

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 157A
October 29, 1955

D. 10.11 p.m. October 29, 1955
R. 10.29 p.m. October 29, 1955

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED
JE 1058/226

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 157A of October 29.
Repeated for information Saving to: G.G. Khartoum
U.K.T.C. Khartoum

My immediately preceding telegram.

Excellency,

With reference to the British Embassy's Note dated October 22, 1955, I have the honour to direct attention to the Egyptian Government's Note which I gave to Your Excellency on October 15 and to the letter which I sent to Your Excellency on October 19 about the International Commission for Self-Determination in the Sudan. The Note and letter contained the following statements:

Firstly: it is laid down under the agreement in force between the two Governments that the International Commission should be carrying out its work before the evacuation of the two armies (to be completed by November 13, 1955). The two contracting Governments agreed by Exchange of Letters annexed to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 12, 1953, that among the questions which the International Commission (to be formed hereafter in accordance with Article 10 of the agreement ratified between the two Governments) would discuss was the question of the supreme command of the Sudanese forces at the completion of the withdrawal from the Sudan of the British and Egyptian armed forces and during the period following this withdrawal.

/Secondly:

31 OCT 1955
Khartoum

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619				87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 157A to Foreign Office

-2-

Secondly: the Egyptian Government agreed to the British draft of the supplementary agreement, after Article 2 of the above mentioned agreement became null and void by reason of the Sudanese Parliament's decision on August 22, 1955. Similarly (the Egyptian Government agreed) to the text of the terms of reference of the Commission as put forward by the British Government on July 25, 1955. (The Egyptian Government) asked to be informed of the necessary arrangements for final signature of the agreement mentioned.

Thirdly: faced with these considerations the Egyptian Government felt itself obliged to inform the representatives of the member States of the above mentioned Commission (on whom the choice of the Sudanese Parliament fell on August 22, 1955) so that they might notify their States to appoint delegates to the above mentioned Commission, and thus to enable the Commission to meet in Khartoum at a suitable time before the completion of the evacuation of the two armies (laid down for November 15). A copy of the letter which the Egyptian Government would send to the representatives of the member States in the above mentioned Commission was attached to the papers given to Your Excellency together with a request to the British Government to adopt a similar measure at the earliest possible moment.

2. The Egyptian Government did not issue the invitation to the diplomatic representatives in Cairo of the seven Powers which the Sudanese Parliament chose, on behalf of Britain, but it sent the letters in its own name, and before sending them asked Your Excellency to ask the British Government to adopt a similar measure at the earliest possible moment.

3. The statement of the terms of reference of the Commission, of which a copy was given to the above mentioned representatives, was a copy of the official British draft which was shown to the two sides, Egyptian and British, and was debated at several sessions

/attended by

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619						87273	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 157A to Foreign Office

-3-

attended by official representatives from the two sides and about which official joint communique were issued. It is impossible to deny the official nature of this document and the fact that it was put forward by the British Government, which is responsible for what is in it and is in agreement with it. If the meetings of both sides had continued for one more sitting after the issue of the Sudanese Parliament's decision on the subject of the composition of the Commission, this document would have actually been signed. This was the British Government's desire, but it appears that it has since changed its mind.

4. The Egyptian Government has not left unconsidered the desires of the Sudanese Parliament. It indicated in its letter to Your Excellency dated October 19, 1955 that it was understood that the carrying out of any procedure to be agreed upon later in connexion with the plebiscite, would be the subject of consultations between the two Governments. The Egyptian Government wants it to be clear that the completion of the process of self-determination in any form will not exempt the two contracting Governments from carrying out their obligations under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, by completing the formation of this Commission. Any shortcoming on their part in this connexion will entail for them grave responsibility before the Sudanese people. The basic terms of reference of the said Commission under which it can take any measures necessary to ensure the free and neutral atmosphere will not be affected by the course followed in the process of self-determination.

5. Your Excellency is not unaware that foremost among the terms of reference of this Commission is the question of the supreme command of the Sudanese forces. The Egyptian Government does not approve of the interpretation put on this matter by the British Government and is not prepared to accept the British Government's viewpoint that the supreme military command in the Sudan remains in the hands of the Sudan Governor General in accordance with Article II of the Self-Government Statute until this law is modified. The question of this command was settled by the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement inasmuch as competence was given to the International Commission in this respect before the completion of the evacuation of the two armies.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619				87273		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 1574 to Foreign Office

-4-

6. For the British to continue holding this position regarding the formation of the International Commission before the evacuation of the two armies - a position which renders impossible the execution of one of the provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, namely the one about the supreme command of the Sudanese forces - is considered as a violation by the British Government of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement!

7. The Egyptian Government in all these steps has looked to the carrying out of the obligations laid upon it by the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. It wants the British Government to weigh the situation in the light of the considerations set forth above. I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest respect.

(signed) Zakaria Mohieddin.

Minister of State for Sudan Affairs.

777777

1955

J
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
 EGYPT AND SUDAN

105
 JE 1058/229

FROM
 Sir H. Newby
 Cairo
 No. 1575
 Dated Oct. 31
 Received in Registry Oct. 31

Sudan.
 Press published gist of Egyptian Note of October 22. Prominence was also given to agency report of statement issued by anti-Imperialist front and alleged to incorporate views of S.A.M., S.A.R., and Azhari. Gives details.

REFERENCES
 -/225

MINUTES
 Para 6: I wonder if there is any connection between these Under-Secretaries and the group who brought Azhari's Govt. down. They might have been paid to do the job by the Egyptians (the fact that this is from the Egyptian press adds a sinister touch).

(Print)

(How disposed of)
 Tel) UICTC (Chartoum) 358 Oct. 31
 Rptd) 99 (Chartoum) 444

J.W.R.ild.
 21/11.
 D.B. 24/11.

(Action completed) 9/11/55
 (Index)

-/338

JE1058/229

J

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En clair.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan D. 11.12 a.m. October 31, 1955.
No. 1575
October 31, 1955 R. 11.39 a.m. October 31, 1955.

