Massacre: The Writing of History and Emotions as Response to the Battle of Nicopolis (1396)

Charles-Louis Morand Métivier

On September 25, 1396, in Nicopolis,[1] the troops of Sultan Bayazid I completely wiped out crusaders from France, Burgundy, and England.[2] This defeat tremendously traumatized all the kingdoms involved. France was particularly impacted, as its armies were completely decimated; the knights who were not killed ended up being held captive. This defeat was yet another tragedy in the reign of Charles VI, already plagued by international tensions and institutional debacles.[3] The narration of the events of Nicopolis was an important part of the traumatic experience that the kingdom experienced after the battle. Anne Curry explains in her analysis of the Battle of Agincourt that it was a "momentous event" for both England and France.[4] The battle of Nicopolis, which occurred almost twenty years before Agincourt, also left an indelible mark on the French kingdom. I will analyze how the battle was depicted, and how

C.-L. Morand Métivier (✉)
University of Vermont, Waterman 511, 85 S. Prospect St., Burlington, VT 05405, USA
e-mail: cmorandm@uvm.edu

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_10

the emotions begotten by the massacre (sadness, fear, hatred, despair) shaped the portrayal of the knights and their behavior. I use three works of three different genres. First, the *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis*, attributed to Michel Pintoin (early fifteenth century), a royal chronicle[5]; a memoir, the anonymous *Livre des faits du bon messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Boucicaut* (1407–1409)[6]; and finally, a travel narrative, the *Reisebuch*, written by Johannes Schiltberger (first printed around 1460).[7] All three narrate the battle, yet they each focus on very different elements, and their description of the massacre varies greatly. The *Chronique* and the *Reisebuch* criticize the deplorable behavior of the knights, and their role in the defeat. The anonymous author of the *Boucicaut* chose not to mention their responsibility and instead glorifies their sacrifice.

The differences in "history retelling" in these three texts are built on the emotionality[8] of their writing, directly deriving from their genre. Different genres induce different points of view. Jean-Claude Mühlethaler notes, "l'émergence de l'affectivité dans un texte est une question de genre" (27).[9] He argues that the affective and emotional dimension of a text can be divided into four Degrees.[10] Degree 0 marks a complete detachment of the author, and a total lack of explicit emotional representation.[11] In Degree 1, there is a dominance of cognitive knowledge, with a blockage of emotions, to stay within real testimony.[12] In Degree 2, the emotional trouble is the source or outcome of an emotional, cognitive discourse.[13] Finally, Degree 3 presents an emotional climax, in which the cognitive dimension is marginalized.[14] Emotions and genre shape the historical narration of the battle. The three pieces focus on different facets of the massacre. They all use the same sets of emotions (grief, sadness, and despair). I will study how these emotions shape very different narrations, and how they write history.

The Crusade and Its Impact

News of the defeat quickly reached the kingdom and spread widely. In 1396 and 1397, Eustache Deschamps wrote "Pour les français morts à Nicopolis" ("For the French who died in Nicopolis"), "Faicte pour ceuls de France quant ilz furent en Hongrie" ("Written for those from France when they were in Hungary"), and "Faisant mencion de la mort de Monseigneur de Coucy" ("About the death of the Lord of Coucy"). "Faicte pour ceulx…" overflows with sadness and despair: "las" (alas),

"essil de coeur" ("banishment of the heart"), "dueil et courroux" ("bereavement and anger"). The refrain of this poem, present four times, personifies by itself all the emotions of the massacre: "Je ne voy que tristesce et plour/Et obseques soir et matin" ("I see only sadness and weeping/And funerals evenings and mornings"). In Deschamps' poetry, the trauma of the defeat creates the image of a national disaster that impacts every single member of the body politic.

The three works in this study were written for audiences of very different origins. Schiltberger wrote the *Reisebuch* as a testimony of his time in captivity. He was enslaved after the battle (which he describes relatively quickly), and his book narrates the numerous voyages he partook as the personal slave of Bayazid. Nicopolis is much more present in the *Chronique* and the *Boucicaut*; both are incredibly detailed accounts of the battle.[15] However, Elizabeth Gaucher points out the differences between the two works. In the *Chroniques*, "Truth appears from collective history"[16] while in the *Boucicaut*, truth is limited to the actions of its "hero" (96). Bernard Guenée also indicates that Michel Pintoin made a point in his writing to distinguish between tragedy and history because he considered himself a historian (225). The implication of the author and his relation to the historical event is another crucial element to take into consideration. A travel narrative could be perceived as relatively neutral (yet, Jean de Mandeville's *Itineraria* is a perfect counterexample to this trend[17]), especially this one, written by a German author. The *Chronique* was written to give a real account of the reign of King Charles VI, not shying away from detailing its darkest times, like his madness.[18] The *Boucicaut*, on the other hand, was clearly written with the intention to praise the deeds of the late marshal, and was likely commissioned for that purpose. Thus, it is deliberately silent about the errors and behavior of the knights, and idolizes them as heroes, as Gaucher proposes (98).

Another important element of the composition of the text is whether the authors directly witnessed the massacre. Only Johannes Schiltberger was physically present at the battle. He was accompanying Lord Lienhart Richartinger, for whom he fought. At the very beginning of the *Reisebuch*, he explains, "Und das ich in der zeitt erfaren han in der haydenschafft, das stet hernach geschribenn;…darumb das ich ain gefanger man was und mein selber nicht was." (1)[19] Schiltberger based his whole book on truth. He lived the battle from the inside and suffered; he is not only a witness, but also a victim. The *Reisebuch* is then a direct prolongation of his experience. Contrary to the *Reisebuch*, the

Chroniques and the *Boucicaut* were not written by direct witnesses. They were penned by authors who were however perfectly aware of the events because they held their accounts from survivors. All these elements shape the narration of the events leading to the battle. They also shine a light on the attitude of the knights.

Preparing for Battle

To understand how these texts intertwine history and emotions, Mühlethaler's chart of emotionality is helpful. The *Reisebuch* belongs to Degree 0[20]; as for the *Chronique*, I am not as convinced as Mühlethaler that it belongs to Degree 0. Its neutral tone becomes very emotional by the end of the passage on Nicopolis. I would, therefore, place it between Degrees 0 and 2, depending on what aspect of the battle is addressed. Finally, the *Boucicaut* clearly belongs to Degree 3. Another important element is the behavior of the crusaders in the *Boucicaut* on the one hand, and in the *Chronique* and the *Reisebuch* on the other hand. Schiltberger did not have any interest in the French situation other than to give a direct account of what he witnessed. Both he and the *Chronique* relate the idiotic behavior of the knights and their lack of humility. Schiltberger states that, when the King of Hungary explained that his men charge first, the French knights insisted in being the ones to lead the assault:

> do das erhört des hertzog von Burguny, der wolt in der eren nicht günnen noch nymands anders, darumb das er ver lantz war zogen mit grossen volck, das man schatzt auff VI thausent man und hett groß gut verzert; darumb wolt er das erst anreytten thun und schikt zu dem chönig, das er in das erst anreytten ließ thun, darumb das er verre war here gezogen. (3)[21]

The pride of the French knights is also central to the *Chronique*. They reportedly challenged the Hungarian knights and mocked them:

> Sed hiis Francie conestabularius et marescallus socordius et cum tantacontencione restiteruut, ut ipsis improperando dicerent: "Ex accerrimis bellatoribus cunctatores nunc effecti, nobis jute uioribus bellum relinquatis, quoniam hec verba timorem et pusillanimitatem sapiunt." (503)[22]

Pride and scorn are central to the depiction of chivalry in these two texts. Even though the knights had no real knowledge of the situation

or the enemy, they declined assistance. They are portrayed as grotesque and vulgar men, and this metaphor is carried throughout the texts. Furthermore, the *Chronique* develops this attack by emphasizing the role of Boucicaut as a "catalyst" for their nefarious demeanor.

Boucicaut is at the core of the attacks of the *Chronique*. The author describes him as a brute terrorizing his troops, who has no respect for his enemies, and who disregards the conventions of war. When his men, returning to their base camp, share the news that Bayazid is bringing reinforcement, Boucicaut is so angered that he has them beaten up or, even worse, mutilated: "…marescallus quosdam affligi fecerat, quosdam exauriculari" (500). His lack of humanity reflects the poor quality of his governance, and foreshadows the outcome of the battle. The knights are responsible for the massacre because anger and scorn fuel their leader. His faulty personality, consequently, directly impacts the actions of his men.

Philippe de Mézières, in the *Epistre lamentable et consolatoire* (1397), written shortly after the defeat, had already denounced the unacceptable conduct of the knights in their camp. He explains how their behavior led to the decay of the four virtues that should constitute the foundations of knighthood: law, discipline, obedience, and justice.[23] The same attacks are present in the *Chronique*. Instead of preparing physically and mentally for the assault, they did feast on elaborate banquets ("exquisitis eciam vinis et dapibus"), wore extravagant and richly adorned clothes ("in vestimentis recentibus fimbriatis et manicatis superflue"), and they gambled ("periculosoque taxillorum ludo"). Finally, they were promiscuous: "cum quibus adulteria et omne fornicacionis genus nonnulli exercebant," (496–498). In the *Reisebuch* and the *Chronique*, the behavior of the knights is intolerable because they gravely stained the image of purity of knighthood. By doing so, it is also the image of France that is tainted.

Because the *Boucicaut* is a praise of the deeds of the marshal, none of these accusations are present there. Norman Housley[24] explains that Boucicaut himself took part in the battle not as a marshal, but as a mere knight. He was very famous among the French knights, and thus was still highly regarded by all, and widely respected: "Although he did not exercise his office as marshal, Boucicaut's status, his experience, and the size of his '*montre*'…meant that he was a figure of weight on the expedition" (Housley, 36). In the eponymous book, Boucicaut is a true knight, whose pride, power, cunning, and courage are second to none during the battle. Housley explains that the *Boucicaut* stems from a very Manichean view of the society and the battle: "subtlety is lacking:

the Saracens were dogs, '*lais et orribles*,' while the Christians who fell at Nicopolis were martyrs, '*sains en paradis.*'" (Housley, 32). Questioning him equates to questioning the power and renown of the king and of France. That is why, in the *Boucicaut*, the knights are described as the epitome of courage, the true heralds of Christianity: "Ha! Noble contree de François! Ce n'est mie de maintenant que tes vaillans champions se montrent hardis et fiers entre trestoutes les nacions du monde!"[25]

The opposition of emotional sets—pride, disgust, and lust vs. emotional courage—shapes the narratives, and is aimed at moving the readers toward a better understanding of the battle itself.

The Battle and Its Aftermath: Emotional and Narrative Choices

As was the case for the presentation of the knights, the narrations on the massacre are also entirely different. Pity, sadness, and horror are used equally in the three works, but for different reasons. In the *Reisebuch*, the battle is very short; Schiltberger simply states, "…die wurden all von im erschlagen and zertrett"[26] (Schiltberger, 4). In the *Chronique*, there are two phases in the battle. First, the strength of the crusaders is so overwhelming that the troops of Bayazid are crushed and massacred: "in eo quoque tandem decem mille eternis tradende incendiis infelices animas exhalarunt" (506). However, despite the retreat of the Turks, the crusaders decided to pursue them: "properos tamen successus temere prosequentes, fugientes conantur insequi invitis capitaneis" (508). When they reached the top of the hill, their horses were exhausted by the weight of the armor and weapons; the knights were soon struck with terror at the view of the large number of Ottoman troops prepared to fight back: "…et mox contabuerent corda eorum pre timoris angustia" (510). Philippe de Mézières referred to the battle in the *Epistre* as a "*verge celeste*," a "divine whip" that struck the knights to punish them for their behavior. The same idea appears in the *Chronique*. God is the one who pushed the events into motion. He is preparing the punishment of his servants at the hand of their enemies: "Dea procul dubio permittente, tunc dies amara, dies funesta instabat christiansis, ut dirus rerum declaravit eventus" (510).[27] The knights are nothing compared to His wrath, as noted by the allusion to Psalm 36:6: "judiccia tua abyssus multa" (510).[28] This God-given punishment is a direct consequence of their actions, and of their lack of piety in crusading.

In the *Boucicaut*, the knights are the heralds of justice, who proudly fought the infidels for God. All of them, young and old alike, fought with courage (italics mine): "Yceux barons et esprouvez chevaliers, et de grant *vertu*, *reconfortoient* et donnoient *hardement*, de fait et de parole, aux nobles jouvenciaulx de la fleur de lis qui la se combattoient, non mie comme enfans, mais *comme se ce fussent tres endurcis chevaliers* (110)."[29] They followed the marshal to war with nobility and pride (italics mine): Et tant ala ainsi faisant devant lui que tous *les plus hardis* le *redouterent* et se prirent a destourner de sa voye; mais non pour tant lui lançoient dars et espees ceulx qui approcer ne l'osoient, et il comme *viguereux* bien se savoit defender (111).[30]

The battle was long, and they fought "tant que force leur pot durer (112)."[31] They are role models, who defended their God and their king until their demise, far from their reckless portrayal in the *Chronique*.

A striking element in the *Boucicaut* is the presentation of the Hungarians. Despite the alliance, they did not come to help the French crusaders after they noticed that it was a lost cause, and rather fled. In the *Chronique*, it is Jean de Vienne, Admiral of France, who claims that, because of the lack of respect of the French toward Sigismund, they should not count on them during the assault: "Ad hoc venire sprevimus, mediantibus Hungaris. Quare, firmiter credatis, nobis non suffragabuntur, sed fugient, si immineant adversa. (504)"[32] In the *Boucicaut*, on the contrary, the wise words of Jean de Vienne are absent. Instead, the cowardice of the Hungarians is the alleged reason for their absence: "Quant les Hongres, qui communement, si comme on dit, ne sont *pas gens arrestez en bataille*…virent celle entrée de bataille, pour *paour* du trait commencierent une grant partie d'eulx a *reculer* et eulx *traire en sus*, comme *laches* et *faillis* que ilz furent (105–106)."[33]

Two emotional tropes are opposed in the *Chronique* and the *Boucicaut*. On the one hand, the pitiful, sad, shameful defeat is attributed to the knights, whose actions were in direct contradiction to the holy mission they were supposedly fulfilling. On the other hand, they are painted as the embodiment of pride, glory, and courage, with no reference whatsoever to the excesses and misbehavior that the two other sources note. This opposition is central to the denouement of the battle, and to the question of the fate of prisoners of war.

Prisoners of War and Massacre: A Retribution?

After the battle, the crusaders who were still alive were imprisoned. For both the Christians and the Muslims, prisoners of war were important, as they had a financial value; their fate was also protected by *Jus in bello*, which codified the laws of war. Prisoners of war were a major component of a conflict. Cicero explains in *De Officiis*, that "not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by force of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of our generals (I.11.35)."[34] St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, was broadly recognized in the Middle Ages as an authority on *Jus in bello*. John Mark Mattox[35] explains that his doctrine "does not provide anything approaching a list of rules either for identifying or, once identified, for safeguarding non-combatants" (Mattox, 63). However, in *Letter 189*, Augustine assured that people overridden by their enemies should be treated with respect: "As violence is used towards him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the vanquished or the captive, especially in the case in which future troubling of the peace is not to be feared"[36] (189: 6). Prisoners of war were protected, a fact that the knights would soon forget.

Koranic law was the base of the laws of war in Islam. Concerning prisoners of war, Munir Muhamad explains, "the Qur'ān mentions only two ways to end captivity, that is, *mann* (grant of freedom gratis) or *fidā* (ransom) (467)."[37] Ali Raza Naqui argues that prisoners of war "should be given necessary advice to be nice at heart. They must be given more than what they lost, and their excesses have to be forgiven"[38] (33). However, the well-being of the prisoners ultimately depends on their behavior during the conflict:

> O Prophet, say to whoever is in your hands of the captives, "If Allah knows [any] good in your hearts, He will give you [something] better than what was taken from you, and He will forgive you, and Allah is Forgiving and Merciful. / But if they intend to betray you—then they have already betrayed Allah before, and He empowered [you] over them. And Allah is Knowing and Wise.[39] (Koran 8: 70–71)

The French knights imprisoned Ottoman soldiers when they took the fort of Rachowa. When they left, they massacred them without any reason. Chapter XXV of Book II of the *Chroniques* is even named after

this terrible event: "De obsidione Nycopolis christiani metu Basati recedentes ultos interfecerunt ex Turcis."[40] The chronicler emphasizes the heartlessness and evil of the French knights: out of pure anger ("iracundiam"), they committed a terrible action ("ex concepto dolore iniquitateminauditam pepererunt") and slayed the prisoners ("occidi crudeliter preceerunt"). The three emotions represented here—"iracundiam," "dolore," and "crudeliter"—all underline the horror of a massacre that should not have happened, and which could not be justified.[41] The most interesting point in this excerpt is that the chronicler recognizes that these actions were dreadful not only from a moral point of view, calling for God's witnessing of these horrors ("o Deus ulcionum et humanorum actuum censor equissime"), but also politically speaking. The massacre goes against every law of war. The French, indeed, even though they had respected their vows so far ("hucusque eciam infidelibus inviolabiliter observatus"), voluntarily nullified their promises and treaties ("spretis condicionibus cum juramento firmatis"). This treason is a crucial element that helps understand the reaction of the Turks; it may give a reason as to why they slaughtered the prisoners even though Islam and the Koran prohibited it.

The roles in the *Chronique* are briefly inverted; Bayazid eventually becomes a pious man who fights evil Christians. If the killing of the knights is not excused, it is justified by their previous behavior. Pintoin devotes one chapter to the massacre of Christian prisoners, much like he did for the Turks (Chapter XXVIII of Book II, "A Turcis christiani crudeliter puniuntur in presencia Basati," 516).[42] Bayazid might be an infidel, but he is a religious, God-fearing one. He was shocked by the behavior of the knights in their camp, ("abhominatus scelera"). They deserved to be vanquished because of their lack of piety ("ipsos non victoria sed animadversione dignos reputavit, cum sic Deum suum Christum ad iracundiam provocabant"). Contrary to Boucicaut, Bayazid is a fair prince ("vir providus et discretus"), who fears God ("Deum timens" 498). Once the battle was over, his first action was to praise God, and give thanks to him for the victory ("…inde gracias Deo dicitur reddidisse, erectis ad celum oculis"). Then, Bayazid decided to have the surviving knights, now his prisoners, massacred, precisely because they did not respect the laws of war:

> Non equum est, inquit, fidelitatem servare legum violatoribus ac pactorum federum, ut isti sunt: nam obmittens transgressions legis sue, neglectis

> convencionibus nostris factis post dedicionem municipii de Racho, eos sub tuto manentes nilque sibi timentes crudeliter occiderunt. (516)[43]

Naqui explains that, in Islam, breaking an agreement is one of the reasons that can justify the massacre of prisoners of war: "in the case of breach of treaty…the Muslims can make war against such people after declaring that no treaty exists between them anymore." (28).[44] Treaties are sacred to Muslims, as Koran 9:4 explains: "Excepted are those with whom you made a treaty among the polytheists and then they have not been deficient toward you in anything or supported anyone against you." However, the breach of treaty can prompt terrible retribution: "And if they break their oaths after their treaty…then fight the leaders of disbelief, for indeed, there are no oaths [sacred] to them; [fight them that] they might cease" (9:12). It is impossible to know whether the monk had any knowledge of the Koran, even though it was available to a Western audience.[45] However, his description of the actions of Bayazid still strikes an unusual emotional chord; the infidels are more pious and faithful than the Christian knights, while the crusaders are described as evil and impure.

In the *Boucicaut*, on the contrary, the execution itself is solely considered from the point of view of the knights. The gathering of the Christian prisoners by Bayazid is then presented as a gratuitous massacre. The title of the related chapter, "De la grant pitie du martire que on faisoit des crestiens devant le Basat, et comment le mareschal fu respite de mort,"[46] focuses on their sad, painful fate. Unlike in the *Chronique*, in the *Boucicaut* Bayazid is not a wise, God-loving warrior. He is a "tirant enemy de la foy" ("tyrant enemy of the faith"), and his men "chiens Sarrasins" ("Saracens dogs"). The knights are contrite and humble, ready to embrace martyrdom. They are tied with ropes ("liez de cordes estroittement") and are brought naked to the executioner ("…lui faisoit amener les nobles barons et chevaliers et escuyer crestiens tous nuds" 114).[47] Martha Easton explains, "nudity as part of baptism signified a stripping away of the cares of the material world, and a return to innocence…So too martyrs were stripped (albeit forcibly), baptized in blood and clothed in the glory of heaven, entering the company of the elect."[48] The death scenes are very graphic; they are "menoit au martire," and behave like "jadis on faisoit les benois martirs"[49] (115). The emotionology of the whole chapter is not only showing the courage of the knights; it is also an attempt by the author to rewrite history through their martyrdom to erase their mistakes.

A Balancing of Emotionology?

The close readings of the three works have shown how the same event can garner various interpretations. Likewise, if emotions are the same in the three works (despair, sadness, and anger), their roles differ completely depending on how the rewriting of the massacre is meant to impact the audience. History and writing are interdependent; this applies to the emotional retelling of the events, but also to the creation of the written counterparts of the actors of the battle. For Donald Wesling, "there's a relation between fictive and real, between literary character and ordinary person (13)."[50] Wesling also argues that "storytelling emotions is a notation, into verbal form, of emotions which is experienced in what we crudely but correctly call real life (64)." Gabrielle Spiegel argues that early romance writers saw themselves as culture transmitters, thus proposing a "romancing of the past" (81) into a vivid presence.[51] We perfectly understand how the emotional responses to the massacre did lead to contrary narratives. As I argued earlier, I believe that the genre of a book influences the narration of history. If we put aside the *Reisebuch*, which had no real, intricate relation to the affairs of the French kingdom, the two French books on Nicopolis, both crucial for the creation of a national and historical narrative of the massacre, have very different views on the events. On the one hand, we have a chronicle depicting the events as they happened, harshly criticizing the behavior of the knights. The *Boucicaut*, on the contrary, uses the sadness of the events solely to emphasize the greatness of the marshal. However, the horror of the event was so tremendous that even the *Chronique* eventually changes its stance on the massacre.

Even though the *Chronique* prides itself on being as close to the truth as possible, there is nevertheless one moment in which the narrator is overflown with sadness:

> …traditi sunt in *commocionem* capitis Sarracenis, unde *lacrimas* non possum *continere*. Quis tam ferrei *pectoris*, tam mentis *adamantine*, cujus interior non *liqueferient*, si vidissent insignes christiccolas more *pecudum* trahi ad victimam et ultimum vale sese dicere in Christo (516–518).[52]

The abundant and diverse emotional vocabulary accentuates how traumatic this experience was, even for a "neutral" chronicler. Even though the *Chronique* proved the responsibility of the knights, as well as Bayazid's reasons for the killing of the prisoners, such a dreadful

massacre, with a soil drenched in blood ("ut sanguine occisorum locus polluertur universus," 518) changed the tone of the neutral chronicler. Guenée notes the fact that the *Chronique* always tends to the side of history, and the fact that "He prefers a sober historical text to tragic clamors (225)."[53] Yet, history is so cringingly traumatic here that the text becomes Degree 2, or even Degree 3, of Mühlethaler's scale, since we notice a complete emotional takeover of a usually neutral narration. We have a "humanization" of the historian, in the sense that he places himself, as a man, at the level of the tragedy. This event is horrible, and thus it must be recognized and transmitted as such. The chronicler also introduces martyrology into his discourse, just like the *Boucicaut* did. There is a strong connection to God, to whom the knights send their last thought ("miserere mei, Christe"). Finally, the death of the knight is described as holy ("devote occumbere" 518). The following chapters of both the *Boucicaut* and the *Chronique* focus on the reaction in France to the news of the defeat. Both underline the terrible consequences on the kingdom of such tragedies. However, they return to their previous stances on the battle. So, does this example mean that genres are not set in an emotional pattern, but can vary? I would argue that the extreme emotionality of a genre is also subject to its vision and retelling of history. The narration of history is dependent on the writer who puts it in motion. The extreme emotions of an event, like Nicopolis showed us, can distort the borders of genres and emotional writing.

How to represent history? The obvious answer that comes out of this discussion is to say "through emotions." Emotions are at the base at three different narrations of the same historical event, which they relate to the same emotional pattern, to reach drastically different objectives, thus producing narratives of different kinds. It is often said, in an overly used and misplaced statement, that history is always repeating. Nineteen years after Nicopolis, the Battle of Agincourt was another great defeat, another emotionally charged trauma for the French kingdom. Narratives on this defeat also followed the same pattern of an emotionally charge historical writing.

Notes

1. Nicopolis is located in Bulgaria; the city is now called Nikopol.
2. The crusaders were coming to rescue Hungary from the Turkish menace. Aziz Atiya, in *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London: Methuen, 1934)

provides the best explanation of the origins of the crusade, the battle itself, and its aftermath.

3. The madness of the king, as well as enduring internal tensions (between Burgundy and the brother of the king) and international problems (i.e., the schism between Rome and Avignon, Hundred Years war against England), made the reign of Charles VI particularly challenging. See, for instance, Françoise Autrand, *Charles VI* (Paris: Fayard, 1986), or Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, *Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 1378–1417* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006).
4. Anne Curry, *The Battle of Agincourt, Sources and Interpretations* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000), 3.
5. *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422.* 3 vol, edited by Louis Bellaguet, introduction by Bernard Guenée (Paris: Editions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 1994).
6. *Le Livre des fais du bon messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, mareschal de France et gouverneur de Jennes,* edited by Denis Lalande (Geneva: Droz, 1985).
7. Hans Schilteberger. *Reisebuch. Nach der Nürnberger Handschrift Herausgegeben*, ed. Valentin Langmantel (Tübingen: Gedruckt für den Litterarischen Verein in Stuttgart, 1885). Because of their long titles, these three books will be hereafter referred to as *Chronique*, *Boucicaut*, and *Reisebuch.*
8. This neologism that I chose to use is meant to define all the elements that make emotions relevant and visible in a text, notably, but not restricted to, the "emotion words" describing what is felt, but also the climate around which they appear in the text, and how they relate to the general historical, sociological, and political climate of the time.
9. Jean-Claude Mühlethaler, "Tristesses de l'engagement: l'affectivité dans le discours politique sous le règne de Charles VI," *Cahiers de recherches médiévales et humanistes* 24 (2012), 21–36. "The emergence of affectivity in a text is all about its genre." Unless otherwise noted, every translation of primary source and critical analysis is mine.
10. All the examples come from "Tristesse de l'engagement."
11. Mühlethaler gives examples of works that he associates to this Degree. For Degree 0, he cites Honoré Bovet's *L'Arbre des batailles* and *Le Jeu des eschaz moralisé* by Jean Ferron.
12. Found in the *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis*, and in Alain Chartier's *Quadrilogue invectif.*
13. In the *Epistre lamentable et consolatoire* by Philippe de Mézières, as well as in Eustache Deschamps' "Ballade sur la division et le cisme de l'Église."
14. In the *Lamentacion sur les maux de la France* by Christine de Pizan.

15. The *Chronique* covers the entirety of the reign of Charles VI, and the *Boucicaut* covers the whole military life and exploits of the eponymous marshal. The battle of Nicopolis is just one of the many events described in each book.
16. "La vérité se détache sur un fond d'histoire collective."
17. In spite of its many zany and totally false descriptions (a cotton tree is, for instance, depicted as bearing fruit that are small lambs), this work tremendously marked the great navigators to come, like Marco Polo and Christopher Columbus. See Ian MacLeod Higgins, ed., *The Book of John Mandeville, with Related Texts* (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 2011).
18. Bernard Guenée underlines the fact that Michel Pintoin's work should be considered as scientific as the work of a modern historian. See Bernard Guenée, "Discours de M. Bernard Guenée, président de la Société de l'histoire de France en 1995," *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France* (1995), 3–10.
19. Johanness Schiltberger, *Reisebuch*, ed. Valentin Langmantel. (Tübingen: Gedruckt für des litterarischen Verein in Stuttgart, 1885), 1. "And I have in that time traveled to the land of the infidels, and have described it here…I was there a prisoner, and was not myself."
20. At least concerning the events at Nicopolis.
21. "When the Duke of Burgundy heard this, he did not want to cede to anyone the right to launch the assault, because he had traveled for a long time with six thousand people, and he had already spent a lot of money; that is why he told the king that he wanted to be the first to charge and attack."
22. "But the constable and the marshal disapproved their ideas with force, and burst with anger, replying to them in a menacing tone: 'since, from valiant men you once were, you turned into people who prefer to wait, please let the young ones fight. Your words reek of fear and cowardice.'"
23. See Philippe de Mézières, *Une Epistre lamentable et consolatoire*, eds. Philipe Contamine and Jacques Paviot (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 2008), particularly 106–109.
24. Norman Housley, "One Man and His Wars: The Depiction of Warfare by Marshal Boucicaut's Biographer," *Journal of Medieval History* 29 (2003), 27–40.
25. "Ah! Noble land of the French! Now your valiant champions show themselves as the most courageous and proudest among all the nations in the world!"
26. "They were all killed and trampled upon."
27. "God allowed a terrible day to happen, as the horrible events that happened to the Christians proves."
28. In the NKJV, translated as "your judgments are a great deep."

29. "These barons, and experienced, virtuous knights, were comforting and bolstering the young nobles with the *Fleur de lys*, so that they fought no longer as children, but as if they were hardened knights."
30. "And it went so that all the boldest ones feared him, and drifted away from his path; yet, he kept on piercing and wielding his sword to all those who did not dare approach him, as he knew how to defend himself like a vigorous man."
31. "…as long as they had the strength to do so."
32. "We decided to ignore the help of the Hungarians. Be well assured that now they will not come to help us, should we need it, and will flee instead."
33. "When the Hungarians, who are commonly not known for their prowess in battle…saw how the fight was going, by great fear a lot of them started to leave, coward and devious as they are." Italics mine.
34. Cicero, "De Officiis," ed. Walter Miller, accessed Nov. 19, 2016, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D35.
35. John Mark Mattox, *Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War* (New York: Continuum, 2006). On the Augustinian idea of just war, with comparisons to the works of Cicero and Ambrose, see particularly Chap. 4, "Augustine's Just War Theory" (44–91).
36. "Letter 189," accessed Nov. 19, 2016, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102189.htm.
37. Munir Muhamad, "Debates on the Rights of War in Islamic Law," *Islamic Studies* 49: 4 (2010), 463–492.
38. Ali Raza Naqui, "Laws of War in Islam," *Islamic Studies* 13:1 (1974), 25–43.
39. "The Noble Quran," accessed. Nov. 19, 2016, http://quran.com/8.
40. "The Christians retire from Nicopolis by great fear of Bayazid, and kill the Turks."
41. The chronicler explains that some argued that the prisoners lacked the money to pay their ransom ("…*non suppetere pro redempcione taxata*"), or that they were rabid dogs ("*rabidorum canum*") (500).
42. "The Turks punish the Christians with cruelty in presence of Bayazid."
43. It would not be fair, he said, to keep our word with these infidels and violators of treaties, who spoiled their own laws and who, in spite of the regulations, have massacred the prisoners they had taken in Rachowa, even though they had promised to spare them."
44. See Koran 9:7, "So as long as they are upright toward you, be upright toward them."
45. The first translation into Latin of the Koran was the *Lex Mahomet pseudoprophete* by Robert of Ketton, published in the twelfth century.

46. "Of the great pity and martyrdom of the knights facing Bayazid, and how the marshall was spared" (113).
47. "…entirely naked, save for a small piece of cloth."
48. Martha Easton, "Pain, Torture, and Death in the Huntington Library Legenda Aurea," in *Gender and Holiness: Men, Women and Saints in Late Medieval Europe*, eds. Sam Riches, Sarah Salih (New York: Routledge, 2002), 53.
49. "led to martyrdom;" "like good martyrs used to be made."
50. Donald Wesling, *Joys and Sorrows of Imaginary Persons (On Literary Emotions)* (New York: Rodopi, 2008).
51. Gabrielle M. Spiegel, *Romancing the Past. The Rise of Vernacular Prose Historiography in Thirteenth Century France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
52. "…they were surrendered for capital punishment to the Sarracens, and hence it is impossible to contain our tears. Who would have a heart of iron, with an indestructible courage, who would not melt inside at the sight of such honorable men, worshipers of Christ, dragged like cattle to their death, addressing their last goodbye to Christ?"
53. "Il préfère aux clameurs tragiques un sobre récit historique."

CHAPTER 11

"*Doel*" In Situ: The Contextual and Corporeal Landscape of Grief in *La Chanson de Roland*

Angela Warner

One of the many gifts of *La Chanson de Roland* is the rich textual and textured landscape of the treatment of emotions that provides a window into how feelings were perceived, experienced, expressed, and described in twelfth century France.[1] Several scholars studying *Roland* have already addressed anger, *orgueil* and *fierté* (two kinds of pride), *démesure* (immoderation), betrayal, vengeance, humor, death, and courtliness, but comparatively few have addressed grief specifically.[2] Grief is absolutely central to the text and that centrality is reflected in the word "*doel*" (grief) appearing in the text over thirty times, far exceeding any other emotion word. Extant research on grief in *Roland* centers on its more obvious manifestations: death, lamentation, crying, and beard-pulling, with most of the scholarship only touching the surface of the anguish

A. Warner (✉)
Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto, 125 Queen's Park, 3rd floor, Toronto, ON M5S 2C7, Canada
e-mail: a.warner@mail.utoronto.ca

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_11

and pain of grief and doing so in a removed and intellectual manner. As such, the issue with the available scholarship on grief in *La Chanson de Roland* is that grief is far more multifaceted than what most research has alluded to and is far more potent. The *Roland* poet himself understands the complexity of this emotion and demonstrates said understanding in his pairing of the word "*doel*" with several other words related in form or meaning, thereby creating a nuanced understanding of a given person's emotional state or a situation's emotional timbre, even as these expressions become formulaic, their very formulaity adding emphasis to the emotion conveyed therein.[3] The poet additionally uses other means of relating the fluctuating emotional landscape within the epic to grief. Literary techniques such as Biblical allusion and foreshadowing abound, as do the structural formats of similar laisses and parallel laisses, which are utilized to intensify the importance of a given situation while also strengthening the emotional amplitude of it. The poet also makes reference to the body and how we express grief on a corporeal level, through weeping, fainting and dying from grief, and hair and beard rending as culturally prescribed responses to grievous situations. The *planctus*, that is, the aggrieved speech eulogizing the dead, is an additional way of articulating grief for the characters in *Roland*. For each of these there is already much scholarship available but I will touch on them here briefly in order to illustrate the physical aspects in these expressions of grief.[4]

To more fully understand the terminologies used, the nuances of *doel* and the related words, *dulors* and *dolenz*, must first themselves be addressed. *Doel* and *dulors* are both substantives meaning pain and grief. The former focuses on lamentation, sorrow, misery, wretchedness, and the latter on sadness and affliction, but in the Tobler-Lommatzsche dictionary, the initial definition of *dolor* is "*körperlich Schmerz*," ("bodily pain"). "*Schmerende Stelle*" ("an aching, hurting, painful area") is the second definition. There is, therefore, a physical quality of suffering present in *dulors* that is not present in *doel*. *Dolenz* is an adjective meaning pained, saddened, unhappy, afflicted, heavy, or oppressed with grief.

Before beginning, it is imperative to start with a theoretical base from which to work in order to situate my analyses. Part of what is necessary to understand is the corporeality of emotional expression within the Middle Ages. Therefore, I will provide an explanation grounded in the corporeality of emotions themselves, insofar as current research has discerned. Pertinently, while I presume a general understanding of what is

meant by the term "emotions," I will clarify that I am indeed using in this paper a more generalized Anglo-American definition, which tends not to make distinctions between emotions, emotional states, sentiments, passions, affects, moods, feelings, and the like.[5]

Looking at the two different ends of the Affect Studies spectrum, Sarah Tarlow describes in her article, "The Archaeology of Emotion and Affect,"[6]

> At the psychological end of the spectrum are those approaches that understand emotion as a bodily agitation. Emotion is located in the brain and in the actions of hormones and is thus broadly shared by all anatomically modern humans as a biological function…At the constructivist pole, emotions are not considered to be universal among humans. Not only does the emotional content of a situation change according to cultural context, but the actual emotional experience is learned and social. (170)

My perspective is that both approaches are simultaneously true, with the major qualification that there still lacks in this explanation a core component: the rest of the body. While all emotions are physically oriented, grief itself may very well be the most corporeal of all the emotions, simply because it lingers.[7] At its most palpable, it is dark, heavy, and low. Its weight bears down on the core of the body, causing the shoulders to slump, the spine to curve. Even a slight increase of spinal curvature stifles the lungs, disrupting the regular pace of breathing. The inhalations are shallower, and there are longer pauses between exhale and inhale. These two components result in an increased frequency of sighing as the body attempts to regain an equilibrium between oxygen and carbon dioxide, and contained within which sighing is a sinking quality. This is reminiscent of *ahan*, a grief-related word oft-repeated in *Roland*, which etymologically is an onomatopoeic expression of a noisy exhalation in relation to making some sort of physical effort: effectively, a vocalized sigh.[8]

Returning to emotions research, while the body is mentioned in the cognitive psychological approach, it seems to be relegated to the sidelines, an afterthought, as most of the focus is on the brain and cognition. In that same vein, it is a grievous mistake to unequivocally state, as Tarlow does, that the locus of emotions is wholly in the brain, while also citing hormonal production as the reason for their existence. The endocrine system, which is a network of glands throughout the core of the body, is what is responsible for hormone production. The pituitary

and pineal glands, both located in the brain, are only two of several. Adrenalin, for example, is produced by the adrenal glands, which sit atop the kidneys and are, thus, fairly distant from the brain, yet are perfectly placed to influence the hips and legs should a fear-inducing flight-fight-or-freeze scenario unfold, requiring precise control of the musculature that adrenalin affords. Hormonal production aside, we feel nervousness and anxiety in the pits of our stomachs; our palms become cold and clammy; our heart rates increase and our breathing patterns change, becoming shallow and rapid. Anger is felt in balled-up fists; joy and elation in our uplifted hearts. This is not the sole machination of the brain. Emotion is an embodied, sensory experience.

There is a physical, sensate quality to every emotion, yet how that sensation or set of sensations is interpreted linguistically and societally will necessarily shift between cultures. The culture of twelfth-century *Roland* is one of high emotional expressivity with low cultural suppression, particularly of grief.[9] Most importantly, there is now research demonstrating the impact of cultural repression or amplification of a given emotion on the physiological manifestation of that emotion.[10] This bridges the contentious gap between the psychological end of the Affect Studies spectrum, which tends to deny cultural influence, and the constructivist end of the spectrum, which tends to deny biological influence. As a general example, if open displays of anger are heavily repressed in a culture, the belief paradigm governing those displays conditions a person's physiological response and will thus determine how a person physiologically reacts to an open display of anger (e.g., a person from an anger-suppressive culture will maintain a lower heart rate in such a situation than one from a culture where anger expression is more acceptable).[11] In short, culture creates the mental filters through which we experience the world physiologically, and directly impacts the amplitude of our emotional responses. There is, therefore, the initial, unconscious emotional response that Antonio Damasio speaks of in *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*, as well as the subsequent, more conscious, culturally-prescribed responses that train a person's physiology and govern their actions.[12]

As mentioned previously, the *Roland* poet uses several different methods of conveying and inflecting a sense of grief. Weeping is both the unconscious response to grief and a culturally-prescribed response. When the eponymous hero dies, "*Plurent Franceis pur pitét de Rollant*" ("The French cried for pity of Roland," v. 3120)

and "…*plurerent.C. milie chevalers*" ("a hundred thousand knights will weep," v. 3870). The shedding of tears illustrates both aspects of expression: crying from the personal loss of a beloved hero and crying as a cultural demonstration of collective public grief.

The *planctus*, that is, the aggrieved speech eulogizing the dead, is an additional way of articulating grief for the characters in *Roland*. It is both a public and private act when grieving the loss of a loved one. While *Roland* is written in eleventh-century France, thirteenth-century Italy legislated against certain forms of public grieving to maintain social cohesion and order. The types of public grief that Carol Lansing refers to in *Passion and Order* as having been outlawed were not the quiet-but-abundant weeping of *flere*, nor the much more physical *plangere* ("to strike the chest or face or beat the hands together"), but *plorare* ("to add the voice, interrupting tears with cries and sobs").[13] Thus, it is not the visual nor the self-injurious aspects of public grieving that were problematic for keeping the peace; it was specifically using one's voice in the form of wailing and sobbing loudly and plaintively. What I want to suggest here is that the cultural vocalizing became subsumed into the *planctus*, a word which was substantivized from the past participle of *plangere* to mean "a lamentation," while also retaining the original meaning of "beating on the breast." While wailing was legislated against, the need for vocalizing remained. A person who is so emotionally struck and beaten by the death of their loved one must mark the occasion by vocalizing their grief. With a modern reading of *planctus*, the focus is on the verbalization, the elegy, the eulogy, rather than on the distinctively corporeal aspect of the word. When Roland dies, Charlemagne delivers a *planctus*, lamenting his death. He faints, he weeps, he rends his beard, and with his *planctus*, his eulogy, one can imagine him beating his breast in lamentation, as well.