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1575
of October 31.

Repeated for information to Khartoum (Governor General)
Khartoum (U.K. Trade
Commissioner)

JE1058/225
My telegram No. 1569: Sudan.

Press yesterday published gist of Egyptian Note
of October 22.

2. Prominence was also given to agency report,
ostensibly from Khartoum, of statement issued by anti-
Imperialist front and alleged to incorporate views of
S.A.M., S.A.R. and Azhari. Statement includes text of
proposed national charter comprising following points:

- (a) Government machinery should serve the national interest.
- (b) Sudan should guard its independence by opposing British imperialist policy of dominating it by military and political pacts. Sudan should promote world peace.
- (c) Process of self-determination should be carried out by direct popular plebiscite.
- (d) Free elections should be held for Constituent Assembly to draft constitution.

3. Statement also included alleged comment by S.A.M. that:

- (a) There was no enmity between his supporters and the Mahdists.
- (b) Plebiscite was correct way to discover will of the people.
- (c) All were opposed to military pacts and foreign economic domination.
- (d) Duty of Constituent Assembly to draft constitution still stood.

/A. S.A.R.

31 OCT 1955

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref. FO 371/113619				87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

Cairo telegram No. 1575 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. S.A.R. also was alleged to have expressed full approval of proposed national charter and opposition to military pacts. Sudanese constitution should be drawn up by Constituent Assembly or by any other body unanimously agreed on.

5. Statement affirmed that plebiscite in South was possible, and that Ashari himself had said that it could be carried out within two months.

6. Press also reported statement by four parliamentary under-secretaries (unspecified) of the N.U.P. in favour of plebiscite and establishment of international commission. Independent Republican party was said to have called for international commission and Constituent Assembly, and to have rejected proposal that present Sudanese Parliament be entrusted with process of self-determination.

7. According to Ahran, Czechoslovakia has made an offer to the Sudanese Government to establish arms and munition factories in the Sudan.

- - - - -

26

CONFIDENTIAL

JE1058/231

SECRET

THE SUDAN

The submission at Flag A dealt with the situation in which the Egyptians had sent out invitations to the countries chosen by the Sudanese Parliament to appoint members to an International Commission to supervise Self-Determination in the Sudan, without our having signified our agreement. Sir H. Trevelyan had suggested a Note to the Egyptian Government pointing out that no final agreement had been reached between us and the Egyptians, that there seemed to be a feeling in the Sudan, typified by a statement by the Sudanese Prime Minister, that the choice should be made by the Sudanese Parliament and not by a plebiscite and that the co-domini should wait until the Sudanese Parliament meets again and gives a final view on the matter before finally deciding on further procedure.

2. Sir H. Trevelyan put these views to the Egyptians in a Note the text of which is at Flag B. The conversation which Sir H. Trevelyan had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs is recorded in telegram No.1515 and the Egyptian Minister then gave him a Note, the text of which is in Cairo telegram No.1516. This contains Egypt's formal acceptance of Self-Determination by means of a plebiscite. The Egyptians consider that a Constituent Assembly should be elected at the same time as the plebiscite^(is held) to draw up a Constitution compatible with the latter's result as well as an electoral law for a permanent Sudanese Parliament. The Assembly would act on behalf of the Sudanese in the exercise of all constitutional powers as soon as the result of the plebiscite is declared. The Egyptians,

/therefore

JE1058/198
Flag C

JE1058/199
Flag D

therefore ask us to negotiate with them for the necessary amendment of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan.

3. In his telegram No.1519 Sir H. Trevelyan suggests a reply to this Egyptian Note and points out that there is an obscurity in the Egyptian Note about the ending of the Condominium. He suggests that we should avoid further discussion of that issue.

JELOS 1201
Flag E

Argument

4. The main point in the reply to the Egyptians suggested by Sir H. Trevelyan is that we would be prepared to accept a plebiscite if the Sudanese Parliament, when it meets, still wants that. But it appears that the Sudanese may no longer want a plebiscite and ^{the co-dominion} ~~we~~ ought, therefore, to wait until the Sudanese Parliament meets so that ^{it} ~~we~~ can see what the final Sudanese view is. Though the arguments for avoiding a plebiscite in present conditions in the Sudan are strong, I do not think that we should wish to pursue the idea of a quicker method of Self-Determination if the Sudanese finally decide that they would prefer a plebiscite. ~~But~~ we should be left out on a limb if that happened. I therefore think that we should stick to the line that we have an open mind ourselves and will accept what the Sudanese Parliament finally decides. I consider therefore, that we should tell Sir H. Trevelyan that we agree with the terms of his draft reply and with his proposal in paragraph 2 of the telegram at Flag E for dealing with the question of the ending of the Condominium.

Recommendation

5. That a reply be sent to Cairo on the lines of the attached draft.

T. Browley
October 24, 1955

JK
25 X.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619				87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS
"HAKIMAM"

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
KHARTOUM.

CONFIDENTIAL

JE 1058/160
My general views remain as outlined in my telegram No. 295 with a hardening of my feeling that the best way out may be for Sudanese to take things into their own hands and face Co-domini with fait accompli. JE 1423/143

2. So far there is no open hint that they contemplate doing so and as I said in my telegram No. 309 they seem reluctant to ask for independence. Though nothing has been said or even hinted by us here it is generally assumed that H.M. Government are ready to grant it. Sudan Agent in Cairo who has been here himself said so to me. I made no comment.

3. At the same time all real interest in plebiscite idea seems to have evaporated and superficially at least nobody now appears to take it seriously. There should therefore be some reaction when Co-domini agreement to plebiscite is announced and Nasser's refusal to agree to immediate independence becomes known - as it certainly will. Guidance in your Intel No. 171 itself points to this. On general grounds therefore I can see little force in para. 5 of Cairo telegram No. 1366.