Alongside the interiority of spontaneous grief expression and the exteriority of public mourning is the abject vulnerability of grief itself. Grief of any sort is born of loss, not just of the loss that death presents but born of a transgression of how a person expected the world to be: the loss is a betrayal, and with it comes a sense of powerlessness. As D.D.R. Owen states, beards for the Franks are symbolic of virility and authority.[14] Charlemagne tearing at his beard becomes the very embodiment of grief itself, as he tears away at his own symbolic power to govern his world, his embodied grief leaving him feeling vulnerable and conquered. When Charlemagne discovers that Roland has died, he *"Tiret sa barbe*

cum hom ki est irét" ("rends his beard like a man who is anguished," v. 2414). Further in the story, when Aude finds Charlemagne and asks him where her beloved Roland is, he "*pluret des oilz, tiret sa barbe blance*" ("He weeps from his eyes and rends his white beard," v. 3712) before telling her she asks about a dead man. Stricken with heart-shock at her loss and unable to process what Charlemagne was telling her, she collapses dead on the spot, rather than fainting. Passing out of consciousness rather than passing away is far more typical of the *Roland* epic.

Unlike death, fainting straddles the two worlds of grief's manifestations. It encompasses both the physical and emotional pain of grief, while showing a direct effect of emotional overwhelm on the corporeal being. When Olivier dies after a long day of battle alongside his companion Roland, and Roland, aggrieved and in dolorous and mortal pain from said battle, faints atop his horse (v. 2031), he does so from both the physical and emotional pain born from the loss of his friend. *"'Quand tu es morz, dulur est que jo vif.' A icest mot se pasmet li marchis sur son ceval que cleimet Veillantif*" ("'When you are dead, it is pain that I live.' At these words, the marquis faints on his horse that he calls Veillantif") illustrates this palpable corporeality of grievous emotional pain, as though grief is a physical injury that the whole body must suffer and endure. The additional layer of physical vulnerability in fainting is that it mimics the vulnerability of a dying person, while also creating a visible manifestation of the vulnerability of grief. One is completely, utterly overcome with emotion and heart-injury such that one cannot maintain consciousness; the heart collapses along with the body. Lindsey Zachary writes, "Rather than being a sign of weakness, fainting can be a display of the deepest sympathy, as it mirrors death itself. As the mourners pass out of consciousness, they come as close as possible to joining the deceased. Yet the living must return to consciousness, and learn to respond and cope with pain of loss."[15] This encapsulates Roland's fainting at the death of Olivier but it is far more poignant with the death of Roland, wherein Charlemagne finds no relief in death and must continue living while grieving.

It is clear that all forms of grief expression are physical in nature, whether weeping or eulogizing with heart-felt words while beating one's breast. The issue with attempting to discern which manifestation of grief is cultural, however, and which is solely a spontaneous, personal expression is that it becomes a question of limitation, or the lack thereof. Determining the cultural element becomes challenging, if not

entirely unnecessary, because culture sets the limitations on how and to what extent an emotion is to be expressed; that is, the limitations create a cultural framework within which that culture functions. Therefore, if the culture in question allows a particular expression, then it is a cultural manifestation of grief. This is not to be conflated with public or ritualistic displays of emotional expression, which are separate areas of study and outside the scope of this chapter. The embodied gestures of weeping, beard rending, beating one's breast, and fainting all demonstrate a genuine, if ritualized, expression of grief.

In addition to these corporeal gestures of grief, the *Roland* poet uses grief-based words, which he pairs with other words to convey a nuanced sense of grief to the audience. To do that, I would like to explore how William Reddy's emotives can be applied to textual analysis. Emotives are defined as emotion statements "in which the statement's referent changes by virtue of the statement."[16] They are a means of self-exploration. However, by Reddy's own admission, his theory of emotives is ill-suited to textual analysis:

> The concept of emotives is, if anything, better suited to the field than to dusty archives and libraries. It focuses on interaction and behavior without ceding to them an all-powerful constructive role. It focuses on uncertainties of interpretation and miscues, reassuring the fieldworker that these are not something to be overcome to get at the truth but an inherent element of social life everywhere.[17]

Given that the bulk of the textual grief in *Roland* comes to the audience in the form of narration rather than by direct discourse, Reddy's approach doesn't appear to be useful in this particular study. Be that as it may, to further elucidate and intensify the emotional aspect of an experience within the text of *Roland*, the poet uses several devices to convey grief in such a way as to provide a direct opportunity to use Reddy's emotives in a way he may not have initially conceived.

When Reddy began writing about emotives, he did so with the understanding that there is an inner and outer process at play within an individual's assessment of their own emotional state. Introducing his concept of emotives in his 1997 article "Against Constructionism," he wrote: "Many ways of expressing feeling work equally well (poorly); all fail to some degree. It is here, rather than in some putative set of genetically programmed 'basic' emotions, that a universal conception of the

person…can be founded."[18] I agree with this supposition because what he's describing is the process of emotional self-awareness, and in the process of becoming self-aware, a person begins to conceive of their state of being. The inner and outer process of emotives can be described as an emergent translation of one's emotional state: "I'm angry…no, I'm upset." The outer process of the initial statement is immediately assessed internally and then, determined to be inaccurate, is corrected with the secondary statement. It is a process of translating the internal state into a vocalized or textual description.[19]

With the definition of emotive in hand we can now explore the pairs of grief words used in *Roland* as emotives. I wish to point out that what follows is by no means a comprehensive list, but merely a narrow window into the collection of grief word pairs in the Oxford *Roland*: "*a doel e a viltét*" ("in grief and dishonor," v. 904), "*e doel e hunte*" ("both grief and shame," v. 929), "*doel e ire*" ("grief and anger," v. 971), "*a dulor e a peine*" ("in suffering and pain," v. 1787), "*dolenz e curuçus*" ("afflicted and wrathful," v. 1813), "*dulor e grant mal* "("grief and distress," v. 2101), "*le doel e la pitét*" ("grief and pity," v. 2206), "*doel* [*e*] *sufraite*" ("grief and suffering," v. 2257), "*par doel e par rancune*" ("by grief and by anger," v. 2301), and "*dulor e pesance*" ("pain and affliction," v. 2335). Of these, I will address only a few.

Beginning with "*a doel e a viltét*" ("in grief and dishonor," v. 904), *viltét* means shame and dishonor, so the combination of *doel* and *viltét* speaks of the grievous turmoil that accompanies being shamed and dishonored. This pair appears in the passage where Balaguez is posturing before Marsile, proudly giving voice to his prowess, as he shouts that should he find Roland and Olivier and the twelve peers, he will end them, and the French will die "*a doel e a viltét.*" Balaguez's appearance before Marsile is seated within the context of a series of similar laisses wherein the poet introduces all the named Saracen nobles, who will act as counterpoints to the twelve peers on the Christian side, parading in front of Marsile. We find a repetition of Balaguez's sentiment in verse 929 coming from Torgis, who says that the French will die if they risk going against them, and Charles the Old will have both "*doel e hunte*" ("grief and shame"). The poet's emphasis on shame and dishonor in this context reflects and underscores the social topos of winning or losing a battle, and the effect the outcome has on the self-worth of a people, both individually and collectively.

When Roland collects Olivier's body, holding him close and carrying him to Turpin to be absolved and blessed, the poet writes that "*le doel e la pitét*" ("grief and pity," v. 2206) grow, and it is here that Roland begins a *planctus* for Olivier. Pity is the English cognate of *pitét*, but pity is a complicated word whose modern definition has shifted from that of its Latinate origins, as well as from its French origins. To have pity for something is to feel sorry for it, which, on one hand can mean feeling tenderness toward it, but more often, in English, there comes a sense of distastefulness associated with pitiable things and pitiable people in Anglo-American culture. Feeling sorry for someone presents a hierarchy where the one who is pitied could be deemed as being of lower status than the one who feels pity, insofar as the specific context in which they are pitied (e.g., I feel sorry for you because *you* have this problem but, thankfully, *I* don't is the unstated understanding). This is a significant shift from the Latin *pietas*, which means piety, duty. Its usage in Old French bears a resemblance to our modern usage with the balance shifted toward tenderness and compassion rather than noting a sense of wretchedness about the person being pitied. When Roland tends to the body of his companion, *pitét* growing, we see a different side of grief. Instead of a grief borne of shame, this is a grief seated in absolute tenderness and affection, as well as a sense of pious responsibility. In the context of the story, Roland is in the process of dutifully gathering the bodies of his slain peers to bring them to Turpin for blessing and absolution and when he comes, at last, to his closest companion, his grief and his pity grow to such a degree as to inspire a *planctus* for his fallen friend.

Another facet of grief is that of frustration. It appears in our modern idiom as the exasperated phrases "Good grief!" and "Quit giving me grief!" A similar sense appears in *Roland* when, while in the midst of dying, having just fought off a Saracen trying to steal his sword, Roland attempts to break his sword on a nearby rock ten times "*par doel e par rancune*" ("by grief and by anger," v. 2301). Like many knights, he has a distinctive relationship with his sword. As a primary means of defense, it is common for swords to take on grand and potent significance, representative of the valor and honor of the knight himself, and contained within is the knight's every success and every defeat. For prominent knights with a noteworthy reputation, there will necessarily be more successes contained in the body and history of the sword. Were the Saracen to steal it, he would not only have proof of Roland's defeat, which would be broadcast

across both their kingdoms, leaving Roland with a legacy of disgrace, but also, in a way, taint all previous successful battles fought by Roland with his sword, Durendal. Appropriating a knight's sword is a final act of humiliation, not just for the knight himself, but humiliation and defeat for the entire army who fought with him in that battle. This is the context behind Roland's desire to break and destroy his sword. He does not want his potency to fall into the wrong hands, and he has no control over that after he dies. He knows he is dying and he wishes to have the final say in what happens with his sword. When his efforts to break his sword are unsuccessful, he is exasperated, frustrated, and angry that this is what it's come to; he is in a panic about not being able to destroy his beloved sword because of all it represents, and he is aggrieved about the whole situation to do with his sword, never mind the way the entire day of battle has gone. He begins eulogizing his sword as he still attempts to break it.

In the middle of this speech, he proclaims "*pur ceste espee ai dulor e pesance*" ("for this sword, I have pain and affliction," v. 2335), saying he would rather die than let his sword fall into the hands of the pagans, pleading with God that he not let France be shamed. *Dulor* is used here, rather than *doel*, which signifies a shift in the type of grief. There is a physical pain associated with *dulor* that is less present in *doel.* Its use here is appropriate given the fact that, while Roland is dying, he is exerting himself enormously, beating his sword time and again on a rock. This is agony, a word which, like *dulor*, straddles the physical and the non-physical—an aggrieved pain. *Pesance*, as well, carries nuance. It is, at once, chagrin, but also weight. Roland feels the heaviness of responsibility for this sword weighing on him, as well as the heaviness of the grief of not being able to break it, which carries with it the anxiety and anticipatory grief of future humiliations. While said humiliation would most assuredly be postmortem, the thought of it in that moment is adversely affecting his spirit, creating the turmoil we see present in his body, as conveyed by the *Roland* poet.

"*Doel e ire*" ("grief and anger") are paired in verse 971, during the parade of Saracen nobles, when Margarit of Seville charges that the French will die, France will be shamed, and never will Charlemagne have a day without *doel e ire*. *Ire* means anger but also frustration, annoyance, grief, and sorrow and both usages are employed in the *Roland* text.[20] Here, the full, nuanced sense is likely meant—anger and frustration—coupled with the grief of being defeated. *Ire* is mentioned in a non-grief pair in verse 1611, in a passage that illustrates the opposite scenario that Margarit had set forth:

l. 122, v. 1608 E cil d'Espaigne s'en cleiment tuit dolent.
Dïent Franceis: "Ben fiert nostre guarent!"
l. 123, v. 1610 La bataille est merveilleuse e hastive;
Franceis i ferent par vigur e par *ire*.
[And those of Spain exclaim with such pain.
The French say: "He defended our guard well!"
The battle is marvellous and quick;
the French attack with vigour and ire.]

Prior to this passage, no one important has yet died. The initial battle is being waged, and the French are in a more powerful position for the moment. Here, *ire* is clearly seen not as sorrow but rather more akin to anger, irritation, fury, and that is demonstrated by its pairing with *vigur*. With the rigors of battle, there is a forceful, driving energy, which is seated in strength and will, that accompanies and inflects this *vigur*, and *vigur*, in turn, inflects *ire*. That is *ire* in this passage.

When Roland finally sounds the horn, and Charlemagne rides to him, there is a different sense of *ire* present. Charlemagne, at this point, has realized the treasonous betrayal of Ganelon, has sent him off in chains, and is deeply upset at the situation.

The forcefulness of this turn of events in the text, the literal turning of the army to return to the physical place where Roland is, is underscored in the repetition of words and imagery in the similar laisses of 137 and 138. In that turning back, the mood is downcast and urgent, evoking an opposite set of emotions as when they were going forward toward their homes in France.

Esclargiz est li vespres e li jurz;
Cuntre soleil reluisent cil adub,
Osbercs e helmes i getent grant flambur,
E cil escuz, ki ben sunt peinz a flurs,
E cil espiez, cil orét gunfanun.
Li empereres cevalchet par irur
E li Franceis dolenz e curuçus.
N'i ad celoi ki durement ne plurt,
E de Rollant sunt en mult grant poür…

Halt sunt li pui e tenebrus e grant,
Li val parfunt e les ewes curant.
Sunent cil graisle e derere e devant
E tuit rachatent encuntre l'olifant
Li empereres chevalchet ireement
E li Franceis curuçus e dolent;
N'i ad celoi n'i plurt e se dement;
E prïent Deu qu'il guarisset Rollant
Josquë il vengent el camp cumunement

(v. 1807–1815)	Ensembl'od lui i ferrunt veirement.
	De ço qui calt? Car ne lur valt nïent:
	Demurent trop, n'i poedent estre a tens.
	(v. 1830–1841)
(The evening and the day lighten;	(The hills were high, shadowed and grand,
Their equipment shines against the sun,	The valley deep and the waters flowing.
Hauberk and helmet are flame bright,	The trumpets sounding in back and front
And the shields, painted with flowers,	And all take up against the oliphant
And the swords, the standard gleaming	Enraged, the emperor galloped on horseback
With rage, the emperor galloped on horseback	And the French wrathful and aggrieved;
And the French pained and wrathful.	Not a one was not crying and lamenting;
There was not a one who was not crying laboriously	And they prayed for God to protect Roland
And they were frightened terribly about Roland…)	Until they arrived at the battlefield together.
	Together with him they would battle there,
	ho fumed,
	come of it.
	They have delayed too long; they wouldn't be able to be there in time.)

Seated within the emperor as he is seated on his horse is a turbulent complex of emotions. There is an anguished, anxious turmoil overlaid with anger. Charlemagne is, at the same time, rushing to Roland's rescue, desperately hoping he makes it there in time, while also being

completely infuriated at Ganelon. This is the *irur* and *ireement* (enraged and wrathful) manner in which he rides to the aid of his nephew. His emotions direct him physically just as he physically directs his horse, the second laisse doubling the intensity of the emotions present in the first.

In both laisses, there was not a one who was not crying, but the quality of the crying shifts as the story progresses. *Durement* (laboriously) in laisse 137 is changed to a similar-sounding *dement* (lament) in laisse 138. The French's bitter, laborious crying born of fear for Roland's safety evolves into hopeless lamentation, tearful and full of regret, as they turn to God to ask for his protection. In the last two lines of laisse 138, the poet expertly conveys an utterly palpable sense of aggrieved futility, despair, and hopelessness. Using a narration style that articulates the thoughts of the French, while also acting as an authorial aside to the audience as though these were the poet's thoughts, too, an authoritarian gravitas is lent to the lines: They might not arrive in time. Whatever they do might be utterly worthless because they waited too long to save Roland. But still they do not give up; they continue onward.

As we can see from the examples provided, despite Reddy not fully believing that his concept of emotives could be of much use for textual analysis, the specific context within *La Chanson de Roland* provides an appropriate example to which emotives are demonstrably suited. I would like to suggest here that his concept needs to be further expanded and used to understand how similar laisses and parallel laisses modify the emotional atmosphere. These literary devices serve to intensify the significance of certain events as well as the emotional tenor of the story. The second laisse represents not so much an emotive-based self-correction as a deeper understanding of the emotional tenor of the unfolding circumstances—a further translation of the emotional atmosphere. The self-corrective nature of the emotive is, in my understanding, a slight misnomer. It is not so much that the initial word needs correcting because it was incorrect; it is taking a word and expanding upon it because, initially, it was either too imprecise or too uncertain. Using literary devices in place of that self-corrective word has the same if not much subtler effect by taking an emotion word and further developing it into something that is more comprehensive, more precise, and more certain.

Some scholars may believe that this approach may water down the concept of emotives, that it pushes it too far out of context; however, what is really at play here within the concept of emotives is the fact that there is a two-part process of assessing an emotional state of being.

The initial assessing description is the facile, superficial, obvious interpretation that when spoken, that is, when tried on, is either not fully accurate or doesn't convey enough understanding with respect to what the person is experiencing. That said, the initial description is also not fully inaccurate, either. The secondary explanation, that is, the secondary emotion word, adds nuance, modifying the original assessment and making the overall state of being more comprehensive while also intensifying the emotional understanding of the situation. If we expand "secondary emotion word" to also include "literary device," then it's not too far afield from the original concept. It is thus through this expanded definition that scholars and researchers are provided with another means by which to analyze emotions within literary texts, particularly those sitting in those aforementioned dusty archives and libraries.

The gestural acts of grief touched on in the first half of this essay—the multitude of tears shed, the *planctus*, the poignant mirror of death found in fainting, the beard-rending—convey to the audience a corporeal dimension of emotions within the story, also allowing for the audience a window into the cultural aspects of grief expression in twelfth-century France.

The distinctive and concentrated meanings of the lexicon of grief addressed in the second half of this essay and the poet's calibrated placement of those word pairs within the text reveal that he possessed a nuanced understanding of the complex, multifaceted nature of grief. Grief is exhausting, frustrating, painful, and heavy. Truly, as much for us now as it was for them then, to grieve is to labor.

Notes

1. For this analysis, I will be using the Cesare Segre edition of *La Chanson de Roland*. Paris: Droz, 2003.
2. Glyn Burgess analyzes the two types of pride in "*Orgueil* and *Fierté* in Twelfth-Century French" *Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie*. 87 (1971): 103–122.
3. When speaking about grief, I am using the word as an inclusive term that at times encompasses and at other times inflects sadness, sorrow, pain, woe, depression, anguish, torment, agony, suffering, gloom, despair, distress, heaviness, mourning, hopelessness, frustration, and other related emotions, adding nuance to the emotional experience. Because grief is so multivalent, it can be difficult to fully articulate its complexity in a single

word, which is why the word pairs exist in the first place and what makes the *Roland* poet so singular in his understanding of grief.

4. For further analysis, Marianne Cramer Vos has a succinct article on Aude's dying from grief on discovering the death of Roland, her betrothed, in "La mort soudain d'Aude, icône feminine, dans le *Roland* d'Oxford" found in *Charlemagne in the North: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference of the Sociéte Rencesvals, Edinburgh 4–11 August 1991*, eds. Bennett, Philip, et al. Société Rencesvals British Branch, (Edinburgh: University of Edinbugh, 1993), 375–385. Analysis of the significance of beards can be found in D. D. R. Owen's "Beards in the *Chanson de Roland*." *Forum for Modern Language Studies*. 24 (1988) 175–179. A worthy starting place for exploring the *planctus* can be found in Paul Zumthor's "Planctus contenus dans *La Chanson de Roland*," *La Technique Littéraire des Chansons de Gestes: actes du Colloque de Liège, septembre 1957*, (Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1959), 219–235, where he describes the structure and motifs of a *planctus*, as well as in *Les Planctus Épiques*, also by Zumthor, found in *Romania* 74 (1963): 61–69.
5. There is a good summary regarding using the word "emotion" for this study rather than other words found in other Western European languages, as well as looking at the term "emotion" as being anachronistically modern in terms of studying emotions themselves in the Middle Ages in Damien Bouquet and Piroska Nagy's "Une Histoire des émotions incarnées" *Médiévales*. 61 (Automne 2011), 5–24, accessed July 10, 2015, http://medievales.revues.org/6249, starting on p. 11.
6. Sarah Tarlow, "The Archaeology of Emotion and Affect," *The Annual Review of Anthropology*. 41 (2012) 170, accessed April 27, 2015, doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-092611-145944.
7. In *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 341, Antonio Damasio notes that "Emotions have varied temporal profiles." Anger is described as having a "burst pattern" of quick onset and fairly rapid decay; whereas, sadness (and grief, I would suggest,) has "more of a wavelike pattern."
8. Alphonse Bos, *Glossaire de la langue d'oïl* (Paris: J. Maisonneuve, 1891), 9. This onomatopoeic definition is also found in Jean-Baptiste de la Curne de Sainte-Palaye's *Dictionnaire historique de l'ancien langage françois depuis son origine jusqu'au siècle de Louis XIV*. Paris: H. Champion Librairie (1875), 256. The initial definition is "*respiration forcée*" (forced respiration) and a subsequent quote is given: "*C'est une imitation du son naturel*" (It is an imitation of a natural sound). In verse 2474 of *Roland*, the Saracens are drowned "*par merveillus ahan*," (by wondrous suffering), but armed with the onomatopoeia of the word, we can more fully

imagine the terrible gasping, groaning vocalic aspect of the suffering as the soldiers drown.

9. Carol Lansing's *Passion and Order: Restraint of Grief in the Medieval Italian Commune*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), discusses the establishment of laws in thirteenth-century Italy, curtailing more excessive expressions of public grieving.
10. Asuka Murata, Jason S. Moser, and Shinobu Kitayama. "Culture shapes electrocortical responses during emotion suppression." *SCAN* 8 (2013): 595–601, accessed September 20, 2014. doi:10.1093/scan/nss036.
11. Iris B. Mauss and Emily A. Butler "Cultural Context Moderates the Relationship Between Emotion Control Values and Cardiovascular Challenge Versus Threat Responses," *Biological Psychology* 84.3 (July 2010): 12, accessed September 20, 2014. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2009.09.010.
12. Damasio, *Feeling of What Happens*, 36–37, argues for the separation of feelings into a nonconscious "state of emotion," an equally nonconscious "state of [sensate] feeling," and the "state of feeling made conscious," stating as proof that we can become conscious of a corporeal state well after the advent of that state.
13. Lansing, *Passion and Order*, 57.
14. Owen, "Beards in *The Chanson de Roland*," 175.
15. Lindsey Zachary, "When Men Cry: Male Demonstrations of Grief in Beowulf, The Song of Roland, and Sir Orfeo." (Master's thesis, University of Arkansas, 2011) 35.
16. William M. Reddy, "Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions," *Current Anthropology* 38:3 (June 1997) 327–351, accessed January 2, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/204622.
17. Reddy, "Against Constructionism," 346.
18. Reddy, "Against Constructionism," 331.
19. Jan Plamper, "The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns," *History and Theory* 49 (May 2010), 240, accessed July 10, 2015. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2303.2010.00541.x.
20. The Tobler-Lommatzsche dictionary defines "*ire*" as "*Zorn*" ("anger," "wrath," "rage"), "*tätliche Feindseligkeit*" ("violent hostility"), and "*Verdruß,*" "*Gram,*" "*Kummer*" ("frustration," "annoyance," "grief," and "sorrow"). Adolf Tobler and Erhard Lommatzsch, *Altfranzösisches Wörterbuch* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1936) 1440–1444.

CHAPTER 12

Performing Chivalric Masculinity: Morality, Restraint, and Emotional Norms in the *Libro del Cavallero Zifar*

Kim Bergqvist

This article analyzes how emotions and affective behavior are portrayed in relation to masculinity in the first domestic Castilian chivalric romance, *El Libro del Cavallero Zifar* (*The Book of the Knight Zifar*, *c.* 1300; hereafter *Zifar*), a work that constructs and embodies a self-restrained knightly manhood. I will suggest intersections between the history of emotions and gender history, and analyze the emotional and affective implications of the literary configuration of chivalric masculinity in early fourteenth-century Castile. The *Zifar* is, to a great extent, a story about chivalric identity. This is widely recognized, and has been asserted by Fernando Gómez Redondo, who identified a spiritual purification of courtly knighthood implied in the narrative. He maintains that the *Zifar* exposes a monarchical vision of knighthood and social movement, proposed by the Queen Regent of Castile-León María de Molina (1264–1321), widow of King Sancho IV (r. 1284–1295) and mother of Fernando IV (r. 1295–1312).[1] Nonetheless, the *Zifar* is also a narrative

K. Bergqvist (✉)
Department of History, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: kim.bergqvist@historia.su.se

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9_12

about masculine identity, and concerned with promoting a model of emotional and affective restraint that was atypical of the knightly heroes of European Arthurian romance with their "emotional extremes."[2] It is also blatantly contrary to Johan Huizinga's and Norbert Elias's influential characterizations of the Middle Ages as emotionally unrestrained.[3]

There is no doubt that the history of emotions is *en vogue*. It has brought with it a prominent place for medieval and early modern studies, since some of the leading figures in the field are specialized in these periods. Barbara Rosenwein, an early medievalist, and William Reddy, whose main focus is the French Revolution, are central names, and their respective understandings of the role of emotions in social and political life have influenced many scholars within the field.[4] It is imperative in years to come to attempt to combine these current approaches to the history of emotions with the efforts made within gender history during several decades of vibrant research. Judith Butler's path-breaking interpretation of gender as the result of a performative and reiterated normative discourse, inspired by Michel Foucault, can be put in dialogue with the notions of emotional communities and regimes coined by these influential scholars of the history of emotions.[5] This would allow us to fathom the connection between emotional norms and practices on the one hand, and culturally constructed gender ideals on the other—how individuals were constrained not only by *emotionologies* (culturally determined norms that govern emotional life) and emotional socialization, but how expectations of gendered behavior and gender practices came into play in this process.[6] So far, little has come of such intersections of gender studies and the history of emotions for pre-modern societies, though there are exceptions, wherein the potential to combine these perspectives to gauge the effect gender ideologies and emotions had on both individuals and communities has been underlined.[7]

Social constructionist gender theory maintains that masculinity is performed by reiterative acts that produce a cultural fiction of stable and polarized genders, today as in the Middle Ages.[8] These acts, that legitimize a socially accepted understanding of gender, are codified in more or less explicit rules of conduct.[9] Performativity functions by referring to existing norms and reproducing socially accepted notions; thus gender identities are upheld and only change slowly by the introduction of difference to reiterated acts.[10] The notion of culturally constructed and contingent gender identities—and the concomitant idea that masculinities as well as femininities are unstable and mutable—is widely accepted

today, and has led to much fruitful research on medieval masculinities, particularly in the 1990s.[11] What is not as commonly acknowledged by scholars of medieval Europe is the importance of the display of proper affective behavior in men seeking to prove their masculine identity; i.e., that to be a "real" man one should feel like a man does. Sometimes that meant feeling very little.

El Libro del Cavallero Zifar

The *Zifar* was composed in the first decades of the fourteenth century, probably by the Toledan cleric Ferrand Martínez.[12] It was influenced by the life of the soldier and martyr Saint Eustace, among other sources. Two manuscripts are extant: a fourteenth-century copy held in Madrid, and a richly illuminated, fifteenth-century manuscript in Paris.[13] Historians have largely ignored the *Zifar*, while it has garnered much attention from literary scholars, focused on the sources of the text, the problem of its genre, author, date, and place of composition.[14] However, the *Zifar*, due to its rich "literary, political and philosophical subtexts,"[15] is also an excellent source to the history of mentalities, gender, and emotions. It is a work embedded in a culture of diversity, composed within a particular political order, and geared toward a social elite with common ideals, notions of gender, and emotional norms and practices. Whether we regard it as a faithful depiction of the values that characterized an emotional community (a system of feeling), or as a set of normative conceptions—an ideal image of what clerical authors had in mind for the aristocracy of the time—it can tell us how medieval Iberian audiences understood the place of emotions in their lives, in their society and culture.[16] "Literature can both reflect common emotional practices and serve as models for new styles of feeling and acting," according to Susan Matt.[17] The normative conceptions inherent in a popular literary genre would have had an impact on the audience, whose selfhood was formed in part by the internalization of cultural norms from narratives. In that way, the text was performatively productive, since its conceptions affected the audience who would identify with the characters, aim to repeat their actions, and adopt the social norms propounded in the narrative.[18]

The *Zifar* is an exceptional literary product in that it combines the fictional universe of chivalric romances with the didacticism of mirrors for princes, a genre that had become prevalent in Castile in the century

preceding its composition not long after 1300.[19] The many books of advice (*castigos*) written in Castilian over the thirteenth century, such as the *Flores de filosofía*, have influenced parts of the *Zifar* directly.[20] The close ties of Christian Iberia to Islamic culture and Arabic literature arguably had a strong impact on the *Zifar*, and may be the explanation for some of its prevalent motifs and its idiosyncrasies.[21] When Arthurian literature was introduced into Castile it was contaminated by the then-dominant exemplary or moral-didactic literature.[22] At the same time, the Arthurian corpus brought in many important themes into Iberian literature, and its ethos had immense influence on the nascent ideological structure of noble society.[23]

Because of its unique structure, combining adventure and quest narratives with a mirror for princes (a collection of *exempla*), scholars have long debated to what genre the *Zifar* belongs. Some have described it as a contradictory work, identifying a conflict between the chivalric and the didactic modes of writing.[24] But in effect, the author marries his didactic proposals well to the narratives; the story of Zifar's adventures and his claim to kingship over the realm of Mentón and his son Roboán's subsequent search for his own autonomous knightly identity can be read as emplotments of the chivalric ethos presented in the explicitly didactic section (the lessons the knight Zifar as King of Mentón teaches his sons). These didactic elements propose a moderate manhood characterized by self-restraint, and a closer look at the eponymous knight demonstrates how well he performs according to this ideal.

Moderating Emotion, Repressing Affect

Early in the narrative, the king to whom the knight Zifar is vassal has rid himself of Zifar's services. Due to advice from other nobles who have the king's ear, the king has stopped asking Zifar for military aid, although he is recognized as the best knight in the realm. This is all owing to a strange curse on Zifar which leads every horse he mounts to die after exactly ten days, which makes the employment of Zifar's services too expensive for the king. Because of his sudden idleness, Zifar is troubled, and his wife Grima reacts strongly, pointing out that she has never encountered her husband in this state before; he is apparently not prone to lament.[25] She continues to point out his excellent qualities, and illustrates some of the key points in the text's ideal of masculinity: Zifar is a courageous man with noble intentions, whose reasoned counsel allows

him to act independently and justly. The opposition between reason and emotion stands out particularly clearly in the didactic parts of the book—and is echoed by the contemporaneous mirror for princes *Castigos de Sancho IV*—but the recommendation not to let reason be blinded by emotion runs throughout the narrative.[26]

In a seminal article, Louise Mirrer analyzed the ideal of the aggressive male as it comes across in the epic *Poema de Mio Cid* (or *Cantar de Mio Cid*, c. 1201–1207; hereafter *PMC*), one of the few extant epic poems of the Spanish Middle Ages.[27] This active, militaristic ideal of manhood is constructed in contrast and opposition to Muslim and Jewish men, through aggressive behavior, threatening speech acts, and sexual assertiveness.[28] In the roughly one hundred years that passed between the composition of the *PMC* and the writing of the *Zifar*, it is possible to discern changes in the ideal of masculinity that governed their authors. For one, the chivalric masculinity of the *Zifar* is not structured by "Othering"; there is no clear opposite to the hegemonic masculinity of the Christian knights, no subjugated or marginalized manhood. Moreover, the characters who use menacing speech and challenge the masculinity of their opponents on the battlefield are not the protagonists, but the antagonists, which implies a difference in the conception of such behavior between epic and romance. The *PMC*, in the form we know it, begins with Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar's disconsolate weeping. Violent outward displays of emotion are not at all uncommon in epic literature such as the *chansons de geste*, as is evidenced by Angela Warner's chapter in this volume,[29] but such displays would be unthinkable for the restrained knight Zifar.

The hero of the *Zifar* is not a Spanish knight, but of Eastern origin. His lineage is noble, of royal stock even; we are told that his ancestor was once a king in India, who fell from his high station because of his evil deeds. Nonetheless, Zifar stood as a mirror for the intended audience of the work, as a model for Castilian nobles in the fourteenth century. As Michael Harney contends: "Even if, as in the case of Zifar and his son Roboán, that homeland is a supposedly exotic local, the setting in question remains an allegorical simulacrum, a Eurocentric stand-in, for a homeland as conceived by European authors and readers."[30] Though his origins are exotic, Zifar is explicitly a Knight of God. The devotion to God is a powerful characteristic of the manhood represented by Zifar. As a *miles Christi*, he could inspire members of the intended audience to *imitatio*.[31] His fictional experience relates to the experiences of the recipients

of the discourse, many of whom were likely to have lived through war, as the century preceding the composition of the work was one of the most intense periods of the Christian conquest of Muslim Spain.

Manuel Abeledo sees faith, moderation (*mesura*), and intelligence as the guiding values of the *Zifar*, in contrast to the French Arthurian romance (exemplified by the *Lancelot en prose*, part of the Vulgate Cycle)[32] and its excessive heroes, whose martial prowess and amorous passions eclipse all other knights in the known world. Zifar, though outstanding in martial matters, is not an exceptional figure to the same degree as Lancelot and Tristan are. Although his actions are brave and his fighting accomplished, his merits are not otherworldly. His feats are more realistic than is typical of Arthurian fiction in general, his actions and tactical judgments moderated by reason and prudence.[33] Though masculinity in the *Zifar* is partly proven by means of prowess in combat, the author of the work is careful to provide his hero with further characteristics and other duties and uses besides war. He emphasizes the great learning of the knight, his wisdom and aptitude for counsel. In contrast to the epic tradition, the aggressive male in the romance is not here the hero, but the adversary who taunts our prudent hero:

> "Çertas –dixo el cavallero– ir vos conviene, e defendetvos." E el cavallero Zifar dixo: "Defiéndanos Dios que puede." "¿Pues de tan vagar está Dios – dixo el otro – non ha que fazer sinon de nos venir a defender?" "Çertas – dixo el cavallero Zifar –, a Dios non es ninguna cosa grave e sienpre ha vagar para bien fazer, e aquel es ayudado e acorrido e defendido aquel a quien quiere él ayudar e acorrer e defender." E dixo el cavallero: "Por palabras me queredes detener." E fincó las espuelas al cavallo e dexóse venir para él…[34]

> ("Defend yourself!" replied the knight. The Knight Zifar answered, "May God, who is able, defend us." "Is this God so idle," answered the other, "that he has nothing to do except come to [our] defense?" "Of course," replied the Knight Zifar, "to God nothing is too difficult and He always has the time to do good. Whomever He wishes to help or defend, to that person He gives help or protection." The other knight then responded, "Are you trying to stop me with words?" He sank his spurs into his horse and charged.)[35]

The narrative and the dialogues provide evidence that the ideal male of the *Zifar* is not a brute warrior, but a virtuous and wise nobleman, as willing to offer reasoned advice to his lord as he is to stand by him on

the battlefield. In terms of emotions, the ideal knight is required to moderate them in a courtly manner and to stand up prudently to discourteous opponents. However, there is a pronounced dichotomy between active and passive roles, which leads to the disparaging of men who do not fulfill the role of the active male. While the ideal man who "practices good principles" in order to lead a Christian life "is known by his deeds," a counter-image is that of the idle king who neglects to fulfill his duties: "And thus the king works at nothing except having books containing many good stories of great deeds read to him."[36] Idleness is described as an unnatural and immoral state for a knight in the *Zifar*, and inactivity was of course generally gendered as feminine in chivalric romance.[37] This is demonstrated by noble ladies asking counsel from the wise men around them before deciding on a course of action. Emotionally, women are more physically expressive. Their unrestrained emotional outbursts often lead to the characterization of women as mad. Research has shown how medieval belief in the excessiveness of female emotion was used as a rationalization of their exclusion from public life.[38] Our author ascribes more violent outward expressions of emotions to women than to men.[39] One lady is described as "out of her wits" (*salida de seso*) with grief, and thus as the opposite of the ideal knight, whose natural reason (*buen seso natural*) constantly guides his actions.[40]

Morality and Masculinity

Despite the king's actions to his detriment, Zifar is sure that he has nothing to be ashamed of, since his conscience is clear: "Therefore, I ought not to be afraid or ashamed, for nothing can make a man's heart cowardly or shameful except his own conscience. If it is bad, he does not do what he ought to…")[41] Fear and shame are here understood as the products of a guilty conscience, underlining the interconnectedness of moral conceptions and emotionality. The degree to which emotions and morals are believed to be interlinked is culturally contingent,[42] but in medieval Castilian literature, moral judgments and emotional states are inextricably connected. Naturally, the link between ideal masculinity and morality is not unique to this context. Rachel Stone has demonstrated how Carolingian virtues were gendered in didactic texts and how the importance of correct behavior for the performance of masculinity stresses the moral character of masculinity constructions.[43] In the *Zifar*, bravery and wisdom are primarily represented as masculine virtues, and emotional moderation and self-restraint are principally reserved for men.[44]

Zifar suffers many setbacks after leaving the town of Galapia and setting out on his quest with his wife and sons. First, one of the boys is taken by a lioness; later the same day, their other son wanders off and loses his way. They are adopted and raised by a childless couple, reared properly and reunited with their birth parents many years later. In the face of these unfortunate events, both Zifar and his wife grieve, but the representation of their emotional expressions is distinctive. Whereas Zifar seems confident that God has a plan that will see them all reunited, Grima is disconsolate and her expressions of sorrow are wild and unrestrained. Not much later, she is taken captive by some men on board a ship, sailing off against her will without her husband. The author divulges that Zifar lamented, but the representation of his grief never involves bodily affective responses. Certainly, uninhibited expressions of grief betrayed a lack of trust in God's plan and were thus sinful in the eyes of some medieval thinkers, such as the rhetorician and Archbishop of Constantinople, the Early Church Father John Chrysostom (c. 349–407), who berated dramatic mourning and employed the feminization of such rituals in order to denigrate them.[45] Yet the author of the *Zifar* shows how tragic events in people's lives affected them and resulted in spontaneous outbursts of feeling. The knight Zifar, however, is different. I suggest that his journeys and sufferings form part of an overarching message on the importance of learning "how to suffer and endure the sorrows of this world,"[46] to learn constancy and faith in the manner of the biblical Job, or Saint Eustace. God tests us endlessly, but in the end all belongs to him and we are only entrusted to keep our loved ones for a short time, as Zifar says:

> "¿Quién ome es –dixo el cavallero– quien llora muerte de los mortales? ¿ca qué pro tiene el llorar en que aquello por que llora non se puede cobrar? Çertas, si las vidas de los muertos se podiesen por lágrimas recobrar, toda la gente del mundo andaría llorando por cobrar sus parientes o sus amigos…" [47]

> ("What man is there who grieves over the death of mortals?…What advantage does grief have? How can one bring back the dead by lamenting? Surely if the lives of the dead could be restored through tears, all the people in the world would go around crying in order to recover their relatives or friends…")[48]

Ultimately, when all other markers of adult and responsible manhood are lost—the king's favor, his sons, his wife—Zifar's mastery of himself, his composure, are what allow him to retain his masculine identity.

Zifar also wants to teach his sons to hide their emotions, to repress their affective responses: "Furthermore, my sons, you ought to be constant in all your actions, which means to be firm and strong…Wherefore a wise man says, 'If I had pain, I did not show it, nor did I want the pain in my heart to be shown in my countenance, but I forced myself to hide it in order to cover my feeling.'"[49] Finally, though, Zifar himself is overcome by feelings, but only because of his sense of moral failing when he again encounters Grima—whom he had presumed dead—after already having married the Queen of Mentón. Despite his suffering, he was untroubled up to this point because he believed in God's justice and his own righteousness. Only when he considers himself to have sinned does anxiety overcome him, and his face is drained of color.[50] Before recognizing his sons upon their reappearance in Mentón, the king hears that his wife has been found asleep with two young men in her bed, and this provokes the greatest upset of all in Zifar, he is overcome with rage and orders her executed, but he realizes his mistake before it is too late.[51] The moral imperative, as is evident, is so essential to chivalric masculinity that it determines the emotional life of Zifar.

Performing Gender, Performing Emotions

The organizational principle underlying the plot of many chivalric romances is the trial (by combat), because the hero's virtue must be constantly reconfirmed, according to Mikhail Bakthin.[52] Masculinity is performed in the romances by the use of violence, as it was in the real life of knights.[53] The imaginary world of the chivalric romances was reflected in the staged performances of its audiences, such as jousts and tournaments.[54] But the chivalric world was not a mere game; it was governed by social conventions, and the performance of masculinity was necessary for a man to uphold his social standing, which depended on his reputation (*fama*).[55] A vital aspect in attaining ideal masculinity was learning to exhibit the correct expression of feelings. Thus, performing gender included as an essential factor the performance of emotions—emotional practices cannot be separated from gendered behavior. The concept of performed emotions should not be understood

as representing inauthentic feeling. Emotions could be simulated, of course, but performed emotions display emotional norms by reiterating socially acceptable practices. They can thus reveal crucial aspects of the emotionology and emotional practices of the society, the emotional community, under study.