4. To me Nasser's remarks in para. 2 of Cairo telegram No. 1364 do not carry conviction. If Nasser is sincere in his statement that unity is dead and if he wants good relations with an independent Sudan surely he would be realistic enough to seek favour with the pro-independents who would constitute the future government rather than be ultra virtuous and cultivate the discredited unity rump? Indeed fact that Nureddin has returned here after apparently kicking his heels idly in Cairo for weeks suggests that the back has already been turned. Again, and on the same assumptions, surely a heavy defeat in the plebiscite (on which he would be known to have insisted) would in balance be more damaging to Nasser's internal position than an independence move now which could be put across by well devised publicity?

5. I suggest that Nasser may be actuated by other motives. He knows that the steadying influence of the British troops will have finally disappeared

- 2 -

a month hence and that H.M. Government are playing no active part here. He must know that the Sudanese administration is not in a good way and he may hope that further deterioration will occur. He could count on time being in his favour so that in desperation the Sudanese would go to him cap in hand and he could then exact another Alexandria agreement which would make the Sudan his slave. This may seem to you a fanciful picture but from here I can see it happening, and I suggest that it accords more with realities than do Nasser's explanations.

6. In any event I venture to suggest that H.M. Government should not be diverted from their course. They now enjoy a fund of goodwill here. This it must be the Egyptian purpose to destroy. For good or ill H.M. Government are still regarded as the "works" of the Condominium and in the Sudan, even without the Egyptian prompting which can be taken for granted, it will be no less easy than it has been elsewhere to blame the British when things go awry. Equally of course H.M. Government will be expected to come to the rescue - and to take the kicks afterwards.

7. From every point of view I can see nothing but advantages in H.M. Government divesting themselves of their Condominium responsibilities and liabilities at the earliest possible moment. If they cannot do so in agreement with Egypt then I suggest that other means should be found. The course of events has left the procedure of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement behind and I greatly doubt whether it would be practicable to return to it. Even if it were I cannot see it being carried through; in any case some amendment (if only to cover the plebiscite) would be necessary. This itself would take time. Meanwhile the climatic conditions for plebiscite or elections are almost upon us.

8. From the point of view of British interests, and failing re-establishment of British control which is out of the question, I would like to see H.M. Government taking a lead in one of the following senses:

(a) going independence alone and so forcing Egypt's hand - perhaps H.M. Government don't need to be squeamish about that.

(b) calling a tripartite conference - British Egyptian and Sudanese - to work out a revised self-determination procedure.

9. Alternatively I suppose that, as constitutional head of the Sudan and in what I believe to be in its best interests, I need not be too zealous in seeking to uphold the sanctity of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement if Sudanese should show a tendency to take matters into their own hands, c.f. para. 1, though I could not go so far as to take the initiative in suggesting this course.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619						87273	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

- 3 -

10. Necessary preliminary to any of these courses would be public knowledge that Nasser had turned down proposal for declaration of independence. As indicated in para. 3 I doubt whether in practice there would now be anything radical in this. It is however for H.M. Government, as it has been for Egypt, to decide where their interests lie.

Ann.

Khartoum.
October 4, 1955

JFT

J E 1058/233 J

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OIP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1576
October 31, 1955

D. 4.54 p.m. October 31, 1955
R. 5.44 p.m. October 31, 1955

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1576 of October 31
Repeated for information to Governor-General Khartoum
H.K.T.C. Khartoum
P.O.M.E.F.

Sudan.

My Oriental Counsellor had an informal meeting with the Egyptian Prime Minister on October 29. The following are the main points which emerged from the talk:-

(a) Nasser said he was far from pleased with the way things were going in the Sudan. Her Majesty's Government were working with the Sudanese to put the Egyptians in a corner. According to reports from Khartoum, which he was convinced were reliable, Mr. Luce had urged the Sudanese Prime Minister to have the Sudanese Parliament declare the independence of the Sudan and had told him that in that event Her Majesty's Government would recognize it. Nasser said that he was particularly disappointed that this should have happened after I had assured him at the time of Salah Salem's resignation that it was our policy to work together.

(b) He was convinced that it was our aim to keep the Governor-General in Office even after the declaration of independence by the Sudanese Parliament and during the process of constitution making. Our attitude to the question of the supreme command of the Sudanese forces was an indication of this. Although the Governor-General's post would be terminated in any case not later than January 1957, his continuance in office, even to that date, would permit British intrigues to go on. This argument betrays some confusion of thought. At one point he enquired (though perhaps he did not intend to be taken seriously) whether, if what we were after was to speed up the process, we should agree to the Condominium being terminated forthwith, and of course to

RECEIVED
F.T. 1955

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619			87273				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 1576 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

course to the Governor-General withdrawing at the same time.

(c) He also feared that if the Sudanese Parliament were entrusted with the process of self-determination, Azhari would remain in office and the Sudanese Parliament remain in being indefinitely. Owing to the rivalry between the two Sayadsan Azhari's position was safe, and on the pretext that conditions did not permit of new selections, the present Parliament could prolong its life as long as it wished. The present Chamber was not representative of the people. Many of the Deputies had changed their views and in any case some of them had been bought by the Egyptians.

(d) If it was our policy to try and put the Egyptians into a corner, he would have to do the same to us. If, therefore, without regard for Egyptian views the Sudanese Parliament declared for independence and Her Majesty's Government recognized it, the Egyptian Government would announce that they were no longer bound by the agreement.

2. My comments are in my following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass Governor-General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum as my telegrams Nos. 212 and 221 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor-General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum].

666666

J
JE1058/234

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1581

D. 8.20 p.m. October 31, 1955.

R. 8.32 p.m. October 31, 1955.

October 31, 1955

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1581

of October 31.

Repeated for information to Khartoum (Governor General)
Khartoum (U.K.T.C.)
P.O.M.E.F. JE1058/233

My telegram No. 1576: Sudan.