At the beginning of Zifar's quest, he meets a rogue (who later becomes his trusted friend and advisor, the Knight Amigo) who is intent on testing Zifar and trying to provoke his rage. The rogue asks him a number of impertinent questions, but Zifar maintains his composure, and finally proves his wisdom and self-possession. In this he fares better than his youngest son Roboán, who in a later part of the romance is provoked to lose his temper in his meeting with a widowed lady in the kingdom of Pandulfa, an episode that mirrors his father's encounter with Amigo. The different reactions pertain partly to their ages; a young knight was considered untested, his manhood unproven, and was more likely to lack self-control and rush off into battle without heeding advice from mature companions.[56] We read in the romance: "It is proper for young knights to prove themselves in some matter of chivalry, because that is how they obtain knighthood. Surely no one can be said to be a knight who hasn't first proved himself on the field of battle."[57] Zifar's sons Garfín and Roboán are described as able knights, though their beards have barely begun to show. But Roboán is also reined in by the Knight Amigo, who considers him rash and says that he has "not thoroughly been tested."[58] When his older brother Garfín encounters the rebellious Count Nason on the battlefield, defeats him and hurts him, the older man tells him that "someone strengthened your arm, for surely you are not man enough to conquer me or to manhandle me so."[59] Raewyn Connell has defined masculinity as a notion of behavior that involves an individual displaying this behavior being considered manly and one who fails to do so being perceived as unmanly. Men are judged according to standards of behavior and patterns of gender practice, since masculinity is not a stable characteristic but a position within a (basically social) gender order; a position that must constantly be defended and reinforced.[60] This is well in line with the notion of performativity; the act of performing the fearless male in battle is repeated throughout the romance, but nowhere so succinctly as when Roboán speaks to his men about his father's advice in the matter:

> E dixo Roboán: "Amigos, los miedos partidos son, segunt me semeja, e vayámoslos acometer, que non ha çinco días que me castigaron que el miedo que los enemigos nos avían a poner en acometiéndonos que gelo posiésemos nos primero feriéndolos muy derraviadamente e sin dubda." Los cavalleros, como omes de buen esfuerço e como aquellos que avían sabor de bien fazer, dixierion que dezíe muy bien…"[61]
>
> (Roboán spoke: "Friends, fears are equally shared, so it seems to me. Let us attack them, for only five days ago I was instructed that the enemy would instill fear in us by attacking. We should instead put fear into them by attacking savagely and without hesitation."
>
> The knights, being men of great strength and having the desire to do well, agreed that he had spoken sense.)[62]

This proves partly that emotions were thought possible to stave off by force of will. Roboán, however, does not stand up to the emotional standards of his father in his further adventures. When he is lured by the devil to ask one favor after another of his new wife, the empress, he cannot contain his anxiety and worry, and she tells him: "But you are troubled in your heart and do not know how to contain what you feel. Certainly, it is not good. I see you are quite moderate in all things except this. If you are not careful in this matter, it will bring you great harm. For goodness' sake, from now on restrain yourself."[63] Roboán is ensnared by the devil to act sinfully and immoderately. In this passage, the author emphasizes that moderation is necessary not only in demeanor, appearance, eating and drinking, but equally important in the form of emotional composure and restraint. Roboán is of course different from Zifar because he is not a full-grown man. In medieval societies, the distinct ages of man corresponded to certain virtues and vices,[64] and a narrative that celebrates the temperate knight—the perfect mean between the reckless young and lifeless old—would naturally choose as hero a grown man, married with children.[65] But that is only part of the story. The author, in narrating the adventures of Roboán, demonstrated—willingly or unwillingly—two things. One, that most or even all men are imperfect; that the taxing standards of emotional restraint are a goal toward which one should strive but which is perhaps unattainable. And two, that only by showing men how they fail to attain ideal masculinity could writers clearly express this ideal. As Matthew Bennett

contends, "it is only by exploration of how men fail to live up to model behavior that they can understand what it is they need to be."[66] Research on the history of masculinity has collectively argued that masculinity was often—if not always—in crisis, a fact that has brought critical questions to bear on the concept of crisis. Conceivably, masculinity appears to experience crises because the hegemonic ideals are always too exacting for actual men to live up to them, which would imply that all men are imperfect and struggle with anxiety because of it. Medieval masculinity was, just like its early modern and modern counterparts, inevitably anxious. Hegemony is never stable, and even if an ideal type would be fixed, the path for actual men to live up to this standard would always be frayed with danger and anxiety.[67] In this particular context, tensions would have been created within masculinity between the ideals of emotional restraint—anger restraint being among the most prevalently espoused in wisdom literature—and the necessarily violent practices and performance required of knights in relation to their zealous fight within the ideological framework of the Christian conquest of Muslim Iberia (the *Reconquista*).

Conclusion

Medieval authors had to represent feelings in a manner that was grounded in their own experience and mentality, and that would resonate with the intended audience, not just as a social instrument. Discourses are social instruments, but they cannot function apart from larger cultural structures. Authors had to conform to socially and culturally accepted standards, to governing gender ideologies and affective modes. In doing so, they related their work to a community with a particular model of hegemonic masculinity. Should we see Zifar, then, as an ideal for the aristocratic male, wrought by clerics of the period who were critical of the lay emotional practices of the time? Gómez Redondo argued that the *estoria* of Zifar fulfilled the difficult aim of creating compatibility between spiritual values and the motives of chivalric conduct, of creating codes of conduct—modeled on the religious life—for the knighthood.[68] To underline the spiritual value of martial struggles could indeed be a way of alleviating tensions within masculinity by resolving the paradox between the violent military role of knights and the ideal of self-restraint. To learn moderation and self-restraint was essential for those who wished to govern others, partly because of the link between

ethics, economics, and politics; to be able to rule others, one must first learn to rule oneself and one's household.[69] As Zifar says, "one who has no control of himself is not powerful."[70] I would like to suggest that the prevalence of the virtue of moderation, and thus the ideal of manly self-restraint, was in effect a consequence of the culturally diverse context in which the *Zifar* was produced. Juan Pablo Rodríguez Argente de Castillo has argued that the Mozarabic identity of the presumed author of the *Zifar* is essential to how we interpret the milieu and setting of the work as a mirror of Toledo.[71] He contends that the Mozarabic tradition of cultural dialogue with Islam had been silenced by this time, and that the traits of Mozarabic identity that were emphasized was their noble Visigothic roots and their resistance to the Muslim invasion.[72] However, the virtue of moderation and self-restraint so central to the *Zifar* was important in the thought of several Islamic Golden Age and medieval philosophers who were influenced by Aristotle, among them Ibn-Sīnā (Avicenna, 980–1037) and Ibn Rušd (Averroes, 1126–1198), the twelfth century Cordoban polymath and commentator.[73] Toledo was a culturally diverse city, and the emotional community of its lay elite had been shaped by contact with the Muslim elite rather than defined in opposition to it. We can hardly say for sure where the ideals of self-restraint and moderation originated or how it found its way into Castilian didacticism, but its preeminence within learned circles in medieval Castile and its importance for the creation of a distinct domestic chivalric literature that differed in emotional mode from the French Arthurian literature was certainly dependent on the diversity of influences available.[74] Surely, medieval Castilian wisdom literature was greatly influenced by its Arabic counterpart. Nevertheless, the particular configuration of knightly masculine identity and emotional self-restraint propounded in the *Zifar* is a fourteenth-century Castilian phenomenon.

The *Zifar* can be read as an attempt to banish anxiety from manhood. Though the discursive reiteration of ideals of manhood and emotional composure echoed socially accepted standards (notions prevalent in the wisdom literature of the preceding century), there was still a potential for reform. The author of the *Zifar* may have been at odds with the emotional practices or system of feeling of the Castilian nobility and considered it not up to the standards—and by repeating the normative conceptions of didactic literature in a narrative form he opened up a new path to the internalization of these norms by his aristocratic audience. In other words, the author was invested in the emotional socialization of his

readers and the moral improvement of their emotional practices. To avoid anxiety, he would most likely have recommended doing good deeds. If we did, we would have a clear conscience and so a guarantee to be free of fear, shame, and anxiety, the torments and agonies of lesser men.

Notes

1. Fernando Gómez Redondo, "Los modelos caballerescos del *Zifar*," *Thesaurus* 54, no. 1 (1999): 117–120, 152. In Fernando Gómez Redondo, "Los públicos del Zifar," in *Studia in honorem Garmán Orduna*, eds Leonardo Funes and José Luis Moure (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2001), 106–154, he proposes a composition in three stages, stretching from the minority of Fernando IV (1295–1301) to the attainment of the age of majority of his son, Alfonso XI, in 1325.
2. Frank Brandsma, Carolyne Larrington, and Corinne Saunders, introduction to *Emotions in Medieval Arthurian Literature: Body, Mind, Voice*, eds Frank Brandsma, Carolyne Larrington, and Corinne Saunders (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2015), 8.
3. Johan Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages: The Study of Forms of Life, Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries*, trans. F. Hopman (London: Edward Arnold, 1924), 9; Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 319. For a critique of this grand narrative of the civilizing process, see Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (2002): 826–828.
4. See primarily: Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
5. Other terms that have been suggested are emotional styles and emotional habitus. See Monique Scheer, "Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion," *History and Theory* 51 (2012): 193–220.
6. Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns, "Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," *American Historical Review* 90 (1985): 825.
7. See, e.g., the study by Kristine Steenbergh, "Emotions and Gender: The Case of Anger in Early Modern English Revenge Tragedies," in *A History of Emotions, 1200–1800*, ed. Jonas Liliequist (London: Routledge, 2012); and the recent collection edited by Susan Broomhall, *Gender*

and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).

8. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminisim and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 25; Ruth Mazo Karras, *From Boys to Men: Formations of Masculinity in Late Medieval Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).
9. Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory," in *The Performance Studies Reader*, eds Henry Bial and Sara Brady, 3rd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 220; Todd W. Reeser, *Masculinities in Theory: An Introduction* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 85.
10. Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 13, 20; Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 92–93.
11. Clara A. Lees, ed., *Medieval Masculinities: Regarding Men in the Middle Ages*, with the assistance of Thelma Fenster and Jo Ann McNamara (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Jeffrey Jerome Cohen and Bonnie Wheeler, eds, *Becoming Male in the Middle Ages* (New York: Garland, 1997); D. M. Hadley, ed., *Masculinity in Medieval Europe* (London: Longman, 1999).
12. The dating of the text to shortly after 1300 is based on historical facts presented in the prologue to the work: Fernando Gómez Redondo, *Historia de la prosa medieval castellana, II: El desarollo de los géneros. La ficción caballeresca y el orden religioso* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1999), 1457–1459.
13. José Manuel Lucía Megías, "Libro del cavallero Zifar," in *Diccionario filológico de la literatura medieval española: textos y transmisión*, eds Carlos Alvar and José Manuel Lucía Megías (Madrid: Castalia, 2002), 773–776. References will be given to editions of ms. M, *Libro del Caballero Zifar*, ed. Joaquín González Muela (Madrid: Castalia, 1982) [hereafter *LCZ* ms. M] and ms. P, *Libro del Cauallero Çifar* ed. Marilyn A. Olsen (Madison: The Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1984) [hereafter *LCZ* ms. P].
14. James F. Burke, *History and Vision: The Figural Structure of the "Libro del Cavallero Zifar"* (London: Tamesis, 1972), xi. Exceptions exist where historians have taken the *Zifar* into account for military history, e.g., David Porrinas González, "Caballería y guerra en la Edad Media castellano-leonesa: el *Libro del Caballero Zifar* y su contexto," *Medievalismo* 15 (2005): 39–70.
15. John C. Parrack, "The Cultural Authority of 'buen seso (natural)' in the *Libro del Caballero Zifar*," *La corónica* 35, no. 1 (2006): 289.
16. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, 2, 23–27.

17. Susan J. Matt, "Recovering the Invisible: Methods for the Historical Study of the Emotions," in *Doing Emotions History*, eds Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 49.
18. Gómez Redondo, "Los públicos del Zifar," 284, 297.
19. Mirrors for princes appeared already in the ninth century Carolingian empire and are didactical tracts intended for the education of future rulers: Joachim Bumke, *Courtly Culture: Literature and Society in the High Middle Ages*, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2000), 276–279. New perspectives are presented in *Global Medieval: Mirrors for Princes Reconsidered*, eds Regula Forster and Neguin Yavari (Boston: Ilex Foundation/Harvard University Press, 2015).
20. There are also traces of the *Bocados de oro*, *Poridat de poridades*, *Castigos de Sancho IV*, *Siete partidas*, and *Barlaam y Josafat*. Walker regards the interpolation of *exempla* and the embedding of narratives within narratives, so frequent in the *Zifar*, as an Oriental literary technique (cf. *A Thousand and One Nights*, *Calila e Dimna*): Roger M. Walker, *Tradition and Technique in "El Libro del Cavallero Zifar"* (London: Tamesis, 1974), 27–70; Joaquín González Muela, "Introducción crítica," in Joaquín González Muela, ed., *Libro del Caballero Zifar* (Madrid: Castalia, 1982), 22–27; Charles P. Wagner, "The Sources of *El Cavallero Cifar*," *Revue Hispanique* 10 (1903): 5–104. Marina S. Brownlee, "Romance at the Crossroads: Medieval Spanish Paradigms and Cervantine Revisions," in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Romance*, ed. Roberta L. Krueger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 256, also points out its inheritance from Alfonsine literary undertakings.
21. Neryamn R. Nieves, "The Centrality of the Oriental in the *Libro del Caballero Zifar*," *Romance Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (2002): 270–279.
22. Gómez Redondo, "Los públicos del Zifar," 289; Manuel Abeledo, "El libro del caballero Zifar entre la literatura ejemplar y el romance caballeresco," *Letras* 59–60 (2009): 120; Walker, *Tradition and Technique*, 50–52.
23. James F. Burke, "Medieval Spanish Prose," in *The Cambridge History of Spanish Literature*, ed. David T. Gies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 101–102; María Luzdivina Cuesta Torre, "Ética de la guerra en el Libro del caballero Zifar," in *Literatura de caballerías y orígenes de la novela*, ed. Rafael Beltrán (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 1998), 110, maintains that the author of the *Zifar* adapted the Arthurian chivalric mentality to the specific circumstances governing Castilian chivalric society. For the concept of chivalric literature as political discourse, see Jesús Rodríguez Velasco, "*Zifar* en la edad de la virtud," *La Corónica* 27, no. 3 (1999): 168.

24. María Rosa Lida de Malkiel, *La idea de la fama en la Edad Media castellana* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1952), 259; Abeledo, "El libro del caballero Zifar," 120.
25. *LCZ* ms. M, 63.
26. Hugo O. Bizzarri, ed., *Castigos del rey don Sancho IV* (Frankfurt am Main & Madrid: Verveurt/Iberoamericana, 2001).
27. Louise Mirrer, "Representing 'Other' Men. Muslims, Jews, and Masculine Ideals in Medieval Castilian Epic and Ballad," in *Medieval Masculinities*, eds Lees, Fenster and McNamara.
28. Mirrer, "Representing 'Other' Men," 169–173, 181–182.
29. Cf. Carol Lansing, *Passion and Order: Restraint of Grief in the Medieval Italian Communes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 78–79, 87.
30. Michael Harney, "Ludology, Self-fashioning, and Entrepreneurial Masculinity in Iberian Novels of Chivalry," in *Self-Fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, ed. Laura Delbrugge (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 152.
31. Burke, *History and Vision*, 36–38.
32. Alexandre Micha, ed., *Lancelot: Roman en prose du XIIIe siécle*, 9 vols. (Genève: Droz, 1978–1983).
33. Abeledo, "El libro del caballero Zifar," 122–123; Marta Ana Diz, "El mundo de las armas en el *Libro del Caballero Zifar*," *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 56 (1979): 190. On *mesura* as a guiding principle of the *Zifar*, see Marilyn A. Olsen, "*Mesura* and *Cobdiçia*: The Ideological Core of the *Cauallero Çifar*," in *Hispanic Studies in Honor of Alan D. Deyermond: A North American Tribute*, ed. John S. Miletich (Madison: Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1986) 223–233.
34. *LCZ* ms. M, 84.
35. *The Book of the Knight Zifar: A Translation of* El Libro del Cavallero Zifar, trans. Charles L. Nelson (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983) [hereafter *BKZ*], 26. Amended here to fit the reading of the M manuscript edited by González Muela.
36. *BKZ*, 106; "…e así el rey non se trabaja de otra cosa si non de fazer leer ante sí muchos libros buenos e de muchas buenas estorias e buenas fazañas…" *LCZ*, ms. M, 175.
37. *LCZ* ms. M, 232; cf. *BKZ*, 153; Simone Pinet, "The Animal Within: Chivalry, Monstrosity, and Gender in Renaissance Spain," in *Gender and Scientific Discourse in Early Modern Culture,* ed. Katherine P. Long (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 121–122.
38. Lisa Perfetti, introduction to *The Representation of Women's Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Culture*, ed. Lisa Perfetti (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), 15.
39. E.g. *LCZ* ms. M, 100.

40. Parrack, "The Cultural Authority of 'buen seso (natural)'," 284–287.
41. *BKZ*, 10; "Ca la palabra es de los sabios que non deve aver vergüença, ca ninguna cosa non faze medroso nin vergoñoso el coraçón del ome sinon la conçiençia de la su vida si es mala, non faziendo lo que deve," *LCZ* ms. M, 62.
42. Jan Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, trans. Keith Tribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 39.
43. Rachel Stone, *Morality and Masculinity in the Carolingian Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 16–17, 317. It should be noted that these performances could be carried out by actors unconscious of the gendered nature of their acts. They were nonetheless governed by set norms, and criticism of masculinity studies that point out that gender was not a significant category for medieval people does not negate the value of such analyses.
44. Though restraint has recently been connected to the possible patronage of María de Molina and the image of this queen in the chronicles of Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, by Janice North, "El Caballero de Dios y la muy noble reina: María de Molina's patronage of the *Libro del Caballero Zifar*," *Romance Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2016): 107–115.
45. Lansing, *Passion and Order*, 100–104.
46. *BKZ*, 70; "…grande es la gloria en saber ome sofrir e en pasar los dolores de este mundo," *LCZ* ms. M, 134.
47. *LCZ* ms. M, 133.
48. *BKZ*, 69.
49. *BKZ*, 216; "Otrosí, mios fijos, devedes en todos vuestros fechos ser costantes, que quiere dezir firmes e estables…Onde dize un sabio: 'Si dolor ove, non llamé testigo nin quis que el dolor del coraçón mostrase el mi bulto; mas enforméme a lo encobrir para encobrir mi fecho'," *LCZ* ms. M, 309.
50. *LCZ* ms. P, 53. This bodily reaction upon recognizing his wife and fearing she will expose him as a bigamist is only present in the Paris manuscript, cf. *LCZ* ms. M, 178.
51. *LCZ* ms. M, 184. Unlike many other royal characters in romance literature, e.g., in the widely translated European narrative of Floire and Blanchefleur, Zifar does not need to be counseled by his advisors to see reason, but finds the restraint within himself.
52. Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination,* ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 390–391; Harney, "Ludology, Self-fashioning, and Entrepreneurial Masculinity," 148.

53. Karras, *From Boys to Men*, 21–22; Cf. Alexandra Sutherland, "Disturbing Masculinity: Gender, Performance and 'Violent' Men," *South African Theatre Journal* 28:1 (2015): 68–77.
54. Harney, "Ludology, Self-fashioning, and Entrepreneurial Masculinity," 148–150; Noel Fallows, *Jousting in Medieval and Renaissance Iberia* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2010), 21–26.
55. Harney, "Ludology, Self-fashioning, and Entrepreneurial Masculinity," 150.
56. Matthew Bennett, "Military Masculinity in England and Northern France c. 1050–c. 1225," in *Masculinity in Medieval Europe*, ed. Hadley, 76–79; William M. Aird, "Frustrated Masculinity: The Relationship between William the Conqueror and his Eldest Son," in *Masculinity in Medieval Europe*, ed. Hadley, 47–50.
57. *BKZ*, 125; "…conviene a los cavalleros mançebos de provar alguna cosa de cavallería, ca por eso la resçebieron; e çertas, ninguno non puede ser dicho cavallero si primeramente non se provare en el canpo," *LCZ* ms. M, 199.
58. *BKZ*, 117; "Señor Roboán, vos sodes muy mançebo e non avedes provado las cosas," *LCZ* ms. M, 188.
59. *BKZ*, 122; "Mal grado aya – dixo el conde – qui vos tan grant fuerça dio; ca, çertas, non érades vos ome para me vençer nin me tan mal traer," *LCZ* ms. M, 194–195. Cf. also the altercation between Roboán and the son of the King of Grimalet: "…non eres tu ombre para dezir al rey mj padre njnguna cosa," *LCZ*, ms. P, 116.
60. Raewyn Connell, *Masculinities*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 67–68, 71–77. She points out that the concept of masculinity is relational, always defined in opposition to femininity or to subordinated or marginalized masculinities.
61. *LCZ* ms. M, 203.
62. *BKZ*, 129.
63. *BKZ*, 286; "…mas sodes muy quexoso de coraçón e non sabedes sofrir en lo que queredes. Çertas, non es buena manera en todas las otras cosas vos ver muy mesurado, sinon en esta manera que traedes en esta razón puédovos traer a grant daño; e por Dios, de aquí adelante non lo fagades," *LCZ* ms. M, 399.
64. Stephen H. Rigby, *Wisdom and Chivalry: Chaucer's Knight's Tale and Medieval Political Theory* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 116–126; cf. Rosalind Brown-Grant, *French Romance of the Later Middle Ages: Gender, Morality, and Desire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 81–88.
65. Cf. Karras, *From Boys to Men*, 12–17.
66. Bennett, "Military Masculinity," 88.
67. Cf. Mark Breitenberg, *Anxious Masulinity in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
68. Gómez Redondo, "Los modelos caballerescos del *Zifar*," 113, 152.