Nasser is now full of suspicion that the Governor-General has been negotiating behind his back with Azhari to force him into a position which will leave Azhari in full possession of the field with no opportunity for a revival of Egyptian influence. He is out to get elections for a constituent assembly, which he may hope will influence Sudan developments more in his favour, coupled with a plebiscite which he cannot get out of now, and to get rid of the Governor-General as early as possible. If the Sudanese Parliament passes a resolution in favour of Sudanese independence and we publicly approve of it, Nasser may well carry out his threat to declare himself no longer bound by the agreement. I believe that we should try and avoid this. Apart from increasing the political instability in the Sudan, it would be a dangerous precedent for the Base agreement, and would hamper all efforts to minimise the effect of the arms deal and make progress on the Palestine issue.

2. I shall be seeing Nasser informally on Thursday evening, November 3, and shall try and explain to him that our only motive is to get the self-determination process finished as soon as possible. I should be glad if you could give me some guidance on the following points for this meeting:-

- (a) May I assure him that when the Sudanese Parliament passes its resolution, we shall discuss the matter with him without commenting on it unilaterally in London or Khartoum?

/(b) Would

NOV 1 1955
M. E. F.
P. O. M. E. F.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619						87273	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 1581 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

- (b) Would you authorize me to discuss with him on a personal basis the possibility of further shortening the self-determination process either by:
- (I) an immediate termination of the Condominium (i.e. as soon as Sudanese Parliament has worked out minimum necessary provisions for transferring supreme constitutional authority to a Sudanese body), which would have the effect of giving the Sudan its independence,
 - (II) or its termination immediately on the acceptance by the co-dominium of a declaration in favour of independence by the Sudanese Parliament?

I see the political and other risks involved in these courses, and Nasser would probably not find it easy to agree to either, as they would both leave Azhari in possession, but these proposals would at least show him that we do not want to keep the Governor-General on for some sinister purpose of our own.

- (c) The command of the Sudan forces is an awkward point, although there are no legal difficulties involved. I fully realize the Governor-General's difficulties over this, but it seems likely that we shall not in any case be able to keep him in command for long. Could I perhaps go so far as to hint that we might consider the immediate appointment of a Sudanese by the Sudanese Parliament instead of waiting for the commission's decision, if we could come to some agreement on the major issue, which would enable us to end the process of self-determination in the next few months?

3. Our major difficulty is, of course, that we are bound by the agreement if we cannot get Egyptian agreement to amend it. If we got completely stuck it might be necessary as a last resort to try and establish the international commission with the power to recommend to the co-dominium alterations in the self-determination process prescribed by the agreement in the light of Sudanese opinion and conditions. I presume that we should not want to put ourselves completely into the hands of this particular commission unless we could see no alternative, and it might be preferable to revert to the text of the agreement, subject to the plebiscite.

/A. I trust

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref. FO 371/113619			87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 1581 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

4. I trust that you will be able to give me some room for manoeuvre. The situation has its risks, and it seems important not to let our negotiations with the Egyptians break down. I shall try in any case to get Nasser to revert to confidential oral exchanges.

Foreign Office please pass Governor General and U.K. Trade Commissioner Khartoum as my telegrams 213 and 222 respectively.

[Repeated to Governor General and U.K.T.C. Khartoum]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir N. Caccia
Mr. Shuckburgh
Head of African Dept.
Resident Clerk

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

JE 1058/237

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1584
October 31, 1955

RECEIVED
D. 9.10 p.m. October 31, 1955
R. 10.25 .m. October 31, 1955

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1584 of October 31.
Repeated for information to Govern-General Khartoum
U. K. T. C. Khartoum

My telegram No. 1575. Sudan.

JE 1058/229

Ahram today published comment by responsible Egyptian source in reply to charge levelled against Egypt by some Sudanese papers that Egypt was attempting to delay self-determination.

2. Source said that Egyptian Government had long urged on British Government necessity for convening international commission, and could therefore not be blamed for delay. Britain intended to torpedo agreement by abstaining from executing its few remaining provisions. This had aroused Egyptian apprehensions and had led her to urge Britain to hasten to convene commission and approve Sudanese Parliament's request for plebiscite.

3. Source also commented on suggestion that Sudanese Parliament should decide country's future saying that Egypt was aware that self-determination by parliamentary vote would be quicker and easier than by method stipulated in agreement, but considered that it would be risky. Britain's very support for the idea should make Egypt stick to her point of view, because Britain had never tried to expedite any country's independence in this way. There was something behind it. Egypt, therefore, had to choose between two courses:

- (1) keeping strictly to the agreement, and
- (2) following an uncharted, dangerous course with no landmarks.

Egypt had chosen the former, sure that if she acted otherwise the Sudan would one day accuse her of abandoning her at the last moment to face greedy imperialism alone.

4. Source added that stage following Parliament's decision was crucial. Britain was anxious to keep Governor-General throughout that period, not only as Supreme Commander, but as Head of State with paramount authority on legislative and judicial affairs also. Britain might also try to have special conditions written into the constitution or try to complicate the situation through having her Governor-General voluntarily, or otherwise, surrender his powers to some other person or body. Numerous problems could arise and Britain was anxious that what went on during this crucial period should be unknown to outside world. What would happen if matters reached verge of collapse? Egypt only wanted to ensure best interests of Sudan, convinced that this was also in Egypt's interest. The course determined on by Egypt might be longer but was safer.

/ 5. Source



1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619			87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

Cairo telegram No. 1584 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. Source concluded by saying that today Sudanese people had last word in determining the future of their country, and that all Egypt wished to do was to acquaint them with the truth about the situation.

6. Ahram also published despatch from special correspondent in Khartoum reporting that Azhari told representatives of Front against Colonialism that present official trend was to carry out self-determination by direct popular plebiscite in accordance with Parliament's decision and advice of Mirghani.

7. Gemheuria editorial said it was dangerous to entrust present Parliament with process of self-determination. If Parliament's decision agreed with British interests, Britain would welcome it; otherwise Britain would assert that Parliament had exceeded its powers under the agreement, and its decision was therefore null and void. This was British attitude. Egypt demanded execution of agreement in letter and spirit.