69. Reeser, *Masculinities in Theory*, 181–182; Rigby, *Wisdom and Chivalry*, passim.
70. *BKZ*, 69; "…aquel non es poderoso el que non ha poder en sí," *LCZ* ms. M, 133.
71. Juan Pablo Rodríguez Argente del Castillo, "El *Libro del Caballero Zifar* como defensa de una identidad toledana," *La Corónica* 43, no. 1 (2014): 141–143, 158–163.
72. Rodríguez Argente del Castillo, "El *Libro del Caballero Zifar* como defensa de una identidad toledana," 163.
73. Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Conception of Justice* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 92, 99.
74. Cf. Nieves, "The Centrality of the Oriental," 277–278; see also Rodríguez Argente del Castillo, "El *Libro del Caballero Zifar* como defensa de una identidad toledana."

Afterword: Reading Historical Emotions

Stephanie Trigg

At the end of Chaucer's *Parlement of Foules*, the birds who have assembled on St. Valentine's Day in spring to choose their mates, gather to sing a song in honor of the goddess Nature, who has presided over their "parliament." It has been a riotous gathering in celebration of social (and species) diversity, as the various classes of birds offer different approaches to the questions of love and procreation. The birds speak in a range of discourses: at one moment, the goose, cuckoo, and duck simply cry raucously "Kek kek! kokkow! Quek quek!" (line 499).[1] At the other end of the social and linguistic spectrum, three courtly eagles put forward elegant arguments about love, devotion, and service to win the approval of the female eagle, Nature's favorite bird. True to form as the aristocratic and unattainable mistress of medieval erotic narrative, the female eagle refuses to choose between her three suitors, and asks to live chastely for one more year before selecting a mate. The other birds are impatient to be gone, though, and Nature gives them all their mates in two lines, "To every foul Nature yaf his make/ By evene accord" (Nature gave his mate to every bird by mutual agreement) (666–667), and they all depart:

> And, Lord, the blisse and joye that they make!
> For ech of hem gan other in wynges take,
> And with here nekkes ech gan other wynde,
> Thankynge alwey the noble goddess of kynde.
> *Parlement of Foules*, 669–712

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9

> (And, Lord, what bliss and joy they make! For each of them took their partner in their wings, and entwined their necks together, ever thanking the noble goddess of nature.)

Chaucer's poem is a study in the relationship between private and public emotion, between the desires of individual bodies and minds, and the force of social rituals and established practice. The emotions of the aristocratic eagles are examined in detail, but this first contest between individuals of the same species threatens to take all day, delaying the emotional (and sexual) fulfillment of all the other birds. Free from the obsessions and deferrals of aristocratic love practices, the majority of the birds in this parliament are driven by more "natural" impulses to procreate and live together companionably. Most of these other birds—the narrator classifies them as birds of prey, birds who eat seeds, birds who eat insects, and lastly, the water birds—are not distinguished as individuals; each speaker seems rather to represent a species. They have bird bodies that behave in a mixture of human and bird ways: the turtledove blushes as he defends his practice of undying faithful love, but in the stanza quoted above, the birds express their love and affection for each other by spreading their wings and entwining their necks with their mates. *The Parlement* thus plays across human and animal registers, suggesting a natural microcosm that is nevertheless also structured by human social hierarchies, as the birds manage the tensions between different classes in the cultural ritual of democratic deliberation: the poem can also be read as a loose allegory of fourteenth century English parliamentary practice. The poem ends with its own afterword, or aftersong—a *balade*—in which the birds carol joyfully in chorus about the arrival of summer. The poem finds a kind of resolution in the expression of emotional community, then, though there is also an important emotional residue suggested by the unresolved narratives of several characters: the reluctant female eagle; her three suitors who must also remain chaste for another year; and the narrator, who declares himself still unsatisfied in his search for knowledge at the end of the poem.

The emotions at work here bring together individual and social desires and affections. The poem celebrates the fantasy of an annual ritual, yet shows how that ritual is riven by contention, change, and delay; and indeed, is almost derailed by the elaborate concerns of one particular group. Participants criticize each other for their interpretation of the rules, and rehearse the principles and social practices that govern, or should govern, the "natural" expression and fulfillment of sexual desire and the emotions associated with loving companionship.

Complex literary texts like *The Parlement*, which can be read for their interest in character, for their poetics, their rhetorical and formal qualities, for their philosophical background, for their social satire, for their gender and class poetics, are also rich materials for the study of emotions and affects. Literary texts embrace the expression of emotion, whether "natural" or exaggerated, realistic or fantastic. In many ways, literature is a privileged space in which to study historical changes in emotional practice. These texts are often structured around challenges to a well-delineated, if fictional, emotional *habitus*: they are often both diagnostic and willing to challenge traditional forms.

The essays in this collection, *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, have helped me see Chaucer's poem afresh, as a deeply emotional and affective text which explores the sociality of emotions and emotional practices, while also foregrounding the role of the body and the community in the emotional practices Chaucer explores here. The birds' parliament is poised between celebrating traditional forms and exploring ideological challenges to those forms. One of the more striking features about this collection is the ease with which it brings together the texts and methods traditionally associated with historical and literary studies. While there are still some important differences between these fields, in terms of their natural starting points, the field of the history of emotions has done a great deal to bring them more closely together. Individually and collectively, the authors in this volume assume that similar techniques of analysis can be used for political, literary, and historical texts, since they all participate in the formation of emotional and affective environments. Most of the contributors share an implicit conceptual model that shakes up the traditional distinction between "emotions" as private and individual, and "affects" as the product of contemporary mass media. Emotions here are just as often political and social as they are personal and private, whether the sources are historical or literary.

Moreover, as Andreea Marculescu and Charles-Louis Morand Métivier explain in their introduction, they have assembled these essays in part to bring the historical study of emotions into closer dialogue with contemporary methodologies associated with affect studies, a field that has tended to focus on contemporary culture. These fields of study are by no means completely congruent, and there are many areas of profound difference in approach across the disciplines of literary, historical, cultural, philosophical, psychological, and sociological studies. But

as the essays in this collection show, medieval and early modern writers and thinkers were often closely engaged with many of the concepts and practices that are usually associated with social, communal, and public affect, and often in quite knowing and self-reflective ways. They offer rich examples in the pre-modern history of the transmission of affect, in Teresa Brennan's term.[2]

We read, for example, in Susan Broomhall's essay, how the private letters of Catherine de Medici to her son François I reveal the queen's sensitive understanding of emotional discourse as a form of statecraft, as she instructs him in the emotional practice of socialization, or the "strategies of emotional management" that will make him a more effective leader. Tracy Adams shows how women like Louise of Savoy and Marguerite of Navarre were able to inhabit traditional emotional roles for women, while also consciously deploying those roles to their own ends, through what she calls "the double persona." In Beatrice Delaurenti's essay, we find that the fourteenth century French doctor, Évrart de Conty, was interested in compassion as a form of social and emotional contagion. Emily Hutchison studies the way public letters from the king or members of the university, the clergy, or town governments were used to manipulate the collective emotions of Parisian citizens in the fifteenth century, reminding us that such public and communal affect did not depend on the invention of print technology. Many of the contributors invoke the language of performative practice and the emotional *habitus*, as well as more personal speech acts such as William Reddy's concept of the "emotive," to draw attention to the ever-changing dynamic between traditional expectation and individual feeling.

Personal emotions are also at the core of this collection, and in rich and sometimes contradictory ways. Sarah Moore's study of medieval English love lyrics draws on scholars and critics as diverse as A. C. Spearing, Barbara Rosenwein, and Lauren Berlant to show how these poems deploy familiar rhetorical conventions to express powerful emotions that bolster the "self" of the speaking subject in ways that sometimes efface or destroy the female object of desire. But, as Moore points out, in other poems the familiar trope of imagining the beloved's body under her clothing can "connect the speaking subject (and thus too, us, his eavesdroppers) most intimately to his desire and his body as it reaches out to hers."

Reading the emotional narratives of the past is always problematic to some degree. Our sources vary widely, and we need to read with careful

attention to both private and personal, as well as public and collective forms, whether religious, secular, civic, military, political, or familial. Questions of gender, the body, and private and public space are also crucial here, while we must also pay attention to what is *not* said, as well as what is openly declared. The essays in this collection speak to some of the most sophisticated methodological developments in the study of historical emotions. They also show that medieval and early modern culture offers rich material for the study of private and public feeling.

Notes

1. All quotations from *The Riverside Chaucer*, gen. ed. Larry D. Benson, third edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987).
2. Teresa Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Agrippa of Nettesheim, "Occulta philosophia." In *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art*, edited by Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, 351–365. London: Nelson, 1964.

Anne de France. *Enseignements à sa fille. Histoire du siège de Brest*. Edited by Eliane Viennot. Saint-Etienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Etienne, 2006.

Aristotle. *Rhetoric*. From *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Baguenault de Puchesse, ed. *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vol. 8, 10. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1901, 1909.

Bastier de la Peruse, Jean. *La Médée. Edited by* James Coleman. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1985.

Baye, Nicolas de. *Journal de Nicolas de Baye, greffier du parlement de Paris, 1400–1417*. vol. 2. Edited by Alexandre Tuetey. Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1885–1888.

Benson, Larry D., Editor. *The Riverside Chaucer*. Third edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987.

Bourdeille, Pierre de, Seigneur de Brantôme. *Œuvres complètes*. Edited by Ludovic Lalanne. 11 vols. Paris: Renouard, 1864–1882.

Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422. 3 vol. Edited by Louis Bellaguet, Introduction by Bernard Guenée. Paris: Editions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 1994.

———. Translated by M. Bellaguet, vol. 4. Paris: Imprimerie de Crapelet, 1852.

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9

Cicero. "De Officiis" Edited by Walter Miller. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D35. Accessed on Nov. 19, 2015.

D'Aubigné, Théodore Agrippa. *Les Tragiques*. In *Œuvres*. Edited by Henri Weber. Paris: Gallimard, 1969.

Garnier, Robert. *Hippolyte*. Paris: Garnier, 2009.

La Chanson de Roland. Ed. Ian Short. Paris: Librairie générale française, 1990.

La Ferrière, H. de, ed. *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vol. 2, 5. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1885–1895.

Le Livre des fais du bon messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, mareschal de France et gouverneur de Jennes. Edited by Denis Lalande. Geneva: Droz, 1985.

Mézières, Philippe de. *Une Epistre lamentable et consolatoire*. Edited by Philipe Contamine, and Jacques Paviot. Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 2008.

Monstrelet, Enguerran de. *La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pieces justificatives 1400–1444*. Ed. L. Douët d'Arcq, vol. 2. Paris, 1857.

Montaigne, Michel de. *Essais*. Edited by Pierre Villey and V. L. Saulnier. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978.

———. *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*. Translated by Donald Frame. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965.

Olsen, Marilyn A., ed. *Libro del Cauallero Çifar*. Madison: Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1984.

Pizan, Christine de. *Le Livre des trois vertus*. Edited by Charity Cannon Willard and Eric Hicks. Paris, Champion, 1989.

———. *The "Livre de la Paix" of Christine de Pizan: a Critical Edition with Introduction and Notes by Charity Cannon Willard*. Edited by Charity Cannon Willard. Gravenhage: Mouton & Co, 1958.

Société des Bibliophiles François, ed. *Registre criminal du Châtelet de Paris: Du 6 septembre 1389 au 18 mai 1392, vol. 2*. Paris: C. Lahure, 1864.

The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius of Loyola translated from the autograph by Father Elder Mullan, SJ. New York: P. J. Kennedy & sons, 1914.

Thomas Aquinas. *Summa Theologica* http://www.newadvent.org/summa/, accessed 10-20-2015.

Ursins, Jean Juvénal des. *Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France et de son règne, depuis 1380–1422. Des mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe*. Edited by.] Joseph François Michaud, and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat. Paris, 1851.

Secondary Sources

Abeledo, Manuel. "El Libro del caballero Zifar entre la literatura ejemplar y el romance caballeresco." *Letras* 59–60 (2009): 119–131.

Adams, Tracy. "Married Noblewomen as Diplomats: Affective Diplomacy." In *Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Destroying Order,*

Structuring Disorder, edited by Susan Broomhall, 51–65. Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2015.

Aird, William M. "Frustrated Masculinity: The Relationship between William the Conqueror and his Eldest Son." In *Masculinity in Medieval Europe*, edited by D. M. Hadley, 39–55. Harlow: Longman, 1999.

Anderson, Ben. "Modulating the Excess of Affect. Morale in a State of 'Total War.'" In *The Affect Theory Reader*, edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, 161–185. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

Arrizabalaga, Jon. "Facing the Black Death: Perceptions and Reactions of University Medical Practitioners." In *Practical Medicine from Salerno to Black Death*, edited by Luis Garcia-Ballester, Roger French, Jon Arrizabalaga, and Andrew Cunningham, 237–288. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Atiya, Aziz. *The Crusade of Nicopolis.* London: Methuen, 1934.

Attigui, Patricia, and Alexis Cukier, eds. *Les Paradoxes de l'empathie. Philosophie, psychanalyse, sciences sociales.* Paris: CNRS, 2012.

Austin, J.L. *How to Do Things with Words.* Second Edition. Edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Autrand, Françoise. *Charles VI: la folie du roi.* Paris: Fayard, 1986.

Baernstein, P. Renée. *A Convent Tale: A Century of Sisterhood in Spanish Milan.* London: Routledge, 2002.

Bailey, Gauvin. *Art on the Jesuit Missions in Asia and Latin America 1542–1773* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

———. *Between Renaissance and Baroque: Jesuit Art in Rome, 1565–1610* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. *The Dialogic Imagination.* Edited by Michael Holquist. Translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.

Bejczy, István P. "The Problem of Natural Virtue." In *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, edited by István P. Bejczy and Richard G. Newhauser, 133–154. Leiden: Brill, 2005.

Bennett, Jane. "The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout," *Public Culture* 17.3 (2005): 445–465.

Bennett, Matthew. "Military Masculinity in England and Northern France c. 1050–c. 1225." In *Masculinity in Medieval Europe*, edited by D. M. Hadley, 71–88. Harlow: Longman, 1999.

Bergmann, Emilie L. "Learning at her mother's knee? Saint Anne, the Virgin Mary, and the Iconography of Women's Literacy." In *Women's Literacy in Early Modern Spain and the New World*, edited by Anne J. Cruz, and Rosilie Hernández. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011.

Berlant, Lauren. "A Properly Political Concept of Love: Three Approaches in Ten Pages." *Cultural Anthropology* 26 (2011): 683–691.

———. *Desire/Love.* Brooklyn: Punctum, 2012.

———. Interview by Ben Myers and Desiree Rowe. "Lauren Berlant on Desire/Love." *The Critical Lede* Episode 125, 2013. Web.

———. Interview by Dana Luciano. "Conversation: Lauren Berlant with Dana Luciano." *Social Text Journal*, 2013. Web.

———. "The Book of Love is long and boring, no one can lift the damn thing…," *Supervalent Thought*, June 3, 2012. Web.

Berthoz, Alain, and Gérard Jorland, eds. *L'Empathie*. Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004.

Bertier, Janine. "*Problemata physica*." In *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Supplément*, ed. Richard Goulet, Jean-Marie Flamand, and Maroun Aouad, 575–593. Paris, CNRS editions, 2003.

Bishop, Louise. *Words, Stones, and Herbs*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2007.

Bizzarri, Hugo O., ed. *Castigos del rey don Sancho IV*. Frankfurt am Main & Madrid: Verveurt/Iberoamericana, 2001.

Black, Deborah. "Psychology: soul and intellect." In *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, 308–326. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Renate. *Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 1378–1417*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006.

Boltanski, Luc. *La Souffrance à distance*. Paris: Métaillé, 1993.

Bond, Gerald A. *The Loving Subject: Desire, Eloquence and Power in Romanesque France*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995.

Boone, Marc. "Urban Space and Political Conflict in Late Medieval Flanders." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 32.4 (2002): 621–640.

Boquet, Damien and Piroska Nagy (ed). *Le Sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge*. Paris: Beauchesne, 2009.

———. "Une Histoire des émotions incarnées," *Médiévales* 61 (2011), pp.

———. *Sensible Moyen Âge: Une histoire des émotions dans l'Occident medieval*. Paris: Seuil, 2015.

———. "Medieval Sciences of Emotions during the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries: An Intellectual History," *Osiris* 31 (2016): 21–45.

Bouchardeau, Hélène. "La Disposition. Un autre point de vue sur l'efficacité de la parole." In *Le pouvoir des mots au Moyen Age. Actes du colloque Lyon, 22–24 juin 2009*, edited by Nicole Bériou, Jean-Patrice Boudet, and Irène Rosier-Catach, 491–507. Turnhout: Brepols, 2014.

Brandsma, Frank, Carolyne Larrington, and Corinne Saunders. "Introduction." In *Emotions in Medieval Arthurian Literature: Body, Mind, Voice*, edited by Frank Brandsma, Carolyne Larrington and Corinne Saunders, 1–10. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2015.

Brantley, Jessica. *Reading in the Wilderness*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Braunmühl, Caroline. "Theorizing Emotions with Judith Butler: Within and Beyond the Courtroom." *Rethinking History* 16.2 (June 2011): 221–240.

Breitenberg, Mark. *Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Brennan, Teresa. *The Transmission of Affect*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.

Brewer, J.S., et al., eds. *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII*. 21 vols. London: HMSO, 1862–1932.

Briçonnet, Guillaume, and Marguerite d'Angoulême. *Correspondance, 1521–1524*. Edited by Christine Martineau, and Michel Veissière, with Henry Heller. 2 vols. Geneva: Droz, 1975–1979.

Britton, Piers D. "(Hu)moral Exemplars: Type and Temperament in Cinquecento Painting." In *Visualizing Medieval Medicine and Natural History, 1200–1550*," edited by Jean A. Givens, Karen M. Reeds, and Alain Touwaide, 177–204. Farnham: Ashgate, 2006.

Broomhall, Susan. "Catherine's tears: diplomatic corporeality and gender at the sixteenth-century French court." In *Fluid Bodies: Corporeality in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, edited by Anne M. Scott, Deborah Seiler and Michael Barbezat. Forthcoming.

———. "Counsel as performative practice of power in Catherine de Medici's early regencies." In *Queenship and Counsel in the Early Modern World*, edited by Helen Graham-Matheson and Joanne Paul. Basingstoke: Palgrave, forthcoming.

———. "Fit for a king?: The gendered emotional performances of Catherine de Medici as dauphine of France, 1536–1547." In *Unexpected Heirs in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Valerie Schutte. Basingstoke: Palgrave, forthcoming.

———. ed. *Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015.

———. "Gendering the Culture of Honour at the Fifteenth-Century Burgundian Court." In *Women, Identities and Communities in Europe, 1400–1800*, edited by Stephanie Tarbin and Susan Broomhall, 181–193. Farnham: Ashgate, 2008.

———. '"My daughter, my dear': The correspondence of Catherine de Medici and Elisabeth de Valois." *Women's History Review* 25.4 (2015): 548–569.

———. "Ordering Distant Affections: Fostering Love and Loyalty in the Correspondence of Catherine de Medici to the Spanish Court, 1568–72." In *Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder*, edited by Susan Broomhall, 67–86. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015.