T T T

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619				87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

Extracts from Arabic Press

MIDAN - OCTOBER 29, 1955.

FRONT AGAINST COLONISATION DELEGATES' INTERVIEW WITH
SAYED ALI MIRGHANI, SAYED ABDEL RAHMAN EL MAHDI AND
SAYED ISMAIL EL AZHARI

With Sayed Ali Mirghani

F.A.C: Our country is passing through difficulties and as we are about to be completely independent we think that you can issue directives to help bring the Sudanese together. We want to hear your views on the note which we sent you.

S.A.M: The difficulties you mention are the after-effects of colonisation. I have seen your note and it is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the mediation efforts for an agreement between the families of El Mahdi and Mirghani. I personally see no real disagreement and I hope that these efforts will reach successful conclusion. The second part deals with the National Charter. This is a matter for the political parties to consider and if they agree to it I am prepared to bless it because I will not oppose anything that serves the national interest. I wish you success and I believe that the wishes of the people should always be respected. When I called for a general plebiscite I wanted that the view should be first supported by the people themselves. I know that the majority of the Sudanese advocate independence but plebiscite is a correct way to determine the people's view. As regards government, I think that all parties should go to the people with their manifestos and leave it to them to decide which party should come to power.

F.A.C: You know that the colonisers will not take away their immediate influence. They are now trying to drag us into military alliances to ensure the continuation of their economic influence in our country, as they do in other countries. We are now trying to warn the people against this.

S.A.M: Military alliances and economic domination will mean the return of colonisation and we oppose this and I am sure that all the Sudanese do the same.

F.A.C: In accordance with your view that there should be a general plebiscite, don't you think that it is also necessary that there should be a constituent assembly immediately after the plebiscite to draw up the new constitution?

S.A.M: My call for a plebiscite means also a call for the formation of a constituent assembly to draw up the constitution.

(A copy of this report was sent to S.A.M. who agreed to it. There was present during the interview Sayed Dardeiri Mohammed Osman. He replied through Sayed Dardeiri as follows:

"The note was approved by S.A.M. who directs me to ask you to publish it and to say meanwhile that he blesses the National Charter which you showed him.")

/With

With Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi

(There were present Sayeds Abdulla Khalil, Mohammed El Khalifa Sherif, Hassan Maghoub and Yahia el Mahdi)

F.A.C: We have the honour to meet you at this time when the country demands that all the people should come together and combine their struggle against colonisation. We think that any directives by you may help to bring the Sudanese together and make them achieve their independence and sovereignty.

S.A.R: I hope agreement will be reached between S.A.M. and myself. As a matter of fact there is no disagreement between us. I think that a private agreement between him and myself would not be so important as a general agreement based on the realisation of our national aspirations which all parties should sign. I fully support you on the question of alliances. I have seen and studied the text of the National Charter and I agree to all its provisions. I am very anxious to see the Sudanese united at the present time but I do not see any practical way of realising this unity among the Sudanese because the Government Party has not taken part in the mediation. You may have some idea of the practical means to realise that unity. After reading your note I am pleased to know your way and I wish you success.

F.A.C: What is your view on the drawing up of the constitution by a constituent assembly?

S.A.R: This is very important. The constitution must be drawn up by a constituent assembly or any other body agreed upon by all the Sudanese. I do not know the details of such political issues. You may discuss this with these gentlemen present. I am always ready to agree to anything that is in the general interest.

(At another meeting a copy of this report and of the National Charter were handed to Sayed Abdel Rahman who was asked by the delegation for his views on the previous meeting and on the National Charter. He was also shown a report on the interview that the Front's Delegates had with Sayed Ali Mirghani.)

S.A.R: It is very nice to hear S.A.M.'s views on the mediation and on independence.

Sayed Abdulla Khalil: There is no doubt that all the Sudanese support independence and there will be no threat or danger if independence comes through a plebiscite or through the present Parliament. (Sayed Abdulla was referring to the safeguards to ensure independence during the period after the realisation of independence.)

F.A.C: The best means to ensure preservation of independence is that independence should come as a result of a general plebiscite.

S.A.R: Do you believe that it would be possible to conduct a plebiscite in the South in the present circumstances?

/F.A.C:

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619				87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

F. A. C: Yes for two reasons; one - there is complete stability in two provinces - Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazel and a plebiscite can be conducted there easily. As regards the Equatoria Province with a population of only 680,000 this should not be taken to deprive the Sudanese of their right to self-determination. Two - the Prime Minister told the Arab News Agency that it would be possible to carry out elections in the Southern Provinces after two months.

S. A. R: I will try to get the details of this question and I beg you to continue discussion with Sayed Abdulla el Fadel and Sayed Abdulla Khalil on the National Charter. I wish you success and I am prepared to support any step taken towards the general good.

With the Prime Minister

F. A. C: We thank you for allowing us this interview. We will show you a copy of the reports on our meetings with Sayed Ali Mirghani and Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi and of the National Charter suggested.

P. M: I personally support the National Charter but it is for the Party to decide whether it will accept it. I think the idea of an agreement between the sects is a good one, and I support the struggle against military alliances and this was my attitude at the Bandung Conference and other occasions. I believe a plebiscite was demanded by the Sudanese people and that their wish was expressed by Parliament in its resolution. Our official course is now the plebiscite and the constituent assembly.

F. A. C: This is good, but what about the idea that the present Parliament should declare the Sudan's independence?

P. M: Yes, the idea was that it will be difficult to conduct a plebiscite at least in Equatoria Province.

F. A. C: You have said that it might be possible to carry out elections after two months and that conditions would be normal to enable the conduction of a plebiscite.

P. M: Yes, and things are improving every day and every month.

F. A. C: The people determine their own future and so a plebiscite is necessary since restoration of order is progressing satisfactorily in the South.

P. M: If we waited until the conduction of a plebiscite was possible it might be said that the Government would like to remain longer in office.

F. A. C: As a plebiscite is the direct exercise of the Sudanese people of their right to self-determination, it is natural that the Government should remain until a plebiscite is conducted. There is no harm in that.

P. M: The declaration of independence must be recognised by the Condominium governments. It may be that one of them may not agree, thereby making it difficult for the other countries to recognise the Sudan's independence.

/F. A. C:

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619				87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

F.A.C: Yes, that is why we hold fast to a plebiscite and the formation of the constituent assembly and the international commission. The latter consists of members from the socialist camp and the Western camp and the Bandung Conference countries, and the result of a plebiscite supervised by these countries will be recognised by them.

P.M: Yes, at any rate the declaration of independence by the present Parliament is subject to support of all the Sudanese. We hope that evacuation will be completed by November 14. I should like to assure you that our official attitude is still the plebiscite and the constituent assembly. I personally support the National Charter and I will bring it before my Party to discuss it. I am always prepared to meet you.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619				87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

Extract from Arabic Press

MIDAN - OCTOBER 29, 1955

NATIONAL CHARTER

To ensure the people's right to a plebiscite and to elections for a constituent assembly.

To ensure democratic freedom and oppose military alliances.

To peacefully pass through the difficult period now confronting our country demands close unity among the people and strong cohesion of their ranks and to realise these objectives necessitates the observance of the democratic principle of respecting the rights of religious sects to exercise their activities in complete freedom. And as the unity of the people necessitates co-operation of all the different sects, it is in the general interest to avoid friction between them and the use of force by them in solving their disputes or in furthering any objectives.

The undersigning parties therefore attach great importance to the unification of the different political parties and religious sects in the interest of the realisation of the following objectives:

- (1) the building of a sound political life in the country on sound foundations to ensure the rights to democratic freedom and to prohibit the use of the State machinery in fighting political parties and religious sects and to direct authority to ensuring prosperity and justice;
- (2) to enable the Sudanese to protect their sovereignty Parliament should adopt a foreign policy that will preserve the national independence, by opposing imperialistic policies which aim at dragging our country into military alliances and political treaties and by adopting an international policy based on defence of world peace;
- (3) as the people have the right to self-determination and as the exercise of such a right through a direct plebiscite will be the decisive judgment in favour of the country's liberty and independence and will ensure it against future imperialistic influence, self-determination should be exercised through a direct public plebiscite;
- (4) and to enable the people to exercise their right to elect their representatives in free elections for the drawing up of the new Constitution to ensure the country's freedom and national independence, the constituent assembly should be set up to exercise its second duty of drawing up the new Constitution as provided for in the agreement;
- (5) this is to decide the principle that the people shall themselves attend to their political questions and to elect the political party which they think ought to govern.

We pledge to respect this National Charter and whoever renounces it shall be deemed to have betrayed his Nation and dishonoured his promise.

JTS *W*
25/10

THE LOCAL NEWS BULLETIN

Cable: "SPAPRESS" Telephone : 3644 P. O. Box 249 KHARTOUM	"A Daily Round-up of Local News"	Published By SUDANESE PRESS AGENCY. Managing Editor Mohamed Ahmed Omar
Published Daily in Khartoum except Saturday morning.		

TUESDAY, 25th. OCTOBER, 1955

AN EGYPTIAN SPOKESMAN
ON THE SUPERVISION COMMISSION QUESTION

The Arab News Agency reports a comment made by an Egyptian spokesman on the official statement of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs published two days ago.

In answer to the accusation that the Egyptian Government made a unilateral invitation to the member-states of the Self-Determination Supervision Commission, the Egyptian spokesman stated that Egypt has, in fact, made a proposal to the U.K. Government of a joint invitation by the Condominium Governments long ago, but that Britain did not care to answer, and even showed an unwillingness to follow such procedure, and since the Egyptian Government has previously unconditionally consented to the competence of the International Commission, the latter Government had, of necessity, to comply with the Anglo-Egyptian agreement which necessitates the formation of the Commission before the completion of evacuation of the Foreign troops from the Sudan. At the same time, the spokesman added, the Egyptian Government informed the United Kingdom Government of this step and requested it once more to take a similar step in order to discharge its obligations under the agreement.

The Egyptian spokesman continued to state that the necessity of taking this step is further reinforced by the fact that an urgent and vitally important matter awaits the decision of the Commission before the completion of evacuation on the 13th. of November.

This matter, the spokesman explained is the high command of the S.D.F. It will be recalled that the Egyptian Government has from the outset objected to placing the high command of the Sudanese Army in the hands of the Governor General after the evacuation of the British and Egyptian forces. To avoid disputes, the two Governments agreed to refer this matter to the International Commission.

The Egyptian spokesman further added that the Sudanese Parliament has previously chosen seven member-states to form the International Commission and informed the Condominium Governments of this wish and in addition demanded a plebiscite as a substitute to a constituent assembly in Self-Determination. The Egyptian Government gave its assent to both demands and in addition informed the U.K. Government of this assent, but the latter never followed a similar course.

- 2 -

This, the Egyptian spokesman concluded, leads to one inference: that the U.K. Government does not approve of the formation of the International Commission, that it creates pretexts to achieve its end, that it aims by so doing to place the command of the S.D.F. in the hands of the Governor General and that it wishes to conduct Self-Determination without any supervision of any sort.

We feel, however, the spokesman added, that in following this course the Egyptian Government is responding to the wishes of the Sudanese people who oppose the command of an English ruler to their army after the evacuation of the foreign troops.

.....

G.G. CONFIRMS 7 DEATH SENTENCES

S.P.A. understands that the Governor General has confirmed seven death sentences passed by the Courts in the South. The rest of the sentences will be sent to the Governor General with the comments of the Chief Justice of the Sudan immediately.

It will be recalled that 33 death sentences has so far been passed. There is, yet, a number of cases pending sentence which will at the latest be passed tomorrow.