———. *Spaces for Feeling: Emotions and Sociabilities in England, 1650–1850*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Brown-Grant, Rosalind. *French Romance of the Later Middle Ages: Gender, Morality, and Desire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Brownlee, Marina S. "Romance at the Crossroads: Medieval Spanish Paradigms and Cervantine Revisions." In *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval*

Romance, edited by Roberta L. Krueger, 253–266. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Bumke, Joachim. *Courtly Culture: Literature and Society in the High Middle Ages*. Translated by Thomas Dunlap. Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2000.

Burke, James F. "Medieval Spanish Prose." In *The Cambridge History of Spanish Literature*, edited by David T. Gies, 95–114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

———. *History and Vision: The Figural Structure of the "Libro del Cavallero Zifar."* London: Tamesis, 1972.

Burrow, J.A. "Poems Without Contexts." *Essays in Criticism* 29.1 (1979): 6–32.

Butler, Judith. *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex."* New York: Routledge, 1993.

———. *Gender Trouble: Feminisim and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

———. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." In *The Performance Studies Reader*, edited by Henry Bial and Sara Brady, 214–225. 3rd ed. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.

Caillé, Alain, and Philippe Chanial, eds. "L'amour des autres, *care*, compassion et humanitarisme." *Revue du MAUSS* 31 (2008).

Carruthers, Mary. *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Casadei, Elena. *I Testi di David di Dinant: filosofia della natura e metafisica a confronto col pensiero antico. Introduzione ed edizione dei testi*. Spoleto: Fondazione Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2008.

Casagrande Carla, and Silviana Vecchio. "Les Théories des passions dans la culture mediévale." In *Le Sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge*, edited by Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet, 107–123. Paris: Beauchesne, 2009.

———. *Passioni dell' anima. Teorie e usi degli affetti nela cultura* medieval. Florence: SISMEL Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2015.

Cave, Terrence. *Devotional Poetry in France 1570–1613*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Certeau, Michel de. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Translated by Steven Rendall. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Chakravarti, Ananya. "Between bhakti and pietà: Untangling Emotion in Marāṭhī Christian Poetry." *History of Religions*, 2017. Forthcoming.

Champollion-Figeac, Aimé-Louis. *Captivité de François Ier*. Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1847.

Chang, Leah L, and Katherine Kong, eds. *Portraits of the Queen Mother: Polemics, Panegyrics, Letters*. Toronto: Iter, 2014.

Chastellain, Pierre. *Affectus Amantis Christum seu Exercitium amoris erga Dominum Jesum*. Paris: D. Bechet, 1648.

Châtellier, Louis. "À l'origine d'une société catholique: Le rôle des congrégations mariales aux xvie–xviiie siècles." *Histoire, économie et société* 3.2 (1984): 203–220.

Chevalier, Bernard. *Les Bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe siècle*. Paris: Éditions Aubier, 1982.

Chipps Smith, Jeffrey. *Sensuous Worship: Jesuits and the Art of the Early Catholic Reformation in Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Cholakian, Rouben, and Mary Skemp, ed. and trans. *Marguerite de Navarre. Selected Writings: A Bilingual Edition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Clark, Roberta L. A. "Spiritual Exercises: The Making of Interior Faith." In *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Christianity,* edited by John H. Arnold, 271–288. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Clough, Patricia T. "The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia, and Bodies." In *The Affect Theory Reader*, edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, 206–225. Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2010.

Clouzot, Martine. "Le son et le pouvoir en Bourgogne aux XVe siècle." *Revue historique* 302 (2000): 615–628.

Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome and Bonnie Wheeler, eds. *Becoming Male in the Middle Ages*. New York: Garland, 1997.

Connell, Raewyn. *Masculinities*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.

Coste, Hilarion de. *Les Éloges et les vies des reynes, des princesses et des dames illustres*. 2 vols. Paris: Cramoisy, 1647.

Coville, Alfred. *Jean Petit et la question du tyrannicide au commencement du XVe siècle*. Paris: Picard, 1932.

———. *Les Cabochiens et l'ordonnance de 1413*. Paris: Hachette, 1888.

Crawford, Katherine. "Catherine de Medicis and the Performance of Political Motherhood." *Sixteenth Century Journal* 31.3 (2000): 643–673.

Crouzet, Denis. "'A Strong Desire to be a Mother to all your Subjects': A Rhetorical Experiment by Catherine de Medici." *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38.1 (2008): 104–118.

Cuesta Torre, María Luzdivina. "Ética de la guerra en el Libro del caballero Zifar." In *Literatura de caballerías y orígenes de la novela*, edited by Rafael Beltrán, 95–124. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 1998.

Curry, Anne. *The Battle of Agincourt, Sources and Interpretations*. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000.

Damasio, Antonio. *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. New York: Penguin, 1994.

———. *Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.

D'Alverny, Marie-Thérèse, and Françoise Hudry. "Al-Kindī, *De radiis*," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 41 (1974): 139–260.

De Beatis, Antonio. *Voyage du cardinal d'Aragon en Allemagne, Hollande, Belgique, France et Italie (1517–1518)*. Translated by Madeleine Havard de la Montagne. Paris: Perrin, 1913.

De Boer, Wietse. "Invisible Contemplation: A Paradox in the Spiritual Exercises." In *Meditatio: Refashioning the Self Theory and Practice in Late Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual Culture*, edited by Karl Enenkel, and Walter Melion, 235–256. Leiden: Brill, 2011.

———. and Christine Gottler, eds. *Religion and the Senses in Early Modern Europe*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

———. "The Counter Reformation of the Senses." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Counter Reformation*, edited by Alexandra Bamji, Geert H. Janssen, and Mary Laven, 243–260. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013.

Decety, Jean, and William Ickes, eds. *The Neuroscience of Empathy*. Oxford, MIT Press, 2011.

———. "Le Sens des/autres ou les fondements naturels de la sympathie." In *Qu'est-ce que la vie psychique*, edited by Yves Michaud, 71–102. Paris, Odile Jacob, 2002.

Delaurenti, Béatrice. "Acting Through Words in the Middle Ages. Communication and Action in the Debates on the Power of Incantations," *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* 158 (2012): 53–71.

De Leemans Pieter. "Medieval Latin Commentaries on Aristotle's *De motu animalium*. A Contribution to the *Corpus commentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum*," *Recherches de philosophie et de théologie médiévales*, 67.2 (2000): 272–360.

DeLillo, Don. "In the Ruins of the Future: Reflections on Terror and Loss in the Shadow of September," *Harper's Magazine*, December 2001: 33–40.

———. *La Contagion des émotions*. Compassio*, une énigme médiévale*. Paris: Garnier Classiques, 2016.

———. *La Puissance des mots: "Virtus verborum." Débats doctrinaux sur les incantations au Moyen Âge*. Paris: Cerf, 2007.

Denery II, Dallas G. "Christine Against the Theologians: The Virtue of Lies in The *Book of the Three Virtues*." *Viator* 39 (2008): 229–247.

Dequeker-Fergon, Jean-Michel. "L'Histoire au service des pouvoirs. L'assassinat du duc d'Orléans." *Médiévales*, 5.10 (1986): 51–68.

Dictionnaire de l'Académie Françoise, cinquième édition. Paris: J.J Smits et Co, 1799.

Di Martino, Carla. *Ratio Particularis. Doctrine des sens internes d'Avicenne à Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2008.

Dixon, Thomas. *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a secular Psychological Category*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Diz, Marta Ana. "El mundo de las armas en el Libro del Caballero Zifar." *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 56 (1979): 189–199.

Douët d'Arcq, Léon. *Choix de pieces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI.* 2 vols. Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1863–1864.

Dreze, Céline. "Musical Practices among Marian Sodalities in the Gallo and Flandro-Belgian Provinces from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries." *Journal of Jesuit Studies* 3 (2016): 163–176.

Ducos, Joëlle. "L'Air corrompu dans les traités de peste." In *Air, miasme et contagion: les épidémies de l'Antiquité au Moyen Âge*, edited by Sylvie Bazin-Tacchella, Danielle Quéruel, and Evelyne Samama, 87–104. Langres, 2001.

—. "Lecture et vulgarisation du savoir aristotélicien: les gloses d'Évrart de Conty." In *Aristotle's "*Problemata*" in Different Times and Tongues,* edited by Michèle Goyens and Pieter De Leemans, 199–226. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006.

Duncan, Thomas, ed. *A Companion to Middle English Lyric*. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2005.

Easton, Martha. "Pain, Torture, and Death in the Huntington Library Legenda Aurea." In *Gender and Holiness: Men, Women and Saints in Late Medieval Europe*, edited by Sam Riches, and Sarah Salih, 49–64. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Ekman, Paul. "An argument for Basic Emotions," *Cognition and Emotion*, 3–4 (1992): 169–200.

Ehrenschwendtner, Marie-Louise. "Jerusalem behind Walls: Enclosure, Substitute Pilgrimage, and Imagined Space in the Poor Clares' Convent at Villingen." *The Medieval Journal,* 3:2 (2013): 1–38.

Elias, Norbert. *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. First published in German 1939. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

Elkman, Paul. "An argument for Basic Emotions," *Cognition and Emotion*, 3–4 (1992), 169–200.

Erner, Guillaume. *La Société des victimes.* Paris: La Découverte, 2006.

Eustace, Nicole, Eugenia Lean, Julie Livingston, Jan Plamper, William M. Reddy, and Barbara H. Rosenwein, "AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions," *American Historical Review* 117, n.5 (December 2012): 1486–1531.

Fabre, Pierre-Antoine. *Ignace de Loyola: Le lieu de l'image*. Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1992.

Fallows, Noel. *Jousting in Medieval and Renaissance Iberia*. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2010.

Famiglietti, Richard C. *Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI, 1392–1420.* New York: AMS Press, 1982.

Fanlo, Jean-Raymond. *Tracés, Ruptures. La Composition instable des Tragiques.* Paris: Champion, 1990.

Fassin, Didier. *La Raison humanitaire. Une histoire morale du temps présent.* Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2010.

Favier, Jean. *Nouvelle histoire de Paris au XVe siècle, 1380–1500.* Paris: Association pour la publication d'une histoire de Paris, 1974.

Fitzsimmons, Maureen A.J. "A Pilgrim's Staff Versus a Ladder of Contemplation: The Rhetoric of Agency and Emotional Eloquence in St Ignatius's Spiritual Exercises." In *Traditions of Eloquence: The Jesuits and Modern Rhetorical Studies*, edited by Cinthia Gannett and John C. Brereton, 88–101. New York: Fordham, 2016.

Fogel, Michèle. *Les Cérémonies de l'information dans la France du XVIe au XVIIe siècle*. Paris: Fayard, 1989.

Forster, Marc R. *Catholic Revival in the Age of the Baroque: Religious Identity in Southwest Germany 1550–1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Forster, Regula and Neguin Yavari, eds. *Global Medieval: Mirrors for Princes Reconsidered*. Boston: Ilex Foundation/Harvard University Press, 2015.

Foucault, Michel. *L'archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 1969.

———. "Useless to Revolt?" In *Power*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, 449–453. New York: The New Press, 1994.

Freud, Sigmund. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18*. Edited by James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.

Frisch, Andrea. "Agrippa d'Aubigné's *Tragiques* as Testimony." In *Memory and Community in Sixteenth-Century France*, edited by David P. LaGuardia, and Cathy Yandell, 97–112. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2015.

———. *Forgetting Differences: Tragedy, Historiography, and the French Wars of Religion*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015.

Fumaroli, Marc. "The Fertility and the Shortcomings of Renaissance Rhetoric: The Jesuit Case," in *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1775*, edited by John O'Malley, 682–690. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

García Avilés, Alejandro. "La Magie astrale comme art visuel au XIII^{e} siècle." In *Images et magie. Picatrix entre Orient et Occident*, edited by Jean-Patrice Boudet, Anna Caiozzo, and Weill-Parot Nicolas, 95–116. Paris: Champion, 2011.

Gaucher, Elizabeth. "Deux regards suur une défaite: Nicopolis (d'après la *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis* et le Livre des fais de Boucicaut)." *Cahiers de recherches médiévales et humanistes* 1 (1996), 93–104.

Génin, François, ed. *Les Lettres de Marguerite d'Angoulême*. Paris: Renouard, 1841.

———, ed. *Nouvelles lettres de la reine de Navarre: adressées au roi François Ier, son frère*. Paris: Crapelet, 1842.

Giguère, Georges-Émile, S. J. "Chastellain, Pierre," in *Dictionnaire Biographique du Canada* Volume 1. Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1966.

Gómez Redondo, Fernando. *Historia de la prosa medieval castellana, II: El desarrollo de los géneros. La ficción caballeresca y el orden religioso*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1999.

———. "Los modelos caballerescos del Zifar." *Thesaurus* 54.1 (1999): 106–154.
———. "Los públicos del Zifar." In *Studia in honorem Garmán Orduna*, edited by Leonardo Funes and José Luis Moure, 106–154. Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2001.
González Muela, Joaquín, ed. *Libro del Caballero Zifar*. Madrid: Castalia, 1982.
Gourévitch, Aaron J. *Les Catégories de la culture médiévale*. Paris: Gallimard, 1983.
Goyens, Michèle and Pieter De Leemans. "La Transmission des savoirs en passant par trois langues: le cas des *Problemata* d'Aristote traduits en latin et en moyen français." In *La Transmission des savoirs au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance, vol.,1* edited by Pierre Nobel, 234–238. Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2005.
Grace, Philip. *Affectionate Authorities: Fathers and Fatherly Roles in Late Medieval Basel*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015.
Greentree, Rosemary. *The Middle English Lyric and Short Poem VII* in *Annotated Bibliographies of Old and Middle English Literature*. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2001.
Gregg, Melissa and Gregory J. Seigworth, eds. *The Affect Theory Reader*. Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2010.
Guenée, Bernard. *Un meurtre, une société. L'assassinat du duc d'Orléans, 23 novembre 1407*. Paris: Gallimard, 1992.
Guichard-Tesson, Françoise, and Michèle Goyens. "Évrart de Conty et ses contemporains." In *Traduire au XIV^e siècle: Évrart de Conty et la vie intellectuelle à la cour de Charles V*, edited by Joëlle Duclos, and Michelle Goyens, 99–126. Paris: Champion, 2015.
———. "Évrart de Conty, poète, traducteur et commentateur." In *Aristotle's "Problemata" in Different Times and Tongues,* edited by Michèle Goyens and Pieter De Leemans, 145–174. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006.
———. "Pietro d'Abano traduit et recyclé par Évrart de Conty." In *Philosophy between Text and Tradition. Petrus de Abano and the Reception of Aristotle's Problemata in the Middle Ages*, edited by Pieter De Leemans and Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, 201–254. Leuven: Leuven University Press, forthcoming.
Hadley, D. M., ed. *Masculinity in Medieval Europe*. London: Longman, 1999.
Hall, Bridget. *The Cult of the Virgin Mary in Early Modern Germany: Protestant and Catholic Piety 1500–1648*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Hamesse, Jacqueline. "*Imaginatio* et *phantasia* chez les philosophes du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle." In *Phantasia–imaginatio. V° colloquio internazionale de Lessico Intelletuale Europeo,* ed. Marta Fattori and Massimo Luigi Bianchi, 153–181. Rome, 1988.
Harney, Michael. "Ludology, Self-fashioning, and Entrepreneurial Masculinity in Iberian Novels of Chivalry." In *Self-Fashioning and Assumptions of Identity*

in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia, edited by Laura Delbrugge, 144–166. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

Harris, Joseph. *Inventing the Spectator: Subjectivity and the Theatrical Experience in Early Modern France*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Harvey, E. Ruth. *The Inward Wits. Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*. London, 1975.

Hirsh, John C. *Medieval Lyric: Middle English Lyrics, Ballads, and Carols*. Malden: Blackwell, 2005.

Hochschild, Arlie Russell. *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

Hofbeck, Joseph, ed. and trans. *L'Âme éprise du Christ Jésus ou exercices de l'amour envers le Seigneur Jésus pour toute une semaine*. Paris: Guérin, 1999.

Holt, Mack. *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Housley, Norman. "One Man and his Wars: the Depiction of Warfare by Marshal Boucicaut's Biographer." *Journal of Medieval History* 29 (2003), 27–40.

Huizinga, Johan. *The Waning of the Middle Ages: The Study of Forms of Life, Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries*. Translated by F. Hopman. First published in Dutch 1919. London: Edward Arnold, 1924.

Hunt, Anne. *The Trinity: Insights from the Mystics*. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2010.

Hutchison, Emily J. "Partisan Identity in the French Civil War, 1405–1418: Reconsidering the Evidence on Livery Badges." *Journal of Medieval History* 33 (2007): 250–274.

———. "Pour le bien du roy et son royaulme: Burgundian propaganda under John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, 1405–1418." Diss. York, UK, 2006.

———. "The Politics of Grief in the Outbreak of Civil War, 1407–1413." *Speculum* 91.2 (April, 2016): 422–452.

———. "Winning Hearts and Minds in Early Fifteenth-Century France: Burgundian Propaganda in Perspective." *French Historical Studies* 35.1 (2012): 1–30.

Isambert, François André, Mr. Decrusy, and Mr. Jourdan (eds). *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l'an 420 jusqu'à la Révolution de 1789… 1380–1400*. Vol. 6. Paris: Berlin-Leprieur & Verdière, 1824.

Jackson, Virginia and Yopie Prins, eds. "Lyrical Studies." *Victorian Literature and Culture* (1999): 521–530.

Jacquart, Danielle. *La Médecine médiévale dans le cadre parisien*. Paris: Fayard, 1998.

Jacqueton, Gilbert. *La Politique extérieure de Louise de Savoie: relations diplomatiques de la France et de l'Angleterre pendant la captivité de Francois Ier (1525–1526)*. Paris: Émile Bouillon, 1892.

James, Susan. *Passion and Action; The Emotions in Seventeenth-century Philosophy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Johnson, Trevor. *Magistrates, Madonnas and Miracles: The Counter Reformation in the Upper Palatinate*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.

Jourda, Pierre. "Marguerite de Navarre, Lettres inédites." *Revue du seizième siècle* 15 (1928): 100–204.

Karant-Nunn, Susan C. *The Reformation of Feeling: Shaping the Religious Emotions in Early Modern Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Karras, Ruth Mazo. *From Boys to Men: Formations of Masculinity in Late Medieval Europe*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

Keller, Marcus. *Figurations of France: Literary Nation-Building in Times of Crisis (1550–1650.)* Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011.

Khadduri, Majid. *The Islamic Conception of Justice*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Klinck, Anne L., and Ann Marie Rasmussen. *Medieval Woman's Song: Cross-Cultural Approaches*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.

Knuuttila, Simo. *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Kong, Katherine. *Lettering the Self in Medieval and Early Modern France*. Boydell and Brewer: Woodbridge, 2010.

Kosofsky Sedgwick, Eve. "Shame, Theatricality, and Queer Performativity: Henry James's The Art of the Novel." In *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity*, 35–66. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003.

Knuuttila, Simo. *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Lacan, Jacques. *Les Quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*. Paris: Seuil, 1973.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*, New York: Basic Books, 1999.

Lalande, André. *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1926, repr. 2002.

Lansing, Carol. *Passion and Order: Restraint of Grief in the Medieval Italian Communes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Laqua-O'Donnell, Simone. "Piety and Community in Early Modern Europe." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Counter Reformation*, edited by Alexandra Bamji, Geert H. Janssen, and Mary Laven, 281–298. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013.

Lecoq, Anne-Marie. *François Ier imaginaire: Symbolique et politique à l'aube de la Renaissance française*. Paris: Editions Macula, 1987.

Lecuppre-Desjardins, Élodie, and Anne-Laure Van Bruaene, eds. *Emotions in the Heart of the City (14th–16th century)*. Turnhout: Brepols, 2005.

Lees, Clara A., ed. *Medieval Masculinities: Regarding Men in the Middle Ages. With the assistance of Thelma Fenster and Jo Ann McNamara*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

Lida de Malkiel, María Rosa. *La Idea de la fama en la Edad Media castellana*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1952.

Loach, Judi. "The Teaching of Emblematics and Other Symbolic Imagery by Jesuits Within Town Colleges in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France." In *The Jesuits and the Emblem Tradition*, edited by John Manning and Marc van Vaeck, 161–186. Turnhout: Brepols, 1999.

Long, Kathleen Perry. "The Representation of Violence in the Works of Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné." In *Repossessions: Psychoanalysis and the Phantasms of Early Modern Culture,* ed. Timothy Murray and Alan K. Smith, 142–167. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

———. "Victim of Love: The Poetics and Politics of Violence in 'Le Printemps' of Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné." In *Translating Desire in Medieval and Early Modern Literature*, ed. Craig A. Berry and Heather Richardson Hayton, 43–61. Tempe, Arizona: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005.

Lucía Megías, José Manuel. "Libro del cavallero Zifar." In *Diccionario filológico de la literatura medieval española: textos y transmisión*, edited by Carlos Alvar and José Manuel Lucía Megías, 773–776. Madrid: Castalia, 2002.