.....

SOUTHERN SENATOR ARRESTED

The Khartoum daily El Ayam reports that the Port Sudan Police arrested Sayed James Gatelwack, Senator, Upper Nile yesterday. The charge, it is reported is a very serious one.

The Senator was arrested inside the Red Sea Hotel, in a state of intoxication and the Speaker of the Senate was informed of the arrest and the reasons thereof.

Sayed Gatelwack was arrested while roaming about in the hotel, carrying an unlicensed revolver and thus intimidated a number of the visitors.

When searched 53 lead shots were found in his possession, which are also unlicensed, and it is understood that this wrongful possession will be included in the charges against him.

The Southern Senator will be presented for trial immediately.

.....

CZECHOSLOVAKIA BUILDS AMMUNITION FACTORY FOR THE SUDAN.

The Khartoum daily El Sudan El Gadid reports that the Government of Czechoslovakia has offered to build a special ammunition factory to supply the Sudan with the ammunition needed by the S.D.F. The Czech Government has in addition offered to train a considerable number of Sudanese in ammunition industry.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619						87273	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

INDEXED
JE 1058/264

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan
No. 1597
November 1, 1955

D. 8.48 p.m. November 1, 1955
R. 9.27 p.m. November 1, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1597 of
November 1

Repeated for information to:- Governor-General Khartoum
UKTC Khartoum

My telegram No. 1584: Sudan. JE 1058/037

Press today gave publicity to alleged statement by Sudanese personality (unspecified) that the Governor-General intended to resign on November 15. This was described as yet another British plot aimed at winning support of Sudanese public opinion.

2. Ahran said that even Sudanese political parties, which had at first favoured British proposal to entrust present Parliament with the task of self-determination, now insisted on provision of certain safeguards and wanted establishment of special body, representing all political trends in the Sudan, to which constitutional and military powers should be entrusted during the period of constitutional vacuum between proclamation of independence and completion of constitution. Britain feared Sudanese political parties would reach agreement on these points. She had, therefore, to transfer her responsibilities in a dramatic way to certain persons, although she knew that such a course of action was not agreeable to all Sudanese parties. She hoped thus to prevent any unanimous Sudanese agreement and to create dissension. Recently she had caused trouble between South and North, now she wanted to cause trouble among Northerners themselves so as to have the opportunity of carrying out her original plan of separating South from North and incorporating her into her African colonies. If the Agreement were only adhered to the Sudanese would be saved from all these pitfalls. Britain's plan was to abandon the Sudan before it attained stability so that the whole structure would collapse and she would be able to return under the pretext of helping in the reconstruction.

/3...

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619			87273				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

Cairo telegram No. 1597 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. Ahram also published details of Egyptian Note of October 30 and printed separate report that Independent Republic Party and Front against Colonization were agreed on opposing Government's proposal that the present Sudanese Parliament should be entrusted with the task of self-determination, and with drafting constitutional and electoral law. Umma Party was reported to oppose proposal that Sudanese Parliament should draft constitutional and electoral law. Support of Mirghani and four Parliamentary Under-Secretaries for plebiscite was also recalled. British plan would fail because majority of Sudanese insisted on plebiscite.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP and by Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 2479
November 3, 1955

D. 3.56 p.m. November 3, 1955

EMERGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 2479 of November 3

Repeated for information to Codel Geneva (for Secretary of State) [Emergency]
Governor-General Khartoum [Immediate]
U.K.T.C. Khartoum
and Saving to P.O.M.E.F. No. 1024

Your telegrams Nos. 1576, 1581 and 1582 [of October 31: Sudan] and Khartoum telegrams Nos. 358 and 359 [of November 2].

In view of these telegrams from Khartoum it is clear that we must now proceed on the assumption that there will be a plebiscite and that the International Commission will be required. But we would still like to keep open the possibility that if the Sudan Parliament at a later date expresses fresh views on self-determination these would be considered by co-dominium. On practical grounds we for our part still have grave doubts as to how a plebiscite could be carried out in present circumstances especially in the South.

2. You may therefore inform Nasser:

- (a) that in view of the Sudanese Prime Minister's statement of October 29 and other indications that the Sudanese are not ready with any alternative, we propose to inform the Governor-General of our acceptance of the plebiscite proposal;
- (b) that we are also issuing invitations to the Governments participating in the International Commission;
- (c) that we are asking the Governor-General to inform the Sudanese Government and Parliament of our decisions at (a) and (b) above. We understand that the Egyptians have already done this.

3. In making this communication you should bring out the following points:-

/(1)

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619			87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office telegram No. 2479 to Cairo

- 2 -

(i) that if later on the Sudanese express a preference for some quicker method of self-determination, we hope both co-dominia will be prepared to consider such proposals sympathetically;

(ii) that we would like to discuss with the Egyptians the terms of reference for the International Commission. These will require modification to take account of the plebiscite;

(iii) that as regards the Governor-General Nasser has clearly misunderstood our position. We have no desire to extend the period of office of the Governor-General. Nor are we seeking to keep the supreme command in his hands for any nefarious purpose. The Governor-General is already in a position in which his responsibilities greatly exceed his powers. Such authority as he is able to command derives from his position as Commander-in-Chief. It was only because he held this position that he was able to play so effective a part in ending the troubles in the South. It is not in the interest either of Her Majesty's Government or of the Egyptian Government that Sir Knox Helm's position should be made even more anomalous than it is already. But we are quite ready to see the Condominium brought to an end as soon as possible and new arrangements for the supreme command settled in accordance with the Self-Government Statute.

4. In view of the above, it should not be necessary for you to make the suggestions in paragraph 2(b) of your telegram No. 1581. We do not want you to get drawn into discussion of procedures until these have been further examined here. I likewise agree with Sir Knox Helm that you should not (repeat not) make the suggestion contained in paragraph 2(c).

5. This telegram is being repeated emergency to the Secretary of State in Geneva. You should be guided by it in your talk with Nasser tonight, subject to any comments you may receive from the Secretary of State.