Luria, Maxwell S., and Richard L. Hoffman. *Middle English Lyrics*. New York: Norton, 1974.

Lutz, Catherine and Leila Abu-Lughod, eds. *Language and Politics of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

MacLeod Higgins, Ian, ed. *The Book of John Mandeville, with Related Texts*. Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 2011.

Marmursztejn, Elsa. "Nicole Oresme et la vulgarisation de la Politique d'Aristote au XIV^{e} siècle." In *Thinking Politics in the Vernacular. From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, edited by Gianluca Briguglia and Thomas Ricklin, 103–107. Freiburg, 2011.

Massumi, Brian. *Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2002.

Matt, Susan J. "Recovering the Invisible: Methods for the Historical Study of the Emotions." In *Doing Emotions History*, edited by Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns, 41–53. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014.

Matthews Grieco, Sara F. "Models of Female Sanctity in Renaissance and Counter-Reformation Italy." In *Women and Faith: Catholic Religious Life in Italy from Late Antiquity to the Present*, edited by Lucetta Scaraffia and Gabriella Zarri, xx–xx. London: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Mattox, John Mark, *Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War*. New York: Continuum, 2006.

McCartney, Elizabeth. "In the Queen's words: Perceptions of Regency Government Gleaned from the Correspondence of Catherine de Médicis." In *Women's Letters Across Europe, 1400–1700: Form And Persuasion*, edited by Jane Couchman and Ann Crabb, 207–222. Farnham: Ashgate, 2005.

———. "The King's Mother and Royal Prerogative in Early-Sixteenth-Century France." In *Medieval Queenship*, edited by John Carmi Parsons. Xx-xx New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

McIlvenna, Una. *Scandal and Reputation at the Court of Catherine de Medici*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2016.

McNamer, Sarah. *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.

———. "Female Authors, Provincial Setting: The Re-versing of Love in the Findern Manuscript." *Viator* 22 (1991): 279–310.

Merback, Mitchell B. *The Thief, the Cross, and the Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Micha, Alexandre, ed. *Lancelot: Roman en prose du XIIIe siécle, 9 vols*. Genève: Droz, 1978–1983.

Michon, Cédric, et al, eds. *Les Conseillers de François Ier*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011.

———. "Le Rôle politique de Louise de Savoie." In *Louise de Savoie (1476–1531)*, edited by Pascal Brioist, Laure Fagnard, and Cédric Michon. 106–107. Rennes: Coédition Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2015.

Middlebrook, Leah. "'Tout mon office': Body Politics and Family Dynamics in the verse epitres of Marguerite de Navarre." *Renaissance Quarterly* 54 (2001): 1108–1141.

Mirot, Léon. "L'enlèvement du dauphin et le premier conflit entre Jeans sans Peur et Louis d'Orléans (juillet–octobre 1405)." *Revue des questions historiques* 51.45 (1914): 329–355.

Mirrer, Louise. "Representing 'Other' Men. Muslims, Jews, and Masculine Ideals in Medieval Castilian Epic and Ballad." In *Medieval Masculinities: Regarding Men in the Middle Ages*, edited by Clara A. Lees, Thelma S. Fenster, and Jo Ann McNamara, 169–186. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

Mitchell, Nathan. D. *The Mystery of the Rosary: Marian Devotion and the Reinvention of Catholicism*. New York: New York University Press, 2009.

Moore, Arthur. *The Secular Lyric in Middle English*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1951.

Muhammad, Munir."Debates on the Rights of War in Islamic Law." *Islamic Studies* 49: 4 (2010), 463–492.

Mühlethaler, Jean-Claude. "Tristesses de l'engagement: l'affectivité dans le discours politique sous le règne de Charles VI." *Cahiers de recherches médiévales et humanistes* 24 (2012), 21–36.

Mussou, Amandine. "Le Médecin et les sons. Musique et magie dans *Le Livre des Eschez amoureux moralisés* d'Évrart de Conty." In *Music and Esotericism*, edited by Laurence Wuidar, 23–43. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Nagy, Piroska. "Les Émotions et l'historien: de nouveaux paradigms." *Émotions médiévales. Critique* 716–717 (2007): 10–22.

———. "Una storia diversa delle emozioni," *Rivista Storica Italiana*. 2016, forthcoming.

Naqui, Ali Raza. "Laws of War in Islam." *Islamic Studies* 13:1 (1974): 25–43.

Newhauser, Richard G., and Arthur J. Russell. "Mapping Virtual Pilgrimage in an Early Fifteenth-Century Arma Christi Roll." In *The Arma Christi in Medieval and Early Modern Material Culture*, edited by Lisa H. Cooper and Andrea Deny-Brown, 83–112. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014.

Nieves, Neryamn R. "The Centrality of the Oriental in the *Libro del Caballero Zifar*." *Romance Quarterly* 49.4 (2002): 270–279.

Nordberg, Michael. *Les Ducs et la royauté. Études sur la rivalité des ducs d'Orléans et de Bourgogne 1392–1407*. Uppsala: Studia Historica Upsaliensia XII, 1964.

North, Janice. "El Caballero de Dios y la muy noble reina: María de Molina's patronage of the *Libro del Caballero Zifar*." *Romance Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2016): 107–115.

Nussbaum, Martha. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Nutton, Vivian. "Seeds of Disease. An Explanation of Contagion and infection from the Greeks to the Renaissance," *Medical History* 27 (1983): 1–34.

Oliver, Raymond. *Poems Without Names: English Lyric 1200–1500*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.

Olsen, Marilyn A. "*Mesura* and *Cobdiçia*: The Ideological Core of the *Cauallero Çifar*." In *Hispanic Studies in Honor of Alan D. Deyermond: A North American Tribute*, edited by John S. Miletich, 223–233. Madison: Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1986.

Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61249?rskey=7AtW87&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid, consulted on November 30, 2015.

Paranque, Estelle. "Catherine of Medici: Henry III's Inspiration to be a Father to his People." In *Royal Mothers and Their Ruling Children: Wielding Political Authority from Antiquity to the Early Modern Era*, edited by Elena Woodacre and Carey Fleiner, 225–240. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Park, Joohee. "Not just a University Theatre: The Significance of Jesuit School Drama in Continental Europe, 1540–1773." In *Catholic Theatre and Drama: Critical Essays*, edited by Kevin J. Wetmore Jr, 29–44. Jefferson: McFarland, 2010.

Parrack, John C. "The Cultural Authority of 'buen seso (natural)' in the *Libro del Caballero Zifar*." *La Corónica* 35, no. 1 (2006): 277–291.

Paster, Gail Kern Paster. *Humoring the Body*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Paul, Jacques. "Sur quelques textes concernant le son et l'audition." In *Jérôme de Moravie. Un théoricien de la musique dans le milieu intellectuel parisien du XIII^e siècle. Actes du Colloque de Royaumont 1989*, edited by Michel Huglo and Marcel Peres, 117–143. Paris: Créaphis, 1992.

Perfetti, Lisa. "Introduction." In *The Representation of Women's Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Culture*, edited by Lisa Perfetti, 1–22. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005.

Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca). *Petrarch's Lyric Poems. The Rime sparse and Other Lyrics*. Translated and Edited by Robert M. Durling. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Pinet, Simone. "The Animal Within: Chivalry, Monstrosity, and Gender in Renaissance Spain." In *Gender and Scientific Discourse in Early Modern Culture,* edited by Katherine P. Long, 115–138. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.

Plamper, Jan. *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*. Translated by Keith Tribe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Plancher, Urbain. *Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne et Preuves,* vol. 3. Dijon, Editions Palais Royal, 1748.

Porrinas González, David. "Caballería y guerra en la Edad Media castellano-leonesa: el *Libro del Caballero Zifar* y su contexto." *Medievalismo: Boletín de la Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales* 15 (2005): 39–70.

Porter, Roy, and G. S. Rousseau. *Gout: The Patrician Malady*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

Prescott, Anne Lake. "And then she fell on a great laughter: Tudor Diplomats Read Marguerite de Navarre." In *Culture and Change: Attending to Early Modern Women,* edited by Margaret Mikesell and Adele Seeff, 41–65. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003.

Prochasson, Christophe. *L'Empire des émotions. Les historiens dans la mêlée*. Paris: Démopolis, 2008.

Prosperi, Adriano. "The Two Standards: The Origins and Development of a Celebrated Ignatian Meditation." *Journal of Jesuit Studies*, 3.3 (2016): 361–386.

Quint, David. *Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy: Ethical and Political Themes in the Essais*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Reddy, William M. *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Reeser, Todd W. *Masculinities in Theory: An Introduction*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Revault d'Allones. Myriam. *L'Homme compassionnel*. Paris: Seuil, 2008.

Ribier, Guillaume, ed. *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, vol. 2. Paris: François Clozier et la veuve Aubouyn, 1666.

Richeome, Louis. *Le Pélerin de Lorète: Voeu à la glorieuse Vierge Marie Mère de Dieu pour Monseigneur le Daufin*. Paris, 1603.

Rigby, Stephen H. *Wisdom and Chivalry: Chaucer's* Knight's Tale *and Medieval Political Theory*. Leiden: Brill, 2009.

Rittiez, F. *L'Hôtel de ville et la bourgeoisie de Paris: origins, moeurs, coutumes et institutions municipales, depuis le temps les plus reculés jusqu'à 1789*. Paris: Durand, 1862.

Robert, Aurélien. "Le pouvoir des incantations selon les médecins du Moyen Âge (XIII^{e}–XV^{e} siècle)." In *Le Pouvoir des mots au Moyen Âge*, edited by Nicole Bériou, Jean-Patrice Boudet, and Irène Rosier-Catach, 459–490. Turnhout: Brepols, 2014.

Ronsard, Pierre de. *La Franciade*. In *Oeuvres Complètes* I. Edited by Jean Céard et.al. Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléïade, 1993.

———. *Franciad*. Edited by Philip John Usher. New York: AMS Press, 2010.

Rosenwein, Barbara H. "Emotion Words." In *Le Sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge*, edited by Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet, 93–106. Paris: Beauchesne, 2009.

———. "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions," *Passions in Context: Journal of the History and Philosophy of the Emotions* 1/1 (2010), http://www.passionsincontext.de/.

———. "Emotional Communities and the Body." *Médiévales* 61 (Autumn, 2011): 55–76.

———. "Pouvoir et passion. Communautés émotionnelles en Francie au VIIe siècle." *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 58, 6 (2003): 1271–1292.

———. *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Rosier, Irène. *La Parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et la sémantique au XIII^{e} siècle*. Paris: Vrin, 1994.

Rothenberg, David J. *The Flower of Paradise: Marian Devotion and Secular Song in Medieval and Renaissance Music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Rosaldo, Michelle Z. "Towards an Anthropology of Feeling," in: *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotions*. Ed. Richard A. Shweder et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984: 142–55.

Rosaldo, Renato. *Ilongot Headhunting: A Social History, 1883–1978*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1980.

Roustang, François. *Jesuit Missionaries to North America*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006.

Rubin, Miri. *Emotion and Devotion: The Meaning of Mary in Medieval Religious Cultures*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009.

———. *Mother of God: A History of the Virgin Mary*. London: Penguin, 2009.

Rudy, Kathryn M. "A Guide to Mental Pilgrimage: Paris Bibl. Arsenal MS 212." *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte*, 63:4 (2000): 494–515.

———. *Virtual Pilgrimages in the Convent: Imagining Jerusalem in the Late Middle Ages*. Turnhout: Brepols, 2011.

Russell, Joycelyne Gledhill. *Diplomats at Work: Three Renaissance Studies*. Wolfeboro Falls: Alan Sutton Publishing, 1992.

Schaub, Michael. "Literature of 9/11 college class accused of being 'sympathetic towards terrorism,'" *The Los Angeles Times*, September 1, 2015. Accessed on September 19, 2015. http://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-et-jc-literature-of-9-11-course-under-fire-20150901-story.html.

Scheer, Monique. "Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieusian Approach to Understanding Emotion." *History and Theory* 51.2 (2012): 193–220.

Schilteberger, Hans. *Reisebuch. Nach der Nürnberger Handschrift Herausgegeben*. Edited by Valentin Langmantel. Tübingen: Gedruckt für den Litterarischen Verein in Stuttgart, 1885.

Schnerb, Bertrand. *Armagnacs et Bourguignons: la maudite guerre*. Paris, Librairie Académique Perrin, 1988.

Schoenfeldt, Michael C. *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert and Milson*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Sebti, Meriem. *Avicenne, l'âme humaine*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000.

Secousse, M, ed. *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race race recueillis par ordre chronologique,* vol. 6. Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1741.

Secousse, M. and Vilevaut, M. de, eds. *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race recueillis par ordre chronologique,* vol. 9. Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1755.

Seigworth, Gregory, and Melissa Gregg. "An Invention of Shimmers." In *The Affect Theory Reader*, edited by Melissa Gregg, and Gregory J. Seigworth, 1–25. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

Sizer, Michael. "Murmur, Clamor, and Tumult. The Soundscape of Revolt and Oral Culture in the Middle Ages," *Radical History Review* 121 (2015): 9–27.

Slote, Michael. *The Ethics of Care and Empathy*. New York, Routledge, 2007.

Smagghe, Laurent. *Les Émotions du prince. Émotion et discours politique dans l'espace bourguignon*. Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012.

Snyder, Susan. "Guilty Sisters: Marguerite de Navarre, Elizabeth of England, and the Miroir de l'âme Pécheresse." *Renaissance Quarterly* 50 (1997): 443–458.

Soman, Alfred, Claude Gauvard, Mary Rouse and Richard Rouse. "Le Châtelet de Paris au début du XVe siècle d'après les fragments d'un registre d'écrous de 1412." *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 157.2 (1999): 565–606.

Spearing, A.C. *Medieval Autographies: The I of the Text*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.

———. *Textual Subjectivity: The Encoding of Subjectivity in Medieval Narratives and Lyrics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Spiegel, Gabrielle M. *Romancing the Past. The Rise of Vernacular Prose Historiography in Thirteenth Century France*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Spivey Ellington, Donna. *From Sacred Body to Angelic Soul: Understanding Mary in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2001.

Standaert, Nicolas. "The Composition of Place: Creating Space for an Encounter." *The Way* 46.1 (January, 2007): 7–20.

Stearns, Peter N. and Carol Z. Stearns. "Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards." *American Historical Review* 90 (1985): 813–836.

Steenbergh, Kristine. "Emotions and Gender: The Case of Anger in Early Modern English Revenge Tragedies." In *A History of Emotions, 1200–1800*, edited by Jonas Liliequist, 119–133. London: Routledge, 2012.

Stewart, Kathleen. "Nostalgia—A Polemic." *Cultural Anthropology* 3, 3 (1988): 227–241.

Stewart, Susan. "Preface to a Lyric History" in *The Uses of Literary History*, edited by Marshall Brown. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.

Stock, Brian. *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Stone, Rachel. *Morality and Masculinity in the Carolingian Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Sutherland, Alexandra. "Disturbing Masculinity: Gender, Performance and 'Violent' Men." *South African Theatre Journal* 28.1 (2015): 68–77.

"The Noble Quran," accessed Nov. 19, 2016, http://quran.com/8.

Thrift, Nigel. *Non-Representational Theory. Space, Politics, Affect*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Tommaseo, M.N., ed. and trans. *Relations des ambassadeurs vénetiens sur les affaires de France au XVIe siècle*. Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1838.

Truc, Gérôme. *Le 11-septembre européen. La sensibilité morale des Européens à l'épreuve des attentats du 11 septembre 2001, du 11 mars 2004 et du 7 juillet 2005*. PhD diss., EHESS, 2014.

Tydeman, William. *English Poetry, 1400–1580*. London: Heinemann, 1970.

Valentin, J.M. *Les Jésuites et le théâtre, 1554–1680: Contribution à l'histoire culturelle du monde catholique dans le Saint Empire romaine germanique*. Paris: Desjonquères, 2001.

van der Lugt, Maaike. "Aristotle's *Problems* in the West." In *Aristotle's "Problemata" in Different Times and Tongues,* edited by Michèle Goyens and Pieter De Leemans, 71–112. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006.

———, Maaike. "The Learned Physician as a Charismatic Healer: Urso of Salerno (Flourished End of Twelfth Century) on Incantations in Medicine, Magic, and Religion." *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 87/3 (2013): 307–346.

Vance, Jacob. "Twelfth and Sixteenth Century Renaissance Discourses on Meditation and Contemplation. Lefèvre d'Etaples' Commentary on Richard of St. Victor's Trinity." In *Meditatio—Refashioning the Self: Theory and Practice in Late Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual Culture,* edited by Karl Enenkel and Walter Melion, 153–180. Leiden: Brill, 2011.

Vaughan, Richard. *John the Fearless: The Growth of Burgundian Power.* Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1966, repr. 2002.

Verdon, Jean. *Information et désinformation au moyen âge*. Paris: Perrin, 2010.

Véronèse, Julien. "Paroles et signes efficaces dans le *Picatrix* latin." In *Images et magie. Picatrix entre Orient et Occident*, edited by Jean-Patrice Boudet, Anna Caiozzo, and Weill-Parot Nicolas, 163–186. Paris: Champion, 2011.

Verstegan, Ian. F. *Federico Barocci and the Oratorians: Corporate Patronage and Style in the Counter Reformation*. Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2015.

Vilevaut, M. de, and M. de Bréquiny. *Ordonnances des rois de la troisième race recueillis par ordre chronologique…données depuis le commencement de l'année 1411, jusqu'à la fin de l'année 1418,* vol. 10. Paris, Imprimerie Royale, 1763.

Vincent, Jean-Didier. *Le Cœur des autres. Biologie de la compassion*. Paris: Plon, 2003.

Wagner, Charles P. "The Sources of *El Cavallero Cifar*." *Revue Hispanique* 10 (1903): 5–104.

Walker, Roger M. *Tradition and Technique in "El Libro del Cavallero Zifar."* London: Tamesis, 1974.

Walusinski, Olivier, ed. *The Mystery of Yawning in Physiology and Disease*. Basel: Karger, 2010.

Warner, Marina. *All Alone of Her Sex: The Myth and the Cult of the Virgin Mary.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976.

Weijers, Olga. "Le Pouvoir d'imagination chez les philosophes néerlandais du XV^{e} siècle." In *Phantasia—imaginatio. V° colloquio internazionae de Lessico Intelletuale Europeo,* edited by Marta Fattori and Massimo Luigi Bianchi, 205–220. Rome, Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e la Storia delle Idee 1988.

Weill-Parot, Nicolas. "Images corporéiformes et *similitudo* dans le Picatrix et dans le monde latin medieval." In *Images et magie. Picatrix entre Orient et*

Occident, edited by Jean-Patrice Boudet, Anna Caiozzo, and Weill-Parot Nicolas, 117–137. Paris: Champion, 2011.

Wells, John Edwin. "Pieces Lyrical in Impulse or Form." In *A manual of the writings in Middle English 1050–1400*, 483–538. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919.

Wesling, Donald. *Joys and Sorrows of Imaginary Persons (On Literary Emotions)*. New York: Rodopi, 2008.

Woolf, Rosemary. *The English Religious Lyric in the Middle Ages*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

Zalloua, Zahi. "From *Le Printemps* to *Les Tragiques*: Trauma, Self-Narrative and the Metamorphosis of Poetic Identity in Agrippa d'Aubigné." *Dalhousie French Studies, special issue on Representations of Trauma in French and Francophone Literature*. Edited by Nicole Simek and Zahi Zalloua. Vol. 81 (Winter 2007): 29–39.

Zampelli, Michael A. "'Lascivi Spettacoli': Jesuits and Theatre (From the Underside)." In *The Jesuits II: Cultures, Sciences and the Arts, 1540–1773*, edited by John. W. O'Malley, SJ, Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris, and T. Frank Kennedy, 550–570. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006.

zum Kolk, Caroline. "Catherine de Médicis et l'espace: résidences, voyages et séjours." In *Moving Elites: Women and Cultural transfers in the European Court System*, edited by Giulia Calvi and Isabella Cabot, 51–56. Florence: EUI Working Papers, 2010.

———. "Les Femmes à la cour de France au XVIe siècle. La fonction politique de la maison de Catherine de Médicis (1533–1574)." In *Femmes de pouvoir et pouvoir des femmes dans l'Occident médieval et moderne*, edited by Armel Nayt-Dubois and Emmanuelle Santinelli-Foltz, 237–258. Valenciennes: Publications de l'université de Valenciennes, 2009.

Zvereva, Alexandra. *Les Clouet de Catherine de Médicis*. Paris: Somogy, Éditions d'Art, 2002.

Index

A. Marculescu and C.-L. Morand Métivier (eds.), *Affective and Emotional Economies in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60669-9