666666

1955

J
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

JE1058/248

EGYPT AND SUDAN

FROM

British Embassy
 Cairo

No. 10223/338/55

Dated Oct 31

Received in Registry - Nov. 2

Sudan.

Transmits a translated copy of the Egyptian Note of October 30.

References to former relevant papers

-1235

MINUTES

It is still not clear from this text exactly what is meant by that part of the paragraph headed "secondly" which I have underlined. It does not specify exactly what constitutional grounds the Sudanese become entitled to.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

J. W. Ridd.
 4/11.

It is, I think, now sufficiently established that the passage on which I underlined above means that the Egyptians think that Self-Determination and the Sudanese come to an end when the Plebiscite has been held.

J. W. Ridd.
 17/11.

I think it is too soon to be sure. They may only want to get the Int^l Commission & the Government general out at that point. Termination of the

(Action completed)

9/12/57

(Index)

8
 20/1/57

References to later relevant papers

10223/238/25
confidential BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO. J

31/10/1955
[Ref: Our Telegram No. 1582 dated 31/10/55]
JE1058/235
INDEXED

With the compliments of
African Dept.,
Foreign Office.

JE1058/248

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref.: FO 371/113619						87273	
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

TRANSLATION OF EGYPTIAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 30, 1955.

Excellency,

With reference to our meeting of October 26, and to the British Embassy Note which I had the honour to receive from Your Excellency on that occasion, I have the honour to draw attention to the note which I had the honour to give to Your Excellency at the meeting which took place between us on October 22 and which contained the Egyptian Government's opinion about the wish of the Sudanese people expressed by Sudanese Parliament on August 29 for a process of self-determination by way of direct popular plebiscite. The Note referred to contained the following statements:-
Firstly, that the Egyptian Government in response to the wish of the Sudanese people expressed by the Sudanese Parliament on August 29 for a process of self-determination for the Sudan by way of direct popular plebiscite agrees to the holding of a direct popular plebiscite for self-determination in the Sudan.

Secondly, that the Egyptian Government in accordance with what was laid down in the preamble of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 12, 1953 about enabling the Sudanese people to decide its own future and to practice effectively all the rights connected therewith, considers that at the same time as the plebiscite, direct popular elections for a Constituent Assembly should be held to draft a constitution consonant with the popular decision resulting from the Plebiscite, to draft an electoral law for a permanent Parliament and also at the same time to act for the Sudanese people in exercising all the constitutional powers to which they become entitled by the mere announcement of the result of the plebiscite.

Thirdly: The Egyptian Government considers that compliance with this wish necessitates negotiation, with the British

/Government...

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref.: FO 371/113619				87273		
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

- 2 -

Government to agree on amendment to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on Self Government and self-determination in the Sudan to meet the requirements of that wish and the provisions referred to.

2. I understood from Your Excellency's conversation and from the Embassy's Note that the British Government was ready to agree to this view, provided it was confirmed that the Sudanese Parliament still wanted this plebiscite. But the British Government, in view of the declaration issued by the Sudanese Prime Minister on October 18 (from which it appears that the plebiscite resolution no longer represents the Sudanese Parliament's viewpoint) considers that the matter should be resubmitted to the Sudanese Parliament to confirm whether it was still insistent on the plebiscite or had switched to some other method. The British Government therefore proposed that a joint letter from the two Governments should be sent to the Governor General so that he might notify the Sudanese Cabinet to put the matter to the Sudanese Parliament anew.

3. The Egyptian Government finds nothing which makes it necessary that our obligations and responsibilities under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement (which have also a fixed time limit) should depend on a possibility that may or may not arise - and this at a time when the Sudanese Parliament's wish of August 29, the only official wish passed to the contracting Governments, is still in effect.

Article 10 of the Agreement obliges us to furnish international control for the Sudanese during the period of self-determination (by forming an International Commission to supervise the detailed arrangements of the process of self-determination, including the safeguards guaranteeing neutrality of the elections and any other arrangements for preparing the free and neutral atmosphere). The observance of duties and

/undertakings...

undertakings laid down by the principles of public international law makes it necessary for us to fulfil our obligations. The establishment of international control is required by the Agreement and by the basic terms of reference of the International Commission regarding the Supreme Command of the Sudanese Forces and the provision of a free and neutral atmosphere. This is not affected by the course followed in self-determination, even if that course were the one indicated by the Sudanese Prime Minister in the declaration referred to i.e. the statement on which the British Government based its view.

4. Therefore the Egyptian Government does not consider that the sort of declaration issued by the Sudanese Prime Minister can justify a departure from the clear obligations defined in the Agreement, especially as a responsible Minister, leader of the majority in the Sudanese Chamber of Deputies, also issued a statement laying on the two Governments the responsibility for failing to carry out the text of the Agreement regarding the formation of the International Commission.

And if we add to this the statements and declarations made by communities and parties represented in the Sudanese Parliament opposing the opinion of the Sudanese Prime Minister, on which the British Government based its new position, and announcing their continued support for the plebiscite and the safeguards provided for in the Agreement, it becomes clear that this kind of statement is no sound basis for joint action by the two Governments, and that the wish of the Sudanese Parliament to have a direct popular plebiscite still stands and enjoys wide popular support.

5. The Egyptian Government therefore adheres to the view it expressed to the British Government in the Note given to Your Excellency on October 22 and reaffirms its position regarding the conduct of the British Government in the matter

/of...

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/113619				87273			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

- 4 -

of the formation of the International Commission - conduct which has made impossible the execution of the provisions of the Agreement, and is considered a violation of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement by the British Government.

6. The Egyptian Government hopes that the British Government will weigh up the position in the light of the considerations set forth above and will act jointly with the Egyptian Government in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement and in response to the wish of the Sudanese Parliament of August 29.

I take this opportunity etc.

Sgd. Zakaria Mohieddin

Minister of State for Sudan
Affairs.